G.R. No.

111180 November 16, 1995

DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles
City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the
relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a
son, Christopher J., who was followed by two more children, both girls.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a
petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
The RTC granted the petition and ordered for the custody of the child to Dasie and for Villar to render monthly
support to the child. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower courts ruling, holding that (1) a habeas corpus case
contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated, hence, not applicable in an
adulterous relationship such as in this case; and (2) Villar is very rich businessman; whereas, petitioner-appellee
depends upon her sisters and parents for support, hence, the former should be granted custody over Christopher J.
RULING:
1.

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code,
Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of
such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her
rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
In addition, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law,
is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.

2.

Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
The fact that private respondent is well-off does not give reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of
her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they
were born. Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises
if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to
support her children according to her means.

3.

As has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the
case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over
seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically
expressed preference to live with his mother.
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have
custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of
support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital.
In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status
sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband and wife. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they
were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United
States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Instead of giving their
marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back
to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was
not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, copetitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
With a pending bigamy case against her in the Philippines, Teresita filed the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children. The trial court ruled in favor of Reynaldo.
While the CA reversed its decision.
RULING:
1.

How to ascertain the best interest of the child.

The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be
determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven
years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to the court to
decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that
consideration.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take
into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the
mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by
"compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by
that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other
parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.

2.

Examinations made on children subject of parental custody cases, when presented to the court must be
construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court
in the determination of the issue before it. The persons who effected such examinations were presented in
the capacity of expert witnesses testifying on matters within their respective knowledge and expertise.
In this case, the second child, Rosalind persistently showed her dislike and refusal to go back to her mother.
It was also noted that she became traumatized of seeing her mother kiss and hug another man inside their
house in the States.

3.

Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child under 7 years of age not to be
separated from the mother, without considering what the law itself denominates as compelling reasons or
relevant considerations to otherwise decree.

In the Unson III case, earlier mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty in not awarding custody
to the mother, it being in the best interest of the child "to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to
say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had placed herself . . . might create in the
moral and social outlook of [the child] who was in her formative and most impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They understand
the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would
be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material
sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of
the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care
which the mother is not in a position to extend.

4. The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under
"compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven
years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already
caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in
Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to
have become final.