In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa

[G.R. No. 14074. November 7, 1918]

1. unless it be written in the language or dialect known by

the testator and signed by him, or by the testators
name written by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction, and
2. attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
3. The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on
the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
sheet.
4. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or
pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof,
or caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses,
and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other.

FACTS:
-

Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917.

He left a will executed in January, 1908, in which he

disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000.

The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then
in force, namely, Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645,
amendatory of said Section 618, prescribing certain
additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills,
in force on and after July 1, 1916.

Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:

"No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall
be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or
affect the same:
1. unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by
the testators name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and
2. attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
3. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator
signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other
person, at his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and
4. that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and
in the presence of each other.
5. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not
render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in
fact signed and attested as in this section provided.

Act No. 2645 has amended Section 618 of the Code of

Civil Procedure :
"SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided
in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate,
real or personal, nor charge or affect the same,

Riosas will was in writing, signed by him, and attested and

subscribed by three credible witnesses in his presence and
of each other; but was not signed by him and the witnesses
on the left margin of each and every page, nor were the
pages numbered correlatively by letters, nor did the
attestation state these facts.

The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of
the will and before the death of the testator, without the
testator having left a will that conforms to the new
requirements.

RTC disallowed the will of Riosa.

ISSUE:
Which of the law is controlling, the law existing on the date of the
execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator?
RULING:
There are 3 rules/views discussed in this case, to wit:
1st:
The rule laid down by the courts in many jurisdictions
is that the statutes in force at the testators death

are controlling, and that a will not executed in

conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its
execution was sufficient at the time it was made.
2nd:
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that
the validity of the execution of a will must be tested
by the statutes in force at the time of its execution
and that statutes subsequently enacted have no
retrospective effect.
3rd:
The statutes relating to the execution of wills, when
they increase the necessary formalities, should be
construed so as not to impair the validity of a will
already made and, when they lessen the formalities
required, should be construed so as to aid wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at
the time of their making.
The Supreme Court adopted the 2nd rule/view that the law
existing at the date of the execution of a will is
controlling.
The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The fact that the testator has provided in detail for the
disposition of his property and that his desires should be
respected by the courts.
All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of
doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective
effect. The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of
retrospective effect.
The order of the lower court disallowing the will of Jose Riosa
was reversed, and the record was remanded to the lower court
with direction to admit the said will to probate.

[G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000]

SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZZARAGOZA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA
Facts: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain
parcels of land situated at the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New
Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He had four children:
Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On
December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was survived by his
four children.

On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta ZaragozaMorgan filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for
delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871,
and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a natural born
Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She further
alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited
properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and
sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but
without valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots
no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then.
She averred that because of her marriage, she became an
American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the
Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no
formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering
these lots during her father's lifetime.
Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private
respondent and the allegations on the properties of their father.
They, however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way
of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 is
still registered in their father's name, while lot 943 was sold by him
to them for a valuable consideration. They denied knowledge of the
alleged intention of their father to convey the cited lots to Alberta,
much more, the reason for his failure to do so because she became
an American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the
estate of their father during his lifetime.
RTC: Adjudicated Lot 871 in the name of Flavio Zaragoza Cano to
plaintiff Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining her share in his
estate and ordering defendants to vacate its premises and deliver
immediately the portion occupied by them to herein plaintiff. It
found that Flavio partitioned his properties during his lifetime
among his three children by deeds of sales; that the conveyance of
Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his plan to distribute his
properties among his children during his lifetime; and that he
intended Lot 871 to be the share of private respondent.
CA: It ruled that Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance share of private
respondent.
It found that the alleged sale of lot 943 in favor of petitioner
Florentino was fictitious and void.
The signature of Don Flavio in the said document was markedly
different from his other signatures appearing in other documents
he signed from January to February 1957.

Issues: (1) whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza

Cano of his properties, which include Lots 871 and 943, is valid;
and (2) whether the validity of the Deed of Sale and consequently,
the Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 943 registered in the name
of the petitioners, can be a valid subject matter of the entire
proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share.

except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all

security in registered titles would be lost.

Ruling:
1.The partition is valid. It is basic in the law of succession that a
partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not
prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime
of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in
Article 1061:

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which

one of the clauses states that the law of the Philippines shall
govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and that
legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions
accruing to them shall be annulled. By virtue of such condition, his
brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded
because, by his action of having opposed the partition scheme, he
did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the conditions
are void being contrary to law which provides that the will shall be
probated according to the laws of the nationality of the decedent.

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,

must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that
it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the
original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded
one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be
dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding
where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful
determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were
prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
2. Respondent, in submitting her petition for the delivery of
inheritance share, was in effect questioning the validity of the deed
of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of petitioner and consequently, the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latter's name. The petition
is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, which provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It can not be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and
correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner.
The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and
shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once
registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished,

Petition granted.
MICIANO v. BRIMO (GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927)

ISSUE: Whether the Turkish Law or Philippine Law be the basis on

the distribution of Joseph Brimo's estates. Will Andre Brimo forfeit
his inheritance?
HELD: The court held that the provision of a foreigner's will that his
propertiesshall be distributed according to Philippine law and not
his national law is NOT LEGAL because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when, according to article 16 of the civil
Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary dispositions.
Testators estate shall be distributed according to his national
(Turkish) law. He cannot provide otherwise. The appellant's
inheritance will not be forfeited because the provision is not legal.
G.R. No. L-23678
June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS,
ET AL
FACTS: Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with
his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children
with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in
which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the
following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and

2nd wives, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The
Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the
entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted
and filed its Executors Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of
the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to
$240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate
children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In
the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into
7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st and
2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate
children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING: It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even
assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same
would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but
would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex
rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however
of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not
rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional

rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on

legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto,
with costs against appellants. So ordered.
In re estate of Piraso, deceased. SIXTO ACOP, petitionerappellant, vs. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponentsappellees.
FACTS: The proponent Acop appeals the judgment of the CFI
Benguet, denying the probate of last will and testament of the
deceased Piraso. The will was written in English; that Piraso knew
how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could
make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the
opinion that his will should have been written in that dialect.
ISSUE: WAS THE WILL VALIDLY EXECUTED?
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills
executed by a Spaniard or a resident of the Philippine Islands,
before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall
be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect
the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by
the testator,"
Nor can the presumption in favor of the will established by this
court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the
testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he
resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, even he invoked in
support of the probate of said document as a will, because, in the
instant case, not only is it not proven that English is the language
of the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where
the will was drawn, but that the record contains positive proof that
said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorrote dialect, with a
smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English language
in which then will is written. So that even if such a presumption
could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly
contradicted and destroyed.
Such a result based upon solidly established facts would be the
same whether or not it be technically held that said will, in order to
be valid, must be written in the Ilocano dialect; whether or not the
Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect is a cultivated language and used as a
means of communication in writing, and whether or not the testator

Piraso knew the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will

written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is quite certain
that the instrument Exhibit A was written in English which the
supposed testator Piraso did not know, and this is sufficient to
invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of
the law, and inevitably prevents its probate.
Jaboneta v. Gustilo
Facts: On 26th of December 1901, Macario Jaboneta being in the
residence of one Arcadio Jarandilla, called for the execution of his
will. Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabeo Jena as witnesses,
executed the said document as his will. They were all together, and
were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when he
signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness,
at his request, and in his presence and in the presence of the other
two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the
presence of the testator, and in the presence of the other two
persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena,
being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was
leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put
himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in
the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left
the room the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the
presence of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
The validity of the will was questioned as it was alleged that Jena
was no longer present when Javellana (last witness) signed the will.
Issue: Whether or not the execution of the will was made in
compliance with the law.
Held: The Court ruled to Reverse the ruling of the Trial Court and
uphold the validity of the wills execution.
The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana
moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the
will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses
which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name
to the will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the
presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and
that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness
was being written, is of no importance.

EUTIQUIA
AVERA
vs.
MARINO
GARCIA,
and
JUAN
RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia and
Jose Garcia
Facts: Eutiquia Avera sought the probate of Esteban Garcias will.
This was opposed by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, guardian
for the minors Jose and Cesar Garcia.
Eutiquia introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who
testified that the will was executed with all necessary external
formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession
of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was
corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the
testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor
was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.
The opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony tended
to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will
was made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to
comprehend what he was about.
The trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of
the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will
had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to
probate.
Issues: (1) Whether a will can be admitted to probate, where
opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness,
without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two
(2) Whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the
fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting
witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will
instead of the left margin.
Held: (1) While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will bay
be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting
witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado, this Court
declared that when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting
witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the
process of the court.
In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why
all three of the attesting witnesses were not produced, but the
probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for

the probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917,
until the date set for the hearing, no formal contest was entered
until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that the
attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the probate
would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the
three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will
was contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to proof
without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he
might produce all the attesting witnesses.
Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses
were not produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for
changing the rule expounded in the case above referred to; and
were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would
probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the
execution of the will had not been proved by a sufficient number of
attesting witnesses.
(2) No. The will in question is valid. It is true that the statute says
that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their
names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is
undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all
statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully
complied with. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and
of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether
the names appear on the left or on the right margin, provided they
are on one or the other.
The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on
every page, and the only point of deviation from the requirement of
the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin
instead of the left. By the mode of signing adopted every page and
provision of the will is authenticated and guarded from possible
alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have been
protected by being signed in the left margin; and the resources of
casuistry could be exhausted without discovering the slightest
difference between the consequences of affixing the signatures in
one margin or the other.
The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well
stated In Re will of Abangan, where the Court, in a case where the
signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the
margin, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution
o will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.

Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a

way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands
more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any
possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual
deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be
considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.
ICASIANO v ICASIANO 11 SCRA 423
FACTS: A special proceeding for the allowance and admission to
probate of the original will of Josefa Villacorte and for the
appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor was opposed
by Natividad Icasiano, daughter of the testatrix and Enrique
Icasiano, son of the testatrix. Proponent subsequently filed a
motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental
petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate
with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date,
submitting the signed duplicate , which he allegedly found only on
or about May 26, 1959 to which oppositors Natividad and Enrique
filed their joint opposition and the court admitted said petition.
The evidence presented by the petitioner alleges the following:
Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila on September 12, 1958;
that on June 2, 1956, she executed a last will and testament in
duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano,
published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses,
namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr.
Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and
by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before
attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of
Manila; and that the will was actually prepared by attorney Fermin
Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of
the decedent's last will and testament, together with former
Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a
little girl.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3)
of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of

one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was
signed in his presence.
The court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to
probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly to this
Court
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL IS VALID IN THE ABSENCE OF A
WITNESS SIGNATURE IN ONE PAGE
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one
witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per
se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution
of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two
other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing
the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom
the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The
law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize
the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness
over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the
law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component
pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation
existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance
of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs.
Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration)
"witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the
attestation clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was
entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as
well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete
set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause
and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise
evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict
and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the
purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal
tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only
page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left
margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41
Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative
lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page
either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro,

81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to

require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard
against fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary
curtailment of the testamentary privilege.
Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO, JESUSA CAGRO,
petitioner-appellee, vs. PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL., oppositorsappellants
FACTS: This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar, admitting to
probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in
Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February 14, 1949.The main
objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally
defective, because attestation clause is not signed by the attesting
witnesses. The signatures of three witnesses to the will do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand
margin. The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the
three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to
the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation
clause.
ISSUE: W/N there is substantial compliance when the witness
signature appears on the left margin but not in the attestation
clause.
HELD: we are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant
is correct. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts
attending the execution of the will required by law to be made by
the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as
an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at
the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that the signatures of the
three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to
the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation
clause. This is yntenable because said signatures are in compliance
with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand
margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause is not signed by the
three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficiend, it
would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent
occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the
witnesses.

BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA

RIMANDO, defendant-appellant.

all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the
purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code.

FACTS: The lower court admitted the instrument propounded

therein as the last will and testament of the deceased, Pedro
Rimando.The defendant appeals the decision, contending that it
one of the witnesses was not present during the signing of the will
by the testator and of the other subscribing witnesses. one of the
witnesses was the outside some 8 or 10 feet away, in a small room
connected by a doorway from where the will was signed ,across
which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the
outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

Caneda v CA

ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL WAS VALIDLY EXECUTED EVEN IF ONE

OF THE WITNESSES WAS IN ANOTHER ROOM DURING THE SIGNING
OF THE WILL
HELD: LOWER COURT AFFIRMED
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the
execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign,
but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition
and position with relation to each other at the moment of
inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with
relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each
signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they
choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator
and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the
instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they
would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment,
without changing their relative positions or existing conditions. The
trial courts decision merely laid down the doctrine that the
question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an
alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does
not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast
upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them,
but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with
relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in
the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To
extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of

Testator Mateo Caballero is a widower without any children. He

executed a will in the presence of three witnesses. He was assisted
by his lawyer and a notary public in the preparation of his will.
Under the said will, the testator disposed of his properties to
persons without blood relation to the testator. The testator himself
submitted the will to the probate court but the testator passed
away even before his petition could be heard. The petitioners, who
claimed to be the nephews and nieces of the testator, filed for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Mateo. The probate
proceedings and special proceedings filed were consolidated.
Petitioners opposed the allowance of the will of Mateo on the
ground that on the date stated in thewill, the testator was already
of poor health and could not have executed the will. They likewise
questioned the genuineness of the signature of the testator in the
said will. The probate court allowed the will. On appeal, the
petitioners contended that the Attestation Clause was fatally
defective for failing to state that the testator signed in the presence
of the witnesses and the witnesses signed in the presence of the
testator and of one another. Court of Appeals, nevertheless
affirmed the probate courts decision and held that there was
substantial compliance with Art. 805.
ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last
will complies with the requirements of Art. 805 and 809?
HELD: In the case of ordinary or notarial wills, the attestation clause
need not be written in a language or dialect known to the testator
since it does not form part of the disposition. The language used in
the attestation clause likewise need not even be known to the
attesting witnesses. The last paragraph of Art. 805 merely requires
that, in such a case, the Attestation Clause shall be interpreted to
said witnesses. Paragraph 3 of Art. 805 requires three things to be
stated in the Attestation Clause, the lack of which would result in
the invalidity of the will:
a) The number of pages
b) That the testator signed or expressly caused another to sign, the
will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting
witnesses and
c) That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the
testator of the will and all of its pages, and that said witnesses also

signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
In the case at bar, the will was comprised of three pages, all
numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page bearing
the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting
witnesses. The testamentary dispositions were expresses in
Cebuano- Visayan dialect and were signed at the foot by the
testator.
The Attestation Clause was recite in English and is likewise signed
at the end of three attesting witnesses. What is fairly apparent
upon a careful reading of the
Attestation Clause herein is the fact that while it recites that the
testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of
three attesting witnesses and stated as well the number of pages
that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. What is clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses
signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The absence of that statement is a
fatal defect which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the
will.
As to the substantial compliance rule under Art. 809,while it may
be true that the Attestation Clause is indeed subscribed at the end
thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting
witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom
that the said witnesses affixed their respective signatures in the
presence of the testator and of each other, since the presence of
such signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed,
but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to
the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. The
execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the
testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in
various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the
imprimatur of effectivity.
In a situation like in the case at bar, the defects is not only in the
form or language of the Attestation Clause but the total absence of
a specific element requires by Art. 805. In order that Art. 809 can
apply, the defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidenced
supplied by the will itself. In the case at bar, proof of the acts
requires to have been performed by the attesting witnesses shall
be supplied only by extrinsic evidence thereof.

CRUZ VS VILLASOR
54 SCRA 31
FACTS: The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and
testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner opposed
the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further
alleged that the instrument was executed without the testator
having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not
executed in accordance with law.
One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before
whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower
court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is
substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at
least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with Art.
805 and 806?
HELD:The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To
acknowledge before means to avow or to own as genuine, to assent
and before means in front or preceding in space or ahead of.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself,
he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will
in front of himself.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against
any illegal or immoral arrangements. That function would be
defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting or
instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested in
sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and
the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent
position and the very purpose of the acknowledgement, which is to
minimize fraud would be thwarted.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the
attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of
having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in
contravention of the provisions of Art. 805 requiring at least three
credible witnesses to act as such and of Art 806 which requires that
the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear
before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result woukd
be, as has been said, that only 2 witnesses appeared before the
notary public for that purpose.

The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer
cannot serve as witness at the same time.
To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to
assent, admit, and 'before' means in front of or preceding in space
or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that
one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in
the making of the will. To permit such situation would be absurd.
Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against
any illegal or immoral arrangements, a function defeated if he were
to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be
interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves
himself and the validity of his own act. he would be in an
inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.
Kalaw v. Relova
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
Facts: Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the
sole heir of sister Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the latter's
holographic will in 1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's
name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead
"Rosario" was written above it. Such was not initialed, b) Rosa's
name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's name was
written above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator.
Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect
so that she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the
probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
HELD: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the
will which could remain valid as there was only one disposition in it.
Such was altered by the substitution of the original heir with
another. To rule that the first will should be given effect is to
disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However, this change of
mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it in
accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.
G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994
Perez vs Tolete

o
o

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of

Non-Resident Aliens
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Reprobate of Foreign Wills:
Requirement of Notices

FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who
became American citizens and residents of New York, each
executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on
presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which
one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to
have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a
fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in
Joses will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in
Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir
according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were
executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further
argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were
Joses heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate
proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter,
Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York
law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New
York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the
wills.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be
allowed

HELD:
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American
citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with
the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the

place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed

in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code
prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed
by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows:
(1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign
laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and
not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in
such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court,
1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954];
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last
requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon
which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the
fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
On Lack of Notice to Joses Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a
very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole
heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not
consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed
to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the
instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting
that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or
formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a
will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27,
Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated
abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that
is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance
with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the
executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to

petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for
proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time
and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge
shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit
evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan
spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent
to the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Testate Estate of Maloto
158 SCRA 451
FACTS: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and
nephews, the petitioners believing that no last wiil and testament
was left they iniateda an intestate proceeding for the settlement of
their aunt's estate. While the case was still in progress, the parties
executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's
estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into
four equal parts among the parties. They then presented the
extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval.
Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma discovered a document
entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated
January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of
Adriana.
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the
matter on whether or not the document or papers allegedly burned
by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon
instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself
and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court
stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of
the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate
court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in
the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the
residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the
latter's possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in
order to have a new will drawn up.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana
HELD:
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning
in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation,
unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part
of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be
done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another
person but under the express direction and in the presence of the
testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document
destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may
be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone
would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary
elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament.
The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical
act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried
out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under
his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show
compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or
papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto.
For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under
the express direction of Adriana.
And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses,
Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only
ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the
kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were
burned. Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the
two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both
illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned
was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the
papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her,
Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his
information that the burned document was the will because
Guadalupe told him so.
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI.
JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee, vs. LUZ,
GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.

Facts: Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941 without any
forced heir either in the descending or ascending line save his wife,
petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew,
the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed
Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi,
deceased brother of the testator. Mariano left two wills, one
executed on August 17, 1918, and another executed on June 20,
1939. The later will executed in 1918.
The will dated June 20, 1939 was probated upon the petition by
Juana. Later on, it was denied upon the petition of the oppositors.
The lower finding that Juana failed to prove that the will was
executed in accordance with law. On February 24, 1944, Juana filed
another petition for the probate of the will executed by the
deceased on August 17, 1918 which was again opposed by the
same parties based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now
estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said
will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3)
that the will has been subsequently revoked. But before the
second petition could be heard, the battle for liberation came and
the records of the case were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for
reconstitution was filed, but the same was found to be impossible
because neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce the copies
required for its reconstitution. As a result, petitioner filed a new
petition on September 14, 1946, similar to the one destroyed, to
which the oppositors filed an opposition based on the same
grounds as those contained in their former opposition. They contend
that,notwithstanding the disallowance of said will, the revocatory clause is valid
and still has the effect of nullifyingthe prior of 1918.
Issue: Whether the 1918 will is still valid despite the revocation in
the subsequent disallowed 1939 will?
Held: Yes . As enunciated in the case of Samson v. Naval, a
subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will,
having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is
void.The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the
principle of "dependent relative revocation".The failure of a new

testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation

depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive
conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will.
But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that
destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must
appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution
of a new will.

as the original in order that the intention of the testator should not
be frustrated by the possible loss or destruction of the
original.lawphil.netIt is a custom in the office of Repide not to
number the consecutive pages of a will, on the typewriting
machine, the duty of numbering the pages being left to the testator
himself.

Tolentino v Francisco
57 PHIL 749

Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saving

that it was his last will and testament, done in duplicate, and he
proceeded to read the original to the witnesses. After this had been
completed, Legarda himself took the will in hand and read it
himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who thereupon proceeded,
with pen and ink, to number the pages of the will thus, "Pagina
Primera", "Pagina Segunda", etc. He then paged the duplicate copy
of the will in the same way. He next proceeded to sign the original
will and each of its pages by writing his name "G. Tolentino" in the
proper places. Following this, each of the three witnesses signed
their own respective names at the end of the will, at the end of the
attesting clause, and in the left margin of each page of the
instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons concerned in
the act of attestation were present together, and all fully advertent
to the solemnity that engaged their attention.

FACTS: Gregorio Tolentino had been married to Benita Francisco,

but she predeceased him years ago. The pair had no children with a
number of his wifes kin as survivors. However, strained relations,
resulting from grave disagreements, developed between Tolentino
and the Francisco relations and he determined to make a new will
in which, apart from certain legacies in favor of a few individuals,
the bulk of his estate, worth probably about P150,000, should be
given to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, as his universal heir.

To this end, Tolentino went to the office of Eduardo Gutierrez

Repide, an attorney and informed him that he wanted to make a
new will and desired Repide to draft it for him. After the necessary
preliminary inquiries had been made, the attorney suggested to
him to bring a copy of the will previously made which was reduced
to itsproper form. As the instrument was taking shape Tolentino
stated that he wanted the will to be signed in Repide's office, with
the latter as one of the attesting witnesses. For the other two
witnesses Tolentino requested that two attorneys attached to the
office, namely, Leoncio B. Monzon and Ramon L. Sunico, should
serve.

When the instrument had been reduced to proper form, changes

were made by Tolentino with regards to the attesting witnesses.
Pursuant to these instructions Repide made the desired changes in
the will and just before twelve o'clock noon of the next day
Tolentino returned to Repide's office and received from him the
criminal document with a carbon copy thereof. Repide advised the
testator that the copy should be executed with the same formality

After preliminary explanations had been made, Tolentino requested

Repide to keep the will overnight in his safe, In this connection the
testator stated that he did not wish to take the will to his home, as
he knew that his relatives were watching him and would take
advantage of any carelessness on his part to pry into his papers.
On the morning of November 9, 1930, Gregorio Tolentino was found
dead in his bed, having perished by the hands of an assassin.

ISSUE: Whether the will was executed and attested in the manner
required by law

HELD: The peculiarity of this case is that, upon the trial of this
proceeding for the probate of the will of the decedent, two of the
attesting witnesses, Jose Syyap and Vergel de Dios, repudiated
their participation in the execution of the will at the time and place

stated; and while admitting the genuineness of their signatures to

the will, pretended that they had severally signed the instrument,
at the request of the testator, at different places. Thus Syyap,
testifying as a witness, claimed that the testator brought the will to
Syyap's house on the afternoon of October 21 a time, be it
remembered, when the will had not yet left the hands of the
draftsman and upon learning that Syyap could not be present at
the time and place then being arranged for the execution of the
will, he requested Syyap, as a mere matter of complaisance, to sign
the will then, which Syyap did. Vergel de Dios has another story to
tell of isolated action, claiming that he signed the will in the
evening of October 22 at the Hospital of San Juan de Dios in
Intramuros.

We are unable to give any credence to the testimony of these two

witnesses on this point, the same being an evident fabrication
designed for the purpose of defeating the will. In the first place, the
affirmative proof showing that the will was properly executed is
adequate, consistent, and convincing, consisting of the testimony
of the third attesting witness, Vicente Legarda, corroborated by
Miguel Legarda and Urbana Rivera, two disinterested individuals,
employees of La Previsora Filipina, who were present in Legarda's
office when the will was executed and who lent a discerning
attention to what was being done. In the second place, each of the
seven signatures affixed to his will by Syyap appear to the natural
eye to have been made by using the same pen and ink that was
used by Legarda in signing the will. The same is also probably true
of the seven signatures made by Vergel de Dios. This could hardly
have happened if the signatures of Syyap and Vergel de Dios had
been affixed, as they now pretend, at different times and places. In
the third place, Both Syyap and Vergel de Dios are impeached by
proof of contradictory statements made by them on different
occasions prior to their appearance as witnesses in this case. In this
connection we note that, after the murder of Gregorio Tolentino,
and while the police authorities were investigating his death,
Nemesio Alferez, a detective, sent for Syyap and questioned him
concerning his relations with the deceased. Upon this occasion
Syyap stated that Gregorio Tolentino had lately made a will, that it
had been executed at the office of La Previsora Filipina under the

circumstances already stated, and that he himself had served as

one of the attesting witnesses.

These circumstances and other incidents revealed in the proof

leave no room for doubt in our mind that Syyap and Vergel de Dios
have entered into a conspiracy between themselves, and in concert
with the opponents, to defeat the will of Gregorio Tolentino
although they are well aware that said will was in all respects
properly executed; and the trial court, in our opinion, committed no
error in admitting the will to probate.

When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of

the attesting witnesses, if available but the validity of the will in no
wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of those
witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the
fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite with
the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity
of the will rests. (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil., 380.) It is
sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof that the will was
executed and attested in the manner required by law. In this case
we feel well assured that the contested will was properly executed
and the order admitting to it probate was entirely proper.
249. PECSON vs. MEDIAVILLO [G.R. No. 7890 September 29,
1914]

FACTS:
-

Some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910, the

last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented
to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for
probate.

Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the

legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been
authorized nor signed by the deceased. However, after
hearing the respective parties, the court found that the will

had been signed and executed in accordance with the

provisions of law.
-

On September 18, 1910, Tomas Lorayes, representing

Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a
motion alleging that Rosario Mediavillo and Joaquin
Mediavillo were the legitimate children of the deceased
Teresa Pecson. Teresa was a daughter of the testator; that
the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was
disinherited by her grandfather, the testator Florencio
Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed
to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised
her hand against him.

On his will, Florencio Pecson stated that he disinherited

Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful to
me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not
remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is
my will that she, the said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no
share in my property."

RTC nullified and set aside paragraph 3 of the will of the

testator; and decreed to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the
estate of Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson which
would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been
surviving.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the court may inquire into the cause of the
disinheritance and decide whether there is a ground for such
disinheritance.
Whether or not Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin
Mediavillo, is the latters heir by representation.

RULING:

Yes, the (Old) Civil Code (Art. 848) provides that

disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes
expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of
the said article, the SC found that Articles 756 and 853

provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or the cases

or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their
heirs.
Article 849 of the (Old) Civil Code (now Article 916) provides
that the disinheritance can only be effected by the
testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or
causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be
disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in the
Civil Code, it would seem to follow that the courts might
properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made
properly and for the causes provided for by law.
The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and
whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or
not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the
Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the
truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be
established by the heirs of the testator, should the
disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the
person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the
cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support
his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire
whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is
also sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in part
provides that: Disinheritance made without statement of the
reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted,
should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of
heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited.

No. The Supreme Court held that the right of representation

shall always take place in the direct descending line, but
never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place
only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether
they be of the whole or half blood.

It will be remembered that the whole argument of the

appellants was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited
and the court evidently believed that there were no
"legitimate children, descendants of the deceased,
surviving," and that therefore the father or mother of said
legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch,
however, as there was a descendant in the direct line,

surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for the

reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that
Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the
estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had
he been living.
-

The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court nullifying and

setting aside paragraph 3 of the will of the testator, and
revoked that part of said judgment which decrees to
Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson,
belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been
given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving.
ACAIN vs. IAC
October 27, 1987

FACTS:
Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the
late Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares from properties
he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo
(father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property
shall be given to Segundos children. Segundo pre-deceased
Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the
deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on
the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
ISSUE:
Was there preterition?
HELD:

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of

the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory
heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there
is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance,
for she is not in the direct line.
The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal
heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted
child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The
only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and
devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected,
except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his
brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results
in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary
disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written.
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the
will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the
appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual
item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At
the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir.
However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of
respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,
petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal
standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.

Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez.

ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL. vs. IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER
CHILDREN
FACTS:
This is a case where the testator in his will left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein
respondents, with preterition of the children by his first marriage,
the herein petitioner. This Court annulled the institution of heirs and
declared a total intestacy.
A motion for reconsideration has been filed by the
respondents on the ground (1) that there is no preterition
as to the children of the first marriage who have received
their shares in the property left by the testator, and (2)
that, even assuming that there has been a preterition, the
effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs
but simply the reduction of the bequest made to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should
be granted based on the two grounds.
RULING:
No. As correctly found by the Court of Appelas, there was no
property has ever been advanced by the testator to the children by
his first marriage. The large parcel of land adjoining parcel No. 1
was alleged by the children of the second marriage to have been
advanced by the testator to the children by his first marriage; but
the Court of Appeals belied this claim. "It is not true," says that
Court, "that this parcel containing 182.6373 hectares is now
assessed in the names of some of the children of the first marriage,
for as shown on Tax Declaration No. 9395, Exhibit 11-g, the owners
of the property are Agapita Neri de Chaves y Hermanos," that is,
the children of both marriages. And the Court of Appeals added
that "apparently, the said land is still claimed to be the property not
only of the children of the first marriage but also of those of the
second marriage," which is another way of stating that the property

could not have been advanced by the testator to the children by

the first marriage would not lay a claim on it.
We conclude, therefore, that according to the findings of fact made
by the Court of Appeals, the testator left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, and that
without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he
left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some of them. This is,
accordingly, a case of preterition governed by article 814 of the
Civil Code, which provides that the institution of heirs shall be
annulled and intestate succession should be declared open.
2. Upon the second question propounded in the motion for
reconsideration, respondents seem to agree that article 814 of the
Civil Code is the law applicable but, in their discussion as to the
effect of preterition, they confuse article 814 with articles 817 and
851 and other articles of the Civil Code. These three articles read:
ART. 814. The preterition of one or of all of the forced heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heirs; but the
legacies and betterments shall be valid in so far as they are not
inofficious.
The preterition of the widower or widow does not annul the
institution; but the person omitted shall retain all the rights granted
to him by articles 834, 835, 836, and 837 of this Code.
ART. 817. Testamentary dispositions which diminish the legitimate
of the forced heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same in so far
as they are inofficious or excessive.
ART. 851. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or
for a cause the truth of which, if contested, is not shown, or which
is not one of those stated in the four following articles, shall annul
the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited
person; but the legacies, betterments, and other testamentary
dispositions shall be valid in so far as they are not prejudicial to
said legitime.

In case of preterition (article 814), the nullity of the institution of

heirs is total, whereas in case of disinheritance (article 851), the
nullity is partial, that is, in so far as the institution affects the
legitime of the disinherited heirs. The construction which may
rightly be given to article 814 is that in case of preterition, the
institution of heirs is null in toto whereas in case of disinheritance
the nullity is limited to that portion of the legitime of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. It is clear that in
cases of preterition, the property bequeathed by universal titled to
the instituted heirs should not be merely reduced according to
article 817, but instead, intestate succession should be opened in
connection therewith under article 814.

children claimed absolute ownership over the property evidence by

a deed of donation executed by Julian in favour of Nilo, covering his
conjugal share, and a deed of extrajudicial partition settlement in
which Julian, Leah, and Rebecca waived in favour of Nilo all their
interests and rights over their share of the property inherited from
Virginia. Both documents were registered 5 years after its
execution, and a new TCT is issued by the Register of Deeds in
Nilos favor. Petitioner Rebecca contends that Delia Viado, their
retardate sister, was not part of the extrajudicial settlement, and
hence amounts to preterition which should invalidate the
settlement. Both the trial court and CA ruled in favor of Nilos wife
and children. Hence this appeal.

Of course, the annulment of the institution of heirs in cases of

preterition does not always carry with it the ineffectiveness of the
whole will. If, aside from the institution of heirs, there are in the will
provisions leaving to the heirs so instituted or to other persons
some specific properties in the form of legacies or mejoras, such
testamentary provisions shall be effective and the legacies
and mejoras shall be respected in so far as they are not inofficious
or excessive, according to article 814. In the instant case, however,
no legacies or mejoras are provided in the will, the whole property
of the deceased having been left by universal title to the children of
the second marriage. The effect, therefore, of annulling the
institution of heirs will be necessarily the opening of a total
intestacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Delias exclusion from the extrajudicial

settlement amounts to preterition?

VIADO NON VS. CA

G.R. No. 137287, 15 February 2000
FACTS: Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned, among others, a
house and lot pertained to as the Isarog property. Virginia died on
20 October 1982, followed by Julian 3 years later. Left as heirs were
their children namely: Rebecca Viado Non, Delia Viado, Nilo Viado,
and Leah Viado Jacobs. Both Nilo and Leah died on 22 April 1987.
Nilo left as heirs his wife Alicia and their 2 children. The children of
spouses Viado lived in the Isarog property together with Nilos
widow and children. However, a dispute arose when Rebecca Viado
Non asked that the property be divided equally between the 2
families to make room for their growing children. Nilos wife and

RULING: Yes. However, in the absence of bad faith and fraud,

Article 1104 of the Civil Code must apply which, in essence,
provides that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and
fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir
shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
G.R. No. L-31703

February 13, 1930

CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria

Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, defendants-appellants.
L. D. Lockwood and Jose M. Casal for appellants.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Leoncio B. Monzon for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with
the association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment
of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose
heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased,
represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.

And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23

against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G.
de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said
judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La
Urbana.
The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara,
secured a preliminary injunction restraining the execution of said
judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that the
plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the
dissolution of the injunction.
The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the
plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara,
and granted a final writ of injunction.
The defendants insist in their contentions, and, in their appeal from
the decision of the trial court, assign the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in holding that a trust was created
by the will of Doa Ana Maria Alcantara.
2. The lower court erred in concluding and declaring that the
amount of P21,428.58 deposited with La Urbana is the
property of the children of the plaintiff as "herederos fideicomisarios."
3. The lower court erred in making the injunction permanent
and condemning defendant to pay the costs.
The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning of
the institution of heirs made in the will of the late Ana Maria
Alcantara already admitted to probate, and whose legal force and
effect is not in dispute.
The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between
the parties are the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, quoted below:
Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my
gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age,
married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living
in this same house with me, I institute her as my sole and
universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the

payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my death

and after probate of this will, and after the report of the
committee on claims and appraisal has been rendered and
approved, she will receive from my executrix and properties
composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them
with God's blessing and my own.
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order
that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving
children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve
to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and
sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never
pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far
as it is legally possible.
Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen
Garchitorena, die after me while her children are still in their
minority, I order that my estate be administered by my
executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by
Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon
Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be
considered as an indication of lack of confidence in my
nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the
duties of administering my estate, because I recognize that
his character is not adapted to management and
administration.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has
ordered a simple substitution, while the appellee contends that it is
a fideicommissary substitution.
This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the
three cases that might give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774,
Civil Code), only the death of the instituted heiress before the
testatrix would in the instant case give place to such substitution,
inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of inheritance, or
incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact, however, clause XI
provides for the administration of the estate in case the heiress
instituted should die after the testatrix and while the substitute
heirs are still under age. And it is evident that, considering the
nature of simple substitution by the heir's death before the
testator, and the fact that by clause XI in connection with clause X,
the substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted
dies after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple substitution.

The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be

denied, and since it cannot be a simple substitution in the light of
the considerations above stated, let us now see whether the
instants case is a fideicommissary substitution.
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and
universal heiress, and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's)
and after probate of the will and approval of the report of the
committee on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall receive and
enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause provides
nothing explicit about substitution, it does not contain anything in
conflict with the idea of fideicommissary substitution. The fact that
the plaintiff was instituted the sole and universal heiress does not
prevent her children from receiving, upon her death and in
conformity with the express desire of the testatrix, the latter's
hereditary estate, as provided in the following (above quoted)
clauses which cannot be disregarded if we are to give a correct
interpretation of the will. The word sole does not necessarily
exclude the idea of substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses
together, such word means that the plaintiff is the sole
heiress instituted in the first instance.
The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall
receive and enjoy the estate, is not incompatible with a
fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is incompatible with the
idea of simple substitution, where the heiress instituted does not
receive the inheritance). In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is
in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by
virtue of which the heir instituted receives the inheritance and
enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass
it on the second heir. On this point the illustrious Manresa, in his
Civil Code (Vol. 6, pp. 142 and 143, 5th ed.), says:
Or, what amounts to the same thing, the fideicommissary
substitution, as held in the Resolution of June 25, 1895,
February 10, 1899, and July 19, 1909, requires three things:
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and
transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate.
3. A second heir.

To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918 adds

another, namely that the fideicommissarius be entitled to
the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to
inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary. (Emphasis
ours.)
It appears from this quotation that the heir instituted or the
fiduciary, as referred to in articles 783 of the Civil Code, is entitled
to enjoy the inheritance. And it might here be observed, as a timely
remark, that the fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary
substitution, which is of Roman origin, is not exactly equivalent to,
nor may it be confused with, the English "trust."
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only
the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says,
she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an
indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.
Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it
does not say whether the death of the heiress herein referred to is
before or after that of the testatrix; but from the whole context it
appears that in making the provisions contained in this clause X,
the testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary substitution, since she
limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress
by this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never pass out
of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally
possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid
the possibility that the substitution might later be legally declared
null for transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code
which prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid
"provided they do not go beyond the second degree."
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary
substitution in clause X is the provision that the wholeestate shall
pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress
is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in
order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs. This
provision complies with another of the requisites of
fideicommissary substitution according to our quotation from
Manresa inserted above.
Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary
substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the
heiress should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause

anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die after
the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the inheritance.

can it be subject to the execution of the judgment against Joaquin

Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.

The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a

fideicommissary substitution, according to the quotation from
Manresa above inserted, are present in the case of substitution now
under consideration, to wit:

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the

appellant, Mariano Garchitorena. So ordered.

1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the

estate. In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress,
called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX
of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve
and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the
estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which
provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her
(heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the
heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of
leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate,
said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the
heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition
thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress
instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in
clause X and in clause XI.
Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918,
to wit, that the fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled
to the estate from the time of the testator's death, which in the
instant case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary consequence
derived from the nature of the fideicommissary substitution, in
which the second heir does not inherit from the heir first instituted,
but from the testator.
By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not
belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute
property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the
testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.
Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the
beginning, which is on deposit with the association known as La
Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor

G.R. No. 109972. April 29, 1996.*

ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES,
NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA
ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES and VIRGINIA ROSALES,
respondents.
FACTS: The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248square meter residential lot. Private respondent, Socorro Cordero
Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over
the subject property and traces her title to the late Macaria Atega,
her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first
with Angel Burdeos and the second, following the latters death,
with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was
survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her
daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage
and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales,
Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some
time after Macarias death, died intestate without an issue. In an
instrument dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, sold
to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot
supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of
sale, dated 14 November 1982, it would appear, however, that the
lot was sold for only P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the
second deed was intended merely to save on the tax on capital
gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the
City Treasurers Office. On 31 March 1987, she sought the
intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa, for the redemption of the
property. She tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter
refused to accept the amount for being much less than the lots
current value of P80,000.00. No settlement having been reached
before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private respondents, on 16 October
1987, initiated against petitioner an action for Legal Redemption
with Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Butuan City.

RTC: ruled that private respondents right to redeem the property

had already lapsed.
CA: reversed.
ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Socorro C.
Rosales entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Article 1088,
NCC) or pro-indiviso share (Article 1620, NCC) of the heirs of Ramon
Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, for being
contrary to law and evidence.
RULING: YES, the SC ruled that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro,
a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is
not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law. However, Socorros right
to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in
Macarias estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David
Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mothers inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mothers death. When
Macaria died on March 8, 1956 her estate passed on to her
surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon
became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself
later died, his own estate which included his undivided interest
over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow
Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
De Papa v. Camacho
Propositus died. The uncles and aunts want the property for them.
The niece wants the property for herself. Where does the property
go?
Held: To the niece. The uncles and aunts are excluded from the
succession by the niece, although they are related to him within the
same degree as the latter. Why? Because the reversion of the
reservable property is governed by the rules on intestate
succession, wherein the nieces/nephews succeed ahead of the
spouse, and only in the absence of the spouse will the uncles and
aunts succeed.
SAYSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR Nos. 89224-25
January 23, 1992
DOCTRINE: Adopted child/ children has no right of representation
FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely,
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on
November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15,1976. Teodoro, who

had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died
nine years later. Their properties were left in the possession of
Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be
their children.
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for
the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children.
Both cases filed on the Lower Court were decided in favor Delia, et
al. on the basis of practically the same evidence. The Lower Court
declared that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children
of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption.
Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth
certificate. Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit
from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were
consolidated. The appellate court affirmed that Delia, et al. are
entitled to the intestate estate of spouses Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson. However, Delia and Edmundo are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson.
ISSUE: W/N CA is correct in holding that Delia and Edmundo are
disqualified to inherit from the estate of the deceased spouses
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.
HELD: A different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia
and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers.
While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights
do not include the right of representation. The relationship created
by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the
adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party.
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as
the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro Saysonand Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and
are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding
that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance
of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents
being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of

the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioners.
Uriarte vs, Court of First Instance
33 SCRA 252
May 29, 1970
Facts of the Case:
Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable
properties in the Philippines. Vicente Uriarte, who is claiming to be
the son and sole heir of the deceased, filed a petition for the
intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental. However, said petition was
opposed by the nephews of Juan stating that there is a valid will left
by the deceased in Spain, a copy of which is being requested. Then,
the nephews filed a settlement of the estate in the court of Manila,
on the basis of the alleged will of the deceased.
Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the
court of Manila stating that the court of Negros Occidental has
already acquired original jurisdiction over the case. The opposition
of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlement In
the CFI of Negros.
Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the
dismissal of the intestate settlement in the CFI of Negros.
Issue:
Whether
dismissed.

or

not

the

intestate

settlement

should

be

Ruling of the Case:

The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the intestate
proceeding is proper. Under the Rules on the settlement of estate of
the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings. Therefore, in case intestate settlement was
filed prior to the finding of the will of the deceased, then the
intestate proceedings shall be dismissed to give priority to the
testate proceeding.
BICOMONG vs. ALMANZA
G.R. No. L-37365 Nov. 29, 1977

Facts: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas having

three children: Perpetua, Igmedia and Ignacio. When Sisenda died,
Simeon married Silvestra producing two children: Felipa and Maura.
The subject matter of the complaint concerns the one-half
undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the 5 parcels of land which she
inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso. Three sets
of plaintiffs filed the complaint, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children
of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic;
and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the CFI of
Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo
Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful
shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic. After the death of
Maura Bagsic, properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took
charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the
plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their
aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta
Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the
last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid.
Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs
brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time
Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly,
had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division
of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the
possession and administration of the same to the defendants.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The
respondents have the right to inherit from Maura by right of
representation. The appellate court certified the case to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the nephews and nieces from the brothers and
sisters whether full or half blood has the right to inherit
Held: Yes. The nephews and nieces from the brothers and sisters
whether full or half blood has the right to inherit. In the absence of
defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, Art. 1003 of the NCC provides that collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and
her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is
succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the
daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her
brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the
provision of Art. 975 of the NCC.

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as

to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal
line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the
deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of
the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half
blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in
Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Art. 1006 of the NCC, which provisions,
in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of
the nephews and nieces of half blood.