Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Municipal Corporation- A body politic and corporate constituted by the
incorporation of the inhabitants for the purpose of local government thereof.
Established by law partly as an agency of the state to assist in the civil
government of the country but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or
internal affairs of the city, town, or district which is incorporated.
Elements:
1. Legal corporation or incorporation;
2. A corporate name by which the artificial personality is known and in
which all corporate acts are done;
3. Inhabitants constituting the population;
4. Territory within which local civil government/ corporate functions are
exercised.
Nature/ status
1. Subordinate branch of the government of the state;
2. Exercises delegated branches of government
Municipal Corporation Proper- Refers to incorporated cities, towns, or
villages invested with the power of local legislation;
Quasi-Municipal Corporation- Quasi-corporation operates directly as
an agency of the state to help in the administration of public functions.
Tests:
1. Voluntary/ involuntary nature of the corporation
2. Existence/ nonexistence of a charter
3. Whether the purpose of the corporation is solely as a governmental
agency or one for self-government
Purposes of Municipal Corporations:
1. Serve as an agency/ instrument of the state in carrying on the
functions of government which the state cannot conveniently exercise.
2. Act as an agency of the inhabitants of the community in the regulation
of municipal franchises and public utilities promotion, management,
of local affairs, maintenance of water system, ferries, wharves, etc.
Lidasan v COMELEC
No bill may be enacted into law should include more than one subject.
Congress must refrain from conglomeration of different subjects. The title of
a bill must be couched in such a language sufficient to notify the public of
the import of the single subject. A change in the boundaries of 2 provinces
may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality.
The principle that only the unconstitutional portion of a statute should
be invalidated and the constitutional part must remain does not apply here.
The explanatory note of the bill from which this statute originated expressed
that the envisioned municipality would be self-sufficient. This of course
includes the 21 barangays, and not the 9 barangays that would be left if the
valid portion would be allowed to continue. Factors affecting the
independence of a municipality include population, territory, and income.
Constitution, Article X
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Sec. 3 The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, elections, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers, and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of said local units.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan and political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and
shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The
jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be
limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters
LGUs, however, still have fiscal autonomy. They have the power to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their share in the national tax.
The withholding is equivalent to a holdback, no matter how temporary. The
wordings of the law is clear that it shall be automatically released. The
formulation/ implementation is subject to consultation with the appropriate
public agencies, private sectors, and LGUs.
Before the President can interfere with fiscal matters of LGUs, the
following must be present:
1. Unmanaged public sector deficit;
2. Consultation with presiding officers of the Senate and the House, and
the various local leagues;
3. Recommendation of the secretaries of the DOF, DILG, and DBM;
4. Must not be lower than 30% of the collection of the national IR taxes
of 3rd fiscal year preceding the current one.
CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Nature
1. Essentially legislative
2. Exclusive/ unlimited
3. Cant be delegated
Essential Requisites
1. Territory- contiguous
2. Population
3. Charter- invests people with power of local government
By prescription- Existence presumed if exercised powers claimed by a
community, with knowledge and acquiescence of legislature, without
interruption.
De Facto Municipal Corporations
Corporation that exists in fact although not in point of law as there is a
certain defect in some essential feature of its organization.
1. Valid law authorizing incorporation;
2. Attempt in good faith to organize it;
3. Colorable compliance with the law;
4. Assumption of corporate powers.
ALTERATION
AND
CORPORATIONS
DISSOLUTION
OF
MUNICIPAL
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted in the political units directly affected, it means that residents of
the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation
have a right to vote. The phrase political units directly affected
contemplates the plurality of political units which would participate in the
exercise.
Miranda v Aguirre (1999)
The wording of the constitution has a common denominator: the
material change in the political and economic rights of the LGU directly
affected. The consent of the people is required to serve as a checking
mechanism to any exercise of legislative power. The changes are substantial.
The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the
provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council will
have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be
collected by the city will have to be shared with the province. There would
be a reduction in their IRA.
When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of
its people thru a plebiscite called for that purpose. There is no reason why
the same should not be done when RA 8528 downgrades the status of their
city. The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward so long
as they result in a material change in the LGU directly affected.
Tobias v Abalos
The creation of a separate congressional district is but a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. The
present limit of 250 is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that
the House shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise provided by law. It means that the present composition of
Congress may be increased if Congress itself so mandates.
The contention that the people of San Juan should have been parties to
the plebiscite is wrong since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite
was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter
of separate district representation was only ancillary to it.
owner of the land, then he is entitled to just compensation for the precipitate
demolition of their buildings. The issuance of a writ of possession and writ
of demolition by the petitioner judge in the ejectment proceedings was
premature. What the petitioner should have done was to stop the proceedings
in this case and wait for the final outcome of the cadastral proceedings.
However, the demolition of the buildings is now fait accompli.
The complaint alleges factual circumstances of a complaint for
abatement of a public nuisance. A public plaza is outside the commerce of
man and constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the municipality.
Patalinhug v CA (1994)
The question of whether Mr. Tepoots bldg. is residential or not is a
factual determination which appellate courts should not disturb. The
testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoots bldg. was
used for a dual purpose: dwelling and for business. While its commercial
aspect has been established by the presence of machineries and laundry
equipment, its use as a residence was not fully substantiated.
The findings of the trial court is supported by the fact that the
Sanggunian declared the area as commercial or C-2. Once a local govt has
reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes
must prevail. While the commercial character of the vicinity was declared
through ordinance, the respondents have failed to substantiate their
arguments that Cabaguio Avenue was still a residential zone. The
declaration of an area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an
exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of
the people in a locality. Persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
restraints and burdens to secure the general welfare of the state.
Tano v Socrates (1997)
Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare
provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to
the LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality
of life for the people of the community.
The LGC grants municipalities the power to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees, or charges for their use.
The sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of
the LGU and its inhabitants.
portions of the streets to them. Such leases are null and void for being
contrary to law.
The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater
number in the community.
Macasiano v Diokno (1992)
The areas are local roads used for public service and are considered
public properties of the municipality.
These properties are under the absolute control of Congress.
Local governments have no authority whatsoever to control the use of
public properties unless specific authority is given by Congress.
The authority given by the LGC to close roads should be read and
interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law.
424 Civil Code: Properties of public dominion devoted to public use
and made available to the public in general is outside the commerce of man
and cannot be disposed of or leased by the LGU to private persons.
Closure: comply with due process; must be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when
circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for
public use or public service. Once withdrawn from public use, it then
becomes patrimonial property.
Only then can the LGU use or convey it for any purpose for which other
property belonging to the LGU might be lawfully conveyed.
The municipality also failed to comply with the conditions imposed
by the MMA. The exercise of the powers of LGUs should be subservient to
paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the
community.
MMDA v Bel Air Village Assn., Inc. (2000)
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting or policies, installation of a system and
administration. Nothing in RA 7924 grants it police power. Even the Metro
Manila Council has not been given any legislative power. Unlike the
legislative bodies of LGUs, nothing in RA 7924 empowers the MMDA to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general
welfare.
intended use, necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. The land
in question has cost the owner P140,000.
Viewed from another angle, the case at bar is weaker for the
condemnor. In the first place, the land that is the subject of the present
expropriation is only one-third of the land sought to be taken in the Guido
case, and about two-thirds of that involved in the Borja condemnation
proceeding. In the second place, the Arellano Colleges' land is situated in a
highly commercial section of the city and is occupied by persons who are
not bona fide tenants. Lastly, this land was bought by the defendant for a
university site to take the place of rented buildings that are unsuitable for
schools of higher learning.
While a handful of people stand to profit by the expropriation, the
development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students
would be sacrificed. Any good that would accrue to the public from
providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in comparison
with the preparation of young men and young women for useful citizenship
and for service to the government and the community, a task which the
government alone is not in a position to undertake.
City of Manila v Chinese Community of Manila (1920)
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case
there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be
public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or
that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is
being exercised in accordance with law
When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private
property and an objection is made thereto by the owner, the courts have
ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof upon
an-issue properly presented, concerning the question whether or not the
purpose of the appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The right of
expropriation is not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it
can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. A
municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot expropriate public property.
cemetery already devoted to a public use, the city of Manila cannot condemn
a portion of the cemetery for a public street.
Province of Camarines Sur v CA (1993)
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader
interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of
eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned
property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges,
public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional
requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means
public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the
general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort
complex for tourists or housing project
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development
center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
Province of Camarines Sur. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also
satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the
legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the
legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the
exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may
be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the
limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed,
either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the
construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying
for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian
Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the
land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that
shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated
shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The
courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a
particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad
their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is
specially mentioned as subject thereto.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of
the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are
unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential
Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value
given to the condemned property either by the owners or the assessor,
whichever was lower.
Municipality of Paraaque v VM Realty Corp. (1998)
The power of eminent domain is lodged in Congress. An LGU may
exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through
the law conferring the power or in other legislations. (See Sec. 19 of RA
7160 which provides that an LGU through its chief executive may exercise
the power of eminent domain through an ordinance)
Requisites for the exercise of the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the
local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings;
2. Exercised for public use, purpose, or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless;
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec. 9 Art.
III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws;
4. Valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated but that it was rejected.
Ordinance- A law. It has a general and permanent character.
Resolution- Merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking
body on a specific matter. Temporary.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise the power through a
resolution, it would have said so.
Article 36, Rule VU of the IRR which requires only a resolution could not
prevail over the law.
Complaint does not state a cause of actionIn a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted before the court is the sufficiency of the allegations in
the complaint itself. WON those allegations are true is beside the point, for
their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion.
Res judicata is present in this case since VM Realty is a successor in
interest of Limpan Investment Corp. The principle of res judicata cannot bar
the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. This right
should be absolute and unfettered even by prior judgment or res judicata.
The ruling in this case that Paranaque could not exercise eminent domain
through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar
proceedings once the legal requirements are complied with.
City of Cebu v Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (2002)
In their Comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did
not err in affirming the decision of the trial court because (1) the trial court
decided the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties that just
compensation shall be fixed by commissioners appointed by the court; (2)
petitioner did not interpose any serious objection to the commissioners'
report of 12 August 1996 fixing the just compensation of the 1,624-square
meter lot at P20,826,339.50; hence, it was estopped from attacking the report
on which the decision was based; and (3) the determined just compensation
fixed is even lower than the actual value of the property at the time of the
actual taking in 1994.
Eminent domain is the Government's right to appropriate, in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose. However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just
compensation as consideration therefor.
In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for
the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of
the time of actual taking.
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just
compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We
explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date
of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this
Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at
the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and
voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the
The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory. Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the
municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals. Being
its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount
importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of
basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and
collections.
Petitioner contends that its period to appeal should be counted not
from the time the ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its
members were personally given copies of the approved ordinance in
November 1997. It insists that it was unaware of the approval and effectivity
of the subject ordinance in 1996 on two (2) grounds: first, no public hearing
was conducted prior to the passage of the ordinance and, second, the
approved ordinance was not posted. In petitioner's two (2) communications
with the Secretary of Justice, it enumerated the various objections raised by
its members before the passage of the ordinance in several meetings called
by the Sanggunian for the purpose. There is no evidence to prove petitioner's
negative allegation that the subject ordinance was not posted as required by
law. In contrast, the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan, presented evidence which clearly shows that the
procedure for the enactment of the assailed ordinance was complied with.
Estanislao v. Costales (1991)
The authority of the City is limited to the imposition of a percentage
tax on the gross sales or receipts of said product which, being non-essential,
shall be at the rate of not exceeding 2% of the gross sales or receipts of the
soft drinks for the preceding calendar year. The tax imposed is based on the
output or production and not on the gross sales or receipts as authorized by
the Local Tax Code.
According to Sec. 19 and Sec. 23 of the LTC: A city may impose, in
lieu of the graduated fixed tax prescribed under Sec. 19, a percentage tax on
the gross sales for the preceding calendar year of non-essential commodities
at the rate of not exceeding two percent and on the gross sales of essential
commodities at the rate of not exceeding one percent.
Pepsi Cola v. Tanauan: Inapplicable here since it involved a different
law, the Local Autonomy Act.
The Ordinance did not become valid by the inaction of the Finance
Minister. It only remains in effect if the minister did not comply with what is
due him.
delegation of taxing power is not even involved since the tax has already
been imposed and the LGUs are just mandated to enforce it.
(2) If the SC were to sanction the interpretation of Benguet, then
necessarily all real properties exempt by any law would be covered, and
there would be no need for congress to specify Real Property Tax Code, as
amended instead of stating clearly realty tax exemption laws. The intention
is to limit the application of the exception clause only to those given by
the Real Property Tax Code.
National Development Corporation v. Cebu City (1992)
To come under the exemption in Article 3, it is important to establish
that the property is owned by the government or by its unincorporated
agency, and once government ownership is determined, the nature of the use
of the property, whether for proprietary or government purposes, becomes
immaterial.
As regards the warehouse constructed, a different rule should apply
since the exemption of public property from taxation does not extend to
improvements on the public lands made by pre-emptioners, homesteaders
and other claimants, or occupants, at their own expense, and these are
taxable by the state. Consequently, the warehouse constructed on the
reserved land by NWC, indeed, should properly be assessed real estate tax as
such improvement does not appear to belong to the Republic. Since the
reservation is exempt from realty tax, the erroneous tax payments collected
by Cebu should be refunded to NDC.
Province of Tarlac v. Judge Alcantara (1992)
The SC did not agree with the lower court that the phrase in lieu of
all taxes and assessments of whatever nature in the second paragraph of
Sec. 1 of PD 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying real
property taxes. Said proviso is modified and delimited by the phrase on
earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale
which specifies the kinds of taxes and assessments which shall not be
collected in view of the imposition of the franchise tax. Said enumerated
items have no relation to, and are entirely different from, real properties
subject to tax.
There is also no merit in the respondents contention that the real
properties being taxed, the machinery for the generation and distribution of
electric power, the bldg. housing said machinery, and the land on which said
exercise the duties of the latter office since the nature of the duties of the
provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.
Garcia v. COMELEC
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions
as appropriate subject of a local initiative. The constitutional command to
include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was
implemented by Congress when it enacted RA 6735. Thus, section 3(a)
includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislation. When
Congress enacted RA 6735, it intended resolutions to be the proper subjects
of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent. The LGC of 1991 dealt
with local initiative and did not change or limit its scope.
Sec. 120, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book I merely defines the concept of
local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It
does not, however, deal with subjects that can be taken up in a local
initiative. It cannot be argued that the subject matter of the resolution merely
temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of
conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong in SSEZ has far reaching
implications. The petitioners were also denied their right to due process.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC
The process started by private respondents was an initiative but
COMELEC made preparations for a referendum only. Not once was the
term initiative used in the resolution.
Congress differentiated the two:
1. Initiative- power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election
called for the purpose.
2. Indirect initiative- Exercise of initiative by the people through a
proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
3. Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a
legislation through an election called for that purpose.
Initiative is resorted to by the people directly either because the lawmaking
body fails or refuses to enact a law, ordinance, resolution, or act that they
desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing.
It is true that RA 2259 created the post of vice mayor, but it did not
provide that he shall be considered a member of the city council or
municipal board.
Quiem v. Seria case is not at point, since in that case, by express
legal mandate, the vice mayor of CDO city was made a member of the
board.
In the absence of any statutory authority constituting the vice mayor
as a member of the municipal board, in addition to being the presiding
officer thereof, we cannot read into the law something which is not there.
The rules of procedure of the municipal board of Naga City exclude
the chairman from voting except in case of a tie vote.
The mere fact that the vice mayor was made the presiding officer
did not ipso jure make him a member thereof.
By explicit statutory command, courts are given authority to
determine the validity of municipal proceedings.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
Homeowners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of
Manila
The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially
police power. The exercise of police power is subject to a qualification,
those found in the Bill of Rights. It must be reasonable.
If the demands of the public welfare are brought about by a state of
emergency, the interference upon individual rights must be coextensive and
coterminous with the existence thereof.
Since emergencies are temporary, the regulations promulgated must
also be temporary.
A law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals, as a means to
tide over a critical condition, to be valid and legal, must be for a definite
period of time, the length of which must be reasonable, in relation to the
nature and duration of the crisis it seeks to overcome or surmount.
The powers of municipal corporations delegated thereto by the
National Government cannot escape the inherent limitations to which the
latteras the source of said powersis subject.
Morata v. Go
The conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by PD 1508
as a precondition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for
cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and
municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts
as well.
Section 6 of PD 1508 is clear: Conciliation is a precondition to the
filing of a complaint. The law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon.
The Lupon of each barangay has the authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of disputes except in some specified cases.
The law makes no distinction with respect to the classes of civil
disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level.
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the
intervention of the barangay leader and other respected leaders of the
barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between
members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and
cooperation, is avoided.
It is designed to discourage the indiscriminate filing of cases in court.
To say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively
cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of its objective.
If it was the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases
cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would have said so.
Circular No. 22 issued by C.J. Fernando: Implementation of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law: Judges were directed to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions, or proceedings in cases falling
within the authority of said Lupons.
Uy v. Contreras
The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by
PD 1508, but it is now under the LGC. PD 1508 was expressly repealed.
The revised katarungang pambarangay law has 3 new significant
features:
1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal cases to offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not
exceeding P5,000.00.
2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where
the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such
parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where
such workplace or institution is located.
3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses
during the pendency of the mediation. Paragraph (c) of Section 410
suffers from ambiguity when it states that the prescriptive periods
shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by
the lupon or pangkat secretary. What is referred to as receipt by the
complainant of the complaint is unclear. Accordingly, in Section 11 of
the Rules and Regulations issued by the SOJ, the phrase the
complaint or is not found, such that the resumption of the running of
the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the
complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file
action issued by the lupon. Such suspension shall not exceed 60 days.
The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any intentional
delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the prescriptive
period and then invoking such proximity as the reason for immediate
recourse to the courts.
Although PD 1508 has already been repealed, the jurisprudence built
thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of
an action in court remains applicable.
Since the slight physical injuries charged were allegedly inflicted on 17
April 1993, the prescriptive period would have expired 2 mos. after.
However, its running was tolled by the filing of the respondents complaints
with the lupon of Valenzuela on 23 April 1993, and automatically suspended
for a period of 60 days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation is reached, a
certification to file action is issued, the respondents would still have 56 days
within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense.
Wingarts v. Mejia
The judge is liable for incompetence and ignorance of the law for
taking cognizance of the criminal case despite the legal obstacles thereto.
Under Art. 408 (c), offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1
year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00 require prior barangay conciliation.
The crime of grave threats punishable under Art. 282 of the Revised Penal
Code falls within the purview of that section.
Had Mejia observed the mandate of the law, he could have remanded
the case to the lupon instead of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely
issuing the warrant of arrest against the accused.
Corpuz v. Court of Appeals
The MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases. The only
issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the
physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de
facto.
Since the petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with the
issue of ownership, Refugia applies:
The inferior court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and
possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the
nature of possession. However, it could not resolve the issue of ownership.
As regards the non-referral to the Lupon, the SC was not persuaded.
Dui v. CA: The failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that
there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure
constitutes a waiver of that defense.
The answer of Alvarado reveals that no reason or explanation was
given to support his allegation.
The proceeding in PD 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and
noncompliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court
had already acquired over the subject matter and the parties.
Bonifacio Law Office v. Judge Bellosillo
The records reveal that such Certification was improperly and
prematurely issued. It showed that no personal confrontation took place
before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. It was
reflected in the minutes submitted by the complainants.
The first hearing was dated 16 Feb 1999 and yet the CFA was issued
on 1 March 1996.
The barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to
conciliate between the parties and to settle the case.
Supreme Court Circular No. 14-93 provides:
In case mediation efforts have proven to be unsuccessful, there having been
no agreement to arbitrate, or where the respondent fails to appear at the
mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay, the Punong Barangay
shall not cause the issuance of the CFA but must constitute the Pangkat
Tagapamayapa before whom the conciliation proceedings should be held.
Mendova v. Judge Afable
An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial
remedy is available.
The complaint in this case did not bother to file a motion for
reconsideration of the judges decision. The instant administrative complaint
is premature. In this case, the records fail to show when the complainant
received the Barangay Certification to File Action. The undated certification
he submitted merely states that the case was set for hearing before the
barangay on several dates, but the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement.
When he filed on 4 May 1998, until the dismissal of the case on 3
November 1998, he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the BCFA.
He cannot fault Judge Afable for dismissing his case based on
prescription.
While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not be
considered ignorance of the law. It can only be an error in judgment.
Muez v. Ario
The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of
the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority
involves the following elements:
1. Offender is an officer of the executive branch;
2. he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or
decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
These elements were alleged in the information. What he issued was a
warrant of arrest. The defense that the former LGC allowed mayors to issue
an arrest warrant will not prosper. This provision has been repealed by the
1987 Constitution.
Ponsica v. Ignalaga: No longer does the mayor have at this time the
power to conduct PI, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the
LGC has been abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional
proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of
determining probable cause and issuing warrants of arrest or search warrants
may be exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in
the present Constitution of the phrase such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law found in the counterpart provision of the 1973
Constitution.
Greater Balanga Dev. Corp. v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan
The authority of the mayor to revoke a permit he issued is premised
on a violation by the grantee of any of the conditions for which the permit
had been granted.
The permit should not have been issued without the required
information given in the application form itself. Revoking the permit,
however, because of a false statement in the application form cannot be
justified under the quoted provision.
There must be proof of willful misrepresentation and deliberate intent
to make a false statement. Good faith is always presumed, and petitioner did
not make any false statement in the pertinent entry.
The application for 2 businesses in one permit is not a ground for
revocation. Their Code does not expressly require two permits for the
conduct of 2 or more businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be
paid for each business. The powers of municipal corporations must be
construed in strictissimi juris and any doubt must be construed against the
municipality.
Assuming arguendo that the lot in question was actually one of those
awarded to the plaintiffs, and the TCT of petitioner is spurious, this still does
not justify the revocation of the Mayors permit.
The records reveal that the Sanggunian did not establish or maintain
any public market on the lot. The resolution merely mentioned the plan to
acquire the lot for expansion of the market beside it. Until expropriation
proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its
right over the land.
Although the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to
regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the
conditions for their issuance or revocation, the anxiety, uncertainty, and
restiveness among the stallholders and traders could not be a valid ground
for revoking the permit of the petitioner. The manner of revocation also
violated the petitioners right to due process.
The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
Even RA 6766 shows that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be
faced with the absurd situation of having 2 sets of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative
powers over exactly the same area.
There will be two legislative bodies: the Cordillera Assembly and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, exercising their legislative powers over the
province of Ifugao.
This must be distinguished from the Abbas case in that it laid the
following rule: What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of
votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as
the individual constituent units.
MUNICIPAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Abella v. COMELEC
Arts, 68 and 69 of the Family Code are at point. Husband and wife as
a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual
place of abode.
In this case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner
temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte, in 1975 to pursue any
calling, profession, or business. What is clear is that she established her
residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considered herself a resident
therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in
Kananga is not present here. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga
does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. Despite the
petitioners insistence, the evidence shows that her supposed cancellation of
registration in Ormoc and transfer to Kananga is not supported by the
records.
Sec. 12 Art. X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly
urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from
voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In
the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province
2.
3.
4.
5.
does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age. Since Frivaldo
reassumed his citizenship, the very day the term of office of governor
began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed. The LGC
requires that an official be a registered voter, it does not require him to
actually vote. The SC also held that the repatriation retroacted to the
date of the filing of his application on 17 August 1994. The legislative
intent in PD 725 was to give it a retroactive operation.
Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a persons future status with finality. A person may
subsequently reacquire, or lose, his citizenship.
The Constitution has granted the COMELEC ample power to exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective, provincial
officials.
There was insufficient evidence presented to show that the people of
Sorsogon knew in fact and in law the alleged disqualification.
Frivaldo should be the one proclaimed.
The claim in the 5th issue is now moot and academic as the resolutions
are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the
COMELEC.
Mercado v. Manzano
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of 2 or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states.
Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individuals volition.
Art. IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution states that Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
In including this section, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 Section 40
(d) and in RA 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under the
disqualification.
It should suffice if, upon the filing of their COC, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
By filing a COC when he ran for this post, Manzano elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. His
COC contained the following statement: I am a Filipino CitizenNaturalBorn.
Coquilla v. COMELEC
The term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to
domicile or legal residence. That refers to a place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi).
Coquilla lost his domicile of origin by becoming a US citizen after
enlisting in the navy.
Residence in the US is a requirement for naturalization as a US
citizen. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship in 2000, he did not
acquire his legal residence here. His registration as a voter of Butnga in
January 2001 is not conclusive of his residency as a candidate since Sec. 117
of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the city where he proposes to vote for
at least 6 months immediately preceding the election.
Caasi v. Court of Appeals
Green card: Stated that Miguel was a resident alien. In his application,
he wrote that he intended to stay permanently. Miguels immigration to the
US in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating; the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
As a resident alien, Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the
US.
Sec. 18, Article XI of the Constitution which states that any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status
of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
law is inapplicable to Miguel since he acquired such status prior to his
election as mayor.
Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to him: Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not
be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such
person has waived his status as permanent resident in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
The records are bare of proof that he had waived his status before he
ran for election as mayor of Bolinao.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for office for at
least one year at the time of filing of the COC is one of the qualifications.
Miguel did not possess that since he was a permanent resident of the US and
he resided in Bolinao for only 3 months after his return to the Philippines.
Marquez v. COMELEC
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of
1991, to the extent that it confines the term fugitive from justice to refer
only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment is an
inordinate and undue circumspection of the law.
The COMELEC in this case did not make any definite finding on
WON, in fact, Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice since the quo warranto
case was outrightly dismissed. This case must be remanded to the
COMELEC.
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
The definition of fugitive from justice indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular
jurisdiction.
Rodriguez case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that
his arrival in the Philippines from the US preceded the filing of the felony
complaint in the LA Court and of the issuance on even date of the arrest
warrant by the same foreign court, by almost 5 months. It was impossible for
Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at
the time he left the US, What prosecution was Rodriguez deliberately
running away from with his departure from the US?
The law of the case doctrine forbids the Court from crafting an
expanded re-definition of fugitive from justice.
The legal rule in the Marquez Decision must govern the instant
petition. The Court specifically refers to the concept of fugitive from
justice as defined in the main opinion of Marquez which highlights the
significance of an intent to evade. In Marquez, the Court ruled that A
fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.
Dela Torre v. COMELEC
Moral turpitude has been defined as: an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
The Court is guided by the general rule that crimes mala in se involve
moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, the Court
admitted that this guideline is inadequate in providing a clear-cut solution.
WON a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and
depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
Moral turpitude is deducible from the 3rd element of the crime: The
accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object, or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft.
The same underlying reason holds even if the fence did not have
actual knowledge, but merely should have known the origin of the
property received.
Petitioners conviction of fencing which is a crime of moral turpitude
subsists and remains unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. A
judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the
accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending
resolution of the application for probation.
Magno v. COMELEC
Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It depends on the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the law.
(Chairman of the Board and CEO of SBMA). Since this is prohibited by the
Constitution, the law is unconstitutional. The fact that the expertise of an
elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body
politic is of no moment.
Even though Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment of a local
elective official to another post if so allowed by law or the primary functions
of his office, it cannot be determinative of the constitutionality of RA 7227
for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
The phrase shall be appointed shows the intent to make the SBMA
posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of mayor of Olongapo.
The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
Galido v. COMELEC
The fact that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the COMELEC in
contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are final,
executory, and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the SC by
way of a special civil action for certiorari.
Article IX (A) Sec. 7 of the Constitution states Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Rivera v. COMELEC
The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
contests involving local elective officials are final, executory, and not
appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil
action for certiorari.
The SC has closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision
and found that the said decision was not arrived at capriciously or
whimsically. A painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was
made by the COMELEC en banc. In fact, 14 ballots originally adjudicated in
Garcias favor were overruled by the Commission en banc, thus reducing the
number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the 2,445 contested ballots.
The appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual determinations.
Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local
Government, has no power to appoint petitioner, at the very least, petitioner
is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
Docena v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar
From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on 19
November 1990, it was intended to be permanent, to fill the permanent
vacancy caused by Capitos death. As such, it was to be valid for the
unexpired portion of the term of the deceased member, who was entitled to
serve until noon of June 30, 1992, in accordance with Article XVIII,
Section 2, of the Constitution.
The said
appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in
fact already assumed office as member of the SPES, as per certification of
the provincial secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioners
appointment had already been complete and enforceable at the time it was
supposed to have been superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar.
Docenas appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and
the petitioner having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just
recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was
permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of the deceased
predecessors term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the
position and could be removed only for any of the causes, and conformably
to the procedure, prescribed in the LGC. These could not be circumvented
by the simple process of recalling his appointment.
De Rama v. Court of Appeals
There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of their tenure.
Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointees assumption
of the position in the civil service, he acquires a legal right which cannot be
taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for
cause and with previous notice and hearing. It is well-settled that the person
assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment
acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position.
It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially
approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in
disregard of applicable provisions of the CSC law and regulations.
David v. COMELEC
The intent of the legislature is to limit the term of barangay officials to
only three years.
RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. Legis posteriors priores
contraries abrogant.
RA 6679 requires the voters to elect seven kagawads and the
candidate who gets the highest number of votes becomes the punong
barangay. The LGC, however, mandates a direct vote on the barangay
chairman.
There is a clear incompatibility between the provisions of these two
laws so the earlier one must be deemed to have been repealed.
The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any
term of office for barangay officials, It merely left the determination of such
term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition,
thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service.
Petitioners are also estopped from pursuing their petitions. Following
the petitioners own theory, the election of Petitioner David was illegal since
they were elected under RA 6679.
Alinsug v. RTC-Negros Occidental
It appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a
municipality only when it is an adverse party in a case involving the
provincial government or another municipality or city in the province.
The key to resolving this issue of whether a local government official
may secure the services of private counsel, in an action filed against him in
his official capacity, lies on the nature of the action and the relief that is
sought.
When moral and/or exemplary damages are claimed, a mayor may
hire a private counsel to defend him at his own personal expense.
A public official, who, in the performance of his duty acts in such
fashion, does so in excess of authority, and his actions would be ultra vires
that can thereby result in an incurrence of personal liability. All the
foregoing considered, we hold that the respondents were not improperly
represented by a private counsel, whose legal fees shall be for their own
account.
piecemeal, apparently to pin him down ten times the pain, when the
Secretary could have pursued a consolidated effort.
The LGC provides that in the event that several administrative cases
are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for
more than 90 days within a single year on the same ground or grounds
existing and known at the time of the first suspension.
Espiritu v. Melgar
The provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to
preventively suspend the municipal Mayor of Naujan at any time after the
issues have been joined when any of the following grounds exist:
1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent has
committed the acts complained of;
2. When the evidence of culpability is strong;
3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or
4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence.
There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges
against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his
innocence.
Mayor Melgars direct recourse to the courts without exhausting
administrative remedies was premature.
Since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained
by the TRO and therefore has already been served, he is deemed reinstated
in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative
investigation of the charges against him.
Aguinaldo v. Santos
Re-election renders administrative case moot and academic.
Except for criminal acts committed, a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term.
Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a LGC
which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is
found in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, then it cannot be said that BP 337
was repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Sec. 48 (1) of BP Blg. 337 grants the Secretary the power to appoint
local government officials in case of incumbents removal from office.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required before the petitioner
could be suspended or removed from office. Petitioner in this case is not
being prosecuted criminally under the RPC, but administratively with the
end view of removing him as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan for acts
of disloyalty to the Republic.
Reyes v. COMELEC
Any agreement to delay service of a decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in administrative cases is illegal. The law makes it mandatory
that copies of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall
immediately be furnished to respondent and/ or interested parties.
The filing of a petition for certiorari does not prevent a decision from
attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action
and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of
the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
When the elections were held on 8 May 1995, the decision of the SP
had already become final and executory. To arrest the course of the principal
action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court
directed to the lower court.
Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged
misconduct was committed.
That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes
may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified
is now settled.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
There is nothing in the LGC that indicates that it has repealed the
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. Repeals by implication are not favored.
Every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws.
Not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be
decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even
before the charges are heard.
Any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or finding
of the Ombudsman may only be entertained by the Supreme Court, on pure
question of law.
Grego v. COMELEC
Sec. 40(b) of the LGC does not have any retroactive effect.
A statute, despite the generality of its language, must not be so
construed as to overreach acts, events, or matters which transpired before its
passage.
Under PD 807, the former Civil Service Decree, the term
reinstatement had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive
positiona public officer administratively dismissed then was not therefore
barred from running for an elective position.
The use of the word may in RA 6646 indicates that the suspension
of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive.
Absent any determination of irregularity in election returns, as well as
an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is
mandatory and ministerial for the Board of Canvassers to count the votes
based on such returns and declare the result.
A possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared
the winning candidate is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions:
1. The one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified;
2. The electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate.
Joson v. Executive Secretary
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.
As the disciplining authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local officials. AO 23
delegates this power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority.
This is not undue delegation, what is delegated is the power to
investigate and not the power to discipline.
An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights
of an accused:
1. Right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel;
2. Right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and
3. Right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of
documentary evidence.
Garcia v. COMELEC
To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute
permits; all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a law.
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before
the end of his term of office.
The LGC of 1983 provided only one mode of initiating the recall
elections of local elective officials.
The LGC of 1991 provided for a second mode of initiating the recall
process through a preparatory recall assembly.
There is nothing in the Constitution that remotely suggests that the
people have the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a
recall proceeding.
Membership of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level
is not apportioned to political parties.
Loss of confidence as a ground for recall is a political question.
Paras v. COMELEC
If the SK election which is set by law to be held every 3 years from
May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local
election, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the
recall provision of the LGC.
The Constitution requires an effective mechanism of recall, initiative,
and referendum. A statute must be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution.
It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of
the LGC to construe regular local election as one referring to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will
be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Angobung v. COMELEC
The issue in Sanchez was not the questioned procedure but the legal
basis for the exercise by the COMELEC of its rule-making power in the
alleged absence of a statutory grant.
In Sanchez and Evardone: The COMELEC-prescribed procedure of
allowing the recall petition to be filed by at least one person and then
inviting voters to sing said petition on a date set for that purpose was never
put to issue.
Sec. 69(d) of the LGC: Expressly provides that the recall of any
elective municipal official may be validly initiated upon petition of at least
25% of the total number of registered voters in the LGU concerned.
The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates a recall
proceeding.
The phrase petition of at least 25% is used and the law does not
state that the petition must be signed by at least 25%; rather, the petition
must be of or by, at least 25% of the registered voters.
Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the
signatures of 25% of the registered voters, the petition must contain the
names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose
behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.
SC: Cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition
by a number of people less than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement,
much less, the filing thereof by just one person.
Recall must be pursued by the people, not just one disgruntled loser or
a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, it will only serve to
stabilize a community and disrupt the running of government.
Malonzo v. COMELEC
Factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and
duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more
so, in the absence of a substantial attack on its validity.
The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the
PRA.
Petitioners insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was
infirm since it was convened by the Liga, is misplaced. It just so happens
that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very
members of the PRA, the majority of whom met and voted in favor of the
resolution for his recall.
Claudio v. COMELEC
(1) On the word recall
Sec. 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. Sec. 69 provides
that the power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters Since
the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall
proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in
Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. The term
recall in par. (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening
of the PRA and the filing of a petition of recall with the COMELEC or the
gathering of the signatures of at least 25% of the voters for a petition for
recall.
The limitations in Sec. 74 apply only to the exercise of the power to
recall which is vested in the registered voters. People v. Garcia: Holding of a
PRA is not the recall itself.
As long as the recall election is not held before the official concerned has
completed one year in office, he will not be judged on the performance
prematurely. To construe the term recall as including the convening of the
PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local
officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and
assembly of its members.
(2) Whether the phrase Regular Local Election includes the election
period for the regular election or simply the date of such election.
There is a distinction between election period and campaign period. To
hold that it includes the entire period would reduce the period to eight
months. Such an interpretation would devitalize the right of recall.
(3) Whether the Recall Resolution was singed by a majority of the PRA
and duly verified.
Yes. Although the term attendance appears at the top of the page, it is
apparent that it was written by mistake. It is more probable to believe that it
was signed to signify their concurrence to the recall resolution.
Mendez v. CSC
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may
be exercised only in a manner and in accordance
corporation with an original charter. All of its shares of stocks are owned by
the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers, it also
exercises regulatory powers.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and regulate gambling casinos.
The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency
of the government. Being an agency of the government, it must be exempt
from local taxes, otherwise, it might be impeded or subject to the control of
a mere local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National
Government over local governments.
GANZON V. CA
Despite the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not
intend to divest the legislature of its rightor the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative
sanctions against local officials. The omission signifies local autonomy from
Congress.
The Constitution did nothing more insofar as existing legislation
authorizing the President to proceed against local officials administratively,
the Constitution contains no prohibition.
Legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Investigating is not
inconsistent with overseeing.
In cases where the Court denied the President the power to suspend/
remove, it was not because it did not think that the President can not exercise
on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere.
The sole objective of a suspension is simply to prevent the accused
from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and
authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records and other
evidence.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment
in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. Suspension is
temporary, it may be imposed for no more than 60 days. A longer
suspension is unjust and unreasonable.
RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites
and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sitesa total of 24 lotssince
these were held by the former province in its governmental capacity and
therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress.
But the law cannot be applied to deprive Z. del Norte of its share in the value
of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since
they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP. INC. AND PAGCOR
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by PD 1869.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not
illegal per se.
Tests for a valid ordinance:
1. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5. It must not be general and consistent with public policy.
6. It must bot be unreasonable.
Under the rule noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it
is associated. Accordingly, the SC held that since the word gambling is
associated with and other prohibited games of chance, the word should be
read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like other prohibited games
of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
Implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing of such intention. There is no sufficient indication of
an implied repeal of PD 1869. On the contrary, PAGCOR is mentioned as a
source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, RA 7309, creating a
Board of Claims under the DOJ and RA 7648 providing for measures for the
solution of the power crisis.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of
gambling, the illegal and those authorized by law. The ordinances violate PD
1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public
policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of
chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them
by Congress as the national law making body.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the LGUs
has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CITY OF MANILA
There was no repeal. The Citys power to tax steam boilers could not
have been affected by the Department of Labors power to regulate or
inspect them: One is taxation, the other is regulation.
The power of inspection of the Labor Secretary does not conflict with
that of the City authorities, since the former is related to the safety of
laborers and employees while the City is not limited to such purposes, but
is related to the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the City, particularly
of the neighborhood where the boilers are located.
In the opinion of judicial authorities, there is nothing inherently
obnoxious in the requirement that a person engaged in a business shall have
two licenses, one issued by the state and another by a political subdivision or
public corporation.
As to the rates, if the Citys power is merely to regulate, then that is
material. However, the City also has the authority to tax steam boilers. There
is every indication that herein charges were collected under both the power
to tax and the power to regulate. The name fee is not conclusivetaxes are
often called fees.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. CA
The LGC does not contain any express provision which categorically
repeals the charter of the Authority.
The charter of LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general
law. The enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. Considering the reasons behind the
establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection,
navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication
that the legislative intent is for the authority to proceed with its mission.
Laguna de Bay cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of
management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise
exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water
The power of local government units to issue fishing privileges was
clearly granted for revenue purposes. The power of the Authority to grant
permits is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities
in the region. It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive and the least limitable and the most demanding of all State
powers. The charter which embodies a valid exercise of the police power
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees since there is a sharing
mechanism in place.
MONDANO V. SILVOSA
Constitution: President shall have control over all the executive
departments exercise general supervision over all local governments as
may be provided by law
Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction but he does
not have the same control of local governments.
Supervision: Overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.
Control: The power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The authority of the Department Head over persons under his
department does not extend to local governments over which the President
exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.
The charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or
any of those enumerated in Sec. 2188 of the Admin. Code, since rape and
concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor
nor do they constitute neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other
form of maladministration of office.
HEBRON V. REYES
President has no inherent power to remove or suspend local elective
officials.
2188: Governor shall receive and investigate complaints against
municipal officers for offenses involving maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.
2189: Trial by municipal board. Preventive suspension shall not be
more than 30 days.
It cannot be disputed that in this case the President is vested with the
authority to order the investigation of petitioner when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires, and such being the case, the petitioner
cannot now contend that the designation of respondent as the official to
investigate him by Rosales has been done without the authority of law.
It cannot be inferred that the power of supervision of the President
over local officials does not include the power of investigation when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires.
As to the cause, considering that the position of mayor of a chartered
city may be fairly compared in category and statute with that of a provincial
governor, we are of the opinion that the former, by analogy, may also be
amenable to suspension and removal for the same causes as the latter, which
causes, under Sec. 2078 of the Admin Code, are: Disloyalty, dishonesty,
oppression, and misconduct in office.
Considering the allegations in the complaint to the effect that
petitioner took advantage of his public post as mayor in committing acts of
violence and intimidation upon respondent to stop his radio program, the SC
held that the acts constitute misconduct in office for which he may be
ordered investigated by the President within the meaning of the law.
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails
to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property,
such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or
municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action
herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a
preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
distinct and different lease contract which requires the prescribed formality
of a public bidding.
Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos
Sec. 7 Par. 2 of the RAC: Requires that before a contract involving the
expenditure of P2,000 or more may be entered into or authorized, the
municipal treasurer must certify to the officer entering into such contract that
funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount
necessary to cover the proposed contract is available for expenditures on
account thereof, and a contract entered into contrary to these requirements is
void.
Sec. 584-A of RAC: The provincial auditor or his representative must
check up the deliveries made by a contractor pursuant to a contract lawfully
and validly entered into and where there is no check up to show actual
delivery, the Auditor General is not duty bound to pass and allow in audit
the sum claimed by a contractor.
The Motor Vehicle Law invoked by Rivera merely allocates 10% of
the money collected under its provisions to the road and bridge funds of the
different municipalities in proportion to the population, as shown in the last
available census, for the repair, maintenance, and construction of municipal
roads. This alone is not sufficient appropriation and authority to disburse
part of the percentage collected under the law for the purpose of paying the
petitioners claim.
Rivera v. Maclang
This action is against defendant-appellee in his personal capacity
based on Sec. 608 of the RAC: A purported contract entered into contrary to
the requirements of the next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void,
and the officer assuming to make such contract shall be liable to the
Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the
same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.
The liability of Maclang is personal, as if the transaction had been
entered into by him as a private party. The intention of the law in this case is
to ensure that public officers entering into transactions with private
individuals calling for the expenditure of public funds observe a high degree
of caution so that the government may not be the victim of ill-advised or
improvident action by those assuming to represent it.
The basis of the lower courts decision is Sec. 2246 of the RAC which
provides that no municipal road or any part thereof shall be closed without
indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby.
That Concepcion Abella was economically damaged, the stipulation
of facts admits, and that the indemnity assessed is within the bounds of the
damages suffered, there is no dispute.
The damages seem to be nominal judged by the description of the
plaintiffs interests adversely affected by the conversion of P. Prieto Street
into a market.
Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo
2165 AC: Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such
are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations, to be exercised by
and through their respective municipal government in conformity with law.
It shall be competent for them to sue and be sued, to contract and be
contracted with
The AC does not specify the kind of property that a municipality can
acquire.
343 Civil Code: Divides the property of provinces and towns into
those for public use and patrimonial property. Provincial roads and footpath, squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, drives and public
improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns, are
property for public use.
All other property possessed by said MCs is patrimonial and shall be
subject to the provisions of the Civil Code.
It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a
municipality, needed for governmental purposes, may not be attached and
sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality. The reason for
this is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is
devoted.
The necessity for government service justifies that the property of
public use of the municipality be exempt from execution.
Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals
The funds deposited in the second PNB account are public funds and
the settled rule is that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statue.
municipal licenses and market fees are provided for and imposed by the law,
they are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of municipal corporations. In fact, the
real estate taxes collected by a municipality do not all go to it.
In conclusion, we hold that the fishery lots numbering about forty in
the municipality of Paoay, mentioned at the beginning of this decision are
not subject to execution. However, the amount of P1,712.01 in the municipal
treasury of Paoay representing the rental paid by Demetrio Tabije on fishery
lots let out by the municipality of Paoay is a proper subject of levy, and the
attachment made thereon by the Sheriff is valid.