Basco vs PAGCOR

GR 91649 197 SCRA 52, 65

May 14, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869
for being allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and
order, monopolistic & tends toward crony economy,
waiving the Manila City governments right to impose
taxes & license fees, and violating the equal protection
clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. The question of wether PD
1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to
determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the
grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by
PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the National
Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect
license fees is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
LGUs
have
no
power
to
tax
Government
instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is therefore
exempt from local taxes. The National Government is
supreme over local governments. As such, mere
creatures of the State cannot defeat national policies
using the power to tax as a tool for regulation. The
power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent
power to wield it. The power of LGUs to impose taxes &
fees is always subject to limitation provided by Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs
sovereign
within
a
state,
it
simply
means
decentralization.
A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all
persons/things. The equal protection clause doesnt
preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere
fact that some gambling activities are legalized under
certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not
render the applicable laws unconstitutional.
Basco v. PAGCOR
FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential
Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of the government,
to regulate and centralize through an appropriate
institution all games of chance authorized by existing
franchise or permitted by law. This was subsequently
proven to be beneficial not just to the government but
also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of
much
needed
revenue
for
the
cash-strapped
Government.
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the
PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and public order, among others.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;
2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of
Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and that the
exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional
principle of Local Autonomy;
3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR
while most other forms are outlawed together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and

4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory

Government, away from monopolistic and crony
economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.
HELD:
1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited,
unless allowed by law. But the prohibition of gambling
does not mean that the government can not regulate it in
the exercise of its police power, wherein the state has
the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare.
2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal
Corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its
charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its
control. Also, local governments have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government.
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is
not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not
prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate.
4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are
within the domain of the political branches of
government and the people themselves as the repository
of all state power.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. In this case, the grounds raised by
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption.
Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649) - Digest
Facts:
Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy
and order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a right
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. It waived the Manila Cit governments right to
impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by
law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the
local governments right to impose local taxes and
license fees. This is in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.
Ruling:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation
has no inherent right to impose taxes. Their charter or
statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power,
otherwise the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to
tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which
is superior having been passed upon by the state itself
which has the inherent power to tax.
The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere
creatures of Congress, which has the power to create
and abolish municipal corporations due to its general
legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power
of control over the Local governments. And if Congress
can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take
back the power.
2. The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on
gambling, has long been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and
vested exclusively on the National Government.
Therefore, only the National Government has the power
to issue license or permits for the operation of
gambling.
3. Local governments have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is
government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks
are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a
dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos.
The latter role is governmental, which places it in the

category of an agency or instrumentality of the

Government.
Being
an
instrumentality
of
the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt
from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause
of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. No. 1869.
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government.
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the
local government to impose taxes and fees is always
subject to limitations which Congress may provide by
law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the
1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It
does not make local governments sovereign within the
state.

with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs

failure to give the additional notice did not negate the
calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs Failure to
Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled
Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not
informed since there had been other accessible
information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless
there had been a patent showing of grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and
conduct of the Comelec.
TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN
G.R. No. 148334
January 21, 2004
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution
No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (Resolution No. 01005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001
(Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on
Elections
(COMELEC).
Resolution
No.
01-005
proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the
14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006
declared official and final the ranking of the 13
Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

Facts:

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the
simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were
conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if
held simultaneously, a special and a regular election
must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in
the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were
proclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to
serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who
vacated a seat in the senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special
election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13th
elected senator.
Issue:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.

Whether or not the petition was moot.
Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, ThreeYear Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction
because what petitioners were questioning was the
validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which
Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasans
right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under
a quo warranto.
On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will
decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the
requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to
give due course to voters suits involving the right of
suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition
is likely to arise again
On the VAlidity of the Election, the Court held that the
May 14, 2001 Election was valid.
The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of
the Time of the Special Election as required under RA
6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such
Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in
case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill
such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. The law charges the voters

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona

as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on
February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to
be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May
14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were
due to be elected in that election. The resolution further
provides that the Senatorial candidate garnering the
13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
which ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results,
the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected
Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the
unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve
the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters
and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition,
praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005.
They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005
without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the
electorate of the position to be filled in the special
election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it
failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their
certificates of candidacy whether they seek election
under the special or regular elections as allegedly
required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently,
(3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the
candidates seeking election under the special or regular
senatorial elections as purportedly required under
Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica
add that because of these omissions, COMELEC
canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates
in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such
that there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen
seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought
the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the
pendency of their petition. Without issuing any
restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC
to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned
Tolentinos and Mojica's standing to bring the instant
petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not
claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor
claim that they sustained personal injury because of the
issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.
Issue:
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should
be nullified:

(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to

and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the
vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi:
(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for
holding a special election but empowers some authority
to fix the time and place after the happening of a
condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving
of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so
will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election
in relation to the failure to give notice of the special
election is whether want of notice has resulted in
misleading a sufficient number of voters as would
change the result of special election. If the lack of official
notice misled a substantial number of voters who
wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill
vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would
be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the
manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special
Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because
the COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for
the special election. No such requirement exists in our
election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A.
6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if
necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be
voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in
conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in
Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said
resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad
made no mention of the manner by which the seat
vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled.
However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the
Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it
now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate garnering
the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni,
G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
I.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine
Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National
War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of
accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is
not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is
charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.
II.
THE ISSUES : Was E.O. No. 68 valid and
constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity
and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of

national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of

international law of the present day including the Hague
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant
precedents of international jurisprudence established by
the United Nation all those person military or civilian who
have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war
of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation
of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently
in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order
No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in
conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission
has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva
Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to
the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be
denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and
Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based
on the generally accepted principals of international law.
In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the
two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who
were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and
is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of
international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Kuroda vs Jalandoni 83 Phil 171
Facts
Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the
Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged
before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes.
As he was the commanding general during such period of
war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and
permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes
committed by his men against noncombatant civilians
and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the
laws and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military
Commission is not a valid court because the law that
created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He
further contends that using as basis the Hague
Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand
ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such
rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that
the United States is not a party of interest in the case
and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in
the Philippines.
Issue
1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional
2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68,
creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing
rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is
constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the
Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces
war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the nation. The generally accepted
principles of international law includes those formed
during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention
and other international jurisprudence established by
United Nations. These include the principle that all
persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of
planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of
the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of
laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In
the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by
these principles and therefore has a right to try persons
that commit such crimes and most especially when it is
committed againsts its citizens. It abides with it even if it

was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere

incorporation of such principles in the constitution.
The United States is a party of interest because the
country and its people have been equally, if not more
greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the
petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No.
68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal
and that the rules as to parties and representation are
not governed by the rules of court but by the very
provisions of this special law.
Lessons Applicable: Generally accepted principles of
international law
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the
Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a
period covering 1943 and 1944 who is now charged
before a military Commission convened by the Chief of
Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties
as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant
civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
violation of the laws and customs of war"
File a petition seeking to establish the illegality of
Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines:
to enjoin and prohibit Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port
from participating in the prosecution of his case; and not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our
personality as an independent state and their
appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our
Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to
practice law in the Philippines and not interested party in
the case
to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding
with the case - Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the
ground that it violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing
of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an
adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law,
national and international
ISSUE: W/N Executive Order No. 68 is valid
HELD: YES
President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to
consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the
trial and punishment of war criminal through the
issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68
Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of
our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to
the conventions embodying them for our Constitution
has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope
and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as continued inn treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the
Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law.
when the crimes charged against petitioner were
allegedly committed the Philippines was under the
sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally
bound together with the United States and with Japan to
the right and obligation contained in the treaties
between the belligerent countries
the appointment of the 2 American attorneys is not
violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and
proper that United States, which has submitted the
vindication of crimes against her government and her
people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed
representation in the trial of those very crimes

PHILIP MORRIS, INC. VS COURT

OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91332

July 16, 1993

Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, to seek the reversal and setting aside of the
following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA).
Philip Morris, Inc. and two other petitioners are ascribing
whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon
magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of
Court when respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, from manufacturing and
selling MARK cigarettes in the local market. Banking on
the thesis that petitioners respective symbols MARK
VII, MARK TEN, and MARK, also for cigarettes, must
be protected against unauthorized appropriation.
All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines
but are suing on an isolated transaction, They Invoked
provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial and Intellectual Property. As corporate
nationals of member-countries of the Paris Union, they
can sue before Philippine courts for infringement of
trademarks, or for unfair competition, without need of
obtaining registration or a license to do business in the
Philippines, and without necessity of actually doing
business in the Philippines.
Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for
infringement and damages against Fortune Tobacco
before the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the
trademark Mark which is identical and confusingly
similar to Philip Morris trademarks. The said act was
dismissed. Hence, this petition at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs
right of property to such trademark or trade name.
Discussions:
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our
municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement
of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an
international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash
is being decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact
that international law has been made part of the law of
the land does not by any means imply the primacy of
international law over national law in the municipal
sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in
most countries, rules of international law are given a
standing equal, not superior, to national legislative
enactments
Ruling/s:
No. There is no proof that any of petitioners products
which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the
trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and
available for commercial purposes anywhere in the
Philippines.
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is
that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a prerequisite to the acquisition of ownership over a
trademark or a trade name.
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the
complaint that they are not engaged in business in the
Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable
damage can be suffered by them not to mention the
foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the
absence of their right to be protected.

G.R. No. 91332 July 16, 1993 PHILIP MORRIS, INC., et al.,
petitioners vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents
Facts:
Philip Morris, Inc. is corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Virginia, United States of America. Philip
Morris and the other petitioners which are also foreign
corporations and are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Philip
Morris are not doing business in the Philippines and are
suing on an isolated transaction. They are registered
owners of "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" per
certificates of registration issued by the Philippine Patent
Office They assert that Fortune Tobacco Corp. has no
right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the
allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark
"MARK" in contravention of the Trademark Law. Further,
they assert that their trademarks are entitled to
protection by treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris
Convention of which the Philippines is a member as
provided for in Article II sec.2 of the Constitution and
under the Incorporation doctrine which provides that the
generally accepted international laws are made part of
the law of the land.
Issue:
WON Fortune Tobaccos trademark Mark had
infringed upon the trademarks of Philip Morris, Inc. and
its wholly owned subsidiaries.
Held:
No. Under Article 2 of the Paris Convention to which the
Philippines is a signatory, the petitioners, as foreign
corporations not engaged in local commerce can bring
about an action for infringement, and under the Doctrine
of Incorporation, such international law is a part of the
law of the land. But, the Trademark law which is a
municipal law provides that actual use in commerce in
the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of
ownership over a trademark or a tradename. It requires
actual commercial use of the trademark prior to its
registration. It is settled that efforts are to be first
exerted to harmonize the municipal laws and the
international laws which are given an equal, not superior
standing with the municipal laws as further provided by
the doctrine of incorporation. But if there be an
irreconcilable conflict, the municipal laws are to be
upheld. Records show that the petitioners have never
conducted any business in the Philippines. Although
petitioners previously sent samples to the Phils., such
commercial use is not equivalent to the use
contemplated by law. Under the law, therefore,
petitioners have no right to the remedy it seeks.

SECRETARY
LANTION

OF

JUSTICE

v.

GR No. 139465 Jan. 18 2000

FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government
of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The
Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale
No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a
panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the
case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter
to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S Government and that he
be given ample time to comment on the request after he
shall have received copies of the requested papers but
the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article
7 that the Philippine Government must present the
interests of the United States in any proceedings arising
out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due
process rights or the governments ironclad duties under
a treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien ,
and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights
claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations
to the government of another state. This is so although
we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations
under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the
land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provision of the constitution or
statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of
international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as
to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in

observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited

constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and a municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be
upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such
courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly
bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal
law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing with,
but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori
takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated
if they are in conflict with the constitution

(or local courts) are confronted with situations in which

there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted
to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is
to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with
proper regard for the generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the observance of the
Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional
provision.
PETITION is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Secretary of Justice vs Judge lantion

GR No 139465 ,Jan 18,2000
FACTS:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is
founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the
Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of
crime both in the state where it was committed and the
state where the criminal may have escaped; the
extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the
intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties
with other interested countries; and the need for rules to
guide the executive department and the courts in the
proper implementation of said treaties.On November 13,
1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America"On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice
received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S.
Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the
United States.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is a conflict between
between the treaty and the due process clause in
the Constitution?
HELD:
1.NO.En contrario, these two components of the law of
the land are not pined against each other. There is no
occasion to choose which of the two should be
upheld.Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RPUS Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential
Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights
of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of
extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier
abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and
during the judicial determination of the propriety of
extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly
granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior
thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to
the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this
silence.In the absence of a law or principle of law, we
must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the
basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will
not go against the treaty or the implementing law.
Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes
these rights from a prospective extraditee.The doctrine
of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals

PILA Case Digest: Government

Of The USA V. Hon. Purganan
(2002)
Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of
Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition
Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty
FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon.
Lantion.
The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr.
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
period within which to file a comment and supporting
evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec.
of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr.
Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed
with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the
issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant
to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr.
Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant
be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the
court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein
seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant
should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order
for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court
deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.
ISSUES:
i.
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before
issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069

ii.
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the
prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is
CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition
proceedings before it.
i. YES.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further
conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage.
From the
knowledge and the material then available to it, the court
is expected merely to get a good first impression or a
prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest
warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and
its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist,
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to
punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending
to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the
request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some
future date would give them ample opportunity to
prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty
nor the Law could have intended.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which
is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To
determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination under oath or affirmation of complainants
and the witnesses they may produce.
The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice
In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b)
they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible,
the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima
facie case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary
hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge
must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the
opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
ii. Yes.
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section
13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies
only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his

guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition,

the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The
provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended finds application only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be
extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case.
Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from
the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He
should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal
cases against him, not before the extradition court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is
subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar
facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted
as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing
1)
that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein
Since this exception has no express or specific
statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant
bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private respondent
ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was
already of public knowledge that the United States was
requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents
were or should have been prepared for the consequences
of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his
claim that his election to public office is by itself a
compelling reason to grant him bail.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special
circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount
to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would
also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably
delay
the
extradition
proceedings
even
more.
Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all
deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions,
delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be
taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be
within reach of our government if and when it matters;
that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
iii.

NO.
Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due
process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of
right to due process and fundamental fairness does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
A
subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will
be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.
Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and
the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the
summary nature of extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US government
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. He already had
that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of
taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression
of Crime
In this era of globalization, easier and faster international
travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to
be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other
states in order to improve our chances of suppressing
crime in our own country.
2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the
Accused
By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is
deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial
system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and
the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
An extradition proceeding is sui generis:
a)
It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination
of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state
where he will be extradited.
b)
An extradition proceeding is summary in nature
while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied,
a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered
extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima
facie case
d)
Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him.
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
assistance through which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the
best claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of
extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable.
4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good
faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be
ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only
the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior
acts of herein respondent:
a)
leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
b)
remaining in the requested state despite learning
that the requesting state is seeking his return and that
the crimes he is charged with are bailable
Extradition is Essentially Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties.
Thus, the Executive Department of government has
broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
Government of USA vs Purganan
Facts:This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465
entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion where the
court held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice

and hearing during

extradition process.

the

evaluation

stage

of

the

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the

United States of America, represented by the Philippine
DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the appropriate
Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition
Case 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that
Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by
the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida on 15 April 1999.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed
before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,
which prayed that Jimenezs application for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the
RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on 5 June 2001. In that hearing, Jimenez
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by
the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case
to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing on 15 June 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its 3 July 2001 Order, directing the issuance of
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez
was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order
dated 4 July 2001. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1.Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and
hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued
Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending
Held: No.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination under oath or affirmation of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused
before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on
record, judges merely further examine complainants and
their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of
respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing
the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would
be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If
the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to
present evidence during the prima facie determination
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop
him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at
this stage if he so desires in his effort to negate a
prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial
of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the
main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema
to the summary nature of extraditions.
***Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
(a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they
show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law,
and (c) the person sought is extraditable.
At his
discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible,
the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge.

On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case

is determined, then the magistrate must immediately
issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at
the same time summoned to answer the petition and to
appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the
issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or
notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to
escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will best serve the ends of justice
in extradition cases.***
No.
Extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal
proceedings. The constitutional right to bail flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a
case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Parettiin
arguing that, constitutionally, [n]o
one
shall
be
deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of
law.
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the
conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not
amount to a violation of his right to due process. We
iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same
time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for
a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances
such as those present in an extradition case call for
it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In
the present case, respondent will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.
Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process
and fundamental fairness.

Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf

of other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of
their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2)
the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended
in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4)
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession,
and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII
and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the
equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is
against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable

grounds exists for making a distinction between those

who fall within such class and those who do not. (2
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is
public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it
not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the
matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use
of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an
unjustified interference with private interest? These are
the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate
aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that
would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest
and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable
basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of
the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that
the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a
matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary and that in any case such matter falls
within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the
law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers
from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or
the segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with
treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been
entered into on the subject and the police power may not
be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL 115
FACTS:
Petitioner, also in behalf of other alien residents
corporations and partnerships, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that RA 1180 is
unconstitutional. Petitioner contends, among others, that
said act violate the equal protection of laws and that it
violates the treaty of the Philippines with China. Solicitor
General contends that the act was a valid exercise of the
police power and that not a single treaty was infringed by
said act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of
laws
HELD:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination on oppression of inequality. The real
question at hand is whether or not the exclusion in the

future aliens for the retail trade unreasonable. The equal

protection clause is not infringed by a specified class if
it applies to all persons within such class and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not. Aliens
are under no special constitutional protection which
forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because
the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. The difference in status between citizens and
aliens constitute a basis for reasonable classification in
the exercise of police power.

Gonzales vs. Hechanova

9 SCRA 230

Facts:
Respondent executive secretary authorized importation
of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter and
president of ilo-ilo palay and corn planters asso., filed
and averring that in making or attempting to make
importation of foreign rice are acting without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction because RA 2207, explicitly
prohibits the importation of rice and corn by Rice and
Corn Administration or any government agency.
Issue: Whether an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courts.
Held:
The power of judicial review is vested with the supreme
court in consonace to section 2 art. VIII of the
constitution. the alleged consummation of the contracts
with vietnam and burma does not render this case
academic. RA 2207, enjoins our government not from
entering contracts for the purchase of rice, but from
entering rice, except under conditions prescribed in said
act.
A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed
importation would not compel our government to default
in the performance of such obligations as it mat have
contracted with the sellers of rice in question because
aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied
without importing the said commodity into the phils., the
proposed importation may still be legalized by complying
with the provisions of the aforementioned law.
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, et. al.
FACTS:
Respondent Executive Secretary Rufino G.
Hechanova authorized an importation of tons foreign
rice. Such act is being questioned by petitioner Ramon
Gonzales, a rice planter and president of the Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association, for being violative of a
particular statute which proscribes importation of rice
and corn by government agencies.
Respondents aver that petitioner as a rice planter
does not give him sufficient interest to file herein
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a real party in
interest.
HELD: Yes. x x x, [S] ince the purchase of said
commodity will have to be effected with public funds
mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and
landowner, petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it
follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to
seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what
he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said
funds.
GONZALES v. HECHANOVA
Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
importation of rice without complying with the requisite
of securing a certification from the Natl Economic
Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals.
Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000
tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local

planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and

Corn Planters Association assailed the executive
agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because RA 3452
prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice
and Corn Administration or any other government
agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2
executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The
former may not interfere in the performance of the
legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments
that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited
by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty
and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time
shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the
contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation
of powers and the system of checks and balances which
are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an
international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts in All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
or executive order or regulation is in question. In other
words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Gonzales vs. Hechanova
9 SCRA 230
FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Thereupon, herein
petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, filed the petition herein, averring that, in
making or attempting to make said importation of foreign
rice, the aforementioned respondents are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic
Act No. 2207, explicitly, prohibits the importation of rice
and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any
other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courts.
HELD: The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly
settled in the affirmative by providing in Section 2 of
Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be
deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as
the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
or executive order, or regulation is in question. In other
words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned
contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this
case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our
government not from entering into contracts for the
purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under the
conditions prescribed in said Act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed

importation would not compel our Government to default
in the performance of such obligations as it may have
contracted with the sellers of rice in question because
aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied
without importing the said commodity into the
Philippines, the proposed importation may still be
legalized by complying with the provisions of the
aforementioned laws.

7. The Court issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction and ordered to immediately readmit the petitioners to their respective classes until
further orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion is valid
NO. The court upheld the petitioners' right under the
Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on
account of their religious beliefs. Religious freedom as a
fundamental right deserving the "highest priority and
amplest protection among human rights. It reversed the
expulsion orders made by the public respondents therein
as violative of both the free exercise of religion clause
and the right of citizens to education under the 1987
Constitution.
Although
the
Court
upholds
in
this
decision
nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our
country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen
to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts:

EBRANILAG, ET. AL. V. THE

DIVISION SUPT. OF SCHOOLS
March 1, 1993
FACTS:
1. In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F.
Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are
43 high school and elementary school students in several
towns of in Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted
by their parents who belong to the religious group known
as Jehovah's Witness. This is a consolidated petition.
2. All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled
from their classes by the public school authorities in
Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA
1265 of July 11, 1955, and by DO No. 8 of the DECS
making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions
3. In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A.
Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade
school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias,
Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both
petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney
Felino M. Ganal.
4. The Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their
children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem,
and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those
are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion only given to
God.They consider the flag as an image or idol
representing the State . They think the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power
and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which
the Constitution protect against official control
5. In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received
complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the
Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and
private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine
national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the
patriotic pledge.
6. The students and their parents filed these special civil
actions for Mandamus,Certiorari and Prohibition alleging
that the public respondents acted without or in excess of
their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion (1)
in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and
hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process,
their right to free public education, and their right to
freedom of speech, religion and worship

In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received

complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the
Jehovahs Witness, and enrolled in various public and
private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National
Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug
of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant issued
Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989,
directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and
Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from
service, after due process, teachers and school
employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from
the benefit of public education, if they do not participate
in daily flag ceremony and doesnt obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find such
memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and
choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate
persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them obey
the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to
their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the
district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu,
dated July 24, 1990, ordering the dropping from the list
in the school register of all Jehovahs Witness teachers
and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow
their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law,
however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they
change their mind.
Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to the
Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to
their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special
civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition,
alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess
of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing,
hence, in violation of their right to due process, their
right to free public education and their right to freedom
of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for
the voiding of the order of expulsion or dropping from
the rolls issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting
and enjoining respondent from barring them from
classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons
acting for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) readmission I their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the
respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to
their respective classes until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated

comment to the petitions defending the expulsion orders
issued by the respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in
the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
external acts or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through observance of the flag ceremony. They
quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to
show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not
engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for
their expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of
Jehovahs Witness from the schools violates right receive
free education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from
the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right
as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to
receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to
protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education, and to make such education accessible to all
(Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a
right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly
stand at attention during flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do
not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the
peace, or pose a grave and present danger of a serious
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
legitimate public interest that the state has a right and
duty to prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our
country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of
religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the
Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier,
perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period
of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting
the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted
and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set aside.

money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or

used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit,
or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or
leprosarium.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in
violation of the principle of separation of church and
state
NO.
1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. In so far as it
instils into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in
order to establish a government that shall embody their
ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him
who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious
sects and denominations.
3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this
case. Act No. 4052 granted the Director of Posts, with the
approval
of
the
Sec.
of
Public
Works
and
Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with
new designs. Even if we were to assume that these
officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and
selling the postage stamps in question, still, the case of
the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the
exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality
of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to
justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed
as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court
resolved to deny the petition for a writ of prohibition.
Aglipay vs Ruiz

Aglipay v. Ruiz Digest

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
Laurel, J.:
Facts:
1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the
dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the
City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head
of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfilment of
what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente
Sotto, a member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President. In spite of the protest of the
petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs
of the postage for printing. The said stamps were
actually issued and sold though the greater part
remained unsold.
3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the
petitioner. He alleged that the provisions of Section 23,
Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution were violated
in the issuance and selling of the commemorative
postage stamps. It was provided therein that, No public

Facts of the Case:

The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila
newspapers that he would order the issuance of postage
stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of Manila.
The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic
Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the
Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the
Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The
said stamps in consideration were actually issued already
and sold though the greater part thereof remained
unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be
prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution
in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress
Held:
No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by
issuing and selling the commemorative postage stamps.
Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which
contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the
Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the

issuance
of
new
postage
stamps
would
be
advantageous to the Government. Of course, the
phrase advantageous to the Government does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at
bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not
intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or
denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman
Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale
of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of
issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of
an international event considered to be a great
opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a
result attract more tourists to the country. In evaluating
the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the
Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The
focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also
bore the inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937. In considering
these, it is evident that there is no violation of the
Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the
stamps is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937
Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church,
filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the
Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic.
The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as
authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature,
contemplates religious purpose for the benefit of a
particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative
stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of
commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church,
but the purpose was only to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourist and the government just took
advantage of an event considered of international
importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its
provision on the separation of the Church and State.
Moreover, the Court stressed that Religious freedom, as
a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in
human affairs. Emphasizing that, when the Filipino
people implored the aid of Divine Providence, they
thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.

IMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.

FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to
protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the
law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones
family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power
of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
Freedom of expression and academic freedom
Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy.
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule

April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for

themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that
the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or

controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus

standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means
an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has
then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail
the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.
These include religious freedom, freedom of the press,
and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to ones freedom of
expression, as they are modes which ones thoughts are
externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as
a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the
doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The
one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the
title of a law must not be so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it

imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no

office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under
this view, the court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses
to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties
just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal
effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for
partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be
willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the
presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The
valid portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
individual Members could express their own views on this
matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory
construction), the traditional meaning of conception
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente
is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a)
conception to refer to the moment of fertilization and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In
addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female
ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for
protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion.
The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is
in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By
using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section
4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion
and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their
office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient
by using the term primarily. Recognizing as
abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion
or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or
the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the
IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term primarily, must be struck
down.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729
(1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the

contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly

licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is
to be considered mandatory only after these devices
and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved
by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b)
right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine
whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of
the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and
thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can
enhance its population control program through the RH
Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH
procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),
intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as
the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a)
the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or
family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of
marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor
undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. In addition, the portion of
Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the
written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their
absence, persons exercising parental authority or nextof-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical
procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed
to procedures) about family planning services. Parents
are not deprived of parental guidance and control over
their minor child in this situation and may assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in lifethreatening procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of
Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education
program, the Court reserves its judgment should an
actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because
the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more

importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children with the use of the term primary. The
right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to
that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and
corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather
than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the
moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations,
school officials, and other interest groups in developing
the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said
that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs
of the petitioners.
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of
the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider
must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a public health service provider. The
private health care institution cited under Section 7
should be seen as synonymous to private health care
service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad
enough to include providing of information and rendering
of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service
and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to
the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
governments RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State
shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to
reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children.
In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is
valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom
of private educational institutions especially with respect
to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private
and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount
to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages
private and non-government RH service providers to
render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec.
17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case

or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already
been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so
because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law
for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating
from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying
reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions
have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if
the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To
dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that
there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish
this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting
only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed,
to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be
assailed through an as-applied challenge, still, the Court
has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing
to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on more
than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing nontraditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public
interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured
by the operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of
the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court
set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that
the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules
of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and
so the Court would just consider them as petitions for

prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original

jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions
of the law shows that both reproductive health and
responsible parenthood are interrelated and germane
to the overriding objective to control the population
growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2
of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and
guarantees the human rights of all persons including
their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance
with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs,
and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between reproductive
health and responsible parenthood which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human
development as stated under its terms, the Court finds
no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs
and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not
in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the
RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious
objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR,

which added the qualifier primarily in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution.
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
Doctrine: Social Justice
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July
17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications
that
animal-drawn
vehicles
be
prohibited from passing along the following for a period
of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to
530 pm; and
2)
along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July
18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the
adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said
Director with the approval from the Secretary of the
Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the
Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by
the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved
the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and
regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above mentioned to the detriment not only of
their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful
inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies
at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies
in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the

humanization of laws and the equalization of social and

economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principles of
salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and
of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest
number.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote
social justice.
HELD:
YES, it still promotes social justice. In enacting the said
law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare.
The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group
(e.g. the poor - because social justice is bringing the
greatest good to the greatest number, not necessarily
just the poor like the drivers of the animal-drawn
vehicles).
Social justice:
: "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic force by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.
: the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the
community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the timehonored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
: must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
RATIO:
(1) Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy.
(2)The citizen should achieve the required balance of
liberty and authority in his mind through education and
personal discipline so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness of all.
Valmonte vs Belmonte
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right
to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a)
to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their respective

loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public

records for the subject information On June 20, 1986,
apparently not having yet received the reply of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS)
Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent another letter, saying that for failure to
receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free
to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens
and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest
loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting
the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only
declare what the law is, and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within
the domain of the political branches of the government,
and of the people themselves as the repository of all
State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may
not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to

privacy, considering the public offices they were holding

at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted.
It cannot be denied that because of the interest they
generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most
especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being
subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used
here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover
both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Considering the intent of the
framers of the Constitution which, though not binding
upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering
further
that
government-owned
and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary
or governmental functions are accountable to the people,
the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by
the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created
by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy
of transparency in government dealings. Although
citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right
to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.