1. 1.

Article VI Legislative Department

2. 2. Legislative Power Legislative power is essentially the authority of
the government to enact laws, repeal, or amend them as well.
Legislative power in the Philippines is vested in the Congress, which
consists of bicameral structure, namely: the Senate and the House of
Representative
3. 3. Meaning of law The term laws, as used previously, refers to the
statutes which are the written enactments of the legislature governing
the relations of the people among themselves or between them and
the government and its agencies.
4. 4. Functions of laws Through laws, the legislative defines the rights
and duties of citizens, imposes taxes, appropriates funds, defines
crimes and provides for their punishment, creates and abolishes
government offices, determines their jurisdiction and functions, and in
general, regulates human conduct and the use of property for the
promotion of the common good.
5. 5. Under the 1987 Constitution, the power to make, propose or
amend laws is also extended to the people, in whom sovereignty
resides, through the mechanisms of initiative and referendum. By
Initiative, we mean that the authority is reserved to the people through
direct participation of the electorate in law-making processes, either
national or local level. By Referendum, it means the process in which
the people are referred directly on any question of law passed by
Congress or a local legislative body for their approval or rejection.
6. 6. Scope and Classification of the Powers of Congress
7. 7. 1.General Legislative Power A general legislative power of
Congress is usually undefined by the Constitution. This power refers
to the overall authority to enact laws for the people and the State,
unless the Constitution itself limits the subject matter on which it may
legislate.
8. 8. 2. Specific Powers They are powers which the Constitution
expressly directs or authorizes Congress to exercise. Among the

specific powers of Congress as mandated by the Constitution are:

a.Power to declare the existence of the state of war. (Art. VI, Section
23 {1}); b.Power to delegate emergency powers to the President. (Art
VI, Sec. 23 {2}); c.Power to Appropriation (Art. VI, Sec 24-25);
d.Power to Taxation (Art. VI, Sec 28 {1-2});
9. 9. e. Power to concur in treaties through the Senate and the House of
Representatives (Art. VII, Sec 21); f. Power to concur the grant of
Amnesty (Art. VII, Sec. 19); and g. Power to act as Board of
Canvassers for Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections (Art VI,
Sec. 4)
10.
10. 3. Implied Powers From the meaning itself, implied powers
are those authority enjoyed by the legislature to effectively exercise its
constitutionally granted powers, like the power to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation (Sec 21), or to determine the rules of
its proceedings (Sec. 16 {3})
11.
11. 4. Generally Non-Delegable Powers These are powers that
are essentially inherent in the Congress, which need no legislation or
constitutional grant to that effect. These fundamental powers of the
State are taxation, eminent domain, and police power.
12.
12. Composition of Congress
13.
13. The Senate (1) Composition and election It is composed of
24 Senators. They are elected at large (nationwide) by the qualified
voters, as may be provided by law (Sec. 2). Unless otherwise
provided by law, the regular election of Senators shall be held on the
second Monday of May (Sec. 8)
14.
14. (2) Term of office It is six (6) years. It shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June
next following election (Sec. 4, par. 1). The Constitution has a similar
provision with respect to the President and Vice-President except that
the hour and date of commencement of their term of office cannot be
changed by law.

15.
15. (3) Qualifications A Senator must be: (a) a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines; (b) at least 35 years of age on the day of the
election (i.e., day of the balloting); (c) able to read and write; (d) a
registered voter; and (e) a resident of the Philippines for not less two
(2) years immediately preceding the day of the election (Sec. 3)
16.
16. (4) Maximum of terms In line with the state policy on equal
access to opportunities for public service and against political
dynasties (Art II, Sec. 6), a Senator is disqualified to serve for more
than two (2) consecutive terms (Sec.4, par. 2)
17.
17. The House of Representatives
18.
18. (1)Composition and election/selection It is composed of not
more than 250 members popularly known as Congressmen. They
are elected from legislative or congressional districts and through a
party-list system. The party-list representatives are filled by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, etc. and other sectors as may be
provided by law, except religious sector (Sec. 5[1]). Unless otherwise
provided by law, the regular election of the members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May (Sec. 8).
19.
19. (2) Terms of office It is three (3) years, to begin also, unless
otherwise provided by the law, at noon on the 30th day next following
election (Sec. 7, par. 1). (3) Qualifications A representative must be:
(a) a natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (b) at least 25 years of
age on the day of the election (c) able to read and write; (d) except for
a party-list representative, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected; and (e) a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one (1) year preceding the day of the election (Sec. 6)
20.
20. (4) Maximum terms The provisions are the same as those
for Senators except that the limit is for not more than three (3)
consecutive terms (Sec. 7, par. 2)
21.
21. Term of Office and Tenure of Office A term of office refers to
the fixed period of service when an elected official may validly keep
his post. The term of office is usually specified by the law. A tenure of

office, on the other hand, refers to the actual period of service when
an elected official holds the office. Say, a congressman has resigned
halfway his term, this is not considered as an interruption, but the
service is still regarded his full term or his actual tenure. Thus, tenure
is the actual incumbency.
22.
22. Party List System The purpose of party list system is to
bring the government closer to people and assure that the democracy
really works in our society. Party list representative system is a device
of balancing the representation in the election of the members to the
House of Representatives from marginalized or under represented
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations duly
recognized by the COMELEC.
23.
23. Only organized and duly registered parties with the
COMELEC may participate instead of individual candidates. These
are: a. Sectoral Parties These refer to organized groups of citizens
whose principal advocacy concerns and special interests are in these
sectors, namely: labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous communities,
veterans, and elderly. b. Sectoral Organizations These organizations
are groups of qualified voters bound together by similar physical
attributes or characteristics or by employment, interests, or concerns.
24.
24. c. Political Parties These are organized groups of qualified
voters pursuing the same ideology, political ideas, and principles for
general conduct of the government. d. Coalitions Coalitions refer to
aggregations of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties, or
organizations for political and/or electoral purposes.
25.
25. Qualifications of a Party List Nominee 1. A natural-born
citizen of the Philippines; 2. A registered voter; 3. A resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the election day; 4. Able to read and write; 5. A bona fide
member of the party he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the election day; 6. A nominee shall come from a
disadvantage group of citizens which are organized and duly

registered to the COMELEC; and 7. At least twenty-five (25) years of

age on the Election Day.
26.
26. In case of the youth sector, a nominee must be at least 25,
but not 30 years of age on the date of election. Party list
representatives are considered elected members of the lower
chamber, and as such, enjoy the same rights, salaries, and
emoluments as regular members of the House. They shall serve for
three (3) year term with the maximum of three (3) consecutive or
successive terms.
27.
27. Vacancy in Congress RA 6645 provides for An Act
Prescribing the Manner of Filling A Vacancy in the Congress of the
Philippines, signed into a law by then President Aquino on December
1987. In case of vacancy arising in the Senate at least 18 months or
in the House of Representatives at least one year before the next
regular election for members of Congress, the COMELEC upon
receipt of certification of vacancy, shall call for special election. The
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected
shall serve only for the unexpired term. The election shall not be
earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from the date of such
resolution.
28.
28. Termination of Members of Congress 1. Voluntary
renunciation of the office (Art. VI, Sec. 7 [21]); 2. Forfeiture of seat of
a member in Congress during incumbency, in case when he or she
keeps another office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporation or subsidiaries (Sec. 13); 3. A
penalty of suspension may serve a member of the Congress for
disciplinary action as determined by each Houses rules proceeding
(Sec. 16{3}). Congress can punish any of its members for disorderly
conduct;
29.
29. 4. An Electoral Tribunal, through a resolution, may disqualify
a member of Congress in election contest (Sec. 17); 5. By means of

resignation, death, incapacity, or conviction which carries a penalty of

disqualification to hold office.
30.
30. Compensation of Members of Congress The salaries of the
members of both Houses are fixed by law; it may be increased, but
the effectivity of such shall only be given to the members after the full
term of their respective offices has elapsed. However, no decrease of
salary of members can be allowed, as they are entitled to the right to
salary. Art. XVIII, Sec. 17 reads, The President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House shall receive an annual salary of P 240,000,
and the Senators and the members of the House of Representatives
shall receive P204,000 each per year
31.
31. Rights and Privileges of Members of Congress The
Constitutional rights and privileges of members of Congress shall
include the following: 1. Right to salary; 2. Freedom of speech and
debate without question; 3. Freedom from arrest while the Congress
is in session, except when the offense of which a member is charged
is punishable by more than six years imprisonment; and 4.
Parliamentary immunity. The aim of this privilege is to facilitate that
members of Congress can Effectively discharge their functions
without previous restraints.
32.
32. Power of Congress
33.
33. 1.Over and above, the power to make laws and to pass
resolutions; 2.To approve appointments made by the President
through Commission of Appointments; 3.To decide cases of electoral
protest involving its members through an Electoral Tribunal; 4.To
declare the existence of a state of war by 2/3 votes of both Houses,
voting independently; 5.To ratify treaties upon 2/3 votes of all
members of Congress, voting separately;
34.
34. 6. To grant the President emergency powers in times of war
and national distress; 7. To provide for the rules of presidential
succession should the speaker of the House fails to qualify; 8. To
concur to a grant of amnesty by the President; 9. To exercise the

power to override the veto power of the President; 10. To hear and
decide cases of impeachment against high officials; 11. To exercise
the power to amend or revise the Constitution; 12. To prescribe,
define, and apportion the jurisdiction of lower courts;
35.
35. 13. To determine or apportion seats of Legislative districts;
14. The power to tax and levy impositions; 15. To determine the
disability of the President and the Vice-President; 16. To break a knot
ion case when there is a tie for the position of President of the
Republic; 17. To cancel or extend Martial Law; 18. To investigate in
aid of legislation; 19. To approve the annual budget of the
government as prepared by the Executive; 20. To determine the rules
of proceedings and more.
36.
36. Parliamentary Immunities Art. VI, Sec. 2 provides two
immunities, which a member of Congress may enjoy in the exercise
of his task (while the Congress is in session). These are: 1.A Senator
or a member of the House of Representatives shall be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session; and 2.No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
37.
37. The privileges are personal ones and may be waived. There
are, however, exemptions from parliamentary immunities: a.Given
gravity and seriousness of the offense committed, any members of
the Congress cannot invoke immunity from arrest, when the penalty
of the charge leveled against him carries the penalty of more than six
(6) years imprisonment; and b.When a member is not acting as a
member of Congress, but on his personal capacity.
38.
38. Disabilities of Members of Congress While the members of
the legislative may be enjoy some constitutional and statutory grants
or privileges, they are likewise constrained by some technical
disqualifications. As provided under Art. VI, Sec.14, the prohibitions
are: 1. No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the

electoral tribunals, or quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. 2. Any

member shall not, either directly or indirectly, show financial interests
in any contract with the government or any of its agency or
instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs, during his incumbency.
This includes government franchise.
39.
39. 3. Any member shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the government for his own benefit.
40.
40. Incompatible and Forbidden Office By Incompatible office,
we mean that no member of the Congress may hold any other office
in the government or its subdivisions, agency, or any instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation, during
his incumbency. A member of Legislative cannot be appointed as a
department secretary or a director of any government positions while
holding his position at the same time, not unless he resigns.
41.
41. By Forbidden office, we mean that no member of the
Congress can be appointed to any office created or the emoluments
of which have been increased during the term for which he was
elected. Under art. IX-B, Sec. 8 no elective officer or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless
specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress any present emolument, office or title of any kind from
foreign government.
42.
42. Sessions of Congress Art. VI, Sec. 15 reads: The
Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July
for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall
continue to be in session for such number of days as it may
determine until 30 days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. The President
may call a special session at any time.
43.
43. 1.Regular Session The Congress shall meet or convene
once in every year beginning on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless law fixes a different date. Once the Congress

has convened, the session continues for such duration until thirty (30)
days before the opening of the next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
44.
44. 2. Special Session The Congress may be called upon by
the President anytime to consider some urgent and national concern.
Some peculiar characteristics include: a.Special session has no
definite or fixed date. It may be called anytime; b.Special session
considers only one subject matter/agendum when Congress is
convened for the purpose; c.Special session may also be called or
convened by the Congress; and d.Special session normally is brief
and attends only to the agenda being called for.
45.
45. 3. Executive Session In some rare cases, the Congress or
the President may call for a secret or close door session when
matters concerning national interest are to be discussed.
46.
46. Quorum and Business Quorum is the required number of
members of each House to be present in order to legally transact a
business. Each House shall determine its own quorum. The
Constitution requires that the majority of each Houses may adjourn
from day to day, and may compel the attendance of absent members
in such manner, and other such penalties as each House may
provide. Both Houses shall elect their political leaders at the pleasure
of their members. The Senate shall determine its speaker by majority
votes of all its respective members.
47.
47. Disciplinary Behavior Under the Constitution, each House of
Congress may determine acts constituting disorderly behavior, and
whether a Member should be suspended or expelled. Each House is
authorized under its Rules to punish its member for disorderly
behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds vote of all kits
members, suspend or expel an erring legislator. The Constitution,
however, limits the suspension to sixty days.
48.
48. Internal Discipline Internal Discipline is an inherent
legislative power. The Court once said: If the power did not exist, it

would be utterly impractible to transact the business of the nation,

either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order. The
humblest assembly of men to understood to posses this power, and
would absurd to deprive the councils of the nations of a like authority.
49.
49. Journal and Enrolled Bill A journal is an official report of the
legislative. It is written business, which arises from all the legislative
proceedings. Art. VI, Sec. 16 (4) each House shall keep a journal of
its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, expecting
such parts as may in its judgment, affect national security, and the
years and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
member present be entered in the journal. Each house shall also
keep a record of its proceedings.
50.
50. An enrolled bill refers to a bill which has been duly
introduced, finally enacted by both House, signed by the proper
officers of each House, and approved by the President. An enrolled
copy bill is conclusive not only of its provisions, but also of its due
enactment. In case of conflict between the journal and an enrolled
bill, the latter prevails over the former, save as to matter required by
the Constitution to be enacted in the journal.
51.
51. Adjournment Art. VI, Sec. 16 (5) adds, neither the House
during the session of the Congress shall without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three (3) days, nor to any other place
than in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
52.
52. The Organization of Electoral Tribunal Each House shall
have and Electoral Tribunal, in which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. The characteristics and composition are:
53.
53. 1. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
members, three whom shall be justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be;

54.
54. 2. Membership shall be chosen on the basis of the
proportional representation from the political parties, and the parties
or organizations registered under the party list system represented
therein; 3. The Senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman (Sec. 17); 4. Members enjoy security of tenure. It is coterminus with their legislative term of service;
55.
55. 5. The decision arrived at by the Electoral Tribunal shall be
final. It may be appealed though to the Supreme Court on the cases
or instances of certiorari, grave abuse of discretion; 6. The Electoral
Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over election contests by the members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives as the case may be.
Pre-proclamation concerns or issues are, however, the jurisdiction
under COMELEC.
56.
56. Organization of the Commission on Appointments The
Congressional and Commission of Appointments (CA) shall approve
all appointments made by the Chief Executive to various government
positions. All appointments by the President can only be pursued
upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
characteristics of the Commission are as follow:
57.
57. 1. The Commission shall consist of the President of the
Senate, as ex-officio chairman, 12 Senators, and 12 members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation; 2. The Chairman of the Commission shall
not vote, except in case of tie;
58.
58. 3. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted
to it within 30 sessions days of Congress from their submission; and
4. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all members (Sec.
18)
59.
59. Inquiries in aid of Legislation The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective Committee, may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The right of person appearing in or affected by

such inquiries shall be respected (Sec. 21). The Senate Blue Ribbon
committee is an example. The power of inquiry and investigation
exists not only to enable Congress to discharge effectively its
primarily legislative and law-making functions.
60.
60. Limitations of the Investigative Power of Congress: 1.
Inquiry shall be conducted only in aid of legislation; 2. The
Constitutional right against self-incrimination to the person being
investigated shall not be violated; 3. The right to counsel shall be
respected to the persons being investigated in Congress; 4. Each
House conducting the inquiry shall publish the rules of procedure
governing the investigation and shall be made known to the person
concerned; and 5. Such congressional inquiry shall not serve a
members personal aggrandizement.
61.
61. Question Hour The question hour is a parliamentary feature
adopted under our presidential system. The power of Congress to call
any head of a department, as its House Rules shall provide, to
appear before and be heard by the requesting.
62.
62. Declaration of Existence of the State of War Section 23
writes: The Congress by a vote of two thirds of both Houses in joint
session assembled voting separately, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war. In times of war or other
national emergency, the Congress may, by the law, authorize the
President, on a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn, by resolution of
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof
63.
63. Appropriation Powers The Administrative Code of 1987
defined appropriation as an organized made by law or other
legislative enactment, directing payment out of government funds
under specified conditions and/or for special programs. Thus, an

appropriation bill aims to authorize the release of public funds from

treasury.
64.
64. The following bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments: 1.Appropriation bills 2.Revenue or tariff bills 3.Bills
authorizing increase of public debt 4.Bill of local application 5.Private
bill
65.
65. A General Appropriation is an annual budget, which the
Congress set aside to appropriate the expenses for the general
operation of the government. A Special Appropriation is a
supplemental appropriation not contained in the budget. A Specific
Appropriation is an appropriation sets aside a fixed amount of money
for the payment of a certain program. A Continuing Appropriation
refers to the named amount of money which, when not appropriated
at the end of the fiscal year, shall automatically be accrued for the
next calendar year.
66.
66. Other Kinds of Appropriation 1. Tariff bill - is one that
imposes revenues or customs duties for specific purposes. But, a bill
imposing high tariff rates in particular foreign goods with the purpose
to protect local goods on industries against competition is not a
revenue bill. 2. Bill authorizing income of the public debt - essentially,
a bill, which facilitates the government to issue bonds and other forms
of indebtedness, which will be chargeable from future public funds. 3.
Bill of local application - a bill that directly allots to local or municipal
appropriation.
67.
67. 4. Private bill - a bill that affects purely private interests, like
indemnification to a person who suffered damages from the
negligence of the government or its agency or instrumentality or any
part thereof.
68.
68. General Rules of Appropriation (See Art. VI, Sec. 25) 1. The
Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the government as specified in the

budget; 2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the

general appropriation bill, unless it relates specifically to some
parts/particular of the appropriation therein; 3. The procedures in
approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies;
69.
69. 4. A special appropriation bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available; 5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriation, except otherwise provided by law (Sec. 25{5}) 6.
Discretionary funds appropriated for particular offices or officers shall
be disbursed only for public use; and 7. if, at the end of any fiscal
year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuring fiscal year, the general
appropriation laws for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted.
70.
70. Budget -refers to the financial statement or record of the
central government for an incoming fiscal year, including the
statements of the projected receipts from revenue collections and
expenditures for the year. Rider -is prohibited under the Constitution.
A rider is a loose provision or enactment being inserted in the general
appropriations bill, which does not form integral part of certain
appropriation contained therein.
71.
71. Passage of a Bill
72.
72. A bill is essentially a proposed law by the legislative
department. Each house may propose a bill, when the House of
Representatives proposes one, it shall be called a House Bill, and
when the Senate initiates a proposal, it shall be called a Senate Bill.
73.
73. The Hodge-podged legislation refers to any proposed
measure consisting of general or more unrelated subjects, but are
integrated in the proposal in order to guarantee support from
members of the Congress. The avoidance of logrolling legislation is to

ensure enough consideration and support from the members in

regard to the passage of a bill into law.
74.
74. The passage of a bill into law follows strictly the procedures:
1.First Reading 2.Second Reading 3.Floor Debates 4.Printing and
Distributions 5.Third Reading 6.Transmitted to the Other House
7.Submission to Joint Bicameral Committee 8.Approval of
Consolidated Bill by Both Houses 9.Submission to the President
10.Veto Power of the President
75.
75. 10. Veto Power of the President Particularly: a.Every bill
must be presented and approved by the President; b.In case, the
President disapproves a bill, he exercises veto power and returns it,
with his objection, to the House where it originated; c.In case the
House, after such deliberation, considered the bill as proposed, a 2/3
vote may carry its power to override the veto.
76.
76. Component Parts of a Law 1.Title refers to the subject
matter of the law, or the Act carried by the legislative department, and
the executive as well. 2.Preamble introduces the objectives for the
enactment of the Act and explains the general reasons for such
legislation. 3.Enacting Clause refers to the collective and distinct
will of both Houses to enact an act or a bill. Enacting clause
specifically states the reason for the legislation Act. 4.Body pertains
to the total substance or content of the proposed bill.
77.
77. 5. Effectively Clause indicates the time at which the law
shall take effect. Usually, a law will be enforced next following the next
15-day publication requirement in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines or in the Official Gazette, not unless a date is fixed
as to its effectivity.
78.
78. Taxation is a means of raising funds for the operation of the
government, especially its public services. The distribution of the tax
burden should be equitable or fair. This means a person has to pay
taxes based on his ability to pay. Taxes should serve as tools in
facilitating economic stability and growth.

79.
79. Basis of Taxation Under the Constitution, the rule of taxation
(See Sec. 28) shall include the following: 1.The rule shall be uniform
and equitable; 2.The taxation should be based on progressive income
system; 3.The Congress may authorize the President to fix tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties and imports, subject to the limitation of the Congress; and
80.
80. 4. Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries and all
lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
81.
81. Who are exempted from paying taxes? Charitable
institutions, churches and parsonages, or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all other facilities used
for religious and educational purposes.
82.
82. Limitations of the Power of Congress 1.Under Art. III based
on the Bill of Rights: a.That the Congress cannot pass laws impairing
the obligations of contrast (Sec. 10) b.That no law shall impair the
freedom of speech, of press, and of expression (Sec. 10) c.That no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof (Sec. 5) d.No person shall be
held liable to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law
(Sec. 14)
83.
83. e. No person shall be imprisoned for debts or non-payment
of a poll tax (Sec. 20); and f. No ex-post facto law or bill of attainder
shall be enacted (Sec. 22)
84.
84. 2. Under Art. VI, Sec. 29 a. Money shall be paid out the
treasury, except in the punishment of an appropriation made by law;
and b. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied or
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or other preacher, minister or

dignitary assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or

government orphanage or leprosarium.
85.
85. 3. Art. VI, Sec. 30 states: no law shall be passed increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence. 4. Art. VI, Sec. 31
declares: no law granting a royalty or nobility shall be enacted. 5.
The Congress cannot pass law granting tax exemption in the absence
of the concurrence of the majority of all members of the House.
86.
86. Legislative Power of the People The legislative department
is no longer the sole body or institution, which enact laws and pass
resolutions. Under the 1987 Constitution, the people have the power
to participate directly in legislating laws through initiative and
referendum.
87.
87. Art. VI, Sec. 32 declares: The Congress shall, as early as
possible, provides for a system of initiative and referendum, and
exemption therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition
thereof signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3 per centum of the registered voters thereof.

Safeguards
that
proscribe
legislative power of inquiry.

the

The power of Congressional inquiry is not absolute.

Section 21, Article VI establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe
the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry
be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published
rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of
an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure.
Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or

affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates

Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, or course, remediable before the courts, upon
the proper suit filed by the person affected, even if they belong to the
executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional
circumstances, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative
power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations
of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department
under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the
particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to
forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction. (Senate, et
al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 167777, April 20, 2006).
Concept of executive privilege.
Executive privilege is the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. It is the
right of the President and high-level executive branch offices to
withhold information from Congress, the courts and ultimately the
public. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 167777, April 20,
2006).
Types or kinds of executive privilege.
Executive privilege is not a clear or unitary concept. It has
encompassed claims of varying kinds.
One variety of the privilege, is the state secrets privilege invoked by
U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the
information is such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial
military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers
privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic
privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental
documents
reflecting
advisory
opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by

which government decisions and policies are formulated. (Senate, et

al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 167777, April 20, 2006).
Basis for the three kinds of executive
privilege.
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a
variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information, the
confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to the fulfillment of the
unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our
government. courts ruled early that the executive had a right to
withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The
courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity
of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right
to withhold information related to pending investigations. (In re
Sealed, 121 F. ed. 729, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 276; Senate, et al. vs.
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 167777, April 20, 2006).
Appearance during the question hour
not mandatory.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature
of such appearance during the question hour in the present
Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of
powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently
understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the
parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to
appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the
legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all
circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory
question period, the need to enforce Congress right to executive
information in the performance of its legislative function becomes
more imperative.
Basis of the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive
officials or the lack of it.

The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive

officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their
basis in the principle of separation powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information, otherwise, it would not be able to perform
intelligently its power of legislation. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al.)
Meaning of the requirement of prior
consent of the President or the head
of office allowing an official to appear
before the Congress.
Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the
President that an official is covered by the executive privilege, such
official is covered by the executive privilege, such official is subject
to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before the Congress. This requirement effectively
bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is
permitted by the President. The provision allowing the President to
give its consent means nothing more than that the President may
reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the
determination by the head of office, authorized by the President
under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in
possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This
determination then becomes the basis for the officials not showing up
in the legislative investigation.
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his
failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a
declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested
information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed
such determination. Such declaration, however, even without
mentioning the term executive privilege, amounts to an implied
claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch,
by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege.

Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita,

et al.).
Invocation of executive privilege to
be accompanied by reasons.
The invocation of executive privilege must be accompanied by
specific reasons.
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive
considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to
merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office,
has determined that it is so, and that the President has not
overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in
the dark on how the requested information could be classified as
privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first
impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more
pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the
question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the
information that it has requested.
No need to specify the exact reason.
Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in
determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege
against self-incrimination.

No claim of executive privilege by

mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature
of the privilege. Executive privilege is recognized with respect to
information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment
of the unique rule and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in
those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine

of executive privilege is thus, premised on the fact that certain

information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in the
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh
the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
(Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 167777, April 20, 2006).
Only the President can claim privilege.
In view of the highly exceptional nature of the privilege, it is essential
to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of
course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on
her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
authority is By the order of the President, which means that he
personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary
power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive
hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to
uphold such authorization where the authorization is not explicit but
mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is invalid on this
score. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 167777, April 20,
2006).

SECTION 1. Power to Conduct Formal Inquiries or

Investigations
The Senate or any of its Committees may conduct formal
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation in accordance with
these Rules.
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or reexamination of any law or appropriation, or in connection with any
proposed legislation or the formulation of, or in connection with
future legislation, or will aid in the review or formulation of a new
legislative policy or enactment. They may also extend to any and all
matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate
alone.

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Sec. 2. Initiation of Inquiry

Inquiries may be initiated by the Senate or any of its Committees
if the matter is within its competence, or upon petition filed or upon
information given by any Senator or by any person not a member
thereof.
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Sec. 3. Jurisdictional Challenge

If the jurisdiction of the Committee is challenged on any ground,
the said issue must first be resolved by the Committee before
proceeding with the inquiry.
If the Committee, by a majority vote of its members present
there being a quorum, decides that its inquiry is pertinent or
relevant to the implementation or re-examination of any law or
appropriation or in connection with any pending or proposed
legislation or will aid in the review or formulation of a new legislative
policy or enactment, or extends to any and all matters vested by the
Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone, it shall overrule
such objection and proceed with the investigation.
Only one challenge on the same ground shall be permitted.
The filing or pendency or any prosecution of criminal or
administrative action shall not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out
a legislative purpose.
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Sec. 4. Quorum

One third of all the regular members of the Committee shall

constitute a quorum but in no case shall it be less than two. The
presence of ex officio members may be considered in determining
the existence of a quorum.
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Sec. 5. Petition by Senators

A petition filed or information given by a Senator shall set forth
the facts upon which it is based. It need not be under oath but may
be accompanied by supporting affidavits.
Such petition or information shall be addressed to the President,
who shall refer the same to the appropriate Committee.
Nothing in this provision shall preclude the Senate from referring
to any Committee or Committees any speech or resolution filed by
any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in
aid of legislation.
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Sec. 6. Petition by Non-members

A petition filed or information given by any person not a Member
of the Senate shall be under oath, stating the facts upon which it is
based, and shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits.
If the President finds the petition or information to be in
accordance with the requirements of this Section, he shall refer the
same to the appropriate Committee.
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Sec. 7. Inquiry by One or More Committees

The President shall determine the Committee or Committees to

which a speech, resolution, petition or information, as the case may
be, shall be referred: Provided, however, That in case referral is
made to two Committees, a joint investigation shall be held.
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Sec. 8. Preliminary Determination

Except in cases of bills and resolutions (which do not call for an
investigation or inquiry) filed for consideration, the Committee to
which a speech, resolution, petition, or information has been
referred by the President shall meet within five (5) days after such
referral, with proper notice to all its members, in an executive
meeting to determine the action it would take thereon.
A decision to conduct an inquiry shall require the concurrence of
a majority of the members present provided there is a quorum.
The decision of a Committee, whether or not to conduct an
inquiry, shall be reported to the Committee on Rules. The
Committee on Rules shall then regularly inform the Senate of such
action taken by the Committee.
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Sec. 9. Internal Rules

A Committee which decides to conduct an inquiry may adopt
internal rules of procedure for such inquiry, subject to these Rules.
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Sec. 10. Rule of Evidence

Technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings

which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the
Committee.
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Sec. 11. Executive Session and Public Hearing

(1) If the Committee believes that the interrogation of a witness
in a public hearing might endanger national security, it may, motu
proprio or upon motion of any interested party, conduct its inquiry in
an executive session for the purpose of determining the necessity or
advisability of conducting such interrogation thereafter in public
hearing; (2) Attend-ance at executive sessions shall be limited to
members of the Committee, its staff, other Members of the Senate,
and other persons whose presence is requested or allowed by the
Chairman; and (3) Testimony taken or material presented in an
executive session, or any summary thereof, shall not be made
public, in whole or in part, unless authorized by the Committee.
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Sec. 12. Testimony Under Oath

All witnesses at executive sessions or public hearings who testify
as to matters of fact shall give such testimony under oath or
affirmation.
Witnesses may be called by the Committee on its own initiative
or upon the request of the petitioner or person giving the
information or any person who feels that he may be affected by the
said inquiry.
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Sec. 13. Transcript of Testimony

A complete and accurate record shall be kept of all testimonies

and proceedings at hearings, both in public and in executive
sessions.
Any witness or his counsel, at his expense, may obtain a
transcript of any public testimony of the witness from the
Committee Secretary.
Any witness or his counsel may also obtain a transcript of his
testimonies given in executive sessions under the following
conditions:
(1) When a special release of said testimony prior to public
release is authorized by the Chairman; or
(2) After said testimony has been made public by the
Committee.
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Sec. 14. Right to Counsel

(1) At every hearing, public or executive, every witness shall be
accorded the right of having a counsel of his own choice; and (2)
Except as provided in the Internal Rules of the Committee on Ethics
and Privileges, the participation of counsel during the course of any
hearing and while the witness is testifying shall be limited to
advising said witness as to his legal rights. Counsel shall not be
permitted to engage in oral argument with the Committee, but shall
confine his activity to the area of legal advice to his client.
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Sec. 15. Conduct of Counsel

Counsel for a witness shall conduct himself in a professional,
ethical and proper manner. His failure to do so shall subject such
counsel to disciplinary action which may include a warning, censure,
removal from the hearing room, or punishment for contempt.

In such case of such removal of counsel, the witness shall have a

reasonable time to obtain another counsel. Should the witness
deliberately or capriciously fail or refuse to obtain the services of
another counsel, the hearing shall continue and the testimony of
such witness shall be taken.
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Sec. 16. Statement of Witness

(1) Any witness desiring to make a prepared or written
statement for the record shall file a copy of such statement with the
Committee Secretary not less than twenty-four (24) hours in
advance of the hearing at which the statement is to be presented;
and (2) All such statements or portions thereof so received which
are relevant and germane to the subject of investigation may, at the
conclusion of the testimony of the witness, be inserted in the official
transcript of the proceedings.
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Sec. 17. Powers of the Committee

The Committee shall have the powers of an investigating
committee, including the power to summon witnesses and take their
testimony and to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum,
signed by its Chairman, or in his absence by the Acting Chairman,
and approved by the President. Within Metro Manila, such process
shall be served by the Sergeant-at-Arms or his assistant. Outside of
Metro Manila, service may be made by the police of a municipality
or city, upon request of the Secretary.
Witnesses who are not government officials summoned by the
Committee shall be entitled, upon request, subject to the approval
of the President, to reasonable transportation expenses, plus such
amounts as may be deemed necessary to defray the cost of his stay
in Metro Manila on a day-to-day basis.
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Sec. 18. Contempt

The Committee, by a vote of a majority of all its members, may
punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of
the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer a
proper question by the Committee or any of its members, or
testifying, testifies falsely or evasively. A contempt of the Committee
shall be deemed a contempt of the Senate. Such witness may be
ordered by the Committee to be detained in such place as it may
designate under the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms until he agrees
to produce the required documents, or to be sworn or to testify, or
otherwise purge himself of that contempt.
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Sec. 19. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

A witness can invoke his right against self-incrimination only
when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate
him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any
question in an executive session.
No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or
affirmation or answer questions before an incriminatory question is
asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him
from his duty to give testimony.
In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the
members present there being a quorum, shall determine whether
the right has been properly invoked. If the Committee decides
otherwise, it shall resume its investigation and the question or
questions previously refused to be answered shall be repeated to
the witness. If the latter continues to refuse to answer the question,
the Committee may punish him for contempt for contumacious
conduct.
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Sec. 20. Subcommittees; Delegation of Authority

The Chairman of a Committee may create subcommittees as
may be deemed necessary for the purpose of performing any and all
acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do and
perform, except the power to punish for contempt under Section 18
hereof.
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Sec. 21. General Counsel

The following committees shall have their respective counsel:
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations;
Committee on Ethics and Privileges; Committee on Justice and
Human Rights; and the Oversight Committee on Government
Operations.
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Sec. 22. Report of Committee

Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the
Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report.
The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its
members. Concurring and dissenting reports may likewise be made
by the members who do not sign the majority report within seventytwo (72) hours from the approval of the report. The number of
members who sign reports concurring in the conclusions of the
Committee Report shall be taken into account in determining
whether the Report has been approved by a majority of the
members: Provided, That the vote of a Member who submits both a
concurring and dissenting opinion shall not be considered as part of
the majority unless he expressly indicates his vote for the majority
position.

The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting

opinions, shall be filed with the Secretary of the Senate, who shall
include the same in the next Order of Business.
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Sec. 23. Action on Report

The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be
referred to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar.
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Sec. 24. Effectivity*

These Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

The congressional power of investigation, which is also known as the

"inquiry in aid of legislation", is one of the three categories under its
oversight powers (see Congressional oversight).
Contents
[hide]

1 Constitutional basis

2 Rationale of the power of inquiry

3 Function under the separation of powers

4 Coverage of the power of inquiry

5 Limitations and exemptions

5.1 Executive Privilege as a limitation

5.2 The President

5.3 The Supreme Court

5.4 Publication of Rules of Procedure

6 Availability of judicial review

7 Distinctions
7.1 Between the power of inquiry in aid of legislation and question

o
hour

8 Power to cite in contempt

9 See also

10 External Links

11 References

Constitutional basis
The Congressional power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Even without this express Constitutional provision, the power of inquiry is
inherent in the power to legislate. The power of inquiry, with process to
enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative
process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the
operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by
parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the
power to compel the disclosure thereof.

Rationale of the power of inquiry

The Supreme Court discussed the rationale of the Congressional power of
inquiry in Arnault vs. Nazareno, thus: "the power of inquiry with process
to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown
that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is
needed."<ref>Arnault vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, 18 July 1950,
citations omitted</ref>

Function under the separation of powers

Under the separation of powers, Congress has the right to obtain
information from any source - even from officials of departments and
agencies in the executive branch. It is this very separation that makes the
congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if
the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people
are adequately to be carried out.

Coverage of the power of inquiry

The power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch. The power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which
may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation. Since Congress has authority to inquire
into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold
that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the
most familiar with and informed on executive operations.

Limitations and exemptions

The power of Congress, both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or
unlimited. The investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected," as provided
in the Constitution. The rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against one's self. <ref>Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, 20 November 1991</ref> As now
contained in the 1987 Constitution (Section 21, Article VI), the power
ofCongress to investigate is circumscribed by three limitations, namely:

(a) It must be in aid of its legislative functions.

(b) It must be conducted in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure.

(c) The persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional

rights, including the right to be represented by counsel and the right
against self-incrimination.
Executive Privilege as a limitation
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric
of executive privilege. SeeExecutive privilege.
The President
The President, on whom executive power is vested, is beyond the reach
of Congress, except through the power of impeachment. It is based on the
President's position as the highest official of the executive branch, and the
due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. See Executive privilege.
The Supreme Court
Members of the Supreme Court are exempt from this power of inquiry on
the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy
and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
Publication of Rules of Procedure

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that: "The Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected"
In the case of Neri,<ref>Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, 4 September
2008</ref>, involving the Senate, the Supreme Court stated that "the
language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the
rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public
on notice."

Availability of judicial review

The power of [[Congress] to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation may be
subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Supreme
Court's certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Since the right of Congress to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation is, in
theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power.

Distinctions
Between the power of inquiry in aid of legislation and question hour
No. Section 21 (inquiry in aid of legislation) and Section 22 (question hour)
of Article VI of the Constitution are closely related and complementary to
each other, but they do not pertain to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the
aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.

Power to cite in contempt

A person may be cited in contempt and imprisoned in relation to the
Congressional exercise of inquiry in aid of legislation, how long will the
imprisonment last?
This is tackled by the Supreme Court in Arnault vs. Nazareno, where the
petitioner argued that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session. According to
the Supreme Court:
That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the
petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject
of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the committee to continue the
investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the
witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative
function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by
compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty
until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as the
Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular
legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for
contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would
be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the
same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its
performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for
contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate
would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding
sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the
investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious
procedure, which should be avoided. As against the foregoing conclusion it
is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively and
oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison
for life. But we must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert
the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this assumption,
proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open
to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.

What is the concept of separation of powers?

There are three branches of the government legislative, executive and
judicial. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But
it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and

distinct

that

the Constitution intended

them

to

be

absolutely

unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided

for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government.
What is congressional oversight?
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken
by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and
(e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest. The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the
grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government.
What are the categories of congressional oversight functions?
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight
powers may be divided into three categories, namely: (1) supervision,
which connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a
congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given
administrative area; (2) scrutiny, primarily intended to determine economy

and efficiency of the operation of government activities, exercised through

budget hearings, the question hour and the power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation, which is also known as the inquiry in aid of legislation.
What is the basis the power of inquiry in aid of legislation?
The Congressional power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21
of Article VI of theConstitution:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Even without this express Constitutional provision, the power of inquiry is
inherent in the power to legislate. The power of inquiry, with process to
enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative
process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation
of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of
reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to
compel the disclosure thereof.
Why is inquiry in aid of legislation important under the separation of
powers?
Under the separation of powers, Congress has the right to obtain
information from any source even from officials of departments and
agencies in the executive branch. It is this very separation that makes the
congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if
the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people
are adequately to be carried out.

Is the Supreme Court covered by the Congressional power of inquiry?

No. Members of the Supreme Court are exempt from this power of inquiry
on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal
autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
Is the power of inquiry subject to judicial review?
Yes. It may be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Supreme Courts
certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Since the
right of Congress to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation is, in theory, no
less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power.
Is the President covered by the power of inquiry?
No. The President, on whom executive power is vested, is beyond the
reach of Congress, except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on the Presidents position as the highest official of the executive branch,
and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
Does the power to inquire extend to officials in the executive branch?
Yes. The power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch. The power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which
may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation. Since Congress has authority to inquire into
the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that
the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most
familiar with and informed on executive operations.

Are there limitations to this power? If yes, what are these limitations?
Yes. As now contained in the 1987 Constitution (Section 21, Article VI), the
power of Congress to investigate is circumscribed by three limitations,
namely: (a) it must be in aid of its legislative functions, (b) it must be
conducted in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and (c)
the persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional rights,
including the right to be represented by counsel and the right against selfincrimination.
In addition, even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still
recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under
the rubric of executive privilege.
What is executive privilege?
Executive privilege is not a clear or unitary concept, although it has been
defined as the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress or the right of the President and
high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress,
the courts, and ultimately the public.
Does executive privilege refer to persons?
No. Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories
of information and not to categories of persons. Executive privilege,
whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized
only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
What matters are covered by executive privilege?
The matters covered under executive privilege include: (1) Information
between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements; (2) Presidential conversations, correspondences,

and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings; and (3) Matters affecting

national security and public order.
How is this invoked?
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his
own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be
afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary
of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to
provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to
consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege.
If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to
respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then
opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
Is an implied claim of executive privilege valid?
No. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to
disclose information, must be clearly asserted. An implied claim of privilege
is invalid per se. The validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a
case to case basis, examining the ground invoked therefore, and the
particular circumstances surrounding it.
What is the Question Hour?
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the question
hour is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime
Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation
of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the
question period. The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the
mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the

present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation

of powers. This is provided in Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution:
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with
the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the
rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Is the power of inquiry in aid of legislation the same as the Question
Hour?
No. Section 21 (inquiry in aid of legislation) and Section 22 (question hour)
of Article VI of theConstitution are closely related and complementary to
each other, but they do not pertain to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the
aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of the oversight function of
Congress. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.

If a person is cited in contempt and imprisoned in relation to the

Congressional exercise of inquiry in aid of legislation, how long will
the imprisonment last?
This is tackled by the Supreme Court in Arnault vs. Nazareno, where the
petitioner argued that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session. According to
the Supreme Court:
That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the
petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject
of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the committee to continue the
investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the
witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative
function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by
compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty
until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as the
Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular
legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for
contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would
be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the
same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its
performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for
contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate
would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding
sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the
investigation

is

completed-an

absurd,

procedure, which should be avoided.

unnecessary,

and

vexatious

As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the
power may be abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which
might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume that the
Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds.
And if, contrary to this assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the
portals of this Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be
transgressed.

A.
Congress may conduct investigations and compel private
individuals to furnish information when necessary and proper to
execute Congress authority to legislate. When relevant to
legislative ends, Congress may make inquiries into existent and
proposed statutes, as well as make surveys of social, economic,
or political defects. Where public interests outweigh private
concerns, a congressional witnessmay not resist inquiry into
pertinent subject matter of which the witness is apprised.

B. Limitations on Power of Inquiry

Because it is not a law enforcement or trial agency, Congress
faces certain limitations on its authority to investigate. For
example, Congress may not:
1.
Expose individuals private affairs for purposes outside the
furtherance of legislative goals;

2.
Inquire into matters exclusive to another governmental branch; or
3.
Compel a groups disclosure of its membership where:
a. Such disclosure would seriously inhibit or impair exercise of
constitutional rights, and
b. The legislature has not convincingly shown a substantial relation
between the information sought and a subject of overriding and
compelling governmental interest.

myself am critical of our legislators exercise of the congressional power of

investigation which, in my view, does not adhere faithfully to the constitutional intent
to limit its scope to being in aid of legislation. The Senates own Rules of Procedure
provide that to be in aid of legislation, such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or reexamination of any law or proposed legislation.
To put it succinctly, the only legitimate object of Congress in conducting an inquiry is
to aid itself in the discharge of its legislative duties. But the sad reality is that, oftener
than not, the inquiry is unrelated to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress. This
is especially so where the aim of the inquiry is to look into possible violations of law
or charges of wrongdoing against government officials or even private persons, with a
view to determining liability or accountabilitya matter that appears more within the
province of the prosecution agencies in the executive branch and ultimately of the
courts.
While it is an established principle that Congress power to conduct inquiries is
inherent in or an attribute of the legislative process, it is not absolute. It must be used
only to implement a clear and precise legislative purpose. It cannot be as great as or
greater than the plenary power to legislate. It should not appear that the skys the
limit. Nor should such power be utilized as a prerogative of Congress to investigate
anything under the sun. As the US Supreme Court in Watkins vs US (354 US 178)
put it, That power is broad . But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not
unlimited.
Recent experience has shown that congressional inquiries are purportedly in aid of
legislation but are actually aimed at ferreting out irregular, anomalous and corrupt
practices of government functionaries. Utilizing this inquisitorial power to probe

reports of irregularities and so-called scams or scandals in government is all right so

long as it is not focused solely on determining the guilt or innocence of the officials or
private persons concerned, or finding possible grounds for administrative or criminal
action against them.
The lament of some keen observers of the contemporary scene is that nothing good
seems to come out of these inquiries given the manner in which legislators exercise
their investigative power. Inevitably, Congress finds itself bogged down in such
wearisome, seemingly interminable inquiries. At the drop of a hat, as it were, a
seemingly trigger-happy Congress would threaten to investigate alleged illegal,
irregular, anomalous and corrupt practices in government that are brought to its
attention. Given the considerable time and effort, let alone the huge outlay of public
funds, that are involved in the conduct of these inquiries, Congress legislative work is
impeded or stalled, to the detriment of public service.
Decades ago, a prominent Filipino journalist pointedly asked: What benefit has the
public derived out of so-called congressional inquiries? Our people have grown tired
of these much-publicized investigations [which] started like a house on fire and
have ended up in either silence or a perfect whitewash.
Apropos of this was Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiagos unsolicited advice to her
colleagues to go easy on probes in aid of legislation which are valueless and are of
no help at all (Inquirer, 8/29/11). And paraphrasing the rueful observation of an
American writer, Congress has a penchant for always investigating somebody in
private life or in the bureaucratic life of the government, but nobody is investigating
Congress.
What is more lamentable is that the power of legislative inquiry can be abused or
misused, that congressional committees tasked to undertake the inquiry can go
overboard during the hearings (which border on proceedings peculiar only to the
courts), and that these committee members, evidently for sensationalism or
grandstanding, pose questions that tend to browbeat, badger, harass, irritate, insult,
humiliate, defame, threaten, intimidate and embarrass resource persons, as if they are
being cross-examined during a court trial. In the process, they are subjected to abuse,
public scorn and obloquy. And all these are done with impunity by the investigating
legislators, who are protected by the mantle of parliamentary immunity.
It is not a rarity that, unable to resist the TV camera during an inquiry, a loquacious
and arrogant senator would subject to incessant grilling certain hapless resource
persons who thereby become the target of ridicule and sarcasm to the point of public
humiliation.
I submit that the power of legislative inquiry should not be viewed as vouchsafing
Congress a license to convert the investigation into a judicial-type hearing. By
constitutional design, it is but a fact-finding exercise aimed at gathering data and
information needed to support the legislative process. To be sure, a legislative inquiry
was never intended to be a forum for ascertaining the guilt or innocence of any

person. Congress should not be equated with or placed in the same category as
investigative agencies or law enforcing authorities. It is first and foremost a legislative
body.
Thus, there is a need for an amendment to the pertinent provision of the 1987
Constitution so as to keep the exercise of the power of legislative inquiry within
reasonable bounds. Specifically, the proposed amendment would restrict in
unequivocal terms the legislative inquiry to a data-gathering exercise toward eliciting
the information needed to support the law-making process. The inquiry will be
conducted for no other purpose. The desired data and information shall be obtained
from invited resource persons or expert witnesses.
Congress is accordingly challenged to seriously consider this proposal from a
concerned citizen in the interest of meaningful and effective governance.

Read more: http://opinion.inquirer.net/80332/legislative-inquiry-is-buta-fact-finding-exercise#ixzz4M2FBkwa9

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Legislative inquiry is a fundamental tool of democracy. It is through which that

Congress gathers the necessary information to legislate vital laws that are to
advance public interests, promote human dignity and enhance social development.
In the same manner, it is intimately related with the public's right to know the
dynamics of governance. As the congressmen and the senators in a republican
system of government are the eyes and ears of the people, the venue provided by
legislative inquiries gives the people the marketplace of information necessary in
making choices of what rules they want to govern the Philippine society. Moreover,
as heavy publicity is given to these inquiries, it could be a powerful means of
participatory govemance for it could mold public opinion and thus could compel
leaders to act according to the will of the people. But in this great forum of
democracy, it is here that great clashes between government might and civil
liberties happen. So much had the public saw how congressmen and senators force
to reveal information from the witnesses invited in their inquiries under their power
of compulsion and cite witnesses in contempt. So Vice Chairperson, PHILIPPINE
LAW JOURNAL Second Year, Ll.B., University of the Philippines, A.B. Economics
(Honors Program) (2000), Utm Uude, Ateneo de Manila University. The author thanks
Prof. Carmelo V. Sison for his insights on privacy and legislative inquiry and Mr. Paolo
Bombase for helping in the initial research of the paper. I GR No. L-20387,January

31,1968,22 SCRA 424,445 [1968); citing Emerson, NineJlIStiafin Search of a

Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219, 229 (1965). much had the public saw how witnesses
hesitandy reveal information and evade queries to the point that they invoke their
right against self-incrimination, freedom of association, right to due-process, right to
be presumed innocent and their right to pnvacy. This paper seeks to understand the
dynamics of a legislative inquiry and how the right to privacy could be properly be
invoked and thus protected. The first part discusses the legislative inquiries - its
nature, scope, and limitations. The second briefly discusses the right to privacy. The
third part looks into the clash between these two great forces. The tests provided by
Philippine and American jurisprudence to reconcile the two are highlighted. The last
part concludes the paper by providing the observations and the conclusions derived
from the analysis.

THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO CONDUcr INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION The

1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI provides: The
Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may
conduct inquiries in aid of kgislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. However, this power granted to the Legislature was only made explicit in
the 1987 Constitution. In the 1935 and 1973 constitutions, no such express grant of
power has been enunciated. It has always been assumed to be inherent, a power
that is necessarily included in the power to legislate. As the court declared in
Amault Vi. Nazareno: 2 [aJlthough there is no provIsIon in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied.3

, Indeed, investigative power is "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the

legislative function,"4 Nevertheless, legislative investigations f1ctually serve four
purposes: law making, checking the executive branch, inquiring into
interr:talmatters of Congress, and formulating and molding public opinion,S

THIS NO one questions: The Senate or the House of

Representatives or any of their respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. They may also request
the heads of departments to appear before them and be heard
on any matter pertaining to their departments.
The prerogative to request the heads of departments to appear
in order to elicit information, sometimes referred to as the
question hour, constitutes the oversight function of
Congress in respect to the executive. In keeping with the
system of separation of powers, Congress may only request
and appearance is discretionary on the part of department
heads. In contrast, when the inquiry is in aid of legislation,
appearance is compulsory, with an attendant power to punish
for contempt. To be in aid of legislation, the inquiry must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested by the
Constitution in Congress, such as to legislate, or to expel a
member. To compel an answer, the question need not of itself
be material to a proposed legislation, but only that it be
material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry.
While extensive, inquiry in aid of
legislation is not absolute or
unlimited. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such
inquiries, such as the rights to due
process and to not be compelled to
testify against ones self, must be
respected.
When former National Economic
and Development Authority
(NEDA) secretary general Romulo
Neri testified at the Senate hearing
INVOKING executive privilege: Commission on
Higher Education Chairman Romulo Neri. [photo
courtesy of Senate]

on the $329-million national broadband network (NBN)

government contract with ZTE Corp. of China, he invoked
executive privilege in declining to answer some of the
questions asked of him by the legislators. His act raised
questions not only inside the Senate and among the
increasingly frustrated public, but also within the legal
community. And while the president recently revoked the
executive order that had created the privilege in the first
place, it remains a topic of debates and discussions in media
and elsewhere.
Yet Neris Senate testimony was not the first time that what
appeared to be another species of limitation to Congressional
power of inquiry gained prominence. In September 2005, the
Committee of the Senate as a whole had issued invitations to
various executive officials to appear as resource speakers in an
inquiry on alleged overpricing and unlawful provisions of a
government contract covering the North Luzon Railways
(North Rail) project. The Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security also issued invitations to various
officials of the Armed Forces in relation to its inquiry into the
alleged role of the military in election fraud, and in the
wiretapping of the presidents telephone conversations.
On September 28, 2005, then Senate President Franklin
Drilon received a letter from Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita informing him that the invited executive officials could
not attend the hearings without the presidents consent,
pursuant to Executive Order 464, which was issued by the
president on that same day. A similar communication was
sent by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to the chairman
of the Committee on National Defense and Security. Two
officers of the Armed Forces who attended the scheduled
hearings without the presidents approval were later relieved

from their military posts and made to face court martial

proceedings.
PARSING EO 464
Section 1 of EO 464 required all heads of departments of the
Executive to secure the presidents consent prior to appearing
before Congress in accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution. Section 2 (a) gave an enumeration of classes
of information between the president and public officers
covered by executive privilege, and section 2 (b) gave an
enumeration of public officers covered by the EO. Section 3
provided that the public officers enumerated under Section 2
(b), in addition to heads of departments as stated in Section 1,
shall likewise secure prior consent of the president before
appearing in Congress to ensure, among others, adherence to
the rule on executive privilege.
The Senate and other parties raised the matter with the
Supreme Court in the case of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No.
169777, 20 April 2006). In its decision, the Supreme Court
held that Section 1 must be construed as limited in its
application to appearances of department heads in the
question hour where attendance is meant to be discretionary
by Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution. It cannot be
applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation under Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution where appearance is mandatory, exempting only
a valid claim of executive privilege.
Sections 3 and 2 (b) were declared invalid for allowing an
implied claim of privilege. The Court said that an implied
claim of privilege is invalid per se since it leaves Congress in
the dark on how the requested information could be classified
as privileged. The effect of this is to severely frustrate the

power of inquiry of Congress. Section 2 (a) was not

invalidated as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on
executive officials and not conclusive on the other branches of
government, on what is covered by executive privilege.
From the court ruling we can distill the parameters of a claim
of executive privilege as an exception to the breadth of the
Congressional power of inquiry:
Executive privilege is recognized only in relation to
certain types of information of a sensitive character. The
Supreme Court cited various sources that point to the
different types of information that may be recognized as
privileged. These may include state secrets regarding
military, diplomatic, and other national security matters,
as well as presidential conversations, correspondences,
and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
That a type of information is recognized as privileged
does not mean that it would be considered privileged in
all instances. In determining the validity of a claim of
privilege, it is not enough to determine whether the
information falls in any of the recognized privileges, it
must also be asked whether the privilege should be
honored in a given procedural setting. Thus, a claim
thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground
invoked and the context in which it is made.
Executive privilege may be invoked in relation to specific
categories of information, but not to categories of
persons.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exception, the
grounds therefore must be clearly asserted and not
merely implied. Congress, however, must not require the

executive to state the reasons for the claim with such

particularity as to in fact disclose the information.
In light of the highly exceptional nature of the privilege,
the power to invoke the privilege is limited to the
president, but may authorize the executive secretary to
invoke the privilege on his or her behalf provided that the
executive secretary states that it is By order of the
president.
When an executive official being summoned by Congress
on a matter that, in his own judgment, might be covered
by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable
time to inform the president or the executive secretary of
the possible need for invoking the privilege.
The extraordinary character of exemptions indicates that
the presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
INVOKING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE ZTENBN INQUIRY
But as we have seen, the issue of executive privilege would
come again in the Senate inquiry into the controversial NBN
deal. The inquiry is being conducted jointly by the Blue
Ribbon Committee, the Committee on Trade and Commerce,
and the Committee on National Defense and Security.
Neri was not the first witness to testify at the hearing on the
deal, but he was among those who was most awaited by the
media. As NEDA chief, Neri was co-chairperson of the
Investment Coordination Committee Cabinet Committee
(ICC-CC), the body tasked to review and evaluate the
technical, financial, economic, and social merits of major
capital and development projects.

A key highlight in Neris September 26, 2007 testimony was

his claim of an offer of 200 made by former Commission on
Elections Chairperson Chairman Benjamin Abalos, which he
interpreted to mean a P200-million bribe offer for the
approval of the ZTE contract. Asked by Senator Panfilo
Lacson whether he reported the incident to the president,
Neri replied that he had informed the president about the
offer by phone, and that he was then instructed not to take the
money. Later, Senator Francis Pangilinan and Senator Loren
Legarda asked him whether there were subsequent
discussions between him and the president on the bribe offer
and the approval of the ZTE contract. At that point, Neri
invoked executive privilege of presidential conversations with
cabinet officials, citing Section 2 (a) of EO 464. The hearing
ended without resolution on the claim of executive privilege.
On November 13, 2007 the Senate joint committees issued a
subpoena addressed to Neri ordering him to again appear on
November 20. On November 15, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita, by order of the president, wrote Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee Chairman Alan Peter Cayetano requesting that
Neris scheduled testimony be dispensed with, invoking
executive privilege.
Seven days later, the Senate joint committees wrote Neri
requiring him to show cause why he should not be cited in
contempt for failure to appear in the November 20 hearing.
On November 29, in compliance to the show cause order, Neri
wrote the committee, with a letter of his counsel attached,
reiterating the executive secretarys earlier position and
requesting that he be furnished questions in advance should
new matters be asked. In addition to the letter-compliance,
Neri filed on December 27 a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the show cause

order, upon the ground that his non-appearance was justified

by a proper invocation of executive privilege.
On January 30, 2008 the Senate joint committees issued an
order citing Neri in contempt and ordered the Senate
sergeant-at-arms to arrest and detain him until he appears
and gives his testimony. In response, on February 1, Neri filed
a supplemental petition for certiorari questioning the validity
of the order of arrest, with application for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court issued a status quo ante order four days
later, thereby preventing Neris arrest. On March 4 the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the petition, in the
course of which it proposed an interim compromise to
proceed with Neris testimony without going into the
questions for which he claimed executive privilege, while the
final resolution of the petition is pending. The Senate rejected
the compromise, opting instead to await the final resolution of
the issues raised in the petition.
EXAMINING THE GROUNDS
In Ermitas November 15 letter to the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, in Neris and his counsels letters to the joint
committees, and in Neris petition before the Supreme Court,
the following are propounded as justification for the
invocation of executive privilege:
1. The questions cover conversations and
correspondence between the President and public
officials which are considered executive privilege,
citing the cases of Almonte vs. Vasquez (G.R. No.
95367, 23 May 1995) and Chavez vs. PEA (G.R. No.
133250, 9 July 2002). The confidentiality of said

conversations is necessary for the protection of

public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt
or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making.
2. The information sought to be disclosed might impair
the countrys diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China.
3. The conversations with the president dealt with
delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials
and the possible loss of confidence of foreign
investors and lenders in the Philippines.
Evaluated against the parameters set by the Supreme Court in
Senate vs. Ermita, the claim of executive privilege must fail. In
terms of class of information sought, they do not fall within
state secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and national
security matters. The bare assertion that the disclosure of the
information might impair the countrys diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China, and
that they deal with delicate and sensitive security and
diplomatic matters, do not meet the standard of a proper
assertion of executive privilege. Mere recital of suppositions
or conclusions, without precise and compelling reasons based
upon facts that can be established, is contempt of the
Congressional power and obstruction of its processes.
The questions for which executive privilege was claimed, as
summarized by Secretary Ermita himself, were as follows:
whether the president followed up the NBN project; whether
Neri was dictated to prioritize ZTE; and whether the president
said to go ahead and approve the projects after being told
about the alleged bribe. The probable answers to these

questions on their face cannot be reasonably linked to the

enumerated categories of state secrets thus, in Neris
testimony in the Senate as well as in his counsels answers to
clarificatory questions in oral argument, no specific and direct
military, diplomatic, or national security harm was cited.
What is left is the claim of privileged conversations and
correspondence between the president and public officials,
sometimes referred to as deliberative process or presidential
communications privilege. Indeed what are asked relate to
conversations that transpired between the president and one
of her Cabinet officials.
BALANCING THE INTERESTS
What must be emphasized, however, is that privileged
conversations and correspondence is accorded a lower
privilege than state secrets. In the case of US vs. Nixon (418
US 683, 24 July 1974) that is cited in Senate vs. Ermita, it is
emphasized that when the privilege depends solely on the
broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the
confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with
other values arise. In US vs. Nixon, the clash of interest
was against the fair administration of criminal justice,
specifically against a subpoena for the production of evidence
in a pending criminal case.
The purpose of the legislative inquiry is clear from Senate
Resolution No. 127, which is to plug loopholes in the BuildOperate-Transfer law and other pertinent legislations, such as
the government procurement law. The information sought to
be disclosed is clearly germane and essential to the subject of
the inquiry. They relate to official executive actions of the
president relating to a major capital or development project,
with strong allegation of fraud, which should be covered by

existing statutes and regulations. What the actions were, and

how they were arrived at, are information necessary for the
evaluation and revision of the said statutes and regulations.
The claim of a generalized interest in confidentiality of the
presidents conversation must also be weighed against the
right of people to information on matters of public concern.
While the conflict appears to be primarily between executive
privilege and the Congressional power of inquiry, the
Supreme Court in Senate vs. Ermita has noted that the
peoples right to information is also involved. Thus:
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are
generally conducted in public, however, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in
such investigations necessarily deprives the people of
information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation,
is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are
thereby denied access to information which they can use in
formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
opinions which they can then communicate to their
representatives and other government officials through the
various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. x
xx
xxx
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a
consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained
above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power
of inquiry.
The interest of the people in the information being withheld
by the claim of executive privilege is clearly overriding. The

search for truth now reverberates across the nation, on a

matter conclusively of public interest as it involves national
indebtedness, disbursement of funds, adherence to laws, and
public accountability and trust.
Finally, Senate vs. Ermita also emphasizes the importance of
the context in which the privilege is invoked. In Neris case,
the privilege is invoked in the context of strong direct
documentary and testimonial evidence of large-scale
corruption. Altogether there are very clear earmarks of
executive privilege being used to cover up wrongdoing, rather
than serve legitimate public purpose.
Lawyer Nepomuceno Malaluan is a trustee of the Action for
Economic Reforms and co-convenor of the Access to
Information Network (ATIN), of which the PCIJ is a
member.

As I argued in my column Friday, the so-called Blue Ribbon Committee, whose

official name is the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, is a total misnomer. Especially under this Administration, its
members havent been nonpartisan nor experts in what they are investigating,
which the term Blue Ribbon means.
Rather, it has been a persecution and harassment weapon of President Aquino:
We should, instead, name it the Yellow Ribbon Committee, after his insignia.
Maybe we should thank Aquino and his Liberal Party inner circle for abusing the
authority of the Blue Ribbon Committee so much that it has become clearer how
utterly flawed the very notion of such a committee is.
We are the only legislature in the world to have a Blue Ribbon Committee or a
congressional body with the authority to investigate any alleged wrongdoing by a
public official.

This is because of an important reason that is at the heart of the idea of

republican democracy: It violates the separation of powers of the three branches
of government.
No matter what the checks on a Blue Ribbon Committee are in our case that
its investigation should be in aid of legislation such an entity appropriates for
itself the powers of the two other branches of government, the executive branch
whose duty is to investigate alleged crimes and the judiciary, which determines if
an accused did commit a crime.

Blue Ribbon Committees then and now. Above, the witchhunting McCarthyist
hearings in the US Senate in the 1950s; below, the Binay investigations.
In more concrete terms, the Blue Ribbon Committee quite obviously expropriates
the power of the Ombudsman, a constitutional body, and the Sandiganbayan, a
court of the judicial branch of government.

Civilization has developed through centuries a gargantuan body of procedures

and regulations governing how an alleged crime is investigated and proven, to
avoid humanitys vulnerability to emotions, especially vengeance and mob rule.
This is called our system of laws and regulations that include, for instance, such
things as Rules of Court, rules of evidence, court procedures. There is such a
thing as jurisprudence, so every court decision is consistent with the laws as
these have been applied in the past.
Our system even limits those who can participate in judicial proceedings to a
particular professional required to have a certain post-collegiate education and
to pass a particular exam called the bar we call the lawyer. There is a system
of appeal, which stops thought at the Supreme Court.
In the blue, aka yellow, ribbon committees hearings, any jerk, as long as he is a
senator, can even be at the forefront of such investigations, such as the former
mutineer Antonio Trillanes 3rd, who has shown his utter ignorance of the law, or
even Alan Cayetano, who should be sent back to law school for his claim that a
TV interview with an alleged landowner is more important that the registered
owner.
There is no such body of knowledge governing investigations by a committee of
the legislative branch. Hence, here you see a Cayetano bullying a witness or a
Trillanes putting words in witnesses mouths. This former mutineer even so
crassly threatens resource persons, for example, when he barked at the
contractors of he Makati Building that he would ask the DPWH to blacklist it from
any public contracts.
Things such as PowerPoint presentations annotated with biased words like
overprice and videos of Hacienda Binay are presented in the Court without
giving the accused the right as he would have in a real court to even block
such presentations if these are not shown to him beforehand (or his lawyer) so he
could question first its authenticity.
I cannot understand why we are treated as fools whenever the Yellow Ribbon
undertakes an investigation it claims is in aid of legislation. No one really
believes that, and no Yellow Ribbon investigation has so far resulted in any bill.
Why do we, as a nation, imbibe such a lie concocted by the Senate?
The McCarthyist Era
The US Congress had its own episode of mob frenzy when it succumbed to such
investigating committees, a blue-ribbon kind of committee in the 1950s: the
House Committee on Un-American Activities and its Senate counterpart,
Permanent Committee on Investigations, led by the infamous head Joseph
McCarthy.

These undertook witch-hunts against suspected Nazi and communist

sympathizers that even led to suicides just like former Defense Secretary
Angelo Reyes did of several people being investigated. The two committees
investigated even Charlie Chaplin, Orson Welles and 300 other artists.
After that horrific episode, which historians have labeled as the irrational
McCarthyist era, the US Congress had made it a point to make such investigative
bodies ad hoc, or temporary ones consisting of people with indisputable integrity,
expertise in the field, and nonpartisan.
Our Supreme Court, relying on decisions by its US counterpart during the
McCarthyist era in general, has in fact, generally frowned on investigations by the
Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is quite interesting that the first Supreme Court ruling against the Blue Ribbon
Committee was made in favor of President Aquinos uncle, Manuel Lopa, in 1991.
In its decision, the Court barred certain witnesses from being compelled by the
Committee headed by Senator Wigberto Tanada to testify in its investigations on
allegations that Lopa, right after Marcos fall, had illegally acquired 36 firms of
the dictators brother-in-law, Benjamin Romualdez.
The allegations were made by then Senator Juan Ponce Enrile who, like Trillanes
in the case of Binay, probably merely wanted to undertake a demolition job, in his
case against President Cory, rather than establishing the truth.
The Court exposed the fact that the committee wasnt really undertaking the
hearings in aid of legislation but was trying to investigate an alleged crime
which it did not have the authority to do so under the Constitution.
Supreme Court ruling
The Court (in G.R. No. 89914) invoked a US Supreme Court ruling against the US
Houses Committee on Un-American Activities:
The power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative
process. That power is broad But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not
unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of
individuals without justification in terms of the functions of Congress Nor is the
Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive
and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be
related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations
conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to
punish those investigated are indefensible. (Emphasis supplied)
But of course, the Yellow Ribbon investigation is not really a probe into an
alleged crime, nor to gather data for drafting a bill. It is totally a demolition job via
the media, to throw dirt on the front-runner in the 2016 elections.

Based on the decision of that Lopa case, Binay is on solid legal footing to refuse
to participate in the Yellow Ribbon hearing. The Court noted that the allegations
against Lopa being investigated by the Committee were the same subject of a
case already filed in the Sandiganbayan.
The Court therefore ruled:
In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same
justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much
earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs United States, 21 it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress
may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters that are within the exclusive province
of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given
to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of
the Judiciary.'
The same people who were the Yellow Ribbon Committees witnesses already had
filed a case against Binay, involving the same allegations with the Ombudsman
July 22. What the Yellow Ribbon Committee is investigating has become, as the
Constitution provides, the province of the Ombudsman, and later the
Sandiganbayan.
But beyond these legal technicalities is the basic question: Why do we allow the
Senates platform to be used for a demolition job, and we, the citizens, are even
paying for it, Aquinos propaganda weapon?
tiglao.manilatimes@gmail.com

The Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations of the Senate of the Philippines, or more popularly known
as the Blue Ribbon Committee, is theSenate committee tasked to
investigate alleged wrongdoings of the government, its officials, and its
attached agencies, including government owned and controlled
corporations, in aid of legislation, that is, the primary purpose is the
suggestion of new laws, or proposals of amendments to existing laws.
Contents
[hide]

1History

2Membership
o

2.1Current members
3References

History[edit]
Cavite Representative Justiniano Montano of the Liberal Party, who was
successfully included in the Liberal's 1949 Senate election ticket, supported
Jose T. Cajulis of theNacionalista Party in the elections to the House of
Representatives seat he was retiring from. While the Liberals' candidate
easily defeated Cajulis, Montano won in the Senate election; he formed a
clique called "The Little Senate" with like-minded Liberal senators and
began to attack President Elpidio Quirino (who was also from the Liberal
Party)'s presidency. Montano then created the Blue Ribbon Committee,
taking the name from other blue ribbon committees, with the mandate to
investigate alleged irregularities from the executive branch. [1]
Thereafter, the Blue Ribbon Committee has become the most powerful
Congressional committee, investigating alleged criminal misconduct by
government officials in aid of legislation. However, the committee cannot
incarcerate witnesses and resource persons, except in cases of contempt
of Congress.
However, the Senate has adopted rules to limit the abuse of this power.
These include that all investigations should be "in aid of legislation", the
right against self-incriminationshould not be violated, the right to
counsel should be respected, rules of procedures should be published and
persons concerned should be informed of the rules, and the investigation
shall serve a not serve as member's personal aggrandizement. [2]

Membership[edit]
Like all other committees, the Senate elects members of the Blue Ribbon
Committee. The chairmanship of the committee has been one of the most
sought posts in the Senate, aside from the Senate Presidency.

Current members[edit]
Members as of July 25 2016:[3]

Chairperson: Richard J. Gordon

Vice chairperson: Sonny Angara

Members:

From the majority:

Grace Poe

Leila de Lima

Risa Hontiveros

Loren Legarda

Cynthia Villar

Francis Pangilinan

Bam Aquino

JV Ejercito

Panfilo Lacson

Manny Pacquiao

Alan Peter Cayetano

Juan Miguel Zubiri

Gregorio Honasan

From the minority:

Francis Escudero

Antonio Trillanes IV
Ex officio members:

Senate President pro tempore Franklin Drilon

Majority Leader Vicente Sotto III

Minority Leader Ralph Recto

Committee secretary: Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo

Only a subcommittee of the Senate Blue Ribbon committee has been leading
the inquiry into corruption allegations against Vice President Jejomar Binay,
but the mother committee would step in should he decide to show up.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel III, the subcommittees chairman, said Blue Ribbon
committee chairman Teofisto Guingona III will lead the hearing on November 6
as an accommodation to the Vice President, whose camp has said he might
turn up at the investigation if the mother committee invites him.
The subcommittee, which the Binay camp has dubbed as a "yellow ribbon
committee," will have a separate hearing on the same day.
Pagka dumating si Vice President and if he needs more than one hour, give
way na ang hearing ng subcommittee ko, Pimentel told reporters on
Wednesday.
If Binay does not appear, the subcommittees hearing will still push through.
Whatever transpires during the hearing we can just reproduce them as part of
the records of the subcommittee, said Pimentel.
Guingona has invited Binay to attend the November 6 hearing.
The subcommittees probe will resume on Thursday, October 30. One of the
resource persons that the subcommittee subpoenaed is Laureano Gregorio
Jr., from whom businessman Antonio Tiu said he bought the property in
Batangas that critics say is Binays.

Some senators had accused Tiu of being Binays front to conceal his
ownership of the property. Tiu insisted that he owns the property, but Pimentel
said he has to show documents as proof.

Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon)

Jurisdiction: All matters relating to, including investigation of, malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies,
subdivisions and instrumentalities; implementation of the provision of the Constitution on
nepotism; and investigation of any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its
attention by any member of the Senate. Rule X, Section 13 (36)

Pros and cons

In this lecture, Justice Gomery explains the function of commissions of inquiry: to

investigate, to educate, and to inform Canadian society. The commission, once
appointed, has a high degree of independence and autonomy, limited only by the
requirements that it restrict its activity to the investigation that it is authorized to
make by the Order-inCouncil. Justice Gomery explains that public inquiries are a
regular part of the political landscape in Canada, constituting what has been
described by the Supreme Court of Canada as a significant and useful part of our
democratic traditions, both in Canada and elsewhere. He reflects on five particular
commissions of inquiry that were subject to judicial review in Canada. Nelles
concerned an Ontario provincial inquiry into the death of children in a public
hospital. The Westray case investigated the deadly underground explosion at the
Westray Coal Mine in Nova Scotia. The Somalia Inquiry was set up to examine the
violent death of a Somali civilian at the hands of Canadian soldiers sent to Somalia
as part of a United Nations mission. The Krever Inquiry dealt with the tragedy
resulting from the contamination of the national blood supply with Hepatitis C and
HIV. Finally, he mentions the Walkerton Inquiry, which explored the reasons for the
fatal contamination of the water supply in Walkerton, Ontario. Commissions of
inquiry have been criticized for several reasons: for being unfair to the persons who
are the subject of unfavourable comment, made during public hearings or in the

commissions report; for costing too much; and for taking too long. Justice Gomery
addresses these concerns and concludes that they are outweighed by the benefits.
The recommendations arising from these commissions, coming from an
independent and impartial source, will not only assist the government in taking
remedial action but will tend to restore public confidence in the industry or process
being reviewed.

The senator added that the Senate inquiry on drug-related killings is an attempt
to undermine the Duterte administration's war on drugs.
"[The Filipino] people support the anti-drug war, criminals don't. Ang mga kriminal
at drug pusher ay gumagastos ngayon... sa kahit ano para i-discredit ang
administrasyon na ito, para matuloy ang kanilang multi-billion na negosyo,"
Cayetano said.
Cayetano noted that ther

With only one law passed,

its time to abolish Congress
Opinion & Analysis Philippines Jan 15, 2014 at 4:22 pm

By Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal

The very dismal performance of our legislators in 2013 with only
one insignificant law enacted for that year with a whopping P35.2
Billion budget, is enough justification to call for a charter change
to abolish Congress and let the provincial governors and mayors
of highly urbanized cities to form the legislative assembly. After
all, these local government executives know the kind of law
needed in their respective areas. We already have enough

national laws waiting implementation with some of them already

obsolete.
Based on the 2013 budget of Congress, the annual appropriation
for the Senate and the House of Representatives was P3.3 Billion
and P6.4 Billion respectively. The amount of P500 million was the
annual budget of the Commission on Appointments which is also
composed of senators and representatives. The annual pork
barrel of a senator is P200 million or a total of P4.8 Billion for 24
senators; while the annual pork barrel per a representative is P70
Million or a total of P20.2 Billion for 289 representatives.
Thus, for 2013, the estimated expenses of Congress, except for
some legislators who did not fully avail of their pork barrels, could
be pegged at P35.2 Billion pesos:
1. Senate

P3.3B

2. Commission on Appointments

.5

3. House of Representatives

6.4

4. Pork Barrel of 24 Senators

4.8

5. Pork Bareel of 289 Represenatives 20.2

Total P35.2 Billion
In that year, Congress passed only one law, the one-page
R.A.10632 which suspended the 2013 Sangguniang Kabataan
elections. In other words, for only one (1) minor legislation, the

entire Filipino people spent the huge amount of close to P35.2

Billion pesos.
While Congress also passed the 2014 budget in 2013, the same
should not even be considered as an accomplishment since it is
Congress obligation to pass the same, as reportedly admitted by
one senator who allegedly asked not to be identified. As a matter
of fact, the constitution provides that if Congress fails to pass the
budget law for a particular year, the budget for the preceding year
is deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect.
Despite Congress high-profile investigations it conducted in
previous years in aid of legislation, no significant or relevant
laws have been enacted as a result of such legislative inquiries.
In year 2011, Senates budget was P2.6B; HR with P8.3B; and
the CA with P400 Million. In 2012 Senates budget was P2.9
Billion; HR with P5.8 Billion and the CA had P500 Million. Again,
with this huge amount and their respective pork barrels, the year
2011 and 2012 did not likewise prove to be very significant years
for Congress in terms of performance and accomplishment. It
only came up with the Reproductive Health Bill and the
postponement of the elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao to synchronize with the 2013 national and local
elections, as its major legislations.
With such a cheerless and disheartening accomplishments of our
legislators where we spent billions and billions of pesos for their

salaries and allowances, some of which could not even be

audited as the same are justified by mere certification of
expenditure without any receipt, time is of the essence that we
now give serious consideration in amending our constitution with
the abolition of Congress as its first priority.
The charter change could likewise be a shortcut to totally abolish
the pork barrel or the PDAF instead of eradicating it through the
long and tedious process of a peoples initiative or repeated filing
of cases in the Supreme Court whose decision declaring the
PDAF as unconstitutional is practically ignored by certain
legislators by merely circumventing the spirit and meaning of the
said decision.
The gigantic savings that would be generated when Congress is
abolished could be properly channeled to augment the much
needed rehabilitation of the areas in the Visayan region badly hit
by typhoon Yolanda and other worthy projects of the government.