Doc.

dr Boris Krev Robert Karan

frustrate Soviet efforts and may have started before Moscow officially
invaded Afghanistan. Brzezinski later said that United States used early secret
operations
in full knowledge that the Soviet reaction could be harsh. He stated, We didnt push
the
Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.
Such
a statement suggests that the Soviets were not as far off the mark as believed by
the
Carter administration when they claimed they were forced to act by American
actions.66
Early in the decision-making process, in a memorandum to the President,
Brzezinski rhetorically asked the question, What is to be done? His answer: A. It is
essential that Afghanistani resistance continues. This means more money as well as
arms
shipments to the rebels, and some technical advice; B. To make the above possible
we
must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels. This will require a

frustrate Soviet efforts and may have started before Moscow officially
invaded Afghanistan. Brzezinski later said that United States used early secret
operations
in full knowledge that the Soviet reaction could be harsh. He stated, We didnt push
the
Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.
Such
a statement suggests that the Soviets were not as far off the mark as believed by
the
Carter administration when they claimed they were forced to act by American
actions.66
Early in the decision-making process, in a memorandum to the President,
Brzezinski rhetorically asked the question, What is to be done? His answer: A. It is
essential that Afghanistani resistance continues. This means more money as well as
arms
shipments to the rebels, and some technical advice; B. To make the above possible
we
must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels. This will require a

frustrate Soviet efforts and may have started before Moscow officially
invaded Afghanistan. Brzezinski later said that United States used early secret
operations
in full knowledge that the Soviet reaction could be harsh. He stated, We didnt push
the
Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.
Such

a statement suggests that the Soviets were not as far off the mark as believed by
the
Carter administration when they claimed they were forced to act by American
actions.66
Early in the decision-making process, in a memorandum to the President,
Brzezinski rhetorically asked the question, What is to be done? His answer: A. It is
essential that Afghanistani resistance continues. This means more money as well as
arms
shipments to the rebels, and some technical advice; B. To make the above possible
we
must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels. This will require a

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