American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2009, 99:2, 466472

http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.2.466

International Aspects of Financial-Market Imperfections

The Aftermath of Financial Crises

By Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff *
War II period (provided the ongoing late-2000s
global financial crisis is taken into account).
Thus, this study of the aftermath of severe
financial crises includes a number of recent
emerging market cases to expand the relevant
set of comparators. Also included in the comparisons are two prewar developed country
episodes for which we have housing price and
other relevant data.
Broadly speaking, financial crises are protracted affairs. More often than not, the aftermath of severe financial crises share three
characteristics. First, asset market collapses
are deep and prolonged. Real housing price
declines average 35 percent stretched over six
years, while equity price collapses average 55
percent over a downturn of about three and a
half years. Second, the aftermath of banking
crises is associated with profound declines in
output and employment. The unemployment
rate rises an average of 7 percentage points
over the down phase of the cycle, which lasts
on average over four years. Output falls (from
peak to trough) an average of over 9 percent,
although the duration of the downturn, averaging roughly two years, is considerably shorter
than for unemployment. Third, the real value
of government debt tends to explode, rising an
average of 86 percent in the major postWorld
War II episodes. Interestingly, the main cause
of debt explosions is not the widely cited costs
of bailing out and recapitalizing the banking
system. Admittedly, bailout costs are difficult
to measure, and there is considerable divergence
among estimates from competing studies. But
even upper-bound estimates pale next to actual
measured rises in public debt. In fact, the big
drivers of debt increases are the inevitable collapse in tax revenues that governments suffer in
the wake of deep and prolonged output contractions, as well as often ambitious countercyclical
fiscal policies in advanced economies aimed at
mitigating the downturn.

A year ago, we presented a historical analysis

comparing the run-up to the 2007 US subprime
financial crisis with the antecedents of other
banking crises in advanced economies since
World War II (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008a). We
showed that standard indicators for the United
States, such as asset price inflation, rising leverage, large sustained current account deficits,
and a slowing trajectory of economic growth,
exhibited virtually all the signs of a country on
the verge of a financial crisisindeed, a severe
one. In this paper, we engage in a similar comparative historical analysis that is focused on the
aftermath of systemic banking crises.
In our earlier analysis, we deliberately
excluded emerging market countries from
the comparison set, in order not to appear
to engage in hyperbole. After all, the United
States is a highly sophisticated global financial
center. What can advanced economies possibly
have in common with emerging markets when
it comes to banking crises? In fact, as Reinhart
and Rogoff (2008b) demonstrate, the antecedents and aftermath of banking crises in rich
countries and emerging markets have a surprising amount in common. There are broadly
similar patterns in housing and equity prices,
unemployment, government revenues, and
debt. Furthermore, the frequency or incidence
of crises does not differ much historically, even
if comparisons are limited to the postWorld

Discussants: Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, University

of California-Berkeley; Andrew Atkeson, University of
California-Los Angeles; Joshua Aizenman, University of
California-Santa Cruz.

*Reinhart: School of Public Policy and Department

of Economics, 4105 Van Munching Hall, University of
Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 (e-mail: creinhar@
umd.edu); Rogoff: Economics Department, 232 Littauer
Center, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 021383001
(e-mail: krogoff@harvard.edu). The authors would like to
thank Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Vincent R. Reinhart
for helpful comments.
466

The Aftermath of Financial Crises

VOL. 99 NO. 2

467

23

Austria, 2008
Hungary, 2008
US,1929
UK, 2007

Ongoing

Iceland, 2007
Malaysia, 1997
Thailand, 1997
Korea, 1997
Ireland, 2007
Norway, 1899
Argentina, 2001
US, 2007
Sweden, 1991

Finland, 1991
Colombia, 1998
Philippines, 1997
Hong Kong, 1997
50

40

21
20

19
18
17
16

15
14
13
12

11
10

9
Spain, 1977
Historical average 8
7
Japan, 1992
6
Norway, 1987
Indonesia, 1997 5

35.5 percent

60

22

30

20

10

Percent decline

6 years

4
3
2
1

10

15

20

Duration in years

Figure 1. Past and Ongoing Real House Price Cycles and Banking Crises:
Peak-to-Trough Price Declines (left panel) and Years Duration of Downturn (right panel)
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis. Only major (systemic) banking crisis episodes are included, subject to data limitations. The historical average reported does not include ongoing crisis
episodes. For the ongoing episodes, the calculations are based on data through the following periods: October 2008, monthly,
for Iceland and Ireland; 2007, annually, for Hungary; and 2008:III, quarterly, for all others. Consumer price indices are used
to deflate nominal house prices.
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) and sources cited therein.

I. The Historical Comparison Group

Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a) included all the

major postwar banking crises in the developed
world (a total of 18) and put particular emphasis
on the ones dubbed the big five (Spain 1977,
Norway 1987, Finland 1991, Sweden 1991, and
Japan 1992). It is now beyond contention that the
present US financial crisis is severe by any metric. As a result, we now focus only on systemic
financial crises, including the big five developed economy crises plus a number of famous
emerging market episodes: the 19971998 Asian
crisis (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Thailand); Colombia 1998;
and Argentina 2001. These are cases where we
have all or most of the relevant data that allow
for thorough comparisons. Central to the analy-

sis is historical housing price data, which can be

difficult to obtain and are critical for assessing
the present episode.1 We also include two earlier historical cases for which we have housing
prices, Norway in 1899 and the United States in
1929.
II. The Downturn after the Crisis:
A Comparison of Depth and Duration

Figure 1 looks at the bust phase in housing price cycles surrounding banking crises,
1
In Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), we look at financial
crises in 66 countries over 200 years, emphasizing the
broad parallels between emerging markets and developed
countries, including, for example, the nearly universal runup in government debt.

468

MAY 2009

AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS

n.a.
Ongoing crises
Past crises

55.9 percent

100.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0

Percent decline

0.0

23

Norway, 1899
22
Argentina, 2001
21
Hong Kong, 1997
20
Norway, 1987
19
Sweden, 1991
18
UK, 2007
17
US, 2007
16
Spain, 2008
15
Hungary, 2008
14
Historical average
Philippines, 1997 13
12
Ireland, 2007
11
Japan, 1992
10
Finland, 1991
9
US, 1929
Colombia, 1998 8
7
Spain, 1977
Malaysia, 1997 6
Indonesia, 1997 5
4
Korea, 1997
3
Austria, 2008
Thailand, 1997 2
1
Iceland, 2007

3.4 years

Duration in years

Figure 2. Past and Ongoing Real Equity Price Cycles and Banking Crises:
Peak-to-Trough Price Declines (left panel) and Years Duration of Downturn (right panel)
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis. Only major (systemic) banking crisis episodes are included subject to data limitations. The historical average reported does not include ongoing crisis
episodes. For the ongoing episodes, the calculations are based on data through December 2, 2008. Consumer price indices
are used to deflate nominal equity prices.
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) and sources cited therein.

i ncluding the current episode in the United

States and a number of other countries now
experiencing banking crises: Austria, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Ongoing crises are in light shading; past crises
are in dark shading. The cumulative decline in
real housing prices from peak to trough averages 35.5 percent. 2 The most severe real housing price declines were experienced by Finland,
the Philippines, Colombia, and Hong Kong.
Their crashes were over 50 percent, measured
from peak to trough. The housing price decline
experienced by the United States to date during
the current episode (almost 28 percent according to the CaseShiller index) is already more

2
The historical average, which is shaded in black in the
diagram, does not include the ongoing crises.

than twice that registered in the US during the

Great Depression.
Notably, the duration of housing price declines
is quite long-lived, averaging roughly six years.
Even excluding the extraordinary experience
of Japan (with its 17 consecutive years of price
declines), the average remains over five years.
As Figure 2 illustrates, the equity price
declines that accompany banking crises are
far steeper than are housing price declines, if
somewhat shorter lived. The shorter duration of
the downturn when compared with real estate
prices is consistent with the observation that
equity prices are far less inertial. The average
historical decline in equity prices is 55.9 percent,
with the downturn phase of the cycle lasting 3.4
years. Notably, during the current cycle, Iceland
and Austria have already experienced peak-totrough equity price declines far exceeding the
average of the historical comparison group.

The Aftermath of Financial Crises

VOL. 99 NO. 2

Malaysia, 1997

7 percent

10

469

15

Indonesia, 1997

14

Japan, 1992

13

Thailand, 1997

12

Philippines, 1997

11

Hong Kong, 1997

10

Norway, 1987

Korea, 1997

Argentina, 2001

4.8 years

Historical average 6

15

20

Percent increase

25

Sweden, 1991

Spain, 1977

Colombia, 1998

Finland, 1991

US, 1929

10

12

Duration in years

Figure 3. Past Unemployment Cycles and Banking Crises: Trough-to-Peak

Percent Increase in the Unemployment Rate (left panel) and Years Duration of Downturn (right panel)
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis. Only major (systemic) banking crisis episodes are included, subject to data limitations. The historical average reported does not include ongoing crisis
episodes.
Sources: OECD, IMF, Historical Statistics of the United States (HSOUS), various country sources, and authors
calculations.

Figure 3 looks at increases in unemployment

rates across the historical comparison group. (As
the unemployment rate is classified as a lagging
indicator, we do not include the current crisis.)
On average, unemployment rises for almost five
years, with an increase in the unemployment
rate of about 7 percentage points. While none
of the postwar episodes rivals the rise in unemployment of over 20 percentage points experienced by the United States during the Great
Depression, the employment consequences of
financial crises are nevertheless strikingly large
in many cases.
It is interesting to note in Figure 3 that when it
comes to banking crises, the emerging markets,
particularly those in Asia, seem to do better in
terms of unemployment than do the advanced

economies. While there are well-known data

issues in comparing unemployment rates across
countries,3 the relatively poor performance in
advanced countries suggests the possibility that
greater (downward) wage flexibility in emerging markets may help cushion employment during periods of severe economic distress. The
gaps in the social safety net in emerging market
economies, when compared to industrial ones,
presumably also make workers more anxious to
avoid becoming unemployed.

3
Notably, widespread underemployment in many
emerging markets is not captured in the official unemployment statistics.

470

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Spain, 1977

Japan, 1992

Norway, 1987

Philippines, 1997 4
Sweden, 1991

Hong Kong, 1997 6

Colombia, 1998

Korea, 1997

Historical average9

9.3 percent

Malaysia, 1997

10

Finland, 1991

11

Thailand, 1997
Indonesia, 1997
Argentina, 2001
US, 1929
30

25

20

15

10

1.9 years

12

13

14

15

Percent decrease

Duration in years

Figure 4. Past Real Per Capita GDP Cycles and Banking Crises:
Peak-to-Trough Decline in Real GDP (left panel) and Years Duration of Downturn (right panel)
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis. Only major (systemic) banking crisis episodes are included, subject to data limitations. The historical average reported does not include ongoing crisis
episodes. Total GDP, in millions of 1990 US$ (converted at Geary Khamis PPPs) divided by midyear population.

Sources: Total Economy Database (TED), Historical Statistics of the United States (HSOUS), and authors calculations.

Figure 4 looks at the cycles in real per capita

GDP around banking crises. The average magnitude of the decline, at 9.3 percent, is stunning. Admittedly, for the postWorld War II
period, the declines in real GDP are smaller for
advanced economies than for emerging market
economies. A probable explanation for the more
severe contractions in emerging market economies is that they are prone to abrupt reversals
in the availability of foreign credit. When foreign capital comes to a sudden stop, to use the
phrase coined by Guillermo Calvo, Alejandro
Izquierdo, and Rudy Loo-Kung (2006), economic activity heads into a tailspin.4

4
When no foreign financing is possible, emerging markets have seen consumption and investment implode during
severe financial crises.

Compared to unemployment, the cycle from

peak to trough in GDP is much shorter, only two
years. Presumably, this is partly because potential GDP growth is positive, and we are measuring only absolute changes in income, not gaps
relative to potential output. Even so, the recessions surrounding financial crises have to be
considered unusually long compared to normal
recessions that typically last less than a year.5
Indeed, multiyear recessions typically occur only
in economies that require deep restructuring,
such as Britain in the 1970s (prior to Thatcher),
Switzerland in the 1990s, and Japan post-1992
(the last due not only to its financial collapse, but
also to the need to reorient the economy in light
5

See International Monetary Fund (2002, chap. 3).

The Aftermath of Financial Crises

VOL. 99 NO. 2

471

Malaysia, 1997
Mexico, 1994

Index = 100 in year of crisis

Japan, 1992
Norway, 1987
Philippines, 1997
Korea, 1997
Sweden, 1991
Thailand, 1997

186.3 (an 86 percent increase)

Historical average
Spain, 1977
Indonesia, 1997
Chile, 1980
Finland, 1991
Colombia, 1998
100

150

200

250

300

Figure 5. Cumulative Increase in Real Public Debt in the Three Years Following the Banking Crisis
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis. Only major (systemic) banking crisis episodes are included, subject to data limitations. The historical average reported does not include ongoing crisis
episodes, which are omitted altogether, as these crises begin in 2007 or later, and debt stock comparison here is with three
years after the beginning of the banking crisis.
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) and sources cited therein.

of Chinas rise). Banking crises, of course, usually require painful restructuring of the financial system, and so are an important example of
this general principle.
Figure 5 shows the rise in real government
debt in the three years following a banking crisis. The deterioration in government finances
is striking, with an average debt rise of over 86
percent. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), taking
advantage of newly unearthed historical data
on domestic debt, show that this same buildup
in government debt has been a defining characteristic of the aftermath of banking crises for
over a century. We look at percentage increase
in debt, rather than debt-to-GDP, because sometimes steep output drops would complicate
interpretation of debtGDP ratios. As Reinhart
and Rogoff (2008b) note, the characteristic,
huge buildups in government debt are driven
mainly by sharp falloffs in tax revenue and, in
many cases, big surges in government spending to fight the recession. The much ballyhooed
bank bailout costs are, in several cases, only a

r elatively minor contributor to postfinancial

crisis debt burdens.
III. Concluding Remarks

An examination of the aftermath of severe

financial crises shows deep and lasting effects
on asset prices, output, and employment.
Unemployment rises and housing price declines
extend out for five and six years, respectively.
On the encouraging side, output declines last
only two years on average. Even recessions
sparked by financial crises do eventually end,
albeit almost invariably accompanied by massive increases in government debt.
How relevant are historical benchmarks for
assessing the trajectory of the current global
financial crisis? On the one hand, the authorities today have arguably more flexible monetary
policy frameworks, thanks particularly to a less
rigid global exchange rate regime. Some central
banks have already shown an aggressiveness to
act that was notably absent in the 1930s, or in

472

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AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS

the latter-day Japanese experience. On the other

hand, one would be wise not to push too far the
conceit that we are smarter than our predecessors. A few years back many people would have
said that improvements in financial engineering
had done much to tame the business cycle and
limit the risk of financial contagion.
Since the onset of the current crisis, asset
prices have tumbled in the United States and
elsewhere along the tracks laid down by historical precedent. The analysis of the post-crisis outcomes in this paper for unemployment,
output, and government debt provide sobering
benchmark numbers for how the crisis will continue to unfold. Indeed, these historical comparisons were based on episodes that, with the
notable exception of the Great Depression in
the United States, were individual or regional
in nature. The global nature of the crisis will
make it far more difficult for many countries to
grow their way out through higher exports, or to
smooth the consumption effects through foreign
borrowing. In such circumstances, the recent
lull in sovereign defaults is likely to come to an

end. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) highlight,

defaults in emerging market economies tend to
rise sharply when many countries are simultaneously experiencing domestic banking crises.
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