BAD

China Wins Navy

China beats the navy
Heginbotham et al, 15 PhD Poli Sci @ MIT [Eric, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey
Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, Lyle J. Morris, 2015, RAND,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html, ge]
In contrast to the situation in 1996, China can now hold the U.S. Navys surface fleet at risk at significant ranges

from the mainland. The extent of the threat to the U.S. surface fleet continues to grow . Chinas antisurface capability is founded on four developments: (1) the establishment of an increasingly capable longrange surveillance system, which improves the PLAs ability to detect and track surface ships at long ranges; (2) the deployment
of sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles and the development of an ASBM with a range of 2,000 km; (3) the acquisition of
strike aircraft and surface ships with greater range and power ; and (4) the deployment of new classes of
larger and quieter submarines armed with both torpedoes and cruise missiles . The U.S. military has a variety of
means to mitigate specific threats, and it will improve them over time . New counterspace and cyber capabilities may enable U.S. forces to
degrade Chinese space-based ISR and OTH radar. The U.S. Navy is almost certainly hard at work on technical counters to Chinas budding
ASBM threat, including both anti-missile systems and, perhaps more importantly, ways to defeat Chinese ISR. Aircraft carriers can provide their
own defensive combat air patrols to defeat the threat from enemy aircraft, and the United States is acquiring more and better anti-submarine
warfare assets. As important, U.S. surface forces can also adjust their operational practices. U.S. surface forces

may, for example, stand off farther from the Chinese coast, thereby reducing Chinas ability to find and
target them. However, several of these defensive measures distract from or diminish the ability of
U.S. forces to project power. Holding carriers farther from the scene of the main battle area would entail longer transit times for
combat aircraft, fewer aircraft on station, and an increased demand for U.S. Air Force tanker support. Particularly in light of the Chinese missile
threat to forward U.S. air bases (see Chapter Three, scorecard 1), finding basing for more tankers to support U.S. Navy air operations would be
difficult. And the reduction in time on station for U.S. naval combat aircraft as they are forced to fly greater distances would further complicate
an increasingly challenged air superiority battle (see Chapter Four, scorecard 2), as would withholding aircraft to protect the carriers. The impact
of Chinese threats to carriers will likely be greatest during the first stages of a conflict. In a protracted fight, U.S. forces would probably be able to
progressively mitigate the threat, allowing U.S. aircraft carriers to approach closer to the main battle areas with less risk to themselves. During the
critical first days of a conflict, however, this would leave U.S. and partner forces less well protected from air attack. Moreover, as Chinese
capabilities grow in both sophistication and numbers, it will take longer to achieve the same level of mitigation. Together with the

Chinese missile threat to U.S. air bases (Chapter Three, scorecard 1), the growing threat to U.S.
surface ships outlined in this chapter is arguably the most serious challenge facing U.S. forces in any
potential China scenario.

China Wins Air Force

China beats the airforce
Heginbotham et al, 15 PhD Poli Sci @ MIT [Eric, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey
Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, Lyle J. Morris, 2015, RAND,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html, ge]
China has made remarkable progress toward improving its air defense capabilities . In less than 20 years, the PLA
has turned its air defense network from a flimsy distraction into a robust network that can successfully safeguard its airspace against all but the
most advanced technology and tactics. The PLA began its defense modernization process by relying heavily on

foreign weapons and an aging air fleet. The Chinese defense industry has since evolved to the point that it
can indigenously produce many elements of a formidable air defense system, although it will likely continue to rely
on foreign sources for the most advanced technologies. The U.S. military plans to use stealth, jamming, and standoff weapons to surmount
modern IADS. U.S. efforts appear to be successful in meeting many of the challenges, particularly from a qualitative standpoint. However, the

United States faces a problem of scale. Given the cost of U.S. high-end systems, they are available only in
limited numbers, while a conflict with China could require large numbers. Given the severity of the
threat that modern Chinese air defenses pose to legacy aircraft, the U.S. SEAD effort will necessarily be
more selective, and U.S. forces as a whole will no longer be able to deliver ordnance in the same
volume that was previously possible without exposing U.S. aircraft to substantial risk. The net effect of these
developments on the outcome depends largely on the geographic reach and duration of the conflict. In a fight close to Chinas coast, such as that
posited in our Taiwan scenario, the PLA could employ a dense and redundant infrastructure to mobilize combat

power over a vast geographic area. Electronic warfare and other support aircraft face severe challenges
accompanying lethal SEAD and strike aircraft to many of the relevant targets, placing the latter at higher
risk. At the same time, stealth aircraft and standoff weapons alone might well prove insufficient to neutralize a
significant portion of the target set. The United States would find itself hard-pressed to attack
mainland China with the necessary frequency and intensity without suffering greater air losses
than it has in any war in recent memory.

Econ Impact
Even limited war collapses the economy
Christensen, Princeton Professor of World Politics and China and the World Program Director, 12
[Thomas J, May 21, Taylor and Francis, Journal of Strategic Sutdies Vol 35 Issue 4, The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic
Modernization and US-China Security Relations, accessed 6/30/16, ge]
America's capacity to ensure the defence of its friends and allies on China's periphery will diminish over the next several decades. This trend
could be offset by a US willingness to employ horizontal and vertical escalation. China also has options in this regard, however. For the

United States, a strategy based upon escalation and ultimately on deterrence by punishment would mean
assuming greater risks in the future than in the past to achieve the same objectives. Some American
interests in the region may not justify such increased risk s. This suggests the need to supplement
military deterrence with other forms of dissuasion, resistance and persuasion. Economic warfare
Sanctions have typically been an option of choice for the United States when the risks, poor costeffectiveness and opprobrium associated with military force are too great . But China is far from a typical target, given
the scale and intensity of Sino-American economic interdependence. It is true that for China the loss of export revenue, interest and liquidity of
credit, investment returns, and critical imports (oil, food and commodities) would have a calamitous effect on its economic and possibly domestic
stability. However, the effects on US equity and credit markets, the value of the dollar, inflation, investment, consumption and employment would
also be devastating, and lasting, even if smaller as a percentage of GDP. Economic war against China would more accurately

be described as economic war with China, America's principal creditor and source of manufactured
goods. Such a war would likely lead to a global contraction much worse than that of 200809.
Thus, the question a very fateful one for the United States is whether it could design economic measures that could hit China
disproportionately hard, even while acknowledging the impact on the US and world economies. One such measure could

be
interference with seaborne oil shipments to China (food presumably being off-limits even in war) . However,
oiltransport routes and arrangements are such that the entire region, including Japan, would suffer some level of disruption as a result of a distant
US blockade of Chinese trade. Of course, China would consider such an action to be a major escalation aimed at

crippling its economy and endangering both domestic stability and the regime itself. China has been expanding its
strategic oil reserve and building oil and gas pipelines to Central Asia in order to mitigate such dangers and would likely retaliate by other
means. Mutual assured economic destruction Given that, short of a nuclear exchange, the greatest damage from any conflict with China is likely
to come in the economic realm, it is clear that massive and mutual economic harm would result from any

significant Sino-American armed conflict, even if the two sides eschewed the use of economic
weapons. The two economies are linked both with each other and with the rest of the world in a manner unparalleled in history. This
mutual dependence can be an immensely powerful deterrent, in effect a form of mutually assured
economic destruction. At the moment, the balance of advantage rests with the United States, but even the
winner in such a contest will wish it had been avoided. The operation of mutually assured economic destruction is somewhat
different from classic mutual assured destruction. It is at least theoretically possible to limit the escalation of a military clash to the sub-nuclear
level; not so with economic consequences. China is not going to continue buying US Treasury notes while the

American and Chinese navies clash somewhere off Taiwan or in the South China Sea. Nor is Apple going
to be shipping iPads from its factories in China. Markets will anticipate widespread disruption in
USChinese and world trade, and exacerbate the consequences, however much Beijing and Washington might seek to limit the
damage. As is the case with mutual assured destruction, even the weaker party gains deterrent benefit from the likelihood of mutual, if unevenly
distributed, destruction. The point could be reached sometime in the next few decades, however, at which the balance of dependence has shifted
so far against the United States that it no longer represents an effective deterrent to Chinese advances against important, if not vital, American
interests in East Asia. This is not an argument for seeking to decouple the US economy from the Chinese economy, as that would simply be to
dispense with the existent deterrent effect while it still has great force. It is, however, a reason to ensure that the balance of dependence does not
shift too heavily against the United States. It is often said that a strong economy is the basis of a strong defence. In the case of ChineseUS
relations, a strong US economy is not just the basis for a strong defence, it is itself perhaps the best defence against an adventurous China.

Yes Status Quo Esc.

Limited regional nuclear wars cause extinction collapses food production for
decades and kills billons
Helfand, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War co-president, 13 [Nov 4, Arms
Control Association, The Humanitarian Consequences Of Nuclear War, https://www.armscontrol.org/print/6021, accessed 7/3/16, ge]
In March, 130 nations gathered in Oslo for a two-day conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear war. The five countries that the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) recognizes as nuclear-weapon states staged a coordinated boycott, arguing that a meeting that discussed
what will actually happen if nuclear weapons are used would somehow distract them from the important initiatives they are pursuing to lower the
number of nuclear weapons that they possess. Next February, there will be a follow-up conference in Mexico to further delineate the medical
effects of nuclear war as they are now understood and to consider the circumstances under which nuclear war might occur. Far from being a
distraction, these meetings are helping to create the conditions necessary for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The United States and the four
other NPT nuclear-weapon states should participate in the Mexico conference and actively promote the process launched in Oslo to educate
policymakers and the general public about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war. This task is particularly urgent in view of
the new data that have emerged over the last few years. This information indicates that even a very limited nuclear war, confined to one region of
the globe, would have devastating effects worldwide. In 2006, climatologist Alan Robock; Brian Toon, a professor of

atmospheric and oceanic sciences; and four colleagues examined the consequences of a potential limited
nuclear war between India and Pakistan.[1] They chose to examine the effects of this scenario because of the two countries long history of
conflict and the ongoing risk of a nuclear exchange. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they gained independence in 1947 and have
come close to war twice when armed with nuclear weapons. During one crisis in the 1990s, it was reported that Pakistani planes armed with
nuclear bombs were kept on the runway with their engines running 24 hours a day so they would be ready for takeoff on a few minutes notice.[2]
It is easy to imagine events, such as an increase in tension over the disputed territories in Kashmir or another terrorist attack like those at the
Indian parliament in 2001 or in Mumbai in 2008, that could escalate into full-scale warfare and the use of nuclear weapons. In their study,

Robock and Toon assumed that each country used 50 nuclear bombs, each with an explosive power of 15
kilotonsthe power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945against urban targets in the other country. The
weapons involved represent less than one-half of the current Indian and Pakistani arsenals and less than 0.5 percent of the
worlds nuclear arsenals. The local effects were devastating: 20 million dead in the first week from blast
effects, burns, and acute radiation exposure. Even more disturbing were their findings concerning the far reaching disruption to global climate conditions that this conflict would cause. The scientists found that
the firestorms generated by these nuclear explosions would loft about 5 million tons of black soot high
into the atmosphere. The soot would block out sunlight, dropping surface temperatures across the planet
by an average of 1.3 degrees Celsius. The cooling would be much more severe in the internal regions of the major continents,
shortening the growing season in areas where much of the worlds grain is produced . In addition, the cooling
would lower total precipitation worldwide as less water evaporated from the oceans to fall back as rain or
snow, and there would be significant changes in precipitation patterns. Further, by heating the upper
atmosphere, the soot particles would cause a major decrease in stratospheric ozone. By allowing
substantially more ultraviolet light to reach the earths surface, this would further reduce crop yields.
The soot particles would be injected so high in the atmosphere that they would not be washed out by rainfall. Their effects
would persist for a full decade until they gradually settled back to earth. The climate disruption predicted by the
Robock-Toon study has been independently confirmed in separate studies done by climatologists Michael Mills2 and Andrea Stenke,[3] each of
whom considered the same limited war scenario but used a different climate model. In the last two years, a number of studies have attempted to
look at the effect this climate disruption would have on food production. Environmental scientist Mutlu zdogan looked at

soybean production and corn production in the U.S. Corn Belt and found an average decline of 7 percent
in soybean production and 12 percent in corn production in the decade following a limited war in South
Asia.[4] Crop specialist Lili Xia and Robock examined the impact on middle-season rice production in
China and found a 15 percent decline from the prewar level for the 10 years following this conflict .[5]
The world is not prepared to deal with this kind of significant decline in food production. World
grain reserves amount to less than 70 days of consumption and would not offer a significant buffer against
a sharp and sustained reduction in grain harvests.[6] In addition, 870 million people in the world today
already are malnourished.[7] They receive less than the 1,800 calories per day required for the average adult to maintain his or her
body mass and do a small amount of physical work to gather or grow food. Even a 10 or 15 percent decline from these levels
of food consumption, sustained over a full decade, would be catastrophic . The decline in food consumption, however,
probably would be much larger than the decline in food production. Market forces would magnify the impact with large
rises in food prices, making even the available food inaccessible to the poor, who are already
malnourished precisely because they cannot afford enough food at current prices. Furthermore, some 300 million
people live in countries where, although most people enjoy adequate nutrition today, much of the food is imported. Most of the countries of North

Africa and the Middle East and many of the wealthy industrial countries of East Asia, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, fall into this
category. In the face of significant declines in food production, it is probable that grain-exporting countries

would suspend exports. This has happened repeatedly, for limited periods of time, over the last decade in response to local crop
shortfalls. Thus, these 300 million people also would face severe food insecurity. In April 2012, at the Nobel
Peace Laureates Summit in Chicago, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and its U.S. affiliate, Physicians for
Social Responsibility, released a report, Nuclear Famine, examining this potential catastrophe.[8] The report concluded that more than one

billion people might starve as a result of a limited, regional nuclear war. Since then, Xia and Robock have
generated new data examining the impact of a limited nuclear war in South Asia on grain crops other than rice in China. Their findings, which
will be published later this year, show that these other grains are affected much more severely than rice. In particular, production of the secondlargest grain crop, winter wheat, is projected to fall 31 percent. These new findings suggest that the Nuclear Famine report may have seriously
underestimated the extent of the catastrophe that would follow a regional nuclear conflict and that arms control advocates need to fundamentally
rethink their assumptions about limited nuclear war. The report assumed that China, along with most of the rest of the industrial world, would be
spared actual famine. The latest studies suggest that there might be widespread starvation in China, putting another 1.3

billion people at risk. At the very least, the predicted food shortfalls would create a decade of severe
economic and social instability in China, which is the largest country in the world and has the worlds second-largest and most
dynamic economy. China also has a large nuclear arsenal of its own, estimated to be nearly 300 warheads, about 50 to 75 of which are deliverable
by land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. There are no simulations examining whether there will be similar shortfalls in other temperatezone grain producers such as Canada, Russia, the United States, and Europe except for zdogans study of corn and soybeans in the United
States. In the absence of such studies, it seems prudent to assume that these countries might well suffer the same major food shortages that are
now predicted for China. Regional War, Global Impact In the 1980s, there was a general understanding that large-scale nuclear war between the
United States and the Soviet Union would be a disaster, not just for those countries but for the whole planet.[9] From the studies described above,
it is clear that even a much more limited nuclear war would be a global catastrophe, with severe humanitarian

consequences extending far beyond the countries directly involved in the conflict. These findings have significant
implications for nuclear weapons policy choices in South Asia and for the policies of other states toward India and Pakistan. Yet, the issue extends
well beyond South Asia. The arsenals of China, France, Israel, and the United Kingdom are all capable of causing the same

or greater degrees of climate disruption.

Conventional war goes nuclear use em or lose em, miscalc, aggressive tactics,
and tactical overlap
Talmadge, George Washington University Political Science and International Affairs Assistant
Professor, 16 [Caitlin, February, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, Preventing Nuclear Escalation in U.S.China Conflict,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/ default/files/ china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf, accessed 7/3/16, ge]
Conventional Counterforce as a Pathway to Nuclear Escalation Conventional War between the United States and China remains a lowprobability event. But if such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalation that is, actual detonation of nuclear
weapons likely

would be higher than many observers realize. Some aspects of a likely U.S. campaign in a
conventional war against China could look to China like an attempt at conventional counterforce,
pressuring China to escalate to nuclear use while it still could. This escalation scenario is distinct from other possible
pathways to nuclear use. For example, in the Cold War the classic scenario for escalation was pre-emption, the notion that one side might try to
use its nuclear weapons to pre-emptively destroy the arsenal of the other. Other scenarios for nuclear escalation include mistaken launch based on
faulty warning information, and unauthorized launch by a commander who is physically able to use nuclear weapons but does not have political
permission to do so. In addition, some states develop doctrines that deliberately threaten to escalate to the first use of nuclear weapons in the
event of rapid conventional losses. Nuclear escalation in response to an opponents perceived attempt at

conventional counterforce constitutes an alternative pathway to nuclear escalation. It can arise when one
sides conventional military campaign infringes or appears poised to infringe on the other sides ability
to use or control its nuclear arsenal. For example, conventional military attacks by one side against the
others command and control networks, air defenses, early warning radars, submarines, and missile
sites have the potential not only to degrade that sides conventional capabilities but also its nuclear
capabilities. After all, command and control networks for conventional forces may also be relevant to the control of nuclear weapons; air
defense systems may protect both conventional and nuclear assets; early warning radars are relevant to both conventional and nuclear operations;
attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines share shore-based infrastructure, with the former often protecting the latter; and the same sites
can house both conventional and nuclear missiles (called co-location). For all of these reasons, a state subject to attack on these

targets may have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is merely conducting a normal
conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the states nuclear capabilities . If the state fears the latter, it may
wish to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Such fears also could lead the state to engage
in behaviors that make other pathways to escalation more likely. For example, the state could opt for more decentralized
control of nuclear weapons, which would reduce vulnerability to conventional counterforce but

heighten the danger of unauthorized launch. Ultimately, escalation depends on how a state perceives an aggressive
conventional campaign against it. The state waging the campaign might use conventional force to target the opponents nuclear capabilities
inadvertently, not realizing that the conventional campaign was starting to look to the opponent like counterforce. Or it might do so deliberately,
actively embracing this risk as a way to increase pressure on the adversary. Either way, the target states fear of disarmament

could lead that state to use nuclear weapons. The Dangers of Nuclear Escalation in the Event of U.S.China Conflict Five
factors suggest that a U.S.China conventional war could activate this escalatory mechanism. First, the United
States embraces highly offensive conventional concepts of operations in the Pacific, despite the nuclear pressures these approaches might place
on China. A U.S. campaign in a conventional war with China could target Chinese submarines, missile sites,

command and control systems, air defense networks, and other sites well inside the Chinese mainland .
From Chinas perspective these assets may be relevant to Chinas assured retaliation capability. Thus
what the United States may view as a purely conventional operation might look to China like the prelude to a
counterforce strike, creating strong use or-lose pressures. Indeed, some Chinese statements indicate that
conventional attacks on Chinas nuclear capabilities could vitiate Chinas no-first-use pledge. Second, U.S.
alliance commitments could further exacerbate this danger . The Pacific Ocean may insulate the United States from much of
Chinas striking power, but U.S. allies, particularly Japan and Taiwan, would be much more militarily and economically
exposed in the event of a U.S.China war. Even if the United States believed it could achieve security
through a slower and more limited conventional campaign, U.S. allies might not share that conviction.
This reality again suggests that U.S. conventional operations could quickly expand in ways that could appear to impinge on Chinese nuclear
capabilities. Third, the U.S. militarys organizational tendencies also tilt in the direction of a more

conventionally aggressive campaign. For understandable reasons, militaries have a well-developed general preference for the
offense. Militaries also tend to pursue tactical and operational advantages at the expense of broader strategic and political objectives.

Historically this behavior has resulted in a U.S. approach that is very good at general deterrence
(preventing the outbreak of war) but less adept at intra-war deterrence (that is, preventing ongoing
wars from escalating). Fourth, civilian control of the U.S. military is unlikely to check these tendencies .
Some civilian policymakers may not be fully aware of the potentially escalatory implications of such
approaches, while others may actually embrace these approaches . The historical record suggests that civilian oversight of
conventional operations with nuclear implications has not always been robust. Fifth, situational awareness is likely to deteriorate
rapidly for the United States and especially China during a conventional conflict, in ways that further
compound all of the escalatory pressures just discussed. After all, denying China knowledge of the battle
space through the destruction of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (ISR) and command
and control networks is likely to be one of the primary objectives of any U.S. military strategy.
These sorts of attacks will be essential to U.S. conventional success but also will make it increasingly
difficult for China to feel confident that U.S. aims are limited and that Chinas nuclear retaliatory
capabilities remain intact. Similarly, the United States may cross Chinese nuclear tripwires without
realizing it.

AT: Carriers
Non-unique - Carriers are vulnerable now newest ev
Heginbotham 15 (Eric, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation specializing in East Asian security issues. Heginbotham is also
a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. PhD from MIT, Chinese Threats to US Surface Ships, RAND,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9858z4.html)
Focus on Chinese Anti-Surface Warfare This brief focuses on one area in which China has made

rapid and
substantial relative improvements: its ability to locate and attack U.S. surface ships, especially aircraft
carriers, in conflicts centered on Taiwan or the Spratly Islands. During the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, China was reportedly unable to locate,
much less attack, two U.S. aircraft-carrier battle groups in the waters around Taiwan. In contrast, China can now hold the U.S.
Navy's surface fleet at risk at significant ranges from the mainland . This threat to the U.S. surface fleet continues to
grow. China's anti-surface capability is founded on four developments : (1) the establishment of an increasingly capable
long-range maritime surveillance capability designed to detect and track surface ships, (2) the deployment of
sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles and the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile, (3) the acquisition
of strike aircraft with greater range and power, and (4) the deployment of new classes of larger and quieter
submarines armed with cruise missiles and torpedoes. While the development of China's anti-ship ballistic missile
capability has garnered headlines, this analysis suggests that the PLA's steady (but less heralded) development of
quieter, more capable submarines represents a more immediate threat one that puts U.S. carrier-strike groups within
2,000 km of the Chinese coast at significant risk. In 1996, China had taken delivery of only two submarines that could be described, by any
reasonable definition, as modern. The remainder of its fleet consisted of legacy boats based on 1950s technology, lacking teardrop shaped hulls
and armed only with torpedoes. By 2017, China will have a smaller but more capable fleet, with 49 modern ships, including both Russian Kiloclass boats and indigenous designs. China's recent submarine classes are armed with both sophisticated cruise missiles and torpedoes, greatly
increasing the range from which they can attack. Although most Chinese boats are diesel-powered and none is not up

to U.S. standards, they could nevertheless threaten U.S. surface ships. Assessing the Submarine Threat in the
Taiwan and Spratly Islands Scenarios The researchers assessed various aspects of Chinese intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities and the anti-surface warfare battle. This discussion is limited to the modeling of Chinese submarine attacks against U.S. carriers in
two scenarios at varying distances from the mainland: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a campaign to occupy a portion of the Spratly Islands.
Inputs included sensor ranges, weapon capabilities, the movement speed of Chinese submarines and U.S. warships, and the ability of U.S. antisubmarine warfare assets (including submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and helicopters) to screen the fleet and to detect and suppress or destroy
Chinese submarines. The primary output metric was "attack opportunities" the number of times Chinese submarines could reach positions to
attack a U.S. aircraft carrier over a seven-day period. In assessing each scenario, the team considered cases in which each submarine acted
individually with no external sources of information about the location of U.S. carriers and cases in which the submarines received cueing about
the target location once every 24 hours. The results are not intended to represent fully developed or precise predictions. But given the consistency
of the methodology applied over the period considered, they provide a good indicator of trends over time, as well as an idea of the general scale
of the challenge at any given point in time. As shown in the figure, under all scenarios and circumstances considered,

Chinese capabilities to generate submarine-attack opportunities increased by more than an order of

magnitude between 1996 and 2010 and further increases are likely through 2017. This improvement came
despite a reduction in the overall size of China's submarine force and improvements to U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities. The quieting
of Chinese submarines and the addition of cruise missiles largely accounts for the change. A second notable
pattern is that even occasional cueing from other ISR assets regarding the location of U.S. carrier-strike
groups would increase the ability of Chinese submarines to engage U.S. aircraft carriers by nearly an
order of magnitude above that without cueing. While it is not possible to confidently assess how often cueing might be
provided in an actual conflict, improvements to Chinese ISR have improved the chances that Chinese submarines
will receive such information. Chinese submarine commanders may not execute an attack every time they have an opportunity to
engage, and each attack may not result in a "hit," much less the disabling or destruction of a carrier. However, the modeling indicates that the
risks to U.S. carriers are substantial and rising. U.S. Mitigation Options The U.S. military has a variety of means to mitigate
specific threats, and it will improve them over time. New counterspace and cyber capabilities may enable U.S. forces to degrade China's spacebased ISR, as well as its over-the-horizon radar. The U.S. Navy is almost certainly working on technical counters to China's budding anti-ship
ballistic-missile threat, both through kinetic ballistic-missile defenses and, perhaps more importantly, ways to defeat Chinese weapons sensors.
Aircraft carriers can provide their own defensive combat air patrols to defeat the threat from enemy aircraft, and the United States is acquiring
more and better anti-submarine warfare assets. Nevertheless, given growing threats from China's submarines, as well as

China's increasingly capable strike aircraft and anti-ship missiles, U.S . carriers may be held farther
from the Chinese coast, particularly during the early stages of a conflict. This will reduce the number of U.S. naval aircraft in the
fight, as these aircraft will have to traverse greater distances and will therefore spend less time on station. It will also increase the demand for
U.S. Air Force tanker aircraft to refuel them. Increased tanker demand will, in turn, place further stress on available

U.S. basing, which may itself be under threat from ballistic and cruise missile attack.

Destroying carriers good - carrier presence causes Chinese nationalist backlash

Goodenough 10 International Editor for CNS News, launched foreign bureaus for CNSNews.com in Jerusalem, London and the
Pacific Rim (Patrick, International Editor for CNS News China Bristles at Prospect of U.S. Aircraft Carrier in the Yellow Sea, 7/12/2010,
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/china-bristles-prospect-us-aircraft-carrier-yellow-sea)
The Pentagon has yet to confirm reports, citing South Korean officials, about the involvement of the USS George Washington. But the possibility
that the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier may take part in the exercise is provoking particular criticism.
In an online poll run by Global Times, a paper affiliated with Peoples Daily, 96

percent of Chinese respondents agreed that a

drill involving an aircraft carrier would pose a threat to China. Based in Yokosuka, Japan since May 2008, the USS
George Washington is the U.S. Navys first permanently forward-deployed nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. It recently returned to port for the
July 4 holiday but according to the Navy sailed again on Friday. In its own editorial, Global Times said China would likely send ships

and aircraft to monitor the drill, and warned of the implications for bilateral relations of any
misunderstanding or unintended incident involving U.S. and Chinese forces. The entire West Pacific is not the
backyard of the U.S. it said. The U.S. must consider the impact its military presence would have on public
perception and the delicate strategic balance in the area . It must give up the idea of constantly aggravating
another important cornerstone of security in the region. Li Hongmei, a Peoples Daily columnist, described a surge
of nationalist sentiment reflected by posts on the Internet by ordinary Chinese calling on China to attack
U.S. warships deployed close to its territorial waters. Undermining Chinas security interests The Chinese government itself
has by comparison been restrained in its response, but critical nonetheless. We firmly oppose foreign military vessels and
planes conducting activities in the Yellow Sea and Chinas coastal waters that undermine Chinas security
interests, said foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang. Our stance is consistent and clear. We have already expressed our
resolute interest and concerns to related parties, Qin told reporters . We hope relevant parties exercise calmness and
restraint and refrain from actions that might escalate tension in the region. As Chinas naval power has grown it has become
increasingly resistant to U.S. military movements in waters to its south and east. At its widest, the Yellow Sea is
around 450 miles across and countries territorial limits stretch only 12 nautical miles from their coastlines. But the 1982 U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea also recognizes exclusive economic zones (EEZ) stretching 200 nautical miles (about 230 miles) from a countrys coastline. The
treaty (which the U.S. has not ratified) provides for freedom of navigation and overflight in EEZs. It does not forbid one country from carrying
out military activities inside anothers EEZ as long as the activity is peaceful and does not harm the coastal states environment or economic
resources. Nonetheless, China has challenged U.S. military activity, and especially surveillance, in its EEZ, going so far as to
pass laws aimed at restricting foreign ships activities in those waters. Chinese

vessels have also tried to harass U.S. ships in

the Yellow, East China and South China seas.
Litany of Chinese threats to the carrier newest ev operating the carrier beyond
the threat envelope and emphasizing denial capabilities solves
Sayler 16 (Kelley, Associate Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program
and the 20YY Warfare Initiative, Red Alert: The Growing Threat to U.S. Aircraft Carriers, Center for a New American Security, February 2016,
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNASReport-CarrierThreat-160217.pdf)
Short-range threats include systems capable of operating within Chinas 200-nautical-mile (nm) exclusive economic zone (EEZ), or the
area in which a given country enjoys sovereign rights over natural resources. These systems such

as surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and tactical unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAVs) are additionally
capable of reaching Taiwan. Medium-range threats include systems capable of operating at ranges of up to 600
nm, such as ASCMs delivered by submarines, land-based fighter aircraft and bombers, and larger surface
vessels. In the event of a conflict, these systems could be used throughout the East and South China Seas and could reach the first island chain
that extends from Japan in the north to the Philippines in the south. Long-range threats include systems capable of operating beyond 600 nm, such
as anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and submarine- and bomber-delivered ASCMs. These systems could extend as far as the

U.S. territory of Guam and additionally cover the entirety of the Bay of Bengal and most, if not all, of the
Arabian Sea. Select land-based fighter aircraft may also threaten the carrier without aerial refueling at
distances greater than 600 nm. Growing international interest in A2/AD capabilities occurs at a time when the U.S. Navy is particularly illequipped to operate at distance. Since the end of the Cold War, the service has steadily retreated from its prior emphasis on long-range carrierbased assets and the deep strike mission, instead focusing on short-range assets intended to improve sortie generation rates.5 During this time, the
average unrefueled combat radius of the carrier air wing plummeted over 300 nm from 800 nm in 1996 to only 500 nm in 2006 bringing it
well within the range of a number of states A2/AD capabilities.6 This was largely the result of the decision to replace the A-6 attack aircraft,
which featured a combat radius of 1,000 nm, with the comparatively low-cost but shortlegged F/A-18 fighter jet. Limitations on the CVWs range
were further exacerbated by the retirement of the KA-6 tanker and the resultant decline in the carriers organic tanking capabilities.7 The

convergence of these factors could present new challenges for the U.S. carrier and its air wing
and foreshadow the end of unrivaled U.S. domination of the worlds oceans.

Short-Range Threats Throughout its history, the carrier has been forced to assume risk at short ranges, operating within the threat envelope of
surface combatants, SAMs, and land-based aircraft. However, advancements in precision and lethality have amplified

this risk at all ranges and will continue to do so in the years to come. China, in particular, is acquiring a robust
portfolio of A2/AD capabilities that could be used to constrain adversary operations within its EEZ. These capabilities could additionally be
brought to bear in a conflict with Taiwan, which lies less than 100 nm from mainland China. At this short range, China operates

approximately 40 Russian-built S-300 SAM batteries in addition to 60 indigenous HQ-9 models, which
together form what the U.S. Department of Defense has termed one of the largest forces of advanced
long-range SAM systems in the world.8 Deployed on mobile launchers, these systems are highly
survivable in combat. Existing batteries are capable of striking incoming cruise missiles and nonstealthy aircraft at a range of 80 nm9 and
may also have limited abilities to strike ballistic missiles.10 Furthermore, when China receives delivery of the upgraded S-400 system, its ability
to strike incoming targets will extend to 215 nm a range large enough to cover the entirety of its EEZ.11 Throughout its EEZ, China

additionally operates a wide range of surface combatants including destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and
fast-attack craft equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles . Over 100 of these vessels are capable of carrying the YJ-83, an
ASCM that employs inertial and active radar guidance and that can receive in-flight target updates.12 Difficult to defend against due to its speed
(Mach .9) and flight altitude (20 to 30 meters), the YJ-83 delivers a 165 kg semi-armor-piercing warhead large

enough to disable destroyers and frigates at ranges of approximately 65 nm.13 China is also capable of delivering
this missile from a range of land-based fighter aircraft and bombers and, in the event of a conflict, would
be likely to attempt a saturation attack that would overwhelm U.S. defenses .14 Chinas four
Russian-built Sovremenny guided missile destroyers also operate an advanced anti-ship cruise missile
the SS-N-22 Sunburn, alternatively known as the 3M80ME Moskit with each ship capable of launching eight missiles. Like the YJ-83,
the Sunburn employs inertial and active radar guidance. It is designed to evade the United States advanced SM-2 missile
interceptors as well as the defenses of the Aegis Combat System, reaching speeds of Mach 2.5 and
conducting 15G maneuvers.15 It is additionally capable of striking targets with a 300 kg semiarmor-piercing warhead at a range of 65
to 130 nm (depending on variant).16 Similarly, China deploys the SS-N-27 Sizzler, or 3M-54 Klub, ASCM aboard
eight of the countrys 12 Kilo-class diesel submarines .17 This system operates in variable flight mode, shifting from subsonic

flight in phases one and two to supersonic flight (Mach 2.2) in the terminal phase, which begins 10 to 35 nm from the target. During the terminal
phase, the Sizzler additionally operates in sea skimming mode at an altitude of five to 10 meters,

following a zigzag flight path.18 This approach both prevents the defender from detecting the
missile until it breaks the defenders radar horizon and complicates fire control calculations . At such altitudes,
detection occurs at a distance of less than 18 nm, leaving the defender less than one minute to respond.19 While the Sizzler has an overall range
of 120 nm, the B variant eliminates the terminal phase sprint vehicle to achieve an extended range of over 160 nm. Both variants are thus capable
of operating throughout Chinas EEZ. Finally, China could deploy its fleet of over 100 Israeli-built Harpy UAVs in

the event of a conflict within its EEZ. These systems, which have a range of approximately 215 nm,
essentially function as loitering anti-radiation missiles equipped with a 32 kg explosive warhead .20 While
a single munition of this size could disable [destroy] a ships radar, it would be highly unlikely to achieve a
mission kill. It is possible that China could, however, swarm its Harpys in a saturation attack against the
carrier. An attack of this nature could overwhelm U.S. defenses and ultimately result in the neutralization
or loss of the carrier. Medium-Range Threats In addition to its short-range A2/AD capabilities, China operates a number of systems that
could be used at medium ranges, throughout the East and South China Seas and the first island chain extending from Japan in the north to the
Philippines in the south. At this distance, ASCMs including those delivered by submarines, land-based fighter aircraft, bombers, and large
surface vessels will continue to pose a threat to the carrier due to the range of their associated platforms. For
example, one major delivery platform for the 65 nm-range YJ-83, the J-10A/S fighter jet, has a combat radius in excess of 540 nm, bringing the
platforms effective reach to around 600 nm.21 In the event of a conflict, these capabilities could limit U.S. freedom of

operation in contested areas and push U.S. aircraft carriers to or even beyond the maximum
unrefueled range of their tactical aircraft. Indeed, the most recent estimate of the F-35Cs combat radius is 610 nm,22 while
the combat radius for the U.S. Navys existing fleet of F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets is less than 500 nm.23 These limitations would likely pull the
carrier well inside the threat envelope. While Chinas ability to track and target the carrier degrades as a function of

distance and could be limited at such ranges, it appears to be developing high-altitude, long- endurance
UAVs that could assist in over-the-horizon targeting for ASCMs and ASBMs. In particular, the design
characteristics of the Soar Dragon suggest that it may be capable of carrying a sensor suite that could be used in support of an emerging
reconnaissance-strike complex.24

Long-Range Threats Beyond the 600 nm range, the number of Chinas A2/AD systems begins to taper. Many of its landbased fighter aircraft
could continue to deliver ASCMs at this range only with the assistance of aerial refueling, a task that could expose the fleet to a high level of
threat from U.S. carrier-based aircraft. Chinas approximately 250 land-based Su-27 Flankers and J-11s (the Su-27s indigenously produced
counterpart) and over 100 land-based Su-30MKK/2 Flankers are notable exceptions to this limitation, featuring combat radii of over 750 nm.27

China is also developing two stealthy, fifth-generation fighters, the J-20 and J-31, each of which is
expected to have a combat radius of over 1,000 nm.28 If paired w ith long-range ASCMs, these aircraft
could be capable of targeting the carrier at distances of over 1,200 nm 29 a range that could be extended to
over 1,600 nm if China were to assume the risk of aerial refueling. As China becomes increasingly proficient in conducting its own carrier
operations, it may also deploy YJ-83s and other ASCMs from carrier-based aircraft.30 In addition to ASCMs, China could use ASBMs

to strike aircraft carriers at distances greater than 600 nm .31 China currently deploys the solid-fuel DF- 21D ASBM on
highly survivable land-based mobile launchers capable of operating in off-road conditions.32 Further complicating defensive

measures, the DF-21D which travels at speeds of Mach 10 features a maneuverable warhead
guided by inertial and GPS navigation and may additionally incorporate cluster flchettes
designed to neutralize carrier flight decks and radar and communications equipment.33 While opensource details of the systems operating parameters vary, the DF-21D reportedly has a circular error probable34 of 20 meters and is capable of
striking slow-moving targets at a range of around 810 nm.35 China appears intent upon increasing its ASBM capabilities further and, at a
recent military parade commemorating the end of World War II, revealed that it may have an ASBM variant of a substantially longer-range missile
the DF-26. As with the DF-21D, estimates of the capabilities of the DF-26 vary widely; however, it is thought to have a range of 1,620 to 2,160
nm and to have both conventional and nuclear warheads.36 If accurate and operational, this system would give China the ability to strike targets
within the second island chain including those in and around the U.S. territory of Guam as well as those throughout the entirety of the Bay of
Bengal.37 In the event of a wider conflict, these systems could also reach targets throughout much, if not all, of the Arabian Sea. While both the
DF-21D and the DF-26 represent a significant threat to the carrier, Chinas ability to successfully track and target adversary assets at such
distances is unclear and there is no evidence that China has tested its ASBMs in a realistic operating environment.38 Nonetheless, China is

actively growing its reconnaissance-strike complex, integrating UAVs such as the Soar Dragon into
an existing suite of over-the-horizon radars and overhead satellites, and additionally improving its ability
to coordinate and cue intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR) assets capable of providing
more precise targeting data.39 Finally, Chinese submarines and bombers will continue to pose a threat to
the carrier throughout much of the Western Pacific .40 In the event of an attack, China would likely launch a large number of
A2/AD systems including ASBMs and submarineand bomber-delivered ASCMs along a variety of azimuths. Doing so would increase the
difficulty of defense and almost certainly result in significant damage to U.S. carriers within range, even assuming a high degree of Chinese
attrition.41

U.S. Countermeasures In the event of a near-term conflict, there

are a number of countermeasures including jamming; spoofing;

United States could undertake in order to

dazzling; kinetic strike;42 passive avoidance;43 and, potentially, hacking that the

attempt to mitigate the missile threat.44 An assessment of the effectiveness of these measures is unavailable in the open source;
however, it is highly unlikely that they could wholly neutralize a saturation attack against U.S.
forces. Furthermore, as China continues to develop and mature its reconnaissance-strike complex, the
threat to the carrier will grow increasingly resilient.45 Over the long term, the United States may have access to additional
countermeasures such as railguns, which could fire projectiles at speeds as high as Mach 7 and ranges of 50 to 100 nm.46 The Navy is
evaluating early-stage prototypes of these systems, but if they become operational at some point a prospect far from guaranteed they will
significantly increase the depth of ships magazines while simultaneously decreasing the cost47 of defending against missile salvos. These
factors would greatly strengthen the defense of U.S. surface assets. Conclusion No longer will aircraft carriers and their associated

air wings be able to operate with impunity. Instead, they will face a dense and growing threat across their full range of
operations as A2/AD systems continue to proliferate . Operating the carrier in the face of increasingly lethal and precise

munitions will thus require the United States to expose a multibilliondollar asset48 to high levels of risk in the event of a conflict.49 Indeed,
under such circumstances, an adversary with A2/AD capabilities would likely launch a saturation attack

against the carrier from a variety of platforms and directions. Such an attack would be di fficult if not
impossible to defend against.

AT: War Inevitable

Relations are stable now but its tenuousfurther cooperation necessary to
prevent devolution of relations
Pickrell 15 (Ryan, October 26, Ryan Pickrell is a writer for The National Interest, The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship
Passed the Point of No Return?, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168)//SLR

Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most realist scholars
suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and China and the
United States are rapidly approaching this point. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more
challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers have been increasingly relying
on their military capabilities and hard power tactics. Thats especially true in the South China Sea, which is one of the single
greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific
that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United
States remain unwilling to compromise and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to move
the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and closer to cooperation and rapprochement .
Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst.

AT: 2nd Strike Bad

Chinese second strike capabilities arent a threat and conventional war escalates
Christensen, Princeton Professor of World Politics and China and the World Program Director, 12
[Thomas J, May 21, Taylor and Francis, Journal of Strategic Sutdies Vol 35 Issue 4, The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic
Modernization and US-China Security Relations, accessed 6/30/16, ge]
The United States now faces a conventionally inferior potential adversary with nuclear weapons, so the hawkish and dovish logics of the Cold
War, somewhat ironically, are turned on their heads in the post-Cold War world. China's military modernization over the past

two decades has produced an array of new conventional capabilities that, for the first time, pose a serious
coercive challenge to forward deployed US forces in the Western Pacific. But it is still fair to say that the
United States enjoys broad spectrum conventional military superiority over China . So, a contemporary application
of the stability-instability paradox might suggest that the acquisition or maintenance of a Chinese second
strike should prove immaterial to the United States because the United States maintains such conventional
superiority and Chinese nuclear retaliatory capabilities can only deter a US nuclear strike against
China, not US conventional operations. This is particularly true, if, as Robert Ross has argued, Chinese elites believe
in the stability-instability paradox and clear firebreaks between conventional and nuclear conflict. 8In other
words, and somewhat ironically, a relatively calm reaction to contemporary Chinese nuclear modernization in the United States requires ascribing
to the Chinese a relatively hawkish view of Cold War deterrence challenges for the United States vis--vis the Soviet Union. Ross's argument is
tightly logical but depends on assumptions about Chinese attitudes regarding nuclear deterrence that, as we will see below, may not be valid.
In this article, I will call into question any unalloyed optimism about the meaning of China's evolving nuclear arsenal. The four lines of
argumentation relate directly to Jervis's Cold War theories. Whenever possible, I will support the arguments by referring to newly available
doctrinal works in China regarding conventional and nuclear deterrence.
First, given the small number and high vulnerability of China's traditional nuclear forces, we cannot be

sure that Beijing's elites believed they had an effective second strike or retaliatory capability in
recent years. In other words, in the minds of China's top leaders, China may be acquiring a secure second
strike capability for the first time or recovering one it lost after the United States developed new strike
capabilities since the 1980s. If true, Chinese leaders might be more bold in conventional crises with the United States than they
otherwise would be, knowing that China is at least capable of countering any American threat of nuclear escalation if a strong response is made to
China's conventional military actions.
Second, even if Chinese leaders are simply upgrading their second strike capability from an older version to

a newer version, Chinese second strike capabilities may matter for the first time in USPRC (People's Republic of
China) crisis management. China is developing new conventional military capabilities designed to assert or protect the PRC's interests in its
maritime periphery in ways that greatly increase the chance of conventional engagement with US forces, something China was previously largely
incapable of doing in an effective manner. While the United States would still enjoy conventional superiority at air

and at sea in an all-out confrontation, Beijing is developing coercive conventional options designed to
delay or deter effective US intervention in support of Taiwan or other regional actors by raising the
potential costs of US intervention. In other words, since in previous years a conventional conflict itself seemed harder to imagine, the
relationship between a perceived second-strike capability and coercive diplomacy at the conventional level was less important to ponder.
Third, the lack of agreement over the legitimate status quo in maritime Asia makes the region potentially

more volatile than the Central European theater during the Cold War . China has expansive maritime claims in the South
and East China Sea (Taiwan, Paracels, Spratlys, and Diaoyu/Senkaku islands), many of which date back to the 1930s and thereby hardly seem
new or revisionist in Chinese thinking. But these claims are contested throughout the region and any effort by China to enforce the claims by
military means would almost certainly look revisionist to many regional actors and to many Americans. In a sense then, from the

perspective of political psychology we may be facing the worst combination of factors: both sides in a
dispute may stand particularly firm because each believes sincerely that it is defending the status quo
against revisionists and that the other side should therefore back down.
Fourth, in order to adjudicate between the relative persuasiveness of arguments about stability based on the stability-instability paradox and
arguments about instability based on the threat that leaves something to chance, we need to be able to assess the robustness of firebreaks
between the conventional and nuclear level and the plausibility of scenarios for escalation from conventional conflict to nuclear conflict. Such

escalation can happen in two ways. First, fighting can become blurred between conventional and nuclear
war in ways that were made likely in Europe by the forward deployment and integration of tactical and
theater nuclear weapons with NATO conventional war-fighting assets. One might argue that it seems somewhat
contradictory to argue that a country has a secure second strike at time t and might therefore be emboldened by that fact politically in a
conventional crisis, but that it might become concerned about the sustainability of that deterrent in the course of war-fighting at the sub-strategic
level at time t plus 1. There is a tension here but no contradiction. Secure second strike is really the ability to survive a bolt-

out-of-the-blue massive enemy strike against one's nuclear forces and still level unacceptable damage on
the enemy with one's own nuclear forces. It does not necessarily posit that the same state can or will stand idly by while its key

strategic assets, including relevant weapons and command and control systems are degraded during a conventional or tactical nuclear war. A

second and perhaps somewhat less inadvertent road from conventional to nuclear war can occur if
conventional strikes by the enemy are deemed themselves to be threatening unacceptable damage to the
state's core national interests and therefore might warrant either the threat of nuclear retaliation or actual
nuclear retaliation as a means to dissuade the enemy from continuing to launch those devastating
conventional strikes. In a sense, the British and French independent nuclear forces may have played such a role during the Cold War in
helping to deter conventional Soviet aggression in Europe.
Unfortunately, in the case of China, one can imagine

both roads to escalation in wartime in ways that may

lend credibility to China's nuclear coercion in conventional crises. One major problem is that China is
simultaneously developing conventional and nuclear coercive capabilities that overlap
significantly. Future war-fighting with some of the key weapons systems in this conventional
modernization drive especially submarines and conventionally-tipped missiles could rather easily blur
the lines between conventional and nuclear war in a Sino-American conflict (since missiles and submarines are also
the backbone of China's nuclear deterrent). For example, if strikes by the United States on China's conventional coercive capabilities or their
critical command and control nodes and supporting infrastructure were to appear in Beijing as a conventional attack on its nuclear retaliatory
capability or as a precursor to a nuclear first strike, even a China that generally adheres to a No-First-Use posture might escalate to the nuclear
level. Moreover, China might simply soften or scrap its adherence to a No First Use principle under various extreme circumstances in a
conventional war. If this were to occur, no one could deny that China's ability to deliver a larger number and wider variety of nuclear weapons
against US targets would be quite consequential indeed for US national security.
Key to answering all these questions is China's own views about nuclear deterrence. The attitudes of top leaders about nuclear

weapons are closely held in most capitals, and Beijing is certainly no exception. But we do have some
windows into China's nuclear thinking, including one important 2004 doctrinal book for China's rocket
force, the Second Artillery of the People's Liberation Army, which recently has become available outside of the
PRC.9The lessons drawn here from that book suggest that the same factors that made Jervis relatively
relaxed about Soviet Cold War military developments in the 1970s and 1980s, should make US strategists
more concerned about Chinese developments today. On the positive side, in general, this work and others are largely
consistent with China's publicly stated No First Use Doctrine. But sections of the book suggest that No First Use is
sometimes vaguely defined and that the conventional and nuclear levels could easily become blurred in a
shooting war between the United States and China if, for example, Beijing perceived that the United States was seeking to
destroy China's retaliatory capability with conventional weapons. Moreover, one section of the book also explicitly discusses
other extreme conditions during conventional war that might warrant adjusting the nuclear deterrence
threshold (or adjusting nuclear policy) in a way that makes China's NFU Doctrine seem more of a guideline than a rule.