Am Jur False Imprisonment

Am. Jur.
2d
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
by
Francis Collins, J.D.
TOPIC SCOPE
Scope of Topic:
This article discusses false imprisonment or false arrest primarily as a tort, treating such
matters as the nature and elements of the wrong, liability, defenses, procedural issues, and
damages. Some consideration is also given to false imprisonment as a crime.
Treated Elsewhere:
Admiralty jurisdiction, false detainer or arrest as within, see 2 Am Jur 2d, Admiralty 93
Agricultural society, liability for arrests or detentions by its officers or agents, see 3 Am
Jur 2d, Agriculture 57
Aliens seeking admission into United States, detention for further inquiry, see 3A Am Jur
2d, Aliens and Citizens 755 , 756
Appeal: statutory or constitutional limitation on jurisdictional amounts on appeal as
inapplicable to actions for false imprisonment, see 5 Am Jur2d, Appeal and Error 21 ;
impropriety of one suing for maliciousprosecution to assert on appeal right of recovery
for false arrest or falseimprisonment,see 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error 568
Survival of cause of action for false imprisonment, see 1 Am Jur 2d, Abatement, Survival,
and Revival 83
Arrest, generally, see 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest
Assignability of cause of action for false imprisonment, see 6 Am Jur2d, Assignments
37
Bank, liability for false arrest resulting from wrongful dishonor of check, see 10 Am Jur
2d, Banks 567 , 576
Illegitimate child, liability of father for false imprisonment of his, see 10 Am Jur 2d,
Bastards
Carriers, liability for arrest and false imprisonment, see 14 Am Jur 2d, Carriers 1208 et
seq.
Federal Civil Rights Act (42 USCS 1983), actionability of claims for unlawful arrest or
detention under, see 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights 19 , 269
Charitable immunity as not extending to false imprisonment, see 15 Am Jur 2d, Charities
213
Choice of law in determining plaintiff's right to recover in action for false imprisonment,
see 16 Am Jur 2d, Conflict of Laws 109
Counterclaim for false arrest, see 20 Am Jur 2d, Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff
42
Falsely representing oneself as officer, agent, or employee of United States, arrest or
detention of person by one, as federal offense, see 32 AmJur 2d, False Personation
Federal question jurisdiction of suits for false imprisonment or illegal detention, see 32A
Am Jur 2d, Federal Practice and Procedure
Federal Tort Claims Act, liability, as to acts or omissions of federal investigative or law
enforcement officers, based on claim arising out of false imprisonment or false arrest, see
35 Am Jur 2d, Federal Tort Claims Act 42 (Supp)
Guardian, liability for false imprisonment of ward, see 39 Am Jur 2d, Guardian and Ward
65 , 67
Order in habeas corpus proceeding as res judicata as to person charged with unlawfully
restraining another of his liberty, see 39 Am Jur 2d, Habeas Corpus 161
Health officers, liability for acts of, in enforcing quarantine, see 39 Am Jur 2d, Health
17 , 18
Hospital authorities, liability for forcible detention of patients, see 40 Am Jur 2d,
Hospitals and Asylums 19
Spouse's liability for forcibly taking husband or wife to mental health facility, see 41 Am
Jur 2d, Husband and Wife
Insurance coverage of liability for false arrest, see 43 Am Jur 2d, Insurance 529
Interest as element of damages in action for false imprisonment, see 22 Am Jur 2d,
Damages 664
Jones Act, false arrest and false imprisonment as not within coverage of, see 32 Am Jur
2d, Federal Employers' Liability and Compensation Acts
Municipality's power to indemnify police officer sued for false arrest, see 56 Am Jur 2d,
Municipal Corporations, Counties, and other Political Subdivisions 208
State or local government entities' liability for false arrest or imprisonment, see 57 Am
Jur 2d, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability 182 , 208 , 463
Comparative negligence as not defense to suit for false imprisonment, see 57B Am Jur
2d, Negligence 1369
Parent's right of action for false imprisonment of child, see 59 Am Jur 2d, Parent and
Child 98
Wrongful conviction and incarceration as basis for liability to prison inmates, see 60 Am
Jur 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions 209 , 210
Institution for reformation of women, liability for false imprisonment, see 60 Am Jur 2d,
Penal and Correctional Institutions 188
Prohibition, state as proper applicant for writ therefor, to restrain from entertaining action
for false imprisonment with regard to detention authorized by state military authorities,
see 63A Am Jur 2d, Prohibition 80
Liability for false imprisonment by sheriff's deputy, see 70 Am Jur 2d, Sheriffs, Police,
and Constables 155
Sureties on official bonds, liability for false imprisonment or unlawful arrest by police
officers, see 70 Am Jur 2d, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables 199 , 201
Workers' compensation acts, false imprisonment action as generally not barred by, see 82
Am Jur 2d, Workers' Compensation 82
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Text References:
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law (15th ed)
Annotation References:
ALR Digest: False Imprisonment
ALR Index: False Imprisonment and Arrest
Practice References:
10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment
7 Am Jur POF2d 181, Malicious Prosecution; 22 Am Jur POF2d 445, Aggravated
Wrongful DetentionMalice Sufficient to Support Award of Punitive Damages; 26 Am
Jur POF2d 617, False ImprisonmentFailure to Take Arrestee Before Magistrate without
Unreasonable or Unnecessary Delay; 40 Am Jur POF2d 81, False Imprisonment in
Connection with Confinement in Nursing Home or Hospital; 13 Am Jur POF3d 111,
Compensatory Damages for False Imprisonment
4 Am Jur Trials 441, Solving Statutes of Limitation Problems; 16 Am Jur Trials 205,
Malicious Prosecution
Insta-Cite(R):
Cases and annotations referred to herein can be further researched through the InstaCite(R) citation verification service. Use Insta-Cite to check citations for Bluebook
styling, parallel references, prior and later history, and annotation references.
I. CIVIL ACTIONS [1-15]

A. In General [1-7]
Research References
ALR Digest: False Imprisonment 1
10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 3, 4
16 Am Jur Trials 205, Malicious Prosecution
7 Am Jur POF2d 181, Malicious Prosecution
1 Definition of false imprisonment [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of
another. 1 False imprisonment entails such restraint without consent 2 or legal
justification. 3 In this phrase, the word "false" seems to be exactly synonymous with
"unlawful," 4 and the gravamen of the action lies in the unlawful detention. 5
Even though false imprisonments often appear to arise from legitimate motives, 6 the
tort of false arrest or false imprisonment exists to protect and vindicate the individual's
interest in freedom from unwarranted interference with that person's personal liberty. 7
Footnotes
Footnote 1. J. J. Newberry Co. v Judd, 259 Ky 309, 82 SW2d 359; Tumbarella v Kroger
Co., 85 Mich App 482, 271 NW2d 284; Hoffman v Clinic Hospital, Inc., 213 NC 669,
197 SE 161; Rogers v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 48 Wash 2d 879, 297 P2d 250; Lane v
Collins, 29 Wis 2d 66, 138 NW2d 264.
The tort of false imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of an individual's personal liberty
or freedom of locomotion. Baltz v Shelley (ND Ill) 661 F Supp 169.
Forms: Instructions to jury defining false imprisonment. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev),
False Imprisonment, Form 3.
Footnote 2. Ross v Meyers (CA6 Ohio) 883 F2d 486, reh den (CA6) 1989 US App
LEXIS 16985, reh den (CA6) 1990 US App LEXIS 419; Abourezk v New York Airlines,
Inc., 283 US App DC 34, 895 F2d 1456.
Footnote 3. Day v Providence Hosp. (Ala) 622 So 2d 1273, reh den, without op (Ala)
1993 Ala LEXIS 986; R.J.D. v Vaughan Clinic, P.C. (Ala) 572 So 2d 1225; Curtis v State
Dep't for Children & Their Families (RI) 522 A2d 203; Kroger Co. v Demakes (Tex Civ
App Houston (1st Dist)) 566 SW2d 653, writ ref n r e (Sep 20, 1978) and rehg of writ of
error overr (Oct 25, 1978); J. C. Penney Co. v Duran (Tex Civ App San Antonio) 479
SW2d 374, writ ref n r e (Oct 4, 1972); Zayre of Virginia, Inc. v Gowdy, 207 Va 47, 147
SE2d 710.
Footnote 4. Stine v Shuttle, 134 Ind App 67, 186 NE2d 168 (ovrld on other grounds as
stated in Seymour Nat'l Bank v State (Ind App) 384 NE2d 1177).
Footnote 5. Gabrou v May Dep't Stores Co. (Dist Col App) 462 A2d 1102;
False imprisonment has been defined as confinement without legal justification by a
wrongdoer of the person wronged. Nooner v Pillsbury Co. (CA8 Mo) 840 F2d 560; Day
v Wells Fargo Guard Service Co. (Mo) 711 SW2d 503.
To constitute false imprisonment, restraint must be unreasonable and unwarranted under
the circumstances. Kanner v First Nat'l Bank (Fla App D3) 287 So 2d 715.
The restraint must be "false," that is, without right or authority to do so. Tumbarella v
Kroger Co., 85 Mich App 482, 271 NW2d 284.
Footnote 6. Fermino v Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal 4th 701, 30 Cal Rptr 2d 18, 872 P2d 559, 59 Cal
Comp Cas 296, 94 CDOS 3399, 94 Daily Journal DAR 6423, 9 BNA IER Cas 1132.
Footnote 7. Phillips v District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 458 A2d 722.
2 False arrest; generally [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

False arrest, a name sometimes given to the tort more generally known as false
imprisonment, 8 has also been defined as the unlawful restraint by one person of the
physical liberty of another, by acting to cause a false arrest, that is, an arrest made
without legal authority, 9 or without sufficient legal authority, 10 resulting in damages.
11 However, the tort of false arrest does not require a formal arrest, but rather a manifest
intent to take someone into custody and subject that person to the defendant's control. 12
For false arrest, there is no requirement that the arrest be formal, that the detention be for
the purpose of arraignment or that the detention continue until presentation to a judicial
officer in order for the arrest to be actionable. 13
Footnotes
Footnote 8. Headrick v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 Ark 433, 738 SW2d 418.
Footnote 9. Stern v Thompson & Coates, 185 Wis 2d 221, 517 NW2d 658,
reconsideration den (Wis) 525 NW2d 736.
Footnote 10. Limited Stores v Wilson-Robinson, 317 Ark 80, 876 SW2d 248.
Footnote 11. Ting v United States (CA9 Cal) 927 F2d 1504, 91 CDOS 1794, 91 Daily
Journal DAR 2996; Trenouth v United States (CA9 Cal) 764 F2d 1305, 119 BNA LRRM
3615.
Footnote 12. Cooper v Dyke (CA4 Md) 814 F2d 941.
Footnote 13. Day v Wells Fargo Guard Service Co. (Mo) 711 SW2d 503.
3 Distinction between false imprisonment and false arrest [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
Some courts have described false arrest and false imprisonment as causes of action which
are distinguishable only in terminology. 14 The two have been called virtually
indistinguishable, 15 and identical. 16 However, the difference between them lies in the
manner in which they arise. 17 In order to commit false imprisonment, it is not
necessary either to intend to make an arrest 18 or actually to make an arrest. 19 By
contrast, a person who is falsely arrested is at the same time falsely imprisoned, 20 and
an unlawful arrest may give rise to a cause of action for either false arrest or false
imprisonment. 21 Thus, it has been stated that false arrest and false imprisonment are
not separate torts, and that a false arrest is one way to commit false imprisonment; since
an arrest involves a restraint, it always involves imprisonment. 22 Furthermore,
unlawful detention after a lawful arrest may give rise to a false imprisonment action. 23
It has been held, however, that a person improperly detained pursuant to a lawful arrest,
though having the right to bring an action for false imprisonment, cannot bring an action
for false arrest. 24

Absent an "arrest", there can be no false arrest. 25 Thus an individual subject to a
warrant who turns himself or herself in voluntarily to the police or issuing authority is
neither subject to false arrest nor able to bring a claim alleging false arrest. 26 In order
to prevail on a claim for false arrest, the arrestee must show a lack of probable cause for
the arrest, 27 or, put otherwise, the plaintiff must prove that the arrest was made without
any legal process or warrant, or was made pursuant to a warrant which was null and void
on its face. 28
False arrest and false imprisonment are derivative of the ancient action of trespass,
generally having to do with unlawful acts done to the person or property of another, by
violence or force, direct or imputed, 29 and false arrest and wrongful detention 30
constitute a continuing tort, encompassing both the unlawful arrest and detention of the
arrested person. 31 Both torts encompass the right to be free from being arrested without
probable cause. 32
Footnotes
Footnote 14. Johnson v Weiner, 155 Fla 169, 19 So 2d 699; Fox v McCurnin, 205 Iowa
752, 218 NW 499; Holland v Lutz, 194 Kan 712, 401 P2d 1015.
Although the distinctions are not always clearly set out by the authorities, false arrest, or
unlawful arrest, is a species of the common-law action for false imprisonment.
Bonkowski v Arlan's Dep't Store, 12 Mich App 88, 162 NW2d 347, revd on other
grounds 383 Mich 90, 174 NW2d 765.
Forms: Instructions to jury defining false arrest. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Imprisonment, Form 4.
Footnote 15. Kraft v Bettendorf (Iowa) 359 NW2d 466.
Footnote 16. Fermino v Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal 4th 701, 30 Cal Rptr 2d 18, 872 P2d 559, 59
Cal Comp Cas 296, 94 CDOS 3399, 94 Daily Journal DAR 6423, 9 BNA IER Cas 1132.
Footnote 17. Harrer v Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428;
Houghtaling v State, 11 Misc 2d 1049, 175 NYS2d 659; Alter v Paul (Franklin Co) 101
Ohio App 139, 1 Ohio Ops 2d 80, 72 Ohio L Abs 332, 135 NE2d 73; Alsup v Skaggs
Drug Center, 203 Okla 525, 223 P2d 530; Bender v Seattle, 99 Wash 2d 582, 664 P2d
492, 9 Media L R 2101.
Footnote 18. Harrer v Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428; Hepworth
v Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P2d 507.
Footnote 19. S. H. Kress & Co. v Bradshaw, 186 Okla 588, 99 P2d 508; Hepworth v
Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P2d 507.
Refusal of a taxicab driver to allow a passenger to leave the cab, followed by transporting
the passenger back to the place of origin of the ride, may have been sufficient to
constitute false imprisonment, but it was not sufficient to constitute an arrest. McGlone v
Landreth, 200 Okla 425, 195 P2d 268 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Parker v
Washington (Okla) 421 P2d 861).
Footnote 20. McGlone v Landreth, 200 Okla 425, 195 P2d 268 (ovrld in part on other
grounds by Parker v Washington (Okla) 421 P2d 861); Hepworth v Covey Bros.
Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P2d 507.
The tort of false arrest is essentially the same as the tort of false imprisonment, and every
false arrest is itself a false imprisonment, with the imprisonment commencing with the
arrest. Budgar v State, 98 Misc 2d 588, 414 NYS2d 463.
Footnote 21. Stallings v Foster, 119 Cal App 2d 614, 259 P2d 1006.
Footnote 22. Schroeder v Lufthansa German Airlines (CA7 Ill) 875 F2d 613; George v
Long Beach (CA9 Cal) 973 F2d 706, 92 CDOS 7892, 92 Daily Journal DAR 12847, cert
den (US) 122 L Ed 2d 664, 113 S Ct 1269; Children v Burton (Iowa) 331 NW2d 673,
cert den 464 US 848, 78 L Ed 2d 143, 104 S Ct 155; Harrer v Montgomery Ward &
Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428; S. H. Kress & Co. v Bradshaw, 186 Okla 588, 99 P2d
508.
Footnote 23. Ogulin v Jeffries, 121 Cal App 2d 211, 263 P2d 75.
Footnote 24. Ogulin v Jeffries, 121 Cal App 2d 211, 263 P2d 75.
Footnote 25. Bonkowski v Arlan's Dep't Store, 383 Mich 90, 174 NW2d 765 (holding
that there had been no "arrest" where a uniformed guard in a department store called back
a customer, who was about 30 feet beyond the door, to a point near the door where he
made certain accusatory statements and, with plaintiff's permission, examined the
contents of her purse to ascertain whether certain jewelry had been stolen, the entire
incident lasting some 4 to 5 minutes).
Footnote 26. Grandjean v Grandjean, 315 Ark 620, 869 SW2d 709.
Footnote 27. Simmons v Pryor (CA7 Ill) 26 F3d 650.
Footnote 28. Duboue v City of New Orleans (CA5 La) 909 F2d 129, cert den 499 US
922, 113 L Ed 2d 247, 111 S Ct 1314.
Footnote 29. Lindsey v Camelot Music (Ala) 628 So 2d 314, reh den, without op (Ala)
1993 Ala LEXIS 1390.
Footnote 30. Cowdrey v Eastborough (CA10 Kan) 730 F2d 1376 (stating that false arrest
and wrongful detention are both actions for false imprisonment).
Footnote 31. Santiago v Fenton (CA1 Mass) 891 F2d 373.

Footnote 32. Bradway v Gonzales (CA2 NY) 26 F3d 313, 29 FR Serv 3d 997 (because
warrantless seizure of property under the plain view doctrine was lawful and conferred a
qualified immunity as to the seizure, the seizure could not form the basis for a false arrest
claim based on 42 USC 1983, regardless of preexisting law).
4 Related torts distinguishedabuse of process [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
The elements of the tort of abuse of process are: (1) regularly issued process compelling
the performance or forbearance of some prescribed act; (2) the person activating the
process must have been motivated to do harm without economic or social excuse or
justification; and (3) such person must be seeking some collateral advantage or
corresponding detriment to the plaintiff which is outside the legitimate ends of process.
33 The absence of probable cause is not an element of abuse of process. 34 Abuse of
process is a distinct claim from false arrest and malicious prosecution to the extent that
abuse of process may lie as a cause of action regardless of whether there was probable
cause or whether the prior proceedings terminated in favor of the charged party. 35 The
two torts may also be distinguished in that the intention or purpose of the defendant in
detaining a person is immaterial to the maintenance of an action for false imprisonment.
36
Footnotes
Footnote 33. Bernard v United States (CA2 NY) 25 F3d 98; Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v Joy
Mfg. Co. (Ala) 619 So 2d 1280, reh den, without op (Ala) 1993 Ala LEXIS 646; Jenkins
v Daniels (Alaska) 751 P2d 19.
Elements of abuse of process include an illegal, improper or perverted use of the process;
an ulterior motive or purpose on the part of the defendant in such exercise of the process;
damage to the plaintiff resulting from such conduct by the defendant. Vahlsing v
Commercial Union Ins. Co. (CA1 Mass) 928 F2d 486, 21 BCD 796, CCH Bankr L Rptr
73872.
Footnote 34. Simone v Golden Nugget Hotel & Casino (CA3 Pa) 844 F2d 1031, 25 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 399.
Footnote 36. 1 Am Jur 2d, Abuse of Process 4.
5 -- Malicious prosecution [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A malicious prosecution is one that is begun in malice, without probable cause to believe
it can succeed, and that ultimately ends in failure. 37 The essential difference between
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution is the validity of the legal authority for the
restraint imposed. 38 In malicious prosecution the detention is malicious, but under due
form of law, whereas in false imprisonment the converse is true. The detention is
unlawful, but malice and lack of probable cause are not essential, as a general rule, to the
cause of action. 39 Thus, where the process on which an arrest is made is regular and
legal in form and issued by a court of competent authority, but issued maliciously and
without probable cause, the remedy is an action for malicious prosecution. 40 However,
a suit for false arrest or imprisonment is the proper action where the aggrieved party is
arrested without legal authority, 41 as where he or she is arrested pursuant to process that
is void. 42
Contrary to the general rule in the case of an action for malicious prosecution, 43 in an
action for false imprisonment it is not necessary to show that the dispute on which the
detention was based was judicially resolved in the plaintiff's favor. 44
In some instances, the court may find that both malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment are involved in the same dispute. 45 If so, the fact that they follow each
other in successive events does not in any way merge the wrongs inflicted, or deprive the
plaintiff of his or her right to recover damages for each offense. 46
Footnotes
Footnote 37. 52 Am Jur 2d, Malicious Prosecution 1.
Footnote 38. See Burt v Ferrese (CA3 Del) 871 F2d 14 (While the defendants might have
committed the tort of malicious prosecution, defendants are not subject to liability for
false arrest and detention, where the arrest is pursuant to a warrant. The distinction
between false arrest and malicious prosecution depends on whether or not the arrest is
made pursuant to a warrant. One who initiates the proceedings that result in a warrant
may be liable for malicious prosecution.)
Practice References Malicious Prosecution. 16 Am Jur Trials 205 2.
Malicious Prosecution. 7 Am Jur POF2d 181 2.
Footnote 39. Stallings v Foster, 119 Cal App 2d 614, 259 P2d 1006; Kredit v Ryan, 68
SD 274, 1 NW2d 813.
Footnote 40. Bernard v United States (CA2 NY) 25 F3d 98; Adams v Metiva (CA6 Mich)
31 F3d 375, 1994 FED App 277P; Reed v City & County of Honolulu, 76 Hawaii 219,
873 P2d 98; Page v Wiggins (Miss) 595 So 2d 1291, reh den (Miss) 1992 Miss LEXIS
208; Coffman v Shell Petroleum Corp., 228 Mo App 727, 71 SW2d 97; Kredit v Ryan, 68
SD 274, 1 NW2d 813.
Malicious filing of false complaint causing issuance of warrant on which plaintiff was
arrested did not give rise to cause of action for false imprisonment; action must be for
malicious prosecution. Genito v Rabinowitz, 93 NJ Super 225, 225 A2d 590.
Acts of court authorizing arrest are not those of complainant in the case and there can be
no charge against him for false imprisonment, whatever his liability might be for
malicious prosecution. Kaye v Shane, 204 Misc 82, 118 NYS2d 592.
Footnote 41. Coffman v Shell Petroleum Corp., 228 Mo App 727, 71 SW2d 97; Kredit v
Ryan, 68 SD 274, 1 NW2d 813.
If an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant issued by a lawfully authorized person, neither
the arrest nor the subsequent imprisonment is "false" and, as a consequence, the
complaining party's action must be one for malicious prosecution. Goodwin v Barry
Miller Chevrolet, Inc. (Ala) 543 So 2d 1171; Ennis v Beason (Ala) 537 So 2d 17.
See Bulkley v Klein (4th Dist) 206 Cal App 2d 742, 23 Cal Rptr 855, discussing
distinction between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution in action charging
private person with both and holding that cause of action for false imprisonment was not
established where arrest by police officer was not shown to be illegal.
Footnote 42. Duboue v City of New Orleans (CA5 La) 909 F2d 129, cert den 499 US
922, 113 L Ed 2d 247, 111 S Ct 1314.
Footnote 43. See 52 Am Jur 2d, Malicious Prosecution 29.
Footnote 44. 16.
Footnote 45. Vernon v Plumas Lumber Co., 71 Cal App 112, 234 P 869; Grimes v
Greenblatt, 47 Colo 495, 107 P 1111.
Footnote 46. Vernon v Plumas Lumber Co., 71 Cal App 112, 234 P 869.
Where plaintiff suspected of shoplifting was first detained in store by store manager and
later, at instigation of store manager, was arrested by police officer, there were 2
transactions, and plaintiff was not required to elect as between his counts for false arrest
and malicious prosecution, although second arrest would, under case, be merged or
blended into action for malicious prosecution. Schwane v Kroger Co. (Mo App) 480
SW2d 113.
The causes of action for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment are sufficiently
distinct so that where a plaintiff chooses to sue for both torts for acts occurring in
sequence the fact that one of the causes of action is dismissed or is decided against him
by the jury does not foreclose him from seeking a remedy on the other cause of action.
Ira v Columbia Food Co., 226 Or 566, 360 P2d 622, 86 ALR2d 1378.
6 -- Defamation [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

Provision of incorrect information to a court resulting in an arrest based on a defective
subpoena and subsequent bench warrant sets out a claim for false imprisonment resulting
in the plaintiff's unlawful restraint, rather than a defamation which invades the plaintiff's
interest in reputation and good name, 47 and mere accusation of commission of a crime,
however slanderous it might be, does not of itself support a claim for false arrest. 48
Footnotes
Footnote 47. Simon v United States (CA5 La) 711 F2d 740.
Footnote 48. Vessels v District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 531 A2d 1016.
7 -- Negligence [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Negligent causation of arrest claims are not intentional torts. 49 Thus, a merchant's
failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid subjecting its customers to arrest and criminal
charges on the basis of negligent record-keeping will give rise to a negligence claim
rather than a false arrest claim. 50 Standard negligence principles, including duty of
care, negligent discharge of that duty, proximate causation of injury and compensability
of damages to the injured party continue to apply, where applicable, in these contexts,
notwithstanding the issues of confinement raised. 51
Footnotes
Footnote 49. King v Otasco, Inc. (CA5 Miss) 861 F2d 438, 12 FR Serv 3d 824.
An allegation amounting to a claim for negligent failure to rescue members of a film
crew from the vicinity of a volcano, which plaintiffs attempted to characterize as a false
imprisonment claim, could not survive, where plaintiffs failed to show that false
imprisonment law had any application to the facts of the case. Johnson v Barker (CA9
Wash) 799 F2d 1396.
Footnote 50. Johnson v Supersave Mkts., 211 Mont 465, 686 P2d 209.
Footnote 51. Vahlsing v Commercial Union Ins. Co. (CA1 Mass) 928 F2d 486, 21 BCD
796, CCH Bankr L Rptr 73872.
B. Elements [8-34]
Research References
ALR Digest: False Imprisonment 2, 3

10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms 5-7, 23, 28, 30, 91, 111,
112, 114
26 Am Jur POF2d 617, False ImprisonmentFailure to Take Arrestee Before Magistrate
Without Unreasonable or Unnecessary Delay; 40 Am Jur POF2d 81, False Imprisonment
in Connection With Confinement in Nursing Home or Hospital
1. In General [8-10]
8 Generally [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The gist of an action for false arrest or false imprisonment is the unlawful violation of a
person's right of personal liberty or the restraint of that person without legal authority:
deprivation of liberty of movement or freedom to remain in the place of one's lawful
choice 52 The essential elements of false imprisonment are (1) the detention or restraint
of one against his or her will, and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention or restraint. 53
It has also been said that the elements of cause of action for false imprisonment include
intent to confine, consciousness of confinement, lack of privilege, and nonconsent. 54
Further, some courts have required that the confinement occur within boundaries fixed by
the defendant, 55 or within a limited area. 56
If the confinement leads to a subsequent prosecution, it is generally held that termination
of the prosecution is not essential to maintenance of the action. 57 Also, it is not
necessary that the wrongful act which results in detention or restraint be under color of
any legal or judicial proceeding, 58 nor, as a general rule, do lack of malice, the presence
of good faith, 59 or the presence of probable cause for the imprisonment 60 affect the
existence of the wrong where the detention is unlawful.
Though assault is often an ingredient of false imprisonment, 61 it is not essential. 62
However, some courts have held or stated that the action of false imprisonment always
includes the element of assault in a technical sense. 63
An action for false imprisonment does not require proof of injury to the individual's
person, character, or reputation. 64
Footnotes
Footnote 52. Bender v Seattle, 99 Wash 2d 582, 664 P2d 492, 9 Media L R 2101.
Whenever a person obstructs or deprives another of his or her freedom to choose his or
her location, for however brief a period, that person will be liable for that interference.
Moody v McElroy (RI) 513 A2d 5.
Footnote 53. Pete v Metcalfe (CA5 Tex) 8 F3d 214; Adams v Metiva (CA6 Mich) 31 F3d
375, 1994 FED App 277P; Schroeder v Lufthansa German Airlines (CA7 Ill) 875 F2d
613; Burlington Transp. Co. v Josephson (CA8 SD) 153 F2d 372; Hill v Georgia Power
Co. (CA11 Ga) 786 F2d 1071, 122 BNA LRRM 2779, 104 CCH LC 11928; R.J.D. v
Vaughan Clinic, P.C. (Ala) 572 So 2d 1225; Hazen v Anchorage (Alaska) 718 P2d 456;
Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278; Ware v Dunn, 80 Cal App 2d
936, 183 P2d 128; Shaw v May Dep't Stores Co. (Dist Col App) 268 A2d 607; Reed v
City & County of Honolulu, 76 Hawaii 219, 873 P2d 98; Renk v City of Pittsburgh (Pa)
641 A2d 289, digest op at (Pa) 17 PLW 225; Kraft v Bettendorf (Iowa) 359 NW2d 466;
Children v Burton (Iowa) 331 NW2d 673, cert den 464 US 848, 78 L Ed 2d 143, 104 S
Ct 155; Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v Stoess, 304 Ky 73, 199 SW2d 994; Page v Wiggins
(Miss) 595 So 2d 1291, reh den (Miss) 1992 Miss LEXIS 208; Richardson v Empire
Trust Co., 230 Mo App 580, 94 SW2d 966; Hardy v La Belle's Distrib. Co., 203 Mont
263, 661 P2d 35; Hoffman v Clinic Hospital, Inc., 213 NC 669, 197 SE 161;
Commonwealth v Brewer, 109 Pa Super 429, 167 A 386; Coffee v Peterbilt of Nashville,
Inc. (Tenn) 795 SW2d 656; J. C. Penney Co. v Duran (Tex Civ App San Antonio) 479
SW2d 374, writ ref n r e (Oct 4, 1972).
Footnote 54. Wiltse v State (4th Dept) 51 App Div 2d 865, 380 NYS2d 175.
As to intent to confine, see 12.
As to awareness of confinement, see 11.
As to the defense of consent, see 60.
Footnote 56. Bennett v Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 60 Ohio St 3d 107,
573 NE2d 633.
Footnote 57. Collins v Owens, 77 Cal App 2d 713, 176 P2d 372; Smith v Embry, 103 Ga
App 375, 119 SE2d 45; Hunt v Davis, 248 NC 69, 102 SE2d 405; S. H. Kress & Co. v
Rust (Tex Civ App) 97 SW2d 997, affd 132 Tex 89, 120 SW2d 425.
Footnote 58. Griffin v Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P2d 297; S. H. Kress & Co. v Bradshaw,
186 Okla 588, 99 P2d 508.
Footnote 59. 9.
Footnote 60. 10.
Footnote 61. Ware v Dunn, 80 Cal App 2d 936, 183 P2d 128; Hoffman v Clinic Hospital,
Inc., 213 NC 669, 197 SE 161.
Footnote 62. Alterauge v Los Angeles Turf Club, 97 Cal App 2d 735, 218 P2d 802;
Hoffman v Clinic Hospital, Inc., 213 NC 669, 197 SE 161.
Footnote 63. Perry v S. H. Kress & Co., 187 Kan 537, 358 P2d 665; Fowler v Valencourt,
334 NC 345, dissenting op at (NC) 435 SE2d 530; Burkland v Bliss, 62 SD 91, 252 NW
25.
Footnote 64. Charles v Norfolk & W. R. Co. (CA7 Ill) 188 F2d 691, cert den 342 US
831, 96 L Ed 628, 72 S Ct 55; Griffin v Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P2d 297; S. H. Kress &
Co. v Bradshaw, 186 Okla 588, 99 P2d 508.
9 Malice or motive; good faith [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Actual malice or bad motive is not an essential element needed to sustain an action for
false imprisonment. 65 and the plaintiff need not allege malice on behalf of the
defendant in order to recover. 66 Except to increase or mitigate the damages, the
existence or nonexistence of malice in fact is ordinarily immaterial; 67 the good or evil
intention or purpose of the defendant neither creates nor excuses the tort. 68
Footnotes
831, 96 L Ed 628, 72 S Ct 55; Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278;
Marshall v District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 391 A2d 1374; Johnson v Weiner, 155
Fla 169, 19 So 2d 699; Holland v Lutz, 194 Kan 712, 401 P2d 1015; Tumbarella v
Kroger Co., 85 Mich App 482, 271 NW2d 284; Teel v May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo
696, 155 SW2d 74, 137 ALR 495; Hall v Rice, 117 Neb 813, 223 NW 4, 78 ALR 1421
(ovrld in part on other grounds by Whitcomb v Nebraska State Education Asso., 184 Neb
31, 165 NW2d 99); Altana v McCabe, 132 NJL 12, 38 A2d 192; McLoughlin v New York
Edison Co., 252 NY 202, 169 NE 277; Moody v McElroy (RI) 513 A2d 5; Kredit v Ryan,
68 SD 274, 1 NW2d 813.
Malice, ill will, or the slightest wrongful intention on the part of the defendant was not
necessary to support a judgment against a peace officer for wrongful arrest for past
misdemeanor without warrant. Crosswhite v Barnes, 139 Va 471, 124 SE 242, 40 ALR
54.
Footnote 66. 123.
Footnote 67. Reilly v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (CA9 Cal) 15 F2d 314;
Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278; Crawford v Huber, 215 Mich
564, 184 NW 594, 39 ALR 1392; Harbison v Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 327 Mo 440, 37
SW2d 609, 79 ALR 1; Kroeger v Passmore, 36 Mont 504, 93 P 805; Gill v Montgomery
Ward & Co., 284 App Div 36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49 ALR2d 1452; Kredit v Ryan, 68 SD
274, 1 NW2d 813.
If the imprisonment is unlawful, the injury suffered is as great whether the motive be
good or evil. Nesmith v Alford (CA5 Ala) 318 F2d 110, reh den (CA5 Ala) 319 F2d 859
and cert den 375 US 975, 11 L Ed 2d 420, 84 S Ct 489.
The subjective state of mind of the defendant is irrelevant once it is determined that the
defendant violated clearly established law. McIntosh v Arkansas Republican Party-Frank
White Election Comm. (CA8 Ark) 816 F2d 409, vacated, remanded, on reh, en banc
(CA8 Ark) 825 F2d 184, on remand (ED Ark) 676 F Supp 912, affd (CA8 Ark) 856 F2d
1185.
As to relevancy, materiality, and competency of evidence as to malice or good faith in
mitigation of damages, generally, see 130.
As to the relevancy of malice with respect to punitive damages, see 150.
Footnote 68. Stubbs v Abercrombie, 42 Cal App 170, 183 P 458; Wiegand v Meade, 108
NJL 471, 158 A 825.
An imprisonment which is lawful does not become unlawful because it was prompted by
malicious motives. Holland v Lutz, 194 Kan 712, 401 P2d 1015.
Forms: Instruction to jurygood faith no justification. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev),
10 Absence of probable cause [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
It is frequently held or recognized that the want of probable cause is not an essential
element of the action for false imprisonment, 69 and need not be alleged by a plaintiff in
the petition or complaint. 70
On the other hand, some courts have expressly required the plaintiff in a false arrest
action to show a lack of probable cause for the detention, 71 or indicated that the
plaintiff has the burden of proving the lack of probable cause by affirmative evidence.
72 It has also been held that allegations of lack of probable cause are requisite parts of
the plaintiff's prima facie case. 73
Footnotes
Footnote 69. Meints v Huntington (CA8 Minn) 276 F 245, 19 ALR 664; Daniels v
Milstead, 221 Ala 353, 128 So 447; Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR
278; Miller v Glass, 44 Cal 2d 359, 282 P2d 501; S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla
471, 180 So 757; Mahan v Adam, 144 Md 355, 124 A 901; Tumbarella v Kroger Co., 85
Mich App 482, 271 NW2d 284; Teel v May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo 696, 155 SW2d
74, 137 ALR 495; Rogers v Barbera, 170 Ohio St 241, 10 Ohio Ops 2d 248, 164 NE2d
162; Swafford v Vermillion (Okla) 261 P2d 187; McNeff v Heider, 216 Or 583, 337 P2d
819, reh den 216 Or 594, 340 P2d 180; Crosswhite v Barnes, 139 Va 471, 124 SE 242,
40 ALR 54.
As to the relevance of probable cause where the issue is justification for an arrest or
detention without a warrant, see 79, 84.
As to the relevance of probable cause where it is asserted that the defendant was acting in
protection of his or her person or property.
Footnote 70. 123.
Footnote 72. Taylor v Dillards Dep't Stores, Inc. (CA10 Okla) 971 F2d 601 (holding that
an instruction that the defendant had the burden of proof on that point constitutes
reversible error).
Footnote 73. Garton v Reno, 102 Nev 313, 720 P2d 1227.
The essential elements of an action for false arrest or false imprisonment are that the
plaintiff was restrained or arrested by the defendant and that the defendant acted without
having reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committed by the plaintiff.
Meerbrey v Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill 2d 455, 151 Ill Dec 560, 564 NE2d 1222.
2. Detention or Restraint [11-20]

In order to constitute a false imprisonment, it is essential that there be some restraint of
the person. 74 However, it is not necessary that there be confinement in a jail or prison.
75 All that is necessary is that the individual be restrained against his or her will and
without sufficient authority either directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any means.
76 The wrong may be committed by acts or by words, or both. 77 The position has also
been taken, however, that to constitute false imprisonment, the restraint or detention
imposed must be within limits set by the restraining party, 78 and that it must be total. 79
There is some authority that merely questioning a person and asking such person to return
to a store does not constitute an "arrest" on which an action for false imprisonment can be
based, 80 particularly where such person was not accused of any crime and nothing was
done to indicate that such person was being taken into custody or being held for delivery
to a peace officer to answer a criminal charge. 81
The existence of false imprisonment is a mixed question of law and fact. It is a question
of law for the court to decide what facts constitute a false imprisonment; 82 and it is a
question of fact for the jury to determine whether such facts do exist as are necessary to
make out an imprisonment under the law as settled by the court. 83
Footnotes
Footnote 74. Vandiveer v Charters, 110 Cal App 347, 294 P 440; Rogers v T.J.X. Cos.,
329 NC 226, 404 SE2d 664 (holding that some restraint of the person is essential,
whether by threats, express or implied, or by conduct); Hoffman v Clinic Hospital, Inc.,
213 NC 669, 197 SE 161; Safeway Stores, Inc. v Amburn (Tex Civ App Fort Worth) 388
SW2d 443.
Footnote 75. 15.
Footnote 76. Griffin v Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P2d 297; Mahan v Adam, 144 Md 355,
124 A 901.
Footnote 77. Griffin v Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P2d 297; Durgin v Cohen, 168 Minn 77,
209 NW 532; Day v Wells Fargo Guard Service Co. (Mo) 711 SW2d 503; West v King's
Dep't Store, Inc., 321 NC 698, 365 SE2d 621.
Restraint may be accomplished by means of physical force, threat of force or arrest,
confinement by physical barriers or by means of any other form of unreasonable duress.
Fermino v Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal 4th 701, 30 Cal Rptr 2d 18, 872 P2d 559, 59 Cal Comp Cas
296, 94 CDOS 3399, 94 Daily Journal DAR 6423, 9 BNA IER Cas 1132.
If not lawful or consented to, any restraint is unlawful. Fowler v Valencourt, 334 NC 345,
dissenting op at (NC) 435 SE2d 530.
As to restraint or detention by force or threats, see 18, 19.
Footnote 78. Stallings v Foster, 119 Cal App 2d 614, 259 P2d 1006.
Footnote 79. 16.
Footnote 80. Carruth v Barker (Ala) 454 So 2d 539 (holding that an investigatory stop is
not an arrest); Conn v Paul Harris Stores, Inc. (Ind App) 439 NE2d 195; Bruce v Meijers
Supermarkets, Inc., 34 Mich App 352, 191 NW2d 132.
Footnote 81. Lester v Albers Super Markets, Inc., 94 Ohio App 313, 51 Ohio Ops 457, 65
Ohio L Abs 315, 114 NE2d 529.
Footnote 82. Brinkman v Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St 171, 119 NE 451.
Footnote 83. See Taylor v Dillards Dep't Stores, Inc. (CA10 Okla) 971 F2d 601 (holding
that a shopper detained on suspicion of shoplifting had the burden of proving lack of
probable cause for detention).
12 Intent [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A person is not liable for false imprisonment unless his or her act is done for the purpose
of imposing a confinement, or with knowledge that such confinement will, to a
substantial certainty, result from it. 84 The necessary intent for purposes of a false
imprisonment claim is merely the intent to confine. 85 So long as there is a manifest
intent to take a person into custody and to subject such person to the defendant's control,
the intent to confine element of a false arrest claim is sufficiently shown, even in the
absence of a formal arrest. 86 Mere enlistment of the aid of law enforcement, however,
does not of itself create a conspiracy to commit false arrest, 87 nor does the mere act of
booking an arrested person render the booking officer liable for the arrestee's
confinement. 88
Deliberate indifference to a person's right to freedom from prolonged incarceration
supplies the necessary intent for a false imprisonment action. 89 In order to demonstrate
the necessary element of intent, the defendants must only intend to accomplish the act
that causes the confinement, they need not intend the confinement to be unlawful; the
defendants' actual motives are immaterial, because the intent relates to the "confinement"
element, rather than to the "unlawful" element of the detention. 90 If an act is done with
the intention of causing the confinement of the person actually confined, or of another,
and such act is a substantial factor in bringing about a confinement, it is immaterial
whether the act directly or indirectly causes the confinement. 91 In this connection,
there is some authority to the effect that the doctrine of transferred intent is applicable to
the tort of false imprisonment. Under this doctrine the intention to confine any person is
sufficient intent to render one liable to the person actually confined, and it is immaterial
that defendant did not know the identity of the person he or she intended to confine, nor
does it matter that the defendant intended to affect some person other than the one
actually confined. 92
It is ordinarily for the jury to determine from the evidence, as a question of fact, the
intention of the defendant in an action for false imprisonment. 93
Where, under state law, the defendant's intent to confine the plaintiff is an essential
element, a false imprisonment claim against an airline arising out of a "skyjacking" by
terrorists does not state a cause of action for false imprisonment, since it is the terrorists
who have the intent to confine, rather than the airline. 94
Footnotes
Footnote 84. Johnson v Weiner, 155 Fla 169, 19 So 2d 699; Lively v Blackfoot, 91 Idaho
80, 416 P2d 27; J. J. Newberry Co. v Judd, 259 Ky 309, 82 SW2d 359; State use of
Powell v Moore, 252 Miss 471, 174 So 2d 352; Roberts v Coleman, 228 Or 286, 365 P2d
79; Hepworth v Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P2d 507.
A deputy sheriff's actions in landing his helicopter, issuing citations to persons in a
restricted area of volcanic activity, and departing, was not tantamount to an arrest so as to
support a claim for false arrest even if, as alleged by the plaintiffs, the officer was angry
and vulgar while he was in the process of issuing the citations. Johnson v Barker (CA9
Wash) 799 F2d 1396.

Footnote 87. Kay v New Hampshire Democratic Party (CA1 NH) 821 F2d 31.
Footnote 88. Kinan v Brockton (CA1 Mass) 876 F2d 1029, 28 Fed Rules Evid Serv 327.
Footnote 89. Oviatt v Pearce (CA9 Or) 954 F2d 1470, 92 CDOS 490, 92 Daily Journal
DAR 723.
DAR 723.
Footnote 91. Griffin v Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P2d 297.
Footnote 92. Du Lac v Perma Trans Products, Inc. (2nd Dist) 103 Cal App 3d 937, 163
Cal Rptr 335.
Footnote 93. Blaz v Molin Concrete Products Co., 309 Minn 382, 244 NW2d 277;
Johnson v Norfolk & W. Ry., 82 W Va 692, 97 SE 189, 6 ALR 1469.
Footnote 94. Abourezk v New York Airlines, Inc., 283 US App DC 34, 895 F2d 1456;
Schroeder v Lufthansa German Airlines (CA7 Ill) 875 F2d 613.
13 Voluntariness of confinement [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A restraint or confinement which is not against the will of the plaintiff is not a false
imprisonment; the restraint must be involuntary. 95 There is no imprisonment if the
plaintiff agrees of his or her own free choice to act in conformity with the request of the
defendant, 96 as where he or she voluntarily complies with the defendant's request to
accompany the defendant. 97
Footnotes
Footnote 95. Griffin v Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P2d 297; Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v
Shaffer (Ky) 402 SW2d 424; State use of Powell v Moore, 252 Miss 471, 174 So 2d 352;
James v MacDougall & Southwick Co., 134 Wash 314, 235 P 812.
An employee, accused of theft, who was not restrained against her will, was not told she
could not leave and admitted that she wished to remain in the office where she had been
led for a discussion, so as to clarify the situation, was not restrained against her will for
purposes of her false imprisonment claim; although she was not initially told the purpose
of the meeting, the employee indicated she would have remained there voluntarily had
she been told. Hardy v La Belle's Distrib. Co., 203 Mont 263, 661 P2d 35.
As to consent as a defense to an action for false imprisonment, see 60.

Footnote 96. James v MacDougall & Southwick Co., 134 Wash 314, 235 P 812.
See also Pounders v Trinity Court Nursing Home, Inc., 265 Ark 1, 576 SW2d 934, 4
ALR4th 442, holding that defendant's commitment of plaintiff, her aunt, to a nursing
home did not amount to false imprisonment, because no force or threats were used and
there was actually consent.
Forms: Instructions to jury as to privilege arising from consent to acts constituting
imprisonment. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 5.
Footnote 97. Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v Shaffer (Ky) 402 SW2d 424; Roberts v
Coleman, 228 Or 286, 365 P2d 79; James v MacDougall & Southwick Co., 134 Wash
314, 235 P 812.
A high school student suspected of transporting a bomb on an airplane was not
unlawfully restrained or confined against her will by the airline crew's request that she
remain strapped in a seat in the plane's cockpit until she could be taken off the plane after
it landed; the passenger cooperated with the requests voluntarily and never said that she
did not want to go or that she wanted to leave. Schroeder v Lufthansa German Airlines
(CA7 Ill) 875 F2d 613.
14 Awareness of confinement [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
It is generally held that the plaintiff in a false imprisonment action must be aware or
conscious of confinement; 98 there is no liability, it is stated, for intentionally confining
another unless that person knows of the confinement. 99 This rule gives recognition to
the fact that false imprisonment, as a dignitary tort, is not suffered unless its victim knows
of the dignitary invasion. 1 A person may be shown to have been conscious of
confinement even though in a state of intoxication at the time of confinement. 2
Where the evidence is conflicting, the issue of plaintiff's awareness of confinement is
properly submitted to the jury. 3
Footnotes
Footnote 98. Harrer v Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428; Little
Stores v Isenberg, 26 Tenn App 357, 172 SW2d 13.
Footnote 99. Harrer v Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428.
The "awareness" requirement was met for purposes of a false imprisonment action
brought against county officials where a clerical error resulted in the detainee's
incarceration for 114 days prior to arraignment. Although the detainee, who was
diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, was incapable of communicating his plight,
he was nonetheless aware of his confinement. Oviatt v Pearce (CA9 Or) 954 F2d 1470,
92 CDOS 490, 92 Daily Journal DAR 723.
Footnote 1. Parvi v Kingston, 41 NY2d 553, 394 NYS2d 161, 362 NE2d 960.
Footnote 2. See Parvi v Kingston, 41 NY2d 553, 394 NYS2d 161, 362 NE2d 960
(evidence in an action against a city for false imprisonment was sufficient to show
consciousness by plaintiff of his confinement by police, even though plaintiff later had
trouble, because of his state of intoxication at the time of confinement, in recollecting the
occurrence; distinction was to be made between later recollection of consciousness and
existence of such consciousness at the time when imprisonment itself took place).
Footnote 3. Blaz v Molin Concrete Products Co., 309 Minn 382, 244 NW2d 277.
15 Place of confinement [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The term "false imprisonment" is misleading in that it does not necessarily refer to
confinement within a jail or prison. 4 Any confinement of a person is said to be an
imprisonment, 5 whether it be in prison 6 or in any place temporarily used for the
purpose of confinement. 7 Thus, an action for false imprisonment may be predicated on
detention or confinement in a mental institution, 8 hospital, 9 nursing home, 10 or
juvenile home. 11 Also, an unlawful restraint and detention, sufficient as a basis for
false imprisonment, may occur in such places as a restaurant, 12 a nightclub, 13 a hotel
room, 14 a private house, 15 a truck at a job site, 16 an airplane on a runway, 17 a
casino, 18 a chemical dependency treatment center under a "voluntary treatment
agreement," 19 a place of employment or former employment, 20 a prison, 21 a barred
room in a private residence, 22 or an automobile. 23
On occasion, the place of confinement may dictate the substantive result, as where state,
federal or international law precludes the action at a particular situs. 24
Footnotes
Footnote 4. Ware v Dunn, 80 Cal App 2d 936, 183 P2d 128; Zayre of Virginia, Inc. v
Gowdy, 207 Va 47, 147 SE2d 710.
It is not necessary that a person actually be incarcerated to have a cause of action for false
imprisonment. Cline v Flagler Sales Corp. (Fla App D3) 207 So 2d 709.
Footnote 5. Watkins v Oaklawn Jockey Club (DC Ark) 86 F Supp 1006, affd (CA8 Ark)
183 F2d 440; Fox v McCurnin, 205 Iowa 752, 218 NW 499.
Footnote 6. Gogue v MacDonald, 35 Cal 2d 482, 218 P2d 542, 21 ALR2d 639; Fox v
McCurnin, 205 Iowa 752, 218 NW 499.
Footnote 7. Vandiveer v Charters, 110 Cal App 347, 294 P 440.
Footnote 8. Wagenmann v Adams (CA1 Mass) 829 F2d 196; Day v Providence Hosp.
(Ala) 622 So 2d 1273, reh den, without op (Ala) 1993 Ala LEXIS 986; Radcliff v County
of Harrison (Ind) 627 NE2d 1305.
As to commitment of mentally ill person, generally, see 33 et seq.
Footnote 9. Gadsden General Hospital v Hamilton, 212 Ala 531, 103 So 553, 40 ALR
294; Cox v Rhodes Ave. Hospital, 198 Ill App (abstract) 82.
A patient confined to the addictive disease unit of a hospital in a detoxification program
failed to produce substantial evidence to rebut the hospital's showing of lawfulness of the
patient's detention in view of a consent form signed by the patient's husband, authorizing
such treatment as was necessary to keep the patient safe. Lolley v Charter Woods Hosp.,
Inc. (Ala) 572 So 2d 1223.
The trial court was held to have committed no error in refusing to direct a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff, who alleged that he was falsely imprisoned by a hospital staff physician
who forcibly restrained him as he was attempting to leave the hospital, in Felton v Coyle
(1st Dist) 95 Ill App 2d 202, 238 NE2d 191, where the plaintiff was hospitalized for
treatment of a fractured clavicle, which required immobilization and bed rest, and
following an apparent altercation with a nurse's aide and a discussion between the
plaintiff, his daughter, and the physician, concerning efforts to find a new doctor and
hospital for the plaintiff, he started to leave.
However, the mere fact that a patient considers himself restrained of his liberty upon
being told that he may not leave the hospital until he has paid his bill does not constitute
false imprisonment where he subsequently left the hospital without payment of the bill
and without restraint by word or act. Hoffman v Clinic Hospital, Inc., 213 NC 669, 197
SE 161.
No false imprisonment of an 8-year-old hospital patient was established by evidence that
her mother was requested by hospital authorities to obtain a dismissal slip from the
cashier's office where, after discussing arrangements for the payment of the patient's
hospital bill with the institution's credit manager, she was requested to sign a cognovit
note to secure payment. Bailie v Miami Valley Hospital, 8 Ohio Misc 193, 37 Ohio Ops
2d 259, 221 NE2d 217.
A three-day hospitalization of a child was lawful and justified in view of the evidence
suggesting to statutorily-mandated authorities that the child might be the victim of
physical abuse. Curtis v State Dep't for Children & Their Families (RI) 522 A2d 203.
As to the liability of hospitals or asylums for forcible detention of patients, generally, see
40 Am Jur 2d, Hospitals and Asylums 19.
Annotation: False imprisonment in connection with confinement in nursing home or
hospital, 4 ALR4th 449.

Forms: Complaint, petition, or declaration alleging unreasonable detention of patient and
infant by hospital for amount of bill due for hospitalization during and after childbirth.
10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 30.
Footnote 10. Big Town Nursing Home, Inc. v Newman (Tex Civ App Waco) 461 SW2d
195.
Where no physical force or threat of force was used to get an elderly woman to enter or
remain in a nursing home, she was held not to have been falsely imprisoned even though
the management of the nursing home initially refused to release her into the custody of
anyone other than the person who had arranged for her admission. Pounders v Trinity
Court Nursing Home, Inc., 265 Ark 1, 576 SW2d 934, 4 ALR4th 442.
Annotation: False imprisonment in connection with confinement in nursing home or
hospital, 4 ALR4th 449.
Forms: False Imprisonment in Connection With Confinement in Nursing Home or
Hospital. 40 Am Jur POF 2d 81.
Footnote 11. McAlmond v Trippel, 93 Cal App 584, 269 P 937.
Footnote 12. Jacques v Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass 438, 138 NE 843, 26 ALR
1329.
Footnote 13. Mason v Wrightson, 205 Md 481, 109 A2d 128.
Footnote 14. Cicurel v Mollet (1st Dept) 1 App Div 2d 239, 149 NYS2d 397, affd 1
NY2d 797, 153 NYS2d 60, 135 NE2d 594.
Footnote 15. Holmes v Nester, 81 Ariz 372, 306 P2d 290, 62 ALR2d 1322.
Footnote 16. Halbert v City of Sherman (CA5 Tex) 33 F3d 526.
Footnote 17. Abourezk v New York Airlines, Inc., 283 US App DC 34, 895 F2d 1456.
Rules Evid Serv 399; Hazelwood v Harrah's, 109 Nev 1005, 862 P2d 1189.
Footnote 19. Collins v Straight, Inc. (CA4 Va) 748 F2d 916, 17 Fed Rules Evid Serv
1351.
Footnote 20. Berry v Loiseau, 223 Conn 786, 614 A2d 414; Meerbrey v Marshall Field &
Co., 139 Ill 2d 455, 151 Ill Dec 560, 564 NE2d 1222.
Footnote 21. Harwood v Johnson, 326 NC 231, 388 SE2d 439, reh den 326 NC 488, 392
SE2d 90; Bennett v Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 60 Ohio St 3d 107, 573
NE2d 633.
Footnote 22. Adelman v State (Tex Crim) 828 SW2d 418, motion for rehearing on PDR
denied (Apr 29, 1992).
Footnote 23. Cline v Flagler Sales Corp. (Fla App D3) 207 So 2d 709; Lewis v Atlantic
Discount Co. (Fla App D1) 99 So 2d 241; National Bond & Inv. Co. v Whithorn, 276 Ky
204, 123 SW2d 263.
Footnote 24. Schroeder v Lufthansa German Airlines (CA7 Ill) 875 F2d 613.
16 Necessity that restraint be total; effect of partial or conditional restraint [32
Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Courts have required that in order for restraint to furnish grounds for a false
imprisonment action, such restraint must be total. 25 Thus, it is held, there is no false
imprisonment if a reasonable way of escape is available, 26 unless the person restrained
is unaware of the way of escape. 27 Nonetheless, false imprisonment has also been
found where a person has been entirely restrained from doing a certain thing or going in a
particular direction. 28 The true test, it has been said, seems to be not the extent of the
restraint, where the interference amounts to a restraint, but the lawfulness thereof. 29
A restraint may be nonetheless an imprisonment although it may lie within the power of
the person restrained to obtain release by complying with the requirements of the person
imposing the restraint; at least this is true where such requirements are without legal
justification. 30
Footnotes
Footnote 25. Pounders v Trinity Court Nursing Home, Inc., 265 Ark 1, 576 SW2d 934, 4
ALR4th 442; Harwood v Johnson, 326 NC 231, 388 SE2d 439, reh den 326 NC 488, 392
SE2d 90.
Footnote 26. Davis & Allcott Co. v Boozer, 215 Ala 116, 110 So 28, 49 ALR 1307.
A customer who was completely surrounded by store staff from the time she was stopped
in the parking lot until the police arrived was "completely confined" so as to meet the
requisite "detention" element of her false imprisonment action. Wal-Mart Stores v
Yarbrough, 284 Ark 345, 681 SW2d 359.
Footnote 27. Talcott v National Exhibition Co., 144 App Div 337, 128 NYS 1059.
Footnote 28. See Cullen v Dickenson, 33 SD 27, 144 NW 656 (the right of freedom of
locomotion may be violated by partial, as well as by total, restraint; to prevent a person
from going to one particular place to which the person wishes to go constitutes a total
deprivation of liberty with reference to that purpose and is an actual restraint).
Where one was restrained of her liberty by means of the removal of her baggage from the
train on which she was traveling, and followed it to regain possession, and was thereby
caused to remain after departure of the train, the circumstances constituted false
imprisonment. Griffin v Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P2d 297.
Where parties attempted to repossess a car and, in doing so, attempted physically to keep
the conditional purchaser of the car from maintaining possession thereof, even though
they did not prevent him from leaving the car, there was a false imprisonment. National
Bond & Inv. Co. v Whithorn, 276 Ky 204, 123 SW2d 263.
Footnote 29. People v Grant (5th Dist) 8 Cal App 4th 1105, 10 Cal Rptr 2d 828, 92
CDOS 7061, 92 Daily Journal DAR 11323, review den (Cal) 1992 Cal LEXIS 6231;
Griffin v Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P2d 297; Weiler v Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 189 Wis
554, 208 NW 599.
Footnote 30. Kroeger v Passmore, 36 Mont 504, 93 P 805 (the wrongful detention of a
woman in an office for three quarters of an hour by closing the door and telling her that
she cannot leave until she gives up a deed in her possession and by threatening to call the
sheriff constitutes a false imprisonment).
17 Period of confinement [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Any period of unlawful confinement, however brief, may create liability for false
imprisonment. 31 Confinement for an appreciable length of time, however short, even as
short as fifteen minutes, may be sufficient to create liability for false imprisonment. 32
Even if no "appreciable" length of time elapses, the necessary element of false
imprisonment is proven if enough time elapses for the plaintiff to recognize the illegal
restraint. 33 It is generally of no concern, except in determining damages, that the
confinement is of a temporary nature. 34
On the other hand, a lengthy confinement does not necessarily mean that a compensable
false imprisonment has occurred. 35 An otherwise lawful detention, such as one
authorized under a merchant's detention statute, may become unlawful if prolonged for an
unreasonable period of time. 36 Similarly, an otherwise reasonable period of detention
may become tortious if the time of detention exceeds the statutory time limit therefor, as
in the case of delay in arraignment, 37 or excessive detention beyond the lawful term of
an incarceration. 38
Footnotes
Footnote 31. Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v Shaffer (Ky) 402 SW2d 424.
An unlawful deprivation of freedom of locomotion for any amount of time, by actual
force or a threat of force, is sufficient. Marshall v District of Columbia (Dist Col App)
391 A2d 1374.
Footnote 33. West v King's Dep't Store, Inc., 321 NC 698, 365 SE2d 621.
Footnote 34. Ware v Dunn, 80 Cal App 2d 936, 183 P2d 128.
The length of the period of restraint will play on the jury's award of damages, but will not
defeat the cause of action itself. West v King's Dep't Store, Inc., 321 NC 698, 365 SE2d
621.
Footnote 35. Caban v United States (CA2 NY) 728 F2d 68 (holding that a six-day
erroneous immigration detention of a non-English speaking American citizen was
unfortunate, but not unreasonable).
Footnote 36. Latek v K Mart Corp., 224 Neb 807, 401 NW2d 503.
DAR 723.
573 NE2d 633.
18 Use of force; threats [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Any exercise of force, or express or implied threat of force, whereby another person is
deprived of his or her liberty or compelled to go where he or she does not wish to go is
imprisonment. 39 The individual is restrained effectively by acts or words that one fears
to disregard. 40 Thus, though the confinement or restraint necessary to create liability
for false imprisonment may be imposed by compulsive physical force, 41 the actual use
of force is not essential. 42 Also, there need not be any actual contact with the person,
43 such as manual seizure or touching. 44 The essential thing is the restraint of the
person. This may be caused by threats, as well as by actual force; and the threats may be
by conduct or by words, 45 if the conduct or words are such as to induce a reasonable
apprehension of the use of force. 46
A person who relinquishes his or her right to move about freely as the only alternative to
relinquishment of another right, such as that of an unsullied reputation, may be restrained
or imprisoned for purposes of a false imprisonment claim. 47 However, a fear of being
arrested or fired is not sufficient to establish the detaining force necessary to establish
false imprisonment. 48
Footnotes
Footnote 39. Watkins v Oaklawn Jockey Club (DC Ark) 86 F Supp 1006, affd (CA8 Ark)
183 F2d 440; Daniels v Milstead, 221 Ala 353, 128 So 447; Limited Stores v WilsonRobinson, 317 Ark 80, 876 SW2d 248; Parrott v Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Asso., 97 Cal App 2d 14, 217 P2d 89, 35 ALR2d 263; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v
Smith, 281 Ky 583, 136 SW2d 759; Mahan v Adam, 144 Md 355, 124 A 901; Durgin v
Cohen, 168 Minn 77, 209 NW 532; Herbrick v Samardick & Co., 169 Neb 833, 101
NW2d 488; Hoffman v Clinic Hospital, Inc., 213 NC 669, 197 SE 161; Hepworth v
Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P2d 507; W. T. Grant Co. v Owens, 149
Va 906, 141 SE 860; Harris v Stanioch, 150 Wash 380, 273 P 198.
Footnote 40. Hardy v La Belle's Distrib. Co., 203 Mont 263, 661 P2d 35.
Footnote 41. Hughes v Oreb, 36 Cal 2d 854, 228 P2d 550.
Footnote 42. Nesmith v Alford (CA5 Ala) 318 F2d 110, reh den (CA5 Ala) 319 F2d 859
and cert den 375 US 975, 11 L Ed 2d 420, 84 S Ct 489; Schroeder v Lufthansa German
Airlines (CA7 Ill) 875 F2d 613 (actual use of force is not necessary; Schroeder v
Lufthansa German Airlines (CA7 Ill) 875 F2d 613 (actual use of force is not necessar;
Parrott v Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Asso., 97 Cal App 2d 14, 217 P2d 89, 35
ALR2d 263; Jacques v Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass 438, 138 NE 843, 26 ALR
1329; Durgin v Cohen, 168 Minn 77, 209 NW 532; Little Stores v Isenberg, 26 Tenn App
357, 172 SW2d 13; Harris v Stanioch, 150 Wash 380, 273 P 198.
Employer's escorting employee to employer's office, the display of a gun, escort to
employer's car, an accompanied trip to employee's residence to retrieve photographs
sought by the employer, during which time the employee did not feel free to leave,
constituted sufficient facts to raise a jury question as to the unlawful detention in
employee's false imprisonment action. Berry v Loiseau, 223 Conn 786, 614 A2d 414.
Footnote 43. People v Agnew, 16 Cal 2d 655, 107 P2d 601; Sweeney v F. W. Woolworth
Co., 247 Mass 277, 142 NE 50, 31 ALR 311; Arlan v Cervini (RI) 478 A2d 976.
Footnote 44. Bruce v Meijers Supermarkets, Inc., 34 Mich App 352, 191 NW2d 132.
Manual touching or seizure is not necessary if there is an intention on the part of one to
arrest the other and an intention on the part of the other to submit under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. Nau v Sellman, 104 Nev 248, 757 P2d 358.
Footnote 45. People v Zilbauer, 44 Cal 2d 43, 279 P2d 534; Lewis v Atlantic Discount
Co. (Fla App D1) 99 So 2d 241; Sweeney v F. W. Woolworth Co., 247 Mass 277, 142 NE
50, 31 ALR 311; Durgin v Cohen, 168 Minn 77, 209 NW 532; Jorgensen v Pennsylvania
R. Co., 25 NJ 541, 138 A2d 24, 41 BNA LRRM 2470, 34 CCH LC 71252, 72 ALR2d
1415; Hoffman v Clinic Hospital, Inc., 213 NC 669, 197 SE 161; S. H. Kress & Co. v
Bradshaw, 186 Okla 588, 99 P2d 508; Roberts v Coleman, 228 Or 286, 365 P2d 79;
Chicago, R. I. & G. R. Co. v Neubert (Tex Civ App) 248 SW 139, writ dism w o j;
Hepworth v Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P2d 507; S. H. Kress & Co. v
Musgrove, 153 Va 348, 149 SE 453; Harris v Stanioch, 150 Wash 380, 273 P 198;
Johnson v Norfolk & W. Ry., 82 W Va 692, 97 SE 189, 6 ALR 1469.
Footnote 46. 19.
Footnote 47. Foley v Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass 82, 508 NE2d 72, 2 BNA IER Cas 328.
Footnote 48. Malanga v Sears, Roebuck & Co. (4th Dept) 109 App Div 2d 1054, 487
NYS2d 194, affd 65 NY2d 1009, 494 NYS2d 302, 484 NE2d 665.
Threat of discharge from employment at will is not "imprisonment" for tort purposes.
Foley v Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass 82, 508 NE2d 72, 2 BNA IER Cas 328.
19 -- Necessity of apprehension of force [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Though the confinement or restraint necessary to create liability for false arrest or
imprisonment may be imposed by an express or implied threat, as well as by actual force,
49 if no force is used there must be a reasonable apprehension of force, 50
which
may exist by reason of the wrongdoer's assertion of legal authority. 51 If the words or
conduct are such as to induce a reasonable apprehension of force and the means of
coercion are at hand, a person may be as effectually restrained and deprived of liberty as
by prison bars. 52 If, however, the words or conduct do not impose confinement upon
the plaintiff or do not induce a reasonable apprehension that force will be used to effect a
confinement, false imprisonment does not exist. 53 Thus, in order to be actionable, the
intended actions or words of the defendant must at least furnish a basis for a reasonable
apprehension of present confinement. 54 The relationship of the parties and the
circumstances surrounding the incident have an important bearing upon the question of
whether particular words or acts have inspired a just fear of injury to person, reputation,
or property. 55
While threats of future action, 56 such as to call the police and have the plaintiff arrested,
57 or to institute criminal proceedings against him or her, 58 are not ordinarily sufficient
in themselves to effect an unlawful imprisonment, such threats may influence the
assessment of damages. 59
Unless it is clear that there is no reasonable apprehension of force, it is a question for the
jury whether the submission was a voluntary act or brought about by fear that force
would be used. 60 In resolving such a question, the jury is at liberty to consider not
only the actual words spoken but also the sex, physical demeanor, and relative size, age,
and experience of the participants. 61
Footnotes
Footnote 49. 18.
and cert den 375 US 975, 11 L Ed 2d 420, 84 S Ct 489; Big B, Inc. v Cottingham (Ala)
634 So 2d 999 (stating that an exercise of force or the express or implied threat of force,
by which in fact the other person is deprived of liberty, compelled to remain where he or
she does not wish to remain or go where he or she does not wish to go, is an
imprisonment); Vandiveer v Charters, 110 Cal App 347, 294 P 440; Whitman v Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co., 85 Kan 150, 116 P 234; Hoffman v Clinic Hospital, Inc., 213 NC 669,
197 SE 161; Roberts v Coleman, 228 Or 286, 365 P2d 79; Harris v Stanioch, 150 Wash
380, 273 P 198; Johnson v Norfolk & W. Ry., 82 W Va 692, 97 SE 189, 6 ALR 1469.
If words and conduct induce in the plaintiff a reasonable belief that resistance or physical
attempts to escape would be useless and futile, it is false imprisonment, even in the
absence of physical restraint. Halliburton-Abbott Co. v Hodge, 172 Okla 175, 44 P2d
122.
Where it is contended that the unlawful detention is brought about by threat, it must be
shown that the threat was such as would inspire in the threatened person a just fear of
injury to his or her person, reputation, or property. Black v Kroger Co. (Tex Civ App
Houston (1st Dist)) 527 SW2d 794, writ dism (Jan 14, 1976).
If the wrongdoer's acts and words are such that they reasonably create in the plaintiff's
mind the belief of the necessity of conforming to the wrongdoer's demands or suffering
the consequences, and plaintiff conforms, plaintiff is restrained of liberty. Hepworth v
Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P2d 507.
Forms: Instructions to jury that recovery is not barred where consent to restraint was
induced by threatened and reasonably apprehended use of force. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr
Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 6.
Footnote 51. 24.
Footnote 52. Vandiveer v Charters, 110 Cal App 347, 294 P 440; Durgin v Cohen, 168
Minn 77, 209 NW 532; Hebrew v Pulis, 73 NJL 621, 64 A 121; West v King's Dep't
Store, Inc., 321 NC 698, 365 SE2d 621; Hoffman v Clinic Hospital, Inc., 213 NC 669,
197 SE 161; Chicago, R. I. & G. R. Co. v Neubert (Tex Civ App) 248 SW 139, writ dism
w o j; W. T. Grant Co. v Owens, 149 Va 906, 141 SE 860; Harris v Stanioch, 150 Wash
380, 273 P 198.
Where a saleswoman delayed putting cash in the register and before she could do so was
summoned to the office, accompanied by another employee, and was charged with
stealing money and articles, abused, and ordered to bring her pocketbook from the locker
room, which she did while accompanied by another employee at the defendant's
direction, was threatened with arrest and feared such action, these facts constituted
imprisonment. Fleisher v Ensminger, 140 Md 604, 118 A 153.
Footnote 53. Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v Shaffer (Ky) 402 SW2d 424; Jacques v Childs
Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass 438, 138 NE 843, 26 ALR 1329; Herbrick v Samardick &
Co., 169 Neb 833, 101 NW2d 488; Roberts v Coleman, 228 Or 286, 365 P2d 79;
Safeway Stores, Inc. v Amburn (Tex Civ App Fort Worth) 388 SW2d 443; James v
MacDougall & Southwick Co., 134 Wash 314, 235 P 812.
False imprisonment may not be predicated on a person's unfounded belief that he was
restrained. White v Levy Bros., Inc. (Ky) 306 SW2d 829.
The fact that one considers himself restrained in person is not sufficient to constitute a
false imprisonment, unless there is in fact a reasonable ground to apprehend a resort to
force upon an attempt to assert his liberty. Hoffman v Clinic Hospital, Inc., 213 NC 669,
197 SE 161.
Footnote 54. Marshall v District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 391 A2d 1374.
Although an implied threat of force, reasonably believed by the plaintiff, is sufficient to
support a finding of false imprisonment, there was no evidence of words or conduct on
the part of officials of a religious organization that the minor plaintiff was not free to
leave, despite the officals' creation of substantial obstacles to her movement, by taking
her far from her home, depriving her of financial resources and limiting her access to
means of communication. George v International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness (4th
Dist) 3 Cal App 4th 52, 4 Cal Rptr 2d 473, 92 CDOS 985, 92 Daily Journal DAR 1593,
reh den (Cal App 4th Dist) 92 CDOS 1855, 92 Daily Journal DAR 2846 and review den,
op withdrawn by order of ct (Cal) 92 CDOS 3848, 92 Daily Journal DAR 5838.
Footnote 55. Black v Kroger Co. (Tex Civ App Houston (1st Dist)) 527 SW2d 794, writ
dism (Jan 14, 1976) (employee accused of theft by employer's agents).
Forms: Complaint, petition, or declaration against bank and bank employee for
unreasonable detention of bank teller on accusation of misappropriation of bank deposit
and attempt to secure confession and restitution. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Footnote 56. Roberts v Coleman, 228 Or 286, 365 P2d 79.
Footnote 57. Sweeney v F. W. Woolworth Co., 247 Mass 277, 142 NE 50, 31 ALR 311
(charging a customer in a store with larceny of goods and requiring him to turn his
pockets inside out do not constitute false imprisonment, if there is no restraint other than
a threat to call an officer if he does not do so).
Threats to invoke peacefully the processes of the law, standing alone and unaccompanied
by force or any other form of restraint, cannot result in such a detention as would
constitute false imprisonment. Blumenfeld v Harris (1st Dept) 3 App Div 2d 219, 159
NYS2d 561, affd 3 NY2d 905, 167 NYS2d 925, 145 NE2d 871, reh den 3 NY2d 1018
and motion den 3 NY2d 1018 and cert den 356 US 930, 2 L Ed 2d 761, 78 S Ct 773.
Footnote 58. Priddy v Bunton (Tex Civ App) 177 SW2d 805, writ ref.
Footnote 59. West v King's Dep't Store, Inc., 321 NC 698, 365 SE2d 621.
Footnote 60. Jorgensen v Pennsylvania R. Co., 25 NJ 541, 138 A2d 24, 41 BNA LRRM
2470, 34 CCH LC 71252, 72 ALR2d 1415.
Footnote 61. Black v Kroger Co. (Tex Civ App Houston (1st Dist)) 527 SW2d 794, writ
dism (Jan 14, 1976) (jury considering whether plaintiff, an employee accused of theft,
could voluntarily have terminated interview with defendant's security agent without
giving statement admitting her guilt or whether she was so over-awed and intimidated by
the agent's threats that she was not able to exercise her free will).
A jury question was raised as to what was reasonably to be implied from store employees'
conduct toward shopper who set off alarm device when she left the store. Limited Stores
v Wilson-Robinson, 317 Ark 80, 876 SW2d 248.
20 Failure to provide means of escape [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
If a person has induced another to put himself or herself in a place which it is impossible
to leave without such person's assistance, by words or other conduct which gives the
other reason to believe that such assistance will be given when it is needed, the refusal to
do so, if for the purpose of detaining the other, is a sufficient act of confinement to make
such person liable. 62 It is generally held, however, that the mere refusal of permission
on the part of an employer to allow an employee to leave the premises during the
ordinary working hours or a failure to provide prompt facilities to enable the servant to
leave does not constitute false imprisonment. 63
Footnotes
Footnote 62. Restatement 2d, Torts. 45, comment a.
The allegation of members of a film crew that a deputy sheriff who cited them for being
in a restricted area of volcanic activity negligently failed to rescue them did not state a
claim for false imprisonment; there was no application of false imprisonment law to the
facts of the case. Johnson v Barker (CA9 Wash) 799 F2d 1396.
In the absence of any showing of exigent circumstances triggering a duty on the part of
an airline to release a passenger who was refused permission to leave the airplane when
the plane was delayed on the runway for three hours, there was no unlawful detention or
false imprisonment of the passenger by the airline. Abourezk v New York Airlines, Inc.,
283 US App DC 34, 895 F2d 1456.
Footnote 63. Davis & Allcott Co. v Boozer, 215 Ala 116, 110 So 28, 49 ALR 1307 (an
employer cannot be held liable for arrest of an employee by merely refusing to permit
him to leave the plant upon his complaining of illness).
Refusing an employee permission to leave the room in which he is being questioned as to

the state of his accounts does not constitute false imprisonment, where during such time
he remains an employee under compensation and subject to the direction of his
superiors. Weiler v Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 189 Wis 554, 208 NW 599.
3. Unlawfulness of Detention or Restraint [21-34]

a. In General [21-23]
Mere loss of freedom cannot constitute false imprisonment even though it is unjust; 64
the imprisonment, confinement, or restraint must be unlawful. 65 Any intentional
restraint by one person of the personal liberty of another is unlawful unless justified by
some valid authority or right, 66 There is no false imprisonment if such imprisonment
is under legal authority. 67 Thus, a false imprisonment action cannot be maintained
where the detention was executed by virtue of legally sufficient process duly issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction. 68
Footnotes
Footnote 64. McMechen ex rel. Willey v Fidelity & Casualty Co., 145 W Va 660, 116
SE2d 388.
Footnote 65. Martin v Lincoln Park West Corp. (CA7 Ill) 219 F2d 622; Durgin v Cohen,
168 Minn 77, 209 NW 532; Weiler v Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 189 Wis 554, 208 NW
599.
The gist of any complaint for false arrest or false imprisonment is an unlawful detention.
Marshall v District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 391 A2d 1374.
Footnote 66. Meints v Huntington (CA8 Minn) 276 F 245, 19 ALR 664; Maxwell v
Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 177 NW 541, 10 ALR 482.
As to justification, see 87 et seq.
Footnote 67. Lolley v Charter Woods Hosp., Inc. (Ala) 572 So 2d 1223; Davis v
Syracuse, 66 NY2d 840, 498 NYS2d 355, 489 NE2d 242; Jones v Columbia, 301 SC 62,
389 SE2d 662; Darrow v Schumacher (SD) 495 NW2d 511.
Footnote 68. Pete v Metcalfe (CA5 Tex) 8 F3d 214; Big B, Inc. v Cottingham (Ala) 634
So 2d 999; Stern v Thompson & Coates, 185 Wis 2d 221, 517 NW2d 658,
Where an arrest is made under the authority of a proper warrant, there is no false arrest in
either the common-law or the constitutional sense. Thomas v Sams (CA5 Tex) 734 F2d
185, reh den (CA5 Tex) 741 F2d 783, cert den 472 US 1017, 87 L Ed 2d 612, 105 S Ct
3476.
As to the defense of justification based upon process, see 87 et seq.
22 Detention of witnesses [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
One who is detained through no fault of his or her own, but merely as a witness to the
wrong of another, is unlawfully imprisoned, at least where he expresses a readiness to
appear as a witness when needed. 69 On the other hand, officers acting properly in the
execution of a warrant for a material witness, and who are not chargeable with
discrepancies in the warrant, effect a privileged arrest by a warrant regular in form and
reasonably appearing to be issued by a court with jurisdiction and cannot be found to be
acting tortiously. 70
Footnotes
Footnote 69. New York, P. & N. R. Co. v Waldron, 116 Md 441, 82 A 709; Daniel v
Phillips Petroleum Co., 229 Mo App 150, 73 SW2d 355.
Footnote 70. Ware v Reed (CA5 Tex) 709 F2d 345; Arnsberg v United States (CA9 Or)
757 F2d 971, cert den 475 US 1010, 89 L Ed 2d 300, 106 S Ct 1183.
23 Effect of subsequent acquittal or discharge of plaintiff [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
One may be acquitted upon the merits of the case, or discharged upon some question of
law, but that fact does not in and of itself make the restraint placed upon one's liberty
false imprisonment. 71
Footnotes
Footnote 71. Coverstone v Davies, 38 Cal 2d 315, 239 P2d 876, cert den 344 US 840,
97 L Ed 653, 73 S Ct 50; Brinkman v Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St 171, 119 NE 451.
A subsequent acquittal on the charge for which the arrest was made or the dropping of
charges is of no consequence in determining the validity of the arrest itself. Marx v
Gumbinner (CA11 Fla) 905 F2d 1503.
An acquittal is not a bar to an adjudication that an arrest based upon an offense
committed in the presence of the officer is lawful. People v Edge, 406 Ill 490, 94 NE2d
359 (pointing out that judgment of not guilty is only determination that evidence
presented did not approve offense charged); Ryan v Conover (Hamilton Co) 59 Ohio App
361, 11 Ohio Ops 565, 26 Ohio L Abs 593, 18 NE2d 277.
b. Arrest [24-32]
(1). Illegality Based Upon Conduct in Making Arrest [24-28]
The term "false imprisonment" is broad enough to include any detention under pretended
color of official right. 72 An officer or individual making an arrest is bound by certain
rules if he or she is to be protected from liability, 73 and in an action for false arrest or
imprisonment the critical question is whether the arrest was made in conformance to
these rules. 74 Where one is properly arrested by lawful authority, even though without
a warrant, an action for false imprisonment cannot be maintained. 75 If probable cause
exists, the subsequent arrest is lawful and there is no false arrest. 76 Similarly, if an
arrest is made pursuant to a warrant valid on its face, there is no false imprisonment, 77
even if the warrant later turns out to be invalid. 78 However, liability may arise for an
arrest made under circumstances or in a manner not authorized by law. 79 This principle
is applicable, for example, to claims of unlawful arrest for theft, 80 shoplifting, 81
prostitution, 82 in an extradition proceeding, 83 detention for another arresting
authority, 84 or an arrest based on alleged contempt of court for failure to obey a court
order based on a settlement agreement. 85 Liability for false imprisonment may arise
before an arrest is made. 86 An action for false imprisonment may be based, for
instance, on an abuse of official authority in making an investigation, 87 arresting and
detaining a person for psychiatric care or hospitalization, 88 execution of a search
warrant and detention during the process of its execution, 89 or detention at a sobriety
roadblock. 90
A right of action for false arrest or false imprisonment "under color of state law" has been
recognized under the Federal Civil Rights Act. 91
Footnotes
Footnote 72. McAlmond v Trippel, 93 Cal App 584, 269 P 937.
Footnote 73. See, generally, 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest.
Footnote 74. Dillon v Haskell, 78 Cal App 2d 814, 178 P2d 462; Taylor v Shields, 183
Ky 669, 210 SW 168, 3 ALR 1619.
Footnote 75. 81.
Footnote 76. Johnson v Morris (Minn) 453 NW2d 31, later proceeding (Minn) 1990
Minn LEXIS 118.
Footnote 77. Moody v McElroy (RI) 513 A2d 5; Horton v Chamberlain, 152 Vt 351, 566
A2d 953; Burt v Ferrese (CA3 Del) 871 F2d 14.
Footnote 78. Rustici v Weidemeyer (Mo) 673 SW2d 762.
As to defense of justification based upon legal process, see 90 et seq.

Footnote 79. Collyer v S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal 2d 175, 54 P2d 20; Laster v Chaney, 180
Miss 110, 177 So 524; Coffee v Peterbilt of Nashville, Inc. (Tenn) 795 SW2d 656
(liability may arise where the warrant relied upon was issued by a court without
jurisdiction over the charged offense); Kalkanes v Willestoft, 13 Wash 2d 127, 124 P2d
219; Lane v Collins, 29 Wis 2d 66, 138 NW2d 264.
Forms: Complaint, petition, or declarationunlawful arrest without warrantagainst
municipal corporation and police officer. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Footnote 80. Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v Joy Mfg. Co. (Ala) 619 So 2d 1280, reh den,
without op (Ala) 1993 Ala LEXIS 646; Aitken v White, 93 Cal App 2d 134, 208 P2d 788.
Footnote 81. Hanna v Raphael Weill & Co., 90 Cal App 2d 461, 203 P2d 564; Vessels v
District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 531 A2d 1016; McClure Ten Cent Co. v Humphries,
33 Ga App 523, 127 SE 151; Gust v Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 Mo App 611, 136
SW2d 94.
Footnote 82. Hazen v Anchorage (Alaska) 718 P2d 456; Fiori v Agnew, 33 Cal App 284,
164 P 899.
Footnote 83. Wood v Bailey, 144 Mass 365, 11 NE 567.
Footnote 84. Qualey v Wilton (Me) 540 A2d 479.
Footnote 85. Dozier v Dozier, 252 Kan 1035, 850 P2d 789.
Footnote 86. As to fact that actual arrest is unnecessary in order to constitute false
imprisonment, see 2.
Footnote 87. Ware v Dunn, 80 Cal App 2d 936, 183 P2d 128.
Footnote 88. McKinney v George (CA7 Ill) 726 F2d 1183.
Footnote 89. Daniel v Taylor (CA11 Ga) 808 F2d 1401.
Footnote 90. Nelson v Lane County, 304 Or 97, 743 P2d 692.
Footnote 91. 42 USCS 1983, discussed in 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights 16-21.
25 Arrest at unlawful or unreasonable time [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
The time when an arrest may be made is determined by the common law and statutes.
92 An arrest at an unlawful or unreasonable time may impose liability for damages, 93
especially when combined with other elements of unlawfulness. 94
Footnotes
Footnote 92. See 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest 96.
Footnote 93. MacDonnell v McConville, 148 App Div 49, 132 NYS 1085, affd 210 NY
529, 103 NE 1126.
Footnote 94. Bryan v Comstock, 143 Ark 394, 220 SW 475, 9 ALR 1346 (arresting a
reputable citizen late at night for driving his automobile without the necessary lights,
refusing to permit him to make bail, and jailing him because of unwillingness to disturb a
magistrate, constitute an abuse of discretion rendering the officer liable for wrongful
arrest).
26 Arrest outside territorial jurisdiction of arresting officer [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
There are limitations upon the territorial extent of the power to arrest. 95 Even when
officers have statewide arrest powers, a warrantless arrest must still be supported by
probable cause and officers acting in a neighboring jurisdiction within the state must also
comply with statutory requirements or limitations on an officer's authorization to stop and
question a person on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, within a particular
geographical area. 96 Arrest by one agency which is authorized to act within a particular
jurisdiction does not relieve another agency or municipality from possible liability for
false imprisonment, based upon a subsequent arrest of the same person. 97
Footnotes
Footnote 95. See 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest 34-36, 69-72.
Footnote 96. Brewster v New York (2d Dept) 111 App Div 2d 892, 490 NYS2d 601
(damages for battery and false imprisonment were properly awarded to an individual who
was stopped by officers from a neighboring county, apparently because he fit the
description of a purse snatcher recently observed there, was subjected to mace and
arrested on charges that were later dismissed).
27 Failure to declare authority and intention to arrest [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
An officer attempting to make an arrest should, if the opportunity exists, make known his
or her purpose and the official capacity in which he or she is acting, as well as the cause
of the arrest. Such notification is sometimes required by statute. 98 In jurisdictions
where there is such a statutory duty, failure to comply with the requirements of informing
the arrestee of the intention of, cause for and authority for the arrest may divest the
person making the arrest of an otherwise applicable privilege or deprive the arresting
person of justification for the arrest, 99 unless there is a showing of circumstances
relieving the officer or other arresting person of compliance with the requirement of
advising of the fact of arrest and the authority for making the arrest. 1 In other
jurisdictions, the officer's failure to convey such information, even when required by
statute, does not necessarily impose liability on the officer for false imprisonment. 2
Footnotes
Footnote 98. See 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest 92-94.
Footnote 99. McFarland v Skaggs Cos. (Utah) 678 P2d 298 (among conflicting
authorities on other grounds noted in Miskin v Carter (Utah) 761 P2d 1378, 90 Utah Adv
Rep 19).
Footnote 1. Sprague v Burley, 109 Idaho 656, 710 P2d 566 (reasonableness of officer's
conduct, including compliance with these requirements, is a jury question, going
ultimately to the existence vel non of qualified immunity).
Footnote 2. Elliott v Haskins, 20 Cal App 2d 591, 67 P2d 698.
The fact that the arrestee is not told that he or she has been arrested generally does not
affect the validity of the arrest. Bauldock v Davco Food, Inc. (Dist Col App) 622 A2d 28.
28 Use of excessive force [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Claims of excessive force are frequently joined with false imprisonment actions in
connection with the circumstances surrounding the arrest in question. 3
The question of the reasonableness of force utilized generally presents a question for the
jury. 4 The resolution of the "reasonableness" issue on the facts of the particular case
may influence or even be determinative on the existence of qualified immunity for an
officer, 5 or on the officer's qualified privilege for use of force during the arrest. 6 The
reasonableness of the use of force is an objective determination; the good or evil
intentions of the arresting party will not change the characterization of the conduct. 7
Footnotes
Footnote 3. Adams v Metiva (CA6 Mich) 31 F3d 375, 1994 FED App 277P; Leslie v
Ingram (CA11 Fla) 786 F2d 1533; Renk v City of Pittsburgh (Pa) 641 A2d 289, digest op
at (Pa) 17 PLW 225; Garton v Reno, 102 Nev 313, 720 P2d 1227.
Footnote 4. Ting v United States (CA9 Cal) 927 F2d 1504, 91 CDOS 1794, 91 Daily
Journal DAR 2996.
Footnote 5. Wardlaw v Pickett (App DC) 303 US App DC 130, 1 F3d 1297, reh den (App
DC) 1993 US App LEXIS 36953 and reh, en banc, den (App DC) 1993 US App LEXIS
36922 and cert den (US) 129 L Ed 2d 808, 114 S Ct 2672, reh den (US) 129 L Ed 2d
911, 115 S Ct 11.
As to immunity, generally, see 98 et seq.
Footnote 6. Etheredge v District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 635 A2d 908.
Footnote 7. Darrow v Schumacher (SD) 495 NW2d 511.
As to what constitutes excessive force in the course of an arrest, See 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest
105 et seq.
(2). Illegality Based Upon Conduct Following Arrest [29-32]

29 Delay in presentment before magistrate [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
It is the duty of an officer or other person making an arrest to take the prisoner before a
magistrate with reasonable diligence and without unnecessary delay. 8 Whether the
arrest is made with a warrant or without a warrant, the person making the arrest, or his or
her principal or employer, is liable for false imprisonment if he or she fails to take the
arrested person before a court or magistrate within a reasonable time or without
unnecessary delay. 9 Under this rule, an officer, without a warrant, arresting a person is
liable for false imprisonment where the officer detains the prisoner an unreasonable time
without securing a warrant or other legal authority for detention. 10
In a lawful arrest without a warrant, the person making the arrest must promptly present
the prisoner before a magistrate; an unreasonable delay will constitute an abuse of the
privilege and make the arresting party liable for the unreasonable portion of the
imprisonment. 11 If, however, the detention is reasonable under the circumstances, 12
there is no liability. 13 Moreover, recovery may be precluded if the conduct of the
person arrested amounts to a waiver of the right to complain of the delay in presentment
before a magistrate. 14 Also, the giving of bail may have the effect of waiving
irregularities in the prior proceedings. 15
Footnotes
Footnote 9. Luker v Nelson (ND Ill) 341 F Supp 111 (applying Illinois law); Peoria v
Underwriter's at Lloyd's London, Unincorporated (SD Ill) 290 F Supp 890 (applying
Illinois law); Hill v Wyrosdick, 216 Ala 235, 113 So 49; State v Gilbert, 105 Ariz 475,
467 P2d 63 (recognizing rule); Dragna v White, 45 Cal 2d 469, 289 P2d 428; Newport
Beach v Sasse (4th Dist) 9 Cal App 3d 803, 88 Cal Rptr 476; Stone v National Surety
Corp., 57 Ga App 427, 195 SE 905; Wilson v Hellard (Ky) 333 SW2d 777; Leisure v
Hicks, 336 Mich 148, 57 NW2d 473; Kleidon v Glascock, 215 Minn 417, 10 NW2d 394;
Teel v May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo 696, 155 SW2d 74, 137 ALR 495; Schreiner v
Hutter, 104 Neb 539, 177 NW 826; Nelson v Las Vegas, 99 Nev 548, 665 P2d 1141;
Ames v Strain (Okla) 301 P2d 641; Westbrook v Hutchison, 195 SC 101, 10 SE2d 145;
Heath v Boyd, 141 Tex 569, 175 SW2d 214; Thurston v Leno, 124 Vt 298, 204 A2d 106
(failure to bring before magistrate one arrested on civil process); Mullins v Sanders, 189
Va 624, 54 SE2d 116; Bergeron v Peyton, 106 Wis 377, 82 NW 291.
False imprisonment is considered to be a continuing tort, which commences at the time of
the false arrest and continues until the unlawful detention ceases. O'Fallon v Pollard
(ND) 427 NW2d 809.
Annotation: Intoxication as ground for police postponing arrestee's appearance before
magistrate, 3 ALR4th 1057 3.
Delay in taking before magistrate or denial of opportunity to give bail as supporting
action for false imprisonment, 98 ALR2d 966.
Practice References False imprisonmentFailure to take arrestee before magistrate
without unreasonable or unnecessary delay. 26 Am Jur POF2d 617.
Forms: Complaint, petition, or declarationconfinement without charge after arrest
without warrantagainst city and jailer. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Complaint, petition, or declarationunreasonable delay in taking prisoner before
magistrate after arrest without warrantaggravation of damages by subjection of prisoner
to public disgrace and humiliationagainst city and police officer 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr
Footnote 10. Von Arx v Shafer (CA9 Alaska) 241 F 649; Bryan v Comstock, 143 Ark
394, 220 SW 475, 9 ALR 1346; Dragna v White, 45 Cal 2d 469, 289 P2d 428; Keefe v
Hart, 213 Mass 476, 100 NE 558; Clark v Kelly, 101 W Va 650, 133 SE 365, 46 ALR
799.
Texas law requires that an arrested motorist be taken "immediately" before a magistrate.
The test for determining compliance is whether the conduct of the police was reasonable
under the circumstances. Roberts v Bohac (CA5 Tex) 574 F2d 1232, holding that a jury
verdict against two police officers for false imprisonment was proper, notwithstanding
that the jury also determined that there had been probable cause for plaintiff's arrest,
where plaintiff was arrested at 11:00 p.m. two blocks from his home, detained overnight
in the local jail, and charged the next morning with having been "drunk under the wheel"
although neither state nor local laws made such activity an offense, where there was
evidence that plaintiff's imprisonment and an attendant 7-week campaign of harassment
were motivated by the concern of one of the arresting officers over plaintiff having
discovered that the officer was having an extra-marital relationship, and where the
officers, in violation of state statute requiring that an arrested motorist be taken
"immediately" before a magistrate, did not even attempt to ascertain whether a magistrate
could make himself available before the next morning.
As to liability of one other than the arresting person or his principal or employer, see
35-37.
As to justification for delay in bringing arrested person before magistrate, see 5 Am Jur
2d, Arrest 102.
Forms: Instructions to jury as to duty to take prisoner arrested without warrant before
magistrate without unnecessary delay. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Footnote 11. McFarland v Skaggs Cos. (Utah) 678 P2d 298 (among conflicting
authorities on other grounds noted in Miskin v Carter (Utah) 761 P2d 1378, 90 Utah Adv
Rep 19).
A one-hundred-fourteen-day delay between arrest and arraignment of arrestee, after
arrestee's name was dropped from the arraignment docket in a clerical error was
unreasonable and constituted grounds for county's liability for the unlawful detention; the
county's minimalist approach to jail procedure and its policy of inaction when similar
problems had been brought to official's attention previously showed a deliberate
indifference to the arrestee's right of freedom from prolonged incarceration, which
supplied the necessary element of intent. Oviatt v Pearce (CA9 Or) 954 F2d 1470, 92
CDOS 490, 92 Daily Journal DAR 723.
Footnote 12. 25.
Footnote 13. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v Hinsdell, 76 Kan 74, 90 P 800.
Officer's initial finding of probable cause for arrest of individual for refusal to leave a bus
terminal justified both the arrest and a reasonable period of continued detention for the
purpose of bringing the arrested person before a magistrate; the officer had no duty to
release the arrested party on post-arrest circumstances casting doubt on the original
probable cause finding, since the post-arrest evidence did not negate probable cause
beyond a reasonable doubt, even though the arrested person truthfully advised the officer
that he suffered from diabetes and was emerging from insulin shock rather than drunk or
incapacitated by drugs, as believed by the arresting officer. Thompson v Olson (CA1
Me) 798 F2d 552, cert den 480 US 908, 94 L Ed 2d 524, 107 S Ct 1354.
Footnote 14. 63.

Footnote 15. 64.
30 -- As trespass ab initio [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A number of cases support the rule that failure to bring the arrested person before a
magistrate without unnecessary delay makes the defendant liable as a trespasser ab initio,
even though the original arrest may have been justified. 16 There are, however, cases
holding to the contrary, at least where the original arrest was made in good faith without
intent to subsequently restrain the arrested persons illegally. 17 Under this view,
unreasonable delay after a lawful arrest is held to subject the offending person to liability
only for so much of the imprisonment as could have been prevented had he or she
exercised due diligence in bringing the arrested person before a magistrate. 18 Under
these circumstances, even if an arrest is made pursuant to valid legal process and thus
unactionable, imprisonment following the arrest may become unlawful; the plaintiff bears
the burden of convincing the trier of fact, assuming the facts are disputed, that the delay
following the arrest was unlawful and that the conduct of those effecting the delay was
unreasonable. 19 However, where the arrest, even though legal, is made for the purpose
of accomplishing some subsequent wrongful act, failure to bring the defendant before a
magistrate within a reasonable time may make the arresting officer a trespasser ab initio.
20
Footnotes
Footnote 16. Great American Indem. Co. v Beverly (DC Ga) 150 F Supp 134; Nelson v
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 128 NJL 46, 24 A2d 371; Seguin v Myers, 279 App Div 690, 108
NYS2d 28; Leger v Warren, 62 Ohio St 500, 57 NE 506; Ulvestad v Dolphin, 152 Wash
580, 278 P 681.
Footnote 17. Oxford v Berry, 204 Mich 197, 170 NW 83; Brown v Meier & Frank Co.,
160 Or 608, 86 P2d 79; Thomas v Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 SC 95, 113 SE2d 337.
Footnote 18. Dragna v White, 45 Cal 2d 469, 289 P2d 428; Anderson v Foster, 73 Idaho
340, 252 P2d 199; Cline v Tait, 116 Mont 571, 155 P2d 752.
Footnote 19. Nelson v Las Vegas, 99 Nev 548, 665 P2d 1141 (jury question was
presented as to reasonableness of continuing detention, particularly in view of detainee's
continuing attempts to pay the $29 bail).
The arresting officer does not have an ongoing duty to decide if probable cause dissipated
to the point that the arrestee should be released. Thompson v Olson (CA1 Me) 798 F2d
552, cert den 480 US 908, 94 L Ed 2d 524, 107 S Ct 1354.
Footnote 20. Shaw v Courtney, 317 Ill App 422, 46 NE2d 170, affd 385 Ill 559, 53 NE2d
432; Stromberg v Hansen, 177 Minn 307, 225 NW 148; Brown v Meier & Frank Co., 160
Or 608, 86 P2d 79.
31 Denial of opportunity to give bail [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Generally, it may be said that one making an arrest is liable in an action for false
imprisonment for wrongfully denying the prisoner an opportunity to give bond. 21
However, the arresting officer has been held not liable for the period of confinement after
a magistrate's refusal to accept bail and to release the prisoner from jail. 22
In addition to the arresting officer, any person who aids in the denial of the opportunity to
obtain bail may be liable for false imprisonment. 23 A jailer may be liable for false
imprisonment for refusal to permit the prisoner to secure release on bail. 24
What amounts to reasonable diligence in affording the prisoner an opportunity to give
bond depends on the circumstances of the individual case, including the time of day or
night the arrest was made, the condition of the prisoner, and the prisoner's ability and
readiness to give a sufficient bond. 25 Thus, for instance, it has been held that the failure
to give a person arrested for drunkenness in a public place an opportunity to give bail
does not become unreasonable until such person is restored to a degree of sobriety which
would guarantee against rearrest. 26
The right to arrange for bail may be waived. 27
Footnotes
Footnote 21. Moran v Beckley (CA4 W Va) 67 F2d 161; Bryan v Comstock, 143 Ark
394, 220 SW 475, 9 ALR 1346; Blocker v Clark, 126 Ga 484, 54 SE 1022; Teel v May
Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo 696, 155 SW2d 74, 137 ALR 495 (recognizing rule); King v
Roberts, 125 Tex 623, 84 SW2d 718; Mullins v Sanders, 189 Va 624, 54 SE2d 116.
Annotation: Delay in taking before magistrate or denial of opportunity to give bail as
supporting action for false imprisonment, 98 ALR2d 966.
Footnote 22. Anderson v Foster, 73 Idaho 340, 252 P2d 199.
Footnote 23. Andersen v Spencer, 229 Iowa 595, 294 NW 904; Harbison v Chicago, R. I.
& P. R. Co., 327 Mo 440, 37 SW2d 609, 79 ALR 1; Sands & Co. v Norvell, 126 Va 384,
101 SE 569; Karney v Boyd, 186 Wis 594, 203 NW 371.
Any person who induces an officer to deny a prisoner the right to give bail when the
prisoner is lawfully entitled thereto is liable for false imprisonment as a principal.
Harbison v Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 327 Mo 440, 37 SW2d 609, 79 ALR 1.

Footnote 24. Oppenheimer v Los Angeles, 104 Cal App 2d 551, 232 P2d 30.
Footnote 25. Harbison v Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 327 Mo 440, 37 SW2d 609, 79 ALR
1.
The arresting officer is not required to travel about with the prisoner in order to enable
him to obtain bail. King v Robertson, 227 Ala 378, 150 So 154; Calderone v Kiernan, 23
RI 578, 51 A 215.
Annotation: Intoxication as ground for police postponing arrestee's appearance before
magistrate, 3 ALR4th 1057.
Delay in taking before magistrate or denial of opportunity to give bail as supporting
action for false imprisonment, 98 ALR2d 966.
Footnote 26. Sheffield v Reece, 201 Miss 133, 28 So 2d 745.
See, however, Markey v Griffin, 109 Ill App 212, rejecting the contention that denial of
an opportunity to give bail was excused by the intoxication of the prisoner, and holding
that a person is entitled to have bail fixed and given if he is able to go to the court for a
length of time sufficient for that purpose, even though he might be so weak or sick that he
is unable to remain long enough for a trial.
Footnote 27. 31.
32 Delay in releasing prisoner [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Unreasonable delay in releasing a person after he or she has a right to be released may
constitute false imprisonment. 28 Thus, detaining a prisoner after a full pardon has
been delivered to one having authority to release him constitutes false imprisonment. 29
Under other circumstances, however, there has been no liability for prolonging detention
even after information was available to cast doubt on the original probable cause finding,
30
Although time of delay is relevant in determining the propriety of delay in releasing a
prisoner, 31 other considerations are also taken into account in determining the
reasonableness of the delay, including administrative steps to be taken, the number of
people to be processed, transportation, booking and filing charges and paperwork. 32
Requiring a detainee to cross a bridge and leave the state or transporting the detainee out
of state may raise a cognizable claim for a constitutional violation, which may include a
false arrest claim, 33 and it is unlawful to extend the imprisonment, after discharge,
beyond the doors of the lockup for the purpose of sending the plaintiff out of town. 34
Footnotes
Footnote 28. Walton v Will, 66 Cal App 2d 509, 152 P2d 639; Teel v May Dep't Stores
Co., 348 Mo 696, 155 SW2d 74, 137 ALR 495.
The defendant city was liable for false imprisonment of plaintiff who was lawfully taken
to the city jail's drunk tank where he was held in jail after authorities knew or should have
known that he was not drunk, but was suffering from diabetes. Tufte v Tacoma, 71 Wash
2d 866, 431 P2d 183.
As to liability of jailer, see 48.
Forms: Complaint, petition, or declarationrefusal to release prisoner on tender of bail
against county and sheriff. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form
114.
Footnote 29. Weigel v McCloskey, 113 Ark 1, 166 SW 944.
Footnote 30. Thompson v Olson (CA1 Me) 798 F2d 552, cert den 480 US 908, 94 L Ed
2d 524, 107 S Ct 1354 (officer had no duty to release detainee who was arrested when he
refused to leave bus terminal, despite detainee's accurate explanation that he was
suffering from insulin shock rather than intoxication, as originally believed by officer;
detainee was held at the police station until officers became convinced of the truth of his
statement after finding medical alert notice on detainee's person).
But see Cooper v Dyke (CA4 Md) 814 F2d 941 (a jury question was raised on the false
arrest claim of a detainee who was transported to the police station and chained to a
detention rail without medical treatment, despite his truthful protestations that he had
been shot in the chest).
Footnote 31. See Thornhill v Wilson (Miss) 504 So 2d 1205 (a five-minute delay in
release from custody by police officers of a belligerent detainee, after the officers
determined there was actually no problem, in their investigation of a "shots fired"
complaint, was not unreasonable and did not subject the officers to liability for false
arrest).
Footnote 32. Lewis v O'Grady (CA7 Ill) 853 F2d 1366.
Footnote 33. Ketchum v West Memphis (CA8 Ark) 974 F2d 81.
Footnote 34. Bath v Metcalf, 145 Mass 274, 14 NE 133.
c. Commitment of Mentally Ill Person [33, 34]
33 Generally; commitment pursuant to valid legal proceeding [32 Am Jur 2d

FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Where a person is detained or confined pursuant to process regular and legal in form,
duly issued in connection with authorized judicial or quasi-judicial "insanity," "mental
disorder" or other authorized mental health commitment proceedings, and such process is
lawfully executed, the person detained or confined cannot recover damages in an action
for false imprisonment. 35 In accordance with the rule governing actions for false
imprisonment under process in general, 36 even where the order of commitment is
erroneously made, if it is valid on its face and issued by a court of competent jurisdiction,
detention thereunder is not false imprisonment. 37
Footnotes
Footnote 35. Savage v Boies, 77 Ariz 355, 272 P2d 349 (apparently recognizing rule);
Smith v Fish, 182 Ark 115, 30 SW2d 223; Maben v Rankin, 55 Cal 2d 139, 10 Cal Rptr
353, 358 P2d 681; Granier v Odom (La App 4th Cir) 167 So 2d 531, cert den 246 La 884,
168 So 2d 268 (apparently recognizing rule); Beaumont v Segal, 362 Mass 30, 283 NE2d
858; Rosvall v Provost, 279 Minn 119, 155 NW2d 900; Lauer v State (3d Dept) 57 App
Div 2d 673, 393 NYS2d 813; Patrich v Menorah Medical Center (Mo App) 636 SW2d
134 (the patient was properly admitted under state statute for treatment of persons
confined by reason of mental disorder, and state probate court issued a commitment order
upon proper filing of physican's report); Fowle v Fowle, 263 NC 724, 140 SE2d 398;
Pate v Stevens (Tex Civ App) 257 SW2d 763, writ dism w o j.
Annotation: Liability for false imprisonment predicated upon institution of, or conduct in
connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 ALR3d 523.
Footnote 36. 90.
Footnote 37. Beitch v State, 280 App Div 855, 113 NYS2d 439; Zuckerman v Sanitarium
Co., 92 Or 90, 179 P 911.
Physician was not liable for false imprisonment of plaintiff on theory that physician
participated in void proceeding by writing letter stating facts sufficient for commitment
while knowing that statute provided that physician be examined under oath, since court
had jurisdiction to order lunacy arrest and letter could not be construed as participation in
illegal proceeding. O'Barr v Feist, 292 Ala 440, 296 So 2d 152.
34 Commitment made without jurisdiction [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
On the other hand, where an order of commitment is made without jurisdiction because
the statutory requirements for commitment are not complied with, 38 as, for example,
where the person to be committed is not given notice, 39 or where the medical
certificates do not comply with the statutory requirements, 40 persons involved in the
individual's detention may not be entitled to the statutory privilege granted for such
participation and are subject to liability upon the false imprisonment claim of the
detained person. 41
There is no duty on the part of state hospital officials to examine the form of the report of
the examining psychiatrists upon which an order of commitment was based, nor is there
any duty to examine or investigate a commitment order valid on its face unless there is
knowledge that there was, in fact, no basis for the execution of the order of commitment.
42
Footnotes
Footnote 38. Washer v Slater, 67 App Div 385, 73 NYS 425.
A psychiatrist ordering the arrest and detention of a woman of allegedly homicidal
tendencies, in a manner not conforming to statute, is responsible to the victim as the
instigator of the false imprisonment. Jillson v Caprio, 86 US App DC 168, 181 F2d 523.
Footnote 39. Troutman v State, 273 App Div 619, 79 NYS2d 709.
Footnote 40. Washer v Slater, 67 App Div 385, 73 NYS 425.
Failure of physician's statement, in emergency proceeding instituted by him to have
plaintiff committed, to comply with statute which required statement to be either sworn to
before person authorized to take acknowledgments or to be witnessed by peace officer,
deprived plaintiff of liberty without legal process. Samons v Meymandi, 9 NC App 490,
177 SE2d 209, cert den 277 NC 458, 178 SE2d 225.
Footnote 41. Welch v County of Westchester (2d Dept) 150 App Div 2d 371, 540 NYS2d
820 (county was not entitled to summmary judgment on false imprisonment claim, since
its papers did not establish compliance with the statutory requirement that each
examining physician file the appropriate certificate).
Footnote 42. Bangs v State (3d Dept) 41 App Div 2d 988, 343 NYS2d 976.
C. Liability of Particular Persons [35-58]

Research References
ALR Digest: False Imprisonment 10-27
10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms 21, 36, 45, 46, 51, 5558, 111
11 Am Jur POF 2d 499, Lack of Care in Selecting Independent Contractor
35 Persons participating in or causing imprisonment; generally [32 Am Jur 2d
FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
All those who, by direct act or indirect procurement, personally participate in or
proximately cause a false imprisonment or unlawful detention are liable therefor. 43
Generally, a defendant must have personally and actively participated in some aspect of
the conduct in order to be found liable for the false imprisonment. 44 A person who is
neither active in the commission of the tort 45 nor responsible for the acts of others is
not liable for false imprisonment. 46 Thus, mere endorsement of conduct by a
supervisor does not create liability in the absence of some causal connection. 47
Similarly, a mere passive knowledge of, acquiescence in, or consent to the acts of
another, for which one is not otherwise responsible, is not sufficient to render one liable
for false arrest or imprisonment, 48 nor will an individual be held liable where such
individual merely acts on the order of a superior. 49
Footnotes
Footnote 43. Allen v Ruland, 79 Conn 405, 65 A 138; Johnson v Weiner, 155 Fla 169, 19
So 2d 699; Anderson v Averbeck, 189 Minn 224, 248 NW 719; S. H. Kress & Co. v
Bradshaw, 186 Okla 588, 99 P2d 508; (Blue) Star Service, Inc. v McCurdy, 36 Tenn App
1, 251 SW2d 139; Winters v Campbell, 148 W Va 710, 137 SE2d 188; Hotzel v
Simmons, 258 Wis 234, 45 NW2d 683.
Footnote 44. Sunshine Jr. Food Stores, Inc. v Aultman (Miss) 546 So 2d 659; Godines v
First Guaranty Sav. & Loan Asso. (Miss) 525 So 2d 1321.
In order to be found liable, a defendant must do something to promote the false arrest.
Alvarado v Dodge City, 238 Kan 48, 708 P2d 174.
Mere presence is not enough to prove liability. Leaon v Washington County (Minn) 397
NW2d 867.
Footnote 45. Director General of Railroads v Kastenbaum, 263 US 25, 68 L Ed 146, 44
S Ct 52; Santiago v Fenton (CA1 Mass) 891 F2d 373; Miller v Fano, 134 Cal 103, 66 P
183; Johnson v Weiner, 155 Fla 169, 19 So 2d 699; Lenaz v Conway, 234 Miss 231, 105
So 2d 762; Harrer v Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428.
Footnote 46. Ingo v Koch (CA2 NY) 127 F2d 667.
After an arrest has been made, one who conveys the prisoner to another county at the
request of peace officers and there delivers him to other peace officers is not liable for the
latter officers' delay in bringing the prisoner before a magistrate. Plummer v Northern
Pac. Ry., 79 Mont 82, 255 P 18.
As to vicarious liability for false imprisonment, see 49 et seq.
Footnote 48. Palmentere v Campbell (CA8 Mo) 344 F2d 234; Dugan v Midwest Cap Co.,
213 Iowa 751, 239 NW 697.
Footnote 49. Vela v White (CA5 Tex) 703 F2d 147.
36 Persons effecting arrest or imprisonment [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
A private person 50 or a police officer 51 who effects an arrest may be held liable for
false arrest or imprisonment unless he or she is justified under the principles of the law of
arrest 52 or under legal process. 53 Thus, police officers may be held liable for
failure to follow up or fully investigate potential exculpatory information or leads which
might prevent or put an end to a false arrest or imprisonment. 54
deliberate concealment of exculpatory facts concerning the detainee during the
investigation, including concealment of such evidence from the prosecutor. 55
suppression of results of an exculpatory lab test of an alleged controlled substance. 56
On the other hand, no liability has been found for
police failure to inform the court of the suspect's alibi claim, where the suspect did
present witnessess on that issue and had the opportunity to develop further facts in that
regard. 57
failure to investigate the arrestee's claim that the drug for possession of which the arrest
was made had actually been legally prescribed, in light of some question of whether the
arrestee mentioned the prescription. 58
mere poor judgment in conducting the investigation, absent any ill motive or legal
malice. 59
failure to interview potential alibi witnesses before arresting the plaintiff on a facially
valid warrant. 60
alleged failure to further investigate evidence of mistaken identity of the person
arrested. 61
As to arrests made by private citizens, such arrests, even if authorized by statute, may
nonetheless subject the arresting party to possible liability for false imprisonment, 62
particularly if the arrest so effected does not comply with all requirements of the statutory
authorization. 63 A warden appointed by a contractor for convict labor and confirmed by
the court under statute is liable for detaining a prisoner after he has received a pardon. 64
The proprietor of a private sanitarium is liable to a person who is induced by false
pretenses to enter the institution and is forcibly detained therein. 65 A school truant or
attendance officer may be held liable for false imprisonment where he takes into custody
a child who had parental permission to be absent from school and hence was not a truant
within the meaning of a statute conferring upon such officers the power of arresting
truants without warrant. 66
Footnotes
Footnote 50. Hill v Levy, 117 Cal App 2d 667, 256 P2d 622; Dohery v Lester, 4 Misc 2d
741, 159 NYS2d 219; Rucker v Barker, 108 Tex 280, 192 SW 528.
False imprisonment may exist apart from any purported process of law enforcement, as
by private individuals acting on their own initiative for their own private purpose without
any pretense of legal authority. Rustici v Weidemeyer (Mo) 673 SW2d 762.
Footnote 51. Dragna v White, 45 Cal 2d 469, 289 P2d 428; Taylor v Shields, 183 Ky 669,
210 SW 168, 3 ALR 1619; Mason v Wrightson, 205 Md 481, 109 A2d 128; Bonnau v
State, 278 App Div 181, 104 NYS2d 364, affd 303 NY 721, 103 NE2d 340.
Footnote 52. 81 et seq.
Footnote 54. Watzek v Walker, 14 Ariz App 545, 485 P2d 3, 66 ALR3d 1; Tufte v
Tacoma, 71 Wash 2d 866, 431 P2d 183.
See also Jacksonville v Walton (Fla App D1) 318 So 2d 546 (officers held detainee for
rape charge even though he was stopped away from the crime area, resembled the suspect
only by being of the same race and police refused detainee's request to confirm his
identity with his wife, who was nearby).
Liability based upon failure to credit or investigate a suspect's alibi claim, which was
supported by twenty witnesses. Miller v East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Dep't (La) 511
So 2d 446, on remand (La App 1st Cir) 522 So 2d 578, cert den (La) 524 So 2d 520.
Officers failed to investigate or advise arresting officer of arrestee's exculpatory statement
that the person videotaped committing a crime was arrestee's wife's brother, which
information would have tended to defeat probable cause. Flones v Dalman, 199 Mich
App 396, 502 NW2d 725.
Footnote 55. Jones v Chicago (CA7 Ill) 856 F2d 985 (suppressed facts included the
failure of the chief witness to positively identify the detainee and differing blood types of
detainee and blood found on victim).
Footnote 56. Lewis v McDorman (WD Va) 820 F Supp 1001, affd without op (CA4 Va)
28 F3d 1210, reported in full (CA4 Va) 1994 US App LEXIS 17760.
Footnote 57. Gisondi v Harrison, 72 NY2d 280, 532 NYS2d 234, 528 NE2d 157, 81
ALR4th 1021.
Footnote 58. Cerna v Rhodes (La App 1st Cir) 341 So 2d 1157, cert den (La) 343 So 2d
1067.
Footnote 59. Lee v Geiger (Fla App D1) 419 So 2d 717, petition den (Fla) 429 So 2d 5.
Footnote 60. Thomas v M----.R----.A----.(Mo App) 713 SW2d 570 (court foreclosed
liability on false imprisonment theory, but not on malicious prosecution theory).
As to defense of justification based on legal process, see 87 et seq.
Footnote 61. Watzek v Walker, 14 Ariz App 545, 485 P2d 3, 66 ALR3d 1.
Footnote 62. Yancey v Farmer (Ala) 472 So 2d 990.
Footnote 63. Nau v Sellman, 104 Nev 248, 757 P2d 358.
Footnote 64. Weigel v McCloskey, 113 Ark 1, 166 SW 944.
Footnote 65. Cook v Highland Hospital, 168 NC 250, 84 SE 352.
Footnote 66. Holmes v Nester, 81 Ariz 372, 306 P2d 290, 62 ALR2d 1322.
Annotation: Truant or attendance officer's liability for assault and battery or false
imprisonment, 62 ALR2d 1328.
37 Joint and several liability [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Where several persons unite in the wrongful act constituting false imprisonment, the
extent of individual participation is immaterial to the question of liability; each is equally
liable, jointly and severally, regardless of whether a conspiracy to do the act had
theretofore been entered into. 67 Thus, more than one officer and more than one police
department may be exposed to liability for an unlawful arrest and subsequent
confinement. 68
Footnotes
Footnote 67. Meints v Huntington (CA8 Minn) 276 F 245, 19 ALR 664; Anderson v
Averbeck, 189 Minn 224, 248 NW 719; Harrer v Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont
295, 221 P2d 428; S. H. Kress & Co. v Bradshaw, 186 Okla 588, 99 P2d 508.
2. Persons Procuring, Directing, or Participating In Arrest or Imprisonment

[38-48]
Persons other than those who actually effect an imprisonment may be so related to the act
or proceeding as instigators or participants therein as to be jointly liable; for all who aid,
direct, advise, or encourage the unlawful detention of a person are liable for the
consequences. 69 However, if an arrest is legal, the third person causing it cannot be
held responsible for the conduct of the person in charge of the prisoner, unless it is shown
that such person acted on the authority of the third person or that such conduct was
caused by the third person. 70 Thus, where the law of a particular jurisdiction provides
that a detention must be "willful" in order to support a false imprisonment action, a
defendant who has effected the plaintiff's confinement through process that is valid on its
face has acted "willfully" only if the process was maliciously or wrongfully obtained; that
is, if the defendant knew that the process was actually void. 71
Footnotes
Footnote 69. Moran v Beckley (CA4 W Va) 67 F2d 161; Hammargren v Montgomery
Ward & Co., 172 Kan 484, 241 P2d 1192; Southern R. Co. v Shirley, 121 Ky 863, 90 SW
597; Heinold v Muntz T. V., Inc. (Mo) 262 SW2d 32; Ferry v Ferry, 94 NH 395, 54 A2d
151; Stearns v New York City Transit Authority, 24 Misc 2d 216, 200 NYS2d 272, affd
(1st Dept) 12 App Div 2d 451, 209 NYS2d 264; Pixton v Dunn, 120 Utah 658, 238 P2d
408; Bergeron v Peyton, 106 Wis 377, 82 NW 291.
Action for common-law tort of false imprisonment will lie against those who actually
procure or participate in restraint of another's liberty either directly or by virtue of others
acting in their stead. Baltz v Shelley (ND Ill) 661 F Supp 169.
An officer was not insulated from false arrest liability merely because the officer was not
the first person to actually effect the arrest but merely transported the arrestee and kept up
the detention. The officer was still liable as a principal, just as is a jailer who imprisons a
plaintiff without justification. Rustici v Weidemeyer (Mo) 673 SW2d 762.
As to joint and several liability for false imprisonment, generally, see 35.
Footnote 70. Richardson v Dybedahl, 14 SD 126, 84 NW 486, later proceeding 17 SD
629, 98 NW 164; Plancich v Williamson, 57 Wash 2d 367, 357 P2d 693.
Even if there is a delay caused by the arresting officer in bringing the plaintiff before a
magistrate, the person who caused the officer to arrest the arrested person is not
responsible for the delay, unless it is shown that he has advised or directed the arresting
officer as to what course he should follow. Mullins v Sanders, 189 Va 624, 54 SE2d 116.
39 Persons issuing process [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
When process is issued by a clerk of court, rather than by a judicial officer whose actions
come within special rules of immunity, 72 the clerk is not entitled to the immunity of a
judicial officer. 73 However, the clerk is not liable for issuing under order of the court a
warrant of commitment which is valid on its face. 74
The actions of a mayor in swearing out a complaint are not part of a judicial function and
thus not cloaked in judicial immunity, particularly where there is no examination of the
complaint and accompanying arrest warrant by an independent magistrate rather than by
the mayor sitting as a magistrate. 75
Footnotes
stated in Seymour Nat'l Bank v State (Ind App) 384 NE2d 1177) (city clerk acting as
clerk of city court).
Footnote 74. Ussery v Haynes, 344 Mo 530, 127 SW2d 410; Langen v Borkowski, 188
Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622.
Footnote 75. Thomas v Sams (CA5 Tex) 734 F2d 185, reh den (CA5 Tex) 741 F2d 783,
cert den 472 US 1017, 87 L Ed 2d 612, 105 S Ct 3476.
40 Private persons requesting, directing, or instigating arrest by officer [32 Am
Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
It is generally held that if an officer makes an arrest without a warrant solely at the
request or instigation of a private citizen, the authority of the officer does not protect the
citizen and the liability of the latter is determined as though he or she had personally
effected the arrest. 76 Accordingly, a private citizen at whose request, direction, or
command a police officer makes an arrest without a warrant is liable if the arrest turns out
to be unlawful, 77 irrespective of whether the officer is liable. 78 On the other hand, it
is sometimes held that if an officer makes an arrest within the officer's own authority to
arrest without a warrant, as, for example, for an offense committed in the officer's
presence, the private citizen is not liable for inducing the officer to make it. 79
Obviously, if the arrest without a warrant is not justifiable on the part of the police
officer, it is not justifiable on the part of the citizen who requests the arrest, and the latter
is liable therefor. 80
At the same time, however, there is a strong policy consideration in favor of insulating
from liability citizen witnesses who act responsibly in assisting law enforcement
personnel in criminal investigations, where the citizens' actions are reasonably justified
by the surrounding circumstances. 81 For that reason, enlisting police aid does not
automatically create a conspiracy as to an unlawful detention, 82 nor is a citizen
informant rendered liable for the instigation of a false imprisonment merely by stating the
facts to an officer, leaving it to the officer as to how to proceed. 83 Before a person may
be found liable for causing false imprisonment through false arrest, that person must have
personally and actively participated therein directly or by indirect procurement. 84
Footnotes
Footnote 76. Porter v Granich, 136 Cal App 523, 29 P2d 220; Hill v Henry, 90 Ga App
93, 82 SE2d 35; Hammargren v Montgomery Ward & Co., 172 Kan 484, 241 P2d 1192;
Robinson v Van Auken, 190 Mass 161, 76 NE 601; Winegar v Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.
(Mo App) 163 SW2d 357.
An arrest by an officer caused or procured by a private person is the same as an arrest by
the private person. Schroeder v Lufthansa German Airlines (CA7 Ill) 875 F2d 613.
Annotation: False imprisonment: liability of private citizen, calling on police for
assistance after disturbance or trespass, for false arrest by officer, 98 ALR3d 542.
False imprisonment: liability of private citizen for false arrest by officer, 21 ALR2d 643.
Footnote 77. Grimes v Greenblatt, 47 Colo 495, 107 P 1111; Fox v McCurnin, 205 Iowa
752, 218 NW 499; Pearson v Great Southern Lumber Co., 134 La 117, 63 So 759;
McDermott v W. T. Grant Co., 313 Mass 736, 49 NE2d 115; Harrer v Montgomery Ward
& Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428.
If the defendant is the motivating power behind the plaintiff's unlawful arrest and
incarceration, he is as liable as if he had actually made the arrest himself. Pixton v Dunn,
120 Utah 658, 238 P2d 408.
Forms: Instruction to jurywhat constitutes direction or instigation by private person for
arrest made by officer. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 56.
Instruction to jury as to liability of private person directing or instigating arrest or
Footnote 78. Wood v Lehne, 30 Cal App 2d 222, 85 P2d 910.
One who actively instigates or procures an arrest, without lawful process, is generally
regarded as the principal for whom the officer acts, and he may be liable to respond in
damages although the officer making the arrest is protected. Webb v Prince, 62 Ga App
749, 9 SE2d 675; Leve v Putting (Mo App) 196 SW 1060.
Footnote 79. Van v Pacific Coast Co. (CC Wash) 120 F 699; Gambill v Cannon, 165 Ala
570, 51 So 755; Haggard v First Nat'l Bank, 72 ND 434, 8 NW2d 5.
Footnote 80. Robinson v Van Auken, 190 Mass 161, 76 NE 601.
Footnote 81. Williams v Adams (CA5 La) 836 F2d 958, reh den, en banc (CA5 La) 844
F2d 788.
The mere giving of information by affidavit to an officer acting within his or her
jurisdiction does not create liability in the informant for false imprisonment for an arrest
procured on that information. Headrick v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 Ark 433, 738 SW2d
418.
Footnote 84. Pokorny v First Federal Sav. & Loan Asso. (Fla) 382 So 2d 678; Godines v
41 --What constitutes direction or instigation [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
The determination of what constitutes direction or instigation sufficient to impose
liability on a private citizen for a wrongful arrest made by an officer, within the rule
imposing liability on a citizen at whose request or instigation an arrest is made without a
warrant, 85 depends on the facts of each case. 86 Instigation consists of words or acts
which direct, request, invite or encourage the false arrest or imprisonment. 87 A person
may be found to have instigated an arrest, even though there is no evidence that he or she
expressly requested or demanded it, where the facts surrounding an arrest create a
permissible inference of instigation. 88 However, in the absence of an express request
for the detention of another, a private citizen will not be found to have instigated an arrest
where his or her actions were reasonable in light of the facts known or readily available at
the time. 89 The issue is for the jury. 90
It is not necessary, to impose liability, that the defendant expressly direct the arrest, 91
nor is it necessary that the defendant be present when the arrest is actually made. 92
However, the individual must take some active part in bringing about the arrest; 93 that
is, there must be some affirmative act on the defendant's part which induces the officer to
make the arrest. 94 Liability will not be found where the private citizen neither
encourages nor commands the police to make the arrest and there is no suggestion of
malice or bad faith on the part of the citizen. 95 The arrest by the officer must be so
induced or instigated by the defendant that the act of arrest is made by the officer, not of
his or her own volition, but to carry out the request of the defendant. 96 Merely
summoning or calling on an officer for protection against a disturbance or trespass or to
keep the peace, 97 or to deal with a person accused of crime, 98 is not sufficient
participation to impose liability, as a general rule. Also, no liability is incurred if a person

merely gives information to an officer tending to show that a crime has been committed;
99 this is so even if the information purports to show that the person later falsely
arrested is the one who committed the alleged crime, 1 and even if the informer acts
maliciously and without probable cause. 2 A private citizen is not liable for a false
arrest where such person acts solely to assist a peace officer in charge of an investigation
of a past offense, 3 or does nothing to effect the arrest or imprisonment except to
accompany an officer to identify one suspected of an offense, 4 even where the
identification may have been the principal cause of the wrongful arrest. 5 Similarly, the
mere identification of goods suspected to have been stolen, at least if made in good faith
and on probable cause, will not render a person liable for a resulting arrest without
warrant by an officer. 6
On the other hand, while the mere giving of inaccurate information is not a basis for
liability, 7 a private citizen who knowingly conveys false information to the police may
be held liable for a subsequent false arrest. 8
Footnotes
Footnote 85. 40.
Footnote 86. (Blue) Star Service, Inc. v McCurdy, 36 Tenn App 1, 251 SW2d 139.
Forms: Instructions to jury on what constitutes direction or instigation by private person
for arrest made by officer. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form
56.
Footnote 87. Godines v First Guaranty Sav. & Loan Asso. (Miss) 525 So 2d 1321
(instigation is the equivalent of saying "Officer, arrest that man.").
Footnote 88. Deadman v Valley Nat'l Bank (App) 154 Ariz 452, 743 P2d 961.
The fact that defendant instigated a false arrest may be shown by circumstantial
evidence. Knupp v Esslinger (Mo App) 363 SW2d 210.
Annotation: False imprisonment: liability of private citizen for false arrest by officer, 21
ALR2d 643.
Footnote 89. Deadman v Valley Nat'l Bank (App) 154 Ariz 452, 743 P2d 961.
Footnote 90. Hales v McCrory-McLellan Corp., 260 NC 568, 133 SE2d 225 (whether
corporate operator of variety store and its agents and servants either actually or by
procurement caused plaintiff to be falsely imprisoned and accused of shoplifting was for
jury, and if plaintiff was under unlawful arrest, not only individual defendants but their
principal might be held civilly liable).
Footnote 91. Webb v Prince, 62 Ga App 749, 9 SE2d 675; Knupp v Esslinger (Mo App)
363 SW2d 210; McAleer v Good, 216 Pa 473, 65 A 934.

Footnote 92. Wood v Lehne, 30 Cal App 2d 222, 85 P2d 910; (Blue) Star Service, Inc. v
McCurdy, 36 Tenn App 1, 251 SW2d 139.
Footnote 93. Burke v New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (CA2 NY) 267 F2d 894; Hughes v
Oreb, 36 Cal 2d 854, 228 P2d 550; Hammargren v Montgomery Ward & Co., 172 Kan
484, 241 P2d 1192; McDermott v W. T. Grant Co., 313 Mass 736, 49 NE2d 115;
Sunshine Jr. Food Stores, Inc. v Aultman (Miss) 546 So 2d 659; Davis v Weil Clothing
Co. (Mo App) 367 SW2d 19; Edgar v Omaha Public Power Dist., 166 Neb 452, 89
NW2d 238; Aiken v Shell Oil Co., 219 Or 523, 348 P2d 51.
Railroad was liable for false arrest where its servant actively participated in apprehension
of plaintiff. Burke v New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (CA2 NY) 267 F2d 894 (applying
Connecticut law).
Bus company was liable where its driver instigated false arrest of passenger. Williams v
Carolina Coach Co. (DC Va) 111 F Supp 329, affd (CA4 Va) 207 F2d 408.
A person who told police that plaintiff had poisoned a baby, and accompanied officers to
apprehend and identify plaintiff, was liable for false imprisonment where he had no
knowledge that a crime had been committed and acted solely on suspicion. Howard v
Burton, 338 Mich 178, 61 NW2d 77.
Administrator who filed affidavit in probate court stating that plaintiff had wrongfully
concealed property was not liable for plaintiff's subsequent false arrest where
administrator was not present and had no knowledge of issuance of commitment on
which plaintiff was arrested and had nothing to do with arrest or false imprisonment.
Zeitinger v Mitchell (Mo) 244 SW2d 91.
In action for false arrest, plaintiff must show that defendant instigated, assisted in,
directed, countenanced, or encouraged arrest in order to make submissible case.
Checkeye v John Bettendorf Market, Inc. (Mo App) 257 SW2d 202.
Footnote 94. Palmentere v Campbell (CA8 Mo) 344 F2d 234; Zwickert v Brooklyn H. R.
Co., 127 App Div 304, 111 NYS 480.
Drug center was liable for false arrest of alleged shoplifter accomplished by police
officers without warrant, where assistant managers called police and police officers took
custody of alleged shoplifter, since when person points out another as perpetrator of
crime and requests or directs police officers to arrest him, such person making request or
direction is liable for subsequent false imprisonment even though he acted on good faith.
Reicheneder v Skaggs Drug Center (CA5 Tex) 421 F2d 307.
A county plumbing inspector who reported to the state's attorney's office that an
individual had performed plumbing work without the necessary permits was not liable for
false imprisonment, where the inspector did not actually detain the plumber or directly
procure his arrest, but merely acted in his official capacity and carried out his legal
duties. Hudson v Dykes (Fla App D1) 402 So 2d 491.
Evidence was sufficient for jury to find that corporation in investigating money theft
instigated ex-employee's arrest and detention, where corporation store supervisor told exemployee to come to drive-in to pick up nonexistent check as pretext to having him
present where he could be arrested, and arranged for police to be there, and ex-employee
was taken to police headquarters and confined there overnight without charge being
lodged afterward, and police told ex-employee that corporation area manager had him
picked up for questioning. Gerald v Caterers, Inc. (Mo App) 382 SW2d 740.
A cause of action for false imprisonment cannot be based upon a mere negation or failure
to speak or act, but can only be based upon some affirmative act instigating thereto.
Richardson v Empire Trust Co., 230 Mo App 580, 94 SW2d 966.
Evidence that defendant's attorney instructed detectives to arrest plaintiff some time
before plaintiff was taken into custody established that defendant caused arrest, and
created presumption that arrest was unlawful; defendant's proof failed to rebut
presumption by showing justification for arrest. Cicurel v Mollet (1st Dept) 1 App Div
2d 239, 149 NYS2d 397, affd 1 NY2d 797, 153 NYS2d 60, 135 NE2d 594 (apparently
involving arrest without warrant).
Where plaintiff's roommate gave police a pill which she had found in her apartment and
indicated that she thought plaintiff was on drugs, and officer, without conducting a
conclusive laboratory test for presence of amphetamine and without knowing whether the
pill in fact belonged to plaintiff, made a warrantless arrest of plaintiff, roommate was
liable for false imprisonment. McGillivray v Siedschlaw (SD) 278 NW2d 796.
ALR2d 643.
Footnote 95. Dixie Beer Co. v Boyett, 158 Ga App 622, 281 SE2d 356.
To accuse another of committing a crime, however slanderous it may be, is not enough to
sustain a claim of false arrest, so long as the decision whether to make the arrest remains
with the police officer and is without the persuasion or influence of the accuser. Vessels v
District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 531 A2d 1016.
There was no liability where store manager summoned the police when former employee
refused to leave store, but the manager did not direct the employee's arrest or request the
arrest; that decision was left to the uncontrolled discretion of the officer. Arrowsmith v
Williams, 174 Ga App 690, 331 SE2d 30.
Footnote 96. Grinnell v Weston, 95 App Div 454, 88 NYS 781.
That arrest was made by police at request of defendant (with result that defendant was
liable for false arrest) was shown by defendant's admission that she said to plaintiff, at
police station, that she would not press charges against him if he would give back jewels
which she alleged he had stolen. Davis v Nadell (Sup) 138 NYS2d 50.
Defendant could be held liable for a false arrest and imprisonment of plaintiff even
though a police officer actually made the arrest where there was plenary evidence that the
officer arrested plaintiff at defendant's "request, direction, or command." Blackwood v
Cates, 297 NC 163, 254 SE2d 7.
So long as the officer acts on his own volition, the informer is not liable; but if the officer
acts under the direction or indirect request of the informer, the informer will be held
liable. (Blue) Star Service, Inc. v McCurdy, 36 Tenn App 1, 251 SW2d 139.
Footnote 97. Crescent Amusement Co. v Scott, 34 Ala App 335, 40 So 2d 882, cert den
252 Ala 296, 40 So 2d 886; Frickstad v Medcraft, 100 Cal App 188, 279 P 840; Karow v
Student Inns, Inc. (4th Dist) 43 Ill App 3d 878, 2 Ill Dec 515, 357 NE2d 682, 98 ALR3d
531; Heitcamp v Willis, 139 La 745, 72 So 216; Lenaz v Conway, 234 Miss 231, 105 So
2d 762; Calloway v Fogel, 358 Mo 47, 213 SW2d 405; Lemel v Smith, 64 Nev 545, 187
P2d 169; Yoder v Yoder, 239 Pa 12, 86 A 523.
Bank official's request for police help was not sufficient to show instigation of arrest.
Curry v Giant Food Co. (Dist Col App) 522 A2d 1283.
Merely telephoning the police that a holdup is taking place is not such a participation in
the resulting arrest as to make liable the employer of the one who telephones, even
though the employee knew that the holdup was not genuine. El Paso E. R. Co. v Crews
(Tex Civ App) 277 SW 732, writ dism w o j.
An opera association and its president were not liable for the arrest of a man gathering
signatures on a petition outside the opera house where the opera association
representative at the scene had merely reported to police that the man was causing a
disturbance and had refused to move, leaving it to the police to determine how to
respond, and where there was no evidence that the representative suggested or approved
of the arrest or even knew of it until after it had occurred. McCord v Tielsch, 14 Wash
App 564, 544 P2d 56.
An action for false imprisonment and abuse of process will not lie against a private
defendant whose employees do no more than request police assistance and protection
against a disturbance or trespass where the responding police officer, acting on his own
observation and independent of any representation or information received from the
dispatcher or from the defendant's employees, decided to have the plaintiff temporarily
detained and confined in the mental health section of a hospital for examination or
observation, under authority of the emergency provisions of a statute. Harris v Kelly, 63
Wis 2d 664, 218 NW2d 360.

Footnote 98. Dodson v Solomon, 134 Fla 284, 183 So 825; Shinglemeyer v Wright, 124
Mich 230, 82 NW 887; Hoock v S. S. Kresge Co. (Mo) 230 SW2d 758.
ALR2d 643.
Footnote 99. Burke v New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (CA2 NY) 267 F2d 894 (applying
Connecticut law); Charles Stores Co. v O'Quinn (CA4 NC) 178 F2d 372; Butler v
Goldblatt Bros., Inc. (ND Ill) 432 F Supp 1122 (applying Illinois law); Peterson v
Robison, 43 Cal 2d 690, 277 P2d 19; Webb v Prince, 62 Ga App 749, 9 SE2d 675; Karow
v Student Inns, Inc. (4th Dist) 43 Ill App 3d 878, 2 Ill Dec 515, 357 NE2d 682, 98
ALR3d 531; Davis v Weil Clothing Co. (Mo App) 367 SW2d 19; Edgar v Omaha Public
Power Dist., 166 Neb 452, 89 NW2d 238; Vickrey v Dunivan, 59 NM 90, 279 P2d 853;
Francis v Taft Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 281 App Div 893, 119 NYS2d 618, reh and app
den 281 App Div 983, 121 NYS2d 259; Nicholson v Roop (ND) 62 NW2d 473, 43
ALR2d 1031; Harrison v Southland Corp. (Tex Civ App Dallas) 544 SW2d 692; Pixton v
Dunn, 120 Utah 658, 238 P2d 408; McCord v Tielsch, 14 Wash App 564, 544 P2d 56.
Private persons calling and giving police officers information which was a principal
cause of plaintiff's arrest and confinement on indecent exposure charge were not liable for
false imprisonment, even though information was mistaken, where they acted in good
faith. Farnsworth v Cote (2nd Dist) 199 Cal App 2d 762, 19 Cal Rptr 45.
Wife's provision of information to law enforcement about ex-husband's whereabouts was
not instigation so as to establish liability for false imporisonment; she had no part in
directing that he be incarcerated or that he remain in jail. Dozier v Dozier, 252 Kan
1035, 850 P2d 789.
If an automobile dealer, upon receiving a telephone inquiry from the police of a distant
city as to whether a person professing to act as his agent has authority to sell a certain
automobile, wrongly answers that the car has been stolen, the dealer is not, on that
evidence alone, liable for a resulting arrest of the agent. Triangle Motors Co. v Smith,
216 Ky 479, 287 SW 914.
Store was not liable for false arrest of plaintiff on shoplifting charges where there was no
evidence showing that manager deliberately gave false information to police. Fletcher v
High's Dairy Products Div. of Capital Milk Producers Co-Operative, Inc., 22 Md App 71,
321 A2d 821.
If the defendant was assaulted by the plaintiff and merely reported the matter to the
police, who then made the arrest within their own responsibility, the defendant is not
liable for false imprisonment though the arrest was made without a warrant. Mitchell v
O'Hara, 165 Misc 630, 1 NYS2d 20.
False arrest requires a showing that the defendant encouraged, promoted, or instigated the
arrest; a showing that the defendant merely gave information to the police is insufficient.
Garner v Texas Discount Gas Co. (Mo App) 723 SW2d 446.
Mere giving to the police of information about commission of a crime or accusing
someone of its commission is not enough to show instigation for purposes of false
imprisonment liability, so long as the giver of information leaves to the police the
decision of what will be done about any arrest. Nau v Sellman, 104 Nev 248, 757 P2d
358.
ALR2d 643.
Footnote 1. Stueber v Admiral Corp. (CA7 Ill) 171 F2d 777, cert den 336 US 961, 93 L
Ed 1113, 69 S Ct 891; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v Lewis, 69 App DC 191, 99 F2d
424.
A judgment of nonsuit in an action against a private citizen for false imprisonment was
proper where it appeared that defendant, from whose home about 100 silver dollars had
been stolen, called the police and pointed out plaintiff as the person spending silver
dollars at his bar, there being nothing to indicate that he gave any false information to the
officers or that he took an active part in bringing about the arrest, which was without
warrant. Hughes v Oreb, 36 Cal 2d 854, 228 P2d 550.
Footnote 2. Carr v National Discount Corp. (CA6 Mich) 172 F2d 899, cert den 338 US
817, 94 L Ed 495, 70 S Ct 59; United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v Henderson,
22 Ala App 448, 116 So 915, cert den 217 Ala 520, 116 So 917; Webb v Prince, 62 Ga
App 749, 9 SE2d 675.
Footnote 3. Charles Stores Co. v O'Quinn (CA4 NC) 178 F2d 372; Standard Oil Co. v
Davis, 208 Ala 565, 94 So 754, companion case 209 Ala 493, 96 So 629; Hughes v Oreb,
36 Cal 2d 854, 228 P2d 550; Scheurrmann v Vaccaro, 118 La 67, 42 So 648; Witham v
Gregory & Read Co., 243 Mass 595, 137 NE 752; Clark v Whitaker (Mo App) 173 SW2d
586; Edgar v Omaha Public Power Dist., 166 Neb 452, 89 NW2d 238; Hamilton v
California Co. (Tex Civ App) 103 SW2d 200, writ dism w o j; Buchholz v Glass, 180
Wis 527, 193 NW 392.
ALR2d 643.
Footnote 4. Mackie v Ambassador Hotel & Inv. Corp., 123 Cal App 215, 11 P2d 3; Cope
v Askins, 208 Ky 86, 270 SW 454; Zinkfein v W. T. Grant Co., 236 Mass 228, 128 NE
24; Gould v Skelly Oil Co. (Mo App) 50 SW2d 193; Meyer v Monnig Dry Goods Co.
(Tex Civ App) 189 SW 80, writ ref.
ALR2d 643.
Footnote 5. Turner v Mellon, 41 Cal 2d 45, 257 P2d 15; Edgar v Omaha Public Power
Dist., 166 Neb 452, 89 NW2d 238; Stearns v New York City Transit Authority, 24 Misc
2d 216, 200 NYS2d 272, affd (1st Dept) 12 App Div 2d 451, 209 NYS2d 264; Schnaufer
v Price (Tex Civ App) 124 SW2d 940, writ ref.
Bus driver's good-faith mistaken identification of plaintiff as person who had assaulted
him and broken window on bus one week earlier did not cast him in personal liability,
where trial court found that defendant did not physically or verbally attempt to detain or
threaten plaintiff until arrival of police and impliedly found that it was solely police
officers who decided to make arrest. Armstead v Escobedo (CA5 Tex) 488 F2d 509
(applying Texas law).
Where defendant's employee thought she saw handle of pistol protruding from plaintiff's
pocket while plaintiff was in store acting in manner that aroused employee's suspicion,
employee left store to call police, and employee accompanied police and identified
plaintiff, defendant was not guilty of false imprisonment. Moon v Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 250 Ark 453, 465 SW2d 330.
Nonsuit was proper where defendant's identification of plaintiff to police as the man who
robbed him was without malice and resulted from honest mistake, even though made on
basis of plaintiff's clothing and size alone, and defendant did not inform arresting officers
of that fact. Cole v Johnson (1st Dist) 197 Cal App 2d 788, 17 Cal Rptr 664.
Persons who mistakenly identified plaintiff, a hospital orderly, as individual responsible
for taking hospital patient's money, were not liable for false arrest. Smith v District of
Columbia (Dist Col App) 399 A2d 213.
However, bail bondsman who improperly identified plaintiff as person he had bonded,
which positive identification resulted in imprisonment of plaintiff on bench warrant, was
liable for false imprisonment, even though there was no proof of malice, where
bondsman did not know for fact that plaintiff was man who had failed to appear, where
he had no personal knowledge of plaintiff's identity, and where, despite plaintiff's claim
that he had been mistakenly identified for other defendant with similar name, bonding
agency took no steps to verify its identification of him. Fontenot v Lavergne (La App 3d
Cir) 365 So 2d 1168.
Defendant's identification of plaintiff as man who passed bogus check at store of
defendant's employer amounted only to giving of information to police officer, who had
requested defendant to come to police station for such purpose and who subsequently
made arrest on own initiative and judgment, and, in absence of evidence that defendant
urged, advised, or approved arrest, defendant did not "direct, countenance, encourage or
instigate" arrest so as to render him liable for false imprisonment. Davis v Weil Clothing
Co. (Mo App) 367 SW2d 19.
Defendant who mistakenly identified plaintiff to police as the person who attempted to
rob him was not liable for false arrest and imprisonment where the arrest was by the
police and the plaintiff acted reasonably and with probable cause under the existing facts.
Barnes v Bollhorst (Sup) 225 NYS2d 286.
Footnote 6. Raphaer v Leader (DC Ga) 203 F 184; Klemm v Adair, 189 Iowa 896, 179
NW 51; State ex rel. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v Trimble, 294 Mo 615, 242 SW 934.
However, where television salesman said that he could determine if television set was a
stolen set if it were taken to police station, and nodded his head when police officer said
that plaintiff, in whose home set was, would have to go to police station, salesman was
liable. See Heinold v Muntz T. V., Inc. (Mo) 262 SW2d 32 (holding salesman's employer
not liable, since arrest was not within scope of salesman's authority).
ALR2d 643.
Footnote 7. Halbert v City of Sherman (CA5 Tex) 33 F3d 526; Schroeder v Lufthansa
German Airlines (CA7 Ill) 875 F2d 613.
Footnote 8. See Jensen v Barnett, 178 Neb 429, 134 NW2d 53 (hotelkeepers were liable
in damages for false arrest and imprisonment of guest, where desk clerk knowingly
conveyed to police officer false information that guest had committed breach of peace
and false information was determining factor in officer's decision to make arrest).
Private person may incur liability for false imprisonment where such person knowingly
gives false information to an arresting officer. K-Mart Corp. v Salmon, 76 Md App 568,
547 A2d 1069, cert den 314 Md 496, 551 A2d 867.
Knowingly giving false information to a police officer may constitute an attempt to
influence the officer's decision as to whether to make an arrest and may be sufficient to
constitute instigation of a false arrest. Godines v First Guaranty Sav. & Loan Asso.
(Miss) 525 So 2d 1321.
Employer's unsupported statements about ex-employee's alleged possession of stolen
gun, procuring employee's arrest despite employer's knowledge that gun was in the
possession of another employee, constituted a submissible case for employer's instigation
of the employee's false arrest. Day v Wells Fargo Guard Service Co. (Mo) 711 SW2d
503.
assistance after disturbance or trespass, for false arrest by officer, 98 ALR3d 542
42 Private persons assisting officer on request [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE

IMPRISONMENT]
In many jurisdictions, the failure of a citizen to assist a known police officer in making an
arrest, when requested to do so, is a statutory offense. 9 Consequently, it is frequently
held that whoever in good faith renders assistance and obeys the directions of a known
public officer in response to a call for assistance is not liable for false arrest or
imprisonment, although the officer may be acting unlawfully and may thus be personally
liable. 10 According to this view a private citizen can respond to the call of a known
officer without first determining the lawfulness of the officer's conduct. 11 This
protection is accorded on the theory that the necessity for immediate action precludes
inquiry and that if the citizen were obliged to make inquiry, the purpose of the statute
authorizing officers to call private citizens to their assistance would be largely frustrated.
12 Moreover, it is said, it would be inequitable to impose liability on a citizen for
conduct the citizen is under a legal obligation to perform. 13
However, a citizen is liable when summoned to assist an officer in making an arrest, if the
citizen acts wantonly or beyond what is required. 14 Also, there is some authority
indicating that a citizen is not protected if the citizen had affirmative knowledge of the
illegality of an arrest. 15
Footnotes
Footnote 9. Peterson v Robison, 43 Cal 2d 690, 277 P2d 19; Babington v Yellow Taxi
Corp., 250 NY 14, 164 NE 726, 61 ALR 1354; Mitchell v Industrial Com. of Ohio
(Delaware Co) 57 Ohio App 319, 10 Ohio Ops 503, 26 Ohio L Abs 102, 13 NE2d 736,
motion overr; Moyer v Meier, 205 Okla 405, 238 P2d 338, 29 ALR2d 818; West Salem v
Industrial Com. of Wisconsin, 162 Wis 57, 155 NW 929.
Footnote 10. Peterson v Robison, 43 Cal 2d 690, 277 P2d 19; Grau v Forge, 183 Ky 521,
209 SW 369, 3 ALR 642; Firestone v Rice, 71 Mich 377, 38 NW 885; Jefferson v Yazoo
& M. V. R. R. Co., 194 Miss 729, 11 So 2d 442; Moore v State, 200 NC 300, 156 SE 806;
Moyer v Meier, 205 Okla 405, 238 P2d 338, 29 ALR2d 818; Kearley v Cowan, 217 Ala
295, 116 So 145.
Annotation: Liability, for false imprisonment or arrest, of a private person answering call
of known or asserted peace or police officer to assist in making arrest which turns out to
be unlawful, 29 ALR2d 825 2.
Forms: Answerdefenseassistance rendered pursuant to command of officer. 10 Am Jur
Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 55.
Footnote 11. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v Cundiff, 166 Ky 594, 179 SW 615; State
v Bertchey, 77 NJL 640, 73 A 524.
Forms: Instructions to jury on liability of person participating with officer in arrest or
Footnote 12. Moyer v Meier, 205 Okla 405, 238 P2d 338, 29 ALR2d 818.
Footnote 13. Presley v Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. (Tex Civ App) 145 SW 669.
Footnote 14. Moyer v Meier, 205 Okla 405, 238 P2d 338, 29 ALR2d 818.
A private person summoned by an officer to assist in an arrest is authorized to use such
force as to him reasonably appears necessary to accomplish the arrest, even though the
acts of the officer are without authority. Smith v State, 139 Tex Crim 355, 140 SW2d
452.
Footnote 15. Jefferson v Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co., 194 Miss 729, 11 So 2d 442.
Annotation: Liability, for false imprisonment or arrest, of a private person answering call
of known or asserted peace or police officer to assist in making arrest which turns out to
be unlawful, 29 ALR2d 825 6.
43 Complainants in criminal prosecution [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
Since a person on whose complaint an arrest is made is usually a layman, not familiar
with and not pretending to determine the legal procedure to be taken, it has been said to
be unjust to hold such a person guilty of any tort if he or she merely makes to a
magistrate an honest statement of the facts, and leaves it to the officers of the law to take
such action as they deem proper; and under such circumstances many courts have held
the complainant not liable. 16 If the facts supporting an arrest are placed before an
independent intermediary, such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary's decision
breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party. 17 It is
frequently held or recognized that a person making a complaint before a magistrate
having general jurisdiction over the subject matter of a criminal prosecution is not,
merely because of that act, liable for false imprisonment, although the complaint is
insufficient to charge the commission of a crime. 18
Footnotes
Footnote 16. Gogue v MacDonald, 35 Cal 2d 482, 218 P2d 542, 21 ALR2d 639; Rush v
Buckley, 100 Me 322, 61 A 774; Smith v Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P 653.
Officer of corporation in connection with the forgery of whose checks plaintiff was
arrested was not liable for false imprisonment when he signed complaint at time when he
knew (1) that corporation's checks were missing; (2) that person who had cashed such a
check told police plaintiff had given it to him; (3) that, in opinion of himself and
detective, plaintiff's signature was similar to that on forged check: and (4) that
prosecuting attorney recommended arrest. Gooch v Wachowiak, 352 Mich 347, 89
NW2d 496.
Defendant was not liable for false arrest on warrant issued by magistrate where he
disclosed all facts to magistrate, and signed complaint on the magistrate's advice, and
magistrate was responsible for arrest. J. C. Penney Co. v Reynolds (Tex Civ App El
Paso) 329 SW2d 104, writ ref n r e (Apr 13, 1960).
As to defense to false imprisonment based upon issuance of legal process, see 87.
Footnote 17. Taylor v Gregg (CA5 Tex) 36 F3d 453, reh den (CA5 Tex) 1994 US App
LEXIS 36112.
Footnote 18. Gogue v MacDonald, 35 Cal 2d 482, 218 P2d 542, 21 ALR2d 639; Rush v
Buckley, 100 Me 322, 61 A 774; Doty v Hurd, 124 Mich 671, 83 NW 632; Harbison v
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 327 Mo 440, 37 SW2d 609, 79 ALR 1; Van Buren v Ford,
189 Misc 352, 71 NYS2d 551; Whaley v Lawton, 62 SC 91, 40 SE 128; Smith v Jones,
16 SD 337, 92 NW 1084; Smith v Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P 653.
If the arrest of the plaintiff was upon a valid indictment but under a warrant void because
not properly descriptive of the offense, and the defendant who instigated the prosecution
in no way directed or influenced the court in issuing the void warrant, or with knowledge
of its defects participated in the arrest under it, the defendant is not liable for the
plaintiff's false imprisonment. Morgan v Baird, 219 Ala 225, 121 So 526.
ALR2d 643.
44 Persons initiating commitment proceedings [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
In suits against persons other than examining physicians, 19 recovery has been allowed
in some cases against those who filed an insanity complaint or in some other manner
directly initiated insanity proceedings against the plaintiff, 20 or at least such cases have
been allowed to proceed past the summary judgment stage; 21 in other cases, however,
relief has been denied. 22
Footnotes
Footnote 19. As to immunity or liability of examining physicians, see 142.
Footnote 20. Burton v Llano Del Rio Co., 177 La 366, 148 So 259; O'Rourke v O'Rourke
(La App, Orleans) 69 So 2d 567, amd on other grounds 227 La 262, 79 So 2d 87; Boesch
v Kick, 98 NJL 183, 119 A 1, 25 ALR 1516; Sheean v Holman, 6 NJ Misc 346, 141 A
170.
connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 ALR3d 523 7[a].
Footnote 21. Wagenmann v Adams (CA1 Mass) 829 F2d 196 (action against police
officers and others who participated in an allegedly pretextual arrest and emergency
psychiatric detention); Welch v County of Westchester (2d Dept) 150 App Div 2d 371,
540 NYS2d 820 (county was not entitled to summary judgment, since county did not
establish compliance with all necessary provisions of state mental health law).
Footnote 22. Baer v Smith, 68 Cal App 2d 716, 157 P2d 646; Dougherty v Snyder, 97 Mo
App 495, 71 SW 463.
The following cases exonerate treatment staff and others not directly involved in the
original arrest or detention itself from liability on a false imprisonment claim, on the
basis of reasonableness of decision-making based upon the detainee's need for protection
or treatment, or on the basis of some other ground, such as the efficacy of consent or
substituted consent: McKinney v George (CA7 Ill) 726 F2d 1183 (nurse and ward
supervisor); Radcliff v County of Harrison (Ind) 627 NE2d 1305 (county
commissioners); Day v Providence Hosp. (Ala) 622 So 2d 1273, reh den, without op
(Ala) 1993 Ala LEXIS 986 (physician and hospital); Lolley v Charter Woods Hosp., Inc.
(Ala) 572 So 2d 1223 (physician and hospital); Reiser v Prunty, 224 Mont 1, 727 P2d 538
(physician and hospital; no violation found in decision to retain patient in hospital over
election day; nor was this decision an unlawful restriction of the patient's right to vote,
inasmuch as the patient was the subject of a lawful detention).
For other cases rejecting liability against defendants who initiated insanity proceedings,
decided on the ground that a false imprisonment suit cannot be based on a commitment
authorized by apparently valid process issued by a court having jurisdiction, see the
following cases: Rosvall v Provost, 279 Minn 119, 155 NW2d 900; Guzy v Guzy, 16
Misc 2d 975, 184 NYS2d 161, affd (2d Dept) 11 App Div 2d 1047, 206 NYS2d 355;
Fowle v Fowle, 263 NC 724, 140 SE2d 398.
A welfare commissioner was held not liable in a false imprisonment suit for making a
petition to commit the plaintiff to a state hospital for the insane, inBridgeman v Andrus,
247 App Div 922, 287 NYS 532, where the plaintiff was given notice of the petition, a
hearing was held, two doctors certified that he was insane, and there was no contention
that the order of commitment itself was unlawful or unauthorized.
In Pendleton v Burkhalter (Tex Civ App Houston (1st Dist)) 432 SW2d 724, writ ref n r e
(Jan 8, 1969), the court said that it found no allegation of false imprisonment in a petition
stating that the executive secretary for the medical staff of a hospital, acting under the
supervision and direction, and as an employee, of various individual defendants who
were physicians connected with the hospital, including one of the two principal
stockholders in the hospital corporation, filed a sworn lunacy complaint which resulted in
the issuance of an order by a justice of the peace committing the plaintiff's decedent, also
a physician and the other principal stockholder in the hospital, to the mental ward of
another hospital for examination and treatment.
connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 ALR3d 523 7[b].
45 -- Persons participating in arrest or confinement of mentally ill person [32 Am
Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The cases are split over the liability of persons who participate in the actual arrest or
confinement of the plaintiff as an allegedly mentally ill person, 23 and persons sought to
be held liable because of other acts or omissions in connection with insanity proceedings.
24
The immunity from civil or criminal penalties provided by a mental health statute, to any
person who acts in good faith to assist in the apprehension or taking into protective
custody and examination of a patient, has been held to preclude civil liability for false
imprisonment on the part of private citizens instituting proceedings for commitment of a
neighbor, where it is found that they acted in good faith and without malice pursuant to
legal process. 25
Liability will not be extended to persons who have no part in the allegedly unlawful
commitment. 26
Footnotes
Footnote 23. In Ingo v Koch (CA2 NY) 127 F2d 667, the court, although reversing
judgment for the plaintiff in a false imprisonment suit and remanding for a new trial on a
question concerning the choice between two New York statutes of limitations, held that
there was evidence sufficient to justify a jury in believing that certain police and jail
officials who carried out the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff for assault, and then
had her transferred to a hospital for treatment of her "paranoid state," were actuated by
personal ill will and malice directed against her because of her previously filed suit
against a police lieutenant and her charges in that suit of corruption by him and another
city official. The court pointed out that the sheriff who made the arrest violated the terms
of the bench warrant authorizing the arrest, and that the certificate under which the
plaintiff was transferred from jail to a hospital for treatment was signed only by the acting
jail physician and not by the warden, contrary to a statutory requirement. Also supporting
the liability of the defendant, and tending to show his bad faith, said the court, was an
application form, prepared by the district attorney for presentation to the county judge,
seeking the plaintiff's removal from the jail to the hospital because of unsound mental
condition. While the particular form was not used, said the court, it is significant that it
was dated the day before her arrest.
Officers' actions in taking detainee into custody and transporting him to mental hospital
on an emergency basis were supported by probable cause, based on numerous citizen
complaints that detainee was running through halls of a residential building, brandishing
knives. McKinney v George (CA7 Ill) 726 F2d 1183.
On the other hand, the following cases rejected liability against a defendant who
allegedly participated in the actual arrest or confinement of the plaintiff, on the ground
that a false imprisonment suit cannot be based on a commitment authorized by apparently
valid process, issued by a court having jurisdiction, and lawfully executed: Savage v
Boies, 77 Ariz 355, 272 P2d 349; Smith v Fish, 182 Ark 115, 30 SW2d 223; Rosvall v
Provost, 279 Minn 119, 155 NW2d 900; Dedrick v Durham, 136 Wash 265, 239 P 385.
The sheriff's actions in implementing an emergency detention order specifying that the
detainee was mentally ill and dangerous were reasonable and the sheriff was entitled to
immunity under the "good faith" provisions of state statute; in the absence of a hospital
bed immediately available for the detainee, the sheriff made reasonable provisions for the
detainee's care and protection until the bed became available and the sheriff could carry
out the order. Radcliff v County of Harrison (Ind) 627 NE2d 1305.
See also Boesch v Kick, 98 NJL 183, 119 A 1, 25 ALR 1516, where the court sustained
liability for false imprisonment against a defendant who, among other things, induced the
plaintiff to go with him to an insane asylum by means of a false statement, and caused her
to be imprisoned there by an officer of the asylum.
Footnote 24. See Fish v Regents of University of Cal. (1st Dist) 246 Cal App 2d 327, 54
Cal Rptr 656 (a general surgeon who apparently reported that a telephone call represented
a threat against him, which led to the detention of the caller for mental examination, was
held not liable for false imprisonment).
On the other hand, an allegation by a plaintiff who had been held in custody at a state
hospital to the effect that he was never served with any order of detention or petition for
examination was held to raise a triable issue of fact and to bar the sustaining of a general
demurrer in a false imprisonment action against the county whose sheriff should have
made such service, inCulbertson v County of Santa Clara (1st Dist) 261 Cal App 2d 274,
67 Cal Rptr 752.
See also Morris v Nowotny (Tex Civ App Austin) 323 SW2d 301, writ ref n r e (Jun 10,
1959) and rehg of writ of error overr (Jul 8, 1959) and cert den 361 US 889, 4 L Ed 2d
124, 80 S Ct 164, reh den 361 US 921, 4 L Ed 2d 189, 80 S Ct 264, where two
university deans were held not liable for, inter alia, false arrest and false imprisonment in
a suit that involved a temporary commitment to a state hospital for mental observation,
although the allegations of the plaintiff as to the deans did not refer to the hospital
commitment but primarily to a prior imprisonment in jail and other matters not related to
the hospital confinement.
Footnote 25. Humphrey v Feazel (La App 2d Cir) 367 So 2d 897, cert den (La) 369 So 2d
1365; Patrich v Menorah Medical Center (Mo App) 636 SW2d 134.
Footnote 26. See Radcliff v County of Harrison (Ind) 627 NE2d 1305 (county
commissioners who had no part in the detention of the patient are not liable in a
subsequent action based upon the detention).
The state governor and mental health commissioner whose tenure in office commenced
subsequent to the patient's commitment are not liable for any claimed deficiencies in that
detention. Temple v Marlborough Div. of Dist. Court Dep't, 395 Mass 117, 479 NE2d
137.
46 Parties in civil litigation [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
One who in good faith invokes the action of public officers on account of a violation of
the criminal law is entitled to more liberal treatment than one who seeks to bring about an
arrest for his private advantage by the use of civil process. 27 Civil arrest is often
regarded as a drastic remedy, penal in nature, which is not looked on with favor by the
courts and should be resorted to only where the right to it is clear. Accordingly, statutes
authorizing such arrests are usually strictly construed; one who invokes them must
strictly follow their provisions. 28 Where the object in view is the protection or
enforcement of a private right and a warrant is issued where none is authorized, and an
arrest is made, the individual procuring it may be liable. 29 Liability may be based upon
participation in the improper arrest 30 or subsequent adoption, or "ratification," of such
arrest. 31
Footnotes
Footnote 27. Teal v Fissel (CC Pa) 28 F 351; Lemmon v King, 95 Kan 524, 148 P 750;
Gifford v Wiggins, 50 Minn 401, 52 NW 904.
Footnote 29. Teal v Fissel (CC Pa) 28 F 351.
Since the court issuing the body attachment sought by attorney on basis of child support
obligor's nonappearance at a child support hearing was satisfied that the requesting
attorney followed the correct procedure and submitted the appropriate materials, the
attorney would be liable for false imprisonment only if it could be proved that the
attorney actively misled or defrauded the issuing court; in the absence of any such
showing, the obligor's action for false imprisonment and abuse of process was a statutory
frivolous claim. Stern v Thompson & Coates, 185 Wis 2d 221, 517 NW2d 658,
ALR2d 643.
Forms: Complaint for procurement by civil litigant of illegal arrest. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr
Footnote 30. Pinkerton v Gilbert, 22 Ill App 568; Haglund v Burdick State Bank, 100
Kan 279, 164 P 167.
Footnote 31. Stuart v Chapman, 104 Me 17, 70 A 1069.

Annotation: 21 ALR2d 643.
47 -- Contempt proceedings [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
In cases of arrest for contempt of court the defendant is not liable for an independent
error of judgment or a mistaken exercise of discretion by the court, even though the order
adjudging the plaintiff to be in contempt was later annulled on that ground. 32 Also, one
who institutes proceedings is not liable for an error of the judge in ordering, in excess of
jurisdiction, a party committed for contempt, if that party is properly before the court and
a regular hearing is had on the issues. 33 However, imprisonment for contempt does
result in liability for false imprisonment where that remedy is not authorized by law for
the particular purpose. 34
Footnotes
Footnote 32. Fischer v Langbein, 103 NY 84, 8 NE 251.
ALR2d 643.
Footnote 33. Terry v Wright, 9 Colo App 11, 47 P 905; Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis
277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622.
Footnote 34. Yahola v Whipple, 189 Okla 583, 118 P2d 395.
A jury question existed as to whether a contempt citation and subsequent arrest of a
debtor, in a replevin action brought subsequent to the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy,
was an attempt to collect a void money judgment rather than a permissible action to
recover the property in question. An attempt to collect on a void judgment could invoke
liability for false imprisonment. Houghton v Foremost Financial Services Corp. (CA10
Okla) 724 F2d 112.
48 Jailers [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The general rule that all who take part or assist in the commission of a false
imprisonment are joint tortfeasors 35 is applicable to jailers. 36 A jailer is liable for
false imprisonment if the jailer knows or should know that an arrest was illegal and that
there is no right to imprison the person arrested, whether the act is done officially or
otherwise. 37 Liability for unlawful imprisonment may also be predicated on a jailer's
unreasonable delay in taking the person arrested before a magistrate, 38 on the refusal of
a jailer to permit the prisoner to secure his release on bail, 39 or on a policy of inaction
or deliberate indifference resulting in incarceration of a detainee without arraignment for
a period of time well beyond the statutory maximum. 40 Finally, a jailer may be found
liable for retaining a prisoner in custody beyond the lawful date for parole. 41
A prisoner has no action against the imprisoning authority, however, where the continuing
imprisonment is not unlawful, as where, for example, a prisoner's sentence is set aside but
the conviction is upheld. 42
Footnotes
Footnote 35. 146.
Footnote 36. Oppenheimer v Los Angeles, 104 Cal App 2d 551, 232 P2d 30; Egleston v
Scheibel, 113 App Div 798, 99 NYS 969.
Footnote 37. Abbott v Cooper, 218 Cal 425, 23 P2d 1027.
Officer in charge, by continuing imprisonment of persons unlawfully arrested by police
officers, makes himself personally liable for the arrests. Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422,
210 P 853, 26 ALR 278 (officer in charge of a police station who, against the will of
persons who were unlawfully arrested and protested their innocence, continued the
imprisonment); Price v Tehan, 84 Conn 164, 79 A 68 (officer who imposed unwarranted
terms on release of persons unlawfully arrested).
Forms: Complaint against jailer for confinement without charge after arrest without
warrant. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 111.
Footnote 38. 29.
Footnote 39. 31.
DAR 723.
See also Lewis v O'Grady (CA7 Ill) 853 F2d 1366 (jailer's liability based upon delay in
effectuating a prisoner's release from custody, after unavoidable administrative delays,
beyond a reasonable period of time, as determined by a jury).
SE2d 90.
Footnote 42. Moore v Zant, 264 Ga 536, 448 SE2d 695, 94 Fulton County D R 3255.
3. Vicarious Liability [49-58]

49 Generally; principles governing liability [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
The liability of a master or principal for the act of a servant or agent in causing a false
arrest or imprisonment depends upon whether the master or principal previously
authorized the act, or subsequently ratified it, or whether the act was within the scope of
the servant's or agent's employment. 43 In determining the scope of authority of the
agent and the responsibility of the principal, liberality must be accorded the person
falsely imprisoned. 44 It is well settled that a master or principal is liable for damages
resulting from a false arrest or imprisonment caused or procured by a servant or agent
while the latter was acting within the course and scope of employment. 45 Clearly the
master or principal may be held liable where the subordinate had express authority to
make or cause the arrest or imprisonment. 46 However, it is not necessary that authority
be expressly conferred or specifically authorized. As a general rule, it is sufficient if the
agent's or servant's authority to cause the arrest can be implied from the nature of the
relationship and the mode in which the agent or servant was permitted to act or conduct
the principal's business. 47 Whatever is fairly implied by the authority given is within
the scope of employment, and in such a case the master is deemed to have consented to
and authorized the act, although the servant acted contrary to instructions. 48 The fact
that an agent or servant, through lack of good judgment or proper discretion, or infirmity
of temper, or under the influence of passion aroused by the circumstances, has gone
beyond the strict line of duty or authority and inflicted unjustifiable injury upon another
does not relieve the master from liability. 49 There is also some authority to the effect
that a principal may be held liable in damages for false imprisonment under the doctrine
of agency by estoppel. 50
An employer will not be held liable for false imprisonment for the actions of an employee
which are outside the scope of employment and not within the policy or practice of the
employer. 51 Where the act of the servant or agent causing the arrest or imprisonment is
not within the scope of the authority expressly or impliedly given for that purpose by the
master, there is no liability on the part of the superior for the act of the subordinate, 52
in the absence of ratification. 53 Thus, where the agent or servant commits willful torts,
not to protect the master's interests, but to gratify some spite or personal object, 54 or
acts in the supposed public interest and not for the benefit of the master, 55 the master is
not liable.
A city cannot be held liable under respondeat superior theory, 56 nor does such vicarious
liability lie against a municipality on a respondeat superior theory in a 1983 action. 57
The question of whether the agent was acting within the scope of employment in causing
the lawful arrest is generally reserved for the jury. 58
Footnotes
Footnote 43. Craven v Bloomingdale, 171 NY 439, 64 NE 169; Bushardt v United Inv.
Co., 121 SC 324, 113 SE 637, 35 ALR 637; Hudson v Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 152
Tenn 691, 280 SW 403.
There is no basic or fundamental distinction to be drawn between the liability of a
principal for the tortious act of an agent and the liability of a master for the tortious act of
a servant. 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency 280.

Footnote 44. J. J. Newberry Co. v Judd, 259 Ky 309, 82 SW2d 359.
Footnote 45. Collazo v John W. Campbell Farms, Inc. (CA5 Fla) 213 F2d 255; Crescent
Amusement Co. v Scott, 34 Ala App 335, 40 So 2d 882, cert den 252 Ala 296, 40 So 2d
886; Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v Waller, 208 Ark 1063, 189 SW2d 361; Schanafelt v
Seaboard Finance Co., 108 Cal App 2d 420, 239 P2d 42; S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132
Fla 471, 180 So 757; Hammargren v Montgomery Ward & Co., 172 Kan 484, 241 P2d
1192; Pilos v First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 319 Mass 475, 66 NE2d 576; Peak v W. T. Grant Co.
(Mo App) 386 SW2d 685; Goldberg v Fleischer's Confidence Food Stores, Inc. (Sup) 102
NYS2d 176; Morton v Murphy Lumber & Hardware Co. (CP) 46 Ohio Ops 70, 62 Ohio
L Abs 245, 102 NE2d 744; Coffee v Peterbilt of Nashville, Inc. (Tenn) 795 SW2d 656;
Odom v Gray (Tenn) 508 SW2d 526; Kroger Co. v Warren (Tex Civ App Houston (1st
Dist)) 420 SW2d 218; Wheatley v Washington Jockey Club, 39 Wash 2d 163, 234 P2d
878.
Pastor's acts of locking repairman in closet and holding him ransom until employer
refunded money were outside the scope of the pastor's authority and summary judgment
for the pastor's church and its parent organization was appropriate. Hendricks v Bauer
(Tex App Beaumont) 709 SW2d 774, writ ref n r e (Sep 17, 1986) and rehg of writ of
error overr (Oct 29, 1986).
As to liability of master or principal for punitive damages based on act of servant or
agent, see 153.
Annotation: Principal's liability for false arrest or imprisonment caused by agent or
servant, 92 ALR2d 15 ( 8 superseded by Principal's liability for punitive damages
because of false arrest or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, by agent or employee,
93 ALR3d 826).
Footnote 46. Schanafelt v Seaboard Finance Co., 108 Cal App 2d 420, 239 P2d 42;
Dillon v Sears-Roebuck Co., 126 Neb 357, 253 NW 331; Adams v F. W. Woolworth Co.,
144 Misc 27, 257 NYS 776; Thomas v F. & R. Lazarus & Co. (App, Franklin Co) 3 Ohio
Ops 2d 75, 40 Ohio L Abs 51, 57 NE2d 116; Alamo Downs, Inc. v Briggs (Tex Civ App)
106 SW2d 733, writ dism w o j; Wheatley v Washington Jockey Club, 39 Wash 2d 163,
234 P2d 878.
Annotation: 92 ALR2d 15 3[b].
Footnote 47. J. J. Newberry Co. v Smith, 227 Ala 234, 149 So 669; Hanna v Raphael
Weill & Co., 90 Cal App 2d 461, 203 P2d 564; S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla 471,
180 So 757; Blickhan v American Brewing Co. (La App) 171 So 865 (dictum); Safeway
Stores v Barrack, 210 Md 168, 122 A2d 457 (criticized on other grounds in Montgomery
Ward v Wilson (Md) 1995 Md LEXIS 129); McDermott v W. T. Grant Co., 313 Mass
736, 49 NE2d 115; Hurst v Montgomery Ward & Co. (Mo App) 145 SW2d 992; Taylor v
New York & L. B. R. Co., 80 NJL 282, 78 A 169; Young v Edelbrew Brewery, Inc., 302
NY 653, 98 NE2d 473; Combs v Kobacker Stores, Inc. (App, Franklin Co) 65 Ohio L
Abs 326, 114 NE2d 447; Spain v Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 78 Or 355, 153 P 470; Leon's
Shoe Stores, Inc. v Hornsby (Tex Civ App Waco) 306 SW2d 402, writ dism (Dec 31,
1957).
Doctrine of apparent authority as applicable where relationship is that of master and
servant, 2 ALR2d 406 5.
Footnote 48. Hammargren v Montgomery Ward & Co., 172 Kan 484, 241 P2d 1192; J. J.
Newberry Co. v Judd, 259 Ky 309, 82 SW2d 359; Schmidt v New Orleans R. Co., 116 La
311, 40 So 714; McDermott v W. T. Grant Co., 313 Mass 736, 49 NE2d 115; Kirschman
v Pitt Pub. Co., 318 Pa 570, 178 A 828, 100 ALR 1062; Birmingham News Co. v
Browne, 228 Ala 395, 153 So 773; Clement v Emmons (Tex Civ App) 170 SW2d 610,
writ ref w o m; Cobb v Simon, 119 Wis 597, 97 NW 276.
Footnote 49. J. J. Newberry Co. v Judd, 259 Ky 309, 82 SW2d 359.
Footnote 50. See Combs v Kobacker Stores, Inc. (App, Franklin Co) 65 Ohio L Abs 326,
114 NE2d 447 (store could not escape liability merely because the one who caused
plaintiff's false arrest was employed by a shoe company which merely leased space in
defendant's store, where there was evidence that the plaintiff had been encouraged to go
to the store as a result of an advertisement for shoes in the local newspaper which
designated the defendant as the advertiser; the court said that since the defendant
advertised that the shoes were for sale in their store, and the plaintiff, in reliance thereon,
bought the shoes at a department therein which was the only place in the store where the
article in question could be found, the doctrine of agency by estoppel applied and the
defendant could not deny that the lessee was its agent).
Annotation: 92 ALR2d 15 5.
Footnote 51. Big B, Inc. v Cottingham (Ala) 634 So 2d 999.
Footnote 52. Charles Stores Co. v O'Quinn (CA4 NC) 178 F2d 372; Wright v Georgia S.
& F. R. Co., 66 Fla 510, 63 So 909; Bernheimer Bros. v Becker, 102 Md 250, 62 A 526;
Heinold v Muntz T. V., Inc. (Mo) 262 SW2d 32; Taylor v Erie R. Co., 268 NY 711, 198
NE 570; Houston v Minneapolis S. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 25 ND 469, 141 NW 994; Bushardt
v United Inv. Co., 121 SC 324, 113 SE 637, 35 ALR 637.
The owner of a store is not liable for the unauthorized act of an employee in causing a
criminal prosecution to be instituted against one charged with having given a bad check
in payment for merchandise, even though the employee's intention was to secure a benefit
for his employer. Lamm v Charles Stores Co., 201 NC 134, 159 SE 444, 77 ALR 923.
Forms: Answer asserting defense that employee's actions not within scope of
employment. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 36.
Footnote 53. 51.
Footnote 54. Birmingham News Co. v Browne, 228 Ala 395, 153 So 773; Mayfield v St.
Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 97 Ark 24, 133 SW 168; Cobb v Simon, 119 Wis 597, 97 NW
276.
Where plaintiff was arrested at the instance of the manager of the defendant's department
store for the alleged issuance of bad checks, and the manager had no authority to receive
checks in payment for merchandise, and the sum represented by the check involved was
covered by the manager's personal funds before the swearing of the warrant for the arrest
of plaintiff, a peremptory instruction for the defendant was proper, since he had no
interest in the check or the prosecution and the manager's action was prompted solely by
personal motive. Cope v Askins, 208 Ky 86, 270 SW 454.
Footnote 55. 50.
Footnote 56. Vela v White (CA5 Tex) 703 F2d 147.
Footnote 58. Crescent Amusement Co. v Scott, 34 Ala App 335, 40 So 2d 882, cert den
252 Ala 296, 40 So 2d 886; Hanna v Raphael Weill & Co., 90 Cal App 2d 461, 203 P2d
564; S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla 471, 180 So 757; Komorowski v Boston Store
of Chicago, 263 Ill App 88; Allen v Ritter (Miss) 235 So 2d 253; Peak v W. T. Grant Co.
(Mo App) 386 SW2d 685; Rolnick v Borden's Farm Products Co., 214 App Div 259, 212
NYS 189; Darden v Louisville & N. R. Co., 171 Ohio St 63, 12 Ohio Ops 2d 82, 167
NE2d 765; Hayes v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 34 Wash 2d 666, 209 P2d 468.
In action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for false arrest of railroad
employee by alleged agents of railroad, whether individual defendants were acting in
official capacity as public officers, or whether they were acting within scope of their
employment as agents of railroad, thereby causing their employer to incur liability, was a
question of fact. Cales v Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (WD Va) 300 F Supp 155, 72 BNA
LRRM 2096, 61 CCH LC 10361.
Annotation: 92 ALR2d 15 3[d].
50 Distinction between protecting master's interests and vindicating justice [32
There is a marked distinction between a false imprisonment or arrest caused by an agent
for the purpose of protecting the rights or interests of the masterthat is, to protect
property, to prevent its theft, or to recover it backand an arrest or imprisonment caused
for the purpose of punishing an offender for an act already done. 59 Generally, the trend
of decisions has been to exonerate the principal where the act was not for the protection
of the principal's property or interest, but was to vindicate public justice or to redress an
offense against society or to punish the offender for something already done, even though
the wrongful act had its origin in some agency relationship. 60 However, as to many
employments, there is an implied authority to do all things that may be proper and
necessary for the protection of the master's property, and it has been held that where a
servant has reason to believe that property has actually been stolen and that the property
could be recovered by taking the supposed thief into custody, and the evidence showed
beyond question that the servant's objective in procuring the arrest of the plaintiff was not
to vindicate public justice, but to recover the property or charges due thereon, the servant
is acting within the scope of employment and the limits of implied authority, and the
master is liable, however erroneous, mistaken, or malicious the act may be. 61
Footnotes
Footnote 59. Southern R. Co. v Beaty, 212 Ala 608, 103 So 658.
Footnote 60. Southern R. Co. v Beaty, 212 Ala 608, 103 So 658; Arkansas Cent. Power
Co. v Hildreth, 174 Ark 529, 296 SW 33; Lichtenstein v New Orleans R. & L. Co., 158
La 284, 103 So 769; McCrory Stores Corp. v Satchell, 148 Md 279, 129 A 348; Pridgen v
Carolina Coach Co., 229 NC 46, 47 SE2d 609; Bushardt v United Inv. Co., 121 SC 324,
113 SE 637, 35 ALR 637.
Where there was some evidence that a hotel detective had caused plaintiff's subsequent
unlawful detention after his justified arrest on a charge of receiving property previously
stolen from the hotel, the hotel would not be liable, since the offense had already been
committed and the detention did not aid in its business nor serve to protect its interests.
Mackie v Ambassador Hotel & Inv. Corp., 123 Cal App 215, 11 P2d 3.
Where a railroad company's police inspector and agent arrested plaintiff for alleged theft
of golf equipment at the request of a head groundkeeper of a golf course which leased
adjoining premises from the defendant, the railroad was not liable for false
imprisonment. Louisville & N. R. Co. v Vinson, 310 Ky 854, 223 SW2d 89.
Where a store manager, after having recovered property allegedly stolen by the plaintiff,
detained her until the arrival of police for the purpose of prosecuting the plaintiff and
vindicating the law, the detention was without the scope of the manager's employment.
Pruitt v Watson, 103 W Va 627, 138 SE 331 (criticized on other grounds by Nees v Julian
Goldman Stores, Inc., 109 W Va 329, 154 SE 769).
93 ALR3d 826).
Footnote 61. S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla 471, 180 So 757; Lewis v Montgomery
Ward & Co., 144 Kan 656, 62 P2d 875; McDermott v W. T. Grant Co., 313 Mass 736, 49
NE2d 115; Hurst v Montgomery Ward & Co. (Mo App) 107 SW2d 183; Long v Eagle 5,
10 & 25 Store Co., 214 NC 146, 198 SE 573; Combs v Kobacker Stores, Inc. (App,
Franklin Co) 65 Ohio L Abs 326, 114 NE2d 447; Sebastianelli v Cleland Simpson Co.,
152 Pa Super 203, 31 A2d 570.
Where the assistant manager of the defendant's store pursued the plaintiff, whom he
mistakenly suspected of shoplifting, into another store for the purpose of recovering the
stolen property, and there caused him to be arrested and searched, the defendant was
responsible for his employee's acts. Moseley v J. G. McCrory Co., 101 W Va 480, 133
SE 73.
51 Ratification [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The general rule that a principal or master is not liable for acts of a servant or agent
which are committed outside the scope of the employment 62 is limited by the doctrine
of ratification. Even though a principal has not authorized the act, the principal may
ratify it and thereby be liable for a false arrest or imprisonment by the agent for which the
principal would not have been liable originally. 63 Ratification may be by acts of
omission as well as commission. 64 Retaining a servant in employment after notice of a
wrongful act is some evidence of ratification, 65 but the principal's information should
be full and complete in order to justify the conclusion of ratification on this ground. 66
There is some indication that mere passive approval of, acquiescence in, knowledge of, or
silence in regard to the act of a servant in making a wrongful arrest will not amount to a
ratification thereof, 67 although under the circumstances of some cases it has been held
that by such conduct an employer may be found to have ratified the act of the employee.
68
Footnotes
Footnote 62. 49.
Footnote 63. Caldwell v Standard Oil Co., 220 Ala 227, 124 So 512; Rolnick v Borden's
Farm Products Co., 214 App Div 259, 212 NYS 189; S. H. Kress & Co. v Rust, 132 Tex
89, 120 SW2d 425; Rogers v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 48 Wash 2d 879, 297 P2d 250;
Lemke v Anders, 261 Wis 555, 53 NW2d 436.
Where liability of corporation was predicated solely on its ratification of acts of manager
of one of its service stations, unrefuted affidavit of corporate officer that manager had no
authority to swear out warrant charging person with crime, and that manager was totally
responsible for money shortages of station while open for business, entitled corporation
to summary judgment in action for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution
resulting from manager's act of swearing out warrant charging another with larceny of
money while station was open for business. Brown v Triton, Inc., 115 Ga App 785, 156
SE2d 200.
In action for false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution arising out of
agreement between third party and defendant's plantation manager to cultivate 32 acres of
cotton, third party in turn having entered into working arrangement with plaintiff but
argument ensued between third party and plaintiff with result that, on plaintiff's refusing
to leave premises, plantation manager made out affidavit charging plaintiff with
trespassing, question was for jury whether signing of affidavit alleging trespass was
outside scope of plantation manager's authority, and, if so, whether his actions were
ratified by plantation owners so as to render them liable as principals. Allen v Ritter
(Miss) 235 So 2d 253.
As to liability of master or principal for punitive damages based on ratification of act of
servant or agent, see 155.
Footnote 64. Rogers v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 48 Wash 2d 879, 297 P2d 250; Cobb v
Simon, 119 Wis 597, 97 NW 276.
Where plaintiff's false arrest on a charge of trespass was caused by a deputy sheriff who
was also employed as a watchman by defendant corporation and there was evidence that
after defendant's regular attorney was notified of the arrest he assisted in the prosecution
of the plaintiff, the ratification by the attorney was sufficient to constitute "direct
corporate action" as alleged in the complaint. Ex parte Central Iron & Coal Co., 212 Ala
130, 101 So 824.
Footnote 65. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v Lethcoe (CA4 W Va) 279 F2d 948;
Safeway Stores, Inc. v Gibson (Mun Ct App Dist Col) 118 A2d 386, affd 99 US App DC
111, 237 F2d 592; Cobb v Simon, 119 Wis 597, 97 NW 276.
Footnote 66. Cobb v Simon, 119 Wis 597, 97 NW 276.
Footnote 67. Henriques v Franklin Motor Car Co., 260 Mass 518, 157 NE 580.
Footnote 68. Topolewski v Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis 52, 126 NW 554.
The principal ratified an unauthorized arrest made by his agent where, after notice of the
arrest, he did not investigate the circumstances under which the arrest was made but left
the agent in control of the situation. Southern R. Co. v Beaty, 212 Ala 608, 103 So 658;
Alamo Downs, Inc. v Briggs (Tex Civ App) 106 SW2d 733, writ dism w o j.
Where the captain of the police force of the defendant railroad investigated plaintiff for
theft of railroad property, the investigation having been ordered by defendant's officers,
who conducted and took part in all of the subsequent proceedings and who did not object
to what was done, even though it was clear that the investigation had shown that plaintiff
had not been guilty of any wrongdoing; and where a supervisor of a division of the
railroad, with knowledge of the facts, discharged plaintiff from his employment with the
railroad and permitted the captain to wrongfully commit him to jail, defendant was
liable. Keidel v Baltimore & O. R. Co., 281 Pa 289, 126 A 770.
52 Effect of exoneration of agent or servant [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
Where a master is sued for a false arrest or imprisonment caused by a servant, the master
may prove in justification that the servant cannot be held liable, or has been released, and
as a general rule if the servant is exonerated or released from liability, the master is also
exonerated. 69 There are a number of exceptions to this rule, however, such as where
liability is based on the acts of other servants, where there are separate grounds upon
which to find the master liable, where the master subsequently ratifies the act of his
servant, or where the act was performed under the direction and supervision of the
master. 70
Footnotes
Footnote 69. Turner v Mellon, 41 Cal 2d 45, 257 P2d 15; Burnett v Griffith (Mo) 739
SW2d 712, transf to (Mo App) 1988 Mo App LEXIS 480, later proceeding, en banc (Mo)
769 SW2d 780; Harrer v Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428; Goines
v Pennsylvania R. Co. (1st Dept) 3 App Div 2d 307, 160 NYS2d 39, reh den (1st Dept)
4 App Div 2d 831, 166 NYS2d 303 and later proceeding (1st Dept) 6 App Div 2d 531,
179 NYS2d 960, reh and app den (1st Dept) 7 App Div 2d 837, 182 NYS2d 295 and app
dismd without op 5 NY2d 711 and app dismd 5 NY2d 1002, 185 NYS2d 257, 158
NE2d 121; Kraft v Montgomery Ward & Co., 220 Or 234, 348 P2d 239, 92 ALR2d 1;
Virginia R. & P. Co. v O'Flaherty, 118 Va 749, 88 SE 312.
93 ALR3d 826).
Footnote 70. Kraft v Montgomery Ward & Co., 220 Or 234, 348 P2d 239, 92 ALR2d 1.
Where the evidence is such that the jury could find that the defendant acted through an
arresting officer and was responsible for his act, aside from, and independent of,
whatever was done by the defendant's servant, although the servant also directed the
arrest to be made, exoneration of the servant does not exonerate the master. Vest v S. S.
Kresge Co. (Mo App) 213 SW 165.
53 Liability of private corporation [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The liability of a corporation in tort may include an action for a false arrest or a false
imprisonment. The general rule is that a corporation may be held liable for the false
imprisonment or false arrest of a third person caused by the act of its officer, agent, or
employee while acting within the scope of authority or the course of employment. 71
However, as in other cases of liability of one for the act of another, in order to bind the
corporation it must appear that the officer, agent, or employee through whom the arrest or
imprisonment was caused was authorized in such respect, that the act if unauthorized
originally was later ratified, or that the act was done within the scope of employment or
general line of duty of such officer, agent, or employee. 72
Exoneration of the employee who caused an assertedly false imprisonment exonerates the
corporate employer. 73
Footnotes
S Ct 52; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v Tukey, 119 Ark 28, 175 SW 403; Moffatt v
Buffums' Inc., 21 Cal App 2d 371, 69 P2d 424 (secretary-treasurer); Evansville & T. H.
R. Co. v McKee, 99 Ind 519; Whitman v Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 85 Kan 150, 116 P
234 (unlawful detention of injured passenger to obtain written statement); Jacques v
Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass 438, 138 NE 843, 26 ALR 1329 (plaintiff and her aunt
detained by cashier in restaurant when only one check was presented); Lamm v Charles
Stores Co., 201 NC 134, 159 SE 444, 77 ALR 923; Alamo Downs, Inc. v Briggs (Tex
Civ App) 106 SW2d 733, writ dism w o j.
Defendant's false arrest claim against an individual employee of a company which
supplied bail bonds was properly kept from the jury in the absence of evidence that the
individual defendant so conducted and controlled the business as to make it his
instrumentality and that the individual was liable for claims against the corporation; the
plaintiff's claim was properly against the corporation. Bloodsworth v Morgan (Ala) 593
So 2d 55, reh den, without op (Ala) 1992 Ala LEXIS 136.
Where a vice-president of a fur company expressly ordered and directed plaintiff's arrest
and imprisonment on a charge of theft of a fur coat, the trial court properly directed a
verdict for plaintiff. Oliver v Kessler (Mo App) 95 SW2d 1226.
93 ALR3d 826).
Forms: Instruction to jury on liability of corporation for act of agent authorized or ratified
by corporation, or done within course of employment. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev),
Footnote 72. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v Sims, 106 Ark 109, 152 SW 985; Lamm v
Charles Stores Co., 201 NC 134, 159 SE 444, 77 ALR 923; Kraft v Montgomery Ward &
Co., 220 Or 234, 348 P2d 239, 92 ALR2d 1; Virginia R. & P. Co. v O'Flaherty, 118 Va
749, 88 SE 312.
Footnote 73. Wade v Campbell, 211 Mo App 274, 243 SW 248.
As to exoneration of agent or servant, generally, see 52.
54 Liability for acts of particular servants or agents [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
The rules in regard to the liability or nonliability of the master or principal for the acts of
a servant or agent in regard to false imprisonment have been applied to various particular
servants or agents; including, among others, amusement park employees, 74 attorneys at
law, 75 auditors or bookkeepers, 76 bank officers or employees, 77 carriers'
employees, 78 cashiers, 79 clerks, 80 collectors, 81 elevator operators, 82 filling
station operators and attendants, 83 finance companies' employees, 84 floorwalkers,
85 insurance companies' employees, 86 managers and assistant managers, 87
messengers, 88 newspaper and television station reporters and photographers, 89
private detectives and policemen, 90 including both private and public employees, 91
salespersons, 92 superintendents, 93 taxicab drivers, 94 toll collectors, 95 ushers, 96
watchmen, 97 an entry level security or loss prevention supervisor for a retailer, 98 and
police officers not engaged in police business at the time. 99
Footnotes
Footnote 74. Rice v Harrington, 38 RI 47, 94 A 736.
Footnote 75. 55.
Footnote 76. Harrer v Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428.
93 ALR3d 826).
Footnote 77. See Ginn v Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga App 175, 243 SE2d
528, 24 UCCRS 15 (where loan officer instigated arrest by knowingly relating to police
officer false information, loan officer and bank were liable for false imprisonment).
Footnote 78. See 14 Am Jur 2d, Carriers 1208 et seq.
1329; S. H. Kress & Co. v Bradshaw, 186 Okla 588, 99 P2d 508.
Where it appears that a cashier was in charge of an establishment in the absence of a
manager and assistant manager, the actions of the cashier may make his principal liable in
false imprisonment. Crescent Amusement Co. v Scott, 34 Ala App 335, 40 So 2d 882,
cert den 252 Ala 296, 40 So 2d 886.
Annotation: 92 ALR2d 15, 14
Footnote 80. Crews-Beggs Dry Goods Co. v Bayle, 97 Colo 568, 51 P2d 1026;
Hammond v Eckerd's of Asheville, Inc., 220 NC 596, 18 SE2d 151; Combs v Kobacker
Stores, Inc. (App, Franklin Co) 65 Ohio L Abs 326, 114 NE2d 447; Bushardt v United
Inv. Co., 121 SC 324, 113 SE 637, 35 ALR 637.
Even though a sales clerk violated the instructions of her employer when she exhibited
certain diamond mountings to a customer, she nevertheless had the authority to attempt to
prevent the stealing of such jewels while she had assumed the custody thereof. Newton v
Rhoads Bros. (Tex Com App) 24 SW2d 378.
A sales clerk who has not been instructed to accuse or arrest a customer is not within the
scope of his employment when he falsely imprisons a customer. Rogers v Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 48 Wash 2d 879, 297 P2d 250.
Annotation: 92 ALR2d 15, 15.
Footnote 81. Bright v Sawyer, 229 Ala 657, 159 So 211; Irby v J. P. Allen & Co., 33 Ga
App 362, 126 SE 888, affd 161 Ga 858, 131 SE 910.
Defendant store could not be charged with illegal acts of collector where petition did not
allege that defendant expressly directed collection agent to cause plaintiff's false arrest or
that it ratified those acts afterward, since agent's authority must not be construed as
authorizing other than legal means to effectuate purposes of agency. J. C. Penney Co. v
Green, 108 Ga App 155, 132 SE2d 83.
Footnote 82. See Turney v Rhodes, 42 Ga App 104, 155 SE 112 (an elevator operator
who refuses to permit a person to leave the elevator is acting within the scope of his
employment).
Footnote 83. Brown v Triton, Inc., 115 Ga App 785, 156 SE2d 200; Cordell v Standard
Oil Co., 131 Kan 221, 289 P 472; Peterson v Crossley, 14 NJ Misc 501, 185 A 926, affd
117 NJL 525, 189 A 624.
Undisputed evidence showed that manager of corporate defendant's filling station had
power and duty to sell and collect for its products, and omission of instructions requiring
jury to find that manager was acting within scope of employment when he gave police
incomplete and misleading information resulting in plaintiff's arrest was not error; and
manager's statement at police station, admissible as to him as an admission against
interest, was, under the circumstances, also admissible on that basis against corporate
defendant. Wehrman v Liberty Petroleum Co. (Mo App) 382 SW2d 56.
Footnote 84. Sanchez v Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 NM 512, 260 P2d 703.
Footnote 85. Ward v S. H. Kress & Co., 138 Kan 860, 28 P2d 983; Peak v W. T. Grant
Co. (Mo App) 386 SW2d 685; Cobb v Simon, 119 Wis 597, 97 NW 276.
Footnote 86. Perry v Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 14 Cal App 2d 609, 58 P2d 701; Huff v
National Acci. & Health Ins. Co., 58 Ga App 355, 198 SE 296.
Insurance association would be liable for acts of its special agent, part of whose duties
was to investigate fires, in falsely imprisoning insured in course of questioning her about
fire that damaged her house. American Ins. Asso. v Smith (Tex Civ App Texarkana) 439
SW2d 418.
Annotation: Insurer's tort liability for acts of adjuster seeking to obtain settlement or
release, 39 ALR3d 739 6.
Footnote 87. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v Waller, 208 Ark 1063, 189 SW2d 361;
Brown v Triton, Inc., 115 Ga App 785, 156 SE2d 200 (manager of filling or service
station); Aldridge v Fox, 348 Ill App 96, 108 NE2d 139; Lewis v Montgomery Ward &
Co., 144 Kan 656, 62 P2d 875; J. J. Newberry Co. v Judd, 259 Ky 309, 82 SW2d 359
(assistant manager of department store); McDermott v W. T. Grant Co., 313 Mass 736, 49
NE2d 115; Allen v Ritter (Miss) 235 So 2d 253 (plantation manager); Peak v W. T. Grant
Co. (Mo) 409 SW2d 58, 31 ALR3d 697; Holloway v Kent, 67 Misc 440, 122 NYS 684;
Szymanski v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (Lucas Co) 79 Ohio App 407, 35 Ohio Ops
177, 74 NE2d 205; Leon's Shoe Stores, Inc. v Hornsby (Tex Civ App Waco) 306 SW2d
402, writ dism (Dec 31, 1957).
The manager of a local unit of a national business dealing with the public is more than a
mere clerk or employee. He is a vice-principal. To permit a corporation of this type to
escape liability for the act of its "manager" on the grounds that he is not one of the
principal officers of the corporation and that he must have actual express authority to do
the particular thing in question would be improper. S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla
471, 180 So 757.
Although the term "manager" implies general power, it is not the size of the job which the
offending agent holds which determines the liability of the principal, but the quality of
the act done in the line of duty. Lamm v Charles Stores Co., 201 NC 134, 159 SE 444,
77 ALR 923.
Forms: Complaint, petition, or declarationunreasonable detention and search of
customer on accusation of shopliftingagainst store owner and store manager. 10 Am Jur
Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 21.
Instructions to jury as to circumstances constituting false imprisonment in detention of
customer by store manager. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form
46.
Footnote 88. Wingate v Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 204 SC 520, 30 SE2d 307.
Footnote 89. Odom v Gray (Tenn) 508 SW2d 526.
Footnote 90. 56, 57.
Footnote 91. Santiago v Fenton (CA1 Mass) 891 F2d 373; Bauldock v Davco Food, Inc.
(Dist Col App) 622 A2d 28; Meerbrey v Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill 2d 455, 151 Ill Dec
560, 564 NE2d 1222; Burnett v Griffith (Mo) 739 SW2d 712, transf to (Mo App) 1988
Mo App LEXIS 480, later proceeding, en banc (Mo) 769 SW2d 780; Latek v K Mart
Corp., 224 Neb 807, 401 NW2d 503.
Footnote 92. Heinold v Muntz T. V., Inc. (Mo) 262 SW2d 32.
Where a head saleswoman employed by defendant procured the plaintiffs' arrest on her
own individual complaint that they had taken a sum of money from her pocketbook, the
acts of the saleswoman were not in the course of the defendant's business. Conover v
Jaffee, 238 App Div 147, 263 NYS 618.
Footnote 93. McGill v Walnut Realty Co., 235 Mo App 874, 148 SW2d 131.
Footnote 94. McGlone v Landreth, 200 Okla 425, 195 P2d 268 (ovrld in part on other
grounds by Parker v Washington (Okla) 421 P2d 861).
Footnote 95. Ware v Barataria & Lafourche Canal Co., 15 La 169.

Footnote 96. Kennington-Saenger, Inc. v Wicks, 168 Miss 566, 151 So 549.
Footnote 97. 56.
Footnote 98. Gardner v Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. (CA2 NY) 907 F2d 1348.
Footnote 99. Leaon v Washington County (Minn) 397 NW2d 867 (an action brought
against sheriff, county and others, in connection with a police officers' stag party, not held
on duty, on official time or on official premises).
55 -- Attorneys [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
It has been held that where an attorney is acting within the general scope of authority the
client is liable for the attorney's tortious acts resulting in false arrest or imprisonment, 1
including an arrest resulting from the failure to cancel a warrant upon satisfaction of the
underlying obligation for which the warrant was issued, attributable to the defendant's
attorney's failure to see to dismissal of the warrant. 2 Thus, the client has been held
liable for the act of the attorney in procuring an unlawful body attachment of a litigant in
a civil suit, 3 or for procuring the issuance and service of an execution which is void,
against the person of a litigant, and causing incarceration thereunder. 4
On the other hand, it has been held that a litigant who merely permits counsel and the
court to commit for contempt one refusing to obey the order of the court, although the
court acted beyond its jurisdiction, is not liable. 5
Footnotes
Footnote 1. Vernes v Phillips, 266 NY 298, 194 NE 762; Morton v Murphy Lumber &
Hardware Co. (CP) 46 Ohio Ops 70, 62 Ohio L Abs 245, 102 NE2d 744; Gibson v
Holmes, 78 Vt 110, 62 A 11.
Where an attorney for a receiver initiated the arrest of one who was in violation of an
order which the attorney should have known to be void, the receiver is liable for false
imprisonment where he is acquainted with the matter and participated therein. Pomeranz
v Class, 82 Colo 173, 257 P 1086.
Footnote 2. Coffee v Peterbilt of Nashville, Inc. (Tenn) 795 SW2d 656.
Footnote 3. Otto v Levy, 244 App Div 349, 279 NYS 462.
Footnote 4. Rizzo v Riddell, 262 App Div 779, 27 NYS2d 837.

Footnote 5. Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622.
56 -- Private detectives, police officers, watchmen, or security agency personnel
[32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Frequently, a principal has been held liable in damages where a private detective, security
guard or police officer directly in the principal's employ procured or instigated a false
arrest or imprisonment, the courts readily concluding that such action falls within the
scope of the agency of such a servant. 6 However, the mere fact that a person is
employed as a "detective" or "policeman" does not necessarily import authority to make
arrests, 7 as where the hiring is for the specific and limited purpose of investigation of a
particular past occurrence. 8
Similarly, a watchman, as guardian of the master's property, usually has implied authority
to use such force as is necessary to protect it and may bind the employer by making a
false arrest. 9 However, if the arrest is not made to preserve or protect the master's
property, it is not within the course of employment and no liability therefor attaches to the
superior. 10
Even where the person causing the arrest is not directly employed by the defendant, but
rather is the employee of a security or detective agency which has contracted with the
defendant to protect the defendant's property from theft or embezzlement, the defendant
is generally held liable. 11 Thus, it has been held or recognized that the doctrine of
respondeat superior is applicable, under which the hirer may be found liable for the acts
of the personnel supplied by an independent agency which are committed within the
scope of employment, 12 at least where the circumstances are such as to render
appropriate the conclusion that the hirer generally exercised control or participated in the
tortious acts. 13 In so holding, some courts have indicated that the ordinary rule
relieving a hirer from liability for the torts of an independent contractor is limited to
negligent acts, and does not extend to intentional torts, 14 while other courts have based
their holdings on the nondelegability of the hirer's duty because of the personal character
of the duties involved, 15 but not because of their inherently dangerous character, there
being no inherent danger in security work. 16 Even where the agreement provides that
the right of control of the personnel supplied remains with the agency, it has been held
that if the evidence indicates that the hirer, notwithstanding the agreement, generally
exercises control over the personnel supplied, the hirer may be liable under the doctrine
of respondeat superior for intentional torts committed by the personnel supplied. 17
Where the hirer or agent participates in or ratifies the specific acts of the agency
personnel, 18 the hirer has been held liable vicariously or as a joint tortfeasor. 19
Under the principles stated above, liability has been imposed upon the hirer based on acts
amounting to false arrest or imprisonment specifically initiated and carried out by agency
personnel against employees of the hirer 20 as well as against customers or other
members of the public, 21 particularly where such acts were done at the request or order
of the hirer's own personnel. 22

However, in the absence of any evidence that police detaining a suspected shoplifter act
at the discretion of the merchant, the merchant is not liable to the person so detained. 23
The mere hiring of an off-duty police officer as a security guard does not make the
merchant liable for the guard's actions, where retailer does not authorize, encourage or
approve any illegal actions on the part of the person so hired. 24 Such exoneration from
liability of the hiring party has been found applicable for purposes of a false arrest claim
based on a security guard's actions after the store manager had told the customer to leave
the store, the customer refused and probable cause existed to arrest the customer for
unlawful entry. 25
Footnotes
Footnote 6. Director General of Railroads v Kastenbaum, 263 US 25, 68 L Ed 146, 44 S
Ct 52; Burke v New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (CA2 NY) 267 F2d 894; Missouri P. R. Co.
v Hill, 200 Ark 253, 138 SW2d 783; Weir v Continental Oil Co., 5 Cal App 2d 714, 43
P2d 375; Hammargren v Montgomery Ward & Co., 172 Kan 484, 241 P2d 1192;
Thompson v St. Louis S. F. R. Co. (Mo App) 3 SW2d 1033; Sebastianelli v Cleland
Simpson Co., 152 Pa Super 203, 31 A2d 570.
A retail store was properly held liable for false imprisonment of its customer, where the
customer felt she had no choice but to accompany the store's security guard to an
"employees" area at the guard's request, required to empty her purse, subjected to an
intrusive pat-search and escorted throughout the store by the store's employees, searching
for the allegedly shoplifted item. Clark v Skaggs Cos. (Mo App) 724 SW2d 545.
See Lunsford v Sage, Inc. of Dallas (Tex Civ App Houston (1st Dist)) 438 SW2d 615,
writ ref n r e (Jul 2, 1969) and rehg of writ of error overr (Jul 30, 1969), holding that a
corporate defendant was not estopped, despite repeated assurances, from denying its
ownership of the premises and its employment of a security guard who assaulted and
falsely imprisoned plaintiff, so that plaintiff was barred by the running of the statute of
limitations from later amending his complaint to include as defendant the proper
corporation which employed the guard. Plaintiff's confusion, it might be noted, was
occasioned by the fact that the original defendant's corporate name was Sage, Inc. of
Dallas, while the actual employer's corporate name was S.A.G.E., Inc. of Houston, and
while there was some evidence that the guard was employed by the Dallas company,
there was a great deal more evidence that he was employed by the Houston company.
As to liability for punitive damages, see 153.
servant, 92 ALR2d 15, 19[a].
Footnote 7. Taylor v Erie R. Co., 268 NY 711, 198 NE 570.
Where the function of a private detective employed to aid in the protection of a railroad
company's property is to secure information, his employment confers no real or apparent

authority to make an arrest. Orr v Burleson, 214 Ala 257, 107 So 825.
The duty imposed on private railroad police to guard and protect property may well imply
the authority to arrest and detain persons found unlawfully interfering with it, but no
authority to punish persons for an act of interference with the property already completed
may be implied from such duty. Southern R. Co. v Beaty, 212 Ala 608, 103 So 658.
Footnote 8. See Milton v Missouri P. R. Co., 193 Mo 46, 91 SW 949 (thus a person
employing detectives to ascertain the facts as to the responsibility for a past robbery is
not liable for a wrongful arrest made by the detectives for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the person arrested was concerned in the robbery).
Annotation: Liability of one hiring private investigator or detective for tortious acts
committed in course of investigation, 73 ALR3d 1175.
Footnote 9. Conchin v El Paso & S. W. R.R., 13 Ariz 259, 108 P 260; Pearson v Great
Southern Lumber Co., 134 La 117, 63 So 759; Kraft v Montgomery Ward & Co., 220 Or
234, 348 P2d 239, 92 ALR2d 1.
Footnote 10. Buman v Michigan C. R. Co., 168 Mich 651, 134 NW 972.
Footnote 11. Schantz v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 NJ Misc 689, 174 A 162, affd 115 NJL
174, 178 A 768; Adams v F. W. Woolworth Co., 144 Misc 27, 257 NYS 776; Szymanski
v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (Lucas Co) 79 Ohio App 407, 35 Ohio Ops 177, 74
NE2d 205; Halliburton-Abbott Co. v Hodge, 172 Okla 175, 44 P2d 122; W. T. Grant Co.
v Owens, 149 Va 906, 141 SE 860.
Annotation: Liability of one contracting for private police or security service for acts of
personnel supplied, 38 ALR3d 1332.
Footnote 12. Greenbaum v Brooks, 110 Ga App 661, 139 SE2d 432; McClure Ten Cent
Co. v Humphries, 33 Ga App 523, 127 SE 151; Nash v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 Mich
App 553, 163 NW2d 471, revd on other grounds 383 Mich 136, 174 NW2d 818;
Bonkowski v Arlan's Dep't Store, 12 Mich App 88, 162 NW2d 347, revd on other
grounds 383 Mich 90, 174 NW2d 765; Singleton v Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition
Co., 172 Mo App 299, 157 SW 964; Dillon v Sears-Roebuck Co., 126 Neb 357, 253 NW
331; Schantz v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 NJ Misc 689, 174 A 162, affd 115 NJL 174,
178 A 768; Adams v F. W. Woolworth Co., 144 Misc 27, 257 NYS 776; Zentko v G. M.
McKelvey Co. (App, Mahoning Co) 54 Ohio L Abs 529, 88 NE2d 265; Szymanski v
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (Lucas Co) 79 Ohio App 407, 35 Ohio Ops 177, 74
NE2d 205; Webbier v Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau, 105 RI 605, 254 A2d
285; Dupree v Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc. (Tex Civ App Corpus Christi) 542
SW2d 882, writ ref n r e (Jan 12, 1977); Kroger Co. v Warren (Tex Civ App Houston (1st
Dist)) 420 SW2d 218; W. T. Grant Co. v Owens, 149 Va 906, 141 SE 860; Clinchfield
Coal Corp. v Redd, 123 Va 420, 96 SE 836.
Thus the hirer of a detective agency for investigative purposes could not delegate the duty
of conducting a proper investigation to the agency, so as to insulate itself from suit, if the
agency failed to conduct reasonable surveillance; the "independent contractor" rule did
not insulate the hiring party from liability in an action for invasion of privacy. Ellenberg
v Pinkerton's, Inc., 125 Ga App 648, 188 SE2d 911, appeal after remand on other grounds
130 Ga App 254, 202 SE2d 701.
Practice References Lack of care in selecting independent contractor. 11 Am Jur POF 2d
499.
Footnote 13. Nash v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 383 Mich 136, 174 NW2d 818 (jury question
as to control of security guard).
A restaurant was properly held liable, under state law, with a security guard and a security
agency, for the tortious conduct of the guard in enforcing parking regulations of the
restaurant, inasmuch as the restaurant, under the facts of the case, was deemed to have
supervision and direction over the guard's activities during the performance of duties.
Cappo v Vinson Guard Service, Inc. (La App 1st Cir) 400 So 2d 1148.
A corporation in the retail grocery business, by securing through the guise of an
independent contractor security guards to protect its property, cannot obtain immunity
from liability for false imprisonment which the storeowner would not be equally entitled
to if the owner itself directly selected and paid the agents, expressly retaining the power
of control and removal. Dupree v Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc. (Tex Civ App
Corpus Christi) 542 SW2d 882, writ ref n r e (Jan 12, 1977).
Footnote 14. See United States Shoe Corp. v Jones, 149 Ga App 595, 255 SE2d 73 (in an
action for false imprisonment of a minor child by a security guard who accused the child
of shoplifting, the trial court acted properly in refusing to direct the verdict or grant
judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the store on its defense of nonliability for the act
of the independent contractor; hirers may be held liable for intentional torts of agency's
personnel committed, in the scope of the agency's employment, against hirer's invitees).
In Nash v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 Mich App 553, 163 NW2d 471, revd on other
grounds 383 Mich 136, 174 NW2d 818, an action for false arrest, false imprisonment,
and assault and battery by security personnel, the court rejected a contention by a store
owner that the principle that an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent
contractor unless the work involved is inherently dangerous should be applied, observing
that this principle applies only to negligence cases and has not been held applicable to
intentional torts.
In Adams v F. W. Woolworth Co., 144 Misc 27, 257 NYS 776, an action for false arrest
against a department store, resulting from the acts of an employee of a security service,
the court expressly declined to apply the principle that where negligence of an
independent contractor is the sole alleged basis of liability, the doctrine of respondeat
superior is inapplicable, observing that negligence does not enter into the tort of false
arrest. The court's position in this respect was quoted in support of the decisions in
177, 74 NE2d 205, and in the Hendricks v Leslie Fay, Inc., 273 NC 59, 159 SE2d 362.
Attention is called, however, to Inscoe v Globe Jewelry Co., 200 NC 580, 157 SE 794, in
which it was held that a detective bureau retained to make collections was an independent
contractor, and that the employer of the bureau could thus not be held liable for a false
imprisonment committed by an employee of the bureau acting pursuant to the agreement
between the employer and the bureau. The court noted that under the agreement the
employer had no right of control over the work, and that the detective bureau was free to
perform its obligations in its own way. But this case may be of questionable value in
view of modern trends and the position of the court in the later North Carolina case of
Hendricks v Leslie Fay, Inc., 273 NC 59, 159 SE2d 362 (a malicious prosecution action),
which, although not directly involving the liability of a hirer, takes a strong position of
opposing tenor, and quotes with apparent approval the statement of the court in Adams v
F. W. Woolworth Co., 144 Misc 27, 257 NYS 776, confining the rule to negligent acts.
Footnote 15. Malvo v J. C. Penney Co. (Alaska) 512 P2d 575, 63 ALR3d 1034; Nash v
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 Mich App 553, 163 NW2d 471, revd on other grounds 383
Mich 136, 174 NW2d 818; Adams v F. W. Woolworth Co., 144 Misc 27, 257 NYS 776;
Zentko v G. M. McKelvey Co. (App, Mahoning Co) 54 Ohio L Abs 529, 88 NE2d 265;
177, 74 NE2d 205; Halliburton-Abbott Co. v Hodge, 172 Okla 175, 44 P2d 122; Dupree
v Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc. (Tex Civ App Corpus Christi) 542 SW2d 882, writ
ref n r e (Jan 12, 1977); W. T. Grant Co. v Owens, 149 Va 906, 141 SE 860; Clinchfield
Coal Corp. v Redd, 123 Va 420, 96 SE 836.
Hirer of security guards was liable for their intentional torts against customers and
invitees of hirer's place of business, even though the guards were supplied by an
independent agency, because the hirer had a personal and non-delegable duty to its
customers to provide responsible security guards. Peachtree-Cain Co. v McBee, 170 Ga
App 38, 316 SE2d 9, affd 254 Ga 91, 327 SE2d 188 (citing annotation).
Racetrack was liable for detective's assault on and false imprisonment of patron, since
racetrack's statutory duty to protect public and preserve order on premises could not be
delegated to security agency furnishing the detectives. Webbier v Thoroughbred Racing
Protective Bureau, 105 RI 605, 254 A2d 285.
Grocery store was liable to customer for false arrest committed by security guards
employed by independent contractor of store where store had "non-delegable" duty to
furnish customer with safe place to shop, where independent contractor was employed
exclusively by store, and where store provided place in which guards were to work and
thus intentionally exposed customers to possible tortious conduct of guards. Dupree v
Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc. (Tex Civ App Corpus Christi) 542 SW2d 882, writ
ref n r e (Jan 12, 1977).
Annotation: 38 ALR3d 1332, 5[a].
Footnote 16. Del Signore v Pyramid Sec. Services, Inc. (3d Dept) 147 App Div 2d 759,
537 NYS2d 640 (citing annotation); Dupree v Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc. (Tex
Civ App Corpus Christi) 542 SW2d 882, writ ref n r e (Jan 12, 1977).
See also Nash v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 Mich App 553, 163 NW2d 471, revd on other
grounds 383 Mich 136, 174 NW2d 818, in which the court expressly recognized that an
exception to an employer's nonliability for acts of an independent contractor is found
where the work delegated is inherently or intrinsically dangerous. Liability being
established on other grounds, however, the court did not reach the issue of whether or not
protection of one's property with firearms was so inherently dangerous as to make the
duties commensurate therewith nondelegable.
Annotation: 38 ALR3d 1332, 5[b].
Footnote 17. Greenbaum v Brooks, 110 Ga App 661, 139 SE2d 432; Komorowski v
Boston Store of Chicago, 263 Ill App 88; Singleton v Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition
Co., 172 Mo App 299, 157 SW 964; Clinchfield Coal Corp. v Redd, 123 Va 420, 96 SE
836.
Defendants' contract with detective agency was not inconsistent with finding that at time
of plaintiff's detention, the investigator was not acting as agent of independent contractor
but as defendants' agent. Greenbaum v Brooks, 110 Ga App 661, 139 SE2d 432.
Although there is a contract between a detective agency and a store whereby the agency
undertakes to protect the store from shoplifters, employ detectives for that purpose,
conduct all investigations incident thereto, and relieve the store from liability for its
wrongful acts, it is not binding on third parties who have no notice of it; while such a
contract prima facie establishes the detective as an employee of the agency and not the
store, the third party may show by extrinsic facts and circumstances that the parties
themselves had placed a different construction upon the contract. Komorowski v Boston
Store of Chicago, 263 Ill App 88. To the same effect, See Thomas v F. & R. Lazarus &
Co. (App, Franklin Co) 3 Ohio Ops 2d 61, 40 Ohio L Abs 29, 57 NE2d 103, motion
overr.
In Bonkowski v Arlan's Dep't Store, 12 Mich App 88, 162 NW2d 347, revd on other
grounds 383 Mich 90, 174 NW2d 765, a department store was held responsible for acts
amounting to false arrest committed by a private policeman employed by a security
police service under contract to protect the store from shoplifters, the court noting only
that during the time he was on duty in the store, his activities were under the direction of
the store's supervisory employees, and concluding that the guard, with respect to the
incident giving rise to this action, was acting within the scope of his authority as the
agent of the department store, which must respond for his acts.
Footnote 18. Safeway Stores, Inc. v Gibson (Mun Ct App Dist Col) 118 A2d 386, affd 99
US App DC 111, 237 F2d 592; Greenbaum v Brooks, 110 Ga App 661, 139 SE2d 432;
McClure Ten Cent Co. v Humphries, 33 Ga App 523, 127 SE 151; Schramko v Boston
Store of Chicago, 243 Ill App 251, appeal after remand 263 Ill App 88; Schantz v Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 12 NJ Misc 689, 174 A 162, affd 115 NJL 174, 178 A 768; HalliburtonAbbott Co. v Hodge, 172 Okla 175, 44 P2d 122; Kroger Co. v Warren (Tex Civ App
Houston (1st Dist)) 420 SW2d 218.
In Dillon v Sears-Roebuck Co., 126 Neb 357, 253 NW 331, it was held that a department
store was liable for the false imprisonment of one of its employees; the court noting that
since the managers of the store were, pursuant to contract with a detective agency,
directed to cooperate with the agency detectives, the defendant store showed not only an
active participation in, but an approval and ratification of the illegal restraint of the store
employee.
Footnote 19. Halliburton-Abbott Co. v Hodge, 172 Okla 175, 44 P2d 122 (employer held
liable as joint tortfeasor).
Although it was found that defendant investigatory agency was at all times material
thereto acting as an agent and representative of defendant department store, it was held in
Kroger Co. v Warren (Tex Civ App Houston (1st Dist)) 420 SW2d 218, that both the store
and the investigatory agency, hired by the store to perform security checks on its
employees, would be held liable for the respective acts of their employees, in a suit for
false imprisonment brought by an employee of the store who had been detained and
questioned by a store detective and an investigator from the agency. In reaching its
conclusion to affirm judgment against both defendants, the court apparently held
applicable a state statute providing that all persons are principals who are guilty of acting
together in the commission of an offense; and that when an offense is actually committed
by one or more persons, but others are present and, knowing the illegal intent, aid by acts
or encourage by words or gestures those actually engaged in the commission of the
unlawful act, such persons so aiding or encouraging are principal offenders.
Footnote 20. Dillon v Sears-Roebuck Co., 126 Neb 357, 253 NW 331; HalliburtonAbbott Co. v Hodge, 172 Okla 175, 44 P2d 122.
Annotation: 38 ALR3d 1332 9[a].

US App DC 111, 237 F2d 592; Nash v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 Mich App 553, 163
NW2d 471, revd on other grounds 383 Mich 136, 174 NW2d 818; Bonkowski v Arlan's
Dep't Store, 12 Mich App 88, 162 NW2d 347, revd on other grounds 383 Mich 90, 174
NW2d 765; Szymanski v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (Lucas Co) 79 Ohio App 407,
35 Ohio Ops 177, 74 NE2d 205.
Footnote 22. Greenbaum v Brooks, 110 Ga App 661, 139 SE2d 432; Singleton v Kansas
City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 172 Mo App 299, 157 SW 964; Schantz v Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 12 NJ Misc 689, 174 A 162, affd 115 NJL 174, 178 A 768; Adams v F.
W. Woolworth Co., 144 Misc 27, 257 NYS 776; W. T. Grant Co. v Owens, 149 Va 906,
141 SE 860.
Footnote 23. Lusk v Ira Watson Co., 185 W Va 680, 408 SE2d 630.
Footnote 24. Alvarado v Dodge City, 238 Kan 48, 708 P2d 174.
Footnote 25. Safeway Stores, Inc. v Kelly (Dist Col App) 448 A2d 856.
57 -- Special officers appointed by public authority [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
As a general rule, a private person or corporation is not responsible for a false arrest or
imprisonment caused by a special police officer appointed by a public authority but
employed and paid by the private person or corporation, where the arrest occurred while
the officer was acting in his official capacity as a public officer. 26
It has also been held that there is a presumption that the special officer acted in the
officer's official capacity in making the arrest. 27 Moreover, the act of a special
policeman in making an arrest cannot be ratified so as to render the employer liable
where the policeman acts in the matter as an agent of the state and not of the employer.
28 An off-duty police officer working as a security guard, acts as a police officer,
exonerating from tort liability the entity which hired the officer as a guard, when the
officer's status changes from that of a guard to that of a police officer, at the time the
officer witnesses unlawful acts in the officer's presence; thereby authorizing by officer to
make the arrest. 29 However, though the master is not liable where the master's agent
acted in an official capacity as a public officer, it does not follow that all the acts of such
an agent are of a public nature so as to absolve the master of liability; and, in a number of
cases the master is liable for a false arrest caused by such an agent where the agent was
acting on behalf of the master or at the master's direction, and not for the public. 30
Where a statute prohibits off-duty police officers working as security guards from
wearing police uniforms or indicating their identity as a police officer, so as to eliminate
public confusion about their role, the fact of private employment prevents the peace
officer from acting in what would otherwise be an official capacity; and thus an employer
of the off-duty peace officer may not escape liability for a false arrest or imprisonment by
such employee while acting as a security guard. 31 Similarly, a penal law provision
making it illegal for any public employee or officer to receive any emolument, gratuity,
or reward for doing an official act has been held to be applicable, giving rise to the
conclusion that the officer must have been performing private rather than official duties
while acting within the course and scope of a private employment as a security guard
during off-duty hours; since otherwise the acts would have been in violation of the
statute. 32
Where an arrest is caused by a special officer appointed by public authority but employed
by a private individual or corporation, it is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury as to
the capacity in which the officer acted in making the arrest. 33 However, if it is
apparent that the person acted in one or the other capacity, the question becomes one of
law. 34 Thus, in some cases it has been held as a matter of law that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that the special officer acted other than in official capacity. 35
For purposes of an action under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 36 a policy of a store to
work with local police may be sufficient to find that the store is acting "in concert with"
police under state authority. 37
Footnotes
831, 96 L Ed 628, 72 S Ct 55; J. J. Newberry Co. v Smith, 227 Ala 234, 149 So 669; St.
Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v Sims, 106 Ark 109, 152 SW 985; Hanna v Raphael Weill &
Co., 90 Cal App 2d 461, 203 P2d 564; Vittorio v St. Regis Paper Co., 239 NY 148, 145
NE 913; Houston v Minneapolis S. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 25 ND 469, 141 NW 994
(conductor); Darden v Louisville & N. R. Co., 171 Ohio St 63, 12 Ohio Ops 2d 82, 167
NE2d 765; Clement v Emmons (Tex Civ App) 170 SW2d 610, writ ref w o m; Wheatley
v Washington Jockey Club, 39 Wash 2d 163, 234 P2d 878; Moss v Campbell's C. R.R.,
75 W Va 62, 83 SE 721.
A police officer, off-duty but in uniform, working as a security guard at a fast-food
restaurant, was acting as a police officer and not as an agent of the restaurant when the
officer arrested one of the restaurant's patrons on its premises; the restaurant was
therefore not liable on the false arrest claim. Bauldock v Davco Food, Inc. (Dist Col
App) 622 A2d 28.
A power company was not liable for an individual's detention as a robbery suspect; even
though the power company's agent, an off-duty police officer, caused the individual to be
detained, the agent arrested the individual pursuant to his powers and duties as a law
enforcement officer, and not as an agent of the power company. Welton v Georgia Power
Co., 189 Ga App 17, 375 SE2d 108.

Where a deputy sheriff who was also employed by the defendant mining company as a
watchman arrested plaintiff under a warrant issued by a justice of the peace on a
complaint of a citizen of the county for an offense committed away from the company's
property, and thereafter locked him up in a building on the defendant's property, the
company was not responsible for the acts of the deputy sheriff, since he was in no way
serving the company in making the arrest but rather was acting simply as an officer of the
state in executing a process of the state regularly issued and in no way procured by the
defendant company. McKinney Steel Co. v Belcher, 205 Ky 453, 266 SW 42.
County police officer who was also employed as part-time security guard at shopping
center was not agent of shopping center when he arrested witness to traffic accident for
obstructing justice where his duty as security guard was to keep peace and good order
and where his investigation of traffic accident out of which false arrest occurred was in
performance of police department function. Leach v Penn-Mar Merchants Asso., 18 Md
App 603, 308 A2d 446.
Baseball club was not liable for alleged assault and false imprisonment resulting from
acts committed in the parking lot of three city policemen employed by club as security
guards after officers had "checked out" at the end of the game; where all employer did
was to advise officers that a certain described person had a gun and decision as to what
officers should do as police officers was left to them. Carmelo v Miller (Mo App) 569
SW2d 365.
servant, 92 ALR2d 15 19[c].
Footnote 27. Erie R. Co. v Johnson (CA6 Ohio) 106 F2d 550, 16 Ohio Ops 1; La Chance
v Berlin S. Ry., 79 NH 291, 109 A 720; Hayes v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 34 Wash 2d 666,
209 P2d 468; McKain v Baltimore & O. R.R., 65 W Va 233, 64 SE 18.
Footnote 28. See Quinones v Maier & Berkele, Inc., 192 Ga App 585, 385 SE2d 719, cert
vacated 259 Ga 875, 390 SE2d 594 (a merchant was not responsible for the actions of the
officer where the officer did not act in any manner at the direction of or according to the
policies and procedures of the store.); Troupe v Superx Drugs Corp. (Mo App) 659 SW2d
276.
Footnote 29. Dinmark v Farrier (Ala) 510 So 2d 819.
831, 96 L Ed 628, 72 S Ct 55; Caudle v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 236 Ala 37, 182 So 461;
Missouri P. R. Co. v Yancey, 178 Ark 147, 10 SW2d 22, appeal after remand on other
grounds 180 Ark 684, 22 SW2d 408 (where evidence was conflicting whether defendant's
special railroad policeman arrested plaintiff for robbery of a boxcar or whether he was
merely assisting town marshal, who had given him a description of men who had been
burglarizing houses in the neighborhood); Hanna v Raphael Weill & Co., 90 Cal App 2d
461, 203 P2d 564; Louisville & N. R. Co. v Mason, 199 Ky 337, 251 SW 184; Hull v
Boston & M. R. R., 210 Mass 159, 96 NE 58; Graalum v Radisson Ramp, Inc., 245 Minn
54, 71 NW2d 904; Winegar v Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (Mo App) 163 SW2d 357; State
ex rel. Cain v Corbett, 235 NC 33, 69 SE2d 20; Darden v Louisville & N. R. Co., 171
Ohio St 63, 12 Ohio Ops 2d 82, 167 NE2d 765; Spain v Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 78 Or
355, 153 P 470; Clement v Emmons (Tex Civ App) 170 SW2d 610, writ ref w o m;
Wheatley v Washington Jockey Club, 39 Wash 2d 163, 234 P2d 878.
Department store which had hired off-duty policeman as security guard was liable for
false imprisonment where guard arrested, searched, and confined plaintiff with no
apparent justification, during which plaintiff was roughed up and detained in security
room for short period of time. Draeger v Grand Cent., Inc. (CA10 Utah) 504 F2d 142
(applying Utah law).
Drug store was liable for false arrest made by police officer, employed during off-duty
hours as clerk and to protect store from shoplifters, where entire incident occurred in one
continuous sequence and commenced while policeman was acting as employee. Drug
Fair of Maryland, Inc. v Smith, 263 Md 341, 283 A2d 392.
Department store was liable for false arrest made by police officer employed during offduty hours to protect store from and apprehend shoplifters, where officer acted under
department store's direction and as its representative, not public's. Nelson v R. H. Macy
& Co. (Mo App) 434 SW2d 767.
Footnote 31. Cervantez v J. C. Penney Co., 24 Cal 3d 579, 156 Cal Rptr 198, 595 P2d
975.
975.
Footnote 33. J. J. Newberry Co. v Smith, 227 Ala 234, 149 So 669; Hanna v Raphael
Weill & Co., 90 Cal App 2d 461, 203 P2d 564; Central of G. R. Co. v Dabney, 44 Ga App
143, 160 SE 818; Noe v Meadows, 229 Ky 53, 16 SW2d 505, 64 ALR 648; Hirst v
Fitchburg & L. S. R. Co., 196 Mass 353, 82 NE 10; Graalum v Radisson Ramp, Inc., 245
Minn 54, 71 NW2d 904; Winegar v Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (Mo App) 163 SW2d 357;
Hayes v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 34 Wash 2d 666, 209 P2d 468.
In false imprisonment action based on plaintiff's arrest for simple larceny, jury question
arose, under evidence presented on defendant's motion for summary judgment, whether
off-duty policeman employed by store's director of security to conduct surveillance of
warehouse acted only in his capacity of public officer in causing arrest and not in his
capacity as store's agent. Colonial Stores, Inc. v Holt, 118 Ga App 826, 166 SE2d 30.
Footnote 34. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v Stumpo, 112 Md 571, 77 A 266.
But see Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v Stuckey, 256 Ark 881, 511 SW2d 154 (it could not be
said as a matter of law that an off-duty police officer was acting solely as a policeman
rather than as an employee of defendant department store where the officer had worked
for defendant in his off duty hours for 2 years, he was paid by defendant at a specified
rate, his primary duty was to deter shoplifting; immediately after he arrested plaintiff he
interrogated her in a back room provided by defendant, and at the police station the
officer made out an offense report describing the offense as shoplifting and listing
defendant as the complainant).
Footnote 35. Erie R. Co. v Johnson (CA6 Ohio) 106 F2d 550, 16 Ohio Ops 1; Fagan v
Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 299 Pa 109, 149 A 159; Du Pont Rayon Co. v Henson,
162 Tenn 394, 36 SW2d 879.
Footnote 36. 42 USCS 1983.
Footnote 37. Murray v Wal-Mart, Inc. (CA8 Ark) 874 F2d 555.
58 -- Partners [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Any liability of a partner for a copartner's act in effecting a false imprisonment without
the partner's participation or consent must be based on the theory of the partners'
reciprocal agency, and it is a general rule, applicable also to false imprisonment, that each
member of a firm is liable for the act of a copartner done within the scope of the firm
business, although the act constitutes a tort. 38 However, where the scope of the
partner's express or implied authority does not extend to procuring the arrest or detention
of a person, a party falsely arrested by a partner in the name of the firm has no cause of
action against the firm or any partner who did not personally authorize the act or
subsequently ratify it; 39 and a partner who is not responsible for any of the wrongful
acts done to the false imprisonment plaintiff may be properly exonerated from individual
liability. 40 Mere approval of, or acquiescence in, a false arrest by a partner may
constitute such ratification as will render the approving party liable for actual damages.
41
Footnotes
Footnote 38. Page v Citizens' Banking Co., 111 Ga 73, 36 SE 418.
Footnote 39. Rosenkranz v Barker, 115 Ill 331, 3 NE 93.
A partner in an ordinary mercantile house has no implied authority to bind his copartner
by his acts in detaining and searching a customer suspected of having stolen property
from the store. Bernheimer Bros. v Becker, 102 Md 250, 62 A 526.
Footnote 40. Niles v Big Sky Eyewear, 236 Mont 455, 771 P2d 114 (ovrld in part on
other grounds by Sacco v High Country Indep. Press (Mont) 896 P2d 411, 10 BNA IER
Cas 1041).
Footnote 41. Rosenkranz v Barker, 115 Ill 331, 3 NE 93.
D. Defenses [59-115]
Research References
ALR Digest: False Imprisonment 29-32
10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms 21-24, 37-41, 43, 44, 53,
71, 72, 74-78, 91-99, 102, 104-106
26 Am Jur POF2d 617, False imprisonmentFailure to take arrestee before magistrate
without unreasonable or unnecessary delay
To avoid liability in an action for false imprisonment, either the defendant must show that
he or she did not imprison the plaintiff or must justify the imprisonment. 42 The
presence of probable cause for imprisonment is not a defense 43 unless it constitutes
reasonable grounds for acting in defense of property, 44 or in making an arrest without a
warrant. 45 On the other hand, proof of the existence of a privilege is a complete
defense, 46 as is proof of the legality of the detention, which negates an essential
element of the cause of action. 47
If one is unlawfully imprisoned, it is no defense to an action therefor that the plaintiff
refused the offer of a third person present to pay the fine which would have allowed the
plaintiff to go free. 48 An offer to release a plaintiff temporarily has no effect upon an
action for false imprisonment. 49
Failure of the plaintiff to join as defendants other persons equally liable with the person
sued or the fact that a codefendant is held not liable is not a defense. 50
Footnotes
Footnote 42. Southern R. Co. v Shirley, 121 Ky 863, 90 SW 597; Kroeger v Passmore, 36
Mont 504, 93 P 805; Kraft v Montgomery Ward & Co., 220 Or 234, 348 P2d 239, 92
ALR2d 1.
and cert den 375 US 975, 11 L Ed 2d 420, 84 S Ct 489; Collyer v S. H. Kress & Co., 5
Cal 2d 175, 54 P2d 20; Hill v Henry, 90 Ga App 93, 82 SE2d 35; Gill v Montgomery
Ward & Co., 284 App Div 36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49 ALR2d 1452; Swafford v Vermillion
(Okla) 261 P2d 187.
Footnote 45. 84.
Footnote 46. Bernard v United States (CA2 NY) 25 F3d 98.
Footnote 47. Hill v Georgia Power Co. (CA11 Ga) 786 F2d 1071, 122 BNA LRRM 2779,
104 CCH LC 11928.
Footnote 48. O'Donnell v Rowe, 16 Pa D & C 212.
Footnote 49. See Johnson v Norfolk & W. Ry., 82 W Va 692, 97 SE 189, 6 ALR 1469 (if
an officer, having made an arrest, tenders the subject permission to go at large
temporarily if he will return for trial, the permit so tendered is in the nature of an offer of
parole which the subject is not bound to accept, and which does not amount to a release
or an abrogation of the arrest; rejection of such offer and an accepted submission leave
the arrest in full force).
Footnote 50. American R. Express Co. v Stone (CA1 Mass) 27 F2d 8, 66 ALR 202;
Grimes v Greenblatt, 47 Colo 495, 107 P 1111; Page v Citizens' Banking Co., 111 Ga 73,
36 SE 418; Anderson v Averbeck, 189 Minn 224, 248 NW 719; Burton v Drennan, 332
Mo 512, 58 SW2d 740.
60 Consent [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Although it has been denied that one may consent to an unlawful restraint, on the ground
that liberty is an inalienable prerogative of which no one may divest himself, 51 it is
frequently held or recognized that consent of the plaintiff to acts which constitute an
imprisonment bars the right of recovery therefor. 52 Such consent is not, strictly
speaking, a privilege or even a defense, but rather goes to negate the existence of any tort
in the first instance. 53 Consent such as will bar the action must be unequivocally
manifested; not all acts on the part of the plaintiff will constitute consent such as will bar
the right of action. 54 Moreover, consent, to be effective as a bar, must be free from any
element of fraud, duress, 55 or mistake. 56
Consent to matters after arrest may operate as a waiver of illegality. 57
The defense of consent raises a question for the jury, as to the existence and voluntariness
of the consent, although reasonableness of the confinement itself is not at issue when the
defense is one of consent. 58
A minor over the age of fourteen may presumptively be capable of consenting to conduct
which would otherwise be tortious, even if defendants' conduct in concealing the minor
from the child's parents would be a civil wrong against the parents. 59 A parent has the
right and duty to care for his or her minor child and may consent to the confinement of a
child so as to preclude a false imprisonment action based upon such confinement. 60
A voluntary consent to admission or treatment at a hospital may be a valid consent so as
to negate tort liability, 61 as may a valid substituted consent given by a parent on behalf
of a child. 62 Consent may also be implied from the circumstances of the case. 63
Footnotes
Footnote 51. Meints v Huntington (CA8 Minn) 276 F 245, 19 ALR 664.
Footnote 52. Vice v Holley, 88 Miss 572, 41 So 7; Brown v Meier & Frank Co., 160 Or
608, 86 P2d 79.
As to jury instructions relating to plaintiff's consent, see 137.
Footnote 53. George v International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness (4th Dist) 3 Cal
App 4th 52, 4 Cal Rptr 2d 473, 92 CDOS 985, 92 Daily Journal DAR 1593, reh den (Cal
App 4th Dist) 92 CDOS 1855, 92 Daily Journal DAR 2846 and review den, op
withdrawn by order of ct (Cal) 92 CDOS 3848, 92 Daily Journal DAR 5838.
Footnote 54. See Grimes v Greenblatt, 47 Colo 495, 107 P 1111 (where the plaintiff,
being in possession of wire claimed to have been stolen, said to the officers who
demanded it of him, "No, you take me, but you can't take the wire," he did not consent to
his arrest or imprisonment).
Consent to forgo an executive order for extradition does not amount to a waiver and
relinquishment of any right to object to the unlawfulness of the arrest, where the plaintiff
protested his innocence and asserted that he was being deprived of his liberty unlawfully.
Drake v Keeling (Iowa) 287 NW 596.
A person illegally detained in a hospital is not barred from his right of action therefor by
the fact that he contracted to be subject to the rules of the institution. Cook v Highland
Hospital, 168 NC 250, 84 SE 352.
Footnote 55. See Meints v Huntington (CA8 Minn) 276 F 245, 19 ALR 664 (the fact that
one consents, under compulsion, to transportation to the state line by persons intent on
driving him out of the state does not prevent their act in so deporting him from being
false imprisonment).
Footnote 56. Whitman v Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 85 Kan 150, 116 P 234 (consent of
passenger to remain and make statement upon being told by conductor that it was
required by law).
Footnote 58. Collins v Straight, Inc. (CA4 Va) 748 F2d 916, 17 Fed Rules Evid Serv
1351.
Footnote 59. George v International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness (4th Dist) 3 Cal
App 4th 52, 4 Cal Rptr 2d 473, 92 CDOS 985, 92 Daily Journal DAR 1593, reh den (Cal
App 4th Dist) 92 CDOS 1855, 92 Daily Journal DAR 2846 and review den, op
withdrawn by order of ct (Cal) 92 CDOS 3848, 92 Daily Journal DAR 5838.
Footnote 60. R.J.D. v Vaughan Clinic, P.C. (Ala) 572 So 2d 1225 (summary judgment
affirmed in favor of psychiatric hospital; hospital was not liable for false imprisonment of
17-year old girl whose admission had been approved by her mother, as mother had
common-law right to commit her unemancipated child).
As to child's right of action against parent for false imprisonment or other intentional
torts, generally, see 59 Am Jur 2d, Parent and Child 148.
Footnote 61. Day v Providence Hosp. (Ala) 622 So 2d 1273, reh den, without op (Ala)
1993 Ala LEXIS 986.
Footnote 62. R.J.D. v Vaughan Clinic, P.C. (Ala) 572 So 2d 1225.
Footnote 63. See Blackman for Blackman v Rifkin (Colo App) 759 P2d 54 (plaintiff's
extreme intoxication and head trauma warranted retention in emergency room to prevent
further harm to herself or others, and the hospital staff's privilege to restrain her from
leaving was commensurate with consent implied for necessary treatment).
61 Negligence of plaintiff [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
While there is some authority to the effect that the negligence of a plaintiff may bar
recovery for the intentional tort of false imprisonment, 64 such authority is contrary to
the prevailing view that negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense to an intentional tort.
65 Moreover, many jurisdictions have adopted the comparative negligence or fault
doctrine, in some form. 66
In any event, plaintiff's contributory negligence may be proved in mitigation of damages.
67
Footnotes
Footnote 64. See Sindle v New York City Transit Authority, 33 NY2d 293, 352 NYS2d
183, 307 NE2d 245, in which, after defendant, a school bus driver, advised the student
passengers that he was taking them to the police station because of the damage they had
done to the bus, plaintiff was seriously injured when he either jumped or fell to the street
attempting to escape through a window while the bus was moving. The court, after
noting that alighting from a moving vehicle, absent some compelling reason, is
negligence per se, stated that upon retrial, if the trier of fact finds that plaintiff was falsely
imprisoned but that he acted unreasonably for his own safety by placing himself in a
perilous position in the window of the bus preparatory to an attempt to alight, recovery
for the bodily injuries subsequently sustained would be barred.
Footnote 65. See Cieplinski v Severn, 269 Mass 261, 168 NE 722 (contributory
negligence resulting in injury to the plaintiff is not a defense in an action of false
imprisonment, when defendant's wrong has the element of wilful, reckless and wanton
misconduct).
See generally 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence 914; 74 Am Jur 2d, Torts 45.
Footnote 66. 57A Am Jur 2d, Negligence 1165.
Footnote 67. 129.
62 Release from liability [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A release executed in consideration of an agreement to seek the dismissal of a pending
prosecution is contrary to public policy and unenforceable, and the trial court may
properly refuse to submit the issue of the release to the jury. 68 One who is arrested on a
charge which is no offense under the law and who secured release under a promise not to
prosecute is not barred from suit, for such promise is without consideration and may be
found to have been exacted by the exigencies of the situation. 69 However, a release in
which a defendant accused of committing the crime of shoplifting has discharged the
complaining party from all civil liability is not void as a matter of public policy, nor is
such a release the product of duress because it was executed in consideration of a nolle
prosequi entered by the state's attorney in the exercise of broad prosecutorial discretion,
where there was probable cause for the charge and the complainant did not participate in
the decision of the state's attorney, directly or indirectly. 70
Footnotes
Footnote 68. Kroger Co. v Demakes (Tex Civ App Houston (1st Dist)) 566 SW2d 653,
writ ref n r e (Sep 20, 1978) and rehg of writ of error overr on other grounds (Oct 25,
1978).
Footnote 69. Rice v Harrington, 38 RI 47, 94 A 736.
Footnote 70. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v Joy, 283 Md 205, 389 A2d 874.
63 Waiver and estoppel [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
It has been held or recognized in some cases that one may, by one's acts at the time of the
alleged illegal detention, waive any right to recover therefor from the judicial officer
involved for false imprisonment. 71 It is generally held, however, that there can be no
valid waiver of an objection that a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, and
that there can be no estoppel to object on this ground. 72

The conduct of the person arrested may amount to a waiver of the right to complain of
the failure to take an arrested person promptly before a magistrate or court. 73 Waiver
may be found where it appears that an arrangement was made whereby the plaintiff was
released upon his or her promise to appear at a future time. 74 Also, it is frequently held
that the right to complain of the failure to take an arrested person before a magistrate
within a reasonable time or without unnecessary delay may be found waived where the
prisoner was discharged at his or her own request or with his or her consent. 75 although
there is authority to the contrary, 76 Also, the arrested person has sometimes been
deemed to have waived the failure to be taken before a magistrate within a reasonable
time or without unnecessary delay, where the person agreed to await an investigation of
the case, 77 or the outcome of a polygraph test. 78
Footnotes
Footnote 71. Pierce v Mitchell, 77 Wash 453, 137 P 1008.
Footnote 72. See Cox v Perkins, 299 Ky 470, 185 SW2d 954 (one committed pursuant to
a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace in a trial held without the territorial
jurisdiction of the justice does not waive, and is not estopped to assert, his or her right of
action against the justice for false imprisonment by reason of the facts that the holding of
the trial outside the jurisdiction was upon the motion and request of the plaintiff and
plaintiff's father, or that no objection was made at the time of the trial as to the place of
holding trial).
Where a justice of the peace was without jurisdiction of proceedings of contempt because
the warrant was not issued on oath or affirmation, appearance before the justice's court
under the illegal warrant did not constitute waiver of the right of the alleged contemner to
proceed against the justice for false imprisonment. Church v Pearne, 75 Conn 350, 53 A
955.
Footnote 73. Janus v United States (CA9 Idaho) 38 F2d 431; Twilley v Perkins, 77 Md
252, 26 A 286; Oxford v Berry, 204 Mich 197, 170 NW 83 (recognizing rule); Venable v
Huddy, 77 NJL 351, 72 A 10; Singerman v William J. Burns International Detective
Agency, Inc., 219 App Div 291, 219 NYS 724; Haggard v First Nat'l Bank, 72 ND 434, 8
NW2d 5; Mackay v Maxwell (App, Madison Co) 17 Ohio L Abs 637, error dismd 128
Ohio St 643, 193 NE 75; Brown v Meier & Frank Co., 160 Or 608, 86 P2d 79.
Where the officer offered to complete the investigation as speedily as possible and effect
the release of the arrested person without filing a formal charge if he then determined that
a charge should not be filed, the officer having pointed out that by permitting him to
follow this course of action the arrested person might save the cost of a bail bond and an
attorney's fee, and where the plaintiff assented to this procedure, the plaintiff would be
held not to have a cause of action for false imprisonment for delay. Gorlack v Ferrari
(4th Dist) 184 Cal App 2d 702, 7 Cal Rptr 699.
Where the plaintiff, arrested without a warrant, agreed to remain in custody without any
warrant being issued for a period of 48 hours and she was released within that time, there
was no liability for false imprisonment. Peloquin v Hibner, 231 Wis 77, 285 NW 380.
supporting action for false imprisonment, 98 ALR2d 966 22.
without unreasonable or unnecessary delay. 26 Am Jur POF2d 617, 639, 10.
Footnote 74. Venable v Huddy, 77 NJL 351, 72 A 10; Mackay v Maxwell (App, Madison
Co) 17 Ohio L Abs 637, error dismd 128 Ohio St 643, 193 NE 75.
Footnote 75. Doherty v Shea, 320 Mass 173, 68 NE2d 707; Singerman v William J.
Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., 219 App Div 291, 219 NYS 724; Reed v
Hutton, 1 Tenn App 36.
Where plaintiff told the sheriff that she did not want a trial or an appearance before the
justice of the peace, and she consented and agreed together with and in company with her
brothers that the defendant sheriff might discharge her from custody without taking her
before the justice of the peace who issued the warrant, the court was correct in instructing
the jury that after the consent of the plaintiff that she be discharged from custody without
any hearing or trial and without being taken before the justice of the peace, plaintiff was
not entitled to recover any damages in the action. Kredit v Ryan, 68 SD 274, 1 NW2d
813.
Footnote 76. Stewart v Feeley, 118 Iowa 524, 92 NW 670 (ovrld in part on other grounds
by Young v Des Moines (Iowa) 262 NW2d 612, 1 ALR4th 431); Stromberg v Hansen,
177 Minn 307, 225 NW 148; Newhall v Egan, 28 RI 584, 68 A 471.
Footnote 77. Gorlack v Ferrari (4th Dist) 184 Cal App 2d 702, 7 Cal Rptr 699; Bishop v
Lucy, 21 Tex Civ App 326, 50 SW 1029, reh overr on other grounds (Tex Civ App) 51
SW 854.
Footnote 78. Grooms v Fervida, 182 Ind App 664, 396 NE2d 405, holding that plaintiff's
agreement to postpone appearance before magistrate until outcome of polygraph test was
learned constituted waiver of right to appear promptly and of right to give bail which
precluded action for false imprisonment.
64 -- Effect of giving bail [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

The authorities are in conflict as to whether the giving of a bail bond by the person
arrested constitutes a waiver. In some jurisdictions, by merely entering into a
recognizance, a party is held to have waived irregularities in the prior proceedings, for the
party is then held by force of the recognizance, and not by any other means. 79 In other
jurisdictions, there is held to be no waiver in such a case, for the party, by giving bail
only, submits to the custody of persons of his or her own choosing, rather than remaining
in the custody of the officer. 80
Footnotes
Footnote 79. See Hill v Day, 168 Kan 604, 215 P2d 219 (the giving of a bond for bail and
an appeal bond constitutes a waiver of any right to object to the legality of an arrest
without a warrant).
Footnote 80. Buzzell v Emerton, 161 Mass 176, 36 NE 796; Worden v Davis, 195 NY
391, 88 NE 745.
65 --Effect of pleading guilty [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The general rule is that civil liability for an illegal arrest is not waived by pleading guilty
to the offense. 81 If, however, the imprisonment is claimed to have been illegal because
the plaintiff was arrested without a warrant and without probable cause, a plea of guilty
of the offense charged or conviction thereof upon trial may well be held conclusive as to
the existence of probable cause, 82 and may thus operate as a bar. 83
Footnotes
Footnote 81. Knickerbocker S. B. Co. v Cusack (CA2 NY) 172 F 358; Anderson v Foster,
73 Idaho 340, 252 P2d 199; McCullough v Greenfield, 133 Mich 463, 95 NW 532; Spain
v Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 78 Or 355, 153 P 470; Hotzel v Simmons, 258 Wis 234, 45
NW2d 683.
Footnote 82. 85.
Footnote 83. Pete v Metcalfe (CA5 Tex) 8 F3d 214; Erie R. Co. v Reigherd (CA6 Ohio)
166 F 247, 7 Ohiolr 485; Hanson v Snohomish, 121 Wash 2d 552, 852 P2d 295.
66 Orders of superior [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The fact that a police officer making an unlawful arrest was acting under direct orders of
a superior is not generally a defense to an action for false imprisonment. 84 It may,
however, be admissible in mitigation of damages. 85
Footnotes
Footnote 84. Grau v Forge, 183 Ky 521, 209 SW 369, 3 ALR 642; Mason v Wrightson,
205 Md 481, 109 A2d 128; Leger v Warren, 62 Ohio St 500, 57 NE 506; Christ v
McDonald, 152 Or 494, 52 P2d 655.
Forms: Answer raising defense that police officer made arrest on command of superior.
Footnote 85. 130.
67 Former recovery [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A matter which was in issue and disposed of in the original action out of which the
plaintiff's imprisonment arose may be res judicata in an action for false imprisonment.
86 However, if the defendant was not a party to the original proceeding, a
determination therein is not binding upon that individual. 87 Similarly, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is not applicable where the parties to the litigation are not identical, 88
or where the burdens of proof in the two proceedings are different. 89
The question of whether a recovery in an action or count for malicious prosecution is a
bar to a recovery for false imprisonment based on the same acts is disputed. Some
authorities hold that only one recovery can be had on either cause of action, 90 but other
authorities declare that the actions are so distinct that a recovery in one does not bar
recovery in the other. 91 Where, however, an issue is fundamental to both the malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment actions, the determination of that issue in one has
been held to be conclusive in the other. 92
Footnotes
Footnote 86. Castor v Bates, 127 Mich 285, 86 NW 810 (holding that where plaintiff
secured his release on habeas corpus, defendant appearing and being heard, adjudication
was conclusive).
Plaintiff in a state law tort action for false imprisonment may be collaterally estopped
from relitigating the issue of probable cause for a warrantless arrest which was resolved
against the plaintiff in prior civil rights litigation. Witherspoon v United States (CA5
Miss) 838 F2d 803, cert den 488 US 858, 102 L Ed 2d 122, 109 S Ct 150.
Plaintiff precluded from relitigating an issue of "justification" which was previously
determined in an administrative proceeding. Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494,
478 NYS2d 823, 467 NE2d 487 (among conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in
Pinaud v County of Suffolk (CA2 NY) 52 F3d 1139).

Party could not seek redetermination of an identification issue resolved against the
individual in a prior criminal proceeding. Hanson v Snohomish, 121 Wash 2d 552, 852
P2d 295.
Footnote 88. Duncan v Clements (CA8 Mo) 744 F2d 48 (among conflicting authorities
on other grounds noted in Mahlberg v Mentzer (CA8 Neb) 968 F2d 772).
Footnote 89. Warren v Byrne (CA2 NY) 699 F2d 95.
Footnote 90. Boeger v Langenberg, 97 Mo 390, 11 SW 223.
Footnote 91. Gore v Gorman's Inc. (DC Mo) 148 F Supp 241, app dismd (CA8 Mo) 244
F2d 716; Ira v Columbia Food Co., 226 Or 566, 360 P2d 622, 86 ALR2d 1378; McNunis
v Zukosky, 141 W Va 145, 89 SE2d 354.
Annotation: Judgment in false imprisonment action as res judicata in later malicious
prosecution action, or vice versa, 86 ALR2d 1385.
Footnote 92. Robinson v Chicago G. W. R. Co. (DC Mo) 154 F Supp 626 (holding that
where acts involved were held in prior action for malicious prosecution to be beyond
authority of agents of defendant, finding would be applicable in subsequent false
imprisonment action).
2. Justification [67-96]
a. In General [68-72]
68 Generally; exercise of personal rights or duties [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
Where a social worker has a statutory duty to report suspected child abuse, and has
reasonable cause to believe that such abuse has occurred, the social worker cannot be
held liable for false imprisonment for taking the child to an emergency room and seeking
his or her hospitalization. 93
A school bus driver entrusted with the care of student passengers and the custody of
public property, has the duty to take reasonable measures for the safety and protection of
both the passengers and the property, and, in this regard, the reasonableness of the
driver's actions, as bearing on the defense of justification, is to be determined from a
consideration of all the circumstances; at a minimum, this would seem to import a
consideration of the need to protect the persons and property in the driver's charge, the
duty to aid the investigation and apprehension of those inflicting damage, the manner and
place of the occurrence, and the feasibility and practicality of other alternative courses of
action. 94
The relationship of husband and wife barred actions between them for false imprisonment
under the common-law concept of the unity of the spouses, since abrogated by statute in a
number of jurisdictions. 95 That relationship may also authorize the rendition of
substituted consent to treatment, under some circumstances which might otherwise
amount to false imprisonment. 96
One may be privileged to interfere with the liberty of another, within limits, for the
purpose of preventing the commission of a crime, defending a third person, 97 or
defending oneself, 98 so long as that privilege is exercised, as provided by law, for the
purpose of defending against an unlawful force. 99
However, an innkeeper's right to exclude the disorderly does not include the right to take
a patron who is willing to leave an establishment, against his or her will, to a private
place in order to read that person an eviction notice, 1 nor will a casino's right to detain a
patron suspected of violating the gaming laws justify a detention which is unreasonable
and without probable cause. 2
Footnotes
Footnote 93. Curtis v State Dep't for Children & Their Families (RI) 522 A2d 203.
Footnote 94. Sindle v New York City Transit Authority, 33 NY2d 293, 352 NYS2d 183,
307 NE2d 245.
Footnote 95. See 41 Am Jur 2d, Husband and Wife 522, 526.
Footnote 96. Lolley v Charter Woods Hosp., Inc. (Ala) 572 So 2d 1223.
Footnote 97. Drabek v Sabley, 31 Wis 2d 184, 142 NW2d 798, 20 ALR3d 1435.
Footnote 98. Cunningham v Shea, 111 App Div 624, 97 NYS 884; Drabek v Sabley, 31
Wis 2d 184, 142 NW2d 798, 20 ALR3d 1435.
Footnote 99. State v Brown, 235 Neb 374, 455 NW2d 547.
Rules Evid Serv 399.
Footnote 2. Hazelwood v Harrah's, 109 Nev 1005, 862 P2d 1189.
69 Acting under advice of counsel [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
While there is some conflict on the question, it is generally held that reliance on the
advice of counsel, whether private or public (such as a prosecuting or county attorney), is
a good and complete defense to an action of false arrest or imprisonment, 3 provided
that such advice is predicated upon a full, correct, and fair statement of all facts bearing
upon the guilt of the accused and acted upon in good faith by the recipient. 4 Thus, it
has been held that the fact that the defendant acted on the advice of counsel in calling for
police assistance in removing an alleged trespasser was a defense to the latter's action for
false arrest and imprisonment. 5
Whether the defendant has fully and clearly stated the facts to counsel in seeking
counsel's advice is a question for the jury, under proper charge from the court. 6
In addition, evidence may be introduced, in mitigation of punitive damages, to show that
a defendant acted under advice of counsel, thus indicating good faith on the part of the
defendant and rebutting the existence of malice. 7
Footnotes
Footnote 3. Seaboard Oil Co. v Cunningham (CA5 Fla) 51 F2d 321, cert den 284 US
657, 76 L Ed 557, 52 S Ct 35; Toomey v Tolin (Fla App D4) 311 So 2d 678, cert dismd
(Fla) 336 So 2d 604; Herbeck v Holdeman (Fla App D2) 163 So 2d 766; Galarza v
Sprague, 284 Ill App 254, 1 NE2d 275; Crawford v Huber, 215 Mich 564, 184 NW 594,
39 ALR 1392 (reliance on advice of prosecuting attorney); Biddle v Jenkins, 61 Neb 400,
85 NW 392; Price v Cook, 120 Okla 105, 250 P 519 (sheriff acting on advice of county
attorney).
Court properly refused to grant judgment n.o.v. in favor of alleged trespasser in false
imprisonment action brought by him against head resident of student apartment building,
even though plaintiff had been on property at express request of lawful tenant and hence
could not have been guilty of trespass, where head resident had informed state's attorney
regarding plaintiff's activities in the apartment building and had acted upon attorney's
advice in calling for police assistance in removing plaintiff. Karow v Student Inns, Inc.
(4th Dist) 43 Ill App 3d 878, 2 Ill Dec 515, 357 NE2d 682, 98 ALR3d 531.
For decisions to the contrary, See Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v Fleming, 78 Ga 733, 3 SE
420; Butcher v Adams, 310 Ky 205, 220 SW2d 398 (reliance on legal opinion of county
attorney).
657, 76 L Ed 557, 52 S Ct 35; Toomey v Tolin (Fla App D4) 311 So 2d 678, cert dismd
(Fla) 336 So 2d 604; Karow v Student Inns, Inc. (4th Dist) 43 Ill App 3d 878, 2 Ill Dec
515, 357 NE2d 682, 98 ALR3d 531; Biddle v Jenkins, 61 Neb 400, 85 NW 392.
Failure to disclose all the known facts to the prosecutor negates prosecutorial advice as to
the existence or not of probable cause, as a defense to a false imprisonment action.
Murray v Wal-Mart, Inc. (CA8 Ark) 874 F2d 555.
In an action for false arrest and malicious prosecution based on the arrest of a newspaper
reporter for disrupting a public meeting of a town board by refusing to stop his tape
recorder, the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that any malice on the
board's part was negated by advice it received from the town attorney, where there was no
evidence that the attorney had advised the board concerning the reporter's right to tape
record the board meetings. Feldman v Bethel (3d Dept) 106 App Div 2d 695, 484
NYS2d 147.
Footnote 5. Karow v Student Inns, Inc. (4th Dist) 43 Ill App 3d 878, 2 Ill Dec 515, 357
NE2d 682, 98 ALR3d 531, holding that court properly refused to grant judgment n.o.v.
in favor of alleged trespasser in false imprisonment action brought by him against head
resident of student apartment building, even though plaintiff had been on property at
express request of lawful tenant and hence could not have been guilty of trespass, where
head resident had informed state's attorney regarding plaintiff's activities in the apartment
building and had acted upon attorney's advice in calling for police assistance in removing
plaintiff.
assistance after disturbance or trespass, for false arrest by officer, 98 ALR3d 542 5.
657, 76 L Ed 557, 52 S Ct 35.
Footnote 7. 130.
70 -- In commitment proceedings [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Reliance upon the advice of counsel has been recognized as a defense in a suit for false
imprisonment based on the institution of insanity proceedings, provided the client had
made a full disclosure and acted in good faith. 8
Footnotes
Footnote 8. Biddle v Jenkins, 61 Neb 400, 85 NW 392.
See also Rosvall v Provost, 279 Minn 119, 155 NW2d 900, an action for both false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution, based on a hospital commitment for a mental
examination, where the court noted in affirming a summary judgment for certain city
officials that the "Petition for Commitment" was filed after consultation with the county
attorney, in whose office it was prepared.
connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 ALR3d 523 6.
71 -- Liability based on invalidity of statute or ordinance [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE

IMPRISONMENT]
Where an arrest or imprisonment would ordinarily have been justified under the terms of
a statute or ordinance with the violation of which the person arrested or imprisoned was
charged, the fact that the provision in question subsequently turned out to have been
unconstitutional or otherwise void has frequently been held not to preclude the defense of
justification by a private person. 9 However some authorities subscribing to the general
view that a private person is not liable for false imprisonment merely because the
enactment under which the person proceeded was invalid indicate that the principle is
applicable only where the private person acted without malice and in the good-faith belief
that the measure was valid. 10 Thus, an arrest under a statute known by the complaining
witness to be invalid has been held to be actionable. 11
On the other hand, a few courts have taken the view that when an arrest is made at the
instance of a private person under an enactment which is subsequently found to be
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the arrest is false and the private person is liable for
false imprisonment. 12 Under such view, it has been said that an arrest under an
unconstitutional statute is prima facie false imprisonment and the time at which the
statute is declared unconstitutional is inconsequential since unconstitutional measures are
deemed to be so from their inception. 13
Footnotes
Footnote 9. Fleming v McEnany (CA2 Vt) 491 F2d 1353 (construing Vermont law);
Bohri v Barnett (CA7 Wis) 144 F 389; Miller v Stinnett (CA10 NM) 257 F2d 910
(applying New Mexico law); Rush v Buckley, 100 Me 322, 61 A 774; Gilbert v Satterlee,
101 App Div 313, 91 NYS 960.
As to liability or immunity of judicial officers acting under invalid law, see 104.
Annotation: False imprisonment: civil liability of private person as affected by invalidity
of statute or ordinance for violation of which arrest was made, 16 ALR3d 535 2[a].
Footnote 10. Bohri v Barnett (CA7 Wis) 144 F 389; Hill v Taylor, 50 Mich 549, 15 NW
899; Gifford v Wiggins, 50 Minn 401, 52 NW 904.
Footnote 11. Miller v Stinnett (CA10 NM) 257 F2d 910.
Footnote 12. Williams v Carolina Coach Co. (DC Va) 111 F Supp 329, affd (CA4 Va) 207
F2d 408; Sumner v Beeler, 50 Ind 341.
See also Miller v Stinnett (CA10 NM) 257 F2d 910 (applying New Mexico law), where
the court, although finding that defendant's bad faith was sufficient to hold him liable for
falsely imprisoning plaintiff under an ordinance he knew to have been twice previously
declared invalid, indicated that the arrest might have been unprivileged because of the
invalidity alone.
A drugstore owner who caused the arrest and detention of the plaintiff by the police, and
signed an affidavit for the arrest charging the plaintiff with a violation of an ordinance
which was subsequently held to be unconstitutional, was guilty of false imprisonment.
Coleman v Mitnick, 137 Ind App 125, 202 NE2d 577, 16 ALR3d 527, reh den 137 Ind
App 133, 203 NE2d 834, 16 ALR3d 533.
Footnote 13. Coleman v Mitnick, 137 Ind App 125, 202 NE2d 577, 16 ALR3d 527, reh
den 137 Ind App 133, 203 NE2d 834, 16 ALR3d 533.
72 Temporary detention or restraint of insane person [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
One is justified in restraining, without legal proceedings, an insane person who is
dangerous to the person or others, and generally an action for false arrest or
imprisonment will not lie for the arrest or detention. 14 Insanity which does not render
the insane person dangerous to self or others, however, is not usually a lawful excuse for
restraint without judicial proceedings. 15
It is frequently held that the right to arrest is dependent upon the existence of the fact of
insanity and of the necessity for restraint, rather than upon a mere belief of insanity. 16
Under this view, the person who makes the arrest assumes the responsibility of an
erroneous estimate as to the arrestee's condition, and the fact that the arrested person was
actually sane, or at least was not actually insane, may render the arrester liable for false
imprisonment. 17 On the other hand, it is sometimes held or recognized that a summary
arrest of a person may be justified on the ground that the arrester had reasonable grounds
to believe and did believe at the time that the person arrested was dangerously insane. 18
An imprisonment on the ground of insanity, even if initially justifiable, may become
unlawful if the detention is protracted unnecessarily without the commencement of sanity
proceedings. 19
Restraint for an emergency detention upon allegation of mental illness or dangerousness
which is a purely pretextual rationale for confinement, may subject the arresting party or
official to liability for false imprisonment. 20
Footnotes
Footnote 14. Crawford v Brown, 321 Ill 305, 151 NE 911, 45 ALR 1457; Maxwell v
Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 177 NW 541, 10 ALR 482; Warner v State, 297 NY 395, 79 NE2d
459, reh gr 297 NY 865, 79 NE2d 271; Mulberry v Fuellhart, 203 Pa 573, 53 A 504.
As to commitment of mentally ill person under judicial proceedings, see 33, 34 et

seq.
Annotation: Right, without judicial proceeding, to arrest and detain one who is, or is
suspected of being, mentally deranged, 92 ALR2d 570 3.
Footnote 15. Collins v Jones, 131 Cal App 747, 22 P2d 39 (ovrld in part on other grounds
by Whaley v Kirby (4th Dist) 208 Cal App 2d 232, 25 Cal Rptr 50); Maxwell v Maxwell,
189 Iowa 7, 177 NW 541, 10 ALR 482; Belger v Arnot, 344 Mass 679, 183 NE2d 866;
Warner v State, 297 NY 395, 79 NE2d 459, reh gr 297 NY 865, 79 NE2d 271.
In action for false arrest and false imprisonment by plaintiff who claimed he was forcibly
taken to mental hospital by police for psychiatric examination, judgment for defendant
was reversed where there was no evidence indicating need for immediate action to
prevent imminent harm and plaintiff's involuntary detention could only be justified by
proceedings initiated by director of hospital. Siegel v New York (1st Dept) 43 App Div
2d 271, 351 NYS2d 394.
Footnote 16. Crawford v Brown, 321 Ill 305, 151 NE 911, 45 ALR 1457; Maxwell v
Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 177 NW 541, 10 ALR 482; Witte v Haben, 131 Minn 71, 154 NW
662.
Footnote 17. Crawford v Brown, 321 Ill 305, 151 NE 911, 45 ALR 1457.
Forms: Complaint for instigation of arrest and imprisonment without warrant on insanity
charge. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 53.
Footnote 18. Christiansen v Weston, 36 Ariz 200, 284 P 149; Plancich v Williamson, 57
Wash 2d 367, 357 P2d 693, 92 ALR2d 559.
Footnote 19. Mulberry v Fuellhart, 203 Pa 573, 53 A 504.
Footnote 20. Wagenmann v Adams (CA1 Mass) 829 F2d 196.
73 "Deprogramming" member of religious sect [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
An action may be brought on false imprisonment and other theories of recovery based on
efforts made to prompt an individual's disaffiliation from a religious sect, 21 which
conduct is sometimes referred to as deprogramming. 22 Evidence that a plaintiff has
been abducted and confined against his or her will for a period of days without any
reasonable means of escape is sufficient to establish liability for false imprisonment

under circumstances of attempted deprogramming, particularly where the plaintiff is
confined beyond the time required to turn the plaintiff over to lawful authorities and
lawful alternatives such as civil commitment are not used. 23 The existence of a
guardianship over the person confined is not necessarily dispositive of that person's false
imprisonment claim. 24
Recovery may be denied where there is evidence that the subject of deprogramming
efforts has assented to the deprivation of liberty. 25
An allegation that a police department has colluded in a deprogramming effort may give
rise to a federal civil rights claim, 26 although use of a state court to obtain a
guardianship order does not constitute sufficient state action to give rise to liability under
1983. 27
Footnotes
Footnote 21. Peterson v Sorlien (Minn) 299 NW2d 123, 11 ALR4th 208, cert den 450
US 1031, 68 L Ed 2d 227, 101 S Ct 1742.
Footnote 22. Weiss v Patrick (DC RI) 453 F Supp 717, affd without op (CA1 RI) 588 F2d
Law Reviews: For a law review article suggesting that liability for false imprisonment
might be imposed on the religious sect itself, see He Who Controls the Mind Controls the
Body: False imprisonment, Religious Cults and the Destruction of Volitional Capacity,
25 Val U L Rev 407-54 (Spr, 1991).
Footnote 23. Eilers v Coy (DC Minn) 582 F Supp 1093.
Footnote 24. Taylor v Gilmartin (CA10 Okla) 686 F2d 1346, cert den 459 US 1147, 74
L Ed 2d 994, 103 S Ct 788 and cert den 463 US 1229, 77 L Ed 2d 1411, 103 S Ct 3570,
reh den 463 US 1249, 77 L Ed 2d 1456, 104 S Ct 37 and (among conflicting authorities
on other grounds noted in Peloza v Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. (CA9 Cal) 37 F3d 517,
94 CDOS 7611, 94 Daily Journal DAR 14090).
Footnote 25. Peterson v Sorlien (Minn) 299 NW2d 123, 11 ALR4th 208, cert den 450
US 1031, 68 L Ed 2d 227, 101 S Ct 1742.
As to defense based upon consent, see 60.
Footnote 26. Cooper v Molko (ND Cal) 512 F Supp 563 (among conflicting authorities
Footnote 27. Taylor v Gilmartin (CA10 Okla) 686 F2d 1346, cert den 459 US 1147, 74
L Ed 2d 994, 103 S Ct 788 and cert den 463 US 1229, 77 L Ed 2d 1411, 103 S Ct 3570,
reh den 463 US 1249, 77 L Ed 2d 1456, 104 S Ct 37 and (among conflicting authorities
b. Protection of Property by Detention of Customer or Employee [74-80]

(1). Common-law rule [74, 75]
At common law, the owner of property, in the exercise of the inherent right to protect it,
is ordinarily justified in restraining another who seeks to interfere with or injure it where
the restraint or detention is reasonable in time and manner. 28 Thus, where a person has
probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that another is taking his or her property,
the person is justified in detaining the suspect for a reasonable length of time for the
purpose of making an investigation in a reasonable manner. 29 In such cases, it has
been held that probable cause is a defense, even though the injury which is about to be
inflicted constitutes only a misdemeanor, for it is the existence of a reasonable ground to
suppose that one's property is in danger which gives right to the protection. 30
Merchants who detain individuals whom they have probable cause to believe are about to
injure their property are privileged against a false imprisonment action, if the detention is
carried out for a reasonable time in a reasonable manner. 31 It follows that the owner of
a store or other premises has a right to detain a customer or patron, for a reasonable time
and for a reasonable investigation, whom the owner has reasonable grounds to believe
has not paid for what was received, 32 or is attempting to take goods without payment.
33
Liability for false imprisonment will be imposed if there are insufficient grounds to
justify the detention 34 or if the detention is for an unreasonable length of time, 35 or is
imposed in an unreasonable manner. 36 The restraint may not be justified under the
rules of arrest, and liability for false arrest or imprisonment may be imposed if the
defendant arrests the suspected individual and takes the person into custody. 37
The existence of probable cause 38 and the reasonableness of the detention of a patron
39 are ordinarily questions for the jury, at least where the facts are in dispute. 40
However, a question which is ordinarily one of fact may become one of law for the court
to determine, as where the facts are undisputed, 41 or where reasonable persons would
not differ in their deductions from the facts. 42
Footnotes
Footnote 28. Parrott v Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Asso., 97 Cal App 2d 14, 217
P2d 89, 35 ALR2d 263; Teel v May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo 696, 155 SW2d 74, 137
ALR 495.
Footnote 29. Collyer v S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal 2d 175, 54 P2d 20.
Although store owners may not proceed with abandon to rectify the problem of
shoplifting, they should not be deterred by the prospect of a punitive damages award
from attempting to apprehend those responsible for the theft of merchandise. Guion v
Associated Dry Goods Corp. (Lord & Taylor Div.) (1st Dept) 56 App Div 2d 798, 393
NYS2d 8, affd 43 NY2d 876, 403 NYS2d 465, 374 NE2d 364.
As to what constitutes "reasonable manner" and "reasonable time" under shoplifting
statutes, see 80.
Footnote 30. Collyer v S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal 2d 175, 54 P2d 20; Teel v May Dep't
Stores Co., 348 Mo 696, 155 SW2d 74, 137 ALR 495.
But see Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v Stoess, 304 Ky 73, 199 SW2d 994, holding that
detention of a customer by store authorities was not justified, though the latter had
probable cause to believe that the customer had taken merchandise, where the offense
constituted a mere misdemeanor.
1329; Teel v May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo 696, 155 SW2d 74, 137 ALR 495.
See also S. H. Kress & Co. v Bradshaw, 186 Okla 588, 99 P2d 508, stating that store
authorities have the right to detain a customer for a reasonable time pending investigation
by them of coin tendered by the customer in payment for goods purchased, and thought
by clerk to be counterfeit.
Forms: Answers asserting defense of reasonable detention of suspected shoplifter. 10 Am
Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms 37-41.
Instructions to jury on privilege of property owner to reasonably detain customer or
patron to investigate suspected theft. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Imprisonment, Forms 43, 44.
Footnote 33. Collyer v S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal 2d 175, 54 P2d 20; Sima v Skaggs
Payless Drug Ctr., 82 Idaho 387, 353 P2d 1085 (under statute authorizing private person
to arrest for misdemeanor committed in his presence); Sweeney v F. W. Woolworth Co.,
247 Mass 277, 142 NE 50, 31 ALR 311; Teel v May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo 696, 155
SW2d 74, 137 ALR 495; Lester v Albers Super Markets, Inc., 94 Ohio App 313, 51 Ohio
Ops 457, 65 Ohio L Abs 315, 114 NE2d 529; Little Stores v Isenberg, 26 Tenn App 357,
172 SW2d 13; Rogers v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 48 Wash 2d 879, 297 P2d 250.
Where plaintiff, while shopping in defendant's store, placed around her waist an article of
merchandise belonging to defendant and walked away from the rack from which the
article had been removed, and where she was thereafter detained by one of defendant's
employees for the purpose of determining whether she was attempting to evade payment
for the merchandise, the summary judgment for the defendant entered by the lower court
was proper. Rothstein v Jackson's of Coral Gables, Inc. (Fla App D3) 133 So 2d 331.
Footnote 34. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v Smith, 281 Ky 583, 136 SW2d 759;
Banks v Food Town, Inc. (La App 1st Cir) 98 So 2d 719.
Where there was no evidence that anyone saw plaintiff take anything and the only
evidence was that someone in the store told a clerk that he believed plaintiff had stolen
something, the proof of probable cause was not sufficient to justify plaintiff's restraint by
a store manager. J. C. Penney Co. v Cox, 246 Miss 1, 148 So 2d 679.
Forms: Complaints for unreasonable detention and search of customer on accusation of
shoplifting. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms 21-24.
1329; Lester v Albers Super Markets, Inc., 94 Ohio App 313, 51 Ohio Ops 457, 65 Ohio
L Abs 315, 114 NE2d 529; Little Stores v Isenberg, 26 Tenn App 357, 172 SW2d 13.
Footnote 36. A. Harris & Co. v Caldwell (Tex Civ App) 276 SW 298, writ dism; Rogers v
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 48 Wash 2d 879, 297 P2d 250.
Footnote 37. Szymanski v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (Lucas Co) 79 Ohio App 407,
35 Ohio Ops 177, 74 NE2d 205; Martin v Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn App
421, 181 SW2d 638.
As to justification of an arrest without a warrant, see 82-84.
Footnote 38. Harrison v May Dep't Stores Co. (Dist Col App) 381 A2d 610; Brown v
Hartford Ins. Co. (La App 3d Cir) 370 So 2d 179; Jarjoura v Fred's One & Two Dollar
Store, Inc. (Miss) 370 So 2d 696.
The court submits the evidence as to probable cause to the jury with instructions as to
what will amount to probable cause, if proved. Director General of Railroads v
Kastenbaum, 263 US 25, 68 L Ed 146, 44 S Ct 52; Drabek v Sabley, 31 Wis 2d 184,
142 NW2d 798, 20 ALR3d 1435.
In an action against a city for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution
arising from the arrest and arraignment of a person for obstructing a police officer in the
performance of his duties by the placement of signs saying "Speed Trap Ahead" near an
intersection at which police used radar equipment, the trial court erred by directing a
verdict in favor of the city, since the issue of probable cause for the arrest was either a
jury issue or, if the issue were one of law, it should have been resolved in favor of the
arrested person on the basis of his right of free speech. Owens v Pensacola (Fla App D1)
355 So 2d 1266, quashed (Fla) 369 So 2d 328 (with respect to claim for malicious
prosecution).
1329; Cooke v J. J. Newberry & Co., 96 NJ Super 9, 232 A2d 425 (detention for about 27
minutes held not unreasonable); Stienbaugh v Payless Drug Store, 75 NM 118, 401 P2d
104; Kroger Co. v Demakes (Tex Civ App Houston (1st Dist)) 566 SW2d 653, writ ref n r
e (Sep 20, 1978) and rehg of writ of error overr on other grounds (Oct 25, 1978).
Question of reasonableness of manner in which plaintiff was detained was for jury to
resolve where defendant contended detention was instigated when plaintiff was observed
taking three shirts from table and leaving store with them in shopping bag and was
reasonable for purposes of investigation, and where plaintiff contended she had brought
shirts into store to exchange them and was told she would be detained until she signed
written admission and returned shirts. Best v Genung's, Inc. (3d Dept) 46 App Div 2d
550, 363 NYS2d 669.
Footnote 40. Neisner Bros., Inc. v Ramos (Dist Col App) 326 A2d 239; Nichols v
Woodward & Lothrop, Inc. (Dist Col App) 322 A2d 283, cert den 419 US 1108, 42 L Ed
2d 804, 95 S Ct 780; May Dep't Stores Co. v Devercelli (Dist Col App) 314 A2d 767.
Probable cause for customer's detention for shoplifting, for purposes of subsequent false
imprisonment action, was established as a matter of law, pursuant to plaintiff's nolo
contendere plea and conviction of misdemeanor theft in connection with the incident.
Adcox v Safeway Stores, Inc. (ND Tex) 512 F Supp 452.
The manner and extent of detention were reasonable when the customer, upon triggering
an electronic device due to the sales clerk's failure to remove a tag on purchased
merchandise, was asked by a detective to accompany the detective back into the store,
where the contents of the package were examined and only five to ten minutes elapsed.
Lindsey v Sears, Roebuck & Co. (La App 4th Cir) 389 So 2d 902.
In a detained customer's action against a store for false arrest, the court's permitting
evidence of plaintiff's companion's record as a shoplifter on the issue of probable cause
for plaintiff's detention was error; the companion's reputation had no bearing on the
store's right to arrest and detain the plaintiff. Duran v Buttrey Food, 189 Mont 381, 616
P2d 327.
A security officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe the customer was
committing larceny where the customer placed a box containing merchandise in his
shopping bag without paying for it, headed for the door to the street and was holding an
inner door open facing inward when stopped by the guard; on being stopped the customer
tendered $20.00 to pay for the merchandise. Mullen v Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 51
NY2d 924, 434 NYS2d 982, 415 NE2d 971.
Store employees did not have probable cause to detain a thirteen-year-old plaintiff based
on a security guard's description of the shoplifting suspect as wearing a baseball cap and
stolen white tennis shoes; the detained child had neither cap nor shoes and was stopped
two blocks from the store in the opposite direction from the suspect's line of flight. Wolf
v Nordstrom, Inc., 51 Or App 715, 626 P2d 953, affd in part and revd in part on other
grounds 291 Or 828, 637 P2d 1280.
A merchant had probable cause to believe a customer had shoplifted where the merchant
received word, through an employee, that the customer had removed an infant seat from
the shelf, put her child in the seat and left the store without paying for the seat. Johnson v
K-Mart Enterprises, Inc. (App) 98 Wis 2d 533, 297 NW2d 74.
Footnote 41. Lansburgh's, Inc. v Ruffin (Dist Col App) 372 A2d 561; Schneider v
Shepherd, 192 Mich 82, 158 NW 182; Diers v Mallon, 46 Neb 121, 64 NW 722;
Stienbaugh v Payless Drug Store, 75 NM 118, 401 P2d 104; Drabek v Sabley, 31 Wis 2d
184, 142 NW2d 798, 20 ALR3d 1435.
Footnote 42. Hebrew v Pulis, 73 NJL 621, 64 A 121; Bushardt v United Inv. Co., 121 SC
324, 113 SE 637, 35 ALR 637.
75 Detention based on theft committed at prior time [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
The right to detain the person suspected of wrongdoing exists only during commission of
the offense, and does not arise where the offense was completed at some prior time. 43
Accordingly, if it appears that the victim is not detained for investigation, but, on the
contrary, is held for the purpose of compelling restitution 44 or securing a confession
45 in connection with property taken at a prior time, liability for false imprisonment
may be imposed. However, at common law, there is a limited privilege for a person to
recapture a chattel, in fresh pursuit, using reasonable force not calculated to inflict serious
bodily harm, after there has been a demand for the return of the chattel and with the
proviso that the person so acting to recapture the chattel be correct as to the facts which
confer the privilege; if incorrect, the actor faces liability for false imprisonment or other
applicable torts. 46
Footnotes
Footnote 43. Moffatt v Buffums' Inc., 21 Cal App 2d 371, 69 P2d 424; Teel v May Dep't
P2d 89, 35 ALR2d 263.
Footnote 45. Moffatt v Buffums' Inc., 21 Cal App 2d 371, 69 P2d 424; Teel v May Dep't
Footnote 46. Gortarez v Smitty's Super Valu, 140 Ariz 97, 680 P2d 807.
(2). Under Statute [76-80]

Many state legislatures have enacted statutes expressly giving the merchant a qualified
privilege to detain suspected shoplifters. 47 Various state statutes giving a merchant a
qualified privilege to detain suspected shoplifters differ in form but are consistent in
providing that merchants or their employees or agents may detain in good faith and upon
probable cause or reasonable grounds any person it is believed was removing goods for
sale from the store without paying for them, provided that the detention is for a
reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. 48
Clearly, the most significant aspect of these statutes, from the merchant's standpoint, is
that the propriety, if not the legality, of the arrest is not dependent upon a finding, either
in the false imprisonment action or in a criminal proceeding for shoplifting, that the
suspect was actually guilty of the offense. 49 The fact that under the statute the
merchant can act upon probable cause or reasonable grounds leaves room for honest
mistake, reasonable grounds or probable cause being a question of fact. 50
A statute may set forth a presumption that a person concealing unpurchased goods is
taking the goods with the intention of depriving the owner of the goods, thus warranting a
reasonable merchant's detention. 51 The issue of the existence of probable cause or of
reasonable grounds for detention of a customer is generally a question of fact for the jury
in a false arrest action. 52 However, if the material facts on the issue of probable cause
for arrest under the shopkeeper immunity statute are undisputed, the issue becomes a
question of law for the court. 53
A statutory provision allowing for a shopkeeper's defense to false arrest or false
imprisonment claims based upon a reasonable belief that the plaintiff was shoplifting or
that the manner of the detention or arrest was reasonable has been read in the conjunctive,
despite use of disjunctive language in the statute. 54
Footnotes
Footnote 47. See statutes delineated in, for example, Rothstein v Jackson's of Coral
Gables, Inc. (Fla App D3) 133 So 2d 331; J. C. Penney Co. v Cox, 246 Miss 1, 148 So 2d
679; Isaiah v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (Summit Co) 111 Ohio App 537, 15 Ohio
Ops 2d 291, 174 NE2d 128, 86 ALR2d 430, motion overr; Doyle v Douglas (Okla) 390
P2d 871; Lukas v J. C. Penney Co., 233 Or 345, 378 P2d 717.
Footnote 48. Morris v Albertson's, Inc. (CA5 Fla) 705 F2d 406; Taylor v Dillards Dep't
Stores, Inc. (CA10 Okla) 971 F2d 601; Whitlow v Bruno's, Inc. (Ala) 567 So 2d 1235,
reh den, without op (Ala) 1990 Ala LEXIS 845; Gortarez v Smitty's Super Valu, 140 Ariz
97, 680 P2d 807; Mendenhall v Skaggs Cos., 285 Ark 236, 685 SW2d 805; Alvarado v
Dodge City, 238 Kan 48, 708 P2d 174; K-Mart Corp. v Washington, 109 Nev 1180, 866
P2d 274; Lusk v Ira Watson Co., 185 W Va 680, 408 SE2d 630.
As to reasonableness of manner and time, see 80.

Footnote 49. 77.
Footnote 51. Murray v Wal-Mart, Inc. (CA8 Ark) 874 F2d 555.
Footnote 52. Coblyn v Kennedy's, Inc., 359 Mass 319, 268 NE2d 860, 47 ALR3d 991
("probable cause" and "reasonable grounds" have substantially identical meanings in
statutes providing for detention of suspected shoplifters).
Footnote 53. Morris v Albertson's, Inc. (CA5 Fla) 705 F2d 406.
Footnote 54. K Mart Corp. v Adamson, 192 Ga App 884, 386 SE2d 680.
77 Factors affecting applicability of statutes [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
The term "shoplifting," as used in a statute according a shopkeeper a qualified privilege
to detain a suspected shoplifter, has been held to include the offense of substituting bogus
price tags, 55 and likewise, the passing of counterfeit money in a store has been held to
be within the term "larceny" as used in a shoplifting statute, 56 although the stealing of
cash by an employee has been held not to constitute "larceny of merchandise." 57
A shoplifting statute has been held unavailable as a defense to a merchant in a false
imprisonment action by one who came to the assistance of a suspected shoplifter. 58
Since privilege to detain on probable cause was established to harmonize the individual
right to liberty with the inherent right of a property owner to protect the interest in
property, protection from civil liability is limited to suits based on detention and does not
extend to suits based on arrest. 59
Despite a provision that detention must take place on the merchant's premises, a
shoplifting statute was held available as a defense to a merchant who stopped a suspected
shoplifter after the suspect had left the store, the court reasoning that the area
immediately outside the store was part of the "premises" as intended by the statute. 60
Formal arrest of the suspected shoplifter is not necessary to invoke the protection of the
statute in favor of the merchant. 61 Similarly, it has been held that the wording of a
particular statute permitting detention of suspected shoplifters on probable cause did not
require that the suspect actually be found guilty of shoplifting before the statute could be
used as a defense by the merchant. 62
Footnotes
Footnote 55. S. S. Kresge Co. v Carty, 120 Ga App 170, 169 SE2d 735.
Footnote 56. Wolin v Abraham & Straus, 64 Misc 2d 982, 316 NYS2d 377.
Footnote 57. Chenkin v Times Square Stores Corp. (2d Dept) 69 App Div 2d 849, 415
NYS2d 468.
Footnote 58. Peak v W. T. Grant Co. (Mo App) 386 SW2d 685.
975.
Footnote 60. Simmons v J. C. Penney Co. (La App 1st Cir) 186 So 2d 358.
Fact that detention occurred in front of shop and not within store did not defeat
merchant's statutory privilege where detention occurred on sidewalk on walkway within
few feet of door of shop which was located in shopping center. Thompson v Le Blanc
(La App 1st Cir) 336 So 2d 344, application den (La) 339 So 2d 26.
Footnote 61. F. B. C. Stores, Inc. v Duncan, 214 Va 246, 198 SE2d 595.
Footnote 62. J. S. Dillion & Sons Stores Co. v Carrington, 169 Colo 242, 455 P2d 201;
Jacques v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 30 NY2d 466, 334 NYS2d 632, 285 NE2d 871.
For purposes of a merchant's detention statute, conviction of the alleged shoplifter is not a
necessary element of the merchant's invocation of the detention statute, so long as the
merchant or employee acts in good faith in detaining the suspect. Mendenhall v Skaggs
Cos., 285 Ark 236, 685 SW2d 805.
78 -- Persons entitled to protection of statute [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
Shoplifter detention statutes have sometimes been applied to cases involving detention of
employees suspected of theft, 63 There is, however, some authority indicating that such a
statute is inapplicable in an employer-employee situation. 64
A statute providing a limited privilege with respect to detention of suspected shoplifters
has been held to be no defense for a pari-mutuel racetrack in a false imprisonment action
brought by one who was detained on suspicion of cashing a nonwinning ticket, since a
pari-mutuel operator was not a "merchant" within the meaning of the statute. 65
A statute granting immunity from liability for false arrest to "a police officer, a merchant,
or a merchant's employee," has been held not to include agents, so that an independent
contractor which employed all the security guards assigned to a supermarket was
properly held liable for false arrest of one who was erroneously accused of shoplifting by
a security guard, who was not an employee of the merchant. 66
Footnotes
Footnote 63. Tumbarella v Kroger Co., 85 Mich App 482, 271 NW2d 284.
Since statutory defense of probable cause in false imprisonment cases is applicable to
employers, as well as to merchants, judgment for plaintiff employee in false
imprisonment case was error where employee was detained momentarily by employer's
supervisory personnel immediately after reports were received that employee was
stealing material from employer, and she was released 20 minutes later when she refused
to open her pocketbook. Faulkenberry v Springs Mills, Inc., 271 SC 377, 247 SE2d 445.
Footnote 64. General Motors Corp. v Piskor, 27 Md App 95, 340 A2d 767, affd in part
and revd in part on other grounds 277 Md 165, 352 A2d 810, appeal after remand 281 Md
627, 381 A2d 16, 93 ALR3d 1097 (a statute permitting detention of suspected shoplifters
by merchants was not applicable to detention of an auto assembly plant employee by
security guards to check for possession of articles stolen from employer, since the statute
applied only to shoplifting, which was not the crime of which employee was suspected,
and privilege created by statute was inapplicable to employer in employee's false
imprisonment action).
Footnote 65. Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. v Edge (Fla App D1) 216 So 2d 512,
cert dismd (Fla) 225 So 2d 522, appeal after remand (Fla App D1) 253 So 2d 726.
Footnote 66. Bishop v Bockoven, Inc., 199 Neb 613, 260 NW2d 488.
79 -- "Probable cause" and "reasonable grounds" for detention [32 Am Jur 2d
FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Several courts have expressly or impliedly supported the proposition that the existence of
"probable cause" or "reasonable grounds," as used in statutes permitting the detention of
persons believed to be shoplifting, must be judged against the objective standard of
whether the facts available to the detaining party at the moment would warrant a
reasonably prudent person to believe that the person in question had been shoplifting.
67
Some of these courts have further held that under this rule, mere suspicion that a
person is shoplifting is insufficient to create probable cause for detention under a
shoplifting statute, 68 although it has been held that the application of the statute is not
dependent upon the actual guilt of the shoplifter. 69
When a merchant detains a customer for investigation of possible shoplifting entirely
upon the word of other persons, and not upon the basis of what the merchant saw, the test
of probable cause would appear to be whether or not the circumstances, as they appeared
to the informer, were sufficient to give the informer probable cause for believing that the
customer was shoplifting. 70 Failure of the merchant to properly attempt to confirm or
disprove suspicions by reasonable investigation has been held in several cases to be a
significant factor in determining the existence or nonexistence of probable cause. Failure
to conduct sufficient inquiry has been considered an important factor in determining that
insufficient cause existed for detaining a suspected shoplifter where
the store detective believed that he saw a customer place a bar of a particular brand of
soap in her bag, but instead of generally asking the cashier whether the customer had paid
for a bar of soap, the detective asked her instead whether the customer had paid for the
particular brand of soap he thought he saw her take. Upon receiving a negative answer,
the detective detained the customer outside the store, and upon investigation found that
the bar of soap he saw her take off the shelf was not the brand that he had thought it was,
but was another brand of soap for which the customer had paid. 71
a store detective testified that he saw a customer take a buffer pad off the store shelf and
place it in her purse, and that he watched her closely from that time on and she did not
pay for the buffer pad before she left the store. The evidence was in conflict as to the
issue of whether shoplifting had been committed, and the court stated that the only
method by which shoplifting, if reasonably suspected, could have been immediately
proved or disproved was by checking the customer's grocery slip, and that since this
method was not employed, it could reasonably have been found that no probable cause
existed for detaining the customer. 72
customers were detained for allegedly stealing a dress from a store, the testimony of
store employees indicating that prior to detaining the suspected shoplifters, they
conducted a quick search of the dress rack to see if the missing dress had been replaced
thereon, but the testimony of the suspected customers indicating that they had returned
the dress to the rack from which they had taken it. The evidence being in dispute, the
court held that a jury could reasonably have found that there was insufficient cause for
detention of the customers, in view of further testimony that the missing dress had later
been discovered on the dress rack in the store. 73 On the other hand, the mere word of a
merchant to a police officer has been held sufficient to constitute probable cause for the
detention of the suspected shoplifter by the officer, although the merchant can still be
held liable for false imprisonment if he or she cannot show probable cause for making the
accusation to police in the first place. 74
Some cases have presented circumstances under which the particular court held as a
matter of law, there apparently being no conflict in the evidence, that probable cause to
detain a suspected shoplifter did exist within the meaning of a statute permitting such
detention where probable cause existed. 75 In other cases, the absence of probable
cause has been found as a matter of law. 76 Similarly, in some cases, in at least some of
which the evidence was apparently in dispute, the courts held that the question of
probable cause, as used in a statute permitting detention of shoplifters, was to be
determined by the jury, 77 and that under the particular circumstances involved, the
juries hearing these cases were justified in concluding that probable cause did exist to
detain the suspected shoplifters. 78 In other cases it was held that under the particular
circumstances involved, the jury or trier of fact could reasonably have found that
probable cause did not exist to justify detention of a suspected shoplifter. 79
A statutory presumption of shoplifting, arising when there is a knowing concealment of

unpurchased items, may impact on such probable cause determination. 80
Footnotes
Footnote 67. S. S. Kresge Co. v Carty, 120 Ga App 170, 169 SE2d 735; Dixon v S. S.
Kresge, Inc., 119 Ga App 776, 169 SE2d 189; Clark v I. H. Rubenstein, Inc. (La) 326 So
2d 497, on remand (La App 1st Cir) 335 So 2d 545; Wilde v Schwegmann Bros. Giant
Supermarkets, Inc. (La App 4th Cir) 160 So 2d 839; Tota v Alexander's, 63 Misc 2d 908,
314 NYS2d 93; Dlep v Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 238 Or 538, 395 P2d 137; Lukas v
J. C. Penney Co., 233 Or 345, 378 P2d 717.
The reasonableness of a department store's restraining of a customer is a jury question
and is to be judged by an objective standard. Swift v R.H. Macy's & Co. (CA8 Mo) 780
F2d 1358.
In a case where the existence of probable cause for a security guard's detention of a
customer was the primary issue, the trial court should have given a probable cause
instruction, preferably one using a "person of reasonable caution" standard. Alvarado v
Dodge City, 238 Kan 48, 708 P2d 174.
In Coblyn v Kennedy's, Inc., 359 Mass 319, 268 NE2d 860, 47 ALR3d 991. the court
rejected an argument by defendant store that the issue of probable cause should be
determined according to the subjective test of whether the defendant had an honest and
strong suspicion that the plaintiff was attempting to commit larceny, and held that the
words "reasonable grounds" as used in the shoplifting statute had the same meaning as
"probable cause" as used in the Fourth Amendment "stop-and-frisk" rule. The court
stated that probable cause must be judged against the facts available to the detaining
person, and whether those facts would lead a reasonable man to believe that the detention
was necessary.
Annotation: Construction and effect, in false imprisonment action, of statute providing
for detention of suspected shoplifters, 47 ALR3d 998 4.
Footnote 68. For example, See Draeger v Grand Cent., Inc. (CA10 Utah) 504 F2d 142;
Coblyn v Kennedy's, Inc., 359 Mass 319, 268 NE2d 860, 47 ALR3d 991; Butler v W. E.
Walker Stores, Inc. (Miss) 222 So 2d 128; J. C. Penney Co. v Cox, 246 Miss 1, 148 So 2d
679.
A store owner was liable for false arrest of a customer who was detained for shoplifting
by a supervisor who mistook the customer for an actual shoplifter; detention was based
on an inadequate description by a store employee, the customer was not acting in a
suspicious manner and the employee did not remain in the area to verify the identification
of the person observed. Morris v Albertson's, Inc. (CA5 Fla) 705 F2d 406.
Store employees lacked probable cause to think that plaintiff was a shoplifter and plaintiff
was subjected to a detention for which she was entitled to compensation from the
merchant where one employee had failed to remove a tag that triggered an antishoplifter
alarm as plaintiff left the store and the alarm system, which was new, had previously been
triggered by employee error or other imperfections in the system and where, when the
alarm went off and plaintiff was asked to return for a search of her goods in the presence
of other shoppers, had plaintiff attempted to leave the scene she would have tended to
confirm the suspicions of the store's employees that she had stolen something and could
have subjected herself to restraint by force. Clark v I. H. Rubenstein, Inc. (La) 326 So 2d
497, on remand (La App 1st Cir) 335 So 2d 545.
Although customer was observed by two store employees placing two items in her purse
or tote bag and leaving the store without paying for them, employees did not have
"reasonable cause to believe that [customer] committed theft of goods held for sale" as
provided by the statute authorizing detention of shoplifters, where customer was known
to be regular customer of store and was known to have check cashing privileges at store,
and where customer telephoned store to inform them of mistake she had made and that
she was returning to store to pay for items. Pace v Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. (La App
1st Cir) 339 So 2d 856, cert den (La) 341 So 2d 404.
Reasonable cause to detain a customer for suspicion of shoplifting a dress from the fitting
room did not exist where there had been a discrepancy as to the number of items the
customer took into the room and where the employee was made aware of the possibility
of the discrepancy and did nothing to straighten it out. Levy v Duclaux (La App 4th Cir)
324 So 2d 1, cert den (La) 328 So 2d 887 and cert den (La) 328 So 2d 888.
Footnote 69. 77.
Footnote 70. Butler v W. E. Walker Stores, Inc. (Miss) 222 So 2d 128; J. C. Penney Co. v
Cox, 246 Miss 1, 148 So 2d 679; Lukas v J. C. Penney Co., 233 Or 345, 378 P2d 717.
Statement of a shopper that the shopper observed another customer opening packages of
pantyhose and closing them after removing contents was sufficient probable cause for
detention of customer; the issue was properly submitted to the jury. Frison v Delchamps
Store No. 11 (Ala) 507 So 2d 478.
Store manager had probable cause to detain customers where a store clerk reported that
the clerk followed the customers through the store after the clerk did not see the
customers pay for or deposit a 59-cent item; even though the reasonableness of the
subsequent detention raised a jury question. Gortarez v Smitty's Super Valu, 140 Ariz 97,
680 P2d 807.
There was no probable cause for detention of customers on suspicion of shoplifting dog
food where, among other factors, the testimony of the store employee who detained the
customers was ambiguous as to whether the employee asked the store cashier whether the
dog food had been paid for before detaining the customers. West v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
(La App 3d Cir) 539 So 2d 1258, cert den (La) 543 So 2d 19.
Where a store security guard observed a customer put an Alka Seltzer in her purse and
leave the store and, after ascertaining that the item had not been checked out, followed
the customer into parking the lot, verified that she had Alka Seltzer, and asked her to
return to the store, the security guard had reasonable cause to believe that a theft had been
committed and initial detention was privileged under statute; the fact that the customer
was asked to and did sign a statement admitting that she took Alka Seltzer without paying
for it, but that store employees failed to investigate further her insistence that she did not
intend to take the item without paying for it, did not render inquiry arbitrary and
unreasonable. Mapes v National Food Stores, Inc. (La App 1st Cir) 329 So 2d 831, cert
den (La) 332 So 2d 486.
Footnote 71. Southwest Drug Stores, Inc. v Garner (Miss) 195 So 2d 837, 29 ALR3d
953.
Footnote 72. Wilde v Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc. (La App 4th Cir) 160
So 2d 839.
Footnote 73. Lukas v J. C. Penney Co., 233 Or 345, 378 P2d 717.
Footnote 74. See Stienbaugh v Payless Drug Store, 75 NM 118, 401 P2d 104 (while a
declaration made to a police officer by a merchant who believed that a customer had been
shoplifting did constitute probable cause for the police to detain the suspect, the store was
nevertheless still under a burden of showing that it had its own probable cause to instigate
the arrest made by the police. The court thus determined that the testimony of a store
employee who observed suspicious actions of the suspected customer, the testimony of
the store manager who, upon an accusation by the observing employee, also observed
suspicious acts on the part of the suspect, and the testimony of the suspect himself to the
effect that he had not committed the suspicious acts he had been accused of, should all be
considered by the jury in determining the issue of probable cause).
Footnote 75. Meadows v F. W. Woolworth Co. (ND Fla) 254 F Supp 907; J. S. Dillion &
Sons Stores Co. v Carrington, 169 Colo 242, 455 P2d 201; Rothstein v Jackson's of Coral
Gables, Inc. (Fla App D3) 133 So 2d 331; Thompson v Le Blanc (La App 1st Cir) 336 So
2d 344, application den (La) 339 So 2d 26; Kimbrough v Giant Food, Inc., 26 Md App
640, 339 A2d 688; Cooke v J. J. Newberry & Co., 96 NJ Super 9, 232 A2d 425; Tota v
Alexander's, 63 Misc 2d 908, 314 NYS2d 93; Dlep v Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 238
Or 538, 395 P2d 137.
Probable cause was established as a matter of law where customer walked out of the store
without paying for videocassettes in the customer's possession. Whitlow v Bruno's, Inc.
(Ala) 567 So 2d 1235, reh den, without op (Ala) 1990 Ala LEXIS 845.
Directed verdict for store was proper where the customer told security guard items were
paid for, store theft detection device was set off and the customer then admitted that the
items had not yet been paid for, as the customer had not yet finished shopping. Gabrou v
May Dep't Stores Co. (Dist Col App) 462 A2d 1102.
Store was entitled to summary judgment where detainee was seen putting small items
into detainee's pockets and signed a form admitting taking the items. Duvall v Kroger
Co. (Ind App) 549 NE2d 403.
Where a customer walked by a counter of hairbrushes near the entrance to the store, and
in one continuous motion, ran her hand across several of the brushes, suddenly raised her
hand and pulled her overcoat tightly around her, and without stopping, went out of the
door of the store, it was held in Simmons v J. C. Penney Co. (La App 1st Cir) 186 So 2d
358; that a store detective who observed the customer's motions had reasonable ground,
within the meaning of the state shoplifting statute, to believe that the customer might
have been shoplifting. Noting that the customer in her own testimony admitted that her
actions might have been such as to lead others to believe that she was taking something
from the counter and hiding it under her coat, the court concluded that a jury could have
found that the detective's detention of the customer, which immediately followed his
observations, was privileged and authorized under the shoplifting statute which provides
that no merchant shall be liable for any detention made by an authorized employee who
suspects on reasonable grounds that a customer is shoplifting.
Footnote 76. Pace v Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. (La App 1st Cir) 339 So 2d 856, cert den
(La) 341 So 2d 404; Wilde v Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc. (La App 4th
Cir) 160 So 2d 839; J. C. Penney Co. v Cox, 246 Miss 1, 148 So 2d 679.
Footnote 77. Swift v R.H. Macy's & Co. (CA8 Mo) 780 F2d 1358; Taylor v Dillards
Dep't Stores, Inc. (CA10 Okla) 971 F2d 601; Limited Stores v Wilson-Robinson, 317 Ark
80, 876 SW2d 248; Wal-Mart Stores v Yarbrough, 284 Ark 345, 681 SW2d 359; Berry v
Loiseau, 223 Conn 786, 614 A2d 414 (detention of employee at place of business);
Alvarado v Dodge City, 238 Kan 48, 708 P2d 174; K-Mart Corp. v Washington, 109 Nev
1180, 866 P2d 274; West v King's Dep't Store, Inc., 321 NC 698, 365 SE2d 621.
Footnote 78. Miller v Roses' Stores, Inc., 151 Ga App 158, 259 SE2d 162; S. S. Kresge
Co. v Carty, 120 Ga App 170, 169 SE2d 735; Consolidated Sales Co. v Malone (Ky) 530
SW2d 680; Bly v Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. (Mo App) 562 SW2d 723.
Evidence that store security guard saw customer break open socket wrench set and
remove one of the sockets; that customer apparently saw security guard watching him;
concealed socket in palm of his hand; and began to walk towards front of store and that
security guard went after customer; but, because of other patrons obstructing his path,
was unable to catch up until customer was almost out of store, although socket was not
found on customer's person when he was searched, warranted conclusion that store had
reasonable cause to believe that customer had committed theft of goods from store and
that store was, therefore, protected from liability for false arrest and imprisonment by
qualified privilege afforded by statute. Jordon v Mangel Stores Corp. (La App 1st Cir)
336 So 2d 278.
Attention is called to Doyle v Douglas (Okla) 390 P2d 871, in which it was held that the
trial court properly permitted the introduction of evidence by a store of alleged activities
of the plaintiff that were claimed to have occurred some 3 weeks prior to the date of the
incident that precipitated the action for false imprisonment. Noting that the Oklahoma
shoplifting statute permitted merchants to take suspected shoplifters into custody upon
probable cause, the court apparently took the position that evidence of prior suspicious
acts on the part of the plaintiff in the store were admissible to show that probable cause
for her detention did exist.
Footnote 79. Draeger v Grand Cent., Inc. (CA10 Utah) 504 F2d 142; Gaszak v Zayre of
Illinois, Inc. (1st Dist) 16 Ill App 3d 50, 305 NE2d 704; Duhe v Schwegmann Bros. Giant
Super Markets (La App 4th Cir) 384 So 2d 1019; Coblyn v Kennedy's, Inc., 359 Mass
319, 268 NE2d 860, 47 ALR3d 991; Butler v W. E. Walker Stores, Inc. (Miss) 222 So 2d
128; Southwest Drug Stores, Inc. v Garner (Miss) 195 So 2d 837, 29 ALR3d 953;
Stienbaugh v Payless Drug Store, 75 NM 118, 401 P2d 104; Isaiah v Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. (Summit Co) 111 Ohio App 537, 15 Ohio Ops 2d 291, 174 NE2d 128, 86
ALR2d 430, motion overr; Lukas v J. C. Penney Co., 233 Or 345, 378 P2d 717.
Evidence was sufficient to support conclusion that there was no reasonable cause for
detention of customer by store employee, although another employee reported that she
saw customer handling card of initial rings, put one ring on her finger and leave the store
wearing the initial ring without paying for it; where customer testified she never touched
any of the store's rings while in the store and where, in fact, the initial ring which
customer was wearing was one she had owned for several years. Guidry v IGF, Inc. (La
App 3d Cir) 332 So 2d 515.
Footnote 80. Wal-Mart Stores v Yarbrough, 284 Ark 345, 681 SW2d 359.
80 -- "Reasonable manner" and "reasonable time" of detention [32 Am Jur 2d
FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Most of the so-called merchant's or shopkeeper's detention statutes provide that any
detention thereunder must be carried out in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable
time. 81 Generally speaking, the reasonableness of the detention is likewise dependent
upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In numerous cases it has been held, under
the circumstances, either that the detention was carried out in a reasonable manner and
for a reasonable time or that a finding to that effect would have been supportable. 82
Detentions have been found unreasonable in time or manner, despite the existence of a
shoplifting statute, in other cases. 83 Where the detention is continued for the purpose of
securing a confession or a release from liability from the suspect, 84 or where the
merchant or the employee or agent is unnecessarily rude or uses excessive force in
carrying out the detention, 85 the test of reasonableness in time and manner provided for
in the statute is not met.
An originally reasonable detention may be denied protection of the statute if the actions
taken in connection with the detention become unreasonable. 86 Thus, a detention
lawfully made which is continued for an unreasonable time, after the detaining party
knows that the suspicion is groundless and the apprehension a mistake, is unreasonable
and is not privileged in a false imprisonment action. 87
Some statutes contain a specific time limit on the detention. 88
Footnotes
Footnote 81. 75.
Footnote 82. Meadows v F. W. Woolworth Co. (ND Fla) 254 F Supp 907; Gonzales v
Harris, 34 Colo App 282, 528 P2d 259, revd on other grounds 189 Colo 518, 542 P2d
842; Mapes v National Food Stores, Inc. (La App 1st Cir) 329 So 2d 831, cert den (La)
332 So 2d 486; Cooke v J. J. Newberry & Co., 96 NJ Super 9, 232 A2d 425; Roker v
Gertz Long Island (2d Dept) 34 App Div 2d 680, 310 NYS2d 536; Mullins v Rinks, Inc.
(Butler Co) 27 Ohio App 2d 45, 56 Ohio Ops 2d 218, 272 NE2d 152; Dlep v Zapp's Drug
& Variety Stores, 238 Or 538, 395 P2d 137.
Store acted in a reasonable manner in detaining a shopper where no force was used and
the shopper was asked to remove undergarments, under reasonable conditions, because a
security guard had observed the shopper place merchandise under her skirt. Wilson v
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (La App 3d Cir) 525 So 2d 111.
Footnote 83. See Hardin v Barker's of Monroe, Inc. (La App 2d Cir) 336 So 2d 1031
(although store security guard, who saw customer put shoes in pocket and leave the store,
had reasonable cause to initially detain and question customer and was authorized to use
reasonable force in overcoming customer's physical resistance to detention, at which
point guard learned from his own inspection that the shoes he saw customer place in his
pockets were the shoes of customer's children, who were still in the store; and that
customer had funds with which to accomplish his stated purpose of purchasing new shoes
for his children, guard had reasonable explanation for customer's suspicious actions;
reasonable cause then ceased to exist and no immunity or legal protection against civil
liability, as provided by statute, was thereafter afforded the store for actions of its
employee in detaining and arresting customer).
Detention of a store customer was not reasonable, within protection of the statute, where
the shopper was detained for fifteen minutes after it was determined there were no
grounds to continue holding the shopper. Adams v Zayre Corp. (2d Dist) 148 Ill App 3d
704, 102 Ill Dec 121, 499 NE2d 678.

Despite existence of probable cause for detention of a store customer, excessive detention
of three hours and forty-five minutes, in derogation of statutory maximum of detention
for sixty minutes, entitled the customer to recover damages for the unreasonable delay.
Attaldo v Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc. (La App 4th Cir) 469 So 2d 1132, cert
den (La) 475 So 2d 354.
Store owner and employee were not immune from liability under a statute authorizing
detention "in a reasonable manner," where employee and owner refused to search
detainees' pocket books, call the police, or explain why detainees could not leave the
store. Ayscue v Mullen, 78 NC App 145, 336 SE2d 863.
for detention of suspected shoplifters, 47 ALR3d 998 9, 10.
Footnote 84. Silvia v Zayre Corp. (Fla App D3) 233 So 2d 856, cert den (Fla) 238 So 2d
112; Jefferson Stores, Inc. v Caudell (Fla App D3) 228 So 2d 99; Wilde v Schwegmann
Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc. (La App 4th Cir) 160 So 2d 839.
Footnote 85. J. C. Penney Co. v Cox, 246 Miss 1, 148 So 2d 679; K-Mart Corp. v
Washington, 109 Nev 1180, 866 P2d 274; Lukas v J. C. Penney Co., 233 Or 345, 378 P2d
717.
A merchant was not entitled to statutory immunity for detention of a 73-year-old
individual accused of shoplifting where the merchant failed to detain the person for the
sole purpose of delivery to the police, and, in the course of the detention, a security guard
pinned the detainee's arms behind his back. Altman v Knox Lumber Co. (Minn App) 381
NW2d 858.
Footnote 86. Murray v Wal-Mart, Inc. (CA8 Ark) 874 F2d 555 (detention prolonged after
shopper was exonerated of shoplifting); Rogers v T.J.X. Cos., 329 NC 226, 404 SE2d 664
(employee impersonated a police officer, badgered the detainee to confess and forced
detainee to sign a release from liability).
Footnote 87. Latek v K Mart Corp., 224 Neb 807, 401 NW2d 503.
Footnote 88. Brown v Hartford Ins. Co. (La App 3d Cir) 370 So 2d 179, (referring to
provision of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, authorizing a peace officer,
merchant, or a specifically authorized employee of a merchant to detain a person for
questioning on the merchant's premises for a length of time not to exceed 60 minutes).
Detention for 3 hours and forty-five minutes was in derogation of statutory limitation of
detention to 60 minutes. Attaldo v Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc. (La App 4th
Cir) 469 So 2d 1132, cert den (La) 475 So 2d 354.
Statute provides that a merchant is not liable for detention for a reasonable time not to
exceed 30 minutes. Lusk v Ira Watson Co., 185 W Va 680, 408 SE2d 630.
c. Arrest Without Warrant [81-86]

Where one is properly arrested by lawful authority, even though without a warrant, an
action for false imprisonment cannot be maintained. 89 It has been held that an arrest
lawfully made without a warrant justifies holding the prisoner only long enough to secure
a warrant or to present the arrestee before a magistrate, and no longer. 90
Footnotes
Footnote 89. Erie R. Co. v Reigherd (CA6 Ohio) 166 F 247, 7 Ohiolr 485; Hill v Levy,
117 Cal App 2d 667, 256 P2d 622; Bushardt v United Inv. Co., 121 SC 324, 113 SE 637,
35 ALR 637.
Warrantless arrest by police officers is justified only if misdemeanor or felony was
committed in their presence or if officers have probable cause to believe that felony has
been or is about to be committed. Cooper v Dyke (CA4 Md) 814 F2d 941 (applying
Maryland law).
Footnote 90. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v Hinsdell, 76 Kan 74, 90 P 800; Kroeger v
Passmore, 36 Mont 504, 93 P 805.
An officer's initial finding of probable cause justifies both the arrest and a reasonable
period of continued detention for the purpose of bringing an arrestee before a magistrate.
Thompson v Olson (CA1 Me) 798 F2d 552, cert den 480 US 908, 94 L Ed 2d 524, 107
S Ct 1354.
Forms: Complaints for unlawful arrest without warrant. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev),
False Imprisonment, Forms 91-97.
82 For felony [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
An officer may justify an arrest, and will not be liable for false imprisonment, where
there are reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is the one who committed it, though, as it turns out, no felony was
actually committed. 91 Ordinarily, however, a private individual may arrest without a
warrant in a felony case only if the felony has actually been committed and the individual
has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested was the one who committed
it. 92 If, in fact, no felony has been committed by anyone, an arrest by a private
individual without a warrant may give rise to an action for false imprisonment, even
though an officer might have been justified in making an arrest under similar
circumstances. 93
Footnotes
Footnote 91. Goodrich v Lawrence, 138 Fla 287, 189 So 233; Tucker v Vornbrock, 270
Ky 712, 110 SW2d 659; Diers v Mallon, 46 Neb 121, 64 NW 722.
Forms: Answers alleging officer's reasonable cause to believe felony committed by
person arrested as justification of arrest without warrant. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms
(Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms 98, 99.
Footnote 93. Garnier v Squires, 62 Kan 321, 62 P 1005; Melton v Rickman, 225 NC 700,
36 SE2d 276, 162 ALR 793.
Under New York law, a private citizen who makes an arrest does so at his peril, and if the
person arrested did not in fact commit the crime for which he is arrested, the person who
arrests him is liable even if he acts in good faith or has probable cause to make the arrest.
Scanlon v Flynn (SD NY) 465 F Supp 32.
83 For misdemeanor [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Liability for false arrest or imprisonment may arise when a private individual 94 or a
peace officer 95 makes an arrest for a misdemeanor and the offense complained of was
actually not committed, even though such arrest is made on reasonable grounds and in
good faith. Furthermore, in the case of an arrest by a private citizen, at least in some
jurisdictions it is the rule that a private person has no power to arrest one committing a
misdemeanor in the person's presence unless it amounts to a breach of the peace; 96 and,
under such a view, the usual shoplifting incident has been held not to be disruptive of the
public peace. 97
On the other hand, it is frequently held that the doctrine of probable or reasonable cause
is a good defense in an action for false arrest or imprisonment where the act was actually
committed in the officer's presence, and where the offender's conduct was such as to
cause a reasonable person to conclude that a public offense was being committed. 98
Footnotes
Footnote 94. Banks v Food Town, Inc. (La App 1st Cir) 98 So 2d 719.
Footnote 95. Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278; Ware v Dunn, 80
Cal App 2d 936, 183 P2d 128; Pearson v Great Southern Lumber Co., 134 La 117, 63 So
759; Bergeron v Peyton, 106 Wis 377, 82 NW 291.
Forms: Instruction to juryarrest withou warrantby private person. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr
Footnote 96. Shaw v May Dep't Stores Co. (Dist Col App) 268 A2d 607.
Forms: Instruction to juryarrest withou warrantby private person. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr
Footnote 97. Shaw v May Dep't Stores Co. (Dist Col App) 268 A2d 607.
97 L Ed 653, 73 S Ct 50; Winegar v Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (Mo App) 163 SW2d 357;
Cave v Cooley, 48 NM 478, 152 P2d 886; Ryan v Conover (Hamilton Co) 59 Ohio App
361, 11 Ohio Ops 565, 26 Ohio L Abs 593, 18 NE2d 277.
Forms: Instruction to jury on right of officer to make arrest without warrant for breach of
peace within hearing of officer. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment,
Form 106.
84 Probable cause justifying arrest [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Probable cause is a complete defense to actions for false arrest 99 and false
imprisonment, 1 so that when probable cause is established, as a matter of law, false
arrest and false imprisonment claims must necessarily fail. 2 It is said that the test for
probable cause for the arrest and prosecution of an individual who later brings a claim of
false imprisonment is an objective one, based not on the individual's actual guilt, but
upon the existence of credible facts or information that would induce a person of ordinary
caution to believe the accused to be guilty. 3 A defendant in a false arrest action who has
established probable cause for the challenged arrest has no additional obligation to
establish his or her good faith in order to raise a valid defense; 4 even malicious motives
will not support a claim if probable cause is found to exist. 5
Practice guide: The defendant has the burden of pleading and proving the defense of
probable cause. 6
Footnotes
Footnote 99. Graebe v Falcetta (ED NY) 726 F Supp 36, affd without op (CA2 NY) 946
F2d 883 (applying New York law); O'Leary v Luongo (ND Ill) 692 F Supp 893, later
proceeding (ND Ill) 1989 US Dist LEXIS 1979; LeGrand v Dean (Fla App D5) 564 So
2d 510, 15 FLW D 1489, review den (Fla) 576 So 2d 288, costs/fees proceeding (Fla App
D5) 598 So 2d 218, 17 FLW D 1171.
Footnote 1. Marx v Gumbinner (SD Fla) 716 F Supp 1434, affd (CA11 Fla) 905 F2d
1503 (applying Florida law); Johnson v Morris (Minn) 453 NW2d 31, later proceeding
(Minn) 1990 Minn LEXIS 118.
Footnote 2. Hanson v Snohomish, 121 Wash 2d 552, 852 P2d 295 (in an action brought
by an individual whose criminal convictions were reversed, the false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution claims were defeated by existence of probable cause, an issue
conclusively resolved in the underlying criminal case).
There was probable cause for arrest for burglary and attempted sexual battery, where the
arresting detective was, at most, guilty of poor judgment in conduct of the investigation
and the arrestee was identified by the victim as the assailant. Lee v Geiger (Fla App D1)
419 So 2d 717, petition den (Fla) 429 So 2d 5.
An arrest based on probable cause is justified, regardless of whether the person arrested
was guilty or not. Renk v City of Pittsburgh (Pa) 641 A2d 289, digest op at (Pa) 17 PLW
225.
As to probable cause for warrantless arrests, generally, see 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest 39-46.
Footnote 4. Welch v District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 578 A2d 175
Footnote 6. Consolidated Sales Co. v Malone (Ky) 530 SW2d 680.
85 Truth of charge [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
If an imprisonment is claimed to have been illegal because the plaintiff was arrested
without a warrant and without probable cause, a plea of guilty to the offense charged or
conviction thereof upon trial may well be held conclusive as to the existence of probable
cause. 7 However, if the ground of the action is not the want of probable cause for the
arrest, but the violation of the law or the exceeding of its authority in some other respect,
the conviction of the prisoner may not be conclusive or even material on the issue, since
one may be guilty of some crime and yet be entitled to redress for illegal imprisonment in
the course of the prosecution therefor. 8
Footnotes
Footnote 7. Erie R. Co. v Reigherd (CA6 Ohio) 166 F 247, 7 Ohiolr 485.
Footnote 8. McCullough v Greenfield, 133 Mich 463, 95 NW 532.
86 Proof of different offense [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

Generally, a person unlawfully arresting another for one offense cannot, when sued for
false imprisonment, justify the arrest on the ground that the one arrested was guilty of
some other offense for which the arrest, under the circumstances, would have been legal,
or because reasonable grounds existed for an arrest for such other offense. 9 However,
the fact that the individual arrested is not tried on the original charge and is later acquitted
on a lesser charge is not relevant in the subsequent false arrest or false imprisonment
case. 10
Where probable cause is lacking to arrest the individual on the announced charge, but
probable cause does exist to believe the individual committed a different offense
proffered by the defense after the fact, the defendant can avoid liability if the
consequences to the individual would have been substantially as unfavorable if the person
had been arrested on the charge on which the defense seeks to rely after the fact. 11
If an arrest is made for several offenses, justification as to one of the offenses charged
will constitute a good defense. 12
Footnotes
Footnote 9. Santiago v Fenton (CA1 Mass) 891 F2d 373; Harrer v Montgomery Ward &
Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428; McNeff v Heider, 216 Or 583, 337 P2d 819, reh den
216 Or 594, 340 P2d 180.
Police officer would not have statutory immunity from suit for false arrest if officer,
while having probable cause to arrest for one act, arrested a person for a separate act as to
which no probable cause existed. Santiago v Fenton (CA1 Mass) 891 F2d 373 (applying
Massachusetts law).
One who mistakenly arrests another on the ground that he has a stolen automobile in his
possession cannot justify the arrest upon the ground that he discovered after the arrest
that the car bore license plates issued for another car. Noe v Meadows, 229 Ky 53, 16
SW2d 505, 64 ALR 648.
Where plaintiff was arrested for disorderly conduct, the fact that defendants could have
arrested him for illegal parking, or other offenses, would not justify his arrest on the
charge of disorderly conduct. Donovan v Guy, 347 Mich 457, 80 NW2d 190.
Although two offenses are intimately associated in time and place, the arrest for one
offense cannot be justified by proof of another separate and distinct offense. Comisky v
Norfolk & W. R. Co., 79 W Va 148, 90 SE 385.
Footnote 10. Darrow v Schumacher (SD) 495 NW2d 511.
Footnote 12. Sima v Skaggs Payless Drug Ctr., 82 Idaho 387, 353 P2d 1085; Noe v
Meadows, 229 Ky 53, 16 SW2d 505, 64 ALR 648; Donovan v Guy, 347 Mich 457, 80
NW2d 190.
d. Justification By Legal Process [87-97]

(1). In General [87-89]
An arrest or commitment by virtue of process which is regular and legal in form, duly
issued by a court, magistrate, or body having authority to issue it, and executed in a
lawful manner, does not constitute false arrest or imprisonment. 13 Valid process is a
complete justification for the acts done under it and in compliance with it. 14 Thus, an
arrest warrant protects the person who sued it out; 15 if the complaint and supporting
evidence contain sufficient facts to present a judicial question to the magistrate as to
whether they show a certain criminal offense, and that question is decided by the
magistrate in favor of issuing the requested warrant, the prosecuting complainant is
protected by the decision. 16 Under such circumstances, the complainant is not liable
for false imprisonment because of any subsequent act or omission of the officer in
executing the warrant whereby the arrest is rendered illegal, 17 such as the arrest by the
officer of the wrong person. 18
However, where an affiant falsely and maliciously misstates the facts and procures
warrant to be issued, he or she is responsible for arrest. 19 One may also be liable in
false imprisonment if one is guilty of officious interference or of a participation in the
issuance and execution of the warrant beyond the mere making of the complaint. 20
Finally, liability for false arrest may also arise where the offense charged is no crime at
all, 21 as where it amounts to only a civil injury. 22
False imprisonment claims may be precluded by grand jury indictments, raising a
presumption of arrest with probable cause; 23 a judgment of conviction; 24 a properly
issued order for a body attachment; 25 or a bench warrant for contempt citation based
on violation of an order incorporating a marital settlement agreement. 26
Footnotes
Footnote 13. Fletcher v McMahon, 73 App DC 263, 121 F2d 729, cert den 314 US 662,
86 L Ed 531, 62 S Ct 131; Stubbs v Abercrombie, 42 Cal App 170, 183 P 458; Clewley v
Brown, Thomson, Inc., 120 Conn 440, 181 A 531; Waters v Winn, 142 Ga 138, 82 SE
537 (criticized on other grounds in Smith v Embry, 103 Ga App 375, 119 SE2d 45); Rush
v Buckley, 100 Me 322, 61 A 774.
The tort of false arrest requires that the plaintiff prove that the arrest was made without
any legal process or warrant or under a warrant null and void on its face. Duboue v City
of New Orleans (CA5 La) 909 F2d 129, cert den 499 US 922, 113 L Ed 2d 247, 111 S
Ct 1314.
Footnote 14. Schneider v Kessler (CA3 NJ) 97 F2d 542; Martin v Sanford, 129 Neb 212,
261 NW 136, 100 ALR 179; James v Southwestern Ins. Co. (Okla) 354 P2d 408;
Thomas v Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 SC 95, 113 SE2d 337.
Footnote 15. Gogue v MacDonald, 35 Cal 2d 482, 218 P2d 542, 21 ALR2d 639; Feld v
Loftis, 240 Ill 105, 88 NE 281; Vittorio v St. Regis Paper Co., 239 NY 148, 145 NE 913;
Click v Parish (Hardin Co) 89 Ohio App 318, 46 Ohio Ops 38, 60 Ohio L Abs 169, 98
NE2d 333, affd 155 Ohio St 84, 44 Ohio Ops 96, 98 NE2d 293.
As to liability for false arrest or imprisonment of complainants in a criminal prosecution
or parties in a civil action generally, see 46, 155.
False imprisonment: liability of private citizen for false arrest by officer, 21 ALR2d 643.
Footnote 16. Traversara v Pinelli (Sup) 140 NYS2d 559.
A warrant issued by a court, unless utterly void, is a complete defense to an action for
false imprisonment. McFarland v Shirkey (Franklin Co) 106 Ohio App 517, 7 Ohio Ops
2d 309, 78 Ohio L Abs 129, 151 NE2d 797, application den (Franklin Co) 106 Ohio App
527, 7 Ohio Ops 2d 314, 155 NE2d 468 and motion overr (Franklin Co) 106 Ohio App
527, 7 Ohio Ops 2d 314, 155 NE2d 925 and app dismd for want of debat q 168 Ohio St
288, 6 Ohio Ops 2d 490, 154 NE2d 83.
In suit against employer and agent for false imprisonment after plaintiff was arrested and
jailed upon defective criminal complaint filed by agent, where record revealed that
plaintiff's arrest was made by officers acting under warrant emanating from justice of the
peace who had authority to issue same, defendants could not be charged with false
imprisonment merely because agent signed complaint at direction of justice after he had
made full disclosure of facts. Sparkman v Peoples Nat'l Bank (Tex Civ App Tyler) 501
SW2d 739, writ ref n r e (Feb 27, 1974) and rehg of writ of error overr (Apr 3, 1974).
Footnote 17. Burlington Transp. Co. v Josephson (CA8 SD) 153 F2d 372; McIntosh v
Bullard, Earnhart & Magness, 95 Ark 227, 129 SW 85.
Footnote 18. Gearon v Bank for Savings, etc., 50 NY Super Ct 264; Stork v Evert (Lucas
Co) 47 Ohio App 256, 15 Ohio L Abs 701, 191 NE 794.
The complaining witness in a criminal action is not liable for mistaken identity by public
officers in charge of the prosecution. Nicholson v Roop (ND) 62 NW2d 473, 43 ALR2d
1031.
As to police officer's liability for arrest of wrong person, see 95.
Annotation: Liability for false arrest or imprisonment under warrant as affected by
mistake as to identity of person arrested, 39 ALR4th 705.
Footnote 19. Earl v Winne, 14 NJ 119, 101 A2d 535.
Misconduct in procurement of the warrant is not cured by the magistrate's acceptance of
the warrant affidavit. Olson v Tyler (CA7 Wis) 771 F2d 277, later proceeding (CA7 Wis)
825 F2d 1116.
Footnote 20. Holloway v Central of G. R. Co., 114 Ga 353, 40 SE 227 (holding defendant
liable where proper warrant had been issued locally but defendant had, with authority of
local police, secured plaintiff's arrest without warrant by communicating with distant
police); Kearley v Cowan, 217 Ala 295, 116 So 145; Smith v Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P
653; Williamson v Glen Alum Coal Co., 72 W Va 288, 78 SE 94.
Footnote 21. Jones v Perry, 128 Misc 263, 219 NYS 295.
Footnote 22. Caudle v Benbow, 228 NC 282, 45 SE2d 361.
Footnote 23. Bernard v United States (CA2 NY) 25 F3d 98.
Footnote 24. Pete v Metcalfe (CA5 Tex) 8 F3d 214; Hanson v Snohomish, 121 Wash 2d
552, 852 P2d 295.
Footnote 26. Dozier v Dozier, 252 Kan 1035, 850 P2d 789.
88 Arrest on civil process [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Where a party seeks the arrest of another on civil process, and the magistrate, having
jurisdiction to pass on the sufficiency of the affidavit, determines on such evidence that it
is sufficient and issues the warrant, the party who invokes the decision is not answerable
in damages for false imprisonment if the magistrate errs in judgment. 27 However, it
has been held that whether the magistrate has jurisdiction must be determined from the
affidavit itself and not from what the magistrate thinks it authorizes, and where there is
no jurisdiction in fact, the order of arrest is void. Hence, it is held that the plaintiff must
see to it that the magistrate is clothed with actual, not merely apparent, authority before
depriving the defendant of liberty. 28 It follows, under this view, that the affidavit must
state sufficient facts to show jurisdiction in the court issuing the order for the arrest. 29
Thus, where the statute forbids imprisonment for debt, 30 or prohibits the arrest of
certain persons under any state of facts, the magistrate cannot acquire jurisdiction to issue
a warrant for such an arrest; and the party applying for it is liable for any wrongful
imprisonment that may follow. 31
Footnotes
Footnote 27. Nelson v Kellogg, 162 Cal 621, 123 P 1115; Feld v Loftis, 240 Ill 105, 88
NE 281; Jastram v McAuslan, 31 RI 278, 76 A 648.
ALR2d 643 13.
Footnote 28. Fkumoto v Marsh, 130 Cal 66, 62 P 303, reh den 130 Cal 71, 62 P 509.
Footnote 29. Neves v Costa, 5 Cal App 111, 89 P 860; Hauss v Kohlar, 25 Kan 640.
Footnote 30. Dallas v Garras, 306 Mich 313, 10 NW2d 897.
But see Dozier v Dozier, 252 Kan 1035, 850 P2d 789 (a bench warrant and resultant
arrest, issued after a finding of contempt and failed service, upon debtor's failure to make
the required payment against an alimony judgment, was not imprisonment for debt; the
parties' contractual agreement for the alimony obligation was merged into the judgment,
which was enforceable by the contempt sanction, by arrest and by imprisonment).
Footnote 31. Nelson v Kellogg, 162 Cal 621, 123 P 1115.
89 Warrant of commitment [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A warrant of commitment protects the officer who takes the person into custody under it
32 and the keeper of the place of incarceration. 33
Footnotes
86 L Ed 531, 62 S Ct 131; Smith v Fish, 182 Ark 115, 30 SW2d 223 (sheriff and
bondsman); Berger v Seneca Falls, 3 Misc 2d 647, 151 NYS2d 133; Langen v
Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622.
86 L Ed 531, 62 S Ct 131; Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR
622.
Individual whose commitment was accomplished through legally correct procedures and
was pursuant to the order of commitment which was in no respect invalid, on its face or
otherwise, could not recover from the state for alleged false imprisonment. Lauer v State
(3d Dept) 57 App Div 2d 673, 393 NYS2d 813.
(2). Action of Officers Under Process [90-97]

(a). In General [90-92]
90 Generally; process valid or fair on its face [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
An officer is protected and justified in executing process fair on its facethat is, process
that is issued by a court, magistrate, or body having authority of law to issue process of
that nature, is legal in form, and contains nothing to notify or fairly apprise the officer
that it is issued without authority. 34 When a police officer, acting in good faith, obtains
a warrant and acts within its scope, there is no official misconduct, even if the arrest turns
out to be unlawful. 35 Thus, if the process is fair on its face it does not matter that it is
irregular, and voidable for such irregularity. 36 The officer to whom such process is
issued is not required at his or her peril to look behind it, 37 and liability of the officer
may not be predicated on defects in the proceedings leading up to its issuance. 38 the
officer is protected from liability even though it should subsequently appear that the
process was erroneously or improvidently issued. 39 Officers whose conduct in the
execution of the warrant is nearly perfect are not charged with liability for relatively
minor and technical discrepancies in the warrant, 40 nor will controversy concerning the
circumstances of the issuance of the process necessarily impugn the efficacy of the
warrant itself. 41 Thus, a warrant is sufficient to confer immunity so long as there is
jurisdiction over the person and the offense named in the warrant, even if the warrant was
issued erroneously, and a warrant which is merely rubber-stamped with the signature of
the issuing authority is valid to confer the immunity allowed for validly issued process.
42 Similarly, an arrest pursuant a body attachment is legally justified, despite errors in
the circumstances underlying its issuance, where those errors are not attributable to the
party executing the process. 43
If the court has apparent jurisdictionthat is, if it has general jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the process is fair on its facethe officer incurs no liability in executing such
process, although the court does not have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. 44
Thus, it is generally held that if a warrant is fair on its face an officer cannot be held
liable for taking the defendant into custody thereunder, though it is issued in a proceeding
under an unconstitutional statute 45 or an invalid ordinance. 46 There is, however,
some authority to the contrary. 47
Footnotes
86 L Ed 531, 62 S Ct 131; Phillips v Morrow, 213 Ala 139, 104 So 260, 40 ALR 285;
Crawford v Huber, 215 Mich 564, 184 NW 594, 39 ALR 1392; Hoppe v Klapperich, 224
Minn 224, 28 NW2d 780, 173 ALR 819; Zeitinger v Mitchell (Mo) 244 SW2d 91; Pate v
Stevens (Tex Civ App) 257 SW2d 763, writ dism w o j.
An arrest pursuant to a validly issued arrest warrant insulated the officer from liability.
Pete v Metcalfe (CA5 Tex) 8 F3d 214.
Where an arrest is made under authority of a properly issued warrant, the arrest is simply
not a false arrest. Thomas v Sams (CA5 Tex) 734 F2d 185, reh den (CA5 Tex) 741 F2d
A facially valid warrant immunizes an officer who acted in an objectively reasonable
manner in securing the warrant. Olson v Tyler (CA7 Wis) 771 F2d 277, later proceeding
(CA7 Wis) 825 F2d 1116.
When a warrant, valid in form and issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, is placed
in the hands of an officer for execution, it is his duty to carry out its demands without
delay, and he incurs no liability for its proper execution, however disastrous may be the
effect on the person against whom it is issued. Barrier v Alexander, 100 Cal App 2d 497,
224 P2d 436.
Forms: Answer alleging defense that arrest was made under warrant fair on its face. 10
Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 74.
Instruction to juryOfficer not liable for proper arrest under valid process. 10 Am Jur Pl
& Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 77.
Footnote 35. Olson v Tyler (CA7 Wis) 771 F2d 277, later proceeding (CA7 Wis) 825 F2d
1116; Rustici v Weidemeyer (Mo) 673 SW2d 762; Nelson v Las Vegas, 99 Nev 548, 665
P2d 1141.
Footnote 36. Robinette v Price, 214 Minn 521, 8 NW2d 800; Pate v Stevens (Tex Civ
App) 257 SW2d 763, writ dism w o j.
A warrant issued by a judge in one county for arrest for a crime committed in another
county is not void on its face so as to afford no protection to the officer executing it
because it was made returnable before the issuing judge, when, by statute, it should have
been made returnable in the county where the crime was committed. Phillips v Morrow,
213 Ala 139, 104 So 260, 40 ALR 285.
Footnote 37. Burlingame v Traeger, 101 Cal App 365, 281 P 1051; Stine v Shuttle, 134
Ind App 67, 186 NE2d 168 (ovrld on other grounds as stated in Seymour Nat'l Bank v
State (Ind App) 384 NE2d 1177); Rush v Buckley, 100 Me 322, 61 A 774; Horton v
Chamberlain, 152 Vt 351, 566 A2d 953.
A police officer must use reasonable prudence and diligence to determine whether a party
being arrested is the one described in the warrant. Nonetheless, it is not the function of
an arresting officer to investigate the procedure by which the warrant was issued, nor is it
the officer's duty to consider the propriety of its issuance provided the warrant is regular
on its face. Lopez v City of Oxnard (2nd Dist) 207 Cal App 3d 1, 254 Cal Rptr 556.
An officer has the right to assume that the court which issued a warrant acted within its
authority. De Witt v Thompson, 192 Miss 615, 7 So 2d 529.
Footnote 38. Jackson v Osborn, 116 Cal App 2d 875, 254 P2d 871.
Footnote 39. Nastasi v State, 275 App Div 524, 90 NYS2d 377, affd 300 NY 473, 88
NE2d 658.
Footnote 40. Arnsberg v United States (1985, CA9 Or) 757 F2d 971, cert den 475 US
1010, 89 L Ed 2d 300, 106 S Ct 1183.
Footnote 41. Goodwin v Barry Miller Chevrolet, Inc. (Ala) 543 So 2d 1171.
A sheriff cannot be made liable for the execution of a warrant in a legal manner, even if
he personally knows the jurisdictional defects in a preliminary proceeding pursuant to
which the warrant was issued. Hoppe v Klapperich, 224 Minn 224, 28 NW2d 780, 173
ALR 819.
Footnote 42. Nelson v Las Vegas, 99 Nev 548, 665 P2d 1141.
Footnote 43. Nooner v Pillsbury Co. (CA8 Mo) 840 F2d 560.
Footnote 44. Rush v Buckley, 100 Me 322, 61 A 774; Brown v Hadwin, 182 Mich 491,
148 NW 693; Whaley v Lawton, 62 SC 91, 40 SE 128.
Officers are entitled to rely on a justice of the peace's representation that the justice has
the authority to sign a warrant. If the defects in the warrant make it voidable but not
void, the arresting officer can rely on the warrant and render the arrest "justified" for
purposes of a false imprisonment claim. Moody v McElroy (RI) 513 A2d 5.
Footnote 45. Yekhtikian v Blessing, 90 RI 287, 157 A2d 669.
Footnote 46. See Rush v Buckley, 100 Me 322, 61 A 774 (the invalidity of an ordinance
under which a magistrate acts in issuing a warrant for the arrest of an accused will not
render the officer who serves it liable for false imprisonment, where the magistrate has
general jurisdiction over the subject matter and the process is not void on its face).
Footnote 47. Coleman v Mitnick, 137 Ind App 125, 202 NE2d 577, 16 ALR3d 527, reh
den 137 Ind App 133, 203 NE2d 834, 16 ALR3d 533.
As to municipal liability for issuance of a warrant of arrest for violation of an invalid

ordinance, see 57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability 208.
91 Conduct of officer seeking warrant [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
When the same officer provides the information to obtain a warrant and then executes the
warrant, the officer is in a position to control the flow of information to the magistrate on
which the probable cause determination is made; so an officer who knowingly withholds
facts in order to obtain a warrant may not assert the facial validity of the warrant as an
absolute defense; that officer must prove to the jury's satisfaction the existence of
probable cause to arrest under the circumstances. 48
Footnotes
Footnote 48. Bender v Seattle, 99 Wash 2d 582, 664 P2d 492, 9 Media L R 2101.
A warrant is not an impenetrable barrier to impeachment of an affidavit supporting the
warrant application; if an officer submits an affidavit with statements known to be false
or submitted with a reckless disregard for truth and no accurate information sufficient to
constitute probable cause, the officer's conduct is the active cause of the legal arrest and
the officer has not acted in an objectively reasonable manner. Olson v Tyler (CA7 Wis)
771 F2d 277, later proceeding (CA7 Wis) 825 F2d 1116.
92 Warrant defective on its face [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
An arrest pursuant to a warrant which is defective on its face is actionable. 49 A police
officer, like all other persons, is presumed to know the law, or held liable as if he or she
did know it; and if the process on which he or she relies is void on its face, it affords no
protection. 50 An officer is charged with knowledge of the superficial requirements of a
valid warrant, 51 and an arrest is unlawful if based on a void judgment, 52 or a warrant
for which there is no subject matter jurisdiction. 53 Thus, a warrant which recites facts
which do not constitute a crime cannot justify an arrest pursuant to such warrant. 54 In
determining whether a writ or warrant is obviously defective and void on its face, a
distinction is sometimes drawn between courts of general and courts of limited
jurisdiction, and it has been ruled that, to be valid, a warrant issued by a magistrate or
officer of limited jurisdiction must show on its face that there was jurisdiction of the
subject matter, the person, and the process. 55
An arrest warrant which does not specify the amount of bail, the offense, or the basis for
plaintiff's arrest, but which rather simply states that plaintiff is to be arrested and brought
before the court for the purpose of setting bail, is not regular on its face within the
meaning of a statute immunizing a peace officer from liability for making an arrest
pursuant to a warrant of arrest regular on its face. 56
Footnotes
Footnote 49. Thompson v Olson (CA1 Me) 798 F2d 552, cert den 480 US 908, 94 L Ed
2d 524, 107 S Ct 1354.
stated in Seymour Nat'l Bank v State (Ind App) 384 NE2d 1177); Folsom v Fisco, 62
Mont 194, 204 P 367; Brinkman v Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St 171, 119 NE 451; Goodell v
Tower, 77 Vt 61, 58 A 790; Winters v Campbell, 148 W Va 710, 137 SE2d 188.
Forms: Complaint alleging arrest by officer under void process. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr
Footnote 52. Houghton v Foremost Financial Services Corp. (CA10 Okla) 724 F2d 112.
Footnote 53. Rush v Buckley, 100 Me 322, 61 A 774; Brinkman v Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio
St 171, 119 NE 451.
One who secures a warrant from a court whose jurisdiction does not extend to the offense
charged, the absence of jurisdiction being clear and not the subject of judicial decision in
the case, is liable for the resulting arrest. Coffee v Peterbilt of Nashville, Inc. (Tenn) 795
SW2d 656.
Footnote 54. Crawford v Huber, 215 Mich 564, 184 NW 594, 39 ALR 1392 (warrant
issued under statute providing only civil remedy); Williamson v Glen Alum Coal Co., 72
W Va 288, 78 SE 94.
Footnote 55. Burke v New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (CA2 NY) 267 F2d 894.
Where record clearly showed that town justice possessed requisite jurisdiction to issue
bench warrants for arrest of claimant upon his failure to appear for trial and order of
commitment which were valid on their face, there could be no liability on part of State
for actions of state officers for alleged false arrest and imprisonment of claimant.
Jemzura v State (3d Dept) 53 App Div 2d 929, 385 NYS2d 196.
Footnote 56. Allison v County of Ventura (2nd Dist) 68 Cal App 3d 689, 137 Cal Rptr
542.
(b). Effect of Improper Procedure by Officer in Execution of Warrant [93-97]

An officer who acts in an illegal or unauthorized manner in executing a warrant is liable
to the person named, even though the writ is valid, 57 and the officer believes that his or
her action is within the scope of the writ. 58 Thus, while a reasonable surveillance and
restraint of a person whose premises are being searched is not false imprisonment, 59 an
officer who, while executing a search warrant, wrongfully imprisons the owner of the
premises being searched, is liable for false imprisonment. 60 An officer may be liable to
the person against whom valid process is executed for failure to make the regular written
return to the court of the fact of service. 61
Process, though fair on its face, affords the arresting officer no protection where the
officer is a party or is a complainant in causing the process to be wrongfully issued solely
for his or her own benefit. 62 Similarly, if the officer uses, or permits the complainant to
use, the imprisonment as a means of extorting money or other things from the prisoner, or
unwarrantably to intimidate or oppress, the process is no protection. 63
The initial privilege of arrest can expire, and justification can end; 64 and imprisonment
following arrest can become unlawful even if an arrest is made pursuant to valid legal
process and is thus itself unactionable. 65 Thus, liability may also be imposed upon an
officer for unreasonable delay in taking his prisoner before a magistrate or denying him
the opportunity to give bail, regardless of the fact that the officer was acting under a valid
warrant. 66
Footnotes
Footnote 57. Schreiner v Hutter, 104 Neb 539, 177 NW 826; Leger v Warren, 62 Ohio St
500, 57 NE 506; Gibson v Holmes, 78 Vt 110, 62 A 11.
The finding of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant will not necessarily
preclude action against the officer involved in the execution of the warrant. Leslie v
Ingram (CA11 Fla) 786 F2d 1533.
Footnote 58. Gomez v Scanlan, 2 Cal App 579, 84 P 50, affd 155 Cal 528, 102 P 12.
1 (holding that otherwise such party could secrete or destroy item searched for and so
defeat purpose of search).
Footnote 61. Gibson v Holmes, 78 Vt 110, 62 A 11.
Footnote 62. Hoppe v Klapperich, 224 Minn 224, 28 NW2d 780, 173 ALR 819.
Footnote 63. McClenny v Inverarity, 80 Kan 569, 103 P 82.
573 NE2d 633.
Footnote 65. Nelson v Las Vegas, 99 Nev 548, 665 P2d 1141.
94 Failure to possess or produce process or state contents [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE

IMPRISONMENT]
A warrant or other process has been held to be no protection to an arresting officer where
there is a duty to produce it or state its contents and the officer does not do so. 67
However, a known or regular officer is not liable for failure to produce or state the
contents of process which the officer has, where the persons arrested know the charge 68
or where the person arrested precludes learning the charge by the arrestee's conduct in
immediately resisting the officer. 69
An officer may be required to have a warrant in his or her possession in order to take
advantage of the defense of justification. 70
Footnotes
Footnote 67. Anderson v Foster, 73 Idaho 340, 252 P2d 199; Crosswhite v Barnes, 139
Va 471, 124 SE 242, 40 ALR 54.
As to duty of officer to produce warrant, see 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest 95.
Footnote 68. Martin v Sanford, 129 Neb 212, 261 NW 136, 100 ALR 179.
Footnote 69. Tuck v Beliles, 153 Ky 848, 156 SW 883.
Footnote 70. Rustici v Weidemeyer (Mo) 673 SW2d 762 (trial court erred in directing
verdict in favor of police officer on false arrest claim where officer did not possess
warrant at time of arrest).
95 Arrest of wrong person [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The obligation of an officer in executing a warrant of arrest has been said to be twofold:
to apprehend the person named in the warrant, and to avoid interfering with one not
involved. 71 It has been held that an officer who arrests the wrong person will be liable
for false imprisonment at the suit of the person taken into custody, even though the name
of the person arrested is the same as or similar to the name in the warrant, unless the
arrest be upon the representation of the person taken that he or she is the person named,
or upon other conduct of the person arrested leading the arresting officer to believe that
he or she is the person intended by the warrant. 72 On the other hand, the view is more
often taken that the good faith of the arresting officer and his reasonable care in
ascertaining the identity of the person arrested with the one named in the warrant are the
test of his liability. 73 Under this view, the officer will not be liable for false
imprisonment for mistaking the identity of the person named in a warrant of arrest if the
officer exercises reasonable diligence and care in ascertaining the identity before serving
the warrant. 74 The officer is liable, however, for failure to take proper precautions to
ascertain the right person, if he or she refuses information offered that would have
disclosed the mistake, or if the officer detains the person an undue length of time without
taking proper steps to establish identity. 75
Officers are generally found to be immune from liability for arrest of the wrong person if
there is a good-faith belief that the officer is arresting the correct person and similarities
of the parties support that belief; 76 if the error is caused by reasonable reliance on
information supplied to the officer; 77 if the erroneous arrest is based upon the similarity
of names and other factors, 78 or if the officer justifiably relies on the description of the
suspect which is set out on the warrant. 79 An arrestee establishes a prima facie case of
false imprisonment by simply showing that the arrestee was not the person named in the
warrant and the arrest is not privileged unless the arresting officer can show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the officer acted reasonably, both subjectively and
objectively, in good faith and with due diligence in determining whether the person
arrested was the one specified in the warrant. 80 If the person named in the warrant is
arrested, the officer is justified, although the wrong name was inserted by mistake. 81 It
is a question for the jury whether an officer used due diligence and reasonably believed
that the plaintiff was the person intended by the warrant. 82
Where, from the description furnished, a police officer has reason to believe that the
person arrested is the one sought upon a warrant, the officer will be exonerated from
liability for arresting and detaining the person until identity can be ascertained, 83
although other aspects of the detention during that period of time, such as an
unwarrantedly intrusive search, may themselves be a basis for liability. 84
In some cases, the acts of the arrested person may be held to have constituted inducement
of or consent to the arrest; 85 however, a claimant's peaceful accompaniment of the
officers without resisting arrest has been held not to indicate consent to a false arrest and
imprisonment. 86
The United States Supreme Court has held that a claim against a sheriff resulting from
incarceration of the wrong person due to mistaken identification is not cognizable under
the federal statute imposing civil liability on any person who, under color of state law,
deprives another of rights secured by "the Constitution and laws", 87 the court stating
that false imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for
which liability may be imposed under that statute merely because the defendant is a state
official. 88
Footnotes
Footnote 71. Wallner v Fidelity & Deposit Co., 253 Wis 66, 33 NW2d 215, 10 ALR2d
745.
Footnote 72. Jordan v C. I. T. Corp., 302 Mass 281, 19 NE2d 5; Stork v Evert (Lucas Co)
47 Ohio App 256, 15 Ohio L Abs 701, 191 NE 794.
As to recovery of damages against a peace officer for the act of his deputy in arresting the
wrong person by mistake, see 70 Am Jur 2d, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables 273.
Forms: Complaint for false imprisonment based on arrest under warrant directing arrest
of another person. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 72.
Footnote 73. Mildon v Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P2d 458; White v Jansen, 81 Wash
435, 142 P 1140.
Police chief was not responsible for the false imprisonment of the plaintiff, who was seen
driving a truck matching the description of the suspect's, and who bore a remarkable
facial resemblance to the suspect. Gero v Henault (CA1 Mass) 740 F2d 78, cert den 469
US 1191, 83 L Ed 2d 970, 105 S Ct 965.
Police officers who arrested plaintiff under a warrant that sought another man but
accurately described the plaintiff and included his proper name, address, telephone
number and driver's license were not liable for the arrest even though the same mistake
had been made before; the sheriff was entitled to rely on a warrant valid on its face
despite refusal to consider other information that the plaintiff was not the person sought.
Lopez v City of Oxnard (2nd Dist) 207 Cal App 3d 1, 254 Cal Rptr 556.
Police were immune from liability where the warrant clearly identified the plaintiff rather
than the actual offender, and the address on the warrant was the same as the plaintiff's
address. Dugger v Off 2nd, Inc. (Ky App) 612 SW2d 756.
An officer must act prudently, reasonably, and use ordinary care in making arrests,
including the ascertainment that the right person is being arrested. State ex rel. Anderson
v Evatt, 63 Tenn App 322, 471 SW2d 949.
Forms: AnswerDefenseOfficer's good faith and reasonable care in mistaken identity
arrest under warrant. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 75.
Probable cause of officer in mistaken-identity arrest under John Doe warrant. 10 Am
Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Arrest, Form 76.
Instruction to juryProbable cause of officer in mistaken identity arrest under John Doe
warrant. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Arrest, Form 78.
Footnote 74. Mildon v Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P2d 458.
Arresting officer, acting in good faith, must either have probable cause to assume that he
is arresting person named in warrant, or he must exercise reasonable diligence to satisfy
himself that he has placed the proper person under arrest. Maracle v State, 50 Misc 2d
348, 270 NYS2d 439 (holding state of New York liable).
Footnote 75. Smith v Madruga (1st Dist) 193 Cal App 2d 543, 14 Cal Rptr 389; Maracle
v State, 50 Misc 2d 348, 270 NYS2d 439; Mildon v Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P2d
458; Wallner v Fidelity & Deposit Co., 253 Wis 66, 33 NW2d 215, 10 ALR2d 745.
Officer must act prudently, reasonably, and with ordinary care in making arrests;
including ascertainment that right person is being arrested; and arrest of plaintiff pursuant
to warrant charging person of same name and middle initial with abandonment of
children ages 3 to 6 in state of Georgia was not reasonable where warrant contained two
addresses, sheriff's office permitted middle initial to replace middle name on warrant,
plaintiff arrested was 65 years old, woman present identified herself as his wife, and
plaintiff insisted he was not right man and told officers he had never lived in Georgia but
had lived in same residence for more than 30 years. State ex rel. Anderson v Evatt, 63
Tenn App 322, 471 SW2d 949.
Footnote 76. Blackwell v Barton (CA5 Tex) 34 F3d 298.
Footnote 77. Scott v District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 493 A2d 319 (computergenerated printout of warrant information).
Footnote 78. Guffey v State, 103 Wash 2d 144, 690 P2d 1163 (ovrld in part on other
grounds as stated in Savage v State (Wash) 899 P2d 1270).
Footnote 80. Pierson v Multnomah County, 301 Or 48, 718 P2d 738 (officer's arrest of
the plaintiff on a warrant for plaintiff's twin brother presented a jury question on
adequacy of identification in the warrant and reasonableness of the officer's conduct, and
the jury exoneration of the officer was proper).
Footnote 81. Blocker v Clark, 126 Ga 484, 54 SE 1022.
The warrant named the person to be arrested at the correct address; the officer arrested
that person and was immune from suit, even though that person turned out not to be the
person who was accused of the crime described in the warrant. Davis v Syracuse, 66
NY2d 840, 498 NYS2d 355, 489 NE2d 242.
Footnote 82. Craner v Corbett (4th Dep't) 27 App Div 2d 796, 279 NYS2d 135.
Summary judgment dismissing complaint against city and one of its police officers for
false arrest was erroneous, where plaintiff was brought to attention of arresting officers
solely due to his stage name being same as alias used by person named in arrest warrant,
plaintiff offered to prove his identity immediately upon being presented with warrant, and
police officers did not consider any of proffered identification when making arrest; jury
might have reasonably concluded either that officers' belief that they were actually
arresting person named in warrant was reasonable or that belief was not reasonable.
Robinson v San Francisco (1st Dist) 41 Cal App 3d 334, 116 Cal Rptr 125.
In an action against two police officers for false arrest, there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether defendants exercised due care in determining whether plaintiff
was the person named in the warrant, and summary judgment was improperly entered for
defendants, where the arrest warrant directed defendants to arrest "Bernard Jackson" for
the crime of selling heroin; plaintiff's name is Clarence Bernard Robinson and nothing in
the record suggests that he was known by any other name; even if defendants can show
that a confidential informant who told one defendant that "Bernard Jackson" lived at
plaintiff's address was reliable, such defendant's affidavit shows that when the officers
went to the address they were informed that Clarence Bernard Robinson was the only
black male who lived there; defendant's affidavits asserted that an SBI agent who
purchased the heroin in question identified a photograph of plaintiff and later identified
plaintiff himself as the person from whom the purchase was made, but the SBI agent's
affidavit was to the effect that he never positively identified either the photograph or the
plaintiff as the heroin seller; and it was unconstructed that even after defendants knew
that they had arrested the wrong person, plaintiff was still held in jail overnight before he
was allowed to go free. Robinson v Winston-Salem, 34 NC App 401, 238 SE2d 628.
Peace officer will not necessarily be held liable for mistaking identity of person named in
warrant of arrest, but this is true only if he has exercised reasonable diligence and care in
ascertaining identity before he serves warrant; where at time officer accosted plaintiff,
latter was conducting himself peaceably and there was nothing to give rise to any
suspicion that he was then involved in or had any connection with a transgression of law,
and there is no indication in record that defendant officer asked any of several persons
standing near plaintiff whether plaintiff was person named in warrant, question of
diligence should have been submitted to jury. Mildon v Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P2d
458.
Footnote 83. Kittredge v Frothingham, 114 Me 537, 96 A 1063.
Footnote 84. Fricker v Stokes, 22 Ohio St 3d 202, 22 Ohio BR 354, 490 NE2d 577.
Footnote 85. See Driskell v Alfano (2d Dep't) 14 App Div 2d 791, 220 NYS2d 513
(plaintiff who knowingly or negligently permitted use of his barber license in barbershop
after license had expired could not recover damages in action for false arrest and false
imprisonment where owner of barbershop told investigator for division of licenses that
plaintiff was owner and at the same time exhibited plaintiff's expired license which was
without required photograph attached thereto and investigator thereupon procured a
summons to be issued and plaintiff was arrested when he did not appear in response to
the summons).
Footnote 86. Maracle v State, 50 Misc 2d 348, 270 NYS2d 439 (holding state of New
York liable).
Footnote 87. 42 USCS 1983, which is discussed generally in 15 Am Jur 2d Civil
Rights 16 et seq.
Footnote 88. Baker v McCollan, 443 US 137, 61 L Ed 2d 433, 99 S Ct 2689, on remand
(CA5 Tex) 601 F2d 903 and (not followed on other grounds as stated in Davidson v
O'Lone (CA3 NJ) 752 F2d 817).
96 -- Identity of name [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Where two persons are of the same name and the name is that stated in the warrant and
the officer arrests one whom the officer knows is not the one intended, or does not in
good faith believe the person to be so, the warrant is not a justification. 89 However, if
the officer in good faith arrests one of two persons having the same name as that stated in
the warrant, believing that one to be the one intended, the officer is justified. 90 The
justification would be all the more apparent if there were only one by that name known to
the officer. 91 In these "misnomer" cases, where the warrant may be applicable to two or
more persons with complete accuracy, the officer is required to exercise reasonable care
in assuring that the officer has arrested the person intended to be apprehended under the
warrant in order to enjoy the benefit of justification. 92 Likewise, where a warrant is
issued for a certain person and executed against that person, the officer executing it is not
liable for false imprisonment although the person who actually committed the offense
was another party of the same name as the plaintiff 93 and the officer doubted that it
was the plaintiff who had committed the crime. 94
Footnotes
Footnote 89. King v Robertson, 227 Ala 378, 150 So 154.
Even though plaintiff had the same name as person named in the warrant, defendant
sheriff had the burden of proving reasonable execution of the warrant. Stewart v
Williams, 243 Ga 580, 255 SE2d 699, on remand 150 Ga App 539, 258 SE2d 251.
Footnote 90. Schneider v Kessler (CA3 NJ) 97 F2d 542; King v Robertson, 227 Ala 378,
150 So 154; Blocker v Clark, 126 Ga 484, 54 SE 1022; O'Neill v Keeling, 227 Iowa 754,
288 NW 887, 127 ALR 1050.
Summary judgment should have been granted defendant sheriff where deputy arrested
person of same name and residing at same address as that in warrant and there was no
other person of that name at that address, even though person for whom warrant was
intended resided in different county, the mistake in warrant having been made by
someone other than arresting officer. Sanders v Jacobs, 119 Ga App 101, 166 SE2d 433.
Where plaintiff, who had the same name, except for middle initial, as person against
whom warrant had been issued in Pennsylvania, was arrested after investigation by police
in Ohio, plaintiff having come to Ohio from Pennsylvania, probable cause for arrest
existed as a matter of law and verdict should be directed in action against arresting
officers for false arrest. Johnson v Reddy (Ohio App, Cuyahoga Co) 120 NE2d 459, revd
on other grounds 163 Ohio St 347, 56 Ohio Ops 316, 126 NE2d 911.
Footnote 91. King v Robertson, 227 Ala 378, 150 So 154.
Footnote 92. Davis v Syracuse, 66 NY2d 840, 498 NYS2d 355, 489 NE2d 242.
Where the person arrested bore the same name but was not the person named in the arrest
warrant, the arresting officer must be shown to have made diligent inquiry as to the
identity of the person named in the warrant, and if the officer made such inquiry and
arrested the person the officer believed was the one named in the warrant, there was no
liability, even though the wrong person was arrested. Wilson v Bonner, 166 Ga App 9,
303 SE2d 134.
Footnote 93. Kalish v White, 36 Cal App 604, 173 P 494.
An officer making an arrest under a valid warrant in which the person to be arrested is
described by name only is not liable for false arrest if the person arrested bears, or is
commonly known by, that name, and is the person intended. O'Neill v Keeling, 227 Iowa
754, 288 NW 887, 127 ALR 1050.
Footnote 94. Kalish v White, 36 Cal App 604, 173 P 494.
97 Arrest of exempt person [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
An exemption from arrest is generally regarded as a personal privilege which may be
waived by the party in whose favor it is granted. 95 Consequently, the mere fact that a
person has such a privilege and it is violated does not furnish a basis for an action for
false imprisonment. 96 The only remedy for such a person is to avail himself or herself
of exemption in a manner provided by law. 97 However, where the exemption is
construed to be such an absolute prohibition of arrest that the arrest of such a person
under any circumstances is illegal, a warrant is no protection. 98
Footnotes
Footnote 95. 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest 143.
Footnote 96. Winchester v Everett, 80 Me 535, 15 A 596.
Footnote 97. 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest 142.
3. Immunity [98-115]
a. Judicial Officers [98-108]
A judicial officer having jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter is exempt
from civil liability for false imprisonment, so long as the judge acts within that
jurisdiction 99 and in a judicial capacity, 1 even though the judicial officer may commit
an error of judgment. 2 Immunity is not extended to these officers in order to protect
them as individuals, but to protect the interests of society upon the theory that society is
best served if the judicial officer is left entirely free to act upon independent convictions,
uninfluenced by fear of consequences personal to himself or herself. 3
Footnotes
Footnote 99. Ravenscroft v Casey (CA2 NY) 139 F2d 776, cert den 323 US 745, 89 L
Ed 596, 65 S Ct 63, reh den 323 US 814, 89 L Ed 648, 65 S Ct 114; Broom v
Douglass, 175 Ala 268, 57 So 860; McDaniel v Harrell, 81 Fla 66, 87 So 631, 13 ALR
1333; Holland v Lutz, 194 Kan 712, 401 P2d 1015; McBurnie v Sullivan, 152 Ky 686,
153 SW 945; Gardner v Couch, 137 Mich 358, 100 NW 673, reh den 137 Mich 362, 101
NW 802; Grant v Williams, 54 Mont 246, 169 P 286, subsequent app 54 Mont 426, 171 P
276; Moore v Cotton, 94 NH 387, 54 A2d 167; Landseidel v Culeman, 47 ND 275, 181
NW 593, 13 ALR 1339.
The magistrate who issued a warrant, upon the affidavit of a citizen informant, for the
driver of a car, deeming it probable that the driver was the car's owner of record, was
within the presumption of good faith for one acting with judicial authority, affording the
magistrate immunity on the false arrest or imprisonment claim. Bahakel v Tate (Ala) 503
So 2d 837.
A claim against a district judge in connection with an alleged false imprisonment raised
with respect to a temporary mental health commitment was barred by judicial immunity.
Temple v Marlborough Div. of Dist. Court Dep't, 395 Mass 117, 479 NE2d 137.
See also Nelson v Las Vegas, 99 Nev 548, 665 P2d 1141 (holding that the issuer of a
warrant is protected against false arrest and false imprisonment claims where the warrant
is regular in form and the issuer has authority over the described offense and jurisdiction
over the person named in the warrant).
Forms: Answerdefensejudicial immunityacts of officer done in judicial capacity and
while acting within jurisdiction. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment,
Form 133.
Footnote 1. As to acting in ministerial capacity, see 107.
Footnote 2. 100.
Footnote 3. Bradley v Fisher, 80 US 335, 13 Wall 335, 20 L Ed 646; Grant v Williams,

54 Mont 246, 169 P 286, subsequent app 54 Mont 426, 171 P 276.
99 Judges of courts of limited jurisdiction [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Judicial immunity from liability for false imprisonment extends to judges of courts of
limited jurisdiction. 4 Moreover, though some distinction has been made between
judges of superior and inferior courts in cases of acts done in excess of their jurisdiction
5 or with malice, 6 it is generally held that judges of courts of limited jurisdiction are
exempt from civil liability in damages for their judicial acts in all cases where judges of
courts of general jurisdiction are exempt. 7
Footnotes
Footnote 4. Lacey v Hendricks, 164 Ala 280, 51 So 157; Holland v Lutz, 194 Kan 712,
401 P2d 1015; McBurnie v Sullivan, 152 Ky 686, 153 SW 945; Whitehead v De Andrea,
186 Misc 546, 60 NYS2d 44; Voll v Steele, 141 Ohio St 293, 25 Ohio Ops 424, 47 NE2d
991; Berry v Smith, 148 Va 424, 139 SE 252, 55 ALR 279.
If a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction has subject matter jurisdiction and a colorable
claim of personal jurisdiction, the judge or magistrate is immune for the issuance of a
warrant, so long as the judge or magistrate acts in good faith. Bahakel v Tate (Ala) 503
So 2d 837.
Even though family court had not considered and transferred to county court charge of
assault arising from claimant's alleged incest with his daughter, county court had at least
the initial power to adjudicate whether the complex fact is required to transfer to the
family court, and county court was not without some power to adjudicate and the state
was protected against a claim for false imprisonment when its administrative officials
acted upon commitment papers issued by county court. Nuernberger v State, 41 NY2d
111, 390 NYS2d 904, 359 NE2d 412.
Footnote 5. 101.
Footnote 6. 108.
Footnote 7. Lacey v Hendricks, 164 Ala 280, 51 So 157; McDaniel v Harrell, 81 Fla 66,
87 So 631, 13 ALR 1333; McBurnie v Sullivan, 152 Ky 686, 153 SW 945; Berry v Bass,
157 La 81, 102 So 76; Allard v Estes, 292 Mass 187, 197 NE 884; Ussery v Haynes, 344
Mo 530, 127 SW2d 410; Grant v Williams, 54 Mont 246, 169 P 286, subsequent app 54
Mont 426, 171 P 276; Moore v Cotton, 94 NH 387, 54 A2d 167; Landseidel v Culeman,
47 ND 275, 181 NW 593, 13 ALR 1339; Shaw v Moon, 117 Or 558, 245 P 318, 45 ALR
600; Richardson v Capwell, 63 Utah 616, 176 P 205; Berry v Smith, 148 Va 424, 139 SE
252, 55 ALR 279; Kalb v Luce, 234 Wis 509, 291 NW 841.
100 Effect of error of judgment while acting within jurisdiction [32 Am Jur 2d
FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The rule of judicial immunity protects a judicial officer from liability when acting within
the court's jurisdiction even though in arriving at a decision he or she has committed an
error of judgment. 8 A judge is not bound at the peril of an action for damages or a
personal controversy to decide rightly in a matter of either law or fact, but is bound only
to decide according to his or her own convictions. 9 So there is no liability where the
magistrate erroneously demands cash bail instead of bond, 10 holds a person for the
grand jury of the county under the belief that the person has committed an offense against
the state, where the only authority is to hold the person for the federal grand jury, 11
sentences a person without first making and entering a finding of guilt 12 or without
offering the alternative of paying a fine as provided by ordinance. 13
Where a court has jurisdiction of a certain class of cases and also the judicial duty of
passing on the papers and the evidence in a particular case to decide whether its judicial
power shall be exerted, any error in the decision is an error in the exercise of jurisdiction
rather than an act outside jurisdiction. 14 For example, in determining whether notice
had been served properly upon an alleged incompetent, a court acts judicially, and even if
it is in error, it is not responsible for false imprisonment. 15
Footnotes
Footnote 8. Lacey v Hendricks, 164 Ala 280, 51 So 157; Malone v Carey, 17 Cal App 2d
505, 62 P2d 166; Waters v Ray (Fla App D1) 167 So 2d 326; Waters v Barclay, 57 Idaho
376, 64 P2d 1079; Brown v Larimer, 132 Kan 81, 294 P 906; Gardner v Couch, 137 Mich
358, 100 NW 673, reh den 137 Mich 362, 101 NW 802; Robinette v Price, 214 Minn
521, 8 NW2d 800; Pogue v Swink, 365 Mo 503, 284 SW2d 868; Bolton v Vellines, 94 Va
393, 26 SE 847; Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622.
A magistrate issuing a warrant, on the affidavit of a citizen informant, deeming it
"probable" that the owner of a car was also the driver of the car in question, acted within
the assumption of good faith accorded to one acting with judicial authority, and the
magistrate was immune from liability for false arrest, even if the magistrate's conclusion
was, in fact, incorrect; a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction, acting within his or her
jurisdiction and with a colorable claim of personal jurisdiction is immune for the issuance
of a warrant, so long as the magistrate acts in good faith, even if wrong. Bahakel v Tate
(Ala) 503 So 2d 837.
A justice of the peace has jurisdiction to determine whether he is to be excused because
of an affidavit of prejudice, and even if he incorrectly decides that he may try the case, he
may not become liable for false imprisonment because of his decision on the question of
prejudice. King v Cawood, 223 Ky 291, 3 SW2d 616.
Neither superior nor inferior judicial officers should be held liable for errors of judgment,
even in respect to the extent of their jurisdiction or of their powers under the laws which
they are called upon to enforce. Berry v Bass, 157 La 81, 102 So 76.
The issuer of a warrant is protected against false arrest and false imprisonment claims
where the warrant is regular in form and the issuer has authority over the described
offense and jurisdiction over the person named in the warrant, even if the warrant was
issued erroneously. Nelson v Las Vegas, 99 Nev 548, 665 P2d 1141.
Footnote 9. See Lewis v Commonwealth, 329 Mass 445, 108 NE2d 922, 35 ALR2d 1277
(if a judge has jurisdiction of the crime of robbery and of the defendant the judge may
impose a sentence for robbery without personal liability, notwithstanding that the facts
presented are not such as would warrant a conviction for robbery).
Footnote 10. Gordon v District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist., 36 Nev 1, 131 P 134.
Footnote 11. McIntosh v Bullard, Earnhart & Magness, 95 Ark 227, 129 SW 85.
Footnote 12. Atwood v Atwater, 43 Neb 147, 61 NW 574.
Footnote 13. Berry v Bass, 157 La 81, 102 So 76.
Footnote 14. Nelson v Cordova (DC Alaska) 7 Alaska 555; Kraft v Porter, 76 Ill App 328;
Grove v Van Duyn, 44 NJL 654; Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43
ALR 622.
Footnote 15. Ussery v Haynes, 344 Mo 530, 127 SW2d 410.
101 Exceeding jurisdiction [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
As a general rule, where a judge or other officer acting in a judicial capacity and having
jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter goes beyond or exceeds his or her
authority, the judge is not liable for false imprisonment. 16 Though in a few instances the
courts seem to except from the rule granting immunity to judicial officers acts done by a
judge of an inferior court in excess of jurisdiction, 17 the validity of any such exception
has more often been expressly denied. 18
Footnotes
Footnote 16. Bradley v Fisher, 80 US 335, 13 Wall 335, 20 L Ed 646; Early v
Fitzpatrick, 161 Ala 171, 49 So 686; Calhoun v Little, 106 Ga 336, 32 SE 86; Waters v
Barclay, 57 Idaho 376, 64 P2d 1079; McBurnie v Sullivan, 152 Ky 686, 153 SW 945;
Allard v Estes, 292 Mass 187, 197 NE 884; De Witt v Thompson, 192 Miss 615, 7 So 2d
529; Pogue v Swink, 365 Mo 503, 284 SW2d 868; Scott v Fishblate, 117 NC 265, 23 SE
436; Waugh v Dibbens, 61 Okla 221, 160 P 589.
Where facts which have either legal value or color of legal value are presented to a judge
of a court of general jurisdiction, the judge is immune from liability for error committed,
even though it is subsequently held that as a matter of law he or she has no jurisdiction
whatsoever in the matter. Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR
622.
Footnote 17. Clarke v May, 68 Mass 410, 2 Gray 410.
Footnote 18. Blancett v Wimberley, 16 Ala App 402, 78 So 318; Berry v Bass, 157 La 81,
102 So 76; Allard v Estes, 292 Mass 187, 197 NE 884; Scott v Fishblate, 117 NC 265, 23
SE 436.
The rule that a judicial officer who exceeds jurisdiction is not liable for false
imprisonment is applicable to protect judges of inferior courts as well as judges of
superior courts. Stahl v Currey, 135 Ohio St 253, 14 Ohio Ops 112, 20 NE2d 529.
102 Acting wholly without jurisdiction [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Where any judicial officer causes the arrest or detention of a person in a proceeding in
which the officer is acting wholly without jurisdiction, the judge or officer may be held
liable for false imprisonment, 19 for even honesty of purpose cannot justify a clear
usurpation of power. 20 This liability applies with equal force to judges of inferior and
superior courts. 21 Thus, a justice who, not having power to require bond for the
appearance of a witness, commits a witness for failure to file a bond is liable for false
imprisonment. 22 Liability may be imposed even where assertion of jurisdiction might
initially have been proper, such as where a magistrate issues process or causes a detention
after the magistrate's term has expired, even though he or she is unaware of this fact, 23
or where a judge acts despite having lost jurisdiction of a case within his or her authority
after the commencement of the action. 24
Jurisdiction of the subject matter alone is not sufficient to protect the judge; he or she
must also have jurisdiction of the person. 25 However, it has been held that judicial
immunity will apply so long as the action complained of is one within the colorable
jurisdiction of the court; 26 thus, the defense will be available unless a clear absence of
jurisdiction is at once apparent to the ordinary understanding. 27
Footnotes
Footnote 19. Ceinar v Johnston, 134 Cal App 166, 25 P2d 28; Tracy v Williams, 4 Conn
107; Brown v Larimer, 132 Kan 81, 294 P 906; Cox v Perkins, 299 Ky 470, 185 SW2d
954, 173 ALR 797; De Witt v Thompson, 192 Miss 615, 7 So 2d 529; Jones v Grooms
(Adams Co) 56 Ohio App 351, 9 Ohio Ops 408, 25 Ohio L Abs 39, 10 NE2d 958;
Goodell v Tower, 77 Vt 61, 58 A 790; Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181,
43 ALR 622.
When a judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction the proceeding is coram non
judice. The judge becomes a mere private person and is liable as a trespasser for the
damages resulting from unauthorized acts, including false imprisonment. Manning v

Ketcham (CA6 Ky) 58 F2d 948.
A municipal court judge wilfully ordering the re-arrest of a person freed on a writ of
habeas corpus is liable for false imprisonment. Farish v Smoot (Fla) 58 So 2d 534.
A municipal magistrate having no jurisdiction over a person imprisoned for violation of a
state statute, which act is not an offense against the municipality, is liable in tort to the
person thus illegally imprisoned. Stembridge v Wright, 32 Ga App 587, 124 SE 115.
Forms: Complaint, petition, or declarationimprisonment on charge not constituting
crimeagainst magistrate acting without jurisdiction. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev),
Footnote 20. Waters v Ray (Fla App D1) 167 So 2d 326.
A justice of the peace is civilly liable for acts which are outside the scope and limits of
jurisdiction even though made in good faith in belief that there was jurisdiction. Cox v
Perkins, 299 Ky 470, 185 SW2d 954, 173 ALR 797.
Footnote 21. Stiles v Morse, 233 Mass 174, 123 NE 615, 4 ALR 1365 (disapproved on
other grounds by Chartrand v Riley, 354 Mass 242, 237 NE2d 10) and (ovrld in part on
other grounds by Gildea v Ellershaw, 363 Mass 800, 298 NE2d 847); Lucas v Central
Missouri Trust Co., 349 Mo 537, 162 SW2d 569; Sweeney v Young, 82 NH 159, 131 A
155, 42 ALR 757; O'Regan v Schermerhorn, 25 NJ Misc 1, 50 A2d 10; Shaw v Moon,
117 Or 558, 245 P 318, 45 ALR 600; Goodell v Tower, 77 Vt 61, 58 A 790.
Footnote 22. Bates v Kitchel, 160 Mich 402, 125 NW 684.
Footnote 23. Grace v Teague, 81 Me 559, 18 A 289.
Footnote 24. Lacey v Hendricks, 164 Ala 280, 51 So 157; Farish v Smoot (Fla) 58 So 2d
534; Holz v Rediske, 116 Wis 353, 92 NW 1105.
Footnote 25. Von Arx v Shafer (CA9 Alaska) 241 F 649.
A judge who imposes a fine upon a witness who acknowledges guilt of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the court while testifying in another case is liable in damages for
imprisoning the witness in default of payment of the fine where the witness does not
consent to trial, and where no papers are served so as to bring the witness within the
jurisdiction of the court. Rammage v Kendall, 168 Ky 26, 181 SW 631.
Footnote 26. Utley v Independence, 240 Or 384, 402 P2d 91.
Footnote 27. Germeroth v Oregon City, 83 Or App 533, 733 P2d 32 (while issue of
whether citations, rather than sworn complaints, could form basis for issuance of arrest
warrant was in doubt, judge was entitled to immunity where he issued warrant in exercise
of his jurisdiction over city parking violations).
See also Colin v County of Suffolk (2d Dep't) 181 App Div 2d 653, 580 NYS2d 460, app
den 80 NY2d 756, 588 NYS2d 824, 602 NE2d 232 (Family Court hearing examiner was
entitled to summary judgment dismissing complaint alleging false arrest and malicious
prosecution, where plaintiff failed to proffer evidence demonstrating that hearing
examiner performed any acts in clear absence of jurisdiction).
103 Acting without sufficient preliminary affidavit or complaint [32 Am Jur 2d
FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
In order to bring the act of a judicial officer in issuing a warrant within the rule granting
immunity for acts done in a judicial capacity, the officer must have issued the warrant on
a sufficient affidavit or complaint properly verified where it is not issued on view. 28 A
magistrate is liable for issuing a warrant without the affidavit or complaint; 29 upon an
oral statement where a written one is required; 30 or at the instance of one having no
legal authority to make a complaint. 31
Some courts have taken or supported the view that if the affidavit or complaint fails to
state any offense within the criminal laws, or an offense not within the jurisdiction of the
court, the magistrate may be held liable. 32
In other cases, however, the courts have held that if the magistrate has general
jurisdiction over the offense sought to be charged, the failure of the affidavit or complaint
to fully or correctly state or sustain the charge will not render the magistrate liable for
false imprisonment, though he or she issues a warrant and proceeds against the accused
thereunder. 33 All that is required to protect the justice in issuing a warrant is that the
evidence produced be colorable, calling upon the justice to act in judicial capacity in
determining the question of probable cause. 34 If the facts presented by the affidavit or
complaint are sufficient to challenge judicial determination, the issuance of a warrant on
the strength of the affidavit or complaint does not render the magistrate liable. 35 Some
fact or circumstance must appear tending to establish the guilt of the accused, however,
and an affidavit showing on its face that it is based on information and belief which is
merely hearsay is insufficient where it is not accompanied by any positive allegation. 36
Footnotes
Footnote 28. Harkness v Hyde, 31 Idaho 784, 176 P 885.
Footnote 29. Harkness v Hyde, 31 Idaho 784, 176 P 885; McCray v Lake Louisvilla (Ky)
332 SW2d 837; Kossouf v Knarr, 206 Pa 146, 55 A 854.
Footnote 30. Shaefer v Smith, 92 NJL 267, 106 A 21.
Footnote 31. Goodell v Tower, 77 Vt 61, 58 A 790 (complaint made by agent of society
for prevention of cruelty to animals where statute authorized complaint only by "officer"
of such society).
Footnote 32. Ceinar v Johnston, 134 Cal App 166, 25 P2d 28; Vickrey v Dunivan, 59 NM
90, 279 P2d 853.
Where the affidavit charged suspicion of malicious destruction of property, which was
not an offense, the justice of the peace was liable for issuance of a warrant on the
affidavit. Minor v Seliga, 168 Ohio St 1, 5 Ohio Ops 2d 256, 150 NE2d 852.
86 L Ed 531, 62 S Ct 131; Platz v Marion, 35 Cal App 241, 169 P 697; Moore v Cotton,
94 NH 387, 54 A2d 167.
See also Germeroth v Oregon City, 83 Or App 533, 733 P2d 32 (while issue of whether
citations, rather than sworn complaints, could form basis for issuance of arrest warrant
was in doubt, judge was entitled to immunity where he issued warrant in exercise of his
jurisdiction over city parking violations).
Footnote 34. Gardner v Couch, 137 Mich 358, 100 NW 673, reh den 137 Mich 362, 101
NW 802.
Footnote 36. McKelvey v Marsh, 63 App Div 396, 71 NYS 541.
104 Acting under invalid law [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
According to the view most generally taken, if the judicial officer has jurisdiction, the
fact that the officer is acting under an invalid statute or ordinance does not render him or
her liable for false imprisonment. 37 There is authority, however, that the magistrate is
liable to a person arrested on a warrant issued under an unconstitutional statute. 38
Footnotes
Footnote 37. Nelson v Cordova (DC Alaska) 7 Alaska 555; Trammell v Russellville, 34
Ark 105 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Parish v Pitts, 244 Ark 1239, 429 SW2d 45);
McDaniel v Harrell, 81 Fla 66, 87 So 631, 13 ALR 1333; Calhoun v Little, 106 Ga 336,
32 SE 86; McCray v Lake Louisvilla (Ky) 332 SW2d 837; Rush v Buckley, 100 Me 322,
61 A 774; Brooks v Mangan, 86 Mich 576, 49 NW 633; Richardson v Capwell, 63 Utah
616, 176 P 205.
Footnote 38. Kelly v Bemis, 70 Mass 83, 4 Gray 83.
105 Acting in contempt proceedings [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The exemption of judicial officers from civil liability for false imprisonment 39 applies
also where the officer, while acting within the officer's jurisdiction, causes the arrest and
commitment of a person for contempt. 40 Thus, one committed for contempt by a court
of general jurisdiction has no right of action against the judge thereof for false
imprisonment, even though the latter acted in excess of jurisdiction and was actuated by
malicious motives and the prisoner was released by habeas corpus proceedings or
otherwise. 41
On the other hand, where the judicial officer is without jurisdiction in the proceeding in
which the order of commitment for contempt is made, or is without statutory authority to
commit the plaintiff for the alleged contempt, the officer is properly held liable for
plaintiff's false imprisonment. 42
Footnotes
Footnote 40. Terry v Wright, 9 Colo App 11, 47 P 905; Waters v Barclay, 57 Idaho 376,
64 P2d 1079; Allard v Estes, 292 Mass 187, 197 NE 884; Bowman v Seaman, 152 App
Div 690, 137 NYS 568, reh den 152 App Div 937, 137 NYS 1112.
Footnote 41. Early v Fitzpatrick, 161 Ala 171, 49 So 686; McBurnie v Sullivan, 152 Ky
686, 153 SW 945; Scott v Fishblate, 117 NC 265, 23 SE 436; Waugh v Dibbens, 61 Okla
221, 160 P 589; Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622.
Footnote 42. Harkness v Hyde, 31 Idaho 784, 176 P 885; Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v
Boyce, 36 Kan 350, 13 P 609; McBurnie v Sullivan, 152 Ky 686, 153 SW 945; Piper v
Pearson, 68 Mass 120, 2 Gray 120; Rutherford v Holmes, 66 NY 368; Jones v Grooms
(Adams Co) 56 Ohio App 351, 9 Ohio Ops 408, 25 Ohio L Abs 39, 10 NE2d 958; Holz v
Rediske, 116 Wis 353, 92 NW 1105.
106 Commitment proceedings [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The rule of judicial immunity has been applied as a defense in false imprisonment actions
based upon the judge's order of commitment or other involvement in insanity
proceedings. 43
Footnotes
Footnote 43. Baer v Smith, 68 Cal App 2d 716, 157 P2d 646; Olepa v Mapletoff, 2 Mich
App 734, 141 NW2d 350; Devault v Truman, 354 Mo 1193, 194 SW2d 29; Reynolds v
Hart, 54 Misc 2d 476, 282 NYS2d 909; Quindlen v Hirschi (Okla) 284 P2d 723; Morris
v Nowotny (Tex Civ App Austin) 323 SW2d 301, writ ref n r e (Jun 10, 1959) and rehg of
writ of error overr (Jul 8, 1959) and cert den 361 US 889, 4 L Ed 2d 124, 80 S Ct 164,
reh den 361 US 921, 4 L Ed 2d 189, 80 S Ct 264.
Probate judge's action in committing plaintiff to state mental hospital was judicial rather
than ministerial act so that judge was immune from liability in plaintiff's action for
wrongful commitment. Perkins v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (CA5 Ala) 433
F2d 1303 (applying Alabama law).
The false imprisonment claim against a district judge, among others, in connection with a
temporary commitment under a statute authorizing emergency restraint of dangerous
persons, was barred by judicial immunity. Temple v Marlborough Div. of Dist. Court
Dep't, 395 Mass 117, 479 NE2d 137.
107 Acting in ministerial capacity [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A distinction is to be noted between acts which are judicial in their nature and those of an
administrative or ministerial character. The protection afforded judicial officers extends
only to judicial decisions or acts of a judicial nature, and not to mere administrative acts.
44 Accordingly, a magistrate who knows of an arrest and, being required to have the
prisoner brought before the magistrate without delay, permits the prisoner to be
imprisoned without hearing or bail, is liable for false imprisonment. 45 The action of a
mayor, for example, in swearing out a complaint and warrant, is not part of the judicial
function and is not an act which is cloaked in judicial immunity. 46
Footnotes
Footnote 44. See Wyatt v Baker, 41 Ga App 750, 154 SE 816, appeal after remand 45 Ga
App 448, 165 SE 133, appeal after remand 49 Ga App 410, 175 SE 678 (where the
defendant as mayor had passed sentence on a plaintiff requiring that he pay a fine and
costs or be imprisoned in lieu thereof, and where, after the fine and costs had been paid,
the defendant, with knowledge of the payment, had issued a commitment and caused the
plaintiff to be imprisoned under the sentence, the act of issuance of the commitment was
ministerial and did not entitle the defendant to an exemption from liability for false
imprisonment on the ground that it was performed in the exercise of a judicial function).
Footnote 45. Von Arx v Shafer (CA9 Alaska) 241 F 649.
108 Effect of malice [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
With respect to judges of superior courts, immunity to suit for false imprisonment may
extend even to cases where the judge is actuated by corrupt or malicious motives, 47
provided the judge is not acting wholly without jurisdiction, which would make him or
her otherwise liable. 48 The immunity extends to judges of inferior courts, where the
acts complained of are committed while they are acting wholly within their jurisdiction,
although they act maliciously or corruptly. 49 There is, however, authority that where a
justice exceeds his or her jurisdiction in sentencing and committing a person, and in
doing so acts wilfully, maliciously, and corruptly, with full knowledge of lack of
jurisdiction, the justice is liable. 50
Footnotes
Footnote 47. Broom v Douglass, 175 Ala 268, 57 So 860; Trammell v Russellville, 34
Ark 105 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Parish v Pitts, 244 Ark 1239, 429 SW2d 45);
Rogers v Marion, 11 Cal App 2d 750, 54 P2d 760; McDaniel v Harrell, 81 Fla 66, 87 So
631, 13 ALR 1333; McBurnie v Sullivan, 152 Ky 686, 153 SW 945; Lange v Benedict,
73 NY 12, error dismd 99 US 68, 9 Otto 68, 25 L Ed 469; Waugh v Dibbens, 61 Okla
221, 160 P 589; Berry v Smith, 148 Va 424, 139 SE 252, 55 ALR 279; Langen v
Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622.
Footnote 48. 102.
Footnote 49. Broom v Douglass, 175 Ala 268, 57 So 860; McBurnie v Sullivan, 152 Ky
686, 153 SW 945; Pratt v Gardner, 56 Mass 63, 2 Cush 63; Grant v Williams, 54 Mont
246, 169 P 286, subsequent app 54 Mont 426, 171 P 276; Gordon v District Court of Fifth
Judicial Dist., 36 Nev 1, 131 P 134; Scott v Fishblate, 117 NC 265, 23 SE 436;
Landseidel v Culeman, 47 ND 275, 181 NW 593, 13 ALR 1339; Tedford v McWhorter
(Tex Civ App Eastland) 373 SW2d 832, writ ref n r e (Apr 8, 1964); Berry v Smith, 148
Va 424, 139 SE 252, 55 ALR 279.
Footnote 50. Robertson v Parker, 99 Wis 652, 75 NW 423.
b. Quasi-judicial Officers [109-113]

An exemption similar to that of judges from personal liability for their judicial acts 51 is
extended to officers in the other departments of government whenever they are entrusted
with the exercise of discretionary power and their determinations or decisions are, by
their nature, judicial. 52 Therefore, no public officer whose functions are quasi-judicial
in nature is liable to persons for false imprisonment based on a determination made
within the officer's jurisdiction, however erroneous it may be, 53 and however malicious
the motives which produced it. 54 This immunity exists only where the officer has
jurisdiction of the particular case and is authorized to determine it; if the officer
transcends the limits of authority the officer ceases, in the particular case, to act as judge,
and is responsible for all the consequences. 55 The doctrine of nonresponsibility has
been applied, for example, to protect a governor from civil liability for acts in the
suppression of an insurrection; 56
to protect grand jurors who are charged with having
acted erroneously and maliciously in the performance of their duties; 57 and to protect
the mayor of a city in restraining and confining an intoxicated constable. 58 Even in

those circumstances, however, a mayor's actions in investigating and swearing out a
complaint and warrant do not entail judicial immunity, if such actions do not constitute
part of the mayor's judicial function. 59 Also, the rule of immunity will not protect a
mayor who is exercising official authority to aid the private interests of individuals,
although the same acts may come within the scope of the mayor's public duties. 60
Under some circumstances, court clerks acting at the direction of a judge also have
absolute immunity. 61
Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity members of a state parole board and analysts
working at their direction are immune from an inmate's false imprisonment suit alleging
unlawful delay in consideration of release on parole. 62
Footnotes
Footnote 52. Papagianakis v The Samos (CA4 Va) 186 F2d 257, cert den 341 US 921,
95 L Ed 1354, 71 S Ct 741; Prentice v Bertken, 50 Cal App 2d 344, 123 P2d 96.
Footnote 53. Robinette v Price, 214 Minn 521, 8 NW2d 800.
Footnote 54. Papagianakis v The Samos (CA4 Va) 186 F2d 257, cert den 341 US 921,
95 L Ed 1354, 71 S Ct 741.
Footnote 55. Mumford v Starmont, 139 Mich 188, 102 NW 662; Bolton v Vellines, 94 Va
393, 26 SE 847.
Forms: Complaint for arrest and imprisonment of person not on probation on warrant of
probation officer acting without jurisdiction. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Footnote 56. Moyer v Peabody (CC Colo) 148 F 870, affd 212 US 78, 53 L Ed 410, 29
S Ct 235; Druecker v Salomon, 21 Wis 621.
Footnote 57. Turpen v Booth, 56 Cal 65.
Footnote 58. Boutte v Emmer, 43 La Ann 980, 9 So 921.
If the mayor of a city is given power by the charter to issue warrants and try persons
accused of violating the city ordinances, the mayor is within the doctrine of judicial
immunity. McDaniel v Harrell, 81 Fla 66, 87 So 631, 13 ALR 1333.
Footnote 60. Tryon v Pingree, 112 Mich 338, 70 NW 905.

Footnote 61. Temple v Marlborough Div. of Dist. Court Dep't, 395 Mass 117, 479 NE2d
137 (immunity from false imprisonment claim in an action concerning judicial
commitment pursuant to a statute authorizing temporary restraint of dangerous persons).
SE2d 90.
110 Attorneys; generally [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
An attorney at law is an officer of the court and occupies what may be termed a quasijudicial office. 63 Accordingly, the rule of judicial immunity 64 is largely applicable to
an attorney. 65 As a general rule, an attorney is protected from personal liability for
false imprisonment if, while acting in good faith on behalf of his or her client, the
attorney procures the arrest or detention of a third person, 66 principally on the ground
that the attorney is acting as the client's agent, rather than for himself or herself. 67 Thus
a law firm cannot be held reponsible for the actions of an arresting officer where the
arrest and incarceration are directed by the judge, 68 and an attorney's actions, based on
probable cause, in instituting a spouse's competency proceeding on behalf of the other
spouse did not entail liability for false imprisonment on the part of the attorney. 69
An attorney who requests and urges the commitment, for contempt, of one who disobeys
an order of the court favorable to the client, even though the attorney subscribes and
endorses the writ of commitment, is not liable for false imprisonment. 70 The same
applies where the attorney requests the commitment, for contempt, of a witness who has
refused to answer a question which was pertinent and material to the issue involved. 71
An attorney's immunity is not absolute, but is, rather, qualified in that the immunity from
liability to third parties extends to an attorney who pursues in good faith the client's
interest in a matter fairly debatable in the law. Immunity does not apply when the
attorney acts in a malicious, fraudulent or tortious manner which frustrates the
administration of justice, or attempts to obtain something for the client to which the client
is not justly entitled. 72 Thus, it is generally held that an action for false imprisonment
may be maintained against an attorney who has acted with malice or some other improper
motive in directing an unlawful arrest or detention. 73
Absolute immunity for statements made in a judicial proceeding does not lie as to false
arrest or false imprisonment claims in an action relating to a witness' subsequent arrest.
74
In some cases, an attorney's liability has been affected by whether the court through
whose power the incarceration was brought about had underlying jurisdiction. 75
Practice guide: A claim of false imprisonment against an attorney is a species of fraud
and, as such, must be pleaded with particularity. 76
Footnotes
Footnote 63. 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law 3.
Footnote 65. Miller v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 28 Ky LR 223, 89 SW 183; Roth v
Shupp, 94 Md 55, 50 A 430; Shull v Boyd, 251 Mo 452, 158 SW 313; Waugh v Dibbens,
61 Okla 221, 160 P 589; McMullin v Erwin, 69 Vt 338, 38 A 62.
It is in the interests of the proper administration of justice that counsel be courageous and
fearless in the discharge of their duties; and, in fact, fearlessness and courage are among
the principal elements that lead to professional success. As we cannot have a strong court
without courageous and fearless judges, so it is impossible to have a strong bar without
courageous and fearless attorneys. Both operate together in a common cause, as parts
and parcels of the judicial system, to bring about the best results. Langen v Borkowski,
188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622.
Footnote 66. Waugh v Dibbens, 61 Okla 221, 160 P 589; Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis
277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622.
Accordingly, in Downey v Allen, 36 Cal App 2d 269, 97 P2d 515, where the plaintiff, by
a second amended complaint, set forth as causes of action fraud and deceit, false
imprisonment, and assault, and alleged that one of the defendants, acting as attorney for
another of the defendants, did certain things as such attorney at the instance and request
of such client which the latter knew to be false and fraudulent, the court affirmed a
dismissal of the complaint as to the attorney, since there was no allegation that the
attorney had knowledge of such fraud or falsity.
Annotation: Liability of attorney, acting for client, for malicious prosecution, 46 ALR4th
249.
Liability of attorney acting for client, for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution of
third party, 27 ALR3d 1113.
Footnote 67. Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622 (if an
attorney does no more than urge on the court, properly and in good faith, the claims of the
client or a view of the law favorable to the client, the attorney does not become
personally liable because the decision of the court thereon may subsequently be held to
have been erroneous).
Footnote 68. Harvey v Pincus (ED Pa) 549 F Supp 332, affd without op (CA3 Pa) 716
F2d 890, cert den 464 US 918, 78 L Ed 2d 262, 104 S Ct 284 (applying Pennsylvania
law).
Footnote 69. Hill v Hill (Fla App D1) 388 So 2d 625, approved (Fla) 415 So 2d 20
(superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Waite v Waite (Fla App D3) 16 FLW
D 1433).
Footnote 70. See Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis 277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622 (the
issue of liability for contempt being fairly debatable, an attorney, in the discharge of
duties toward the client, must urge the client's position regarding punishment upon the
court, and if the court imprisons the accused, the attorney is not liable).
Footnote 71. Waugh v Dibbens, 61 Okla 221, 160 P 589; Shull v Boyd, 251 Mo 452, 158
SW 313.
Footnote 73. Roth v Shupp, 94 Md 55, 50 A 430; Monson v Rouse, 86 Mo App 97;
McMorris v Howell, 89 App Div 272, 85 NYS 1018.
An attorney, who procured a bench warrant for a witness in a criminal case upon the
erroneous representation that the witness had been served and had failed to appear, was
not entitled to immunity from the witness' subsequent action for wrongful arrest and false
imprisonment. Simon v United States (CA5 La) 711 F2d 740.
An attorney is not immune from an action brought by an individual sentenced to jail for
contempt of court for failure to answer attorneys' questions which the individual could
not lawfully be required to answer; malice and absence of probable cause being alleged in
the claim. Stafford v Muster (Mo) 582 SW2d 670.
Footnote 74. Simon v United States (CA5 La) 711 F2d 740.
Footnote 75. 112.
111 -- Liability where attorney's participation caused illegal detention [32 Am Jur
2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Assuming that a plaintiff has been illegally detained, many courts have based the liability
of an attorney who acts for a client in connection with the matter, on whether the
illegality of the detention was caused by the action of the attorney, and the courts in such
cases have done so without deeming it necessary to consider whether the attorney was
acting with malice or want of probable cause. 77 Thus, liability has been found where
the illegal incarceration was actively procured by the attorney, 78 or was obtained while
acting in the attorney's rather than the client's behalf, 79 or was the result of "officious"
interference. 80
Footnotes
Footnote 77. Casey v Casey, 142 Ark 246, 218 SW 678; Pomeranz v Class, 82 Colo 173,
257 P 1086; Clyma v Kennedy, 64 Conn 310, 29 A 539; Vernes v Phillips, 266 NY 298,
194 NE 762; Yahola v Whipple, 189 Okla 583, 118 P2d 395; Gibson v Holmes, 78 Vt
110, 62 A 11.
Annotation: Liability of attorney, acting for client, for malicious prosecution, 46 ALR4th
249 3.
Liability of attorney acting for client, for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution of
third party, 27 ALR3d 1113.
257 P 1086; Clyma v Kennedy, 64 Conn 310, 29 A 539 (drawing up of void mittimus);
Tiede v Fuhr, 264 Mo 622, 175 SW 910; Otto v Levy, 244 App Div 349, 279 NYS 462;
Gibson v Holmes, 78 Vt 110, 62 A 11 (suing out of illegal writ).
Footnote 79. Yahola v Whipple, 189 Okla 583, 118 P2d 395 (attorneys seeking to collect
award of attorney's fees by imprisoning debtor husband under contempt order).
Footnote 80. Vernes v Phillips, 266 NY 298, 194 NE 762.
An attorney representing a detainee in an involuntary hospitalization proceeding was not
immune from a legal malpractice claim in connection with the hospitalization, where the
detainee's arrest and subsequent hospitalization was found to be pretextual in its entirety
and a valid basis for the detainee's false arrest action against the arresting officer and
others. Wagenmann v Adams (CA1 Mass) 829 F2d 196.
Annotation: 27 ALR3d 1113 4[c].
112 -- Liability as affected by whether court had jurisdiction [32 Am Jur 2d
FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A factor of importance in determining an attorney's liability has been whether or not the
court through whose power the incarceration was brought about had underlying
jurisdiction. Thus, in those states which follow the rule that an attorney is liable when the
attorney's participation was the cause of the illegal detention, 81 liability has been
imposed where the court did not have jurisdiction, 82 although it has been held that
where the court's jurisdiction was not clear-cut, the attorney will not be held liable for
having taken a position if it should later be proved that the position was erroneous and the
court did not have jurisdiction. 83 Furthermore, liability has been denied where it was
found that there was no malice on the part of the attorney and that the court had
jurisdiction in the matter. 84
Footnotes
Footnote 81. 111.
257 P 1086; Tiede v Fuhr, 264 Mo 622, 175 SW 910.
In action against attorney and his client for false imprisonment, attorney was not entitled
to automatic immunity from liability, even though he acted as officer of the court, in good
faith, and in order to enforce his client's rights, where attorney procured void arrest order
from court acting without jurisdiction over plaintiff. Havens v Hardesty, 43 Colo App
162, 600 P2d 116.
In Otto v Levy, 244 App Div 349, 279 NYS 462, the court held that where an attorney
was himself the active and procuring cause of an arrest, and not a mere passive agent, and
the body attachment pursuant to which the arrest was made was wholly invalid, the court
being without any power to issue it under the circumstances, the attorney was liable for
false arrest or for malicious prosecution.
Annotation: Liability of attorney acting for client, for false imprisonment or malicious
prosecution of third party, 27 ALR3d 1113 ( 9-15 superseded by Liability of attorney,
acting for client, for malicious prosecution, 46 ALR4th 249) 6[a].
Footnote 83. Fischer v Langbein, 103 NY 84, 8 NE 251; Langen v Borkowski, 188 Wis
277, 206 NW 181, 43 ALR 622.
Footnote 84. Melton v Jenkins, 50 Ga App 615, 178 SE 754; Roth v Shupp, 94 Md 55, 50
A 430; Shull v Boyd, 251 Mo 452, 158 SW 313.
113 Prosecuting attorney or similar officer [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
It is the accepted rule that a prosecuting attorney or similar officer is protected by the
doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity if the conduct in question was performed within the
scope of his or her official duties. 85
In actions for false arrest or false imprisonment, quite a few courts have adopted the view
that the immunity protecting the prosecutor acting within the scope of his or her duties is
absolute, and is not vitiated by wrongful or malicious motive in arresting or imprisoning
the plaintiff. 86 Other courts, however, have indicated that only a limited immunity
applies to a prosecutor's actions, and that improper personal motive for bringing an action
without probable cause will destroy the immunity which would protect the prosecutor had
the prosecutor merely made a mistake in judgment by bringing the action. 87
Courts have found that the doctrine of judicial immunity protected prosecutors from
liability in actions in which the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had acted to initiate criminal process as part of a conspiracy to arrest or
imprison the plaintiff. 88
the initiation of criminal proceedings had been erroneous because the provision under
which plaintiff had been arrested was invalid. 89
the acts for which plaintiff was charged did not constitute a crime. 90
the process had been initiated on the basis of a witness' perjured or erroneous testimony.
91
the arrest warrant had been issued by a court lacking jurisdiction. 92
Footnotes
Footnote 85. Zellner v Wallace (MD Ala) 233 F Supp 874 (applying Alabama law); Link
v Greyhound Corp. (ED Mich) 288 F Supp 898 (applying Michigan law); Bottos v
Beamer (ND Ind) 399 F Supp 999; Duba v McIntyre (CA8 Neb) 501 F2d 590, cert den
424 US 975, 47 L Ed 2d 745, 96 S Ct 1480 (applying Nebraska law); Reilly v United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (CA9 Cal) 15 F2d 314 (applying California law; Casey v
Casey, 142 Ark 246, 218 SW 678; Schneider v Shepherd, 192 Mich 82, 158 NW 182;
Bloss v Williams, 15 Mich App 228, 166 NW2d 520; Wheeler v Moe, 163 Mont 154, 515
P2d 679 (recognizing rule); Koch v Grimminger, 192 Neb 706, 223 NW2d 833, 79
ALR3d 874; Polidor v Mahady, 130 Vt 173, 287 A2d 841.
An assistant United States attorney is immune from civil suit for damages caused by acts
done by him in the discharge of his official duty. Cooper v O'Connor, 69 App DC 100,
99 F2d 135, 118 ALR 1440, cert den 305 US 643, 83 L Ed 414, 59 S Ct 146, reh den
305 US 673, 83 L Ed 436, 59 S Ct 242 and reh den 307 US 651, 83 L Ed 1530, 59 S
Ct 1035; Daniels v Kieser (CA7 Ill) 586 F2d 64, cert den 441 US 931, 60 L Ed 2d 659,
99 S Ct 2050; Henderson v Fisher (CA3 Pa) 631 F2d 1115, on remand (WD Pa) 506 F
Supp 579 and (criticized on other grounds by Ybarra v Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home
Village (CA9 Nev) 723 F2d 675); Holland v Rubin (ED NY) 460 F Supp 1051; Stevens v
Rifkin (ND Cal) 608 F Supp 710; Black v Cloose (DC Minn) 612 F Supp 470, affd (CA8
Minn) 758 F2d 317; Davis v Eddie, 130 Mich App 284, 343 NW2d 11, app den 419 Mich
943; State ex rel. Department of Justice v District Court, 172 Mont 88, 560 P2d 1328;
Minicozzi v Glen Cove (2d Dep't) 97 App Div 2d 815, 468 NYS2d 689.
Annotation: Immunity of prosecuting attorney or similar officer from action for false
arrest or imprisonment, 79 ALR3d 882 3.
Footnote 86. Reilly v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (CA9 Cal) 15 F2d 314
(applying California law); Fletcher v McMahon, 73 App DC 263, 121 F2d 729, cert den
314 US 662, 86 L Ed 531, 62 S Ct 131 (by implication); Lang v Wood, 67 App DC 287,
92 F2d 211, cert den 302 US 686, 82 L Ed 530, 58 S Ct 48; Polidor v Mahady, 130 Vt
173, 287 A2d 841.
Allegations that prosecutors made false pretrial statements, tampered with evidence and
altered trial transcripts did not relate to the investigative phase of the process, and
prosecutors were protected by prosecutorial immunity. Gutierrez v Vergari (SD NY) 499
F Supp 1040, 31 FR Serv 2d 293 (criticized on other grounds in Curro v Watson (ED
NY) 884 F Supp 708).
Claims of allegedly unlawful arrest, illegal search and seizure, excessive bail, untimely
prosecution and illegal detention related to judicial phase of the criminal process and
were barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Holland v Rubin (ED NY) 460 F Supp
1051.
County prosecutor representing a child's mother as a private attorney also initiated child
molesting charges against the child's father and arranged for father's arrest one day before
hearing on contempt charge concerning the mother's failure to comply with a visitation
order; the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity on father's false arrest claim.
Petry v Lawler (SD Ind) 718 F Supp 1396.
Asserting that the immunity from a civil action, including that of false imprisonment,
which protects a prosecuting attorney acting within the scope of his or her duties was
identical to that protecting a judge, the court expressed the view in Bottos v Beamer (ND
Ind) 399 F Supp 999, apparently applying federal law, that the immunity applies
regardless of intentions and motivationsno matter how evil, sinister, or diabolical they
may be.
County prosecutor was absolutely immune from claim of false imprisonment concerning
involuntary commitment to detoxification center, regardless of the prosecutor's failure to
make an adequate investigation before preparing petition, and despite fabricated
accusations included in the petition; the only accusations which would destroy absolute
immunity were destruction of exculpatory evidence or commission of perjury. Dick v
Watonwan County (DC Minn) 551 F Supp 983, later proceeding (DC Minn) 562 F Supp
1083, 13 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1068, revd on other grounds (CA8 Minn) 738 F2d 939.
Alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurring after the preliminary hearing was related
unquestionably to trial preparation and was subject to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Reed v City & County of Honolulu, 76 Hawaii 219, 873 P2d 98.
A county attorney who was requested by an officer to accompany the officer in locating a
suspect, and who carried a concealed weapon in doing so, was acting in the scope of
employment by keeping the peace and arresting the suspect, and was immune from the
suspect's false arrest claim. Mendoza v Reno County, 235 Kan 692, 681 P2d 676.
arrest or imprisonment, 79 ALR3d 882 4[a].
Footnote 87. Koch v Grimminger, 192 Neb 706, 223 NW2d 833, 79 ALR3d 874; Cashen
v Spann, 66 NJ 541, 334 A2d 8, cert den 423 US 829, 46 L Ed 2d 46, 96 S Ct 48 and on
remand 143 NJ Super 560, 364 A2d 21, affd 150 NJ Super 500, 376 A2d 186, revd on
other grounds 77 NJ 138, 389 A2d 969; Price v Cook, 120 Okla 105, 250 P 519.
Although prosecutors have absolute immunity for approving or ratifying a warrantless
arrest, prosecutors enjoy only qualified immunity when engaged in investigative
activities and detainee's claim against prosecutor for illegal arrest, detention and use of
force was proper, where the prosecutor had participated in the detainee's 12-hour
marathon interrogation. Thomas v Riddle (ND Ill) 673 F Supp 262.
Due to a clerical error, a witness detained to testify in a criminal action was detained for
five months after trial was completed; district attorney was immune from false
imprisonment claim, since there were no allegations of malice and the evidence indicated
mere negligence. Navarre v Foti (La App 4th Cir) 562 So 2d 1113.
In Carpenter v Rochester, 67 Misc 2d 832, 324 NYS2d 591, affd (4th Dep't) 39 App Div
2d 1019, 335 NYS2d 255, the court, in discussing the liability of a district attorney for
false arrest and false imprisonment, stated that a prosecutor is immune from liability for
civil suit unless it is alleged that he, after acquiring knowledge that he should not have
brought the suit against the plaintiff, had expressly conducted himself in a manner
calculated to injure the plaintiff. To hold otherwise, stated the court, would constitute an
unreasonable interference with the disposition of criminal proceedings and the court
related social services provided therewith.
See, however, Zimmerman v New York, 52 Misc 2d 797, 276 NYS2d 711, where,
although the court was only concerned with the liability of a municipality for the alleged
false imprisonment of the plaintiff by a district attorney and his assistants, the court stated
that as quasi-judicial officers, prosecutors as well as all persons acting under their
direction and control are immune from civil suit for official acts performed by them in the
investigation and prosecution of the crime with which the plaintiff was charged, even if it
be assumed that they acted maliciously to the injury and damage of the plaintiff.
arrest or imprisonment, 79 ALR3d 882 4[b].
Footnote 88. Price v Cook, 120 Okla 105, 250 P 519 (county attorney and assistant
county attorney).
Footnote 89. Bohri v Barnett (CA7 Wis) 144 F 389.
Footnote 90. Casey v Casey, 142 Ark 246, 218 SW 678.
Footnote 91. Downey v Allen, 36 Cal App 2d 269, 97 P2d 515; Koch v Grimminger, 192
Neb 706, 223 NW2d 833, 79 ALR3d 874; Cashen v Spann, 66 NJ 541, 334 A2d 8, cert
den 423 US 829, 46 L Ed 2d 46, 96 S Ct 48 and on remand 143 NJ Super 560, 364 A2d
21, affd 150 NJ Super 500, 376 A2d 186, revd on other grounds 77 NJ 138, 389 A2d 969.
86 L Ed 531, 62 S Ct 131.
c. Physicians [114, 115]

Examining physicians who testify or otherwise give evidence in proceedings to determine
sanity have been held immune from liability for false imprisonment in a number of cases
on several different theories. 93 In a few cases such immunity has been granted on the
ground that court-appointed physicians are in effect judicial or quasi judicial officers and
as such entitled to the protection of judicial immunity. 94 Other cases have ruled that
physicians giving testimony or other forms of evidence in connection with insanity
proceedings are protected from liability in a later suit for false imprisonment by the
doctrine of privilege or immunity for relevant testimony in judicial proceedings. 95 The
mantle of sovereign immunity has sometimes been extended to examining physicians
employed by an agency of the state, so as to protect them from liability for false
imprisonment based on the institution of insanity proceedings resulting in a commitment
for mental examination. 96
Footnotes
Footnote 93. Niven v Boland, 177 Mass 11, 58 NE 282; Linder v Foster, 209 Minn 43,
295 NW 299; Springer v Steiner, 91 Or 100, 178 P 592; Dyer v Dyer, 178 Tenn 234, 156
SW2d 445.
connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 ALR3d 523 5[a].
Footnote 94. Bartlett v Weimer (CA7 Ind) 268 F2d 860, cert den 361 US 938, 4 L Ed 2d
358, 80 S Ct 380; Baer v Smith, 68 Cal App 2d 716, 157 P2d 646; Sukeforth v Thegen
(Me) 256 A2d 162 (recognizing rule); Linder v Foster, 209 Minn 43, 295 NW 299.
See also Beckham v Cline, 151 Fla 481, 10 So 2d 419, 145 ALR 705, where the court
apparently recognized that physicians appointed to examine an allegedly insane person
would be entitled to rely on the defense of immunity as quasi-judicial officers in a
subsequent action for false imprisonment based on an erroneous commitment, but ruled
that this defense was not available to protect physicians who reported to the judge in a
lunacy proceeding that the woman whom they had been appointed to examine was
insane, when in fact they had not even examined her, since without making an
examination the physicians had no authority to make any report to the court concerning
the mental condition of the woman.
And see Bromund v Holt, 24 Wis 2d 336, 129 NW2d 149, where the court cited a
number of cases, including some for false imprisonment, as authority for the view that
physicians appointed to examine a person in connection with proceedings to determine
sanity are immune from civil liability, either on the ground that they are quasi-judicial
officers and as such immune from liability for actions within their jurisdiction, or that
they are expert witnesses and are immune on the theory of absolute privilege for relevant
testimony.
As to the immunity of quasi-judicial officers, generally, see 109 et seq.
Footnote 95. Hurley v Towne, 155 Me 433, 156 A2d 377; Mezullo v Maletz, 331 Mass
233, 118 NE2d 356; Bromund v Holt, 24 Wis 2d 336, 129 NW2d 149.
Footnote 96. Fish v Regents of University of Cal. (1st Dist) 246 Cal App 2d 327, 54 Cal
Rptr 656; Morris v Nowotny (Tex Civ App Austin) 323 SW2d 301, writ ref n r e (Jun 10,
1959) and rehg of writ of error overr (Jul 8, 1959) and cert den 361 US 889, 4 L Ed 2d
124, 80 S Ct 164, reh den 361 US 921, 4 L Ed 2d 189, 80 S Ct 264.
Facts presented by plaintiff did not support a cause of action against two physicians for
false imprisonment where emergency admissions to mental hospitals were the result of
legal processes. Olsen v Karwoski (1st Dist) 68 Ill App 3d 1031, 25 Ill Dec 173, 386
NE2d 444.
115 Effect of errors or omissions by physician [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
In some cases involving the liability of physicians who have examined allegedly insane
persons and given evidence as to their sanity, the courts, while not expressly rejecting the
privilege or immunity defense, have treated the issue of liability for false imprisonment
as one to be generally resolved on the merits. Recovery has ordinarily been allowed in
such cases where the physician, although certifying that he examined the plaintiff and
found him to be insane, in fact made the certification without conducting any
examination. 97 However, where the physician has made an examination, and the
plaintiff's contention is that it was a faulty or inadequate examination, or that the
physician reached the wrong conclusion as to the plaintiff's sanity, recovery has generally
been denied. 98
Although a physician's failure to file a required report with the court in connection with
an emergency detention procedure does not of itself make the detention unlawful or
create a basis of liability for the physician, the detainee may also allege violations of
medical practice in connection with the physician's handling of the matter, raising a jury
issue by presenting an expert witness with a contrary medical view. 99 A physician
acting as a court psychiatrist may not be immune under state law as to alleged procedural
violations in a civil commitment procedure. 1
Footnotes
Footnote 97. Beckham v Cline, 151 Fla 481, 10 So 2d 419, 145 ALR 705; Crouch v
Cameron (Ky) 414 SW2d 408, 30 ALR3d 520; O'Rourke v O'Rourke, 227 La 262, 79 So
2d 87.
Assuming that members of incompetency committee had no immunity, allegations
contained in complaint filed in action for deprivation of civil rights that plaintiff had not
been examined by committee as required by law, stated cause of action for false
imprisonment. White v Padgett (CA5 Fla) 475 F2d 79, cert den 414 US 861, 38 L Ed 2d
112, 94 S Ct 78 (applying Florida law).
See, however, Christopher v Henry, 284 Ky 127, 143 SW2d 1069, where two certifying
physicians were held not liable for illegally causing the incarceration of an alleged insane
person, even though one of the physicians made no examination at all and the other was
unable to make a personal examination because of the refusal of the alleged insane person
to submit to one.
Coroner who issued certificate attesting plaintiff's need for commitment to mental
institution without observing and examining plaintiff could not rely on immunity based
on state constitution or statute where petition alleged illegal commitment. Delatte v
Genovese (La App 1st Cir) 228 So 2d 252.
Although recognizing that examining and certifying physician acting as witness in
commitment proceedings enjoys absolute immunity from civil liability, or that physician
acting in quasi-judicial capacity, as in present case, where he alone determines whether
individual is mentally ill and should be subjected to immediate emergency restraint, also
enjoys immunity from civil liability arising out of acts which are proper exercise of his
discretionary and judicial functions; physician acting in quasi-judicial capacity could not
receive protection of immunity where he did not perform examination needed to acquire
jurisdiction over person to be restrained, and thereafter falsely certified that examination
had been made and determined that plaintiff was mentally ill and needed to be restrained.
Sukeforth v Thegen (Me) 256 A2d 162.
Punitive damages were improperly awarded against physician who failed to examine
plaintiff within 10 days before signing certificate of insanity where plaintiff, who was
denied compensatory damages as matter of law on ground that she required psychiatric
help so that no actual damage resulted from her commitment, had been constantly
attended by defendant physician until 5 months before he signed certificate; physician
had received numerous reports concerning plaintiff's conduct during the last 5 months
from the plaintiff's family, and had signed certificate at request of plaintiff's daughter and
on condition that psychiatrist confirm his diagnosis; record showed that had physician
examined plaintiff within 10 days of signing certificate his conclusions would have been
no different; and it was not contended that physician acted vindictively but contrarily it
was undisputed that he was motivated by interest in plaintiff's welfare and health. Di
Giovanni v Pessel, 55 NJ 188, 260 A2d 510.
Footnote 98. Christiansen v Weston, 36 Ariz 200, 284 P 149; Bailey v McGill, 247 NC
286, 100 SE2d 860.
For other cases rejecting liability for false imprisonment against examining physicians
who allegedly conducted an inadequate or erroneous medical examination, decided on the
ground that a false imprisonment suit cannot be based on a commitment authorized by
apparently valid process, issued by a court having jurisdiction, see Fisher v Payne, 93 Fla
1085, 113 So 378; Mezullo v Maletz, 331 Mass 233, 118 NE2d 356; Guzy v Guzy, 16
Misc 2d 975, 184 NYS2d 161, affd (2d Dep't) 11 App Div 2d 1047, 206 NYS2d 355;
Pate v Stevens (Tex Civ App) 257 SW2d 763, writ dism w o j.
See also Christopher v Henry, 284 Ky 127, 143 SW2d 1069. Although the court said that
the principles to be applied in this case were those of an action to recover damages for
malicious prosecution, the plaintiffaccording to the court's description of his petition
did not use the word "malicious" or any form of it in charging that the physicians
"illegally caused his apprehension and incarceration" in an insane asylum, and the court
itself indicated that the action was to recover damages "for the brief imprisonment of
plaintiff." Thus, it appears more likely that the court was viewing the action as one for
false imprisonment rather than one for malicious prosecution.
Plaintiff's claim for alleged wrongful detention in state mental hospital was properly
dismissed where statements made to examining physicians, plus her prior history, were
sufficient to support determination that she was mentally ill; alleged failure of state's
physicians to make exhaustive investigation of plaintiff's statements made during
examination was at most error in medical judgment for which state was not liable. Young
v State (3d Dep't) 40 App Div 2d 730, 336 NYS2d 470.

Footnote 99. Reiser v Prunty, 224 Mont 1, 727 P2d 538.
Footnote 1. Temple v Marlborough Div. of Dist. Court Dep't, 395 Mass 117, 479 NE2d
137.
E. Practice And Procedure [116-139]

Research References
ALR Digest: False Imprisonment
10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms 1, 1.1, 1.3, 21-33, 43-46,
51-54.1, 56-58, 71-73, 91-97, 104-107, 111-113, 119, 131, 132
26 Am Jur POF2d 617, False imprisonmentFailure to take arrestee before magistrate
without unreasonable or unnecessary delay
4 Am Jur Trials 441, Solving Statutes of Limitations Problems
1. In General [116-118]
116 Time to sue; limitations [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Under statutes barring actions for false imprisonment begun more than a specified time
after the accrual of the cause of action, it is generally held that the limitation begins to run
from the termination of the imprisonment or confinement and not from the time of
termination of the proceedings under which the plaintiff's arrest occurred. 2
Each day of a false imprisonment is a continuing trespass against the plaintiff, 3 and a
statute of limitation period will be analyzed separately for each cause of action. 4
While the period of limitation for actions for false arrest, false imprisonment and
wrongful detention are generally the same, 5 issues may arise, where statutory periods do
not specifically refer to false imprisonment as a cause of action, as to the applicability of
limitation periods related to actions against public officers, as opposed to more general
limitation statutes concerning other civil actions. 6
Where the statute is viewed as running from the time of termination of the imprisonment
or confinement, the mere fact that, until the police testified in the criminal trial, the
defendant was unaware that the arrest had been illegal, has been held not to delay
commencement of the period of limitations. 7 It has also been held that duress allegedly
preventing a plaintiff from commencing the action within the prescribed time, even if
proved, will not toll the running of the statute. 8 For the purpose of a statutory provision
requiring that claims against the state be filed within 90 days after accrual of such claims,
it has been held that a claim for false arrest accrues at the time of arraignment and release
on bail, rather than at the time of acquittal. 9 In this connection, a distinction has been
made between a cause of action for false imprisonment and a cause of action for false
arrest, it being held that the former accrues upon release from detention while the latter
accrues at the time of arraignment. 10
In some jurisdictions, however, the rule appears to be that the statute of limitations runs
from the date of arrest or the order of commitment, rather than from the date of release
from confinement. 11 In such a jurisdiction, where the pleadings indicate that a cause of
action is for false arrest only, and not also for malicious prosecution, the statute will
begin to run on the date of the arrest rather than on the date of termination of the
proceedings, 12 and the statute is not tolled because plaintiff was imprisoned. 13
Where an action for false imprisonment is brought under the Federal Civil Rights Act
provision creating a private right of action for acts done under color of state law, 14
there being no federal statute of limitations applicable to such actions, it is uniformly held
that the state statute of limitations should be applied. 15
Designation of a party to the complaint as "John Doe," and subsequent naming of the
individual so designated as a party to the action, may not be permitted to relate back in
date, so as to preserve a cause of action from the bar of a statute of limitation. 16
Footnotes
Footnote 2. Warren v Byrne (CA2 NY) 699 F2d 95; Lathon v Parish of Jefferson (ED La)
358 F Supp 558 (applying Louisiana law); Alexander v Thompson (CA6 Mich) 195 F 31;
Kirwan v State, 31 Conn Supp 46, 320 A2d 837, affd 168 Conn 498, 363 A2d 56;
Matovina v Hult, 125 Ind App 236, 123 NE2d 893; De Bouchel v Koss Const. Co., 177
La 841, 149 So 496; Hackler v Miller, 79 Neb 206, 112 NW 303, adhered to 79 Neb 209,
114 NW 274; O'Fallon v Pollard (ND) 427 NW2d 809; Belflower v Blackshere (Okla)
281 P2d 423, 49 ALR2d 917; Nave v Seattle, 68 Wash 2d 721, 415 P2d 93, app dismd
385 US 450, 17 L Ed 2d 513, 87 S Ct 614, reh den 386 US 929, 17 L Ed 2d 803, 87 S
Ct 853; Oosterwyk v Bucholtz, 250 Wis 521, 27 NW2d 361.
Arrestee's complaint alleging civil rights violations and false arrest was time-barred; state
law claims accrued on the date of arrest, while civil rights claim accrued on the date of
release from confinement. Young v Philadelphia (ED Pa) 744 F Supp 673, affd without
op (CA3 Pa) 931 F2d 53.
In suit for false imprisonment, arising out of plaintiff's involuntary civil commitment to
mental hospital, confinement was continuing tort and limitation period commenced
running only upon patient's release. Donaldson v O'Connor (CA5 Fla) 493 F2d 507,
vacated on other grounds 422 US 563, 45 L Ed 2d 396, 95 S Ct 2486, on remand on
other grounds (CA5 Fla) 519 F2d 59.
Party's cause of action for false arrest accrued for purposes of statutory period of
limitations when plaintiff regained his liberty by release upon recognizance.
Jedzierowski v Jordan, 157 Me 352, 172 A2d 636.
False arrest technically accrues at the initial moment of restraint but becomes complete at
the end of the restraint, and the latter date is the date of accrual for statute of limitation
purposes. Karen v State, 111 Misc 2d 396, 444 NYS2d 381, 1982-1 CCH Trade Cases
64593.
False imprisonment is a continuing tort for which a cause of action accrues when the
detention ceases. Adler v Beverly Hills Hospital (Tex Civ App Dallas) 594 SW2d 153.
Annotation: When statute of limitations begins to run against action for false
imprisonment or false arrest, 49 ALR2d 922.
Practice References Solving Statutes of Limitations Problems. 4 Am Jur Trials 441 12.
Footnote 3. Bennett v Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 60 Ohio St 3d 107, 573
NE2d 633.
Footnote 4. King v Otasco, Inc. (CA5 Miss) 861 F2d 438, 12 FR Serv 3d 824.
Footnote 5. Cowdrey v Eastborough (CA10 Kan) 730 F2d 1376; Jenkins v Daniels
(Alaska) 751 P2d 19; Mound Bayou v Johnson (Miss) 562 So 2d 1212, reh den (Miss)
1990 Miss LEXIS 375.
Footnote 6. Jenkins v Daniels (Alaska) 751 P2d 19; Fowler v Valencourt, 334 NC 345,
dissenting op at (NC) 435 SE2d 530.
Footnote 7. Collins v County of Los Angeles (2nd Dist) 241 Cal App 2d 451, 50 Cal Rptr
586.
Footnote 8. Jastrzebski v New York (SD NY) 423 F Supp 669 (applying New York law).
Footnote 9. Huff v State (3d Dept) 27 App Div 2d 892, 278 NYS2d 12.
Footnote 10. Jastrzebski v New York (SD NY) 423 F Supp 669 (applying New York law).
Generally as to distinction between false imprisonment and false arrest, see 2.
Footnote 11. Henig v Odorioso (ED Pa) 256 F Supp 276, affd (CA3 Pa) 385 F2d 491, cert
den 390 US 1016, 20 L Ed 2d 166, 88 S Ct 1269, reh den 391 US 929, 20 L Ed 2d
671, 88 S Ct 1814 (apparently assuming that statute of limitations on action for false
imprisonment began running on date of arrest or order of confinement, rather than on
date of release from confinement); Whitsell v Rodrigues (ED La) 351 F Supp 1042
(applying Louisiana law); Gilpin v Tack (WD Ark) 256 F Supp 562 (expressing dictum to
effect that statute of limitations on false arrest claim began running on date of arrest);
Brewster v Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 174 US App DC 164, 530 F2d 1016; Buvens v
Buvens (La App 3d Cir) 286 So 2d 144.
Cause of action for false arrest and false imprisonment accrued for limitations purposes
on the date of arrest. Hitchmon v United States (SD Fla) 585 F Supp 256.
See also Evans v Chipps, 56 NC App 232, 287 SE2d 426 (criticized on other grounds by
Clark v Velsicol Chem. Corp., 110 NC App 803, 431 SE2d 227) and (disapproved on
other grounds by Fowler v Valencourt, 334 NC 345) (plaintiff's actions to recover
damages for alleged violations of civil rights, false imprisonment and other claims were
barred by the statute of limitations; all of the claims arose by the date on which the
plaintiff was sentenced to prison and on which the plaintiff would necessarily have
known of the injuries forming the bases of the actions).
Footnote 12. Meyers v Edwards (La App 1st Cir) 256 So 2d 337.
Footnote 13. Hileman v Knable (MD Pa) 266 F Supp 317 (applying Pennsylvania law).
Footnote 14. 42 USCS 1983. For discussion, see 15 Am Jur 2d (Rev), Civil Rights
16-21, 269.
Footnote 15. Hileman v Knable (MD Pa) 266 F Supp 317 (applying Pennsylvania law);
King v Otasco, Inc. (CA5 Miss) 861 F2d 438, 12 FR Serv 3d 824; Ketchum v West
Memphis (CA8 Ark) 974 F2d 81; Rodgers v Corporation of Harpers Ferry, 179 W Va
637, 371 SE2d 358.
Action under Federal Civil Rights Act for false imprisonment and false arrest was barred
by state statute of limitations of 1 year where events took place over 2 years prior to
filing complaint and where statute began to run upon occurrence of events and was not
tolled during period of confinement. Getz v Bruch (ED Pa) 400 F Supp 1033 (applying
Pennsylvania law).
In action under Federal Civil Rights Act (42 USCS 1983, 1988) apparently stating
cause of action analogous to action under state law for false arrest and false
imprisonment, state statute of limitations of 1 year applied, and began to run from date of
plaintiff's arrest, plaintiff's intervening imprisonment not operating to toll statute in regard
to false arrest claim; but in regard to false imprisonment claim, although statute of
limitations also was not tolled, since plaintiff had been in prison continuously since his
arrest, he had cause of action for those damages incurred during year immediately
preceding commencement of his action. Whitsell v Rodrigues (ED La) 351 F Supp 1042
(applying Louisiana law).
Footnote 16. Leaon v Washington County (Minn) 397 NW2d 867.
117 Jurisdiction and venue [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Venue of false imprisonment actions is usually controlled by statute. Thus, for example,
depending on the pertinent statutory provisions, the county in which the cause of action
arose, 17 or the county of the defendant's residence, 18 may be the proper place in
which to bring the action.
While a court may, within its discretion, decline jurisdiction of an action for false
imprisonment on the grounds of forum non conveniens, such discretion is not unlimited.
19
In many jurisdictions, statutes have been enacted providing that an action against a public
officer for an act done by virtue or under color of office must be tried in the county where
the cause or some part thereof arose. 20 Under such a statute, it has been held that the
action might be brought in the county in which the seizure of the plaintiff took place,
even though the plaintiff was subsequently taken to and detained in another county. 21
Or, it has also been held, it might be brought in the county to which the plaintiff was
subsequently taken, or in which the plaintiff was subsequently detained, 22 or in the
county in which the affidavit was made forming the grounds for the arrest. 23
Where the plaintiff is arrested in one county but transported through another county to a
place of incarceration in the county of arrest, there is a division of authority whether
venue can properly be laid in the county through which the arrested person was
transported, some authority holding venue properly laid in that county, 24 and others
holding that venue is in the county in which the plaintiff was arrested. 25
It has been held that actions for false imprisonment do not come within a statute
providing that a cause of action for injury to person or property shall be tried "in the
county where the injury occurs", the statute being construed as limited to the infliction of
physical or bodily injury and as not including mere injury to reputation, business, or
personal feelings. 26 There is, however, authority to the contrary. 27
Footnotes
Footnote 17. Summers v Southern R. Co., 118 Ga 174, 45 SE 27; Lawton v Farrell, 178
App Div 376, 164 NYS 838, affd 221 NY 654, 117 NE 1075.
Footnote 18. Miles v Wright, 22 Ariz 73, 194 P 88, 12 ALR 970; Monk v Ehret, 192 Cal
186, 219 P 452; Haffner v United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 35 Idaho 517, 207 P 716,
later proceeding 49 Idaho 451, 288 P 1071 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by
Helgeson v Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P2d 957).
Footnote 19. Washington v May Dep't Stores (Dist Col App) 388 A2d 484 (where the
plaintiff was a resident of the jurisdiction in which the suit was brought, the defendant
had a significant presence there, and most of the witnesses resided there, the court's
determination to dismiss the action on the grounds of forum non conveniens was
improper, it being clear that a balancing of the private interests involved favored
conducting the suit in such jurisdiction).
Footnote 20. 63 Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees 612, 613.
As to venue of action against sheriff for false imprisonment, see 70 Am Jur 2d, Sheriffs,
Police, and Constables 223.
Footnote 21. Enos v American Sur. Co., 95 Mont 588, 28 P2d 197; Ellis v Baker, 62 App
Div 542, 71 NYS 88; Jordan v Koerth, 212 Wis 109, 248 NW 918.
Annotation: Venue of actions or proceedings against public officers, 48 ALR2d 423
11[c].
Footnote 22. Shugart v Cruise (CA4 Va) 260 F 36; King v Milner, 63 Colo 405, 167 P
957.
If the arrest occurred in one county, and the imprisonment in another, the action can
properly be tried in either county. Haffner v United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 35 Idaho
517, 207 P 716, later proceeding 49 Idaho 451, 288 P 1071 and (ovrld in part on other
grounds by Helgeson v Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P2d 957); Meihak v Schreckenghaust,
67 SD 603, 297 NW 122.
Footnote 23. Leach v Stone (Tex Civ App) 264 SW 620.
Footnote 24. Hooper v Deisher (Tex Civ App) 113 SW2d 966.
Footnote 25. Bergin v Temple, 111 Mont 539, 111 P2d 286, 133 ALR 1115, in which it
was held that in false imprisonment the cause of action arises at the moment of the arrest
by which plaintiff's personal liberty is unlawfully violated, and no further cause of action
arises even though during the imprisonment plaintiff is carried from the county of his
arrest into another county.
Footnote 26. Plum v Forgay Lumber Co., 118 Cal App 76, 4 P2d 804.
Footnote 27. Rains v Smith, 155 Ky 766, 160 SW 493.
118 Joinder of actions [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Under the rules of pleading in many jurisdictions, actions for false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution may properly be joined in separate counts. 28 However, the two
causes have been held to be inconsistent; consequently, the plaintiff may be required to
elect upon which count to go to the jury. 29
A claim of false arrest frequently ripens into false imprisonment and the two claims are
often brought together. 30
Frequently, the same facts which give rise to a false imprisonment also establish a cause
of action for abuse of process, in which case the causes may be joined in the same action,
but not in the same count, 31 since actions for false arrest or imprisonment and abuse of
process are separate claims. 32
Footnotes
Footnote 28. Stubbs v Abercrombie, 42 Cal App 170, 183 P 458; Page v Citizens'
Banking Co., 111 Ga 73, 36 SE 418; Haskins v Ralston, 69 Mich 63, 37 NW 45; Burton v
Drennan, 332 Mo 512, 58 SW2d 740; Thomas v F. & R. Lazarus & Co. (App, Franklin
Co) 3 Ohio Ops 2d 75, 40 Ohio L Abs 51, 57 NE2d 116.
Footnote 29. Rosendale v Market Square Dry Goods Co. (Mo App) 213 SW 169.
Where the plaintiff states a cause of action for false arrest, the fact that he pleads
additional facts which may constitute a cause of action for malicious prosecution will not
support a demurrer for misjoinder, at least where the plaintiff has clearly, in his pleading,
elected the remedy of false arrest rather than the remedy of malicious prosecution. State
ex rel. Cain v Corbett, 235 NC 33, 69 SE2d 20.
As to distinctions between malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, see 5.
Footnote 30. Mound Bayou v Johnson (Miss) 562 So 2d 1212, reh den (Miss) 1990 Miss
LEXIS 375.
Footnote 31. See 1 Am Jur 2d, Abuse of Process 20.
As to distinctions between abuse of process and false imprisonment, see 4.
2. Parties [119, 120]

119 Generally; parties plaintiff [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Generally, actions for false imprisonment or arrest are personal, and do not give rise to a
cause of action in anyone other than the person aggrieved. 33 However, it has been held
that when a party plaintiff dies pendente lite, that party's representative is properly
substituted. 34
Two plaintiffs may join in an action where the relief sought arises out of the same
transaction, and where a question of law or fact will arise that is common to all parties;
thus, if two persons are arrested at the same time, at the same place, and with the same
persons present, the arrest constitutes one "transaction," and its wrongfulness would be a
question of fact common to both parties, within the meaning of the rule. 35 The fact that
damages in a false arrest or imprisonment action may require individualized
determination would not preclude certification of a plaintiff class of aggrieved
individuals, but the necessity of individualized liability determination suggests that a
class action would not be the best way to resolve such claims. 36
Footnotes
97 L Ed 653, 73 S Ct 50.
As to survival of causes of action for false imprisonment, generally, see 1 Am Jur 2d,
Abatement, Survival, and Revival 91.
Footnote 35. Peters v Bigelow, 137 Cal App 135, 30 P2d 450.
Footnote 36. McCarthy v Kleindienst, 239 US App DC 247, 741 F2d 1406, 39 FR Serv
2d 1165.
120 Parties defendant [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Distinctions have been drawn between false arrest and false imprisonment with respect to
potential party defendants. 37
Where several persons unite in the commission of a false imprisonment, each is equally
liable, jointly and severally, regardless of whether a conspiracy to do the act had
theretofore been entered into. 38 Hence, the injured person may sue all of them, any
one, or as many as he or she chooses. 39
The necessity for individual liability determinations on a false imprisonment claim
suggests that a class action may not be the best method of resolving such claims. 40
Footnotes
Footnote 37. Bender v Seattle, 99 Wash 2d 582, 664 P2d 492, 9 Media L R 2101 (holding
that false arrest may be committed only by one who has legal authority to arrest or who
had pretended legal authority to arrest, while false imprisonment may exist apart from
any purported process of law enforcement, through the actions of private individuals
acting on their own initiative).
Footnote 38. 37.
Footnote 39. American R. Express Co. v Stone (CA1 Mass) 27 F2d 8, 66 ALR 202;
Grimes v Greenblatt, 47 Colo 495, 107 P 1111; Page v Citizens' Banking Co., 111 Ga 73,
36 SE 418; Blackman v Simpson, 120 Mich 377, 79 NW 573; Anderson v Averbeck, 189
Minn 224, 248 NW 719; Burton v Drennan, 332 Mo 512, 58 SW2d 740; Burk v Howley,
179 Pa 539, 36 A 327.
Footnote 40. McCarthy v Kleindienst, 239 US App DC 247, 741 F2d 1406, 39 FR Serv
2d 1165.
3. Pleadings [121-125]
121 Petition or complaint; allegations as to particular matters [32 Am Jur 2d
FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Generally, in order to set forth a cause of action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must
allege that the imprisonment was wrongful or unlawful, or allege facts or circumstances
showing the unlawfulness thereof. 41 There must be an allegation that there is no color
of legal authority lending legal justification for the restraint of the plaintiff. 42
Allegations of procedural irregularities with respect to the underlying arrest or
imprisonment cannot substitute for allegations as to the absence of legal justification. 43
A general allegation in a false imprisonment pleading that the police arrested the plaintiff
without probable cause is not sufficient to preserve a question of material fact not
asserted by the plaintiff in the trial court. 44
Where the arrest or confinement was under a warrant or other process, the facts
constituting the invalidity of the process must be set forth in the complaint. 45 However,
if an allegedly false arrest was made without a warrant, it is sufficient to plead the arrest
and a subsequent confinement, as the illegality of the arrest is presumed. 46
A claim of false imprisonment against an attorney raises the issue of fraud and must
therefore be pled with particularity. 47
As a general rule, the plaintiff is not required to plead that the proceeding upon which the
arrest or detention was based has terminated in his or her favor. 48
Footnotes
Footnote 41. Burlington Transp. Co. v Josephson (CA8 SD) 153 F2d 372; Whaley v
Jansen (4th Dist) 208 Cal App 2d 222, 25 Cal Rptr 184; Webb v Prince, 62 Ga App 749, 9
SE2d 675; Smith v Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P 653.
Allegations that the defendant appeared before the chief of police and willfully,
maliciously, and without cause, falsely charged the plaintiff with adultery, and that the
police chief executed a warrant for the plaintiff's arrest, were sufficient to support an
action for false imprisonment. Wilson v Eberle (DC Alaska) 15 Alaska 260.
A declaration was sufficient to plead an action for false imprisonment where it pleaded
the following: that the defendant, a merchant, had sued out a warrant for the arrest of a
person by a particular name; that the warrant had been placed in the hands of the sheriff;
that the defendant had notified the sheriff that the person sought in the warrant was in his
store; that the sheriff came to the store and arrested the plaintiff; that the defendant was
acquainted with the plaintiff, or should have been, as he had bought merchandise from
the defendant for a number of years; that plaintiff had committed no crime and was not
the person of the same name against whom the defendant had sought the warrant; and
that defendant maliciously and wrongfully had had plaintiff arrested and put in jail.
Johnson v Weiner, 155 Fla 169, 19 So 2d 699.
A pleading that defendant had suddenly grabbed plaintiff and laid hold of her hands,
arms, and body and imputed to her that she had stolen certain articles from a store, and
thereupon unlawfully, and against her will, took her into custody and detained her,
deprived her of her right to freedom and locomotion, and publicly searched her and her
shopping bag, states a cause of action for false imprisonment. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v Smith, 281 Ky 583, 136 SW2d 759.
Cause of action for false imprisonment was stated in petition alleging that defendant
unlawfully, maliciously, and with intent to injure, falsely imprisoned plaintiffs for 24
hours by force, without reasonable cause, right, or authority, and against will of
plaintiffs. Pogue v Smallen (Mo) 285 SW2d 915.
Where the complaint alleges the facts and circumstances leading to an arrest in
considerable detail, showing that an arrest without a warrant or any other process was
unjustified, together with the direct allegation that the arrest was made "without warrant,"
the complaint sufficiently charges the arrest to have been made without legal justification,
and is sufficient against the objection of the absence of a further specific allegation that
the arrest was "without other process." Harrer v Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont
295, 221 P2d 428.
Forms: Complaint, petition, or declarationfalse imprisonment imposed by private
individualAttempted extortion by means of threats of violence. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr
Complaint, petition or declaration in actions based on false imprisonment imposed by
private individualSexual assault. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment,
Form 1.1.
Complaint, petition or declaration in actions for false imprisonment on refusal of
defendant to allow former domestic partner to leave defendant's residence upon return to
pick up clothing and personal belongings. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Imprisonment, Form 1.3.
Complaint, petition or declaration in actions based on imprisonment of store employee on
accusation of misuse of employee discount privilege. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev),
False Imprisonment, Form 54.1.
Complaint, petition, or declaration in actions based on illegal detention after arrest. 10
Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms 111 et seq.
Complaint, petition, or declaration in actions based on arrest or imprisonment by judicial
or quasi-judicial officer. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms

131, 132.
Footnote 42. Mann v Cannon (CA1 RI) 731 F2d 54.
Pleading brought by former prisoner against county, alleging false arrest, false
imprisonment and civil rights violations, was sufficient to make the requisite statement of
a claim for relief; the action was brought subsequent to the former prisoner's release after
federal habeas corpus proceeding, following ten years' imprisonment on a life sentence.
Cunha v Algona (Iowa) 334 NW2d 591.
Footnote 44. Vessels v District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 531 A2d 1016.
Footnote 45. Kaufman v Brown, 93 Cal App 2d 508, 209 P2d 156 (disapproved on other
grounds by Dragna v White, 45 Cal 2d 469, 289 P2d 428).
A complaint is insufficient to state a cause of action for false arrest where it is not alleged
that the warrant under which the plaintiff was arrested was void, and there are no
allegations in the complaint from which such fact might be determined. Stauffacher v
Brother, 67 SD 314, 292 NW 432, 128 ALR 925.
Forms: Complaint, petition, or declaration in actions based on arrest or imprisonment by
peace officer pursuant to legal process. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Imprisonment, Forms 71-73.
Footnote 46. Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278; Stine v Shuttle, 134
Ind App 67, 186 NE2d 168 (ovrld on other grounds as stated in Seymour Nat'l Bank v
State (Ind App) 384 NE2d 1177).
It has long been the law that a cause of action for false imprisonment is stated where it is
alleged that there was an arrest without process, followed by imprisonment and damages.
Cervantez v J. C. Penney Co., 24 Cal 3d 579, 156 Cal Rptr 198, 595 P2d 975.
Allegations that defendants did not have a warrant authorizing arrest of the plaintiff, and
that plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned in jail for about 24 hours without being taken
before a magistrate, together with the averment of damages, constitute a cause of action
for false arrest. Kaufman v Brown, 93 Cal App 2d 508, 209 P2d 156 (disapproved on
other grounds by Dragna v White, 45 Cal 2d 469, 289 P2d 428).
As to presumption of illegality of detention in case of an arrest without a warrant,
generally, see 126.
peace officer without legal process. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False

Footnote 48. Neves v Costa, 5 Cal App 111, 89 P 860; Boesch v Kick, 98 NJL 183, 119 A
1, 25 ALR 1516.
As to general rule that termination of the prosecution is not essential to the maintenance
of an action for false imprisonment, see 8.
122 -- Defendant's responsibility for acts complained of [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
The plaintiff must allege that the person sought to be held liable instigated, caused, or
procured the arrest or confinement of the party complaining. 49 Liability is not shown
absent allegations that the named defendant was personally and actively involved in the
actions complained of. 50 Thus no liability was shown where the defendant's actions
were not part of the allegedly unlawful arrest, 51 where the defendants were not involved
in deciding the length of the plaintiff's confinement, 52 where a supervisor did not
participate in the broadcast which allegedly caused an allegedly unlawful arrest, 53 or
where the defendant, a merchant, had no part in the subsequent alleged tortious conduct
of police officers. 54
Where an action is brought against a principal for the act of his agent, the plaintiff should
allege that the agent's acts were authorized or ratified by the principal. 55 Similarly, in
an action to hold a superior public officer liable for the act of an inferior who is not the
officer's servant, the complaint should show that the act of the inferior was an official
one. 56 A simple allegation that the act was done by a deputy in the deputy's official
capacity is a mere conclusion. 57
Footnotes
Footnote 49. Burlington Transp. Co. v Josephson (CA8 SD) 153 F2d 372; Richardson v
Empire Trust Co., 230 Mo App 580, 94 SW2d 966.
Averments claiming false arrest were sufficient to state a cause of action where it was
alleged that plaintiff was accosted, stopped, detained by defendant's employee while
deputy sheriff was being called, and required to accompany defendant's employee and
deputy sheriff to locker room, and it was further alleged that defendants, "in perpetuating
the said false arrest and imprisonment of plaintiff, were intentional or in willful and
wanton disregard of the rights and feelings of the plaintiff." McDonald v Lakewood
Country Club, 170 Colo 355, 461 P2d 437.
Complaint alleging that defendant unlawfully ordered and procured arrest of plaintiff by
police, without warrant, forcibly and against will of plaintiff and without reasonable or
probable cause, and that plaintiff was confined in city prison as consequence of false
arrest, was good as against general demurrer. McCoy v Baer (Franklin Co) 100 Ohio App
274, 60 Ohio Ops 226, 136 NE2d 66.
Generally as to liability of persons procuring, directing, or participating in arrest or
imprisonment, see 38 et seq.
private individual. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms 21-30.
Complaint, petition, or declaration in actions based on instigation of or participation in
arrest or imprisonment by private individual. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Footnote 50. Sunshine Jr. Food Stores, Inc. v Aultman (Miss) 546 So 2d 659; Godines v
Footnote 51. Williams v Adams (CA5 La) 836 F2d 958, reh den, en banc (CA5 La) 844
F2d 788.
Footnote 54. Lusk v Ira Watson Co., 185 W Va 680, 408 SE2d 630.
Footnote 55. Minter v Southern Express Co., 153 NC 507, 69 SE 497.
A pleading that the manager of a store has the specific duty to guard the interests of his
principal against the passing of spurious coin and against other misdemeanors liable to
result in monetary loss to his employer is sufficient to plead his authority to inspect a bill
tendered by a customer, to pronounce it counterfeit, even if falsely, and to cause the
customer to be detained in the store and to be given into the custody of a policeman. S.
H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla 471, 180 So 757.
Generally as to vicarious liability for acts of employees or agents, see 49 et seq.
Footnote 56. Miles v Wright, 22 Ariz 73, 194 P 88, 12 ALR 970.
Footnote 57. Jones v Van Bever, 164 Ky 80, 174 SW 795 (ovrld in part on other grounds
by Maryland Casualty Co. v McCormack (Ky) 488 SW2d 347, 82 ALR3d 857).
123 -- Malice; want of probable cause [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Malice 58 and the want of probable cause 59 are not ordinarily elements of a cause of
action for false imprisonment. Although it has been indicated that, where exemplary or
punitive damages are sought, an allegation of malice 60 or want of probable cause 61

may be required, it is generally held that it is not necessary to allege these factors, 62
although there is some contrary authority indicating that failure to allege lack of probable
cause or reasonable grounds renders the complaint demurrable. 63
Even if want of probable cause need not be averred, it has been suggested that its
averment may be helpful, 64 and there is authority supporting the contention that such
allegations, although unnecessary to the action in the first instance, when made must be
supported by proof in order to recover. 65
Footnotes
Footnote 58. 9.
Footnote 59. 10.
Footnote 60. Gill v Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 App Div 36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49
ALR2d 1452.
Footnote 61. McCoy v Baer (Franklin Co) 100 Ohio App 274, 60 Ohio Ops 226, 136
NE2d 66.
Footnote 62. Meints v Huntington (CA8 Minn) 276 F 245, 19 ALR 664; Robinson v
Chicago G. W. R. Co. (DC Mo) 144 F Supp 713; Buttrey v Wilhite, 208 Ala 573, 94 So
585; Stallings v Foster, 119 Cal App 2d 614, 259 P2d 1006; S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell,
132 Fla 471, 180 So 757; Southern R. Co. v Shirley, 121 Ky 863, 90 SW 597; Tumbarella
v Kroger Co., 85 Mich App 482, 271 NW2d 284; Broughton v State, 37 NY2d 451, 373
NYS2d 87, 335 NE2d 310, cert den 423 US 929, 46 L Ed 2d 257, 96 S Ct 277; Jones v
Independent Fence Co., 12 Misc 2d 413, 173 NYS2d 684; McCoy v Baer (Franklin Co)
100 Ohio App 274, 60 Ohio Ops 226, 136 NE2d 66 (recognizing rule); Brown v Meier &
Frank Co., 160 Or 608, 86 P2d 79; Strong v Milwaukee, 38 Wis 2d 564, 157 NW2d 619
(by implication).
Lack of probable cause does not have to be pleaded and proved in action for false arrest
and imprisonment, except that where offense is apparently being committed in presence
of arresting officer, he may by way of defense invoke doctrine of probable cause to
justify arrest without warrant. Miller v Glass, 44 Cal 2d 359, 282 P2d 501.
Malice is not an essential element of a false imprisonment complaint, nor is good faith a
necessary showing. Moody v McElroy (RI) 513 A2d 5.
Annotation: Necessity and sufficiency of allegations in complaint for malicious
prosecution or tort action analogous thereto that defendant or defendants acted without
probable cause, 14 ALR2d 264 18.
Footnote 63. Klimper v Glendale, 99 Cal App 2d 446, 222 P2d 49 (disapproved on other
grounds by Rand v Andreatta, 60 Cal 2d 846, 36 Cal Rptr 846, 389 P2d 382); Edens v
Hudson (Ky) 243 SW2d 501.

Causes of action for false arrest and malicious prosecution against special agent of FBI
were stated by complaint alleging, inter alia, that defendant, without reasonable cause,
arrested plaintiff without warrant for theft of freight being shipped in interstate
commerce; that plaintiff was brought before United States commissioner where he
waived preliminary examination and was held until released on bail; and that complaint
was later dismissed before action by grand jury. Waiver of hearing is at most prima facie
evidence of probable cause, and does not destroy general averment of want of probable
cause. Kozlowski v Ferrara (DC NY) 117 F Supp 650.
Footnote 64. McCoy v Baer (Franklin Co) 100 Ohio App 274, 60 Ohio Ops 226, 136
NE2d 66.
Footnote 65. Wilson v Orr, 210 Ala 93, 97 So 133; Billingsley v Kline Cloak Co., 196
Mo App 534, 196 SW 415.
124 --Exemplary or punitive damages [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Exemplary or punitive damages need not be requested in the pleading. If the facts of the
case warrant an award of such damages, they may be allowed even though the petition
does not pray for them. 66
Footnotes
Footnote 66. Davis v Seeley, 91 Iowa 583, 60 NW 183; Gill v Montgomery Ward & Co.,
284 App Div 36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49 ALR2d 1452.
As to liability for exemplary or punitive damages, see 149 et seq.
125 Answer [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A number of cases recognize that, at common law, where the complaint is sufficient to
raise the issue of allowance of punitive damages, the defendant may, under a general
denial, show that the defendant acted without malice and in good faith so as to defeat or
diminish the recovery of exemplary damages. 67 However, it has been held, under
statutes in force in a particular jurisdiction, that a special plea of good faith is at least
permissible, 68 and that such a plea is even necessary before the evidence in mitigation
may be received. 69
The defense of justification must be pleaded; it is not available under the general issue.
70
A plea of justification in behalf of a justice must aver his or her jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the person of the defendant in the proceedings. 71
The cases are not in accord as to whether a general denial and a plea of justification are
inconsistent defenses, 72 but, it has been held, such pleas may be joined in the same
answer where a statute allows the pleading of inconsistent defenses. 73
Where a plea to the merits is of such nature that under it a defense to the action may be
proved, the plea is good, and a demurrer thereto should not be sustained. 74
Even if collateral estoppel is not pled as an affirmative defense, with respect to a
plaintiff's guilty plea to an underlying charge relating to the false imprisonment claim, the
jury may be given the issue, if the facts which form the basis for the collateral estoppel
defense are pleaded in the answer, received in evidence and called to the court's attention
on a motion for directed verdict. 75
Footnotes
Footnote 67. Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278; Richardson v
Huston, 10 SD 484, 74 NW 234, later proceeding 14 SD 126, 84 NW 486, later
proceeding 17 SD 629, 98 NW 164.
Facts to establish absence of malice may be pleaded in mitigation to avoid imposition of
punitive damages for assault and for false arrest but not with respect to cause of action for
malicious prosecution. Versosa v New York, 22 Misc 2d 597, 194 NYS2d 5.
Annotation: Pleading good faith or lack of malice in mitigation of damages in action for
false arrest or imprisonment, 49 ALR2d 1460.
Footnote 68. Newburn v Durham, 10 Tex Civ App 655, 32 SW 112.
Footnote 69. See Gill v Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 App Div 36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49
ALR2d 1452 (notwithstanding tender of the issue of punitive damages by the plaintiff in
an action for false imprisonment, a general denial by the defendant is insufficient to
permit the defendant to introduce proof to show an absence of malice or wilfulness).
Proof in an action for false arrest that arrest was made because a felony had been
committed in a sister state and that arresting officer had reasonable grounds for believing
that plaintiff had committed it and that arrest was made on this ground was not admissible
in mitigation of damages where it was not pleaded. MacDonnell v McConville, 148 App
Div 49, 132 NYS 1085, affd 210 NY 529, 103 NE 1126.
Footnote 70. Kaufman v Brown, 93 Cal App 2d 508, 209 P2d 156 (disapproved on other
grounds by Dragna v White, 45 Cal 2d 469, 289 P2d 428); Woodson v New York City
Housing Authority, 10 NY2d 30, 217 NYS2d 31, 176 NE2d 57; Brown v Meier & Frank
Co., 160 Or 608, 86 P2d 79; Westbrook v Hutchison, 195 SC 101, 10 SE2d 145.
In false imprisonment action against city, burden was on city both to prove and plead
legal justification; city's failure to do so precluded it from introducing evidence of
justification under its general denial. Parvi v Kingston, 41 NY2d 553, 394 NYS2d 161,
362 NE2d 960.
Footnote 71. Smith v Roebuck, 155 Ala 395, 46 So 455.
As to immunity of judicial officers, see 98 et seq.
Footnote 72. Hull v Boston & M. R. R., 210 Mass 159, 96 NE 58 (denying right to plead
both).
Footnote 73. Shallcross v West J. & S. R. Co., 75 NJL 395, 67 A 931.
Footnote 74. McDaniel v Harrell, 81 Fla 66, 87 So 631, 13 ALR 1333.
A separate defense stating that defendant's agent had observed plaintiff pick up an item
from defendant's stock and take it from the store without paying for it states facts relevant
to the question whether plaintiff was lawfully arrested and detained, and therefore it
should not be struck from the answer. Thomas v Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 SC 95, 113
SE2d 337.
Footnote 75. Prinz v Greate Bay Casino Corp. (CA3 Pa) 705 F2d 692.
4. Proof and Evidentiary Matters [126-133]

126 Generally; presumptions and burden of proof [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
A plaintiff has the burden of proving false arrest, 76 whereas the defendant bears the
burden of production and persuasion for any defense. 77 There is a division of authority,
however, as to which party bears the burden of proof with respect to probable cause.
Some courts have placed the burden of proving absence of probable cause upon the
plaintiff in both false arrest 78 and false imprisonment cases. 79 Other courts have held
that a defendant in a false arrest action has the burden of establishing probable cause. 80
Yet another approach places on the plaintiff, after defendant makes a prima facie showing
of probable cause, the burden of rebutting that showing and of establishing the lack of
probable cause. 81
A warrantless arrest is presumed to be unlawful; 82 once a warrantless arrest has been
established, the burden of going forward with evidence to establish probable cause passes
to the defendant. 83 By contrast, a magistrate's finding of probable cause in issuing a
warrant creates a presumption of probable cause. 84 One jurisdiction permits rebuttal of
this presumption upon proof of fraud, perjury, or misrepresentation or falsification of
evidence. 85
The plaintiff in a false imprisonment action must prove that the defendant proximately
caused the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks damages. 86 However, the defendant
will bear the burden of proving that a detention was reasonable in both time and manner.
87
A presumption that a person who knowingly conceals an unpurchased item is shoplifting
will not apply where a store employee, in observing a customer, is able to see the item at
all times. 88
Where an action is based on a principal's responsibility for the acts of an agent, the
plaintiff has the burden of showing by clear proof that the agent had express or implied
authority to cause the unlawful arrest or imprisonment. 89
Footnotes
Footnote 76. United Steelworkers of America v Milstead (DC Ariz) 705 F Supp 1426,
128 BNA LRRM 3168.
Plaintiff bears burden of establishing that the arrest was made without color of legal
authority. Touchton v Kroger Co. (La App 3d Cir) 512 So 2d 520.
Footnote 77. Gasho v United States (CA9 Ariz) 39 F3d 1420, 94 CDOS 8368, 94 Daily
Journal DAR 15508, cert den (US) 132 L Ed 2d 831, 115 S Ct 2582.
In a customer's action against a retailer, the trial court erred in placing the burden on the
customer to negative the statutory privilege rather than requiring the retailer to establish
that privilege; the statutory privilege was an affirmative defense. Castillo v Sears,
Roebuck & Co. (Tex App El Paso) 682 SW2d 432, revd on other grounds (Tex) 693
SW2d 374.
Footnote 78. Taylor v Dillards Dep't Stores, Inc. (CA10 Okla) 971 F2d 601; Garrett v
Bloomington (Ind App) 478 NE2d 89.
Footnote 79. Hajawii v Venture Stores, Inc. (1st Dist) 125 Ill App 3d 22, 80 Ill Dec 461,
465 NE2d 573.
Footnote 80. Safeway Stores, Inc. v Kelly (Dist Col App) 448 A2d 856; Lee v Geiger (Fla
App D1) 419 So 2d 717, petition den (Fla) 429 So 2d 5.
Plaintiff in false arrest or false imprisonment case need not prove lack of probable cause.
Garton v Reno, 102 Nev 313, 720 P2d 1227.
Footnote 81. Thomas v Hamilton (Ala) 611 So 2d 1038.
Footnote 82. Broadaway v New York (SD NY) 601 F Supp 624; McCarthy v Kleindienst,
239 US App DC 247, 741 F2d 1406, 39 FR Serv 2d 1165.
Footnote 83. United Steelworkers of America v Milstead (DC Ariz) 705 F Supp 1426,
128 BNA LRRM 3168; Reams v Tucson (App) 145 Ariz 340, 701 P2d 598; Children v
Burton (Iowa) 331 NW2d 673, cert den 464 US 848, 78 L Ed 2d 143, 104 S Ct 155.
Where plaintiff has demonstrated an arrest without process, followed by imprisonment
and damages, burden is on defendant to prove justification. Trenouth v United States
(CA9 Cal) 764 F2d 1305, 119 BNA LRRM 3615 (applying California law).
In false imprisonment action, burden of proving that imprisonment came within
exception permitting a warrantless arrest is on the person making the arrest or causing the
imprisonment. Scott Housing Systems, Inc. v Hickox, 174 Ga App 23, 329 SE2d 154.
Defendant has burden of justifying warrantless arrest by showing that probable cause
existed as of time of arrest. Kramer v New York (1st Dept) 173 App Div 2d 155, 569
NYS2d 67, app den 78 NY2d 857, 574 NYS2d 938, 580 NE2d 410.
But see Noel v King County, 48 Wash App 227, 738 P2d 692 (warrantless felony arrest in
public place was not presumed to be unlawful and plaintiff had the burden of proving
unlawfulness of arrest).
Annotation: Necessity and sufficiency of allegations, in complaint for malicious
prosecution or tort action analogous thereto, that defendant or defendants acted without
probable cause, 14 ALR2d 264 18 (action for false arrest or imprisonment).
Forms: Instruction to jury as to burden of proving justification for arrest without warrant.
Footnote 84. See Benjamin v United States (ED NY) 554 F Supp 82 (where arrest is
pursuant to facially valid warrant issued by court of competent jurisdiction, probable
cause for arrest is conclusively established).
Footnote 85. LoSacco v City of Middletown (DC Conn) 745 F Supp 812, summary
judgment den (DC Conn) 1992 US Dist LEXIS 21672, reconsideration den (DC Conn)
1993 US Dist LEXIS 16098 and approved, adopted (DC Conn) 1993 US Dist LEXIS
16100, reported in full (DC Conn) 822 F Supp 870, affd without op (CA2 Conn) 33 F3d
50.
Footnote 86. Fischer v Famous-Barr Co. (Mo App) 618 SW2d 446, appeal after remand
on other grounds (Mo App) 646 SW2d 819.
Footnote 87. Signorino v National Super Markets, Inc. (Mo App) 782 SW2d 100 (false
arrest action based upon detention of customer on suspicion of shoplifting); Luppo v
Waldbaum, Inc. (2d Dept) 131 App Div 2d 443, 515 NYS2d 871 (false imprisonment
action based upon detention of retail employee on suspicion of theft of merchandise).
But see Nelson v Las Vegas, 99 Nev 548, 665 P2d 1141 (plaintiff must prove that delay
in release following valid arrest was unlawful).

without unreasonable or unnecessary delay. 26 Am Jur POF2d 617 11 (burden of proof
and evidence).
for detention of suspected shoplifters, 47 ALR3d 998.
Footnote 89. White v Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n, 143 Fla 518, 197 So 125; J. C.
Penney Co. v Green, 108 Ga App 155, 132 SE2d 83; Sanchez v Securities Acceptance
Corp., 57 NM 512, 260 P2d 703.
Annotation: Principal's liability for punitive damages because of false arrest or
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, by agent or employee, 93 ALR3d 826.
Principal's liability for false arrest or imprisonment caused by agent or servant, 92
ALR2d 15.
127 Relevancy, materiality, and competency [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
The general rules governing the admissibility of evidence in civil actions 90 are
applicable in actions for false arrest or imprisonment. 91 Generally, all the facts and
circumstances connected with the unlawful arrest or imprisonment are admissible in
evidence. 92 The complaint, warrant, and transcript of the record of proceedings before
a magistrate may be admissible to show what such proceedings were and who conducted
them, or to mitigate the damages or to defeat the claim. 93 In an action for false arrest
under a warrant issued for a person indicted by a grand jury, the issue as to what person
was intended by the name used in the warrant may be shown by all the competent facts
and circumstances surrounding the transaction out of which the indictment arose and the
warrant issued. 94
Where the plaintiff has been imprisoned by an agent of the defendant acting in the course
of his employment, the declarations, as well as the conduct of such agent, are admissible
against the principal. 95 Declarations may also be admissible as part of the res gestae.
96
Rules or instructions for dealing with shoplifters have sometimes been offered in
evidence in actions for false imprisonment for the purpose of showing that the
defendant's employee was or was not acting within his or her authority in causing the
arrest or prosecution, or for the purpose of showing grounds for the award of punitive
damages. A few cases have held the defendant's rules or instructions admissible for one
or both of such purposes. 97 However, it has been held that the defendant's rules or
instructions were inadmissible in an action for false imprisonment, where such evidence
was offered by the defendant for the purpose of showing that the defendant's employee
was not acting within the employee's authority in causing the arrest. 98 Proffered store
manuals have also been excluded as irrelevant where the store did not deny liability, 99
where receipt in evidence might have created doubts in the minds of the jury as to
whether the applicable standard of care was the statute or the manual, 1 or where the
court was concerned that the merchant's liability for false arrest be determined according
to the minimum legal standards established by statute rather than the merchant's own
standards. 2
In some instances, courts have rejected the testimony of experts in false imprisonment
cases on grounds of relevance. 3 In other cases, courts have suggested that expert
testimony might be admissible on issues of negligent hiring, 4 on the issue of the
appropriate medical standards to be applied, 5 or, on the proper evidentiary foundation,
to validate an item of claimed damages. 6
Footnotes
Footnote 90. See 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 301 et seq.
Footnote 91. Martin v Sanford, 129 Neb 212, 261 NW 136, 100 ALR 179 (holding
inadmissible contradictory statements made by third person unconnected with defendant,
and not made in his presence).
In an action for false imprisonment against a bank and bank officials by a former bank
employee suspected of stealing money mistakenly assumed to have been left for deposit,
the compromise and settlement of an earlier action for slander against the supposed
depositor, offered in evidence by the defendants, has been held properly excluded since
the compromise agreement could not alleviate the wrongful acts of the defendants or
mitigate the punitive damages recoverable from them. Parrott v Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Asso., 97 Cal App 2d 14, 217 P2d 89, 35 ALR2d 263.
In an action for false arrest, the admission in evidence of a police department property
receipt, to which the plaintiff objected on the ground that the receipt constituted hearsay
evidence of the matters set out therein, was cumulative as to the existence of the articles
listed and, if error, would not constitute grounds for reversal of the judgment. Olund v
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. (Fla App D3) 300 So 2d 31.
In an action for false imprisonment against a storekeeper by an employee accused of theft
from the employees' cloakroom, the pleading of a lawful arrest as a justification does not
render admissible, upon that issue, evidence of prior thefts from the cloakroom, since it
has no probative value in establishing the actual guilt of the plaintiff. Gill v Montgomery
Ward & Co., 284 App Div 36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49 ALR2d 1452.
Footnote 92. Miller v Fano, 134 Cal 103, 66 P 183.
Footnote 93. Thompkins v Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (CA8 Mo) 211 F 391.
Footnote 94. O'Neill v Keeling, 227 Iowa 754, 288 NW 887, 127 ALR 1050.
Footnote 95. White v Apsley Rubber Co., 194 Mass 97, 80 NE 500.
294 (declaration of person in charge in the hospital to officer serving writ of habeas
corpus that reason for detention was nonpayment of bill).
Footnote 97. See Peak v W. T. Grant Co. (Mo App) 386 SW2d 685 (a store's written
"Operation Manual on Shoplifting" was held admissible when offered into evidence by a
patron in an action for false arrest and imprisonment growing out of her detention in the
store on unfounded charges of shoplifting against her sister, the court pointing out that the
manual was material to the issue of the authority of the store's floor supervisor in
detaining the patron, that it was material to the issue of punitive damages, and that the
manual was first brought into the case by the store's own counsel, who questioned a
witness concerning it).
Failure of merchant to go through store's manual with its assistant manager was relevant
with respect to determination of merchant's liability for punitive damages concerning the
conduct of its employee. Big B, Inc. v Cottingham (Ala) 634 So 2d 999.
In an action by a customer detained for suspected shoplifting, the trial court erred in
excluding the store's rules on dealing with shoplifting suspects, since those rules were
illustrative of what might be reasonable cause for, manner of and length of detention.
Luckie v Piggly-Wiggly Southern, Inc., 173 Ga App 177, 325 SE2d 844.
In an action by a supermarket customer against a store security agency, training manuals
and testimony were properly admitted on the punitive damages issue, as material to the
issues of wantonness and reckless disregard for the rights of others. Globe Sec. Systems
Co. v Sterling, 79 Md App 303, 556 A2d 731.
See also Brown v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 275 App Div 304, 89 NYS2d 247,
where a patron brought an action against a store for assault, false imprisonment, and
slander, and the store had a carefully drawn, printed manual of instructions relating to the
undesirability of making arrests for pilfering, the court said that the store was entitled to
offer the instructions in evidence for the consideration of the jury on the issue of whether
the store's employee was acting within the scope of employment in charging the patron
with stealing groceries. Explaining that the instructions of the employer would not be
determinative on the issue of agency, the court nevertheless ruled that they might be
given such weight, if any, as appropriate under the circumstances of the case in
connection with the jury's consideration of whether the act complained of was within the
general scope of employment in carrying on the employer's business and with a view to
the furtherance thereof.
Annotation: Admissibility of defendant's rules or instructions for dealing with shoplifters,
in action for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, 31 ALR3d 705.
Footnote 98. See J. J. Newberry Co. v Judd, 259 Ky 309, 82 SW2d 359 (where a store
attempted to elicit testimony concerning its instructions to its employees that they should
never cause the arrest of a suspected shoplifter, apparently for the purpose of disproving
that its assistant manager was acting within his authority in causing a patron's arrest, it
was held that such testimony was properly excluded; the court merely explained that the
evidence was properly rejected because the store could not be relieved of liability on the
basis of the assistant manager's violation of his orders in this respect).
Footnote 99. Curry v Giant Food Co. (Dist Col App) 522 A2d 1283.
Footnote 1. Jones v Montgomery Ward & Co., 49 Or App 231, 619 P2d 907.
Footnote 3. Nau v Sellman, 104 Nev 248, 757 P2d 358 (testimony of prosecutor as to
guilt or not on the underlying charge).
Footnote 5. Reiser v Prunty, 224 Mont 1, 727 P2d 538.
128 -- To enhance damages [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Any elements of the arrest or imprisonment which increase its hardships to the plaintiff
may be proved to add to the amount which will constitute the fair compensation to which
the plaintiff is entitled. 7 Thus, the plaintiff may show that he or she was taken to a jail
or police station, 8 what he or she experienced there, 9 including harsh or humiliating
treatment while in custody, 10 and the filthy or evil conditions of the jail or place where
he or she was lodged. 11
The plaintiff may show that he or she was compelled to leave a cash bail to secure his or
her release, 12 that he or she was discharged from restraint by habeas corpus, 13 that he
or she lost employment by the imprisonment, 14 or that the fact of arrest and the charges
made were published in a newspaper. 15 Where punitive damages may be awarded, the
plaintiff may show the existence of malice, lack of reasonable cause, or other
aggravations essential to recovery. 16
Some courts have held that testimony concerning the personal and family affairs of the
plaintiff is inadmissible, since such testimony is calculated improperly to increase the
damages; 17 other courts hold that evidence of the circumstances of the plaintiff's
family may be shown 18 on the ground that mental pain and suffering is an element of
damages. 19 It is not permissible to show ill treatment of the plaintiff by one for whose
conduct the defendant is not responsible, 20 or the fact that the defendant had put
handcuffs on the plaintiff if there was nothing to show that this was done unreasonably.
21
Footnotes
Footnote 7. New York, P. & N. R. Co. v Waldron, 116 Md 441, 82 A 709; Gallon v House
of Good Shepherd, 158 Mich 361, 122 NW 631; Spain v Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 78 Or
355, 153 P 470.
As to damages, generally, see 140 et seq.
Forms: Complaints alleging aggravation of damages resulting from arrest or
imprisonment by private individual. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Complaints alleging aggravation of damages resulting from arrest or imprisonment by
law enforcement officers. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms
92-95.
Footnote 8. New York, P. & N. R. Co. v Waldron, 116 Md 441, 82 A 709.
Footnote 9. Kraft v Montgomery Ward & Co., 220 Or 234, 348 P2d 239, 92 ALR2d 1.
Footnote 10. Miller v Fano, 134 Cal 103, 66 P 183.
Footnote 11. Grimes v Greenblatt, 47 Colo 495, 107 P 1111; S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell,
132 Fla 471, 180 So 757; Fox v McCurnin, 205 Iowa 752, 218 NW 499; Stoecker v
Nathanson, 5 Neb Unof 435, 98 NW 1061; Brockwell v Western Union Tel. & Cable Co.,
205 NC 474, 171 SE 784; Spain v Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 78 Or 355, 153 P 470.
Footnote 12. New York, P. & N. R. Co. v Waldron, 116 Md 441, 82 A 709.
Footnote 13. Whittaker v Sanford, 110 Me 77, 85 A 399.
P2d 89, 35 ALR2d 263; Stoecker v Nathanson, 5 Neb Unof 435, 98 NW 1061.
Footnote 15. Filer v Smith, 96 Mich 347, 55 NW 999.
Footnote 16. 130.
Footnote 17. Winters v Campbell, 148 W Va 710, 137 SE2d 188; Bergeron v Peyton, 106
Wis 377, 82 NW 291.
Footnote 18. Davis v Seeley, 91 Iowa 583, 60 NW 183; Stoecker v Nathanson, 5 Neb
Unof 435, 98 NW 1061.
Footnote 19. 146.

1.
129 -- To mitigate damages [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Facts and circumstances attending the arrest or imprisonment which may be inadmissible
on the question of liability may nevertheless be received in mitigation of damages. 22
Thus, evidence of previous arrests and time spent in jail may be admitted where the
plaintiff claims humiliation and upset caused by the alleged false arrest. 23 Evidence is
admissible to show that although the defendant could not justify an arrest upon the
ground for which it was made, the plaintiff was at the same time guilty of another
offense. 24 Likewise, the plaintiff's conduct and the provocation by the plaintiff, if any,
may be shown. 25 Where punitive damages may be awarded, evidence of the defendant's
financial standing is admissible. 26 The existence of good faith and probable cause for
imprisonment may be shown in mitigation of punitive damages, 27 but the authorities
are not entirely in accord as to the admissibility of the plaintiff's conviction or guilt, 28
or of character or reputation. 29
Footnotes
Footnote 22. Smith v Executive Club, Ltd. (Dist Col App) 458 A2d 32, 48 ALR4th 147;
Comisky v Norfolk & W. R. Co., 79 W Va 148, 90 SE 385.
Footnote 23. Smith v Executive Club, Ltd. (Dist Col App) 458 A2d 32, 48 ALR4th 147.
Footnote 24. Comisky v Norfolk & W. R. Co., 79 W Va 148, 90 SE 385.
Footnote 25. Petit v Colmary, 20 Del 266, 4 Penne 266, 55 A 344; Palmer v Maine C. R.
Co., 92 Me 399, 42 A 800.
P2d 89, 35 ALR2d 263; Heinze v Murphy, 180 Md 423, 24 A2d 917; Nelson v
Halvorson, 117 Minn 255, 135 NW 818.
Footnote 27. 130.
Footnote 28. 131.
Footnote 29. 132.
130 -- Good faith or malice; probable cause [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE

IMPRISONMENT]
The defendant's malice or good faith 30 does not affect the essentials of false
imprisonment. Nor, as a general rule, is the want of probable cause an essential element
of the action of false imprisonment. 31 The motive of the defendant is immaterial as to
the right of the plaintiff to recover a fair compensation for all injury sustained as a natural
consequence of the imprisonment. 32 Hence, evidence as to defendant's good faith,
probable cause for the arrest or detention, or lack of malice, is ordinarily not admissible
in mitigation of compensatory damages. 33
On the other hand, the existence of malice, lack of reasonable cause, or other
aggravations essential to the allowance of exemplary or punitive damages, 34 may be
admitted in proof thereof. 35 Likewise, evidence as to probable cause may become
material and thus admissible where it tends to show justification for the arrest or
detention. 36 Probable cause may also be shown in mitigation of exemplary or punitive
damages, 37 as may all the facts or circumstances surrounding the arrest or
imprisonment which tend to show good faith on the part of the defendant and to rebut the
existence of malice. 38 Although an imprisonment is without actual warrant of law, one
sued for damages therefor may show in mitigation of punitive damages that he or she
acted under an honest belief that he or she was within legal rights, and with intent only to
enforce the law. 39 Thus, it may be shown that a defendant acted under advice of
counsel; 40 or under the orders or instructions of one's superiors. 41
Footnotes
Footnote 30. 9.
Footnote 31. 10.
Footnote 32. Phillips v Morrow, 210 Ala 34, 97 So 130, appeal after remand, remanded
on other grounds 213 Ala 139, 104 So 260, 40 ALR 285; Bean v Best, 77 SD 433, 93
NW2d 403.
Footnote 33. Beckwith v Bean, 98 US 266, 8 Otto 266, 25 L Ed 124; Phillips v Morrow,
210 Ala 34, 97 So 130, appeal after remand, remanded on other grounds 213 Ala 139, 104
So 260, 40 ALR 285; Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278; Nelson v
Kellogg, 162 Cal 621, 123 P 1115; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v Cundiff, 166 Ky
594, 179 SW 615; Nelson v Halvorson, 117 Minn 255, 135 NW 818; Bean v Best, 77 SD
433, 93 NW2d 403; Crosswhite v Barnes, 139 Va 471, 124 SE 242, 40 ALR 54.
In action for recovery of compensatory damages for false arrest, affirmative defense
based on lack of malice is unavailing as plea in mitigation. Rifkin v New York, 12 Misc
2d 367, 176 NYS2d 716.
Footnote 34. 149.
on other grounds 213 Ala 139, 104 So 260, 40 ALR 285; Palmer v Maine C. R. Co., 92
Me 399, 42 A 800; McNeff v Heider, 216 Or 583, 337 P2d 819, reh den 216 Or 594, 340
P2d 180.
Evidence of acts of the defendant after plaintiff was arrested and turned over to the
authorities is admissible if it tends to show that the defendant acted maliciously. Parrott v
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Asso., 97 Cal App 2d 14, 217 P2d 89, 35 ALR2d
263; Thomas v F. & R. Lazarus & Co. (App, Franklin Co) 3 Ohio Ops 2d 61, 40 Ohio L
Abs 29, 57 NE2d 103, motion ovrld.
S Ct 52; Carr v National Discount Corp. (CA6 Mich) 172 F2d 899, cert den 338 US
817, 94 L Ed 495, 70 S Ct 59; Collyer v S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal 2d 175, 54 P2d 20;
Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v Wegner, 90 Ga App 267, 83 SE2d 58; Sima v Skaggs Payless
Drug Ctr., 82 Idaho 387, 353 P2d 1085; Teel v May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo 696, 155
SW2d 74, 137 ALR 495; Morgan v New York C. R. Co., 256 App Div 177, 9 NYS2d
339.
Defendant who reported to police that plaintiff appeared to be driving while intoxicated
was not liable for false arrest where manner in which plaintiff was driving furnished
defendant with probable cause for his acts. Vickrey v Dunivan, 59 NM 90, 279 P2d 853.
Footnote 37. Beckwith v Bean, 98 US 266, 8 Otto 266, 25 L Ed 124; Oates v Bullock,
136 Ala 537, 33 So 835; Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278; S. H.
Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla 471, 180 So 757; Rogers v Toliver, 139 Ga 281, 77 SE 28;
Conoly v Imperial Tobacco Co., 63 Ga App 880, 12 SE2d 398; Jefferson Dry Goods Co.
v Stoess, 304 Ky 73, 199 SW2d 994; Kroeger v Passmore, 36 Mont 504, 93 P 805; Baker
Co. v Turpin (Tex Civ App) 53 SW2d 154, writ dism w o j; Zayre of Virginia, Inc. v
Gowdy, 207 Va 47, 147 SE2d 710.
Footnote 38. Beckwith v Bean, 98 US 266, 8 Otto 266, 25 L Ed 124; Nesmith v Alford
(CA5 Ala) 318 F2d 110, reh den (CA5 Ala) 319 F2d 859 and cert den 375 US 975, 11 L
Ed 2d 420, 84 S Ct 489; Phillips v Morrow, 210 Ala 34, 97 So 130, appeal after remand,
remanded on other grounds 213 Ala 139, 104 So 260, 40 ALR 285; Adair v Williams, 24
Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278; Klein v Pollard, 149 Mich 200, 112 NW 717; Bean v
Best, 77 SD 433, 93 NW2d 403.
Evidence of good faith is relevant to rebut a claim for punitive damages. Yancey v
Farmer (Ala) 472 So 2d 990.
Footnote 39. Nelson v Halvorson, 117 Minn 255, 135 NW 818; Gill v Montgomery Ward
& Co., 284 App Div 36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49 ALR2d 1452; McNeff v Heider, 216 Or
583, 337 P2d 819, reh den 216 Or 594, 340 P2d 180.
on other grounds 213 Ala 139, 104 So 260, 40 ALR 285; Filer v Smith, 96 Mich 347, 55
NW 999 (stating that facts and evidence known to defendant must have been fully and
fairly laid before counsel).
As to reliance on advice of counsel as justification or defense, generally, see 69.
Footnote 41. Christ v McDonald, 152 Or 494, 52 P2d 655; Cullen v Dickenson, 33 SD
27, 144 NW 656 (holding that purpose of evidence should be pointed out clearly in
instructions).
As to admissibility of rules or instructions of employer for dealing with shoplifters, see
127.
131 -- Plaintiff's conviction or guilt [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
There exists some confusion as to the effect, upon an action for false imprisonment, of
the plaintiff's plea of guilty to, or conviction for, the offense with which the plaintiff was
charged and for which an arrest was made. 42 As a result, courts have reached varying
results regarding the admissibility of such evidence. In some cases, evidence of the
plaintiff's plea of guilty, 43 or, where compensatory damages only were asked, his
conviction, has been held inadmissible. 44 However, in other cases, evidence of a plea
of guilty and evidence of conviction have been held admissible in the action as proof of
an admission on the part of the plaintiff; 45 and where the unlawfulness of the
imprisonment arises out of a defect in the proceedings, the defendant may show in
mitigation of damages that the plaintiff is in fact guilty of the crime. 46
Footnotes
Footnote 43. Larson v Feeney, 196 Mich 1, 162 NW 275 (arrest without warrant).
Footnote 44. Hickman v Jones, 76 US 197, 9 Wall 197, 19 L Ed 551; Sundholm v
Bettendorf (Iowa) 389 NW2d 849; Dewberry v Brookshire Bros. #1 (Tex App Beaumont)
699 SW2d 685; Crosswhite v Barnes, 139 Va 471, 124 SE 242, 40 ALR 54 (failure to
exhibit warrant in making arrest).
Footnote 45. Spain v Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 78 Or 355, 153 P 470.
The convictions of the plaintiffs for disorderly conduct conclusively established probable
cause to support their arrests and prevented their successful prosecution of an action for
damages for false arrest, notwithstanding the fact that their convictions were
subsequently reversed on appeal for lack of evidence. Carter v St. Petersburg (Fla App
D2) 319 So 2d 602.
Footnote 46. Friesenhan v Maines, 137 Mich 10, 100 NW 172.
132 -- Reputation and character [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

The general rule is that evidence of character and reputation is not admissible unless put
in issue by the very proceeding itself. 47 This rule is applied to actions for false
imprisonment, under which it is usually held that the plaintiff's character is not at issue,
48 and proof of bad character in mitigation of damages is excluded, 49 as well as proof
of the defendant's good character. 50 In the absence of an attack by the defendant upon
the plaintiff's character, evidence of the plaintiff's good character will not be received. 51
However, character is an issue in a false imprisonment action where the plaintiff claims
compensatory damages for emotional distress, and in such a case evidence as to the
plaintiff's character may be admitted, 52 unless the probative value of such evidence is
outweighed by the danger of confusion or undue prejudice. 53 The fact that the
plaintiff's general reputation before the arrest was bad has been held admissible in
rebutting the proof of want of probable cause, and in mitigation of damages. 54
Similarly, evidence that a person is generally reputed to be insane is admissible in
mitigation of damages in an action by such person for false imprisonment on a charge of
insanity. 55
In certain situations, evidence of the character of the plaintiff's associates may be
admissible. 56
Footnotes
Footnote 47. See 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 364.
Footnote 48. Texas M. R. Co. v Dean, 98 Tex 517, 85 SW 1135.
Footnote 49. Hickman v Jones, 76 US 197, 9 Wall 197, 19 L Ed 551; Meints v
Huntington (CA8 Minn) 276 F 245, 19 ALR 664.
Footnote 50. Meints v Huntington (CA8 Minn) 276 F 245, 19 ALR 664.
Footnote 51. Humphreys v St. Louis S. F. R. Co. (Mo App) 286 SW 738; Diers v Mallon,
46 Neb 121, 64 NW 722; Doyle v Douglas (Okla) 390 P2d 871; S. H. Kress & Co. v
Roberts, 143 Va 71, 129 SE 244.
Footnote 52. Bean v Best, 77 SD 433, 93 NW2d 403.
Footnote 54. Rosenkranz v Barker, 115 Ill 331, 3 NE 93; S. H. Kress & Co. v Roberts,
143 Va 71, 129 SE 244.
Footnote 55. State v Charles, 124 La 744, 50 So 699; Biddle v Jenkins, 61 Neb 400, 85
NW 392.
Footnote 56. See Spain v Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 78 Or 355, 153 P 470 (where the
plaintiff was arrested upon a charge of drunkenness and it was claimed that an intoxicant
was given him by his companion, the plaintiff claiming that it was ginger ale, it was
permissible to show that the plaintiff's companion "was a good, clean athlete and drank
no liquor").
133 Weight and sufficiency [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The general rules as to the weight and sufficiency of evidence 57 apply in actions for
false imprisonment. If it is shown that the imprisonment was by force, by threats, or
without process of law, a prima facie case is established for the plaintiff. However, if it is
shown that the imprisonment was by virtue of judicial proceedings and by the execution
of a warrant or other legal process issued thereon, the plaintiff must show something
more than a mere detention and imprisonment to make a prima facie case. 58 Direct
and express evidence is not the only means of proof. The fact that the defendant
instigated a false arrest may be shown by circumstantial evidence, 59 so long as there is
some basis for the inference. 60 Also, the scope of an agent's authority, as well as
ratification of his acts, may be established by circumstantial evidence. 61 However,
ratification of an illegal imprisonment for shoplifting was not shown on the part of one of
the partners in the business by the fact that upon receiving a complaint from the husband
of the victim, he ordered him out of the store. 62 Nor is ratification of an unauthorized
arrest by an employee shown by evidence that on notice of the arrest the employer
promptly investigated the situation and within an hour following notice of the arrest acted
to release the arrested customer. 63
Evidence of a plea of guilty and conviction upon an arrest for a criminal offense has been
held not to be conclusive upon the plaintiff in a civil action for false imprisonment, such
record being between different parties. 64 However, it has been held that a conviction of
the charge on which the plaintiff was arrested is a conclusive determination that there was
probable cause for the arrest. 65
The fact that an officer discharges a prisoner before presenting the prisoner to a
magistrate is not conclusive proof that the arrest was not made in good faith. 66
Footnotes
Footnote 57. As to weight and sufficiency of evidence, generally, see 30 Am Jur 2d,
Evidence 1430 et seq.
Footnote 58. 126.
Footnote 59. Grimes v Greenblatt, 47 Colo 495, 107 P 1111; Hammargren v Montgomery
Ward & Co., 172 Kan 484, 241 P2d 1192; Knupp v Esslinger (Mo App) 363 SW2d 210;
Harrer v Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont 295, 221 P2d 428; Sylvester v D'Ambra,
73 RI 203, 54 A2d 418; (Blue) Star Service, Inc. v McCurdy, 36 Tenn App 1, 251 SW2d
139.
Footnote 60. See Burlington Transp. Co. v Josephson (CA8 SD) 153 F2d 372 (proof of a
request to police to remove the plaintiff from a bus, and of a complaint drawn by a deputy
court clerk charging a disturbance of the peace in violation of a city ordinance, is not
sufficient, either as pleading or as proof, to show that the individual instigated the
unlawful arrest).
Proof of a private conversation between the defendant or his agent and a police officer,
followed by plaintiff's arrest, is not sufficient evidence to support a contention that the
defendant instigated the arrest. There must be other facts and evidence which warrant the
inference that arrest was instigated by the defendant or by an authorized agent of
defendant during the conversation. Heinold v Muntz T. V., Inc. (Mo) 262 SW2d 32.
Footnote 61. See 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency 364.
Footnote 62. Bernheimer Bros. v Becker, 102 Md 250, 62 A 526.
Footnote 63. Rogers v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 48 Wash 2d 879, 297 P2d 250.
Footnote 64. Warren v Byrne (CA2 NY) 699 F2d 95; Spain v Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 78
Or 355, 153 P 470.
Footnote 65. Hill v Day, 168 Kan 604, 215 P2d 219.
Footnote 66. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v Hinsdell, 76 Kan 74, 90 P 800.
5. Trial [134-137]
The plaintiff in a false arrest proceeding has a constitutional right to the trial of his or her
claim by a jury, whose role includes the assessment of damages. 67 The general rule that
the control of the conduct of counsel in the trial and argument of a case rests largely in
the discretion of the trial court, which will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an
abuse of such discretion, 68 has been applied in the review of trial court rulings with
respect to the conduct, statements, or arguments of counsel in actions for false
imprisonment or false arrest. 69 Resubmission of an inconsistent verdict to a jury is
proper. 70 However, an ex parte communication of a trial judge to the jury has been held
to constitute reversible error. 71
Footnotes
Footnote 67. Wochek v Foley, 193 Conn 582, 477 A2d 1015.
Footnote 68. See 75A Am Jur 2d, Trial 497.

Footnote 69. Felton v Coyle (1st Dist) 95 Ill App 2d 202, 238 NE2d 191.
In a false arrest action arising out of detention of a customer suspected of shoplifting, it
was held that there was no abuse of judicial discretion in permitting plaintiff's counsel to
argue that defendant operated a self-service store inadequately staffed, and to inject the
"golden rule" into the case by saying to the jury that "today it can be thee, tomorrow it
might be me."Wisner v S.S. Kresge Co. (Mo App) 465 SW2d 666.
Footnote 70. Larson v Neimi (CA9 Cal) 9 F3d 1397, 93 CDOS 8528, 93 Daily Journal
DAR 14699.
135 Issues for judge and jury [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The general principle that questions of law are to be determined by the court while
questions of fact are to be decided by the jury 72 has been applied in actions for false
imprisonment or false arrest with respect to such issues as:
(1) the intent of the defendant to confine, 73
(2) the involuntariness of the confinement, 74
(3) the plaintiff's awareness of his confinement, 75
(4) the existence of false imprisonment under particular facts, 76
(5) the connection of the defendant to the alleged unlawful acts, 77
(6) whether a special officer appointed by public authority was acting in an official
capacity or on behalf of a private employer in making an arrest, 78
(7) probable cause for, and reasonableness of, the detention of a suspected shoplifter, 79
and
(8) the legality of a warrantless arrest by a police officer. 80 Where a question is one of
fact for the jury, proper instructions must be given by the court to guide the jury in its
determination. 81 It has been said that the majority rule views the probable cause issue
as a mixed question of law and fact to be decided in some instances only by the judge and
in others by a combination of judge and jury, while the minority rule sees probable cause
as a question of fact which is ordinarily one for the jury. 82
Footnotes
Footnote 72. See, generally, 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial 714 et seq.

Footnote 73. 12.
Footnote 75. 14.
Footnote 76. 11.
Footnote 77. 35.
Footnote 78. 57.
Footnote 80. 81.
Footnote 81. 137.
Footnote 82. District of Columbia v Murphy (Dist Col App) 635 A2d 929; Jones v
Columbia, 301 SC 62, 389 SE2d 662.
Probable cause is an issue decided by the court only if there is no dispute on the facts.
Parkin v Cornell University, Inc., 78 NY2d 523, 577 NYS2d 227, 583 NE2d 939, 121
CCH LC 56790, on remand on other grounds (3d Dept) 182 App Div 2d 850, 581
NYS2d 914, app dismd 80 NY2d 914, 588 NYS2d 821, 602 NE2d 229.
In an action based on the arrest of a newspaper reporter for disrupting a public meeting of
a town board by refusing to stop the reporter's tape recorder, the trial court properly
submitted the issue of probable cause for the reporter's arrest to the jury where, in view of
the reporter's legal right to record the meeting, it could not be said, as a matter of law, that
there was probable cause for the arrest. Feldman v Bethel (3d Dept) 106 App Div 2d
695, 484 NYS2d 147.
136 Failure to raise issues as waiver [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Failure to raise issues at trial may be construed as a waiver, including the issue of
absolute immunity, 83 or the existence of an inconsistent verdict. 84
Footnotes
Footnote 83. Henderson v District of Columbia (Dist Col App) 493 A2d 982.
Footnote 84. Burnett v Griffith (Mo) 739 SW2d 712, transf to (Mo App) 1988 Mo App
LEXIS 480, later proceeding, en banc (Mo) 769 SW2d 780.
137 Instructions to jury [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

The general rules governing the form, contents, and sufficiency of instructions to the jury
and the necessity for and propriety of giving them 85 are applicable in actions for false
imprisonment or false arrest. In general, instructions which are meandering, so as to tend
to the misleading of the jury, should be avoided, 86 although an issue may be fairly
submitted if a party fails to object. 87
Where the facts of the case raise the issue, instructions should be given on good faith as a
justification, 88 or on the defense of acting on the advice of counsel. 89
In actions arising out of an arrest without a warrant, proper instructions should be given
on the circumstances under which a peace officer is authorized to make such an arrest,
90 and on what constitutes reasonable grounds or probable cause for a warrantless
arrest. 91 If a police officer is outside his or her territorial jurisdiction, an instruction
may yet be proper regarding the right to make a citizen's arrest for a misdemeanor
committed in his or her presence and amounting to a breach of the peace. 92 Also, there
is no error in instructing the jury that there was at the time of the arrest a statute
proscribing the conduct for which plaintiff was arrested, even though such statute was
subsequently held to be unconstitutional. 93
Where the arrest was made pursuant to legal process, instructions should be given
regarding the defense of reasonable good faith justifying one's actions in the
imprisonment of a prisoner. 94
In the proper case, the jury should be instructed on the applicable standards for qualified
immunity, 95 although failure to elaborate on that point is not erroneous. 96 If the
action is based on illegal detention after a proper arrest, instructions may be necessary on
the officer's duty to take the arrested prisoner before a magistrate without unnecessary
delay. 97
In an action arising out of voluntary commitment of a mentally ill person, a charge
regarding the patient's statutory right to release upon application or request therefor is
proper. 98
In actions based on a private individual's instigation of or participation in an arrest or
imprisonment, 99 a charge should be given on what constitutes direction or instigation
and the liability of a private person for such instigation or participation. 1 In actions
arising out of a merchant's protection of property by detention of a customer or employee
suspected of shoplifting or theft, 2 instructions should be given on such merchant's
general privilege 3 or statutory defense 4 of reasonable detention of a suspected
shoplifter; 5 what constitutes probable cause or reasonable grounds for detention of a
suspected shoplifter should be clearly and accurately defined. 6
Where a plaintiff pleads alternatively or cumulatively both false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution, the jury should be separately charged concerning these distinct
torts. 7
To aid the jury in its determination of damages, 8 the court should charge the jury as to
the measure and elements of compensatory damages, 9 including damages for mental
suffering 10 where the plaintiff's allegations and proof at trial support such an item, 11
and, where appropriate, on the liability of defendant for exemplary or punitive damages.
12 The trial court may properly refuse to give a requested charge on liability for
damages, actual or punitive, if it states the applicable law incorrectly. 13 However, a
charge regarding damages, though inaccurate, may become the law of the case if not
objected to. 14
A court may also properly instruct on the concepts of legal cause as opposed to proximate
cause, where such a distinction is present on the issue of fixing damages. 15
Footnotes
Footnote 85. 75A Am Jur 2d, Trial 1077 et seq.
Footnote 86. State v Plentychief (ND) 464 NW2d 373.
Footnote 87. Swift v R.H. Macy's & Co. (CA8 Mo) 780 F2d 1358.
Footnote 88. See Curry v Giant Food Co. (Dist Col App) 522 A2d 1283 (instructions on
good faith and reasonable belief in connection with detention of a store customer were
properly given, in connection with merchant's detention statute).
Footnote 89. Karow v Student Inns, Inc. (4th Dist) 43 Ill App 3d 878, 2 Ill Dec 515, 357
NE2d 682, 98 ALR3d 531.
As to acting under advice of counsel, generally, see 69.
Footnote 90. Horn v Elgin, 28 Or App 545, 559 P2d 1319.
Forms: Instructions to jury as to arrest without warrant. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev),
False Imprisonment, Forms 104-107.
Footnote 91. See Dawkins v Los Angeles, 22 Cal 3d 126, 148 Cal Rptr 857, 583 P2d 711
(where the evidence establishes as a matter of law that the police officers validly detained
plaintiff for investigation, an instruction to that effect should have been given).
The jury should receive an instruction defining probable cause. Alvarado v Dodge City,
238 Kan 48, 708 P2d 174.
Footnote 92. Sturman v Golden Beach (Fla App D3) 355 So 2d 453, cert den (Fla) 361 So
2d 836.
Footnote 93. Mitchell v Drake, 172 Ind App 376, 360 NE2d 195.
It would be reversible error to fail to instruct the jury that at the time of the arrest the
ordinance for violation of which the plaintiff was arrested was still in effect and that its
constitutionality had not yet been specifically determined, although it was later rendered
unconstitutional as a result of a United States Supreme Court decision. Boca Raton v
Coughlin (Fla App D4) 299 So 2d 105, wherein an ordinance making possession of
obscene material a misdemeanor was found to have been subsequently rendered
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court's decision regarding noncriminality of mere
private possession of obscene material, Stanley v Georgia, 394 US 557, 22 L Ed 2d
542, 89 S Ct 1243, on remand on other grounds 225 Ga 273, 167 SE2d 756.
Footnote 94. Miller v Jones (CA5 Tex) 534 F2d 1178.
Forms: Instruction to JuryOfficer not liable for proper arrest under valid process. 10
Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 77.
Instruction to juryProbable cause of officer in mistaken-identity arrest under John Doe
warant. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 78.
Footnote 96. K-Mart Corp. v Washington, 109 Nev 1180, 866 P2d 274.
Footnote 97. Librach v Litzinger (Mo) 401 SW2d 433.
As to delay in presentment before magistrate, generally, see 29 et seq.
Forms: Instructions to jury on duty to take prisoner arrested without warrant before
magistrate without unnecessary delay. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Footnote 98. Rice v Mercy Hospital Corp. (Fla App D3) 318 So 2d 436, cert den (Fla)
330 So 2d 726.
As to false imprisonment actions arising out of commitment of mentally ill persons,
generally, see 33-45.
Footnote 99. As to liability of persons procuring, directing, or participating in arrest or
imprisonment, generally, see 38 et seq.
Footnote 1. Greenwell v Canyon Lincoln Mercury (Utah) 575 P2d 688 (where, after
defendant's employee told the police not to arrest plaintiff on a charge of theft, the
officers arrested plaintiff on their own authority and incarcerated him for offenses
committed in their presence, it was error for the court not to instruct the jury to the effect
that where an officer makes an arrest on his own authority, and not at the instance of the
defendant, the defendant is not liable for any resulting damage).

Forms: Instructions to jury in actions based on instigation of or participation in arrest or
imprisonment by private individual. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Footnote 3. 74.
Footnote 4. Generally as to statutes providing for detention of suspected shoplifters, see
75-78.
Footnote 5. Bly v Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. (Mo App) 562 SW2d 723.
See also Codner v Toone, 224 Kan 531, 581 P2d 387, holding, however, that failure to
give defendants' requested instruction, which was in the language of the statute, was not
prejudicial error where the instructions actually given by the court gave defendants even
more protection than they were entitled to under the statute.
Forms: Instructions to jury in action for detention by property owner or merchant. 10 Am
Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms 43-46.
Footnote 6. Moore v Target Stores, Inc. (Okla App) 571 P2d 1236.
Instruction that employer, on reasonable cause, may request police investigation of
suspected theft and that a store employee may temporarily detain another person to
investigate a theft only upon probable cause accurately stated the law for false
imprisonment cases. Hardy v La Belle's Distrib. Co., 203 Mont 263, 661 P2d 35.
In a customer's false imprisonment suit against a retailer, submission of the retailer's
privilege of detention to investigate a possible theft as an instruction rather than as a
special issue was not an abuse of discretion; the trial court submitted the claim broadly
with appropriate instructions and the charge correctly stated the law. Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v Castillo (Tex) 693 SW2d 374.
Footnote 7. Colonial Stores, Inc. v Scarbrough (Fla App D1) 338 So 2d 1119, approved
(Fla) 355 So 2d 1181.
As to distinction between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, generally, see
5.
Footnote 9. Pimental v Postoian, 121 RI 6, 393 A2d 1097.
As to measure and elements of compensatory damages, generally, see 145-148.

Forms: Instructions to jury on compensatory damages. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev),
Footnote 10. 146.
Footnote 11. Stewart v Williams, 243 Ga 580, 255 SE2d 699, on remand on other
grounds 150 Ga App 539, 258 SE2d 251.
The trial court correctly instructed that probable cause or the good faith of a person
making an arrest is admissible to rebut a claim for punitive damages. Dinmark v Farrier
(Ala) 510 So 2d 819.
Forms: Instructions to jury on exemplary or punitive damages where false imprisonment
effected with malice. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 9.
Footnote 13. Moore v Target Stores, Inc. (Okla App) 571 P2d 1236 (requested charge
allowing jury to find defendant not liable for actual or punitive damages for the acts of
other defendants if jury found them to be independent contractors).
Footnote 15. Niles v Big Sky Eyewear, 236 Mont 455, 771 P2d 114 (ovrld in part on
other grounds by Sacco v High Country Indep. Press (Mont) 896 P2d 411, 10 BNA IER
Cas 1041).
6. Judgment [138, 139]

In an action against two or more parties liable for the wrong, a judgment may be rendered
for or against any or all, which may be reversed as against one or more and sustained as
against others. 16 A trial court's refusal to set aside a verdict in a false imprisonment
action is entitled to great weight. 17
Footnotes
Footnote 16. See Sparrow v Bromage, 83 Conn 27, 74 A 1070 (where a judgment is
recovered against two defendants, the court may set it aside as to one and permit it to
stand as against the other, where it clearly appears that the latter performed acts which
would have rendered him liable if sued alone).
Footnote 17. Berry v Loiseau, 223 Conn 786, 614 A2d 414.
139 Summary judgment [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

In cases involving questions of intent, credibility, or state of mind, such as arise in actions
for false imprisonment, summary judgment is hardly ever appropriate. 18 While
summary judgment may be appropriate on the question of existence of probable cause in
a false imprisonment case, 19 or in a case involving an arrest on a warrant, 20 a case
should not be taken from jury consideration when there is a substantial dispute in the
evidence. 21
Footnotes
Footnote 18. Tumbarella v Kroger Co., 85 Mich App 482, 271 NW2d 284, holding that in
an action for false imprisonment of plaintiff who was discharged from her position as a
cashier by defendant employer for allegedly stealing $5, issues of credibility, intent, and
state of mind were present and the question of probable cause on the part of the security
officers in detaining plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact upon which
reasonable minds could differ, precluding summary judgment.
Footnote 19. Marx v Gumbinner (CA11 Fla) 905 F2d 1503.
Footnote 20. Jackson v Smith Sec. Service, Inc. (Tex App Houston (1st Dist)) 786 SW2d
787, supp op (Tex App Houston (1st Dist)) 1990 Tex App LEXIS 2661.
Footnote 21. Penrod v Carter (Utah) 737 P2d 199, 56 Utah Adv Rep 16.
F. Damages [140-156]
Research References
ALR Digest: False Imprisonment 8.5
10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 9
13 Am Jur POF3d 111, Compensatory Damages for False Imprisonment; 22 Am Jur
POF2d 445, Aggravated wrongful detentionMalice sufficient to support award of
punitive damages
1. In General [140-144]
Damages in a false imprisonment case are those which flow from the detention. 22 A
person injured by conduct that is either intentional or reckless, such as false arrest, is
entitled to compensatory damages and is under no duty to mitigate such damages. 23
Where the law provides no legal rule of measurement, assessment of damages is the
province of the jury, 24 and its assessment should be set aside only when the verdict is
plainly excessive and exorbitant. 25
One falsely arrested is entitled to at least nominal damages. 26
Footnotes
Footnote 22. Sundholm v Bettendorf (Iowa) 389 NW2d 849.
Footnote 23. Wilson v Walla Walla, 12 Wash App 152, 528 P2d 1006, holding that
plaintiff, a customer, who was detained by store detectives who inquired whether
payment had been made for items plaintiff had just placed in his automobile was under no
duty to submit to the inquiries of the detectives to mitigate damages.
In a false imprisonment case, there is no set "legal" measure of damages, that matter
being left to the jury's discretion. Wal-Mart Stores v Jones (Ala) 533 So 2d 551.
As to excessiveness of damages, see 143.
141 Apportionment of damages [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Where a jury returns verdicts against a master and a servant in different amounts, it has
been said to be proper, at least where the intent of the jury apparently was to apportion
damages, 27 to enter a judgment in the larger of the two amounts, especially where the
master is a corporation, 28 but where the purpose of the jury was to hold the master
liable while absolving the servant, the verdict should be overturned and a new trial
awarded. 29
Footnotes
Footnote 27. Goines v Pennsylvania R. Co. (1st Dep't) 3 App Div 2d 307, 160 NYS2d
39, reh den (1st Dep't) 4 App Div 2d 831, 166 NYS2d 303 and later proceeding (1st
Dep't) 6 App Div 2d 531, 179 NYS2d 960, reh and app den (1st Dep't) 7 App Div 2d
837, 182 NYS2d 295 and app dismd without op 5 NY2d 711 and app dismd 5 NY2d
1002, 185 NYS2d 257, 158 NE2d 121.
Footnote 28. Aldridge v Fox, 348 Ill App 96, 108 NE2d 139.
Footnote 29. Goines v Pennsylvania R. Co. (1st Dep't) 3 App Div 2d 307, 160 NYS2d
39, reh den (1st Dep't) 4 App Div 2d 831, 166 NYS2d 303 and later proceeding (1st
Dep't) 6 App Div 2d 531, 179 NYS2d 960, reh and app den (1st Dep't) 7 App Div 2d
837, 182 NYS2d 295 and app dismd without op 5 NY2d 711 and app dismd 5 NY2d
1002, 185 NYS2d 257, 158 NE2d 121 (action to recover damages for false imprisonment
caused by two of defendant railroad company's special policemen, wherein jury, after first
attempting to return verdict against railroad but exonerating special police officers, and
after being sent back for further deliberations, returned verdict of $8,000 against railroad
and one dollar against each of special police officers).
142 Direct, or proximate, and remote consequences [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
Most cases declare the broad and general rule that a person causing a wrongful
imprisonment is liable for all the natural and probable consequences thereof. 30 Where a
plaintiff is injured due not only to false imprisonment but also due to another
noncompensable cause, only those damages found to be a "natural result" of the false
imprisonment are recoverable. 31
If an arrest was illegal only because it was made before the issuance of a warrant, the
plaintiff can recover damages only for detention until the time when the plaintiff was
turned over to an officer holding a valid warrant. 32
The independent illegal acts of the officers of the law are not the natural and probable
consequences of a false arrest, but the question of whether the action of the magistrate or
other officer of the law after the person arrested has been turned over to the proper
custodian is the natural and probable consequence of the original unlawful act, is one
upon which the authorities conflict, at least in result. 33 It has been held that an arresting
officer is liable for damages only up to the time the officer produced the person arrested
before a judicial officer, and is not liable thereafter for acts of other persons or for any
subsequent confinement upon the order or judgment of the judicial officer, unless the
arresting officer directs or urges such acts or imprisonment, or such is the direct result of
the arrest. 34 Under this rule, damages for false arrest are to be measured only to the
time of arraignment or indictment, whichever comes first, the rationale for this rule being
that arraignment or indictment involves an independent evaluation of the grounds for the
charges against the defendant, so that detention subsequent to such evaluation, or costs
subsequently incurred, cannot be attributed to the earlier improper arrest; the
independent, supervening determination of probable cause cutting off the liability of the
arrestor. 35
Where, however, there exists such continuity in time and circumstances
between an unlawful arrest and the subsequent discharge of the accused as to constitute
one continuous unlawful act, the defendant is liable for all the consequences resultant
from the false arrest. 36 So, a police officer who arrests without warrant a person whom
the police officials desire to interview is answerable in damages for mistreatment of the
prisoner by such officials while they are subjecting the prisoner to examination in the
absence of the officer. 37
In an action against an officer for excessive force in making an arrest, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover for only such mental and physical suffering as resulted from force in
excess of what was necessary to effect the arrest or to retain the plaintiff in custody after
the arrest was made. 38
Footnotes
Footnote 30. Knickerbocker S. B. Co. v Cusack (CA2 NY) 172 F 358; Westbrook v
Hutchison, 195 SC 101, 10 SE2d 145; Little Stores v Isenberg, 26 Tenn App 357, 172
SW2d 13.
Where the damages follow as a consequence of the plaintiff's detention without
justification, an award may include those for bodily injuries. Sindle v New York City
Transit Authority, 33 NY2d 293, 352 NYS2d 183, 307 NE2d 245.
Footnote 31. Dupler v Seubert, 69 Wis 2d 373, 230 NW2d 626, holding that since
plaintiff's action against two of her superiors at work, such action claiming that they
falsely imprisoned her during an interview in which she was fired, rested entirely upon
false imprisonment, and no claim was made that the firing itself was tortious or illegal;
only those damages found to be a natural result of the false imprisonment were
recoverable; emotional harm caused by the firing was noncompensable and had to be
distinguished.
Footnote 33. Knickerbocker S. B. Co. v Cusack (CA2 NY) 172 F 358.
Footnote 34. Gisske v Sanders, 9 Cal App 13, 98 P 43.
Footnote 35. Scanlon v Flynn (SD NY) 465 F Supp 32 (applying New York law);
Broughton v State, 37 NY2d 451, 373 NYS2d 87, 335 NE2d 310, cert den 423 US 929,
46 L Ed 2d 257, 96 S Ct 277.
Assessment of damages in part for incarceration subsequent to arraignment was
improper; such damages must be compensated for by a malicious prosecution claim.
Dabbs v State, 59 NY2d 213, 464 NYS2d 428, 451 NE2d 186.
Footnote 36. Spain v Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 78 Or 355, 153 P 470; Comisky v Norfolk
& W. R. Co., 79 W Va 148, 90 SE 385.
Footnote 37. Ross v Kohler, 163 Ky 583, 174 SW 36.
Footnote 38. Romans v McGinnis, 156 Ky 205, 160 SW 928.
143 Excessiveness or inadequacy [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The amount of damages to be awarded in an action for false imprisonment is a question

for the jury, and the general rule is that their verdict will not be disturbed on the ground
of excessiveness unless it is so flagrantly large as to evince passion, partiality, or
corruption. 39 The fact that the amount awarded is larger than the court would have
allowed, 40 or that the court doubts that the plaintiff was morally entitled to any verdict,
will not make the award excessive. 41 Although there is no measure for compensatory
damages in cases of false imprisonment, the amount awarded may be so large as to
exceed any compensation which a jury might reasonably allow under the circumstances
of the case, 42 and a verdict will be set aside, or a remittitur will be ordered, where the
damages awarded are out of all reason and conscience and so disproportionate to the
injury sustained that they show that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice 43
or by a mistaken estimate of the proprieties of the case. 44 A judgment on
compensatory damages will not be sustained where the award is so excessive as to shock
the judicial conscience, 45 or so exorbitant and shocking to the judicial conscience as to
entitle the defendant to a new trial. 46 The question to be asked is whether the award of
damages falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable
compensation or whether it so shocks the conscience as to compel the conclusion that the
jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption. 47
The courts appear equally reluctant to set aside the verdict of a jury on the ground that the
damages awarded are not adequate compensation for the injury received from the false
imprisonment, and the general rule is that the verdict will not be set aside on the ground
that the damages awarded are too small. 48 However, the verdict will be set aside where
the damages awarded are grossly inadequate to the injury sustained. 49
In the jury's attempt to strike a balance between ensuring that important personal rights
are not lightly regarded and avoiding extravagant awards bearing little or no relation to
the injury involved, length of the confinement is an appropriate factor for the jury to
consider. 50
Footnotes
Nelson v Halvorson, 117 Minn 255, 135 NW 818; Little Stores v Isenberg, 26 Tenn App
357, 172 SW2d 13; J. C. Penney Co. v Duran (Tex Civ App San Antonio) 479 SW2d 374,
writ ref n r e (Oct 4, 1972); Bolton v Vellines, 94 Va 393, 26 SE 847; Comisky v Norfolk
& W. R. Co., 79 W Va 148, 90 SE 385.
Verdict of $20,000 was not excessive in action brought by former employee against
former employer, where former employer locked employee inside the business and then
instigated false report to the police that the spouse of the former employee was
vandalizing a motor vehicle. Taiwo v Vu, 249 Kan 585, 822 P2d 1024.
An appellate court is justified in reversing or granting a new trial on damages only if the
verdict is so flagrantly improper as to indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption in the
jury; which is not shown solely by the fact that the verdict is large in amount. Hernandez
v Salt Lake, 100 Nev 504, 686 P2d 251.
Annotation: Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for false

imprisonment or arrest, 48 ALR4th 165.
Footnote 40. Boesch v Kick, 97 NJL 92, 116 A 796.
Footnote 41. Howell v Wysor, 74 W Va 589, 82 SE 503.
Footnote 42. Gomez v Scanlan, 155 Cal 528, 102 P 12; Hogg v Plant, 145 Va 175, 133
SE 759, 47 ALR 308.
Footnote 43. Fotheringham v Adams Exp. Co. (CC Mo) 36 F 252; Cincinnati, N. O. & T.
P. R. Co. v Cundiff, 166 Ky 594, 179 SW 615; Herbrick v Samardick & Co., 169 Neb
833, 101 NW2d 488.
A verdict is excessive if it is so large as to be beyond all reason. Phillips v District of
Columbia (Dist Col App) 458 A2d 722.
Damage award of $25,000 was excessive, in the absence of any evidence of hospital or
doctor bills, loss of earnings, future medical expenses or permanent injury or disability, in
case involving a restaurant customer involved in an altercation with police and the
restaurant's manager. Smith v Executive Club, Ltd. (Dist Col App) 458 A2d 32, 48
ALR4th 147.
The trial court's rejection of the $994,000 jury award was not clearly erroneous, in case
involving a department store customer detained outside the store, where the evidence
indicated that the plaintiff had returned to performing household chores, there was
medical testimony of improvement in the plaintiff's condition and there was expert
testimony that the plaintiff's depression was caused by several serious personal events,
beside the arrest, suffered by the plaintiff. Panas v Harakis, 129 NH 591, 529 A2d 976.
294.
Footnote 46. Wagenmann v Adams (CA1 Mass) 829 F2d 196.
Footnote 48. Bergeron v Peyton, 106 Wis 377, 82 NW 291.
Footnote 49. Hoagland v Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo 335, 70 SW
878.
Award of $25,000 was not excessive for plaintiff's arrest and confinement in a hospital
after an altercation at the plaintiff's home, where the plaintiff had not previously been
arrested; was subjected to verbal abuse and physical threats; was subsequently unable to
hold a part-time job and 7 years later still suffered nightmares about the incident.
Wochek v Foley, 193 Conn 582, 477 A2d 1015.
Award of $225,000 for false imprisonment of 42 days after erroneous arrest did not shock
the judicial conscience. Hernandez v Salt Lake, 100 Nev 504, 686 P2d 251.
Annotation: 48 ALR4th 165.
144 Remittitur [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
While a trial court may order remittitur of damages in lieu of a new trial, where there is
no conflict in the evidence on damages, a remittitur order is suspect on review unless the
amount awarded in damages by the jury is so excessive as to suggest passion or
prejudice. 51 To avoid a violation of the constitutional right to a trial by jury, however,
only when there is no genuine issue of material fact may a court impose a remittitur
without offering the prevailing party a new trial. 52 A remittitur order, if too drastic,
may constitute an abuse of discretion, as where a court orders remittitur of 80 percent of
the damage award. 53
An evidentiary challenge on appeal to the trial court's reduction of damages is foreclosed
by the plaintiff's acceptance of remittitur. 54
An order restoring the jury verdict, which the trial court had found excessive, as a result
of failure of the defendant to file a required escrow on appeal was reversible error. 55
Footnotes
Award of $10,000 for a 3-to 5-hour detention by police was excessive, and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in finding it such and directing remittitur. Phillips v District
of Columbia (Dist Col App) 458 A2d 722.
Footnote 55. Ross v Meyers (CA6 Ohio) 883 F2d 486, reh den (CA6) 1989 US App
LEXIS 16985, reh den (CA6) 1990 US App LEXIS 419.
2. Measure and Elements of Compensatory Damages [145-148]

The general rule in personal tort action that the plaintiff is entitled to recover such a sum
as will be a fair and just compensation for the injuries sustained and that the recoverable
damages are limited to such compensation, in the absence of circumstances justifying an
award of exemplary or punitive damages, 56 applies in actions for false imprisonment.
57 The mere unlawful detention of a person constitutes a basis of recovery of at least
nominal damages; 58 but an award of only nominal damages may be insufficient and
erroneous where the facts proved indicate a right to greater damages. 59 Plaintiff is
limited, however, to nominal damages where a legal right is to be vindicated from an
invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind. 60
The damages recoverable in any case must be susceptible of ascertainment with a
reasonable degree of certainty, 61 and damages for false imprisonment which are merely
speculative are not recoverable. 62 It is nonetheless recognized, however, that there is
no legal measure of damages in false imprisonment cases, damage ascertainment being
left to the jury's discretion. 63
Elements of injury to the person imprisoned which are properly included in the recovery
comprise injury to the person and physical suffering, 64 mental suffering and
humiliation; 65 loss of time or earnings and interruption of business; 66
reasonable
and necessary expenses incurred; 67 injury to reputation; 68 and, generally, the
deprivation of any right caused by the loss of liberty, 69 such as plaintiff's loss of the
family's company during the period of arrest. 70 The fact that expenses incurred have
not been paid does not affect the rule allowing recovery of expenses. 71
Footnotes
Footnote 56. See 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages 27.
Goodell v Tower, 77 Vt 61, 58 A 790.
As to interest on damages, generally, see 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages 648 et seq.
Practice References Compensatory Damages for False Imprisonment, 13 Am Jur POF3d
111.
Footnote 58. George v Long Beach (CA9 Cal) 973 F2d 706, 92 CDOS 7892, 92 Daily
Journal DAR 12847, cert den (US) 122 L Ed 2d 664, 113 S Ct 1269; Marshall v District
of Columbia (Dist Col App) 391 A2d 1374; Hoagland v Forest Park Highlands
Amusement Co., 170 Mo 335, 70 SW 878; Worden v Davis, 195 NY 391, 88 NE 745;
Noce v Ritchie, 109 W Va 391, 155 SE 127.
Where plaintiff offers no proof of damages and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
estimate his damages on a pecuniary basis, he will be held entitled to nominal damages
on reversal by an appellate court of a judgment for the defendant. Mason v Wrightson,
205 Md 481, 109 A2d 128.
Footnote 59. See, for example, Schulz v Lamb (CA9 Nev) 591 F2d 1268 (applying
Nevada law), holding that an award of token damages of only $1 was in error, the court
stating that arrest, handcuffing, transportation to jail, processing, and incarceration for
some 4 1/2 hours in a lockup called for some compensation for embarrassment,
humiliation, and inconvenience to a 27-year-old college graduate never before arrested,
even if testimony as to long-lasting mental effects were entirely discounted.
Footnote 60. Salo v Smith, 25 Cal App 295, 143 P 322; Miller v Belmar, 5 NJ Misc 224,
135 A 795; Clements v Canon, 170 Okla 340, 40 P2d 640; Duggan v Baltimore & O. R.
Co., 159 Pa 248, 28 A 182; Wegner v Risch, 114 Wis 270, 90 NW 168.
Footnote 61. 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages 486.
Footnote 62. Spain v Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 78 Or 355, 153 P 470.
But see Jeffers v Heavrin (CA6 Ky) 10 F3d 380 (even though damages may not generate
paid receipts or documented out-of-pocket expenses, they are not speculative and may be
relatively easy to compute).
Footnote 63. Wal-Mart Stores v Jones (Ala) 533 So 2d 551.
Footnote 64. Beckwith v Bean, 98 US 266, 8 Otto 266, 25 L Ed 124; Dogarin v Connor,
6 Ariz App 473, 433 P2d 653 (assault and battery); S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla
471, 180 So 757; Lemmon v King, 95 Kan 524, 148 P 750; Ross v Kohler, 163 Ky 583,
174 SW 36; Johnson v Supersave Mkts., 211 Mont 465, 686 P2d 209; Little Stores v
Isenberg, 26 Tenn App 357, 172 SW2d 13; S. H. Kress & Co. v Musgrove, 153 Va 348,
149 SE 453; Woodard v Albany (3d Dep't) 81 App Div 2d 947, 439 NYS2d 701.
Footnote 65. 146.
Footnote 66. Beckwith v Bean, 98 US 266, 8 Otto 266, 25 L Ed 124; Simon v United
States (CA5 La) 711 F2d 740; S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla 471, 180 So 757;
Ross v Kohler, 163 Ky 583, 174 SW 36; Guion v Associated Dry Goods Corp. (Lord &
Taylor Div.) (1st Dep't) 56 App Div 2d 798, 393 NYS2d 8, affd 43 NY2d 876, 403
NYS2d 465, 374 NE2d 364; Duggan v Baltimore & O. R. Co., 159 Pa 248, 28 A 182;
Little Stores v Isenberg, 26 Tenn App 357, 172 SW2d 13; Gibson Discount Center, Inc. v
Cruz (Tex Civ App El Paso) 562 SW2d 511, writ ref n r e (May 17, 1978); Goodell v
Tower, 77 Vt 61, 58 A 790.
Inability of the plaintiff to accept a job in another state due to pendency of the criminal
case resulting from allegedly false arrest did not flow from the detention and damages
therefor were not recoverable in false arrest action. Sundholm v Bettendorf (Iowa) 389
NW2d 849.
Footnote 67. Beckwith v Bean, 98 US 266, 8 Otto 266, 25 L Ed 124; Nelson v Kellogg,
162 Cal 621, 123 P 1115 (doctors' bills); S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla 471, 180 So
757; Thomas v Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 SC 95, 113 SE2d 337; Little Stores v Isenberg,
26 Tenn App 357, 172 SW2d 13; Bolton v Vellines, 94 Va 393, 26 SE 847.
In an action against a department store for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution
stemming from the arrest and prosecution of the plaintiff for the alleged theft of a hat, of
which charge the plaintiff was acquitted at a criminal trial, plaintiff's recoverable actual
damages would include the costs of his bail bond and defense at the criminal trial.
Gibson Discount Center, Inc. v Cruz (Tex Civ App El Paso) 562 SW2d 511, writ ref n r e
(May 17, 1978).
As to recovery of attorneys' fees, see 148.
Footnote 68. Beckwith v Bean, 98 US 266, 8 Otto 266, 25 L Ed 124; S. H. Kress & Co.
v Powell, 132 Fla 471, 180 So 757; Little Stores v Isenberg, 26 Tenn App 357, 172 SW2d
13.
Footnote 69. Gardner v Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. (CA2 NY) 907 F2d 1348; George v
Long Beach (CA9 Cal) 973 F2d 706, 92 CDOS 7892, 92 Daily Journal DAR 12847, cert
den (US) 122 L Ed 2d 664, 113 S Ct 1269; Phillips v District of Columbia (Dist Col
App) 458 A2d 722; S. H. Kress & Co. v Powell, 132 Fla 471, 180 So 757; Westbrook v
Hutchison, 195 SC 101, 10 SE2d 145.
Footnote 70. Gibson Discount Center, Inc. v Cruz (Tex Civ App El Paso) 562 SW2d 511,
writ ref n r e (May 17, 1978).
146 Mental suffering [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Mental suffering, including fright, shame, and mortification from the indignity and
disgrace, consequent upon an illegal detention, is usually considered an injury for which
compensation may be made in an action for false arrest or false imprisonment. 72
The fact that no physical hurt or injury was inflicted on one complaining of false
imprisonment or arrest has been said not to be grounds for denying recovery of
reasonable compensation for mental suffering; 73 however, where a shoplifter detention
statute limits recovery to compensatory damages where the merchant acted with probable
cause, the contrary result has been reached. 74
Humiliation, shame, and fright are elements to be considered in assessing mental
suffering. 75 The jury has considerable discretion in determining the amount of damages
where a legal restraint is accompanied by circumstances causing humiliation, shame and
public disgrace. 76
Evidence, such as character evidence, which would not be admissible on other issues, is
admissible on the question of mental suffering and humiliation. 77
Footnotes
Footnote 72. Scanlon v Flynn (SD NY) 465 F Supp 32; Boies v Raynor, 89 Ariz 257, 361
P2d 1; Gomez v Scanlan, 155 Cal 528, 102 P 12; Davis v Seeley, 91 Iowa 583, 60 NW
183; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v Smith, 281 Ky 583, 136 SW2d 759; Mumford v
Starmont, 139 Mich 188, 102 NW 662; Herbrick v Samardick & Co., 169 Neb 833, 101
NW2d 488; Budgar v State, 98 Misc 2d 588, 414 NYS2d 463; Westbrook v Hutchison,
195 SC 101, 10 SE2d 145; Little Stores v Isenberg, 26 Tenn App 357, 172 SW2d 13;
Hepworth v Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P2d 507.
Where the record disclosed that plaintiff was wrongfully imprisoned for murder for about
4 years, of which approximately 2 years was in a state penitentiary; that he was on "death
row" for 2 months and 5 days; that on the day set for his execution his head was shaved,
he was served his "last meal" and was shown the coffin in which he was to be buried; that
he testified that he had a wife and 2 children at the time of his imprisonment and that he
never got to see them, and that he worried about them greatly; and that after the death cell
experience it was hard for him to remember because of the mental anguish he had
suffered; it was held that the trial court's finding that he suffered extreme mental pain and
suffering as a proximate result of his erroneous conviction and imprisonment; and that he
sustained damages in the sum of $20,000, was sufficiently supported by the record. State
v Vargas (Tex Civ App San Antonio) 419 SW2d 926, writ ref n r e (Tex) 424 SW2d 416,
rehg of writ of error overr (Mar 6, 1968).
Footnote 73. J. C. Penney Co. v Duran (Tex Civ App San Antonio) 479 SW2d 374, writ
ref n r e (Oct 4, 1972); McDonald v Henderson (Tex Civ App) 250 SW 463.
An essential part of the injury done by a false arrest is the mental anguish it causes the
victim, including the shame and humiliation to which the injured party has been
wrongfully subjected; which recovery is not conditioned on proof of physical
manifestations of such suffering. Kraft v Bettendorf (Iowa) 359 NW2d 466.
Where there is evidence of substantial invasion of a legal interest which causes a
significant impact on the person of the plaintiff, emotional distress is compensable
without showing physical or mental injury, including evidence of depression and
withdrawal; post-traumatic stress disorder and personality change affecting marriage.
Niles v Big Sky Eyewear, 236 Mont 455, 771 P2d 114 (ovrld on other grounds in part by
Sacco v High Country Indep. Press (Mont) 896 P2d 411, 10 BNA IER Cas 1041).
Courts will decide, on a case by case basis, if emotional distress is compensable in the
absence of a physical injury, looking at whether the tortious conduct results in a
substantial invasion of a legally protected interest and causes a significant impact on the
person of the plaintiff. Johnson v Supersave Mkts., 211 Mont 465, 686 P2d 209.
Footnote 74. See Tumbarella v Kroger Co., 85 Mich App 482, 271 NW2d 284; Mosley v
Federals Dep't Stores, Inc., 85 Mich App 333, 271 NW2d 224.
For general discussion of such statutes, see 75-78.
Footnote 75. J. C. Penney Co. v Duran (Tex Civ App San Antonio) 479 SW2d 374, writ
ref n r e (Oct 4, 1972).
Mental suffering damages are recoverable for damages related to public embarassment
and humiliation which flow directly from the plaintiff's false imprisonment. Arlan v
Cervini (RI) 478 A2d 976.
Footnote 76. Washington v Farlice (2nd Dist) 1 Cal App 4th 766, 2 Cal Rptr 2d 607, 91
Daily Journal DAR 15105.
147 Future damages [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The scope of damages recoverable goes beyond those already actually suffered. The
general rule that in an action for personal torts future damages to the injured person are
an element of recovery, where there is reasonable certainty that they will result, 78
applies to actions for false imprisonment. 79 There is insufficient evidence to warrant
submission to the jury of a damage claim for future lost wages, absent any showing that
such consequences are nonspeculative and reasonably certain. 80 Recovery of damages
for loss of earning capacity has been precluded in the absence of expert testimony. 81
Footnotes
Footnote 78. See 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages 675 et seq.
Footnote 79. Winters v Campbell, 148 W Va 710, 137 SE2d 188.
Footnote 81. Panas v Harakis, 129 NH 591, 529 A2d 976.
148 Attorneys' fees [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
It has generally been held or recognized that in an action for false imprisonment or arrest,
the plaintiff may recover as an element of damages attorneys' fees incurred as a result of
the unlawful imprisonment or arrest in question. 82 The plaintiff's right to recover
attorneys' fees as an element of damages ordinarily extends to attorneys' services received
by the plaintiff for his discharge or release from imprisonment or restraint. 83 However,
the courts are not altogether in agreement as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover
attorneys' fees incurred to defend against a prosecution or action instituted against him or
her in connection with the false imprisonment or arrest in question. In some cases, the
plaintiff was allowed to recover attorneys' fees incurred for this kind of service. 84
However, in those jurisdictions following the rule that where a plaintiff successfully
establishes liability for false imprisonment damages will be measured only to the time of
arraignment or indictment, whichever comes first, 85 it necessarily follows that such
damages will not include attorneys' fees expended in the subsequent defense of the
criminal prosecution. 86 It has been said, in this connection, that such damages are
properly attributable to the tort of malicious prosecution, and that the reason for the rule
is that an action for false imprisonment redresses the violation of plaintiff's freedom of
movement and not freedom from unjustifiable litigation, so that attorneys' fees are not
proximate after arraignment or indictment and hence not recoverable. Consequently,
when malicious prosecution has not been alleged or established, the plaintiff will be
limited to those legal fees incurred up to and including the evaluation by a neutral body
that the charges are warranted. 87 It has also been held that the plaintiff in an action for
false imprisonment or arrest is not entitled to recover attorneys' fees incurred in
defending against a prosecution or action instituted in connection with the false
imprisonment or arrest in question where the plaintiff has been discharged or released
from imprisonment or restraint at the time of such services. 88
In order to recover attorneys' fees as an element of damages in an action for false
imprisonment or arrest, the plaintiff must ordinarily prove the legal services rendered and
the amount paid or obligated to be paid. 89 It must also be shown that the attorneys' fees
sought to be recovered were proximately and necessarily caused by the act complained
of. 90 Attorneys' fees that may be recoverable as an element of damages in this
connection must be reasonable under the circumstances. 91
Footnotes
Footnote 82. Rosario v State, 51 Misc 2d 790, 274 NYS2d 81, revd on other grounds (3d
Dep't) 33 App Div 2d 122, 305 NYS2d 574, affd 36 NY2d 901, 372 NYS2d 647, 334
NE2d 596; Vallon v Ramage, 196 Misc 740, 93 NYS2d 56; Moyer v Cordell, 204 Okla
255, 228 P2d 645; Lane v Collins, 29 Wis 2d 66, 138 NW2d 264.
Plaintiff was entitled to damages for expenses incurred in securing discharge from
restraint, including a reasonable attorney fee. Phillips v District of Columbia (Dist Col
App) 458 A2d 722.
Stating that it was error to grant defendant's motion to strike from the complaint the
allegation that the plaintiff was required to furnish a bond and employed an attorney to
represent and defend her, the court in Thomas v Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 SC 95, 113
SE2d 337, pointed out that any reasonable expense necessarily incurred in procuring her
release was an element of damages in the event plaintiff's cause of action for false
imprisonment was sustained.
Annotation: Attorneys' fees as element of damages in action for false imprisonment or
arrest, or for malicious prosecution, 21 ALR3d 1068 3[a].

Footnote 83. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Adkins, 222 Ala 17, 130 So 552; Neves v Costa, 5
Cal App 111, 89 P 860; Nastasi v State, 194 Misc 449, 86 NYS2d 635, revd on other
grounds 275 App Div 524, 90 NYS2d 377, affd 300 NY 473, 88 NE2d 658; Warner v
State, 189 Misc 51, 68 NYS2d 60, revd on other grounds 272 App Div 954, 71 NYS2d
559, revd on other grounds 297 NY 395, 79 NE2d 459, reh gr 297 NY 865, 79 NE2d 271;
S. H. Kress & Co. v Roberts, 143 Va 71, 129 SE 244.
In claim against state for false arrest and imprisonment, trial judge properly awarded
claimant $250 for counsel fees in connection with habeas corpus proceeding to obtain
release from jail. Casler v State (4th Dep't) 33 App Div 2d 305, 307 NYS2d 695.
Where the plaintiff in an action for damages was wrongfully arrested and his place of
business closed, it was held in Moyer v Cordell, 204 Okla 255, 228 P2d 645, that he was
entitled to the recovery of $20 paid by him to his attorney in connection with his false
arrest and his release from jail on bond.
Footnote 84. Worden v Davis, 195 NY 391, 88 NE 745; Maracle v State, 50 Misc 2d
348, 270 NYS2d 439; Simanton v Caldbeck, 96 Vt 523, 121 A 411.
In action for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, plaintiff was entitled to
reimbursement of $500 incurred as a result of defending a charge of disorderly conduct
where plaintiff was arrested by state trooper after blowing the horn and shaking a fist at
the trooper who made a sudden U-turn in front of him, and then throwing his insurance
card at the trooper. Budgar v State, 98 Misc 2d 588, 414 NYS2d 463.
Courts so holding, it has been noted, take the more practical view that a person falsely
arrested and charged will thereafter opt to defend himself on the assumption that the
foundations of the prosecution are valid, rather than take the risks of disregarding those
proceedings in reliance upon a subsequent ruling that they were void at the outset, while
courts denying recovery proceed on the theoretical principle that all actions arising from
an initial invalid arrest are void and that therefore any defense undertaken in such
proceedings is wholly voluntary and hence not recoverable. Berberian v Mitchell, 115 RI
149, 341 A2d 56.
Footnote 85. 142.
Footnote 86. Broughton v State, 37 NY2d 451, 373 NYS2d 87, 335 NE2d 310, cert den
423 US 929, 46 L Ed 2d 257, 96 S Ct 277; Laskowski v County of Nassau (2d Dep't)
57 App Div 2d 888, 394 NYS2d 442.
Although plaintiff could not recover attorney fees incurred while defending underlying
criminal action, plaintiff was entitled to expenses incurred in securing discharge from
restraint, including reasonable attorney's fees. Barnes v District of Columbia (Dist Col
App) 452 A2d 1198.
See also Berberian v Mitchell, 115 RI 149, 341 A2d 56; where, although the court held
that reasonable legal fees shown to have been incurred in a person's defense against
criminal prosecution directly resulting from his false arrest may be includible among the
natural and probable consequences of that wrong and hence may be recoverable as
damages, expressly reserved for a later case the question whether the intervention of
indictment or other substantial proceedings between a person's unlawful arrest and his
later prosecution would compel a different result.
Footnote 87. Broughton v State, 37 NY2d 451, 373 NYS2d 87, 335 NE2d 310, cert den
423 US 929, 46 L Ed 2d 257, 96 S Ct 277.
Footnote 88. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Adkins, 222 Ala 17, 130 So 552; Miami Beach v
Bretagna (Fla App D3) 190 So 2d 364, 21 ALR3d 1064.
Footnote 89. Smith v Bryson (Tex Civ App) 33 SW2d 268, writ dism w o j (wherein the
court sustained the defendant's assignment of error regarding the trial court's instructions
to the jury authorizing them to consider attorneys' fees paid by the plaintiff to secure his
release from jail, on the ground that the same was not warranted by the evidence).
Footnote 90. Nelson v Kellogg, 162 Cal 621, 123 P 1115; Zimmerman v Knox, 34 Kan
245, 8 P 104; Powell v State, 19 Misc 2d 9, 191 NYS2d 846; Berberian v Mitchell, 115
RI 149, 341 A2d 56.
In an action to recover damages suffered by the plaintiffs as the result of criminal
proceedings instituted and prosecuted against them by the defendants, where at the trial
the plaintiffs had shown that they were arrested, held in custody for several hours
immediately prior to and after the preliminary hearing, and required to post bail, that they
were subjected to a 3-day criminal trial on charges amounting to felonies, and that each
paid $1,250 as attorneys' fees; the court in Biggans v Hajoca Corp. (DC Pa) 94 F Supp
593, affd (CA3 Pa) 185 F2d 982, denying defendant's motion to set aside verdicts for the
plaintiffs and noting that if plaintiffs were to recover for loss other than general damages,
such loss must be established by proof and shown to be the natural and proximate result
of the criminal proceedings, held that with the exception of the physical harm and loss of
business, it could not be said that the plaintiffs had failed to offer evidence from which
the jury could allow compensatory damages in addition to the amount of the attorneys'
fees.
Footnote 91. Tutwiler Coal, Coke & Iron Co. v Tuvin, 158 Ala 657, 48 So 79; Berberian
v Mitchell, 115 RI 149, 341 A2d 56.
3. Exemplary or Punitive Damages [149-156]

In most jurisdictions, if an arrest or imprisonment is effected recklessly, oppressively,
insultingly, or willfully and maliciously, with a design to oppress and injure, the jury may
go beyond the rule of compensation; and, as a punishment to the defendant, assess such
additional damages as, in their discretion, they deem proper. 92 Punitive damages have
been described as a means of deterring defendants from future conduct, 93 where the
defendant's conduct is recklessly indifferent to the rights of others or in intentional or
wanton violation of those rights. 94 In some jurisdictions, however, exemplary or
punitive damages are not recoverable at all; 95 while in other jurisdictions, they may be
recovered only when permitted by express statutory enactment, which may not include an
action for false imprisonment. 96
Even in those jurisdictions in which recovery of punitive damages is generally permitted,
such damages will not be allowed in the absence of actual damage sustained by plaintiff.
97 However, where actual damages are shown, the extent thereof is immaterial in order
to sustain a recovery of punitive damages. 98 Accordingly, awards of exemplary
damages greatly in excess of the award of actual damages have been sustained. 99
Some jurisdictions require proof of all elements of the claim by the higher standard of
clear and convincing evidence in order to award punitive damages. 1
Footnotes
Footnote 92. Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278; Parrott v Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Asso., 97 Cal App 2d 14, 217 P2d 89, 35 ALR2d 263; Farish
v Smoot (Fla) 58 So 2d 534; National Bond & Inv. Co. v Whithorn, 276 Ky 204, 123
SW2d 263; Heinze v Murphy, 180 Md 423, 24 A2d 917; Hoagland v Forest Park
Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo 335, 70 SW 878; Jackson v American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 139 NC 347, 51 SE 1015; Landseidel v Culeman, 47 ND 275, 181 NW 593, 13
ALR 1339; McAleer v Good, 216 Pa 473, 65 A 934; Cullen v Dickenson, 33 SD 27, 144
NW 656.
Footnote 94. Berry v Loiseau, 223 Conn 786, 614 A2d 414.
Punitive damages were warranted where store employee impersonated a police officer,
detained a customer for 35 minutes, badgered customer to confess to shoplifting,
pressured customer even after determining that no offense had been committed, and
forced customer to sign a release from liability. Rogers v T.J.X. Cos., 329 NC 226, 404
SE2d 664.
Footnote 95. See 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages 737.
Footnote 96. Hall v Rice, 117 Neb 813, 223 NW 4, 78 ALR 1421 (ovrld in part on other
grounds by Whitcomb v Nebraska State Education Asso., 184 Neb 31, 165 NW2d 99).
Footnote 97. Hoagland v Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo 335, 70 SW
878; Rogers v T.J.X. Cos., 329 NC 226, 404 SE2d 664; Moyer v Meier, 205 Okla 405,
238 P2d 338, 29 ALR2d 818.
Footnote 98. McConathy v Deck, 34 Colo 461, 83 P 135 (ovrld in part on other grounds
by Ress v Rediess, 130 Colo 572, 278 P2d 183); Hoagland v Forest Park Highlands
Amusement Co., 170 Mo 335, 70 SW 878; Moyer v Cordell, 204 Okla 255, 228 P2d 645.
Annotation: Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for false
imprisonment or arrest, 48 ALR4th 165.
Footnote 99. Halliburton-Abbott Co. v Hodge, 172 Okla 175, 44 P2d 122.
Footnote 1. Big B, Inc. v Cottingham (Ala) 634 So 2d 999; Niles v Big Sky Eyewear, 236
Mont 455, 771 P2d 114 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Sacco v High Country Indep.
Press (Mont) 896 P2d 411, 10 BNA IER Cas 1041).
150 State of mind of defendant; malice, generally [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
Courts have frequently said that "malice" or "malicious" conduct will warrant an award
of punitive damages in an action for false arrest or imprisonment, without affording any
guidance, by way of definition or example, as to the content of those concepts. 2
Similarly, "implied" or "presumed" malice has been held to sustain such an award, again
without any clarification of the circumstances warranting an implication or presumption.
3 On the other hand, some courts have specifically held that the requisite malice may be
inferred from want of probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest; 4 or from disregard of, or
indifference to, one's rights. 5
Malice, justifying an award of punitive damages, has also been held to be inferable from
evidence of ill will or dislike, 6 disparate treatment of plaintiffs as opposed to others
similarly situated; 7 and assault and battery upon the plaintiff. 8 Malice has been held
not inferable, however, from a physician's false certification that he had examined the
plaintiff prior to the plaintiff's commitment to a mental institution. 9
"Malice," as used in the cases which allow recovery for exemplary damages where the
imprisonment is actuated by malice, does not necessarily mean anger, or a malevolent or
vindictive feeling toward the plaintiff; but a wrongful act without reasonable excuse is
malicious within the legal meaning of the term. 10
Punitive damages will not be allowed where the false imprisonment was brought about in
good faith, without malice in fact or in law, and where there is no element of wantonness
or oppression. 11 Evidence of good faith is admissible to rebut a claim for punitive
damages. 12
Footnotes
Footnote 2. Beckwith v Bean, 98 US 266, 8 Otto 266, 25 L Ed 124; Wells v Adams, 232
Ark 873, 340 SW2d 572 (by implication); Walker v Tucker, 131 Colo 198, 280 P2d 649
(by statute); Karow v Student Inns, Inc. (4th Dist) 43 Ill App 3d 878, 2 Ill Dec 515, 357
NE2d 682, 98 ALR3d 531 (by implication); Guion v Associated Dry Goods Corp. (Lord
& Taylor Div.) (1st Dep't) 56 App Div 2d 798, 393 NYS2d 8, affd 43 NY2d 876, 403
NYS2d 465, 374 NE2d 364; Doyle v Douglas (Okla) 390 P2d 871; Skillern & Sons, Inc.
v Stewart (Tex Civ App Fort Worth) 379 SW2d 687, writ ref n r e (Oct 7, 1964) and rehg
of writ of error overr (Nov 18, 1964); Lane v Collins, 29 Wis 2d 66, 138 NW2d 264.
Annotation: Defendant's state of mind necessary or sufficient to warrant award of
punitive damages in action for false arrest or imprisonment, 93 ALR3d 1109 3.
Practice References Aggravated wrongful detentionMalice sufficient to support award of
punitive damages. 22 Am Jur POF2d 445.
Forms: Instruction to jury on recovery of exemplary or punitive damages where false
imprisonment effected with malice. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False
Footnote 3. Maher v Wilson, 139 Cal 514, 73 P 418 (presumed); Alterauge v Los Angeles
Turf Club, 97 Cal App 2d 735, 218 P2d 802 (implied); Young v Gormley, 120 Iowa 372,
94 NW 922 (presumed); Hill v S.S. Kresge Co., 202 Mo App 385, 217 SW 997 (implied).
In Parrott v Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Asso., 97 Cal App 2d 14, 217 P2d 89, 35
ALR2d 263, an action against a bank and certain of its officials for false arrest and
imprisonment, and other wrongful acts, the court concluded that the jury could
reasonably infer both from the facts alleged and the evidence that the defendants were
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, and that, therefore, the issue of
punitive damages was properly submitted to the jury.
Footnote 4. Standard Oil Co. v Davis, 208 Ala 565, 94 So 754, companion case 209 Ala
493, 96 So 629; Farish v Smoot (Fla) 58 So 2d 534 (by implication); Jackson v
Thompson (Mo App) 188 SW2d 853.
In affirming a verdict for punitive damages in an action for false imprisonment, the court,
in Oliver v Kessler (Mo App) 95 SW2d 1226, rejected the defendants' contention that
there was no showing of malice on the part of the defendants, and that the trial court
therefore erred in commissioning the jury to award punitive damages on a finding of

malice. The court declared that malice was a question of fact for the jury, and was
generally inferred from a want of probable cause, and that the requisite showing had been
made by the plaintiff to sustain the award.
Appropriate standard for determining availability of punitive damages is "malice in fact"
or "actual malice," which cannot be implied from the absence of probable cause in
effecting the plaintiff's arrest. McFarland v Skaggs Cos. (Utah) 678 P2d 298 (among
conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in Miskin v Carter (Utah) 761 P2d 1378,
90 Utah Adv Rep 19).
Footnote 5. Birmingham Ledger Co. v Buchanan, 10 Ala App 527, 65 So 667, cert den
191 Ala 659, 66 So 1008; Wrains v Rose (Fla App D2) 175 So 2d 75; Garvis v K Mart
Discount Store (Mo App) 461 SW2d 317.
While the good faith of an arresting officer, in the sense of absence of malice, does not by
itself relieve the officer from liability for compensatory damages for false imprisonment
because good faith implies due diligence and the failure to exercise ordinary care is
inconsistent with good faith; a showing of malice or of conduct demonstrating reckless
disregard of the rights of others is required to support an award of punitive damages for
such false imprisonment. Robinson v Winston-Salem, 34 NC App 401, 238 SE2d 628.
In an action against a department store for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution
stemming from the arrest and prosecution of the plaintiff for the alleged theft of a hat, of
which charge the plaintiff was acquitted at a criminal trial, exemplary damages were
properly recoverable on the grounds that the evidence reflected malice and that the
defendant's employees acted without regard to the rights of the plaintiff where the police
were called even though three people stated that the hat had been bought at an earlier
date; where the hat itself evidenced wear and that it had been used for a period of time;
where, even when confronted at trial with a sales receipt showing that the hat had been
bought and paid for a month prior to the incident, the defendant's security agent still
stated that she thought the plaintiff had stolen the hat and where the defendant's
employees never acknowledged the possibility of an honest mistake or that they should
have further investigated before filing theft charges on merchandise valued at less than
$5. Gibson Discount Center, Inc. v Cruz (Tex Civ App El Paso) 562 SW2d 511, writ ref
n r e (May 17, 1978).
Annotation: 93 ALR3d 1109 4[d].
Footnote 6. Vandermeer v Pacific Northwest Development Corp., 274 Or 221, 545 P2d
868 (citizen's arrest for minor infraction held probative of malice).
Footnote 7. O'Brien v Eugene Chemical Exports, Inc., 63 Or App 284, 664 P2d 1106.
Footnote 8. Altman v Knox Lumber Co. (Minn App) 381 NW2d 858.
Footnote 9. Di Giovanni v Pessel, 55 NJ 188, 260 A2d 510.
Footnote 10. Fotheringham v Adams Exp. Co. (CC Mo) 36 F 252; Farish v Smoot (Fla)
58 So 2d 534; Winegar v Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (Mo App) 163 SW2d 357; Jones v
Hebdo, 88 W Va 386, 106 SE 898.
Footnote 11. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v Cundiff, 166 Ky 594, 179 SW 615;
Heinze v Murphy, 180 Md 423, 24 A2d 917; Gamble v Keyes, 43 SD 245, 178 NW 870.
Malice authorizing punitive damages cannot be predicated on the mere fact that hospital
authorities, under a mistaken view of their rights, detained a patient for a few hours to
compel payment of the bill. Gadsden General Hospital v Hamilton, 212 Ala 531, 103 So
553, 40 ALR 294.
Claim for punitive damages will be dismissed where there is no showing that the wrong
complained of was actuated by evil and reprehensible motives, duration of imprisonment
is brief and there is no substantial mental or physical injury. Hollender v Trump Village
Cooperative (2d Dep't) 97 App Div 2d 812, 468 NYS2d 683.
Footnote 12. Dinmark v Farrier (Ala) 510 So 2d 819.
151 -- Actual or express malice [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Various rules have been expressed by the courts with respect to the role of actual or
express malice, in the common-law sense of ill will or hostility, as a basis for an award of
punitive damages in an action for false arrest or imprisonment. Some courts have held
that only express or actual malice would warrant an award of punitive damages in an
action for false arrest or imprisonment. 13 Moreover, by stating rules which included
actual malice as one of several states of mind that would support an award of punitive
damages, many courts have indicated that actual malice was a sufficient basis therefor.
14 Other courts have expressly held that proof of actual malice was not necessary for
recovery of punitive damages. 15
Footnotes
Footnote 13. F. B. C. Stores, Inc. v Duncan, 214 Va 246, 198 SE2d 595.
In an action for false arrest against police officer who arrested individual charged with
slapping the officer's wife prior to marriage, under the mistaken belief that unrelated
capias issued nearly 33 months later authorized the arrest, the jury was properly
instructed that punitive damages could be awarded if they found that officer acted with
actual malice or in such a reckless or wanton manner as to amount to malice, and the
additional instruction (to which no objection was made) that officer's asserted good faith
in acting on capias was only one factor to be considered in the determination of whether
he acted with malice became the law of the case for purposes of appeal, so that the trial
court erred in granting a new trial on the asserted basis that officer's reliance on capias
precluded malice, and a jury verdict would be reinstated. Pimental v Postoian, 121 RI 6,
393 A2d 1097.
Footnote 14. Williams v Carolina Coach Co. (DC Va) 111 F Supp 329, affd (CA4 Va) 207
F2d 408 (by implication); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v Waller, 208 Ark 1063, 189
SW2d 361; Parrott v Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Asso., 97 Cal App 2d 14, 217
P2d 89, 35 ALR2d 263; Hollywood v Coley (Fla App D4) 258 So 2d 828; Darlow v
State, 207 Misc 124, 137 NYS2d 69 (recklessness that betokens vindictiveness); Nappi v
Wilson (Franklin Co) 22 Ohio App 520, 4 Ohio L Abs 766, 155 NE 151; Vandermeer v
Pacific Northwest Development Corp., 274 Or 221, 545 P2d 868.
Footnote 15. Farish v Smoot (Fla) 58 So 2d 534; Hammargren v Montgomery Ward &
Co., 172 Kan 484, 241 P2d 1192; Helming v Adams (Mo App) 509 SW2d 159; Stevens v
O'Neill, 51 App Div 364, 64 NYS 663, affd 169 NY 375, 62 NE 424; Nappi v Wilson
(Franklin Co) 22 Ohio App 520, 4 Ohio L Abs 766, 155 NE 151.
Distinguishing actions involving torts arising out of a contractual relationship, in which
actual malice in the common-law sense of spite, hatred, or animosity was required to be
shown to recover punitive damages, the court, in General Motors Corp. v Piskor, 281 Md
627, 381 A2d 16, 93 ALR3d 1097, held that such malice was not required in an action,
such as that before it, for false imprisonment and assault which, the court stated, were
torts in the "purest sense" of that term. The action was brought by an employee of the
defendant automobile manufacturer, who had been detained and searched by the
defendant's security personnel to ascertain whether he had stolen certain items from one
of the defendant's production lines. The defendant claimed that the detention and search
were authorized by an express plant rule which was a part of the employment contract.
The court held, however, that, be that as it may, there was no such direct relationship
between the defendant's tortious conduct and the employment contract as would justify
the conclusion that the tort arose out of the contractual relationship.
152 -- Other states of mind [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
States of mind other than malice or actual malice have been held to justify an award of
punitive damages in an action for false arrest or imprisonment. Thus, some courts have
spoken of willful, wanton, reckless, or intentional misconduct; 16 or of bad faith in
making or instigating an arrest. 17 Punitive damages have also been allowed where an
arrest was made with the knowledge that it was in violation of law or a court order. 18
Generally, the courts, either by not expressing any contrary view, or by including
improper motive or evil intent in an enumeration of states of mind warranting an award
of punitive damages, have indicated that such motive or intent is sufficient, but not
required, to justify an award of punitive damages. 19
Some courts have indicated that more than one of the categories of the foregoing mental
states must be present to warrant an award of punitive damages in an action for false
arrest or imprisonment. 20
Footnotes
Footnote 16. Beckwith v Bean, 98 US 266, 8 Otto 266, 25 L Ed 124 (wanton); Atkinson
v Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc. (CA5 Miss) 143 F2d 477, cert den 323 US 758, 89 L Ed
607, 65 S Ct 92 (wanton or willful applying Mississippi law); Fotheringham v Adams
Exp. Co. (CC Mo) 36 F 252 (willful, wanton, or reckless); Bujaki v Egan (DC Alaska)
237 F Supp 822 (willful); Brown v Evans (CC Nev) 8 Sawy 488, 17 F 912, affd 109 US
180, 27 L Ed 898, 3 S Ct 83 (wanton recognizing rule).Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v
Waller, 208 Ark 1063, 189 SW2d 361 (wanton or willful); Hollywood v Coley (Fla App
D4) 258 So 2d 828 (willful); Hammargren v Montgomery Ward & Co., 172 Kan 484, 241
P2d 1192 (wanton or willful); General Motors Corp. v Piskor, 277 Md 165, 352 A2d 810
(wanton recognizing rule); Garvis v K Mart Discount Store (Mo App) 461 SW2d 317
(wrongful act done intentionally and without just cause or excuse); Di Giovanni v Pessel,
55 NJ 188, 260 A2d 510 (reckless indifference to consequences recognizing); Guion v
Associated Dry Goods Corp. (Lord & Taylor Div.), 43 NY2d 876, 403 NYS2d 465, 374
NE2d 364 (wanton by implication); Guion v Associated Dry Goods Corp. (Lord & Taylor
Div.) (1st Dep't) 56 App Div 2d 798, 393 NYS2d 8, affd 43 NY2d 876, 403 NYS2d 465,
374 NE2d 364 (wanton and reckless); Selden v Albany (3d Dep't) 50 App Div 2d 975,
376 NYS2d 46 (willful or wanton); Doyle v Douglas (Okla) 390 P2d 871 (wanton);
Travelers Indem. Co. v Hoard, 47 Tenn App 565, 340 SW2d 260 (willful); Big Town
Nursing Home, Inc. v Newman (Tex Civ App Waco) 461 SW2d 195 (intentionally done
in violation of plaintiff's rights).
Punitive damages award was justified against officer who arrested individual, whom
officer understood to be seeking help, without making an effort to assist the individual or
discover whether the complaint was justified; officer's actions displayed a reckless
disregard for the rights of others. Gagnon v Ball (CA2 Conn) 696 F2d 17.
Actual malice need not be proven to make a case for punitive damages; it is sufficient if
the imprisonment is willfully, wantonly or oppressively done, to warrant punitive
damages. Collins v Straight, Inc. (CA4 Va) 748 F2d 916, 17 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1351.
See also Wal-Mart Stores v Yarbrough, 284 Ark 345, 681 SW2d 359 (state of mind of
"conscious indifference" raises a jury question on punitive damages).
Punitive damages are generally allowable where there is a showing that the acts were
either willful or malicious or that they were performed in such a way as would indicate a
gross neglect or disregard for the rights of the person wronged. Horton v Union Light,
Heat & Power Co. (Ky) 690 SW2d 382.
A judgment for punitive damages was reversed, in Consolidated Sales Co. v Malone (Ky)
530 SW2d 680, an action for false imprisonment, in which the court stated that punitive
damages must be premised on one or both of the following two circumstances: (1) the
defendant's conduct was malicious, in that he acted in bad faith, and was not motivated
by a belief that he had probable cause to detain the plaintiff, or (2) even though he acted
in good faith, his treatment of the plaintiff was grossly in excess of what the
circumstances, as the defendant actually believed them to be, reasonably required.
Actual ill will or vindictiveness of purpose is not required, and exemplary damages have
frequently been awarded when the imprisonment is accompanied by fraud, recklessness,
wantonness, bad faith, oppression, insult, outrage, willful injury or wrongful act without a
reasonable excuse or in known violation of law. Rogers v T.J.X. Cos., 329 NC 226, 404
SE2d 664.
Footnote 17. Farish v Smoot (Fla) 58 So 2d 534; Superx Drugs of Kentucky, Inc. v Rice
(Ky App) 554 SW2d 903 (by implication); Heinze v Murphy, 180 Md 423, 24 A2d 917;
Hadler v Rhyner, 244 Wis 448, 12 NW2d 693.
According to the court in Consolidated Sales Co. v Malone (Ky) 530 SW2d 680, an
action for false imprisonment arising out of the plaintiff's arrest and detention on
suspicion of shoplifting, punitive damages must be premised either on a showing that the
defendant's conduct was malicious, in that he acted in bad faith and was not motivated by
a belief that he had probable cause to detain the plaintiff or that his treatment of the
plaintiff was grossly in excess of what the circumstances, as the defendant actually
believed them to be, reasonably required. Finding that the defendant's security officer
acted in good faith in unlawfully arresting the plaintiff and did not mistreat her, the court
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and ordered a new trial, eliminating, however, the
question of punitive damages.
In order to recover punitive damages there must be some evidence that the persons
making the arrest were acting in bad faith, or that treatment of the person being arrested
was grossly in excess of what circumstances reasonably required, as perceived by the
persons making the arrest. Taylor Drugstores, Inc. v Story (Ky App) 760 SW2d 102.
Footnote 18. Farish v Smoot (Fla) 58 So 2d 534; Greaves v Kansas City Junior Orpheum
Co., 229 Mo App 663, 80 SW2d 228; Caudle v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 236 Ala 37, 182
So 461.
No punitive damages will lie where there is no evidence that the defendant knew the
confinement to be unlawful at the time it occurred. Rustici v Weidemeyer (Mo) 673
SW2d 762.
Footnote 19. Beckwith v Bean, 98 US 266, 8 Otto 266, 25 L Ed 124 (by implication);
Curtis v Peerless Ins. Co. (DC Minn) 299 F Supp 429 (malicious motive; Gilmer v
Playboy Club of Denver, Inc. (Colo App) 513 P2d 1065; Hammargren v Montgomery
Ward & Co., 172 Kan 484, 241 P2d 1192; Beardsley v Soper, 184 App Div 399, 171
NYS 1043 (by implication); Darlow v State, 207 Misc 124, 137 NYS2d 69 (recklessness
that betokens improper motive); Vandermeer v Pacific Northwest Development Corp.,
274 Or 221, 545 P2d 868; Skillern & Sons, Inc. v Stewart (Tex Civ App Fort Worth) 379
SW2d 687, writ ref n r e (Oct 7, 1964) and rehg of writ of error overr (Nov 18, 1964)
(design to oppress and injure).
The trial court's instruction, in an action for false arrest and imprisonment and assault and
battery against two police officers, that punitive damages should not be imposed if the
jury found that the defendants acted in good faith under an erroneous sense of duty or
right, without any intention to oppress or without any actual oppression, was upheld, in
Hash v Hogan (Alaska) 453 P2d 468.
In setting aside an award of exemplary damages, the court, in Johnson v Enlow, 132 Colo
101, 286 P2d 630, an action for unlawful arrest and imprisonment against the sheriffs of
two counties and their deputies, stated that to justify a recovery of such damages, the act
causing the injury must be done with an evil intent and with the purpose of injuring the
plaintiff; or with such a wanton and reckless disregard of his rights as to evidence a
wrongful motive, and the court found nothing in the record to bring the case before it
within this rule.
Footnote 20. Bujaki v Egan (DC Alaska) 237 F Supp 822 (willfully and maliciously;
Shelton v Barry, 328 Ill App 497, 66 NE2d 697 (willfully and maliciously, with design to
oppress and injure); Rauma v Lamont, 82 Minn 477, 85 NW 236 (malicious and wanton
act); Voltz v Blackmar, 64 NY 440 (willfully and maliciously, with design to oppress and
injure); Fittipaldi v Legassie (4th Dep't) 18 App Div 2d 331, 239 NYS2d 792, 53 BNA
LRRM 2175, 47 CCH LC 50849 (willfully and maliciously, with design to oppress and
injure); Nappi v Wilson (Franklin Co) 22 Ohio App 520, 4 Ohio L Abs 766, 155 NE 151
(wanton and reckless invasion of rights of another); McAleer v Good, 216 Pa 473, 65 A
934 (wantonly and maliciously).
153 Liability of principal for act of agent or employee; particular principals [32
It has been held, implied, recognized, or assumed, in cases dealing with the nature of the
entity or office as such, that corporations 21 and receivers 22 may be held liable for
punitive damages as principals, on account of the wrongful acts of their agents or
employees, in actions for false arrest or imprisonment.
On the other hand, it has been held that in the absence of statutory authorization, punitive
damages are not available against a municipality, irrespective of the nature of the conduct
involved; 23 and that absent evidence of actual malice, wanton conduct or deliberate
violence of the agent-shareholder of a corporation, the plaintiff could not recover punitive
damages against the corporation, even if the corporation was found to have participated
in or ratified its agent/shareholder's actions. 24
Footnotes
Footnote 21. Craven v Bloomingdale, 171 NY 439, 64 NE 169; Thomas v F. & R.
Lazarus & Co. (App, Franklin Co) 3 Ohio Ops 2d 61, 40 Ohio L Abs 29, 57 NE2d 103,
motion overr.
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, by agent or employee, 93 ALR3d 826 3.
Footnote 22. Gardner v Martin, 123 Miss 218, 85 So 182, 10 ALR 1054; Comstock v
Wells (Mo App) 259 SW 500.
Footnote 23. Stebbins v Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Dist Col App)
495 A2d 741.
But see Kieninger v New York (2d Dep't) 53 App Div 2d 602, 384 NYS2d 11 (in an
action for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and assault, the court assumed that,
in a proper case, punitive damages may be awarded against a governmental agency but
found no factual basis for such an award in the case before it).
154 -- Bases of liability, generally [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
The courts have adopted, or rejected, various bases of liability for punitive damages,
asserted against a principal in actions for false arrest or imprisonment. They have agreed,
in cases involving corporate or individual principals, that the mere fact that their agent's
acts were wrongful is not sufficient to charge the principals with liability for punitive
damages; 25 except that some courts have imposed such liability on a corporation when
the wrongful acts were committed by managerial or executive employees. 26
There is a difference of opinion among the courts as to whether, in actions for false arrest
or imprisonment, punitive damages may be assessed against a principal on the basis,
simply, that the agent's wrongful acts were within the scope or in the course of
employment. Some courts have taken the position that the principal is liable in that
situation, 27 while others have adopted the contrary view. 28
The mere fact that the principal had prior knowledge that the agent would commit the
wrongful acts in question has been held or indicated, in actions for false arrest or
imprisonment, to be sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages against the
principal, 29 while the fact that such knowledge was lacking has been relied on as a
factor, among others, precluding an award of such damages. 30
Footnotes
Footnote 25. Dart Drug, Inc. v Linthicum (Dist Col App) 300 A2d 442, 93 ALR3d 821;
111, 237 F2d 592; Craven v Bloomingdale, 171 NY 439, 64 NE 169; Murray v Long I. R.
R. Co. (2d Dep't) 35 App Div 2d 579, 313 NYS2d 610, affd 28 NY2d 849, 322 NYS2d
248, 271 NE2d 227 (by implication); S. H. Kress & Co. v Lindley (Tex Civ App) 46
SW2d 379 (by implication).
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, by agent or employee, 93 ALR3d 826 7[a].
Footnote 26. Western Union Tel. Co. v Thomasson (CA4 Va) 251 F 833; Standard Oil Co.
v Davis, 208 Ala 565, 94 So 754, companion case 209 Ala 493, 96 So 629; Gill v
Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 App Div 36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49 ALR2d 1452; Bingham
v Lipman, Wolfe & Co., 40 Or 363, 67 P 98; Baker Co. v Turpin (Tex Civ App) 53 SW2d
154, writ dism w o j.
Footnote 27. Standard Oil Co. v Davis, 208 Ala 565, 94 So 754, companion case 209 Ala
493, 96 So 629; Safeway Trails, Inc. v Schmidt (Dist Col App) 225 A2d 317 (applying
Maryland law); Peak v W. T. Grant Co. (Mo App) 386 SW2d 685; Moore v Target Stores,
Inc. (Okla App) 571 P2d 1236 (false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution
by implication); Davis v Chesapeake & O. Ry., 61 W Va 246, 56 SE 400.
Observation: Decision of newspaper and television station was liable for acts of reporters
and photographers employed by it who conspired to obtain false arrest of plaintiff where
such unlawful acts were done in furtherance of their employer's business; namely, to get
news stories and pictures, and products of their unlawful acts were used by employer in
publication of news stories; employer was liable for punitive damages for malicious acts
of servants even though it had not participated in such acts, nor authorized or ratified
such acts. Odom v Gray (Tenn) 508 SW2d 526.
Footnote 28. Reardon v Erie R. Co., 179 App Div 374, 166 NYS 287 (by implication);
Kastner v Long Island R. Co., 76 App Div 323, 78 NYS 469 (false arrest and malicious
prosecution); Staples v Schmid, 18 RI 224, 26 A 193 (by apparent implication).
Holding that, under New Mexico law, a principal was not liable for the tortious conduct
of an employee, even though the employee was acting within the scope of his authority,
unless the principal participated in, authorized, or ratified the agent's conduct, and finding
no evidence that the defendant finance company, a corporation, had participated in,
authorized, or ratified the tortious conduct of its agent in repossessing an automobile, the
court, in Sanchez v Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 NM 512, 260 P2d 703, an action for
the wrongful taking and detention of the vehicle and false imprisonment of the plaintiff,
reversed a judgment for punitive damages in the plaintiff's favor.
Craven v Bloomingdale, 171 NY 439, 64 NE 169.
Footnote 30. Alterauge v Los Angeles Turf Club, 97 Cal App 2d 735, 218 P2d 802.
Although the defendant hotel company's assistant manager had apparently authorized the
removal from the defendant's hotel by its house detective, and the arrest, at the latter's
request, of an aged loiterer, the court in Ft. Worth Hotel Co. v Waggoman (Tex Civ App)
126 SW2d 578, writ dism, an action for false imprisonment, found that the assistant
manager was not aware that the house detective would subsequently maliciously cause
the arrest of the plaintiff when he offered to furnish bond for the old man, and the court
accordingly held that the defendant was not liable for exemplary damages.
Annotation: 93 ALR3d 826 9[b]
Liability of one contracting for private police or security service for acts of personnel
supplied, 38 ALR3d 1332 10.
155 -- Authorization, ratification, or participation by principal [32 Am Jur 2d
FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Courts have frequently expressed the view that a private principal is liable for punitive
damages, in an action for false arrest or imprisonment, where the principal authorized or
directed, 31 ratified, 32 or participated in 33 the agent's wrongful acts precipitating the
litigation. However, notwithstanding the mutual agency that exists between partners, it
has been held that ratification by one partner of a wrongful arrest caused by the other did
not warrant assessment of punitive damages against the innocent partner. 34
In several cases the evidence adduced was held to be sufficient to establish authorization
by the principal of the agent's wrongful behavior and, accordingly, to warrant an award of
punitive damages against the principal; 35 and in others was found to be insufficient for
that purpose. 36 A similar difference in result exists in the courts' holdings with respect
to ratification by the principal of the agent's wrongful acts, with the evidence being found
sufficient in some cases 37 but not in others. 38
It has been held that a bonus policy of the principal based upon the number of arrests
made by security personnel does not show a prior authorization for a private detective's
improper actions, and that without further evidence as to the extent of the rewards or
bonuses, the types of arrests for which the awards were given, the administration of the
program, or the encouragement given by the management personnel, it cannot be inferred
that the bonus policy authorized false arrests and it would be speculation for the jury to
conclude that the management had previously authorized malicious acts by its employees.
39 Moreover, the fact of a private detective's retention and promotion several years
after the incident giving rise to the cause of action has been held not enough, standing
alone, to indicate that the employer had ratified the individual's actions; there must be
some additional evidence of approval by the management which tends to prove
ratification. 40
Several courts have held or implied that to hold a principal liable for punitive damages on
the basis of ratification of an agent's wrongful act, in an action for false arrest or
imprisonment, it must appear that the principal had full knowledge of the nature of the
agent's acts at the time of the ratification, 41 while some courts have held the opposite,
that is, that such knowledge is not required. 42
Footnotes
Footnote 31. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v Lethcoe (CA4 W Va) 279 F2d 948
(applying West Virginia law); Schanafelt v Seaboard Finance Co., 108 Cal App 2d 420,
239 P2d 42; Dart Drug, Inc. v Linthicum (Dist Col App) 300 A2d 442, 93 ALR3d 821;
Sanchez v Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 NM 512, 260 P2d 703; Craven v
Bloomingdale, 171 NY 439, 64 NE 169; Gill v Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 App Div
36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49 ALR2d 1452; Morton v Murphy Lumber & Hardware Co. (CP)
46 Ohio Ops 70, 62 Ohio L Abs 245, 102 NE2d 744; Ft. Worth Hotel Co. v Waggoman
(Tex Civ App) 126 SW2d 578, writ dism; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v Wynne, 149
Va 882, 141 SE 829 (false arrest and malicious prosecution).
It is undoubtedly the law, the court said, in McInerney v United R. of S. F., 50 Cal App
538, 195 P 958, an action for assault and false imprisonment, that a corporation may
become liable in exemplary damages where an act of one of its employees, done in ill
will or in actual malice or under circumstances of fraud or oppression, is done under the
express direction of its superior officials having power to bind the corporation.

(applying West Virginia law); Alterauge v Los Angeles Turf Club, 97 Cal App 2d 735,
218 P2d 802; Dart Drug, Inc. v Linthicum (Dist Col App) 300 A2d 442, 93 ALR3d 821;
Sanchez v Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 NM 512, 260 P2d 703; Craven v
Bloomingdale, 171 NY 439, 64 NE 169; Gill v Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 App Div
36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49 ALR2d 1452; Fitscher v Rollman & Sons Co. (Hamilton Co) 31
Ohio App 340, 167 NE 469; Morton v Murphy Lumber & Hardware Co. (CP) 46 Ohio
Ops 70, 62 Ohio L Abs 245, 102 NE2d 744; K-Mart No. 4195 v Judge (Tex Civ App
Beaumont) 515 SW2d 148, writ dism w o j (Feb 26, 1975); Ft. Worth Hotel Co. v
Waggoman (Tex Civ App) 126 SW2d 578, writ dism; Hogg v Plant, 145 Va 175, 133 SE
759, 47 ALR 308.
Evidence that a restaurant manager owned fifty percent of the stock of the restaurant was
a sufficient showing that the corporation participated in or ratified the manager-owner's
actions in allegedly putting a choke hold on a departing customer in the course of an
altercation about the customer's bill to warrant submission to the jury of the issue of the
corporation's liability for punitive damages. Smith v Executive Club, Ltd. (Dist Col App)
458 A2d 32, 48 ALR4th 147.
Footnote 33. Dart Drug, Inc. v Linthicum (Dist Col App) 300 A2d 442, 93 ALR3d 821;
Sanchez v Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 NM 512, 260 P2d 703; Magagnos v Brooklyn
H. R. Co., 128 App Div 182, 112 NYS 637; Fitscher v Rollman & Sons Co. (Hamilton
Co) 31 Ohio App 340, 167 NE 469; Morton v Murphy Lumber & Hardware Co. (CP) 46
Ohio Ops 70, 62 Ohio L Abs 245, 102 NE2d 744; Staples v Schmid, 18 RI 224, 26 A 193;
Hogg v Plant, 145 Va 175, 133 SE 759, 47 ALR 308.
Under state law, punitive damages may be imposed on an employer for the intentional
wrongdoing of its employees if there is sufficient proof that a superior officer, or an
individual employed in a managerial capacity, participated in, authorized, consented to or
ratified the misconduct; the concern being that the individual's responsibility is
sufficiently important and that his or her participation in the wrongdoing renders the
employer blameworthy and arouses the institutional conscience for corrective action.
Gardner v Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. (CA2 NY) 907 F2d 1348.
An employer is not liable for punitive damages based on the actions of an employee
unless the employer knew or should have known of the unfitness of the employee and
continued employment or services, authorized the wrongful conduct, ratified the
wrongful conduct, or the acts of the agent were calculated to and did benefit the principal,
except where the plaintiff participated in the fraud or wrongful conduct with knowledge
of his or her acts. Big B, Inc. v Cottingham (Ala) 634 So 2d 999.

Footnote 34. Birmingham Ledger Co. v Buchanan, 10 Ala App 527, 65 So 667, cert den
191 Ala 659, 66 So 1008.
See also Moore v Target Stores, Inc. (Okla App) 571 P2d 1236, an action for false arrest
and imprisonment, in which the court held that punitive damages could be awarded for
the act of the defendant corporation's agent, even though the defendant did not
"personally" participate in or ratify the agent's act.
111, 237 F2d 592; Reardon v Erie R. Co., 179 App Div 374, 166 NYS 287.
Footnote 36. Alterauge v Los Angeles Turf Club, 97 Cal App 2d 735, 218 P2d 802;
Walker v Lord & Taylor, 236 App Div 111, 258 NYS 96; Ft. Worth Hotel Co. v
Waggoman (Tex Civ App) 126 SW2d 578, writ dism.
Finding no evidence in the record before it of prior authorization or subsequent
ratification by the defendant's store manager of the actions of its store detective in
arresting a customer on suspicion of shoplifting, the court, in Dart Drug, Inc. v Linthicum
(Dist Col App) 300 A2d 442, 93 ALR3d 821, reversed the judgment of the court below
to the extent that it awarded punitive damages to the customer in his action for false arrest
against the drug store.
US App DC 111, 237 F2d 592; S. H. Kress & Co. v Rust, 132 Tex 89, 120 SW2d 425;
Virginia Electric & Power Co. v Wynne, 149 Va 882, 141 SE 829.
Annotation: 93 ALR3d 826 12[e].
(applying Virginia law); McInerney v United R. of S. F., 50 Cal App 538, 195 P 958;
Sanchez v Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 NM 512, 260 P2d 703; Fitscher v Rollman &
Sons Co. (Hamilton Co) 31 Ohio App 340, 167 NE 469.
In reversing a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in her action for false arrest against the
defendant store, a corporation, to the extent that it awarded punitive damages, the court,
in Dart Drug, Inc. v Linthicum (Dist Col App) 300 A2d 442, 93 ALR3d 821, an action
for false arrest, held, among other grounds of reversal, that ratification of the defendant's
store detective's action in wrongfully arresting the plaintiff on suspicion that she had
secreted a lipstick in her purse, could not be inferred from the fact that the defendant's
store manager had released the plaintiff after examining her purse with her consent and
finding no lipstick there, or from the fact of the detective's retention and promotion 2
years after the incident.
Annotation: 93 ALR3d 826 12[f].
Footnote 39. Dart Drug, Inc. v Linthicum (Dist Col App) 300 A2d 442, 93 ALR3d 821.
Footnote 40. Dart Drug, Inc. v Linthicum (Dist Col App) 300 A2d 442, 93 ALR3d 821.
As to culpability in selection, retention, discipline, or supervision as a separate basis of
liability, see 156.
US App DC 111, 237 F2d 592; Cope v John Wanamaker of New York, 249 App Div 747,
292 NYS 51, affd 274 NY 622, 10 NE2d 581; Thomas v F. & R. Lazarus & Co. (App,
Franklin Co) 3 Ohio Ops 2d 61, 40 Ohio L Abs 29, 57 NE2d 103, motion overr (false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v Wynne, 149
Va 882, 141 SE 829 (false arrest and malicious prosecution).
It is undoubtedly the law, the court said, in McInerney v United R. of S. F., 50 Cal App
538, 195 P 958, an action for assault and false imprisonment, that a corporation may
become liable in exemplary damages where an act of one of its employees, done in ill
will or in actual malice or under circumstances of fraud or oppression, is thereafter
ratified by its superior officials, having power to bind the corporation, with full
knowledge as to the willful and malicious quality of such acts.
See also Walker v Lord & Taylor, 236 App Div 111, 258 NYS 96, an action for false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution, in which the court held that the defendant
department store could be assessed punitive damages for the illegal acts of its detectives
in detaining and causing the plaintiff's arrest on a "framed" case of shoplifting only if it
authorized such acts or ratified them after notice (presumably meaning notice of those
acts).
Footnote 42. S. H. Kress & Co. v Rust, 132 Tex 89, 120 SW2d 425.
156 -- Culpability in selection, retention, discipline, or supervision [32 Am Jur 2d
FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A private principal's culpability in the selection, supervision, disciplining, or retention of

an incompetent or unfit agent or employee has been held to warrant assessment of
punitive damages against the principal, in an action for false arrest or imprisonment. 43
A similar view that such liability is warranted, has been implied or assumed in actions
against a governmental body. 44
Footnotes
Footnote 43. Reardon v Erie R. Co., 179 App Div 374, 166 NYS 287; Kastner v Long
Island R. Co., 76 App Div 323, 78 NYS 469.
Punitive damages were recoverable where bus driver's detention of passenger was
motivated by malice; fact that bus driver was scheduled to leave employ of bus company
at time of incident placed employer in difficult position from standpoint of control but did
not exonerate it from liability. D. C. Transit System, Inc. v Brooks, 264 Md 578, 287
A2d 251.
Among the bases of liability of a principal for punitive damages on account of the
wrongful act of the agent stated by the court, in Gill v Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 App
Div 36, 129 NYS2d 288, 49 ALR2d 1452, an action for false imprisonment, was the
principal's employment or retention of an unfit employee, whose malicious act
occasioned the litigation, with knowledge of his unfitness.
In Morton v Murphy Lumber & Hardware Co. (CP) 46 Ohio Ops 70, 62 Ohio L Abs 245,
102 NE2d 744, an action for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of the
plaintiff's unlawful arrest and detention on a contempt order obtained by the defendant
corporation's attorney in the mistaken belief that the plaintiff, who had not appeared for
examination in aid of execution on a judgment against her husband, had been served
personally with an order for her appearance, the trial court found that there was no proof
that the defendant's attorney had acted with malice; but that, even if malice on his part
had been shown no punitive damages should be awarded against the defendant
corporation, because there was no evidence that the defendant had authorized,
participated in, or ratified the arrest, nor any proof that the defendant had failed to
exercise due care in the selection of its agent, the attorney.
Footnote 44. Kieninger v New York (2d Dep't) 53 App Div 2d 602, 384 NYS2d 11;
Chirieleison v New York (2d Dep't) 49 App Div 2d 873, 373 NYS2d 361.
Finding, in an action against a county for assault and false arrest, that the defendant was
not wanton or reckless in permitting the arresting officers to serve on its police force, and
was not derelict in failing to discipline the officers or to investigate the incident on which
the plaintiff's action was based, the court, in Laskowski v County of Nassau (2d Dep't)
57 App Div 2d 888, 394 NYS2d 442, set aside an award of punitive damages in favor of
the plaintiff.
See also Budgar v State, 98 Misc 2d 588, 414 NYS2d 463, wherein the court noted that
there was no evidence that the defendant state employed an unfit police officer and hence
any assessment of punitive damages (which were not sought) would not be justified.
II. CRIMINAL LIABILITY [157-162]

Research References
ALR Digest: False Imprisonment 9.5
In some jurisdictions, false or unlawful imprisonment, 45 or false arrest, 46 has been
made a crime by statute. Other states, not having a statute making false imprisonment a
crime, may punish it as a crime at common law. 47
The definition of false imprisonment as either a crime or a tort is generally the same, 48
and the general principles which are applicable in the civil action also apply in criminal
proceedings, 49 except as the criminal prosecution is affected by the general laws of
criminal jurisprudence. 50
The crime and the tort of false imprisonment are identically defined as the unlawful
violation of the personal liberty of another. 51 At common law, false imprisonment was
the unlawful restraint or detention of another against his or her will, without authority of
law, by actual force or reasonably apprehended force. 52 The similar offense of criminal
confinement requires proof of substantial interference with a person's liberty but not
necessarily by touching or attempting to touch the person; confinement can be
accomplished by fraud, enticement, force or the threat of force. 53
There is no criminal liability for false imprisonment in connection with taking children
out of the state where the defendant has the consent of the child's physical and legal
custodian, where lack of consent is an element of the offense. 54
Under a statute providing that a person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment who
knowingly restrains another person, and defining "restraint" as restricting a person's
movements without consent and without legal authority in a manner which interferes
substantially with liberty, the term "substantial" is used as an adjective to mean a "real" or
"material" interference with the liberty of another as contrasted with a petty annoyance, a
slight inconvenience, or an imaginary conflict. 55
Practice guide: An instruction which departs from statutory definitions and clouds the
essential elements of the offense may not fairly inform the jury of the law that applies in
the case, thereby necessitating a new trial. 56

False imprisonment is not a "continuing offense" so limitation on the number of
convictions concerning one incident which might apply under an "uninterrupted offense"
or "continuing course of conduct" crime does not apply, and a defendant can be convicted
of multiple separate offenses for imprisonment of several people in the same incident. 57
A person may be indicted, prosecuted, and convicted for aiding and abetting in the
commission of the offense of false imprisonment. 58
Footnotes
Footnote 45. As to degrees of offense under statutes punishing the offense of false or
unlawful imprisonment, see 159.
Footnote 46. See, for example, Finch v Commonwealth (Ky) 419 SW2d 146, holding that
an indictment charging that citizen's arrest was "otherwise than according to law" was
sufficient to charge the offense under a statute punishing false arrest.
Footnote 47. State v Fulcher, 34 NC App 233, 237 SE2d 909, petition gr 293 NC 741,
241 SE2d 516 and error den 294 NC 503, 243 SE2d 338.
Footnote 48. Street v State, 307 Md 262, 513 A2d 870, 67 ALR4th 1095.
At common law, false imprisonment was the unlawful restraint or detention of another
against that person's will, without authority of law, by actual force or reasonably
apprehended force. State v Berntsen, 295 SC 52, 367 SE2d 152.
Footnote 49. People v Agnew, 16 Cal 2d 655, 107 P2d 601; Kroeger v Passmore, 36
Mont 504, 93 P 805.
Footnote 50. See, generally, 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law.
Footnote 52. State v Berntsen, 295 SC 52, 367 SE2d 152.
A person commits the offense of unlawful restraint when the person knowingly, without
legal authority, detains another. People v Wisslead, 108 Ill 2d 389, 92 Ill Dec 226, 484
NE2d 1081.
Footnote 53. McDonald v State (Ind) 511 NE2d 1066.
Footnote 54. State v Niska (Minn) 514 NW2d 260, reh den (Minn) 1994 Minn LEXIS
368.
Footnote 55. State v Robinson, 20 Wash App 882, 582 P2d 580, affd 92 Wash 2d 357,
597 P2d 892, holding that the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had
interfered "substantially" with the liberty of the female victim.
In order to constitute a case of criminal false imprisonment under state statute, it is
essential that there be some restraint of the person; but it is not necessary that there be
confinement in a jail or a prison. People v Grant (5th Dist) 8 Cal App 4th 1105, 10 Cal
Rptr 2d 828, 92 CDOS 7061, 92 Daily Journal DAR 11323, review den (Cal) 1992 Cal
LEXIS 6231.
Defendant's conduct in binding each of the victims to their beds was a substantial
interference with their liberty, sufficient for conviction of confinement. Hansford v State
(Ind) 490 NE2d 1083.
Footnote 57. Smith v State, 296 Ark 451, 757 SW2d 554, post-conviction proceeding
(Ark) 1989 Ark LEXIS 229, habeas corpus proceeding (CA8 Ark) 923 F2d 1314.
Footnote 58. People v Henderson, 19 Cal 3d 86, 137 Cal Rptr 1, 560 P2d 1180.
158 Relation to other offenses; as lesser included offense [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE
IMPRISONMENT]
While some courts state that false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of
kidnapping, 59 other courts hold that where the crime of false imprisonment has been
incorporated into a statute as one method of proving kidnapping, a trial court may
correctly refuse to instruct the jury on the common law crime of false imprisonment as a
lesser included offense of statutory kidnapping. 60
One approach to the question of whether the crime committed constitutes kidnapping or a
lesser included offense of false imprisonment looks to the purpose of the confinement,
restraint or removal of the victim; if the purpose was to accomplish one of the statutorilyenumerated purposes of kidnapping, the offense is kidnapping, rather than false
imprisonment. 61 A kidnapping statute, in the particular case, may be broad enough to
include, yet not require, proof of the elements constituting false imprisonment. 62
Where, under statutes, kidnapping involves abduction and restraint of the person
abducted with intent to inflict physical injury or sexual abuse, and the crime of unlawful
restraint involves restraint of another person under circumstances exposing the latter to a
substantial risk of physical injury, kidnapping can be committed without committing
unlawful restraint and consecutive sentences for the two offenses are proper. 63
The crime of confinement is not inherently included in the crime of rape, so as to bar
conviction for both on double jeopardy grounds, because each requires different
elements, and conviction for both is proper even though convictions arise from a single
incident, particularly where the defendant confined the victim both before and after the
rape. 64 However, where there are convictions for both rape and unlawful
imprisonment, and the rape conviction is reversed, the related conviction for unlawful
imprisonment must also be reversed where such conviction is factually dependent on the
conviction for rape. 65
It has been held that a charge of unlawful imprisonment exists independently of the
charge of sexual abuse, since the elements of both crimes are totally different, and the
crime of sexual abuse can be committed without an unlawful imprisonment where an
underage victim engages in acts of sexual abuse without resistance. 66
A charge of confinement, that the defendant knowingly confined the victim while the
defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, has been held coextensive with a robbery
charge for the same incident, thus precluding conviction for both, on double jeopardy
grounds. 67 On the other hand, conviction for both confinement and attempted battery is
proper, since confinement can be accomplished by fraud, enticement, force or threat of
force and, unlike battery, does not require proof of touching or attempting to touch the
victim. 68
Where a statute provides, in relevant part, that a person commits the crime of unlawful
restraint if he or she knowingly restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing
the victim to risk of serious bodily injury, while the crime of false imprisonment is
completed when a person knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere
substantially with that person's liberty, it has been held that since unlawfully restraining a
person in circumstances entailing risk of serious bodily injury would necessarily
constitute a substantial interference with the victim's liberty, false imprisonment is thus a
lesser included offense of unlawful restraint; in other words, once the crime of unlawful
restraint has been proved, no additional facts are necessary to prove false imprisonment,
and thus, for sentencing purposes, the two offenses merge. 69
Under the terms of a statute, the misdemeanor of unlawful imprisonment, involving the
knowing subjection of another to unlawful restraint, is a lesser included offense to the
charge of felonious restraint under terrorizing circumstances, or an attempt thereof, which
involves abduction or knowing restraint under terrorizing circumstances or circumstances
exposing the victim to the risk of serious bodily injury. 70
A false imprisonment almost always constitutes or includes a common-law assault, 71
and may be prosecuted as a distinct and separate offense under the common law. 72
However, there is authority holding that where the offenses of false imprisonment and
battery are committed by the same act of the defendant, the battery is a lesser included
offense of the false imprisonment and it is error to adjudicate the defendant guilty of the
battery count. 73
Footnotes
368; State v Kyle, 333 NC 687, 430 SE2d 412.
See 1 Am Jur 2d, Abduction and Kidnapping 2.

Footnote 61. State v Kyle, 333 NC 687, 430 SE2d 412.
Footnote 63. State v Palmer, 206 Conn 40, 536 A2d 936.
Footnote 64. Purter v State (Ind) 515 NE2d 858.
Footnote 65. People v Watson, 45 NY2d 867, 410 NYS2d 577, 382 NE2d 1352.
Footnote 66. In re M., 93 Misc 2d 545, 403 NYS2d 178.
Footnote 67. Tingle v State (Ind) 632 NE2d 345.
Footnote 68. McDonald v State (Ind) 511 NE2d 1066.
Footnote 69. Commonwealth v Belgrave, 258 Pa Super 40, 391 A2d 662.
Footnote 71. 8.
Footnote 72. Meints v Huntington (CA8 Minn) 276 F 245, 19 ALR 664; Doss v State,
220 Ala 30, 123 So 231, 68 ALR 712; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v Smith, 281 Ky
583, 136 SW2d 759; Commonwealth v Brewer, 109 Pa Super 429, 167 A 386.
Footnote 73. Jane v State (Fla App D4) 362 So 2d 1005 (defendant wrapping his arms
around the victim in a "bear hug").
159 Degree of offense [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
Under some state statutes, if a false imprisonment is effected without the use of violence,
menace, fraud or deceit, it is a misdemeanor. The presence of one or more of these
elements elevates the false imprisonment to a felony. The primary element of the offense,
the unlawful restraint of another's liberty, does not require one or more of these elements
necessary to raise the crime to felony status. All that is necessary to make out a
misdemeanor charge of false imprisonment is that the individual be restrained of his or
her liberty without any sufficient complaint or authority, and it may be accomplished by
words or acts, together with the requisite intent to confine, which the individual fears to
disregard. To raise the offense to a felony, violence or menace, which may or may not be
life endangering, or fraud or deceit, which presents no present significant danger to the
victim, must be established. 74 The required element of the felony of confinement
entailing commission while armed with a deadly weapon or resulting in serious bodily
harm, can be provided, for example, by evidence of holding the victim at gunpoint or
inflicting serious injuries, 75 by abandoning helpless victims in circumstances of danger,
76 or through confinement directed to accomplish murder and effected through
concerted action with co-perpetrators. 77
The distinction between a charge alleging restraint under terrorizing circumstances or
circumstances exposing the victim to the risk of serious bodily injury and a charge
alleging unlawful restraint is characterized under some statutes as the distinction between
false imprisonment in the first degree and false imprisonment in the second degree. 78
In states not having a statute making false imprisonment a crime, the offense may be
punishable as a crime under the common law, 79 under which it is a general
misdemeanor. 80 Where the crime of false imprisonment under state law is a common
law offense for which the penalty is not statutorily prescribed, statutory penalties for
other offenses do not influence the penalty for the common law crime; imposition of a
fine is a reasonable exercise of the sentencing court's discretion and is not cruel and
unusual punishment. 81
The Model Penal Code provides that a person commits the misdemeanor offense of false
imprisonment if he or she knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere
substantially with the other person's liberty. 82 A person who knowingly restrains
another unlawfully in circumstances exposing the other person to risk of serious bodily
injury, or who holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude, commits felonious
restraint, a felony of the third degree. 83
Footnotes
Footnote 74. People v Haney (4th Dist) 75 Cal App 3d 308, 142 Cal Rptr 186 (criticized
on other grounds by People v Olivencia (6th Dist) 204 Cal App 3d 1391, 251 Cal Rptr
880).
Similarly, a statutory offense of unlawful imprisonment is a misdemeanor when the
offender simply restrains another person,People v Ennis (2d Dept) 37 App Div 2d 573,
322 NYS2d 341, affd 30 NY2d 535, 330 NYS2d 384, 281 NE2d 180, and a felony when
the offender restrains such other person under circumstances which expose the latter to a
substantial risk of serious physical injury. People v Amazon (3d Dept) 52 App Div 2d
1012, 383 NYS2d 686.
In the absence of "terrorizing circumstances," meaning circumstances that result when
threats of violence or acts dangerous to human life are made with intent to place another
human being in fear of his or her safety, evidence was insufficient to support conviction
for attempted felonious restraint under terrorizing circumstances, and would support only
the misdemeanors of unlawful imprisonment or attempted unlawful imprisonment. State
v Plentychief (ND) 464 NW2d 373.
The evidence was sufficient to find a "substantial risk of serious bodily injury" where the
victims were bound and gagged and placed in a store's refrigerated meat locker, since
they were thereby exposed to a risk of frostbite, pneumonia, or any of the other wellknown health hazards associated with near-freezing and sub-freezing temperatures.
Taylor v State (Tex Crim) 550 SW2d 695.
Footnote 75. Tingle v State (Ind) 632 NE2d 345 (victim was held at point of shotgun
while defendant ransacked the house); State v Vance, 240 Neb 794, 484 NW2d 453
(husband and wife held at gunpoint, wife sexually assaulted); State v Brown, 235 Neb
374, 455 NW2d 547 (victim confined in car, forcibly removed from car, forced into
residence and sexually assaulted); State v Moreno, 228 Neb 210, 422 NW2d 56 (victim
was robbed, severely beaten so as to cause crushed bones and skull fractures, and
prevented by the injuries from reporting the offense).
Footnote 76. Jordan v Commonwealth (Ky) 703 SW2d 870.
Footnote 77. Nelson v State (Ind) 528 NE2d 453.
Footnote 78. State v Schwartz, 219 Neb 833, 366 NW2d 766.
Footnote 79. 157.
Footnote 80. State v Fulcher, 34 NC App 233, 237 SE2d 909, petition gr 293 NC 741,
241 SE2d 516 and error den 294 NC 503, 243 SE2d 338.
At common law, false imprisonment, being the unlawful detention of a person against
that person's will, is a misdemeanor. Street v State, 307 Md 262, 513 A2d 870, 67
ALR4th 1095.
Footnote 81. Street v State, 307 Md 262, 513 A2d 870, 67 ALR4th 1095 (taxi driver kept
passenger locked in taxi for twenty-five minutes, because passenger did not have correct
amount, and refused to allow passenger to leave to secure change for the fare, even
though the passenger had sufficient money to pay the fare).
Footnote 82. Model Penal Code 212.3.
Footnote 83. Model Penal Code 212.2.
160 Defenses [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
To support a conviction for the crime of false imprisonment, there must be criminal
intent. 84 The good motives and purpose of the defendant are therefore legitimate
matters of defense. 85 Thus, where the defendant's claim is that the defendant only
detained the complainant to protect the complainant from attempting to commit suicide,
the court's failure to give an appropriate instruction on defendant's good motive or
purpose as a defense constitutes prejudicial error warranting a new trial. 86 However, a
surety who arrests a bail-jumper forcibly and without a warrant, for the purpose of
surrendering such person as principal on the forfeited bond to protect the obligation on
the bond, cannot raise such matter as a defense and cannot complain of the court's refusal
to instruct the jury with respect to such defense, in the absence of any written
interpretation of the state statutes by a court or by a public official charged with
responsibility for interpreting the law which would justify any reasonable belief that the
surety's conduct did not constitute a crime. 87
Consent may also be raised as a defense in a criminal false imprisonment or confinement
case, as an attempt to negate an element of the crime. 88 Thus, the consent of a child's
legal and physical custodian to removal of children out of the state is a defense to the
crime of false imprisonment of a child, where lack of consent is an element of the crime.
89
Practice guide: In a false imprisonment or confinement prosecution, an instruction on the
defense of consent is acceptable, in circumstances where more than one offense has been
charged and where the charge and victim to which the issue of consent is applicable are
clear to the jury. 90
Parental privilege as to alleged confinement of the parent's own child may also be a
defense to a charge of unlawful imprisonment. 91
The facts of the case may rule out the possibility of self-defense as a viable defense to
false imprisonment, as where the defendant fails to allege the use of any unlawful force to
which the defendant might be privileged to respond. 92
Footnotes
Footnote 84. Commonwealth v Cheney, 141 Mass 102, 6 NE 724; Commonwealth v
Trunk, 311 Pa 555, 167 A 333.
In both the tort and criminal offense of false imprisonment, the required mental state is
only intent to confine or to create a similar intrusion; no motive to cause harm is
required. Fermino v Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal 4th 701, 30 Cal Rptr 2d 18, 872 P2d 559, 59 Cal
Comp Cas 296, 94 CDOS 3399, 94 Daily Journal DAR 6423, 9 BNA IER Cas 1132.
Even if the intent of defendant is to escape, confinement of another person in the process
of effectuating the escape may be sufficient proof to support the defendant's conviction
for criminal confinement. McDonald v State (Ind) 511 NE2d 1066.
Footnote 85. State v Hembd, 305 Minn 120, 232 NW2d 872; Commonwealth v Trunk,
311 Pa 555, 167 A 333.
Footnote 86. State v Hembd, 305 Minn 120, 232 NW2d 872.
Footnote 87. Austin v State (Tex Crim) 541 SW2d 162.
Footnote 88. State v Lawrence, 135 Ariz 569, 663 P2d 561; State v Horswill, 75 Hawaii
152, 857 P2d 579; State v Niska (Minn) 514 NW2d 260, reh den (Minn) 1994 Minn
LEXIS 368.
368.
Footnote 90. State v Horswill, 75 Hawaii 152, 857 P2d 579.
Footnote 91. State v Lawrence, 135 Ariz 569, 663 P2d 561.
Footnote 92. State v Brown, 235 Neb 374, 455 NW2d 547.
161 Sufficiency of evidence [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A conviction for criminal confinement may be sustained on the testimony of the victim
alone. 93 Multiple convictions for false imprisonment, in connection with several
persons imprisoned in a single incident, may be sustained without the necessity of calling
every victim to testify that he or she felt restrained without consent or legal justification;
the prosecution is not required to put every victim on the witness stand in order to satisfy
the required proof of all the elements. 94
Evidence on the issue of identification of the defendant may be held sufficient in a
prosecution for criminal confinement, even in view of pretrial identification of others as
the perpetrator, where the identification of the defendant is corroborated by other
evidence. 95
Evidence has been found sufficient to support conviction in cases involving unlawful
imprisonment or similar charges where
the victim was beaten too badly to move and the defendant told police defendant
intended to keep the victim there until the victim's appearance improved. 96
the defendant and a codefendant brandished guns, demanded drugs, forced a husband
and wife into a car and kept them captive at gunpoint, later participating in the sexual
assault of the wife. 97
the defendant kept defendant's adult developmentally-disabled son shackled hand and
foot in a room in defendant's home, although the son was not violent. 98
the defendant kidnapped and killed an estranged spouse, putting the body in a fifty-five
gallon drum. 99
the defendant brandished a knife at the victim at 1:00 a.m., forced the victim to drive to
another area, handcuffed the victim and led the victim to another area before releasing the
victim and fleeing. 1
the defendant and an accomplice entered a store with knives and took money from a
cash drawer and employees' possessions from their persons. 2
the defendant held persons in an office at gunpoint and threatened to kill everyone in the
building if defendant did not receive a check. 3
the defendant forcibly entered the victim's vehicle at 2:00 a.m. robbed and sexually
assaulted the victim and implied harm to the victim if the assault were reported to the
authorities. 4
the evidence, albeit all circumstantial in character, indicated that the victim was bound
at wrist and ankles, gagged and blindfolded and subsequently murdered. 5
where two robberies were committed; in the first, one perpetrator held a knife to the
victim's throat while holding him by the hair, and in the second robbery, one perpetrator
knocked the victim to the floor and sat on her while the co-perpetrator accomplished the
theft. 6
Under a statute, the element of "restraint" is adequately shown by evidence of the fact
that the defendant's conduct toward the victim invoked enough fear and apprehension for
the safety of the victim that four other persons who had been with the defendant and the
victim followed them and took steps to attempt to rescue the victim from potential harm.
7
Footnotes
Footnote 93. Lewis v State (Ind) 511 NE2d 1054.
Footnote 95. Winfrey v State (Ind) 547 NE2d 272.
Footnote 96. Roberts v State (Ind) 599 NE2d 595, reh den (Jan 26, 1993).
Footnote 97. State v Vance, 240 Neb 794, 484 NW2d 453.
Footnote 98. Adelman v State (Tex Crim) 828 SW2d 418, motion for rehearing on PDR
denied (Apr 29, 1992).
Footnote 99. Raskin v State, 261 Ga 848, 412 SE2d 832, 103-35 Fulton County D R 21,
related proceeding 216 Ga App 478, 454 SE2d 809, 95 Fulton County D R 857, 23 Media
L R 2054.
Footnote 1. State v Fleck, 238 Neb 446, 471 NW2d 132.
Footnote 2. Bivens v State (Ind) 553 NE2d 127.
Footnote 4. Fointno v State (Ind) 487 NE2d 140.
Footnote 5. Felker v State, 252 Ga 351, 314 SE2d 621, cert den 469 US 873, 83 L Ed 2d
158, 105 S Ct 229, reh den 469 US 1067, 83 L Ed 2d 440, 105 S Ct 554, cert den 502
US 1064, 117 L Ed 2d 118, 112 S Ct 950, habeas corpus den (CA11 Ga) 52 F3d 907, 9
FLW Fed C 61, reh, en banc, den (CA11 Ga) 62 F3d 342, 9 FLW Fed C 339.
Footnote 6. Steele v State (Ind) 533 NE2d 1197.
Footnote 7. State v Wyatt, 234 Neb 349, 451 NW2d 84.
But see State v Dokken (Minn) 312 NW2d 106 (in a criminal prosecution for false
imprisonment, the fact that an 11-year-old boy is bound on two or three occasions for less
than ten minutes while the defendant takes photographs of him with his shirt removed is
insufficient to show the requisite intent to restrict the child's freedom of movement for
purposes of proving the "intent" element).
162 Penalties; sentencing [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]
A statutory penalty for unlawful restraint is not clearly irrational simply because the
penalty is greater than that set for aggravated assault, the two statutes having different
purposes, the aggravated assault charge being concerned with threatened bodily harm
while the unlawful restraint is concerned with actual restriction of another's freedom to
move about. 8
In a number of cases involving prosecutions for a variety of criminal offenses, the
imposition of consecutive sentences for criminal confinement, false imprisonment or
similar offenses has been upheld as not excessive under the circumstances. 9
Footnotes
Footnote 8. People v Wisslead, 108 Ill 2d 389, 92 Ill Dec 226, 484 NE2d 1081.
Footnote 9. State v Palmer, 206 Conn 40, 536 A2d 936 (imposition of consecutive
sentences for kidnapping and unlawful restraint, in connection with a single incident, was
proper, since it was possible for defendant to have committed kidnapping without
committing unlawful restraint, indicating that the two were separate offenses, rather than
an offense and a lesser included offense); Zeilinga v State (Ind) 555 NE2d 471; Pyle v
State (Ind) 476 NE2d 124, appeal after remand on other grounds (Ind) 493 NE2d 452
(consecutive sentencing for confinement and attempted murder was adequately supported
by the aggravating circumstances, including the defendant's extensive criminal history,
separate offenses, two victims and the ruthless, premeditated and heartless manner of
commission of the crimes); State v Schumacher, 240 Neb 184, 480 NW2d 716, postconviction proceeding (Neb Ct App) 1994 Neb App LEXIS 99 (consecutive sentences of
five to ten years for sexual assault, one to two years for false imprisonment and one year
for use of a firearm); State v Winchester, 239 Neb 535, 476 NW2d 862 (sentence of eight
to fifteen years for sexual offense, two to five years consecutive for use of knife and two
to five year concurrent sentence for false imprisonment).
But see Fointno v State (Ind) 487 NE2d 140 (an additional sentence of twenty-four years
was excessive in view of the reduced significance of the confinement offense compared
to the rape and robbery offenses committed in the same incident, and which were all part
of a single criminal episode).

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Am. Jur.

I. CIVIL ACTIONS [1-15]

2 False arrest; generally [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

for false arrest. 24

Footnote 31. Santiago v Fenton (CA1 Mass) 891 F2d 373.

6 -- Defamation [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

ALR Index: False Imprisonment and Arrest

2. Detention or Restraint [11-20]

Wash) 799 F2d 1396.

As to consent as a defense to an action for false imprisonment, see 60.

hospital, 4 ALR4th 449.

Refusing an employee permission to leave the room in which he is being questioned as to

3. Unlawfulness of Detention or Restraint [21-34]

As to defense of justification based upon legal process, see 90 et seq.

(2). Illegality Based Upon Conduct Following Arrest [29-32]

Footnote 14. 63.

Annotation: Delay in taking before magistrate or denial of opportunity to give bail as

c. Commitment of Mentally Ill Person [33, 34]

33 Generally; commitment pursuant to valid legal proceeding [32 Am Jur 2d

C. Liability of Particular Persons [35-58]

2. Persons Procuring, Directing, or Participating In Arrest or Imprisonment

participation to impose liability, as a general rule. Also, no liability is incurred if a person

363 SW2d 210; McAleer v Good, 216 Pa 473, 65 A 934.

Annotation: False imprisonment: liability of private citizen, calling on police for

42 Private persons assisting officer on request [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE

Footnote 31. Stuart v Chapman, 104 Me 17, 70 A 1069.

3. Vicarious Liability [49-58]

a servant. 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency 280.

Footnote 95. Ware v Barataria & Lafourche Canal Co., 15 La 169.

Footnote 4. Rizzo v Riddell, 262 App Div 779, 27 NYS2d 837.

of the hirer's own personnel. 22

company's property is to secure information, his employment confers no real or apparent

Annotation: 38 ALR3d 1332 9[a].

Co., 189 Ga App 17, 375 SE2d 108.

that there can be no estoppel to object on this ground. 72

64 -- Effect of giving bail [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

Pinaud v County of Suffolk (CA2 NY) 52 F3d 1139).

71 -- Liability based on invalidity of statute or ordinance [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE

As to commitment of mentally ill person under judicial proceedings, see 33, 34 et

reasonable means of escape is sufficient to establish liability for false imprisonment

b. Protection of Property by Detention of Customer or Employee [74-80]

(2). Under Statute [76-80]

As to reasonableness of manner and time, see 80.

A statutory presumption of shoplifting, arising when there is a knowing concealment of

704, 102 Ill Dec 121, 499 NE2d 678.

c. Arrest Without Warrant [81-86]

86 Proof of different offense [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE IMPRISONMENT]

d. Justification By Legal Process [87-97]

(2). Action of Officers Under Process [90-97]

As to municipal liability for issuance of a warrant of arrest for violation of an invalid

(b). Effect of Improper Procedure by Officer in Execution of Warrant [93-97]

94 Failure to possess or produce process or state contents [32 Am Jur 2d FALSE

Footnote 3. Bradley v Fisher, 80 US 335, 13 Wall 335, 20 L Ed 646; Grant v Williams,

damages resulting from unauthorized acts, including false imprisonment. Manning v

b. Quasi-judicial Officers [109-113]

the mayor of a city in restraining and confining an intoxicated constable. 58 Even in

Footnote 60. Tryon v Pingree, 112 Mich 338, 70 NW 905.

c. Physicians [114, 115]

Annotation: 30 ALR3d 523 9.

E. Practice And Procedure [116-139]

2. Parties [119, 120]

or quasi-judicial officer. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Forms

Imprisonment, Forms 91-97.

punitive damages are sought, an allegation of malice 60 or want of probable cause 61