ATUN v.

NUEZ
GR No.L-8018, October 26, 1955
87 PHIL 762
FACTS: Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the plaintiffs,
her neices and nephews, a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun
to Silvestra Nuez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for cultivation, for which
Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the harvest as rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over
the land to defendant Eusebio Nuez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs'
ownership or to deliver their share of the produce. The defendant turn sold the land to
his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it
belonged, not to Nuez, but to plaintiffs. There was no prior judicial declaration,
however, that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the decedent.
ISSUE: Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?
HELD: Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name
of Estefania Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It
is of record that Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her only
surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is
settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action arising out of a right
belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial declaration of their status as
such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the
decedent's estate.
LEDESMA
GR
66 PHIL 547

No.L-44837,

v.
November

23,

MCLACHLIN
1938

FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as
heirs. Plaintiff Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her
mother, sued to declare her as compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two
years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he left some personal and real
properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was instituted and a court order
declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following such
court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory note
then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of
Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the
defendants represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of
his father Eusebio.
ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father from her
grandfather's estate?
HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather
by representation are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their
deceased father, who died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the
provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother
who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of
representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted
by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the

Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received

with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties
received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness
of their father from whom they did not inherit anything.
LIMJOCO
GR
80 PHIL 776

v.

INTESTATE
No.L-770,

ESTATE
April

OF

PEDRO
27,

FRAGRANTE
1948

FACTS: Petitioner opposed the issuance by the Public Service Commission of a certificate
of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan to the
respondent despite his demise, contending that the Commission erred in allowing the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter
as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently
granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of
law.
ISSUE: Is the decision of the Commission correct and with basis?
HELD: Yes. If the respondent had not died, there can be no question that he would have
had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion.
No one would have denied him that right... The aforesaid right of respondent to
prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse
through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which right
was a property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied
his application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the
application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice
plant.
USON
GR
92 PHIL 530

No.L-4963,

v.

January

DEL

29,

ROSARIO
1953

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria
Uson, the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five
parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-lawspouse and her children. As a defense, defendant presented a deed of separation
agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson containing among others an statement
giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to any
inheritance
from
Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are
illegitimate children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any
successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and
rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law
accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these
successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his
widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death"
(Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question in view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her
husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had
entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot
be
the
subject
of
a
contract
nor
can
it
be
renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be
given retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which
are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only
when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin...
As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson
over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband
and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the
rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil
Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate
children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested
right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
LITONJUA
GR
No.L-4170,
90 PHIL 757

January

v.

31,

1952,

MONTILLA
90PHIL757

FACTS: Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of
a sum of P4,039. Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner
then proceeded to file a claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin
Montilla Sr, father of the deceased. The estate has not yet been properly probated.
ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the
debtor's deceased parent?
HELD: No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it
was held that the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his
claim out of the property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the
debts of the testate or intestate have been paid and when the net assets that are
divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of the deceased must first be
paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a person who is not a
creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in the
proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the
succession. The foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar,
because the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he
seeks to collect his claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the
net assets of the intestate estate have been determined.