BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), petitioner v.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
RONALDO ZAMORA, respondent
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000.
FACTS:
- On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a military
bases agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine
territory by the US military personnel.
- To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the US
entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951.
- Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their
territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft
- In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military
exercises between the two countries were held in abeyance. However, the defense and
security relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
- On July 18, 1997 the United States panel exchanged notes with the Philippine panel to
discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
- This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12
and 13, 1998.
-Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
- Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the
senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
- The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions
under which US armed forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines.
- Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

ISSUE:
WON the Visiting Forces Agreement is Unconstitutional.
HELD:
[The petition was dismissed, held that the petitioners did not commit grave
abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met,
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum;
and
(c) Recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the
VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary
since Congress has not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United
States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to
the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the
sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to
the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or
acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations
under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT

SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA
G.R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

v EXECUTIVE

NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the
Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners
have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.

FACTS:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30,
1951, To further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the
parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces,
public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence
of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of
conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter,
President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through
respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-governmental
organizations, citizens and taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to
herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.

As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress
of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that
he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are
involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds
are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing
to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus
standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring
this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its
National President to commence the present action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of
the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance
of the petitions.
2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution?

Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by
congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence of
foreign military troops in the Philippines.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that,
what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least
two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

Section 21, Article VII reads: [n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

ISSUES AND RULING:

1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or
legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?

The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements.

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military
Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which
case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is
required to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down
the general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or
particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid
and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to
treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the
requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the
agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other
contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting
the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel,
and further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials
and supplies. Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties
involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a
certain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with
regard to determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
Senate.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient
agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the
establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between transient
and permanent. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is
made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that
Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign
troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription covers foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of
troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer
to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and
independent subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated a military
treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c)
foreign facilities any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section
25, Article XVIII.
3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?
YES
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;

(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA.
The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with
the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred.
As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the
other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the
US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to
accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language
should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated
that the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US
accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its
treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the
concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our
nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the
obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be
an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal
acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the
process of ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the
President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part,
under principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the
agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations

.Pimentel

v. HRET

Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance
with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first
time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose
nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q.
Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from
party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang
Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and
Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2
representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative
each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on
Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998
elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the
HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the
HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the
different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two
letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the
HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to
conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20
January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator
Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same
day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the
letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February
2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its
Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend
that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list Jr. as an additional
respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the
CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator
Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and
uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He
was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and
COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Issue:

[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list
representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include
party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative,
within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and
the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on
the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power
to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy
the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional
provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to
the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on
proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated
duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for
each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither
can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are
duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any
allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating
in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the
11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the
party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election
process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the
time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any
party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the
party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the Court cannot resolve
the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves.

Pastor Endencia and Fernando Jugo vs. Saturnino David

G.R No. L-6355-56 93 Phil 696 (August 31, 1953)

Gustilo vs. Real, Sr.

Facts: Rimeo S. Gustilo was proclaimed duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa,

FACTS:
Saturnino David, who was the Internal Revenue Collector, collected the sum of P 1,744.45
representing the income tax in the salary of Justice Pastor M. Endencia as Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951 and from the salary of Justice Fernando Jugo as
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals from January 1, 1950 to October 19, 1950, and
from October 20, 1950 to December 31, 1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme court
the amount of P 2,345.46 pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 promulgated by
the Congress which provides that No salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of
which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law.
However, Judge Higinio Macadaeg argued that under the doctrine of separation of powers
in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, judges are exempt from taxation. The collection of income
taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their
compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, thus,
ordering Saturnino David to refund the said taxes.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the
collection of income ta on the salary of the judicial officers
HELD: No, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income
taxes in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by Article VIII,
Section 9 of the Constitution that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts shall hold office during good behaviour, until they reach the age of seventy,
or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and
each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
In this case, the act of the Congress in interpreting the Constitution, promulgating Section
13 of Republic Act 590 is an invasion of the power of the Judicial department in the
interpretation and application of the laws.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or
act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight
with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its
meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial
function in defining a term.
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision,
validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by declaration that is shall be so
construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of the statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law,
the Legislature may not legally provide interpretation will violate the Constitution.
Therefore, the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer provided in
Republic Act 590, is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution.

Manapla. His opponent, Weddy Libo-on filed an election protest case and sought the recounting
of ballots. Judge Ricardo S. Real, Sr. issued a TRO and annulled the proclamation of Gustilo.
Complainant declares that no copy of this order was served to him. Gustilo took his oath of office
and that same day, he filed a petition for certiorari before RTC. RTC lifted the TRO and declared
as null and void the order nullifying complainants proclamation. Gustilo moved for Reals
inhibition believing that he could not decide the case impartially. Real denied the motion for
inhibition and after hearing the case issued a second TRO to maintain the status quo between
the contending parties. Gustilo argued that the second TRO reversed the order of the RTC.
Issue: W/N Judge Real, Sr. transgressed the jurisdiction between his court and COMELEC.
Held: Yes. Judge Real, Sr. usurped a power exclusively vested by law in the COMELEC. Real,
Sr. in transgressing the jurisdictional demarcation lines between his court and the
COMELEC clearly failed to realize the position that his court occupied the interrelation
and operation of the countrys justice system. He displayed a marked ignorance of basic
laws and principles. By annulling Gustilos proclamation despite being aware of the fact
that his court had no power to do so, not only is respondent guilty of grave abuse of
authority, he also manifests unfaithfulness to a basic legal rule as well as injudicious
conduct.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
FACTS : Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB
Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a
range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others,
that The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys
shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or
reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC
allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having
filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty
(20%) percent of the existing fares.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus
fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare
range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is
unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.
HELD: Yes. Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public
Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing
regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. x
x x However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB
alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS

ARANETA V. DINGLASAN
(G.R. NO. L-2044 AUGUST 26, 1949)
TUASON, J.:
FACTS:
The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Concerned in case L-3055 is Executive Order
No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines. On the other hand, case No. L-3054 relates to
Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. Affected in case No.
L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with,
and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. Petitioners rest their
case chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to
have any force and effect.

Rodriguez Sr. v. Glla

Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in
1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public
works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces
and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and
other calamities. They sought to have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be
enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EOs were pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed
House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President
due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note
also that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the Supreme Court in the same
case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.

ISSUE: Whether or the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect.
HELD:
Yes. Section 26 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides: In time of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy. Article VI of the
Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been
defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration,
extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean
restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary
or it can not be said to be an emergency." It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved
with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is
contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of
its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the
Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the
delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain.
Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple
majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. Section 4 of the Act goes far to settle the legislative
intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The
silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal
of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National
Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the
time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assemble failed to make a provision for this
termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the effects and incidents of the delegation. There
would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself
was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he
could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature. It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and
that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the session of
Congress instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think giving
effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider
general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In
a regular session, the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by
the organic law. Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.

HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to
CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual
emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has
been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit
for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671.
Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given
due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by
two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers
than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act
No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the
agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust,
in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or
at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the
Act is coupled with interest.
Facts:Petitioners herein seek to invalidate E.O. Nos. 545 and 546issued on
November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sumof P37,850,500 for urgent and
essential public works, and thesecond setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief
in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, drought,earthquakes and other
calamities. E.O.s were issued by virtueof C.A. No. 671 The Emergency Powers Act.
Issue:WON E.O.s Nos. 545 and 546 are valid?
Held: NO. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides thatin times of war or
other national emergency, the Congressmay by law authorize the President, x x x to
prescribe/promulgate rules and regulations to carry out adeclared national policy. The
said powers are limited in the prescribed period. It cannot be exercised at any time as
thePresident may want to be

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.

Case No. 158
G.R. No. 111097 (July 20, 1994)
Chapter V, Page 208, Footnote No. 130
FACTS:
PAGCOR, created by P.D. 1896, leased a building belonging to Pryce in order
to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Various civic organizations,
religious elements, womens and youth groups, and even the local officials angrily
denounced the project. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two
ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino. Petitioners argue that by
virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC), the Sangguniang Panlungsod may
prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general
welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling.
ISSUE:
W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro are valid.
HELD:
The two local ordinances are not valid. In Basco v. Phil. Amusements and
Gaming Corp., this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. Under the
LGC, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress gambling and
other prohibited games of chance. Since the world gambling should be read as
referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance,
must be prevented or suppressed. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869
and the LGC, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give
effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D.
1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by
a mere ordinance.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC.,
respondent.
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all
buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from
entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for
picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the
City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this
ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the
grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as
unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise
of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police
power, i.e. lawful subject and lawful means.
Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of
the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic
congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the
interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is
thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed
by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were
reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances
assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the
terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and
charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate
court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies
and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and
liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are
enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness,
which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured
by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen
to be effective.

DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO, Petitioners vs.

JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA and CITY OF CEBU, Respondents G.R. No. 155746,
October 13, 2004
Facts: The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late 1965,
the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the
province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This
prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages in the then
Court of First Instance. The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the
Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take
possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus
petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC
affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition.
However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin
Garcia wrote two lettersto the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the
ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the
mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition. Unfortunately for
petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City
passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA
7279. Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No.
1843 for being unconstitutional.
Issue: WON the Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of
their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution.
Ruling: Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its lawmaking
authority are denominated ordinances. Local government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By
virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to
expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners lot was
enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and lowincome residents of the City. However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most
serious social problems of the country, local government units do not possess unbridled
authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the
power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly
states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.

CRUZ v. PARAS
Facts: Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their
other adverse effects on the community, the respondents passed Ordinance No. 84
which may be cited as the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan
which says that operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be
issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no
license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and
professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments.
The prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to said persons and operators of
said establishments shall include prohibition in the renewal thereof. Petitioners allege
that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the
licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. The
lower court dismissed the cases of prohibition with preliminary injuction and upheld
the constitutionality of the Ordinance in question. Hence, the petition for certiorari by
way of appeal.
Issue: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by
respondents, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs,
and the pursuit of a lawful occupation
Held: No Ratio: Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as
follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations. - The
municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein." It is a general rule that ordinances passed
by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be
reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and
not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. If night clubs were merely then
regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of
validity. The case is different from Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City
Mayor because what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory
power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. The writ of certiorari is
granted and the decision of the lower court reversed, set aside, and nullified.
Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and
unconstitutional.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting
short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels
who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private
rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the
ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered
to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note
that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the
infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited
group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
US v Ang Tang HoGR L-17122February 27, 1922Johns
Facts:The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section
1,authorizing the governor-General fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergencymeasures for
carrying out the purposes of the Act. Thus, on August 1, 1919, theGovernor-General signed EO
53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang TangHo was caught selling a ganta of rice at
the price of eighty centavos, a price higher thanthat fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty
and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers

.Issue:Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?

Held:Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized
theGovernor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect thelaw.
The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify whatconditions
the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states for any cause. It also
failed to define extraordinary rise that such proclamation by theGovernor-General aims to
prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures by the Governor-General

YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

148 SCRA 659, NO. L- 74457, MARCH 20, 1987
CRUZ, J:
FACTS:
Executive Order 626-A prohibited the transport of the
carabaos or carabao meat across the provincial boundaries without
government clearance, for the purpose of preventing the indiscriminate
slaughter of those animals.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in
a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the
police station commander for violation of EO 626-A. The executive order
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The petitioner claimed that
the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a
right to be heard before a competent and impartial cout as guaranteed by
due process. The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the said
order and the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power in
relation to the disposal of the confiscated properties
HELD:
No. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable
manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property
shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal ad the
Director of the Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The
phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse
and even corruption, One searches in vain for the usual standard and the
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers
must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries
of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose
the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.

DAR v. Sutton
FACTS: Respondents herein inherited a land which has been devoted exclusively to
cow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. a new agrarian law,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising
livestock, poultry and swine. Thereafter, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz
Farms v. Secretary of DAR
this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in
the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain
provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of
agrarian reform. Thus, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to
withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and
thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. However, DAR issued A.O. No. 9,
series of 1993 which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from
the coverage of the CARL. The DAR Secretary issued an Order partially granting the
application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL but applying the
retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9. Respondents moved for
reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it
is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and appealing that the DAR A.O. No. 9 be
declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which
prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is
constitutional?
HELD: The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage
of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership is
invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
.
The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry- raising
are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or
agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop
or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural activity. DAR has no power to
regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the
coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional
as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the
1987 Constitution
Solicitor General v Metro Manila Authority

Cruz, 1991
FACTS:

In
Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong
, the SC ruled that (1) theconfiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was
not among the sanctions that couldbe imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605; and,
that (2) even the confiscation of driver'slicenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the
decree nor was it allowed by the decree to beimposed by the Commission.
Several complaints were filed in the SC against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's
licenses andremoval of license plates for alleged traffic violations. These sanctions were not among
those that may beimposed under PD 1605
The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to
detach thelicense plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked orobstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was
adoptedpursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. There was no conflict between the
decision andthe ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter.
The Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it
representedan invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. It violated PD 1605 which does not
permit, and soimpliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses
for trafficviolations in Metropolitan Manila.
ISSUE & HELD:
WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)
The problem before the Court is not the validity of the
delegation
of legislative power. The question the SC must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated
power. A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may
regulatetrade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for
trafficviolations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the
Metropolitan ManilaCommission, now the Metropolitan Manila Authority, to impose such sanctions.
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from thenational legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to
levy taxes isconferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the
power of subordinatelegislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all timesthe will of their principal. Here, the enactments in question, which
are merely local in origin, cannot prevailagainst the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose
sanctions thedecree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. There is no statutory authority for and
indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan
Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by thechallenged enactments
by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
NOTE: SC emphasized that the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the
Metropolitan Manila area. It isan exception to the general authority conferred by RA 413 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punishviolations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with
the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned

Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. de la Serna 228 SCRA 329, Dec. 10, 1993

Facts: P.D. No. 851 provides for the Thirteen-Month Pay Law. Under Sec. 1 of said law, all employers are
required to pay all their employees receiving basic salary of not more than P 1,000.00 a month, regardless of
the nature of the employment, and such should be paid on December 24 of every year. The Rules and
Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 contained provisions defining 13-month pay and basic salary and the
employers exempted from giving it and to whom it is made applicable. Supplementary Rules and Regulations
Implementing P.D. 851 were subsequently issued by Minister Ople which inter alia set items of compensation
not included in the computation of 13-month pay. (overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations which are
not part of basic salary shall not be included in the computation of 13-month pay). Pres. Corazon Aquino
promulgated on August 13, 1985 M.O. No. 28, containing a single provision that modifies P.D. 851 by
removing the salary ceiling of P 1,000.00 a month. More than a year later, Revised Guidelines on the
Implementation of the 13-month pay law was promulgated by the then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon, among
other things, defined particularly what remunerative items were and were not included in the concept of 13month pay, and specifically dealt with employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission or
commissions were included in the computation of 13th month pay) A routine inspection was conducted in the
premises of petitioner. Finding that petitioner had not been including the commissions earned by its medical
representatives in the computation of their 1-month pay, a Notice of Inspection Result was served on petitioner
to effect restitution or correction of the underpayment of 13-month pay for the years, 1986 to 1988 of Medical
representatives. Petitioner wrote the Labor Department contesting the Notice of Inspection Results, and
expressing the view that the commission paid to its medical representatives are not to be included in the
computation of the 13-moth pay since the law and its implementing rules speak of REGULAR or BASIC salary
and therefore exclude all remunerations which are not part of the REGULAR salary. Regional Dir. Luna Piezas
issued an order for the payment of underpaid 13-month pay for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988. A motion for
reconsideration was filed and the then Acting labor Secretary Dionisio de la Serna affirmed the order with
modification that the sales commission earned of medical representatives before August 13, 1989 (effectivity
date of MO 28 and its implementing guidelines) shall be excluded in the computation of the 13-month pay.
Similar routine inspection was conducted in the premises of Phil. Fuji Xerox where it was found there was
underpayment of 13th month pay since commissions were not included. In their almost identically-worded
petitioner, petitioners, through common counsel, attribute grave abuse of discretion to respondent labor
officials Hon. Dionisio dela Serna and Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano.
ISSUE: Whether or not commissions are included in the computation of 13-month pay
HELD: NO. Contrary to respondents contention, M.O No. 28 did not repeal, supersede or abrogate P.D. 851.
As may be gleaned from the language of MO No. 28, it merely modified Section 1 of the decree by removing
the P 1,000.00 salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Month pay as envisioned, defined and implemented under
P.D. 851 remained unaltered, and while entitlement to said benefit was no longer limited to employees
receiving a monthly basic salary of not more than P 1,000.00 said benefit was, and still is, to be computed on
the basic salary of the employee-recipient as provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the interpretation given to the
term basic salary was defined in PD 851 applies equally to basic salary under M.O. No. 28. The term basic
salary is to be understood in its common, generally accepted meaning, i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard
work period exclusive of such additional payments as bonuses and overtime. In remunerative schemes
consists of a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is patently the basic
salary for this is what the employee receives for a standard work period. Commissions are given for extra
efforts exerted in consummating sales of other related transactions. They are, as such, additional pay, which
the SC has made clear do not from part of the basic salary. Moreover, the Supreme Court said that, including
commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised
Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of "basic salary"
as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the
provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority
by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into
effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, ET AL. vs. BF HOMES, INC. G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999
Facts. 1.In 1988 because of financial difficulties, the Securities and exchange commission place respondent under
receivership to undergo a10 year rehabilitation
program appointing attorney Orendain as receiver.
2. Preliminary to the rehabilitation, attorney Orendain entered in to tripartite agreement with the Bf Paranyake homes
owners association and the confideration
homes owners association which resulted in the creation of the united home owners association and was registered
with the Home insurance guaranty corporation.
3. Respondent through its receiver turn over to the petitioner the administration and operation of the subdivision clab
house at 37 Pilar street and a
strip of open space in Concha Cruz garden row.
4. On 1994, the first receiver was relief and a new committee of receivers was appointed and based on the Bfis title on
the main road, the newly appointed
committee of receivers sent a letter to the different Home owners association informing them that they are now
responsible for the security of the subdivision
as a basic requirements. For its rehabilitation.
5.Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with a preliminary injunction with the Higc against the respondent who issue
a temporary restraining order enjoining
the respondent from taking over the clubhouse at 37 Pilar street.
6. Respondent filed a petition for prohibition for the issuance of the temporary restraining order and to enjoin the Higc
from proceeding with the case
Before the Court of Appeals who grant the petition and all denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner.
7. Petitioner filed a petition for certitorari before the supreme court.
Issue: Whether or not, the Higc was correct in promulgating the rules of procedure in the settlements of the home
owners dispute.
According to the Supreme court, the Home insurance guaranty corporation went beyond its authority as provided for by
the law when it promulgated the revise rules of procedure because an administrative agency cannot amend An act of
congress. So the supreme court denied the petition for certiorari.
Lupangco vs. CA PONENTE: GANCAYCO, J. Facts: Respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy. 1 Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy schedule filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the RTC of Manila, Branch
XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent
PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction
to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that
it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied with the lower courts decision, they appealed to
CA and CA ruled in their favor declaring that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case. Issue: WON the
Resolution No. 105 is unconstitutional. Held: CA decision REVERSE and SET ASIDE. It is an axiom in administrative
law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To
be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should
prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed
to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their
faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful
knowledge that will promote their personal growth. Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates
the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of 1 Provisions
embodied in the resolution: No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by,
or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or
the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions
during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. Any examinee
violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of
the Commission. review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the
standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are
clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped
from helping out their students.