G.R. No.

113811 Case Digest

G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994
Ishmael Himagan, petitioner
vs People of the Philippines
respondents
Ponente: Kapunan

and

Hon.

Judge

Hilario

Mapayo,

Facts:
Himagan is policeman assigned with the medical company of the PNP
Regional Headquarters as Camp Catitigan, Davao City, and was
implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar Jr., and the
attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the infromations were
filed, RTC Davao issued as order suspending petitioner until the
termination of the case.
October 11, 1993, Himagan filed a motion to lift the order for his
suspension relying on the Civil service Decree that his suspension
should be limited to 90 days. But respondent Judge denied the
motion pointing out under section 47 of RA 6975, the accused shall
be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion
for reconsideration of the order was denied also, hence this
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent
Judge.
Held:
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975
is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning
than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP
charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one
day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The
suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The
second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not
qualify
or
limit
the
first
sentence.
The
two
can
stand
independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the
trial should be finished.
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous
reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting
of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation,
not in criminal cases, as here. In the instant case. Petitioner is
charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is
undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which
categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case
is terminated.

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on

preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of
imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against
him is terminated.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the
other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively
insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law
which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them,
as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or
privilege.
It
is
intended
to
eliminate
discrimination
and
oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real
differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal
protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such
as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification
is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the
purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same
class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the
classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's
equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and
reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose
such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious
nor unfounded.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Suspension of PNP
Members Charged with Grave Felonies
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder
of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother,
Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into
suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that:
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years
and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office

until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service
Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims
that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service
Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.
HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the
member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day
or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before
the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the
trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit
the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the
period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be
finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed
to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47
of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the
suspension of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the
phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests
that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within
that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without
justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases
where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed

without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not
without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to
dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal bycertiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus
ALMONTE et. al. VS VASQUEZ G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
Facts
The case is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum
and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Neria Rogado and Elisa Rivera,
as chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all
evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988 and to enjoin him from
enforcing his orders. An anonymous and unsigned letter purportedly written by an employee of the
EIIB, was sent to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished to several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman. In the letter were allegations as to the misuse of funds from
the savings of unfulfilled plantilla positions, among other forms of corruption and abuse of power. As
a response to the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied allegations. Petitioner Perez also
denied the issue for the savings realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM
only allotted for the remaining 947 personnel, and that the disbursement of funds for the plantilla
positions for overt and covert personnel had been cleared by COA. Jose F. Sano, the Graft
Investigation Officer of the Ombudsmans office found their responses unsatisfactory; therefore
he asked for authority to conduct an investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a
subpoena to petitioners, compelling them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses, as well as subpoena duces tecum to the chief of the EIIBs Accounting Division,
ordering him to bring all documents relating to Personal Service Funds for the year 1988 and all
evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. Petitioners then
moved to quash the subpoena (which was granted by the Ombudsman since no affidavit was filed
against petitioners) and the subpoena duces tecum, which was denied, since it was directed to the
Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the
Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all
documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary
vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."
Petitioners filed for a motion of reconsideration, which was denied.
Issue(s) 1. Whether or not an unsigned and unverified letter complained is an appropriate
case within the concept of the Constitution 2. Whether or not the documents in question are
classified, and therefore beyond the reach of public respondent s subpoena duces tecum.
Discussion

The petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents be made
personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in the decision. True,
the court recognizes the privilege based on state secrets. However, in the case at bar, there have
been no claims that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Nor is there a law or regulation which considers personnel
records of the EIIB as classified information. On the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293 states that
The only item of expenditure which should be treated as strictly confidential because it falls
under the category of classified information is that relating to purchase of information and payment
of rewards. And even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, the
decision would only justify ordering the inspection in camera, and not their nonproduction. Further,
documents in question are public documents and as petitioner claims, the disbursements by the EIIB
of funds for personal service has already been cleared by COA, then there should be no reason why
they should object to the examination of the documents by the respondent Ombudsman. As to the
issue whether or not an unsigned and unverified letter is an appropriate case, it is expressly
provided for in the Constitution that the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the complainants
of the actions taken and the result thereof.
Ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of
subpoenaed documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the
safeguards outlined in this decision.

Commissioner Jose T. Almonte, petitioner v Honorable Conrado Vasquez, respondent

Facts:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of
funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and
Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the
EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the
Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have
been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of
Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide
documents relating tWhether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena
duces tecum to provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.o
personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production
of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation
of intelligence reports and information. "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling
production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed
documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this
decision.

PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
Posted by kaye lee on 9:14 AM
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation
for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the
ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress
themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional
conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under
the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of

the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive.
the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

Duncan vs. Glaxo Case Digest

Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc.
G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004
FACTS:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment
signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing
company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management
find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may
transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for
employment outside of the company after 6 months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition.
Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of
interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of
conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign
from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the
Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied,
Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act
as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid...

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company is valid

RULING:

On Equal Protection

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other
confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under
the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the
company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.

It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the
state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US
Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with
the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner,
with due regard for the lot of the employee.

On Constructive Dismissal

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued

employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or
diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case