Belgica vs.

Executive Secretary Ochoa (digest)

BELGICA, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. (G.R. NO.
208566; SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, ET

activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the first time
when the Vice-President was given an allocation.

The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except

that the Department of Budget and Management was required to submit
reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.

Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form of

congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF. Examples of the CIs include
the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations,
and the Public Works Fund, among others.

AL. (G.R. NO. 208493); NEPOMUCENO VS. PRES. AQUINO (G.R. NO.
209251) NOVEMBER 19, 2013
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

The term pork barrel, a political parlance of American-English

origin, refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representatives district.

The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior
consultation with the representative of the legislative district concerned
and the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.

The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of

Act 3044, otherwise known as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this
provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended portions of an
item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee
elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.

In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by
three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para
sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation
with members of Congress for the release of funds.

In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives

of the people, also became involved in project identification.

The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial

law was declared.

In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)

appeared in the GAA. PDAF required prior consultation with the
representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also allowed
realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and
other personnel benefits.

It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General

Appropriations Act (GAA) called Support for Local Development Projects
(SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to individual
legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or
hard projects but also covered soft projects such as those which would
fall under education, health and livelihood.

In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is

essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.

It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal

participation of non-governmental organizations in the implementation of
PDAF projects was introduced.

The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to

specific amounts for individual legislators.

In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express

statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the
Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds but
with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.

The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as

implementing agencies. Legislators were also allowed identify
programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds
and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the
case may be.

After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of

democracy, the pork barrel was revived through the Mindanao
Development Fund and the Visayas Development Fund.

In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed Countrywide Development

Fund (CDF). The CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and
other priority community projects.

CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released

directly to implementing agencies subject to the submission of the required
list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen could identify any
kind of project from hard projects such as roads, buildings and bridges to
soft projects such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.

In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of
funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and

MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND

The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain
funds of the President such as the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential
Social Fund (PSF).

The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section

8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand
Marcos on March 22, 1976.

The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or
the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the
share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional
Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for violating the constitutional
provisions on (a)separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative
power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political
dynasties, (f) local autonomy.

RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy

There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system.

PORK BARREL MISUSE

In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed
that huge sums of money regularly went into the pockets of legislators in
the form of kickbacks.

In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the

PDAF but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary
basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.

The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and
the laws allowing for their utilization are currently existing and operational
and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners.

In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the

allegation that a syndicate defrauded the government of P10 billion using
funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies
for scores of ghost projects.

The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the
abolition thereof does not actually terminate the controversy on the
matter. The President does not have constitutional authority to nullify or
annul the legal existence of the PDAF.

In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a

three-year audit investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of
the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.

Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the

Malampaya Funds had gone into a dummy NGO.

The moot and academic principle cannot stop the Court from
deciding the case considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of
the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents
a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public
interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the systems
constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the
preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.

ISSUE/S

PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
involve an actual and justiciable controversy, (b) the issues raised are
matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c) petitioners have legal
standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.

(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable

The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of the
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon.
The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power
such that the Supreme Court has the power to determine whether there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.

(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue

Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and
citizens of the Philippines.

As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional

usage of public funds.

As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of

transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.

evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the
regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers
principle.

Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its

members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely

recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since
the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law.

Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is

only recommendatory in nature. They even admitted that the identification
of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can
be tapped as a funding source.

(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases

The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs.
Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa case was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring
post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and the PDAF Articles
with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund
release and realignment.
Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies considering that the authority to identify
projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a
form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be
exercised by individual members of Congress and the authority to
appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already been passed.

(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has

That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through

legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

The legislators are individually exercising the power of

appropriation because each of them determines (a) how much of their PDAF
fund would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine.

The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary

of Budget and Management[2] does not also bar judgment on the present
case because it was dismissed on a procedural technicality and hence no
controlling doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

(a) The separation of powers between the Executive

and the Legislative Departments has been violated.

The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund
release, and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to
the executive department.
Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in the various operational aspects of budgeting, including the

been violated
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is
lodged in Congress.

(c) Checks and balances

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only
appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be
further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.

This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification

budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the Presidents power of item veto.

It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire

PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators,

which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.

In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification

feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it
would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation. This is
because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of
the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power
of item veto.
(d)

The

Congressional

Pork

Barrel

partially

prevents

The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional

principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who
are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds
for local development.

The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on

the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.

The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine

parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have
been taken into consideration.

This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF

conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils
(LDCs) which are already legally mandated toassist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.

Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are

essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies
and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body.

accountability as Congress is incapable of checking itself or its

members.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles
in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law.

The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who

are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate.

The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14,

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress to
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government, because it
renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same postenactment authority and/or the individual legislators control of his PDAF
per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.

The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which

must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869

(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties

is

not self-executing.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
the state shall prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a
self-executing provision.

Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set

apart a determinable amount: a Special Fund comprised of all fees,
revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and all
sources.

It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development

and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.

Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law

because it set apart a determinable amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%)
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government

Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the

policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from
ruling on this issue.

(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional

principles on local autonomy

are valid appropriation laws.

For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law, it is
enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and(b) allocates the same for a particular
public purpose.

in the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate

gross earnings be less thanP150,000,000.00.

It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure

development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office
of the President of the Philippines.

(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869

constitutes undue delegation of legislation powers.

The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.

This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the

Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.

This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of

Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government, remains legally effective and subsisting.

Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of

legislative powers because it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law.

The law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure

development projects and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same.

The delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad

of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.

Case Digest: Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 203766 : April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot,
Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54
with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May
2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in
October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that
these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized
and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a
marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they
intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of
their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for participating in the
party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral

parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral
parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can
participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution."
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that
implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or
a sectoral partyor a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different
from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that
a"political partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that
a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously,
they are separate and distinct from each other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political
party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be
organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector.
There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political
party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists

Political Law- Party-list system

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list

elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as
political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and
do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list

system, stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of
the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987

Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent
may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of
advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the
cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme
Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme
Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases.

have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover,
a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees
failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified
nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and
subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under
the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include

professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "welldefined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions
faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political
experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial
power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners,
but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.
Petitions Granted