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DANILOB.PARADAvs.JUDGELORENZOB.

VENERACION

Parrenovs.COAG.R.No.162224

JUDICIALQUESTIONS:

Topic:Prospectiveandretrospectiveeffectoflaws.

Why did the trial did not assure the duly notification to Parada?
FACTS:
Parada had not been duly notified of the absentia are wanting clearly.
ItissaidinthecasethatParadaviolatedrequisitesofavalidtrialinabsentiawhicharethe
accusedhasalreadybeenarraigned;hasbeendulynotifiedbythetrialandfailuretoappearis
unjustifiable.
June3,6,7and8,1994isthedatethatParadasfailuretoappearinthehearingbytheabsenceof
a valid service of notice of hearing to him is justified.
JudgeVeneracionshouldhavesentthenoticeofhearingdatedApril27,1994toParadascounsel
were he should have already taken cognizance of the new address.
ItissaidintheProceduralDueprocessthatthedefendantmustbegivenanopportunitytobe
heard.Withthat,Paradamustbegivenachancetodefendhimselftowardstheissueaboutthe
unclaimed duly of notice that should be given to him.
Judge Veneracion exhibited the ignorance of gross that degree which the court cannot
countenance.
DaniloB.Paradafiledacaseagainsttherespondentjudgeforhisgrossignoranceofthelaw,
abuse of authority and rendering unjust and erroneous interlocutory orders and judgement.
JudgeVeneracionwasfinedintheamountofP10,000.00withawarningwasfinedbytheOffice
of

the

Court

Administrator.

Facts: a petition for certiorari assailing the January 9, 2003 decision and January 13, 2004
resolution of the COA filed by 2lt Salvador Parreno (ret) represented by his daughter.
SalvadorParrenoservedintheAFPfor32yearsandwasretiredonJanuary1982.Hereceived
paymentofhislumpsumpensionandstartedreceivinghismonthlypensionin1985.Petitioner
migratedtoHawaiiandbecameanaturalizedAmericancitizen.InJanuary2001,theAFPstopped
petitionersmonthlypensioninaccordancewithsec.27ofP.D.1638whichprovidesthataretiree
wholoseshisFilipinocitizenshipshallberemovedfromtheretiredlistandhisretirementbenefits
terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but AFP
JAGOdeniedhisrequest.

RESOLUTION:
Inresolvingmattersinlitigation,judgesshouldendeavourassiduouslytoascertainthefactsandthe
factsandtheapplicablelaws.WHEREFORE,respondentJudgeLorenzoB.VeneracionisFINED
P10, 000.00 for disregarding Paradas right to procedural due process and for showing gross
ignoranceofthelaw,withaSTERNWARNINGthatarepetitionofasimilaractinthefuturewill
dealt

with

more

severely.

ISSUE:IsthepetitionercorrectinmaintainingthatP.D.1638,asamendedappliesprospectively
andshouldapplyonlytothosewhojoinedthemilitaryserviceafteritseffectivity?

PetitionerfiledaclaimbeforetheCOAforthecontinuanceofhismonthlypensionbutonJanuary
9,2003,COAdeniedhisclaimforlackofjurisdiction.COAruledthattheissueathandrequires
thecourtsasmandatedbytheconstitutiontodeterminethevalidityofthelawre:P.D.1638sec.27.
PetitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationbutonJanuary13,2004,initsresolutionCOAdenied
themotionfurtherrulingthatevenifassumedjurisdictionovertheclaim,petitionersentitlementto
theretirementbenefitshewaspreviouslyreceivingmustnecessarilyceaseuponthelossofhis
Filipinocitizenshipinaccordancewithsec.27ofP.D.1638asamended.
PetitionerarguedthatP.D.1638,asamendedappliesprospectivelyandshouldapplyonlytothose
whojoinedthemilitaryserviceafteritseffectivity.

HELD: Yes, petitioner is correct in saying that P.D. 1638 applies prospectively. There is no
questionthatP.D.1638asamendedappliesprospectivelyanditdoesnotprovideforitsretroactive
application.Butinpetitionerscontentionthatitshouldonlyapplytothosewhojoinedthemilitary
serviceafteritseffectivity,heiswrongbecauseP.D.1638asamended,isaboutthenewsystemof
retirementandseparationfromserviceofmilitarypersonnel,itshouldapplytothosewhowerein
theserviceatthetimeofitsapproval.Sec.2ofP.D.1638,asamendedprovidesthat,thedecree
shallapplytoallmilitarypersonnelintheserviceoftheAFP.P.D.1638asamendedwassigned
intolawonSeptember10,1979whilepetitionerretiredin1982,whichislongaftertheapprovalof
P.D. 1638, as amended. Hence, the provisions of P.D. 1638, as amended, apply to
petitioner.IslamicDawahCouncilofthePhilippines,Inc.vs.ExecutiveSecretary
G.R.No.153888.July9,2003.
Facts:
PetitionerisanongovernmentalorganizationthatextendsvoluntaryservicestotheFilipino
people,especiallytoMuslimCommunities.Petitionerbegantoissue,forafee,halalcertifications
toqualifiedproductsandfoodmanufacturersonaccountoftheactualneedtocertifyfoodproducts
ashalalandalsoduetohalalfoodproducers'request.Subsequently,ExecutiveOrder(EO)46was
issuedcreatingthePhilippineHalalCertificationSchemeanddesignatingrespondentOfficeof
MuslimAffairs(OMA)tooverseeitsimplementation.Inthispetitionforprohibition,petitioner
alleged,amongothers,thatthesubjectEOviolatestheconstitutionalprovisionontheseparationof
ChurchandState.
Ingrantingthepetition,theSupremeCourtruledthatfreedomofreligionwasaccorded
preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this
preferredstatus.Withoutdoubt,classifyingafoodproductashalalisareligiousfunctionbecause
thestandardsusedaredrawnfromtheQur'anandIslamicbeliefs.BygivingtheOMAtheexclusive
powertoclassifyfoodproductsashalal,EO46encroachedonthereligiousfreedomofMuslim
organizationslikehereinpetitionertointerpretforFilipinoMuslimswhatfoodproductsarefitfor
Muslimconsumption.Also,byarrogatingtoitselfthetaskofissuinghalalcertifications,theState
hasineffectforcedMuslimstoacceptitsowninterpretationoftheQur'anandSunnahonhalal
food.
TheCourtfurtherruledthatonlythepreventionofanimmediateandgravedangertothe
securityandwelfareofthecommunitycanjustifytheinfringementofreligiousfreedom.Inthecase
at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations,likehereinpetitioner,oftheirreligiousrighttoclassifyaproductashalal,evenon
thepremisethatthehealthofMuslimFilipinoscanbeeffectivelyprotectedbyassigningtoOMA
theexclusivepowertoissuehalalcertificates.
Issue:
WhetherornotEexecutiveOrder46violatestheconstitutionalprovisionontheseparation
ofChurchandState.
Held:
No.Ingrantingthepetition,theSupremeCourtruledthatfreedomofreligionwasaccorded
preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this
preferredstatus.Withoutdoubt,classifyingafoodproductashalalisareligiousfunctionbecause
thestandardsusedaredrawnfromtheQur'anandIslamicbeliefs.BygivingtheOMAtheexclusive
powertoclassifyfoodproductsashalal,ExecutiveOrder46encroachedonthereligiousfreedom
ofMuslimorganizationslikehereinpetitionertointerpretforFilipinoMuslimswhatfoodproducts
arefitforMuslimconsumption.Also,byarrogatingtoitselfthetaskofissuinghalalcertifications,

theStatehasineffectforcedMuslimstoacceptitsowninterpretationoftheQur'anandSunnahon
halalfood.
TheCourtfurtherruledthatonlythepreventionofanimmediateandgravedangertothe
securityandwelfareofthecommunitycanjustifytheinfringementofreligiousfreedom.Inthecase
at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations,likehereinpetitioner,oftheirreligiousrighttoclassifyaproductashalal,evenon
thepremisethatthehealthofMuslimFilipinoscanbeeffectivelyprotectedbyassigningtoOMA
theexclusivepowertoissuehalalcertificates.

Onlythepreventionofanimmediateandgravedangertothesecurityandwelfareofthe
communitycanjustifytheinfringementofreligiousfreedom.Ifthegovernmentfailstoshowthe
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a
societywithademocraticframeworklikeours,theStatemustminimizeitsinterferencewiththe
affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and
religiousactivity.Inthecaseatbar,wefindnocompellingjustificationforthegovernmentto
depriveMuslimorganizations,likehereinpetitioner,oftheirreligiousrighttoclassifyaproductas
halal,evenonthepremisethatthehealthofMuslimFilipinoscanbeeffectivelyprotectedby
assigningtoOMAtheexclusivepowertoissuehalalcertifications.Theprotectionandpromotion
oftheMuslimFilipinos'righttohealtharealreadyprovidedforinexistinglawsandministeredto
bygovernmentagencieschargedwithensuringthatfoodproductsreleasedinthemarketarefitfor
humanconsumption,properlylabeledandsafe.UnlikeEO46,theselawsdonotencroachonthe
religiousfreedomofMuslims.

CalalangvWilliams

Facts:TheNationalTrafficCommissionrecommendedtheDirectorofPublicWorksandtothe
Secretaryof Public WorksandCommunication thatanimaldrawnvehiclesbe prohibitedfrom
passingalongRosarioSt.extendingfromPlazaCalderondelaBarcatoDasmarinasSt.from7:30
amto12pmand1:30pmto5:30pmandalsoalongRizalAvenuefrom7amto11pmfroma
periodofoneyearfromthedateoftheopeningofColganteBridgetotraffic.Itwassubsequently
passedandthereafterenforcebyManilaMayorandtheactingchiefofpolice.MaximoCalalang
then,asacitizenandataxpayerchallengesitsconstitutionality.

Issue:WhethertherulesandregulationspromulgatedbytheDirectorofPublicWorksinfringes
upontheconstitutionalpreceptregardingthepromotionofsocialjustice

Held:Thepromotionofsocialjusticeistobeachievednotthroughamistakensympathytowards
any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither communism,
despotism,noratomism,noranarchybutthehumanizationoflawsandtheequalizationofsocial
andeconomicforcesbythestatesothatjusticeinitsrationalandobjectivelysecularconception
mayatleastbeapproximated.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v.National Labor Relations


Commission(NLRC)164SCRA671(1988)
FACTS:
Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, was
accusedbytwocomplainantsof havingdemandedandreceivedfromthemthetotalamountof
P3,800.00inconsiderationofherpromisetofacilitateapprovaloftheirapplicationsfortelephone
installation.Investigatedandheard,shewasfoundguiltyaschargedandaccordinglyseparatedfrom
theservice.ShewenttotheMinistryofLaborandEmploymentclaimingshehadbeenillegally
removed.Despiteofherbeingdismissedforcause,(ascontendedbyPLDT)thelaborarbiter(from
NLRC)inhisdecisionruledthatthecomplainant(hereinprivaterespondent)mustbegivenone
month pay forevery year of service asfinancial assistance. The labor arbiter finds the same
asequitable,takingintoconsiderationherlongyearsofservicetothecompanywherebyshehad
undoubtedlycontributedtothesuccessofthecompany.NOTE:MarilynAbucayhadservedinthe
companyfor10years.Thus,shemustbeawarded10monthsseparationpayforeveryyearofher
service.
ISSUE:
Whetherornottheawardofseparationpayfortheprivaterespondentisjust.
RULING:
NO.TheruleembodiedintheLaborCodeisthatapersondismissedforcauseasdefinedthereinis
notentitledtoseparationpay.Theseparationpay,whenitwasconsideredwarranted,wasrequired
regardlessofthenatureordegreeofthegroundproved,beitmereinefficiencyorsomethinggraver
likeimmoralityordishonesty.Separationpayshallbeallowedasameasureofsocialjusticeonlyin
thoseinstanceswheretheemployeeisvalidlydismissedforcausesotherthanseriousmisconductor
thosereflectingonhismoralcharacter.Wherethereasonforthevaliddismissalis,forexample,
habitualintoxicationoranoffenseinvolvingmoralturpitude,liketheftorillicitsexualrelations
withafellowworker,theemployermaynotberequiredtogivethedismissedemployeeseparation
pay,orfinancialassistance,orwhateverothernameitiscalled,onthegroundofsocialjustice.If
the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he isvalidly
dismissed,itisnotunlikelythathewillcommitasimilaroffenseinhisnextemploymentbecause
hethinkshecanexpectalikeleniencyifheisagainfoundout.Thiskindofmisplacedcompassion
isnotgoingtodolaboringeneralanygoodasitwillencouragetheinfiltrationofitsranksbythose
whodonotdeservetheprotectionandconcernoftheConstitution.
Thosewhoinvokesocialjusticemaydosoonlyiftheirhandsarecleanandtheirmotivesblameless
andnotsimplybecausetheyhappentobepoor.

Weholdthatthegrantofseparationpayinthecaseatbarisunjustified.

Theprivaterespondenthasbeendismissedfordishonesty,asfoundbythelaborarbiterandaffirmed
bytheNLRCandassheherselfhasimpliedlyadmitted.Thefactthatshehasworkedwiththe
PLDTformorethanadecade,ifitistobeconsideredatall,shouldbetakenagainstherasitreflects
aregrettablelackofloyaltythatsheshouldhavestrengthenedinsteadofbetrayingduringallofher
10yearsofservicewiththecompany.Ifregardedasajustificationformoderatingthepenaltyof
dismissal,itwillactuallybecomeaprizefordisloyalty,pervertingthemeaningofsocialjusticeand
underminingtheeffortsoflabortocleanseitsranksofallundesirables.ImbongvOchoa
SUBSTANTIVEISSUES:
A.OntheconstitutionalityofRA10354/ReproductiveHealth(RH)Law
1.Whetherornot(WON)RA10354/ReproductiveHealth(RH)Lawisunconstitutionalfor
violatingtherighttolife:
NO.Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientificandmedicalissuethatshouldnotbedecided,atthisstage,withoutproperhearingand
evidence.However,theyagreedthatindividualMemberscouldexpresstheirownviewsonthis
matter.

andintheregularpurchaseofessentialmedicinesandsuppliesofallnationalhospitals(Section9
oftheRHLaw).Theyciterisksofgettingdiseasesgainedbyusinge.g.oralcontraceptivepills.
Somepetitionersdonotquestioncontraceptionandcontraceptivesperse.Rather,theypraythatthe
statusquounderRA4729and5921bemaintained.Theselawsprohibitthesaleanddistributionof
contraceptiveswithouttheprescriptionofadulylicensedphysician.
TheRHLawdoesnotintendtodoawaywithRA4729(1966).WithRA4729inplace,theCourt
believesadequatesafeguardsexisttoensurethatonlysafecontraceptivesaremadeavailable
tothepublic.InfulfillingitsmandateunderSec.10oftheRHLaw,theDOHmustkeepinmind
theprovisionsofRA4729:thecontraceptivesitwillprocureshallbefromadulylicenseddrug
store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugsanddeviceswillbedonefollowingaprescriptionofaqualifiedmedicalpractitioner.
Meanwhile,therequirementofSection9oftheRHLawistobeconsideredmandatoryonly
after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the
FDA.Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, nonabortificient and
effective.
3.Whetherornot(WON)RA10354/ReproductiveHealth(RH)Lawisunconstitutionalfor
violatingthefreedomofreligionandrighttofreespeech

TheintentoftheframersoftheConstitutionforprotectingthelifeoftheunbornchildwasto
preventtheLegislaturefrompassingameasurepreventabortion.TheCourtcannotinterpret
thisotherwise.TheRHLawisinlinewiththisintentandactuallyprohibitsabortion.Byusing
thewordorindefiningabortifacient(Section4(a)),theRHLawprohibitsnotonlydrugsor
devicesthatpreventimplantationbutalsothosethatinduceabortionandinducethedestructionofa
fetusinsidethemotherswomb.TheRHLawrecognizesthatthefertilizedovumalreadyhaslife
andthattheStatehasaboundeddutytoprotectit.
However,theauthorsoftheIRRgravelyabusedtheirofficewhentheyredefinedthemeaningof
abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
primarilyinduceabortionorthedestructionofafetusinsidethemotherswombortheprevention
ofthefertilizedovumtoreachandbeimplantedinthemotherswomb(Sec.3.01(a)oftheIRR)
wouldpavethewayfortheapprovalofcontraceptivesthatmayharmordestroythelifeofthe
unbornfromconception/fertilization.ThisviolatesSection12,ArticleIIoftheConstitution.For
thesamereason,thedefinitionofcontraceptivesundertheIRR(Sec3.01(j)),whichalsousesthe
termprimarily,mustbestruckdown.
2.Whetherornot(WON)RA10354/ReproductiveHealth(RH)Lawisunconstitutionalfor
violatingtherighttohealth
NO.PetitionersclaimthattherighttohealthisviolatedbytheRHLawbecauseitrequiresthe
inclusionofhormonalcontraceptives,intrauterinedevices,injectablesandothersafe,legal,non
abortifacientandeffectivefamilyplanningproductsandsuppliesintheNationalDrugFormulary

TheCourtcannotdeterminewhetherornottheuseofcontraceptivesorparticipationinsupportof
modernRHmeasures(a)ismoralfromareligiousstandpoint;or,(b)rightorwrongaccordingto
onesdogmaorbelief.However,theCourthastheauthoritytodeterminewhetherornottheRH
LawcontravenestheConstitutionalguaranteeofreligiousfreedom.
a.)WONtheRHLawviolatestheguaranteeofreligiousfreedomsinceitmandatestheState
sponsoredprocurementofcontraceptives,whichcontravenethereligiousbeliefsofe.g.the
petitioners
NO.TheStatemaypursueitslegitimatesecularobjectiveswithoutbeingdictateduponthepolicies
ofanyonereligion.Toallowreligioussectstodictatepolicyorrestrictothergroups wouldviolate
ArticleIII,Section5oftheConstitutionortheEstablishmentClause.ThiswouldcausetheStateto
adheretoaparticularreligion,andthus,establishesastatereligion.Thus,theStatecanenhanceits
populationcontrolprogramthroughtheRH Law evenifthepromotionofcontraceptiveuse is
contrarytothereligiousbeliefsofe.g.thepetitioners.
b.) WON the RHLaw violatestheguaranteeof religiousfreedom bycompellingmedical
health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers,under pain of penalty, torefer
patientstootherinstitutionsdespitetheirconscientiousobjections
YES.Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obligesa hospital or medical practitioner to
immediatelyreferapersonseekinghealthcareandservicesunderthelawtoanotheraccessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical

beliefs.Theseprovisionsviolatethereligiousbeliefandconvictionofaconscientiousobjector.
TheyarecontrarytoSection29(2),ArticleVIoftheConstitutionortheFreeExerciseClause,
whosebasisistherespectfortheinviolabilityofthehumanconscience.
TheprovisionsintheRHLawcompellingnonmaternityspecialtyhospitalsandhospitalsowned
and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to referpatients to other
providersandpenalizingthemiftheyfailtodoso(Sections7and23(a)(3))aswellascompelling
themtodisseminateinformationandperformRHproceduresunderpainofpenalty(Sections23(a)
(1)and(a)(2)inrelationtoSection24)alsoviolate(andinhibit)thefreedomofreligion.While
penaltiesmaybeimposedbylawtoensurecompliancetoit,aconstitutionallyprotectedright
mustprevailovertheeffectiveimplementationofthelaw.
Excludingpublichealthofficersfrombeingconscientiousobjectors(underSec.5.24oftheIRR)
alsoviolatestheequalprotectionclause.Thereisnoperceptibledistinctionbetweenpublichealth
officersandtheir private counterparts. Inaddition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic inevery
individualandtheprotectionofthisfreedomremainsevenifhe/sheisemployedinthegovernment.
Using the compelling state interest test, there isno compelling state interestto limit the free
exerciseofconscientiousobjectors.Thereisnoimmediatedangertothelifeorhealthofan
individualintheperceivedscenariooftheabovequotedprovisions.Inaddition,thelimitsdonot
pertaintolifethreateningcases.
Therespondentsalsofailedtoshowthattheseprovisionsareleastintrusivemeanstoachievea
legitimatestateobjective.TheLegislaturehasalreadytakenothersecularstepstoensurethatthe
right to health is protected, such as RA 4729,RA 6365 (The Population Act of the
Philippines)andRA9710(TheMagnaCartaofWomen).
c.) WON the RHLaw violatesthe guarantee of religious freedom by requiringwouldbe
spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on
parenthood,familyplanning,breastfeedingandinfantnutrition
NO.Section 15 of the RH Law, which requireswouldbe spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood,familyplanning,breastfeedingandinfantnutritionasaconditionfortheissuanceofa
marriagelicense,isareasonableexerciseofpolicepowerbythegovernment.Thelawdoesnot
evenmandatethetypeoffamilyplanningmethodstobeincludedintheseminar.Thosewhoattend
theseminararefreetoacceptorrejectinformationtheyreceiveandtheyretainthefreedomto
decideonmattersoffamilylifewithouttheinterventionoftheState.
4.Whetherornot(WON)RA10354/ReproductiveHealth(RH)Lawisunconstitutionalfor
violatingtherighttoprivacy(maritalprivacyandautonomy)
YES.Section23(a)(2)(i)oftheRHLaw,whichpermitsRHproceduresevenwithonlytheconsent
of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),intrudes into martial
privacyandautonomyandgoesagainsttheconstitutionalsafeguardsforthefamilyasthe
basicsocialinstitution.Particularly,Section3,ArticleXVoftheConstitutionmandatestheState
todefend:(a)therightofspousestofoundafamilyinaccordancewiththeirreligiousconvictions

andthedemandsofresponsibleparenthoodand(b)therightoffamiliesorfamilyassociationsto
participateintheplanningandimplementationofpoliciesandprogramsthataffectthem.TheRH
Lawcannotinfringeuponthismutualdecisionmaking,andendangertheinstitutionsofmarriage
andthefamily.
Theexclusionofparentalconsentincaseswhereaminorundergoingaprocedureisalreadya
parentorhashadamiscarriage(Section7oftheRHLaw)isalsoantifamilyandviolatesArticle
II,Section12oftheConstitution,whichstates:Thenaturalandprimaryrightanddutyofparents
intherearingoftheyouthforcivicefficiencyandthedevelopmentofmoralcharactershallreceive
thesupportoftheGovernment.Inaddition,theportionofSection23(a)(ii)whichreadsinthe
case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercisingparentalauthorityornextofkinshallberequiredonlyinelectivesurgicalproceduresis
invalidasitdeniestherightofparentalauthorityincaseswherewhatisinvolvedisnonsurgical
procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services.Parentsarenotdeprivedofparentalguidanceandcontrolovertheirminorchild inthis
situationandmayassistherindecidingwhethertoacceptorrejecttheinformationreceived.In
addition,anexceptionmaybemadeinlifethreateningprocedures.
5.Whetherornot(WON)RA10354/ReproductiveHealth(RH)Lawisunconstitutionalfor
violatingthefreedomofexpressionandacademicfreedom
NO.The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandatestheStatetoprovideAgeandDevelopmentAppropriateReproductiveHealthEducation.
AlthougheducatorsmightraisetheirobjectiontotheirparticipationintheRHeducationprogram,
theCourtreservesitsjudgmentshouldanactualcasebefiledbeforeit.
AnyattackonitsconstitutionalityisprematurebecausetheDepartmentofEducationhasnotyet
formulatedacurriculumonageappropriatereproductivehealtheducation.
Section12,ArticleIIoftheConstitutionplacesmoreimportanceontheroleofparentsinthe
developmentoftheirchildrenwiththeuseofthetermprimary.Therightofparentsinupbringing
theiryouthissuperiortothatoftheState.
TheprovisionsofSection14oftheRHLawandcorrespondingprovisionsoftheIRRsupplement
(ratherthansupplant)therightanddutiesoftheparentsinthemoraldevelopmentoftheirchildren.
Byincorporatingparentteachercommunityassociations,schoolofficials,andotherinterestgroups
indevelopingthemandatoryRHprogram,itcouldverywellbesaidthattheprogramwillbeinline
withthereligiousbeliefsofthepetitioners.
6.Whetherornot(WON)RA10354/ReproductiveHealth(RH)Lawisunconstitutionalfor
violatingthedueprocessclause

NO.TheRHLawdoesnotviolatethedueprocessclauseoftheConstitutionasthedefinitions
ofseveraltermsasobservedbythepetitionersarenotvague.

However,conscientiousobjectorsareexemptfromSec.17aslongastheirreligiousbeliefsdonot
allowthemtorenderRHservice,probonoorotherwise(SeePart3bofthisdigest.)

ThedefinitionofprivatehealthcareserviceprovidermustbeseeninrelationtoSection4(n)of
theRHLawwhichdefinesapublichealthserviceprovider.Theprivatehealthcareinstitution
citedunderSection7shouldbeseenassynonymoustoprivatehealthcareserviceprovider.

B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
determineWONasupplyorproductistobeincludedintheEssentialDrugsListisvalid

Thetermsserviceandmethodsarealsobroadenoughtoincludeprovidingofinformationand
renderingofmedicalprocedures.Thus,hospitalsoperatedbyreligiousgroupsareexemptedfrom
renderingRHserviceandmodernfamilyplanningmethods(asprovidedforbySection7oftheRH
Law)aswellasfromgivingRHinformationandprocedures.
TheRHLawalsodefinesincorrectinformation.UsedtogetherinrelationtoSection23(a)(1),
thetermsincorrectandknowinglyconnoteasenseofmaliceandillmotivetomisleador
misrepresentthepublicastothenatureandeffectofprogramsandservicesonreproductivehealth.
7.Whetherornot(WON)RA10354/ReproductiveHealth(RH)Lawisunconstitutionalfor
violatingtheequalprotectionclause
NO.ToprovidethatthepooraretobegivenpriorityinthegovernmentsRHprogramisnot
aviolationoftheequalprotectionclause.Infact,itispursuanttoSection11,ArticleXIIIofthe
Constitution,whichstatesthattheStateshallprioritizetheneedsoftheunderprivileged,sick,
elderly,disabled,women,andchildrenandthatitshallendeavortoprovidemedicalcareto
paupers.
TheRHLawdoesnotonlyseektotargetthepoortoreducetheirnumber,sinceSection7ofthe
RHLawprioritizespoorandmarginalizedcoupleswhoaresufferingfromfertilityissuesanddesire
tohavechildren.Inaddition,theRHLawdoesnotprescribethenumberofchildrenacouplemay
haveanddoesnotimposeconditionsuponcoupleswhointendtohavechildren.TheRHLawonly
seekstoprovideprioritytothepoor.
TheexclusionofprivateeducationalinstitutionsfromthemandatoryRHeducationprogramunder
Section14isvalid.There isaneedtorecognize theacademicfreedomof private educational
institutionsespeciallywithrespecttoreligiousinstructionandtoconsidertheirsensitivitytowards
theteachingofreproductivehealtheducation.
8.Whetherornot(WON)RA10354/ReproductiveHealth(RH)Lawisunconstitutionalfor
violatingtheprohibitionagainstinvoluntaryservitude
NO.TherequirementunderSec.17oftheRHLawforprivateandnongovernmenthealthcare
serviceproviderstorender48hoursofprobonoRHservicesdoesnot amounttoinvoluntary
servitude,fortworeasons.First,thepracticeofmedicineisundeniablyimbuedwithpublicinterest
thatitisboththepowerandadutyoftheStatetocontrolandregulateitinordertoprotectand
promotethepublicwelfare.Second,Section17onlyencouragesprivateandnongovernmentRH
serviceproviderstorenderprobonoservice.BesidesthePhilHealthaccreditation,nopenaltyis
imposedshouldtheydootherwise.

NO.ThedelegationbyCongresstotheFDAofthepowertodeterminewhetherornotasupplyor
productistobeincludedintheEssentialDrugsListisvalid,astheFDAnotonlyhasthepowerbut
alsothecompetencytoevaluate,registerandcoverhealthservicesandmethods(underRA3720as
amendedbyRA9711ortheFDAActof2009).
C.WONtheRHLawinfringesuponthepowersdevolvedtoLocalGovernmentsandthe
AutonomousRegioninMuslimMindanao(ARMM)
NO.TheRHLawdoesnotinfringeupontheautonomyoflocalgovernments.Paragraph(c)of
Section17providesacategoricalexceptionofcasesinvolvingnationallyfundedprojects,facilities,
programsandservices.Unlessalocalgovernmentunit(LGU)isparticularlydesignatedasthe
implementingagency,ithasnopoweroveraprogramforwhichfundinghasbeenprovidedbythe
nationalgovernmentundertheannualgeneralappropriationsact,eveniftheprograminvolvesthe
deliveryofbasicserviceswithinthejurisdictionoftheLGU.
Inaddition,LGUsaremerelyencouragedtoprovideRHservices.Provisionoftheseservicesare
notmandatory.Therefore,theRHLawdoesnotamounttoanundueencroachmentbythenational
governmentupontheautonomyenjoyedbyLGUs.
ArticleIII,Sections6,10,and11ofRA9054ortheOrganicActoftheARMMmerelydelineates
thepowersthatmaybeexercisedbytheregionalgovernment.Theseprovisionscannotbeseenas
anabdicationbytheStateofitspowertoenactlegislationthatwouldbenefitthegeneralwelfare.

MeyervNebraska
Factsofthecase
Nebraska,alongwithotherstates,prohibitedtheteachingofmodernforeignlanguagestograde
schoolchildren.Meyer,whotaughtGermaninaLutheranschool,wasconvictedunderthislaw.
Question
DoestheNebraskastatuteviolatetheFourteenthAmendment'sDueProcessclause?
Conclusion
Yes,theNebraskalawisunconstitutional.Nebraskaviolatedthelibertyprotectedbydueprocessof
the Fourteenth Amendment. Liberty means more than freedom from bodily restraint. State
regulationoflibertymustbereasonablyrelatedtoaproperstateobjective.Thelegislature'sviewof
reasonablenesswassubjecttosupervisionbythecourts.Thelegislativepurposeofthelawwasto
promote assimilation and civic development. But these purposes were not adequate to justify
interferingwithMeyer'slibertytoteachorthelibertyofparentstoemployhimduringa"timeof
peaceanddomestictranquillity."

PiercevSocietyofsisters
Brief Fact Summary.Appellees, two nonpublic schools, were protected by a preliminary
restrainingorderprohibitingappellantsfromenforcinganOregonActthatrequiredparentsand
guardians to send their children to public school. Appellants appealed the order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law.The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parents or
guardiansrighttodecidethemodeinwhichtheirchildrenareeducated.Statesmaynotusurpthis
rightwhenthequestionedlegislationdoesnotreasonablyrelatetoaviablestateinterest.
Facts.Appellee the Societyof Sisters,acorporationwiththe power toestablishandmaintain
academiesorschoolsandAppelleeHillMilitaryAcademy,aprivateorganizationconductingan
elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining
orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act. The Act
requiredallparentsandguardianstosendchildrenbetween8and16yearstoapublicschool.The
appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.
Issue.DoestheActunreasonablyinterferewiththelibertyofparentsandguardianstodirectthe
upbringingandeducationofchildrenundertheircontrol?

Held.TheActviolatesthe14thAmendmentbecauseitinterfereswithprotectedlibertyinterests
and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.
TheAppelleeshavestandingbecausetheresultofenforcingtheActwouldbedestructionofthe
appelleesschools.Thestatehasthepowertoregulateallschools,butparentsandguardianshave
therightanddutytochoosetheappropriatepreparationfortheirchildren.NewYorkvFerber
TheRespondent,Ferber(Respondent),wasconvictedofdistributingchildpornographyinviolation
of

New

York

state

law.
SynopsisofRuleofLaw.Childpornographyisobscenewithoutexception.
Facts.Use of children in pornographic materials has increased over the years causing the
introductionofmanystatelawsprohibitingsuchactivity.TheRespondentwasastoreownerwho
sold material showing children under the age of 16 engaged in sexual activities.
Issue.Ischildpornographyaformofobscenitythatmaybeconstitutionallyrestricted?
Held.Yes.Theprohibitiononthesaleanddistributionofchildpornographyisconstitutionaleven
if

the

material

is

not

obscene.
Distribution of these materials is intrinsically related to child abuse.
Advertisingandsellingthesetypesofmaterialsprovideaneconomicmotivetoengageinillegal
activity.
The value of showing children engaged in sex is de minimis.
Concurrence.Itispossibleforsomedepictionsofchildsexactstohaveseriousliterary,artistic,
scientificormedicalvalue.