G.R. No.

157376

October 2, 2007

CORAZON C. SIM, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EQUITABLE PCI-BANK, respondents*.
Facts:
Corazon Sim filed a case before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. She alleged that she has been
a Marketing Consultant of PCI-Bank in the Frankfurt Office. Sometime after having been promoted to
a Manager position, she was dismissed for loss of trust and confidence due to mismanagement and
misappropriation of funds
Respondent denied any employer-employee relationship between them, and sought the dismissal of
the complaint.
On September 3, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision dismissing the case for want of
jurisdiction as it declared that the labor relations in the Philippines has no exra-territorial jurisdiction
since complainant was hired in a foreign land. The Arbiter gave more weight to the belief of the
respondent company that the complainant is guilty of the charge under the doctrine that the basic
premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employee concerned holds a
position of trust and confidence.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and
dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner went to the CA via petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without filing a motion for reconsideration.
On October 29, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition due to petitioner's non-filing of a motion for
reconsideration with the NLRC.
Hence, the present recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Issue:
Whether or not a prior motion for reconsideration is indispensable for the filing of petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Held:
Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is
no appeal; or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A "plain" and
"adequate remedy" is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution, the filing of which
is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. This is to give the lower
court the opportunity to correct itself.
Petitioner, however, failed to qualify her case as among the few exceptions. In fact, the Court notes
that the petition filed before the CA failed to allege any reason why a motion for reconsideration was
dispensed with by petitioner. It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.

The Court invokes the provision of R.A No. 8042 providing the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC its original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of employer-employee relationship
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the rules and procedures of the
NLRC.
In any event, since the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the petition before it for failure to file
a prior motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, and considering that the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC's factual findings as regards the validity of petitioner's dismissal are accorded great weight and
respect and even finality when the same are supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds no
compelling reason to relax the rule on the filing of a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a
petition for certiorari.
The petition is denied.

RULE 65. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

ARNEL C. ALCARAZ vs RAMON GONZALEZ, GR No 164715, September 20, 2006
Petition for Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the petition for review of the Resolution of the
secretary of Justice for attempted homicide as well as the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
Facts:
Alcaraz fired towards Gonzales after they almost met a vehicular accident in the South Luzon Expressway. A formal
complaint for attempted homicide was then filed against the former. However, then Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez issued a Resolution granting the petition for review filed by Alcaraz and ordering the City Prosecutor to withdraw
the information. A motion for reconsideration was filed but denied.
Gonzalez then filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA, seeking the
reversal of the Justice Secretarys Resolution. In his comment to the petition, Alcaraz averred that the CA had no
appellate jurisdiction over the petition, and that Gonzalez had no legal standing to file the petition. He insisted that the
remedy from an adverse resolution of the Justice Secretary is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, grounded on grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, not one under Rule
43 of said Rule. He averred that the Justice Secretary is not a quasi-judicial officer under Rule 43 whose resolutions
may thus be reviewed by the CA. Alcaraz likewise pointed out that the CA was without power to substitute its own
judgment for that of the Justice Secretary regarding the existence or non-existence of probable cause to charge him
with attempted homicide.
On March 22, 2004, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and reversing the assailed resolution of the
Secretary of Justice
Issue:
Whether the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy of respondent
Held:
In the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, the executive branch of the government
has full discretionary authority. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the private
respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the Investigating Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the
Secretary of Justice. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch.
The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the Revised
Administrative Code, exercises the power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may
affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor. Thus, while the CA may review the resolution of the

Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground
that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
It bears stressing that the Resolution of the Justice Secretary affirming, modifying or reversing the resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor is final. Under the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals (now the 2000 National Prosecution Service
Rules on Appeals), resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations from the Justice Secretary's resolution,
except the aggrieved party, has no more remedy of appeal to file a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution of
such motion if it is denied by the said Secretary. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since there is no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of
law.

G.R. No. 150806; January 28, 2008; EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners, V
BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, renewed its Contract of Lease with
Ponciano L. Almeda, as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel
Almeda.
The Contract of Lease contained the following pertinent provisions which gave rise to the instant
case:
6. It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on the present rate
of assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased or any new
tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are
located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the additional rental or charge
corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event that the present
assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated
rental, likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him;
7. In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of
Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment;

Petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) and
that its monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract
and Article 1250 of the Civil Code.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals and instituted an action for declaratory
relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7.
ISSUE: Whether the action for declaratory relief is proper.
HELD: YES.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or
validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration

of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the
question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the
general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is
available under the circumstances.
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1) The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) The terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
3) There must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4) There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons
whose interests are adverse;
5) The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
The foregoing requisites are present in the instant case.

MILITANTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 107040

April 12, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Pilo Militante is the registered owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land expropriated
under PD 1315 for the national Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Program administered by
the NHA Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). The properties were included in BBP Phase 7 but was not
among those acquired and paid for in 1978-1979.
With Proclamation No. 1893 declaring the entire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban Land Reform
Zone petitioner requested non-coverage from it and was approved. With this, petitioner asked NHA
to relocate the squatters on this land. However, the demolition did not take place.
Four (4) years later, in 1986, BBP Phase 7 was listed as among the priority projects for
implementation under the government's Community Self-Help Program but negotiation failed.
On September 8, 1990, petitioner requested for a revalidation of his demolition clearance and
relocation of the squatters. On January 15, 1991, NHA General Manager Monico Jacob revalidated
the demolition clearance.
Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to implement
the clearance to eject the squatters on petitioner's land. At the conference of February 13, 1991,
Carangdang claimed that petitioners land had already been declared expropriated by P.D. 1315.

Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
with Declaration as Inexistent and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1315" against the NHA
and Carangdang.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ANNABELLE CARANGDANG CAN BE COMPELLED TO
EFFECT THE DIRECTIVE/ MEMORANDUM OF RELOCATION/ RESETTLEMENT SUBJECTING
THE SAID 24 SQUATTER FAMILIES FROM UNLAWFULLY OCCUPYING PETITIONERS
SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Held: No
Ration:
First. Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of prohibition..
Petitioner does not pray that respondent Carangdang should be ordered to desist from relocating the
squatters. What petitioner challenges is respondent Carangdang's refusal to implement the
demolition clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to discharge a
legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.
Second. The petitioner is not also entitled to a writ of mandamus.
It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant
the grant of the writ of mandamus. He failed to discharge this burden. The records show that there is
no direct order from the NHA General Manager addressed to respondent Carangdang to evict the
squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject property. The NHA demolition clearance issued
by General Tobias on January 21, 1982 was addressed to Mayor Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan
City. The clearance's revalidation by NHA General Manager Monico Jacob was likewise addressed
to Mayor Asistio.
1w phi 1.nt

Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for mandamus is
premature if there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner. If superior administrative
officers could grant the relief prayed for, special civil actions are generally not entertained. In the
instant case, petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He may seek another
demolition order from the NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to respondent
Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. In fact, the Government Corporate
Counsel asserts that petitioner should have brought Carangdang's inaction to the attention of her
superiors. There is therefore no extreme necessity to invoke judicial action as the administrative setup could have easily corrected the alleged failure to act. The General Manager, as Chief Executive
Officer of the NHA, has the power of supervision over the operations and internal affairs of NHA.

SAN PEDRO vs. HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA

G.R. No. 164560 July 22, 2009
FACTS:

Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana
Dionisio, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, a Complaint against
herein petitioners and Wood Crest Residents Association, Inc., for Accion Reivindicatoria,
Quieting of Title and Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Private
respondents alleged the subject property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, was titled in the
name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice and evident bad
faith, claimed that they were the owners of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject
property. Private then prayed that they be declared the sole and absolute owners of the subject
property, and to be paid actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees. Petitioners, for their part,
filed a Motion to Dismiss said complaint on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action, as the subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The MeTC then issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss, ruling that, under Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over actions
involving title to or possession of real property of small value. Petitioners assailed the
aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Subsequently, RTC dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
MeTC Presiding Judge. The RTC sustained the MeTC ruling.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, insisting
that both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by not ordering the dismissal of the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of
jurisdiction over the same. CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari was not
available to petitioners as they should have availed themselves of the remedy of appeal. Hence,
this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari is proper.
HELD:
No. The present Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have been entertained
from the very beginning.
The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA
should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari, as provided for under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
In the case of Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court expounded as follows:
The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA
via Rule 65, because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy,
namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. A petition
for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was, therefore, the correct
remedy.
With respect to the issue on jurisdiction, the court ruled that under the present law,
original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to,
possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129

is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the
real property involved as the benchmark.
Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint forAccion Reivindicatoria.
Bank of Commerce vs Planters Development Bank

FACTS:
The Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of seven Central Bank
(CB) bills which were sold to the BOC. The BOC, in turn, sold these CB bills to the PDB.
The PDB informed Lagrimas Nuqui over their claim on the CB bills and requested to record its
claim in the BSP books which the latter denied. The PDB then filed with the RTC separate petitions for
Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injuction and Temporary Restraining
Order which the RTC decided in their favor. PDB then filed an amended petition additionally impleading
the BOC and ALL ASIA. RTC granted BSPs motion to interplead and accordingly required the BOC to amend
its answer. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not interpleader is proper in the case at bar?

RULING:
YES.
SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may
bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves.
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action
arises, where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as
plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when
proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed
out in an action. Section 2 of Rule 62 provides:
SEC. 2. Order. Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring
the conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the
court may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.

This is precisely what the RTC did by granting the BSPs motion to interplead. The PDB itself
"agreed that the various claimants should now interplead." Thus, the PDB and the BOC subsequently
entered into two separate escrow agreements, covering the CB bills, and submitted them to the RTC for
approval.
In granting the BSPs motion, the RTC acted on the correct premise that it has jurisdiction to
resolve the parties conflicting claims over the CB bills - consistent with the rules and the parties conduct
- and accordingly required the BOC to amend its answer and for the PDB to comment thereon. Suddenly,
however, the PDB made an about-face and questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC. Swayed by the PDBs
argument, the RTC dismissed even the PDBs petition - which means that it did not actually compel the
BSP to resolve the BOCs and the PDBs claims.

G.R. No. 137538 September 3, 2001

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs HON. IBAY, UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and LOURDES T. MARQUEZ

FACTS:
Sometime in 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation on the alleged "scam" on the
Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation. The alleged scam found to be
committed throughdeposits of checks in several financial institutions, including te Union Bank of the
Philippines-Julia Vargas Branch.
The Ombudsman ordered Lourdes Marquez, branch manager of UBP-Julia Vargas branch to produce
several bank documents for inspection relative to certain accounts. Marquez failed to comply with the
order since the accounts pertained to Interbank, and that despite diligent efforts, the bank could not
identify these accounts.
The Ombudsman ordered Marquez to produce the requested bank documents, and in event of failure, she
was ordered to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and should not be charged for
obstruction. The Ombudsman cited RA 6770 stating that it had the power to examine and have access to
bank accounts and records.
Marquez filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Makati RTC, and averred that under the Law on
Secrecy of Bank Deposits, she had the legal obligation not to divulge any information relative to all deposits.
She sought a definite ruling and/or guidelines as regards her rights as well as petitioner's power to inspect
bank deposits.
The Ombudsman contends that the RTC of Makati City lacks jurisdiction over the petition since Section 14
of RA 6770 provides:
Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. No

court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
ISSUE: WON the RTC had jurisdiction to petition for declaratory relief.

RULING:
YES, the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief.
RA 6770 is not applicable.
Under Sec 1, Rule 63, the special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. It is not among the actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even
if only questions of law are involved.
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) it must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
In this case, the controversy concerns the extent of the power of petitioner to examine bank accounts
under Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 vis--vis the duty of banks under R.A. 1405 not to divulge any information
relative to deposits of whatever nature. The interests of the parties are adverse considering the
antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one hand, that is the power of Ombudsman to examine bank
deposits, and on the other, the denial thereof apparently by private respondent who refused to allow
petitioner to inspect in camera certain bank accounts. The party seeking relief, private respondent herein,
asserts a legal interest in the controversy. The issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination as litigation is
inevitable. Note that petitioner has threatened private respondent with "indirect contempt" and
"obstruction" charges should the latter not comply with its order.
Wherefore, petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Estrera v CA
Facts:
Petitioner [herein private respondent Kavoori] is employed with the Philippine Postal Corporation as
POSTMAN II and assigned at the Registry Delivery Section of the Cagayan de Oro City Post Office. While
respondent [herein petitioner] Alfredo Estrera is the Regional Director, Region 10 of the Philippine Postal
Corporation.
Sometime in the second week of March 2001 BOMBO RADYO, DXIF, Cagayan de Oro City aired about the
alleged pilferage and/or loss of PVAO checks and foreign mail matters and other alleged anomalies.
Regional Office Order No. 01-06 was issued creating an investigation team to look into the said allegations
and submitted recommendation for POSTMAN VENUS KAVOORI be ADMINISTRATIVELY charged for
DISHONESTY, GROSS VIOLATION OF REGULATIONS and/or NEGLIGENCE and/or LAXITY IN THE

PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, be criminally charged for DISHONESTY (infidelity in the custody
of official documents) and VIOLATIONS of the ANTI-GRAFT LAW and be reassigned/transferred/detailed
immediately in a work area not directly handling mails, preferably at the APDM Office or Administrative
and Finance Division, Philippine Postal Corporation.
Kavoori filed a formal charge against Estrera. Thereafter, he filed a motion to quash the allegations then
later an MR, however, both were denied.
Feeling no more other recourse, Kavoori came to the court filing for prohibition, injunction with prayer
for preliminary injunction and TRO and damages. The RTC ruled in favor of him stating that the complaint
not being sworn, had no effect and proceedings initially had are hereby invalidated including the creation
of the fact-finding committee and the designation of the members and their report.
Estrera no longer filed MR for the foregoing RTC order and proceeded to file a petition for certiorari with
the CA. CA issued first assailed resolution stating that petitioners failed to attach the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping which hereby dismissed the petition. Consequently, petitioner did
not file MR of the foregoing Resolution and instead filed another petition for certiorari with the CA in
which the petition was dismissed outright and was directed to show cause why they should not be dealt
with contempt for engaging in forum shopping. Estrera explained his Manifestation/Explanation and his
MR, that his failure to disclose the previous petition for certiorari was through sheer inadvertence or
oversight and the belief that since the previous petition had already been dismissed, there is no longer
any similar case pending with the court.
CA issued the second assailed Resolution and denied MR and ruled that Estrera and his counsel are found
guilty of forum shopping and EACH is sentenced to pay a fine and suffer imprisonment for three (3)
months.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the remedy of certiorari is proper.
Held:
The remedy of certiorari is not proper in this case.
Ruling:
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would
not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari.
In the instant case, the issues alleged are only possible errors of judgment, questioning the correctness of
the CAs rulings. Since the issues involved do not affect the jurisdiction of the CA, the writ of certiorari
cannot be availed of by petitioner.

Although it is true that the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in was without prejudice and petitioner
could have re-filed such petition, such re-filing should still be done within the prescribed period under
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, or not later than sixty days from notice of the
assailed Order of the RTC. The CA was correct in ruling that since petitioner received said RTC Order dated
October 24, 2001 on November 7, 2001, the last day for filing a petition for certiorari was on January 6,
2002. Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari on February 8, 2002 was undoubtedly beyond the 60day period provided for under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On this point alone, the
petition was clearly dismissible and should not be given due course.
Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal. Since
appeal was available to petitioner, the present petition for certiorari cannot be granted.
ARATUC V COMELEC
G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979

FACTS:
On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang Pambansa were held
throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII. Tomatic
Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in
Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region had
already been canvassed showing partial results. A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election
Hon. Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the
alleged irregularities in the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional
Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,
declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected.
Hence, petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of respondent Comelec.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review COMELECs decisions under certiorari.

RULING:
No. Errors of judgment are not reviewable in certiorari, so long as they are founded on substantial
evidence.
The 1973 Constitution provides: "Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party xxx" (Section 11, Article XII c), even as it ordains that
the Commission shall "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city official" (Section 2(2))
The legislative construction of the constitutional provision is to the effect that the actuations of the
Commission are final, executory and even inappealable. While such construction does not exclude the

general certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which inheres in it as the final guardian of the
Constitution, particularly, of its imperious due process mandate, it correspondingly narrows down the
scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari
as distinguished from review.
A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment while certiorari deals
exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise
erroneous. Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to
weight pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation.
Therefore under the 1973 Constitution and statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court
over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process.

Ferdinand S. Topacio vs. Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Santos Ong,
G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008,
Facts: Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via petition for certiorari and prohibitionseeks to prevent
Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers,duties and responsibilities of a
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,the
Court, byDecision of July 3, 2007, enjoined Ong from accepting an appointment to theposition
of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position anddischarging the functions
of that office, until he shall have successfully completedall necessary steps, through the
appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, toshow that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and
correct the records of his birthand citizenship. On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Pasig City a Petition for the amendment/ correction/
supplementation orannotation of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth. Meanwhile, petitioner, by
verified Letter-Request/Complaint imploredrespondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
initiate post-haste a quowarrantoproceeding against Ong. But the OSG, informed petitioner that
it cannotfavorably act on [his] request for the filing of a quo warrantopetition until the[RTC]
case shall have been terminated with finality. Petitioner assails this positionof the OSG as being
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside from Ongscontinuous discharge of judicial
functions.
Issue:Whether the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring thefiling of a petition
for quo warranto.
Ruling:
The Court rules in the negative.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment asis
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in anarbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patentand gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the dutyenjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law. (Feliciano v. Villasin, G.R. No. 174929, June 27,2008, 556
SCRA 348, 363-364). The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a graveone, on
the part of the OSG in deferring action on the filing of aquo warrantocase until after theRTC case
has been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse ofdiscretion

simply because the affected party disagrees with it. (Marohomsalic v. Cole, G.R. No.169918,
February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 98).The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its
agencies and instrumentalities,and its officials or agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor
General must see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within he limits set by
law.
Esquivel vs Ombudsman
G.R. No. 137237. September 17, 2002

Facts:
Police officers Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero
Esquivel, brother, Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with
alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats.
According to Eduardo, he was about to eat lunch at his parents house at Nueva Ecija, when
petitioners arrived who disarmed him of his Cal. 45 service pistol. They then forced him to board
petitioners vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall. On the way to the town hall,
Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel
pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said, "Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito,
bakit mo ako kinakalaban!" Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, saying
"Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at report." He was struck with a handgun and released.
Prior to his release, however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was
in good physical condition.
PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and
threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was among the law
enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked
the fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary investigation and
issued the impugned resolution 11 recommending that both Mayor Esquivel and Barangay Captain
Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and
Mayor
Esquivel
alone
for
grave
threats.
Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No. 24777 for less
serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, and
Criminal Case No. 24778 for grave threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners submit that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offenses filed
against petitioners, and thus committed GAD when it assumed jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing
of the informations against petitioners (Whether or not Petition for Certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus is proper in this case)?
Held:
1. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, much less grave abuse in

disregarding PO2 Eduardo's admission that he was in good physical condition when he was
released from the police headquarters.
Certiorari is not proper in the determanition of probative value of evidence. The admission
that petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but a matter of evidence best addressed to the public
respondents' appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature and its probative value can be best passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper
remedy. As previously held, but now bears stressing: this Court is not a trier of facts and it is not
its function to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned
tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.
Prohibition is not proper in case at bar For the same reason, petitioners' prayer for a writ of
prohibition must also be denied. First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself,
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. Second,
being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and usual
remedies provided by law are adequate and available. Prohibition is granted only where no other
remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and complete
remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying the
issuance of the writ. In this case, petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of
law. They could have filed a motion to quash the informations at the first instance but they did not.
They have only themselves to blame for this procedural lapse as they have not shown any adequate
excuse for their failure to do so. Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for time to file a motion
to quash the informations, during their much delayed arraignment, but its denial is not a proper
subject for certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an interlocutory order. Third, a writ of
prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the attention of the court whose
proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The foundation of this rule is the respect and consideration due to the lower court and the
expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation; it cannot be presumed that the lower court would
not properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly presented to it. The records show
that petitioners only raised the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before
this Court.
Further, Mandamus is also NOT PROPER FOR DISCRETIONARY DUTIES. Nor can
petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary
duty. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment. Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or
review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and judgment that is
to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision has been reached in a matter involving
discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it
may be. Moreover, as earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary
course of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not
lie.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondents petition for authority to remarry
invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an,
Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S.
bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in
the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a
petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted
the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an

action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his
second marriage.

The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner
raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Held:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing
his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.
Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to

remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore,
the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied.
The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and
injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature
may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirits or intent.
Heirs of Pidacan vs. Transportation Office
G.R. No. 162779

Facts:
Sometime in 1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo acquired under the homestead provision of
Act No. 2874 a parcel of land Patent No. 33883 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2204 were issued
on the land, in the names of the Pidacan spouses.

In 1948, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (now Air Transportation Office or ATO) used a portion of
the said property as an airport. Upon the death of the Pidacan spouses in 1974, the ATO constructed a
perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the property. The ATO also lengthened, widened, and
cemented the airports runway.

The spouses heirs namely, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de Robles demanded
from ATO the payment of the value of the property as well as rentals for the use of the occupied
premises. However, they were told that payment could not be made because the property was still in
their parents name.

The heirs subsequently filed with the RTC a complaint against the ATO for payment of the value of the
property as well as rentals for its use and occupation. The ATO, in turn, filed a complaint for
expropriation, which was dismissed on the ground that it would be absurd for the ATO to expropriate a
parcel of land it considered its own.

On September 12, 1994, the trial court promulgated a Decision[5] ordering the ATO to pay rentals and
the value of the land at P89 per square meter. The ATO appealed to the Court of

Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in fixing the value of the property on the basis of its
present value.

The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[6] setting aside the RTC Decision and remanded the case to
the court a quo for further proceedings. The appellate court also ruled that just compensation should be
determined as of the time the property was taken for public use.

Issue:
1.

Whether there was a taking of the subject property

Ruling:
Eminent domain or expropriation is the inherent right of the state to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of just compensation.[10] A number of circumstances must be
present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a
private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3)
the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be
devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property.[11]

When private property is rendered uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise
eminent domain, the taking is deemed complete.[12] Taking occurs not only when the government
actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also
when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of
his property.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners private property was converted into an airport by
respondent ATO. As a consequence, petitioners were completely deprived of beneficial use and
enjoyment of their property. Clearly, there was taking in the concept of expropriation as early as 1948
when the airport was constructed on petitioners private land.

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008
Facts: On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for
the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of
petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of various provisions
of the law relating to the right to life, health, and a balanced ecology.
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the
Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
In the RTC, decision was made in favor of respondents. Finding merit in the complaint,
the Court ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming,
skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.
The Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive
departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and
obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the
performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the
nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court
of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine
National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed
directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.
The appeals were consolidated in a resolution passed by the RTC.
CA Decision sustained the decision of the RTC
Hence, the present petition.
Issues: Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be
compelled by mandamus.
Ruling: YES. The cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay can be compelled by mandamus.
The implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of
sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each
site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are
Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others,
after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for
solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.

The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not
only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of
putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as
earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to
act officially according to their judgment or conscience.

MADRIGAL TRANSPORT INC VS. LAPANDAY

G.R. NO. 156067 August 11, 2004
FACTS:
P e t i t i o n e r M a d r i g a l T r a n s p o r t f i l e d a P e t i t i o n f o r Voluntary
Insolvency before the RTC of Manila, Branch 49. S u b s e q u e n t l y , p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d
a C o m p l a i n t f o r Damages against Respondents Lapanday Holdings Corporation,
Macondray and Co., and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36. In the
latter complaint, Madrigal alleged (1) that it h a d e n t e r e d i n t o a j o i n t
v e n t u r e a g r e e m e n t w i t h Lapanday for the primary purpose of operating vessels t o
s e r v i c e t h e s h i p p i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s o f D e l M o n t e Philippines, Inc.; ( 2 )
t h a t i t h a d d o n e s o o n t h e strength of the representations of
Lorenzo, in hisc a p a c i t y e i t h e r a s c h a i r m a n o f t h e b o a r d o r a s
president of Del Monte, Lapanday and Macondray; (3)t h a t M a c o n d r a y h a d
t h e r e a f t e r b e e n a p p o i n t e d - - allegedly upon the insistence of Lapanday as broker,
for the purpose of securing charter hire contracts from D e l M o n t e ; ( 4 ) t h a t
pursuant to the joint venture agreement, Madrigal had purchased a
v e s s e l b y o b t a i n i n g a P 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 b a n k l o a n ; a n d ( 5 ) t h a t contrary
to their representations and guarantees and d e s p i t e d e m a n d s , L a p a n d a y
a n d L o r e n z o h a d allegedly been unable to deliver those Del
M o n t e charter hire contracts. T h e i n s o l v e n c y c o u r t ( B r . 4 9 ) d e c l a r e d
p e t i t i o n e r i n s o l v e n t . T h e r e s p o n d e n t s f i l e d t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Motions to
Dismiss the complaint in Branch 36. B r a n c h 3 6 g r a n t e d t h e m o t i o n f o r
f a i l u r e o f t h e complaint to state a cause of action. The court opined that when
petitioner was declared insolvent, it lost itsr i g h t t o f i l e a c o m p l a i n t f o r
d a m a g e s s i n c e t h e exclusive right to institute said actions is now vested
with the court-appointed assignee. Petitioner filed MR which was denied. Pet itioner
thenwent to the CA on a petition for certiorari. CA granted the petition. Respondents
moved for reconsideration. Ruling of the CA: The RTCs Order granting the Motionto
Dismiss was final, therefore, the proper remedy was an appeal. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
W h e t h e r o r n o t A p p e a l w a s t h e p r o p e r remedy.
RULING:
Y e s . W h e r e a p p e a l i s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e a g g r i e v e d p a r t y , t h e action
for
certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for
review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative o r
s u c c e s s i v e . Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,

especially if ones own negligenceor error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be noa v a i l a b l e a p p e a l
o r a n y p l a i n , s p e e d y a n d a d e q u a t e remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari
w i l l n o t p r o s p e r , e v e n i f t h e g r o u n d t h e r e f o r i s g r a v e a b u s e o f discretion.
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order.
It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves
nothing more to be done by the lowercourt. Therefore the remedy of the plaintiff is to
appeal theorder. Petitioner avers that Section 5 of Rule 16 bars the filing of an appeal when
the dismissal is based on lack of cause of action. It adds that Section 5 limits the
remedy of appealonly to dismissals grounded on prior judgments or on the s t a t u t e
of limitations, or to claims that have been e x t i n g u i s h e d o r
a r e u n e n f o r c e a b l e . W e f i n d t h i s interpretation absurd. The provision is
clear. Dismissals on the aforesaid grounds constitute res judicata. However, such
dismissals are still s u b j e c t t o a t i m e l y a p p e a l . F o r t h o s e b a s e d o n o t h e r
grounds, the complaint can be refiled. Section 5, therefore, confirms that an appeal is the
remedy for the dismissal of an action. Citing Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41,
petitioner further claims that it was prohibited from filing an appeal. Section 1(a) of the
said Rule prohibits the filing of an appeal from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration, because the remedy is to appeal the main decision as
petitioner could have done. In fact, under Section 9, Rule 37, the r e m e d y
a g a i n s t a n o r d e r d e n y i n g a m o t i o n f o r reconsideration is to
appeal the judgment or final order. Section 1(h) does not apply, because the trial
courts Order did not dismiss the action without prejudice. W h e r e t h e e x i g e n c i e s
o f t h e c a s e a r e s u c h t h a t t h e ordinary methods of appeal may not prove
adequate --either in point of promptness or comp leteness, so that a partial if
not a total failure of justice could result -- a writ of certiorari m a y s t i l l b e
i s s u e d . Petitioner cites some of these exceptions to justify the remedy it has
undertaken with the appellate court, but these are not applicabl e to the present
factual milieu. Even assuming that the Order of the RTC was erroneous, i t s e r r o r
did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner asserts that
t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d n o t h a v e dismissed the Complaint or should have at
least allowed the substitution of the assignee in petitioners stead. These alleged errors
of judgment, however, do not constitute a despotic, capricious, or whimsical
exercise of power.
Republic vs Lim
GR 161656 June 29 2005

FACTS: Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriation
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932
and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a
military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia
Denzon while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon.

After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the CFI
dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940,
the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as
just compensation.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successorsin-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI
an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein
respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the
mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
63894 was issued in his name. Respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title.
The Republic argues that respondent is not entitled to recover possession but only to demand
payment of its fair market value.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to recover possession.
RULING: YES.
The facts of the present case do not justify the application of the doctrine that non-payment of just
compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landwonders to
recover possession of the expropriated lots.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property
passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and
terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner.
Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to
dispose of his property subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through
expropriation.
It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in 1964,
they were still the owners thereof and their title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In
fact, it never did. Such title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled in
Valdehueza that: It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having
been a transfer of said lots in favor of the Government.
The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is immaterial considering that the
Republic did not complete the expropriation process. In short, it failed to perfect its title over Lot
932 by its failure to pay just compensation.

While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the
private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment
in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession
of their property. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay
just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of
the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the
payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation
as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the
payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered just.

RACHEL C. CELESTIAL v. JESSE CACHOPERO

Petitioner Rachel Celestial is the sister of defendant Jesse Cachopero. They had a dispute
over a piece of land which was a dried-up creek, as Cachopero was trying toobtain a Miscellaneous
Sales Application (MSA) to the Department of Environment andNatural Resources (DENR)
alleging that he had been the owner of that land whereon he built a house and other improvements.
However, Celestial protests that she has preferential right over the land because it is adjacent to
and is the only outlet from her house. According to the Bureau of Land, the land in dispute was a
creek and is therefore outside the commerce of man. The first MSA was denied by the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) prompting Cachopero to obtain another MSA which was granted by the DENR.
Due to conflicting interests of the parties, the land in dispute must be sold in a public auction.
Cachopero then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the DENR
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) but was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Celestial contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Cachoperos petition for certiorari
as it is in the nature of an appeal falling within the jurisdiction of the CA and that the Cachopero
has not exhausted all administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
HELD:
RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and SC over originalpetitions for certiorari,
prohinition and mandamus.
Celestial has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e. through a
petition for review of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court)

and a special civil action for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court).
Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to issue the
prerogative writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a continuation
of the original suit and not a commencement of anew action. In contrast, to invoke a courts
jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari requires the commencement of a new and original action
therefore, independent of the proceedings which gave rise to the questioned decision or order. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court over original petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Section 21 of B.P. 129.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals conclusion that the instant case falls
under the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, which
provides that such is inapplicable if (1) it should appear that an irreparable injury or damage will
be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final action of the
administrative officialconcerned on the matter as a result of a patently illegal order or (2) where
appeal would not prove to be speedy and adequate remedy.
This requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being
instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to
immediately, among which are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the
administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there
is urgent need for judicialintervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable
damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when
strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto proceedings.

RULE 67
NAPOCOR v. Dela Cruz
The Case
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner NationalPower
Corporation (NAPOCOR) seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the CA which fixed the
fair market value of the expropriated lots at PhP 10,000.00 pe square meter.
The Facts
NAPOCOR decided to acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of land within the
areas of Dasmarias and Imus, Cavite for the construction andmaintenance of the proposed
Dasmarias-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project.
On November 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for eminent domain andexpropriation of
an easement of right-of-way against respondents as registeredowners of the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated.After respondents filed their respective answers to petitioners
Complaint, petitioner deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.5 Then, on February 25, 1999,
petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which

thetrial court granted in its March 9, 1999 Order. The trial court issued a Writ ofPossession over
the lots owned by respondents spouses de la Cruz and respondent Ferrer on March 10, 1999 and
April 12, 1999, respectively.
However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and their mortgagee,Metrobank, as
parties-defendants in its May 11, 1999 Order,6 in view of the Motion to Intervene filed by
respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimedownership of the land sought to be
expropriated from respondents spouses Dela Cruz.
As to the just compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz
spouses, the trial court ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise agreement.
The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection and based on the analysis ofdata gathered
and making the proper adjustments with respect to the location,area, shape, accessibility, and the
highest and best use of the subject properties, itis the opinion of the herein commissioners that
the fair market value of the subject real properties is P10,000.00 per square meter.
Both commissioners recommended that the property of S.K. Dynamics to beexpropriated by
petitioner be valued at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.
Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation pegged in the RTC, petitioner filed an appeal
before the CA but it was dismissed. Significantly, petitioner did not file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision,
but it directly filed a petition for review before the SC.
The Issues
1. Whether the petitioner was denied due process when it was not allowed topresent evidence on
the reasonable value of the expropriated property beforethe board of commissioners. YES
2. Whether the valuation of just compensation herein was not based from the evidence on record
and other authentic documents. NO
The Decision
1. Petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not given the opportunity
to present evidence before the commissioners.
It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to afford the parties theopportunity to introduce
evidence in their favor, conduct hearings beforethem, issue notices to the parties to attend
hearings, and provide the
opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes. It is alsoundisputed that petitioner
was not notified of the completion or filing of the
commissioners report, and that petitioner was also not given any opportunity
to file its objections to the said report.
It is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection performed by the two
appointed commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct ahearing or hearings to
determine just compensation; and to provide theparties the following: (1) notice of the said
hearings and the opportunity toattend them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their
favor duringthe said hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective
causes during the said hearings.
The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the
property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriationcases. In the instant
expropriation case, where the principal issue is thedetermination of just compensation, a hearing

before the commissioners isindispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of
just
compensation. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value,the latter may only do
so for valid reasons, that is, where the commissioners
have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they
have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amountallowed is either
grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of
the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all."
The constitutional guarantee of due process still requires that a party should
be given the fullest and widest opportunity to adduce evidence during trial, and the availment of
a motion for reconsideration will not satisfy a partys
right to procedural due process, unless his/her inability to adduce evidence
during trial was due to his/her own fault or negligence.
2. The legal basis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
sought to be expropriated. The measure is not the takers gain but theowners loss. The
compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner
but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without
due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the
market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential
damages after deducting therefrom the consequential benefits which may
arise from the expropriation. If the consequential benefits exceed the
consequential damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the
basic value of the property should be paid in every case.
The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by
parties willing but not compelled to enter into the contract of sale. Not
unlikely, a buyer desperate to acquire a piece of property would agree to pay
more, and a seller in urgent need of funds would agree to accept less, than
what it is actually worth.
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the
property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its
actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape,
location, and the tax declarations thereon.
It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of thetaking, which usually
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the
property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the
filing of the complaint.
It is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just compensation was the
commissioners ocular inspection of the properties inquestion, as gleaned from the
commissioners October 5, 1999 report. The trial courts reliance on the said report is a serious
error considering that the

recommended compensation was highly speculative and had no strongfactual moorings. For one,
the report did not indicate the fair market value ofthe lots occupied by the Orchard Golf and
Country Club, Golden City Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex, and other business
establishments cited. Also, the report did not show how convenience facilities, public
transportation, and the residential and commercial zoning could have added value to the lots
being expropriated.
Moreover, the trial court did not amply explain the nature and application of
the "highest and best use" method to determine the just compensation inexpropriation cases. No
attempt was made to justify the recommended "justprice" in the subject report through other
sufficient and reliable means suchas the holding of a trial or hearing at which the parties could
have had
adequate opportunity to adduce their own evidence, the testimony of realtors
in the area concerned, the fair market value and tax declaration, actual sales
of lots in the vicinity of the lot being expropriated on or about the date of thefiling of the
complaint for expropriation, the pertinent zonal valuation derived
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, among others.
More so, the commissioners did not take into account that the Asian financialcrisis in the second
semester of 1997 affected the fair market value of the
subject lots. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that after the crisis hit thereal estate market,
there was a downward trend in the prices of real estate inthe country.
Furthermore, the commissioners report itself is flawed considering that itsrecommended just
compensation was pegged as of October 5, 1999, or thedate when the said report was issued, and
not the just compensation as of
the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, or as of November27, 1998. The period
between the time of the filing of the complaint (whenjust compensation should have been
determined), and the time when the
commissioners report recommending the just compensation was issued (oralmost one [1] year
after the filing of the complaint), may have distorted thecorrect amount of just compensation.
Clearly, the legal basis for the determination of just compensation in this case is insufficient as
earlier enunciated. This being so, the trial courts ruling inthis respect should be set aside.

G.R. No. 181303

September 17, 2009

CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA

DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein
by
their
Attorney-in-Fact,
MARIA
DANAO
ACORDA,
Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO
AND MARIA LIGUTAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and
Damages against respondents on 27 March 2007. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they
are the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-127937

situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject property
from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had
allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy
the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would
vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.
Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same.
Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.
Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that
they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of
ownership. Petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud
from their title.
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing
petitioners Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No.
7691, amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less than
P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their
Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion
reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents.
Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It
reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action.
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion. They reiterated their earlier
argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners Motion.
The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be
brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which
includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to
Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed
value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00
in all other places.

Hence, the petition before the SC.

ISSSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS
MOTU PROPRIO.
RULING:
The Court rules in the negative.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract
or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties
rights or duties thereunder.
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly
made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances
in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court refers to three remedies which
are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal
rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require
that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" that an
action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief,
and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision
is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses
the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00.
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No.
02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the

said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.
In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already
demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed
only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before the
Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of
their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief.
Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction
over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject
property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an
action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of
jurisdiction.

Calleja vs Panday

FACTS:
On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein
petitioners. Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they
had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime
in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation,
forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents.
On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court
in Naga City. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the
subject case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring
a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction. On July 13, 2005, RTC issued the assailed

Order. Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately
elevated the case to the Supremer Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC Branch 58 has jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto?
RULING:
NO.
Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried
in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed
that the principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No.
00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial
Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein
respondents.
Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents
petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an
intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the
aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special
Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the
SEC.
Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer
of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on
the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development Corp.
v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association, the Court held that the trial court, having no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the issues therein could
be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.

City of Iloilo v. Contreras-Besana and Javellana

GR No. 168967 Feb 12, 2010
FACTS:
In an expropriation case filed by petitioner against private respondent (Javellana), the plaintiff was able
to take possession of two parcels of land owned by Javellana for the purpose of making the said lots the
site for Lapaz High School. A writ of possession was issued to plaintiff after it allegedly made a deposit of

the amount of the value of the said lots (Php 40,000). Such was issued by the trial court in an order dated
May 17, 1983.
On April 2000, private respondent found out that the amount of Php 40,000 was not deposited by the
petitioner when he tried to withdraw the said amount (as proved by a certification issued by the PNB).
When no amicable resolution and a negotiated sale was successful, he (Javellana) filed a complaint for
Recovery of Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages. He alleged that since he was not
compensated for the expropriation of his property, the possession by the plaintiff was illegal. This
argument was opposed by the petitioner, claiming that Javellana can no longer file an action for the
recovery of the possession of the lots since the same was already utilized for public use, therefore can
only demand for the payment of just compensation.
The RTC then issued an order (2003 order) which nullified the 1983 order, ordering the petitioner to
immediately deposit the 10% of the just compensation after determining the value of the property at the
time the complaint was filed. This was amended six months later (2004 order), changing the reckoning
point from the time of the filing of the complaint to the date of the issuance of this order. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner, arguing that there was no legal basis for its issuance. This was
denied by the trial court, ruling that since no deposit was made, the reckoning point for the determination
of the fair market value of the property should be the date of the issuance of the order.
On April 15, 2004, the commission created for this case submitted a report determining estimates of the
fair market value of the properties in question in different reckoning points, as shown in the table below.

Reckoning Point

Value per square

meter
P110.00/sqm

Fair Market
Value
P79,860.00

P686.81/sqm

P498,625.22

2002

P3,500.00/sqm

P2,541,000.00

2004

P4,200.00/sqm

PhP3,049,200.00

1981 - at the time

the complaint was
filed
1981 at the time
the complaint was
filed

Basis
based on three or more recorded
sales of similar types of land in the
vicinity in the same year
Appraisal by Southern Negros
Development Bank based on market
value, zonal value, appraised value of
other banks, recent selling price of
neighboring lots
Appraisal by the City Appraisal
Committee, Office of the City Assessor
Private Appraisal Report (Atty.
Roberto Cal Catolico dated April 6,
2004)

\
Petitioner assailed the aforementioned orders claiming that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
overturning the 1983 order which was already final and executory, and that the just compensation for the
expropriation should be based on the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking or at the
time of the filing of the complaint. Private respondent argued that there was no error committed by the
trial court, and that the said orders were subject to amendment and nullification at the courts discretion.

ISSUES:
(1) W/N an expropriation order becomes final (W/N the trial court erred in overturning the 1983 Order).
(2) W/N the reckoning point of the determination of just compensation is the time of the taking or the
time of the filing of the complaint.

HELD:
(1) YES. The Court, in its ruling, defined the two stages in an expropriation proceeding. The first stage ends
in an order of dismissal or a determination that the property in question is to be acquired for public use.
These orders are deemed final but appealable by the aggrieved party. The second phase is the
determination of just compensation, which ends in an order fixing the amount to be paid to the
landowner. This order is also a final one, but appealable.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not file an appeal assailing the 1983 order. Therefore, the said
order had become final, and the petitioners right to expropriate is no longer subject to review. The trial
court therefore erred in issuing the orders which nullified the 1983 Order.
(2) NO. As established in a long line of cases, the Court constantly affirmed that:
x x x just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into
the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
It is also provided in Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Procedure that just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the case at bar, no exception was found
based on the pertinent facts.
The Court also held that since the expropriation proceedings are final, and no appeal was made, the said
legality of the petitioners possession of the lots in question can no longer be subject to review, hence,
private respondent cannot re-claim the said lots. However, he is still subject to just compensation.
Additionally, since he was not paid for just compensation by the petitioner, he is also entitled to exemplary
damages.

G.R. No. 193978 : February 28, 2012

(667 SCRA 150)
JELBERT B. GALICTO
Versus
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the
Republic of the Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of

Budget and Management, Respondents.

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin
the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President
on September 8, 2010. Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for
having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing
laws.
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive
allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors
of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing obligations. Subsequently,
the Senate conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries,
allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).
Based on its findings, officials and governing boards of various GOCCs and GFIs have
been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and
other benefits as well as other irregular and abusive practices. Consequently, the Senate
issued Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order the immediate suspension of
the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other
perks of members of the governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs. Heeding the call of
Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled Directing the
Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the GOCCs and
GFIs, and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to
establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.
EO 7 was published and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of
GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of
directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and
allowances
to
their
employees.
Petitioner Jelbert Galicto questions the constitutionality of E.O. 7 in his capacity s a lawyer
and as an employee of PhilHealth Regional Office. As he stands to be prejudiced by E.O.
7 because it suspends or impose a moratorium om the grant of salary increase and other
benefits granted to the GOCC and GFI officials. Moreover, he claims interest in making
sure that laws and orders by government officials are legally issued and implemented.
The respondents pointed out the following procedural defects as grounds for the petition's
dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus standi; and (2) certiorari is not applicable to this
case.
Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy.

HELD: No.
Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to
question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not
judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an
incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the
validity of EO 7.
RCBC VS. Metro Container Inc.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari on the Decision, promulgated on 18 October 1996 and the Resolution,
promulgated on 08 January 1997, of the Court of Appeals.The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Ley
Construction Corporation (LEYCON) contracted a loan from Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in the
amount of Thirty Million Pesos. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a property, located in
Valenzuela City. LEYCON failed to settle its obligations prompting RCBC to institute an extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding. After LEYCONs legal attempts to forestall the action of RBCB failed, the foreclosure took place with RCBC
as the highest bidder. LEYCON promptly filed an action for Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages
against RCBC. Meanwhile, RCBC consolidated its ownership over the property due to LEYCONs failure to redeem it
within the 12-month redemption period and a title was issued in favor of the bank. By virtue thereof, RCBC
demanded rental payments from Metro Container Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the property from
LEYCON.Thereafter, LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against METROCAN before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Valenzuela. METROCAN filed a complaint for Interpleader, before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, against LEYCON and RCBC to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves and to determine which among them shall rightfully receive the payment of monthly rentals on the
subject property. During the pre-trial conference, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case insofar as
METROCAN and LEYCON were concerned in view of an amicable settlement they entered by virtue of which
METROCAN paid back rentals to LEYCON. Judgment was rendered in Civil Case which among others, ordered
METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises. Such decision became final and executory.
METROCAN moved for the dismissal of Civil Case for having become moot and academic due to the amicable
settlement it entered with LEYCON. LEYCON, likewise, moved for the dismissal of the case citing the same grounds
cited by METROCAN. However, the two motions were dismissed for lack of merit. The motions for reconsideration
filed by METROCAN and LEYCON were also denied prompting METROCAN to seek relief from the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
a writ of preliminary injunction. LEYCON, as private respondent, also sought for the nullification of the RTC
orders.The Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the orders of the RTC. The appellate court also
ordered the dismissal of the civil case. RCBCs motion for reconsideration was also denied for lack of merit.
Issue:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN THE EJECTMENT CASE
BETWEEN METROCAN AND LEYCON DOES NOT AND CANNOT RENDER THE INTERPLEADER ACTION
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
(2) WHETHER OR NOT A PARTY WHO INITIATES AN INTERPLEADER ACTION MAY NOT BE COMPELLED TO
LITIGATE IF HE IS NO LONGER INTERESTED TO PURSUE SUCH CAUSE OF ACTION, SAID PARTY MAY
NOT UNILATERALLY CAUSE THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AFTER THE ANSWER HAVE BEEN

FILED. FURTHER, THE DEFENDANTS IN AN INTERPLEADER SUIT SHOULD BE GIVEN FULL

OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS.
HELD:
The court held that in Section 1 Rule 63 Interpleader when proper. - Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
In the case, it is undisputed that METROCAN filed the interpleader action because it was unsure which between
LEYCON and RCBC was entitled to receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. LEYCON was
claiming payment of the rentals as lessor of the property while RCBC was making a demand by virtue of the
consolidation of the title of the property in its name. Further, the court held that it is also undisputed that LEYCON,
as lessor of the subject property filed an action for unlawful detainer against its lessee METROCAN. The issue in Civil
Case No. 6202 is limited to the question of physical or material possession of the premises. The issue of ownership
is immaterial therein and the outcome of the case could not in any way affect conflicting claims of ownership, since
RCBC is neither a co-lessor or co-lessee of the same, hence he has no legal personality to join the parties herein with
respect to the issue of physical possession the contract of lease between the parties. Hence, the reason for the
interpleader action ceased when the MeTC rendered judgment whereby the court directed METROCAN to pay
LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises x x x. While RCBC, not being a party to civil case, could not be
bound by the judgment therein, METROCAN is bound by the MeTC decision. When the decision in civil case became
final and executory, METROCAN has no other alternative left but to pay the rentals to LEYCON. Thus, METROCAN
moved for the dismissal of the interpleader action not because it is no longer interested but because there is no
more need for it to pursue such cause of action. Petitioner is correct in saying that it is not bound by the decision in
the civil case. It is not a party thereto. However, it could not compel METROCAN to pursue the civil case. RCBC has
other avenues to prove its claim. In fact, the issue of ownership can very well be threshed out in the case for
Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages filed by LEYCON against RCBC. Thus the petition for
review was denied and the judgment promulgated by Court of Appeals was affirmed.

17 September at 00:59
Triplex Enterprises vs PNB-Republic Bank and Solid Builders
Facts: Petitioner sought to annul the sale of two parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City by
PNB-Republic Bank to Solid Builders, Inc. and to compel PNB-Republic Bank to award instead
the sale to it as the highest bidder. Petitioners claim was rejected by PNB-Republic Bank due to
the sale of the properties to Solid Builders, Inc.
After the rejection of petitioners bid, Atty. Romeo Roque, the real estate broker whose services
were engaged by petitioner for its negotiations with PNB-Republic Bank concerning the
Tagaytay properties, obtained a legal opinion from the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the presentation and admission in
evidence of Roques testimony.

Ruling: The petition has no merit.

Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court
or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[8] Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction
and not errors in judgment
Ollada vs. Central Bank
G.R. No. L-11357, May 31, 1962

Facts:

Felipe B. Ollada, a Certified Public Accountant (CPA for brevity) having passed the examination
of the board of accountancy and authorized to practice accounting at Central Bank filed in the
Court of First Instance a petition for declaratory relief after his petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction had been dismissed in the Court of First Instance assailing the enforcement of the
above mentioned Bank with the two requirements for Certified Public Accountants, re: that the
applicant CPA should sign a statement under oath and that, upon accreditation, a Certified Public
Accountant would be governed by the rules and regulations of the Central Bank and not by those
of the Philippine Institute of Accountants. He alleges that because of these requirements he had
suffered serious injury, and that such enforcement has resulted in the unlawful restraint in the
practice of Certified Public Accountants in the Office of the Central Bank.

The Court of First Instance Dismissed said petition hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not a declaratory relief is proper is proper in this case at bar.

Held:

No, declaratory relief is not proper

Under the law a complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or
right has been breached or violated. In the present case such is precisely the situation arising
from the facts alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner
himself, respondent had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury all these

giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or
proceeding.

An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract,
statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach which
would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper
only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or
proceeding.

G.R. No. 169957

July 11, 2012

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
SPS. FLORIMON V. ILETO et. al.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint seeking to expropriate certain
parcels of land in Bulacan, in connection with its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line
project. Specifically, the NPC sought to expropriate the land of respondents and the estate
of Sofia Mangahas.
To determine the issue of just compensation, the RTC constituted a team of commissioners,
composed of the following: Atty. Luis Manuel Bugayong, representing the NPC; Barangay
Captain Manuel Villacorta, representing the defendants; and Branch Clerk of Court Ariston
Tayag, acting as the Chairperson.
The Heirs of Sofia Mangahas and the NPC filed with the RTC a jointly executed
compromise agreement where they agreed that NPC would acquire 13,855 square meters
of the 95,445 square meter property owned by the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas. In turn, the
NPC would pay the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas the total amount of P3,463,750.00 as just
compensation for the property, with an assessed value of P250.00 per square meter. The
RTC found the compromise agreement to be proper, and rendered a partial decision
approving it.
As for the other owners, since Commissioner Bugayong, representing the NPC, could not
agree with the other commissioners on the manner of valuation, he chose to submit a
separate report.
In turn, Commissioner Tayag and Commissioner Villacorta submitted their report,
recommending that the just compensation for all the affected lands be pegged at P250.00
per square meter. The report took into account another commissioners report in a different
expropriation case filed by the NPC that was pending before Branch 10 of the same

court, which fixed the just compensation per square meter of agricultural lands at P265.00,
residential land at P1,540.00, and commercial land at P2,300.00. In the end, however, the
commissioners were greatly persuaded by the value fixed in the compromise
agreement between NPC and the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas.
The commissioners report was set for hearing where the Sps. Florimon V. Ileto and
Rowena Nolasco, the Sps. Valero and the Brillos manifested their consent to the
recommended price of P250.00 per square meter. Consequently, the RTC approved the
report submitted by Commissioner Tayag and Commissioner Villacorta, and rendered a
decision.
The NPC opposed to the valuation of the RTC based from the recommendations of the
commissioners.
ISSUES: Whether or Not the Commissioners and the RTCs way of determining the
value of just compensation is proper in this case.
HELD: NO
We cannot affirm the RTCs decision in fixing just compensation of all the subject properties
at P250.00 per square meter, for lack of legal or factual basis.
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner
of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum
of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." [The market
value] is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market
values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these values may
serve as factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property.
To determine the just compensation to be paid to the landowner, the nature and character
of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion.
In the present case, the RTC made a determination that all the properties subject of the
NPCs expropriation complaint, regardless of their location or classification, should be
valued at P250.00 per square meter. In arriving at this valuation, the RTC explained, thus:
In order to determine the issue of just compensation, the Court constituted a team of three
commissioners chaired by Atty. Aristan Tayag with Atty. Luis Manuel Bugayong as
representative of the plaintiff and Barangay Captain Manuel Villacorta as representative of
the landowners.
Eventually, the team of commissioners submitted its report adopting the recommendation of
just compensation in a similar case for eminent domain of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan wherein it set the just compensation for agricultural land at P265.00 per square
meter, residential land at P1,540.00 per square meter, and commercial land at P2,300.00
per square meter. However, considering that a partial decision was already rendered

wherein the lands affected were valued at P250.00 per square meter, the team
recommended the latter amount for the remaining properties subject of expropriation.
It is apparent from this RTC explanation that Commissioner Tayag and Commissioner
Villacorta based their recommendation for just compensation of all the properties in
question solely on the value fixed in the compromise agreement between the NPC and the
Heirs of Sofia Mangahas. But in accepting this recommendation, the RTC failed to take
into consideration the fact that the property subject of the compromise agreement is
located in Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, while the other properties subject of the
RTCs decision are located in other municipalities in Bulacan.
Even worse, the commissioners recommended valuation is not supported by any
corroborative evidence, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned and
tax declarations or zonal valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It does not even
appear from the records that the commissioners conducted any ocular inspections to
determine the location, nature, character, condition, and other specific features of the
expropriated lands that should have been taken into account before making their
recommendation.
Although the determination of just compensation lies within the trial courts discretion, it
should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. The decision of the trial court must be based
on all established rules, correct legal principles, and competent evidence. The courts are
proscribed from basing their judgments on speculations and surmises.