Velasco vs COMELEC

This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the resolutions denying the COC
Velasco had filed for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Sasmuan, Pampanga.
The distinctions between inclusion/exclusion proceedings and COC denial/cancellation
proceedings, refute and belie Velasco's position that the COMELEC improperly ruled on
his right to vote when it cancelled his COC.
ISSUE: Is decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding operate as a bar to any future
action challenging ones right to be registered as a voter?
HELD: Inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in character, are summary
proceedings. A decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as a bar
to any future action in any other election that a party may take concerning his right to be
registered as a voter. A ruling on the right to vote by the trial court for a specific election
is binding on the COMELEC. By clear implication, the COMELEC itself does not rule on
the right to vote by recognizing in a Sec. 78 COC denial/cancellation proceeding the final
and executory ruling by a court, as mandated by law, in an inclusion/exclusion
proceeding.

EN BANC[G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001]AKBAYAN Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,
KOMPIL II Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z.
TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE,
RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M. VALENCIA,
EDBENTABUCOL, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.[G.R.
No. 147179. March 26, 2001]MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN
ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONERS MEHOL SADAIN, RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA
TANCANGCO, RALPH LANTION, FLORENTINO TUASONand RESURRECCION BORRA, all
of the Commission on Election (COMELEC), respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001
General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around
four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline
set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.On February 8,
2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 denying the petition.Aggrieved by
the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II(YOUTH) et al.
filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a
special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs
imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
HELD: The petitions are bereft of merit.As to the procedural limitation, the act of
registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in
the election process. Thus, contraryto petitioners argument, registration cannot
and should not be denigrated to thelowly stature of a mere statutory requirement.
Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the
right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power,
may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for
the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one
which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and
the prevalent circumstances of the times.Considering the circumstances where the
writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm
belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they
are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel
respondent COMELEC toconduct a special registration of voters. For the
determination of whether or notthe conduct of a special registration of voters
is feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date
of election, involves theexercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by
mandamus.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari
and mandamus are hereby DENIED.

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:
1.

That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent
to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must
be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to
vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;

2.

That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim

winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.

1.

There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically
reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is
a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place
where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does
not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.

2.

The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to
allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to
usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential
elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by
virtue of RA 9189.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC.,
respondent.
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all
buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering
the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up
and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of
Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It
also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central
terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on
the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an
undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police
power, i.e. lawful subject and lawful means.
Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise
stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic
congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference
of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.
This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena
Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are
characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the
traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by
petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is
unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been
done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and

liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are
enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which
bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its
effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be
effective.
DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882
March 30, 2006
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and
of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June 1994 by the
Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the
laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes
under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of
stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000
hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay
Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the
full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not
to be prevented from entry into private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when
prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and indigenous
peoples organized under Philippine laws, representing a community actually affected by the mining
activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC.
ISSUES & RULINGS:
I
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID BECAUSE THEY ALLOW
THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION , IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.
NO.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-owned
contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface areas within the
FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine infrastructure. The government then acquires
ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor, through a voluntary transaction in
order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called
for at this stage since there are still various avenues by which surface rights can be acquired other
than expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of the FTAA
given to CAMC and shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and regulations do
not provide for just compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942
and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE VOID
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR SANCTIONING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
OF DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION.
NO.
there is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations that
exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in expropriation proceedings
involving mining operations.
Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the authority to decide cases where
surface owners, occupants, concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus, necessitating
involuntary taking, this does not mean that the determination of the just compensation by the Panel of
Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board is final and conclusive. The determination is only
preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary
jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary
matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or occupants. The original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of just compensation remains intact despite
the preliminary determination made by the administrative agency.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA, ABDICATED
ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER NATURAL
RESOURCES.
RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over mining operations. The following
provisions thereof establish the mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over mining operations
and institute reportorial requirements.
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the State to the role of a passive
regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the government agencies
concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and change -- the
various work programs and the corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for each of the
exploration, development and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE ROLE OF WHOLLY FOREIGN AND
FOREIGN-OWNED CORPORATIONS IN THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN MINING ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES
PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2, ARTICLE XII OF THE CONSTITUTION.
the use of the word involving signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or
activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance.
Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid
the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression agreements x x x
involving either technical or financial assistance in an exclusionary and limiting manner.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS SERVICE CONTRACTS

NO. The mere fact that the term service contracts found in the 1973 Constitution was not carried over
to the present constitution, sans any categorical statement banning service contracts in mining
activities, does not mean that service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution was eradicated
in the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations as
contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full
control and supervision of the State; this time, however, safety measures were put in place to prevent
abuses of the past regime.
the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4,
are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign
corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or
owner of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital,
technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of largescale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively
exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.
OBITER DICTA: ! justiciable controversy: definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the
application of a law. ! to exercise the power of judicial review, the following must be extant (1) there
must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; - involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
In the instant case, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No.
7942 has been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been entered into. The
FTAA holders have already been operating in various provinces of the country.
(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and - A question is considered ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. (3) the
person challenging must have the standing" - personal or substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said
to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
! taking under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property for more than a
momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
(1)

the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2)

the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3)

the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4)
the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
! Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police Power

The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the
power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just
compensation.On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.
Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their
object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an implement of
the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence,
no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power, property rights of private
individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state. Thus, an ordinance prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in excess of their
seating capacity (which would result in the diminution of profits of the theater-owners) was upheld
valid as this would promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the customers.
where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to
public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to
public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and
applied to some public purpose, there is compensable taking.
! On different roles and responsibilities:
* DENR Secretary : accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. (Executive
Order No. 279, 1987)
! in re: easements and taking
In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that the imposition of burden over a private property
through easement was considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is required. The
Court declared:
And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is
not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use
of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for public use which, be it what it may, can not be
accomplished unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly
indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as
it is only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is
nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which
the same is invested.
! in order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be inconsistent.The
former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act.

Tan vs. Del Rosario Case Digest

Tan vs. Del Rosario

237 SCRA 324

Facts:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the
simplified income taxation scheme (SNIT) under Arts (26) and (28) and III (1).
The SNIT contained changes in the tax schedules and different treatment in
the professionals which petitioners assail as unconstitutional for being
isolative of the equal protection clause in the constitution.
Issue:
Is the contention meritorious?
Ruling:
No. uniformity of taxation, like the hindered concept of equal
protection, merely require that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly
situated are to be treated alike both privileges and liabilities. Uniformity,
does not offend classification as long as it rest on substantial distinctions, it
is germane to the purpose of the law. It is not limited to existing only and
must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The legislative intent is to increasingly shift the income tax system
towards the scheduled approach in taxation of individual taxpayers and
maintain the present global treatment on taxable corporations. This
classification is neither arbitrary nor inappropriate.

ABAKADA Guro Party List v PurisimaG.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008FACTS:
1.This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335(Attrition Actof 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and theBureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR
and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets byproviding a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a RevenuePerformance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status
2.Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the

constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reformlegislation. They contend that, by

establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the
officials andemployees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of
suchrewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrineof separation of powers,
for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of
the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno,
the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhanceits understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agenciesare

properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to

prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority,and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to beintrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of governmentWith this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight
is not unconstitutional
per se
, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes anencroachment on the executive
power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral tothe checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as itprevents
the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basicand related constraints
on Congress
. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power.
And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specifiedunder the Constitution
including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.Thus, any postenactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressionaloversight must be confined to the
following:(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection withit, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matterpertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation
And
(2) investigation and monitoringof the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries inaid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in thisclass.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules
andregulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprovesuch
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of

a congressional oversight committee is in the form of aninward-turning

delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to whichCongress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution's diagram of power asit entrusts to Congress a direct role
in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Bagong Bayani v. Comelec

Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petitionunder
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by
theCOMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties,including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek
thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system
wasintended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream political parties, the none-marginalized or over represented.
Issues:
a.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections
b.Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized andunderrepresented
sectors and organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELECwhich
will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties
andorganizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of
theConstitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC to
refrainproclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until
after theCOMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance.
a.Yes
b.No.
Rationale:
a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. Under the
Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot bedisqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. For its part,
Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional
andsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states
that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."

b. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,however,
that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- maydo so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistentwith the purpose of
the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution. The provision on the party-listsystem is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "inaccordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it
was thus up to Congress tosculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA
7941 was enacted.

Banat vs comelec
586 SCRA 210 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party
List System; Proportional Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction Rule in Interpreting the Constitution Intent of the Framers vs
Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made
a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners
at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or thePanganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of
the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a partylist candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to
fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the
3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally,
the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be
from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the
number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were
220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to
allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a
seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2%
threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get
a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two

percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every
party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed
50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral
or group interests in the House of Representatives.

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than
2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters)
are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were
able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in
the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number
of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.

Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a twopercenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and
there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists
and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the
likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from
the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the
Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and
the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in
the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in
St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she
taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to
work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he
was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When
Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal
where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission
on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months
under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood"

in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived
at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be

eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are
in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in
the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the
district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of

origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile,
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence
of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired
right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon
returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close

ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other

important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and
May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to
order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.