LEONILO ANTONIO (P) vs. MARIE IVONNE F.

REYES (R)
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has
unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception
between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the
depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the
modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to
fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of
Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F.
Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and
affirm instead the trial court.
1

Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old
and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and through
a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog,
Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a child was born
on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents
incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up
to the present.8
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to
wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her
family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape
and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. 12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with
Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her
family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same
vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village
Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under
those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and
touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one
who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only
figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or
connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her
payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set
from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous
furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up
his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her

unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a

reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in
November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents
persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship
that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They further asserted that
respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was
having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there
was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was
afraid of losing her husband. 25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from
head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for

the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank.
She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not
under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after
office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at
the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. 28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the
writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan
was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred
that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking
for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts. 30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten
people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to
their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay
and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is
not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes
testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale
(CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and
poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of
disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and
interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only

one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake
the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that
respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of
health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent
and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of makebelieve. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable
of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. 36 The trial court thus declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of
the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the
ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37During the pendency
of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was
affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic
tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding
that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court
of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that the
requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The
Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the
veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court
concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the
operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts
as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards
were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals
cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one
case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the
remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the
Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner
seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the
proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity
under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the

case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish
respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the
credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41 It is a
settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of
laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons
"who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting
marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among
others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce
Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the
time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage
Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was
permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of
"unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable
marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not
among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the
marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one
contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent,
just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential
requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a
specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of
the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse
may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless
incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in
the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the
consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased
by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity
to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which
makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and
thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the
same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological
incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this

would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns though were
answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court,
through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was
further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice
(now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish
psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that
psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity
deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code
committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by
avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee
was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for

annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on
the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as
intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the
auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed
the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has
proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in
adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time,
the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a
case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this
evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at
present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that
precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then
in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of
psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family
Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological
incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted
as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic
Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard
the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent
understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local
Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole

source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept
may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code
and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.
Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive
on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological
incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized
in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too
frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have
favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded
to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe
the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such
legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes
the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of
the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree
of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article
XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in
resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a

psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the
State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who,
for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply
with the essential obligations of marriage.

physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the
judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles

68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidence
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue
a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48
of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the
consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court
is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this
Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of
facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these
facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about
many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains
whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological
incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses
who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed
respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented
two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the
aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In
any event, both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible
enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally
honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of
evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter
between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code
likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney,
fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with
preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would
necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint
alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal
behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names,

and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and
family background, among others.81

xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to

medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology.
Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can
say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards.
There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again
in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her
marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The
lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that
endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are
expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is
going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines
that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the
basic obligations of the marriage?

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third
witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the
petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page
six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means
that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an
affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is
not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and
then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If
there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with
another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an
affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid
jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of
petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the
case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as
the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally
examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that
personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the
spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the

methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical

conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of
respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of
petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated
its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It
has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity
for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her
singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make
believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to
her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is
based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by
petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated
friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real
parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after
their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove
her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately
discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation
before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance
speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that
respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in
extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they
indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at
least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic
on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of
her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability
to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a
person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be
unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic
meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well
to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried
her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform
her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly
banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly
disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her
commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states
that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud
under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will
give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to
draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the
misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3)
vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated
consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent
point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in

particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is
difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration
the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The
appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no
reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners
efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed
the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995,
citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent. 90Such decree of
nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the
Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92 In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the
Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when
elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct
appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that
based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the
marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were

markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the

Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words,
afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern,
the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial
consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well
the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by
the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import
of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since
they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings
of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value.
After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such
effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he
returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents
aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories,
and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion
that respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that
respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents
psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would
have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents
condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on
this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court
rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that
the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36
or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995,
began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code
committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars, 97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity. 98 Santos did
refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a former presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that
psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability
as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court
came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondents
psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate
that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for
declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of
the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision
that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only
with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after
the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
102

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of
a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet we

approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement
that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert
opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert
witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable
simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and
the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we
apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those
cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate
review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses
would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in
those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is
actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of
Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to
reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced
that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been
established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact
that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an
integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that
respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that
annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly
ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the
marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that
respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as
exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and

not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the

legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10
August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL
and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.