Chinese Politics FileMadeline Gochee

T Arguments
1.

Against Climate Coop: engagement must be over a point of

disagreement in the squo, best limits and clear neg ground is lost
because, for example, Paris can non-unique most DAs and link turns are
much easier because can cite the squo as an example. Also jusitifes affs
that are an obscure increase for what US and China are doing, like
increasing Visa programs or Student exchange programs. Also gives neg
core ground with China Says no.
2. Against SCS or Space: Increase engagement must be building
off of past engagement, the word increase was chosen from a reason
rather than create, justifies doing anything new with china which
explodes reasurch burden for neg teams
3. Against Space: The resolution says economic and/or diplomatic,
excluding military, meaning military cooperation is not topical. Either
they directly link to this or it prove sthey are extra topical because a lot
of the space advantages have to do with military cooperation, proving
the abuse by the advantages stemming off of the extra topical section
of the plan.

Articles to Read
1. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chinese-president-xijinping_us_55fed862e4b08820d918ff14 - about Xi and his political capital
2. https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2016/04/06/does-politicalcapital-matter/ - What is political capital? (only really need the first two
paragraphs)
3. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-triumph-ofconservative-hardliners-in-chinas-power-transition/265273/ - About Chinese
Hardliners

1NC Shell
1. Uniqueness 1/2: Xi has enough political capital to push
through economic reforms now, but only if he maintains
an anti-western, nationalist stance
Sheehan, Matt. "What You Need To Know About Chinas Strongman
President." Huffington Post. N.p., 20 Sept. 2015. Web. 3 July 2016.
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ chinese-president-xijinping_us_55fed862e4b08820d918ff14>. Matt Sheehan is a China
correspondent for the WorldPost.
Xi has quickly emerged as maybe the most powerful Chinese
leader since Mao Zedong. Chinas previous leaders largely shunned the spotlight, portraying
themselves as part of a group ruling by consensus. Xi has instead built a huge personal
brand by employing strongman tactics at home and abroad. In China, Xi
Strongman

has consolidated enormous personal power through a blistering

crackdown on both corrupt officials and civil society activists .

The

prosecution of powerful officials (many who happen to be Xis political rivals) and the
detention of civil rights lawyers have shocked China-watchers in their audacity and depth.
Some scholars argue that the twin crackdowns reveal Xis vision for Chinas future: not a liberal, electoral
democracy, but an efficient authoritarian state with a strong leader at the helm. Abroad,

asserted Chinas contentious territorial claims

Xi has

by building artificial islands in the

South China Sea. Over the objection of the United States and its allies, China has managed to build
airstrips and outposts in waters also claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam.

Xi has also

expanded Chinese influence in Southeast and Central Asia

by founding

new international organizations and pledging huge money for infrastructure investments abroad.
Reformer ?

Those stances have built popularity and political capital that

Xi may spend on broad-ranging economic and environmental

reforms.

In 2013

the Chinese leadership announced its intention to

kick-start sputtering economic reforms , shrinking the role of the state by giving
market forces a decisive role in the economy. Those reforms are meant to power the Chinese economy
through a tough transition: away from traditional sources of growth (cheap exports and heavy industry)
and toward a new economy built on services, consumption and innovation. Thats a monumental task, and

so far the record on reform is mixed. Early progress was made on

thorny issues of restructuring local government debt and wrenching
the Chinese economy away from high-polluting industries such as
steel and cement. Sudden drops in Chinese coal consumption also
laid the groundwork for last falls landmark climate change
agreement with the U.S. But this summer, the government fumbled
on several fronts. When a politically expedient stock market bubble began to burst, the
leadership pumped in money in a desperate attempt to keep the party going. That move and a sudden

Xi may sacrifice deep reform in hopes

of propping up short-term growth. GREG BAKER VIA GETTY IMAGES President Xi Jinping
is striving to push reforms at home and assert Chinese preeminence
devaluation of the RMB fueled speculation that

in the Asia-Pacific. Revival Xi has branded his administration with the trademark phrases the
Chinese dream and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. That branding reinforces a narrative
that the Chinese Communist Party has been preaching for decades: after a century of humiliation
characterized by foreign invasion and domestic strife, China is finally returning to its rightful place of

Xi is striving to take ownership of that revival

narrative by pushing reforms at home and asserting Chinese
preeminence in the Asia-Pacific. He has appealed to nationalism with
an enormous military parade, and to hopes for clean governance by
cracking down on lavish official expenditures and corrupt officials.
prominence in the world.

Taken together, Xi has attempted to build a public image as a strong leader devoted to the people. While
there are few reliable gauges of public opinion, surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest

Xi remains

immensely popular at home. Dangerous Road Ahead. But ahead lie enormous
challenges for China as a whole and Xi in particular. Can he transform the Chinese
economy without generating massive unemployment? Can he truly
root out corruption while also quashing the sprouts of independent
civil society? Can he crack down on official perks without provoking a
mutiny within the Chinese Communist Party? Can China expand its
influence abroad without driving other countries into the arms of the
United States? We wont know the full answer for years, but when two of the most powerful people
in the world sit down next week, these are the questions and currents that will be driving the conversation.

2. Uniqueness 2/2: A Chinese economic drop off is coming

now, but economic reforms, which are on the agenda, can
stop it.
Parker 15 (Deputy Director, Social Science Communications at Stanford
University)
Clifton, July 13, 2015, China's economy would benefit from market reforms,
Stanford scholars say, http://news.stanford.edu/2015/07/13/china-slowdownexperts-071315/, 7/5/16, CD)
Chinas tight control over its economy is one reason why it is facing
an economic slowdown of global implications, Stanford scholars say.

Chinas stock market fall is now in its third week, and share prices have lost a third of their value since
mid-June, though the market is still higher than a year ago. China has the worlds second-largest economy,
with deep financial links to the United States. Nicholas Hope, director of the China Program at the Stanford
Center for International Development, which is part of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research,

nothing grows at 10 percent

forever. However, the dropoff is sharper than the government of
China expected or desires, he noted. Hope said the deceleration is
due to the effects of slow growth globally on international trade,
slower progress than hoped in rebalancing the Chinese economy
toward spending more on consumption and less on investment, and
the inefficiency of much of Chinese investment. Another big problem is the debt
said the simple answer behind the slowdown is that

load of local and regional governments. Hope does not think the steep fall of Chinas stock market is
comparable to the American crash of 1929 so long as the Shanghai market index remains comfortably
above where it was a year ago. Yet the frighteningly sharp correction over the past few weeks highlights
the fragility of the Chinese financial system, he said. It also serves as a cautionary tale for the many small
investors who speculated on high returns with borrowed money. Borrowed funds have financed many risky
economic investments in infrastructure by subnational [regional and local] governments as well as stock
purchases by unwise investors, he said. The result threatens to be an unwanted increase in non-

China can
overcome its problems if it adopts economic reforms aimed at
fostering more private enterprise and less state control over the
performing loans in the banking system as borrowers are unable to repay. Hope believes

market. Back in 1993, Chinas Communist Party announced those

reforms and updated them in 2013, so they are technically on the
books. Paradoxically, current weaknesses could be a longer-term source of strength, as the shares of
income and consumption in Chinese GDP rise, investment is increasingly more efficiently allocated by a
transformed financial system and all factors of production land, capital and labor are put to more
productive uses, he said. To counteract the market drop, the government ordered state-owned companies
to buy shares, hiked the amount of equities insurance companies can hold and offered more credit to
finance trading. Hope said this may cause a problem. It is introducing considerable moral hazard by
attempting to bail out small investors because of the concern over the potential for social unrest if too
many of those investors lose all of their savings, he said. Charlotte Lee, associate director of the China
Program at Stanfords Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, says it is too early to tell if the
market fall will diminish the credibility of the government and Communist Party in the eyes of the people.

Xi Jinping, does want to maintain his popularity. The

governments management of the economy is, however, one of the
pillars of its credibility, Lee said. She described this as a small dent in that credibility, as
Chinas President,

the government has many other ways it aids the Chinese people.

3. Link: Engagement with the US undermines Xis political

influence- sends a signal of weakness to hardliners
Buckley 14 (Chris Buckley is a correspondent for The New York Times and
graduated from the Australian National University)
Chris, November 11, 2014, Xi Jinping Rapid Rise in China Presents Challenges to the
U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/president-xi-jinping-makes-ithis-mission-to-empower-china.html?_r=0, 7/6/16, CD)

President Obama will sit down Wednesday with the kind of Chinese leader no
American president has ever encountered: a strongman with bold ambitions at
home and abroad who sees China as a great power peer of the
United States. President Xi Jinping has amassed power faster than
any Chinese leader in decades, and his officials have cast his talks with Mr. Obama and

other regional leaders this week in Beijing as another affirmation of the ascendance of China and of Mr. Xi.
For over 20 years, the Chinese Communist Party elite largely made decisions by consensus, seeking to
avoid a repeat of the turbulence under Mao and Deng Xiaoping. But less than two years after assuming

Mr. Xi has emerged as more than the first among equals in the ruling Politburo Standing
Committee, shaking the longstanding assumption that China would be
steered by steady, if often ponderous, collective leadership. The
power,

implications of his rise for the United States, and for Mr. Obama, are two-sided. When the two leaders
meet, Mr. Obama may have a surer sense that his counterpart has the power to make good on his
promises. On Wednesday, they unveiled a deal on curbing greenhouse gases, including a landmark
agreement by China to reach a peak in carbon dioxide emissions by about 2030. On Tuesday, China also
said it would eliminate tariffs on many information technology products. But so much now depends on Mr.
Xis political calculations, and he has shown himself to be wary of the West and disinclined to make
concessions under pressure. Xi portrays himself in some ways not unlike Putin, said Dali Yang, a political
science professor at the University of Chicago. Hes

basically saying that I am here to defend

the party, to defend the national interests in terms of national territorial
sovereignty. Signs of Mr. Xis ascendancy are everywhere, from the collections of his speeches
selling in bookstores to the intense, often adulatory, news coverage of his busy routine. In lighter
moments, the state-run news media have taken to calling him Xi Dada: roughly, Big Papa Xi. Mr. Xi, 61,
has shaken up party ranks with an extended campaign against official corruption and pursued a crackdown
on dissent that has dismayed liberal intellectuals. Rather than distribute portfolios among his colleagues,
he has hoarded control of the partys most important policy committees, known as leading small groups,
and established several new ones under his command: on national security, military overhauls, economic
restructuring and control of the Internet. Xi

has been more vigorous than anyone

probably had imagined he would be, Professor Yang said. We did anticipate some
strong moves on his part, but not the scale, the breadth and the scope of his initiatives. Mr. Xi has
overseen a muscular foreign policy, pressing Chinas claims to disputed seas and

islands, deepening rifts with Japan and neighbors in Southeast Asia. Those tensions have been tempered,
for now, by an agreement with Japan on Friday acknowledging their differences and a trade agreement

He has said he wants to build a new great

power relationship with Washington to avoid confrontation that could tip into armed
conflict, but also to win greater recognition for Chinas demands and interests. In June last year, he
sought to build trust with Mr. Obama during two days of talks at the Sunnylands
retreat in California. At the same time, Mr. Xis administration has resurrected and
amplified traditional party themes that Chinas woes have been
exacerbated, even instigated, by hostile forces controlled by
Western governments. Chinese officials accuse the United States of
seeking to topple Communist Party rule, most recently by supporting pro-democracy
demonstrations in Hong Kong, a charge the United States government denies. There is this
contradiction between this Cold War ideological thinking about
hostile foreign forces and U.S. subversion, but at the same time
saying that they want to have this new type of great power
relationship, said Susan L. Shirk, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, who was a
deputy assistant secretary of state in the Clinton administration. Its the domestic
insecurity of the Chinese Communist Party. Gnawing fear and
anxiety, Professor Shirk and other China experts say, are the flip side of Chinas new
strength and assertiveness, and may go a long way toward
explaining what can appear to be dissonant positions. The sources of Chinas
with South Korea announced Monday.

insecurities are many: public discontent over smog, graft and land seizures; a bureaucracy and military
rotted by corruption; tumult in Hong Kong; ethnic strife in Tibet and Xinjiang; and the uncertain effects of
slowing economic growth. The

tasks our party faces in reform, development

and stability are more onerous than ever, Mr. Xi said in late October, and the
conflicts, dangers and challenges are more numerous than ever. That calculus applies to domestic policies
as well. Mr. Xi has already overseen the most intense and extended crackdown on political dissent in China
in years, as well as a sweeping campaign against corruption whose targets have included retired senior
security and military officials once thought of as immune to scrutiny. He has also vowed to overhaul the
economy and give businesses more room to grow, and party leaders at a meeting last month endorsed
proposals to give citizens fairer treatment at the hands of the police and in court. Several China scholars

Mr. Xi was likely to defy early expectations that he might shift to

a more moderate course after consolidating power. Such a shift
could be seen as a sign of dangerous weakness, they said. If over
the next year or two, there is a significant slowdown in the Chinese
economy, the air quality fails to improve in major cities such as
Beijing, or the violence spreads from Xinjiang to other parts of the
country, then Xi may well take a serious hit to his political authority ,
said

Elizabeth C. Economy, director for Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in emailed
answers to questions. The

motivation behind his tough approach may well

include fear that it will all come crashing down otherwise . Echoing

previous party leaders, Mr. Xi has said that China needs a stable and peaceful international neighborhood
so that it can focus on its domestic needs, and analysts said that focus could encourage his government to
contain tensions with Japan and neighbors in Southeast Asia. It looks to me like there has been a
recalibration, a kind of learning from the reaction of your neighbors by China, Professor Shirk said. But Ms.
Economy said she was skeptical that the calm would last. There

is certainly a foreign
policy debate underway within China over whether Chinas
assertiveness in the region has been harmful to Chinas broader
foreign policy objectives, she said. But I dont think that it has
been resolved in a way that suggests this moderation is
permanent.

4. Impact: Chinese economic decline causes war and

collapses the global economy- territorial disputes will
escalate
Carpenter, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor to
The National Interest, 2015
(Ted G. Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War? The National
Interest, 9/6/15, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economictroubles-spark-war-13784, Accessed 7/6/16, JCP JMoore)
Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock
market and mounting evidence that Chinas economic growth is
slowing dramatically. Moreover, the contagion appears to be spreading,
characterized by extreme volatility and alarming declines in
Americas own equity markets. Those worries are compounded because there always
have been doubts about the accuracy of Beijings official economic statistics. Even before the
current downturn, some outside experts believed that Chinese
officials padded the results, making the countrys performance
appear stronger than it actually was. If China is now teetering on the brink of
recession, the political incentives for officials to conceal the extent of
the damage would be quite powerful. The focus on the possible wider economic
consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is
understandable, since the ramifications could be extremely
unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies. But we should also be vigilant
about how such economic stress might affect Beijings diplomatic and military behavior. It is not
unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by
fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation

Chinas leaders likely feel increasingly

uncomfortable. The implicit bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented
to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.

reforms in the late 1970s has been that if the public does not challenge the Communist Partys dominant
political position,

the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for

the people.

The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what
happens if the Partys position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain
seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often double digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what
happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous
degree of public discontent will surface. Beijing might refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign
policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export markets, and access to those markets
would be jeopardized by war. However,

the need to preserve and strengthen

national unity and distract the public from mounting economic
troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline
policies in at least three areas. And all of those situations entail the
danger of miscalculations that could lead to war. One issue is the South
China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily broad territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent
of that body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval patrols
and the building of artificial islands. Those policies have brought
Beijing into acrimonious disputes with neighbors such as Vietnam
and the Philippines, which have rival territorial claims, and with the
worlds leading maritime power, the United States, which resists any
manifestation of Chinese control over the South China Sea and the crucial commercial
lanes that pass through it. The conditions are in place for a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have
already stressed the countrys alleged historical claims to the area, and made it clear that it will not

Such arguments are designed

to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of the countrys long period of
tolerate being subjected to humiliation by outside powers.

weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s. A second issue is Taiwan. Beijing has long
argued that Taiwan is rightfully part of China and was stolen from the country in the Sino-Japanese war in
1895. Although Chinese leaders have exhibited patience regarding the issue of reunification, relying in
large measure on growing cross-strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to eventually accept that outcome,
Beijing has also reacted very sharply whenever Taiwanese officials have pushed an agenda of

The danger or
renewed confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that the nominee of
Chens old party, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, will be Taiwans next leader. A
new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely serious , since the
United States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese efforts at
coercion as a grave breach of the peace of East Asia. Yet there is little
independence, as during the administration of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008.

doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a stern response by the
Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be
more political danger to the regime if it did not take a strong stance on that issue. The

third possible

arena for crisis is the East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its claims to the
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which are under Japanese control. From Chinas perspective, those islands were
stolen by Imperial Japan at the same time that Tokyo took possession of Taiwan following the 1895 war.
And ginning up public anger against Japan is never difficult. China just
finished celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which is touted in China as the
Chinese Peoples War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. Recalling
Japans invasion of China, and the resulting atrocities, was a prominent theme of the various

Anger at
Japan over the ongoing East China Sea dispute and other matters
has already produced anti-Japanese riots in Chinese cities,
characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and automobiles.
commemorative events. But the animosity is not based solely on historical grievances.

There is a powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising stance on the
Diaoyu/Senkaku feud, confident that the Chinese people will back such a stance.

Extra Links

General- engagement with the US

1. Nationalism in China causes resistance against any
engagement with the US China is inclined to be more
hostile to the US.
Blackwill 16 (Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, 5-26-2016, "China's Strategy for Asia: Maximize Power, Replace
America," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinasstrategy-asia-maximize-power-replace-america-16359?page=show 7/6/16
MK)
Economic growth and nationalism have for decades been the two
founts of legitimacy for the Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi
will likely rely increasingly on the latter . As a powerful but exposed leader, Xi
will tap into this potent nationalist vein through foreign policy ,

burnishing his nationalist credentials and securing his domestic position from elite and popular criticism, all
while pursuing various Chinese national interests. In the future,

Xi could become more

hostile to the West, using it as a foil to boost his approval ratings the
way Putin has in Russia. Already, major Chinese newspapers are running articles
blaming the countrys economic slump on efforts undertaken by
insidious foreign forces that seek to sabotage the countrys rise. On territorial matters, Xi
will be unwilling or unable to make concessions that could harm his
domestic position, and may even seek to escalate territorial disputes
against Japan or South China Sea claimants as a way of redirecting
domestic attention away from the economic situation and burnishing
his nationalist record. Globally, in order to demonstrate at home that China is taken seriously
abroad, Xi will maintain a proactive and assertive Chinese foreign
policy that involves institution-building and occasional provocation, while remaining firm in
the face of external pressure on the South and East China Seas,
human rights, conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and diplomatic visits
by the Dalai Lama. Finally, Xis resistance to Western culture and
values may intensify . Because Chinas economy is now slowing, Xis fear of political instability
may push him to adopt even sterner measures, and new violations of human rights and
the emerging challenges that Western NGOs and businesses face will
likely cause renewed friction in Chinas relationships with the West.

2. Engaging with the US is against Chinas best interests

of taking primacy in Asia.
Blackwill 16 (Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, 5-26-2016, "China's Strategy for Asia: Maximize Power, Replace
America," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinasstrategy-asia-maximize-power-replace-america-16359?page=show 7/6/16
MK)
Chinas primary strategic goal in contemporary times has been the
accumulation of comprehensive national power. This pursuit of

power in all its dimensionseconomic, military, technological and diplomaticis driven by the
conviction that China, a great civilization undone by the hostility of
others, could never attain its destiny unless it amassed the power
necessary to ward off the hostility of those opposed to this quest. This
vision of strengthening the Chinese state while recovering Chinas centrality in international politicsboth

the aims of
Beijings grand strategy both implicate and transcend the United
States and Chinas other Asian rivals, to replace U.S. primacy in
Asia writ large. For China, which is simultaneously an ancient civilization and a modern polity,
objectives requiring the accumulation of comprehensive national powersuggests that

grand strategic objectives are not simply about desirable rank orderings in international politics but rather
about fundamental conceptions of order. Because the acquisition of comprehensive national power is
meant to both increase the Chinese states control over its society and maximize the countrys overall
capabilities relative to its foreign competitors, Beijing has consistently pursued four specific operational
aims since the revolutionthough the instruments used to achieve these ends have varied over time. The
first and most important aim pursued by Chinas leaders since the founding of the modern Chinese state
has been the preservation of internal order and the domination of the Chinese Communist Party. - The goal
of ensuring continued and unchallenged Communist rule leads to the second operational aspiration:
sustaining the high levels of economic growth necessary to preserve social order. The external advantages
arising from Chinas high growth rates thus far have strengthened its capacity to achieve the third
operational aim deriving from its quest for comprehensive national power: the pacification of its extended
geographic periphery. Beijing has sought to accomplish this by deepening economic ties with its Asian
neighbors to reduce regional anxieties about Chinas rise; making common cause with some states, such
as Russia, that have reasons to resist joining the larger balancing against China now under way in Asia;
embarking on a concerted modernization of the PLA; and renewing older efforts to delegitimize the U.S.
alliance system in Asia. The CCPs desire to preserve domestic control is enhanced by the final element of
the strategic goal of maximizing comprehensive national power: enhancing Chinas status as a central
actor in the international system. The fundamental conclusion for the United States, therefore, is that

China does not see its interests served by becoming just another
trading state, no matter how constructive an outcome that might
be for resolving the larger tensions between its economic and
geopolitical strategies. Instead, China will continue along the path to
becoming a conventional great power with the full panoply of
political and military capabilities, all oriented toward realizing the
goal of recovering from the United States the primacy it once
enjoyed in Asia as a prelude to exerting global influence in the
future.

3. Chinese leaders are against cooperating with the US.

Eikenberry 15 (Karl W. Eikenberry, 6-9-2015, "Chinas Place in U.S.
Foreign Policy," American Interest, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/2015/06/09/chinas-place-in-u-s-foreign-policy/ 7/6/16 MK)
Given the possibility that the PRC may continue to accumulate national power at rates surpassing those of

understanding Chinas desired strategic ends is critical

to designing an effective foreign policy. Chinas core national
security objectives are to protect its sovereignty, achieve modernity,
and maintain stability. Effective pursuit of these objectives requires complementary political,
economic, and military strategies. When determining national goals and priorities, PRC leaders
generally exhibit a cautious realist worldview, but their aspirations
are ambitious, historically inspired, and politically informed . They feel a
the United States,

deep sense of mission to restore the assumed former greatness of

the Chinese state, and as part and parcel of that mission, to

recover Chinas territories lost during a century of humiliation

at the hands of the West and Japan. Chinas leaders also strongly believe
that the Communist Party must maintain its monopoly on political
power for the sake of internal stability. Keenly aware of the hugely disruptive forces attending Chinas
rapid transition from a poor rural to an emerging middle class urban society, Party leaders do not take
national unity for granted.

North Korea
China has ZERO reason to cooperate against NK- every
possible outcome hurts their interests and will not be
peaceful
Doug Bandow, Jan 15, 2016, (senior fellow at the Cato Institute and
former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, Persuading China to
Cooperate Against North Korea, The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/how-persuade-china-cooperateagainst-north-korea-14923)
Beijing has perfectly understandable reasons to avoid wrecking
the North Korean state. Denouncing the PRC for being unreasonable
isnt going to help. After all, American officials cannot credibly claim
that their policies toward the Korean peninsula are unrelated to
their perception of Americas national interests. If the administration wants to
In fact,

enlist Chinas aid, Washington must convince the PRC that acting is in Chinas, not Americas, best interest.

the
DPRK is not a major problem for China. The Kim Jong-un regime has cut the refugee
flow across the Yalu in half. Economic cooperation remains profitable despite
That requires addressing Beijings concerns. While unpredictable, obstinate and irritating, so far

persistent North Korean unreasonableness. The North disrupts

American regional dominance and forces Seoul and Washington to
beg for assistance in dealing with the DPRK . Even Pyongyangs
growing nuclear arsenal poses no obvious threat to China. Any North
Korean weapons will be pointed south. Moreover, while it is widely presumed that the
PRC was not informed of the latest test ahead of time, high level envoys recently passed both ways
between the two countries. So Kim may have alerted his reluctant patronwithout, of course, asking its

Why, then,
should the PRC sacrifice its political influence and economic
interests? A Chinese cut-off of energy and food would cause great
hardship in the North. But that would not guarantee Pyongyangs
permissionmaking his actions appear less destabilizing, even though still unwelcome.

compliance. A half million or more people died of starvation during

the late 1990s without any change in DPRK policy . Renewed privation would
be a blow to Kim, who has promised economic growth, but the leadership has never
based its policy on protecting its people from hardship . In contrast, from its
founding the regime jealously guarded its independence even from its major communist benefactors. Thus,

The result might

be a return to the 1990s, with a horrific collapse in living conditions
but regime survivaland continued development of nuclear
weapons. In which case China would have sacrificed its relationship
with its sole ally for no reason. Even worse, from Beijings standpoint,
Vladimir Putins Russia might step in as North Koreas savior. Moscow and
the DPRK leadership may refuse to bend, forcing Beijing to act on its threats.

Pyongyang recently revived their relationship and Putin might decide to preserve this important challenge
to the United States. In fact, Moscows UN ambassador insisted that any new sanctions be "proportionate,"

If so, the PRC again would find that it had

compromised its interests for nothing. Or the North Korean regime
might collapse, bringing to mind the old warning about getting what you wish for. The
not what Washington wanted to hear.

consequences could be violent conflict, social chaos, loose nukes,

and mass refugee flows.

Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans already have crossed the

Yalu; starvation highlighted by combat among armed factions could create a human tsunami .

The PRC
might feel forced to intervene militarily to stabilize the North and
Chinese forces might not be able to leave quickly. Indeed, Beijing might decide to
maintain 'its' Korea under different leadership rather than accept a
unified Western-leaning state on its border. After all, a united Republic
of Korea would be more rival than supplicant. Chinas political influence would
ebb. PRC business investments would be swept away as South Korean money flooded the North.

Worse, a reunited Korea allied with America would put U.S. troops
on the Yalu and aid Washingtons ill-disguised attempt at military
containment .

Climate Coop
Xi will face backlash if he cooperates on climate change,
plan undermines push for economic reforms
Lehr 5/30/16 , Senior Fellow of the Paulson Institute. She has served in a
number of positions focused on China and other emerging markets. In the
private sector, she was a Senior Advisor to the Chairman and CEO of Merrill
Lynch as well as a Senior Managing Director at the New York Stock Exchange.
Deborah, May 30th 2016, Huffington Post, Xis Green Teams Fight for the
Environment, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deborah-lehr/xis-green-teamsfight-for_b_10206812.html, NC
Xi has turned his attention to the even more difficult task of
delivering on those commitments at home. To do so, hes taking a page
from his anti-corruption campaign: creating Green Teams or
environmental experts tasked with conducting random inspections
across China to ensure that provincial and municipal leaders are
actually implementing his policies. Xis Green Teams are a broader
symbol of his challenges to implementing his domestic reform
agenda, particularly enforcing local compliance of his national
policies. While President Xi may have consolidated power at the
national level, he still has tremendous difficulty ensuring that
policies issued from the center are carried out consistently at the
local level. As the Chinese proverb goes, the sky is high and the emperor is far away. And Xis
environmental effort will fail if he cannot get local leaders in line . The
Now

new inspection unit at the Ministry for Environmental Protection (MEP) is 120 experts strong and will visit
all of Chinas provinces every two years. They began their task this May in Hebei Province, adjacent to
Beijing and home to the most polluted cities in China It is ground zero in the war against pollution. This
initial Green Teams conclusion would come as no surprise to President Xi: Hebei officials are not enforcing
the laws consistently. The inspectors found 2,856 environmental infractions, shuttered illegal companies,
detained 123 individuals and investigated another 65. As a result, the province has conducted their own
investigation and identified 13,784 issues to be addressed by the end of 2016. Local officials are now on
notice, and will be held personally accountable for successfully implementing these changes. To create

Chinese have also changed the criteria for

promotion of local officials to include implementation of
environmental reforms as a key consideration for rising within the
government system. Historically, the two main criteria were economic growth and job creation.
some incentives to follow the rules, the

Now mayors and governors are also ranked on their abilities to clean up the environment in their region.
President Xi has also taken the much needed step of changing the reporting structure for the MEP and its
provincial and municipal branches. Previously, all MEP branches were under the authority of the local
Mayor or provincial governor, allowing them to exert undue influence if the MEP policies differed from their
own interests. Now local MEP leaders are under the authority of the MEP headquarters in Beijing, which
should ensure more policy consistency in the provinces. The concept of the Green Team is not new. Last
year, the Xi dispatched eight SWAT-like inspection teams to the provinces to determine whether local
officials were implementing Xis ambitious economic plans. They came back with a 1,000 page report that

Party continues to
investigate the lack of consistent policy implementation as part of
its anti-corruption campaign. Three years into his presidency, Xi is
still struggling with implementing his sweeping agendawith one of
the main obstacles being local recalcitrance. In the case of the
environment, China is making progress where the central
government has authority. Investment in infrastructure is one of those areas: China now
basically concluded that local officials were not cooperating. The

accounts for 30% of wind power and 17% of the solar power globally. China is also on track to become the

worlds largest green bond market, and is uniting its seven regional carbon markets into a unified

government is also exploring unique publicprivate partnerships models to green finance the implementation
of these commitments. There is strong economic rationale for
growing the environmental sector and transitioning to low carbon
growth. Xi is not taking this aggressive action however just to
please the Paris signatories. At home, the number one source of protests is the poor quality
nationwide system next year. The

of the environment. The growing Chinese middle class expects clean air to breath, safe food to eat and
pure water to drink. One Green Team member told the media he was receiving at least 100 calls a day
from the public just in Hebei province with complaints about local environmental degradation.

Environmental protection has become a political imperative for the

senior leadership as much as an economic one. Yet the battle for the
future of Chinas environmentmuch like the battle over curtailing
corruption or spurring economic growthwill be fought as much in
Chinas myriad provinces and cities as in the halls of power in
Beijing. Which begs the question: when it comes to cleaning up Chinas environment, will the Green
Teams be enough?

SCS
Cooperation over the South China Sea is extremely
unpopular in China.
Yunbi 15 (Zhang Yunbi, 6-5-2015, "China voices opposition to US
interference," Asia Weekly, http://epaper.chinadailyasia.com/asiaweekly/article-4584.html 7/6/16 MK)

Senior Chinese officials have spoken harshly about interference from

the United States in the South China Sea situation as China talked about its
commitment to regional stability at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. At the dialogue on May

Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese Peoples

Liberation Army (PLA), voiced Chinas firm opposition to the US as
it has ignored history, legitimate reasons and fact, delivered a
number of alienating comments, and made false accusations over
Chinas construction on territorial islands. Construction taking place on
Chinas Nansha Islands is not targeting any country or impeding the
freedom of navigation, Sun said. Never expect us to surrender to
poorly reasoned arguments, might and hegemony, and never expect
us to accept the bitter consequences brought by sabotaging national
interests in regard to sovereignty, security and development , Sun said.
31,

Last week, a US air force reconnaissance aircraft flew near the Chinese islands and reefs on a spying
mission and received warnings from the PLA. US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said at the dialogue on
May 30 that China has quickly done extensive land reclamation recently, and he criticized Chinas actions
in the South China Sea as out of step with international norms and rules. The PLA senior official told

the construction on the

islands and reefs is completely within the scope of Chinas
sovereignty, justified and legitimate. There is no change in Chinas
pursuits regarding the South China Sea, and in Chinas position of peacefully
resolving disputes through negotiation and reconciliation, Sun said. The engagement of US
vessels and aircraft has fueled regional tension, has brought changes
to the nature of the disputes and drastically squeezed the space for
a diplomatic settlement, Zhao Xiaozhuo, researcher at the Center on China-America Defense
insiders at the annual international defense affairs gathering that

Relations at the PLAs Academy of Military Science, warned in an article. In response to Carters comments,
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told reporters on May 30 that the

US is not a
party to the South China Sea issue. It is not and shall not become an
issue between China and the US. Hua said Beijing urges the US to honor its
commitment of not taking sides on issues concerning territorial sovereignty and show sincere respect to
regional countries efforts to safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea.

2AC Frontline
1. No Uniqueness: Xis reforms will not go through anyway
Minxin Pei, professor of government and non-resident senior fellow at the
German Marshall Fund of the US, August 13 2015, the same bad movie,
Indian express, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-samebad-movie/
Chinese leaders, particularly President Xi Jinping, will likely suffer a serious
erosion of their carefully cultivated image of decisiveness and
competence. In a one-party state without elections or meaningful
opinion surveys, the closest proxy of public support for the
government is the stockmarket index. When the bubble was taking
Chinese stocks to new highs a few months ago, Chinese officials
portrayed it as evidence of public confidence in Xis reforms. Now
that stock prices keep diving, the same logic must imply that the
public is losing confidence. An even more likely casualty is Xis economic reform plan. The
crash is his first and most public setback. Opponents of financial liberalisation,
which has accelerated in the last two years, will almost certainly cite
the turmoil in the stockmarket as reason to postpone or scrap new
reforms, such as further decontrol of interest rates and capital flows. Internationally, the credibility of
Xis reform plan has also come under question. International investors find it impossible to reconcile
Beijings pledge to pursue bold market-oriented reforms with the contempt for market forces revealed by
the governments intervention.

2. No Uniqueness: Xis political capital is low

Minxin Pei, professor of government and non-resident senior fellow at the
German Marshall Fund of the US, 9-11-2015, if XI stumbles, Indian
express, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/if-xi-stumbles/
If Xi thought
that the parade would boost his political capital, he needs to think
again. This is not to say that holding this parade was unwise. The unfortunate truth is that the timing is
a bit off. When Xi and his political advisors decided on the parade six months ago, they could not
have foreseen the series of events this summer that has raised
disquieting doubts about Xis leadership and political strength . First
came the stockmarket crash. The governments attempt to save the bubble,
reportedly on Xis order, turned out to be an expensive flop. After
spending nearly $190 billion, the main stock indices have essentially
remained where they were when the market-rescue operations
began in mid-July. Then there was the tragic explosion in Tianjin, which
killed 160 people. Although the accident was blamed on corrupt local officials and unscrupulous
However, it is impossible to assess the longer-term political effect of the parade.

businessmen who violated regulations in storing hazardous chemicals in close proximity to a densely
populated area, the governments handling of the incident, such as evasive answers to many key

the identification of
the hazardous materials stored and the suppression of reporting by
the media, severely damaged the notion that Xis reforms have
made a difference in how officials behave. The Tianjin tragedy was
questions about the ownership of the company involved in the accident,

followed by perhaps the worst real economic event of the year : A

sudden devaluation of the Chinese currency after a spate of bad
news indicating stagnant growth. All of a sudden, popular
perceptions of the Chinese economy and of the strength of Xis
political leadership appeared to have changed. In their totality, these events
revealed a clueless government that did not seem capable of getting things done the right way, or at all.
For Xi, even the slightest perception of a stumble is politically risky. In the two-and-a-half years since he

his anti-corruption drive has turned many of his former

comrades into bitter enemies. The bureaucracy, frozen in fear and
outraged about the loss of many of its privileges, including
entitlements to bribes, may well be cheering the apparent
comeuppance of Chinas new strongman. Xis rivals, cowed by his sheer display of
came to power,

power and momentum not too long ago, may smell blood now. Even though the horrid events of the
summer may not have fatally wounded Xi, they have made him, for the first time, politically vulnerable.

3. No link: The US and China cooperate all the time, no

indication that specific action of plan will decrease
political capital enough to trigger impacts
4. Link turn: Engagement with the United States boosts
Xis political capital
Li, Cheng, and Lucy Xu. "Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism

Over the New Type of Great Power Relations.'" Brookings. N.p., 14 Dec. 2014.
Web. 3 July 2016. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/
05-chinese-pessimism-american-cynicism-great-power-li-xu>. Li is the
Director, John L. Thornton China Center and a Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy.
Obama did not even once mention the
New Type of Great Power Relations on his recent trip to Beijing. It has been widely
noted that President Xi Jinping, however, repeatedly promoted the framework
As China-watchers were quick to realize, President

first at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July, and then at the summit with Obama

Chinas official news agency reported that Xi

and Obama pledged to push forward a new type of major-country
relations, and that [Obama] is willing to lift the new type of
major-country relationship between China and the U.S. to a higher
level. Xinhua implied that Obama not only accepts, but also actively supports, the New Type
concept. In fact, the Obama administration has been cautiously staying away from it. Why is China
in mid-November. After the summit,

so keen on a New Type of Great Power Relations and on creating

perceptions of endorsement by Obama?

And why is the U.S. reluctant to adopt it?

What are the reasons behind such contrasting views Chinese enthusiasm and American cynicism
towards this seemingly benign concept? When Xi Jinping defined the New Type of Great Power Relations
in his meeting with Obama at Sunnylands last year, he described it in three points: 1) no conflict or
confrontation, through emphasizing dialogue and treating each others strategic intentions objectively; 2)
mutual respect, including for each others core interests and major concerns; and 3) mutually beneficial
cooperation, by abandoning the zero-sum game mentality and advancing areas of mutual interest.
Embedded in the New Type of Great Power Relations is a nations hope for an international environment
more conducive to its development. From the rise and fall of its many dynasties to its forced opening up to
the West in the wake of the Opium Wars, China has always seen itself as a civilization deeply entangled
and affected by history. Recognizing the historically recurring clashes between an existing great power and
an emerging power,

China looks to the New Type framework to

determinism and to

seek a less-disruptive rise in an increasingly integrated

avoid historical

world.

At the same time,

China wants to be viewed as an equal . By using the

term Great Power to primarily, if not solely, refer to China

and

the United States, China

aims to

elevate itself to a level playing field . Obtaining U.S. support of the concept would
imply Uncle Sams recognition of Chinas strength and power. This is what Chinas official media sought to
show when it suggested Obamas support of the concept: parity and respect between the two countries.
Furthermore, Chinese leaders believe that the New Type of Great Power Relations enables the two
powers to establish a new code of conduct in line with Chinas interests. By emphasizing the respect of
core interests as an element of the concept,

China pushes its territorial claims to

the forefront. This is Chinas attempt at more clearly demarking where the United States and other
neighboring countries need to toe the line. American adoption of the term would
imply that the United States recognizes Chinas core interests. This
mutual respect of each others national interests is at the core of Chinas
aspirations. The Chinese media avidly reporting on Obama and Xis
joint endorsement

of the concept

suggests that there are also domestic

reasons driving the New Type of Great Power Relations.

Although the

Chinese concept is an inherently U.S.-geared proposal, the domestic goals of such a concept should not be

the United States is the only superpower

in todays world that has the capacity to contain Chinas rise . By
overlooked. From a Chinese perspective,

strengthening Chinas view of itself as a recognized and respected

power, Xi Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under
CCP leadership and gain political capital to consolidate his own
power at home. Across the Pacific, Americans view this Chinese concept
with suspicion and cynicism. The United States is particularly sensitive to how its adoption
of the concept would be portrayed by allies in the region. Traditionally, American policy makers have no

There are unspoken

concerns that American recognition of the Chinese concept would not only
imply that Obama is taking a backseat role in the bilateral relationship, but
also suggest that the United States recognizes itself as the declining
established power in a Thucydides trap with rising China. However, the key
interest in embracing a new geopolitical framework offered by another country.

barrier for the White House is its suspicions towards Chinese intentions. Washington is not fond of Chinese
designs to obtain foreign recognition of its core interests, which the administration sees as a murky

Cynics see it as Chinas trap to gain official American

recognition of its disputed territorial claims in the East China Sea and the
South China Sea. Moreover, the Pacific power is held back by how neighboring countries in the
jumble of territorial demands.

region would interpret its embracement of the concept. The Great Powers framework is inherently
flawed, as it ignores key American allies and the important role they play for the United States in the

From a Japanese perspective, a stronger U.S.-China relationship

threatens their security alliance and exacerbates fears of
abandonment. Other smaller countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam
worry that the stronger partnership would only fuel Chinese expansionism.
With such concerns from pivotal allies, the United States is reluctant to risk upsetting
the regional security balance. How can Beijing and Washington reconcile their differing
attitudes towards the New Type of Great Power Relations? If China seeks American
endorsement of the concept, it needs to adopt real changes in its behavior to
demonstrate commitment and resolve towards the stability and prosperity of
the region. China needs to develop a keener sensitivity to how its actions are perceived. Greater
region.

assertiveness in territorial disputes and a hardened stance against its neighbors do no good to improve

The emerging power needs to take on the responsibility to be a

voice for smaller Asian countries and to advance the interests of the AsiaChinas image.

Pacific region. The concept will not succeed if it is not backed by substantive action.

On the other
hand, the U.S. should also re-evaluate its position on the New Type of Great Power Relations. The concept
has helped to break old mindsets, challenge realist thinking and erase a cold war mentality. As Larry
Summers once said, he could picture a 21st century in which the United States and China both prospered,
or a 21st century in which both countries failed to prosper, but not one in which one country prospered and
the other did not. The Chinese concept evidently has similarities to the worldview of American leaders and
scholars such as Larry Summers, and no country should or can monopolize the ownership of this common
worldview. Thus, the Obama administration should not be too cynical about it. A better American strategy
could be developed. Instead of being overtly concerned with the specifics, the United States should look at
the bigger picture: the concept is constructive and helpful so long as it can effectively guide and
encourage a non-confrontational foreign policy in China.

5. Link turn (econ engagement): Xis engagement with the

US highlight attempts to have economic benefits for the
Chinese, which will improve Xis political capital
Page, reporter in the Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, and Wei, Chinese
finance from The Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, 2015
(Jeremy Page, and Lingling Wei, China Stresses the Positive Ahead of Xi
Jinpings U.S. Trip. The Wall Street Journal, 9/17/15,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-leaders-u-s-trip-includes-stop-on-memorylane-1442509680, Accessed 7/8/16, JCP JMoore)
BEIJINGChinese

officials are seeking to highlight the benefits of

economic ties with America and burnish President Xi Jinpings image
as a man of the people ahead of a state visit to the U. S., despite clouds in
Washington over Chinas economic, political and military outlook. But even as Beijing tries to improve the
atmosphereeven arranging a folksy stopover at a West Coast high schoolU.S. and other foreign
business leaders are raising fresh worries. Those include concerns about Chinas commitment to open its

Top economic
advisers to Mr. Xi made a rare public appearance on Thursday to tout
new cooperation deals between U.S. and Chinese companies ahead
of Mr. Xis trip, which starts in Seattle on Tuesday. The advisers unveiled an agreement with a
markets and new Chinese security rules for foreign technology companies.

closely held U.S. firm, XpressWest, to pursue a high-speed, 230-mile rail line linking Southern California to
Las Vegas. Details about funding sources for the long-mooted project werent disclosed, however. A highspeed rail project between Los Angeles and Las Vegas has been discussed for years, and past attempts
have failed for a variety of reasons, including environmental impact, land use restrictions and cost.
XpressWest, the U.S. company formerly known as DesertXpress, has been working toward such a project
for a decade, according to its website. XpressWest didnt immediately respond to a call. Chinese and
American construction workers putting together a pagoda at the Chinese Reconciliation Park in Tacoma,
Wash., in 2010. ENLARGE Chinese and American construction workers putting together a pagoda at the
Chinese Reconciliation Park in Tacoma, Wash., in 2010. PHOTO: DEAN J. KOEPFLER/THE NEWS
TRIBUNE/ASSOCIATED PRESS The advisers also disclosed plans for a $3 billion fund to invest in energyefficient projects in China, and a tie-up between General Electric Co. and China National Machinery

Economic and trade cooperation

have always been the ballast and propeller of the China-U. S.
relationship, said Shu Guozeng, a deputy director of the ruling Communist Partys economic
advisory group. Chinese officials will also try to re-create a feel-good
moment from Mr. Xis 2012 trip to the U.S., this time arranging for him to drop by
Industry Corp. to build clean-energy projects in Africa.

the port of Tacoma, Wash., which he visited once in 1993. He faces a much more skeptical U.S. audience
now, however, than three years ago, when he was still vice president and went to Muscatine, Iowa, to look

Chinas
economic slowdown and its handling of a recent currency
devaluation and stock market slump have caused U.S. officials and
investors to question his economic management.
up a family he had stayed with in 1985 as part of a delegation researching animal feed.

6. No brink to the amount of political capital that would

have to decrease in order to fail to persuade hardliners
7. DA not intrinsic- Rational Chinese legislators could pass
both plan and economic reforms- bills are considered
separately
8. No internal link: No evidence that says Hardliners will
stop reforms from being passed even if Xis political
capital decreases
9. No Impact: China economy is still growing and resilient
ARTHUR R. KROEBER, STEPHEN S. ROACH, ORVILLE
SCHELL, 1-28-2016, (director of an independent global economic
research firm; Senior Fellow at Yale Universitys Jackson Institute of Global
Affairs and a Senior Lecturer at Yales School of Management.; Orville Schell is
Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society
in New York.; Without Reform from Beijing The World Will Endure More China
Scares, Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/28/china-scareeconomy-management-failures-currency-renminbi-stocks/)
It is tempting to argue that markets are overreacting. After all, Chinas
economy grew by a solid 6.9 percent in 2015. Financial media
headlines bewailed this as the lowest growth rate in a quarter
century, but neglected to mention that this is still by a good
margin the fastest growth of any major economy except for India.
Even at this slower pace, China continues to grow more than twice as fast as
developed economies. There are some doubts about the reliability of Chinas economic
statistics, of course, but most credible alternative estimates (based on hard-to-fake
indicators of physical output) suggest that China is growing at around 6 percent, and that
if anything there was a slight pickup in activity in late 2015. The tumult on equity and currency markets
can be explained as an uncomfortable but necessary part of the countrys transition from an investment-

China
is unlikely to see a collapse in economic growth any time soo n.
led command economy to a consumer-led market economy. This sanguine reading is partly true.

Construction and heavy industry, the mainstays of its growth from 2000 to 2013, are faring poorly, but the
service economy and consumer spending remain strong, underpinned by strong employment and wage
gains. Everything is slowing down a bit, but another year of six percent-plus growth should be achievable
in 2016.

10. No Impact: US-China interdependence checks back

pressure situations from the other country
Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Relations at Georgetown
University, 2015
(Robert, Grading Xi Jinpings America Policy: C-, ASAN Forum, 10/15/15,
http://www.theasanforum.org/author/?user_id=109, Accessed 7/6/16, JCP
JMoore)
The second set of constraints on tough Chinese measures against
the United States involves strong, ever-growing interdependence in

relations. Beginning at the turn of the century, each government used

engagement to build positive and cooperative ties and
interdependence and webs of relationships that had the effect of
constraining the other power from taking actions that opposed its
interests. While the analogy is not precise, the policies of engagement pursued
by the United States and China toward one another featured
respective Gulliver strategies that were designed to tie down the
aggressive, assertive, and other negative policy tendencies of the
other power through webs of interdependence in bilateral and
multilateral relationships.17 The power of interdependence to
constrain assertive and disruptive actions has limits. Nevertheless,
Chinas uncertain domestic situation seems unprepared to absorb
the shock of an abrupt shut down of normal economic interaction
that might result from a confrontation with America . And both sides
have become increasingly aware of how their respective interests
are tied to the well-being and success of the other; thereby limiting
the tendency of the past to apply pressure on one another.

2NC Blocks

AT: No Uniqueness: Reforms wont

pass
1. Extend the Sheehan 15 card from the 1NC that says
that economic reforms will pass now as long as China
continues its current anti-US policy. This card
explicably outlines the ways in which Xi has gained
enough political capital to pass reforms, and that Xi
is striving to push the reforms, meaning he will use
his political capital to push them
2. Extned our Parker 15 and Carpenter 15 cards from
the 1NC that state that economic decline will happen
without the reforms, and the catastrophic impacts of
econ decline, this should motivate the public and
lawmakers to pass reforms if there is no resentment
at Xi, (which plan would cause)
3. The warrant for reforms not passing from their
Minxin Pei card is that the public wont like Xi ,which
pushes people who are against the reforms from
passing. However, our Sheehan 15 card from the 1NC
lists the ways that the public likes Xi because of his
actions against the west, so the card is not relevant
4. Reforms will pass, Policymakers are invested and
pushing economic reforms now
Jia Kang, 3-28-16, (head of the China Academy of New Supply Side

Economics and a Beijing-based private think tank, [speech compiled by Li

Qiaoyi, a Global Time reporter], Supply-side reform can unleash Chinas
potential, Global Times,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/976435.shtmhttp://www.globaltimes.cn/co
ntent/976435.shtml)
China's top policymakers have made it clear that the country is
pushing for structural economic reform on the supply side, indicating new
thinking over fine-tuning to deal with problems in the economy. Demand and supply are economic

the government is supposed to act

in a way that maintains the dynamic balance between overall
demand and overall supply. For years, the government has
accumulated rich experience in managing the amount of aggregate
demand in the economy by means of tightening or relaxing
monetary policy in order to boost or curb overall demand. Managing the economy
on the supply side, however, has long been neglected, as supply-side
concepts that are opposite yet complementary, and

management involves greater difficulty than managing demand. To

understand the need for supply-side reform from the viewpoint of innovation in basic economic theories,
demand is considered an innate mobilizing force, but it is the way supply responds to demand and the
characteristics of the response that play a decisive role in distinguishing separate stages of economic
development. Key innovations in the evolution of productive forces have occurred on the supply side. For
example, in the era of globalization, new gadgets announced by US technology giant Apple Inc that typify
product innovation on the supply side have the effect of prompting a buying spree among Chinese
consumers.

5. SQUO provides impetus for passing reforms

Hongying Wang, Jan. 09, 2016, (senior fellow with the global economy
program at the Centre for International Governance Innovation , Will Beijing
finally see the light after years of plodding reform?, The Globe and Mail,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/willbeijing-finally-see-the-light-after-years-of-plodding-reform/article28088176/)
Chinese policy makers have recognized the shortfalls of the old development model for more than a

leaders have called for a shift to a new

development model based more on domestic consumption and less on
investment and exports. However, due to strong resistance from powerful vested
interests, change has been slow and hesitant. Since 2013, bold measures
have been announced by the government to deepen economic
reforms, increasing the role of market forces in the allocation of resources, including capital, and
decade. Since the early 2000s, Chinese

exposing state-owned enterprises to more domestic and international competition. However, to the

few of these reform measures have been

implemented. In the absence of a major crisis, Beijing has been content to take a path of least
resistance in the realm of structural reform. The worsening situation of the Chinese
economy, amplified by the financial-market downturn of late, has
mixed effects on the important issue of structural reform . On the one
disappointment of many observers,

hand, the government has been under great pressure to calm financial markets. During the stock-market
crash last summer, it brought in a so-called national team a coalition of state-controlled financial
institutions to buy shares, and banned large shareholders from selling off their holdings. This week,
Chinese regulators implemented a new (but short-lived) circuit-breaker that automatically suspended
trading when the market fell by more than 7 per cent. After markets reopened, they again shut down when
stocks took another big tumble. Rather than getting out of the market, the government increased its

The serious financial and economic woes of recent months

have greatly increased the stakes and urgency of reform. Herein lies
a potential silver lining for the dark cloud. In December, the Chinese Communist Party held an
economic work conference, which explicitly emphasized the need to carry out supply-side
structural reform. Earlier this week, the partys newspaper carried a much-noted interview with
an individual sourced only as an authoritative figure, who stressed that the time has
come to reduce excessive capacity, to withdraw life support for
inefficient enterprises and projects and to let market forces play a
decisive role in the allocation of resources. The source recognized that the process
would be painful, but argues it is inevitable, and that the Chinese economy will come
out of this process with new vigour. One can hope, cautiously, that the recent
intervention.

crisis serves as an impetus to overcome some of the tough political

obstacles for further economic reform .

AT: No UQ- Political capital is too

low
1. Extend the Sheehan 15 card from the 1NC that says
that economic reforms will pass now as long as China
continues its current anti-US policy. This card
explicably outlines the ways in which Xi has gained
enough political capital to pass reforms because of
the policies he has implemented that are antiwestern. This is what hardliners like, so this is why
he has political capital specifically with them
2. Our evidence from the 1NC postdates, which is
important because a lot can happen in political
relations, so the having the newest evidence is key
3. The rest of the card from their evidence is actually
proves Xi has enough political capital after recent eventsits from the same article
Pel, Minxin. "If Xi stumbles: Even the slightest perception of vulnerability is
politically risky. He needs to change the subject in China." Indian Express.
N.p., 11 Sept. 2015. Web. 8 July 2016.
<http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/if-xi-stumbles/>. The
writer is professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a senior
fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Even the slightest perception of vulnerability is politically risky . He
needs to change the subject in China. By any measure, Chinas Victory Day parade on
September 3 was an unforgettable show of force. For Chinese
President Xi Jinping, the original intent of holding the first-ever
Victory Day parade was to showcase his political authority. Judging
by international reaction to the display of goose-stepping soldiers
and Chinas most modern weapons systems, most outside observers
seemed less impressed than worried. Instead of reassuring the rest
of the world that Chinas rise would be peaceful, the parade
demolished the notion that China would be a different kind of great
power. Even Xis announcement of a reduction in the size of the Chinese military by 3,00,000 soldiers
failed to quell worries that feverish nationalist sentiments in China may drive
the country in a more aggressive direction.

The impact of the parade on the

Chinese people is harder to gauge. While official propaganda is not to be trusted, it is a safe bet that

many ordinary Chinese must have been proud of the advances their
country has made in military technology. It said that, to ensure that the
parade would be watched by as many people as possible, all other
entertainment programmes were stopped from broadcasting on the day of the
parade. If nothing else, a military parade is an entertaining sight. However, it is impossible to assess the

longer-term political effect of the parade. If Xi thought that the parade would boost his political capital, he
needs to think again. This is not to say that holding this parade was unwise. The unfortunate truth is that
the timing is a bit off. When

Xi

and his political advisors decided on the parade six months ago, they

could not have foreseen the series of events this summer that has
raised disquieting doubts about Xis leadership and political
strength. First came the stockmarket crash. The governments
attempt to save the bubble, reportedly on Xis order, turned out to
be an expensive flop. After spending nearly $190 billion, the main stock indices have
essentially remained where they were when the market-rescue operations began in mid-July. Then
there was the tragic explosion in Tianjin, which killed 160 people. Although the
accident was blamed on corrupt local officials and unscrupulous businessmen who violated regulations in

the governments
handling of the incident, such as evasive answers to many key
questions about the ownership of the company involved in the accident, the identification of the
hazardous materials stored and the suppression of reporting by the media, severely damaged
the notion that Xis reforms have made a difference in how officials behave.
The Tianjin tragedy was followed by perhaps the worst real economic
event of the year: A sudden devaluation of the Chinese currency
after a spate of bad news indicating stagnant growth. All of a sudden,
popular perceptions of the Chinese economy and of the strength of
storing hazardous chemicals in close proximity to a densely populated area,

Xis political leadership appeared to have changed.

In their totality,

these

events revealed a clueless government that did not seem capable

of getting things done the right way , or at all. For Xi, even the
slightest perception of a stumble is politically risky . In the two-and-a-half
years since he came to power,

his anti-corruption drive has turned many of his

former comrades into bitter enemies. The bureaucracy, frozen in fear and
outraged about the loss of many of its privileges, including entitlements to bribes,
may well be cheering the apparent comeuppance of Chinas new
strongman. Xis rivals, cowed by his sheer display of power and
momentum not too long ago, may smell blood now . Even though
the horrid events

of the summer

may not have fatally wounded Xi, they

have made him, for the first time, politically vulnerable. To recover
his lost momentum and repel any attempt by his rivals to challenge
his authority, Xi has to do something quickly to demonstrate his
political strength.

He has two options, one political and the other economic. The political option

is to arrest and prosecute another very senior retired leader for corruption. This step will dispel doubts
about his weakened grip on power. More importantly, escalating the anti-corruption campaign has
deterrence value: Anyone trying to conspire against him will end up in jail. The risk of this option, however,
is that it will further fuel the division inside the regime and have no effect on his standing with ordinary
people, who are now waiting for him to deliver actual improvement in the economy. The economic option
is, therefore, more urgent and necessary. But unfortunately, it is also more difficult because it is more

A more
sustainable way of fixing Chinas sputtering economy is to apply
bitter medicine in the short term. This will entail forcing zombie firms (mostly statecomplex and, if poorly executed, could create even more economic turmoil down the road.

owned enterprises and real-estate developers) into bankruptcy to squeeze out excess manufacturing

The price of this measure could be recession

for two to three years as real financial deleveraging takes place, but the reward is
capacity and the property bubble.

sustainable long-term growth. A less painful way of delivering the

goods immediately is to stimulate the economy

with more monetary easing and

pumping more funds into investment projects (consumption would be nice, but Beijing may not want to
hand out free money to ordinary people).

This step can revive growth immediately,

but at a high cost. Chinas debt load will likely rise to potentially
catastrophic heights . Zombie firms will continue to sap economic
vitality. No real reform will be implemented. And artificially
stimulated growth will sputter as soon as the stimulus is withdrawn.
Chinas current economic mess will only worsen.

It is hard to know which route

Xi will take. None of the options is particularly attractive. But he may have no choice. As the image of the
Victory Day parade fades,

Xi has to show off and preserve his own

political might.

4. And Xi specifically gained political capital from his anitcorruption reforms

Minxin Pei, professor of government and non-resident senior fellow at the
German Marshall Fund of the US, 5-6-2016, "Commentary: Minxin Pei,"
Nikkei Asian Review, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/PolicyPolitics/Minxin-Pei-Two-ways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate

Unfortunately, these embittered officials may have either underestimated Xi's resolve or failed to

Xi harbors a visceral revulsion

toward corruption inside the CCP and believes that only a selfdisciplined one-party regime can survive in a modern society. At the
same time, fighting corruption has earned Xi a huge amount of
political capital and given him a potent weapon against his rivals.
appreciate his political dilemma. Unlike his predecessors,

Giving it up equals unilateral disarmament. Finally, having staked so much of his credibility on purging the
rot from the party, Xi risks losing it altogether if he allows the anti-corruption campaign to fizzle out. As he
said in his January 2016 speech to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party's powerful
anti-corruption arm, "If

corruption is revived and returns, it will not only

worsen our political environment, but also damage the morale of our
party and the people. As someone has said, if corruption bounces
back, our people will lose hope." The challenge for Xi is that the campaign
against corruption is yielding diminishing returns. To be sure, it has been effective in
limiting theft by greedy officials, but it cannot motivate them to do anything positive. For
local officials, far removed from the center of power, their only weapon is passive resistance. There is now
a political stalemate between the system and its strongman.

AT: Link turns

1. Extend the Sheehan 15 card from the 1NC, this
shows that even if Xi gained political capital with the
public from working with the US, he still did not gain
political capital with Hardliners, who are uniquely
key to pass reforms. The hardliners are strictly
against cooperation with the US because of their
nationalist ties, so any cooperation between the US
and China (aka the plan) would definitely not gain Xi
Political Capital
2. Nationalists hate the US working with us could hurt
Xi.
Gries, Peter. "Why China Resents Japan, and Us." The New York Times. N.p.,
23 Aug. 2012. Web. 6 July 2016.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/opinion/ why-china-resents-japan-andus.html?_r=0>. Peter Hays Gries is a professor of international and area
studies at the University of Oklahoma and the director of its Institute for U.S.China Issues. (WC)
And although

Chinese nationalist rage is

primarily aimed at Japan, it is also

directed

toward the United States. As Chinese nationalists see it, America is

the cause of Chinas continuing problems with both Taiwan and
Japan. If it were not for the American imperialists inserting the United
States Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait during the Korean War, they say, Taiwan would long
ago have been reunified with mainland China, erasing that national
humiliation. And Japans continuing impertinence is also Americas
fault: the United States alliance with Japan gives Japanese
nationalists the gumption to defy a rising China. The statements of American
politicians further stoke Chinese anger at the United States. Speaking in Ohio late last week, the
presumptive Republican vice-presidential nominee, Paul D. Ryan, accused China of stealing intellectual
property, blocking access to its markets and manipulating the exchange rate. President Obama promised
he would stop these practices, Mr. Ryan declared. He said hed go to the mat with China. Instead, theyre
treating him like a doormat. Were not going to let that happen. Mr. Ryans views echo those of Mitt
Romney, who has promised if elected to declare China a currency manipulator. This could lead to
punitive tariffs on Chinese imports and a possible trade war. There is a long history of challengers using
China to attack incumbents during presidential elections. Most famously, in 1992, Bill Clinton accused
President George Bush of coddling the butchers of Beijing following the Tiananmen Square massacre of
1989. While there is some antipathy toward China in the Democratic Party, particularly among labor unions
and human rights activists, anti-Chinese sentiment these days comes mostly from the right. Economic
conservatives dont like the income redistribution and government regulation they associate with
socialism; the Christian right fears the atheism of Godless Communism; and libertarians dont like any
government at all, let alone the authoritarian government of China. China-bashing will therefore be good
election year politics for the Romney-Ryan ticket. But it will be bad for Americas relations with China and
could undermine our national security.

Many Chinese are already suspicious of

American intentions, and ideologically driven rhetoric

from across the Pacific will only confirm

their worst fears. Worse, the Communist Party is currently undergoing its own leadership transition, and it
is happening at a time when popular nationalism is bringing people into the streets. Because the party
bases its legitimacy in large part on its nationalist credentials, no party leader is likely to quiet the

nationalists until the new leadership is finalized. Lacking a secure foundation of mutual trust,

American-Chinese relations today remain susceptible to the random

accidents of history that have plagued them in the past. In 1999, the mistaken NATO bombing

of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, killed three and led to huge anti-American protests across
China. And in 2001, the collision between a Chinese jet and an American surveillance plane led to a
Chinese pilots death and an American crews being detained for two weeks. If comparable accidents occur
during this falls leadership transitions in both countries, popular pressure for more confrontational policies
in both China and the United States will be more difficult to contain and will increase the likelihood of
conflict in Asia.

3. A negative portrayal of the US is key to CCP

legitimacy, cooperation with America risks backlash and
instability.
Xuecun, Murong. "A Land China Loves and Hates." The New York Times.
N.p., 13 Oct. 2015. Web. 8 July 2016.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/opinion/ united-states-a-land-chinaloves-and-hates.html?_r=0>.

HONG KONG On the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, a major Chinese television network
broadcast a documentary that investigated how Chinese people viewed not only those pivotal events but

One man, referring to the slaughter of thousands of

Americans, declared, What a beautiful job! Another said, They
should give America more of the same. And a student standing in Tiananmen
Square said he approved of the attacks because the United States was a bully and a
hegemon. Later in the film, the young man in Tiananmen Square went on to describe his
plans for the future. He said that he loved America and that he was about to go there to
study. If I dont have to come back, then I wont, he said. The Chinese view of America
hasnt changed since this aired four years ago. On Sept. 3, President Xi Jinping
America itself.

orchestrated an extravagant military parade in Beijing. An acquaintance from my schooldays was so

excited by the spectacle the disciplined troop formations, the advanced equipment that he wrote in a
post on WeChat that he could hardly sleep that night. He added that his friends should guard against
America because American imperialism still wants to destroy us. Only a few months earlier, this same
man had taken his daughter on a trip to Boston, where he reported enthusiastically on social media about
visiting Harvard University and eating a huge lobster. He also pledged to send his daughter to America.
We should help our next generation live in a place without pollution, without recycled cooking oil and
poisoned milk powder, he wrote. The young man in Tiananmen Square and my former schoolmate are

For many Chinese

people, the depth of their admiration for the American system and
way of life is matched only by their animosity toward the country .
According to a Pew Research Center survey released earlier this year, only 44 percent of
hardly alone in holding contrasting, schizophrenic views of America.

Chinese people have a favorable view of America

the 33rd lowest approval

rating out of 40 countries surveyed, and far lower than the 84 percent reported for South Korea and the 68
percent for Japan. The Chinese hostility to America is first and foremost the result of government
propaganda. Because of censorship, many people lack a basic understanding of life outside China. And
although in the past few decades the Chinese government has been careful to avoid a real clash with
America,

Beijings domestic propaganda has never ceased presenting it

as the enemy. Stir in 60 years of uninterrupted anti-American

schooling, and it is hardly surprising that one result is an irrational
hostility toward the United States.

Another Chinese documentary, Silent Contest,

from 2013, highlighted one of the major reasons for castigating America as the eternal enemy. In the film,

it was said that Americas key strategic objective is to dominate and

break up China. You hear a lot of this kind of talk from Chinese
officials. Like most despotic governments, the Chinese leadership likes to play

the part of defender of the people a role that necessitates the

existence of a powerful external enemy. A strong and hostile
America is an important source of the legitimacy for Communist
Party rule.

But in our globalized age, where there are myriad, multilayered interactions between

countries, it is impossible for our government to fully stop people from seeking to research, study and
understand the United States. American films, TV shows and products, and many other aspects of
American culture remain influential in everyday Chinese life. On the Internet, Chinese netizens loudly
praise Americas system of government and spontaneously rally to Americas defense in global affairs.
Some people like to compare America and Russia in recent years Beijing has been cozying up to Moscow
and analyze the behavior of the two countries toward China, wondering aloud if we have chosen the
right friend. Many of the same people who are suspicious of Americas intentions are the ones who harbor
the most fervent hopes of going to live there. In everyday conversation these people might be ashamed of
Chinas human rights record and our political situation, or they may talk about how they want to buy an
apartment in New York to find a secure place for their money, but when a foreign government or
organization (from no matter what country) criticizes the Chinese system, they become defensive. In the
case of the United States, they will often fire off a list of Americas failings, such as racism and gun
violence. A mixed view of extremes about America is not uncommon around the world, but what makes it
so striking here is that many Chinese government officials and elites seem to hold these contrasting views.
Like the young man in the documentary in Tiananmen Square, the children of many high officials go to
America to study, to settle down, to invest in property. For years, the children and grandchildren of the
Communist Party elite have been attending Americas top universities. Perhaps most famously, President
Xi Jinpings daughter enrolled at Harvard in 2010. Many Chinese people cant help but notice that the elites
have no problem taking advantage of what America has to offer, but when theyre preaching to the public,
they seem to have another view.

Government leaders cant be relied on to

deliver better bilateral relationships, especially not the Chinese

government.

But its encouraging that, in the shadow of censorship, some ordinary Chinese people

are opening their eyes and looking more realistically at our country and its place in the world. American
leaders should realize that the best hope for improved Chinese-American relations resides with these
Chinese people. Nevertheless,

as long as the Chinese government pretends to

be the defender of the people against the United States and

persists in its negative propaganda, Chinese-American relations will
have a long way to go . Murong Xuecun is a writer whose latest novel to be published in
English is Dancing Through Red Dust. This article was translated by The New York Times from the
Chinese.

4. And even if you believe that public support would give

Xi political capital it doesnt matter, because Chinas
perception on the US is low
Wike, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL ATTITUDES RESEARCH 16,
(Richard Wike, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL ATTITUDES RESEARCH 3-30-2016, "6
facts about how Americans and Chinese see each other," Pew Research
Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/30/6-facts-about-howamericans-and-chinese-see-each-other/ 7/1/16 MK)
Americans and Chinese do not have especially positive views of
each other. In our 2015 survey, just 38% of Americans have a favorable view of China, compared
Overall,

with a global median of 55% across 39 countries. Only a slightly higher share of the Chinese public

44% give the U.S. a positive rating, in stark contrast with the
global median of 69%. 2 a list of possible issues with China, Americans are most concerned
about economic issues, cybersecurity and human rights. Specifically, the amount of U.S. debt held by
China and the loss of jobs to China are Americans top worries, but cyberattacks and Beijings human rights
record arent far behind. 3Republicans are more critical of China compared with Democrats. From U.S. debt
held by China to the loss of U.S. jobs and Chinas growing military power, Republicans are far more
concerned about these issues as a very serious problem than are Democrats. The exception is Chinas

impact on the environment, which worries Democrats more. 4Many Americans think China will ultimately
become the worlds top superpower, and most Chinese agree. Americans are closely divided on this
question: 46% say China either already has or will someday replace the U.S. as the top global power, while
48% say this will never happen. However, 67% of Chinese think their country has supplanted the U.S. or

5Most Chinese think the U.S. is trying

to hold their nation back. More than half (54%) of Chinese say the
U.S. is trying to prevent China from becoming as powerful as the
U.S. Only 28% say the U.S. accepts that China will become as
powerful.
will in the future; only 16% say it wont happen.

AT: No internal link

1. Extend the Parker 15 card from the 1NC, the card
takes into account the 10% increase in economy and
states that 1) 10% cannot happen forever and the
current chinese reliance on it is what will inevitabley
cause its collapse and that 2) the economy is
already starting to drecrease because of the
slowness of international trade. It also states that
the economic reforms are the only way to solve
2. Chinese economic reforms are key to stopping an
economic crash.
The Economist 2015
Apr 18th 2015, The quiet revolution: A slowing economy commands
headlines, but the real story is reform,
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21648641-slowing-economycommands-headlines-real-story-reform-quiet-revolution, 7/1/16, CD)
Fears are rising that, after three soaring decades, China is about to
crash. That would be a disaster. China is the worlds second-largest economy and Asias
pre-eminent rising power. Fortunately, the pessimists are missing something. China is not only more
economically robust than they allow, it is also putting itself through a quietand welcomefinancial

These reforms will lead to capital being allocated more

efficiently. Lenders will price risks more accurately, with the most
deserving firms finding funds and savers earning decent returns.
And then comes politics. Economic reforms have high-level backing .
revolution.

Yet the anti-corruption campaign of President Xi Jinping means that officials live in fear of a knock on the
door by investigators. Many officials dare not engage in bold local experiments for fear of offending
someone powerful.

3. Xis political reforms are necessary for sustainable

economic growth and transparent government.
Kroeber, Arthur. "Xi Jinpings Reform Express Gathers Steam." Brookings
Institute. N.p., 15 Dec. 2014. Web. 3 July 2016.
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/ 15-xi-jinpin-reformkroeber>. Arthur Kroeber is a Senior Fellow, Brookings-Tsinghua Center and
the managing director of an independent global economic research firm.
After

the

enthusiasm which greeted the launch of

Jinpings
2013,

landmark

reform blueprint

Chinese President Xi

at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in November

the mood among observers of Chinas economy has gradually

soured. A common view is that progress on economic reforms has

been slow , bogged down not only by the opposition of vested
interests but also by the governments own distraction with its
endless anti-corruption campaign, and by its anxiousness to support

short-term growth through easy monetary policy. This popular take misses the mark
in three respects. First, the top priority of Xis reform is not about economics;
it is to remake Chinas system of governance . Successful reform of
government

and administration, along with more specific market reforms,

will, in turn, enable

more sustainable economic growth. Second, Chinas leaders clearly

reject the view that to be serious about structural economic reform,
they must accept a sharp cyclical slowdown. Instead, they believe that
maintaining relatively rapid growth in the short term will give them
more breathing room to push through their complex economic
agenda. Finally, a tally of economic reform measures this year shows
that progress has in fact been impressively brisk . Governance, Not Economics,
Tops the Agenda Understanding the primacy of governance reform is
essential to grasping the role of the anti-corruption campaign, which
has resulted in the investigation or disciplining of over 70,000
officials at all levels of government in virtually every province , and has
now spread to senior levels of the Peoples Liberation Army. This campaign is often portrayed
as a cynical effort by Xi Jinping to consolidate power, eliminate his
enemies and curtail the influence of retired senior leaders , notably former
Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. These motives no doubt play a large role, but the campaign is too far-reaching, and
has gone on for too long, for them to be a full explanation. It is now apparent that

the campaigns

central goal is to sharply reduce the systems tolerance of

corruption, which has been quite high

since the beginning of economic reforms in the late

1970s. This, in turn, suggests a desire to renegotiate the basic bargain between the central and local governments that
has held throughout the reform period. In essence, that bargain tasked local officials with maximizing economic growth, in
exchange for which they were tacitly permitted to skim off part of the financial gains from that growth. Central authorities
only cracked down when the graft reached grotesque proportions (as with smuggling scandals in Xiamen and other
coastal cities in south China in the late 1990s), or when political and policy interests converged in an exemplary
prosecution (as in the purge of Shanghai party Secretary Chen Liangyu in 2005, which both removed a Politburo rival to
Hu Jintao and sent a message to cities to rein in property speculation). This bargain proved effective in stimulating
sustained rapid growth while China was still a low-income country. But

now matured and

the nations economy has

with a per capita national income of $6,560, China now qualifies as an upper-middle

income country, by the World Banks definition.

To sustain high growth

at this income level,

China

needs better governance, a more reliable legal system and

considerably less corruption.
from the main reform agenda

Thus, the anti-graft campaign is not incidental to or a distraction

it is an essential part of the foundation of a more

successful economic and political system.

Similarly, the legal system reform outlined at

the Fourth Plenum in October, while disappointing many Western observers because it sanctified the Communist Partys
position above the laws that apply to everyone else, is in fact a significant step towards a more consistent, predictable,
rules-based system. As Cheng Li has pointed out, the very act of devoting a Plenum to legal issues has made possible a
discussion about how to create rule of law in China (see Fourth Plenum Has Opened Discourse on Constitutionalism,

specific reforms that legal scholars believe are likelycreation of circuit

courts to limit the influence of parochial interests, more consistent
publication of court decisions, prohibition on Party interference in
most cases and the creation of limited avenues for public-interest
litigation against polluting industrieshave the potential to make
Chinese governance fairer, more transparent and more responsive to
citizens' concerns. As with the anti-corruption drive, a key theme is
to readjust the balance of power in favor of the central government
Governance). And the

at the expense of the localities. A final element in the governance reform agenda is the important
but often-overlooked fiscal program adopted by the Politburo on June 30. By 2016, China will complete its first major
overhaul of the nations taxation and government spending system in two decades.

Key items include

the

elimination of land-based local government financing and its replacement by provincial bond issues;

restructuring of taxes to reduce local governments revenue

shortfalls and encourage them to promote consumer services,
rather than heavy industry; and stronger resource and
environmental taxes to arrest environmental degradation and
promote more efficient energy use. Once more, much of the focus is
on redefining the core role of local governments: their main mission
will shift from promotion of economic growth to effective provision
of public services. Cyclical Economic Management Supports the Reform Agenda Once we understand the
primary role of governance, the sequencing of reform measures becomes more evident, and the relative tardiness of more
narrowly economic reforms becomes more understandable. But skeptics have another concern: that the government is
losing sight of its long-term structural reform goals in a desperate effort to keep short-term gross domestic product (GDP)
growth above seven percent. The premise of this worry is that unless the authorities are willing squeeze out inefficiencies
and curb the rapid rise in debtmeasures which inevitably require a sharp slowdown in growththen the structural
reforms have little chance of success. In short, the economic model cannot change unless the old, bad habits are punished
by clear failure. Two pieces of recent evidence support this view. First, early in 2014, Beijing relaxed monetary policy and
started removing long-standing administrative restrictions on house purchases, in order to prop up a property market that
seemed on the brink of collapse. These measures reversed the tight monetary policy of the second half of 2013, which
succeeded in bringing credit growth down from 23 percent in April to around 16 percent by the end of the year. Second,
the new, looser policy meant that the countrys aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio continued to rise in 2014. After rising from
145 percent of GDP in 2008 to 220 percent in 2013, this ratio continued to climb in 2014 and now exceeds 230 percent of
GDP. In absolute terms, this figure is not alarmingmost developed countries, including the United States, have
significantly higher ratios. But

the rapid increase in leverage in a short time is

usually a harbinger of financial problems . It is a mistake, however , to assume

that the continued increase in leverage shows that Beijing is incurably addicted to its old debt-fueled growth model, or
that the authorities have decided to prioritize growth over reform. First of all, the credit stimulus used to support the
property market this year was extremely modest: the year-on-year growth rate of credit ticked up only about one
percentage point for a few months, and quickly dropped again once stimulus was withdrawn. The removal of
administrative restrictions on house purchases arguably played a larger role in the property stabilization than did easy

Beijings approach to deleveraging is a deliberate

policy choice driven by the conviction that growth and reform are
partners, rather than antagonists. A relevant comparison is the debate between U.S. and
credit. More important,

European policymakers after 2008 about the appropriate response to the global financial crisis, which left the rich
economies stuck with low growth and big debts. Washington argued that policy must focus on sustaining growth (through
ultra-easy monetary policy and large fiscal deficits), and that fiscal consolidation should take a back seat. European
officials, especially in Germany, argued that fiscal consolidation and debt reduction had to be a top priority, even if it
harmed growth. Beijing obviously favors an American-style approach to deleveraging and structural adjustment. Given the
superior performance of the U.S. economy (relative to Europe) since the global crisis, this is a defensible choice. Economic
Reforms are Proceeding Smartly The last point is that, in fact,

Chinas rollout of specific reform

measures over the past year has been impressive. In addition to the fiscal
reform package, whose significance has been severely underrated

by the market-

achievements of 2014 include : Abolition of

registered capital requirements for new firms, which caused growth
in new-company registrations to surge to over 20 percent, the highest rate in
a decade. Switching the resource tax on coal from a volume to a value basis, a long-delayed
measure which should discourage excessive investment and promote energy efficiency.
Publication of a plan to deregulate all pharmaceutical prices beginning in 2015.
Publication by virtually all provinces of plans for mixed-ownership reform of state enterprises. A
obsessed international financial media,

significant opening of the capital account via the Shanghai-Hong Kong Connect program which permits investors in those
two financial hubs to put money directly in each others stock markets. The publication of draft rules on deposit
insurance, paving the way for implementation next year, followed by full liberalization of deposit interest rates. Clearly

these are just initial steps and much work needs to be done to
broaden these reforms in ways that will have material impact on

Chinas $8 trillion economy . But it is hard to think of another major world leader whose government
has accomplished so much in such a short period of time. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, for instance, came to office
two years ago promising three arrows of monetary easing, expansive fiscal policy and deep structural reform. So far he
has delivered only onemonetary easing, which has driven the yen down and the stock market upbut structural reform
is missing in action and fiscal policy was disastrously captured by Ministry of Finance hawks, whose consumption-tax
increase drove the country into a needless recession.

AT: No Econ Impact

1. (This is the same analytic as from the AT: No internal
link above) Extend the Parker 15 card from the 1NC,
the card takes into account the 10% increase in
economy and states that 1) 10
2. cannot happen forever and the current Chinese
reliance on it is what will inevitably cause its
collapse and that 2) the economy is already starting
to decrease because of the slowness of international
trade. It also states that the economic reforms are
the only way to solve
3. All your evidence says is that the economy is growing
now, which is true. However, our evidence indicates that
the current Chinese economy will inevitably collapse (as
explained in the first analytic above), so this card does
not take out the disad, because it is talking about the
squo not the near future
4. I would also put one of the two pieces of evidence
that were included above here, probably the Economist 15
card
5. We can win this impact as long as we prove that the
current situation of the economy will inevitably collapse,
which we have done. They did not dispute the impacts of
economic decline, meaning a 1% risk of decline that would
be solved by the reforms constitutes a neg ballot

AT: No war Impact

1. Extend our Carpenter 15 card from the 1NC, this
explains how after an economic decline the US and China
would not have the same interdependence as they do In
the squo, so they are more prone to war and miscalc
2. Their cards against our impact do not apply because
they do not take into account the world of economic
decline.
3. Chinese Economic collapse leads to war
Kumar, Writer for International Business Times, 2015
(Kalyan, Economic collapse of big economies like US and China may trigger
war, says financial analyst Warren Pollock. International Business Times,
11/17/15, http://www.ibtimes.com.au/economic-collapse-big-economies-uschina-may-trigger-war-says-financial-analyst-warren-pollock, Accessed 7/6/16,
JCP JMoore)
Leading American financial analyst Warren Pollock has warned that
the US will slip into the biggest ever financial depression in the
history of the world. Not stopping there, the veteran also cautioned that
the lingering economic turbulence in China and US will eventually
trigger a war, which will be like "resetting the old order. Pollock notes that
a climate of war is already in the offing and the world is getting
ready for war. In his analysis, he brought to the fore many geo political variables to explain the
current strains in the political economy of the world. They included China, Russia and the US Fed, among
others.However, Pollock is optimistic that gold will survive all vagaries of depression or war, reports USA
Watchdog. I wouldnt sell my gold for anything because its going to survive through this crisis. Its going
to survive through deflation. Its going to survive through hyperinflation. Gold is going to survive through

Pollock said the global

economy is the key to the timing of war and argued that the world
economy is in a tailspin. "War starts when Chinas economy
implodes. . . . The economy in China is coming to a halt. Its in
deflation. Its in a depression. All the capital that has been pouring into
China has been misallocated. Its similar to the 1920s in the United States. The onset
of the boom-time and the follow-on depression . . . . People in China
want to get out of China. They want their assets out of China . . . They see
war, assuming that you do, Pollock said. Economy and war

this is going to be a full blown deflation where debt is going to go bad. Peoples commitments are not
going to be honored, and they might try to delay . . . bide for time and try the old formula first," Pollock

Pollock sees signs of war manifest everywhere,

including the recent US missile launch off the coast of California
which is a message to China. "They are firing them in the direction of
China. What is amazing is the ocean is a vast place. They could have chosen anywhere to launch these
said. Message to China

missiles from and, instead, they launched them right next to a metropolitan area. So, really, they are
sending a message to the people in the United States. More so than that, they are sending a message to
the people in China. Its definitely not directed at Russia," Pollock reasoned. He said the government
wanted to show that the US has a powerful military and is in control of the world, and the reserve currency
is worth something. Sign of impotence However, Pollock lampooned that show of strength. We are a
strong military power and, really, on a conventional sense, the emperor has no clothing. This use of a last
resort weapon, the demonstration of it, is really a sign of impotence, Pollock quipped. Pollock reiterated

that the biggest financial depression in the history of the world will engulf US and added that unlike what
has been seen, it is possible that war will turn into a resetting mechanism. "Lets look at it from the

Their economy goes bad and guess what? They are

going to say the Japanese are evil. The Americans are evil. . . . Japan
sees this war coming. Russia sees this war coming. To some extent,
some generals in the U. S. see this war coming. They are stockpiling
bullets. They have their heads in their asses in the Pentagon," he
added. China harps on innovation Meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping told the
Group of 20 (G20) summit that targeted medicine for sluggish
growth is required. In a speech entitled "Innovative Growth That Benefits All," the
Chinese leader called for collective work to maintain a stable
economic growth in the short term, while adding a new impetus to
the world economy in the long term, the Xinhua reported . Xi said the
momentum generated by the last round of scientific and industrial
revolution has waned and the potential for growth under the
traditional economic system and development model is diminishing.
perspective of China.

4. CCP regime instability causes nuclear war

Yee and Storey 4, Professor of Politics and International Relations at

Hong Kong Baptist University and Lecturer in Defense Studies at Deakin

University
Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, November 13, 2004, The China Threat:
Perceptions, Myths and Reality, https://chinaperspectives.revues.org/421, NC
perception of a China threat is the fear
of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial
fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into
neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios
would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability.
Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems,
including the increasing political demands of its citizens , a growing
The fourth factor contributing to the

population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid
industrialization and pollution. These

problems are putting a strain on the central

governments ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration

or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees
seeking asylum in neighbouring countries . Such an unprecedented
exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a
severe strain on the limited resources of Chinas neighbours.
A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare
scenario of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of
irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this
perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its
neighbours and the world.

5. We dont even have to win that economic decline

causes an external impact like war, because as long as we
win that passage of the plan will cause a global economic
decline that impact itself warrants a vote neg.