PATRICIO TAN ET AL. V.

COMELEC (1986)
Facts: Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 (Act Creating Province of Negros del Norte), petitioners who are residents of the Province of
Negros Occidental filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping Comelec from conducting the plebiscite which,
pursuant to and in implementation of the law. Petitioners contend that BP 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the
LGC as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution regarding the requirements in land area and estimated annual income. Petitioners also
contend that a number of voters were excluded since the plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of three cities and eight
municipalities in Negros del Norte, to the exclusion of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental.. Comelec contends that the law is not
unconstitutional. They claim that BP 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the LGC have been complied with. They
submit that the case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of Negros del Norte as during the plebiscite, 164,734 were
in favor of the creation of the new province while only 30,400 were against it.
Issue: WON the province of Negros del Norte xomplied with the requirements as to land area.
Held: No. Ratio: The original parliamentary bill no 3644 expressly declared that the new province contained an area of 285,656 ha. More or
less. However, when Parliamentary bill was enacted into BP 885, the province now comprised a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers. The
certification of the provincial treasurer also indicates that there the province comprised of a lesser area. Although the certification stated
that the land area of the municipality of Don Salvador was not available, it appeared that such is only 80.2 kilometers. This area if added to
2,685.2 square kilometers will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers. The last sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 197 LGC1 (requirements) is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof,
clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political
unit exercises control. Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous."
Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent."Contiguous", when employed
as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of
matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the
statute. Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory"---- the physical mass of land area.
There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land
area but also territorial waters, It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph ofSection 197 is meant to be
synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature. The
sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction. The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents
make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and
obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a
statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of
harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored. Teehankee, concurring: The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional.
Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the
appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as
provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely,
the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of La Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran,
Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and
disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its
boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. " It is plain that
all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new province, comprise the units
affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the
plebiscite, because the whole province is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite
to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to
vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule. The
argument of fait accompli viz. that the railroaded plebiscite of January 3, 1986 was held and can no longer be enjoined and that the new
province of Negros del Norte has been constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of the challenged Act. This Court has always held that it "does
not look with favor upon parties 'racing to beat an injunction or restraining order' which they have reason to believe might be forthcoming
from the Court by virtue of the filing and pendency of the appropriate petition therefor. Where the restraining order or preliminary
injunction are found to have been properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writs shall be issued by the Court to restore matters to
the statusquo ante." Where, as in this case, there was somehow a failure to properly issue the restraining order stopping the holding of the
illegal plebiscite, the Court will issue the mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the status quo ante and restore the territorial
integrity of the province of Negros Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality of the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid
proclamation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte and the equally invalid appointment of its officials.
Footnote 1 SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square
kilometers, a population of at least five hun- dred thousand persons, an average estimated annual in- come, as certified by the Ministry of
Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income
of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both
the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring in- come.
TORRALBA V. MUN. OF SIBAGAT (1987)

Facts:BP 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur, is being challenged as violative of Section 3 Article XI of the
1973 Constitution2. Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officers are the local public officials of the new Municipality.
According to the petitioners, the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code
had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent
Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void.
Issue:WON BP 56 is invalid
Held: No Ratio: The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended
to cripple legislative competence to create municipalcorporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not
proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It contains no
requirement that the LGC a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation
of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a LGC. What the Constitutional provision means is that once said
Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid
down. In the interregnum, before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation
of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose. The
creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the
unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. The officials of the newMunicipality
have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions. A de jure entity has thus been created. It is a
long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of
any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient
administration of government.The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then
vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs
Comelec and in this case: in the Tan case, the LGC already existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3
December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 885 in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new
province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the LGC
that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a plebiscite "in the
area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area for the creation of a new province was not complied
with in BP Blg. 885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste"
attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56
creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the
period specified in that law.
Footnote 2 "Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary sub- stantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria es- tablished in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."
PROVINCE OF SHARIFF KABUNSUAN BAI SEMA V. COMELEC (2008)
Facts: The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines apportioned 2 legislative districts for Maguindanao. The first
consists of Cotabato City and 8 municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM, created under its Organic Act, RA 6734, as amended by
RA 9054. Cotabato City, as part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII (having voted against its
inclusion in November 1989 plebiscite).On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.Later, 3 new municipalities were carved out of the
original 9, constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, resulting to total of 11. Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao. Maguindanao voters ratified
Shariff Kabunsuans creation in 29 October 2006 plebiscite.On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board Resolution No. 3999, requesting
the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province
under MMA Act 201. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, adopted the COMELECs Law Department
recommendation under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007. The COMELEC issued on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.On 10 May 2007, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 (subject of these cases), amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).Meanwhile, the
Shariff Kabunsuan creation plebiscite was supervised and officiated by the COMELEC pursuant to Resolution No. 7727. (Option Votes: In favor
for creation 285,372; Against the creation 8,802). The following municipalities seceded from Maguindanao and formed the new province. All
of them were from the first legislative district of Maguindanao. (Barira, Buldon, Datu Blah T. Sinsuat, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan,
Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, Upi) Kabuntalan was chosen as the capital of the new province. The province was the first
to be created under Republic Act No. 9054 or the Expanded ARMM law.

Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 which combined Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a single legislative district
during the Philippine general election, 2007. Sema lost to incumbent Congress representative of the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato district,
Didagen Dilangalen.
Issue: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units - province, city, municipality or barangay - must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its
plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress
has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within theirjurisdiction,
subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section
10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create
provinces, cities or municipalities. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation
under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative
powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether the
delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with
any provision of the Constitution. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides,
"Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in
the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that
may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x."
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well
as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be
created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the
power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a
legislative district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a
province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an
Act of Congress Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and
any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a
national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion
legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change
the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its
exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Nothing in
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts
for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The Regional Assembly may
exercise legislative powerx
x
x except on the following matters:x
x
x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional
Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in
national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the "next national elections"
from the effectivity of the law.Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a
Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is
maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never
create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside
the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction.This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional
Assembly's legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdictionx
x
x ." The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff
Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress' power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a
legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new
provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution." The Court
answered in the negative. Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of
a province for "each province shall have at least one member" in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several
representative districts within a province.The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory

thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of
provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact
that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress.Indeed , when a province is created by statute,
the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise
nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment. Second. Sema's theory also undermines the
composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can
create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual
income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following
scenarios thus become distinct possibilities: An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces
and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the
Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); (2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one
representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the
requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and (3) Representatives
from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assembly's continuous
creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM. Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting theprovisions in Article X on
regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck
the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, thepower to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot
be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The Constitution
empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution
which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least
one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases
the actual membership of the House ofRepresentatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress,
there are 219[38] district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members
shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case
50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent
district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before
Congress can create new provinces. The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the
creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does
not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the
creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an
appropriate case In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces
and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers
of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus,
we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. Resolution No.
7902 Complies with the Constitution Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative
district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of
Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO ET AL VS GOVERNMENT OF RP (2008)
Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective
peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under
the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the
ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist
orientations.[1] The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners,
specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior
agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF
Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement
of Intent on August 27, 1998. The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same
contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with
sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while
the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.[2] Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any
smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in
Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.[3] In response, then President Joseph
Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military
offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF
member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously
discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP. The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by
the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the
MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions.Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22,
2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and
agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the
Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next
meeting." A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the
Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was

followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which
was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the
MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad,
who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.[6] In
2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its
final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
Held: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared
contrary to law and the Constitution.
Ratio: The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected
constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere
act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper
matter for judicial review. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the
Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance
adopted in David v.Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non- signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual
dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the
"moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation
and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact
that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRPMILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another
one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. The Court, however, finds that the prayers for
mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final
draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in
splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the
right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the
same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law. The contents of the MOA-AD is a
matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the
agreement. An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of
these public rights. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be
consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or
program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing
in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The invocation of the doctrine of executive
privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit
legal respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for
judicial compliance and public scrutiny. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform
the dutyenjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional , for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in
the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is
amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the
BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed
to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution
and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with thatprocess. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international

agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by
itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
GEMILIANO LOPEZ JR V COMELEC (1985)
Facts: PD 824 or an act creating the Metropolitan Manila, was enacted to establish and administer program and provide services common to"
the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities in the surrounding area. This is in response to the sharp
growth in the population of Manila and the proliferation of commercial firms and industries, which resulted to the ever-increasing inability of
the separate local governments to cope with the ensuing serious problems. Metro Manila shall be administered by the Commission.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of PD 824. They rely on this provision: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The Local Government Code
was not enacted until 1983.
Issue: WON PD 824 is unconstitutional as it was enacted prior to the creation of a local government code.
Held: No. Ratio:The challenge does not suffice to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality. The last vestige of doubt has been removed by
the present constitutional provision regarding the Batasang Pambansa. That provision clearly recognizes the existence of the Metropolitan
Manila. Justification as to PD 824. In PD 824, reference was made to "the referendum held on February 27, 1975 wherein the residents of the
Greater Manila Area authorized the President to restructure the local governments into an integrated unit of the manager or commission
form of government. It was then pointed out that "the rapid growth of population and the corresponding increase of social and economic
requirements in the contiguous communities has brought into being a large area that calls for development both simultaneous and unified. It
"is vital to the survival and growth of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that a workable and effective system be established for the
coordination, integration and unified management of such local government services or functions" therein. There is necessity for "the unified
metropolitan services or functions to be planned, administered, and operated [based on] the highest professional technical standards." 15
The foregoing constitutes the justification for and the objective of such Presidential Decree.Application of Paredes vs Executive
Secretary. In Paredes vs Executive Secretary, the Court did came to the conclusion that the constitutional provision on the need for a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if "those voters who are not from the
barangay to be separated were excluded in the plebiscite." It cannot be argued therefore that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to
constitute Metropolitan Manila in the referendum on February 27, 1975 was not a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision.
With the voters in such four cities and thirteen municipalities, now composing Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will, the
constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in
February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code. Presidential Authority to Issue the PD.At that time there was no interim Batasang
Pambansa. It was the President who was entrusted with such responsibility. The legality of the law making authority by the President during
the period of Martial Law was already established in Aquino vs Comelec. Sangguniang Bayan. The point has been raised, however, that unless
Presidential Decree No. 824 be construed in such a way that along with the rest of the other cities and municipalities, there should be
elections for the Sangguniang Bayan, then there is a denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution. The point is not well-taken.
It is clear that under the equal protection clause, classification is not forbidden. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made
arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinction which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class." All such elements are present. There is no need to set forth anew the compelling reasons that called for the creation
of Metropolitan Manila. It is quite obvious that under the conditions then existing - still present and, with the continued growth of
population, attended with more complexity - what was done was a response to a great public need. The government was called upon to act.
PD 824 was the result. It is not a condition for the validity of the Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities and thirteen
municipalities that the membership be identical with those of other cities or municipalities. There is ample justification for such a distinction
Basis in the Constitution.Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly recognized the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila.
Such express constitutional affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls for the dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal
justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it the first time that there has been
acknowledgment in law of the creation of Metropolitan Manila. (Election Code of 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1396 creating the Ministry of
Human Settlements, Presidential Decree No. 824, creating the Metropolitan Manila Commission, Amendments to the Constitution, Ordinance)
Control of the President. It is undeniable that the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is free from any constitutional objection.
There is, however, a question that may arise in connection with the powers of the President over the Commission. According to PD 824: "The
Commission, the General Manager and any official of the Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control of the President.
Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the President shall have the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act
of the Commission, the General and the Commissioners." It may give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it confers the power of control
on the President. That control he certainly exercises under the present Constitution over the ministries. His power over local governments
does not go that far. It extends no further than general supervision. These doubts, however, do not suffice to nullify such a provision.
Succinctly put, that construction that would save is to be preferred as against one that will destroy. To show fidelity to this basic principle of
construction is to lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that the constitution enters into and forms part of every statute. Accordingly, the
presidential power of control over acts of the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in character. There can be
no valid objection to such exercise of authority. That is a clear recognition that some of its attributes are those of a national character. Where,
however, the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to local government functions, the power of the
President is confined to general supervision. As thus construed, Section 13 clearly appears to be free from any constitutional infirmity. Abad Santos,
dissenting. 1. The referendum of February 27, 1975, did not satisfy the prohibition contained in Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution. For
one thing the provision speaks of "the criteria established in the local government code." There was then no local government code so there
were no criteria. Also the grant of power to restructure the 4 cities and 13 municipalities in the Greater Manila area "under such terms and
conditions as the President may decide" was so broad that it was in fact not an intelligent decision on the part of the people. I submit that a
grant of power must be definite to be valid; it must not be nebulous and uncircumscribed so as to amount to a total abdication thereof.
Finally, the referendum did not include all of the peoples of Bulacan and Rizal to ascertain if they were willing to give up some of their towns
to Metropolitan Manila. The referendum suffers from the same infirmity present in the case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, cited in the
main opinion, where I dissented. 2. The January 27, 1984, amendment to the Constitution providing for representation in the Batasang
Pambansa and which allocates representatives to "districts in Metropolitan Manila" cannot be construed to constitutionally validate P.D. No.

824 for the simple reason that the issue before the people when the amendment was submitted for ratification was not the creation of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission
ALVAREZ V GUINGONA (1996)
Facts: This concerns the validity of RA 7330 converting the municipality of Santiago Isabela into an independent component city to be known
as the city of Santiago. The law was challenged mainly because the act did not allegedly originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Consitution. Also, petitioner claims that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the
minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the LGC in order to be converted into a component city. Apparently, RA 7330
originated from HB 8817 which was filed on April 18, 1993. After the third reading, the bill was transmitted to the Senate on January 18,
1994. Meanwhile, a counterpart bill SB 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. On February 23, 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the senate. The
committee recommended that HB 8817 be approved without amendment, taking into consideration that the house bill was identical to the
senate bill.
Issue: WON the IRAs are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for the purposes of its conversion
into an independent component city
Held: Yes. Ratio: Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of P20,000,000 for its conversion into a city. After
deducting the IRA, ti appears that the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices.
Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they
fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. Petitioners asseverations are untenable
because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. It is true that for a municipality to be converted
into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. A Local Government Unit is a
political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is
autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The practical side to development through a
decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased
responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses.
Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for
reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is effectuated
through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be
allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its
equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.For
purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the
IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined
in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The
IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. 11
They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. To reiterate, IRAs are
a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical
definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers
referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-orcontrolled corporations". Issue: WON considering that Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 2770 can be said to have
originated in the House of Representatives
Held: Yes. Ratio: Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that RA 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the
same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817
was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act
in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the
instant controversy. Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and duly
transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was
approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month
thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the
Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of
Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not
act thereupon until it receives the House bill. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of
the House bill.Every law, including RA No 7720 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. It is a well entrenched jurisprudential rule
that on the side of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality,.Consequently, for RA No 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Consititution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one, in other words, the grounds for nullity
must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully
establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our
stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No 7720, the court stands on the
holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore inevitable.

LEAGUE OF CITIES v COMELEC (2011)

FACTS: During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before the House of
Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the
12th Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement to
qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13 th Congress, 16 of the 24
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
ISSUE: Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?
RATIO: November 18, 2008 Ruling No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. The Cityhood Laws violate sec.
6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. The
criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining
the just share of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes . (League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951,
November 18, 2008)
March 31, 2009 Ruling No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.
April 28, 2009 Ruling No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.
December 21, 2009 Ruling Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws
or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress deliberations and clear legislative intent was
that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No.
2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a
municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable
treatment
accorded
the
sixteen
municipalities
by
the
cityhood
laws
rests
on
substantial
distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much
higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate
that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city
status using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded
in the SCs Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al.
and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16
municipalities into cities. Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the
prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the
same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision, the Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its
November 18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that no cityshall be
createdexcept in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. It stressed that while all the criteria for the
creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the
increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the
fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution.Congress exceeded and abused its lawmaking power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution, the Court held. The Court further held
that limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities
can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec,
August 24, 2010)
February 15, 2011 Ruling Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first
resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.
April 12, 2011Ruling Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities
covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements
of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the
considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and
unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress, the SC said.The Court stressed that
Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which
imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities. The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being
deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the
Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of
Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in
Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution.

Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for
approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower
House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also
unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws
are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No.
9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in
the exemption clauses.(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2011/04/04141101.php)The Court held that the imposition
of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. While the Constitution mandates that the
creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution
must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of
the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth. (GR No. 176951, League
of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499,League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC: GR No. 178056, League of City of
the Philippines v. COMELEC, April 12, 2011)
DRILON VS LIM (1994)
Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code3. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to
him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in
the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution
and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over
LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but
reinstated it anyway.)
Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held: Yes. Ratio:BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In the exercise of this
jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court,
including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the
measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined B y them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
Issue:WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. Ratio: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the
tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the
Code should be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the
petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of
tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an
act not ofcontrol but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local
Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the
tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of
judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been
observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court
but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain
theconstitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on thismatter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the
Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and noncompliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom
or reasonableness, of the tax measure. The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance, no
minutes

of

public

hearing, no

posting,

no

translation

into

Tagalog) Judge

Palattao

however

found

that

all

the

procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had

not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which
to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We agree with
the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent
to interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and
C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25,
1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and
in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not
affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy
due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this
requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit
and not to tax ordinances.
Footnote 3 Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for
approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings
shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of
tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice
who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have
the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided,
finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting
upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
SOLICITOR GENERAL V METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (1991)
Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of the license
plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD
1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was
there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it
allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation
of drivers licenses and removal of license plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had never
authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.
Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/
unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a resolution
requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the contradiction between the Ordinance
and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32
(formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it
represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD
1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence
of a formal challenge to its validity.
Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC
Held: No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the
requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the
presence of a sufficient standard.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these
agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply
the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a
municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be
partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent
with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because
they do not conform to existing law. The pertinentlaw is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates
or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following
provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions
prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise
discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree
itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by
the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall
not be

confiscated."

These

restrictions

are

applicable

to

the Metropolitan

Manila

Authority

and

all

other

local

politicalsubdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the

municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue
of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the
power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey
at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in
origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. To sustain the ordinance would be to
open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus,
ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance ofmarriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter
imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end
be valid, would be ultra vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose
sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in
effect partially repeal the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan
Manila area. It is anexception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation
to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with thesanction therein prescribed, including those here
questioned. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern
ofthe rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition
and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon trafficviolators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the
public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described
in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory
prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they
cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislativepowers. It is for Congress to
determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or
by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605
remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions
prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
GANZON v CA (1991)
Facts: The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city
officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent
(Sec of Local Government) issued a preventive suspension order for a period of sixty days. In the other case, respondent ordered petitioner's
second preventive suspension for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction in the RTC. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted
an action for prohibition against the respondent in the RTC. Presently, he instituted an action for prohibition, in the respondent CA.
Meanwhile, the respondent issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty
months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced before the CA, a
petition for prohibition. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the cases.
Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
Held: Yes. Ratio: It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first,
to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law," to strip the President of
the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional
Commission. The issue consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to
divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections
62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language? It is the considered
opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its
right - or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is
our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from
congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline Autonomy does not,
after all, contemplate making mini- states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the USA. Autonomy, in the
constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the
Constitution - and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest - is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central
government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the
passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures
designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government
under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government
code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub
silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court

of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the
President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition. The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression
because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully
point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by
themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from The president,
commissioner blas ople would not.The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government
Code, Batas Blg. 337. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding
the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg.
337 is still in force and effect. As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up
the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local
governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence
between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken
such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than
precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government. As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national
administration - but not power - to the local levels. Thus: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
order tobroaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure
their fullest development as self- reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He
has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its contituency.
Issue:WON the several suspensions imposed upon Mayon Ganzon are proper
Held:No. Ratio: The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what
indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600
days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public
office (assuming that Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is
effectively, to suspend him out of office.
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to
have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering
the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other
evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local
Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise
sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.Suspension finally is
temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is
unjust and unreasonable, and nothing less than tyranny. We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of
Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and
needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
Ganzon Supplement: Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local
officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide; The new Constitution does not prescribe
federalism; The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over
local governments; it did not exempt thelatter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of
autonomy; Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein,
impose disciplinary action against local officials; "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify
"control" (which the President does not have); The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no
longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided: that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault,
neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)] that if during, or
after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are
fled against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if
warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
GANZON v CA (1991) supra.
Held:The 1987 Constitution did not divest the President [in this case acting through Sec of LocGov] of the power of supervision over LGUs.
The change in the constitutional language merely underscores local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress "control"
over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all
authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of local
government units, as in the federal governments of the US. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not
control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest is to wean
local LGUs from over-dependence on the central government. Under the Constitution, "local autonomy" is not instantly self- executing, but
subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national

representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. Also, despite the autonomy, the Constitution places the
local government under the general supervision of the Executive. Finally, the Charter allows Congress to include in the LGC provisions for
removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing LGC has done, delegate its exercise
to the President. The petitioners are under the mistaken impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers,
which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. Legally,
"supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. "Control" = the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter.
"Supervision" = overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. As we held, however,
"investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering"
MCIAA V. MARCOS (1996)
Facts: Petitioner was created by virtue of RA6958, mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective control,
management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Under Section 1:
The authority shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities. However, the Officer of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on parcels of land belonging to
petitioner. Petitioner objected invoking its tax exemption. It also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing
governmental functions, citing section 133 of the LGC which puts limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. The city refused insisting that
petitioner is a GOCC performing proprietary functions whose tax exemption was withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC. Petitioner
filed a declaratory relief before the RTC. The trial court dismissed the petitioner ruling that the LGC withdrew the tax exemption granted
the GOCCs.
Issue: WON the City of Cebu has the power to impose taxes on petitioner.
Held: Yes. Ratio: As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very
nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency who are to pay it. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against
exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be
mistaken. There can be no question that under Section 14 RA 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the
National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and
exemption is the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The LGC, enacted pursuant to
Section 3, Article X of the constitution provides for the exercise by LGUs of their power to tax, the scope thereof or its limitations, and the
exemption from taxation. Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs: (o) Taxes, fees or charges
of any kind on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities and LGUs. Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real
property tax. Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of GOCCs, except as provided therein. On the other hand, the
LGC authorizes LGUs to grant tax exemption privileges. Reading together Section 133, 232 and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a general
rule, as laid down in Secs 133 the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of inter alia, "taxes, fees, and charges of any kind of the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalties, and LGUs"; however, pursuant to Sec 232, provinces, cities, municipalities in the
Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or
any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial used thereof has been granted to a taxable person." As to tax exemptions or
incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section
193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except upon the effectivity of the LGC,
except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234, which enumerates the
properties exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption in so far as
the real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated there-in; all others not included in the
enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as the real property is owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, or any of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the
beneficial use of such property has been granted to taxable person for consideration or otherwise. Since the last paragraph of Section 234
unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons,
including GOCCs, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily
follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary
can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under Section 133, as it
now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. In short, the petitioner can no longer invoke the
general rule in Section 133. It must show that the parcels of land in question, which are real property, are any one of those enumerated in
Section 234, either by virtue of ownership, character, or use of the property. Most likely, it could only be the first, but not under any explicit
provision of the said section, for one exists. In light of the petitioner's theory that it is an "instrumentality of the Government", it could only
be within be first item of the first paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of the terms Republic of the Philippines" to
embrace ."instrumentalities" and "agencies." This view does not persuade us. In the first place, the petitioner's claim that it is an
instrumentality of the Government is based on Section 133(o), which expressly mentions the word "instrumentalities"; and in the secondplace
it fails to consider the fact that the legislature used the phrase "National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities" "in Section
133(o),but only the phrase "Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivision "in Section 234(a). The terms "Republic of the
Philippines" and "National Government" are not interchangeable. The former is boarder and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of
the Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987 defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which the functions of the
government are exercised through at the Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through
which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous reason, the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivision or other forms of local government." These autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions" are
the political subdivision. On the other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire machinery of the central government, as
distinguished from the different forms of local Governments." The National Government then is composed of the three great departments the
executive, the legislative and the judicial. An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit

therein;" while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy; usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and governmentowned and controlled corporations". If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal of the exemption from
payment of real property taxes under the last sentence of the said section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government
mentioned in Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the latter. Yet, it did not Moreover, that Congress did not wish to
expand the scope of the exemption in Section 234(a) to include real property owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of the
government including government-owned and controlled corporations is further borne out by the fact that the source of this exemption is
Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 646, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "and
any government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt by its charter" was excluded. The justification for this restricted exemption in
Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax exemption privileges, specially in light of the general provision on withdrawal of exemption
from payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of property taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234. These policy considerations
are consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments 33 and the objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self- reliant communities and make them effective partners
in the attainment of national goals. 34 The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support
myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal
of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such
privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was a need for
this entities to share in the requirements of the development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes and other charges due from them. The
crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether the parcels of land in question belong to the Republic of the Philippines whose beneficial
use has been granted to thepetitioner, and (b) whether the petitioner is a "taxable person". It may be reasonable to assume that the
term "lands" refer to "lands" in Cebu City then administered by the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of land the respondent City of
Cebu seeks to levy on for real property taxes. This section involves a "transfer" of the "lands" among other things, to the petitioner and not
just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained by the Republic of the Philippines. This "transfer" is actually
an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because the petitioner's authorized capital stock consists of "the value of such real estate
owned and/or administered by the airports." Hence, the petitioner is now the owner of the land in question and the exception in Sec 234(c)
of the LGC is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a "taxable person" under its Charter. It was only exempted from the
payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusiveproof of the legislative intent to make it a
taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxableperson for purposes of
real property tax, in light of the forgoing disquisitions, it had already become even if it be conceded to be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of
the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the
payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to the petitioner. Accordingly, the position taken by the petitioner is
untenable. Reliance on Basco vs. Pagcor is unavailing since it was decided before the effectivity of the LGC. Besides, nothing can
prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the government performing governmental functions may be
subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy, no onecan doubt its wisdom.
SAN JUAN v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (1991)
Facts: The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for Rizal Province was left vacated. Petitioner, Gov. Reynaldo San Juan informed Dir.
Reynaldo Abella of the DBM that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO and requested Dir Abella to endorse the appointment of
Santos. In a memo, however, Dir Abella appointed Cecilia Almajose as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget
Officers. According to Abella, Almajose was most qualified as she was a CPA. DBM Undersecretary Nazario Cabuquit signed the appointment
papers of Almajose. In a letter, Petitioner reiterated his request for Santos appointment. DBM Regional Dir Agripino Galvez denied the
request as Santos was not qualified. When petitioner learned of Almajoses appointment, he protested on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM
Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that Almajose lacks the required three years work experience as provided in
Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under EO 112, it is the Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to
recommend nominees for the position of PBO. The DBM issued a memo ruling that petitioners protest is not meritorious as the DBM validly
exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements. The
CSC affirmed.
Issue: WON petitioner has the right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO.
Held: Yes. Ratio: The tug of war between the Secretary of DBM and the Governor of Rizal over a position involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is
capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must
be weighed in favor of autonomy. The exercise by LGUs of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of the century. And yet,
inspite of constitutional provisions and legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials, national officers cannot seem to let go of
centralized powers. They deny or water down what little grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal corporations. President
McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission ordered the new Government "to devote their attention in the first instance to
the establishment of municipal governments in which natives of the Islands, both in the cities and rural communities, shall be afforded the
opportunity to manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision
and control which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the
maintenance of law, order and loyalty." In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which combined both executive and
legislative powers was directed to give top priority to making local autonomy effective. The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local
autonomy. However, the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision as may be provided
by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that is
both general and circumscribed by statute. Pursuant to this principle under the 1935Constitution, legislation implementing local autonomy
was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) was enacted. The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country
further towards greater autonomy. An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a local
government code defining more responsive and accountable local governmentstructures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or
substantial boundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the local government code and upon approval by a plebiscite. The

power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon local governments. The exercise of greater local
autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution (Art II Sec 25, Art X Sec 2-3). When the Civil Service Commission interpreted
the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions
on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to
develop self- reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and
set back. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for
review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner
sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and
resources. It is for this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from
both the local and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between
the two levels of government. It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and
Judges. Under Article VIII of the Constitution, nominations for judicialpositions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. DBMs grave abuse
of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Dir Galvez required the Governor to submit at leastthree other names of nominees better
qualified than his earlier recommendation. The appointment of Almajose was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of
being informed that his nominee had been rejected. The complete disregard of the LGUs prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has
absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are manifest. In his work, Dean Vicente G. Sincostated that the value of LGUs as institutions of
democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. He stated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of
free nations. A people may establish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of
liberty." Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate
the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITIONVS.COMMISSION ON AUDIT (1991)
Facts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera People s LiberationArmy (CPLA) and the Cordillera
Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall notundertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by
peaceful means, such as politicalnegotiations.A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement states
that theyare to:Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that couldperform policy-making and
administrative functions and undertake consultations and studiesleading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.Par. 3. Have representatives
from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel indrafting the Executive Order.Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O.
220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine governmentand of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by
President CorazonAquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR],which covers the
provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and theCity of Baguio.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order,the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually preempted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras
Issue: Constitutionality of EO 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region - assailed on the primary ground
that the President pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by Congress and the approval of such act through a plebiscite.
Held: EO 220 envisions the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National
Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not
create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment
of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict
with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras which undoubtedly, will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first
Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime the
organic act had not yet been passed. Petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of
the local autonomy for the provinces composing it. It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,
which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy, not just administrative, to these regions. As said
earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the
resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or
administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC V ERICTA (1983)
Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burial. For several years, the section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the
ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the a resolution directing the City Engineer to stop selling memorial park lots where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space for pauper burial. Respondent reacted by filing with the CFI a petition for declaratory
relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged
that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. The
Court declared the Section 9 null and void. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon
City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power. On the other hand, respondent contends that the taking or
confiscation of property is obvious because the ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Issue:WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power

Held:No Ratio:An examination of the Charter of Quezon City does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question
except the provision granting police power to the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (. A fortiori, the power
to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery. There are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1)
police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his
property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner
does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. The police power being the most active power of the
government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government
and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is
usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does
not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon
City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay,
even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers
who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the
city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When
the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial
of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned
land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues
to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the
land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fact, the
petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law
as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to
cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received
necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as
having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.