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G.R. No. 82220 July 14, 1995

PABLITO MENESES and LORENZO MENESES, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO
QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed
Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato,
Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING,
SR. (Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Luisa, Norberto, Jimmy, Ma.
Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed Quisumbing), all represented by Atty. Galileo
Brion, respondents.
G.R. No. 82251 July 14, 1995
CESAR ALMENDRAL, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, respondent.
G.R. No. 83059 July 14, 1995
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING
(Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO
QUISUMBING, (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all
surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR. (Petrona, Natividad,
Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO
QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed
Quisumbing), petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLITO MENESES, LORENZO MENESES and BRAULIO C.
DARUM,respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07049 affirming the Decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna, in Civil Case No. 474-83-C which declared as null and
void the original certificates of title and free patents issued to Pablito Meneses over lots found by
the court to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by Ciriaca
Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing.
I

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On March 1, 1977, Braulio C. Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baos, Laguna, issued
to Pablito Meneses Free Patent No. (IV-5) P-12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268
covering Lot 1585 with an area of 417 square meters, and Free Patent No (IV-5) 12808 and
Original Certificate of Title No P-1269 for Lot 190 with an area of 515 square meters. Both lots
are located in Los Baos, Laguna.
Pablito Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and
Transfer of Rights executed on May 5, 1975 in consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" for
and "some monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito Meneses (Rollo, p. 45). After the execution of
said document, Pablito Meneses took possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon,
declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn,
Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt, Sergia (Gliceria) M. Almeda. He had
been occupying the land since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as far back as September
6, 1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 989 covering a lot with an area of 859 square meters located in Los Baos,
Laguna with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was
registered on August 14, 1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of
Ciriaca's heirs: Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios
and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing.
In 1962, the Quisumbing instituted and accion publiciana in the then Court of First Instance of
Bian, Laguna to recover possession over a portion of the property from Dominga Villamor and
Lorenzo Lanuzo docketed as Civil Case No. B-350. On January 3, 1966, the case was decided in
favor of the Quisumbings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the Quisumbings' right over
the property.
In LRC Case No. B-327, the Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an
additional area of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to their property by the
natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. In its Decision of September 28, 1978, the Court of
First Instance of Bian confirmed the Quisumbings' title thereto which, after it was duly surveyed,
was identified as Psu-208327. The additional area was divided into two lots in the survey plan
approved by the Director of Lands on November 16, 1964. In ordering the confirmation and
registration of title on favor of the Quisumbings, the land registration court said:
. . . There is no doubt that the applicants' right to the property was bolstered by the
unappealed decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350 of this Court
when the properties applied for were classified as accretions made by the waters of
the Laguna Lake. . . . (G.R. No. 82229, Rollo, p. 20).
On April 17, 1979, the Quisumbings filed Civil Case No. 07049 before the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, Branch VI, Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio C. Darum and Cesar
B. Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They
alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baos, using his brother Pablito as a "tool
and dummy," illegally occupied their "private accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and,

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confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtained
free patents and original certificates of title to the land.
On March 26, 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the
Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid right as owners of
the riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. In so holding, the
trial court relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350, and
quoted the following portions of the appellate court's decision:
Plaintiffs-appellees are titled owners of a (sic) 859 square meters of land under TCT
No. 25978 of the Laguna Land Registry, the northwest boundary of which is the
Laguna de Bay.
It is ascertained that the northwest portion of Quisumbing's lot is bounded by the
Laguna de Bay. The nature of the Laguna de Bay has long been settled in the case
of Government of the Philippines v. Colegio de San Jose (55 Phil. 423) when it held
that:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depression of the earth; it
contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks and springs, and is
connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the
definition first quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.
Consequently, since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the authorities cited by the appellants
referring to seashore would not apply. The provision of the law on waters will govern
in determining the natural bed or basin of the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of
the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:
Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers andlakes by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Since the title indicate(s) that the northwest portion of the property is bounded by
Laguna de Bay, which is a lake, even if the area where Lanuza's house and
Villamor's house for that matter is located is not included within the title, it must
necessarily be an accretion upon appellees' land by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof which should belong to the owner of the adjacent land. The
authorities cited by the appellants treat of the ownership of accretions by water of
the sea under Title I. Lakewaters being terrestrial waters, their ownership is
governed by Title II of the Law of Waters. As held in the Colegio de San Jose case,
the provisions of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of sea water
are not applicable to the ownership and use of lakes which are governed by
different provisions. As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is
necessary in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation as the law does not
require the same (Ignacio Grande, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L17652, June 30, 1962 citing Roxas vs. Tuazon, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of Manila,
10 Phil. 567 and 3 Manresa, C.C. pp. 321-326, pp. 4-5) (Records, pp. 80-84).

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The trial court also found that the free patents issued to Pablito Meneses had been procured
through fraud, deceit and bad faith, citing the following facts as bases for its conclusion: (1) The
Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights allegedly executed by Silverio Bautista in favor of Pablito
Meneses was a simulated contract for lack of consideration; (2) The said instrument was sworn to
before Mayor Lorenzo Meneses who had no authority to notarize deeds of conveyances; (3)
Although the lots subject of the deed of conveyance were placed in his brother's name, Mayor
Meneses actually exercised rights of ownership thereto; (4) Land Inspector Cesar Almendral
admitted having anomalously prepared the documents to support the free patent applications of
Pablito Meneses and, having personally filled up the blank forms, signed them in the absence of
the persons concerned; (5) Almendral kept the documents in his possession from 1979 to 1980
despite orders from the Director of Lands to produce and surrender the same; (6) District Land
Officer Braulio Darum approved the free patent applications and issued the questioned titles
without the required cadastral survey duly approved by the Director of Lands and despite the
pendency of LRC Case No. B-327 involving the contested lots; (7) Darum represented the Bureau
of Lands in LRC Case No. B-327 without authority from the Director of Lands and after he had
withdrawn his appearance in said case, persisted in filing a motion to set aside the order for the
issuance of a decree in favor of the Quisumbings; (8) Darum and Almendral in bad faith, refused
to produce the missing original records of the free patent applications and their supporting
documents; and (9) When Darum was not yet an oppositor in LRC Case No. B-327, he admitted in
his letter to the Land Registration Commission that the contested lots are portions of the land
being claimed by the Quisumbings contrary to his later representation in the joint answer to the
petition that the subject lots are not portions of Lots 1 and 2, Psu-208327 owned by the
Quisumbings. Accordingly, the trial court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the lands covered by Pablito Meneses' Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 (Exh. "J"), covering Lot No. 1585, consisting of
417 square meters and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No. 12808
(Exh. "H"), covering Lot No. 190, consisting of 515 square meters, both located at
Los Baos, Laguna, as accretion lands forming parts of a bigger accretion land
owned by plaintiffs as declared in a final judgment (Exh. "A"), rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Bian, Laguna, in LRC Case No. B-327, which bigger accretion
land is directly adjacent to or at the back of plaintiffs' riparian land, and
consequently, declaring as null and void and cancelled Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free
Patent No. 12808;
2. Directing that the Register of Deeds of Laguna or his Deputy at Calamba, Laguna,
to make the corresponding entries of cancellation in his Registry of the above
mentioned Original Certificate of Titles/Free Patents;
3. Directing defendants Lorenzo Meneses and Pablito Meneses and all persons
acting in their behalves to vacate the subject lands and surrender the possession
thereof to the plaintiffs immediately; and
4. Directing the defendants to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sums of:

5/43

a) P20,000.00, plus P500.00 per month from January, 1977, until the
subject property is completely vacated, as actual and compensatory
damages;
b) P350,000.00, as moral damages;
c) P70,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d) P40,000.00, as attorney's fees; and
e) the costs (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
Thereafter, the Quisumbings filed a motion for execution pending appeal which the trial court
granted in its Order of September 7, 1984 subject to the posting by the Quisumbings of a bond in
the amount of P500,000.00. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for the reconsideration of said
order.
The Quisumbings also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Pablito Meneses,
Silverio Bautista, Pablo Silva, Virgilio Cruz and Cesar Almendral for violation of paragraphs (e)
and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, for conspiring in the approval and grant of the free
patents over portions of Lots 1 & 2 of Psu-208327 owned by the heirs of Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de
Quisumbing. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty
as charged. The case was elevated to this Court but on August 27, 1987, the judgment of
conviction was affirmed (Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 [1987]).
Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 07049 to
the Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1987, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without
merit and affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
The defendants-appellants filed two motions for the reconsideration of the appellate court's
decision but it was denied in the Resolution of February 23, 1988 which in pertinent part stated:
However, for humanitarian considerations, and considering the appeal of the
defendants-appellants for a reduction of the moral and exemplary damages, We
favor the reduction of the moral damages from P350,000.00 to P50,000.00 and the
exemplary damages from P70,000.00 to P5,000.00. In all other respects, We find no
justification for modifying the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court
(G.R. No. 82220, Rollo, p. 67).
Pablito and Lorenzo Meneses filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 82220. Cesar Almendral filed a motion in G.R. No. 82251 for a 45-day
extension within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. After this Court had granted
them a 30-day extension, Almendral still failed to file any petition. The Quisumbings also filed a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 83059, solely on the issue of the propriety
of the reduction of the amount of damages in the Court of Appeals' Resolution of February 23,
1988. Upon motion of petitioners in G.R. No. 83059, the three petitions were consolidated in the
Resolution of August 1, 1988.

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Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 retell the same errors they had raised before the Court of Appeals,
contending in the main: (1) that the lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the
public domain; (2) that no conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the
issuance of the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and (3) that the Deed of Waiver and
Transfer of Rights was founded on a valid consideration.
As regards the issue of whether the lands in question are accretion lands, petitioners relied on
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in Republic of the Philippines v. Braga, CA-G.R. No. 55390-R,
October 23, 1980, holding that the property involved therein was part of the natural bed of the
Laguna de Bay and therefore what had to be determined was whether said property was covered
by water when the lake was at its highest depth.
Petitioners' assigned errors in G.R. No. 82220 are evidently factual issues which have been
thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court
(Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 533 [1994]) and they carry
even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court
(Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374 [1991]). The jurisdiction of this Court is thus limited to
reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion (BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 566 [1941]). We find
no such showing in this case.
Petitioners' protestations notwithstanding the final decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case
No. B-350 has a bearing in the resolution of this case for while the lots occupied by Villamor and
Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming here, the two cases refer to the
same accretion lands northwest of the original land owned by the Quisumbings.
In the same vein, the decision of the land registration court in LRC Case No. B-327 ordering the
confirmation and registration of title in favor of the Quisumbings over 2,387 square meters of
accretion land is binding on petitioners in G.R. No. 82220. As correctly pointed out by the Court
of Appeals, said decision, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the whole world, more so
because it became final and executory upon the Bureau of Lands' failure to interpose an appeal.
Since petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 claim that "the foreshore land known as Lots 190 and 1585
are part of Laguna de Bay" and therefore the Quisumbings "have no legal right to claim the same
as accretion land," we quote the following pertinent portions of the decision in Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) which, although the case deals with the registration of a
reclaimed land along the Laguna de Bay, is nonetheless enlightening:
Laguna de Bay is a lake. While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same
gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans, this
phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. Thus, the
alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly
account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five
months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about the
inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level

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which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five
months a year) than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry, the
latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay.
Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna
de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land. The Brief for the Petitioner
Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore land, to wit:
. . . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and
left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides.
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land
in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from
different sources." Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux
and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of
the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be
registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land
as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of
registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a
registerable title (at pp. 538-539).
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
While the trial court mainly relied on the findings in Civil Case No. B-350 that the lands in
controversy are accretion lands and it has not determined on its own the presence of said
requisites, it is too late now for petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 to claim otherwise. Consequently,
the lands held to be accretion lands could only benefit the Quisumbings, who own the property
adjacent to the lands in controversy (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 350 [1992]).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 also assert that the principle of indefeasibility of title should favor
them as the one-year period provided for by law to impugn their title had elapsed. They also
urged that, having been granted by the state, their title is superior to that of the Quisumbings.
We hold, however, that in the light of the fraud attending the issuance of the free patents and
titles of Pablito Meneses, said assertions crumble. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court
in Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 (1987) which held the petitioners therein liable for violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles.
Unlike the petition in G.R. No. 82220, the petition in G.R. No. 83059 (questioning the reduction of
the damages awarded to the Quisumbings by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution of February
23, 1988) is meritorious. The task of fixing the amount of damages is primarily with the trial
court (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]). While it is the appellate court's duty to
review the same, a reduction of the award of damages must pass the test of reasonableness. The
Court of Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded as damages when they are

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palpably or scandalously and reasonably excessive (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
226 SCRA 423 [1993]; Prudenciano v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]).
There is no justification for the radical reduction by the Court of Appeals of the damages awarded
by the trial court. Its action was premise merely on "humanitarian considerations" and the plea of
the defendants-appellants. We may agree with the Court of Appeals in reducing the award after
scrutinizing its factual findings only if such findings are diametrically opposed to that of the trial
court (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra). But as it is, the Court of Appeals
affirmed point by point the factual findings if the lower court upon which the award of damages
had been based.
We, therefore, see no reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial court.
Respondent Braulio C. Darum in G.R. No. 83059 must also be solidarily liable for said damages in
his capacity as a public officer. A public official is by law not immune from damages in his
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are
no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions (Vidad v. RTC of Negros, Br. 42,
227 SCRA 271 [1993]).
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82220 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 83059 is
GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED while its
Resolution of February 23, 1988 insofar as it reduces the amount of damages awarded to the
Quisumbing family is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 and respondent
Braulio Darum in G.R. No. 83059.
SO ORDERED. Padilla, Davide Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

PACIFIC FARMS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO G. ESGUERRA, ET AL., defendants,
CARRIED LUMBER COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Primicias, Del Castillo, Macaraeg and T. P. Regino for defendant-appellant.
Araneta and Araneta for plaintiff-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
Before us for review, on appeal by the defendant Carried Lumber Company (hereinafter referred
to as the Company), is the decision, dated May 30, 1962, of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan in civil case D-1317, annulling the levy and certificate of sale covering six buildings
owned by the plaintiff Pacific Farms, Inc., executed by the defendant deputy provincial sheriff
Simplicio G. Esguerra in favor of the Company to satisfy a money judgment against the Insular
Farms, Inc., the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest over the said buildings.
The environmental setting is uncontroverted.

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On several occasions from October 1, 1956 to March 2, 1957 the Company sold and delivered
lumber and construction materials to the Insular Farms, Inc. which the latter used in the
construction of the aforementioned six buildings at its compound in Bolinao, Pangasinan, of the
total procurement price of P15,000, the sum of P4,710.18 has not been paid by Insular Farms,
Inc. Consequently, on October 17, 1958 the Company instituted civil case D-775 with the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan to recover the said unpaid balance from the Insular Farms, Inc. On
August 23, 1961 the trial court rendered judgment sustaining the Company's claim. The
judgment debtor did not appeal; so on December 19, 1961 the corresponding writ of execution
was issued. On January 16, 1962 the defendant sheriff levied upon the six buildings. On January
30, 1962 the Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a third-party claim, subscribed by its corporate president,
asserting ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the Insular Farms, Inc.
by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed on March 21, 1958, about seven months before the
Company filed the above-mentioned action (civil case D-775). Shielded by an indemnity bond of
P7,120 put up by the Company and the Cosmopolitan Insurance Company, Inc., the sheriff
proceeded with the announced public auction on February 12, 1962 and sold the levied buildings
to the Company for P6,110.78.
Asserting absolute and exclusive ownership of the buildings in question, the Pacific Farms, Inc.
filed a complaint on May 14, 1962 against the Company and the sheriff with the court a quo,
praying that judgment be rendered, (a) declaring null and void the levy and judicial sale of the
six buildings, and (b) adjudging the defendants jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff in the
sum of P2,000 by way of actual damages and for such amount as the court may deem proper
and just to impose by way of exemplary damages and for costs of the suit.
After due trial, the court a quo on May 30, 1963 rendered judgment annulling the levy of January
16, 1962 and the certificate of sale of February 12, 1962. The court, however, denied the
plaintiff's claim for actual and exemplary damages on the ground that it was not "prepared to
find that there was gross negligence or bad faith on the part of any of the defendants."
Hence this appeal, imputing errors which, according to the appellant's formulation, are the
following:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the credit of the defendant-appellant, Carried
Lumber Company, against the Insular Farms, Inc., consisting of the value of lumber and
construction materials used in the buildings which were later acquired by the Pacific
Farms, Inc., the appellee, was not a statutory lien on those buildings; .
2. The lower court, likewise, erred in holding that the doctrine laid down in De Barretto, et
al. vs. Villanueva, et al. (G.R. No. L-14938, December 29, 1962) is applicable to the facts of
this case as found by said court; and .
3. The lower court erred, finally, in declaring that the sale at public auction conducted by
the defendant deputy provincial sheriff of Pangasinan, covering the six buildings described
in the certificate of sale dated February 12, 1962, was null and void.
1. In ruling against the appellant below, the trial court relied mainly on the resolution (on the
motion for reconsideration) promulgated on December 29, 1962 by this Court in De Barretto, et

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al. vs. Villanueva, et al., L-14938 (6 SCRA 928). The said case, however, is inapplicable because it
concerned not one but two or more preferred creditors who, pursuant to articles 2242 and 2249
of the Civil Code, must necessarily be convened and the nature and extent of their respective
claims ascertained. Thus, we held that before there can be a pro rata payment of credits entitled
to preference as to the same specific real property, there must first be some proceeding where
the claims of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the
settlement of a decedent's estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or liquidation proceedings
of similar import.
But the case before us does not involve a question of preference of credits, and is not one where
two or more creditors have separate and distinct claims against the same debtor who has
insufficient property. Indeed, it is a matter of necessity and logic that the question of preference
should arise only where the debtor cannot pay his debts in full. For, if debtor A is able in full to
pay all his three creditors, B, C, and D, how can the need arise for determining which of the three
creditors shall be paid first or whether they shall be paid out of the proceeds of a specific
property?
2. It is undenied and undeniable that the appellant furnished lumber and construction materials
to the Insular Farms, Inc. (the appellee's predecessor-in-interest) which the latter used in the
construction of the six buildings. Likewise unchallenged is the lower court's factual finding that
out of the total procurement price of P15,000, the amount of P4,710.18 remains outstanding and
unpaid by the Insular Farms, Inc. The appellant is therefore an unpaid furnisher of materials.
Whether there exists a materialman's lien over the six buildings in favor of the appellant, is a
question we do not here decide. To our mind the application by analogy of the rules of accession
would suffice for a just adjudication.
Article 447 of the Civil Code1 provides:
The owner of the land who makes thereon personally or through another, plantings,
constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted
in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the
materials shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to
the work constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed.
However, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove
them in any event with a right to be indemnified for damages.
The abovequoted legal provision contemplates a principal and an accessory, the land being
considered the principal, and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of
the land who in good faith whether personally or through another makes constructions or
works thereon, using materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the owner of the said
materials with the obligation however of praying for their value. 2The owner of the materials, on
the other hand, is entitled to remove them, provided no substantial injury is caused to the
landowner. Otherwise, he has the right to reimbursement for the value of his materials.
Although it does not appear from the records of this case that the land upon which the six
buildings were built is owned by the appellee, nevertheless, that the appellee claims that it owns

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the six buildings constructed out of the lumber and construction materials furnished by the
appellant, is indubitable. Therefore, applying article 447 by analogy, we perforce consider the
buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into their
construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the six buildings, must bear the
obligation to pay for the value of the said materials; the appellant which apparently has no
desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them
without necessarily damaging the buildings has the corresponding right to recover the value of
the unpaid lumber and construction materials.
Well-established in jurisprudence is the rule that compensation should be borne by the person
who has been benefited by the accession. 3 No doubt, the appellee benefited from the accession,
i.e., from the lumber and materials that went into the construction of the six buildings. It should
therefore shoulder the compensation due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher of materials.
Of course, the character of a buyer in good faith and for value, if really possessed by the
appellee, could possibly exonerate it from making compensation.
But the appellee's stance that it is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith is open to
grave doubt because of certain facts of substantial import (evident from the records) that cannot
escape notice.
In the deed of absolute sale, exhibit 1, the Insular Farms, Inc. (vendor) was represented in the
contract by its president, J. Antonio Araneta. The latter was a director of the appellee (Pacific
Farms, Inc.) and was the counsel who signed the complaint filed by the appellee in the court
below. J. Antonio Araneta was, therefore, not only the president of the Insular Farms, Inc. but also
a director and counsel of the appellee.
During the trial of civil case D-775 the Insular Farms, Inc. was represented by Attorney Amado
Santiago, Jr. of the law firm of J. Antonio Araneta. The latter was one of the counsels of the Pacific
Farms, Inc. The appellee cannot claim ignorance of the pendency of civil case D-775 because the
Insular Farms, Inc. was defended by the same lawyer from the same law firm that commenced
the present action. J. Antonio Araneta, as counsel for the Pacific Farms, Inc., cannot close his eyes
to facts of which he as president of the Insular Farms, Inc. had actual knowledge. Significantly,
exhibit 1 (supra) itself shows that the Insular Farms, Inc. and the Pacific Farms, Inc. were housed
in adjacent rooms (nos. 304 and 303, respectively), of the same building, the Insular Life
Building, as early as March 21, 1958.
It is reasonable therefore to conclude that the appellee, through its director and counsel, J.
Antonio Araneta, knew about the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the lumber and
construction materials supplied or furnished by the appellant to the Insular Farms, Inc.
Parenthetically, it is likewise worth our attention that despite the appellee's knowledge of the suit
instituted by the appellant against the Insular Farms, Inc. (the appellee's predecessor-in-interest)
for the recovery of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the lumber and materials used in
the construction of its six buildings, it merely folded its arms in disinterest and waited, so to
speak. Not until a decision was rendered therein in favor of the appellant, a writ of execution
issued, and the six buildings levied upon by the sheriff, did it file a third-party claim over the

12/43

levied buildings. In the face of the knowledge that its predecessor-in-interest had not fully paid
for the lumber and construction materials used in the six buildings it had purchased, its natural
and expected reaction should have been to intervene in the suit filed by the appellant against
the Insular Farms, Inc. and hold the latter to account for breach of the warranties deemed
included in the deed of absolute sale conveying said building to it.
Curiously enough, although the six buildings in question were supposedly sold by the Insular
Farms to the appellee on March 21, 1958, as evidenced by the deed of absolute sale (exhibit 1),
about seven months before the appellant filed civil case D-775, the Insular Farms, Inc. never
moved to implead the appellee therein as a necessary party-defendant, and remained
completely and strangely silent about the sale. It is not amiss to surmise that it is entirely
possible that the Insular Farms, Inc. and the appellee chose to remain silent in the hope that the
appellant's claim against the Insular Farms, Inc. in civil case D-775 would be dismissed or nonsuited.
Moreover, the appellee was in a better position to protect its interest. It knew that the Insular
Farms, Inc., its predecessor-in-interest, was a mere lessee of the premises on which the buildings
were located. This should have placed it on guard and compelled it to ascertain the
circumstances surrounding the construction of the said buildings on the premises.
On the other hand, the appellant was not as advantageously situated as the appellee. There
being no separate registry of property for buildings and no procedure provided by law for
registering or annotating the claim of an unpaid furnisher of materials, it was helpless to prevent
the sale of the property built from lumber and construction materials it furnished. But certainly,
because it has a right, pursuant to article 447, supra, to reimbursement for the value of its
unpaid materials, the appellant could pursue any remedy available to it under the law in order to
enforce the said right. Thus, the appellant acted correctly in bringing an action (D-775) against
the Insular Farms, Inc. and enforcing its right of reimbursement through the execution of the final
judgment it obtained in the said case against the six buildings in the possession of the appellee
who now stands to benefit therefrom. It follows, as a necessary corollary, that the sale at public
auction conducted by the defendant sheriff of the six buildings described in the certificate of sale
dated February 12, 1962, exhibit 7, was valid and effective.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the complaint is hereby dismissed.
In view, however, of the equities clearly attendant in this case, it is the sense of this Court that
the plaintiff-appellee Pacific Farms, Inc. should be, as it is hereby, granted a period of thirty (30)
days from the date this judgment becomes final, within which it may exercise the option of
redeeming the six buildings, by paying to the defendant-appellant Carried Lumber Company the
sum of P4,710.18, with legal interest from September 23, 1961 (the date the judgment in civil
case D-775 became final), until the said amount shall have been fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

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G.R. No. L-43456

May 6, 1935

CATALINO BATACLAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE and
VICENTE SANTO DOMINGO BERNARDO, respondents.
Nicolas Santiago for petitioner.
Pedro de Leon for respondent Santo Domingo Bernardo.
No appearance for the other respondent.
VICKERS, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul an order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite
issued on April 24, 1934 for the sale at public auction of the land which was the subject of civil
case No. 2428 of said court between the respondent, Vicente Santo Domingo Bernardo, as
plaintiff, and the petitioner herein, Catalino Bataclan, as defendant.
The dispositive part of the decision in that case is as follows:
Por las consideraciones expuestas, se declara al demandante Vicente Santo Domingo
Bernardo dueo y con derecho a la posesion del terreno que se describe en la demanda, y
al demandado Catalino Bataclan con derecho a que el demandante le pague la suma de
P1,642 por gastos utiles hechos de buena fe en el terreno, y por el cerco y ponos de coco
y abca existentes en el mismo, y con derecho, ademas, a retener la posesion del terreno
hasta que se le pague dicha cantidad. El demandante puede optar, en el plazo de treinta
dias, a partir de la fecha en que fuere notificado de la presente, por pagar esa suma la
demandado, haciendo asi suyos el cerco y todas las plantaciones existentes en el terreno,
u obligar al demandado a pagarle el precio del terreno, a eazon de trescientos pesos la
hectarea. En el caso de que el demandante optara (por) que el demandado le pagara el
precio del terreno, el demandado efectuara el pago en el plazo convenido por las partes o
que sera fijado por el Juzgado. Sin costas.

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On appeal to this court the value of the land containing 90 hectares was reduced from P300 to
P200 a hectare, and the value of the improvements made by the defendant thereon was
increased from P1,642 to P2,212. The decision of the lower court was affrimed in all other
respects. (G.R. No. 37319.)1
The plaintiff in that case, Vicente Santo Domingo Bernardo, elected to compel the defendant,
Catalino Bataclan, to pay him the value of the land, P18,000. Petitioner alleges that he filed a
motion on January 12, 1934 praying that he be granted a period of fifteen years in which to pay
said sum of P18,000; that said motion was never granted or denied, but on April 24, 1934 the
court issued an order directing that the land be sold at public auction and that out of the
proceeds of the sale the sum of P18,000 be paid to the plaintiff in addition to the legal expenses
of the sale, and that the remainder to the amount of P2,212 be paid to the defendant.
It appears, however, from the order of Judge Leopoldo Rovira of January 24, 1934 that the
plaintiff informed the court that he elected to compel the defendant to pay him the value of the
land, and that the defendant appeared in court and stated that he did not have any money; that
the court then granted the plaintiff thirty days in which to pay the defendant the sum of P2,212,
and ordered that if said payment was not made the land should be sold at public auction of the
payment of said sum to the defendant, the balance after deducting the expenses of the sale to
be delivered to the plaintiff.
On March 16, 1934 Judge Rovira modified his order of January 24th, and ordered that from the
proceeds of the sale the plaintiff should be paid for the land at the rate of P200 a hectare, and
that the balance, if any, should be delivered to the defendant.
On April 24, 1934 Judge Sixto de la Costa issued an order for the sale of the land at public
auction in order that the plaintiff might be paid from the proceeds the sum of P18,000 and the
legal expenses of the sale, and that from the balance, if any, P2,212 should be paid to the
defendant. This is the order complained of.
The decision of the lower court was based on article 361 of the Civil Code, which reads as
follows:
Any owner of land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted, in good faith, shall
be entitled to appropriate the thing so built, sown, or planted, upon paying the
compensation mentioned in articles 453 and 454, or to compel the person who has built or
planted to pay him the value of the land or, to require the person who sowed thereon to
pay the proper rent therefore.
The contention of the petitioner is that in issuing the order of April 24, 1934 the court exceeded
its jurisdiction because it constituted an amendment to a final judgment of said court, which had
been affirmed by this court.
It is true that in the decision in question it was provided that in case the plaintiff elected to
compel the defendant to pay him the value of the land, the payment should be made within the
period agreed upon by the parties or that it would be fixed by the court; but, according to the
petitioner, he asked for a period of fifteen years in which to pay the owner of the land the value

15/43

thereof; and when he appeared in court he informed the court that he had no money with which
to pay for the land. Under those circumstances, it would have been futile for the court to grant
the defendant a reasonable period of thirty or sixty days in which to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P18,000, and if there was any irregularity in the court's ordering the sale of the property at public
auction under the conditions stated in the orders of March 16, 1934 and April 24, 1934, it was
not prejudicial but favorable to the petitioner, because his only right was to purchase the land for
the sum of P18,000.
Furthermore the petitioner could have appealed from the order in question, and his right to
appeal was an adequate remedy.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied, with the costs against the petitioner. Abad
Santos, Hull, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-28721

October 5, 1928

MARTIN MENDOZA and NATALIO ENRIQUEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
MANUEL DE GUZMAN, defendant-appellant.
MAX B. SOLIS, intervenor-appellant.
Juan S. Rustia for appellants.
Godofredo Reyes for appellees.
MALCOLM, J.:
This case calls for the application of articles 361, 435, and 454 of the Civil Code to the proven
facts.
On November 6, 1916, Leandra Solis and her husband Bernardo Solis brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas against Martin Mendoza for the recovery of a certain piece of
land. Judgment was rendered in that case absolving Mendoza from the complaint, and this
judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. 1 When the case was remanded to
the court of origin, the trial judge issued an order requiring the provincial sheriff immediately to
dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction and to put Mendoza in the possession of the land. By
virtue of this order, Mendoza was in fact put in possession of the property.
In the cadastral proceedings of the municipality of Sariaya, Tayabas, the piece of land abovementioned was identified as lot No. 687. In the decision rendered in the cadastral case, this lot
was adjudicated in favor of Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez in equal parts pro
indiviso subject to the right of retention on the part of Manuel de Guzman until he shall have
been indemnified for the improvements existing on the land. By virtue of this judgment, De
Guzman presented a motion requesting the issuance of a writ of possession for lot No. 687 in his
favor which was granted on June 25, 1924. From the time Leandra Solis and Bernardo Solis, as
well as Manuel de Guzman who was working on the land, were ejected therefrom, Martin

16/43

Mendoza possessed it until June 25, 1924, when de Guzman obtained the writ of possession
above- mentioned. Since then De Guzman has had dominion over the land.
Being unable to come to an agreement as to the amount which should be allowed for the
improvements made on the land, Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez began an action
requesting the court to (a) fix the value of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by Manuel
de Guzman in introducing the improvements; (b) require the defendant to render an accounting
of the fruits received by him and order that the value of the fruits be applied to the payment of
the necessary and useful expenses; and (c) decree the restitution of the possession to the
plaintiffs. To the complaint, the defendant filed an answer in the form of a general denial with
special defenses and appended a counter-claim and crosscomplaint, in which a total of P6,000
was asked. During the pendency of the case, Bernardo Solis, or Max. B. Solis, one of the persons
who was ejected from the land, asked leave to intervene, alleging, among other things, that De
Guzman, in consideration of the sum of P5,000, had transferred all his rights in the
improvements and in the lot to him with the exception of two hundred coconut trees. This
petition was granted by the trial court.
When the case was called for trial, the parties entered into the follwing stipulation:
1. That the plaintiffs are the owners and proprietors of the land described in the second
paragraph of the complaint.
2. That a decree of registration has been issued on said land in the terms set forth in
paragraph 3 of the complaint.
3. That the defendant Manuel de Guzman is the one who has been in possession and
enjoyment of the land from June 25, 1924, up to the present time by virtue of a writ of
possession obtained by him from the Court of Land Registration.
4. That the defendant has made improvements on said land be planting coconut trees
thereon.
5. That the plaintiff Martin Mendoza is the one who has been in possession and enjoyment
of said property and its improvements since December 16, 1916, by virtue of a writ of
possession in civil case No. 356 until said pssession was transferred to the defendant
Manuel de Guzman.
6. That from March 20, 1920, the plaintiff Natalio Enriquez has been in possession and
enjoyment of a portion of the land, the subject matter of the complaint herein, by virtue of
a deed of sale executed in his favor by Attorney Agustin Alvarez, who, in turn, acquired it
from the other plaintiff Martin Mendoza, until June 25, 1924.
The parties desire to submit, as they do submit, under this stipulation of facts the
following questions:
(a) The amount of the indemnity to be paid to the defendant for the improvements
made by him on said lot and the basis upon which said amount shall be fixed.

17/43

(b) Whether or not the defendant is obliged to render an account of the fruits
received by him from June 25, 1924, until the improvements are delivered after
same have been paid for. 1awph!l.net
(c) Whether the value of said fruits and products received by the defendant shall be
applied to the indemnity to which he is entitled, or whether said defendant is
obliged to deliver to the plaintiffs the remainder in case of excess.
(d) Whether or not the defendant has the right to be paid by the plaintiffs in whole
or in part for the value of the fruits received by Martin Mendoza and Natalio
Enriquez from the respective dates that they were in possession and enjoyment of
the land until June 25, 1924.
The parties at the same time that they submit to the court for decision the questions
presented in the above stipulation reserve to themselves, whatever said decision may be,
the right to present later their evidence in support of their respective views with respect to
the amount of the indemnity.
After the preliminary questions have been decided, the parties request that commissioners
be appointed to receive said evidence with respect to the amount of the indemnity in
accordance with the views of both parties.
The trial court resolved the questions presented by holding (1) that in accordance with the
provisions of articles 435 and 454 in relation with article 361 of the Civil Code, the value of the
"indemnization" to be paid to the defendant should be fixed according to the necessary and
useful expenses incurred by him in introducing "las plantaciones en cuestion"; (2) that the
plaintiffs as the owner of the property have the right to make their own "las plantaciones hechas
por el demandado" upon payment in the form indicated in No. 1, the defendant having the right
to retain the land until the expenditures have been refunded; (3) that the defendant is obliged to
render a detail and just account of the fruits and other profits received by him from the property
for their due application; and (4) that the value of the fruits received by the defendant should
first be applied to the payment of the "indemnizacion," and in that it exceeds the value of the
"indemnizacion," the excess shall be returned to the plaintiffs. With respect to the last question
as to whether or not the plaintiffs are obliged to return to the defendant the value of the fruits
received by them before the defendant took possession of the land, the trial court abstained
from making any pronouncement for the reason that the circumstances under which the plaintiffs
acquired possession and the defendant again acquired it were not before him, the parties
needing to submit their evidence with respect to this point.
At the trial which followed and at the instance of the parties, two commissioners were appinted
with instructions to inspect the land and to count the number of coconut trees planted thereon,
determining the number of fruit-bearing trees and those that are not fruit-bearing as well as the
condition of the same. After trial, Judge of First Instance Gloria rendered judgment declaring (a)
that the defendant Manuel de Guzman and the intervenor Bernardo Solis have the right to collect
from the plaintiffs Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez the sum of P2,046 as compensation for
the necessary and useful expenditures in the proportion of 20 per cent for Manuel de Guzman
and 80 per cent for Bernardo Solis; and (b) that Manuel de Guzman and Bernardo Solis are

18/43

obliged to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P666.93 per annum from June 25, 1924, one-fifth of
this amount to be paid by Manuel de Guzman and the other four-fifths by Bernardo Solis. As on
the date when this judgment was rendered, that is on September 23, 1927, the amount that the
plaintiffs were required to pay to the defendant and intervenor exceeded the amount that the
latter were to pay the former, the defendant and intervenor were ordered to deliver the land and
its improvement as soon as the plaintiffs have paid the difference, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
The appeal of the defendant and intervenor is based on fourteen assigned errors relating to both
questions of fact and of law. The question of fact mainly concerns the amount to be paid as
"indemnizacion" in the form of necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. The
question of law mainly concerns the interpretation of articles 361, 453, and 454 of the Civil Code.
Counsel for the appellants has presented a learned brief divided into three chapters. Counsel for
the appellees has countered with an equally helpful brief in which the fourteen assigned errors
are reduced for purposes of arguments to four fundamental questions. It would not be profitable
and it is not necessary to follow opposing counsel into all of their refinements of fact and law.
As to the facts, the findings of the trial judge should be given effect. An examination of the
evidence shows that these findings are fully substantiated. Our only doubt has been as to the
just value for each coconut tree now found on the land. However, everything considered, we
have at last determined that we would not be justified in changing the value per tree of P2 as
fixed in the trial court. With respect to the fruits received by the defendant while the land was in
his possession, the finding in the trial court is correct.
With the facts as above indicated, little time need be taken to discuss the points of law. Article
361 of the Civil Code in the original Spanish text uses the word "indemnizacion." However one
may speculate as to the true meaning of the term "indemnizacion" whether correctly translated
as "compensation" or "indemnity," the amount of the "indemnizacion" is the amount of the
expenditures mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code, which in the present case is
the amount of the necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. Necessary
expenses have been variously described by the Spanish commentators as those made for the
preservation of the thing (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 258); as those without
which the thing would deteriorate or be lost (Scaevola's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p.408); as
those that augment the income of the things upon which they are expanded (4
Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 261; 8 Scaevola'sComentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 416).
Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation, production, upkeep, etc. (4
Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 257). Here the plaintiffs have chosen to take the
improvements introduced on the land and are disposed to pay the amount of the necessary and
useful expenses incurred by the defendant. Inasmuch as the retentionist, who is not exactly a
posessor in good faith with in the meaning of the law, seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary
and useful expenditures, it is only just that he should account to the owners of the estate for any
rents, fruits, or crops he has gathered from it.
In brief, therefore, and with special reference to the decision appealed from, the errors assigned
on appeal, and the argument of counsel as addressed to the decision in the lower court and the
assignment of errors, we may say that we are content to make the findings of fact and law of
Judge Gloria in the lower court the findings of fact and law in the appellate court.

19/43

Based on the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellants. Avancena, C.J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand,
Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-17985

September 29, 1962
GIL SAN DIEGO and RUFINA SAN DIEGO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, et
al., respondents.
Isidro T. Almeda for petitioners.
Jose P. Osorio for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Presented before us in this petition for mandamus is the peculiar case of party-defendants
insisting on, and prevailing party-plaintiffs resisting, the execution of a final and executory
decision.
To understand this peculiarity, we will state briefly facts leading to the controversy.
After trial in Civil Case No. 770 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on complaint of Jose,
Maria and Urbano all surnamed "de la Cruz", to recover a parcel of land and damages from Gil
San Diego and Rufino San Diego, the Court (Hon. Jesus Y. Perez, presiding) rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby rendered considers judgment as follows:
(a) Declaring the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, null and void;
(b) Ordering the defendants and third-party plaintiffs to vacate the land in question upon
payment to them by the plaintiffs and third-party defendants, within thirty (30) days after
this decision has become final, of the sum of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,500.00);
(c) Dismissing the counterclaim of the third-party defendants; and
(d) No pronouncement as to costs.
The court found that the disputed portion of a parcel of land belonged to the plaintiffs through
hereditary succession; that the defendants built a house on the land in good faith, having
acquired the land from Catalina Anastacio, mother of the plaintiffs, by purchase for P1,000.00.
During the proceedings, the defendants filed a third-party complaint against said vendor. The
vendor (mother of plaintiffs) subsequently died; hence, herein respondent who were the
plaintiffs, became at the same time third-party defendants in substitution of their deceased
mother. The court voided the sale on the ground that the vendor had no right to the land, but
upheld the defense of defendants as builders in good faith.
On appeal by the plaintiffs and third-party defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
lower court's decision, and the same, thereafter, became final and executory. Over two years
later, the defendants and third party plaintiffs, who were in possession of the parcel of land in
litigation, moved to execute paragraph (b) of the aforequoted dispositive portion of the decision
in order to collect the sum of P3,500.00 and thereafter to vacate the premises. The motion was
denied by the court (Hon. Agustin P. Montesa presiding), and a motion for reconsideration was
likewise of no avail Hence, the instant petition for mandamus was filed to compel the respondent
judge to issue the writ applied for.1awphl.nt
Petitioners' argument is that the pertinent part of the dispositive portion of the decision ordains,
first, that they vacate the land, and second, that the plaintiffs pay P3,500.00 within 30 days after
this decision becomes final,
with the connecting preposition "upon" unmistakably denoting that the second (payment
of indemnity) is a condition precedent to the first (vacation of the premises).
(Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 5)
They hold the view that the respondents should pay them first before they vacate, and not viceversa; and that they are entitled now to insist on the payment through a writ of execution.

20/43

Respondents, upon the other hand, contend:

(1) That petitioners have no right to the writ of execution, because as absolute owners of
the land, the respondents have the right, under Article 448, to exercise the option to either
pay the value of improvements or demand reasonable rent if respondents do not choose
to appropriate the building;
(2) That in fact respondents have elected to demand payment of rentals on land actually
occupied by petitioners' building at TEN PESOS a month, and made a demand therefor
immediately after the finality of the Court of Appeals decision, because the amount of
P3,500.00 is exorbitant, so that the land owners choose to allow petitioners to remain on
the land;
(3) That respondents have long suggested to petition that a commissioner be appointed to
assess the present fair market value of the building, taking depreciation into account; and
(4) That the denial of the motion for execution is justified because it is premature and has
no legal basis.
We find the petition meritorious. The judgment affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and now final,
explicitly ordains the payment by the respondents de la Cruz of the amount of P3,500.00 "within
30 days after this decision becomes final" to petitioners San Diego. If it also orders petitioners to
vacate only upon the payment, it did so in recognition of the right of retention granted to
possessor in good faith by Article 546 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This provision is
expressly made applicable to builders in good faith (Article 448). The right of retention thus
granted is merely a security for the enforcement of the possessor's right to indemnity for the
improvement comments made by him. As a result, the possessor in good faith, in retaining the
land and its improvements pending reimbursement of his useful expenditures, is not bound pay
any rental during the period of retention; otherwise the value of his security would be impaired
(cf. Tufexis vs. Chunaco (C.A.), 36 O.G. 2455).
Normally, of course, the landowner has the option to either appropriate the improvement or to
sell the land to the possessor. This option is no longer open to the respondent landowners
because the decision in the former suit limits them to the first alternative by requiring t
petitioner's to vacate the land (and surrender the improved comments) upon payment of
P3,500.00. Evidently, the Courts of First Instance and of Appeals opined that the respondents suit
to recover the property was an exercise their right to choose to appropriate the improvements
and pay the indemnity fixed by law. The respondents acquiesced in this view, since they did not
ask for a modification of the judgment, and allowed it to become final. Consequently, they can no
longer insist on selecting another alternative; nor can they be heard now to urge that the value
of the indemnity, set at P3,500.00, is exorbitant for the same reason that the judgment fixing
that amount is no longer subject to alteration.
The judgment ordering payment to petitioners of P3,500.00, by way of indemnity, having
become final, and the 30 days for its payment having elapsed, the court of first instance has the
ministerial duty to order its execution (Zulueta vs. Paredes, 62 Phil. 5; Buenaventura vs. Garcia,
78 Phil. 759; Amor vs. Jugo, 17 Phil. 703; Viquiera vs. Baraa 78 Phil. 456). That duty is
compellable by mandamus; and the execution is leviable on any property of respondents de la
Cruz, including the land now in question and its improvements.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted, and the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is ordered
to issue the writ of execution in favor of petitioners. Costs against respondent de la Cruz.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. L-12812

September 29, 1959

-----------------------------G.R. No. L-12813

21/43

FILIPINAS COLLEGES, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL., defendants.

September 29, 1959

MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL., plaintiffs.

MARIA GARICA TIMBANG, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, defendant-appellee.
De Guzman and Fernandez for appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc.
San Huan, Africa and Benedicto for appellant Maria Garcia Timbang.
Nicanor S. Sison for appellee Maria Gervacio Blas.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated May 10, 1957
(a) declaring the Sheriff's certificate of sale covering a school building sold at public auction null
and void unless within 15 days from notice of said order the successful bidders, defendantsappellants spouses Maria Garcia Timbang and Marcelino Timbang, shall pay to, appellee Maria
Gervacio Blas directly or through the Sheriff of Manila the sum of P5,750.00 that the spouses
Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriff's sale; (b) declaring the other appellee Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. owner of 24,500/3,285,934 undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a covered by certificate
of tile No 45970, on which the building sold in the auction sale is situated; and (c) ordering the
sale in public auction of the said undivided interest of the Filipinas Colleges, Inc., in lot No. 2-a
aforementioned to satisfy the unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of appellee Blas and
against Filipinas Colleges, Inc. in the amount of P8,200.00 minus the sum of P5,750.00
mentioned in (a) above.
The order appealed from is the result of three motions filed in the court a quo in the course of the
execution of a final judgment of the Court of Appeals rendered in 2 cases appealed to it in which
the spouses Timbang, the Filipinas Colleges, Inc., and Maria Gervacio Blas were the parties. IN
that judgment of the Court of Appeals, the respective rights of the litigants have been
adjudicated as follows:
(1) Filipinas Colleges, Inc. was declared to have acquired the rights of the spouses
Timbang in and to lot No. 2-a mentioned above and in consideration thereof, Filipinas
Colleges, Inc., was ordered to pay the spouses Timbang the amount of P15,807.90 plus
such other amounts which said spouses might have paid or had to pay after February,
1953, to Hoskins and Co. Inc., agent of the Urban Estates, Inc., original vendor of the lot.
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. original vendor of the total amount with the court within 90 days
after the decision shall have become final.

22/43

(2) Maria Gervacio Blas was declared to be a builder in good faith of the school building
constructed on the lot in question and entitled to be paid the amount of P19,000.00 for the
same. Filipinas Colleges, Inc., purchaser of the said building was ordered to deliver to Blas
stock certificate (Exh. C) for 108 shares of Filipinas Colleges, Inc. with a par value of
P10,800.00 and to pay Blas the sum of P8,200.00 of the house.
(3) In case Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed to deposit the value of the land, which after
liquidation was fixed at P32,859.34, within the 90-day period set by the court, Filipinas
Colleges would lose all its rights to the land and the spouses Timbang would then become
the owners thereof. In that eventuality, the Timbangs would make known to the court their
option under Art. 448 of the Civil Code whether they would appropriate the building in
question, in which even they would have to pay Filipinas Colleges, Inc. the sum of
P19,000.00, or would compel the latter to acquire the land and pay the price thereof.
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. having failed to pay or deposit the sum of P32,859.34 within the time
prescribed, the spouses Timbang, in compliance with the judgment of the Court of Appeals, on
September 28, 1956, made known to the court their decision that they had chosen not of
appropriate the building but to compel Filipinas Colleges, Inc., for the payment of the sum of
P32,859,34. The motion having been granted, a writ of execution was issued on January 8, 1957.
On January 16, 1957, appellee Blas in turn filed a motion for execution of her judgment of
P8,200.00 representing the unpaid portion of the price of the house sold to Filipinas Colleges, Inc.
Over the object of the Timbangs, the court grated the motion and the corresponding writ of
execution was issued on January 30, 1957, date of the granting of the motion for execution, Blas
through counsel, sent a letter to the Sheriff of Manila advising him of her preferential claim or
lien on the house to satisfy the unpaid balance of the purchase price thereof under Article 2242
of the Civil Code, and to withhold from the proceed of the auction sale the sum of P8,200.00.
Levy having been made on the house in virtue of the writs of execution, the Sheriff of Manila on
March 5, 1957, sold the building in public auction in favor of the spouses Timbang, as the highest
bidders, in the amount of P5,750.00. Personal properties of Filipinas Colleges, Inc. were also
auctioned for P245.00 in favor of the spouses Timbang.
As a result of these actuation, three motion were subsequently filed before the lower court:
(1) By appellee Blas, praying that the Sheriff of Manila and/or the Timbang spouses be
ordered to pay and deliver to her the sum of P5,750.00 representing the proceeds of the
auction sale of the building of Filipinas Colleges, Inc. over which she has a lien of
P8,200.00 for the unpaid balance of the purchase price thereof;.
(2) Also by the appellee Bals, praying that there being still two unsatisfied executions, one
for the sum of P32,859.34 in favor the land involved, Lot No. 2-a, be sold at public auction;
and (3) By Filipinas Colleges, Inc. praying that because its properties, the house and some
personal properties, have been auctioned for P5,750.00 and P245.00 respectively in favor
of the Timbang spouses who applied the proceeds to the partial payment of the sum of
P32,859.34 value of the land, Lot No. 2-a, it (Filipinas Colleges, Inc.) be declared part
owner of said lot to the extent of the total amount realized from the execution sale of its
properties.1wphl.nt

23/43

The Timbang spouses presented their opposition to each and all of these motion. After due
hearing the lower court rendered its resolution in the manner indicated at the beginning of this
decision, from which the Timbangs alone have appealed.
In assailing the order of the court a quo directing the appellants to pay appellee Blas the amount
of their bid (P5,750.00) made at the public auction, appellants' counsel has presented a novel,
albeit ingenious, argument. It is contended that because the builder in good faith has failed to
pay the price of the land after the owners thereof exercised their option under Article 448 of the
Civil Code, the builder lost his right of retention provided in Article 546 and by operation of
Article 445, the appellants as owners of the land automatically became the owners ipso facto,
the execution sale of the house in their favor was superfluous. Consequently, they are not bound
to make good their bid of P5,750.00 as that would be to make goods to pay for their own
property. By the same token, Blas claim for preference on account of the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of the house does not apply because preference applies only with respect to the
property of the debtor, and the Timbangs, owners of the house, are not the debtors of Blas.
This Court cannot accept this oversimplification of appellants' position. Article 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code defining the right of the parties in case a person in good faith builds, sows or plants on
the land of another, respectively provides:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or plated in good
faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnify provided for in article 546 and 548, or to obligate the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right
of retention the person who has defeated him in the possession having to option of
refunding the amount of expenses or of paying the case in value which thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.
Under the terms of these article, it is true that the owner of the land has the right to choose
between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or compelling
the builder in good faith to pay for his land. Even this second right cannot be exercised if the
value of the land is considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the right of the
builder to be paid the value of his improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary right of
retention of the property until he is indemnified by the owner of the land. There is nothing in the
language of these two article, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion of appellants that,
upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the landowner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445. The

24/43

case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66 Phil., 590 cited by appellants is no authority for this conclusion.
Although it is true it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the
land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder's right of retention provided
in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the
builder loses entirely all rights over his own building. The question is; what is the recourse or
remedy left to the parties in such eventuality where the builder fails to pay the value of the land?
While the Code is silent on this Court in the cases of Miranda vs. Fadullon, et al., 97 Phil., 801; 51
Off. Gaz., [12] 6226; Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil., 605 and the cited case of Bernardo vs.
Bataclan, supra.
In the first case, this Court has said:
A builder in good faith not be required to pay rentals. he has right to retain the land on
which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by
him. Possibly he might be made to pay rental only when the owner of the land chooses not
to appropriate the improvement and requires the builder in good faith to pay for the land
but that the builder is unwilling or unable to pay the land, and then they decide to leave
things as they are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee, and should they disagree
as to the amount of rental then they can go to the court to fix that amount. (Emphasis
supplied)
Should the parties not agree to leave things as they are and to assume the relation of lessor and
lessee, another remedy is suggested in the case of Ignacio vs. Hilario, supra, wherein the court
has ruled that the owner of the land in entitled to have the improvement removed when after
having chosen to sell his land to the other party, i.e., the builder in good faith fails to pay for the
same.
A further remedy is indicated in the case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan, supra, where this Court
approved the sale of the land and the improvement in a public auction applying the proceeds
thereof first to the payment of the value of the land and the excess, if any, to be delivered to the
owner of the house in payment thereof.
The appellants herein, owners o the land, instead of electing any of the alternative above
indicated chose to seek recovery of the value of their land by asking for a writ of execution;
levying on the house of the builder; and selling the same in public auction. Sand because they
are the highest bidder in their own auction sale, they now claim they acquired title to the
building without necessity of paying in cash on account of their bid. In other words, they in effect
pretend to retain their land and acquire the house without paying a cent therefor.
This contention is without merit. This Court has already held in Matias vs. The Provincial Sheriff
of Nueva Ecija(74 Phil., 326) that while it is the inveriable practice, dictated by common sense,
that where the successful bidder is the execution creditor himself, he need not pay down the
amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgement, nevertheless, when their is
a claim by a third-party, to the proceeds of the sale superior to his judgment credit, the
execution creditor, as successful bidder, must pay in cash the amount of his bid as a condition
precedent to the issuance to him of the certificate of sale. In the instant case, the Court of
Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance

25/43

of the purchase price of the school building. Blas is actually a lien on the school building are
concerned. The order of the lower court directing the Timbang spouses, as successful bidders, to
pay in cash the amount of their bid in the sum of P5,750.00 is therefore correct.
With respect to the order of the court declaring appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. part owner of the
land to the extent of the value of its personal properties sold at public auction in favor of the
Timbang, this Court Likewise finds the same as justified, for such amount represents, in effect, a
partial payment of the value of the land. If this resulted in the continuation of the so-called
involuntary partnership questioned by the difference between P8,200.00 the unpaid balance of
the purchase price of the building and the sum of P5,750.00 amount to be paid by the
Timbangs, the order of the court directing the sale of such undivided interest of the Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. is likewise justified to satisfy the claim of the appellee Blas.
Considering that the appellant spouses Marcelino Timbang and Maria Garcia Timbang may not
voluntarily pay the sum of P5,750.00 as ordered, thereby further delaying the final termination of
this case, the first part of the dispositive portion of the order appealed from is modified in the
sense that upon failure of the Timbang spouses to pay to the Sheriff or to Manila Gervacio Blas
said sum of P5,750.00 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the final judgment, an order of
execution shall issue in favor of Maria Gervasio Blas to be levied upon all properties of the
Timbang spouses not exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the said amount.
In all other respects, the appealed order of the court a quo is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellants.
It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-12486

August 31, 1960

LEONOR GRANA and JULIETA TORRALBA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA BONGATO and JARDENIO SANCHEZ, respondents.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioners.
E.D. Mercado, J.V. Ong and J.T. Gonzales for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Leonor Grana and Julieta Torralba, defendants below and herein petitioners, were on April 13,
1951 sued by Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, respondents herein, before the Court of First
Instance of Agusan, for the recovery of 87 square meters of residential land. After trial, the court
rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs, herein respondents, owners of the land in controversy

26/43

and ordering petitioners to vacate and deliver it to said respondents and to pay a monthly rental
of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until they actually vacate the same, plus attorney's
fees and costs. The decision, on appeal, having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the
only modification of disallowing the award for attorney's fees, petitioners brought the case to this
Court through the present petition for review.
The record discloses that sometime in 1909 a cadastral survey of Butuan, Agusan, was made by
the Bureau of Lands. In that survey, the parcel of land here in question was included as part of
the lot belonging to Gregorio Bongato and Clara Botcon for which Original Certificate of Title No.
RO-72 (138) was issued in their favor on February 12, 1923. On November 25, 1933, this lot was
purchased by the spouses Marcos Bongato and Eusebia More, and upon their death, the land was
inherited by the respondents Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, the former being the
daughter of Marcos Bongato by his first marriage while the latter is the son of Eusebia More also
by her first marriage.
Petitioners claim that the lands in Butuan were subsequently resurveyed due to conflicts and
overlapping of boundaries. In that resurvey (TS-65 Butuan Cadastre), Gregorio Bongato's lot,
according to petitioners, was identified as Lot No. 311 and that of Isidaria Trillo, their predecessor
in interest, as Lot No. 310. Citing the fact that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138) covers
295 square meters of land, while the sketch plan of the second cadastral survey of Butuan shows
that Lot No. 311 has only 230 square meters, petitioners maintain that it is the latter area
properly belongs to respondents and that the land in question is part of the adjoining land, Lot
No. 310, which belonged to their predecessor in interest.
Petitioners' stand is untenable. No proof was presented to show that the first survey was
erroneous or that it included part of the contigous land of petitioners' predecessor in interest as
part of the lot now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138). Note that the
difference in area between the land covered by said title and Lot No. 311 of the resurvey plan is
65 square meters while the area of the land in dispute if 87 square meters. And what is more, the
alleged sketch plan of the resurvey was not presented in evidence.
Upon the other hand, it is not disputed that the land in question is part of the lot covered by the
Torrens title issued way back in 1923 in the name of respondents' predecessor in interest. Said
title has not been contested up to the present, and, therefore, has become inconvertible
evidence of the ownership of the land covered by it. Well settled is the rule that a Torrens
certificate of title becomes conclusive and indefeasible after the lapse of the period within which
it may be impugned (Reyes, et al. vs. Borbon, et al., 50 Phil., 791; Yumul vs. Rivera, et al., 64
Phil., 13).
Petitioners' contention that the Court of Appeals erred in not granting their motion for new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, likewise, cannot be sustained. The new evidence
sought to be introduced was the sketch plan of the second survey, which, with the employment
of reasonable diligence would have easily been discovered and produced at the trial. Anyway,
even if presented at the result of the case. If a subsequent certificate of title cannot be permitted
to prevail over a previous Torrens title (Reyes, et al, vs. Borbon, et al.,supra) with more reason
should a resurvey plan not to be allowed to alter or modify such title so as to make the area of

27/43

the land therein described agree with that given in the plan. (See Government of the
Philippines vs. Arias, 36 Phil., 195).
Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were
found by the Court of Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith.
Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner of the land on which
anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own faith shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of necessary
and useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to
oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the land, have
therefore the choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their
land upon payment of the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that part of
their land on which stands the improvement. It may here be pointed out that it would be
impractical for respondents to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the
house standing on their land, for in that event the whole building might be rendered useless. The
more workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that part of their
land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are unwilling or
unable to buy, then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so. Of course,
respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the case, then petitioners must pay
reasonable rent. The parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the lease, and
should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix the same. (Article 361, old Civil Code; Article 448
of the new).
In this connection, the appellate court erred in ordering petitioners to pay monthly rentals of
P10.00 from the date of filing of the complaint until they actually vacate said land. A builder in
good faith may not be required to pay rentals. He has a right to retain the land on which he has
built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. (Miranda vs. Fadullon, et
al., 97 Phil., 801; 51 Off. Gaz., 6226, see also Martinez vs. Baganus, 28 Phil., 500; De
Guzman vs. De la Fuente, 55 Phil., 501; Kasilag vs. Rodriguez, Off. Gaz., Supp., August 16, 1941,
p. 247).
Petitioners further contend that he complaint should have been dismissed for nonjoinder of an
indispensable party, it being alleged that their mother Maria Cupin, who owns the land in
question as part of her Lot No. 310, has not been made a party defendant in the case. This
contention, which was not raised in the trial court, deserves scant consideration. Petitioners
clearly asserted ownership over the land in dispute as well as over Lot No. 310 in their answer to
the complaint. They are consequently estopped from alleging otherwise.
As to petitioners' assertion that they should have been awarded damages alleged to have been
suffered by them in their counterclaim, suffice it to say that petitioners failed to prove that they
suffered any damage at all by reason of the filing of the complaint. Indeed, in the light of the
view we have taken of the case, they could not have substantiated their claim for damages.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is modified in the sense that respondents are
hereby directed to exercise within 30 days from this decision their option to either buy the
portion of the petitioners' house on their land or sell to said petitioners the portion of their land

28/43

and petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the same and must pay
reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly from the time respondents made their choice up to the time
they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is considerably more than the
value of the improvement, then petitioners may elect to rent the land, in which case the parties
shall agree upon the terms of a lease. Should they disagree, the court of origin is hereby
instructed to intervene and fix the terms thereof. Petitioners shall pay reasonable rent of P10.00
monthly up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the curt fixes such
terms.
So ordered without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-18771

March 26, 1923

NICOLAS PANLILIO, EUTIQUIANO CUYUGAN, and SIXTO TIMBOL, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ATILANO MERCADO, CIRIACO PIMPING, MANUEL REYES, and TELESFORO
MARTINEZ, defendants-appellants.
Aurelio Pineda and Gibbs, McDonough and Johnson for plaintiffs-appellants.
Perfecto J. Salas Rodriguez, Vicente S. de Villa, and Elias Canapy for defendants-appellants.
OSTRAND, J.:

29/43

This is a petition for a writ of injunction to restrain the defendants from entering upon certain
lands situated in the municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga, and from disturbing the
plaintiffs in their peaceful possession of the same. The plaintiffs also pray for damages for
trespass on the land.
The defendants' answer denies generally the allegations of the petition. The defendant Reyes
and Martinez alleged by way of special defense that the former is the district engineer; that the
latter is the Commander of the Constabulary of the Province of Pampanga; that in their relations
to the matter in controversy they have been acting in their official capacity; and that they
therefore have no interest in the litigation. The defendants Mercado and Pimping set up a
counterclaim for P40,000 alleging that the plaintiffs, by placing bamboo stakes in the River
Abacan, caused it to change its course, thus invading said defendants' lands and causing
damages in the sum mentioned.
The court absolved the defendants from the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim,
without costs. From this judgment all of the parties appeal.
It appears from the evidence that the plaintiffs are the owners of various parcels of land in the
municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga, more particularly described in plaintiffs' amended
complaint. From 1911 until August, 1919, the parcels of land belonging to the plaintiffs were
divided by a small river known as the Estero Abacan. The defendants Atilano Mercado and
Ciriaco Pimping are the owners of various parcels of land which, previously to the months of
August, 1919, were situated to the east of the land of the plaintiffs and were not touched by the
Abacan River.
In the month mentioned, a very heavy flood occurred in the Abacan River and when the flood
subsided, the river no longer flowed in the channel through the lands of the plaintiffs but had
opened a new course for itself through the lands of the defendants where it still continues to
flow. This new course was the course of the river previous to the year 1911. It may be noted that
in the years 1916 and 1917 a cadastral survey was made of the district where the lands of both
the plaintiffs and the defendants are situated and that upon the plans of that survey the then
course of the river is excluded from the cadaster and set apart as a public stream.
After the termination of the 1919 rainy season and early in the year 1920, a complaint was made
to the provincial board of the Province of Pampanga by various land owners including the
defendant Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping, setting forth that the new course of the river
was destroying their land and rendering it useless and asking that the river be returned to its
former channel. The complaint was endorsed to the district engineer and on June 10, 1920, the
defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping, accompanied by the defendant district
engineer, Manuel Reyes, proceeded to the point where the river had first begun to change its
course, and, after locating this point upon the cadastral plan, proceeded with laborers of the
defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping to excavate the old bed of the river for the
purpose of causing the river to return to this bed. As a consequence, this action was instituted on
June 25, 1920.
The facts stated are not disputed and the law of the case presents, in our opinion, no serious
difficulty. Article 370 of the Civil Code reads:

30/43

Los cauces be los ros, que quedan abandonados por variar naturalmente el curso de las
aguas, pertenecen a los dueos de los terrenos ribereos en toda la longitud respectiva a
cada uno. Si el cauce abandonado separaba heredades de distintos dueos, la nueva lnea
divisoria correr equidistante de unas y otras.
Relying on the provisions of this article, the plaintiffs maintain that the old bed of the river
Abacan became ipso facto absolutely abandoned upon the river varying its course in 1919.
Examining the provisions in question, it is apparent that while the abandonment of the bed may
be the consequence of the riving changing its course, it is not necessarily the action of the river
itself which is the only and final determining factor in such abandonment. In the case of a public
stream, the bed is of public ownership and the public cannot be considered absolutely divested
of this ownership until there is some indication of an intention on the part of the Government to
acquiesce in the change in the course of the stream. That the Government is not compelled to
stand idly by and let nature take its course is clearly indicated by article 372 of the Civil Code.
(See also discussion in Manresa's Commentaries on the Civil Code, vol. 3, pp. 253, 254.)
In the present case the river is a public stream; its bed is of public ownership and was definitely
located and determined in the cadastral survey. As soon as practicable after the river changed its
course, steps were taken under the direction of the Government functionaries to bring it back
into its old course and work was continued until interrupted by the present action. This certainly
does not indicated abandonment on the part of the Government.
As to the defendants' claim for damages, we agree with the trial court that while the evidence
undoubtedly shows that the plaintiffs placed bamboo stakes across the river and that the stakes
may have caused an accumulation of sand or sediment which in turn may have contributed to
the change in the course of the river, such evidence falls short of showing that this was the
primary cause of the change and of the damage to the defendants' property.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs in this instance. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN
LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG &
GERONIMA UBINA, respondents.
Antonio N. Laggui for petitioners.
Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.

31/43

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the
province of Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic Engineer
of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao
Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan
River owned by defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).
As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the
western bank. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.
In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying
lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo
Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882,
7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. BMelad). Pablo Binayug began his possession in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to
tobacco and corn while 12 hectares were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's
Homestead Application No. W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug).
Binayug's possession was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. F-Binayug). On
the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the predecessor-in-interest of
Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351 of
Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.
Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern
bank among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. E-Melad),
depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western
bank.
However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919
bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses
Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao,
side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river.
In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots
located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor
and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the
private respondents from the premises.
On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil
Case No. 343-T) to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion.
On April 24, 1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No.
344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions.
On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:

32/43

In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel
and Octavio Bancud, or anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents to
vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre together with its accretion consisting of
portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these
defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are
the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.
In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo
Tagacay, Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang,
Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun,
Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay, or any of their
agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875,
7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, together with its accretion and to
restore possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina. Without
pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven and to costs.
SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)
Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in Civil Case
No. 344-T, only defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by
his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed. But upon motion of plaintiffs-private
respondents, the trial court ordered the execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case
No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory
as they had not presented evidence at the trial (Order dated August 15, 1975).
On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in
toto the judgment of the trial court, with costs against the defendants-appellants.
In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents'
estate as a result of accretion;
2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to
pertain to petitioners' estate cannot preclude the private respondents from being
the owners thereof; and
3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not
affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when
it reverted to its old bed
The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private
respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated
from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is

33/43

conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA,
132 SCRA 514).
All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:
. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49
years. Within this period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become
greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the
addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it but can be
measured after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these cases
that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is overwhelming as against
the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of
Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco
Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that
when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of Tuguegarao
Cadastre executed in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao
Cadastre was not eroded by the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies
cannot be destroyed by the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio
Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27, Rollo.)
The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had
been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and
imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares described in the free
patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become
known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent
issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional
50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These
accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas
vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is
because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the
destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners
thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila,
10 Phil. 567).itc-asl
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden
and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old
1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the
river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.

34/43

Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate
on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of
the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it,
provided that he removes the same within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece
of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also
retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis
supplied).
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a
strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be
"separated from the estate by the current." The private respondents have retained the
ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-39677 July 22, 1975

INTER-REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO CABALLERO, respondents.
Raquiza, Esparraqo, Amante, Pacificador, Ozamis and Adaza for petitioner.
German M. Lopez for private respondent.

CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR 02794SP. Upon consideration of the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments
adduced in the petition, as well as the respondent's comment thereon, the Court resolved to
treat this case as a special civil action. 1 The challenged decision declares null and void an order
dated January 16, 1974 of Judge Sancho Y. Inserto of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Branch
1) which enjoined the defendant in its civil case 9562, entitled "Inter-Regional Development
Corporation vs. Ricardo Caballero," from cutting and milling the sugar cane crop which the
therein plaintiff company (herein petitioner) asserts to have planted in good faith.
On December 13, 1974 we issued a temporary restraining order which reads as follows:

35/43

You (respondent Court of Appeals) are hereby RESTRAINED from enforcing and/or
implementing your decision in CA-GR No. 02794-SP entitled "Ricardo Caballero
versus Hon. Sancho Inserto, etc., et al." and you (respondent Caballero), your
agents, representatives, assigns, successors-in-interest and/or any person or
persons acting upon your orders or in your place or stead, are likewise RESTRAINED
from collecting and/or negotiating the quedans representing the milled sugar canes
homestead from Lots No. I and 6, Psu-118496 in Batad, Iloilo for the crop year 197374.
In civil case 8195 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, entitled "Inter-Regional Development
Corporation vs. Isidro Estrada, et al.," for annulment of sales and damages and involving land
ownership, the court, thru Judge Castrence Veloso of Branch III, rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint and, among others, ordering the spouses Jose Baez and Isabel Baez (president
and treasurer, respectively, of the inter-Regional Development Corporation) or their privies
to immediately vacate and surrender the possession of Lots 1 and 6, Plan Psu118496 to the third-party plaintiff (Isidro A. Estrada) and not to molest, disturb or in
any manner interfere with his possession thereof ....
The corporation appealed; nonetheless, Judge Veloso issued, on May 7, 1973, a partial writ of
execution pending appeal, and possession of the two lots was delivered to Estrada, following
which the latter, on May 25, 1973, leased the lots to now respondent Ricardo Caballero for a
term of ten years, starting with the crop year 1973-74.
On July 6, 1973 the corporation filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
praying that Judge Veloso be enjoined from enforcing the partial writ of execution. Holding that
the said Judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering partial execution, the Court of Appeals, on
October 16, 1973, dismissed the petition. This decision became final.
However, five days before entry of judgment, or on November 15, 1973, the corporation filed
civil case 9562, for injunction and damages, against the lessee Caballero to settle the question of
ownership of the sugar crop for 1973-74 which the corporation alleged to have planted in good
faith on the lands litigated in civil case 8195. Judge Sancho Inserto, to whom the case was
assigned, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Caballero "from cutting, milling the
growing sugar cane ...."
Caballero moved for reconsideration, but before the court could act on his motion, he filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On September 30, 1974 the appellate court
promulgated its decision setting aside Judge Inserto's preliminary injunction.1wph1.t
Hence, the present recourse by the corporation.
On the issue of whether the preliminary injunction issued in case 9562 by Judge Inserto enjoining
Caballero from cutting and milling the sugar cane constitutes an interference with the partial writ
of execution pending appeal issued in case 8195 by Judge Veloso ordering the Baez spouses to
vacate and surrender possession of the parcels of land and not to molest or disturb Estrada's
(Caballero's lessor) possession thereof, we find that neither order interferes with the other; as a

36/43

matter of fact the order of Judge Inserto complements that of Judge Veloso. The latter refers to
the land itself, the ownership of which was the only issue adjudged in the decision pending
appeal, while the former refers to the sugar cane crop standing thereon. True it is that under
article 440 of the Civil Code the ownership of property includes the right of accession to
everything attached thereto either naturally or artificially, and that under article 415, trees,
plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land, are immovable property; it is
equally true that when a person plants in good faith on land belonging to another, the landowner
does not ipso facto acquire ownership of what has been planted; he must first indemnify the
planter before he can appropriate the same. And so provides article 448:
The owner of the land in which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548 ....
The aforequoted article, not those relied upon by the respondent, applies in the present case,
because the petitioner has alleged good faith in planting the sugar cane, thus giving rise to a
conflict of rights which poses the issue of the protection of the alleged planter in good faith
without causing injustice to the landowner. 2
Absent any incompatibility between the orders issued by Judges Inserto and Veloso, the doctrine
that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decrees of another
court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, having equal power to grant the relief, 3 does not
apply.
In holding that the gathering of the crops existing on the land is part of Estrada's right of
ownership and possession, the Court of Appeals in effect prematurely held that the petitioner is a
planter in bad faith; this is error since the issues as to who planted and whether the planter
planted in good faith are the very issues posed in case 9562, which is yet pending.
The Court of Appeals, however, did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari even if a
motion for reconsideration had not yet been resolved by the Court of First Instance, in view of the
urgency of securing a definitive ruling on the sugar cane crop, which is perishable. 4
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 02794-SP is set aside, and the
restraining order heretofore issued is made permanent, without prejudice, however, to the final
outcome in case 9562 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. No costs.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-46963 March 14, 1994

GLORIA A. FERRER, petitioner,
vs.

Fortunato F.L. Viray, Jr. for petitioner.

37/43

HON. ANTONIO BAUTISTA, MARIANO BALANAG, AND MAGDALENA

DOMONDON, respondents.

Agaton D. Yaranon, Jr., for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the order, dated 11
December 1976, of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of La Union, Branch III,
dismissing petitioner's complaint for Quieting of Title to Real Property, as well as its order of 03
May 1977, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Pursuant to this Court's Resolution, dated 19 August 1977 (p. 4, Rollo), petitioner was allowed to
file the instant petition under Republic Act No. 5440 considering that only questions of law had
been raised.
On 03 August 1978, the Court dismissed the petition for lack of interest due to the failure of
petitioner's counsel to submit the requisite memorandum in support of the petition (p. 58, Rollo).
In a Resolution, dated 28 September 1978 (p. 63, Rollo), however, the Court resolved to
reconsider the dismissal and to reinstate the petition.
Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay, La
Union. Petitioner claims its ownership by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980
covered by TCT No. T-3280, which is immediately north of the land in question. On the other
hand, private respondents equally assert ownership over the property on account of long
occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the name of respondent Magdalena
Domondon, pursuant to Free Patent No. 309504 issued on 24 January 1966 (p. 29,Rollo).
On 23 March 1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III of the then Court of
First Instance of La Union to "Quiet Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano
Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. The case was denominated Civil Case No. A-514.
Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union,
Branch III, a complaint for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965, against
private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also handled the case, dismissed, on 10
February 1976, the complaint, without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority
to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of Lands on the basis of a mere
collateral attack (pp. 22-23, Rollo).
On 11 March 1976, private respondents also moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 514-A on
the following grounds, to wit:

38/43

1) Gloria A. Ferrer's lack of personality to file and

prosecute Civil Case No. 514-A;
2) Civil Case 514-A is barred by prior judgment;
3) Lack of sufficient averments to constitute a cause of
action; and
4) Civil Case No. 514-A, is a collateral attack on the Free
Patent Decree No. 309504 and O.C. of Title No. F-168
(Annex "B," pp. 17-21). (p. 66, Rollo.)
On 07 December 1976, Judge Antonio G. Bautista issued an order
(pp. 23-24, Record on Appeal), dismissing petitioner's complaint, ratiocinating, thus
This has reference to the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants, through
counsel. The plaintiff filed an Answer to the Motion to Dismiss also through counsel.
The subject of the present action for Quieting of Title to Real Property, is covered by
Free Patent No. 309504 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the names of
the defendants. However, the plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that said Free Patent
and Original Certificate of Title were secured through fraud, etc., on January 24,
1966, for which reason, they are null and void. In view thereof, while the plaintiff
filed the present action ostensibly to Quiet Title of her alleged real property, it is in
reality for the annulment or revocation of the Free Patent and Original Certificate of
Title of the defendants. The observation of the Court is clinched by prayer (a) of the
plaintiff's complaint, i.e., "That Patent Title No. 168 be declared revoked and
cancelled as null and void from the Records of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
San Fernando, La Union, etc." Consequently, the present action is untenable
because it constitute a collateral or indirect attach on the Free Patent and Original
Certificate of Title of the defendants. That is so, because it was held in the case
of Samonte, et al. vs. Sambelon, et al., L-12964, February 29, 1960, that like a
decree, a Patent cannot be attacked collaterally.
Furthermore, the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants because
the Patent title issued in favor of the Firmalos (defendants here) by the Director of
Lands is by now already indefeasible due to the lapse of one year following the
entry of the decree of registration in the records of the register of deeds (Firmalos
vs. Tutaan, No. L-35408, October 27, 1973).
WHEREFORE, the Court is constrained to order dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.
There is no pronouncement as to damages and costs. (p. 33, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the court in its order of 03 May 1977 (p. 38,
Record on Appeal).
Hence this petition.

39/43

Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors on the part of respondent judge:
I. In not finding and declaring that Gloria A. Ferrer has
legal personality to prosecute Civil Case No. 514-A;
II. In not finding and declaring that Civil Case No. 514-A
has stated sufficient cause of action;
III. In not finding and declaring that petitioner Gloria A.
Ferrer's title to the land is beclouded by the contrary
claim of the private respondents thereto; and
IV. In outright dismissing Civil Case No. 514-A on the
ground of collateral attack on Free Patent Decree No.
309504 being an abuse of judicial discretion and an
excess of his jurisdiction. (p. 13, Rollo.)
The petition has merit.
Article 457 of the Civil Code, under which petitioner claims ownership over the dispute parcel of
land, provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Undoubtedly, plaintiff is the lawful owner of the accretion, she being the registered owner of Lot
1980 which adjoins the alluvial property. Parenthetically, the same finding has also been made by
the trial court in Civil Case No. A-86 (p. 29, Rollo).
Alluvion gives to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion which
is gradually received from the effects of the current of waters (Art. 457, Civil Code; Tuason vs.
Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37; Cureg vs. IAC, 177 SCRA 313). The rationale for the rule is to
provide some kind of compensation to owners of land continually exposed to the destructive
force of water and subjected to various easements (Agustin vs. IAC, 187 SCRA 218; Binalay vs.
Manalo, 195 SCRA 374).
The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private
ownership and which has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by
him would be null and void (Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37). The nullity arises, not
from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and not
those that are privately owned (Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793).
Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue
of the free patent since at the time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not
a part of the disposable land of the public domain.

40/43

Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued pursuant to a
public grant, the rule does not apply when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare
the nullity of that void title does not prescribe (Agne vs. Director of Lands, supra); in fact, it is
susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack (Estoesta, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA
203).
Private respondents contend that an action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years. The tenyear prescriptive period is applicable to an action for reconveyance if, indeed, it is based on an
implied or constructive trust. Article 1456 of the Civil Code, upon which a constructive trust can
be predicated, cannot be invoked, however, since the public grant and the title correspondingly
issued to private respondents that can create that juridical relationship is a patent nullity. Even
assuming, nonetheless, that a constructive trust did arise, the running of the prescriptive period
is to be deemed interrupted when an action is filed in court (Art. 1155, Civil Code) or, obviously,
when one is already there pending.
Here, to recall, the Free Patent was issued on 24 January 1966 and OCT P-168 was transcribed in
the Registration Book of La Union on 08 February 1966 (pp. 38-39, Rollo). At that time, Civil Case
No. A-86 forreivindicacion between the parties was still pending in court. After Civil Case No. A-86
was dismissed, without prejudice, on 10 February 1976 (p. 32, Rollo), petitioner, on 22 March
1976 (p. 1, Record on Appeal), promptly filed Civil Case No. A-514 (now on appeal in this
instance).
Neither can private respondents claim ownership of the disputed property by acquisitive
prescription. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years if the adverse possession is with a just title and the
possession is in good faith. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, this time without need of title
or of good faith. (See Art. 1134, Civil Code.)
Given the settings in this case at bench, the applicable period of acquisitive prescription, if at all,
would be thirty years. Even assuming, then, that private respondents were in adverse possession
of the property from 1966 when the free patent was obtained, or even at the inception of their
alleged adverse possession in 1954 ("Comment on Petition for Review," p. 35, Rollo), that
possession, for purposes of acquisitive prescription, was deemed interrupted upon their receipt
of summons (Art. 1123, Civil Code) in Civil Case No. A-86 pending since 1965, as well as Civil
Case No. A-514 filed in 1976 following the dismissal the month previous of Civil Case No. A-86.
The prescriptive period of prescription may not be held to commence anew during the pendency
of said cases.
The instant petition has merely prayed that respondent court be directed to continue hearing
Civil Case No. 514-A. We have repeatedly ruled, however, that where the determinative facts are
before this Court, and it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, the expeditious
administration of justice will be subserved by the resolution of the case and thereby obviate the
needless protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case to the trial court (Heirs of
Crisanta Almoradie, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 91385, January 4, 1994; Lianga
Bay Logging Co., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 357; Escudero vs. Dulay, 158, SCRA 69).
Clearly, the records support the finding that herein petitioner is the true owner of the land

41/43

subject of the free patent issued to private respondents. The court then, in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction. may, instead of remanding the case to the trial court, direct the owner to
reconvey the disputed parcel to its lawful owner (Limaza vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 855; Agne vs.
Director of Lands, supra). Considering, moreover, the length of time that this case has been
pending between the parties, not counting petitioner's original action for reivindicacion in Civil
Case No.
A-86 filed on 25 November 1956, an order from this Court requiring such reconveyance can
certainly be just and warranted.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 514-A is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING petitioner to be the
owner of the disputed parcel of land and ORDERING private respondents to reconvey the same to
said petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-19570

April 27, 1967

JOSE V. HILARIO, JR., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee,
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS, CITY ENGINEER OF MANILA, FERNANDO BUSUEGO and
EUGENIO SESE,defendants-appellants,
MAXIMO CALALANG, intervenor;
DIRECTOR OF MINES, intervenor.
Maximo Calalang for plaintiff and appellant.
Gregorio Ejercito and Leandro L. Arguelles for defendant-appellee City of Manila.
Office of the Solicitor General for other defendants and appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49 hectares in area
located at Barrio Guinayang, in San Mateo, Rizal. 1 Upon his death, this property was inherited by
his son, herein plaintiff-appellant Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of title 2 was issued.
During the lifetime of plaintiff's father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the
San Mateo River.3 To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was
constructed on the northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the
northern side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and
extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios

42/43

and municipalities. The river destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed and
meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular place of land.
The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now stands between the old
riverbed site and the new course.4
In 1945 the U.S. Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises 5 and started scraping,
excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby areas the River. The operations
eventually extended northward into this strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was
filed with the U.S. War Department by Luis Hilario, the then administrator of Dr. Hilario's estate.
The U.S. Army paid.6 In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and
appellee who took over its operations and continued the extractions and excavations of gravel
and sand from the strip of land along an area near the River.
On October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint 7 for injunction and damages against the
defendants City Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and
Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge of the plant. It was prayed that the latter be restrained
from excavating, bulldozing and extracting gravel, sand and soil from his property and that they
solidarily pay to him P5,000.00 as damages. Defendants' answer alleged, in affirmative defense,
that the extractions were made from the riverbed while counterclaiming with a prayer for
injunction against plaintiffwho, it was claimed, was preventing them from their operations.
Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed to join
the litigation as intervenors. The former complained that the disputed area was within the bed of
the river so that plaintiff should not only be enjoined from making extractions therefrom but
should also be ordered to pay the fees and penalties for the materials taken by him. On the other
hand, the latter claimed that he was authorized by plaintiff to extract materials from the disputed
area but this notwithstanding, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal collected from him a sand and
gravel fee which would be an illegal exaction if the disputed area turns out to be of private
ownership. Answers to the two complaints in intervention were duly filed by the affected parties.
On March 14, 1954, defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor
Calalang in the same case, alleging that the latter have fenced off the disputed area in
contravention of an agreement8 had between the latter and the Director of Public Works wherein
he defendants were allowed to continue their operations but subject to the final outcome of the
pending suit. It was prayed that plaintiff and intervenor Calalang be ordered to remove the fence
and allow defendants' men to continue their operations unhampered. Opposition to this petition
was filed by the other side, with a prayer for counter injunction. On March 23, 1954, the lower
court issued an order maintaining the status quo and allowing the defendants to continue their
extractions from the disputed area provided a receipt 9 in plaintiff's favor be issued for all the
materials taken.
On May 13, 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint. Impleaded as additional defendants were the
City of Manila,10the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal,11 and Engr. Eugenio Sese, the new Engineer-incharge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely for damages directed against
the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in the amount of P1,000,000.00, as
the cost of materials taken since 1949, as well as those to be extracted therefrom until
defendants stop their operations.

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Came the separate amended answers of the several defendants. Manila City denied ownership of
the plant and claimed that the City Engineer, acted merely as a deputy of the Public Works
Director. The other defendants12 put up, as special defense, the agreement between plaintiff and
the Public Works Director, and asserted a P1.2 million counterclaim for damages against plaintiff.
The rest13 renewed the same defense; that the disputed area was part of the public domain,
since it was situated on the riverbanks.
On November 3, 1954, the defendant City Engineer of Manila filed a petition to delimit the area
of excavation and asked the lower court to authorize his men to extend their operations west of
the camachile tree in the disputed area. This met vigorous opposition from plaintiff and
intervenor Calalang. On May 27, 1955, the petition was denied.
Finally, on December 21, 1956, the lower court rendered its decision on the merits. The
dispositive portion provided:14
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants City of Manila and the
Director of Public Works, to pay solidarily the herein plaintiff the sum of P376,989.60, as
the cost of gravel and sand extracted from plaintiff's land, plus costs. Judgment is likewise
hereby rendered against the defendant Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, ordering him to
reimburse to intervenor Maximo Calalang the amount of P236.80 representing gravel fees
illegally collected. Finally, defendants herein are perpetually enjoined from extracting any
sand or gravel from plaintiff's property which is two-fifths northern portion of the disputed
area.
It is so ordered.
None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they all sought a
reconsideration of the same. On August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the motions to
reconsider with an order, the dispositive portion of which provided: 15
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff and
intervenor Calalang; dismisses the complaint with respect to defendant City of Manila;
holds that the northern two-fifths portion of the area in controversy belongs to the plaintiff
with right to the immediate possession thereof and hereby enjoins the defendants and
intervenor Bureau of Mines to vacate the same and to stop from extracting gravel thereon.
The Court however hereby dismisses the case against the defendant Bureau of Public
Works and its agents and employees insofar as the claim for money is concerned without
prejudice to plaintiffs taking such action as he may deem proper to enforce said claim
against the proper party in accordance with law.
It is so ordered.
Still unsatisfied, plaintiff and intervenor Calalang filed a second motion for reconsideration. The
lower court stood firm on its ruling of August 30, 1957. 16

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Hence, this appeal.17 The defendants Director of Public Works, City Engineer of Manila, and Engrs.
Busuego and Sese have also appealed from the declaration made by the lower court that the
northern two-fifths of the disputed area belongs to plaintiff Hilario.
The parties herein have presented before this Court mixed questions of law and fact for
resolution and adjudication. Foremost among them is this legal query; when a river, leaving its
old bed, changes its original course and opens a new one through private property, would the
new riverbanks lining said course be of public ownership also? 18
The defendants answer in the affirmative. They claim that under the Law of Waters of August 3,
1866, the riverbanks are, by definition, considered part of the riverbed which is always of public
ownership. On the other hand, plaintiff would have the question resolved in the negative. He
maintains that not all riverbanks are of public ownership because: (1) Art. 372 of the old Civil
Code, which governs this particular case, speaks only of the new bed; nothing is said about the
new banks; (2) Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the phrase "banks of a river" cannot be
applied in the case at bar in conjunction with the other articles cited by defendants since that
article applies only to banks of natural riverbeds and the present, River is not in its natural bed;
and (3) if all banks were of public ownership, then Art. 553 of the old Civil Code and the second
sentence, first paragraph of Art. 73 of the Law of Waters can never have any application.
Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, long before the present Civil Code
took effect,19the question before Us should be determined in accordance with the provisions of
the old Civil Code and those of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866.
We agree with defendants that under the cited laws, all riverbanks are of public ownership
including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private
estate. Art. 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear. Without any qualifications, it provides:
Property of public ownership is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, as correctly contended by defendants, the riverbank is part of the riverbed. Art. 73 of
the Law of Waters which defines the phrase "banks of a river" provides:
By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which
are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. ...
(Emphasis supplied)
The use the of words "of its bed [de sus alveos]" clearly indicates the intent of the law to
consider the banks for all legal purposes as part of the riverbed. The lower court also
ruled correctly that the banks of the River are paint of its bed. 20 Since undeniably all
beds of rivers are of public ownership, 21 it follows that the banks, which form part of them,
are also of public ownership.

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Plaintiff's contention that Arts. 70 and 73 of the Law of Waters cannot apply because Art. 312 of
the old Civil Code mentions only the new bed but omits the banks, and that said articles only
apply to natural meaning original bed and banks is untenable. Art. 70, which defines beds
of rivers and creeks, provides:
The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during
the highest [ordinary] floods.22 (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that
Whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course from natural causes and opens
a new bedthrough a private estate, the new bed shall be of public ownership, but the
owner of the estate shall recover it in the event that the waters leave it dry again either
naturally or as the result of any work legally authorized for this purpose. (Emphasis
supplied)
did not have to mention the banks because it was unnecessary. The nature of the banks
always follows that of the bed and the running waters of the river. A river is a compound
concept consisting of three elements: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed and (3) the
banks. 23 All these constitute the river. American authorities are in accord with this view:
'River' consists of water, a bed and banks. 24
A "river" consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts constituting the river, the
whole river. It is a compound idea; it cannot exist without all its paints. Evaporate the
water, and you have a dry hollow. If you could sink the bed, instead of a river, you would
have a fathomless gulf. Remove the banks, and you have a boundless flood. 25
Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should either
be totally public or completely private. And since rivers are of public ownership, 26 it is implicit
that all the three component elements be of the same nature also. As Manresa commented:
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el
Codigo Civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio
publico de anquellos tres elementos que integran el rio. 27
However, to dispel all possible doubts, the law expressly makes all three elements public. Thus,
riverbanks and beds are public under Arts. 339 and 407, respectively, of the Code, while the
flowing waters are declared so under Art. 33, par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866.
Articles 70, 72 and 73 of the Law of Waters speak of natural beds and their banks. Plaintiff now
equates the term "natural" with the word "original" so that a change in the course of a river
would render those articles inapplicable. However, the premise is incorrect. Diccionario De La
Real Academia Espaola defines the word "natural" as follows:
NATURAL perteneciente a la naturaleza o conforme a la calidad o propriedad de las
cosas; nativo, originario de un pueblo o nacion; hecho con verdad, ni artificio, mezcla ni

46/43

composicion alguna; ingenuo y sin doblez en su modo de proceder; diceze tambien de las
cosas que imitar a la naturaleza con propiedad; regular y que comunmente sucede, y por
eso, facilmente creible; que se produce por solas las fuerzas de la naturaleza, como
contrapuesto a sobre natural y milagroso, (Emphasis supplied)
"Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or "prior condition". On the contrary, even if a
river should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course
would still fall within the scope of the definition provided above. Hence, the law must have used
the word "natural" only because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river
always to have a bed and banks.
Plaintiff's third point is not lightly to be taken. Indeed, it would seem possible to acquire private
ownership of banks under Art. 553 of the old Civil Code which provides:
Las riberas de los rios, aun cuando sean de dominio privado, estan sujetas en toda su
extension y en sus margenes, en una zona de tres metros, a la servidumbre de uso publico
en interes general de la navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento. (Emphasis
supplied) .
And plaintiff is not without jurisprudential backing for in Commonwealth vs. Gungun,28 it
was said that the private ownership of the banks was not prohibited. His point is then
neatly brought home with the proposition that it is precisely when a river changes its
course and opens a new bed through a private estate that there can be private ownership
of the banks.
A study of the history of Art. 553 will however reveal that it was never intended to authorize the
private acquisition of riverbanks. That could not have been legally possible in view of the
legislative policy clearly enunciated in Art. 339 of the Code that all riverbanks were of public
ownership. The article merely recognized and preserved the vested rights of riparian owners
who, because of prior law or custom, were able to acquire ownership over the banks. This was
possible under the Siete Partidas which was promulgated in 1834 yet.29 Under Law 6, Title 28,
Partidas 3, the banks of rivers belonged to the riparian owners, following the Roman Law
rule.30 In other words, they were privately owned then. But subsequent legislation radically
changed this rule. By the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, riverbanks became of public
ownership, albeit impliedly only because considered part of the bed which was public by
statutory definition.31 But this law, while expressly repealing all prior inconsistent laws, left
undisturbed all vested rights then existing. 32 So privately owned banks then continued to be so
under the new law, but they were subjected by the latter to an easement for public use. As Art.
73 provides:
Se entienden por riberas de un rio las fajas o zonis laterales de sus alveos que solamente
sor baadas por las aguas en las crecidas que no causan inundacion. El dominio privado
de las riberas esta suieto a la survidumbre de tres metros de zona para uso publico, en el
interest general de la navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento. ... (Emphasis
supplied).1wph1.t

47/43

This was perhaps the reconciliation effected between the private ownership of the banks, on the
one hand, and the policy of the law on the other hand, to devote all banks to public use. 33 The
easement would preserve the private ownership of the banks and still effectuate the policy of the
law. So, the easement in Art. 73 only recognized and preserved existing privately owned banks; it
did not authorize future private appropriation of riverbanks.
The foregoing observation is confirmed by the still subsequent Law of Waters of June 13, 1879,
which was principally based on the Law of August 3, 1865. 34 Art. 36 of the new law, which was a
substantial reenactment of Art. 73 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, reads:
Las riberas, aun cuando sean de dominio privado en virtud de antigue ley o de costumbre,
estan sujetas en toda su extension las margenes en una zona de tres metros, a la
servidumbre de uso publico en interes general de la navegacion, la flotacion la pesca y el
salvamento. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The new law also affirmed the public ownership of rivers and their beds, and the treatment of the
banks as part of the bed.35 But nowhere in the law was there any provision authorizing the
private appropriation of the banks. What it merely did was to recognize the fact that at that time
there were privately owned banks pursuant to theSiete Partidas, and to encumber these with an
easement for public use.
However, the public nature of riverbanks still obtained only by implication. But with the
promulgation of the Civil Code of 1889, this fact was finally made explicit in Art. 339 thereof.
Riverbanks were declared as public property since they were destined for public use. And the
first paragraph of Art. 36 of the Law of Waters of 1879 was substantially reenacted in Art. 553 of
the Code.36 Hence, this article must also be understood not as authorizing the private acquisition
of riverbanks but only as recognizing the vested titles of riparian owners who already owned the
banks.
The authority, then, for the private ownership of the banks is neither the old Civil Code nor the
Law of Waters of 1866 but the Siete Partidas. Unfortunately, plaintiff cannot invoke it. Law 6, Title
28, Partida 3, which provides for private ownership of banks, ceased to be of force in this
jurisdiction as of 1871 yet when the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, took effect. 37 Since the
change in the course of the River took place in 1937, the new banks which were formed could
not have been subjected to the provisions of the Siete Partidas which had already been
superseded by then.
Coming to the factual issues: both parties assail the conclusion made by the lower court that
only the northern two-fifths of the disputed area remained as plaintiff's private property. This
conclusion was apparently based on the findings that the portion where rice and corn were
found38 in the ocular inspection of June 15, 1951, was on the northern two-fifths of the disputed
area; that this cannot be a part of the bed because of the existence of vegetation which could
not have grown underwater, and that this portion is man-made. However, there is no evidentiary
basis for these findings. The area indicated by Nos. 1 and 2 in Exh. D-1 where no excavations
had been made, appears to be more on the south-western one-fourth of the disputed area. The
American cases39cited by the lower court cannot apply here. Our Law of Waters, in defining
"beds" and considers the latter is part of the former. Those cited cases did not involve a similar

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statutory provision. That plants can and do grow on the banks which otherwise could not have
grown in the bed which is constantly subjected to the flow of the waters proves the distinction
between "beds" and "banks" in the physical order. However, We are dealing with the legal order
where legal definitions prevail. And apart from these considerations, We also note the
considerable difficulty which would attend the execution of the ruling of the lower court. The
latter failed to indicate fixed markers from which an exact delimitation of the boundaries of the
portion could be made. This flaw is conducive to future litigations.
Plaintiff's theory is that the disputed area, although covered at times by flood waters, cannot be
considered as within the banks of the River because: (1) such floods are only accidental, and (2)
even if they are regular, the flooding of the area is due to the excavations and extractions made
by defendants which have caused the widening of the channel. 40 Defendants claim, however,
that the area is always covered by the normal yearly floods and that the widening of the channel
is due to natural causes.
There is a gravel pit41 located along the west side of the River. This is about 500 meters long. 42 A
greater part of this pit occupies a portion of the strip of land that was sliced by the River from the
rest of the Hilario estate. As shown in Exhs. D and D-1, this strip of land is that western segment
of the Hilario estate bounded on the west by the same lines connecting stakes 23 through 27,
which form part of the western boundary of the estate, and on the east, bounded by the western
waterline of the River.
Now, the disputed area, generally speaking, 43 is only that part of the gravel pit which is within
the strip of land. Its northern tip is that point where the so-called "secondary bank" line
intersects the west River waterline up north; its southern boundary is along the line connecting
stakes 23 and 24. From these two ends, the disputed area measures approximately 250 meters
long. The eastern boundary is the western River waterline at low tide and the western boundary
is the "secondary bank" line, a line passing near stake 24 and running almost parallel to the line
connecting stakes 25 and 26. Around the later part of 1949, the disputed area was about 150 to
160 meters wide.44 This increased to about 175 to 180 meters by the later part of 1950. And by
January, 1953, the distance from the "secondary bank" line to the west waterline was about 230
meters.45
This increasing width of the disputed area could be attributed to the gradual movement of the
River to the east. Since it entered into the Hilario estate, the River has not stayed put. 46 Vicente
Vicente, plaintiff's witness declared47 that after the River changed its course in 1937, the
distance between the old and the new river sites was about 100 meters. Exh. D-2 shows that in
1943, the south end of the River was about 5 meters southeast of stake 24. 48 Honorato Sta.
Maria, another witness for plaintiff, indicated the flow of this course with a blue line in Exh. D1.49 This blue line is about 100 meters from the line connecting stakes 25 and 26, which was also
the east boundary of the old River. 50 Around 1945 to 1949, the River was about 193 meters 51 east
of this line. This measurement is based on the testimonies of two defense witnesses 52 and stated
that during that period, the River passed along the Excavated Area and the New Accretion
Area53 sites, as shown in Exh. 54. By the later part of 1949 up to November 1950, the west
waterline was from 248 to 270 meters54 east of the aforesaid boundary line. And finally in
January, 1953, based on the scale in Exh. 3-Calalang, the west waterline was from 300 to 305

49/43

meters away already. Hence, from 100 meters in 1937, the River had moved to 305
meters eastwardin 1953.
There are two questions to be resolved here. First, where on the strip of land are the lateral
borders of the western riverbank? And second, where have defendants made their extractions?
Anent the first question, the key is supplied by Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the
limits of banks of rivers
By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which
are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause in inundations. ...
(Emphasis supplied)
The farthest extremity of the bank on the west side would, therefore, be that lateral line or
strip which is reached by the waters during those high floods that do not cause
inundations. In other words, the extent reached by the waters when the River is at high
tide.
However, there is a difference between the topography of the two sides immediately adjoining
the River. The line indicated as "primary bank" 55 in Exh. 3-Calalang, which is on the east, is about
3 meters high and has a steep grade right at the edge where it drops almost vertically to the
watercourse level. The precipice here, which is near the east waterline, is very easily detectible.
But the opposite side has no such steep activity. In fact, it is almost flat with the bed of the River,
especially near the water edge, where it is about 30 to 50 cms. high only. But it gradually slopes
up to a height of about 2 to 2- meters along the line indicated as "secondary bank", which is
quite far from the waterline. This "bank" line is about 1- meters higher than the level of the
gravel pit and there are erosions here. This is about 175 meters west from the November 1950
waterline, and about 100 meters west from the camachile tree. 56
During the dry season, the waterlevel of the River is quite low about knee-deep only. However,
during the rainy season, the River generally becomes swollen, and the waterlevel rises, reaching
up to the neck.57 However, considering the peculiar characteristics of the two sides banking the
river, the rise in the waterlevel would not have the same effect on the two sides. Thus, on the
east, the water would rise vertically, until the top of the "primary bank" is reached, but on the
west, there would be a low-angled inclined rise, the water covering more ground until the
"secondary bank" line is reached. In other words, while the water expansion on the east is
vertical, that on the west is more or less lateral, or horizontal.
The evidence also shows that there are two types of floods in the area during the rainy
season.58 One is the so-called "ordinary" flood, when the river is swollen but the flowing water is
kept within the confines, of the "primary" and "secondary" banks. This occurs annually, about
three to four times during the period. Then there is the "extraordinary" flood, when the waters
overflow beyond the said banks, and even inundate the surrounding areas. However, this flood
does not happen regularly. From 1947 to 1955, there were only three such floods. 59 Now,
considering that the "ordinary" flood easily cover the west side since any vertical rise of the
waterlevel on the east would necessarily be accompanied by a lateral water expansion on the
west the "inundations" which the law mentions must be those caused by the "extraordinary"

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floods which reach and overflow beyond both "primary" and "secondary" banks. And since the
"primary" bank is higher than the "secondary" bank, it is only when the former is reached and
overflowed that there can be an inundation of the banks the two banks. The question
therefore, may be stated thus: up to what extent on the west side do the highest flood waters
reach when the "primary" bank is not overflowed?
Defendants have presented several witnesses who testified on the extent reached by the
ordinary flood waters. David Ross, a bulldozer operator at the plant since 1945, testified 60 that
from 1945 to 1949, when the River was still passing along the site where the camachile tree is
located, the annual flood waters reached up to the "secondary bank" line. These floods usually
took from 3 to 5 days to recede, during which time their work was suspended. Corroboration is
supplied by Macario Suiza, a crane operator in the plant since 1945, and by Fidel Villafuerte, a
plant employee since 1946. Suiza stated61 that from 1947 to 1949, the area enclosed within the
blue lines and marked as Exh. 54-B which includes the New Accretion Area was always
covered by water when it rained hard and they had to stop work temporarily. The western
extremity of this area reaches up to the "secondary bank" line. Villafuerte stated 62 that in the
ordinary floods when the water was just 50 cm. below the top of the "primary bank", the waters
would go beyond the camachile tree by as much as 100 meters westward and just about reach
the "secondary bank" line. Further corroboration is supplied by plaintiff's own evidence. Exh. 1Calalang states that from 1947 to 1949, based on the casual observations made by geologist
David Cruz, the area between the "primary" and "secondary" banks were always covered by the
non-inundating ordinary floods.
From 1950 to 1952, We have the testimony of Ross who stated 63 that there were still floods but
they were not as big anymore, except one flood in 1952, since the River had already moved to
the east. Engr. Ricardo Pacheco, who made a survey of the disputed area in November 1952, and
who conducted actual observations of the extent of the water reach when the river was swollen,
testified64 that the non-inundating flood regularly reached up to the blue zigzag line along the
disputed area, as shown in Exh. I-City Engineer Manila. This blue line, at the point where it
intersects line BB,65 is about 140 meters west of the waterline and about 20 meters west of the
camachile tree. His testimony was based on three floods 66 which he and his men actually
recorded. Corroboration is again supplied by Exh. 1-Calalang. According to Cruz' report, the
floods in 1950 and 1951 barely covered the disputed area. During the normal days of the rainy
season, the waters of the swollen river did not reach the higher portions of the gravel pit which
used to be submerged. One cause for this was the lesser amount of rainfall from 1949 to 1951.
But two floods occurred from October 16 to 28, 1952, which overflowed the whole area and
inundated the banks. From 1953 to 1955, when the River was farther away to the east, the flood
waters still covered the west side.67 Testifying on the extent reached by the water during the
rainy season in 1954, Ross stated68 that it reached up to the camachile tree only. The last and
latest data comes from Engr. Magbayani Leao, the Engineer-in-charge of the plant from August
1954. He testified69 that as of December 1955, when the disputed area was underwater, the
water reach was about 20 meters or less to the east from the camachile tree.
From all the foregoing, it can be safely concluded: (1) that from 1945 to 1949, the west bank of
the River extended westward up to the "secondary bank" line; (2) that from 1950 to 1952, this
bank had moved, with the River, to the east its lateral borders running along a line just 20
meters west of the camachile tree; and (3) that from 1953 to 1955, the extremities of the west

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bank further receded eastward beyond the camachile tree, until they lay just about 20 meters
east of said tree.
To counteract the testimonies of the defense witnesses, plaintiff presented two rebuttal
witnesses70 who told a somewhat different story. However, their testimonies are not convincing
enough to offset the dovetailing testimonies of the defense witnesses who were much better
qualified and acquainted with the actual situs of the floods. And said defense witnesses were
corroborated by plaintiffs' own evidence which contradicts the aforesaid rebuttal witnesses.
However, plaintiff maintains that the floods which cover the area in question are merely
accidental and hence, under Art. 77 of the Law of Waters, 71 and following the ruling
in Government vs. Colegio de San Jose,72 he is deemed not to have lost the inundated area. This
is untenable. Plaintiff's own evidence73 shows that the river floods with annual regularity during
the rainy season. These floods can hardly be called "accidental." The Colegio de San Jose case is
not exactly in point. What was mainly considered there was Art. 74 of the Law of Waters relating
to lakes, ponds and pools. In the case at bar, none of these is involved.
Also untenable is plaintiff's contention that the regular flooding of the disputed area was due to
the continuous extraction of materials by defendants which had lowered the level of said area
and caused the consequent widening of the channel and the river itself. The excavations and
extractions of materials, even from the American period, have been made only on the strip of
land west of the River.74 Under the "following-the-nature-of-things" argument advanced by
plaintiff, the River should have moved westward, where the level of the ground had been
lowered. But the movement has been in the opposite direction instead. Therefore, it cannot be
attributed to defendants' operation. Moreover, plaintiff's own evidence indicates that the
movement eastward was all due to natural causes. Thus, Exh. 1-Calalang shows that the
movement eastward of the channel by as much as 31 meters, from 1950 to 1953, was due to
two typhoons which caused the erosion of the east bank and the depositing of materials on the
west side which increased its level from as much as .93 to 2 meters.
Plaintiff's assertion that the defendants also caused the unnatural widening of the River is
unfounded. Reliance is made on the finding by the lower court that in 1943, the River was only
60 meters wide as shown in Exh. D-2, whereas in 1950, it was already 140 meters wide as shown
in Exh. D. However, Exh. D-2 only shows the width of the River near the southwestern boundary
of the Hilario estate. It does not indicate how wide it was in the other parts, especially up north.
And Eligio Lorenzo, plaintiff's own witness, admitted 75 on cross-examination that the width of the
new river was not uniform. This is confirmed by Exhs. D and D-1 which show that the new river
was wider by as much as 50% up north than it was down south. The 140-meter distance in Exh.
D was at the widest part up north whereas down south, near the mouth of the Bulobok River, it
was only 70 meters wide. Lastly, the scale in Exh. 3-Calalang will show that in January 1953, the
River, near the same point also, was less than 50 meters wide.
The only remaining question now is to determine if the defendants have really confined their
operations within the banks of the River as alleged by them. To resolve this, We have to find out
from what precise portion in the disputed area the defendants have extracted gravel and sand
since they did not extract indiscriminately from within the entire area. None of the parties' briefs

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were very helpful but the evidence on record discloses that defendants made their extractions
only within specified areas during definite periods.
From 1947 to the early part of 1949, the defendants conducted their operations only in the New
Accretion Area along a narrow longitudinal zone contiguous to the watercourse then. This zone,
marked as Exh. 2-City Engineer Manila, is about one (1) km. long and extends northward up to
pt. 50.35 in Exh. 54. However, no extractions nor excavations were undertaken west of this zone,
i.e., above the "temporary bank" line.76 These facts are corroborated by plaintiff's witnesses. That
the extractions were near the river then finds support in Vicente's testimony 77 while Leon
Angeles and Mrs. Salud Hilario confirm the fact that defendants have not gone westward beyond
the "temporary bank" line.78 This line is located east of the "secondary bank" line, the lateral
extremity of the west bank then.
In the later part of 1949, plaintiff prohibited the defendants from extracting along the New
Accretion Area and constructed a fence across the same. This forced the defendants to go below
southeast of the "Excavated Area" and the New Accretion Area sites in Exh. 54. 79 Engr.
Busuego, testifying80 in 1952, indicated their are of extraction as that enclosed within the red
dotted line in Exh. D-1 which lies on the south end of the strip of land. Only a small portion of the
southeastern boundary of the disputed area is included. The ocular inspection conducted on June
15, 1951, confirms this.81 Exh. 4-Calalang shows the total amount of materials taken from within
the area from 1949 to 1951.82 Thus, from 1950 up to 1953, although the defendants were able to
continue their operations because of the agreement between the plaintiff and the Director of
Public Works,83 they were confined only to the southeastern portion of the disputed area. On the
other hand, the lateral extremities of the west bank then ran along a line about 20 meters west
of the camachile tree in the New Accretion Area.
From 1954 to 1955, defendants' area of operation was still farther near of the New Accretion
Area. They were working within a confined area along the west waterline, the northern and
western boundaries of which were 20 meters away east from the camachile tree. 84 Ross
indicated85 this zone in Exh. 54 as that portion on the southern end of the disputed area between
the blue lines going through the words "Marikina River Bed" and the red zigzag line indicating the
watercourse then. Engr. Leao even stated, 86 that they got about 80% of the materials from the
river itself and only 20% from the dry bed. The sand and gravel covered by Exhs. LL to LL-55
were all taken from here. The foregoing facts are not only corroborated by Mrs. Hilario 87 but even
admitted by the plaintiff in his opposition 88 to defendants' petition to extend their area of
operation west of the camachile tree. And because their petition was denied, defendants could
not, and have not,89 gone beyond the lateral line about 20 meters east from said tree, which has
already been established as the lateral extremity of the west bank during the period.
It appears sufficiently established, therefore, that defendants have not gone beyond the receding
western extremities of the west riverbank. They have confined their extraction of gravel and
sand only from within the banks of the river which constitute part of the public domain
wherein they had the right to operate. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that
defendants have gone beyond the limits of the west bank, as previously established, and have
invaded his private estate. He cannot, therefore, recover from them.

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As a parting argument, plaintiff contends that to declare the entire disputed area as part of the
riverbanks would be tantamount to converting about half of his estate to public ownership
without just compensation. He even adds that defendants have already exhausted the supply in
that area and have unjustly profited at his expense. These arguments, however, do not detract
from the above conclusions.
First of all, We are not declaring that the entire channel, i.e., all that space between the
"secondary bank" line and the "primary bank" line, has permanently become part of the riverbed.
What We are only holding is that at the time the defendants made their extractions, the
excavations were within the confines of the riverbanks then. The "secondary bank" line was the
western limit of the west bank around 1945 to 1949 only. By 1955, this had greatly receded to
the line just 20 meters east of the camachile tree in the New Accretion Area. All that space to the
west of said receding line90 would still be part of plaintiff's property and also whatever portion
adjoining the river is, at present, no longer reached by the non-inundating ordinary floods.
Secondly, it is not correct to say that plaintiff would be deprived of his property without any
compensation at all. Under Art. 370 of the old Civil Code, the abandoned bed of the old river
belongs to the riparian owners either fully or in part with the other riparian owners. And had the
change occurred under the Civil Code of the Philippines, plaintiff would even be entitled to all of
the old bed in proportion to the area he has lost. 91
And, lastly, defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiff's expense. They were
not responsible for the shifting of the River. It was due to natural causes for which no one can be
blamed. And defendants were extracting from public property then, under proper authorization.
The government, through the defendants, may have been enriched by chance, but not unjustly.
Considering the conclusions We have thus reached, the other questions involved in the
remaining assignments of errors particularly those apropos the doctrine of state immunity
from suit and the liability of defendant City of Manila are rendered moot.
Wherefore, the decision and orders appealed from are hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby entered as follows:
(1) Defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public Works and his agents and
employees are hereby absolved from liability to plaintiff since they did not extract
materials from plaintiff's property but from the public domain.
(2) All that portion within the strip of land in question, starting from the line running
parallel to the western waterline of the river and twenty meters east from the camachile
tree in the New Accretion Area measured along line AA in Exhs. 3-Calalang, 13 and 54, and
going to the west up to the western boundaries of the Hilario estate, is hereby declared as
not part of the public domain and confirmed as part of plaintiff's private property. No costs.
So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

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G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995
PEDRO P. PECSON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID and ERLINDA NUGUID, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 affirming in part the order 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-41470.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case as gathered from the record are as follows:
Petitioner Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street, Quezon
City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For his failure to pay realty
taxes amounting to twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00), the lot was sold at public auction by the
city Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn sold it on 12 October 1983 to
the private respondents, the spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid, for one hundred three
thousand pesos (P103,000.00).
The petitioner challenged the validity of the auction sale in Civil Case No. Q-41470 before the
RTC of Quezon City. In its decision of 8 February 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint, but as to
the private respondents' claim that the sale included the apartment building, it held that the
issue concerning it was "not a subject of the . . . litigation." In resolving the private respondents'
motion to reconsider this issue, the trial court held that there was no legal basis for the
contention that the apartment building was included in the sale. 3
Both parties then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 2931. In its decision of 30 April 1992, 4 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
assailed decision. It also agreed with the trial court that the apartment building was not included
in the auction sale of the commercial lot. Thus:
Indeed, examining the record we are fully convinced that it was only the land
without the apartment building which was sold at the auction sale, for plaintiff's
failure to pay the taxes due thereon. Thus, in the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent
Property To Purchaser (Exh. K, p. 352, Record) the property subject of the auction
sale at which Mamerto Nepomuceno was the purchaser is referred to as Lot No. 21A, Block No. K-34, at Kamias, Barangay Piahan, with an area of 256.3 sq. m., with

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no mention whatsoever, of the building thereon. The same description of the

subject property appears in the Final Notice To Exercise The Right of Redemption
(over subject property) dated September 14, 1981 (Exh. L, p. 353, Record) and in
the Final Bill of Sale over the same property dated April 19, 1982 (Exh. P, p. 357,
Record). Needless to say, as it was only the land without any building which
Nepomuceno had acquired at the auction sale, it was also only that land without
any building which he could have legally sold to the Nuguids. Verily, in the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Registered Land executed by Mamerto Nepomuceno in favor of the
Nuguids on October 25, 1983 (Exh. U, p. 366, Record) it clearly appears that the
property subject of the sale for P103,000.00 was only the parcel of land, Lot 21-A,
Blk. K-34 containing an area of 256.3 sq. meters, without any mention of any
improvement, much less any building thereon. (emphases supplied)
The petition to review the said decision was subsequently denied by this Court. 5 Entry of
judgment was made on 23 June 1993. 6
On November 1993, the private respondents filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of
possession of the lot and the apartment building, citing article 546 of the Civil Code. 7 Acting
thereon, the trial court issued on 15 November 1993 the challenged order 8 which reads as
follows:
Submitted for resolution before this Court is an uncontroverted [sic] for the Delivery
of Possession filed by defendants Erlinda Tan, Juan Nuguid, et al. considering that
despite personal service of the Order for plaintiff to file within five (5) days his
opposition to said motion, he did not file any.
In support of defendant's motion, movant cites the law in point as Article 546 of the
Civil Code . . .
Movant agrees to comply with the provisions of the law considering that plaintiff is a
builder in good faith and he has in fact, opted to pay the cost of the construction
spent by plaintiff. From the complaint itself the plaintiff stated that the construction
cost of the apartment is much more than the lot, which apartment he constructed at
a cost of P53,000.00 in 1965 (par. 8 complaint). This amount of P53,000.00 is what
the movant is supposed to pay under the law before a writ of possession placing
him in possession of both the lot and apartment would be issued.
However, the complaint alleges in paragraph 9 that three doors of the apartment
are being leased. This is further confirmed by the affidavit of the movant presented
in support of the motion that said three doors are being leased at a rental of
P7,000.00 a month each. The movant further alleges in his said affidavit that the
present commercial value of the lot is P10,000.00 per square meter or
P2,500,000.00 and the reasonable rental value of said lot is no less than P21,000.00
per month.
The decision having become final as per Entry of Judgment dated June 23, 1993 and
from this date on, being the uncontested owner of the property, the rents should be

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paid to him instead of the plaintiff collecting them. From June 23, 1993, the rents
collected by plaintiff amounting to more than P53,000.00 from tenants should be
offset from the rents due to the lot which according to movant's affidavit is more
than P21,000.00 a month.
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the Motion, the Court hereby grants the following
prayer that:
1. The movant shall reimburse plaintiff the construction cost of
P53,000.00.
2. The payment of P53,000.00 as reimbursement for the construction
cost, movant Juan Nuguid is hereby entitled to immediate issuance of a
writ of possession over the Lot and improvements thereon.
3. The movant having been declared as the uncontested owner of the
Lot in question as per Entry of Judgment of the Supreme Court dated
June 23, 1993, the plaintiff should pay rent to the movant of no less
than P21,000.00 per month from said date as this is the very same
amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the lot.
4. The amount of P53,000.00 due from the movant is hereby offset
against the amount of rents collected by the plaintiff from June 23,
1993, to September 23, 1993.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order but it was not acted upon by the trial
court. Instead, on 18 November 1993, it issued a writ of possession directing the deputy sheriff
"to place said movant Juan Nuguid in possession of subject property located at No. 79 Kamias
Road, Quezon City, with all the improvements thereon and to eject therefrom all occupants
therein, their agents, assignees, heirs and representatives." 9
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the order of 15 November 1993, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
32679. 10 In its decision of 7 June 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the order of the trial
court citing Article 448 of the Civil Code. In disposing of the issues, it stated:
As earlier pointed out, private respondent opted to appropriate the improvement
introduced by petitioner on the subject lot, giving rise to the right of petitioner to be
reimbursed of the cost of constructing said apartment building, in accordance with
Article 546 of the . . . Civil Code, and of the right to retain the improvements until he
is reimbursed of the cost of the improvements, because, basically, the right to
retain the improvement while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the
tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which they are built . . . [2 TOLENTINO,
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1992) p. 112]. With the facts extant and the
settled principle as guides, we agree with petitioner that respondent judge erred in

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ordering that "the movant having been declared as the uncontested owner of the lot
in question as per Entry of Judgment of the Supreme Court dated June 23, 1993, the
plaintiff should pay rent to the movant of no less than P21,000 per month from said
date as this is the very same amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the lot.
We, however, agree with the finding of respondent judge that the amount of
P53,000.00 earlier admitted as the cost of constructing the apartment building can
be offset from the amount of rents collected by petitioner from June 23, 1993 up to
September 23, 1993 which was fixed at P7,000.00 per month for each of the three
doors. Our underlying reason is that during the period of retention, petitioner as
such possessor and receiving the fruits from the property, is obliged to account for
such fruits, so that the amount thereof may be deducted from the amount of
indemnity to be paid to him by the owner of the land, in line with Mendoza vs. De
Guzman, 52 Phil. 164 . . . .
The Court of Appeals then ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, while it appears that private respondents have not yet indemnified
petitioner with the cost of the improvements, since Annex I shows that the Deputy
Sheriff has enforced the Writ of Possession and the premises have been turned over
to the possession of private respondents, the quest of petitioner that he be restored
in possession of the premises is rendered moot and academic, although it is but fair
and just that private respondents pay petitioner the construction cost of
P53,000.00; and that petitioner be ordered to account for any and all fruits of the
improvements received by him starting on June 23, 1993, with the amount of
P53,000.00 to be offset therefrom.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 11
Aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in good faith of the apartment building on the
theory that he constructed it at the time when he was still the owner of the lot, and that the key
issue in this case is the application of Articles 448 and 456 of the Civil Code.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals, as well as the parties, concerned themselves with the
application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. These articles read as follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree

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upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof. (361a)
xxx xxx xxx

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same
right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the
option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value
which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more
parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing
or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in
Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or planter
had acted in good faith. 12
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter
who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco
vs. Regalado: 13
Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado
constructed the house on his own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article
361 applies only in cases where a person constructs a building on the land of
another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply to a case
where a person constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be no
question as to good or bad faith on the part of the builder.
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue
of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe
that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary
intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the
two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable
and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the
indemnity.
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should be
determined. The respondent court and the private respondents espouse the belief that the cost
of construction of the apartment building in 1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient
reimbursement for necessary and useful improvements made by the petitioner. This position is,
however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this Court in similar cases. In Javier
vs. Concepcion, Jr., 14 this Court pegged the value of the useful improvements consisting of
various fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong material based on the market

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value of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana, 15 despite the finding that the useful
improvement, a residential house, was built in 1967 at a cost of between eight thousand pesos
(P8,000.00) to ten thousand pesos(P10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to reimburse the
builder in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the house at the time of
the trial. In the same way, the landowner was required to pay the "present value" of the house, a
useful improvement, in the case ofDe Guzman vs. De la Fuente, 16 cited by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties
involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila 17 that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and
possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such
a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him.
Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which
should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private
respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit
apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed
to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial
court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.
The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to the aggregate
rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment building. Since the private respondents have opted
to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and
enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the
portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain
the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. 18 The petitioner not having
been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income
therefrom.
It follows, too, that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial court's
determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering the petitioner to account for the rentals of
the apartment building from 23 June 1993 to 23 September 1993.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 and the Order of 15
November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 101, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-41470
are hereby SET ASIDE.
The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to determine the current market value of the
apartment building on the lot. For this purpose, the parties shall be allowed to adduce evidence
on the current market value of the apartment building. The value so determined shall be
forthwith paid by the private respondents to the petitioner otherwise the petitioner shall be
restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of the required indemnity.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Quiason, J., is on leave.

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G.R. No. 79688

February 1, 1996
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and ELDRED
JARDINICO,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the
owner's agent, a builder in good faith? This is the main issue resolved in this petition for review
on certiorari to reverse the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. No. 11040, promulgated
on August 20, 1987.
By resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First Division of this Court resolved to transfer this
case (along with several others) to the Third Division. After due deliberation and consultation, the
Court assigned the writing of this Decision to the undersigned ponente.
The Facts
The facts, as found by respondent Court, are as follows:
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located
at Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico
bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on
December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was then that he
discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had
taken possession thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under the
Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess the lot even before the completion of all
installment payments. On January 20, 1975, Kee paid CTTEI the relocation fee of P50.00 and
another P50.00 on January 27, 1975, for the preparation of the lot plan. These amounts were
paid prior to Kee's taking actual possession of Lot 8. After the preparation of the lot plan and a
copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kee's
wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was
Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto repair shop and
other improvements on the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to
reach an amicable settlement, but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinico's lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all
improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC), a complaint for ejectment with
damages against Kee.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. It further
ruled that petitioner and CTTEI could not successfully invoke as a defense the failure of Kee to
give notice of his intention to begin construction required under paragraph 22 of the Contract to
Sell on Installment and his having built a sari-sari store without the prior approval of petitioner
required under paragraph 26 of said contract, saying that the purpose of these requirements was
merely to regulate the type of improvements to be constructed on the Lot. 3
However, the MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8
for the latter's failure to pay the installments due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission.
The rescission was effected in 1979, before the complaint was instituted. The MTCC concluded
that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the contract between him and petitioner.
Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he cannot
claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced on said lot.
The MTCC thus disposed:

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IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to vacate the premises of Lot 9, covered by TCT No.
106367 and to remove all structures and improvements he introduced thereon;
2. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to pay to the plaintiff rentals at the rate of P15.00 a
day computed from the time this suit was filed on March 12, 1981 until he actually vacates
the premises. This amount shall bear interests (sic) at the rate of 12 per cent (sic) per
annum.
3. Third-Party Defendant C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Subdivision are
ordered to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees
and P700.00 as cost and litigation expenses. 4
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner and CTTEI
were not at fault or were not negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that they
directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee 5. It found Kee a builder in bad faith. It further
ruled that even assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he was, nonetheless, guilty
of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served
with notice to vacate said lot, and thus was liable for rental.
The RTC thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed with respect to the order against the
defendant to vacate the premises of Lot No. 9 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T106367 of the land records of Bacolod City; the removal of all structures and
improvements introduced thereon at his expense and the payment to plaintiff (sic) the
sum of Fifteen (P15.00) Pesos a day as reasonable rental to be computed from January 30,
1981, the date of the demand, and not from the date of the filing of the complaint, until he
had vacated (sic) the premises, with interest thereon at 12% per annum. This Court further
renders judgment against the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs of litigation.
The third-party complaint against Third-Party Defendants Pleasantville Development
Corporation and C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. is dismissed. The order against Third-Party
Defendants to pay attorney's fees to plaintiff and costs of litigation is reversed. 6
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration on October 20, 1986, Kee appealed directly
to the Supreme Court, which referred the matter to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the "mix-up"
when he began construction of the improvements on Lot 8. It further ruled that the erroneous
delivery was due to the negligence of CTTEI, and that such wrong delivery was likewise
imputable to its principal, petitioner herein. The appellate court also ruled that the award of
rentals was without basis.
Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and judgment
is rendered as follows:
1. Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he
introduced on Lot 9, and is entitled to the rights granted him under Articles 448, 546 and
548 of the New Civil Code.
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development
Corporation are solidarily liable under the following circumstances:
A.
If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter,
remove these structures, the third-party defendants shall answer for all demolition
expenses and the value of the improvements thus destroyed or rendered useless;
b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer
for the amount representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico.
3. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development
Corporation are ordered to pay in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as
attorney's fees, as well as litigation expenses.
4. The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.

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Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the determination of the
actual value of the improvements and the property (Lot 9), as well as for further
proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of the New Civil Code. 7
Petitioner then filed the instant petition against Kee, Jardinico and CTTEI.
The Issues
The petition submitted the following grounds to justify a review of the respondent Court's
Decision, as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way probably not in accord with law or
the the (sic) applicable decisions of the Supreme Court on third-party complaints, by
ordering third-party defendants to pay the demolition expenses and/or price of the land;
2. The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted course of judicial
proceedings, by granting to private respondent-Kee the rights of a builder in good faith in
excess of what the law provides, thus enriching private respondent Kee at the expense of
the petitioner;
3. In the light of the subsequent events or circumstances which changed the rights of the
parties, it becomes imperative to set aside or at least modify the judgment of the Court of
Appeals to harmonize with justice and the facts;
4. Private respondent-Kee in accordance with the findings of facts of the lower court is
clearly a builder in bad faith, having violated several provisions of the contract to sell on
installments;
5. The decision of the Court of Appeals, holding the principal, Pleasantville Development
Corporation (liable) for the acts made by the agent in excess of its authority is clearly in
violation of the provision of the law;
6. The award of attorney's fees is clearly without basis and is equivalent to putting a
premium in (sic) court litigation.
From these grounds, the issues could be re-stated as follows:
(1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?
(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and
(3) Is the award of attorney's fees proper?
The First Issue: Good Faith
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's ruling that Kee was a
builder in bad faith.
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith. We agree with the following observation of the
Court of Appeals:
The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when
it pointed the wrong property to Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly improbable that a
purchaser of a lot would knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot owned by
another, deliberately exposing himself and his family to the risk of being ejected from the
land and losing all improvements thereon, not to mention the social humiliation that would
follow.
Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining
the identity of his property. Lot 8 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-69561,
while Lot 9 is identified in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106367. Hence, under the
Torrens system of land registration, Kee is presumed to have knowledge of the metes and
bounds of the property with which he is dealing. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he had to
find a way to ascertain that what was described in TCT No. 69561 matched Lot 8. Thus, he
went to the subdivision developer's agent and applied and paid for the relocation of the
lot, as well as for the production of a lot plan by CTTEI's geodetic engineer. Upon Kee's
receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI's
employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was
indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of

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the company's positive identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that
there had been a misdelivery. The steps Kee had taken to protect his interests were
reasonable. There was no need for him to have acted ex-abundantia cautela, such as
being present during the geodetic engineer's relocation survey or hiring an independent
geodetic engineer to countercheck for errors, for the final delivery of subdivision lots to
their owners is part of the regular course of everyday business of CTTEI. Because of
CTTEI's blunder, what Kee had hoped to forestall did in fact transpire. Kee's efforts all went
to naught.8
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title 9. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the
burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee 10.
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from
petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith.
Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's violation of paragraphs 22 and 26 of
the Contract of Sale on Installment.
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good
faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged
violations may give rise to petitioner's cause of action against Kee under the said contract
(contractual breach), but may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in
good faith.
Petitioner also points out that, as found by the trial court, the Contract of Sale on Installment
covering Lot 8 between it and Kee was rescinded long before the present action was instituted.
This has no relevance on the liability of petitioner, as such fact does not negate the negligence of
its agent in pointing out the wrong lot. to Kee. Such circumstance is relevant only as it gives
Jardinico a cause of action for unlawful detainer against Kee.
Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot "claim that another lot was erroneously pointed out to
him" because the latter agreed to the following provision in the Contract of Sale on installment,
to wit:
13. The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his contract he/she has
personally examined or inspected the property made subject-matter hereof, as to its
location, contours, as well as the natural condition of the lots and from the date hereof
whatever consequential change therein made due to erosion, the said Vendee shall bear
the expenses of the necessary fillings, when the same is so desired by him/her. 11
The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of the location, contour and
condition of the lot due to erosion. It merely provides that the vendee, having examined the
property prior to the execution of the contract, agrees to shoulder the expenses resulting from
such change.
We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee contracted away his right to
recover damages resulting from petitioner's negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to public
policy and cannot be allowed. "Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law." 12
The Second Issue: Petitioner's Liability
Kee filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI, which was dismissed by the RTC
after ruling that there was no evidence from which fault or negligence on the part of petitioner
and CTTEI can be inferred. The Court of Appeals disagreed and found CTTEI negligent for the
erroneous delivery of the lot by Octaviano, its employee.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that CTTEI was its agent. But it contends that the erroneous
delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was an act which was clearly outside the scope of its authority, and
consequently, CTTEI I alone should be liable. It asserts that "while [CTTEI] was authorized to sell
the lot belonging to the herein petitioner, it was never authorized to deliver the wrong lot to
Kee" 13.
Petitioner's contention is without merit.

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The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his
authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons 14. On the other hand, the agent
who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage 15
CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of petitioner when it
made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent. It is
this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as principal of CTTEI, per Articles 1909
and 1910 of the Civil Code.
Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals, Jardinico and Kee on July 24, 1987
entered into a deed of sale, wherein the former sold Lot 9 to Kee. Jardinico and Kee did not inform
the Court of Appeals of such deal.
The deed of sale contained the following provision:
1. That Civil Case No. 3815 entitled "Jardinico vs. Kee" which is now pending appeal with
the Court of Appeals, regardless of the outcome of the decision shall be mutually
disregarded and shall not be pursued by the parties herein and shall be considered
dismissed and without effect whatso-ever; 16
Kee asserts though that the "terms and conditions in said deed of sale are strictly for the parties
thereto" and that "(t)here is no waiver made by either of the parties in said deed of whatever
favorable judgment or award the honorable respondent Court of Appeals may make in their favor
against herein petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and/or private respondent C.T.
Torres Enterprises; Inc." 17
Obviously, the deed of sale can have no effect on the liability of petitioner. As we have earlier
stated, petitioner's liability is grounded on the negligence of its agent. On the other hand, what
the deed of sale regulates are the reciprocal rights of Kee and Jardinico; it stressed that they had
reached an agreement independent of the outcome of the case.
Petitioner further assails the following holding of the Court of Appeals:
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development
Corporation are solidarily liable under the following circumstances:
a. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter,
remove these structures, the third-party defendants shall answer for all demolition
expenses and the value of the improvements thus destroyed or rendered useless;
b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer
for the amount representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico. 18
Petitioner contends that if the above holding would be carried out, Kee would be unjustly
enriched at its expense. In other words, Kee would be able to own the lot, as buyer, without
having to pay anything on it, because the aforequoted portion of respondent Court's Decision
would require petitioner and CTTEI jointly and solidarily to "answer" or reimburse Kee therefor.
We agree with petitioner.
Petitioner' s liability lies in the negligence of its agent CTTEI. For such negligence, the petitioner
should be held liable for damages. Now, the extent and/or amount of damages to be awarded is
a factual issue which should be determined after evidence is adduced. However, there is no
showing that such evidence was actually presented in the trial court; hence no damages could
flow be awarded.
The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner in good
faith, respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was
error for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight modification" in the application of such law, on
the ground of "equity". At any rate, as it stands now, Kee and Jardinico have amicably settled
through their deed of sale their rights and obligations with regards to Lot 9. Thus, we delete
items 2 (a) and (b) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision [as reproduced
above] holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily liable.
The Third Issue: Attorney's Fees
The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorney's fees and costs in the amount of P3,000.00 and P700.00,
respectively, as prayed for in his complaint. The RTC deleted the award, consistent with its ruling

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that petitioner was without fault or negligence. The Court of Appeals, however, reinstated the
award of attorney's fees after ruling that petitioner was liable for its agent's negligence.
The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the
circumstances of each case 19. We shall not interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals.
Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of his interests and for the recovery of
damages sustained as a result of the negligence of petitioner's agent 20.
In sum, we rule that Kee is a builder in good faith. The disposition of the Court of Appeals that
Kee "is entitled to the rights granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code"
is deleted, in view of the deed of sale entered into by Kee and Jardinico, which deed now governs
the rights of Jardinico and Kee as to each other. There is also no further need, as ruled by the
appellate Court, to remand the case to the court of origin "for determination of the actual value
of the improvements and the property (Lot 9), as well as for further proceedings in conformity
with Article 448 of the New Civil Code."
WHEREFORE , the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith;
(2) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. are declared solidarily liable for damages due to negligence; however,
since the amount and/or extent of such damages was not proven during the trial, the
same cannot now be quantified and awarded;
(3) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. are ordered to pay in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as
attorney's fees, as well as litigation expenses; and
(4) The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.
SO ORDERED.
Navasa, C.J., Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-101177 March 28, 1994

GUILLERMO JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (15th DIVISION), DEMETRIO CARINGAL, SPOUSES DIONISIO CAAY
AND NAZARIA CARINGAL, respondents.
Valerio & De Guzman Law Offices for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for private respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:.

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PETITIONER GUILLERMO JAVIER seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 13112 dated 26 March 1991 setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Balayan, Batangas dated 7 July 1986 which declared petitioner the rightful owner of the disputed
land.
On 2 April 1985, petitioner filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession with
damages against respondents Demetrio Caringal and spouses Dionisio Caay and Nazaria
Caringal involving a parcel of land situated at Barangay No. IV, Poblacion, Balayan, Batangas,
with an area of 973 square meters. The evidence for the petitioner shows that the property was
the subject of a prior Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 14-2-305 filed by petitioner with the
Bureau of Lands on 2 April 1973. Petitioner claims that he has been in peaceful and adverse
possession of the property since 1971 and this possession was confirmed by the Bureau of Lands
Investigator Felix O. Laude, Sr., when the latter recommend that the miscellaneous sales
application of petitioner be given due course.
On 14 August 1974, petitioner sold the land covered by his sales application to Santiago de
Guzman by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. During this time, respondents Dionisio Caay and
Cesaria Caringal constructed a house on the disputed lot with permission and upon tolerance of
Santiago de Guzman. Respondent Dionisio Caay was then the driver of Santiago de Guzman.
On 31 August 1981, petitioner repurchased the property from Santiago de Guzman with
knowledge that the house of respondents Dionisio Caay and Cesaria Caringal was existing on the
property but did not immediately eject them as respondent Caay was a good friend of petitioner.
Petitioner later discovered that in 1982, respondent Demetrio Caringal, father of respondent
Cesaria Caringal, was awarded by the Bureau of Lands a free patent over the property in
question and was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-462 in his name.
On the other hand, evidence for private respondents shows that on 1 July 1981 respondent
Demetrio Caringal filed a free patent application covering the disputed property; that his
possession started in 1981 when it was sold to him by Gavino Tesorero who appeared to be the
only surviving heir of Gregoria Pineda, the original applicant for free patent. Gregoria Pineda had
been in possession of the property since 1942 and had applied in 1951 for a revocable permit
with the Bureau of Lands in Tanduay, Manila. During the lifetime of Gregoria, respondent Caringal
had introduced improvements on the property including the house presently occupied by
respondents Dionisio Caay and Cesaria Caringal.
After Gregoria died in November 1976, her surviving heir, Gavino Tesorero, sold the disputed
property to respondent Caringal in 1981 for a consideration of P5,000.00 as evidenced by an
affidavit executed by Tesorero. After proper inspection and investigation by the Bureau of Lands,
the free patent application of respondent Caringal was given due course. In 1982, the land was
awarded by the Bureau of Lands to respondent Demetrio Caringal under Free Patent Application
No. 18220 and registered under Original Certificate of Title No. P-462 in his name.
On 7 July 1986, the trial court rendered its decision declaring petitioner the legal owner of the
disputed property. It also ordered the Register of Deeds of Batangas to cancel the name and
personal circumstances of respondent Caringal as the registered owner in OCT No. T-462 and to
substitute, in lieu thereof, the name and personal circumstances of petitioner. The court further

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directed the Register of Deeds to issue to petitioner an owner's duplicate certificate of OCT No. T462 upon payment by the latter of the fees required by law. The court also ordered respondents
Demetrio Caringal, spouses Dionisio Caay and Cesaria Caringal to pay petitioner jointly and
severally litigation expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of
P3,000.00.
In granting the complaint, the trial court found circumstances showing that fraud attended the
issuance of the free patent thus making it null and void, to wit: (a) The existence of a prior
miscellaneous sales application of petitioner should have barred the acceptance and processing
of the free patent application of respondent Demetrio Caringal; (b) The said free patent was
issued on
21 August 1982 to Caringal without the technical description of the property having been first
issued; and, (c) The survey plan of Gregoria Pineda, original applicant for free patent and
predecessor-in-interest of respondent Caringal, was spurious as it was approved only after her
death.
Respondent Demetrio Caringal appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 26 March 1991
overturned the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the complaint of petitioner.
In finding for respondent Caringal, the appellate court cited the following reasons for its decision:
(a) While petitioner had filed a prior sales application of the property in 1973, no action on the
application was taken by the Bureau of Lands even after respondent Caringal filed a free patent
application in 1981; the mere filing of the miscellaneous sales application does not mean that
petitioner Guillermo Javier had acquired any vested right or title over the disputed property, the
application being evidence only of a claim over the land; (b) Petitioner had not established
continuous, adverse and open possession of the land because he sold his rights over the same to
Santiago de Guzman in 1974 and reacquired the same from the latter in 1981. There was also no
evidence that petitioner occupied and possessed the land under claim of ownership after he
reacquired the same. On the other hand, unrebutted evidence for private respondents shows
their continuous possession and that of their predecessor in-interest since 1951 until 1981 when
respondent Demetrio Caringal filed an application for free patent; and, (c) No survey plan was
ever submitted by petitioner for the lot in question. Thus, it is doubtful whether the lot claimed
by petitioner, which contains 1,000 square meters, is the same property awarded to respondent
Caringal by virtue of the free patent which covers a 973-square meter lot.
Hence, this petition alleging that respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred (a) in ruling that an
action for reconveyance of title must be commenced within one (1) year from the issuance of the
original certificate of title; (b) in misapprehending the facts and disregarding the findings of fact
of the trial court that fraud attended the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-462 in the
name of respondent Caringal; and, (c) in declaring petitioner as not having established
continuous, adverse and open possession contrary to the testimonial and documentary evidence
of petitioner on record.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of
registration is no longer open to review or attack although its issuance is attended with actual
fraud. This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is
still available. 2 The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1)

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year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in
court for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages. In this case, the
disputed property is still registered in the name of respondent Demetrio Caringal, so that
petitioner was correct in availing himself of the procedural remedy of reconveyance.
However, despite the availability to petitioner of the remedy of reconveyance, this Court finds no
merit in petitioner's claim that he has legal title over the property in question that will justify its
return to him. Petitioner failed to show sufficient proof of ownership over the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-462. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law,
he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. 3
In the case at bar, petitioner as plaintiff in the trial court tried to prove his ownership over the
property registered in the name of respondent Caringal by a miscellaneous sales application he
filed with the Bureau of Lands and by his continuous possession thereof since 1971 when he
applied for a sales patent.
The records show that the property subject of petitioner's Miscellaneous Sales Application
contained an area of 1,000 square meters and is particularly bounded as follows: on the North,
by Gregoria Pineda; on the East, by a river; on the South, by Balayan Bay; and, on the West, by
Severino Labrador, situated in the Barrio of Boulevard, Balayan, Batangas. 4 On the other hand,
the land subject of the controversy which was awarded to respondent Demetrio Caringal by
virtue of free patent and registered in his name under Original Certificate of Title No. P-462
contained an area of 973 square meters and is bounded on the Northeast, by Paula Tesorero; on
the Southeast, by Guillermo Javier; on the Southwest, by Francisco Espineli; and, on the
Northwest, by Gregoria Pineda. 5
However, in his complaint for reconveyance which he filed with the trial court, petitioner
described the parcel of land he sought to recover as
A parcel of land situated at Boulevard, Balayan, Batangas. Bounded on the North by
the property of Gregoria Pineda; on the East by River; on the South by Salvage
Zone; and on the West by the property of Reneirio Ramos, containing an area of
ONE THOUSAND (1,000) SQUARE METERS, more or less. 6
The evidence for petitioner, which the court upheld, showed the petitioner had been in
possession of the parcel of land described in his complaint since 1970 and had introduced
improvements thereon; that petitioner paid realty taxes as early as 1974; that District Land
Officer Constante Q. Asuncion testified that he conducted an ocular inspection of the land subject
of the miscellaneous sales application and found petitioner to be in possession thereof and had
constructed four (4) houses of light materials thereon. 7

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On the other hand, the evidence for respondent Demetrio Caringal as found by the Court of
Appeals showed that as early as 1942 Gregoria Pineda had occupied the disputed lot covered by
OCT No. P-462, and upon her death in 1976, her brother and only heir, Gavino Tesorero,
succeeded to her rights over the lot; then in 1981, respondent Caringal bought the rights over
the lot from Gavino Tesorero and later filed an application for free patent; on 7 August 1981,
District Land Officer Constante Q. Asuncion issued a certification to the Director of Lands that
respondent Caringal and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession thereof and had introduced improvements thereon consisting of fruit-bearing coconut
trees and banana plants; respondent Caringal had paid realty taxes thereon for the years 1983 to
1985; and, respondent Caringal has free patent over the property and was issued OCT No. P-462.
Culled from the evidence on record, there is serious doubt on the precise identity of the parcel of
land petitioner seeks to recover. The description and boundaries of the land allegedly possessed
by petitioner and which was the subject of his application for sales patent differ from the parcel
of land he described in his complaint for reconveyance. What petitioner seeks to recover in his
complaint is the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-462 which he claims to have been
fraudulently registered in the name of Caringal. But, interestingly, the description and boundaries
of the lot covered by OCT No. P-462 are totally different from the description in petitioner's
complaint for recovery of ownership before the trial court against respondent Caringal in whose
name OCT
No. P-462 is registered.
In order to maintain an action to recover ownership of real property, the person who claims that
he has a better right to it must prove not only his ownership of the same but he must also
satisfactorily prove the identity
thereof. 8 In this case, failing to fix the identity of the property he claims, petitioner's action for
reconveyance must fail. But, assuming in gratia argumenti that the property which petitioner
seeks to be reconveyed to him is the same as that covered by OCT No. P-462 in the name of
respondent Caringal, petitioner has not proved his ownership of the same. The filing of the
miscellaneous sales application did not vest title upon petitioner over the property as there was
no showing that his application was approved by the Bureau of Lands or that a sales patent over
the property was granted to him prior to the issuance of free patent and OCT No. P-462 in favor
of respondent Caringal.
Under the Public Land Act, even the approval of a sales application merely authorizes the
applicant to take possession of the land so that he can comply with the requirements prescribed
by law before a final patent can be issued in his favor. Meanwhile, the Government still remains
the owner thereof, as in fact the application can still be cancelled and the land awarded to
another applicant, if it be shown that the legal requirements have not been complied with.
Hence, when the Bureau of Lands did not take action on the sales application of petitioner but
instead issued the Free Patent and title to another applicant, herein respondent Caringal, it was
only then that the Government was divested of its ownership and the land was segregated from
the mass of public domain, converting it into private property. 9
Moreover, the record shows, which petitioner admits, that after the filing on 7 April 1973 of the
miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands, he sold the property in 1974 to
Santiago de Guzman. The records fail to disclose that the sale was approved by the Bureau of

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Lands. Subsequently, Santiago de Guzman resold the property to petitioner. The sale of the
property by petitioner to de Guzman pending the approval of the former's sales application
without the approval of the Bureau of Lands violated Sec. 29 of C.A. No. 141 provides:
After title has been granted, the purchaser may not, within a period of ten years
from such cultivation or grant, convey or encumber or dispose said lands or rights
thereon to any person, corporation or association, without prejudice to any right or
interest of the government in the land: Provided, That any sale or encumbrance
made in violation of the provisions of this section, shall be null and void and shall
produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all
rights thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore
made to the Government shall be forfeited.
Clearly, this provision contemplates a sale and encumbrance that a purchaser may desire to
make during the pendency of his application and before his compliance with the requirements of
the law. 10 Since the application is still pending consideration and the rights of the applicant have
not yet been determined, he cannot make any transfer that may affect the land, without the
approval of the government. Thus, the law allows an applicant "after the cultivation of the land
has begun" to convey or encumber his rights to any person "provided such conveyance or
encumbrance does not affect any right or interest of the Government on the land." And to
safeguard such right or interest, previous approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources is required. Such approval becomes unnecessary after the right of the purchaser is
already deemed vested, the issuance of the patent being a mere ceremony. 11
In this case, the sale of the property covered by a pending application for a sales patent without
the required approval of the government produced the effect of annulling the sales application as
if none had been filed. Thus, the Bureau of Lands could consider and approve subsequent
applications for the acquisition of the property filed by other persons with the necessary
qualifications. In granting the free patent applied for by respondent Caringal which led to the
issuance of OCT No. P-462 in his favor, the Bureau of Lands acted regularly within its authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 March
1991 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 108065 July 6, 1993
SPOUSES FELIX BAES AND RAFAELA BAES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Lorenzo F. Miravite for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:

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This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in
totothe ruling of the trial court in Civil Case No. 0460-P, the dispositive portion of which read thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring null and void TCT Nos. 14405, 29592,
29593, 29594, 29595, and TCT No. 29593's derivative titles TCT No4s. 124725, 124726,
124727 and 124729, and ordering the Register of Deeds for Pasay City to cancel them and
issue new ones in their stead in the name of the plaintiff after segregating from TCT No. 29593
452 sq. m., the actual area of Lot 2958-C (covered by cancelled TCT No. 11043) belonging to
defendant Felix Baes. The counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for Pasay City.
SO ORDERED.
The controversy began in 1962, when the government dug a canal on a private parcel of land, identified as Lot
2958 and covering an area of P33,902 sq.m., to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek.
This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes, who registered it in his name under TCT No. 10990 and then had it
subdivided into three lots, namely: (a) Lot 2958-A, with an area of 28,889 sq.m.; (b) Lot 2958-B, with an area of
3,588 sq.m.; and (c) Lot 2958-C, with an area of 452 sq.m., covered by TCT Nos. 11041, 11042 and 11043,
respectively.
In exchange for Lot 2958-B, which was totally occupied by the canal, the government gave Baes a lot with
exactly the same area as Lot 2958-B through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970. 1 The
property, which was near but not contiguous to Lot 2956-C, was denominated as Lot 3271-A and later
registered in the name of Felix Baes under TCT No. 24300. The soil displaced by the canal was used to fill up
the old bed of the creek.
Meanwhile, Baes had Lot 2958-C and a portion of Lot 2958-A designated as Lot 1, Blk., 4, resurveyed and
subdivided. On January 12, 1968, he submitted a petition for the approval of his resurvey and subdivision
plans, claiming that after the said lots were plotted by a competent surveyor, it was found that there were errors
in respect of their bearings and distances.
The resurvey-subdivision plan was approved by the Court of First Instance of Pasay City in an order dated
January 15, 1968. 2
As a result, the old TCTs covering the said lots were canceled and new ones were issued, to wit: (a) Lot 1-A,
Blk. 4, with 672 sq.m., under TCT No.
T-14404; (b) Lot 1-B, with 826 sq.m., representing the increase in area after the resurvey, under TCT No. T14405; (c) Lot 2958-C-1, with 452 sq.m., under TCT No. T-14406; and (d) Lot 2958-C-2, with 2,770 sq.m.
representing the increase after resurvey, under TCT No. T-14407.
Lots 2958-C-1 and 2958-C-2 were later consolidated and this time further subdivided into four (4) lots, namely,
Lot 1, with an area of 147 sq.m.; Lot 2, with an area of 950 sq.m.; Lot 3, with an area of 257 sq.m.; and Lot 4,
with an area of 1,868 sq.m., which were respectively issued TCT Nos. 29592, 29593, 29594, and 29595.
In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot 1-B (with TCT No. 14405 and an area of 826
sq.m.), on which the petitioners had erected an apartment building, covered Lot 3611 of the Pasay Cadastre,
which is a filled-up portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek. Moreover, Lot 2958-C (covered by TCT Nos. 29592 to
29595, with an increased area of 2,770 after resurvey and subdivision) had been unlawfully enlarged.
On November 17, 1982, it filed a petition for cancellation of TCT Nos. 14405 and 29592 to 29595. 3
Baes did not object in his answer to the cancellation of TCT Nos. 29592, 29594 and 29595 and was notable to
prove during the trial that the government utilized a portion of Lot 2 under, TCT No. 29593. The trial court
therefore decreed (correctly) that the original Lot 2958-C (with an area of 452 sq.m.) be reverted to its status
before the resurvey-subdivision of Lot 2958-C.
The only remaining dispute relates to Lot 1-B (TCT No. 14405), which the petitioners, relying on Article 461 of
the Civil Code, are claiming as their own. The government rejects this claim and avers that the petitioners had
already been fully compensated for it on June 20, 1970 when they agreed to exchange their Lot 2958-B with
Lot 3271-A belonging to the government.
Article 461 of the Civil Code states:
River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso
factobelong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the
area lost. However, the owners of the land adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire
the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area
occupied by the new bed. (Emphasis supplied)

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A portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek was diverted to a man-made canal which totally occupied Lot 2958-B
(with an area of 3,588 sq.m.) belonging to Felix Baes. Thus, the petitioners claim that they became the owners
of the old bed (which was eventually filled up by soil excavated from Lot 2958-B) by virtue of Article 461.
The petitioners rely heavily on Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino's interpretation of this Article, to wit:
This article (461) refers to a natural change in the course of a stream. If the change of the
course is due to works constructed by concessioners authorized by the government, the
concession may grant the abandoned river bed to the concessioners. If there is no such grant,
then, by analogy, the abandoned river bed will belong to the owners of the land covered by the
waters, as provided in this article, without prejudice to a superior right of third persons with
sufficient title. (Citing 3 Manresa 251-252; 2 Navarro Amandi, 100-101; 3 Sanchez Roman 148)
We agree.
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes,
there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected through
artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the result of a deliberate act
on the part of the government when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore
obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.
We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A in
exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970.
This was a fair exchange because the two lots were of the same area and value and the agreement was freely
entered into by the parties. The petitioners cannot now claim additional compensation because, as correctly
observed by the Solicitor General,
. . . to allow petitioners to acquire ownership of the dried-up portion of the creek would be a
clear case of double compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of the state.
The exchange of lots between the petitioners and the Republic was the result of voluntary negotiations. If these
had failed, the government could still have taken Lot 2958-B under the power of eminent domain, upon
payment of just compensation, as the land was needed for a public purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Grio-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-43346

March 20, 1991

MARIO C. RONQUILLO, petitioner

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ROSENDO DEL ROSARIO, AMPARO DEL ROSARIO and FLORENCIA DEL ROSARIO, respondents.*
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the decision 1 rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on September 25,
1975 in CA-G.R. No. 32479-R, entitled "Rosendo del Rosario, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus Mario
Ronquillo, Defendant-Appellant," affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, and its amendatory
resolution 2 dated January 28, 1976 the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of this Court dated September 25, 1975 is hereby
amended in the sense that the first part of the appealed decision is set aside, except the last portion
"declaring the plaintiffs to be the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub which is
abutting plaintiffs' property," which we affirm, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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The following facts are culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals:
It appears that plaintiff Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot
34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision, situated at Sampaloc, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 34797 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila (Exhibit "A"). The other plaintiffs Florencia and
Amparo del Rosario were daughters of said Rosendo del Rosario. Adjoining said lot is a dried-up
portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied by the defendant since 1945 which is the subject matter of
the present action.
Plaintiffs claim that long before the year 1930, when T.C.T. No. 34797 over Lot No. 34 was issued in the
name of Rosendo del Rosario, the latter had been in possession of said lot including the adjoining
dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub having bought the same from Arsenio Arzaga. Sometime in
1935, said titled lot was occupied by Isabel Roldan with the tolerance and consent of the plaintiff on
condition that the former will make improvements on the adjoining dried-up portion of the Estero
Calubcub. In the early part of 1945 defendant occupied the eastern portion of said titled lot as well as
the dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub which abuts plaintiffs' titled lot. After a relocation survey
of the land in question sometime in 1960, plaintiffs learned that defendant was occupying a portion of
their land and thus demanded defendant to vacate said land when the latter refused to pay the
reasonable rent for its occupancy. However, despite said demand defendant refused to vacate.
Defendant on the other hand claims that sometime before 1945 he was living with his sister who was
then residing or renting plaintiffs' titled lot. In 1945 he built his house on the disputed dried-up portion of
the Estero Calubcub with a small portion thereof on the titled lot of plaintiffs. Later in 1961, said house
was destroyed by a fire which prompted him to rebuild the same. However, this time it was built only on
the called up portion of the old Estero Calubcub without touching any part of plaintiffs titled land. He
further claims that said dried-up portion is a land of public domain.3
Private respondents Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia, all surnamed del Rosario (Del Rosarios), lodged a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila praying, among others, that they be declared the rightful
owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub. Petitioner Mario Ronquillo (Ronquillo) filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case since the dried-up
portion of Estero Calubcub is public land and, thus, subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands. The Del
Rosarios opposed the motion arguing that since they are claiming title to the dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub as riparian owners, the trial court has jurisdiction. The resolution of the motion to dismiss was
deferred until after trial on the merits.
Before trial, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
1. That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797;
2. That said property of the plaintiffs abuts and is adjacent to the dried-up river bed of Estero Calubcub
Sampaloc, Manila;
3. That defendant Mario Ronquillo has no property around the premises in question and is only claiming
the dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub, whereon before October 23, 1961, the larger portion of
his house was constructed;

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4. That before October 23, 1961, a portion of defendant's house stands (sic) on the above-mentioned
lot belonging to the plaintiffs;
5. That the plaintiffs and defendant have both filed with the Bureau of Lands miscellaneous sales
application for the purchase of the abandoned river bed known as Estero Calubcub and their sales
applications, dated August 5, 1958 and October 13, 1959, respectively, are still pending action before
the Bureau of Lands;
6. That the parties hereby reserve their right to prove such facts as are necessary to support their case
but not covered by this stipulation of facts. 4
On December 26, 1962, the trial court rendered judgment the decretal portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiffs the
portion of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of title No. 34797 which is occupied by him and to
pay for the use and occupation of said portion of land at the rate of P 5.00 a month from the date of the
filing of the complaint until such time as he surrenders the same to the plaintiffs and declaring plaintiffs
to be the owners of the dried-up portion of estero Calubcub which is abutting plaintiffs' property.
With costs to the defendant.
SO ORDERED. 5
On appeal, respondent court, in affirming the aforequoted decision of the trial court, declared that since Estero
Calubcub had already dried-up way back in 1930 due to the natural change in the course of the waters, under
Article 370 of the old Civil Code which it considers applicable to the present case, the abandoned river bed
belongs to the Del Rosarios as riparian owners. Consequently, respondent court opines, the dried-up river bed
is private land and does not form part of the land of the public domain. It stated further that "(e)ven assuming
for the sake of argument that said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or disappeared, said
dried-up estero would still belong to the riparian owner," citing its ruling in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama. 6
Upon motion of Ronquillo, respondent court modified its decision by setting aside the first portion of the trial
court's decision ordering Ronquillo to surrender to the Del Rosarios that portion of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34797 occupied by the former, based on the former's representation that he had already
vacated the same prior to the commencement of this case. However, respondent court upheld its declaration
that the Del Rosarios are the rightful owners of the dried-up river bed. Hence, this petition.
On May 17, 1976, this Court issued a resolution 7 requiring the Solicitor General to comment on the petition in
behalf of the Director of Lands as an indispensable party in representation of the Republic of the Philippines,
and who, not having been impleaded, was subsequently considered impleaded as such in our resolution of
September 10, 1976. 8 In his Motion to Admit Comment, 9 the Solicitor General manifested that pursuant to a
request made by this office with the Bureau of Lands to conduct an investigation, the Chief of the Legal
Division of the Bureau sent a communication informing him that the records of his office "do not show that
Mario Ronquillo, Rosendo del Rosario, Amparo del Rosario or Florencia del Rosario has filed any public land
application covering parcels of land situated at Estero Calubcub Manila as verified by our Records Division.
The position taken by the Director of Lands in his Comment 10 filed on September 3, 1978, which was
reiterated in the Reply dated May 4, 1989 and again in the Comment dated August 17, 1989, explicates:

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5. We do not see our way clear to subscribe to the ruling of the Honorable Court of Appeals on this
point for Article 370 of the Old Civil Code, insofar as ownership of abandoned river beds by the owners
of riparian lands are concerned, speaks only of a situation where such river beds were
abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the waters. Conversely, we submit that if the
abandonment was for some cause other than the natural change in the course of the waters, Article
370 is not applicable and the abandoned bed does not lose its character as a property of public
dominion not susceptible to private ownership in accordance with Article 502 (No. 1) of the New Civil
Code. In the present case, the drying up of the bed, as contended by the petitioner, is clearly caused by
human activity and undeniably not because of the natural change of the course of the waters
(Emphasis in the original text).
In his Comment 11 dated August 17, 1989, the Director of Lands further adds:
8. Petitioner herein and the private respondents, the del Rosarios, claim to have pending sales
application(s) over the portion of the dried up Estero Calubcub, as stated in pages 4-5, of the Amended
Petition.
9. However, as stated in the Reply dated May 4, 1989 of the Director of Lands, all sales application(s)
have been rejected by that office because of the objection interposed by the Manila City Engineer's
Office that they need the dried portion of the estero for drainage purposes.
10. Furthermore, petitioner and private respondents, the del Rosarios having filed said sales
application(s) are now estopped from claiming title to the Estero Calubcub (by possession for petitioner
and by accretion for respondents del Rosarios) because for (sic) they have acknowledged that they do
not own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands
(Director of Lands vs. Santiago, 160 SCRA 186, 194).
In a letter dated June 29, 1979 12 Florencia del Rosario manifested to this Court that Rosendo, Amparo and
Casiano del Rosario have all died, and that she is the only one still alive among the private respondents in this
case.
In a resolution dated January 20, 1988, 13 the Court required petitioner Ronquillo to implead one Benjamin Diaz
pursuant to the former's manifestation 14 that the land adjacent to the dried up river bed has already been sold
to the latter, and the Solicitor General was also required to inquire into the status of the investigation being
conducted by the Bureau of Lands. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor General presented a letter from the
Director of Lands to the effect that neither of the parties involved in the present case has filed any public land
application. 15
On April 3, 1989, petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari, 16 this time impleading the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which subsequently bought the property adjacent to the dried-up river bed from
Benjamin Diaz. In its resolution dated January 10, 1990, 17 the Court ordered that DBP be impleaded as a party
respondent.
In a Comment 18 filed on May 9, 1990, DBP averred that "[c]onsidering the fact that the petitioner in this case
claims/asserts no right over the property sold to Diaz/DBP by the del Rosarios; and considering, on the
contrary, that Diaz and DBP claims/asserts (sic) no right (direct or indirect) over the property being claimed by
Ronquillo (the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub), it follows, therefore, that the petitioner Ronquillo has no
cause of action against Diaz or DBP. A fortiori from the viewpoint of the classical definition of a cause of action,

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there is no legal justification to implead DBP as one of the respondents in this petition." DBP thereafter prayed
that it be dropped in the case as party respondent.
On September 13, 1990, respondent DBP filed a Manifestation/Compliance 19 stating that DBP's interest over
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 139215 issued in its name (formerly Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 of
the Del Rosarios and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135170 of Benjamin Diaz) has been transferred to
Spouses Victoriano and Pacita A. Tolentino pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated September 11, 1990.
Petitioner Ronquillo avers that respondent Court of Appeals committed an error of law and gross abuse of
discretion, acted arbitrarily and denied petitioner due process of law (a) when it declared private respondents
Del Rosarios the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub by unduly relying upon decisional
law in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama, ante, which case was decided entirely on a set of facts different from that
obtaining in this case; and (b) when it ignored the undisputed facts in the present case and declared the driedup portion of Estero Calubcub as a private property.
The main issue posed for resolution in this petition is whether the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub being
claimed by herein petitioner was caused by a natural change in the course of the waters; and, corollary thereto,
is the issue of the applicability of Article 370 of the old Civil Code.
Respondent court, in affirming the findings of the trial court that there was a natural change in the course of
Estero Calubcub declared that:
The defendant claims that Article 370 of the old Civil Code is not applicable to the instant case because
said Estero Calubcub did not actually change its course but simply dried up, hence, the land in dispute
is a land of public domain and subject to the disposition of the Director of Land(s). The contention of
defendant is without merit. As mentioned earlier, said estero as shown by the relocation plan (Exhibit
"D") did not disappear but merely changed its course by a more southeasternly (sic) direction. As such,
"the abandoned river bed belongs to the plaintiffs-appellees and said land is private and not public in
nature. Hence, further, it is not subject to a Homestead Application by the appellant." (Fabian vs.
Paculan CA-G.R. Nos. 21062-63-64-R, Jan. 25 1962). Even assuming for the sake of argument that
said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or disappeared, said dried-up estero would
still belong to the riparian owner as held by this Court in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama (CA-G.R. No.
8389, Jan. 8, 1943; 2 O.G. 307). 20
Elementary is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the review of errors of law,
and that said appellate court's finding of fact is conclusive upon this Court. However, there are certain
exceptions, such as (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; and (6) when the Court of Appeals in making its findings went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee. 21
A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in the case at bar will reveal that the change in the
course of Estero Calubcub was caused, not by natural forces, but due to the dumping of garbage therein by
the people of the surrounding neighborhood. Under the circumstances, a review of the findings of fact of
respondent court thus becomes imperative.

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Private respondent Florencia del Rosario, in her testimony, made a categorical statement which in effect
admitted that Estero Calubcub changed its course because of the garbage dumped therein, by the inhabitants
of the locality, thus:
Q When more or less what (sic) the estero fully dried up?
A By 1960 it is (sic) already dried up except for a little rain that accumulates on the lot when it rains.
Q How or why did the Estero Calubcub dried (sic) up?
A It has been the dumping place of the whole neighborhood. There is no street, they dumped all the
garbage there. It is the dumping place of the whole community, sir. 22
In addition, the relocation plan (Exhibit "D") which also formed the basis of respondent court's ruling, merely
reflects the change in the course of Estero Calubcub but it is not clear therefrom as to what actually brought
about such change. There is nothing in the testimony of lone witness Florencia del Rosario nor in said
relocation plan which would indicate that the change in the course of the estero was due to the ebb and flow of
the waters. On the contrary, the aforequoted testimony of the witness belies such fact, while the relocation plan
is absolutely silent on the matter. The inescapable conclusion is that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub
was occasioned, not by a natural change in the course of the waters, but through the active intervention of
man.
The foregoing facts and circumstances remove the instant case from the applicability of Article 370 of the old
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 370. The beds of rivers, which are abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the
waters, belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout the respective length of each. If the
abandoned bed divided tenements belonging to different owners the new dividing line shall be
equidistant from one and the other.
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation.1wphi1 Article 370 applies only if there
is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions23 nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage
systems. 24 Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by
the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del
Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public
domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. That such is the case is made more
evident in the letter, dated April 28, 1989, of the Chief, Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands 25 as reported in
the Reply of respondent Director of Lands stating that "the alleged application filed by Ronquillo no longer
exists in its records as it must have already been disposed of as a rejected application for the reason that other
applications "covering Estero Calubcub Sampaloc, Manila for areas other than that contested in the instant
case, were all rejected by our office because of the objection interposed by the City Engineer's office that they
need the same land for drainage purposes". Consequently, since the land is to be used for drainage purposes
the same cannot be the subject of a miscellaneous sales application.

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Lastly, the fact that petitioner and herein private respondents filed their sales applications with the Bureau of
Lands covering the subject dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub cannot but be deemed as outright admissions
by them that the same is public land. They are now estopped from claiming otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, the remaining effective portion of which declares private
respondents Del Rosarios as riparian owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 95907 April 8, 1992
JOSE REYNANTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch VIII, and the HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS and DOLORES A. CARLOS,
and HEIRS OF GORGONIO CARLOS and CONCEPCION CARLOS, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal of: a) decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated
February 28, 1990 in CA-G.R. No. 1917 entitled "JOSE REYNANTE versus HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, Judge,
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, and HEIRS OF LEONCIO AND DOLORES CARLOS, et al.", affirming the
decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 8, Third Judicial Region which reversed the decision 3 of the Municipal Trial Court
of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch 1, Third Judicial Region in Civil Case No. 1526 entitled "HEIRS OF
LEONCIO CARLOS & DOLORES A. CARLOS and HEIRS OF GORGONIO A. CARLOS & CONCEPCION
CARLOS versus JOSE REYNANTE: and b) the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows:
More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos, owner
and father-in-law of herein private respondents, over a fishpond located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan with an area of 188.711 square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
25618, Land Registry of Bulacan.
During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his family lived and took
care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering an area of 5,096 square meters and
6,011 square meters respectively. These lots are located between the fishpond covered by TCT No. 25618 and
the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Petitioner harvested and sold said nipa palms without interference
and prohibition from anybody. Neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa palms
near the fishpond or to harvest and appropriate them as his own.
After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs (private respondents' predecessors-in-interest) entered into a
written agreement denominated as "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NG PAGSASAULI NG KARAPATAN" dated
November 29, 1984 with petitioner Jose Reynante whereby the latter for and in consideration of the sum of
P200,000.00 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered all
his rights therein as caretaker or "bantay-kasama at tagapamahala" (Rollo, p. 77).
Pursuant to the said written agreement, petitioner surrendered the fishpond and the two huts located therein to
private respondents. Private respondents thereafter leased the said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz.
Petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa
palms he had planted therein.
On February 17, 1988, private respondents formally demanded that the petitioner vacate said portion since
according to them petitioner had already been indemnified for the surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite
receipt thereof, petitioner refused and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2.
Hence, on April 22, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory
injunction against petitioner alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over the physical,

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actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan
River and cutting off and/or disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto.
On January 10, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and finding that petitioner
had been in prior possession of lots 1
and 2.
Private respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court and on August 8, 1989 it rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant and
hereby reverses the decision of the Court a quo. Accordingly, the defendant is ordered to
restore possession of that piece of land particularly described and defined as Lots 1 & 2 of the
land survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan on March 2, 1983, together with
the sasa or nipa palms planted thereon. No pronouncement as to attorney's fees. Each party
shall bear their respective costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 55; Decision, p. 4).
From said decision, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review (Rollo, p. 30; Annex "A"). On
February 28, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo, being consistent with law and jurisprudence, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. The instant petition seeking to issue a restraining order is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30; Decision, p. 3).
On November 5, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner (Rollo, p.
35; Annex "B").
Hence, this petition.
In its resolution dated May 6, 1991, the Second Division of this court gave due course to the petition and
required both parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 93).
The main issues to be resolved in this case are: a) who between the petitioner and private respondents has
prior physical possession of lots 1 and 2; and b) whether or not the disputed lots belong to private respondents
as a result of accretion.
An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title to the property is never determined. A
party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana oraccion reivindicatoria (German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216,
September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495, 498, 499). On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical
possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the
property (Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil. 469 [1942]).
Hence, the Court of Appeals could not legally restore private respondents' possession over lots 1 and 2 simply
because petitioner has clearly proven that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2.
The evidence on record shows that petitioner was in possession of the questioned lots for more than 50 years.
It is undisputed that he was the caretaker of the fishpond owned by the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than
50 years and that he constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and planted nipa palms therein. This fact
is bolstered by the "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY" executed by Epifanio Lucero (Records, p. 66), Apolonio D.
Morte (Records, p. 101) and Carling Dumalay (Records, p. 103), all of whom are disinterested parties with no
motive to falsify that can be attributed to them, except their desire to tell the truth.
Moreover, an ocular inspection was conducted by the trial court dated December 2, 1988 which was attended
by the parties and their respective counsels and the court observed the following:
The Court viewed the location and the distance of the constructed nipa hut and the subject
"sasahan" which appears exists (sic) long ago, planted and stands (sic) adjacent to the fishpond
and the dikes which serves (sic) as passage way of water river of lot 1 and lot 2. During the
course of the hearing, both counsel observed muniment of title embedded on the ground which
is located at the inner side of the "pilapil" separating the fishpond from the subject "sasa" plant
with a height of 20 to 25 feet from water level and during the ocular inspection it was judicially
observed that the controversial premises is beyond the titled property of the plaintiffs but

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situated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River it being a part of the public domain. (Rollo, p. 51;
Decision, p. 12).
On the other hand, private respondents based their claim of possession over lots 1 and 2 simply on the written
agreement signed by petitioner whereby the latter surrendered his rights over the fishpond.
Evidently, the trial court did not err when it ruled that:
An examination of the document signed by the defendant (Exhibit "B"), shows that what was
surrendered to the plaintiffs was the fishpond and not the "sasahan" or the land on which he
constructed his hut where he now lives. That is a completely different agreement in which a
tenant would return a farm or a fishpond to his landlord in return for the amount that the landlord
would pay to him as a disturbance compensation. There is nothing that indicates that the tenant
was giving other matters not mentioned in a document like Exhibit "B". Moreover, when the
plaintiffs leased the fishpond to Mr. Carlos de La Cruz there was no mention that the lease
included the hut constructed by the defendant and the nipa palms planted by him (Exhibit "1"), a
circumstance that gives the impression that the nipa hut and the nipa palms were not included
in the lease to Mr. de la Cruz, which may not belong to the plaintiffs. (Rollo, p. 49; Decision, p.
9).
With regard to the second issue, it must be noted that the disputed lots involved in this case are not included in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25618 as per verification made by the Forest Management Bureau, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources. That tract of land situated at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
containing an area of 1.1107 hectares as described in the plan prepared and surveyed by Geodetic Engineer
Restituto Buan for Jose Reynante falls within Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond development) under
Project No. 15 per B.F.L.C. Map No. 3122 dated May 8, 1987 (Rollo, p. 31; Decision, p. 2).
The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and hence the
property of private respondents pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual
and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (c) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61647,
October 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 514, cited in Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5,
1990, 187 SCRA 218).
Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and while it is true that
accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property
of the owner of the banks, such accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area
by another person through prescription.
This Court ruled in the case of Ignacio Grande, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17652, June
30, 1962, 115 Phil. 521 that:
An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives
such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility
of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration
and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter,
protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have beenprovided.
Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by accretion, still their
failure to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years subjected said accretion to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the subject lots for more than fifty (50) years and
unless private respondents can show a better title over the subject lots, petitioner's possession over the
property must be respected.

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PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated February 28, 1990 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch I,
is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-17652
June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case
No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title
to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an
area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of
Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro
Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title
No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was
surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the
same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the
northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank
thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964
square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against
respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their
complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in
peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land
under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the
land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim
ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of
said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership
of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver
possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in
part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe
that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in
question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as
declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony
portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his
witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933
do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the
incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason
for which, it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax
Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants'
assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2"
says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared

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the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by
mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land
cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion
to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New
Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the
defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of
possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes
manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of
appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the
alluvial formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that
they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on
January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could
not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover,
as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as
registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in
the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore,
unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically
in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457),
which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend
that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this
case. The Courta quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by
accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original
estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496,
which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the
defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for
prescription before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land
as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend
beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of
confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of
their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to
all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned.
What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession:
and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through
prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No.
19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of
time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the
land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under
occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of
taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name

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of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's
testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years
of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins
his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful
possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the
defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less
than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of
the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the
defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact
that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs
did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of
title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation
purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land
surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself
and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title.
This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part
thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1wph1.t
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933 to 1958
is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the
plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have
immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the
fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of
the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was
not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was
legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the
defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in
possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up
to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had
already supervened in favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question
through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners
are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins.
The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which
receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered
land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not
vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be
placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed
sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9,
1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The
increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of
imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.

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The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a
question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession.
The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of
the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the
filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after
an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by
us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil
Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not
in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
[G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997]
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF
SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land Registration case by
oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government lessee, involving as it does ownership of land formed
by alluvium.
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His registered
property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the
Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries
of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land. Applicant's
registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally
accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land?
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision [1] and (2) two subsequent resolutions[2] of the
Intermediate Appellate Court[3] (now the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case No. N-84, [4] the
application over which was filed by private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now
deceased, before the Court of First Instance[5] (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application
was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.

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Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with
the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially,
such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the public
domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1988, gave due course to his application
but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for
fishpond purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application. Aggrieved by the decision of the
Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the grant. The then
Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his
title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of
146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas,
Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay
River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as
the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property
resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto
stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same
being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry,
through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same reason as that advanced by the Director
of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole
oppositor.
On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry.
Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro
thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always
been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a
part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office
of the President; and that he had already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for
ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed
and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The
defendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon: thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of
the premises sought to be registered. This, notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the
parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land registration case and was
jointly tried by the court a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on November 1, 1961 and was
substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.

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Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the herein private respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a
part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No. 2873;
(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the land in question; and
(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2873 and as applicant in Land
Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in both instances."[6]
The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assigned the following errors:
"1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers to the land admittedly owned by applicants-appellants [private respondents].
2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.
3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the and is controversy in favor of applicants-appellants [private
respondents].
4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private respondents] are entitled to eject the
oppositor-appellee [petitioners]."[7]
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the petition for
registration of the subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1;
and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:
"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in their respective briefs is whether or not the
land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was formed by the action of the
two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan
rivers, the subject land is accretion but if formed by the action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.
xxx
It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land immediately adjoining the land sought to
be registered. Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west
by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing
downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the property of
applicants with both rivers acting as the boundary to said land and the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the

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Manila Bay.The subject land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land adding thereto the
land now sought to be registered.
This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject land is immediately attached to
appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land immediately faces the Manila
Bay which is part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion this case might have caused the lower court, faced
as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding whether or not the subject land was formed by the action of the two rivers
or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private
respondents'] land, it would be quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial property of
the State as the lower court did in fact rule x x x .
xxx
It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents'] land lies between these two rivers and it is precisely
appellants' [private respondents'] land which acts as a barricade preventing these two rivers to meet. Thus, since the flow
of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of the deposit thereat for in the natural
course of things, the waves of the sea eat the land on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland. It would not therefore add
anything to the land but instead subtract from it due to the action of the waves and the wind. It is then more logical to
believe that the two rivers flowing towards the bay emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus causing
appellants' [private respondents'] land to accumulate therein.
However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem to accept this theory and stated that the
subject land arose only when x x x Pascual planted 'palapat' and 'bakawan' trees thereat to serve as a boundary or
strainer. But we do not see how this act of planting trees by Pascual would explain how the land mass came into
being. Much less will it prove that the same came from the sea.Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were the
few trees that acted as strainers or blocks, then the land that grew would have stopped at the place where the said trees
were planted. But this is not so because the land mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were planted.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants' [private respondents'] clearly show that the land that accumulated
beyond the so-called boundary, as well as the entire area being applied for is dry land, above sea level, and bearing
innumerable trees x x x. The existence of vegetation on the land could only confirm that the soil thereat came from inland
rather than from the sea, for what could the sea bring to the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the
other hand, the two rivers would be bringing soil on their downward flow which they brought along from the eroded
mountains, the lands along their path, and dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private respondents']
land.
In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding. While it is true that the subject land is found
at the shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants' [private respondents'] land, said land is not foreshore but an accretion
from the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly what the Bureau of Lands found out, as shown in
the following report of the Acting Provincial Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:
'Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made on June 11, 1960, it was found out that the said land
is x x x sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers x x x These two rivers bring down considerable amount of soil and sediments
during floods every year thus raising the soil of the land adjoining the private property of the applicant [private
respondents]. About four-fifth [sic] of the area applied for is now dry land whereon are planted palapat trees thickly
growing thereon. It is the natural action of these two rivers that has caused the formation of said land x x x subject of this

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registration case.It has been formed, therefore, by accretion. And having been formed by accretion, the said land may be
considered the private property of the riparian owner who is the applicant herein [private respondents'] x x x .
In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government should be withdrawn, except for the portion
recommended by the land investigator in his report dated May 2, 1960, to be excluded and considered foreshore. x x x'
Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the Bureau of Lands withdrew his opposition dated
March 25, 1960, and limited 'the same to the northern portion of the land applied for, compromising a strip 50 meters wide
along the Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as part of the foreshore' x x x. [8]
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the issuance of the corresponding
decree of registration in the name of private respondents and the reversion to private respondents of the
possession of the portion of the subject property included in Navarro's fishpond permit.
On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision. The
Director of Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same decision. Both motions were opposed by
private respondents on January 27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its decision, to read, viz:
"(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion included in their fishpond permit
covered by Plan Psu-175181 and hand over possession of said portion to applicants-appellants, if the said portion is not
within the strip of land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on the northern portion of the land subject of the
registration proceedings and which area is more particularly referred to as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner
1; and fifty (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181. x x x [9]
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the Director of Forestry, an
extension of time within which to file in this court, a petition for review of the decision dated November 29, 1978
of the respondent appellate court and of the aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition for review entitled,
"The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals." [10] We, however, denied the same in a minute resolution
dated July 20, 1981, such petition having been prematurely filed at a time when the Court of Appeals was yet
to resolve petitioners' pending motion to set aside the resolution dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
decision dated November 29, 1978.
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating that the decision
dated November 29, 1978 had become final and executory as against herein petitioners as oppositors in
L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of
Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978 was
filed by petitioners' new counsel.

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On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners' request for leave
to file a second motion for reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court which provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen (15) days
from the notice of the final order or judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably erred in appreciating
the facts of the case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and case law relating to accretion, specifically,
Article 457 of the Civil Code.
We find merit in the petition.
The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the
accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought soil and sand
sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in
1948.
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, private respondents vigorously argue
that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers
which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of private respondents' own tract
of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
bank of the river.[11] Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited
on the estate fronting the river bank; [12] the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners
are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the
sea or lake or other tidal waters.[13] The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically
owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen [14] but is not automatically
registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.[15]
Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is
misplaced.
First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila
Bay. Private respondents' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two
rivers whose torrential action, private respondents insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In fact,
one of the private respondents, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the waves of Manila Bay used to
hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted palapat and bakawan trees
thereon in 1948, the land began to rise.[16]
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) private respondents' own tract
of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Private respondents' own land lies
between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land
where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both

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of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern
and western boundaries of private respondents' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is
adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is
deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that private respondents' own tract of land adjoins the Manila
Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water
the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held that:
"Appellant next contends that x x x Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is
part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:
'Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of
the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake.' 7 C.J. 1013-1014." [17]
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private respindents' own tract of land on the northern side. As such,
the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the facts of the case. As
the trial court correctly observed:
"A perusal of the survey plan x x x of the land subject matter of these cases shows that on the eastern side, the property is
bounded by Talisay River, on the western side by Bulacan River, on the southern side by Lot 1436 and on the northern
side by Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers meet a certain portion because the two
rivers both flow towards Manila Bay. The Talisay River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit meandering and
there is no portion where the two rivers meet before they end up at Manila Bay. The land which is adjacent to the property
belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers].
Applicant Pascual x x x has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land he has applied for registration is the
result of the settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered as an
accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no applicability where the accretion must have been
caused by action of the bay."[18]
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the foregoing observation is that the disputed land
is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public domain.The respondent appellate court,
however, perceived the fact that petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, to be basis
to conclude that the disputed land must be an accretion formed by the action of the two rivers because private
respondents' own land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to meet and that the current of the two
rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay which accumulated somehow to a 14hectare land. These conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in the light of the one undisputed critical
fact: the accretion was deposited, not on either the eastern or western portion of private respondents' land
where a river each runs, but on the northern portion of petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse,
such conclusions are further eroded of their practical logic and consonance with natural experience in the light
of Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat and bakawan trees on the northern boundary of
their own land. In amplification of this, plainly more reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's
observations in his dissenting opinion when he stated that:

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"As appellants' (titled) land x x x acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers to meet, and considering the wide
expanse of the boundary between said land and the Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters x x x it is believed rather
farfetched for the land in question to have been formed through 'sediments of sand and salt [sic] . . . deposited at their
[rivers'] mouths.' Moreover, if 'since the flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and
silt are deposited at their mouths,' why then would the alleged cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the northern
portion of appellants' titled land facing Manila Bay instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these two rivers? That
being the case, the accretion formed at said portion of appellants' titled [land] was not caused by the current of the two
rivers but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.
The conclusion x x x is not supported by any reference to the evidence which, on the contrary, shows that the disputed
land was formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs of the original applicant,
testified on cross-examination that the land in dispute was part of the shore and it was only in 1948 that he noticed that the
land was beginning to get higher after he had planted trees thereon in 1948. x x x
x x x it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high tide could reach as far as the dike of
appellants' fishpond within their titled property, which dike now separates this titled property from the land in
question. Even in 1948 when appellants had already planted palapat and bakawan trees in the land involved, inasmuch as
these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could still reach the dike. This must be so because in x x x the survey plan
of the titled property approved in 1918, said titled land was bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So Manila Bay was
adjacent to it on the north. It was only after the planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in question began to
rise or to get higher in elevation.
The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water and at the same time a kind of block to
the strained sediments from being carried back to the sea by the very waves that brought them to the former shore at the
end of the dike, which must have caused the shoreline to recede and dry up eventually raising the former shore leading to
the formation of the land in question."[19]
In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan trees, the
withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its former foreshore, and the
regular torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the northern
boundary of private respondents' own tract of land.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed
property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain.
At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.
While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano[20] that Manila Bay is considered a
sea for purposes of determining which law on accretion is to be applied in multifarious situations, we have
ruled differently insofar as accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.
In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose,[21] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[22] Republic
v. Alagad[23], and Meneses v. Court of Appeals,[24] we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the
accretion on which, by the mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner
of the land contiguous thereto.

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The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all
legal purposes, considered a sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public
domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or
for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land
in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of
Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long
as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent
authority."[25]Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make
the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility
or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services. [26] Petitioners utterly fail to
show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified,
under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of private respondents as owners of
the estates adjacent thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.
The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in CA G.R. No. 59044-R dated
November 29, 1978 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution dated November 21, 1980 and
March 28, 1982, respectively, promulgated by the Intermediate Appellate Court are likewise REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, is
hereby ORDERED REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., concurs; The amendatory provisions of the Water Code (P.D. 1067) did not affect Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

G.R. No. L-43105 August 31, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of Lands), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) AND SANTOS DEL RIO, respondents.

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G.R. No. L-43190 August 31, 1984

AURORA BAUTISTA, OLIMPIO LARIOS, FELICIDAD DE LA CRUZ, ELPIDIO LARIOS, LUCITA BANDA,
BENITO SANTAYANA, FRUCTUOSA BANHAO LUCIO VELASCO, GREGORIO DATOY, FELIMON
GUTIERREZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SANTOS DEL RIO, respondents.
Bonifacio, Perez & Concepcion for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.
Eduardo Cagandahan for respondent Santos del Rio.
CUEVAS, J.:
These two 1 Petitions for Review of the same decision of the defunct Court of Appeals 2 have been
consolidated in this single decision, having arisen from one and the same Land Registration Cage (LRC Case
No. N-283, Laguna), and presenting as they do issues which may be resolved jointly by this Court.
The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the land in favor of applicant, now private respondent, Santos del Rio. Petitioner Director of
Lands in G.R. No. L-43105 claims that the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain and
therefore not registerable. Petitioners private oppositors in G.R. No. L-43190, on the other hand, allege that
they reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells thereon, and that they have been in possession of the
same for more than twenty (20) years.
The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with an area of 17,311 square meters, is situated near the
shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20) meters therefrom (Exh. D), 3 in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna.
It was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. The Deed of Sale evidencing said
purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The land was declared for tax
purposes beginning the year 1918, and the realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. When Benedicto
del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his son,
Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance.
Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application for registration of said parcel on May
9, 1966. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners in G.R.
No. L-43190.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses
on the land in question. Although there was no definite commitment as to rentals, some of them had made
voluntary payments to private respondent. In violation of the original agreement, private oppositors constructed
residential houses on the land which prompted private respondent to file an ejectment suit against the former in
1966. 4Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had simultaneously filed their
respective sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios application
for registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant
appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private
oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said decision.
The two consolidated petitions raise substantially the same issues, to wit :
1) whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and
2) whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of public dominion or of private
ownership. 5 Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as those which, under existing
legislation are not the subject of private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. 6 The New Civil Code
enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof. Article 420 provides:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Article 502 adds to the above enumeration, the following:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;

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(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the
beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since a portion of the land sought to be registered is
covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least,
a foreshoreland, which brings it within the enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code quoted above and
therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as follows:
The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when
at their highest ordinary depth. (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been interpreted in the case of Government
of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose 7 to be the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season,
such depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year." The
foregoing interpretation was the focal point in the Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed. We see no
reason to disturb the same.
Laguna de Bay is a lake. 8 While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational forces that
cause the formation of tides 9 in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the
case of lakes. 10 Thus, the alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could
hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five months a year
during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in
question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter
period (four to five months a year) than the level of the water at which the is completely dry, the latter should be
considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not
part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land. The Brief for the
Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore land, to wit:
... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux
of the tides... 11
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water mark and that is alternately wet and
dry according to the flow of the tide. 12
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the
rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources. 13 Since the inundation of a
portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the
meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part
of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a
public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he
has a registerable title. This brings us to the second issue, which is whether or not applicant private respondent
has registerable title to the land.
(a) ...
(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under bona fide c of ownership, for at least tirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title ...
The claim of private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L43190, that they have reclaimed the land from the
waters of Laguna de Bay and that they have possessed the same for more than twenty (20) years does not
improve their position. In the first place, private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies
belonging to the public domain without proper permission from government authorities. 19 And even if such
reclamation had been authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the
same as they may still be subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. 20 Private oppositors-petitioners
failed to show proper authority for the alleged reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel
must fall. In the second place, their alleged possession can never ripen into ownership. Only possession
acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription. 21As

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correctly found by the appellate court, the private oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land
with the permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio. The fact that some of them at one time or
another did not pay rent cannot be considered in their favor. Their use of the land and their non-payment of
rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and these could not have affected the character of the latter's
possession 22 which has already ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this application for
registration.
The applicant private-respondent having satisfactorily established his registerable title over the parcel of land
described in his application, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the registration in
favor of applicant private-respondent of the land described in his application is hereby ordered.
Costs against private petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Makasiar, J., (Chairman), is on leave.
G.R. No. 92161

March 18, 1991

SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES, GREGORIO

ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO
MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.
FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area
of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation
lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road. Through the years, the western
portion would periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming
of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-appear during the dry season from January to August.
It would remain under water for the rest of the year, that is, from September to December during the rainy
season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May 1959, respondent
Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The
land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale 1 as follows:
. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500 hectares,
more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the East by National Road; on South by
Julian Tumolva and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No.
12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P 750.00. . . .
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier
acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total acquisition of respondent
Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property was more particularly described as follows:

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. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000 square
meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by Faustina Taccad (now
Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River assessed
at P 440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. . . . 2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2) parcels of
land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307,
Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from
Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the
survey was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water
was left unsurveyed and was not included in Lot 307.
The Sketch Plan 3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent Manalo shows
that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two (2) branchesthe
western and the eastern branchesand then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of
land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water
only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the
land belonging to respondent Manalo. For about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the
point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into the eastern branch.
While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River
looked very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December 1969. 4
It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822. The area of
Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly opposite
Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy
season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from
Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the
submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821. They occupy
the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other
agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion during summer. 5 This
situation compelled respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The
case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15
December 1972, respondent Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case
was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints 6 before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela,
Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2)
parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed
that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion.
Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he
had laid his claim during the survey.

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Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was then set for trial
for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of facts. 7 On 10
November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the
defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:
1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question, Lot No. 821,
Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the
Complaint;
2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821,
Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the
Complaint;
3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in question, Lot No.
821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the
Complaint; and
4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court. They filed
a motion for reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of the Cagayan
River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with the finding of the trial court
that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan
River substantially dries up for the most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes
physically (i.e., by land) connected with the dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in
effect rejected the assertion of petitioners that the depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307
and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that they carry
even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 9 This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on
the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying.
Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. 10 But whether
a conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court. 11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their findings that
periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the eastern bed of the
Cagayan River. The trial court held:
The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion (Accretion), for
it appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same land in controversy (Lot
No. 821, Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio Taguba
and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12)

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meters in width at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been
held by our Supreme Court that "the owner of the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of
alluvion, does not have to make an express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the
deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408). 12
The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus:
As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the word since the
eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the Cagayan River dries up
during summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes during rainy season
especially from September to November which increases the water level of the Cagayan river. As the
river becomes swollen due to heavy rains, the lower portion of the said strip of land located at its
southernmost point would be inundated with water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river gains
its entry. Consequently, if the water level is high the whole strip of land would be under water.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that
According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the highest depth of
the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they
attain during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular, common,
natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year, while the latter is uncommon,
transcends the general rule, order and measure, and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If
according to the definition given by Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed or
basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the
natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth
during the dry season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question.
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of the waters of the
Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only on the west side of Lot [821] and
Lot [822]. This is the natural Cagayan river itself. The small residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part
of the small stream already in existence when the whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was still
susceptible to cultivation and uneroded. 13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio
de San Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a
lake, the Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and
shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court
applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August
1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the case
at bar:
Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the
highest floods. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its
waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the

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annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion.
Though the eastern bed substantially dries up for the most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we
cannot ignore the periodical swelling of the waters ( i.e., from September to December) causing the eastern
bed to be covered with flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of
record.1wphi1 Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from Gregorio
Taguba was included in Lot 307. 15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot
307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from
Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to
the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the
Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from the western branch of the Cagayan
River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but also what this Court characterizes as the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed
portion as a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July 1973 or at a time
when the eastern bed becomes visible. 16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to respondent Manalo was
taken facing the east and Exhibit "W-3" which was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up
portion has a markedly lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides
connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward and very prominent. This topographic feature is
compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy
season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to go down what he called a "cliff"
from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo to the depressed portion. The cliff, as related by
petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight (8) meters. 17
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surface of the
earth. However, Exhibit "E" 18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property standing in the
name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before the sale to respondent
Manalo. The words "old bed" enclosed in parenthesesperhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private
ownership over the submerged portionis an implied admission of the existence of the river bed. In the
Declaration of Real Property made by respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio
Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on either side of the eastern bed could have been
formed only after a prolonged period of time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of
the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by
Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have validly sold land that
constituted property of public dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code states:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)

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Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1) the
running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks. 19 Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of
river beds:
La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario considerar
en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto en todo rio es preciso
distinguir 1. esta agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos ultimas
cosas siempre de dominio publico, como las aguas?
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo civil que
los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de aquellos tres
elementos que integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion
del art. 407, num 1, donde dice: son de dominion publico . . . los rios y sus cauces naturales;
declaracion que concuerda con lo que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de
dominion publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de los arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y
2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los riosen la extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores
crecidas ordinarias. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis even if it were
alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the purchase from
Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of
law, respondent Manalo of private ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River into his landholding obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence
since estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the
waters. That loss is compensated by, inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil
Code. 21 It so happened that instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River
had carved a channel on it.
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considers that there
was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the
river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of
three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the
result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). 22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by
respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern
branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed
accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the
river.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of
the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court
are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from
the action of the aver in a slow and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made
mention of several floods that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and
forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil
Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian
owner.

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Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of
the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as
Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by
respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio
Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion.
The cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If
respondent Manalo's contention were accepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had
more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As
already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot
821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot
821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the waters of either
the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821 rests on
accretion coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought separately from
Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession
thereof through his (Judge Taccad's) tenants. When ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo
took over the cultivation of the property and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners
forcibly entered into his property, he twice instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of
Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo's allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax
declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot
821 since 1955.
If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the depressed
portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did
not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for forcible entry lodged before the
Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and
not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of
respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at
least have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. The
evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain from
determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as
owner(s) thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 are hereby SET
ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly submerged portion or the
eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of public dominion. The ownership of
Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 77294 December 12, 1988
ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.

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COURT OF APPEALS, LEONOR P. LADRIDO, LOURDES LADRIDO IGNACIO, EUGENIO P. LADRIDO and
L P. LADRIDO, defendants-appellees.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
Miraflores Law Offices for respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1986, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 69942 entitled, "ANGELICA VIAJAR, et. al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus LEONOR LADRIDO,
et. al., Defendants-Appellees," affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Iloilo dated December 10, 1981.
The antecedent facts in the instant case are as follows: The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and Leonor P. Ladrido
were the owners of Lot No. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in barangay Cawayan, Pototan,
Iloilo. This lot contained an area of 154,267 square meters and was registered in the names of the spouses
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21940 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo.
Spouses Rosendo H. Te and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described in their title
as Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan.
On September 6, 1973, Rosendo H. Te, with the conformity of Ana Te, sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and
Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in the names of Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F.
Viajar.
Later, Angelica F. Viajar had Lot No. 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of
Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused.
On February 15, 1974, Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of possession
and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9660 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo. Summoned to plead, defendant Ladrido filed his answer with a counterclaim. Plaintiffs filed
their reply to the answer.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo H. Te as another defendant. Plaintiffs sought
the annulment of the deed of sale and the restitution of the purchase price with interest in the event the
possession of defendant Ladrido is sustained. Defendant Te filed his answer to the amended complaint and he
counter claimed for damages. Plaintiffs answered the counterclaim.
During the pendency of the case, plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No. 7340 to his mother and
co-plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. For this reason, plaintiff Angelica F. Viajar now appears to be the sole registered
owner of this lot.
On May 25, 1978, defendant Ladrido died. He was substituted in the civil action by his wife, Leonor P. Ladrido,
and children, namely: Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido, as parties
defendants.
The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of real property which used to be Lot
No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan Pototan, Iloilo; that it
consisted of 20,089 square meters; that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No.
7340 were separated by the Suague River; that the area of 11,819 square meters of what was Lot No. 7340
has been in the possession of the defendants; that the area of 14,036 square meters, which was formerly the
river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of the defendants;
and that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.
After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which included damages was admitted.
The plaintiffs raised the following issues to be resolved:
1. Whether the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden as claimed
by the plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the defendants;
2. Assuming arguendo it was gradual, whether or not the plaintiffs are still entitled
to Lot "B' appearing in Exhibit "4" and to one-half () of Lot "A," also indicated in
Exhibit "4;" and
3. Damages (pp. 12-13, Rollo).
On December 10, 1981, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs:
1. Dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar with
costs against them;

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2. Declaring defendants Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P.

Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido as owner of the parcel of land indicated as Lots A
and B in the sketch plan (Exhs. 'C' as well as '4,' '4-B' and '4-C') situated in
barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan Pototan, Iloilo, and containing an area of
25,855 square meters, more or less; and
3. Pronouncing that as owners of the land described in the preceding paragraph,
the defendants are entitled to the possession thereof.
Defendants' claim for moral damages and attorney's fees are dismissed.
SO ORDERED (p. 36, Rollo).
Not satisfied with the decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned the following
errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO LOT
B APPEARING IN EXHIBIT "4" AND TO ONE-HALF () OF LOT A IN THE SAID EXHIBIT "4."
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS (p. 42, Rollo).
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo. Plaintiffs (the petitioners herein)
now come to Us claiming that the Court of Appeals palpably erred in affirming the decision of the trial court on
the ground that the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual and not sudden.
In the decision appealed from, the Court of Appeals held:
This appeal is not impressed with merit.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by
accretion and erosion (Martinez Canas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; Payatas Estate Improvement
Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133). In the case at bar, the
lower court correctly found that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff to show that the change
in the course of the Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear
and convincing.
Contrariwise, the lower court found that:
... the defendants have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 a gradual
accretion on the eastern side of Lot No. 7511 took place by action of the current of the Suague
River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912 square meters (2.9912 hectares), more or
less, had been added to Lot No. 7511. (Exhs. '1' as well as Exhs. 'C' and '4'). Apropos it should
be observed that the accretion consisted of Lot A with an area of 14,036 square meters; Lot B,
11,819 square meters; and Lot C, 4,057 square meters. (Exhs. '4-B,' '4-C' and '4-D'). Only Lot C
is not involved in this litigation. (See Pre-trial Order, supra)
The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot No. 7511 was the Suague River
based on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the
Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received
deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The consequent increase in the area
of Lot No. 7511 due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants
plowed and planted the same with coin and tobacco.
The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years. The land is already plain
and there is no indication on the ground of any abandoned river bed. The river bed is definitely
no longer discernible now.
What used to be the old river bed (Lot A) is in level with Lot No. 7511. So are the two other
areas to the East. (Lots B and C) Lots A, B and C are still being cultivated.
Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. (Art.
366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950 [Lara v. Del

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Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion to Lot No. 7511 which consists of Lots A and B
(see Exhs. 'C' and '4') belongs to the defendants (pp. 34-35, Record on Appeal).
We find no cogent reason to disturb the foregoing finding and conclusion of the lower court.
The second assignment of error is a mere offshoot of the first assignment of error and does not
warrant further discussion (pp. 4244, Rollo).
The petition is without merit.
The petitioners contend that the first issue raised during the trial of the case on the merits in the Court of First
Instance, that is, "whether the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden as claimed by the
plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the defendants," was abandoned and never raised by them in their appeal
to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals, in holding that the appeal is without merit, because of the
change of the Suague River was gradual and not sudden, disposed of the appeal on an issue that was never
raised and, accordingly, its decision is void. In support of its contention, petitioners cite the following
authorities:
It is a well-known principle in procedure that courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to
decide a question not in issue (Lim Toco vs. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166).
A judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the
parties were not heard, is not merely irregular, but extra-judicial and invalid ( Salvante vs. Cruz,
88 Phil. 236-244; Lazo vs. Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., 31 SCRA 329, 334).
The pivotal issue in the petitioners' appeal was whether the change in the course of the Suague River was
gradual or sudden because the trial court below resolved the same in its decision thus subjecting the same to
review by respondent appellate court. By simply abandoning this issue, the petitioners cannot hope that the
affirmance of the decision wherein this issue was resolved makes the decision of the Court of Appeals void. In
effect, the petitioners are expounding a new procedural theory that to render a questioned decision void, all
that has to be done is to simply abandon on appeal the pivotal issue as resolved by the lower court and when
its decision is affirmed on appeal, attack the decision of the appellate court as void on the principle that a court
of justice has no jurisdiction or power to decide the question not in issue. This is not correct. Even the
authorities cited by the petitioners, more specifically the Salvante and Lazo cases, supra, do not support their
contention. They were heard in the trial court and they cannot complain that the proceeding below was
irregular and hence, invalid.
The trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual and this finding was
affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. We do not find any valid reason to disturb this finding of fact.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code (reproduced from Article 366 of the Old), the law applied by the courts a
quoprovides:
Art. 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Petitioners contend that this article must be read together with Sections 45 an 46 of Act No. 496 which
provides:
SEC. 45. 1 The obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a certificate of title shall be
regarded as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all
successors in title that the land shall be and always remain registered land, and subject to the
provisions of this Act and all Acts amendatory thereof.
SEC. 46. 2 No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
As a result, petitioners contend, Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the accretion
mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to the riparian owner, and should not extend to registered
land. Thus, the lot in question having remained the registered land of the petitioners, then the private
respondents cannot acquire title there in derogation to that of the petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat
the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution
of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled.
InPayatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55, We ruled:
The controversy in the present cases seems to be due to the erroneous conception that Art. 366
of the Civil Code does not apply to Torrens registered land. That article provides that "any
accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current belong

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to the owners of the estates bordering thereon." Accretions of that character are natural
incidents to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It
follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his
land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.
In C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, We also ruled:
It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estate as a result
of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to his land
used to pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, cannot
preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the
riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from
the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old
Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on
running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the
Registration Act.
We find no valid reason to review and abandon the aforecited rulings.
As the private respondents are the owners of the premises in question, no damages are recoverable from
them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., is on leave.

[G.R. No. 125683. March 2, 1999]

EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY LING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, GONZALO GO, WINSTON GO, LI CHING YAO, ARANETA INSTITUTE OF
AGRICULTURE and JOSE N. QUEDDING, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of the thirdparty complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA) but reinstated the complaint against respondents Li Ching
Yao and Jose N. Quedding. The appellate court found that it was the erroneous survey by respondent. Quedding that
triggered the discrepancies in the lot areas and it was this survey that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing
his house on his fathers land. Thus, instead of ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the subject
land, the appellate court ordered them to pay petitioner Efren Bahlatan, and respondent Yao to pay respondents Go, a
reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which they encroached, the value to be fixed at the time of taking. It also
ordered respondent Quedding to pay respondents Go attorneys fees for his erroneous survey.

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The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA. The
claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIAs fault was not proved. The Court likewise ruled that all the
parties herein are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their rights must therefore be determined in accordance with
Article 448 of the Civil Code. Article 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of improvements built by
mistaken belief on land belonging to the adjoining owner. Thus, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to
purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying
the improvement is impractical as it may render the Gos house useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents Go that
portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands. If the Gos are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they
must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot compel
respondents Go to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the
value of the land is much more than the Gos improvement, then respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not
agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to Court to fix the same. In the event that petitioners elect to sell to
respondents Go the subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of
payment. The Court likewise held that Article 448 of the Civil Code applies to respondents Go as owners and possessors
of their land and respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty-seven (37) square
meters of respondents Gos land.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; REAL ACTIONS; DOCKET AND FILING FEES;
PAYMENT THEREOF, A REQUISITE BEFORE THE COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE
ACTION AND CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint
of petitioners against respondents Go. The complaint filed was for accion publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession
of real property which is a real action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the
complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. In real actions, the docket and
filing fees are based on the value of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any. If the complaint is filed
but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a
reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been
paid but the fees of certain related damages are not, the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action, may
not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages. Accordingly, the court may expunge those
claims for damages, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege the
precise amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal fees. If there are unspecified claims, the
determination of which may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading, the additional filing fee
thereon shall constitute a lien on the judgment award. The same rule also applies to third-party claims and other
similar pleadings.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT; THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT; DISMISSAL THEREOF, PROPER IN CASE AT
BAR. We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA. The claim that
the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA's fault was not proved. The appellate court, however, found that it
was the erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this survey that
respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father's land. He built his house in the belief that
it was entirely within the parameters of his father's land. In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they
encroached on petitioners lot. They are deemed builders in good faith until the time petitioner Ballatan informed
them of their encroachment on her property.
3. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ATTORNEYS FEES; ADDITIONAL FILING FEE ON CLAIM THEREOF
DEEMED TO CONSTITUTE A LIEN ON THE JUDGMENT AWARD. Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court
of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite the Go's failure to specify the amount prayed for and pay the

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corresponding additional filing fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees refers to damages arising after the filing of
the complaint against the Go's. The additional filing fee on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment
award.
4. ID.; PROPERTY; OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF ACCESSION; GOOD FAITH IS ALWAYS PRESUMED;
BURDEN OF PROOF LIES UPON HIM WHO ALLEGES BAD FAITH. Respondent Li Ching Yao built his
house on his lot before any of the other parties did. He constructed his house in 1982, respondents Go in 1983, and
petitioners in 1985. There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that respondent Li Ching Yao was aware that
when he built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on respondents Go's adjoining land. Good faith is
always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. All the
parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their right must, therefore be determined in accordance with the
appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF THE OWNER OF THE LAND WHEN IMPROVEMENT WAS BUILT BY A
MISTAKEN BELIEF ON HIS LAND. Article 448 of the Civil Code has been applied to improvements or portions
of improvements built by mistaken belief on land belonging to the adjoining owner. petitioners, as owners of Lot No.
24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the
subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's house useless, then petitioners
may sell to respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands. If the Go's are unwilling
or unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners.
Petitioners, however, cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the portion
of their house constructed thereon. If the value of the land is much more than the Go's improvement, then
respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to court to
fix the same.
6. ID.; ID.; ID,; ID.; WHEN THE OWNER OF THE LAND ELECTS TO SELL THE LAND OR BUY THE
IMPROVEMENT, THE PURCHASE PRICE MUST BE FIXED AT PREVAILING MARKET VALUE AT
THE TIME OF PAYMENT. In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the subject portion of their
lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment. The Court of Appeals erred in
fixing the price at the time of taking, which is the time the improvements were built on the land. The time of taking
is determinative of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. The instant case is not for expropriation. It is
not a taking by the state of private property for a public purpose upon payment of just compensation. This is a case
of an owner who has been paying real estate taxes on his land but has been deprived of the use of a portion of this
land for years. It is but fair and just to fix compensation at the time of payment. .Article 448 and the same conditions
above-stated also apply to respondents Go as owners and possessors of their land and respondent Li Ching Yao as
builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty-seven (37) square meters of respondents Go's land.

DECISION
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1996 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 32472 entitled "Eden Ballatan, et. al., plaintiffs-appellees v. Gonzalo Go and Winston Go, appellants and thirdparty plaintiffs-appellants v. Li Ching Yao, et.al., third-party defendants."[1]
The instant case arose from a dispute over forty-two (42) square meters of residential land belonging to
petitioners. The parties herein are owners of adjacent lots located at Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street, Araneta University
Village, Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot No. 24, 414 square meters in area, is registered in the name of petitioners Eden

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Ballatan and spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. [2] Lots Nos. 25 and 26, with an area of 415 and 313 square
meters respectively, are registered in the name of respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr. [3] On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go,
son of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27, 417 square meters in area, and is
registered in the name of respondent Li Ching Yao.[4]
In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24. During the construction, she noticed that the
concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the
eastern side of her property.[5] Her building contractor informed her that the area of her lot was actually less than that
described in the title. Forthwith, Ballatan informed respondent Go of this discrepancy and his encroachment on her
property. Respondent Go, however, claimed that his house, including its fence and pathway, were built within the
parameters of his father's lot; and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the
Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA), the owner-developer of the subdivision project.
Petitioner Ballatan called the attention of the AIA to the discrepancy of the land area in her title and the actual land
area received from them. The AIA authorized another survey of the land by Engineer Jose N. Quedding.
In a report dated February 28, 1985, Engineer Quedding found that the lot area of petitioner Ballatan was less by a
few meters and that of respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away, increased by two (2) meters. Engineer
Quedding declared that he made a verification survey of Lots Nos. 25 and 26 of respondents Go in 1983 and allegedly
found the boundaries to have been in their proper position.He, however, could not explain the reduction in Ballatan's area
since he was not present at the time respondents Go constructed their boundary walls. [6]
On June 2, 1985, Engineer Quedding made a third relocation survey upon request of the parties. He found that Lot
No. 24 lost approximately 25 square meters on its eastern boundary, that Lot No. 25, although found to have encroached
on Lot No. 24, did not lose nor gain any area; that Lot No. 26 lost some three (3) square meters which, however, were
gained by Lot No. 27 on its western boundary. [7] In short, Lots Nos. 25, 26 and 27 moved westward to the eastern
boundary of Lot No. 24.
On the basis of this survey, on June 10, 1985, petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondents Go to
remove and dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24. Respondents Go refused. The parties, including Li Ching Yao,
however, met several times to reach an agreement on the matter.
Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan brought the issue before the barangay. Respondents Go did not appear.
Thus, on April 1, 1986, petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents Go Civil Case No. 772-MN for recovery of
possession before the Regional Trial Court, Malabon, Branch 169. The Go's filed their "Answer with Third-Party
Complaint" impleading as third-party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding.
On August 23, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of petitioners. It ordered the Go's to vacate the subject portion of
Lot No. 24, demolish their improvements and pay petitioner Ballatan actual damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the
suit. It dismissed the third-party complaint against: (1) AIA after finding that the lots sold to the parties were in
accordance with the technical description and verification plan covered by their respective titles; (2) Jose N. Quedding,
there being no privity of relation between him and respondents Go and his erroneous survey having been made at the
instance of AIA, not the parties; and (3) Li Ching Yao for failure to prove that he committed any wrong in the subject
encroachment.[8] The court made the following disposition:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter:
1. To demolish and remove all improvements existing and encroaching on plaintiff's lot;

3. To pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the following:

a) P7,800.00 for the expenses paid to the surveyors;

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2. To clear, vacate and deliver possession of the encroached area to the plaintiffs;

b) P5,000.00 for plaintiffs' transportation;

4. To pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the current market value of the subject
matter in litigation at the time of execution; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
The third-party complaint filed by third-party plaintiff Gonzalo Go and Winston Go against third-party defendants Araneta
Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching Yao is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
Respondents Go appealed. On March 25, 1996, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It
affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint against the AIA but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and
Jose Quedding. Instead of ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the subject land, the appellate
court ordered them to pay petitioner Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching Yao to pay respondents Go, a reasonable amount
for that portion of the lot which they encroached, the value to be fixed at the time of taking. It also ordered Jose Quedding
to pay respondents Go attorney's fees of P5,000.00 for his erroneous survey. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the dismissal of the
third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture is concerned but modified in all other aspects as follows:
1) Defendants-appellants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellees the reasonable value of the forty-two (42) square
meters of their lot at the time of its taking;
2) Third-party defendant Li Ching Yao is hereby ordered to pay defendants-appellants the reasonable value of the thirtyseven (37) square meters of the latter's lot at the time of its taking; and
3) Third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding is hereby ordered to pay to defendants-appellants the amount of P5,000.00. as
attorney's fees.
LET THE RECORD of the case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for further proceedings and
reception of evidence for the determination of the reasonable value of Lots Nos. 24 and 26.
SO ORDERED."[9]
Hence, this petition. Petitioners allege that:
"RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN:

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1. IT APPLIED EQUITY OR EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE INSTANT CASE IN UTTER DISREGARD AND IN
VIOLATION OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE VESTING BASIC
PROPERTY RIGHTS TO HEREIN PETITIONERS. RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER TO APPLY/USE
EQUITY IN THE PRESENCE OF EXISTING LAWS TO THE CONTRARY.
2. UNDER THE GUISE OF APPLYING EQUITY BUT IN EFFECT A VERY APPARENT PARTIALITY AND FAVOR
TO RESPONDENTS GO, IT ORDERED PAYMENT OF THE ENCROACHED AREA AT THE VALUE AT THE TIME
OF ITS TAKING AND NOT THE VALUE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT, THEREBY ENRICHING THE GO'S BUT
DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THE FRUITS OR INCREASE IN VALUE OF THEIR PROPERTY TO WHICH THEY
ARE ENTITLED UNDER THE LAW AS THE REGISTERED OWNERS WITH TORRENS TITLE IN THEIR NAMES.
3. WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ANY FILING OR
DOCKET FEE.
4. WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS THE RECOVERY OF THE NECESSARY EXPENSES IN PROTECTING
THEIR RIGHTS IN THIS CASE."[10]
Petitioners question the admission by respondent Court of Appeals of the third-party complaint by respondents Go
against the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party complaint should not have been
considered by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to third-party plaintiffs' failure to pay the docket and filing
fees before the trial court.
The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint of petitioners against respondents Go. The
complaint filed was for accion publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession of real property which is a real action. The rule
in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the
requisite docket and filing fees. [11] In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the property and the
amount of damages claimed, if any.[12] If the complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court
acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription.
[13]
Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of certain related damages are not, the court,
although having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for
damages.[14] Accordingly, the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for
amendment of the complaint so as to allege the precise amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal fees.
[15]
If there are unspecified claims, the determination of which may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien on the judgment award. [16] The same rule also applies to
third-party claims and other similar pleadings. [17]
In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed by respondents Go was incorporated in their answer to the
complaint. The third-party complaint sought the same remedy as the principal complaint but added a prayer for attorney's
fees and costs without specifying their amounts, thus:
"ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
1. That summons be issued against Third-Party Defendants Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li
Ching Yao;
2. That after hearing, they be sentenced to indemnify the Third-Party Plaintiffs for whatever is adjudged against the latter
in favor of the Plaintiffs;

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3. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay attorney's fees as may be proved during trial;
4. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay the costs.
Other just and equitable reliefs are also prayed for." [18]

The Answer with Third-Party Complaint was admitted by the trial court without the requisite payment of filing fees,
particularly on the Go's prayer for damages. [19] The trial court did not award the Go's any damages. It dismissed the thirdparty complaint. The Court of Appeals, however, granted the third-party complaint in part by ordering third-party
defendant Jose N. Quedding to pay the Go's the sum ofP5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite the Go's failure to
specify the amount prayed for and pay the corresponding additional filing fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees refers
to damages arising after the filing of the complaint against the Go's. The additional filing fee on this claim is deemed to
constitute a lien on the judgment award.[20]
The Court of Appeals found that the subject portion is actually forty-two (42) square meters in area, not forty-five
(45), as initially found by the trial court; that this forty-two (42) square meter portion is on the entire eastern side of Lot
No. 24 belonging to petitioners; that on this said portion is found the concrete fence and pathway that extends from
respondent Winston Go's house on adjacent Lot No. 25; that inclusive of the subject portion, respondents Go did not gain
nor lose any portion of Lots Nos. 25 and 26; that instead, Lot No. 27, on which respondent Li Ching Yao built his
house, encroached on the land of respondents Go, gaining in the process thirty-seven (37) square meters of the latter's
land.[21]
We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA. The claim that the
discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA's fault was not proved. The appellate court, however, found that it was the
erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent
Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father's land. He built his house in the belief that it was entirely
within the parameters of his father's land. In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they encroached on petitioners'
lot. They are deemed builders in good faith[22] until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their encroachment on
her property.[23]
Respondent Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other parties did. [24] He constructed his house in
1982, respondents Go in 1983, and petitioners in 1985. [25] There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that respondent
Li Ching Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on respondents Go's
adjoining land. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the
burden of proof.[26]
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their rights must, therefore, be determined in accordance
with the appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property.
Article 448 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and
548,[27] or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed the proper
rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the

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building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof."
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the building, planting or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the necessary and
useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner of the land may also oblige
the builder, planter or sower to purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner chooses to sell his land, the builder,
planter or sower must purchase the land, otherwise the owner may remove the improvements thereon. The builder, planter
or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably more than the building, planting or
sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to the owner of the land. If the parties cannot come to
terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the
improvement or selling the land on which the improvement stands to the builder, planter or sower, is given to the owner of
the land.[28]
Article 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of improvements built by mistaken belief on land
belonging to the adjoining owner.[29] The facts of the instant case are similar to those inCabral v. Ibanez,[30] to wit:
"[P]laintiffs Geronima Zabala and her husband Justino Bernardo, constructed their house in the belief that it was entirely
within the area of their own land without knowing at that time that part of their house was occupying a 14-square meter
portion of the adjoining lot belonging to the defendants, and that the defendants Bernardo M. Cabral and Mamerta M.
Cabral were likewise unaware of the fact that a portion of plaintiff's house was extending and occupying a portion of their
lot with an area of 14 square meters. The parties came to know of the fact that part of the plaintiff's house was occupying
part of defendant's land when the construction of plaintiff's house was about to be finished, after a relocation of the
monuments of the two properties had been made by the U.S. Army through the Bureau of Lands, according to their
'Stipulation of Facts,' dated August 17, 1951.
On the basis of these facts, we held that:
"The Court, therefore, concludes that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith and the relative rights of the defendant
Mamerta Cabral as owner of the land and of the plaintiffs as owners of the building is governed by Article 361 of the Civil
Code (Co Tao v. Joaquin Chan Chico, 46 Off. Gaz.5514). Article 361 of the old Civil Code has been reproduced with an
additional provision in Article 448 of the new Civil Code, approved June 18, 1949." [31]
Similarly, in Grana and Torralba v. Court of Appeals,[32] we held that:
"Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were found by the Court of
Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith. Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code
(Article 448 of the new), the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of necessary or useful expenses, and in the proper case,
expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. Respondents, as owners
of the land, have therefore the choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their land
upon payment of the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that part of their land on which
stands the improvement. It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose to
exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that event the whole
building might be rendered useless. The more workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to
petitioners that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are
unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so. Of course,
respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the

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aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the case, then petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The parties
must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the lease, and should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix
the same."[33]
In light of these rulings, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by
respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical as it
may render the Go's house useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their
improvement stands. If the Go's are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they
vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the value of the land is much more than the
Go's improvement, then respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then they
may go to court to fix the same.
In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at
the prevailing market value at the time of payment. The Court of Appeals erred in fixing the price at the time of taking,
which is the time the improvements were built on the land. The time of taking is determinative of just compensation in
expropriation proceedings. The instant case is not for expropriation. It is not a taking by the state of private property for a
public purpose upon payment of just compensation. This is a case of an owner who has been paying real estate taxes on
his land but has been deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years. It is but fair and just to fix compensation at the
time of payment.[34]
Article 448 and the same conditions abovestated also apply to respondents Go as owners and possessors of their land
and respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty-seven (37) square meters of
respondents Go's land.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is modified as follows:
(1) Petitioners are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision their option to either buy
the portion of respondents Go's improvement on their Lot No. 24, or sell to said respondents the portion of their land on
which the improvement stands. If petitioners elect to sell the land or buy the improvement, the purchase price must be at
the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the improvement will render respondents Go's house useless,
then petitioners should sell the encroached portion of their land to respondents Go. If petitioners choose to sell the land
but respondents Go are unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent
from the time petitioners made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is
considerably more than the value of the improvement, then respondents Go may elect to lease the land, in which case the
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease.Should they fail to agree on said terms, the court of origin is directed to fix
the terms of the lease.
From the moment petitioners shall have exercised their option, respondents Go shall pay reasonable monthly rent up
to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the court fixes such terms.
(2) Respondents Go are likewise directed to exercise their rights as owners of Lots Nos. 25 and 26, vis-avis respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty seven (37) square meters of
respondents Go's land in accordance with paragraph one abovementioned.
(3) The Decision of the Court of Appeals ordering Engineer Quedding, as third-party defendant, to pay attorney's fees
of P5,000.00 to respondents Go is affirmed. The additional filing fee on the damages constitutes a lien on this award.

SO ORDERED.

115/43

(4) The Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture
is affirmed.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 120303. July 24, 1996]

FEDERICO GEMINIANO, MARIA GEMINIANO, ERNESTO GEMINIANO, ASUNCION GEMINIANO, LARRY
GEMINIANO, and MARLYN GEMINIANO,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINADOR
NICOLAS, and MARY A. NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari has its origins in Civil Case No. 9214 of Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) in Dagupan City for unlawful detainer and damages.The petitioners ask the Court to set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City, which, in turn, reversed the MTCC; ordered the petitioners to reimburse the private
respondents the value of the house in question and other improvements; and allowed the latter to retain the
premises until reimbursement was made.
It appears that Lot No. 3765-B-1 containing an area of 314 square meters was originally owned by the
petitioners' mother, Paulina Amado vda. de Geminiano. On a 12-square-meter portion of that lot stood the
petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners sold in November 1978 to the private respondents for
the sum of P6,000.00, with an alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot occupied by the
house. Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a contract of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of
the lot, including that portion on which the house stood, in favor of the private respondents for P40.00 per
month for a period of seven years commencing on 15 November 1978. [1] The private respondents then
introduced additional improvements and registered the house in their names. After the expiration of the lease
contract in November 1985, however, the petitioners' mother refused to accept the monthly rentals.
It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit, which resulted in its acquisition by one Maria
Lee in 1972. In 1982, Lee sold the lot to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold it in 1984 to the spouses Agustin and
Ester Dionisio.
On 14 February 1992, the Dionisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor
of the petitioners.[2] As such, the lot was registered in the latter's names.[3]
On 9 February 1993, the petitioners sent, via registered mail, a letter addressed to private respondent
Mary Nicolas demanding that she vacate the premises and pay the rentals in arrears within twenty days from
notice.[4]

116/43

Upon failure of the private respondents to heed the demand, the petitioners filed with the MTCC of
Dagupan City a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to confine the issues to: (1) whether there was an
implied renewal of the lease which expired in November 1985; (2) whether the lessees were builders in good
faith and entitled to reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements; and (3) the value of the
house.
The parties then submitted their respective position papers and the case was heard under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
On the first issue, the court held that since the petitioners' mother was no longer the owner of the lot in
question at the time the lease contract was executed in 1978, in view of its acquisition by Maria Lee as early as
1972, there was no lease to speak of, much less, a renewal thereof. And even if the lease legally existed, its
implied renewal was not for the period stipulated in the original contract, but only on a month-to-month basis
pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code. The refusal of the petitioners' mother to accept the rentals starting
January 1986 was then a clear indication of her desire to terminate the monthly lease. As regards the
petitioners' alleged failed promise to sell to the private respondents the lot occupied by the house, the court
held that such should be litigated in a proper case before the proper forum, not an ejectment case where the
only issue was physical possession of the property.
The court resolved the second issue in the negative, holding that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code,
which allow possessors in good faith to recover the value of improvements and retain the premises until
reimbursed, did not apply to lessees like the private respondents, because the latter knew that their occupation
of the premises would continue only during the life of the lease. Besides, the rights of the private respondents
were specifically governed by Article 1678, which allows reimbursement of up to one-half of the value of the
useful improvements, or removal of the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.
On the third issue, the court deemed as conclusive the private respondents' allegation that the value of the
house and improvements was P180,000.00, there being no controverting evidence presented.
The trial court thus ordered the private respondents to vacate the premises, pay the petitioners P40.00 a
month as reasonable compensation for their stay thereon from the filing of the complaint on 14 April 1993 until
they vacated, and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs.[5]
On appeal by the private respondents, the RTC of Dagupan City reversed the trial court's decision and
rendered a new judgment: (1) ordering the petitioners to reimburse the private respondents for the value of the
house and improvements in the amount of P180,000.00 and to pay the latter P10,000.00 as attorney's fees
and P2,000.00 as litigation expenses; and (2) allowing the private respondents to remain in possession of the
premises until they were fully reimbursed for the value of the house. [6] It ruled that since the private
respondents were assured by the petitioners that the lot they leased would eventually be sold to them, they
could be considered builders in good faith, and as such, were entitled to reimbursement of the value of the
house and improvements with the right of retention until reimbursement had been made.
On appeal, this time by the petitioners, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC [7] and
denied[8] the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.

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The Court is confronted with the issue of which provision of law governs the case at bench: Article 448 or
Article 1678 of the Civil Code? The said articles read as follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is
intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall
pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount,
the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not,
however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the
ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by
paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
The crux of the said issue then is whether the private respondents are builders in good faith or mere
lessees.
The private respondents claim they are builders in good faith, hence, Article 448 of the Civil Code should
apply. They rely on the lack of title of the petitioners' mother at the time of the execution of the contract of
lease, as well as the alleged assurance made by the petitioners that the lot on which the house stood would be
sold to them.
It has been said that while the right to let property is an incident of title and possession, a person may be a
lessor and occupy the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner of the premises let.
[9]
After all, ownership of the property is not being transferred, [10] only the temporary use and enjoyment thereof.
[11]

In this case, both parties admit that the land in question was originally owned by the petitioners'
mother. The land was allegedly acquired later by one Maria Lee by virtue of an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage. Lee, however, never sought a writ of possession in order that she gain possession of the property in
question.[12] The petitioners' mother therefore remained in possession of the lot.
It is undisputed that the private respondents came into possession of a 126 square-meter portion of the
said lot by virtue of a contract of lease executed by the petitioners' mother in their favor. The juridical relation
between the petitioners' mother as lessor, and the private respondents as lessees, is therefore wellestablished, and carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. [13] The private respondents, as lessees who
had undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease, are then estopped to deny their landlord's title,
or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in possession
of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord.[14] This estoppel applies even

118/43

though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, [15] and may be asserted
not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.[16]
Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation of the premises would continue
only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith.[17]
In a plethora of cases,[18] this Court has held that Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of
the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief
that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental
contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
Anent the alleged promise of the petitioners to sell the lot occupied by the private respondents' house, the
same was not substantiated by convincing evidence. Neither the deed of sale over the house nor the contract
of lease contained an option in favor of the respondent spouses to purchase the said lot. And even if the
petitioners indeed promised to sell, it would not make the private respondents possessors or builders in good
faith so as to be covered by the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot raise the mere
expectancy of ownership of the aforementioned lot because the alleged promise to sell was not fulfilled nor its
existence even proven. The first thing that the private respondents should have done was to reduce the
alleged promise into writing, because under Article 1403 of the Civil Code, an agreement for the sale of real
property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum thereof be produced. Not
having taken any steps in order that the alleged promise to sell may be enforced, the private respondents
cannot bank on that promise and profess any claim nor color of title over the lot in question.
There is no need to apply by analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was done in Pecson vs.
Court of Appeals,[19] because the situation sought to be avoided and which would justify the application of that
provision, is not present in this case. Suffice it to say, "a state of forced co-ownership" would not be created
between the petitioners and the private respondents. For, as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the rights
of the private respondents as lessees are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows
reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvements.
It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code arises only if
the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. Since the petitioners refused to exercise that option,[20] the
private respondents cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and
improvements. Neither can they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents'
sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property leased
than is necessary.[21]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition; REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 January 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34337; and REINSTATING
the decision of Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Dagupan City in Civil Case No. 9214 entitled
"Federico Geminiano, et al. vs. Dominador Nicolas, et al."
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. L-57288 April 30, 1984

LEONILA SARMINETO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ENRIQUE A. AGANA, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District,
Branch XXVIII, Pasay City, and SPOUSES ERNESTO VALENTINO and REBECCA LORENZOVALENTINO,respondents.
Mercedes M. Respicio for petitioner.
Romulo R. Bobadilla for private respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
This Petition for certiorari questions a March 29, 1979 Decision rendered by the then Court of First Instance of
Pasay City. The Decision was one made on memoranda, pursuant to the provisions of RA 6031, and it
modified, on October 17, 1977, a judgment of the then Municipal Court of Paranaque, Rizal, in an Ejectment
suit instituted by herein petitioner Leonila SARMIENTO against private respondents, the spouses ERNESTO
Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo. For the facts, therefore, we have to look to the evidence presented by the
parties at the original level.
It appears that while ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's mother had told him the couple could
build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on a lot of 145 sq. ms., being Lot D of a subdivision in Paranaque (the LAND,
for short). In 1967, ERNESTO did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to
P10,000.00. It was probably assumed that the wife's mother was the owner of the LAND and that, eventually, it
would somehow be transferred to the spouses.
It subsequently turned out that the LAND had been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who, on
September 7 , 1974, sold the same to petitioner SARMIENTO. The following January 6, 1975, SARMIENTO
asked ERNESTO and wife to vacate and, on April 21, 1975, filed an Ejectment suit against them. In the
evidentiary hearings before the Municipal Court, SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the LAND in her
favor, which showed the price to be P15,000.00. On the other hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of
the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The figures were not questioned by
SARMIENTO.
The Municipal Court found that private respondents had built the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE in good faith, and,
disregarding the testimony of ERNESTO, that it had a value of P20,000.00. It then ordered ERNESTO and wife
to vacate the LAND after SARMIENTO has paid them the mentioned sum of P20,000.00.
The Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Pasay where, after the submission of
memoranda, said Court rendered a modifying Decision under Article 448 of the Civil Code. SARMIENTO was
required, within 60 days, to exercise the option to reimburse ERNESTO and wife the sum of 40,000.00 as the
value of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, or the option to allow them to purchase the LAND for P25,000.00.
SARMIENTO did not exercise any of the two options within the indicated period, and ERNESTO was then
allowed to deposit the sum of P25,000.00 with the Court as the purchase price for the LAND. This is the hub of
the controversy. SARMIENTO then instituted the instant certiorari proceedings.
We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith in view of the peculiar circumstances under
which they had constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far as they knew, the LAND was owned by
ERNESTO's mother-in-law who, having stated they could build on the property, could reasonably be expected
to later on give them the LAND.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Code provides:t.hqw
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith,
shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
for in articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably
more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner

120/43

of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
the terms thereof. (Paragraphing supplied)
The value of the LAND, purchased for P15,000.00 on September 7, 1974, could not have been very much
more than that amount during the following January when ERNESTO and wife were asked to vacate. However,
ERNESTO and wife have not questioned the P25,000.00 valuation determined by the Court of First Instance.
In regards to the valuation of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, the only evidence presented was the testimony of
ERNESTO that its worth at the time of the trial should be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The Municipal Court
chose to assess its value at P20,000.00, or below the minimum testified by ERNESTO, while the Court of First
Instance chose the maximum of P40,000.00. In the latter case, it cannot be said that the Court of First Instance
had abused its discretion.
The challenged decision of respondent Court, based on valuations of P25,000.00 for the LAND and
P40,000.00 for the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, cannot be viewed as not supported by the evidence. The provision
for the exercise by petitioner SARMIENTO of either the option to indemnify private respondents in the amount
of P40,000.00, or the option to allow private respondents to purchase the LAND at P25,000.00, in our opinion,
was a correct decision.t.hqw
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain
the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453 (now Article
546). The owner, of the land. upon, the other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article
448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he
cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and
compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to
such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the
same. (Emphasis ours)
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to
remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter
chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends
substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361
(now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605,
608 [1946]).
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby ordered dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-47475 August 19, 1988
MANOTOK REALTY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOSE H. TECSON, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and NILO
MADLANGAWA, respondents.
Ceferino V. Argueza for petitioner.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession and damages against the private respondent,
the then Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which provides inter
alia:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In Civil Case No. 72872, declaring the defendant Nilo Madlangawa as a builder or possessor
in good faith; ordering the plaintiff to recognize the right of said defendant to remain in Lot No.
345, Block 1, of the Clara Tambunting Subdivision until after he shall have been reimbursed by
the plaintiff the sum of P7,500.00, without pronouncement as to costs. (p. 24, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and upon affirmance
by the latter of the decision below, the petitioner elevated its case to this Court.

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On July 13, 1977, we issued a resolution dated July 11, 1977 denying the petitioner's petition for lack of merit.
Hence, on August 5, 1977, the petitioner filed with the trial court, presided over by respondent Judge Jose H.
Tecson, a motion for the approval of petitioner's exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment, praying that
the court issue an order: a) approving the exercise of petitioner's option to appropriate the improvements
introduced by the private respondent on the property; b) thereafter, private respondent be ordered to deliver
possession of the property in question to the petitioner.
On October 7, 1977, the respondent judge issued the disputed order, to wit:
Acting on the motion for approval of plaintiffs exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment
filed by the plaintiff, and the opposition thereto interposed by the defendant, both through
counsels, and after a judicious review of all the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case,
in the light of statutory provisions (Art. 6, New Civil Code) and jurisprudential doctrines (Vide,
Benares v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., L-7330 (Nov. 29, 1960), and considering further the
definitive ruling of our Supreme Tribunal in the case of Jose C. Cristobal v. Alejandro Melchor,
G.R. No. L-43203 promulgated on July 29, 1977, wherein the Court says:
"This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound to a rigid application of the law
but rather its action should conform to the conditions or exigencies of a given problem or
situation in order to grant relief that it will serve the ends of justice."
xxx xxx xxx
the Court is of the considered view that under the peculiar circumstances which supervened after the institution
of this case, like, for instance, the introduction of certain major repairs of and other substantial improvements
on the controverted property, the instant motion of the plaintiff is not well-taken and therefore not legally proper
and tenable.
WHEREFORE, and for lack of merit, the instant motion for approval of the plaintiff's fai-rn of
option and for satisfaction of judgment should be, as hereby it is, denied. (pp. 45-46, Rollo)
After a denial of its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed the present petition for mandamus alleging
that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to exercise option and for
execution of judgment on the grounds that under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, the exercise of option
belongs to the owner of the property, who is the petitioner herein, and that upon finality of judgment, the
prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of right, to its execution which is only a ministerial act on the part of the
respondent judge.
On April 15, 1978, the private respondent filed his comment on the petition alleging that the same has already
become moot and academic for two reasons: first, fire gutted not only the house of the private respondent but
the majority of the houses in Tambunting Estate; and second, as a result of the said fire, the then First Lady
and Metro Manila Governor Imelda R. Marcos has placed the disputed area under her Zonal Improvement
Project, thereby allowing the victims of the fire to put up new structures on the premises, so that the willingness
and readiness of the petitioner to exercise the alleged option can no longer be exercised since the subjectmatter thereof has been extinguished by the fire. Furthermore, the President of the Philippines has already
issued a Presidential Decree for the expropriation of certain estates in Metro Manila including the Tambunting
Estate. Therefore, the beneficient and humanitarian purpose of the Zonal Improvement Project and the
expropriation proceeding would be defeated if petitioner is allowed to exercise an option which would result in
the ejectment of the private respondent.
On December 28, 1980, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1669 was issued providing for the expropriation of the
Tambunting Estate. However, this decree was challenged before this Court in G.R. No, 55166 entitled The
"Elisa R. Manotok, et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al." Hence, we decided to hold the decision on this
petition pending the resolution of the above entitled case.
On May 21, 1987, the Court rendered a decision in the Elisa Manotok case (Manotok v. National Housing
Authority, 150 SCRA 89) ruling that P.D. 1669 is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.
Thus, since the present petition has not been rendered moot and academic by the decision in said case, we
will now decide on its merits.
As stated earlier, the petitioner argues that since the judgment of the trial court has already become final, it is
entitled to the execution of the same and that moreover, since the house of the private respondent was gutted
by fire, the execution of the decision would now involve the delivery of possession of the disputed area by the
private respondent to the petitioner.
We find merit in these arguments.

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When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it became incumbent upon the respondent
judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. There is, therefore, no basis for the respondent
judge to deny the petitioner's motion to avail of its option to approriate the improvements made on its property.
In the case of Duenas v. Mandi (151 SCRA 530, 545), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
...Likewise settled is the rule that after a judgment has become final, no additions can be made
thereto, and nothing can be done therewith except its execution, otherwise there would be no
end to legal processes. (Fabular v. Court of Appeals, 11 9 SCRA 329)
Neither can the respondent judge deny the issuance of a writ of execution because the private respondent was
adjudged a builder in good faith or on the ground of "peculiar circumstances which supervened after the
institution of this case, like, for instance, the introduction of certain major repairs of and other substantial
improvements..." because the option given by law either to retain the premises and pay for the improvements
thereon or to sell the said premises to the builder in good faith belongs to the owner of the property. As we
have in Quemel v. Olaes (1 SCRA 1159,1163):
xxx xxx xxx
...The plaintiffs claim that their second cause of action is based on Article 448 in connection with
Art. 546, of the new Civil Code. A cursory reading of these provisions, however, will show that
they are not applicable to plaintiff's case. Under Article 448, the right to appropriate the works or
improvements or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land' belongs to
the owner of the land. The only right given to the builder in good faith is the right to
reimbursement for the improvements; the builder, cannot compel the owner of the land to sell
such land to the former. ...
Again, in the recent case of Paz Mercado, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., (G.R. No. L- 44001, June 10,
1988), we said:
... To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person assert title to the land on
which he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner (Art. 525, Civil Code; Lopez,
Inc. v. Phil. Eastern Trading Co., Inc., 98 Phil. 348) and that he be unaware 'that there exists in
his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.' (Art. 526, Civil Code; Granados v.
Monton, 86 Phil. 42; Arriola v. Gomez de la Serna, 14 Phil. 627; See also Manotok Realty, Inc. v.
C.A., 134 SCRA 329, citing Caram v. Laureta, 103 SCRA 7) It is such a builder in good faith who
is given the 1ight to retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he has been
reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses but also for useful expenses. (Art. 546,
Civil Code; Policarpio v. CA., 129 SCRA 51; Sarmiento v. Agana, 129 SCRA 1221; cf, Queto v.
C.A., 122 SCRA 206) ...
Furthermore, the private respondent's good faith ceased after the filing of the complaint below by the petitioner.
In the case of Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap (13 SCRA 190,196), we ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
...Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and hence as between
themselves their rights would be as if both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the
transaction, this legal fiction of Yap's good faith ceased when the complaint against him was
filed, and consequently the court's declaration of liability for the rents thereafter is correct and
proper . A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not
legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons (Arts.
544 and 1123, Civil Code).
Thus, the repairs and improvements introduced by the said respondents after the complaint was filed cannot
be considered to have been built in good faith, much less, justify the denial of the petitioner's fai-rn of option.
Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent's right to
retain the premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other recourse
for the private respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to herein petitioner.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED and the respondent judge is hereby
ordered to immediately issue a writ of execution ordering the private respondent to vacate the disputed
premises and deliver possession of the same to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortos, JJ., concur.

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[G.R. No. 108894. February 10, 1997]

TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(FORMER SPECIAL SEVENTEENTH DIVISION) and EDUARDO UY, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The parties in this case are owners of adjoining lots in Paraaque, Metro Manila. It was discovered in a
survey that a portion of a building of petitioner, which was presumably constructed by its predecessor-ininterest, encroached on a portion of the lot owned by private respondent. What are the rights and obligations of
the parties? Is petitioner considered a builder in bad faith because, as held by respondent Court, he is
presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property as described in his certificate of title? Does petitioner
succeed into the good faith or bad faith of his predecessor-in-interest which presumably constructed the
building?
These are the questions raised in the petition for review of the Decision [1] dated August 28, 1992, in CAG.R. CV No. 28293 of respondent Court[2] where the disposition reads:[3]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby reversed and set aside and
another one entered 1. Dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action;
2. Ordering Tecnogas to pay the sum of P2,000.00 per month as reasonable rental from October 4, 1979 until appellee
vacates the land;
3. To remove the structures and surrounding walls on the encroached area;
4. Ordering appellee to pay the value of the land occupied by the two-storey building;
5. Ordering appellee to pay the sum of P20,000.00 for and as attorneys fees;
6. Costs against appellee.
Acting on the motions for reconsideration of both petitioner and private respondent, respondent Court
ordered the deletion of paragraph 4 of the dispositive portion in an Amended Decision dated February 9, 1993,
as follows:[4]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, our decision of August 28, 1992 is hereby modified deleting paragraph 4 of the
dispositive portion of our decision which reads:
4. Ordering appellee to pay the value of the land occupied by the two-storey building.
The motion for reconsideration of appellee is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The foregoing Amended Decision is also challenged in the instant petition.

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The Facts
The facts are not disputed. Respondent Court merely reproduced the factual findings of the trial court, as
follows:[5]
That plaintiff (herein petitioner) which is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws
is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila known as Lot 4331-A
(should be 4531-A) of Lot 4531 of the Cadastral Survey of Paraaque, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 409316 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal; that said land was purchased by plaintiff from Pariz
Industries, Inc. in 1970, together with all the buildings and improvements including the wall existing thereon; that the
defendant (herein private respondent) is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4531-B of Lot 4531 of
the Cadastral Survey of Paraaque, LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 19645 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 279838, of
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal; that said land which adjoins plaintiffs land was purchased by defendant
from a certain Enrile Antonio also in 1970; that in 1971, defendant purchased another lot also adjoining plaintiffs land
from a certain Miguel Rodriguez and the same was registered in defendants name under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
31390, of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal; that portions of the buildings and wall bought by plaintiff
together with the land from Pariz Industries are occupying a portion of defendants adjoining land; that upon learning of
the encroachment or occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of defendants land, plaintiff offered to buy from
defendant that particular portion of defendants land occupied by portions of its buildings and wall with an area of 770
square meters, more or less, but defendant, however, refused the offer. In 1973, the parties entered into a private
agreement before a certain Col. Rosales in Malacaang, wherein plaintiff agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of
its land thus giving to defendant possession of a portion of his land previously enclosed by plaintiffs wall; that defendant
later filed a complaint before the office of Municipal Engineer of Paraaque, Metro Manila as well as before the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal against plaintiff in connection with the encroachment or occupation by plaintiffs buildings
and walls of a portion of its land but said complaint did not prosper; that defendant dug or caused to be dug a canal along
plaintiffs wall, a portion of which collapsed in June, 1980, and led to the filing by plaintiff of the supplemental complaint
in the above-entitled case and a separate criminal complaint for malicious mischief against defendant and his wife which
ultimately resulted into the conviction in court of defendants wife for the crime of malicious mischief; that while trial of
the case was in progress, plaintiff filed in Court a formal proposal for settlement of the case but said proposal, however,
was ignored by defendant.
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court [6] of Pasay City, Branch 117, in Civil Case No. PQ-7631-P,
rendered a decision dated December 4, 1989 in favor of petitioner who was the plaintiff therein. The dispositive
portion reads:[7]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant and ordering the latter to sell to
plaintiff that portion of land owned by him and occupied by portions of plaintiffs buildings and wall at the price
of P2,000.00 per square meter and to pay the former:
1. The sum of P44,000.00 to compensate for the losses in materials and properties incurred by plaintiff through thievery as
a result of the destruction of its wall;
2. The sum of P7,500.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and
3. The costs of this suit.

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Appeal was duly interposed with respondent Court, which as previously stated, reversed and set aside the
decision of the Regional Trial Court and rendered the assailed Decision and Amended Decision. Hence, this
recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:[8]
(A)
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner a builder in bad faith because it is
presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property.
(B)
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred when it used the amicable settlement between the petitioner
and the private respondent, where both parties agreed to the demolition of the rear portion of the fence, as estoppel
amounting to recognition by petitioner of respondents right over his property including the portions of the land where
the other structures and the building stand, which were not included in the settlement.
(C)
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in ordering the removal of the structures and surrounding walls on
the encroached area and in withdrawing its earlier ruling in its August 28, 1992 decision for the petitioner to pay for the
value of the land occupied by the building, only because the private respondent has manifested its choice to demolish it
despite the absence of compulsory sale where the builder fails to pay for the land, and which choice private respondent
deliberately deleted from its September 1, 1980 answer to the supple-mental complaint in the Regional Trial Court.
In its Memorandum, petitioner poses the following issues:
A
The time when to determine the good faith of the builder under Article 448 of the New Civil Code, is reckoned during the
period when it was actually being built; and in a case where no evidence was presentednor introduced as to the good faith
or bad faith of the builder at that time, as in this case, he must be presumed to be a builder in good faith, since bad
faith cannot be presumed.[9]
B.
In a specific boundary overlap situation which involves a builder in good faith, as in this case, it is now well settled that
the lot owner, who builds on the adjacent lot is not charged with constructive notice of the technical metes and bounds
contained in their torrens titles to determine the exact and precise extent of his boundary perimeter. [10]
C.
The respondent courts citation of the twin cases of Tuason & Co. v. Lumanlan and Tuason & Co. v.
Macalindong is not the judicial authority for a boundary dispute situation between adjacent torrens titled lot owners, as the
facts of the present case do not fall within nor square with the involved principle of a dissimilar case. [11]

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D.

Quite contrary to respondent Uys reasoning, petitioner Tecnogas continues to be a builder in good faith, even if it
subsequently built/repaired the walls/other permanent structures thereon while the case a quowas pending and even while
respondent sent the petitioner many letters/filed cases thereon. [12]
D. (E.)
The amicable settlement between the parties should be interpreted as a contract and enforced only in accordance with its
explicit terms, and not over and beyond that agreed upon; because the courts do not have the power to create a
contract nor expand its scope.[13]
E. (F.)
As a general rule, although the landowner has the option to choose between: (1) buying the building built in good faith, or
(2) selling the portion of his land on which stands the building under Article 448 of the Civil Code; the first option is not
absolute, because an exception thereto, once it would be impractical for the landowner to choose to exercise the first
alternative, i.e. buy that portion of the house standing on his land, for the whole building might be rendered useless. The
workable solution is for him to select the second alternative, namely, to sell to the builder that part of his land on which
was constructed a portion of the house.[14]
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that the petition is suffering from the following flaws:[15]
1. It did not give the exact citations of cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court that allegedly contradicts the
ruling of the Hon. Court of Appeals based on the doctrine laid down in Tuason vs. Lumanlan case citing also
Tuason vs. Macalindong case (Supra).
2. Assuming that the doctrine in the alleged Co Tao vs. Chico case is contradictory to the doctrine in Tuason vs.
Lumanlan and Tuason vs. Macalindong, the two cases being more current, the same should prevail.
Further, private respondent contends that the following unmistakably point to the bad faith of petitioner: (1) private
respondents purchase of the two lots, was ahead of the purchase by petitioner of the building and lot from Pariz Industries;
(2) the declaration of the General Manager of Tecnogas that the sale between petitioner and Pariz Industries was not
registered because of some problems with China Banking Corporation; and (3) the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner was
registered in its name only in the month of May 1973.[16]
The Courts Ruling
The petition should be granted.
Good Faith or Bad Faith
Respondent Court, citing the cases of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Vda. de Lumanlan [17] and J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong,[18] ruled that petitioner cannot be considered in good faith because as a land
owner, it is presumed to know the metes and bounds of his own property, specially if the same are reflected in
a properly issued certificate of title. One who erroneously builds on the adjoining lot should be considered a
builder in (b)ad (f)aith, there being presumptive knowledge of the Torrens title, the area, and the extent of the
boundaries.[19]

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We disagree with respondent Court. The two cases it relied upon do not support its main pronouncement
that a registered owner of land has presumptive knowledge of the metes and bounds of its own land, and is
therefore in bad faith if he mistakenly builds on an adjoining land. Aside from the fact that those cases had
factual moorings radically different from those obtaining here, there is nothing in those cases which would
suggest, however remotely, that bad faith is imputable to a registered owner of land when a part of his building
encroaches upon a neighbors land, simply because he is supposedly presumed to know the boundaries of his
land as described in his certificate of title. No such doctrinal statement could have been made in those cases
because such issue was not before the Supreme Court. Quite the contrary, we have rejected such a theory in
Co Tao vs. Chico,[20] where we held that unless one is versed in the science of surveying, no one can
determine the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title.
There is no question that when petitioner purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other
structures were already in existence. The record is not clear as to who actually built those structures, but it may
well be assumed that petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so. Article 527 of the Civil Code
presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped
portion of private respondents land was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter
should be presumed to have built them in good faith. [21] It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed
in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. [22] Good faith consists in the belief
of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. [23] Hence,
such good faith, by law, passed on to Parizs successor, petitioner in this case. Further, (w)here one derives title
to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the
property, is evidence against the former.[24] And possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character
except in case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.[25] The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are
made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true
owner.[26]
Recall that the encroachment in the present case was caused by a very slight deviation of the erected wall
(as fence) which was supposed to run in a straight line from point 9 to point 1 of petitioners lot. It was an error
which, in the context of the attendant facts, was consistent with good faith. Consequently, the builder, if sued
by the aggrieved landowner for recovery of possession, could have invoked the provisions of Art. 448 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige
the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case,
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the land, he
can compel the landowner to make a choice between the two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying
the indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either
option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.[27]
The question, however, is whether the same benefit can be invoked by petitioner who, as earlier stated, is
not the builder of the offending structures but possesses them as buyer.

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We answer such question in the affirmative.

In the first place, there is no sufficient showing that petitioner was aware of the encroachment at the time it
acquired the property from Pariz Industries. We agree with the trial court that various factors in evidence
adequately show petitioners lack of awareness thereof. In any case, contrary proof has not overthrown the
presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code, as already stated, taken together with the
disputable presumptions of the law on evidence. These presumptions state, under Section 3 (a) of Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, that the person is innocent of a crime or wrong; and under Section 3 (ff) of Rule 131, that
the law has been obeyed. In fact, private respondent Eduardo Uy himself was unaware of such intrusion into
his property until after 1971 when he hired a surveyor, following his purchase of another adjoining lot, to survey
all his newly acquired lots. Upon being apprised of the encroachment, petitioner immediately offered to buy the
area occupied by its building -- a species of conduct consistent with good faith.
In the second place, upon delivery of the property by Pariz Industries, as seller, to the petitioner, as buyer,
the latter acquired ownership of the property. Consequently and as earlier discussed, petitioner is deemed to
have stepped into the shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of ownership over the immovable sold, including
the right to compel the private respondent to exercise either of the two options provided under Article 448 of
the Civil Code.
Estoppel
Respondent Court ruled that the amicable settlement entered into between petitioner and private
respondent estops the former from questioning the private respondents right over the disputed property. It held
that by undertaking to demolish the fence under said settlement, petitioner recognized private respondents
right over the property, and cannot later on compel private respondent to sell to it the land since private
respondent is under no obligation to sell.[28]
We do not agree. Petitioner cannot be held in estoppel for entering into the amicable settlement, the
pertinent portions of which read:[29]
That the parties hereto have agreed that the rear portion of the fence that separates the property of the complainant and
respondent shall be demolished up to the back of the building housing the machineries which demolision (sic) shall be
undertaken by the complainant at anytime.
That the fence which serve(s) as a wall housing the electroplating machineries shall not be demolished in the mean time
which portion shall be subject to negotiation by herein parties.
From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner agreed only to the demolition of a portion of the wall
separating the adjoining properties of the parties -- i.e. up to the back of the building housing the
machineries. But that portion of the fence which served as the wall housing the electroplating machineries was
not to be demolished. Rather, it was to be subject to negotiation by herein parties. The settlement may have
recognized the ownership of private respondent but such admission cannot be equated with bad
faith. Petitioner was only trying to avoid a litigation, one reason for entering into an amicable settlement.
As was ruled in Osmea vs. Commission on Audit,[30]

xxx xxx xxx

129/43

A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that is expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code
and is therein dealt with in some detail. `A compromise, declares Article 2208 of said Code, `is a contract whereby the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.

The Civil Code not only defines and authorizes compromises, it in fact encourages them in civil actions. Art. 2029 states
that `The Court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise. x x x.
In the context of the established facts, we hold that petitioner did not lose its rights under Article 448 of the
Civil Code on the basis merely of the fact that some years after acquiring the property in good faith, it learned
about -- and aptly recognized -- the right of private respondent to a portion of the land occupied by its
building. The supervening awareness of the encroachment by petitioner does not militate against its right to
claim the status of a builder in good faith. In fact, a judicious reading of said Article 448 will readily show that
the landowners exercise of his option can only take place after the builder shall have come to know of the
intrusion -- in short, when both parties shall have become aware of it. Only then will the occasion for exercising
the option arise, for it is only then that both parties will have been aware that a problem exists in regard to their
property rights.
Options of Private Respondent
What then is the applicable provision in this case which private respondent may invoke as his
remedy: Article 448 or Article 450[31] of the Civil Code?
In view of the good faith of both petitioner and private respondent, their rights and obligations are to be
governed by Art. 448. The essential fairness of this codal provision has been pointed out by Mme. Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, citing Manresa and applicable precedents, in the case of Depra vs. Dumlao, [32] to
wit:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes
necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticality of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the
land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to
pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option,
because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
(3 Manresa 213; Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico, G. R. No. 49167, April 30, 1949;
Article applied; see Cabral, et al. vs. Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 52 Off. Gaz. 2050).
The private respondents insistence on the removal of the encroaching structures as the proper remedy,
which respondent Court sustained in its assailed Decisions, is thus legally flawed.This is not one of the
remedies bestowed upon him by law. It would be available only if and when he chooses to compel the
petitioner to buy the land at a reasonable price but the latter fails to pay such price. [33] This has not taken
place. Hence, his options are limited to: (1) appropriating the encroaching portion of petitioners building after
payment of proper indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to buy the lot occupied by the structure. He cannot
exercise a remedy of his own liking.
Neither is petitioners prayer that private respondent be ordered to sell the land [34] the proper remedy. While
that was dubbed as the more workable solution in Grana and Torralba vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., [35] it was

130/43

not the relief granted in that case as the landowners were directed to exercise within 30 days from this decision
their option to either buy the portion of the petitioners house on their land or sell to said petitioners the portion
of their land on which it stands. [36] Moreover, in Grana and Torralba, the area involved was only 87 square
meters while this case involves 520 square meters [37]. In line with the case of Depra vs. Dumlao, [38] this case
will have to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to fully implement the mandate of Art. 448. It
is a rule of procedure for the Supreme Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.[39]
Petitioner, however, must also pay the rent for the property occupied by its building as prescribed by
respondent Court from October 4, 1979, but only up to the date private respondent serves notice of its option
upon petitioner and the trial court; that is, if such option is for private respondent to appropriate the
encroaching structure. In such event, petitioner would have a right of retention which negates the obligation to
pay rent.[40] The rent should however continue if the option chosen is compulsory sale, but only up to the actual
transfer of ownership.
The award of attorneys fees by respondent Court against petitioner is unwarranted since the action
appears to have been filed in good faith. Besides, there should be no penalty on the right to litigate.[41]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and the
Amended Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In accordance with the case of Depra vs. Dumlao,[42] this
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for further proceedings consistent
with Articles 448 and 546 [43] of the Civil Code, as follows:
The trial court shall determine:
a) the present fair price of private respondents 520 square-meter area of land;
b) the increase in value (plus value) which the said area of 520 square meters may have acquired by reason of
the existence of the portion of the building on the area;
c) the fair market value of the encroaching portion of the building; and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than the fair market value of the portion of the
building thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the regional trial court shall render judgment as
follows:
a) The private respondent shall be granted a period of fifteen (15) days within which to exercise his
option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the portion of the building as
his own by paying to petitioner its fair market value, or to oblige petitioner to pay the price of said
area. The amounts to be respectively paid by petitioner and private respondent, in accordance with
the option thus exercised by written notice of the other party and to the court, shall be paid by the
obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the trial
court in favor of the party entitled to receive it;
b) If private respondent exercises the option to oblige petitioner to pay the price of the land but the
latter rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial court, the value of the land is

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considerably more than that of the portion of the building, petitioner shall give written notice of such
rejection to private respondent and to the trial court within fifteen (15) days from notice of private
respondents option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15)
days from such notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the
trial court formal written notice of the agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by
the parties, the trial court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination of the said period
fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease provided that the monthly rental to be
fixed by the Court shall not be less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) per month, payable
within the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be
more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of
time since 1970 that petitioner has occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be
increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease. Petitioner shall not make
any further constructions or improvements on the building. Upon expiration of the two-year period,
or upon default by petitioner in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months, private
respondent shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover his land, and to have the
portion of the building removed by petitioner or at latters expense. The rentals herein provided
shall be tendered by petitioner to the trial court for payment to private respondent, and such tender
shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the
said court.
c) In any event, petitioner shall pay private respondent an amount computed at two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of private respondents land
for the period counted from October 4, 1979, up to the date private respondent serves notice of its
option to appropriate the encroaching structures, otherwise up to the actual transfer of ownership
to petitioner or, in case a forced lease has to be imposed, up to the commencement date of the
forced lease referred to in the preceding paragraph;
d) The periods to be fixed by the trial court in its decision shall be non-extendible, and upon failure of
the party obliged to tender to the trial court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such
payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount
due and for compliance with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-31934 July 29, 1977

RAMON LANZAR, petitioner
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and CITY OF ILOILO, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo and Solicitor Jose A. Janolo
for respondents.

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FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 34333-R entitled
"Ramon Lanzar, Applicant-Appellee, versus The Director of Lands and The City of Iloilo, OppositorsAppellants", declaring the property sought to be registered as the property of the public domain devoted to
public use not susceptible of private appropriation.
In May 1960, the petitioner, Ramon Lanzar, filed an application for registration of title to a parcel of land located
in the District of Molo, Iloilo City in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo alleging that he is the owner in fee simple
of the land in question and asking that the title thereto be registered in his name.
In August 1961, the Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo filed an opposition to the application on the ground
that the land in question a foreshore land which forms part of the public domain and is needed by the City of
Iloilo as a road right of way of the Molo Arevalo Boulevard, and that the applicant had not possessed the
property in such a manner as to warrant an implied grant entitled him to confirmation of his title thereto.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered a decision in March 1963 holding that the property in
question, having been possessed by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, publicly, continuously and
adversely for more than 30 years, the same was adjudicated to the petitioner, it appearing that no proof had
been adduced that the said land is necessary for public utility or establishment of special industries (Record on
Appeal, pp. 30-37).
The Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo appealed to the Court of Appeals which on March 24, 1970
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and held that the land in question, being an
accretion formed by the action of the sea, is property of the public domain and not susceptible of private
appropriation.
Hence, the applicant-appellee, Ramon Lanzar, filed this petition for certiorari to review the aforesaid decision of
the Court of Appeals. The petitioner assigns the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LANDS FORMED BY ACTION OF
THE SEA AS ACCRETION TO THE SHORES ARE PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION, ON
THE AUTHORITY OF ART. 4, LAW OF WATERS, KER & CO. VS GAUDEN AND
GOVERNMENT VS. ALDECOA.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RELYING ON MONTEVERDE VS. DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, 93 PHIL. 134 HOLDING THAT ONLY THE EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATURE CAN
DECLARE THE LAND AS NO LONGER INTENDED FOR PUBLIC USE AND SO SHALL
BELONG TO THE ADJACENT OWNER.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SINCE ART. 422 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE PROVIDES THAT PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMAIN WHEN NO LONGER INTENDED
FOR PUBLIC USE, SUCH INTENTION CAN ONLY BE SPELLED OUT BY THE EXECUTIVE
OR LEGISLATURE, NOT BY THE COURTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS ACQUIRED
THE PROPERTY THRU ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.
(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 1-2)
The pertinent facts are not disputed.
The petitioner has applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land which is admittedly an accretion of
Lot No. 1899 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, it having been formed by the gradual action of the sea before
1,922. Ignacio Arroyo, the registered owner of Lot 1899, leased in 19M the property to Maximo Tonogbanua
who possessed the whole of Lot 1899 and its accretion. In 1927, Ignacio Arroyo donated Lot 1899 of the
Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, together with its accretion, to Beaterio de Santissimo Rosario de Molo, which in turn
the property to the applicant, Ramon Lanzar. The lessee planted coconuts and bananas on the land and a
portion thereof was devoted to palay. A verification of Lot 1899 by the Bureau of Lands disclosed that the
portion of land applied for and described in the plan, Exhibit A, and in its technical description, is outside of Lot
1899, the same being an accretion thereto formed by the action of the sea. Beaterio de Santissimo Rosario de
Molo and the applicant entered into an agreement, Exhibit 1, on August 13,1959, under which Beaterio de

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Santissimo Rosario de Molo assigned all its rights to the accretion, the title to which is sought to be registered
by the applicant. Beaterio de Santissimo Rosario de Molo had possessed Lot 1899 and its accretion through its
lessee, openly, publicly, uninterruptedly and adversely to all claimants and under claim of ownership. The
Beaterio had declared Lot 1899 for taxation and when it assigned the rights to the applicant, he caused the tax
declaration to be transferred to his name in May 1960, Exhibit J.
During the Cadastral Survey of 1911-1912, the lot in question was non-existent (Exhibit 2, Director of Lands).
Hence, said land as an accretion to Lot 1899 must have gradually developed from 1912 to 1922 and thereafter.
It is now separated by the Arevalo-Molo Boulevard from the sea.
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the title to the land in question which was formed by action of
the sea as an accretion to Lot 1899 may be registered in the name of the applicant on the basis of adverse
possession for over 30 years.
Article 4 of the Law of Waters provides:
ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvium deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the
sea, and are not necessary for the purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property
of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.
In Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil. 732, this Court said:
This case is directly covered by the first part of said article 4. There is therein an express
declaration that land formed in the way this land was formed is public property. Nothing could be
more explicit and the effect of this declaration is not in any way limited by the subsequent
provisions of the same article. The claim of the appellants that these subsequent provisions
indicate that the ownership of such land is in the private persons who own the adjoining
property, and that the declaration which is spoken of is simply proof of that ownership, can not
be sustained. It is in direct conflict with the statement made in the first part of the article. The
true construction of the article is that when these lands which belong to the State are not
needed for the purposes mentioned therein, then the State shall grant them to the adjoining
owners. No attempt was made by the appellants to prove any such grant or concession in this
case and, in fact, it is apparent from the evidence that the conditions upon which the adjoining
owners would be entitled to such a grant have never existed because for a long time the
property was by the Spanish navy and it is now occupied by the present government as a naval
station, and works costing more than $500,000, money of the United States, have been erected
thereon. (Idem. p. 736)
It is contended by the petitioner that:
As found by the Court of Appeals, the accretion began before 1922, but after 1912, as shown by
the undisputed evidence, hence, during the regime of the Spanish Civil Code, which became
effective on December 8, 1889, and consequently, its nature shall be determined by the said
code. Now, the said code provides:
ARTICLE 399. The following are property of public domain:
l. Those things intended for public use, as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads and others
of a like nature.
(Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 10-11)
However, in Insular Government vs. Aldecoa and Company, 19 Phil. 505, this Court held:
The Civil Code, which went into effect in these Islands on December 7, 1889, the twentieth day
of its publication in the Gaceta de Manila of the 17th of November of the same year, confirms
the provisions of the said Law of Waters, since, in its article 339, it prescribes that:
Property of public ownership is
l. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges
constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
Article 341 of the same code provides:
Property of public ownership, when no longer devoted to general uses or to the requirements of
the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the State property.

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The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public
uses and no grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain a
part of the public domain and are for public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial
property of the State, such lands, thrown up by the action of the sea, and the shores adjacent
thereto, are not susceptible of prescription, inasmuch as, being dedicated to the public uses,
they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance with the provision of article 1936
of the Civil Code.
The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretions and
alluvium deposits occasioned by the sea, where the occupant or possessor is a private person
and holds without previous permission or authorization from the Government, granted in due
form, although he may have had the intention to hold it for the purpose of making it his own, is
illegal possession on his part and amounts to nothing more than a mere detainer of the land,
which is out of the sphere of the commerce of men, as belonging to the public domain and being
alloted to public uses and for the use of all persons who live at the place where it is situated.
(Idem, pp. 514-515)
It is thus seen that the petitioner could not acquire the land in question by prescription.
The contention of the petitioner-appellant that by "thus expanding the meaning of shores to include inland
property formed by the action of the sea, Government vs. Aldecoa is guilty of judicial legislation ..." (Brief of
Petitioner-Appellant, p. 15) has no merit.
Articles 339 and 340 of the Spanish Civil Code are not repugnant to Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. The said provisions of the said Spanish Code did not provide that lands added to the shores by action of
the sea form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
As stated by this Court in Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, supra, p. 541, the Civil Code of Spain confirms the
provisions of Article 4 of the Law of Waters, citing Article 339 of said code. This Court has been consistent in
ruling that lands formed by the action of the sea belong to the public domain. Thus in Monteverde vs. Director
of Lands, 93 Phil. 134, it was held:
Lots Nos. 1 and 2 were admittedly formed and added to the shores by the natural. action of the
sea, and the petitioners herein have claimed title thereto as accretion to their adjoining lots, in
accordance with article 4 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1966, which provides as follows:
'Lands added to the shores by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by action of
the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the
water of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service, the Government
shall declare them to be property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto
and as increment thereof.'
(Idem. pp. 135-136)
In view of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring the property sought to be registered as
part of the public domain devoted to public use not susceptible of private appropriation. The land in question is
needed by the City of Iloilo for the expansion of the Arevalo-Molo Boulevard.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to
be reviewed is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Martin and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-31163

November 6, 1929
URBANO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE C. BERNABE, ET AL., defendants.
PABLO TIONGSON and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF BULACAN, appellants.
Arcadio Ejercito and Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellants.
Eusebio Orense And Nicolas Belmonte for appellee.

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VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal was taken by the defendants Pablo Tiongson and the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan from the
judgment of the Court of First of said province, wherein said defendant Pablo Tiongson was ordered to pay the
plaintiff Urbano Santos the value of 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay, at the rate of P3 per cavan, without
special pronouncement as to costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors committed by the lower court in its
judgment, to wit:
1. The court erred in holding that it has been proved that in the cavans of palay attached by the herein
defendant Pablo Tiongson from the defendant Jose C. Bernabe were included those claimed by the
plaintiff in this cause.
2. The court erred in ordering the defendant Pablo Tiongson to pay the plaintiff the value of 778 cavans
and 38 kilos of palay, the refund of which is claimed by said plaintiff.
3. The court erred in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial.1awphil.net
The following facts were conclusively proved at the trial:
On March 20, 1928, there were deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse by the plaintiff Urbano Santos 778
cavans and 38 kilos of palay and by Pablo Tiongson 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of the same grain.
On said date, March 20, 1928, Pablo Tiongson filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan a complaint
against Jose C. Bernabe, to recover from the latter the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay deposited in the
defendant's warehouse. At the same time, the application of Pablo Tiongson for a writ of attachment was
granted, and the attachable property of Jose C. Bernabe, including 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay found
by the sheriff in his warehouse, were attached, sold at public auction, and the proceeds thereof delivered to
said defendant Pablo Tiongson, who obtained judgment in said case.
The herein plaintiff, Urbano Santos, intervened in the attachment of the palay, but upon Pablo Tiongson's filing
the proper bond, the sheriff proceeded with the attachment, giving rise to the present complaint.
It does not appear that the sacks of palay of Urbano Santos and those of Pablo Tiongson, deposited in Jose C.
Bernabe's warehouse, bore any marks or signs, nor were they separated one from the other.
The plaintiff-appellee Urbano Santos contends that Pablo Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans and 31
kilos of palay attached by the defendant sheriff as part of those deposited by him in Jose C. Bernabe's
warehouse, because, in asking for the attachment thereof, he impliedly acknowledged that the same belonged
to Jose C. Bernabe and not to him.
In the complaint filed by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C. Bernabe, civil case No. 3665 of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, it is alleged that said plaintiff deposited in the defendant's warehouse 1,026 cavans and 9
kilos of palay, the return of which, or the value thereof, at the rate of P3 per cavan was claimed therein. Upon
filing said complaint, the plaintiff applied for a preliminary writ of attachment of the defendant's property, which
was accordingly issued, and the defendant's property, including the 924 cavans and 31 kilos of palay found
by the sheriff in his warehouse, were attached.
It will be seen that the action brought by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C. Bernabe is that provided in section
262 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the delivery of personal property. Although it is true that the plaintiff and
his attorney did not follow strictly the procedure provided in said section for claiming the delivery of said
personal property nevertheless, the procedure followed by him may be construed as equivalent thereto,
considering the provisions of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the effect that "the provisions of this
Code, and the proceedings under it, shall be liberally construed, in order to promote its object and assist the
parties in obtaining speedy justice."
Liberally construing, therefore, the above cited provisions of section 262 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
writ of attachment applied for by Pablo Tiongson against the property of Jose C. Bernabe may be construed as
a claim for the delivery of the sacks of palay deposited by the former with the latter.
The 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay belonging to the plaintiff Urbano Santos, having been mixed with the
1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay belonging to the defendant Pablo Tiongson in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse;
the sheriff having found only 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay in said warehouse at the time of the
attachment thereof; and there being no means of separating form said 924 cavans and 31 1/2 of palay
belonging to Urbano Santos and those belonging to Pablo Tiongson, the following rule prescribed in article 381
of the Civil Code for cases of this nature, is applicable:
Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the
mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot be separated without injury, each

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owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the
value of the things mixed or commingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, we will take the proportion only of the 924 cavans
of palay which were attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49
thereof, and Pablo Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of P3 per
cavan.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and Pablo Tiongson is hereby ordered to pay the
plaintiff Urbano Santos the value of 398.49 cavans of palay at the rate of P3 a cavan, without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Johns, J., dissents.