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LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Municipal Corporation- A body politic and corporate constituted by the
incorporation of the inhabitants for the purpose of local government thereof.
Established by law partly as an agency of the state to assist in the civil
government of the country but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or
internal affairs of the city, town, or district which is incorporated.
Elements:
1. Legal corporation or incorporation;
2. A corporate name by which the artificial personality is known and in
which all corporate acts are done;
3. Inhabitants constituting the population;
4. Territory within which local civil government/ corporate functions are
exercised.
Nature/ status
1. Subordinate branch of the government of the state;
2. Exercises delegated branches of government
Municipal Corporation Proper- Refers to incorporated cities, towns, or
villages invested with the power of local legislation;
Quasi-Municipal Corporation- Quasi-corporation operates directly as
an agency of the state to help in the administration of public functions.
Tests:
1. Voluntary/ involuntary nature of the corporation
2. Existence/ nonexistence of a charter
3. Whether the purpose of the corporation is solely as a governmental
agency or one for self-government
Purposes of Municipal Corporations:
1. Serve as an agency/ instrument of the state in carrying on the
functions of government which the state cannot conveniently exercise.
2. Act as an agency of the inhabitants of the community in the regulation
of municipal franchises and public utilities promotion, management,
of local affairs, maintenance of water system, ferries, wharves, etc.

Municipal Corporation- Applies to incorporated villages, towns and cities;


with power of local administration.
Public Corporation- Broader term, established for purposes connected with
the administration of civil/ local government
Sec. 15. Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code
is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in
conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory.
Dual Nature of Municipal Corporations
1. Public/ Governmental- Acts as an agent of the State for the
government of the territory and the people within the municipal limits.
Exercises a part of the sovereignty of the state by delegation.
2. Private aspect- Acts in a similar category as a business corporation,
doing functions not strictly governmental or political. Stands for the
community in the administration of local affairs, beyond the sphere of
the public purposes for which its government powers are conferred.
Quasi- Municipal Corporations
Public corporations created as agencies of the state for a narrow/ limited
purpose. Not possessed of powers/ liabilities of self-governing corporations.
Generally relate to matters of state as distinguished from municipal
concerns.
Vilas v City of Manila
A municipal corporation has two powers: Governmental and Private.
Municipal laws that regulate private and domestic rights continue in force
until abrogated/ changed by the new ruler. Only laws of a political character
are totally abrogated/ changed by the new ruler. The property rights
relinquished by Spain are limited to those which belong to the public
domain. It did not affect property which belonged to the City of Manila as a
municipal corporation. Absent any express legislative declaration, there is no
reason to suppose that reincorporation intended to permit an escape from the
obligations of the old city.

Lidasan v COMELEC
No bill may be enacted into law should include more than one subject.
Congress must refrain from conglomeration of different subjects. The title of
a bill must be couched in such a language sufficient to notify the public of
the import of the single subject. A change in the boundaries of 2 provinces
may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality.
The principle that only the unconstitutional portion of a statute should
be invalidated and the constitutional part must remain does not apply here.
The explanatory note of the bill from which this statute originated expressed
that the envisioned municipality would be self-sufficient. This of course
includes the 21 barangays, and not the 9 barangays that would be left if the
valid portion would be allowed to continue. Factors affecting the
independence of a municipality include population, territory, and income.
Constitution, Article X
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Sec. 3 The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, elections, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers, and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of said local units.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan and political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and
shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The
jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be
limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters

of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such


prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials.
Tan v COMELEC
Two political units would be affected in case of a division of a
provincethe parent and the proposed province. The Constitution
commands that affected units be considered in a plebiscite. The Court
noted that the case of Paredes v Executive Secretary, which involved the
creation of a new municipality where the parent unit was not involved, could
not be considered as a precedent. That case involved a barangay while this
case involves a province. Almost half of the sugar plantations would be
dismembered form the parent province and some of its most important cities.
The SC also considered the new province as lacking in the territory
requirement since the land mass of the new territory was only 2,856 square
kilometers. The Court rejected the suggestion of the Solicitor General that
even the area of the EEZ should be considered in determining the territorial
requirement.
San Juan v Civil Service Commission
The phrase upon recommendation of the local chief executive
concerned must be given a mandatory application pursuant to the State
policy of local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one
in favor of centralized power in Malacaang, and the other beneficial to
local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. The
contention of the CSC that the recommendatory power of the governor is
merely directory is wrong. The Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states
that the DBM has the right to fill the vacancies if none of the nominees
meets the requirements is baseless.
Pimentel v Aguirre
The request for a reduction in expenditures is legal. The
withholding of the IRA is illegal.
Decentralization involves the devolution of national administration,
not power, to LGUs. The decentralization of power involves the abdication
of political power in favor of LGUs declared to be autonomous. The policy
setting in our country still lies with the president and with congress. The

LGUs, however, still have fiscal autonomy. They have the power to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their share in the national tax.
The withholding is equivalent to a holdback, no matter how temporary. The
wordings of the law is clear that it shall be automatically released. The
formulation/ implementation is subject to consultation with the appropriate
public agencies, private sectors, and LGUs.
Before the President can interfere with fiscal matters of LGUs, the
following must be present:
1. Unmanaged public sector deficit;
2. Consultation with presiding officers of the Senate and the House, and
the various local leagues;
3. Recommendation of the secretaries of the DOF, DILG, and DBM;
4. Must not be lower than 30% of the collection of the national IR taxes
of 3rd fiscal year preceding the current one.
CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Nature
1. Essentially legislative
2. Exclusive/ unlimited
3. Cant be delegated
Essential Requisites
1. Territory- contiguous
2. Population
3. Charter- invests people with power of local government
By prescription- Existence presumed if exercised powers claimed by a
community, with knowledge and acquiescence of legislature, without
interruption.
De Facto Municipal Corporations
Corporation that exists in fact although not in point of law as there is a
certain defect in some essential feature of its organization.
1. Valid law authorizing incorporation;
2. Attempt in good faith to organize it;
3. Colorable compliance with the law;
4. Assumption of corporate powers.

Attack against validity- May not be attacked collaterally, it may be


challenged by state in a direct quo warranto proceeding. However, if it is an
absolute nullity, it is subject to collateral attack. De Jure corporations cannot
be attacked.
Alvarez v Guingona (1996)
The acquisition of resources necessary to discharge its powers and
effectively carry out its functions is effected through the vesting in every
LGU of:
1. The right to create and broaden its own source of revenue;
2. The right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share
being in the form of Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs); and
3. the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its
territorial boundaries.
- The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and National wealth utilization
proceeds accrue to the general fund of the LGU and are used to finance its
operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for
in the LGC and its implementing rules and regulations.
Income- all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross
accretions of funds of the LGU.
- DOF certified that the municipality had an average annual income of
at least 20M for the last 2 consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices.
Sec. 450 (c) of the LGC provides that the average annual income shall
include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income. IRAs are a regular, recurring item of
income.
Cawaling, Jr. v COMELEC
- The phrase A municipality or a cluster is not a criterion but just
one of the modes by which a city may be created. Sec. 10 Art. X of
the Constitution allows the merger of LGUs to create a province, city,
municipality, or barangay in accordance with LGC standards.

- The creation of an entirely new LGU through a division or a merger


of existing LGUs is recognized under the Constitution so long as it
complies with the standards set by the LGC.
- In response to Cawalings argument that there is no compelling
reason merge the two municipalities, the Court stated that it could
not pass upon the wisdom of RA 8806;
- The word approval in Sec. 54 of RA 8806, which should be read
together with Sec. 65 thereof, could only mean effectivity as used
and contemplated in Sec. 10 of the Code.
- The law was first published in 25 Aug 2000 issue of TODAY. The
publication of the law was completed on 1 Sept 2000, which should
be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within
which to conduct the plebiscite.
- COMELEC: Since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a
law, it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect.
- As to the failure of the COMELEC to conduct an intensive info
campaign, the Court said that no proof was presented by the petitioner
to substantiate his claim. There is the presumption that COMELEC
regularly performed its duty under the law in conducting the
plebiscite.
Pelaez v Auditor General
- Where the power to fix such common boundary, in order to fix such
common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative
natureinvolving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry
into effect the law creating said municipalities, the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
- Although Congress may delegate to another branch the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it
is essential that the law be:
o Complete in itselfset forth the policy to be executed
o Fix a standardthe limits of which are sufficiently determinate
or determinable
- Sec. 68 of the RAC does not meet these requirements of a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law.
- The creation of municipalities is not an administrative function, but
one eminently legislative in character.

- The power of control of the President over executive departments,


bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to assume
directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of
discretion by its officials. Such control does not include the authority
either to abolish one executive department or bureau or to create a
new one.
- The alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations
would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even
greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices.
Municipality of Candijay, Bohol v CA (1995)
The petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical
personality of the respondent on 19 January 1984 (35 yrs. after its creation in
1949) during the proceedings in this case. After presentation of evidence,
Candijay asked the trial court to bar the respondent from presenting evidence
on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Candijay argued that EO
265 issued by Pres. Quirino is null and void ab initio since Sec. 68 of the
RAC constituted an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.
The Municipality of Alicia was created by EO 265, or ten years ahead
of the Municipality of San Andres, and had been in existence for 16 years
when Pelaez was promulgated. Various governmental acts through the years
all indicate the States recognition and acknowledgement of its existence.
Alicia must benefit from the effects of Sec. 422 (d) of the LGC and should
be considered a regular, de jure municipality.
According to Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC, municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and
aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with, are validly
accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against
impairment of vested rights.

Municipality of Jimenez v Baz


Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly
recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer
be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC
laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of a municipal
corporation:
1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not
been challenged;
2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity
of the EO creating the municipality; and
3. the fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5th class
municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and
considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House.
In this case, the following factors are present:
1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was
decided in 1965 and yet the validity of EO 258 creating it had
never been questioned. It was only 40 years later that its existence
was questioned.
2. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacabans corporate
existence. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc.
Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities. Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the
2nd District of Misamis Occidental.
Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987
Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It
applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the
Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art.
XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal
corporations created before, such as Sinacaban.

ALTERATION
AND
CORPORATIONS

DISSOLUTION

OF

MUNICIPAL

Power to alter/ dissolve:


1. Fixing, altering, changing boundaries of municipal corporations
2. Dividing a municipal corporation- 2 or 1 separate municipality
3. Merging or consolidating 2 or more municipalities into 1.
4. Annexing one municipality to another.
5. Repealing its charter.
Effects of annexation/ consolidation:
1. On the legal existence of territory annexedDissolves annexed
territory, under its jurisdiction;
2. Laws/ ordinances of annexed corporation subject to all laws/
ordinances by which annexing corporation is governed;
3. Right of officers/ employees of annexed consolidated territory to
continue to hold their office. Terminate official relation with offices.
4. Title to propertyAcquire title to property without compensation.
But, if it forms part of municipality, provide for payment.
5. Debt/ obligationsAssumed.
Effects of division of municipal corporation:
1. Legal existence of original corporation extinguishes corporate
existence of original municipality.
2. Property/ powers/ rights: Divided- each municipality acquires title to
the properties, powers, rights, and obligations falling within its
territorial limits.
PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENTS
Padilla v COMELEC
The deletion of the phrase unit or in Sec. 10 Art. XI of the 1973
Constitution has not affected the ruling of the SC in Tan v COMELEC.
During the 1986 Con Com:
Mr. Davide: I precisely asked for the deletion of the words
unit or because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all
the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay, the municipality
itself must participate in the plebiscite because it is affected. It would
mean a loss of a territory.

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted in the political units directly affected, it means that residents of
the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation
have a right to vote. The phrase political units directly affected
contemplates the plurality of political units which would participate in the
exercise.
Miranda v Aguirre (1999)
The wording of the constitution has a common denominator: the
material change in the political and economic rights of the LGU directly
affected. The consent of the people is required to serve as a checking
mechanism to any exercise of legislative power. The changes are substantial.
The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the
provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council will
have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be
collected by the city will have to be shared with the province. There would
be a reduction in their IRA.
When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of
its people thru a plebiscite called for that purpose. There is no reason why
the same should not be done when RA 8528 downgrades the status of their
city. The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward so long
as they result in a material change in the LGU directly affected.
Tobias v Abalos
The creation of a separate congressional district is but a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. The
present limit of 250 is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that
the House shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise provided by law. It means that the present composition of
Congress may be increased if Congress itself so mandates.
The contention that the people of San Juan should have been parties to
the plebiscite is wrong since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite
was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter
of separate district representation was only ancillary to it.

GENERAL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS


Technology Developers v CA (1991)
The matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its actions
shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it can be shown that it acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
No mayors permit was secured. Although the matter of determining
whether there is pollution that requires control/ prohibition is addressed to
the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, it must be recognized
that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants
from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the
application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same
unless appropriate measures are taken to control/ avoid injury to the health
of the residents. The action of the mayor was in response to complaints
made by the residents of the area. The closure was made after due
investigation. The permit the petitioner obtained had already expired and it
did not exert any effort to extend its permit.
Concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to
the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting
the health of the people from the deleterious effects of environmental
pollution.
Chua Huat v CA (1991)
Petitioners failed to show the elements needed for certiorari to
prosper. The power to condemn buildings in Manila falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the bldg.
official (Sec. 206, PD 1096).
Sec. 275 and 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of Manila
provide:
275. Deterioration and Defects.All buildings or parts of buildings
which show defects in any essential parts shall be repaired and put in safe
condition at once, or if the deterioration be greater than fifty per centum of
the value of the bldg., as estimated by the city engineer, they shall be
removed.
276. Condemnation Proceedings.Whenever in the judgment of the
City Engineer any bldg. has been damaged by any cause to such an extent as
to be dangerous for use, he may condemn the same. If the owner of the bldg.

is unwilling to abide by the condemnation order, he may formally object


within 7 days. The mayor shall hear the owner and his experts and decide the
case on the evidence presented. If the mayor confirms the city engineers
action, the owner must remove the bldg. w/in 15 days from date of
notification. If the owner does not comply, the bldg. shall be removed at his
expense and the city shall recover from him.
Sec. 215 of PD 1096 (Natl Bldg. Code) also states that when any
bldg. is found dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its
repair, vacation, or demolition, depending on the degree of danger to life,
health or safety. There is no grave abuse of discretion in this case. The
orders were made after thorough ocular inspections which showed that the
bldg. had defects of up to 80%. The act of the Mayor in approving the
condemnation was also done in accordance with law. The petitioners
submitted their protest 3 mos. after notice, contrary to the 7-day rule
prescribed by the city ordinance. Petitioners also failed to exhaust
administrative remedies since PD 1096 provided for an appeal to the
Secretary of the Ministry of Public Works and a request for a reinspection of
the bldg., something the petitioners failed to do.
Binay v Domingo (1991)
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations.
Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a
valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of
the inherent powers of the State.
A valid delegation may arise from express delegation, or be inferred
from the mere fact of the creation of the corporation, and as a general rule,
municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and
purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the
powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
corporations have been construed as empowering them to do things essential
to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people.
The inferred powers are as much delegated powers as are those
conferred in express terms.
Police power- power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It
is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past
conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and is


commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs
of the people in their health, safety, and convenience as consistently as may
be with private rights. It extends to all the public needs.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally
benefits a limited number of persons. The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an
accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
No violation of equal protection clause in classifying paupers. They
may be reasonably classified.
Tatel v Municipality of Virac (1992)
Municipal Corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion
and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with
police powers to carry out the objects of their creation. Its authority
emanates from the general welfare clause of the Admin Code.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must be within the corporate powers of
the municipality to enact. Ordinances are required to be:
1. In accord with the Constitution or any statute;
2. not be unfair or oppressive;
3. not be impartial or discriminatory;
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. must be general and consistent with public policy, and
6. must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 13 meets these criteria. The ordinance regulates the
construction of warehouses located at a distance of 200 meters from a block
of houses wherein inflammable materials are stored and not the construction
of a warehouse per se. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in
case of fire. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody
to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable
products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and
properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is
concerned, there can be no better policy that what has been conceived by the
municipal government.
Judge Tamin v CA (1992)
The legality of the occupation by the private respondents in this case
is still to be resolved in the cadastral proceedings. If Medina is declared the

owner of the land, then he is entitled to just compensation for the precipitate
demolition of their buildings. The issuance of a writ of possession and writ
of demolition by the petitioner judge in the ejectment proceedings was
premature. What the petitioner should have done was to stop the proceedings
in this case and wait for the final outcome of the cadastral proceedings.
However, the demolition of the buildings is now fait accompli.
The complaint alleges factual circumstances of a complaint for
abatement of a public nuisance. A public plaza is outside the commerce of
man and constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the municipality.
Patalinhug v CA (1994)
The question of whether Mr. Tepoots bldg. is residential or not is a
factual determination which appellate courts should not disturb. The
testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoots bldg. was
used for a dual purpose: dwelling and for business. While its commercial
aspect has been established by the presence of machineries and laundry
equipment, its use as a residence was not fully substantiated.
The findings of the trial court is supported by the fact that the
Sanggunian declared the area as commercial or C-2. Once a local govt has
reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes
must prevail. While the commercial character of the vicinity was declared
through ordinance, the respondents have failed to substantiate their
arguments that Cabaguio Avenue was still a residential zone. The
declaration of an area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an
exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of
the people in a locality. Persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
restraints and burdens to secure the general welfare of the state.
Tano v Socrates (1997)
Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare
provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to
the LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality
of life for the people of the community.
The LGC grants municipalities the power to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees, or charges for their use.
The sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of
the LGU and its inhabitants.

The centerpiece of the LGC is decentralization. Indispensable to this


is devolution. One of these powers is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. The term
municipal waters includes not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within
the municipality, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn
perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary
lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line
parallel with the general coastline and 15 km from it (Sec. 131 [r] LGC).
Two principal objectives of the Ordinances:
1. Establish a closed season for the species of fish covered therein for
5 years (This falls within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws
in municipal waters);
2. Protect the coral in the marine waters of the city and the province
from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities (this falls
within the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate
there to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which harm the environment.
Cabrera v CA (1991)
The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or
convey it for other purposes is derived from RA 5185 in relation to Section
2246 of the Admin. Code. RA 5185, Sec. 11 (II) (a): A municipal council
may close any municipal road, street, alley, park, etc. Property thus
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose
for which said other property belonging to the municipality might be
lawfully used or conveyed. While the cases on this subject dealt with city
councils and not provincial boards, there is no reason for not applying the
doctrine announced therein with respect to the closure of provincial roads.
This authority is inferable from the grant by congress of the funds to the
province for the construction of provincial roads.
Dacanay v Asistio (1992)
A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce
of man. It may not be the subject of lease or other contract. As the stall
holders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of
the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing

portions of the streets to them. Such leases are null and void for being
contrary to law.
The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater
number in the community.
Macasiano v Diokno (1992)
The areas are local roads used for public service and are considered
public properties of the municipality.
These properties are under the absolute control of Congress.
Local governments have no authority whatsoever to control the use of
public properties unless specific authority is given by Congress.
The authority given by the LGC to close roads should be read and
interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law.
424 Civil Code: Properties of public dominion devoted to public use
and made available to the public in general is outside the commerce of man
and cannot be disposed of or leased by the LGU to private persons.
Closure: comply with due process; must be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when
circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for
public use or public service. Once withdrawn from public use, it then
becomes patrimonial property.
Only then can the LGU use or convey it for any purpose for which other
property belonging to the LGU might be lawfully conveyed.
The municipality also failed to comply with the conditions imposed
by the MMA. The exercise of the powers of LGUs should be subservient to
paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the
community.
MMDA v Bel Air Village Assn., Inc. (2000)
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting or policies, installation of a system and
administration. Nothing in RA 7924 grants it police power. Even the Metro
Manila Council has not been given any legislative power. Unlike the
legislative bodies of LGUs, nothing in RA 7924 empowers the MMDA to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general
welfare.

MMDA is not an LGU or a public corp. endowed with legislative power. It


is not even a special metropolitan political subdivision since it requires the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in the
Sangalang case. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA,
an examination of PD 824 shows that the latter possessed greater powers
which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. MMDA Chair: appointed
by the president. LGUs: President only exercises supervisory authority;
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune St., its proposed
opening by MMDA is therefore illegal.
City of Manila v Arellano College (1950)
Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be applied in
determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far in the direction
of a liberal construction as to hold that public use is synonymous with public
benefit, public utility, or public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of
the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially
where the interests involved are of considerable magnitude.
The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of
congested areas and unsanitary dwellings diminishes the potentialities of
epidemics, crime and waste, prevents the spread of crime and diseases to
unaffected areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding
communities, and promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general.
"In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity,
and land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or city,
bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated,
the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic
reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public
interest and public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish
economic slavery, feudalistic practices, endless conflicts between landlords
and tenants, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and
contentment and public peace and order.
Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be
expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a
reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit
to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning
party and property owner consistent with such benefit. But measured even
by this standard, and forgetting for a moment the private character of the

intended use, necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. The land
in question has cost the owner P140,000.
Viewed from another angle, the case at bar is weaker for the
condemnor. In the first place, the land that is the subject of the present
expropriation is only one-third of the land sought to be taken in the Guido
case, and about two-thirds of that involved in the Borja condemnation
proceeding. In the second place, the Arellano Colleges' land is situated in a
highly commercial section of the city and is occupied by persons who are
not bona fide tenants. Lastly, this land was bought by the defendant for a
university site to take the place of rented buildings that are unsuitable for
schools of higher learning.
While a handful of people stand to profit by the expropriation, the
development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students
would be sacrificed. Any good that would accrue to the public from
providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in comparison
with the preparation of young men and young women for useful citizenship
and for service to the government and the community, a task which the
government alone is not in a position to undertake.
City of Manila v Chinese Community of Manila (1920)
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case
there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be
public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or
that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is
being exercised in accordance with law
When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private
property and an objection is made thereto by the owner, the courts have
ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof upon
an-issue properly presented, concerning the question whether or not the
purpose of the appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The right of
expropriation is not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it
can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. A
municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot expropriate public property.

The land to be expropriated must be private, and the purpose of the


expropriation must be public. If the court. upon trial, finds that neither of
said condition exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to expropriate
does not exist. If the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public
improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken
for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection
by the courts.
It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority should
grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some
specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to
inquire into the purpose of that legislation.
However, if the Legislature should grant general authority to a
municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, the
courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above
quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented,
concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose
was, in fact, public.
There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a
municipality is given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain and a
decision by the municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise of
that right in a particular case.
The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the
necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of a state, is an unreasonable
exercise of the right of eminent domain
The exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority
must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with
greater tenacity and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more
sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature
interferes with that right, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
The ascertainment of the necessity must precede, and not follow, the
taking of the property. The general power to exercise the right of eminent
domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case.
Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part
of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority.
The city of Manila is not authorized to expropriate public property.
Since the city of Manila is only permitted to condemn private property for
public use and since the Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public

cemetery already devoted to a public use, the city of Manila cannot condemn
a portion of the cemetery for a public street.
Province of Camarines Sur v CA (1993)
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader
interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of
eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned
property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges,
public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional
requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means
public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the
general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort
complex for tourists or housing project
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development
center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
Province of Camarines Sur. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also
satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the
legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the
legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the
exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may
be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the
limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed,
either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the
construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying
for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian
Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the
land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that
shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated
shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The
courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a
particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad
their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is
specially mentioned as subject thereto.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of
the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are
unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential
Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value
given to the condemned property either by the owners or the assessor,
whichever was lower.
Municipality of Paraaque v VM Realty Corp. (1998)
The power of eminent domain is lodged in Congress. An LGU may
exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through
the law conferring the power or in other legislations. (See Sec. 19 of RA
7160 which provides that an LGU through its chief executive may exercise
the power of eminent domain through an ordinance)
Requisites for the exercise of the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the
local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings;
2. Exercised for public use, purpose, or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless;
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec. 9 Art.
III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws;
4. Valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated but that it was rejected.
Ordinance- A law. It has a general and permanent character.
Resolution- Merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking
body on a specific matter. Temporary.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise the power through a
resolution, it would have said so.
Article 36, Rule VU of the IRR which requires only a resolution could not
prevail over the law.
Complaint does not state a cause of actionIn a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted before the court is the sufficiency of the allegations in

the complaint itself. WON those allegations are true is beside the point, for
their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion.
Res judicata is present in this case since VM Realty is a successor in
interest of Limpan Investment Corp. The principle of res judicata cannot bar
the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. This right
should be absolute and unfettered even by prior judgment or res judicata.
The ruling in this case that Paranaque could not exercise eminent domain
through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar
proceedings once the legal requirements are complied with.
City of Cebu v Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (2002)
In their Comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did
not err in affirming the decision of the trial court because (1) the trial court
decided the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties that just
compensation shall be fixed by commissioners appointed by the court; (2)
petitioner did not interpose any serious objection to the commissioners'
report of 12 August 1996 fixing the just compensation of the 1,624-square
meter lot at P20,826,339.50; hence, it was estopped from attacking the report
on which the decision was based; and (3) the determined just compensation
fixed is even lower than the actual value of the property at the time of the
actual taking in 1994.
Eminent domain is the Government's right to appropriate, in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose. However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just
compensation as consideration therefor.
In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for
the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of
the time of actual taking.
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just
compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We
explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date
of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this
Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at
the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and
voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the

commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract


between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be
complied with in good faith.
Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did
not interpose a serious objection. It is therefore too late for petitioner to
question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable
estoppel. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally
or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to
exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will
be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation
recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement
now and assail correctness of the commissioner's assessment.
Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that
just compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which
is a substantive law.
Hagonoy Market Vendors Assn v Municipality of Hagonoy Bulacan
The appeal with the Secretary of Justice is already time-barred. The
applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code which
provides: That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30)
days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render
a decision within sixty (60) days from the receipt of the appeal: Provided,
however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment of the tax, fee or charge
levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of
the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of
Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings.
An appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to
the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the
ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed
ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance
No. 28 took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in
December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance in
1996.

The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory. Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the
municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals. Being
its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount
importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of
basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and
collections.
Petitioner contends that its period to appeal should be counted not
from the time the ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its
members were personally given copies of the approved ordinance in
November 1997. It insists that it was unaware of the approval and effectivity
of the subject ordinance in 1996 on two (2) grounds: first, no public hearing
was conducted prior to the passage of the ordinance and, second, the
approved ordinance was not posted. In petitioner's two (2) communications
with the Secretary of Justice, it enumerated the various objections raised by
its members before the passage of the ordinance in several meetings called
by the Sanggunian for the purpose. There is no evidence to prove petitioner's
negative allegation that the subject ordinance was not posted as required by
law. In contrast, the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan, presented evidence which clearly shows that the
procedure for the enactment of the assailed ordinance was complied with.
Estanislao v. Costales (1991)
The authority of the City is limited to the imposition of a percentage
tax on the gross sales or receipts of said product which, being non-essential,
shall be at the rate of not exceeding 2% of the gross sales or receipts of the
soft drinks for the preceding calendar year. The tax imposed is based on the
output or production and not on the gross sales or receipts as authorized by
the Local Tax Code.
According to Sec. 19 and Sec. 23 of the LTC: A city may impose, in
lieu of the graduated fixed tax prescribed under Sec. 19, a percentage tax on
the gross sales for the preceding calendar year of non-essential commodities
at the rate of not exceeding two percent and on the gross sales of essential
commodities at the rate of not exceeding one percent.
Pepsi Cola v. Tanauan: Inapplicable here since it involved a different
law, the Local Autonomy Act.
The Ordinance did not become valid by the inaction of the Finance
Minister. It only remains in effect if the minister did not comply with what is
due him.

Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia, Rizal


Admin regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.
The framers of PD 426 intended to terminate the effectivity of the provincial
circulars.
The exercise of LGUs of the power to tax is ordained in the present
Constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition would
amount to restricting their power to tax by mere admin issuances.
Mayor may not waive the payment of the mayors permit and sanitary
inspection fees.
Local tax code does not provide for prescriptive period for collection
of local taxes. Art. 1143 of the Civil Code governs. Action for obligation
created by law prescribes within ten years from time right of action accrues.
Floro Cement Corporation v. Gorospe (1991)
Municipalitys power to levy taxes on manufacturers and importers is
provided in Art. 2, Sec. 19 of PD 231: Municipality may impose a tax on
business except those for which fixed taxes are provided for in this Code.
Cement is not a mineral product but rather a manufactured product. It
is the result of a definite processcrushing of minerals, grinding, mixing,
etc. Its minerals had already undergone a chemical change before cement
reaches its saleable form.
The power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty. Its
relinquishment is never presumed. The exemptions mentioned in Sec. 52 of
PD 463 only refers to machineries, equipment, tools, for production, etc., as
provided in Sec. 53 of the same decree. The manufacture and export of
cement do not fall under it since it is not a mineral product.
Tuzon and Mapagu v. Court of Appeals (1992)
The Court did not concern itself with the validity of the Resolution
since the issue was not raised in the petition as an assigned error of the CA.
The measures have been sustained in the challenged decision, from which
the respondent has not appealed. The implementing agency made the
donation obligatory.
If it is to be considered as a tax ordinance, it must be shown to have
been enacted in accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. It
would include the holding of a public hearing on the measure, its subsequent

approval by the Secretary of Finance, in addition to the requisites for


publication of ordinances in general.
Drilon v. Lim (1994)
Sec. 187 authorizes the Secretary to review only the constitutionality
or legality of the tax ordinances and to revoke them if it does not pass the set
standards. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not
also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did not set aside the
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what
the Code should be. He did not pronounce it as unwise or unreasonable. All
he said is that it is illegal.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, he may, in his discretion , order that the act be undone or
redone by his subordinate or even decide to do it himself.
As regards the procedural requirements, they have all been observed
as correctly found by the trial court. Notices of the public hearings were sent
to the interested parties, the minutes are there, and they were published. The
only exceptions are the posting of the ordinances as approved but this
omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three
successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due
process. Although the text was not translated and disseminated, this
requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public
investment programs and not to tax ordinances.
Benguet Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals (1992)
(1) The provisions of Sec. 52 of the Mineral Resources Development
Decree of 1974 (PD 463) and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code are mere
limitations on the taxing power of LGUs; they are not pertinent to the issue
before the SC. They cannot affect the imposition of the real property tax by
the national government.
Although LGUs are charged with fixing the rates of real property tax,
it does not follow that they also have the authority to determine WON they
can impose the tax.
It is the national government that levies real property tax. When LGUs
are required to fix the rates, they are merely constituted as agents of the
national government in the enforcement of the real property tax code. The

delegation of taxing power is not even involved since the tax has already
been imposed and the LGUs are just mandated to enforce it.
(2) If the SC were to sanction the interpretation of Benguet, then
necessarily all real properties exempt by any law would be covered, and
there would be no need for congress to specify Real Property Tax Code, as
amended instead of stating clearly realty tax exemption laws. The intention
is to limit the application of the exception clause only to those given by
the Real Property Tax Code.
National Development Corporation v. Cebu City (1992)
To come under the exemption in Article 3, it is important to establish
that the property is owned by the government or by its unincorporated
agency, and once government ownership is determined, the nature of the use
of the property, whether for proprietary or government purposes, becomes
immaterial.
As regards the warehouse constructed, a different rule should apply
since the exemption of public property from taxation does not extend to
improvements on the public lands made by pre-emptioners, homesteaders
and other claimants, or occupants, at their own expense, and these are
taxable by the state. Consequently, the warehouse constructed on the
reserved land by NWC, indeed, should properly be assessed real estate tax as
such improvement does not appear to belong to the Republic. Since the
reservation is exempt from realty tax, the erroneous tax payments collected
by Cebu should be refunded to NDC.
Province of Tarlac v. Judge Alcantara (1992)
The SC did not agree with the lower court that the phrase in lieu of
all taxes and assessments of whatever nature in the second paragraph of
Sec. 1 of PD 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying real
property taxes. Said proviso is modified and delimited by the phrase on
earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale
which specifies the kinds of taxes and assessments which shall not be
collected in view of the imposition of the franchise tax. Said enumerated
items have no relation to, and are entirely different from, real properties
subject to tax.
There is also no merit in the respondents contention that the real
properties being taxed, the machinery for the generation and distribution of
electric power, the bldg. housing said machinery, and the land on which said

bldg. is constructed, are necessary for the operation of its business of


generation, distribution and sale of electric current and should be exempt
from taxation. The lower court erred in exempting the private respondents
from paying real property tax on its properties enumerated in the complaint.
Casio v. Court of Appeals (1991)
Resolution No. 378 failed to comply with the votes needed for its
validity. In the enactment of ordinances in general, the application of the
LGC is undisputed. However, under Sec. 6.44 of the ordinance, it is specific
regarding amendments. When there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense
would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must
be operative, and the general statement must be taken to affect only such
cases within its language as are not within the provisions of the particular
enactment. Block 125 remains classified as a residential area.
No registration certificate was issued by the PGC. It was a condition
precedent to the granting of a mayors permit. PGC did not grant such
certificate because the cockpit was not constructed within the appropriate
areas of the city as prescribed in its zoning laws.
Gamboa, Jr. v. Aguirre, Jr.
Sections 49(a) and 466(a)(1) of RA 7160 provide that the Vice
Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to that, he
becomes the Governor and assumes the higher office for the unexpired term
of his predecessor, in case of permanent vacancy therein. In case of a
temporary vacancy, he shall automatically exercise the powers and perform
the duties and functions of the Governor. It is true that in this case, the Vice
Governor only acts and does not become the governor.
A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually
a quasi-Governor. This means, that for the purposes of exercising his
legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the
SP for the time being. Unlike the old Code where the Governor is not only
the provincial Chief Executive but also the presiding officer of the local
executive body, the new Code delineated the union of the executivelegislative powers in the provincial, city and municipal levels except in the
Barangay. The Governor is no longer a member of the SP. Not being
included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded. Being the
Acting Governor, the Vice Governor cannot continue to simultaneously

exercise the duties of the latter office since the nature of the duties of the
provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.
Garcia v. COMELEC
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions
as appropriate subject of a local initiative. The constitutional command to
include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was
implemented by Congress when it enacted RA 6735. Thus, section 3(a)
includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislation. When
Congress enacted RA 6735, it intended resolutions to be the proper subjects
of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent. The LGC of 1991 dealt
with local initiative and did not change or limit its scope.
Sec. 120, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book I merely defines the concept of
local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It
does not, however, deal with subjects that can be taken up in a local
initiative. It cannot be argued that the subject matter of the resolution merely
temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of
conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong in SSEZ has far reaching
implications. The petitioners were also denied their right to due process.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC
The process started by private respondents was an initiative but
COMELEC made preparations for a referendum only. Not once was the
term initiative used in the resolution.
Congress differentiated the two:
1. Initiative- power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election
called for the purpose.
2. Indirect initiative- Exercise of initiative by the people through a
proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
3. Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a
legislation through an election called for that purpose.
Initiative is resorted to by the people directly either because the lawmaking
body fails or refuses to enact a law, ordinance, resolution, or act that they
desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing.

Under Sec. 13 of RA 6735: local legislative body is given the opportunity to


enact the proposal. If it refuses to do so within 30 days from its presentation,
the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representatives
may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local
legislative body concerned. Should the proponents collect the required
number within the period granted by the statute, the COMELEC shall state a
date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the
registered voters in the LGU.
While initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is
begun and consented to by the lawmaking body. The process and voting in
an initiative are more complex than in a referendum where the voters simply
write either yes or no in a ballot. There is a need for the COMELEC to
supervise an initiative more closely especially if the proposal is lengthy and
complicated. On the other issue, the Municipal Resolution still in the
proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law.
Ortiz v. Posadas
The ayes and noes are taken upon (1) the passage of all ordinances,
(2) all propositions to create any liability against the municipality, and (3)
any other proposition, upon the request of any member. The same idea is
carried into the next sentence. For the passage of (1) any ordinance or (2)
any proposition creating indebtedness, the affirmative vote of a majority of
all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary. Other measures
prevail upon the majority vote of the members present.
Sec. 2224 of the Administrative Code, requiring in mandatory
language the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the
municipal council for the passage of any ordinance, whether or not an
ordinance creating an indebtedness, an ordinance passed by less than that
majority is invalid.
The basic idea of the legislative body is to make impossible the
approval of ordinances or of propositions creating indebtedness by minority
votes of municipal councils at meetings hastily called.
Perez v. De la Cruz
There is nothing in RA 305 (Charter of Naga City) that provides that
the vice mayor is a member of the municipal board. The position of vice
mayor was not even provided for, as the city treasurer was designated as the
acting mayor in case of the absence of the mayor.

It is true that RA 2259 created the post of vice mayor, but it did not
provide that he shall be considered a member of the city council or
municipal board.
Quiem v. Seria case is not at point, since in that case, by express
legal mandate, the vice mayor of CDO city was made a member of the
board.
In the absence of any statutory authority constituting the vice mayor
as a member of the municipal board, in addition to being the presiding
officer thereof, we cannot read into the law something which is not there.
The rules of procedure of the municipal board of Naga City exclude
the chairman from voting except in case of a tie vote.
The mere fact that the vice mayor was made the presiding officer
did not ipso jure make him a member thereof.
By explicit statutory command, courts are given authority to
determine the validity of municipal proceedings.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
Homeowners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of
Manila
The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially
police power. The exercise of police power is subject to a qualification,
those found in the Bill of Rights. It must be reasonable.
If the demands of the public welfare are brought about by a state of
emergency, the interference upon individual rights must be coextensive and
coterminous with the existence thereof.
Since emergencies are temporary, the regulations promulgated must
also be temporary.
A law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals, as a means to
tide over a critical condition, to be valid and legal, must be for a definite
period of time, the length of which must be reasonable, in relation to the
nature and duration of the crisis it seeks to overcome or surmount.
The powers of municipal corporations delegated thereto by the
National Government cannot escape the inherent limitations to which the
latteras the source of said powersis subject.

Morata v. Go
The conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by PD 1508
as a precondition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for
cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and
municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts
as well.
Section 6 of PD 1508 is clear: Conciliation is a precondition to the
filing of a complaint. The law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon.
The Lupon of each barangay has the authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of disputes except in some specified cases.
The law makes no distinction with respect to the classes of civil
disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level.
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the
intervention of the barangay leader and other respected leaders of the
barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between
members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and
cooperation, is avoided.
It is designed to discourage the indiscriminate filing of cases in court.
To say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively
cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of its objective.
If it was the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases
cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would have said so.
Circular No. 22 issued by C.J. Fernando: Implementation of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law: Judges were directed to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions, or proceedings in cases falling
within the authority of said Lupons.
Uy v. Contreras
The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by
PD 1508, but it is now under the LGC. PD 1508 was expressly repealed.
The revised katarungang pambarangay law has 3 new significant
features:
1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal cases to offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not
exceeding P5,000.00.
2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where
the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such

parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where
such workplace or institution is located.
3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses
during the pendency of the mediation. Paragraph (c) of Section 410
suffers from ambiguity when it states that the prescriptive periods
shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by
the lupon or pangkat secretary. What is referred to as receipt by the
complainant of the complaint is unclear. Accordingly, in Section 11 of
the Rules and Regulations issued by the SOJ, the phrase the
complaint or is not found, such that the resumption of the running of
the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the
complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file
action issued by the lupon. Such suspension shall not exceed 60 days.
The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any intentional
delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the prescriptive
period and then invoking such proximity as the reason for immediate
recourse to the courts.
Although PD 1508 has already been repealed, the jurisprudence built
thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of
an action in court remains applicable.
Since the slight physical injuries charged were allegedly inflicted on 17
April 1993, the prescriptive period would have expired 2 mos. after.
However, its running was tolled by the filing of the respondents complaints
with the lupon of Valenzuela on 23 April 1993, and automatically suspended
for a period of 60 days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation is reached, a
certification to file action is issued, the respondents would still have 56 days
within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense.
Wingarts v. Mejia
The judge is liable for incompetence and ignorance of the law for
taking cognizance of the criminal case despite the legal obstacles thereto.
Under Art. 408 (c), offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1
year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00 require prior barangay conciliation.
The crime of grave threats punishable under Art. 282 of the Revised Penal
Code falls within the purview of that section.

Had Mejia observed the mandate of the law, he could have remanded
the case to the lupon instead of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely
issuing the warrant of arrest against the accused.
Corpuz v. Court of Appeals
The MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases. The only
issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the
physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de
facto.
Since the petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with the
issue of ownership, Refugia applies:
The inferior court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and
possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the
nature of possession. However, it could not resolve the issue of ownership.
As regards the non-referral to the Lupon, the SC was not persuaded.
Dui v. CA: The failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that
there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure
constitutes a waiver of that defense.
The answer of Alvarado reveals that no reason or explanation was
given to support his allegation.
The proceeding in PD 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and
noncompliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court
had already acquired over the subject matter and the parties.
Bonifacio Law Office v. Judge Bellosillo
The records reveal that such Certification was improperly and
prematurely issued. It showed that no personal confrontation took place
before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. It was
reflected in the minutes submitted by the complainants.
The first hearing was dated 16 Feb 1999 and yet the CFA was issued
on 1 March 1996.
The barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to
conciliate between the parties and to settle the case.
Supreme Court Circular No. 14-93 provides:
In case mediation efforts have proven to be unsuccessful, there having been
no agreement to arbitrate, or where the respondent fails to appear at the
mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay, the Punong Barangay

shall not cause the issuance of the CFA but must constitute the Pangkat
Tagapamayapa before whom the conciliation proceedings should be held.
Mendova v. Judge Afable
An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial
remedy is available.
The complaint in this case did not bother to file a motion for
reconsideration of the judges decision. The instant administrative complaint
is premature. In this case, the records fail to show when the complainant
received the Barangay Certification to File Action. The undated certification
he submitted merely states that the case was set for hearing before the
barangay on several dates, but the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement.
When he filed on 4 May 1998, until the dismissal of the case on 3
November 1998, he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the BCFA.
He cannot fault Judge Afable for dismissing his case based on
prescription.
While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not be
considered ignorance of the law. It can only be an error in judgment.
Muez v. Ario
The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of
the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority
involves the following elements:
1. Offender is an officer of the executive branch;
2. he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or
decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
These elements were alleged in the information. What he issued was a
warrant of arrest. The defense that the former LGC allowed mayors to issue
an arrest warrant will not prosper. This provision has been repealed by the
1987 Constitution.
Ponsica v. Ignalaga: No longer does the mayor have at this time the
power to conduct PI, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the
LGC has been abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional
proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of
determining probable cause and issuing warrants of arrest or search warrants
may be exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in

the present Constitution of the phrase such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law found in the counterpart provision of the 1973
Constitution.
Greater Balanga Dev. Corp. v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan
The authority of the mayor to revoke a permit he issued is premised
on a violation by the grantee of any of the conditions for which the permit
had been granted.
The permit should not have been issued without the required
information given in the application form itself. Revoking the permit,
however, because of a false statement in the application form cannot be
justified under the quoted provision.
There must be proof of willful misrepresentation and deliberate intent
to make a false statement. Good faith is always presumed, and petitioner did
not make any false statement in the pertinent entry.
The application for 2 businesses in one permit is not a ground for
revocation. Their Code does not expressly require two permits for the
conduct of 2 or more businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be
paid for each business. The powers of municipal corporations must be
construed in strictissimi juris and any doubt must be construed against the
municipality.
Assuming arguendo that the lot in question was actually one of those
awarded to the plaintiffs, and the TCT of petitioner is spurious, this still does
not justify the revocation of the Mayors permit.
The records reveal that the Sanggunian did not establish or maintain
any public market on the lot. The resolution merely mentioned the plan to
acquire the lot for expansion of the market beside it. Until expropriation
proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its
right over the land.
Although the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to
regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the
conditions for their issuance or revocation, the anxiety, uncertainty, and
restiveness among the stallholders and traders could not be a valid ground
for revoking the permit of the petitioner. The manner of revocation also
violated the petitioners right to due process.

Lim and Garayblas v Court of Appeals


It is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and
permits necessarily includes the power to suspend or revoke these licenses.
However, this power is premised on the violation of the conditions of these
licenses and permits.
The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers.
Mayors have no power to order a police raid on these establishments
in the guise of inspecting or investigating them.
It violated Ordinance No. 7716 which prohibits police raids and
inspections. The proper LG officials include the City health officer or his
representative and the City treasurer.
The regulatory power of MCs must always be exercised in accordance
with law. Lims exercise of the power violated Bistros property rights that
are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.
Abbas v. COMELEC
As regards the Tripoli Agreement, it need not be discussed by the
Court to resolve this case.
The law refers to the Constitution and it indicates that the creation of
the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional
requirements.
Under the Constitution and RA 6734, the creation of the autonomous
region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and citi4es
where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the
autonomous region.
The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall
not be included in the autonomous region.
This majority must be of each unit. If the framers of the Constitution
intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the
plebiscite, they would have so indicated. It can be seen that the creation of
the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in
the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units
and the proviso underscores this.
What the Constitution requires is a simple majority of votes approving
the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of
the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as the individual
constituent units.

While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly


provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments.
Pandi v. Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reliance on Sec. 478 of the LGC as Provincial
Governor Mutilans authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. Sec. 478 which
provides that The appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for
provincial, city and municipal governments, is not a grant of power to
governors and mayors to appoint local health officers. It is simply a directive
that those empowered to appoint local health officers, being essential for
public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law
with the power to appoint them.
As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of 6 Nov 1993, the
official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial
health offices in the ARMM.
The Regional Secretary, by virtue of EO 133, assumed the
administrative powers and functions of the Secretary of Health of the
National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the
ARMM.
The official exercising supervision and control over an office has the
administrative authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an
Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant.
Macacua, therefore, had the authority on 6 Nov 1993 to designate an
OIC in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the
appointment of the permanent provincial health officer.
After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional
Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation.
Ordillo v. COMELEC
Art. X Sec. 15 of 1987 Constitution:
There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
Even RA 6766 shows that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be
faced with the absurd situation of having 2 sets of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative
powers over exactly the same area.
There will be two legislative bodies: the Cordillera Assembly and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, exercising their legislative powers over the
province of Ifugao.
This must be distinguished from the Abbas case in that it laid the
following rule: What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of
votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as
the individual constituent units.
MUNICIPAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Abella v. COMELEC
Arts, 68 and 69 of the Family Code are at point. Husband and wife as
a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual
place of abode.
In this case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner
temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte, in 1975 to pursue any
calling, profession, or business. What is clear is that she established her
residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considered herself a resident
therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in
Kananga is not present here. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga
does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. Despite the
petitioners insistence, the evidence shows that her supposed cancellation of
registration in Ormoc and transfer to Kananga is not supported by the
records.
Sec. 12 Art. X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly
urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from
voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In
the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province

whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. shall not be qualified


and entitled to vote in the election of the
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
Nottebohm: Irrelevant since it dealt with a conflict between the
nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state.
If Frivaldo really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in
accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by
CA 473 and PD 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by repatriation, or by naturalization.
His alleged forfeiture does not concern us. Frivaldo should have tried
to acquire naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must
be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officers entire tenure.
Labo v. COMELEC
The fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the
pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a preproclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee.
Publication is still necessary despite an immediately upon approval clause
as regards its date of effectivity.
Labo did not question the authenticity of the evidence nor does he
deny his acquisition of an Australian passport. Res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship. Labo became a citizen of Australia because he was
naturalized through a formal and positive process. He was not even a
qualified voter because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a
candidate for mayor of Baguio under Sec. 42 of the LGC.
The people of that locality could not have changed the requirements
of the LGC and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a
stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Philippines to preside over
them as mayor of their city. The respondent who filed the petition cannot
replace the petitioner as mayor. The simple reason is that as he obtained only
the second highest number of votes in the election, he was not the choice of
the people of Baguio City.

Topacio v. Paredes: It would be extremely repugnant to the basic


concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate
who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him.
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC
The fact remains that Labo has not submitted in this case any evidence
to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. There was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in canceling his COC.
Sec. 72 if the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by
Sec. 6 of RA 6646. The COMELEC can now legally suspend the
proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of
votes notwithstanding, especially so in this case where Labo failed to present
any evidence to support his claim.
Labos status has not changed in this case. He was disqualified for
being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for
holding public office. Up to this point, the Special Committee on
Naturalization has not yet acted on the application of the petitioner for
repatriation. In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper
authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not amount to automatic
reacquisition of the applicants Philippine citizenship.
The rule is the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office. The exception to this rule is if the electorate is
fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. There is a waiver of the validity
and efficacy of their votes in such a case.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
1. Frivaldo had proved that he has acquired Philippine citizenship by
repatriation under PD 725 and that he took his oath of allegiance on
30 June 1995. There is a presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty and that was not successfully rebutted by Lee. The law

2.

3.

4.

5.

does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age. Since Frivaldo
reassumed his citizenship, the very day the term of office of governor
began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed. The LGC
requires that an official be a registered voter, it does not require him to
actually vote. The SC also held that the repatriation retroacted to the
date of the filing of his application on 17 August 1994. The legislative
intent in PD 725 was to give it a retroactive operation.
Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a persons future status with finality. A person may
subsequently reacquire, or lose, his citizenship.
The Constitution has granted the COMELEC ample power to exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective, provincial
officials.
There was insufficient evidence presented to show that the people of
Sorsogon knew in fact and in law the alleged disqualification.
Frivaldo should be the one proclaimed.
The claim in the 5th issue is now moot and academic as the resolutions
are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the
COMELEC.

Mercado v. Manzano
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of 2 or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states.
Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individuals volition.
Art. IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution states that Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
In including this section, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 Section 40
(d) and in RA 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual

allegiance. Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under the
disqualification.
It should suffice if, upon the filing of their COC, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
By filing a COC when he ran for this post, Manzano elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. His
COC contained the following statement: I am a Filipino CitizenNaturalBorn.
Coquilla v. COMELEC
The term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to
domicile or legal residence. That refers to a place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi).
Coquilla lost his domicile of origin by becoming a US citizen after
enlisting in the navy.
Residence in the US is a requirement for naturalization as a US
citizen. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship in 2000, he did not
acquire his legal residence here. His registration as a voter of Butnga in
January 2001 is not conclusive of his residency as a candidate since Sec. 117
of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the city where he proposes to vote for
at least 6 months immediately preceding the election.
Caasi v. Court of Appeals
Green card: Stated that Miguel was a resident alien. In his application,
he wrote that he intended to stay permanently. Miguels immigration to the
US in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating; the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
As a resident alien, Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the
US.

Sec. 18, Article XI of the Constitution which states that any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status
of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
law is inapplicable to Miguel since he acquired such status prior to his
election as mayor.
Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to him: Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not
be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such
person has waived his status as permanent resident in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
The records are bare of proof that he had waived his status before he
ran for election as mayor of Bolinao.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for office for at
least one year at the time of filing of the COC is one of the qualifications.
Miguel did not possess that since he was a permanent resident of the US and
he resided in Bolinao for only 3 months after his return to the Philippines.
Marquez v. COMELEC
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of
1991, to the extent that it confines the term fugitive from justice to refer
only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment is an
inordinate and undue circumspection of the law.
The COMELEC in this case did not make any definite finding on
WON, in fact, Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice since the quo warranto
case was outrightly dismissed. This case must be remanded to the
COMELEC.
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
The definition of fugitive from justice indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular
jurisdiction.
Rodriguez case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that
his arrival in the Philippines from the US preceded the filing of the felony
complaint in the LA Court and of the issuance on even date of the arrest
warrant by the same foreign court, by almost 5 months. It was impossible for
Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at
the time he left the US, What prosecution was Rodriguez deliberately
running away from with his departure from the US?

The law of the case doctrine forbids the Court from crafting an
expanded re-definition of fugitive from justice.
The legal rule in the Marquez Decision must govern the instant
petition. The Court specifically refers to the concept of fugitive from
justice as defined in the main opinion of Marquez which highlights the
significance of an intent to evade. In Marquez, the Court ruled that A
fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.
Dela Torre v. COMELEC
Moral turpitude has been defined as: an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
The Court is guided by the general rule that crimes mala in se involve
moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, the Court
admitted that this guideline is inadequate in providing a clear-cut solution.
WON a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and
depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
Moral turpitude is deducible from the 3rd element of the crime: The
accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object, or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft.
The same underlying reason holds even if the fence did not have
actual knowledge, but merely should have known the origin of the
property received.
Petitioners conviction of fencing which is a crime of moral turpitude
subsists and remains unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. A
judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the
accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending
resolution of the application for probation.
Magno v. COMELEC
Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It depends on the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the law.

Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. It can be inferred


from the third element of bribery. The fact that the offender agrees to accept
a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his
fellowmen.
In David v COMELEC, the SC declared that RA 7160 is a codified set
of laws that specifically applies to local government units. Section 40
thereof specially and definitely provides for disqualifications of candidates
for elective local positions. It is applicable to them only. Sec. 12 of BP 881
speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public office.
It deals with the election of all public officers. Thus, Sec. 40 of RA
7160, insofar as it governs the disqualification of candidates for local posts,
assumes the nature of a special law which ought to prevail.
Although the crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude,
petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001
elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to
Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioners
disqualification ceased as of 5 March 2000 and he was therefore under no
such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro in the
2001 elections.
Lingating v. COMELEC
The rule that an elective local officer, who is removed before the
expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a
candidate for a local elective position does not apply where the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finding a local mayor guilty of dishonesty,
falsification and malversation of public funds has not become final.
Where there was failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve a
local officials motion for reconsideration before the elections, it is unfair to
the electorate to be told after they have voted for said official that after all he
is disqualified, especially so where at the time of the election, the decision
sought to be reconsidered had been rendered nearly ten years ago.
There is no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of.
Flores v. Drilon
In this case, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official, i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo, to other government posts

(Chairman of the Board and CEO of SBMA). Since this is prohibited by the
Constitution, the law is unconstitutional. The fact that the expertise of an
elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body
politic is of no moment.
Even though Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment of a local
elective official to another post if so allowed by law or the primary functions
of his office, it cannot be determinative of the constitutionality of RA 7227
for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
The phrase shall be appointed shows the intent to make the SBMA
posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of mayor of Olongapo.
The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
Galido v. COMELEC
The fact that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the COMELEC in
contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are final,
executory, and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the SC by
way of a special civil action for certiorari.
Article IX (A) Sec. 7 of the Constitution states Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Rivera v. COMELEC
The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in
contests involving local elective officials are final, executory, and not
appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil
action for certiorari.
The SC has closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision
and found that the said decision was not arrived at capriciously or
whimsically. A painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was
made by the COMELEC en banc. In fact, 14 ballots originally adjudicated in
Garcias favor were overruled by the Commission en banc, thus reducing the
number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the 2,445 contested ballots.
The appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual determinations.

It is settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of


administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred
such factual determinations.
Borja v. COMELEC
To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only
policy in the Constitutionthe other policy is that of enhancing the freedom
of choice of the people.
In considering the historical background of Art. X Sec. 8 of the
Constitution shows that the members of the Commission were as much
concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power.
Not only historical examination but textual analysis supports the
ruling that this provision contemplates service by local officials for three
consecutive terms as a result of election. If an official is not serving a term
for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served
the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration.
There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a
member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies,
resigns, becomes incapacitated or is removed from officethe vice-mayor
succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law while the Representative is
elected to fill the vacancy. The Representative serves a term for which he
was elected.
It is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position
for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Lonzanida v. COMELEC
Conditions for the application for disqualification:
1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post;
2. and that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

A proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all


and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the
proclamation of the Board of Canvassers, he is only the presumptive winner
who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales, from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected
to the post; he merely assumed office as a presumptive winner, which
presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided that
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term
in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Adorneo v. COMELEC
The ruling of the COMELEC that private respondent was not elected
for three consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a
private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat
in the 1998 elections.
Socrates v. COMELEC
The SC is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters
within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings
are patently erroneous.
The intent of Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and under Sec. 43
(b) of RA 7160 is that only consecutive terms count in determining the
three-term limit rule; Involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate reelection for a 4th term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons:
1. A subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms;
2. The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.

A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive


term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third
term.
The winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the
fill term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an
elective officials terms in office.
Osmea v. COMELEC
RA 7056, which provides for the holding of desynchronized election,
is violative of the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold
synchronized national and local elections in the second Monday of May
1992.
The term of office of the local elective officials, except barangay
officials, is fixed by the Constitution at 3 years. The incumbent local
officials were elected in January 1988. Their term would have expired on 2
February 1991. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of 30 June
1992. The reason for this is to synchronize the national and local elections.
On the other hand, RA 7056 provides for 2 separate elections in 1992.
The legislature cannot extend the term of officers by providing that
they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the
Constitution has in effect fixed the term and the day on which the official
term shall begin.
Menzon v. Petilla
In the absence of any contrary provision in the LGC, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
empowering the President to make temporary appointments in case of any
vacancy in appointive positions, may, in the best interest of public service,
also be applied in case of vacancy in the position of Vice-Governor, as in
this case.
The appointment of the petitioner is in full accord with the intent
behind the LGC. Here is no question that Sec. 49 in connection with Sec. 52
of the LGC shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the
performance of the duties of the Vice Governor. In this case, there was a
need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The
Dept. Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment.

Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local
Government, has no power to appoint petitioner, at the very least, petitioner
is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
Docena v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar
From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on 19
November 1990, it was intended to be permanent, to fill the permanent
vacancy caused by Capitos death. As such, it was to be valid for the
unexpired portion of the term of the deceased member, who was entitled to
serve until noon of June 30, 1992, in accordance with Article XVIII,
Section 2, of the Constitution.
The said
appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in
fact already assumed office as member of the SPES, as per certification of
the provincial secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioners
appointment had already been complete and enforceable at the time it was
supposed to have been superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar.
Docenas appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and
the petitioner having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just
recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was
permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of the deceased
predecessors term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the
position and could be removed only for any of the causes, and conformably
to the procedure, prescribed in the LGC. These could not be circumvented
by the simple process of recalling his appointment.
De Rama v. Court of Appeals
There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of their tenure.
Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointees assumption
of the position in the civil service, he acquires a legal right which cannot be
taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for
cause and with previous notice and hearing. It is well-settled that the person
assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment
acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position.
It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially
approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in
disregard of applicable provisions of the CSC law and regulations.

David v. COMELEC
The intent of the legislature is to limit the term of barangay officials to
only three years.
RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. Legis posteriors priores
contraries abrogant.
RA 6679 requires the voters to elect seven kagawads and the
candidate who gets the highest number of votes becomes the punong
barangay. The LGC, however, mandates a direct vote on the barangay
chairman.
There is a clear incompatibility between the provisions of these two
laws so the earlier one must be deemed to have been repealed.
The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any
term of office for barangay officials, It merely left the determination of such
term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition,
thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service.
Petitioners are also estopped from pursuing their petitions. Following
the petitioners own theory, the election of Petitioner David was illegal since
they were elected under RA 6679.
Alinsug v. RTC-Negros Occidental
It appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a
municipality only when it is an adverse party in a case involving the
provincial government or another municipality or city in the province.
The key to resolving this issue of whether a local government official
may secure the services of private counsel, in an action filed against him in
his official capacity, lies on the nature of the action and the relief that is
sought.
When moral and/or exemplary damages are claimed, a mayor may
hire a private counsel to defend him at his own personal expense.
A public official, who, in the performance of his duty acts in such
fashion, does so in excess of authority, and his actions would be ultra vires
that can thereby result in an incurrence of personal liability. All the
foregoing considered, we hold that the respondents were not improperly
represented by a private counsel, whose legal fees shall be for their own
account.

Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Appeals


The CA is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to
file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the municipality. The matter of
representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled. The
RAC provides: The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any
municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases
whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the SC or in cases where the
municipality or district in question is the party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality or district in the same province.
When the interests of a provincial government and of any of the political
division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the
province. A special attorney may be employed by its council in this case.
Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a
province of municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The
municipalitys authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only
to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
In this case, there is nothing to show that the provincial fiscal is
disqualified. Hence, the appearance of herein counsel is without authority of
law.
The fiscals refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal
justification for employing the services of private counsel. A fiscal cannot
refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without
violating his oath of office. The council should have requested the SOJ to
appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the fiscal who declined to
handle such case.
Ramos v. Court of Appeals
None of the exceptions is present here. It may be said that Atty.
Romanillos appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch as he was
already counsel of Kristi Corporation which was sued with respondent
municipality in this case. The order of the trial court stated that Atty.
Romanillos entered his appearance as collaborating counsel of the provincial
attorney. This collaboration is contrary to law and should not have been
recognized as legal.
The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to
collaborate with a private law firm does not legalize the latters
representation of the municipality.

Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own, and


neither may they do so even in collaboration with authorized government
lawyers.
Although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it
in litigation, in the interest of substantial justice, however, a municipality
may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer,
which work is beneficial to it provided (1) that no injustice is thereby heaped
on the adverse party and (2) provided that no compensation in any guise is
paid therefore by said municipality.
Salalima v. Guingona
An administrative offense means every act or conduct or omission
which amounts to, or constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary action.
There is no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of
suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeds six months and the
unexpired portion of the elective officials term of office where the
suspension imposed for each administrative offense does not exceed six
months and there is an express provision that the successive service of the
suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office.
The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected
officials, and the grant under the LGC of 1991 to the disciplining authority
of the power to remove local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the
Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations.
Where the province buys the delinquent properties sold in a public
auction to satisfy unpaid real estate taxes and penalties, the municipalities
entitled to taxes on said properties may be considered co-owners of such
properties to the extent of their respective shares in the real property taxes
and the penalties thereon.
Public officials could not be subject to disciplinary action for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term.
Artieda v. Santos
If simultaneous service of two suspension orders is allowed, this
would work in favor of the local elective official as the balance of his third
preventive suspension would, in effect, be reduced from 46 days to 17 days.
It will be recalled that, in the main decision, noting that successive
suspensions have been imposed on Mayor Ganzon, the SC stated that what is
intriguing is that respondent Secretary has been cracking down on the mayor

piecemeal, apparently to pin him down ten times the pain, when the
Secretary could have pursued a consolidated effort.
The LGC provides that in the event that several administrative cases
are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for
more than 90 days within a single year on the same ground or grounds
existing and known at the time of the first suspension.
Espiritu v. Melgar
The provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to
preventively suspend the municipal Mayor of Naujan at any time after the
issues have been joined when any of the following grounds exist:
1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent has
committed the acts complained of;
2. When the evidence of culpability is strong;
3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or
4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence.
There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges
against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his
innocence.
Mayor Melgars direct recourse to the courts without exhausting
administrative remedies was premature.
Since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained
by the TRO and therefore has already been served, he is deemed reinstated
in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative
investigation of the charges against him.
Aguinaldo v. Santos
Re-election renders administrative case moot and academic.
Except for criminal acts committed, a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term.
Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a LGC
which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is
found in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, then it cannot be said that BP 337
was repealed by the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 48 (1) of BP Blg. 337 grants the Secretary the power to appoint
local government officials in case of incumbents removal from office.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required before the petitioner
could be suspended or removed from office. Petitioner in this case is not
being prosecuted criminally under the RPC, but administratively with the
end view of removing him as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan for acts
of disloyalty to the Republic.
Reyes v. COMELEC
Any agreement to delay service of a decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in administrative cases is illegal. The law makes it mandatory
that copies of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall
immediately be furnished to respondent and/ or interested parties.
The filing of a petition for certiorari does not prevent a decision from
attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action
and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of
the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
When the elections were held on 8 May 1995, the decision of the SP
had already become final and executory. To arrest the course of the principal
action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court
directed to the lower court.
Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged
misconduct was committed.
That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes
may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified
is now settled.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
There is nothing in the LGC that indicates that it has repealed the
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. Repeals by implication are not favored.
Every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws.
Not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be
decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even
before the charges are heard.
Any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or finding
of the Ombudsman may only be entertained by the Supreme Court, on pure
question of law.

Grego v. COMELEC
Sec. 40(b) of the LGC does not have any retroactive effect.
A statute, despite the generality of its language, must not be so
construed as to overreach acts, events, or matters which transpired before its
passage.
Under PD 807, the former Civil Service Decree, the term
reinstatement had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive
positiona public officer administratively dismissed then was not therefore
barred from running for an elective position.
The use of the word may in RA 6646 indicates that the suspension
of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive.
Absent any determination of irregularity in election returns, as well as
an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is
mandatory and ministerial for the Board of Canvassers to count the votes
based on such returns and declare the result.
A possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared
the winning candidate is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions:
1. The one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified;
2. The electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate.
Joson v. Executive Secretary
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.
As the disciplining authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local officials. AO 23
delegates this power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority.
This is not undue delegation, what is delegated is the power to
investigate and not the power to discipline.
An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights
of an accused:
1. Right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel;
2. Right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and
3. Right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of
documentary evidence.

Petitioners right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the


complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers.
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against local elective government
officials are not similar to those against appointive officials.
Pablico v. Villapando
An elective local official may be remove from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court. It may be decreed only by a
court of law.
The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is
lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124(b), Rule XIX, of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC, insofar as it vests power on
the disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local
officials, is void for being against the last paragraph of Sec. 60 of the LGC.
The law on suspension and removal of elective public officials must
be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of
suspension or removal is vested must exercise it in good faith.
Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend
and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the
law by usurping the power to remove.
Conducto v. Monzon
The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct committed
during a prior term, to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefore. The rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases.
Evardone v. COMELEC
The Constitution, Article XVIII, Sec. 3 provides that all existing laws
not inconsistent with it shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked. RA 7160, specifically repeals BP 337. But the LGC will take effect
only on 1 January 1992. The old LGC is still applicable to the present case.
The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of
conducting elections for the recall of a local official.
Whether the electorate of the municipality has lost confidence in the
incumbent mayor is a political question. It is valid and has legal effect.

Garcia v. COMELEC
To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute
permits; all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a law.
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before
the end of his term of office.
The LGC of 1983 provided only one mode of initiating the recall
elections of local elective officials.
The LGC of 1991 provided for a second mode of initiating the recall
process through a preparatory recall assembly.
There is nothing in the Constitution that remotely suggests that the
people have the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a
recall proceeding.
Membership of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level
is not apportioned to political parties.
Loss of confidence as a ground for recall is a political question.
Paras v. COMELEC
If the SK election which is set by law to be held every 3 years from
May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local
election, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the
recall provision of the LGC.
The Constitution requires an effective mechanism of recall, initiative,
and referendum. A statute must be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution.
It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of
the LGC to construe regular local election as one referring to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will
be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Angobung v. COMELEC
The issue in Sanchez was not the questioned procedure but the legal
basis for the exercise by the COMELEC of its rule-making power in the
alleged absence of a statutory grant.
In Sanchez and Evardone: The COMELEC-prescribed procedure of
allowing the recall petition to be filed by at least one person and then

inviting voters to sing said petition on a date set for that purpose was never
put to issue.
Sec. 69(d) of the LGC: Expressly provides that the recall of any
elective municipal official may be validly initiated upon petition of at least
25% of the total number of registered voters in the LGU concerned.
The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates a recall
proceeding.
The phrase petition of at least 25% is used and the law does not
state that the petition must be signed by at least 25%; rather, the petition
must be of or by, at least 25% of the registered voters.
Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the
signatures of 25% of the registered voters, the petition must contain the
names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose
behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.
SC: Cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition
by a number of people less than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement,
much less, the filing thereof by just one person.
Recall must be pursued by the people, not just one disgruntled loser or
a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, it will only serve to
stabilize a community and disrupt the running of government.
Malonzo v. COMELEC
Factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and
duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more
so, in the absence of a substantial attack on its validity.
The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the
PRA.
Petitioners insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was
infirm since it was convened by the Liga, is misplaced. It just so happens
that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very
members of the PRA, the majority of whom met and voted in favor of the
resolution for his recall.
Claudio v. COMELEC
(1) On the word recall
Sec. 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. Sec. 69 provides
that the power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters Since
the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall

proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in
Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. The term
recall in par. (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening
of the PRA and the filing of a petition of recall with the COMELEC or the
gathering of the signatures of at least 25% of the voters for a petition for
recall.
The limitations in Sec. 74 apply only to the exercise of the power to
recall which is vested in the registered voters. People v. Garcia: Holding of a
PRA is not the recall itself.
As long as the recall election is not held before the official concerned has
completed one year in office, he will not be judged on the performance
prematurely. To construe the term recall as including the convening of the
PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local
officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and
assembly of its members.
(2) Whether the phrase Regular Local Election includes the election
period for the regular election or simply the date of such election.
There is a distinction between election period and campaign period. To
hold that it includes the entire period would reduce the period to eight
months. Such an interpretation would devitalize the right of recall.
(3) Whether the Recall Resolution was singed by a majority of the PRA
and duly verified.
Yes. Although the term attendance appears at the top of the page, it is
apparent that it was written by mistake. It is more probable to believe that it
was signed to signify their concurrence to the recall resolution.
Mendez v. CSC
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may
be exercised only in a manner and in accordance

Macalincag and Carlos v. Chang


Under Sec. 41 of PD 807, designation of the replacement is not a
requirement to give effect to the preventive suspension.
BP 337 provides for the automatic assumption of the assistant
municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of suspension of the
municipal treasurer.

The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably under the


Department of Finance. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper
disciplining authority to issue the preventive suspension order. More
specifically acting Sec. of Finance Macalincag, acted within his jurisdiction
in issuing that order.
Garcia v. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan
The power to discipline is specifically granted by Sec. 47 of the
Admin. Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities, provinces, and cities. On the other hand, the power to
commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or
employee is granted by the Omnibus Rules to the secretary of a department,
the head of an agency, LGU, the chief of an agency, the regional director or
a person with a sworn written complaint.
In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply
the opportunity to explain ones side; Due process is deemed satisfied if a
person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a
ruling.
Parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to
answer charges filed against them cannot complain of a denial of due
process.
A public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a
clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence.
Javellana v. DILG and Santos
LGC, Sec. 90. Sanggunian members may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours.
Provided, that sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall
not: Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government
is the adverse party; Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the LGU of which he is an official.
The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang
against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City
Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana
is a councilman. Hence, judgment against Divinagracia would actually be a
judgment against the City Government.

By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting


them to prosecute the claims against Divinagracia, the petitioner violated
Memo Circular No. 74-58 prohibiting a government official from engaging
in the private practice of his profession, is such practice would represent
interests adverse to the government.
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE RELATIONS
Local Governments are subject to legislative control. This is limited by the
Constitution.
Constitutional limitations:
1. Protect private property;
2. Previously entered contracts must not be impaired;
3. Uniform laws
4. Limitations depending on nature of rights and powers exercised by the
municipality.
BASCO V. PAGCOR
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally
prohibited. But the prohibition does not mean that the Government cannot
regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
PD 1869: Enacted to provide funds for social impact projects and
subjected gambling to close government scrutiny.
The City of Manila is a mere Municipal corporation and has no
inherent right to impose taxes. Its power to tax must yield to a legislative act
which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the
inherent power to tax.
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. If
Congress can grant Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions and even take back the power.
The Citys power to impose license fees on gambling has long been
revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate
gambling thru the grant of franchise, licenses, or permits was withdrawn
by PD No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government.
Only the National Government has the power to issue licenses or
permits for the operation of gambling.
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the
National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled

corporation with an original charter. All of its shares of stocks are owned by
the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers, it also
exercises regulatory powers.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and regulate gambling casinos.
The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency
of the government. Being an agency of the government, it must be exempt
from local taxes, otherwise, it might be impeded or subject to the control of
a mere local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National
Government over local governments.
GANZON V. CA
Despite the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not
intend to divest the legislature of its rightor the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative
sanctions against local officials. The omission signifies local autonomy from
Congress.
The Constitution did nothing more insofar as existing legislation
authorizing the President to proceed against local officials administratively,
the Constitution contains no prohibition.
Legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Investigating is not
inconsistent with overseeing.
In cases where the Court denied the President the power to suspend/
remove, it was not because it did not think that the President can not exercise
on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere.
The sole objective of a suspension is simply to prevent the accused
from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and
authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records and other
evidence.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment
in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. Suspension is
temporary, it may be imposed for no more than 60 days. A longer
suspension is unjust and unreasonable.

CITY OF CEBU V. NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE


AUTHORITY
RA 1383 provides that the net book value of the properties of the
government owned water works systems shall be received by the Authority
in payment for an equal value of the assets of NAWASA. All the properties
of the OWS are transferred to NAWASA in exchange for an equal value of
the latters assets. However, nothing concrete is said as to what assets are to
be traded on the part of NAWASA.
The OWS was established out of the $125,000.00 loan extended to the
municipality by the US, payable within 30 years. Cebu applied for and
obtained a certificate of public convenience from the PSC. The System
owned properties which are estimated to be worth P10,000,000.00. The
system pays all who pay the charges. It is open to the public (in this sense it
is public service), but upon the payment only of a certain rental (which
makes it proprietary).
The police power is not without limitations, there is the constitutional
prohibition against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE V. CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA
The validity of the law depends on the nature of the properties. If the
property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. If
it is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and
Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment of just compensation.
This controversy is more along the domains of Municipal
corporations. It results then that Z. del Norte is still entitled to collect from
the City the formers share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in
nature. The share cannot be paid in lump sum, except at to the money
already returned to the City.
Applying the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50
properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed
public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered
public, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental
purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.

RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites
and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sitesa total of 24 lotssince
these were held by the former province in its governmental capacity and
therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress.
But the law cannot be applied to deprive Z. del Norte of its share in the value
of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since
they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP. INC. AND PAGCOR
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by PD 1869.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not
illegal per se.
Tests for a valid ordinance:
1. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5. It must not be general and consistent with public policy.
6. It must bot be unreasonable.
Under the rule noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it
is associated. Accordingly, the SC held that since the word gambling is
associated with and other prohibited games of chance, the word should be
read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like other prohibited games
of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
Implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing of such intention. There is no sufficient indication of
an implied repeal of PD 1869. On the contrary, PAGCOR is mentioned as a
source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, RA 7309, creating a
Board of Claims under the DOJ and RA 7648 providing for measures for the
solution of the power crisis.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of
gambling, the illegal and those authorized by law. The ordinances violate PD
1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public
policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of
chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them
by Congress as the national law making body.

The basic relationship between the national legislature and the LGUs
has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CITY OF MANILA
There was no repeal. The Citys power to tax steam boilers could not
have been affected by the Department of Labors power to regulate or
inspect them: One is taxation, the other is regulation.
The power of inspection of the Labor Secretary does not conflict with
that of the City authorities, since the former is related to the safety of
laborers and employees while the City is not limited to such purposes, but
is related to the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the City, particularly
of the neighborhood where the boilers are located.
In the opinion of judicial authorities, there is nothing inherently
obnoxious in the requirement that a person engaged in a business shall have
two licenses, one issued by the state and another by a political subdivision or
public corporation.
As to the rates, if the Citys power is merely to regulate, then that is
material. However, the City also has the authority to tax steam boilers. There
is every indication that herein charges were collected under both the power
to tax and the power to regulate. The name fee is not conclusivetaxes are
often called fees.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. CA
The LGC does not contain any express provision which categorically
repeals the charter of the Authority.
The charter of LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general
law. The enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. Considering the reasons behind the
establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection,
navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication
that the legislative intent is for the authority to proceed with its mission.
Laguna de Bay cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of
management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise
exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water
The power of local government units to issue fishing privileges was
clearly granted for revenue purposes. The power of the Authority to grant
permits is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities

in the region. It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive and the least limitable and the most demanding of all State
powers. The charter which embodies a valid exercise of the police power
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees since there is a sharing
mechanism in place.
MONDANO V. SILVOSA
Constitution: President shall have control over all the executive
departments exercise general supervision over all local governments as
may be provided by law
Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction but he does
not have the same control of local governments.
Supervision: Overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.
Control: The power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The authority of the Department Head over persons under his
department does not extend to local governments over which the President
exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.
The charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or
any of those enumerated in Sec. 2188 of the Admin. Code, since rape and
concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor
nor do they constitute neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other
form of maladministration of office.
HEBRON V. REYES
President has no inherent power to remove or suspend local elective
officials.
2188: Governor shall receive and investigate complaints against
municipal officers for offenses involving maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.
2189: Trial by municipal board. Preventive suspension shall not be
more than 30 days.

2190: Provincial board then acts by dismissing the charges or by


forwarding to the Interior Secretary the record of the case.
2191: Renders a final decision within 30 days. No final dismissal is
made until recommended by the Secretary and approved by the President.
Laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers,
especially those chosen by the direct vote of the people, must be strictly
construed in their favor. When the procedure for the suspension of an officer
is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to
strictly, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. In this case,
Hebron was suspended in May 1954. The records of the investigation were
forwarded to the Executive Secretary since 15 July 1954. The decision has
not been rendered as of 13 May 1955. The continued indefinite suspension
cannot be reconciled with the letter and spirit of the Admin Code.
Since the powers given to the President in addition to his general
supervisory authority, the application of those powers to municipal
corporationsinsofar as they may appear to sanction the assumption by the
Executive of the functions of the provincial governors and boardswould
contravene the constitutional provision restricting the authority of the
President over local government to general supervision.
If there is any conflict between Sec. 64(b) and (c), 79(c) and 86 of the
Admin Code, and 2188 and 2191 of the same code, the latter, being specific
provisions, must prevail. The alleged authority of the Executive to suspend a
municipal mayor directly without any opportunity on the part of the
provincial governor and the provincial board to exercise the administrative
powers of both under sections 23188 and 2190 of the AC, cannot be adopted
without conceding that said powers are subject or repeal or suspension by
the President. This cannot be done without legislation. If neither the
Secretary not the President may disapprove a resolution of the Provincial
Board, passed within its jurisdiction, because such would connote the
assumption of control, it is manifest that greater control would be wielded by
said officers of the national government if they could either assume the
powers vested in said provincial board or act in substitution thereof, such as
by suspending municipal officers, without the admin proceedings prescribed
in the AC.
The power of the president over LGUs is limited to general
supervision and this is unqualified so it applies to all powers: corporate or
political.

GANZON V. COURT OF APPEALS


Notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter
did not intend to divest Congress of its right, or the president of his
prerogative to provide admin sanctions against local officials. The
Constitution did not intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations.
Investigating is not inconsistent with overseeing, although it is a lesser
power than altering. In several cases, the Court denied the President the
power to suspend/remove because the law lodged the power elsewhere and
not because the Court thought the President cannot exercise it on account of
his limited power.
The Secretary acted under Batas Blg . 337, Sec. 62-63.
Sec. 63: Preventive suspension may be meted out by the Minister of
Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the
provincial governor if the respondent is
The successive 60-day suspension imposed on Ganzon is different.
The sole objective of suspension is to prevent the accused from hampering
the normal course of the investigation. Under the LGC, such cannot exceed
60 days. Imposing 600 days of suspension is to make him spend the rest of
his term in inactivity.
Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere
decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials
remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may
provide.
Ganzon may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer
be suspended for the offenses he was originally charged.
GANZON V. KAYANAN
The pertinent provisions are found in Sec. 64(b) and (c) of the Admin
Code.
(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare
vacant the offices held by such removed officials
(c) To order an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in
the Government service
Constitution: Sec. 10 (1). The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices
It may be clearly inferred that the President may remove an official in
the government service conformably to law.

It cannot be disputed that in this case the President is vested with the
authority to order the investigation of petitioner when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires, and such being the case, the petitioner
cannot now contend that the designation of respondent as the official to
investigate him by Rosales has been done without the authority of law.
It cannot be inferred that the power of supervision of the President
over local officials does not include the power of investigation when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires.
As to the cause, considering that the position of mayor of a chartered
city may be fairly compared in category and statute with that of a provincial
governor, we are of the opinion that the former, by analogy, may also be
amenable to suspension and removal for the same causes as the latter, which
causes, under Sec. 2078 of the Admin Code, are: Disloyalty, dishonesty,
oppression, and misconduct in office.
Considering the allegations in the complaint to the effect that
petitioner took advantage of his public post as mayor in committing acts of
violence and intimidation upon respondent to stop his radio program, the SC
held that the acts constitute misconduct in office for which he may be
ordered investigated by the President within the meaning of the law.
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails
to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property,
such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or
municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action
herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a
preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special


agent, but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the
task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176
shall be applicable.
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.
LGC
SEC. 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials
are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to
property.
San Diego v. Municipality of Naujan
Sec. 2323 of the RAC: Requires that when the exclusive privilege of
fishery is ranted to a private party, the same shall be given to the highest
bidder.
The requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting
competition and to guard against favoritism, fraud, and corruption. The
original lease contract in this case was awarded to the highest bidder, but the
reduction of the rental and the extension of the term of the lease have been
granted without a prior public bidding.
Statutes requiring public bidding apply to amendments of any contract
already executed in compliance with the law where such amendments alter
the original contract in some vital and essential particular.
Since the period in a lease is a vital and essential particular to the
contract, its extension, which was granted without the requisite public
bidding, is not in accordance with law.
It is not an impairment of the obligation of contract since the
constitutional provision on impairment refers only to contracts legally
executed. Legally speaking, there is no contract abrogated since the
extension contract is void and inexistent. Public biddings are held for the
best protection of the public and to give the public the best possible
advantages by means of open competition between bidders.
The reduction of the rentals by 20% of the original price is also null
and void since it is a substantial alteration of the contract, making it a

distinct and different lease contract which requires the prescribed formality
of a public bidding.
Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos
Sec. 7 Par. 2 of the RAC: Requires that before a contract involving the
expenditure of P2,000 or more may be entered into or authorized, the
municipal treasurer must certify to the officer entering into such contract that
funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount
necessary to cover the proposed contract is available for expenditures on
account thereof, and a contract entered into contrary to these requirements is
void.
Sec. 584-A of RAC: The provincial auditor or his representative must
check up the deliveries made by a contractor pursuant to a contract lawfully
and validly entered into and where there is no check up to show actual
delivery, the Auditor General is not duty bound to pass and allow in audit
the sum claimed by a contractor.
The Motor Vehicle Law invoked by Rivera merely allocates 10% of
the money collected under its provisions to the road and bridge funds of the
different municipalities in proportion to the population, as shown in the last
available census, for the repair, maintenance, and construction of municipal
roads. This alone is not sufficient appropriation and authority to disburse
part of the percentage collected under the law for the purpose of paying the
petitioners claim.
Rivera v. Maclang
This action is against defendant-appellee in his personal capacity
based on Sec. 608 of the RAC: A purported contract entered into contrary to
the requirements of the next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void,
and the officer assuming to make such contract shall be liable to the
Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the
same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.
The liability of Maclang is personal, as if the transaction had been
entered into by him as a private party. The intention of the law in this case is
to ensure that public officers entering into transactions with private
individuals calling for the expenditure of public funds observe a high degree
of caution so that the government may not be the victim of ill-advised or
improvident action by those assuming to represent it.

Palafox, et al v. Province of Ilocos Norte


1903 Civil Code: To attach liability to the State for the negligence of
Torralba, a declaration must be made that he was a special agent and not one
upon whom properly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion.
Merrit v. Government of the Philippines: This ruling may not be made
since the driver was not a special agent of the Government.
The principle applies to the Insular, as distinguished from the
provincial or municipal governments.
If the negligent employee was engaged in the performance of
governmental duties, as distinguished from corporate functions, the
government is not liable.
The construction of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at
the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities.
Mendoza v. De Leon
The Municipal Code confers both governmental and corporate powers
upon municipal corporations. For the exercise of the former, it is not liable
to private persons. Its liability to them for the wrongful exercise of the latter
is the same as that of a private corporation or individual.
Officers and agents of MCs charged with the performance of
governmental duties which are in their nature legislative, judicial, or quasijudicial, are not liable for consequences of their official acts unless it can be
shown that they acted willfully and maliciously, with the express purpose of
inflicting injury upon the plaintiff.
The officers of municipalities charged with the administration of
patrimonial property are liable for mismanagement of its affairs as are
directors or managing officers of private corporations, not for mere mistakes
of judgment, but only when their acts are so far opposed to the true interest
of the municipality as to lead to the clear inference that no one thus acting
could have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests.
The defendant councilors regularly leased an exclusive ferry privilege
to the plaintiff for two years. After continuous user of a little more than one
year, they forcible evicted him on the pretext that he was not operating the
ferry leased to him.

Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme


The judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the
exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of nonsuability of the State in the guise of the municipality. The doctrine of nonsuability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of
the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Consent takes the form of express or implied consent. Express consent
may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when
the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the
level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a
complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are
agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and
therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Suability depends
on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does
not first consent to be sued.
The test of liability of the municipality for torts depends on whether or
not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions.
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity: They exercise the
right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers
and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are
nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such
they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from
their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Driver of the
dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the
Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets."
Palafox, et. al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte: "the construction or
maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of
the accident are admittedly governmental activities."
Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its
regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
functions.

Fernando et al v. Court of Appeals and City of Davao


Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demanded, whereby such other person suffers injury.
2176: A person who by his omission causes damage to another, there
being negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence
of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and
the damage. He must prove under 2179 that the defendants negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. While it may be true that
the city was remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such
negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the
market master about the need to clean the tank, the city immediately
responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service.
The absence of any accident was due to the compliance of the city
with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and
the septic tank. Hence, the toxic gases from the waste matter could not have
leaked out because it was air-tight.
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article
694 of the Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the
protection of the public.
An accident such as toxic gas leakage from the tank is unlikely to
happen unless one removes its covers. The accident occurred because the
victims on their own and without authority from the city opened the tank.
The failure of Mr. Bertulano to exercise prudence was the proximate cause
of the accident.
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things
requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and sill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which
he attempts to do.
The accident which befell the victims who are not in any way
connected with the winning bidder happened before the award could be
given. Considering that there was yet no award and order to commence work
on the tank, the duty of the market master or his security guards to supervise
the work could not have started.
The surreptitious way in which the victims did their job without
clearance from the market master or any of the guards goes against their
good faith.

Tuzon and Mapagu v. Court of Appeals


The purpose of Art. 27 is to end the bribery system. Official inaction
may be due to plain indolence or a cynical indifference to the responsibilities
of public service.
The provision presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public
official to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable
negligence. The erring public officer is justly punishable under this article
for whatever loss or damage the complainant has sustained.
In this case, it has not even been alleged that Mayor Tuzons refusal to
act on the respondents application was an attempt to compel him to resort to
bribery. It cannot be said that the mayor and the treasurer were motivated by
personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the permit to
Jurado.
The respondents were not singled out and the resolution was
uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality. The petitioners
acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest
interpretation of the resolution. In the absence of any judicial decision
declaring the resolution invalid, its legality would have to be presumed.
The respondent could have taken the prudent course of signing the
agreement under protest and later challenging it in court to relive him of his
obligation to donate.
Torio v. Fontanilla
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a
governmental function or duty, no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the
municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its
officers, as long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or
that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, a municipal corporation can be
held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto.
Sec. 2282 of the Admin Code simply authorizes the municipality to
celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose a duty to observe one.
Holding a fiesta for whatever purpose is in essence an act for the special
benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a state policy.
The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit
or gain but merely to provide entertainment is not a conclusive test.

The basic element is that it is governmental in essence. Under the


doctrine of respondent superior, the municipality is to be held liable for
damages for the death of Fontanilla if that was attributable to the negligence
of the officers of the municipality.
CA: Found and held that there was negligence. Only P100 was
appropriated for the two stages and the posts and braces were only made of
bamboo.
The performance was a donation offered by the respondents, and that
when the Municipality accepted it, the participants in the stage show had the
right to expect that the Municipality, through its Committee would build a
stage strong enough to support the performance. The Councilors did not
directly participate in the construction of the stage so they could not be held
liable.
Teotico v. City of Manila
2189: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective
conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control and supervision.
The Civil Code and not the Charter of Manila applies in this case. It is
true that insofar as territorial application is concerned, the Charter is a
special law. However, as regards the subject matter of the provisions, the
Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription. Sec. 4 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof. 2189
governs liability due to defective streets in particular.
The Article requires that the province, city, or municipality have
either control or supervision over the street. The authority of Manila over
the streets has neither been withdrawn nor restricted by any law.
The determination of whether or not P. Burgos Ave. is under the
control or supervision of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of
negligence, in connection with its maintenance, is a question of fact which
was resolved by the CA in the affirmative. It is not subject to the review of
the SC.
Abella v. Municipality of Naga
The City was not charged with any unlawful act, or with acting
without authority.

The basis of the lower courts decision is Sec. 2246 of the RAC which
provides that no municipal road or any part thereof shall be closed without
indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby.
That Concepcion Abella was economically damaged, the stipulation
of facts admits, and that the indemnity assessed is within the bounds of the
damages suffered, there is no dispute.
The damages seem to be nominal judged by the description of the
plaintiffs interests adversely affected by the conversion of P. Prieto Street
into a market.
Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo
2165 AC: Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such
are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations, to be exercised by
and through their respective municipal government in conformity with law.
It shall be competent for them to sue and be sued, to contract and be
contracted with
The AC does not specify the kind of property that a municipality can
acquire.
343 Civil Code: Divides the property of provinces and towns into
those for public use and patrimonial property. Provincial roads and footpath, squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, drives and public
improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns, are
property for public use.
All other property possessed by said MCs is patrimonial and shall be
subject to the provisions of the Civil Code.
It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a
municipality, needed for governmental purposes, may not be attached and
sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality. The reason for
this is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is
devoted.
The necessity for government service justifies that the property of
public use of the municipality be exempt from execution.
Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals
The funds deposited in the second PNB account are public funds and
the settled rule is that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statue.

Absent a showing that the MC of Makati passed an ordinance


appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance
due, less the sum of P99T deposited in the first account, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the second account.
Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to
effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant
may avail of the remedy of mandamus to compel the enactment and
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and its corresponding
disbursement.
In this case, the RTC decision is not disputed by Makati. For 3 years
now, the city enjoyed possession and use of the property notwithstanding its
failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation.
Pasay City Government v. CFI of Manila
2028: A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.
A compromise agreement not contrary to law, public order, public
policy is a valid contract.
2041:One of the parties to a compromise has two options:1.Enforce it;
2. Rescind/insist on original demand
It is true that all government funds deposited with the PNB by any
agency of the government remain government funds and may not be subject
to garnishment or levy. However, since an ordinance has already been
enacted expressly appropriating the amount of P613T, then this case is
covered by the exception.
Having established that the compromise agreement was final and
executory, the Court was in error when it still entertained the supplemental
complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the Court no longer
had jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The parties to the compromise contemplated a divisible obligation
needing a performance bond in proportion to the uncompleted work. The
city was initially content with a mere 5% bond, it is strange for it to
suddenly demand a 20% bond. The premium of the bond will be sizeable
and will eat up the contractors profits. The submission of the bond was not
a condition precedent to the payment to the plaintiff. The P613T has already
been collected through execution and garnishment and the contractor already
finished some stages of the construction. The argument that it is reciprocal is
already moot.

Municipality of Paoay v. Manaois


Properties for public use held by municipal corporations are not
subject to levy and execution. The reason behind this exemption extended to
properties for public use, and public municipal revenues is that they are held
in trust for the people.
If it is patrimonial and which is held by a municipality in its
proprietary capacity, it is treated as the private asset of the town and may be
levied upon and sold under an ordinary execution. The same rule applies to
municipal funds derived from patrimonial properties, for instance, it has
been held that shares of stock held by a municipal corporation are subject to
execution.
The fishery or municipal waters of the town are not subject to
execution. They do not belong to the municipality. They are property of the
State. What Paoay holds is merely a usufruct or the right to use said
municipal waters, granted to it by section 2321 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
It is based merely on a grant, more or less temporary, made by the
Legislature. The Legislature, for reasons it may deem valid or as a matter of
public policy, may, at any time, repeal or modify said section 2321 and
revoke this grant to coastal towns and open these marine waters to the
public. Or the Legislature may grant the usufruct or right of fishery to the
provinces concerned so that said provinces may operate or administer them
by leasing them to private parties.
All this only goes to prove that the municipality of Paoay is not
holding this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so
as to enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its
property through execution.
Another reason for this prohibition is that the buyer would only buy
the rights of the municipality. All that he can do is rent out to private
individuals the fishery rights over the lots after public bidding. This, he must
do since that is the only right granted by the legislature. It is anomalous
since a private individual would be forced to conduct a public bidding. It
will also deprive Paoay of income.
The right or usufruct of the town of Paoay over its municipal waters,
particularly, the forty odd fishery lots included in the attachment by the
Sheriff, is not subject to execution.
But we hold that the revenue or income coming from the renting of
these fishery lots is certainly subject to execution. It may be profitable, if not
necessary, to distinguish this kind of revenue from that derived from taxes,

municipal licenses and market fees are provided for and imposed by the law,
they are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of municipal corporations. In fact, the
real estate taxes collected by a municipality do not all go to it.
In conclusion, we hold that the fishery lots numbering about forty in
the municipality of Paoay, mentioned at the beginning of this decision are
not subject to execution. However, the amount of P1,712.01 in the municipal
treasury of Paoay representing the rental paid by Demetrio Tabije on fishery
lots let out by the municipality of Paoay is a proper subject of levy, and the
attachment made thereon by the Sheriff is valid.

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