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HAZOP Study Methodology

Overview

Learning goals

Topics

- Develop an in-depth understanding of the


key principles and methodologies
associated with executing a HAZOP study

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Slide 2

Deviations / Guidewords
HAZOP process
Preparations
Selection of study sections

How do we perform a HAZOP?


By considering the plant section by section, line by line, item by item
By defining normal operation
By considering deviations from normal operation
By using guidewords to identify these deviations and to initiate the discussion

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Slide 3

Selecting a HAZOP Study Section/Nodes


This is the HAZOP Leaders responsibility
Choice depends on the system and the team
Golden rule is Keep it simple
Large, complex systems increase the chance of missing something
Normally follow the process flow
Start where the line enters the P&ID
Continue
- to next change of design intent or
- to significant change of process conditions or
- to next equipment item

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Slide 4

Selecting a HAZOP Study Section


Aim for sections which will take no more than 1 hour to study
Aim for not more than 5 causes for the first guideword
If the team needs to address the section in parts, it is more than 1 section
HAZOP Leader and Recorder should study sections before the workshop

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Slide 5

Guidewords / Deviations
Original Guideword
Flow

Parameters
Pressure
Temp

No
Reverse (Wrong)
More
Less
Part of
As well as
Other than

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Slide 6

Composition

HAZOP process
Describe design intention, operating conditions etc.

Consider first or next guide word

Identify all causes and record

Identify all consequences and record

List existing safeguards and record

Agree any actions necessary and responsible person /org. and record
No
Last guide word?
Yes
Take next section

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Slide 7

HAZOP / HAZID logsheet


Step

Guideword
/ Deviation

Cause

1.

1.1

1.2

2.

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Consequence

Existing
Safeguards

Finding /
Recommendation
R: Remark / A:
Action

Action
responsible

Time

HAZOP / HAZID logsheet with risk ranking


Step

Guideword
/ Deviation

Cause

1.

1.1

1.2

2.

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Conseq
uence

Existing
Safeguards

Finding /
Recommendati
on
R: Remark /
A: Action

Action
responsible

Time

Video: HAZOP team in action


25 minutes
Demonstrates use of guidewords
Team selection
Facilitator skills
Cooperation between facilitator and scribe

After the video:


10 minutes with reflection / discussion: What did the group do?

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Slide 10

HAZOP Guidewords No Flow


Wrong routing
Blockage
Incorrect slip plate
Incorrectly fitted check valve
Burst pipe, large leak
Equipment failure (valve, pump, vessel, control system, etc.)
Incorrect pressure differential, isolation in error, etc.

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Slide 11

HAZOP Guidewords Less Flow


Line restrictions
Filter blockage
Defective pumps
Fouling of vessels, valves, orifice plates
Density or viscosity changes - etc.

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Slide 12

HAZOP Guidewords Reverse Flow


Defective check valve
Incorrect pressure differential
Two-way flow
Emergency venting - incorrect operation
In-line spare equipment etc.
Leak upstream

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Slide 13

HAZOP Guidewords More Level


Outlet isolated or blocked
Inflow greater than outflow
Control failure
Faulty level measurement
Gravity liquid balancing etc.

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Slide 14

HAZOP Guidewords More Pressure


Surge problems
Connection to high pressure system
Gas breakthrough (inadequate venting)
Defective isolation procedures for relief valves
Thermal overpressure
Positive displacement pumps
Failed open P.C.V.'s

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Slide 15

HAZOP Guidewords Less Pressure


Generation of vacuum condition
Condensation
Gas dissolving in liquid
Restricted pump/compressor suction line
Undetected leakage
Vessel drainage
Blockage of blanket gas reducing valve
etc.

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Slide 16

HAZOP Guidewords More Temperature


Ambient conditions
Fouled or failed exchanger tubes
Fire situation
Cooling water failure
Defective control
Heater control failure
Internal fires
Reaction control failures
Heating medium leak into process
etc.

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Slide 17

HAZOP Guidewords Less Temperature


Ambient conditions
Reducing pressure
Fouled or failed exchanger tubes
Loss of heating
Depressurization of liquefied gas
Joule/Thompson effect
etc.

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Slide 18

HAZOP Guidewords Composition Change


Phase change
Settling of slurries
Leaking isolation valves, exchanger tubes etc.
Incorrect feedstock specification
Process control upsets
Reaction intermediates or byproducts

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Slide 19

HAZOP Guidewords Abnormal Operations


Purging
Flushing
Start-up
Normal Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
Emergency Operations
Inspection of operating machines
Guarding of machines

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Slide 20

HAZOP Guidewords Maintenance (typically covered


separately)
Isolation Philosophy

Rescue plan

Drainage

Training

Purging

Pressure testing

Cleaning

Work permit system

Drying

Condition monitoring

Slip plates

Lifting and manual handling

Access

etc.

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Slide 21

HAZOP Guidewords - Safety


Toxic and hazardous properties of process materials
Fire and gas detection
Emergency shutdown
Fire-fighting response time
Emergency Plans, Training
Testing of emergency equipment
First aid, medical resources
Effluent disposal
Hazards created by others

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Slide 22

Safeguards
Safety valves
Detectors
Training
Procedures
Monitoring of critical parameters
Maintenance / Inspections
Heat tracing
PSD, ESV
PPE (last barrier)

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Slide 23

HAZOP Example: Storage Tank Filling

LAH

LSH

LI

To Process

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Slide 24

Example HAZOP Study


- Section (Node) Description Sheet
Project: Fuel Transfer System

Node Description:

Revision: 0

Node:
001

Date: 31/10/95

Time: 12:18:49

Session: 0

Team: (see below)

Leader:

Recorder:

The hose connection from the road tanker to the tank including the pump and manual valves on
the pump inlet and outlet.
Organisation: XYZ
Location: Various
Design Intention:

P&IDs

Rev #s:

To transfer petrol from the road tanker to the tank via the installed pump.
Normal Process Conditions (Range):
Temperature:
Ambient
Pressure:
Static head from tanker, 3 Bar g maximum at pump discharge
Flow Rate:
500 litres per minute
Team Members:
L D Red
R E Cord
N O Flow
E X Pert
O P Erator
S I Tinn

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Slide 25

Mal Function

R N Awae

Page: 1

Example HAZOP Study


- Logsheet
Project:
Fuel Transfer System

Mode: 001

Page: 2

Node Description:
The hose connection from the road tanker to the tank including the pump and manual valves on the pump inlet and outlet.
GUIDEWORD/
DEVIATION
No Flow

CAUSES

CONSEQUENCES

SAFEGUARDS

REC#

RECOMMENDATIONS

Manual valve on pump


inlet closed

No transfer of fuel. Pump


starved of liquid which
could cause mechanical
damage and possible
leakage from the pump on
to the road way.

Operators knowledge and


training.
Local stop which will be
used by operator if pump
leaks or is noisy.

R1

Provide low level/dry running


cut out for the pump to
prevent pump damage on loss
of suction.

Manual valve on pump


outlet closed

No transfer of fuel. Pump


As before. Also this valve is
runs against a closed
normally kept open.
discharge which could cause
overheating, mechanical
damage and leakage of left
for too long.

R2

Develop a checklist for use by


the operator when carrying
out transfers. Ensure checks of
manual valve positions are
included in this checklist for
all stages of fuel delivery.

Line blocked

As above

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As above. Line blockage is


unlikely since fuel delivered
is clean.

Slide 26

Example HAZOP Study Logsheet (Continued)


Project:
Fuel Transfer System

Mode: 001

Page: 3

Node Description:
The hose connection from the road tanker to the tank including the pump and manual valves on the pump inlet and outlet.
GUIDEWORD/
DEVIATION
Reverse Flow

More Flow

CAUSES

CONSEQUENCES

SAFEGUARDS

Backflow of fuel when


disconnecting tanker
hose

Spillage of fuel in area with


possible discharge on the
road way to the surface
water system.

Driver would physically lift R3


hose to check whether liquid
remains before
disconnecting.

Install a non-return valve in


the line between the manual
valve and pump.

Driver or operator could be


splashed with fuel when
disconnecting hose.

Driver wears goggles and


gloves.

R4

Ensure operator wears suitable


eye protection and gloves

Discharge of fuel from hose


or pipe. Spillage locally
with potential for fire.

Hoses and pipework are


rated for 7 Barg pressure.
Maximum pump pressure is
3 Barg.

R5

Review adequacy of the fire


fighting equipment at the road
tanker unloading area.

Discharge of fuel on the


road way and potentially to
the surface water system.

As above.

R6

The road tanker unloading


area should be bunded and
provided with an interceptor
to prevent discharge of fuel to
the surface water system.

Tanker hose or transfer


pipe rupture.

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Slide 27

REC#

RECOMMENDATIONS

Safeguarding life, property


and the environment
www.dnv.com

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