ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 1

1. Province of Tayabas v. Perez (page 402) Sec 9

THE PROVINCE OF TAYABAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SIMEON PEREZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
Provincial Fiscal Valdes y Nieto of Tayabas, for Appellant.
Marcelino Lontok, for appellee Oppus.
No appearance, for other appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION IS THE MONEY EQUIVALENT OF THE LOSS SUFFERED BY THE
OWNER OF THE THING EXPROPRIATED. The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of
the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever
it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has
always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation (Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil., 286).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COLLECTION OF THE EXPENSES FOR THE TRANSFER AND RECONSTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS. It
is unjust to compel the appellant to defray the expenses incurred in the transfer and reconstruction of the
expropriated houses in another place by the owners thereof, who, strictly speaking, already cease to be so from
the time they are paid the price thereof. To do so would mean double compensation, or in other words, it
would be equivalent to giving the appellees, for their expropriated houses, more than the money value thereof.
The appellees have no right to collect at the same time the just prices of their houses and the cost of their
transfer and reconstruction in another place. At most, they are entitled to either one or the other, and nothing
more.
DECISION
DIAZ, J.:
Among the various property owners against whom the plaintiff filed its complaint for expropriation in the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, were Florentino San Gil, who died in the course of the trial and was
substituted by Josefa R. Oppus, Jose Cabrera, Josefa Villareal de Meric, Hilarion Castor, Rafaela Martinez, Enrica
Malubag and Bernardino Maao. After it had been proven that the plaintiff had a perfect right to the
expropriation sought by it, the lower court rendered judgment granting it said expropriation and ordering it to
pay to the above-named defendants, by way of indemnity, the following sums:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1)
To Josefa R. Oppus, for her building known as "Esperanza Hotel", P1,500, the value thereof, plus P700
for its removal and reconstruction in a different place;
(2)
to Jose Cabrera, for his house, P800, the value thereof, plus P200 for expenses of removing and
reconstructing it in a different place;
(3)
To Josefa Villareal de Meric, for her house, P400, the value of his expropriated house, plus P25 for
expenses of removing and reconstructing it in another place;
(4)
To Hilarion Castor, P40, the value of his expropriated house, plus P25 for expenses of removing and
reconstructing it in another place;
(5)
To Rafaela Martinez, P20, the value of her house, plus P10 for expenses of removing and
reconstructing it in another place;
(6)
To Enrica Malubag, P100, the value of her house, plus P50, also removing and reconstructing it in
another place;
(7)
To Bernardino Maao, P25, the value of his house, plus P20 for its removal and reconstruction in
another place.
Not satisfied with the judgment rendered as above-stated, the plaintiff appealed therefrom, raising, by means

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 2

of its sole assignment of alleged error, the question whether or not the above-named defendants, in addition to
recovering the price of their respective houses, are entitled to the additional compensation granted them in
said judgment, for the transfer and reconstruction of said houses in other places.
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a
just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment,
than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and
complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation (Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil., 286).
Now then, it appears from reading the decision of the lower court that, to arrive at the conclusion reached by
it, said court has taken into consideration the recommendation of the commissioners on assessment who, to
arrive in turn at the conclusion reached by them, not only relied upon the evidence presented to them but also
inspected each and every one of the houses expropriated in order to know in detail their respective conditions
and extent of conservation. It was by basing their opinion upon their knowledge of the facts obtained as abovestated, that they decided that the expropriated houses of the appellees had, at the time of the expropriation,
such values as those stated in their report, which are the same ones fixed by the lower court in its judgment, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The house "Esperanza Hotel" of Josefa R. Oppus, P1,500;
The house of Jose Cabrera, P800;
The house of Josefa Villareal de Meric, P400;
The house of Hilarion Castor, P40;
The house of Rafaela Martinez, P20;
The house of Enrica Malubag, P100; and
The house of Bernardino Maao, P25.
The foregoing sums were considered as the prices of the appellees houses purchased by the appellant, and like
in any other case of purchase, the purchaser, that is, the appellant, may well be said to have acquired the
expropriated houses. The truth, however, is that it was not the intention of the appellant to acquire them in
order to become the owner thereof, but in order to have them removed from the expropriated place, because
they did not and do not answer the purpose for which the expropriation case was instituted. Instead of keeping
the houses or all or part of the materials employed in their construction, it waives that right and allows the
owners thereof to take them to another place. After considering the question from this angle, it appears clearly
unjust to compel the appellant to defray the expenses incurred in their transfer and reconstruction in another
place by the owners of said houses, who, strictly speaking, already cease to be so from the time they are paid
the price thereof. To do so would mean double compensation, or in other words, it would be equivalent to
giving the appellees, for their expropriated houses, more than the money value thereof. The appellees have no
right to collect at the same time the just prices of their houses and the cost of their transfer and reconstruction
in another place. At most, they are entitled to either one or the other, and nothing more.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is modified, by eliminating therefrom that part
granting the appellees the right to collect from the appellant the expenses for the transfer and reconstruction
of their respective houses, and it is affirmed in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial and Laurel, JJ., concur.
DIGEST: NONE

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 3

2. Tuason v. Land Tenure Administration 31 SCRA 413 (page 424) Sec 9

G.R. No. L-21064 June 30, 1970
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondentsappellants.
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for petitioner-appellee.
Besa, Aguilar and Gancia, Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C.
Zaballero, Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon and Special Attorney Magno B. Pablo for respondents-appellants.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
From our decision of February 18, 1970, reversing the judgment of the lower court holding that Republic Act
No. 2616 as amended is unconstitutional, printed motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner-appellee
on March 31, 1970 reiterating its arguments as to its alleged invalidity for being violative of the due process
and equal protection guarantees. On May 27, 1970, a detailed opposition to such a motion for reconsideration
was filed by the Solicitor General, the Honorable Felix Q. Antonio, on behalf of respondents-appellants. Then
came a rejoinder of petitioner, on June 15, 1970, to the pleading of the Solicitor General. The motion for
reconsideration is thus ripe for determination. With due recognition of the vigor and earnestness with which
petitioner argued its motion, based on what it considered to be our applicable decisions, the Court cannot
grant the same. Our decision stands.
1.
It was a unanimous Court that could not locate a constitutional infirmity vitiating Republic Act No.
2616 directing the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. There are points of differences in the
three written opinions, but there is none as to the challenged legislative act being invulnerable on the grounds
therein asserted to justify its sought for nullification. While, to repeat, petitioner apparently remains
unconvinced, standing fast on the contentions to which it would seek to impart greater plausibility, still the
intent of the framers of the Constitutional Convention, as shown not only by the specific provisions allowing
the expropriation of landed estates, but also by the social justice provision as reflected in our decisions, save
possibly Republic vs. Baylosis, 1 preclude a favorable action on the impassioned plea of petitioner for a
reconsideration of our decision. At any rate, petitioner-appellee can take comfort in the separate opinion of
Justice Teehankee, with which four other members of the Court, including the Chief Justice, are in agreement,
to enable it to raise questions, the answers to which, if its view would be sustained, would certainly afford
sufficient protection to what it believes to be an unconstitutional infringement on its property rights.
2.
It may not be amiss to make more explicit and categorical what was held in our opinion that Section 4
of Republic Act No. 2616 prohibiting a suit for ejectment proceedings or the continuance of one already
commenced even in the absence of expropriation proceedings, is unconstitutional, as held in Cuatico v. Court
of Appeals. 2 Greater emphasis likewise should be laid on our holding that while an inaccuracy apparent on the
face of the challenged statute as to the ownership of the Tatalon Estate does not suffice to call for its invalidity,
still to erase even a fanciful doubt on the matter, the statement therein found in Section 1 of the Act that in
addition to petitioner-appellee, Gregorio Araneta & Co., Inc. and Florencio Deudor, et al. are included, cannot
be understood as conferring on any juridical or natural persons, clearly not entitled thereto, dominical rights
over such property in question.
3.
In the aforesaid decision of Cuatico v. Court of Appeals, reference was made to the amendatory Act,
Republic Act No. 3453 to Section 4 as it originally was worded in Republic Act No. 2616, the amendment
consisting of the following: "Upon approval of this amendatory Act, no ejectment proceedings shall be
instituted or prosecuted against the present occupants of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and no ejectment
proceedings already commenced shall be continued, and such lot or any portion thereof shall not be sold by
the owners of said estate to any person other than the present occupant without the consent of the latter given
in a public instrument." 3 The question before the, Court, according, to the opinion penned by Justice Bautista
Angelo, was: "Are the provisions embodied in the amendatory Act which prescribe that upon approval of said

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 4

Act no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against any occupant of any lot in the Tatalon
Estate, or that no ejectment proceedings already commenced shall be continued, constitutional and valid such
that it may be said that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in denying the petitions for suspension filed
by petitioners.?" 4
Then came this portion of the opinion: "This is not the first time that this Court has been called upon to pass
upon the validity of a provision which places a landowner in the situation of losing his dominical rights over
the property without due process or compensation. We refer to the provisions of Republic Act 2616 before they
were amended by Republic Act No. 3453. Note that, as originally provided, Republic Act No. 2616 prohibited the
institution of an ejectment proceeding against any occupant of any lot in the Tatalon Estate or the continuance
of one that has already been commenced after the expropriation proceedings shall have been initiated and
during the pendency of the same. On the surface this provision would appear to be valid if the same is carried
out in the light of the provisions of our Constitution relative to cases of eminent domain, for in that case the
rights of the owner of the property to be expropriated are protected. But then an attempt came to circumvent
that provision in an effort to safeguard or protect the interest of some occupants of the land, which reached
this Court for adjudication, as when some occupants attempted to block their ejectment upon the plea that the
government would soon start expropriation proceedings even if no sufficient funds were appropriated to
provide compensation to the owner and even if it was not in a position to take possession of the estate, and so
the owner contested the attempt invoking its rights under the Constitution. And this Court upheld the
contention of the owner by declaring the attempt unconstitutional." 5
The conclusion that inevitably was called for is worded thus: "It is, therefore, imperative that we declare, as we
now do, that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453 which prohibits the filing of an ejectment proceeding, or the
continuance of one that has already been commenced, even in the absence of expropriation proceedings
offends our Constitution and, hence, is unenforceable." 6
What we said then, we reaffirm now, as was indeed evident in our decision sought to be reconsidered but
perhaps not given the importance which, in the opinion of petitioner-appellee, it was entitled to. Nothing in
our decision can be taken to detract in any wise from the binding force and effect of the Cuatico ruling which
declared unconstitutional Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453.
4.
We likewise ruled that the mistake imputed to Congress in apparently recognizing the rights of
ownership in entities or individuals not possessed of the same could not invalidate the challenged statute. In
the same way, it cannot be made the basis for non-existent rights of ownership to the property in question. It is
in that sense that, as noted in our decision, no fear need be entertained that thereby the petitioner-appellee
would be adversely affected. The government certainly would not pay to a party other than the owner the
claim for just compensation which, under the Constitution, it is required to meet. Neither, then can any party
who is not in that situation have any standing whatsoever. This much is beyond dispute. To repeat, the
apprehension entertained by petitioner-appellee, perhaps indicative of it, excess of caution, is without legal
foundation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for the reconsideration of our decision of February 18, 1970, filed by petitionerappellee, is denied.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
DIGEST:
Facts:
On August 3, 1959, Republic Act no. 2616 took effect. The act states that the Tatalon Estate jointly owned by J.M.
Tuason and Co. Inc, Gregorio Araneta and Co. Inc., and Florencio Deudor et al was authorized to be
expropriated. More than a year later Land Tenure Administration was directed by the executive secretary to
institute the expropriation of the aforesaid property. Appellee thereupon filed a prohibition with a preliminary
injunction to prevent respondents from instituting the expropriation. The lower court decided that the said act
was unconstitutional and a writ of prohibition was granted to the appellee. Respondent appealed to C.A.
Issue:
Whether the RA 2616 as amended by 3454 is constitutional? YES

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 5

Held:
The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963, holding that RA 2616 is unconstitutional as
amended by RA 3454 is reversed i.e. the expropriation is constitutional
Rationale (as was stated in each:
1. Judicial Review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear implication from constitutional provisions. It
may be exercised if an affected part files the appropriate suit to test the validity of a legislative act, executive
act, or municipal ordinance for that matter.# The constitution is the supreme law and is binding on all
governmental agencies. Failure to comply provides a ground to nullify a governmental measure
2. The question if one of constitutional construction (of interpreting the constitution). The task is to ascertain
the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in adopting the Constitution. It is assumed that
that the words in the constitutional provisions express the objectivity sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed in which case the significance
attached to them prevails. This case is such a case and is therefore one of minimal construction. The congress
has the legislative will to expropriate and subdivide lands it deems to be fit for sale. Moreover, it cannot be
denied that congress has the capacity to exercise such authority. The language employed is not swathed in
obscurity (because congress has the legislative power as stated in the constitution). It is presumed that the
constitution suffices to govern the life of the people not only at the present time but also in the indefinite
future. The constitution though does not give rigid answers but is flexible and accommodates the problems the
future may pose.
The constitution is dynamic in nature and not static. It reflects the socialpolitical environment of the times. It
adapts and changes. Although looking at the historical reasons for why an act was passed would be helpful, it is
not enough.
4. There should be no fear that the constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is limitless. There is to be
just compensation. This means the equivalent for the value of the property at its taking. The market value of
the land taken is just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled.
5. According to the Chief Justice, acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only
under pain of nullity.
6. It is the failure to provide equal protection of the laws (Article 3, Section 1, par.1 of the Constitution) that
rests the case of the petitioner. Since the statute in question, R.A. 2616, singles out the Tatalon Estate for
expropriation, the petitioner is in the right to assert a denial of equal protection. However, there is nothing to
prevent Congress in view of the public funds at its disposal to follow a system of priorities, especially when a
serious social or economic problem is at hand. In the bills Explanatory Note, Congress claims that given the
problem of Quezon Citys growing population, expropriating the land will help solve the overpopulation and
implement the land-for-the-landless program of the present Administration. Singling out Tatalon Estate
doesnt stigmatize the effort of the statute as denial of equal protection.
7. On the occasion of expropriation, whatever contractual rights might be possessed by vendors and vendees
could be asserted and accorded the appropriate constitutional protection.
8. The statute of concern can stand the test of validity. If it were otherwise, then the judiciary may lend itself
susceptible to the charge that in its appraisal of governmental measures with social and economic implications,
its decisions are characterized by the narrow, unyielding insistence on the primacy of property rights,
contrary to what the Constitution ordains.
TEEHANKEE, concurring and dissenting
Concurs with main opinion to reverse the decision of the lower court dated January 10, 1963
respondents may now properly file the expropriation proceedings
Doesnt agree with the court that the constitutional power of the Congress for the expropriation of lands is
well-nigh all embracing.
3. Manotok v. NHA (page 428) Sec9
SECOND DIVISION
PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, SPS. EDUARDO GO and PACITA GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, ELISA MANOTOK, MIGUEL
A.B. SISON, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
- versus NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,* Respondent.

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 6

G.R. No. 140377

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 14, 2008
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition for review on certiorari raises the question of from what date should just compensation of
the subject properties sought to be expropriated be reckoned whether it is from the taking of the property or
on the filing of the complaint.
Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) took possession in 1978 of properties belonging to petitioners
Patricia L. Tiongson, et al. pursuant to P.D. No. 1669, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE
PROPERTY KNOWN AS THE TAMBUNTING ESTATE REGISTERED UNDER TCT NOS. 119059, 122450, 122459,
122452 AND LOT NOS. 1-A, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-F, 1-G AND 1-H OF (LRC) PSD-230517 (PREVIOUSLY COVERED BY TCT
NO. 119058) OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA AND FOR THE SALE AT COST OF THE LOTS THEREIN TO
THE BONA FIDE OCCUPANTS AND OTHER SQUATTERS FAMILIES AND TO UPGRADE THE SAME, AND
AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE (Underscoring supplied), and of properties
belonging to Patricia Tiongson, et al. pursuant to P.D. No. 1670, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE EXPROPRIATION
OF THE PROPERTY ALONG THE ESTERO DE SUNOG-APOG FORMERLY CONSISTING OF LOTS NOS. 55-A, 55-B AND
55-C, BLOCK 2918 OF THE SUBDIVISION PLAN PSD-11746, COVERED BY TCT NOS. 49286, 49287 AND 49288,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA AND FOR THE SALE AT COST OF THE LOTS THEREIN TO
THE BONA FIDE OCCUPANTS AND OTHER SQUATTER FAMILIES AND TO UPGRADE THE SAME, AND
AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE (underscoring supplied).
In G.R. Nos. L-55166, Elisa R. Manotok, et al.v. National Housing Authority et al., and 55167, Patricia Tiongson et
al. v. National Housing Authority, et al., this Court, by Decision of May 21, 1987,[1] held that Presidential Decree
Numbers 1669 and 1670, which respectively proclaimed the Tambunting Estate and
the Estero de Sunog-Apoy area expropriated, are declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void, they
being violative of the therein petitioners right to due process of law. The decision had become final and
executory.
Subsequently or on September 14, 1987, NHA filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint
against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-42018, which was later amended, for expropriation of parcels
of land part of those involved in G.R. No. L-55166.
By Order of April 29, 1997,[2] Branch 41 of the Manila RTC[3] to which the complaint for expropriation was
raffled brushed aside a previous order dated June 15, 1988 of the then Presiding Judge of said branch of the
RTC[4] and held that the determination of just compensation of the properties should be reckoned from the
date of filing of NHAs petition or on September 14, 1987. The NHA moved to reconsider the said April 29, 1997
Order of the trial court, contending that the determination of the just compensation should be reckoned from
the time it took possession of the properties in 1978. The trial court, by Order of August 5, 1997,[5] denied NHAs
motion for reconsideration.
The NHA assailed the above-stated trial courts Orders of April 29, 1997 and August 5, 1997 via petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, by the challenged Decision of June 16, 1999,[6]
reversed and set aside the trial courts orders and held that the just compensation should be based on the actual
taking of the property in 1978. Thus it disposed:

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 7

WHEREFORE, the lower courts Order dated April 29, 1997 ruling that the amount of just compensation should
be based on the date of the filing of the complaint in 1987, as well as the Order dated August 5, 1997 denying
the motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and the appointed commissioners are ordered to reconvene and submit to the court a recommendation on the amount of just compensation of subject property
based on the actual taking of the property in 1978. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision but the same was denied by Resolution
of October 7, 1999,[7] hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
In its Petition for Expropriation filed before the RTC on September 14, 1987, the NHA alleged, inter alia, that:
xxxx
9. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1669 providing for the expropriation of the subject properties and
granting the plaintiff the authority to immediately take possession, control and disposition, with power of
demolition of the subject properties, plaintiff took and had been in possession of the subject properties, until
Presidential Decree No. 1669 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case entitled Patricia
Tiongson, et al. vs. National Housing Authority and Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 5516[6].[8] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) x x x,
and prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that:
1. An order be issued provisionally fixing the value of said properties in the amount equal to the assessed value
of the same and authorizing the plaintiff to enter or take possession and/or placing the plaintiff in possession
of the parcels of land described above; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
In the present petition, petitioners argue that since P.D. No. 1669 pursuant to which NHA took possession of
their properties in 1978 was declared unconstitutional, [n]ecessarily, in thereafter resurrecting the filing of
another (sic) complaint for expropriation of the same properties, it would be unlawful . . . to fix the reckoning
period for purposes of computing the just compensation . . . based on [NHAs] previous unlawful taking of said
properties in 1978. They thus maintain that the trial courts Order of April 29, 1997 holding that the
determination of the just compensation of their properties should be reckoned from the date NHA filed the
petition before the RTC on September 14, 1987 is in order.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In declaring, in its challenged Decision, that the determination of just compensation should be reckoned from
NHAs taking of the properties in 1978, the appellate court simply relied on Annex C of NHAs petition before it,
the Order dated June 15, 1988 of the then Presiding Judge of the trial court reading:
In this condemnation proceedings, by agreement of the parties, the total value of the properties to be
condemned is hereby fixed at P14,264,465.00, provisionally, and considering the admission of the parties that
plaintiff has taken possession of the properties in question sometime in 1978, or long before the complaint in
this case was filed, plaintiff is hereby authorized to retain possession thereof upon its depositing with the City
Treasurer of Manila the aforesaid sum of P14,264,465.00 subject to the Orders of this Court and forthwith
submit the Official Receipt of the said deposit to this Court,[9] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
and thus concluded that the parties admitted that [NHA] took possession of the subject properties as early as
1978. The appellate court reached that conclusion, despite its recital of the antecedents of the case including
herein petitioners sustained moves, even before the trial court, in maintaining that the reckoning of just
compensation should be from the date of filing of the petition for expropriation on September 14, 1987.
The earlier-quoted allegations of the body and prayer in NHAs Petition for Expropriation filed before the RTC

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 8

constitute judicial admissions[10] of NHA that it possessed the subject properties until this Courts
declaration, in its above-stated Decision in G.R. No. L-55166 promulgated on May 21, 1987, that P.D. No. 1669
pursuant to which NHA took possession of the properties of petitioners in 1978 was unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void. These admissions, the appellate court either unwittingly failed to consider or escaped
its notice.
Petitioners even brought to the appellate courts attention, in their Motion for Reconsideration[11] of its
Decision of June 16, 1999, the fact that they had called the trial courts attention to NHAs allegation-admissions
in the body and prayer of its petition. But the appellate court, by Resolution of October 7, 1999,[12] denied
petitioners motion upon the ground that it raised substantially the same issues that were already considered
and passed upon in arriving at its decision. The appellate courts June 16, 1999 decision glaringly shows,
however, that the matter of judicial admissions of NHA in the body and prayer in its petition were not
considered by it.
Following then Rule 67, Section 4 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court
may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
vis a vis the factual backdrop of the case, the just compensation of petitioners properties must be determined
as of the date of . . . the filing of [NHAs] complaint on September 14, 1987.
WHEREFORE, the challenged June 16, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
April 29, 1997 Order of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 87-42018 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST:
FACTS
Two petitions assailing the constitutionality of PD 1669 and 1670 (expropriation of Tambunting Estate and
property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog).
In 1977, President issued LOI No. 555 nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program (SIR) and LOI
No. 557 slum improvement as a national housing plicy
Governor of MM issued EO No. 6-77 Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) which includes
the aforementioned properties as they were identified as blighted communities
In 1978, a fire razed the Tambunting Estate. Government made an announcement that property would be
acquired for the victims through the NHA. Negotiations did not materialize.
1978 PD 1810: all areas identified by MM LGUs and approved by the Ministry of Human Settlements to be
included in the ZIP. Includes two properties here.
1980 PD 1669 and 1670: declared the two properties expropriated
NHA to immediately take possession
Compensation not more than 17m and 8m respectively
NHA asked register of deeds to cancel old titles and replace them with new ones issued to the Republic of the
Philippines. NHA also informed petitioners that amounts had been deposited to PNB for part of their
compensation for the expropriation. Lesses were told by the NHA to stop paying rentals to the petitioners.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUES/HELD
WON direct expropriation of the lots in question violated constitutional rights of the owners of the lots? YES.

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 9

RATIONALE
Power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such
power only serve to limit its exercise to protect the individual against whose proper the power is enforced.
Taking must be for public use
Payment of just compensation
Due process must be observed
PDs are uniquely unfair procedures
No opportunity for owners to plead or contest, no interest for balance of payments, no payment was made
before taking and resolutions by NHA are out of reach of judicial review.
Basis of eminent domain is necessity of a public character.
Reasonable or public necessity
In this case, there was no reason given in the PDs for the valid expropriation of the lots for housing projects.
They were valuable commercial lots. Beneficiaries of the housing project would have just rented out or sold
their lots to wealthy merchants. Public use and social justice ends would not be served.
PD 1669 allows NHA to use part of the Tambunting Estate for commercial use to defray development costs of
the housing program. Private property cannot be expropriated for private purposes.
Sunog-Apog area was not exactly blighted. There was no justification provided for the conclusion of the
PD/ZIP.
Government should have focus on truly blighted areas and squatter infested communities first.
In just compensation, the value of the property should be fixed at the time of taking
Fixing a maximum amount deprives owners of the opportunity to present higher value. PDs were issued in
1980 but cut off was set in 1978, when they were determined to be part of the housing program.
Owners must be informed with formal notice, not mere public announcements.
Time of reckoning is when orders are given notice.
Valuation made by a local assessor is not enough, other factors must be considered.
Assessor cannot substitute Courts judgment. This is violative of due process and eminent domain provisions in
the Constitution.
4. RAMAS V. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS (page 457) Sec 10
G.R. No. L-19555

May 29, 1964

MATEO DE RAMAS, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS and GERONIMO B. RAMOS, respondents.
Carlos P. Torres for petitioner.
J. M. Dator and T. T. Riel for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of with prohibition to review and set aside a decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Hon. Guillermo B. Santos, presiding, approving a petition of Geronimo B. Ramos, tenant, against his
landlord, Mateo de Ramas, for the change of their tenancy from share to leasehold tenancy.
Respondent Geronimo B. Ramos is the tenant of herein petitioner Mateo de Ramas on a 2-1/2 hectare land at
Muzon Naic, Cavite, under a verbal share tenancy contract at 70-30. On June 22, 1960, or one month before the
beginning of the agricultural year 1960-1961, Ramos informed petitioner of his desire to change their contract
from that of share tenancy to leasehold tenancy. Petitioner refused to grant the request insisting on the former
70-30 sharing basis, so on May 23, 1961 Ramos filed a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations praying that
he be allowed to change their tenancy contract from share to leasehold, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended. Petitioner opposed the petition as groundless and violating
their gentleman's agreement.
During the pendency of the case respondent Ramos moved to suspend the proceedings on the ground that the
constitutionality of Section 14 Republic Act No. 1199 has been raised, among other issues, before the Supreme
Court in the case of Juliano v. CAR, et al., G.R. No. L-17627, and that to continue with the case would only result
in loss of time, money, etc., if the Supreme Court declare Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 unconstitutional. This

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 10

motion was denied in an order dated September 22, 1961. On December 14, 1961 Ramos presented his evidence;
but Ramas waived the presentation of his evidence, manifesting that he would appeal whatever decision the
agrarian court might render. On March 1, 1962, respondent court rendered judgment upholding the
constitutionality of Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, citing Our ruling in Pineda, et al. vs. Pingul and CIR, G.R.
No. L-5565, September 30, 1952, where We upheld the constitutionality or validity of Act No. 4054, as amended
by Com. Act 178 and Republic Act 34.
Against the above judgment the present petition is brought before Us, petitioner praying that after proper
hearing, Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 be declared unconstitutional and that the writ of prohibition prayed
for be granted.
Petitioner first questions the agrarian court's action in proceeding with the hearing of CAR Case No. 246, Cavite
'61, deciding the same, and ordering execution of its decision despite, the pendency before Us of a similar case
raising the constitutionality of Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 1199. We find no error or irregularity in the court's
proceeding with the case. The mere fact that the constitutionality of a law is raised in another case pending in
the Supreme Court is not a valid reason for suspending the proceedings in this case. Laws are considered valid
until declared unconstitutional, and until then courts are in duty bound to enforce them. (Magtibay v. Alikpala,
G.R. No. L-17590 and Juliano v. CAR, G.R. No. L-17727, both promulgated on November 29, 1962.)
The present suit, specifically concerns the validity of Section 14 of the said Act which is as follows:
SEC. 14. Change of System. The tenant shall have the right to change the tenancy contract from one of share
tenancy to leasehold tenancy and vice versa and from one crop sharing arrangement to another of the share
tenancy. If the share tenancy contract is in writing and is duly registered, the right to change from one crop
sharing arrangement to another may be exercised at least one month before the beginning of the next
agricultural year after the expiration of the period of the contract. In the absence of any registered written
contract, the right may be exercised at least one month before the agricultural year when the change shall be
effected. (As amended by Section 4, R.A. 2263.)
The above provision is attacked on the ground of unconstitutionality in that it impairs the obligation of
contracts, because after a contract of share tenancy has been adopted between the landlord and the tenant, the
latter is empowered, notwithstanding said contract, to change it into leasehold tenancy. The question
presented makes a review of tenancy laws useful in order to secure a correct perspective of the issue.
The promotion of social justice and of the well-being and economic security of all the people is a primary aim
of the Constitution (Sec. 5, Art. 11). In line with this goal, the State encourages small landholdings as against
large estates (Article XII of the Constitution) and has taken upon itself the duty to protect the agricultural
laborer and to regulate the relations between him and the landowner. (Sec. 6, Art. XIV, id.)
Even before the approval of the Constitution the Legislature had already passed Act No. 4054, known as the
Philippine Rice Tenancy Act", approved February 27, 1933. The Act's aim is primarily to regulate the relations
between landlords and tenants. Freedom of tenancy contract is allowed so long as it is not contrary to existing
laws, customs, morals and public policy (Sec. 7). In the absence of contract the crop is divided equally between
the landlord and the tenants a system known as the share tenancy (Sec. 8). The contract is to last according to
the stipulation of the parties, and in its absence it shall be in force only during one agricultural year. The
landlord may not dismiss a tenant while a tenancy contract is in force, except for any just and reasonable cause
as enumerated in Section 19 of Act No. 4054.
On June 9, 1939, Commonwealth Act No. 461 was passed. This law further protects the security of tenure of the
tenant, and provides that the tenant may not be dispossessed of the land except for any of the causes
mentioned in Section 19 of Act No. 4054 and subject to the approval of a representative of the Department of
Justice (Sec. 1).
On September 30, 1946, Republic Act No. 34 was approved, amending certain sections of Act No. 4054 and
providing for a sharing ratio between the landlord and the tenant, depending on which of them furnishes the
necessary implements and work animals and defrays all the expenses for planting and cultivation (Sec. 3, Rep.
Act No. 34, amending Sec. 8, Act No. 4054).

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 11

In the case of Tapang v. Court of Industrial Relations, 72 Phil. 79, the validity of Section 19 of Act No. 4054 (Sec.
19 provides that landlord may not dismiss tenant except for good pause) and of Commonwealth Act No. 461
was questioned on the ground that they violate the constitutional guarantee against impairment of contracts.
Overruling this argument, the Supreme Court said:
El arguments de que la Ley No. 461 del Commonwealth es contraria a la Constitution porque altera obligaciones
contractuales, no tiene ningua fuerza, porque, ... la misma Constitution manda que se debe "promoter la
justicia social a fin de asegurara el bienestar y la estabilidad economica de todo el pueblo," y que se debe
protegee al mismo tiempo "a todos los trabajadores, especialmente a las mujeres"; y no hay duda de que las dos
mencionadas leves tienden a licho fina, protegiendo al aparcero y al propietario por igual y estableciendo
reglas que han de determinar las relaciones que deben existing entre los dos para su propio beneficio. (Per
Pablo, J., Tapang v. CIR, supra)
The argument that the tenancy relationship had ceased after the expiration of the agricultural year was
declared by the Court to be without any validity because Section 26 of Act No. 4054, the basis of said argument,
must be understood to have been annulled or at least subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 461
(ante) Said this Court:
"No obstante todo contrato o disposicion en contrario de cualquier ley vigente en todos los casos en que un
terreno es ocupado bajo un sistema cualquiera de aparceria no se ha de desposeer alaparo del terreno cultivado
porel mismo, in la aprobacion de un representante del Departmento de Justicia debidamiente authorizado al
efecto y como no sea por alguna de las causes expresadas en al articulo diecinueva de la Ley Numero Cuatro mil
cincuenta y cuatro o por alguno otro motivo justificada." (Ibid.)
After the passage of the above laws the need was felt for an agency familiar with landlord-tenant problems and
capable of effectively enforcing existing laws. So, a special division of the Department of Justice to act as
compulsory arbiter was first set up; later the arbitration and litigation aspects of tenancy cases were
transferred to the Court of Industrial Relations whose docket was already clogged with cases involving other
labor legislation. Act No. 4054 left much to be desired. It is not of universal application. Its principles were not
in force throughout the Philippines, but only in localities where it was adopted or where it was put into effect
by presidential proclamation. (C.A. 178, Sec. 4; Iburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234.) In other places, the standard of
conduct laid down by Act No. 4054 was inapplicable (De la Cruz v. Asociacion Zanjero Casilia; 83 Phil. 214). Even
under the law oppressive conditions under which tenants theretofore found themselves were practically left
unremedied; they still remained at the mercy of their landlords. 1wph1.t
The latest attempt to remedy the miserable plight of tenants came with the passage of Republic Act No. 1199,
otherwise known as the "Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines," which repeals the old Tenancy Act (Act
No. 4054), Commonwealth Act No. 461, and various amendments of these laws. The purpose of this Act,
according to Section 2 thereof, is "to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants
upon the principle of social justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landlords; to
insure an equitable division of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant farmers with
incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural production; to bolster their economic position and to
encourage their participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities."
Later on, or on June 14, 1955, Republic Act No. 1267 was passed creating the "Court of Agrarian Relations", said
to be a concomitant of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and designed to provide the long-needed medium for
deciding agricultural problems. (3 Philippine Annotated Laws, p. 72.)
A study of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Rep. Act No. 1199) discloses that it is an improvement of its
predecessor Act 4054, as amended. Most of its provisions deal with the regulation of the relations of the
landlord and tenant (Secs. 6, 7, 8, 9), fixing of the share of each in the products of the land cultivated by the
tenant in general (Secs. 32, 33, 34, 35), the guaranteeing of the permanency of tenure of the tenant and his
heirs on the land he and his predecessors cultivate (Secs. 6, 7, 9, 49, 50, 51). Its most important provision is the
protection of the tenant against exploitation by the landlord as it prescribes the utilization by the landlord of
the personal services of the tenant and the members of his household without compensation (Sec. 23). It fixes
interests on loans secured by the tenant from the landlord and prescribes the payment of such loans from the
share of the tenant in the harvest at the current price, and requires the keeping of books of account showing
the amounts received by the tenant as loans from the landlord, etc. (Secs. 16, 18, 48.)

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 12

The above provisions are clearly an improvement of Act No. 4054. They are intended to protect tenants from
abuse and exploitation by their landlords. The validity of these provisions has not been questioned as they
clearly fall within the province of regulatory provisions enjoined expressly in the Constitution (Art. XIV, Sec.
6). The provisions are clearly of apparent wisdom and validity, evidently not subject to question as they do not
appear to have ever been questioned in the short span of life of the law (approved August 30, 1954).
The history of land tenancy, especially in Central Luzon, is a dark spot in the social life and history of the
people. It was among the tenants of Central Luzon that the late Pedro Abad Santos, acting as a saviour of the
tenant class, which for generations has been relegated to a life of bondage, without hope of salvation or
improvement, enunciated a form of socialism as a remedy for the pitiful condition of the tenants of Central
Luzon. It was in Central Luzon also that the tenants forming the PKM organization of tenants and, during the
war, the Hukbalahap, rose in arms against the constituted authority as their only salvation from permanent
thralldom. According to statistics, whereas at the beginning of the century we had only 19% of the people
belonging to the tenant class, after 60 years of prevailing percentage has reached 39%. It is the desire to
improve the condition of the peasant class that must have impelled the Legislature to adopt the provisions as a
whole of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and particularly Section 14 of said Act.
The section in question (See. 14, Rep. Act No. 1199) permits a tenant who has accumulated savings to free
himself from obtaining the usurious loans for expenses needed in plowing, harrowing, planting, and
harvesting. The tenant who has accumulated savings that would enable him to buy implements and farm
animals is allowed by the provision in question to free himself from the bondage of permanent share tenancy
by a change to lease-hold tenancy. The tenant who is used to cultivating riceland cannot conceive of any form
or manner in which he can invest his meager savings other than by the purchase of farm implements and work
animals. In other words, the only avenue left to him to improve his lot is by permitting him to change his
contract to tenancy from that of share system to that of leasehold system. The increase that he receives in his
share as a consequence of the change, is only 5% (under the share system the landlord receives 30% and under
leasehold he receives only 25% if the land is first class, and 20% if the land is second class). But by the change
the tenant is released from the stranglehold of the landord, and becomes a semi-independent farmer. The
provision in question is certainly justified by the directive contained in the Constitution to do justice to labor.
By the change the laborer can improve his lowly lot. And if it cannot be justified as an act of social justice
enjoined in the Constitution, it may be considered as an exercise of the police power of the State, which tries to
improve the situation of a great percentage of the people and preserve the security of the State against
possible internal upheavals that the tenant class might be forced to create to improve their lowly lot. The
tenants uprising in Central Luzon from 1946 to 1952 must certainly have been the main cause or reason for the
enactment of the Agricultural Tenancy Act in 1954 and of the particular section in question. The desire to
improve the tenant class certainly has been impelled by the necessity of insuring the internal security of the
country, a paramount aim and end justifying the exercise of the police power.
The legal question that is posed before Us is: Is the enactment of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 in virtue of
the police power of the State limited by the fact that it violates a contractual right (existing in favor of the
defendant-appellant in this case) ? The general rule has been stated thus:
A police regulation, obviously intended as such, and not operating unreasonably beyond the occasions of its
enactment, is not rendered invalid by the fact that it may affect incidentally the exercise of some right
guaranteed by the Constitution. For example, it is said that the proper exercise of the police power is not
subject to restraint by constitutional provisions designed for the general protection of rights of individual life,
liberty and property. (11 Am. Jur. 991-992)
Is Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 legally justified in impairing the obligation of an existing contract
between the tenant and the landlord? The answer to this is again stated as follows:
The constitutional prohibition against state laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not restrict the
power of the state to protect the public health, the Public morals, or the public safety. One or more of these
factors may be involved in the execution of such contracts. Rights and privileges arising from contracts are
subject to regulations for the protection of the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, in the
same sense and to the same extent as is all property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations. Not
all police legislation which has the effect of impairing a contract is obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 13

as to impairment. (Ibid., pp. 1000-1001).

Obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police power when such power is exercised, as in
this case, to preserve the security of the State and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the
accomplishment of that end and are not arbitrary or oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. 1002-1003.)
The right granted to the tenant to change the contract from share tenancy to that of leasehold tenancy can not
be considered unreasonable or oppressive, because by the landlord's giving up of 5% of the harvest (the change
from share to leasehold tenancy reduces the landlord's share from 30% to 25%), the tenant becomes, more
responsible, more competent, and financially prepared to comply with his obligations under the lease, to the
ultimate benefit of the landlord, with the consequent improvement of a lot of a big segment of the population
and thereby giving full meaning to the social justice directive contained in the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, in view of the above considerations, We hold the disputed Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199
constitutional and valid. The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Without costs.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, C.J., concurring:
Without voting on the constitutional question, I concur in the result. According to the Agrarian Court's
decision (p. 4), Ramos became the tenant of Ramas (Mateo de) sometime in 1959 or 1958, when Republic Act
1199 was already in force, and was consequently deemed to be a part of their contract of tenancy. So the
landowner may not now be heard to complain about impairment of the contract.
DIGEST: NONE
5. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers 59 SCRA 54 (page 461) Sec 10
59 SCRA 54 Political Law Primacy of the Constitution over Contractual Rights
Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory
(ERF) since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers Union). Under the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which means
that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in
the said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from
EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a
member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It
was only in 1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF
then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that
he is not exempt from the close shop agreement because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization, is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWUs and ERFs legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to
join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was
employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein.
Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It
recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it
recognizes the workers right to join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a
constitutional right over a contractual right.

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 14

6. Martinez v. People GR no. 132852 (page 465) sec 11

TEOFILO MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, erroneously filed as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. But this procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we have decided to give it due course to resolve the question
whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to appeal as a pauper
litigant.[1]
The antecedents: Petitioner was accused of homicide in Crim. Case No. 5753 before the Regional Trial Court of
Butuan City.[2] During the hearing on 23 June 1994 petitioner represented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public
Attorney's Office of Butuan City objected to petitioner's motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper and moved
instead to strike out the entire testimony of the first witness for the prosecution on the ground that it was
inadmissible for being violative of the testimonial privilege afforded to children in cases involving their
parents. The Presiding Judge[3] deferred his ruling on the objection and allowed the testimony to be continued.
[4] On 21 July 1994 the trial court issued an order overruling the objection. On 8 August 1994 the court denied
the motion for reconsideration.[5] This prompted petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for certiorari alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it issued the assailed orders.[6]
On 23 August 1994 petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Litigate as Pauper attaching thereto
supporting affidavits executed by petitioner himself and by two (2) ostensibly disinterested persons attesting
to petitioner's eligibility to avail himself of this privilege.[7] The appellate court subsequently issued its
resolution dated 21 March 1997 denying the motion and directing petitioner to remit the docketing fees in the
total amount of P420.00 within five (5) days from notice.[8] On 7 April 1997 petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the order denying his motion to litigate as a pauper, but this was similarly denied in the
resolution of 8 October 1997.[9] Petitioner then filed a Manifestation on 28 October 1997 wherein he stated
through counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees required of his client "under protest" and that the
money remitted was advanced by his counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez himself.[10] The transmittal of the amount
was evidenced by two (2) postal money orders attached to the Motion to Litigate as Pauper.[11]
In the assailed Resolution of 10 November 1997 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, citing petitioners
failure to pay the required docket fee.[12] Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with the
docket fee requirement as alleged in his Manifestation adverted to above.[13] However, the Court of Appeals in
the second assailed Resolution of 21 January 1998 denied this latest motion on the ground that, per verification
by the Judicial Records Division, the amount remitted by petitioner as docket fee was short of 150.00.[14]
Msesm
The only issue expressly raised by petitioner is whether a motion to litigate as pauper can be entertained by an
appellate court. When petitioner filed on 23 August 1994 his original motion to appeal as pauper before the
appellate court the applicable rule was the second paragraph of Sec. 16, rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, which providesSec. 16. Appeal by pauper Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to the satisfaction of the trial court
that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such
importance, by reason of the amount involved, or the nature of the question raised, that it ought to be
reviewed by the appellate court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper. The
clerk shall transmit to the appellate court the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial
and the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the appellate court upon the original record so
transmitted without printing the same. Esmso
A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate court.
Even prior to the adoption of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, the Court had uniformly frowned upon appellate

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 15

courts entertaining petitions to litigate as pauper, holding that the question of whether a party-litigant is so
poor as to qualify him to litigate as pauper is a question of fact which is best determined by the trial court. The
trial court is the court which may properly decide or pass upon the question of fact which may require
presentation of evidence whether the appellant is an indigent and may appeal as such, and whether the case is
of such importance that, by reason not only of the amount involved but of the nature of the question raised in
the court below, it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court.[15]
When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect on 1 July 1997 the provision abovequoted was not
reenacted. Section 21 of Rule 3, as now worded, outlines the procedure for, as well as the effects of, the grant of
a motion to litigate as pauper Sec. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the
court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful
fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Esmmis
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial
court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with
sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the
clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment
thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
On the other hand, Sec. 18 of Rule 141 prescribes the evidentiary requirements for the exemption of pauper
litigants from payment of legal fees Sec. 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - Pauper-litigants (a) whose gross income and that
of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila,
and three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real
property with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the
payment of legal fees. Esmsc
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the pauper-litigant, unless the
court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor do they own any real property with the
assessed value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the
litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to strike out the
pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. Esm
It cannot be inferred from any of the aforementioned provisions that the restrictive policy enunciated by Sec.
16, Rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court was carried over to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nowhere
can we find a provision to the effect that "(a) petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be
entertained by the appellate court."
We resolve to apply the present rules on petitioner retrospectively. Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that
sense and to that extent procedural laws are retroactive.[16] We therefore hold that a motion to litigate as an
indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for
review or in special civil actions. Jksm
We believe that this interpretation of the present rules is more in keeping with our Bill of Rights, which

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 16

decrees that, "(f)ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty."[17] Our espousal of the democratization of appellate remedies is
shared by the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in
a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have
money enough to pay the costs in advance x x x x Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording
equal justice to all and special privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. There can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.[18]
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner has complied with all the evidentiary requirements for
prosecuting a motion to appear in court as a pauper. He has executed an affidavit attesting to the fact that he
and his immediate family do not earn a gross income of more than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real
property, a hut, cannot be worth more than P10,000.00.[19] He has also submitted a joint affidavit executed by
Florencia L. Ongtico and Helen Maur, both residents of Butuan City, who generally attested to the same
allegations contained in petitioner's own affidavit.[20] Based on this evidence, the Court finds that petitioner is
qualified to litigate as an indigent. Chief
WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November 1997 dismissing the
petition for certiorari of petitioner Teofilo Martinez and its Resolution dated 21 January 1998 denying
reconsideration are SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this case is
REMANDED for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is further ordered to allow petitioner to
litigate as pauper and to return to him the amount of P420.00 representing the docket fees he paid.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., on leave.
Digest:
FACTS:
Teofilo Martinez, herein petitioner, was accused of homicide. Before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed a
motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper. However, this was denied by the trial court and prompted petitioner
to go to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleged that the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders.
Later on, petitioner also filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to litigate as pauper attaching thereto
affidavits by himself and two disinterested persons of his eligibility to avail this privilege. The appellate court
subsequently issued a resolution denying the motion and directing the petitioner to pay the proper docketing
fees within five (5) days from notice. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was also
denied by the appellate court. Petitioner then filed a manifestation through his counsel that he was
transmitting the docket fees required "under protest" and that the money was advanced by his counsel. The
transmittal was evidenced by two (2) postal money orders attached to the motion to litigate as pauper.
In the assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to
pay the required docket fees. Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with the required
docket fee. In the second assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the latest motion on the ground that
it was short of 150.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to
appeal as pauper litigant?
RULING:
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court applied the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The Court held that a motion
to litigate as indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in
petitions for review or in special civil actions. It maintained that the interpretation of the present rules is more

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 17

in keeping with the Bill of Rights, which decrees that "free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner complied with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a
motion to appear in court as pauper. The affidavits executed by himself and two other disinterested persons
were enough to convince the court that petitioner is qualified to litigate as indigent.
The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, the case is remanded for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is further
ordered to allow the petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the docket fees he paid.
7. City of San Pablo v. Judge Reyes and Meralco GR no. 127708 March 25, 1999 (page 462) sec 10
CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA, CITY TREASURER OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO V. REYES, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City and the MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review on a pure question of law the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 29 in Civil Case No. SP-4459(96), entitled Manila Electric
Company vs. City of San Pablo, Laguna, City Treasurer of San Pablo Laguna, and the Sangguniang Panglunsod of
San Pablo City, Laguna. The RTC declared the imposition of franchise tax under Section 2.09 Article D of
Ordinance No. 56 otherwise known as the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo as ineffective and void insofar
as the respondent MERALCO is concerned for being violative of Act No. 3648, Republic Act No. 2340 and PD 551.
The RTC also granted MERALCOS claim for refund of franchise taxes paid under protest.
The following antecedent facts are undisputed:
Act No. 3648 granted the Escudero Electric Services Company, a legislative franchise to maintain and operate
an electric light and power system in the City of San Pablo and nearby municipalities Section 10 of Act No. 3648
provides:
x x x In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay unto the municipal
treasury of each municipality in which it is supplying electric current to the public under this franchise, a tax
equal to two percentum of the gross earnings from electric current sold or supplied under this franchise in
each said municipality. Said tax shall be due and payable quarterly and shall be in lieu of any and all taxes of
any kind, nature or description levied, established or collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal,
provincial or insular, now or in the future, on its poles, wires, insulators, switches, transformers, and
structures, installations, conductors, and accessories place in and over and under all public property, including
public streets and highways, provincial roads, bridges and public squares, and on its franchise, rights,
privileges, receipts, revenues and profits from which taxes the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.
Escuderos franchise was transferred to the plaintiff (herein respondent) MERALCO under Republic Act No.
2340.
Presidential Decree No. 551 was enacted on September 11, 1974. Section 1 thereof provides the following:
Section 1. Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable
by all grantees of franchise to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be
two percent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions
incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current.
Such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized
representative on or before the twentieth day of the month following the end of each calendar quarter or
month as may be provided in the respective franchise or pertinent municipal regulation and shall, any
provision of the Local Tax Code or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, be in lieu of all taxes and

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 18

assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and
privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the
LGC) took effect on January 1, 1992. The said Code authorizes the province/city to impose a tax on business
enjoying a franchise at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts
for the preceding calendar year realized within its jurisdiction.
On October 5, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City enacted Ordinance No. 56, otherwise known
as the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo. The said Ordinance took effect on October 30, 1992:[1]
Section 2.09 Article D of said Ordinance provides:
Sec. 2.09. Franchise Tax There is hereby imposed a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty
percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on
account realized during the preceding calendar year within the city.
Pursuant to the above-quoted Section 2.09, the petitioner City Treasurer sent to private respondent a letter
demanding payment of the aforesaid franchise tax. From 1994 to 1996, private respondent paid under protest a
total amount of P1,857,711.67.[2]
The private respondent subsequently filed this action before the Regional Trial Court to declare Ordinance No.
56 null and void insofar as it imposes the franchise tax upon private respondent MERALCO[3] and to claim for a
refund of the taxes paid.
The Court ruled in favor of MERALCO and upheld its argument that the LGC did not expressly or impliedly
repeal the tax exemption/incentive enjoyed by it under its charter. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the imposition of a franchise tax under Sec. 2.09 Article D of Ordinance No. 56 otherwise known
as the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo, is declared ineffective and null and void insofar as the plaintiff
MERALCO is concerned for being violative of Republic Act No. 2340, PD 551, and Republic Act No. 7160 and the
defendants are ordered to refund to the plaintiff the amount of ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED ELEVEN & 67/100 (P1,857,711.67) and such other amounts as may have been paid
by the plaintiff under said Revenue Ordinance No. 56 after the filing of the complaint.[4]
SO ORDERED.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court[5] the petitioners filed the instant petition
with this Court raising pure questions of law based on the following grounds:
I. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACT NO. 3648, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2340 AND
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 551 AS AMENDED, INSOFAR AS THEY GRANT TAX INCENTIVES, PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT, HAVE NOT BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160.
II. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 193 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160 HAS NOT
WITHDRAWN THE TAX INCENTIVES, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES BEING ENJOYED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT UNDER ACT NO. 3648, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2340 AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 551, AS
AMENDED.
III. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FRANCHISE TAX IN QUESTION CONSTITUTES
AN IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
Petitioners position is the RA 7160 (LGC) expressly repealed Act No. 3648, Republic Act No. 2340 and
Presidential Decree 551 and that pursuant to the provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, the province or
city now has the power to impose a franchise tax on a business enjoying a franchise. Petitioners rely on the
ruling in the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Marcos[6] where the Supreme Court held
that the exemption from real property tax granted to Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority under its
charter has been withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC.

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 19

In addition, the petitioners cite in their Memorandum dated December 8, 1997 an administrative interpretation
made by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance in its 3rd indorsement dated
February 15, 1994 to the effect that the earlier ruling of the Department of Finance that holders of franchise
which contain the phrase in lieu of all taxes proviso are exempt from the payment of any kind of tax is no
longer applicable upon the effectivity of the LGC in view of the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges as
provided in Sections 193 and 234 thereof.
We resolve to reverse the court a quo.
The pivotal issue is whether the City of San Pablo may impose a local franchise tax pursuant to the LGC upon
the Manila Electric Company which pays a tax equal to two percent of its gross receipts in lieu of all taxes and
assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on savings or income.
It is necessary to reproduce the pertinent provisions of the LGC.
Section 137 Franchise Tax Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the
province may impose a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent 50% of one
percent 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipts, or
realized, within its territorial jurisdiction. xxx
Section 151 Scope of Taxing Powers Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes,
fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and
charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to them and
distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or
municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement taxes.
Section 193 Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions
or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under
R.A. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this Code.
Section 534 (f) Repealing Clause All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 534 (f), the repealing clause of the LGC, provides that all general and special laws, acts, city charters,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
This clause partakes of the nature of a general repealing clause.[7] It is certainly not an express repealing
clause because it fails to designate the specific act or acts identified by number or title, that are intended to be
repealed.[8]
Was there an implied repeal by Republic Act No. 7160 of the MERALCO franchise insofar as the latter impose a
2% tax in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature?
We rule affirmatively.
We are mindful of the established rule that repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. A general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law by mere implication unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest[9]
and it must be convincingly demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent
that they cannot co-exist.[10]
It is our view that petitioners correctly rely on the provisions of Section 137 and 193 of the LGC to support their

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 20

position that MERALCOs tax exemption has been withdrawn. The explicit language of Section 137 which
authorizes the province to impose franchise tax notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other
special laws" is all-encompassing and clear. The franchise tax is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed
under special laws.
Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption privileges. By stating that unless otherwise
provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons whether
natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations except 1) local water districts, 2)
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, (3) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code, the obvious import is to limit the exemptions to
the three enumerated entities. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exlcusio alterius.[11] In the absence of any provision of the Code to the contrary, and we find no other
provision of the Code to the contrary, and we find no other provision in point, any existing tax exemption or
incentive enjoyed by MERALCO under existing law was clearly intended to be withdrawn.
Reading together Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, we conclude that under the LGC the local government unit
may now impose a local tax at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding
calendar year based on the incoming receipts realized within its territorial jurisdiction. The legislative purpose
to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing law or charter is clearly manifested by the language used in
Section 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated.
Since it would be not only tedious and impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing
for special tax exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such
exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been used.
It is true that the phrase in lieu of all taxes found in special franchises has been held in several cases to exempt
the franchise holder from payment of tax on its corporate franchise imposed by the Internal Revenue Code, as
the charter is in the nature of a private contract and the exemption is part of the inducement for the
acceptance of the franchise, and that the imposition of another franchise tax by the local authority would
constitute an impairment of contract between the government and the corporation.[12] But these magic words
contained in the phrase shall be in lieu of all taxes.[13] Have to give way to the peremptory language of the LGC
specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemption privileges.
Accordingly in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Marcos,[14] this Court held that Section 193 of
the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., the tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by
natural or juridical persons are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC except with respect to those entities
expressly enumerated. In the same vein We must hold that the express withdrawal upon effectivity of the LGC
of all exemptions only as provided therein, can no longer be invoked by Meralco to disclaim liability for the
local tax.
Private respondents further argue that the in lieu of provision contained in PD 551, Act No. 3648 and RA 2340
does not partake of the nature of an exemption, but is a commutative tax. This contention was raised but was
not upheld in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co. Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue[15] wherein the
Supreme Court stated:
xxx Congress could impair petitioners legislative franchise by making it liable for income tax from which
heretofore it was exempted by virtue of the exemption provided for in section 3 of its franchise xxx
xxx Republic Act No. 5431, in amending section 24 of the Tax Code by subjecting to income tax all corporate tax
payers not expressly exempted therein and in section 27 of the Code, had the effect of withdrawing petitioners
exemption from income tax xxx
Private respondents invocation of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is accordingly unavailing.
The LGC was enacted in pursuance of the constitutional policy to ensure autonomy to local governments[16]
and to enable them to attain fullest development as self-reliant communities.[17] Thus in Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority vs. Marcos, supra, this Court pointed out, in upholding the withdrawal of the
real estate tax exemption previously enjoyed by the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority, as follows:

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 21

Note that as reproduced in Section 234(a) the phrase and any government owned or controlled corporation so
exempt by its charter was excluded. The justification for this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems
obvious: to limit further tax exemption privileges especially in light of the general provision on withdrawal of
tax exemption privileges in Section 193 and the special provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of
real property taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234. These policy considerations are consistent with the
State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments and the objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them effective partners in attainment of national goals. The power to tax is the most effective
instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local government units for the
delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace,
progress, and prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the
withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned or controlled corporations and all other
units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax
treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was a need for these entities to share in the
requirements of development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes and other charges due from them.[18]
The Court therein concluded that:
nothing can prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the Government
performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to fulfill a constitutional
mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom.[19]
The power to tax is primarily vested in Congress. However, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local
legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution.[20] Thus Article X, Section 5 of the Constitution reads:
Section 5 Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the Local
Governments.
The important legal effect of Section 5 is that henceforth, in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal
fiscal powers, doubts will have to be resolved in favor of municipal corporations.[21]
There is further basis for the conclusion that the non-impairment of contract clause cannot be invoked to
uphold Meralco's exemption from the local tax. Escudero Electric Co. was originally given the legislative
franchise under Act. 3648 to operate an electric light and power system in the City of San Pablo and nearby
municipalities. The term of the franchise under Act No. 3648 is a period of fifty years from the Acts approval in
1929. The said law provided that the franchise is granted upon the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, or repeal by the Congress of the United States.[22] Under the 1935,[23] the 1973[24] and the
1987[25] Constitutions, no franchise or right shall be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject
to amendment, alteration or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires. With or
without the reservation clause, franchises are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police
power; they are also subject to alteration by the power to tax, which like police power cannot be contracted
away.[26]
Finally, while the matter is not of controlling significance, the Court notes that whereas the original Escudero
franchise exempted the franchise holder from all taxes levied or collected now or in the future[27] this phrase
is noticeably omitted in the counterpart provision of P.D. 551 that said omission is intended not to foreclose
future taxes may reasonably be deduced by statutory construction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and the complaint of MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 22

Digest: none
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE; CANNOT BE INVOKED TO UPHOLD
MERALCO'S EXEMPTION FROMLOCAL TAX; FRANCHISES SUBJECT TO ALTERATION THROUGH REASONABLE
EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER AND THE POWER TO TAX. Private respondent's invocation of the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution is accordingly unavailing. The LGC was enacted in pursuance of the
constitutional policy toensure autonomy to local governments and to enable them to attain fullest
development as self-reliant communities. There is further basis for the conclusion that the non-impairment of
contract clause cannot be invoked to uphold Meralco's exemption from thelocal tax. Escudero Electric Co. was
originally given the legislative franchise under Act 3648 to operate an electric light and power system in the
City of San Pablo and nearby municipalities. The term of the franchise under Act No. 3648 is a period of fifty
years from the Act's approval in 1929. The said law provided that the franchise is granted upon the condition
that it shall be subject to amendment, or repeal by the Congress of the United States. Under the 1935, the 1973
and the 1987 Constitutions, no franchise or right shall be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires.
With or without the reservation clause, franchises are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of
the police power; they are also subject to alteration by the power to tax, which like police power cannot be
contracted away.
8. People v. Tolentino 145 SCRA 597 (page 469) sec 12
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABUNDIO TOLENTINO, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This case is before us for the automatic review 1 of the decision 2 of 19 May 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Macabebe, Pampanaga, Branch 55, in Criminal Case No. 96-1763, in view of the death penalty imposed
on accused-appellant Abundio Tolentino (hereafter TOLENTINO).
TOLENTINO was charged with the crime of rape in an information 3 which reads:
That during the period from May 1, 1995 to July 1995, in Masantol, Pampanga, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused ABUNDIO TOLENTINO, step father of nine (9) year old Rachelle Parco, the former
being the common-law spouse of the latter's mother, Teresa David, by taking advantage of his moral
ascendancy over Rachel Parco, then eight (8) years old, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
thru force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of the said minor Rachel Parco, against her will and
consent.
The facts as synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in the Appellee's Brief, 4 which we hereby
quote and adopt as our own for being fully in accord with the transcript of stenographic notes of witnesses, are
as follows:
On May 1, 1995, at past noon, Rachelle Parco, 8 years old, was inside one of the two bedrooms at the second
floor of the house of her grandmother, which was located at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga (TSN, January
22, 1997). Rachelle was arranging the clothes while in the room (Ibid, p. 7).
Suddenly, Abundio Tolentino, the stepfather of Rachelle Parco, entered the same room and closed the door
(Ibid). Abundio Tolentino ordered Rachelle Parco to stand up and lie down on the bed (Ibid, pp. 7-8). When
Rachelle Parco was already on the bed, Abundio Tolentino removed his short pants and the short pants of
Rachelle Parco (Ibid, p. 8).
Abundio Tolentino placed his sex organ on Rachelle Parco's genitals and bumped (binubundol-bundol) hers
with his (Ibid). At that moment, Rachelle Parco remained silent, because she was afraid and did not know what
Abundio Tolentino was doing to her (Ibid, pp. 8-9). Abundio Tolentino's carnal act lasted only for three
minutes, because Rachelle Parco's brother knocked at the door and ask money from Abundio (Ibid, p. 9).
Abundio Tolentino told Rachelle's brother to ask money from Lola Iding (Ibid). Thereafter, Abundio Tolentino
put on his short pants and hers and went down the house (Ibid).

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 23

Abundio Tolentino repeatedly did the same thing to Rachelle Parco at least three to four times a week in May,
June, and July 1995 (Ibid, pp. 11-12). Rachelle Parco was overc[o]me by fear that she did not tell anyone about
what Abundio Tolentino was doing to her.
When the family [of] Rachelle Parco transferred residence to Taguig, because Masantol became flooded, it was
then that Rachelle Parco mustered enough courage to tell her mother, Maria Teresa David, about Abundio
Tolentino's bestial behavior (Ibid, pp. 12-13). Upon learning her daughter's sad flight, Maria Teresa David
accompanied her on May 20, 1996, to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, to file a complaint against
Abundio Tolentino (TSN, February 10, 1997, p. 14).
The victim, Rachelle Parco (hereafter RACHELLE) was likewise subjected to a physical examination, the result
of which revealed that she was still a virgin and that her hymen was still intact and its orifice was 0.5 cm. in
diameter "as to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any genital injury." 5
In his defense, TOLENTINO interposed alibi, claiming that it was impossible for him to be in Masantol on 1 May
1995 because as a taxi driver he would come home to Masantol every Sunday only, which was his rest day. He
also claimed that the incident was a concoction of Cecille Yabut, the grandmother of RACHELLE, as she was
opposed to his relationship with her daughter Ma. Teresa David. 6
On 19 May 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting TOLENTINO of the crime of rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of death and indemnify RACHELLE in the sum of P100,000.
In his Appellant's Brief, TOLENTINO submits this lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF HEREIN ACCUSED APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
First, TOLENTINO raises the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court. He maintains that the alleged rape was
committed in Taguig, Metro Manila, and hence the trial court, had no jurisdiction thereon. We are not
persuaded. RACHELLE testified that she was sexually abused by TOLENTINO in their residence in Barangay San
Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. 7
TOLENTINO likewise asserts that the prosecution failed to prove with moral certainty that rape had been
committed because the physical examination disclosed no genital or extragenital injuries on RACHELLE; her
hymen was intact, and the orifice was so small as to "preclude penetration by an average-size adult Filipino
male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury." If there had been penetration as claimed by
RACHELLE, there would have been injuries to her genitals, considering her age and the number of times the
incident allegedly took place. RACHELLE's testimony in the vernacular that "binundul-bundol ang kanyang ari"
by TOLENTINO does not conclusively prove that rape was committed, to the exclusion of other offenses, in light
of the aforesaid medical findings; besides, that testimony is subject to different interpretations and will not
lead to the conclusion that TOLENTINO's intent was to have carnal knowledge of her.
Lastly, TOLENTINO faults the trial court in not considering that the incident was concocted by his mother-inlaw, who was against his relationship with her daughter, the victim's mother.
In its Appellee's Brief, the OSG supports the appealed judgment and asks us to affirm the death penalty
imposed by the trial court.
Rape is committed even with the slightest penetration of the woman's sex organ. It is enough that there is
proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of
the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of hymen, suffices to warrant
a conviction for rape. Thus, a finding that the victim's hymen is intact and has no sign of laceration does not
negate a finding that rape was
committed. 8
Pertinent portions of the findings 9 of Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Uniel, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, are as

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 24

follows:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense, vertibular mocusa, pinkish.
Hymen, short, thin, intact. Hymenal orifice, measures 0.5 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls and Rugosities cannot
be reached by the examining finger.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the body of the subject at the time of
the examination.
2. Hymen, intact and its orifice small (0.5 cm. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an averagesized, Adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury.
In light of these findings of the medico-legal officer, a rigorous scrutiny of the testimony of RACHELLE must
perforce be made to determine whether there was evidence of the entrance of TOLENTINO's male organ within
the labia of the pudendum or the lips of the vagina of RACHELLE, without necessarily reaching either the
orifice or the hymen. The following is RACHELLE's testimony:
Q You said that on May 1, 1995, your were inside this room. What were you doing then?
A I was folding clothes, sir.
Q While you were folding clothes, what happened next?
A Abundio Tolentino entered the room, sir.
Q Where did he enter the room?
A In the place where I was situated, sir.
Q Did he pass through a window or through the door of the room?
A He entered through the door, sir.
Q After Tolentino entered the room, what happened next?
A When he entered the room, he closed the door, sir.
Q After he closed the door, what did Abundio Tolentino do, if he did anything?
A He told me to stand up.
Q What did you tell him?
A I did not tell him anything. I just stood up.
Q Did you stand?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then what happened?
A Then he told me to lie down on the bed.
Q What happened next?

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 25

A He removed his shorts, sir.

Q And then what happened?
A He removed my shorts also, sir.
Q When Abundio Tolentino removed his shorts as well as yours, what transpired next?
A He placed his sex organ, sir.
Atty. Gutierrez:
May we request that the words used by the witness, "binubundul-bundol ang kanyang ari" be placed on the
records, your Honor.
Court:
Granted.
Pros. Datu:
Will you please explain what you mean by the word "binubundul-bundol"?
A He was trying to force his sex organ into mine, sir.
Q How long did that take?
A Around three (3) minutes, sir.
Q What did you do, if you did anything, when the accused was forcing his sex organ into yours?
A I did not do anything, sir. I remain[ed] silent.
Q Why did you remain silent?
A I was afraid, sir.
Q Why were you afraid?
A Because I did not know what he was doing.
Q What was your reaction when Abundio Tolentino was trying to force his sex organ into yours?
A I was just looking at our aparador and remaining [sic] silent.
Q You said that the accused was doing this to you in a span of 3 minutes. What happened next?
A My brother knocked at the door, sir.
Q What is the name of your brother?
A Mariel D. Parco, sir.
Q When Mariel Parco knocked at the door, what happened next?
A He was asking for some money from Abundio Tolentino, sir.

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 26

Q Do you mean to say, Mariel was able to enter that room?

A No, sir, he was just near the door.
Q And what happened next?
A Abundio Tolentino told my brother to ask money from Lola Iding.
Q What happened next?
A Before he went down, he put on my shorts and also his shorts. 10
There was nothing from RACHELLE's testimony that proved that TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of the
pudendum of RACHELLE's vagina. As translated, she only said: "He placed his sex organ to my sex organ, sir."
This was the translation of the "binubundul-bundol." And when asked to explain what she meant by it, she
answered: "He was trying to force his sex organ into mine, sir."
The prosecution did not ask her the appropriate questions to get some more important details that would
demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of the pudendum or the
lips of RACHELLE's vagina. It should have, for instance, asked whether TOLENTINO's penis was firm and erect
or whether RACHELLE's legs were spread apart to bring us to the logical conclusion that, indeed, TOLENTINO's
penis was not flabby and had the capacity to directly hit the labia of the pudendum or the lips of RACHELLE's
vagina. There is paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever took place. Consequently, TOLENTINO
can only be liable for attempted rape.
Under the law 11 there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In this case, there is no doubt at all that
TOLENTINO had commenced the commission of the crime of rape by (1) directing RACHELLE to lie down, (2)
removing his shorts and hers, and (3) "trying to force his sex organ into" RACHELLE's sex organ. But there is no
conclusive evidence of the penetration, however slight, of RACHELLE's sex organ. The penetration was an
essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, in the absence of a convincing evidence thereof,
TOLENTINO should be given the benefit of the doubt and can be convicted of attempted rape only.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had
been consummated would have been death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, since RACHELLE was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of RACHELLE's
mother. The last paragraph thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consaguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
The information specifically alleges that RACHELLE was eight years old when the crime was committed and
TOLENTINO was "the stepfather . . . being the common-law spouse of [RACHELLE's] mother, Teresa David." That
allegation is inaccurate. TOLENTINO was not RACHELLE's step-father, for that relationship presupposes a
legitimate relationship, i.e., he should have been legally married to Teresa David. A step-father is the husband
of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring; 12
or, a stepdaughter is a daughter of one's spouse by a previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses
by a former marriage. 13 Nevertheless, since the information specifically alleges that TOLENTINO was the
common-law-spouse of RACHELLE's mother and that RACHELLE was under eighteen years of age, we shall
appreciate these special qualifying circumstances.
We disagree with the contention of the OSG that "relationship" is an aggravating circumstance in this case 14

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 27

in that TOLENTINO was the step-father of RACHELLE. In the first place, as stated earlier, TOLENTINO was not
the step-father of RACHELLE. Second, the alternative circumstance of relationship can be considered only
"when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or
sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender." 15 RACHELLE does not fit in any of the
enumeration. At any rate, the circumstance that TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of RACHELLE's
mother, together with the fact that RACHELLE was eight years old when the rape was committed, has already
served as a special qualifying circumstance in this case.
TOLENTINO's allegation of ulterior motive cannot be sustained. We cannot believe that the grandmother would
expose her granddaughter RACHELLE, a young and innocent girl, to the humiliation and stigma of a rape trial
just to stop the relationship between TOLENTINO and her daughter, the mother of RACHELLE. There is, as well,
no showing whatsoever that RACHELLE allowed herself to be manipulated by her grandmother to tell a lie just
to satisfy the wishes of the latter. Granting arguendo that TOLENTINO and RACHELLE's grandmother did not
get along well, we do not see how RACHELLE would be able to concoct a story of rape, risk public censure, and
expose herself to the rigors and embarrassment of a public trial if her motive had been other than to secure
justice. 16
Besides, against RACHELLE's positive testimony, TOLENTINO had nothing to offer but denial and alibi. Settled is
the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. 17 Equally settled is that alibi a weak
defense, for it is easy to concoct and, fabricate. It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, the
positive identification by a credible witness that the accused committed the crime. 18 RACHELLE positively
identified TOLENTINO as her rapist.
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the penalty lower by two degrees that
death. However, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an
indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum shall be within the range of prision mayor and whose
maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
And now on the damages which may be awarded to RACHELLE. There have been new developments in
jurisprudential law on the matter. In People v. Prades, 19 we ruled that irrespective of proof thereof, the victim
of consummated rape is entitled to moral damages of P50,000. In People v.
Victor, 20 we also increased to P75,000 the indemnity in rape cases if the penalty of death is to be imposed.
The trial court awarded P100,000 as indemnity. Clearly, the award finds no support in the law and in our
decisions. Since TOLENTINO is found guilty of attempted rape only, an indemnity of P50,000 and moral
damages of P25,000 are in order.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the appealed decision of 19 May 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch 55, in Criminal Case No. 961763-M. As modified, accused-appellant
ABUNDIO TOLENTINO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of attempted rape,
under Article 335, in relation to Article 51, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and, pursuant to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer no imprisonment penalty ranging from ten (10)
years of prison mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the victim RACHELLE PARCO the sums of P50,000 as indemnity and P25,000 as moral
damages.1wphi1.nt
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Digest: None

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 28

9. Diokno v. Enrile GR 36315 Dec 19, 1981 (page 475) sec 12

JOSE W. DIOKNO, BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., and LORENZO M. TAADA, petitioners,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense, and RAFAEL G. ZAGALA, in his capacity as
Commanding General of Fort Bonifacio, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
It is primarily the constitutional right to counsel, 1 as reinforced by statute 2 on which this mandamus
proceeding is based, the crucial allegation being that petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada, a highly-respected
member of the Philippine Bar and former Senator as counsel, was denied the right "to visit and confer" 3 with
his clients, the other petitioners, Jose W. Diokno and Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., then both under detention. His
efforts to do so failed notwithstanding the request made to respondent Brigadier General Rafael G. Zagala, then
the Commanding Officer in Fort Bonifacio, and as such "having custody of petitioners Diokno and Aquino." 4 In
accordance with the suggestion coming from such respondent, petitioner Tanada, "wrote a letter addressed to
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense, reiterating to him the previous
requests addressed to respondent Zagala and asking for final word from him. It was also requested that should
petitioner Taada be allowed to visit and confer with petitioners Diokno and Aquino, petitioner Taada be
permitted to confer with them in 'private without the presence of any officer from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or any third person for that matter, and without any listening devices or similar instruments.' It
was made clear in that letter that "the presence of these nullifies the confidential nature of consultations
between lawyer and client, as it would prevent them from fully communicating with each other." 5 Again such
request "to visit and confer with petitioners Diokno and Aquino was denied. The reason proferred was that "it
is the considered view of this Office and of the Armed Forces authorities that it would be to the best interests of
everyone concerned if contacts, such as the one you are requesting for, are minimized pending final
disposition of their cases." 6 Hence this petition for mandamus.
As could be expected, there was in the answer a reiteration of the stand of then Secretary Ponce Enrile. There
was in addition, as an annex to such answer, a true copy of General Order No. 16 ordering "the Secretary of
National Defense, in his capacity as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, to
immediately organize by utilizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the nucleus of the structure, a
national command that shall be responsible for the administration of detainees from the time of their arrest to
the final disposition of their cases, and in the prosecution thereof, the Secretary of National Defense is hereby
authorized to utilize the existing facilities and resources of the government and to promulgate rules and
regulations pertaining thereto. 7 After which came this paragraph in the answer: "Pursuant to and in
implementation of General Order. No. 16, the Secretary of National Defense has promulgated rules and
regulations for the orderly administration of persons arrested and detained under Proclamation No. 1081 and
general orders. Among such rules and regulations is that limiting visits of detainees to the immediate members
of their families. Visits by people other than the immediate members of the families of detainees, especially
those held to protect the national security, have to be approved by the Secretary of National Defense. 8 It was
then submitted that the denial of counsel's request to visit his clients, the other petitioners, "is in accord with
General Order No. 16 and the above quoted implementing rule and regulation." 9
The case was then heard and, with the submission of memoranda, submitted for decision. In the deliberations
that followed, the Court clearly was of one mind, some members stressing that at no time is the right to
counsel more important than during emergency periods where either the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended or martial law declared. For manifestly, it is of the essence to avoid possible injustice, the power
of preventive detention being recognized, to leave unimpeded the opportunity for a detained person consult
counsel so that he could be informed as to his legal rights under the circumstances. There was, however,
equally a recognition that rules and regulations, if reasonable in character and not arbitrary, may be issued by
then respondent Secretary, acting for the President, as long as they did not render nugatory the right to
counsel, necessarily implicit in which, is the need for confidentially and secrecy.
With the release, however, on September 11, 1974 of petitioner Jose W. Diokno 10 with petitioner Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. after being released from custody on May 8, 1980 to enable him to proceed to the Baylor Medical
Center in Dallas, Texas for medical treatment and his continued stay abroad resulting in a petition for habeas
corpus filed on his behalf by his mother being dismissed for being moot and academic, 11 it becomes quite

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 29

apparent why there is no need to rule on the constitutional question raised.

WHEREFORE, this petition for mandamus is dismissed for being moot and academic.
Makasiar, Aquino, Fernandez, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Ericta, Plana and Escolin JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part.
Barredo and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
Digest: None
10. People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 (page 482) sec 12
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO PENILLOS y LUCINDO @ GUILLERMO "BILLY" PENILLOS, MARIANO MARAO y MENDEZ, JOSE
NUYDA y MARMEDA and ROMEO NUYDA y PEDROSA, accused. ABELARDO PENILLOS y LUCINDO @ GUILLERMO
"BILLY" PENILLOS, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision 1 of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, in Criminal
Case No. 2144 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Abelardo Penillos, et al.," promulgated on 28 September
1983, convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Attempted Homicide
pursuant to Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of "reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment."
The information prepared by the then assistant city fiscal charges the above-named accused with the crime of
"Robbery with Homicide and Attempted Homicide" committed as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

That on or about the 31st day of July, 1981, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common
purpose, with intent of gain (sic) and by means of violence against or intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the spouses APRONIANO LLADONES and EPIFANIA LOPEZ
LLADONES and once inside, forcibly take the amount of P1,000.00 from the said spouses and by reason of or on
occasion of the robbery and with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted, hogtied and stabbed APRONIANO LLADONES
inflicting injuries upon the latter which directly caused his untimely death; while EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES
was hacked on her shoulder, thus accused commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but
did not perform all the acts of execution which could produce the crime of Homicide upon said EPIFANIA
LOPEZ LLADONES by reason of causes other than their spontaneous desistance. 2
xxx

xxx

xxx

Only accused-appellant Abelardo Penillos was apprehended. The others remain at large. 3
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and was given a separate trial.
The court a quo summarized the evidence for the prosecution, upon which it based its conviction of appellant,
as follows:
Four defendants are charged with the offense of "Robbery with Homicide and Attempted Homicide." Among
them, only one was apprehended and a separate trial was held. On June 18, 1982, defendant Abelardo Penillos

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 30

pleaded "Not Guilty."

The following facts are not disputed. On July 31, 1981, in the early hours of the evening or thereabouts (sic), at
Sitio Naontogan, Bariis, Legazpi (sic) City, Aproniano Lladones and spouse Epifania Lopez were awakened as
four (4) persons suddenly entered their house. The intruders demanded money from the couple and when
Aproniano Lladones refused to accede he was carried outside his dwelling by the four persons. He was later on
found hogtied and lifeless suffering (sic) from multiple stab wounds. His wife, Epifania LIadones Lopez was also
hacked with a bolo by one of the entrants (sic) as she tried to follow to find out where her husband was being
taken. The following morning Abelardo Penillos was apprehended and after giving an extra-judicial confession,
the present complaint was filed against him and his co-conspirators, Mariano Marao, Romeo Nuyda and Jose
Nuyda. The last three defendants remained at-large hence Abelardo Penillos was afforded a separate trial.
Testifying for the prosecution, Epifania Lopez Lladones narrated that on the night in question while she and
her husband were asleep inside their house they were awakened by the entry of four persons who demanded
money from them; that one of the intruders even sat on the belly of her husband who was caught still lying
down and at that moment she was able to recognize one of them as Abelardo Penillos because of the
illumination coming from a kerosene lamp in the kitchen adjoining the sala; that Abelardo Penillos was one of
the four persons who brought her husband outside the house and as she tried to follow she was hacked by one
of them whose identity she cannot tell; that she suffered a hack wound and later on she came to know that her
husband, hogtied, was found dead from stab wounds; that she crawled in the dark to the house of her neighbor
Celerino Nudo who reported the incident to the barangay captain who in turn lost no time in notifying the
police authorities; that recollecting the robbery she discovered the loss of P1,000.00 kept in a bamboo basket
and during the time she was confined at the hospital she recognized Abelardo Penillos as one of the
perpetrators when brought to her for confrontation.
Celerino Nudo also testifying recalls that in the evening of July 31, 1981 Epifania Lopez then seriously injured
from a hack wound arrived at his house to seek his help regarding an incident in their house; that she
mentioned a certain Billy Penillos as one of the men who forcibly entered their dwelling while they were
asleep; that he at once reported the matter to the barangay captain and rushed Epifania Lladones to the
hospital. 4
xxx

xxx

xxx

Upon the other hand, appellant relied on alibi as his defense, which is summarized by the trial court as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . Penillos testified that on July 3l, 1981, he was in the house of his grandmother at Barangay Esperanza,
Putiao, Sorsogon, in the morning until six o'clock in the evening; that he left Barangay Esperanza thereafter
riding on a carabao sledge loaded with coconuts and arrived at Barangay Imalnod, Legaspi City, a distance of
about 4 kilometers at past eight o'clock in the evening; that he proceeded to the house of his father-in-law
where he spent the night because he was already tired; that he was able to surmise the time of his arrival
because he overheard from the radio that the drama serial Zimatar had just been concluded. 5
After trial, the lower court rendered the challenged decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
xxx

xxx

xxx

All the foregoing and EVIDENCE considered, and finding the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt,
Abelardo "Billy" Penillos @ Guillermo Penillos is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or life
imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Aproniano Lladones in the amount of P20,000; further, defendant
to pay Epifania Lopez Lladones the amount of Pl,000.00, cash stolen, in both instances without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Credit the defendant the full time of any preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance
with law. 6
xxx

xxx

xxx

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 31

Appellant immediately filed a Notice of Appeal 7 wherein he manifested that he is appealing the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal should have been made to this Court.
The records of the case were erroneously transmitted to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) which properly forwarded the same to this Court on 24 November 1983. 8 On 20 December 1983, We
required the appellant to file his Brief, 9 which he complied with on 16 July 1984 10 after being granted several
extensions. The appellee, on the other hand, submitted its Brief on 15 November 1984. 11
Appellant submits the following assignment of errors:
I
THAT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT BY THE
COMPLAINT.
II.
THAT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING THE STATEMENT OF APPELLANT GREAT WEIGHT WHEN SAID
STATEMENT WAS TAKEN IN DEROGATION OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND IN
CONTRAVENTION OF PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY JURISPRUDENCE.
In support of the first assigned error, appellant insists that Epifania Lladones could not have made a proper
identification of the offenders because: (1) The only illumination at the scene of the incident was a gas lamp
which was placed in the kitchen. There were partitions between both the kitchen and the sala and the sala and
the bedroom where she and her deceased husband were sleeping. There could not have been enough light for
her to properly recognize the accused. (2) Having just been roused from sleep by one of the perpetrators who
sat on the deceased's belly, she was most probably "in a state of shock or terror" and thus positive
identification of the accused is highly improbable. Besides, she testified that the very reason for her rushing to
the kitchen upon waking up was to get the gas lamp in order to see who her husband's attacker was. (3) Even
when Epifania was overtaken by the accused and pinned under a table, visibility was still not sufficient as both
were still some distance from the kitchen, the only source of illumination. (4) Finally, her claim that she had
known the accused prior to the incident should have compelled the latter to have at least worn a mask so he
would not be recognized.
Appellant also takes exception to the procedure undertaken by the police authorities on the day after the
incident when he was brought to the hospital to be identified by Epifania Lladones. He laments that:
The evidence for the prosecution also pointed out that on the following morning of the incident (August 1,
1981), Abelardo was made to face Epifania while the latter was still confined at the Albay Provincial Hospital for
medical treatment of the hack wound she sustained and that Epifania pointed to Abelardo as one of the
perpetrators of the offense charged. The defense submits that this particular procedure undertaken by the
police in showing the victim, Epifania, a single person and asking her whether or not that man is one of those
who perpetrated the offense, is most unfair and violative of the constitutional rights of the accused. The proper
procedure should have been an identification in a line-up, whereby the suspect is made to line up with other
persons who are not suspects at all, and then the victim is asked to point to whoever he or she recognize as the
perpetrator of the offense. 12
Anent the second assigned error, appellant claims that his constitutional rights to remain silent, to be entitled
to counsel and to be informed of such rights "had no longer any meaning or purpose." This is because before
giving his confession to the police investigator, he was interviewed by other policemen. The prosecution failed
to show that in the said interview, the accused was apprised of his constitutional rights. He further avers that
he initially disclaimed responsibility for the crime but when manhandled, boxed and struck with a piece of
wood on the head, he was forced to confess. Thus, the confession he prepared on 1 August 1981 (Exh. "B") is a
mere formality in spite of his having been informed by the police investigator during the formal investigation
of his constitutional rights.
And even conceding the absence of coercion during the initial interview, the signed confession would still be
inadmissible as it does not appear that a waiver of the right to counsel was made by the accused.

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 32

In the People's Brief, the Solicitor General asserts the view that the principal issue to be resolved is whether or
not the appellant was sufficiently identified as one of the culprits responsible for the offense.
Appellee avers, and We agree, that Epifania was able to sufficiently identify Abelardo Penillos as the person
who sat on her husband's belly and demanded money from her. She testified that she was able to recognize
Penillos when the latter pinned her down under the table; such identification was aided by her having known
Penillos long before the incident, when the latter would go to the Lladones' house. 13 She was even able to
declare that Penillos was wearing short pants at the time of the commission of the crime. 14
Furthermore, the illumination provided by the kerosene lamp was enough for Epifania to have recognized
Penillos. This Court has held in the past that illumination produced by kerosene (gasera) lamps is sufficient for
the identification of persons. 15 Where conditions of visibility are favorable, the ability of a witness to identify
the malefactor should be upheld. 16
The frenetic efforts of the appellant's counsel to cast doubt on the positive identification by Epifania,
characterized by attempts to mislead the latter, proved to be a bad gamble for it only provided the prosecution
a rare opportunity to elicit the details for the positive identification, to wit:
Q
How were you able to say that it was Billy Penillos who sat on the stomach of your husband and
pointed the knife when you said there were two persons present inside your bedroom?
A
I recognized him; he was then wearing short-pant while his other companions was (sic) wearing long
pants.
Q
And according to you after you ran away to get the lamp in the kitchen before you reached the
kitchen, Billy Penillos twisted your arm and pinned you under a table. Is that correct?
FISCAL:
No. It is misleading, Your Honor please, because she was already in the kitchen. Before she could get hold of the
lamp, that was the time when Abelardo Penillos twisted her right arm, she was already in the kitchen.
COURT:
Witness may answer. She is under cross-examination.
A

He placed me under the table.

BENDAA:
Q

And it was under the table that you recognized the face of Billy Penillos?

While inside, I already recognized him inside. Before I have (sic) already recognized him.

Q
Did you not testify a while ago that you ran towards the kitchen to get a lamp, so that, you can
recognize the persons inside the room?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And do you want to impress the (sic) Court that before you could get the lamp from the kitchen, you
were already able to recognize Billy Penillos?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And you were able to recognize Billy Penillos although at that time you were running towards the
kitchen and Billy Penillos was behind inasmuch as he was sitting on the stomach of your husband?

ELS: Consti 2
A

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 33

Yes. I already recognized him.

Q
So, your statement a while ago that you prefer (sic) in giving to the kitchen to get a lamp was to
recognize who the persons were inside your house is not correct?
A
He was the very first one to get inside the house while his companions who were wearing long pants
followed him. So I tried to recognize them.
Q

Is there a partition between the kitchen and your room?

Yes, sir.

And you said the lamp is (sic) situated inside the kitchen?

Yes, sir, because there was (sic) a door leading to that place.

How far is the kitchen to your bed?

Very near.

Q
But the direct light of the lamp is (sic) being obstructed by the partition separating the bedroom and
the kitchen?
p

The gas lamp was situated near the door.

Is it the door of the room or near the door of the kitchen?

Near the door of the sala.

So, you are now telling the Court that the lamp is (sic) near the sala and not in the kitchen?

It is (sic) inside the kitchen but near the door leading to the sala.

Q
But your bedroom is inside a room which has a partition separating it from the sala, Is there a
partition?
A

Yes, sir.

So, you were not able to recognize the companions of Abelardo Penillos?

A
No, sir. I was not able to recognize the companions of Abelardo Penillos because when Abelardo
Penillos ran to hold my husband and then suddenly his companions entered. 17
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
So, the only moment that you were able to recognize Billy Penillos was while you were inside the
room, and while Abelardo Penillos was demanding from you some money while you were being pinned under
the table?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And in these two instances where (sic) according to you, you recognized the face of Abelardo Penillos,
first, when you were in the room, the room was still dark because the lamp was in the kitchen. Is that correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And the second time that you recognized Billy Penillos was while you were being pinned under the
table, and under the table it was also dark at that time. Is that correct?

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 34

A
No, not dark, because the light from the kitchen was illuminating the place wherein I was being pinned
under the table. It was not dark.
Q

The table where you said you were pinned by Abelardo Penillos, how far was it from the kitchen?

About two meters.

How big is the table?

It is small, we use it, for our eating purposes. 18

This Court cannot yield to the postulations of the appellant that Penillos would have worn a mask during the
incident knowing as he did that Epifania was familiar with him and that the latter was impelled by evil motives
in implicating him in the commission of the offense.
The first theory assumes that the wearing of masks to hide one's identity is a universal practice resorted to by
criminals who are known to their prospective victims and who exercise utmost prudence and care in ensuring
that no witness would be able to identify them while committing a crime. These assumptions are, of course,
without any empirical basis and are, at best, speculative. On the other hand, the evil motive ascribed to
Epifania by reason of an alleged prior verbal exchange between Penillos and her is a mere figment of the
former's imagination. Such verbal disagreement allegedly arising from the refusal by Epifania to allow Penillos
to use her yard as a pathway, even if true, is inconsequential, trivial and insufficient to move one to accuse
another of committing robbery with homicide.
With his positive identification, appellant's defense of alibi must fail.
We defer to the conclusion by the court a quo that the protestations of the appellant "held in contrast with the
positive identification made by Epifania Lopez on his complicity in the commission of the offense could not
provide a justifiable ground to extricate him." 19
Appellant testified that between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on 31 July 1981, the day of the incident, he was
travelling by carabao from Sitio Esperanza to Nauntogan, the place of the incident, a distance of about four (4)
kilometers. He was allegedly accompanied by one Victor Marao. Arriving at his destination at around 8:00
p.m., he proceeded to the house of his father-in-law, co-accused Mariano Marao, which is about thirty (30)
meters away from the residence of the victims. At the house of Mariano, appellant also encountered his other
co-accused, Jose Nuyda and Romeo Nuyda. While having supper therein, appellant overheard Mariano and the
Nuydas talking about something that they would divide among themselves. 20
Appellee easily demolishes this defense by alleging that: Penillos' alleged travel from Esperanza to Nauntogan
was not even corroborated by his supposed companion, Victor Marao, who was not presented as a witness;
Penillos' presence at the house of his co-accused, a mere thirty (30) meters away from the scene of the crime,
militates against his defense in view of the positive identification by Epifania; and that it was not physically
impossible for the appellant to have been at the place of the incident during the commission of the crime.
Settled is the rule that alibi cannot prevail over a positive identification made by a prosecution witness. 21 For
alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere when the crime was committed but
that he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
22
Appellant also questions the manner in which he was initially identified by Epifania Lladones in the hospital
while the latter was recuperating from her injury. The former contends that the procedure for conducting a
police line-up should have been strictly followed. In People vs. Espiritu, 23 We ruled that there is no law
requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. Clearly then, this argument must also fail.
And now on the second assigned error. In respect to the allegation that the signed confession (Exh. "B") was
defective and should not have been admitted in evidence, the appellee practically concedes the irregularity
when it avers thus:

ELS: Consti 2
xxx

xxx

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 35

xxx

From the record, it appears that appellant's sworn statement was executed in a manner not in full accord with
his right to the assistance of counsel. This may be seen in the preliminary portion of the sworn statement, on
which appellant was:
". . . reminded that under the new rules of the Constitution you have the right to remain silent and the right to
have counsel of your own choice. You are also reminded that whatever you say here might be used for or
against you in any court proceedings. Is this clearly understood by you?
Answer: Yes sir.
Question:
investigation?

After having been informed of your constitutional rights do you wish to proceed with this

Answer: Yes sir.

Question:

Are you ready to give free voluntary statement?

Answer: Yes sir. (Folder of Exhibits, p. 2)."

Neither the preliminary portion aforecited nor the testimony of the investigating officer showed an affirmative
offer to provide appellant with counsel de oficio if he could not retain counsel of his choice. Consequently, the
sworn statement may very well be inadmissible and may not be utilized against appellant. 24
Indeed it does not appear that constitutional safeguards afforded an accused under investigation for the
commission of an offense were complied with. Aside from the Solicitor General's observations, it is clear that
waiver of the right to counsel was not made in the presence of counsel. On cross-examination, police
investigator Demosthenes Martillano testified:
xxx

xxx

xxx

COURT:
Q

Why did you not place in the investigation that the witness is waiving his right to a (sic) counsel?

That is my error.

BENDAA:
Q
Why? What do you mean by that answer of yours that it was your error? Will you please explain to us
that answer of yours?
A

All I know is that if the suspect does not need a counsel, I think, it was (sic) also suffice.

Q
Tell the court whether or not during the investigation Billy Penillos did not waive his right to a (sic)
counsel?
FISCAL
It is already stated, Your Honor please, in his statement that when the affiant chose to proceed with the
investigation, to answer all questions, he in effect is waiving his right to a (sic) counsel after having been
informed of all his rights.
xxx
COURT:

xxx

xxx

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 36

The witness had already admitted that he did not place specifically that portion of waiver. But it does not mean
that he did not ask the suspect. It is a matter of interpretation how you are going to interpret that portion of
your question. The court under that respect will sustain the objection of the Fiscal. 25
Even if the confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 26 The
same would necessarily apply to a waiver of the right to counsel not made in the presence of counsel.
In Morales vs. Enrile, et al., 27 this Court, applying and interpreting Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, which provides as follows:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
laid down the duties of an investigator during custodial interrogation and ruled that the waiver of the right to
counsel shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel, thus:
7.
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be
in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
We reiterated the above ruling in People vs. Galit, 28 People vs. Lumayok, 29 People vs. Albofera 30 and People
vs. Marquez. 31 In view therefore of the law and jurisprudence, the sworn statement of appellant, Exhibit "B",
is hereby declared inadmissible in evidence and should have been rejected by the trial court even if it is not in
fact a confession for, as correctly observed by the People, it is exculpatory in nature. Just the same, since it was
taken in violation of appellant's constitutional right to counsel, its exculpatory character did not cure the fatal
defect.
We wish to underscore that Section 12(l) of Article III of the present Constitution has gone further to protect,
promote and enhance the right to counsel of any person under investigation by expressly providing that such
is a right "to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice" and that it "cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."
Be that as it may, We affirm the judgment of conviction by the trial court on the basis of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented by the prosecution. Concluded the lower court: "The truth and as clearly borne by the
evidence is: the defendant was among the perpetrators of the heinous offense. The robbery, left in its wake the
death of Aproniano Lladones and the wounding of his wife Epifania Lopez Lladones." 32
A trial court's findings of facts carry great weight for it has the privilege of examining the deportment and
demeanor of witnesses and, therefore, can discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or not. 33 In the light
of the evidence presented in the proceedings below, We do not see any reason to disturb the lower court's
factual conclusions.
We, however, modify the designation of the offense the appellant was convicted for on the basis of the
information prepared by the then assistant city fiscal. The information should have charged the appellant
simply with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
This Court has consistently held that this offense is denominated as such regardless of the number of the
homicides or injuries committed. These other circumstances merely serve as generic aggravating
circumstances which can be offset by other mitigating circumstances. 34 There is no crime of robbery with

ELS: Consti 2

Cases Batch 6

Twenty 19 37

homicide and frustrated homicide 35 or robbery with homicide and attempted homicide. 36 The term
"homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is to be understood in its generic sense; it
includes murder and slight physical injuries committed during the robbery which crimes are merged in the
crime of robbery with homicide. 37
The trial court, however, should have taken into consideration the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with homicide because this type of robbery could be committed without the
necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. 38 It is indisputably clear from the pleadings and the
decision of the trial court that although the homicide was committed outside the house of the deceased, the
principal offense of robbery was perpetrated inside; the killing thus occurred as a result of the initial evil
design to steal.
The penalty for robbery with homicide and physical injuries defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the
greater penalty, which is death, shall be applied. 39 However, in view of the abolition of the death penalty, the
appellant is entitled to the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of
"reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of the
former, which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of People vs. Baguio,
40 this Court held:
The Code 41 does not prescribe the penalty of "life imprisonment" for any of the felonies therein defined, that
penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special
laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes
eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It
is not the same as "life imprisonment" which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and
for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration.
As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, 42 reiterated in People vs.
Pilones, 43 and in the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People vs. Sumadic, 44 this Court already
made it clear that reclusion perpetua is not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every
judge should take note of the distinction and this Court expects, that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake
one for the other.
Finally, conformably with the stated policy of this Court, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of
P20,00.00 is increased to P50,000.00. 45
WHEREFORE, except as modified in its dispositive portion to specify that appellant Abelardo Penillo's penalty is
to be reclusion perpetua, to remove the alternative reference therein to "life imprisonment" and to increase
the indemnity for the death of Aproniano Lladones to be paid by him to the heirs of said deceased, the
judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 2144 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. The attempted
homicide aspect of the charge is likewise deemed absorbed in one special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, and the civil indemnity for the
death of Aproniano Lladones is hereby increased to P50,000.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.
Digest: None