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Practical challenges in IoT

security and privacy


Pankaj Rohatgi

IoT Chipmaker/Devicemaker dilemma: Cost, Cost, Cost

High-end smart phone: $600


retail

Cost of security: $3
Security as percentage of retail: 0.5%
Average useful life: 4.6 years

Connected light bulb : $13.19

0.5 % of retail spent on security = 6.5


Will require14 years of support!

Additional spending/ROI on security will require tapping deeper in the value chain
Premier services, big-data analysis, etc
Security must add tangible value there (protection of service, provenance of data)
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Challenge: Provisioning keys, trust models + lifecycle


management
Root-of-trust
Owner

$$$$
Chip maker

Component
Provider

OEM

COMMS/
Gateway

Service
Provider

Root of trust/keys/security/trust model established/provisioned at


the low-end of value chain low-cost, insecure location
Many entities need keys and rights on end system using root-oftrust

Fully hierarchical/high-friction trust models will not work

Lifecycle: Manufacturing, Secure Test and Debug Lifecycle and


3 RMA across value chain, end-of-life

Solutions/Areas of Research
Secure provisioning/personalization

Keysplit 1

Keysplit 2

Keysplit 3

Multi-step key provisioning at low cost

Trust models

Dynamic addition of multiple security principals


Enabling trust without being trusted

Chip
A&T

Wafer
Sort

Privilege Assignment/Transfer vs. Delegation

Secure IC Debug Lifecycle


Si Tester
All debug
features are
available,
including DFT

OEM/ODM
SW
development
Load Image
QA

Disable
DFT

Disable debug
Enable SecBoot
Provision keys

End
Customer
Normal Use
Key refresh
SW updates

Malfunctioned
product?
Silicon Issue?

OEM/ODM

Si Tester
All debug
features are
available,
including DFT

Re-enable DFT
Block access to HW keys

Debug
malfunction
to determine
cause

Re-enable Debug of the


specific RMA sample
Block access to HW key

Challenge: Long-term security renewability


Over the long term:

Hardware rooted secrets on device compromised via physical attacks (but unlikely at
large scale)
Device software stack and software rooted secrets regularly compromised (very likely +
large scale)
Services and service secrets compromised (likely with large scale effect )

At the lowest level (root-of-trust)

Secure software updates and anti-rollback features needs to be built in


Recovery mechanism from key compromise (used by software and services) should be
built in
IoT Service
Blacklisting compromised root-of-trust

IoT Device
5

Challenge: Long term privacy


Privacy is a common requirement

$$$$$$$$

EPID
DAA
Differential
Privacy

Vs.

Group
Key

Lightweight, low-cost privacy ?


Is privacy even possible in a usage-based services, big-data/data-mining funded IoT
ecosystem ?
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