Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183202

June 2, 2014

ALBERTO ALMOJUELA y VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals' (CA) decision dated March 17, 2008 and resolution dated June 2, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29268.
These assailed rulings affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, dated
January 27, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 93-129891, finding petitioner Alberto Almojuela y Villanueva (Almojuela)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
1

Factual Antecedents
This case stemmed from two informations for attempted homicide and homicide filed with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 39, against accused Almojuela. The trial court dismissed the charge for attempted homicide for
insufficiency of evidence. The information for homicide is quoted below:
5

That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating with one whose true name, identity and present whereabouts are (sic)still unknown and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon one Ricardo Quejong y Bello by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon
twice, hitting him on the left side of his back, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.

During arraignment, Almojuela entered a plea of "not guilty". Pre-trial conference was conducted then trial on the
merits followed. Two different versions of the facts surrounding the victim Ricardo Quejongs (Quejong) death
surfaced.
8

The Prosecutions Version

Sanito Masula (Masula) narrated the prosecutions account of the events which transpired on November 21,
1993, the crimes date.
9

At around 8:00 in the evening, Masula, Quejong, Jose Buenhijo Paz (Paz), along with some others, were on
their way home from a party when they encountered Almojuela, who was having a drinking spree with his friends
in front of his house.
Almojuela called on Paz and shouted, "Matagal ka nang namumuro sa akin," to which, Paz replied, "Ganoon ba?
What do you want?" Immediately, a fight ensued between the two. In the course of the fight, Almojuela stabbed
Paz in his right arm, causing the latter to retreat. It was at this point that Quejong joined in the fight and grappled

with Almojuela to the ground. A certain Dale Abarquez (Kagawad Abarquez) at that point, came to pacify the
parties. But the two men did not heed the kagawads order and continued wrestling with each other. This
prompted Kagawad Abarquez to hit Quejong twice in his back and to fire two warning shots in the air. On hearing
the gunshots, Quejong and his group immediately ran away.
10

Masula testified that he did not actually see Almojuela stab Quejong when they were grappling on the ground.
However, he also said that he noticed blood on Quejongs back. On Quejongs way home, their friends saw that
he had stab wounds in his back. They immediately rushed him to the University of Santo Tomas Hospital where
he died approximately two to three hours from admission.
11

12

The Defenses Version

The evidence for the defense showed that on November 21, 1993, Almojuela was cooking pulutan for his
drinking buddies Felicisimo Venezuela and Winfred Evangelista, when his daughter told him that smoke was
entering their house. He checked the report and saw the group of Paz, Quejong, Masula, and others, smoking
marijuana. Almojuela confronted the group, to which Paz responded by cursing him. Despite this response,
Almojuela simply went inside his house and continued with his cooking.
13

When Pazs group was already high on drugs, they called on Almojuela and challenged him to a fistfight, which
he accepted. The fight only ended when Almojuelas neighbors came to pacify them. But as Almojuela was about
to enter his house, Quejong pulled him, leading to another fight. They were grappling on the ground when
Kagawad Abarquez arrived to intervene to stop the fight. No one heeded the kagawad; hence, he fired two
warning shots in the air. The shots forced Quejong and his group to scamper away.
14

At around 10:30 in the evening of the same day, policemen came to Almojuelas house. They did not find him
because he hid at the kamoteng kahoy thicket near his house. He did not know though that Quejong sustained
any serious injury since they only engaged in a fistfight; no bladed weapon was used. He voluntarily surrendered
himself, however, when he learned from Kagawad Abarquez that Quejong had died from stab wounds. He
surrendered to SPO1 Danilo Vidad through the assistance of a certain SPO4 Soriano, the following day.
15

The RTCs Ruling

In its decision dated January 27, 2005, the RTC found Almojuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide,
and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum. It also ordered him to pay the following indemnities to
the heirs of Quejong: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P832,000.00 for loss of
earning capacity; P35,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses.
The RTC gave great weight to Masulas testimony. Although Masula did not actually see Almojuela use a knife
on Quejong, strong evidence still existed to support his conviction.
Only three persons were actually involved in the fight Almojuela, Quejong and Paz. Since only Almojuela was
armed with a knife and in fact he wounded Paz in his right arm, it was reasonable to conclude that he also
stabbed Quejong. The RTC noted that Paz could not have stabbed Quejong as he himself was wounded.
16

The RTC did not give credence to the testimony of Winfred Evangelista that Almojuela never held a bladed
weapon during the fight. This statement was inconsistent with his earlier claim that Almojuela tried to take a knife
away from Quejongs hand. The RTC concluded that Evangelista lied in open court.
17

The CAs Ruling

The CA affirmed Almojuelas conviction but reduced the RTCs imposed penalty to six (6) years and eight (8)
months of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
18

The CA appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender; and noted that, although Almojuela hid
when policemen first visited him in his home, he still voluntarily surrendered to the authorities the day after the
incident.
19

The CA also gave evidentiary weight to the attendant circumstantial evidence. It noted that the pieces of
circumstantial evidence, taken together, form an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that
Almojuela committed the crime charged. The CA reasoned out:
As established by the testimonies, it is apparent that only Jose Buenhijo Paz, victim Ricardo Quejong and
accused ALMOJUELA were involved in the brawl and of the three of them it was accused ALMOJUELA who was
likely to have stabbed the victim. He was the one who had the motive since he held a grudge against Jose
Buenhijo Paz and he was the one who confronted the group of the victim. It was accused ALMOJUELA and the
victim Ricardo Quejong who wrestled with each other, thus only accused ALMOJUELA could have inflicted the
fatal injury to the (sic) Ricardo Quejong. It was also highly unlikely that Jose Buenhijo Paz had inflicted the injury
since he himself was injured by the knife that stabbed the victim Ricardo Quejong. It was in fact Jose Buenhijo
Paz who was being aided by the victim Ricardo Quejong against the assault of accused ALMOJUELA.
20

The Petition
In his Rule 45 petition before us, Almojuela imputes error on the CA for finding that the prosecutions evidence
was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He maintains that the circumstantial evidence is not strong enough to identify him as the crimes perpetrator.
Even assuming that he did stab Quejong, he submits that the CA failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense. Paz and Quejong ganged up on him, forcing him to repel their unlawful aggression
with a bladed weapon.
21

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
argues that only questions of law may be reviewed in a Rule 45 petition, and that the findings of fact by the trial
court, if affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court.
The OSG also maintains that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support Almojuelas conviction. Also, the
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense should not be appreciated since it was Almojuela who started
the unlawful aggression.
22

The Courts Ruling

We DENY the petition.
Circumstantial evidence as basis for conviction
We find it clear, based on the records and the evidence adduced by both parties, that no direct evidence points
to Almojuela as the one who stabbed Quejong in the night of November 21, 1993.
Lest this statement be misunderstood, a finding of guilt is still possible despite the absence of direct evidence.
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence may result if sufficient circumstances, proven and taken together,
create an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
was the author of the crime.
23

Circumstantial evidence may be characterized as that evidence that proves a fact or series of facts from which
the facts in issue may be established by inference. Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, a conviction based
on circumstantial evidence may be sustained if the following requisites are all present:
24

a. There is more than one circumstance;

b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
25

In People v. Galvez, we laid down the basic guidelines that judges must observe when faced with merely
circumstantial evidence in deciding criminal cases. The probative value of such circumstantial evidence must be
distilled using the following:
26

a. Circumstantial evidence should be acted upon with caution;

b. All the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
c. The facts must exclude every other theory but that of the guilt of the accused; and
d. The facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused so as to convince beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is
that the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but collectively.
The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one(1) particular piece of evidence.
They are like puzzle pieces which when put together reveal a convincing picture pointing to the conclusion that
the accused is the author of the crime.
27

In the present case, the RTC and the CA relied on the following circumstances in concluding that Almojuela was
the perpetrator of the crime:
1. Almojuela orally provoked Paz when the latter and his group passed by Almojuelas house;
2. A fight ensued between them and Almojuela wounded Pazs right arm with a knife;
3. The wounded Paz retreated and Quejong next fought with Almojuela;
4. During Quejong and Almojuelas fight, they grappled and wrestled with each other on the ground;
5. Quejong and Almojuela were only pacified when Kagawad Abarquez came and fired two gunshots in
the air;
6. Masula did not see Almojuela stab Quejong but he saw blood in Quejongs back during the fight;
7. Quejongs group scampered away after the gunshots. On Quejongs way home, one of his friends
noticed that he had stab wounds in his back;
8. Quejong was immediately rushed to the hospital where he expired a few hours after; and
9. Almojuela hid when policemen came to his home to investigate.
The nine circumstances, individually, are not sufficient to support Almojuelas conviction. But taken together, they
constitute an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that Almojuela is guilty of the crime of
homicide.

First,Almojuela was the one who provoked Paz and his group to a fight. His unlawful aggression was the starting
cause of the events which led to Quejongs death.
Second, Masula categorically testified that only Almojuela was armed with a knife during the fight. In fact, he hit
Paz in his right arm, forcing the latter to retreat.
Third, only three persons actually were involved in the fight: Almojuela, Paz and Quejong. Paz was wounded,
forcing him to retreat. This fact renders it improbable that Paz was the one who stabbed Quejong. Thus,
Almojuela alone was the perpetrator.
Fourth, although Masula admitted that he did not actually see Almojuela stab Quejong, he testified that he saw
blood on Quejongs back during his fight with Almojuela.
Fifth, after Quejong and his group scurried away from the scene, his friend noticed that he had stab wounds in
his back. Almojuela did not present any evidence that Quejong figured in any other fight with another person
after the fight with Almojuela. In fact, Quejong was immediately rushed to the hospital.
Sixth, Almojuela hid in the kamoteng kahoy thicket near his house when policemen visited him for investigation.
We have repeatedly held that flight is an indication of guilt. The flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible
explanation, is a circumstance from which guilt may be inferred. An innocent person will normally grasp the first
available opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence.
28

These proven circumstances lead to the reasonable conclusion that Almojuela stabbed Quejong during their
fight, causing the latters subsequent death.
The mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender
Almojuela argues that even if he did stab Quejong, the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
should be appreciated in his favor. An incomplete self-defense is appreciated when:
a. there is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
b. the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression is not reasonably necessary; and
c. there is lack of provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. This mitigating circumstance is inapplicable in the
present case because the unlawful aggression did not start from the victim Quejong but from Almojuela. The
prosecution proved that it was Almojuela who first challenged Paz and his group to a fight. Almojuela came
prepared to fight and was in fact armed with a bladed weapon.
29

Moreover, the third element is also absent since there is no lack of sufficient provocation on Almojuelas part as
shown by his confrontational stance right from the start.
We affirm, however, the CAs ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in favor of Almojuela. For voluntary surrender to apply, the following requisites must concur:
a. the offender had not been actually arrested;
b. the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latters agent; and
c. the surrender was voluntary.

The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to submit himself to the
authorities either because he acknowledged his guilt or he wished to save the authorities the trouble and
expense that may be incurred for his search and capture.
30

Although Almojuela hid when policemen first visited him in his home, it was also duly proven that soon after he
learned of Quejongs death, Almojuela voluntarily gave himself up to a certain SPO4 Soriano who then turned
him over to SPO1 Danilo Vidad of the Western Police District. Under these facts, all the elements of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender are present in this case.
31

The awarded indemnities

We note that the RTC awarded P35,000.00 as funeral expenses to the heirs of Quejong; this amount was
affirmed by the CA. However, since no documentary evidence was presented to support this claim, it cannot be
awarded. Nonetheless, an award ofP25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper
when no evidence of the said expenses is presented during trial. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages may be recovered since it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss, though
the exact amount was not proven.
1wphi1

32

We also -delete the award of litigation expenses for lack of actual proof. We additionally impose a 6% interest on
all the monetary awards for damages to be reckoned from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
As a final note, the general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA,
deserve great weight and respect.
33

These factual findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless these are facts of weight and substance that
were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case. We have
carefully scrutinized the records and we find no reason to deviate from the RTC and CA's findings. We see no
indication that the trial court, whose findings the CA affirmed -overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, we defer to the trial court on the findings of facts as it
was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.
34

35

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM the March 17, 2008 decision
and June 2, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29268 with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (a) the awarded funeral and litigation expenses are deleted; (b) the petitioner is ordered to
pay the victim's heirsP25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages; and (c) he is further ordered
to pay the victim's heirs interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
36

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201858

June 4, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JENNY LIKIRAN alias "Loloy", Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:
Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay City, Branch 8, for the death of Rolando Sareno, Sr. (Sareno ). In its Decision dated July 17, 2006,
the RTC disposed as follows:
1

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder and imposes upon him the
penalty of Reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of [P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
[P]50,000.00 moral damages; [P]30,000.00 actual damages, and [P]10,000.00 attorney's fee and to pay the
costs. This court has no jurisdiction over Jerome alias Caro Likiran as he is not impleaded in the information.
SO ORDERED.

The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March 19, 2000 in Barangay Bugcaon, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance was being held at the basketball court.
Prosecution witnesses Celso Dagangon (Dagangon), Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno
(Goloceno) testified that on said night, they were at the dance together with Sareno at around 8:00 p.m. After a
few hours, while Mercado and Goloceno were inside the dance area, Jerome Likiran (Jerome), the accusedappellants brother, punched Mercado on the mouth. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that
Jerome was armed with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was holding a hunting knife, so he backed
off. Dagangon and Sareno, who were outside the dance area, heard the commotion. Afterwards, Jerome
approached Sareno and shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the
back. It was Dagangon who saw the incident first-hand as he was only three meters from where Sareno was.
Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno
was already dead at that point. Sareno suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular
area.
3

The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he admitted that he was at the
dance, he did not go outside when the commotion happened. He and Jerome stayed within the area where the
sound machine was located and they only heard the gunshots outside. Other witnesses testified in the accusedappellants defense, with Edgar Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing incident and that it was some other
unknown person, and not the accused-appellant, who was the culprit; and Eleuterio Quiopa stating that he was
with the accused-appellant and Jerome inside the dance hall at the time the commotion occurred.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellants culpability. Prosecution
witness Dagangons positive identification of the accused-appellant was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the
latter of the crime of murder. The RTC also rejected the accused-appellants defense of denial as it was not
supported by evidence. It also ruled that alibi cannot favor the accused-appellant since he failed to prove that it
was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on the night of March 19, 2000.
5

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto per assailed Decision dated July 27, 2011, to wit:
8

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8 of Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 10439-00 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. The CA, nevertheless, deviated from the RTCs conclusion that there was conspiracy
between Jerome and the accused-appellant, and that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the
crime. According to the CA, the information failed to contain the allegation of conspiracy, and the evidence for
the prosecution failed to establish that Jerome and the accused-appellant ganged up on the victim.
10

The CA, however, sustained the RTCs finding of treachery.

11

The accused-appellant protested his conviction. According to him, the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accused-appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove the
identity of the assailant and his culpability.
12

13

Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, including their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Factual findings of the trial court are,
except for compelling or exceptional reasons, conclusive to the Court especially when fully supported by
evidence and affirmed by the CA.
14

The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. In this case,
the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime has been adequately established by
the prosecution, more particularly by the testimony of Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the accusedappellants argument that it was impossible for Dagangon to see the assailant considering that there was no
evidence to show that the place where the crime occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only
three meters away from the accused-appellant and Jerome and had a good view of them. Moreover, there was
no distraction that could have disrupted Dagangons attention. He even immediately identified the accusedappellant and Jerome during police investigation, and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the
police beforehand that the accused-appellant was one of the suspects. Positive identification by a prosecution
witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than alibi and
denial. Such positive identification gains further ground in the absence of any ill motive on the part of a witness
to falsely testify against an accused.
15

16

17

18

The accused-appellant also asserted that the information charged him of murder committed by attacking,
assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous death. The accused-appellant
argued that the evidence on record established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other person. At this
juncture, the Court notes that the testimony of Dagangon, indeed, identified two assailants the accusedappellant and his brother, Jerome; however, it was only the accused-appellant who was charged with the death
of Sareno. Defense witnesses also testified that Jerome died on March 12, 2005.
19

20

21

The CA disregarded the accused-appellants contention and ruled that "the cause of death was not made an
issue in the court a quo" and the Certificate of Death was admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the
fact and cause of death. And even assuming that the cause of death was an issue, the CA still held the
accused-appellant liable for the death of Sareno on the basis of the Courts ruling in People v. Pilola.
22

23

The Court reviewed the records of this case and finds sufficient basis for the CAs disregard of the accusedappellants argument.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon and admitted by the
prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the
Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted as
proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area." Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is
allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes
that all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing
and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. In this case,
while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same
may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its admission. Moreover, a death
certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the regular performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of
the cause of death of the victim. Note that the certificate of death issued by Dr. Dael provides the following:
24

25

26

27

CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate cause

DOA

Antecedent cause

Multiple GSW

Underlying cause

Stab wound scapular area (L)

28

The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sarenos cause of death.

29

More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical consequence resulting
from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter, it is nevertheless true that the stab wound
he inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latters death. In Quinto v. Andres, the Court stated that:
30

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows
as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other
causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if
his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. A different doctrine would tend to
give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. x x x[.] (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
31

The Court, however, cannot agree with the RTC and CAs conclusion that the killing of Sareno was attended by
treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.
Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements are shown: a) the malefactor
employed means, method, or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense
or retaliation; and b) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not
preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as
a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment.
32

33

In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact that the shooting and stabbing of
Sareno was actually a spur of the moment incident, a result of the brawl that happened during the barrio dance.
The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant and his brother Jerome deliberately planned the
means by which they would harm Sareno. In fact, what was revealed by the prosecution evidence was that
Sareno was an innocent bystander who unfortunately became a target of the accused-appellant and Jeromes
rampage. Consequently, the accused-appellant should be liable only for the lesser crime of Homicide.
In convictions for homicide, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes the penalty of reclusion
temporal, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In the absence of any
modifying circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, or from fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant shall be within the range of
reclusion temporal medium, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC for the offense, or prision mayor in any of its periods, which ranges from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the Court thereby
sentences the accused-appellant to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum.
34

35

36

37

38

39

With regard to the damages awarded, the Court affirms the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos ( P50,000.00) civil
indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) moral damages, as these are in accord with the Court's
judicial policy on the matter. These, on top of the Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) actual damages and Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Further, the
monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
40

41

The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's fees awarded by the RTC as there is nothing on record proving that
the heirs of Sareno actually incurred such expense. Attorney's fees are in the concept of actual or compensatory
damages allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, and absent any
evidence supporting its grant, the same must be deleted for lack of factual basis.
42

1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00484 is
MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy" is hereby found guilty of the lesser crime of
HOMICIDE, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
Further, the award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED.
Interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded, to earn from
the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
In all other respects, the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189850

September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, and RONNIE
TORRES, Accused,
BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925,
which modified the December 5, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, Branch 27 in Criminal
Case No. 02-200171. The RTC found appellant Bobby Torres @Roberto Torres y Nava (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder but on appeal, the CA found appellant guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.
1

Factual Antecedents
On January 28, 2004, an Amended lnformation was filed before the charging siblings Reynaldo Torres
(Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie) and appellant with the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide committed against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended Information contained the following
accusatory allegations:
3

That on or about September 21, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, armed with bladed
weapons, conspiring and confederating together with one malefactor whose true name, real identity and present
whereabouts [is] still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent of gain and by means of force, violence, and intimidation, to wit: while one JAIME M. ESPINO was on
board his car and travelling along C.M. Recto Avenue corner Ylaya St., Tondo , this City, by blocking his path
and forcibly grabbing from the latter his belt-bag; that on the occasion of the said robbery and by reason thereof,
the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, attack, assault, use personal violence and abuse of superior strength upon the said JAIME
M.ESPINO and that when the latter resisted, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed weapons on x x x
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter, and after which, divest, take, rob and carry away a belt-bag, wallet,
necklace, watch and ring of undetermined amount, belonging to said JAIME M. ESPINO.
Contrary to law.

Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date. During arraignment, appellant
entered a plea of "not guilty". After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
5

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as eyewitnesses Eduardo Umali (Umali), a butcher, and Merlito Macapar (Macapar),
a cigarette vendor. Also presented were Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen), who testified on the cause of death of
Espino. From their testimonies, the following facts emerged:
7

10

At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21,2001, Espino was driving his car along C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria,
Manila when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path. Espino alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who
tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-bag but the
latters brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified companion suddenly appeared. With all of them
brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in different parts of his
body while the unidentified companion held him by the neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground,
they took his belt-bag, wallet and jewelries and immediately fled.
Espino was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. In his Medico-Legal Report No. W-6582001, Dr. Salen concluded that Espino died of multiple stab wounds caused by sharp bladed instruments. The
back portion of his head bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four stab wounds which proved fatal.
Considering the number and varying measurements of the wounds, Dr. Salen opined that there were more than
one assailant.
8

To prove the civil aspect of the case, Espinos daughter, Winnie Espino Fajardo (Winnie) testified that the pieces
of jewelry stolen from her father consisted of a necklace worth P35,000.00, bracelet worth P15,000.00,
wristwatch worth P10,000.00 and two rings worth P10,000.00 each. As for their expenses, Winnie said
that P25,000.00 was spent for the burial lot and P37,000.00 for the funeral services. She stated further that
Espino was 51 years old at the time of his death and was earning P3,000.00 a day as a meat vendor.
9

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, he
was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario (Merlita). They proceeded to the house of their friend, Marilou Garcia
(Marilou), in Villaruel, Tayuman, Manila where they had a drinking session which lasted until they fell asleep.
They did not leave their friends house until the following morning when they went home. Thereupon, he was told
that policemen were looking for him because his brothers got involved in an altercation that resulted in the death
of someone. Merlita and Marilou corroborated appellants alibi in their respective testimonies.
10

11

From the testimony of another defense witness, Jorna Yabut-Torres (Jorna), wife of Ronnie, the defenses
version of the incident emerged as follows:
In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing jokes with other vendors in Divisoria
when a car stopped a few meters from their stall. The driver alighted and asked why they were laughing. Ronnie
replied that it had nothing to do with him. The driver seemed drunk since he walked back to his vehicle in an
unsteady manner. Moments later, the driver returned and stabbed Ronnie on the wrist with a knife. Jay saw the
assault on his brother, Ronnie, and got a bolo which he used to hack the driver repeatedly. Thereafter, Ronnie
and Jay fled. Ditas Biescas-Mangilya, a vegetable vendor in Divisoria, corroborated Jornas version of the
incident in her testimony.
12

13

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its December 5, 2006 Decision, the RTC held that appellant could not have committed robbery. It
ratiocinated, viz:
14

Prosecution witness Merlito D. Macapar testified that Ronnie took the belt bag of the deceased while Bobby and
the rest took his wristwatch, ring and necklace. However, on cross-examination, witness admitted that he did not
see who took the ring, wristwatch and necklace because as soon as the deceased fell on the ground, accused
and companions surrounded him. Merlitos testimony was contradicted by Eduardo Umali on a vital point. Thus,
Merlito testified that there was an exchange of heated words. There was no intimation whatsoever what the
altercation was about. He was ten meters away. No such altercation, however, took place according to Eduardo
who was barely five meters away. This tainted the testimony of Merlitoand Eduardo with suspicion. When
material witnesses contradict themselves on vital points, the element of doubt is injected and cannot be lightly
disregarded. That was not all though. Merlito testified [that] several people witnessed the incident. The stall of
the victims daughter was about ten meters from the crime scene, which was a few meters from the stall of
Ronnie. They both had been in their respective stalls for quite sometime. The principal prosecution witnesses
are familiar with the deceased and the accused except for the unidentified companion as they often see them at
the vicinity. Thus, in all likelihood, accused and the victim are familiar if not know each other very well. The
perpetration of robbery at the place was thus unlikely.

11

Even granting that the element of taking is present, still, accused cannot be held liable for the complex crime of
robbery with homicide for the reason that it was not indubitably shown that the main purpose of the accused was
to rob the victim. To the mind of the Court, this is precisely the reason why the prosecution skipped the
utterances made by the protagonist[s] during the attack. To sustain a [conviction] for the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the homicide is
perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, or by reason or on the occasion of the robbery
(People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627).
xxxx
The crime of robbery not having been indubitably established, the accused cannot be convicted of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
15

The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of Espino. It held him guilty of murder
after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which was alleged in the Information and
duly established by the prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy among the accused attended the
crime.
Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity, actual and moral damages to the heirs of
Espino, but denied the claim for loss of earning capacity for lack of documentary evidence.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused Bobby Torres y Nava, "Guilty"
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
attended the commission of the crime and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00, the additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
actual damages in the amount of P62,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay Torres and Ronnie Torres.
SO ORDERED.

16

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated April 10, 2007.
17

Hence, appellant appealed to the CA.

18

19

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In modifying the ruling of the RTC, i.e., finding appellant guilty of robbery with homicide instead of murder, the
CA found that the primary intention of appellant and his co-accused was to rob Espino and his killing was only
incidental to the robbery. The blocking of Espinos car and the struggle for possession of his belt-bag after he
alighted are clear manifestations of the intent to commit robbery. The dispositive portion of the July 23, 2009
Decision of the CA reads as follows:
20

WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the appealed decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 27 dated December 5,
2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ROBBERY with HOMICIDE and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial
courts award to the heirs of the victim, Jaime Espino, of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral
damages in the amount ofP50,000.00, and actual damages in the amount of P62,000.00 as well as its order to
appellant to pay the costs of suit, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

21

Hence, this present appeal.

Assignment of Errors
Appellant imputes upon the CA the following errors in his Supplemental Brief.

12

22

The acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be left undisturbed as being final and
executory which cannot be overturned without violating the proscription against double jeopardy.
23

The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire case despite the fact that the accusedappellant only appealed his conviction for murder.
24

It was an error to convict the accused-appellant of the crimes charged considering that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
25

Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
In an appeal by an accused, he waives his right not to be subject to double jeopardy.
Appellant maintains that the CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with homicide as charged in the Amended
Information. He argues that his appeal to the CA was limited to his conviction for murder and excluded his
acquittal for robbery. And by appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive his constitutional right not to
be subject to double jeopardy for the crime of robbery. He claims that even assuming that the RTC erred in
acquitting him of the robbery charge, such error can no longer be questioned on appeal.
We cannot give credence to appellants contentions. "An appeal in [a] criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question including one not raised by the parties." "[W]hen an accused appeals from the sentence
of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant." In other words, when appellant appealed the RTCs
judgment of conviction for murder, he is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double
jeopardy since it became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed
judgment. Thus, appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information instead of murder.
26

27

Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

"Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the
taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as
used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose
and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery."
28

In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the primary intention of appellant and
his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, testified
that at around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellants brother and co-accused, Ronnie, blocked Espinos
car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street. When Espino alighted from his vehicle, Ronnie
attempted to grab his belt bag. A struggle for possession of the belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that
appellant and the other co-accused joined the fray and stabbed Espino several times in the head and body.
When Espino fell to the pavement from his stab wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the
victims wallet, beltbag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together.
29

From the foregoing, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino.
Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would have immediately stabbed him to death. However, the fact
that Ronnie initially wrestled with appellant for possession of the belt-bag clearly shows that the central aim was
to commit robbery against Espino. This intention was confirmed by the accuseds taking of Espinos belt-bag,
wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he was stabbed to death. The killing was therefore merely incidental,
resulting by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
The testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses are worthy of credence.

13

Appellant attempts to discredit Umali and Macapar by asserting that there are glaring contradictions in their
testimonies. He calls attention to the RTCs observation that Macapar gave conflicting testimonies on whether he
actually witnessed who among appellant and his cohorts took Espinos valuables after he fell to the ground.
Appellant asserts further that Umalis testimony that an altercation did not precede the commission of the crime
contradicts the testimony of Macapar that a heated exchange of words occurred prior to the incident. He also
claims that it is contrary to human nature for Espino to alight from his car at 10:00 p.m. while in possession of a
large amount of money without fear of an impending hold-up.
We are not persuaded. The inconsistencies attributed to the prosecutions eyewitnesses involve minor details,
too trivial to adversely affect their credibility. Said inconsistencies do not depart from the fact that these
eyewitnesses saw the robbery and the fatal stabbing of Espino by appellant and his cohorts. "[T]o the extent that
inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the Court to relate to details of peripheral significance which
do not negate or dissolve the positive identification by [Umali and Macapar of appellant] as the perpetrator of the
crime." "Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."
30

31

Moreover, it is unlikely that Espino feared alighting from his vehicle at a late hour while in possession of a huge
amount of money since he was a vendor doing business in the vicinity where the incident occurred. He was
familiar with the people and their activities in the premises. In view of the above, the Court finds that the CA
properly lent full credence to the testimonies of Umali and Macapar.
The weapons are not the corpus delicti.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for his conviction since the weapons used in the stabbing of
Espino were not presented. In other words, he asserts that it was improper to convict him because the corpus
delicti had not been established.
We disagree. "[C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom or to the body of the person murdered or, in this case, [the weapons used in the commission of robbery
with homicide]. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even
a single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor.
Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence."
32

In this case, the corpus delicti was established by the evidence on record. The prosecution eyewitnesses
testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives to perpetrate the crime. Their testimonies on the existence
and use of weapons in committing the offense was supported by the medical findings of Dr. Salen who
conducted the post-mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that Espino sustained several stab wounds with
varying measurements which were caused by sharp bladed instruments. Appellant is therefore mistaken in
arguing that the failure to present the weapons used in killing Espino was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
The defenses of denial and alibi cannot prosper.
We are in complete agreement with the RTC and the CA in finding lack of merit in appellants defenses of denial
and alibi.
Appellant claims that he was in a drinking session in his friends house in Villaruel, Tayuman,Manila, from 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001 until 1:00 a.m. of the following day. He alleges to have slept at the place and went
home at around 7:00 a.m. of September 22, 2001. According to appellant, he did not depart from his friends
house from the time they started drinking until he went home the following morning.
Appellants alibi is unworthy of credence. Appellant himself testified that Villaruel is less than two kilometers
away from Divisoria and that it would only take a few minutes to go to Divisoria from Villaruel. Clearly, it was not
impossible for appellant to be physically present at the crime scene during its commission. "For alibi to prosper, it
must strictly meet the requirements of time and place. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it must also be demonstrated that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time the crime was committed."
33

34

14

The fact that appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi deserves scant consideration. Their
testimonies are viewed with skepticism due to the very nature of alibi the witnesses affirm. Appellant can easily
fabricate an alibi and ask relatives and friends to corroborate it.
35

36

We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the
prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. Moreover, it is only axiomatic
that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.
37

The evidence was sufficient to establish the presence of abuse of superior strength.
Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the presence of abuse of superior strength.
In the same manner, appellant claims that the number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not the criterion for the
appreciation of this circumstance.
"There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their combined strength in order to
consummate the offense." Here, appellant and his four companions not only took advantage of their numerical
superiority, they were also armed with knives. Espino, on the other hand, was unarmed and defenseless. While
Ronnie was wrestling with Espino, appellant and his co-accused simultaneously assaulted the latter. The
unidentified companion locked his arm around the neck of Espino while appellant and his co-accused stabbed
and hacked him several times. While Espino was lying defenseless on the ground, they divested him of all his
valuables. Thereafter, they immediately fled the scene of the crime. It is clear that they executed the criminal act
by employing physical superiority over Espino.
38

39

The Proper Penalty

Nonetheless, the presence of abuse of superior strength should not result in qualifying the offense to
murder. When abuse of superior strength obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is to
be regarded as a generic circumstance, robbery with homicide being a composite crime with its own definition
and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. With the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death imposed for
committing robbery with homicide, "[t]he generic aggravating circumstance of[abuse of superior strength]
attending the killing of the victim qualifies the imposition of the death penalty on [appellant]." In view, however,
of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," the
penalty that must be imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
1wphi1

40

41

42

The Civil Liabilities

In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded automatically without need of
allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owing to the commission of the crime. Here, the RTC
and CA granted civil indemnity and moral damages to Espinos heirs in the amount of P50,000.00 each. These
courts were correct in granting the awards, but the awards should have been P100,000.00 each. Recent
jurisprudence declares that when the imposable penalty is death, the awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages shall beP100,000.00 each.
43

44

In granting compensatory damages, the prosecution must "prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable to the injured
party." "Receipts should support claims of actual damages. Thus, as correctly held by the [RTC] and affirmed
by the CA, the amount of [P62,000.00] incurred as funeral expenses can be sustained since these are
expenditures supported by receipts." The existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits the grant of
exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we
likewiseawardP100,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victims heirs. An interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum on all awards of damages from the finality of this judgment until fully paid should likewise be granted to
the heirs of Espino.
45

46

47

48

Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of earning capacity of Espino despite the
testimony of his daughter that he earned P3,000.00 a day as a meat dealer. "Such indemnity is not awarded in
the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Since it was neither alleged nor proved
that the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage earner, indemnity for loss of earning capacity
cannot be awarded to the heirs of the victim."
49

15

WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925 that affirmed
with modifications the December 5, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal
Case No. 02-200171 is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Bobby Torres@ Roberto Torres y
Nava is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Jaime M. Espino, P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as
moral damages, and Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages. The interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all
damages awarded from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198022

April 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and EDUARDO QUISAYAS, Accused,
EDUARDO QUISAYAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated February 23, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
03593 affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated June 20, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 13838
convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with Homicide committed against the victim Januario Castillo
y Masangcay (Januario).
1

The facts of the case follow:

Appellant and accused Sonny Gatarin y Caballero were charged in an Information with Robbery with Homicide
committed as follows:
4

That on or about the 3rd day of November, 2004, at about 8:00 oclock (sic) in the evening, at Barangay
Poblacion, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and confederating together, acting in
common accord and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof and with violence against or intimidation of person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob, and carry away cash money amounting to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
Philippine Currency, belonging to Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka Maning," to the damage and prejudice
of the latter in the aforementioned amount and that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, the said
accused with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka Maning,"
thereby inflicting upon the latter the stab wounds to [the] anterior chest and right shoulder and right axilla, which
directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.

Appellant was arrested, while his co-accused remained at-large. When arraigned, he pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial
on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Maria Castillo, the victims wife; (2)
Howel Umali (Umali), who allegedly saw how the accused mauled the victim; (3) SPO3 Gregorio G. Mendoza
(SPO3 Mendoza) of the Mabini Police Station, who saw the victim lying on the floor and the accused running
away from the crime scene, and testified on the dying declaration of Januario; (4) Dr. Catalino Ike A. Rasa Jr.
16

(Dr. Rasa), who attended to the victim when he was brought to the hospital; and (5) PO1 Rogelio Dizon Coronel
(PO1 Coronel), who saw the accused running fast near the crime scene and who, likewise, testified on
Januarios ante mortem statement.
From the testimonies of the above-named witnesses, the prosecution established the following facts:
On November 3, 2004, at 8 oclock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle on his way home when he saw
Januario being mauled by two persons opposite Doms Studio in Poblacion, Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the
incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that the accused ran away and were chased by
policemen who alighted from the police patrol vehicle.
6

On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing their routine
patrol duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were running at a fast speed. When
asked why they were running, the accused did not answer prompting the policemen to chase them. The
policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and when it became evident that they could no longer
find them, they continued patrolling the area. There they saw Januario lying on the street in front of Doms
studio. As he was severely injured, the policemen immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and
brought him to the Zigzag Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He
answered that it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the appellant herein,
while Jay-R is his co-accused who remains at-large.
7

At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him in critical condition. Three fatal
wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in Januarios body which eventually caused his death.
8

Maria Castillo, for her part, testified on how she learned of what happened to her husband, the victim herein, the
amount allegedly stolen from her husband, as well as on the expenses and loss incurred by reason of Januarios
death. She, further, quantified the sorrow and anxiety the family suffered by reason of such death.
9

In his defense, appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that he is from the Province of Samar
but has been residing in Cupang, Muntinlupa City since 1987. He denied knowing, much more residing in,
Mabini, Batangas, as he only heard about the province from his employer who happens to be a resident therein.
He claimed that he did not know Januario and that he was, in fact, working in Muntinlupa City on the date and
time the crime was allegedly committed.
10

The prosecutions rebuttal witness Mr. Bienvenido Caponpon, however, belied appellants claim and insisted that
appellant was renting a house in Mabini, Batangas and that he was seen there until the day the crime was
committed.
11

On June 20, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision against the appellant, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the People having proven the guilt of accused Eduardo Quisayas beyond reasonable doubt, he
is hereby declared "GUILTY" of the offense as charged. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to a prison term of
Reclusion Perpetua.
Further, he is hereby ordered to pay herein offended party of the following:
(a) civil indemnity in the amount of Php50,000.00
(b) actual damages in the amount of Php20,000.00, plus Php35,310.00 (funeral and hospital expenses),
and
(c) moral damages in the amount of Php100,000.00
SO ORDERED.

12

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Maria Castillo not only as to the fact of taking money from
Januario but also the amount taken. The fact of death was, likewise, found by the court to have been
adequately proven by the testimony of Dr. Rasa. Though there was no evidence whether the unlawful taking
preceded the killing of Januario, the court held that there was direct and intimate connection between the two
acts.
13

14

15

17

As to the identity of the perpetrators, the court considered the victims response to SPO3 Mendozas question as
to who committed the crime against him as part of the res gestae, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. As
to appellants defense of alibi, the court gave more weight to the prosecutions rebuttal evidence that indeed the
former was an actual resident of Mabini, Batangas.
16

17

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Contrary, however, to the RTCs conclusion, the appellate court
considered Januarios statement to SPO3 Mendoza, that the accused were the ones who stabbed him and took
his wallet, not only as part of res gestae but also as a dying declaration.
18

Hence, the appeal before the Court.

We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt not of robbery with homicide but of murder.
The trial courts factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight
of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings are accorded great respect and even
conclusive effect. We, nevertheless, fully scrutinize the records, since the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the
CA imposed on appellant demands no less than this kind of careful and deliberate consideration.
19

To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the
taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as
used in the generic sense, was committed.
20

First, in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself
be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. In order for the crime of robbery with
homicide to exist, it must be established that a robbery has actually taken place and that, as a consequence or
on the occasion of robbery, a homicide be committed.
21

22

For there to be robbery, there must be taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon on things. Both the RTC and the
CA concluded that robbery was committed based on the testimonies of Maria Castillo, SPO3 Mendoza, and PO1
Coronel. A closer look at the testimonies of these witnesses, however, failed to convince us that indeed robbery
took place.
23

Maria Castillos testimony was offered by the prosecution to prove that her husband, the victim herein, was a
victim of robbery with homicide and that he is a businessman, and that she suffered damages by reason of such
death. The pertinent portion of her direct testimony is quoted below for a closer scrutiny:
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q The victim in this case Januario Castillo, how are you related to him?
WITNESS:
A My husband, sir.
Q On November 3, 2004, do you remember of any unusual incident that has occurred?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is that event?
A At around 8:30 oclock in the evening of November 3, 2004 while I was at home, policemen arrived and
informed me that my husband was wounded, sir.
Q Did these police officers inform you the location (sic) of where your husband was located?
A According to the policemen, my husband was at Zigzag Hospital, sir.
Q Did you go to Zigzag Hospital, Madam Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened, Madam Witness, when you arrived at the hospital?
A I was informed by the nurse there that my husband was already dead.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q Were you informed of the cause of the death of your husband?
WITNESS:

18

A According to them my husband was wounded, many wounds and he was robbed, sir.
Q Madam Witness, were you able to know who are the persons responsible for the death of your husband?
ATTY. EBORA:
We will object. That will be misleading.
COURT:
If she is aware.
ATTY. EBORA:
We submit.
COURT:
You ask her if she is aware who the perpetrators are.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q Madam Witness, were you informed who are the perpetrators of the crime on your husband?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, sir. It was not told to me by the policemen because the policemen were in a hurry.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q After the policemen went to your house, was there [any] person who informed you who were the perpetrators
of the crime?
A Yes, sir. My niece.
Q And who is that niece of yours, Madam Witness?
A Josephine Borbon, sir.
Q Did Miss Borbon tell you about the identity of the perpetrators of the crime, Madam Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And who are the persons did Miss Borbon mention?
A My former helper Sonny Gatarin and his uncle Eduardo Quisayas, sir.
Q You were told that your husband was robbed, how much was taken from your husband, Madam Witness?
A P20,000.00.
Q And can you tell, Madam Witness, why is your husband carrying that amount of money at the time of his
death?
A Yes, sir.

WITNESS:
A Those were the earnings for that day for he delivered merchandise and groceries, sir.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q Do you know, Madam Witness, if your husband is engaged in any business?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is your proof in saying your husband is engaged in business?
A Our business was we delivered bottled goods and groceries, sir.
Q The business wherein your husband is engaged has an existing license with the appropriate local
government?

19

A Yes, sir.
Q If a copy will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you [a] certified copy of [the] Mayors permit previously marked as Exhibit "H"?
A This is it, sir.
Q If you know, Madam Witness, how much is your husband earning in his sari-sari or grocery business?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q How much is he earning at the time?
A He earns P40,000.00.
Q In a month or year?
A P40,000.00 a month, sir.
Q How do you feel or confront the situation that your husband is already dead?
A We felt deep sorrow together with my three (3) children, sir. (Witness is crying)
xxxx

24

From the above testimony, it can be inferred that Maria Castillo obviously was not at the scene of the crime on
that fateful night as she was only informed that the incident took place and that Januario was brought to the
Zigzag Hospital. It, likewise, appears that she had no personal knowledge that Januario was robbed. While she
claimed that P20,000.00 was illegally taken from him, no evidence was presented to show that Januario indeed
had that amount at that time and that the same was in his possession. As Maria Castillo claimed that the said
amount was allegedly received from their clients in their grocery business, said fact could have been proven by
receipts or testimonies of said clients. The prosecutions failure to present such evidence creates doubt as to the
existence of the money.
The trial and appellate courts likewise relied on the testimony of SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel on the
statement of Januario after the commission of the crime. While both policemen testified as to the dying
declaration of Januario pertaining to the cause and circumstances surrounding his death, only PO1 Coronel
testified during his direct examination that when asked who stabbed him, Januario replied that it was "Jay-Ar and
his uncle who stabbed him and took his wallet." In response to the Presiding Judges clarificatory question,
however, PO1 Coronel admitted that when he asked Januario who stabbed him, he replied that it was Jay-Ar
and his uncle. After which, no further question was asked. On the other hand, nowhere in SPO3 Mendozas
testimony did he talk about the alleged taking of wallet. The pertinent portions of their testimonies read:
25

26

Direct Examination of PO1 Coronel:

xxxx
Q: What did you do next after boarding him inside your vehicle?
A We brought him at the Zigzag Hospital and we asked him who stabbed him.
Q What was his reply Mr. Witness?
A He told us that Jay-ar and his uncle stabbed him and took his wallet.
xxxx

27

PO1 Coronels Answers to the questions propounded by the Presiding Judge:

THE COURT:
Alright, the Court will ask.
Q When did you talk with the victim?
A When we were inside the patrol car, your Honor.
Q What exactly did you ask from the victim?

20

A I asked him who stabbed him, your Honor.

Q Did you tell the victim his condition?
A No, your Honor.
Q You just asked the victim who stabbed him?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What was the answer of the victim?
A That he was stabbed by Jay-ar and his uncle, your Honor.
Q And no other question did you ask him?
A None, your Honor.
xxxx

28

Direct Testimony of SPO3 Mendoza:

xxxx
Q And when you saw Januario Castillo lying on the street, what did you do?
A We lifted him and boarded him in our vehicle then we brought him to the hospital.
Q While you were travelling, were you able to talk to the victim Januario Castillo?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your conversation all about?
A I asked Ka Maning Castillo as to who stabbed him and he answered Jay-R and his uncle.
xxxx

29

It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the evidence presented to prove the robbery aspect of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, does not show that robbery actually took place. The prosecution did not
convincingly establish the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery.
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the
fact that a crime has actually been committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission
by someone of the particular crime charged. In this case, the element of taking, as well as the existence of the
money alleged to have been lost and stolen by appellant, was not adequately established. We find no sufficient
evidence to show either the amount of money stolen, or if any amount was in fact stolen from Januario. Even if
we consider Januarios dying declaration, the same pertains only to the stabbing incident and not to the alleged
robbery.
30

31

Moreover, assuming that robbery was indeed committed, the prosecution must establish with certitude that the
killing was a mere incident to the robbery, the latter being the perpetrators main purpose and objective. It is not
enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the homicide was to rob; a mere presumption of such fact is
not sufficient. Stated in a different manner, a conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose,
and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. What is crucial for a
conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to firmly establish the offenders intent to
take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried out. In this
case, there was no showing of the appellants intention, determined by their acts prior to, contemporaneous with,
and subsequent to the commission of the crime, to commit robbery. No shred of evidence is on record that
could support the conclusion that appellants primary motive was to rob Januario and that he was able to
accomplish it. Mere speculation and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required in establishing the guilt of
an accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence does not conclusively prove the robbery, the killing
of Januario would be classified either as a simple homicide or murder, depending upon the absence or presence
of any qualifying circumstance, and not the crime of robbery with homicide. To establish the fact that appellant
and his co-accused killed the victim by stabbing him with a bladed weapon, the prosecution presented Umali as
an eyewitness to the mauling incident. It was this same witness who identified the perpetrators. The trial and
appellate courts also relied on the statement of Januario as to the circumstances of his death, testified to by PO1
Coronel and SPO3 Mendoza as dying declaration and as part of res gestae.
32

33

34

35

36

37

38

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless
be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns the cause and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the
21

declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify
had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves
the declarant's death.
39

In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the records, no
questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that the declarant was
under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to
make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the
declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a
dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked
on death as certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying
declaration.
40

However, even if Januarios utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his statements may still
be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that
grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part
of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with
the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
41

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. When Januario gave the
identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling occurrence which is the stabbing by
appellant and his co-accused. At that time, Januario and the witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to
the hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance about appellant
and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity
and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant because it identified the
accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario, perpetrated by appellant, is adequately
proven by the prosecution.
From the evidence presented, we find that as alleged in the information, abuse of superior strength attended the
commission of the crime, and thus, qualifies the offense to murder. Abuse of superior strength is considered
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority
of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the
commission of the crime.
42

It is clear from the records of the case that Januario was then fifty-four (54) years old. Appellant, on the other
hand, was then forty (40) years old. Appellant committed the crime with his co-accused, his nephew. Clearly,
assailants are younger than the victim. These two accused were seen by Umali as the persons who mauled
Januario. Moreover, assailants were armed with a bladed weapon, while Januario was unarmed. This same
bladed weapon was used in repeatedly stabbing Januario, who no longer showed any act of defense. Dr. Rasa,
the medical doctor who attended to Januario when he was brought to the hospital, also testified as to the nature
and extent of the injury sustained by Januario. He clearly stated that Januario sustained three fatal injuries which
caused his death. The pertinent portion of Dr. Rasas testimony reads:
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q How many injuries were sustained by the victim, Mr. Witness?
A Three.
Q In what parts of the body was the victim injured?
A The victim sustained three injuries: one on the left side of the parasternal border the heart (sic) and it
penetrated, and then the second one was on the right side of the chest near the shoulder and the third one was
under the armpit also to the chest.
ATTY. MASANGYA:

22

Q Which of those injuries caused the death of the victim?

A All of them are fatal, because the one over the heart penetrated the heart and the aorta. The one in the
anterior chest near the right shoulder hit the blood vessels of the armpit and the wound under the armpit
apparently hit the lungs.
xxxx
43

This same physician issued the Medical Certificate explaining the location of the stab wounds as well as the
cause of death of Januario, to wit:
Location of Stab Wounds:
1. Stab wound penetrating 2nd inter-costal space left para-sternal border, 6" deep penetrating the heart
chambers and aorta
2. Stab wound over the right anterior deltoid muscle, penetrating
3" into the right axilla space; injuring the axilla blood vessels.
3. Stab wound over the right axilla, penetrating to the right chest cavity.
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate Cause: Hypovolemic Shock
Antecedent Cause: Multiple stab wounds to the anterior chest, right
axilla, and right axilla penetrating the chest cavity.
xxxx

44

From the testimony of the eyewitness and corroborated by the medical certificate of Dr. Rasa, it can be inferred
that indeed the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. To
be sure, with two assailants younger than the victim, armed with a bladed weapon and inflicting multiple mortal
wounds on the victim, there is definitely abuse of superior strength deliberately taken advantage of by appellant
and his co-accused in order to consummate the offense.
Now on the penalty. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
xxxx

45

There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, appellant shall be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Finally, the award of damages. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity which has been fixed by jurisprudence
atP50,000.00 requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accuseds
responsibility therefor. Moral damages, on the other hand, which in this case is also P50,000.00 are awarded in
view of the violent death of the victim. Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should
likewise be given, considering that the offense was attended by an aggravating circumstance whether ordinary,
or qualifying as in this case. As duly proven by Maria Castillo, actual damages representing the hospital and
funeral expenses, as evidenced by receipts in the amount of P35,300.00, be awarded. Finally, in addition and in
conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal
rate of six percent (6%) from date of finality of this decision until full payment.
46

47

23

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the Court of Appeals Decision dated February 23, 2011 in
CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03593, affirming the Regional Trial Court Decision dated June 20, 2008 in Criminal Case
No. 13838, convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with Homicide. We find appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
We, likewise, ORDER appellant TO PAY the heirs of the victim Januario Castillo y Masangcay the following:
(1)P35,300.00 actual damages; (2) P50,000.00 civil indemnity; (3) P50,000.00 moral damages; (4) P30,000.00
exemplary damages; plus (5) six percent (6%) interest on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of
this decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207949

July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS,
and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron (Armando), Renato
Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos (Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
1

The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother Edwin
Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text
message from another brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped. Records show that three (3) men,
later identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the
gym and pushed him inside a dark green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194. Upon receiving the message,
Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police. At around 10 oclock in the morning of the same day, he
received a phone call from Edwins kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the
police.
2

The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment of ransom
money in the amount of P15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only had P50,000.00.
On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for
the amount of P110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next
call.
5

At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom
money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he was driving and to turn on
the hazard light when he reaches the designated place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing

24

him to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park
beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH 498
pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone
and upon uttering the word "alat," the men returned to their car and drove away.
6

Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by SPO3 Romeo
Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime
Emergency Response (PACER). During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is
Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the
one who tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio Varona (Virgilio) on the condition that he will
be given a share in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to
their arrest on June 12, 2003. In the early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team
found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.
7

Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information which reads:

10

That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then
private persons, did then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of
motor vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his
will, for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand of P15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the
victims release and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted.
Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty and interposed the defenses of denial and alibi.
Except for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their respective houses
when they were taken by men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there
allegedly tortured and detained. On the other hand, Rodolfo, for himself, averred that at around 8 oclock in the
evening of June 12, 2003, while walking on his way home, he noticed that a van had been following him.
Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle, boarded him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually
tortured him. He likewise claimed that he was made to sign an extrajudicial confession, purporting too that while
a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had been summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do so.
11

12

During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of Death with Registry No.
2003-050 (subject certificate of death) showing that he died on May 19, 2003 from a gunshot wound on the
head.
13

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in Crim. Case
No. C-68329, convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing
each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
14

It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which clearly
established that it was the accused appellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a car and,
consequently, deprived him of his liberty. In light thereof, it rejected accused-appellants respective alibis and
claims of torture, which were not substantiated. It also held that the crime of Kidnapping had been committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom, which is punishable by death. However, in view of the suspended imposition of
the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 9346, only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
imposed. Further, the RTC found that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the accusedappellants individual participation was geared toward a joint purpose and criminal design.
15

16

17

18

25

Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim Edwin was
abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed, a fact which is supported by the subject certificate of death,
it did not consider said death in its judgment. The CA Ruling
19

In a Decision dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTCs conviction of accused-appellants,
finding that the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts
for more than three days; (2) it is committed simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. It likewise
sustained the finding that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, as sufficiently
proven by the testimony of the brother of the victim. Moreover, the CA affirmed that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from the same purpose or common
design, and they were united in its execution.
20

21

22

23

Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants claims of torture were never supported, and that Rodolfo
voluntarily signed the extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent and independent counsel in its
execution.
24

Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accused appellants are guilty of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. Its
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is conclusive and binding unless
shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence has not been considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge
acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate court.
25

In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, which they found to be straightforward and consistent. Through these testimonies, it was clearly
established that accused-appellants, who were all private individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him of
his liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of extorting ransom. Thus, seeing no semblance of
arbitrariness or misapprehension on the part of the court a quo, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb
its factual findings on this score.
26

1wphi1

Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise finds the conclusion
of the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is
established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable
regardless of the extent of their respective participations. In this relation, direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose,
design, concerted action, and community of interests. Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly
27

28

26

show that accused-appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their acts
emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution, the CA, affirming the trial
court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
29

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as
the crime the accused appellants have committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide. This is in view of the victims (i.e., Edwins) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the
Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the
issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule
that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the
appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.
30

31

After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of the same
Code now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in
the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:

32

In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and
murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found
the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph
of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of special complex crime of kidnapping
with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where
the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim
was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the
person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought
or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art.
48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
33

27

Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom,
accused-appellants conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated,
the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accusedappellants could, as the CA and trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
To this, the Court adds that the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.
34

On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity as well as damages
to the family of the kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon, the Court explained that even if the death penalty was
not to be imposed on accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity was
nonetheless proper, not being dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
crime. In the present case, considering that both the qualifying circumstances of ransom and the death of the
victim during captivity were duly alleged in the information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in the amount
of P100,000.00 must therefore be awarded to the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.
35

36

37

Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under Article 2217 of the
Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
moral shock and similar injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be
recovered in cases of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in this case, that the kidnap victim s family suffered
mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and
in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 must perforce be
awarded to the family of the victim.
38

Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid qualifying
circumstances and in order to deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, therefore, the Court awards exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the
family of the kidnap victim.
39

In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.
40

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the accused appellants herein
are equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and
severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2)P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207950

September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias "NOY", Accused-appellant.

28

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Every conviction for any crime must be accompanied by the required moral certainty that the accused has
committed the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove "the offender's intent to
take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide [was] actually carried out" !n
order to convict for the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused may nevertheless be convicted of the
separate crime of homicide once the prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt the accused's culpability
for the victim's death.
1

In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide:
That on or about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and means of force, violence and intimidation upon the
person of ELMER DUQUE y OROS, by then and there, with intent to kill, stabbing the latter repeatedly with a
kitchen knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter, and on the saidoccasion or by reason thereof, accused took, robbed and carried away the
following:
One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone
One (1) Unit Motorola Cellphone
Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring
Two (2) pcs. Necklace
One (1) pc. Bracelet All of undetermined value and undetermined amount of money, all belonging to said
ELMER DUQUE y OROS @ BARBIE to the damage and prejudice of the said owner/or his heirs, in the said
undetermined amount in Philippines currency.
Contrary to law.

Chavez pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on December 4, 2006. The court proceeded to trial. The
prosecution presented Angelo Peamante (Peamante), P/Chief Inspector Sonia Cayrel (PCI Cayrel), SPO3
Steve Casimiro (SPO3 Casimiro), Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen), and Raymund Senofa as witnesses. On the
other hand, the defense presented Chavez as its sole witness.
3

The facts as found by the lower court are as follows.

On October 28, 2006, Peamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from work as a janitor in Eastwood
City. When he was about to go inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person
wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding something while leaving the house/parlor of
Elmer Duque (Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, just six meters across Peamantes house.
4

There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peamante stated that
he was able to see the face of Chavez and the clothes he was wearing.
6

Chavez could not close the door of Barbies house/parlor so he simply walked away. However, he dropped
something that he was holding and fell down when he stepped on it. He walked away after, and Peamante was
not able to determine what Chavez was holding. Peamante then entered his house and went to bed.
7

29

Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI Cayrel. She was
joined by PO3 Rex Maglansi (photographer), PO1 Joel Pelayo (sketcher), and a fingerprint technician. They
conducted an initial survey of the crime scene after coordinating with SPO3 Casimiro of the Manila Police District
Homicide Section.
10

11

The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbies dead body inside. They
took photographs and collected fingerprints and other pieces of evidence such as the 155 pieces of hair strands
found clutched in Barbies left hand. They documented the evidence then turned them over to the Western
Police District Chemistry Division. Dr. Salen was called to conduct an autopsy on the body.
12

13

14

At around 11:00 a.m., Peamantes landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found dead at 9:00 a.m.
He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbies house at 2:45 a.m.
15

At around 1:00 p.m., Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found that the time of death was
approximately 12 hours prior to examination. There were 22 injuries on Barbies body 21 were stab wounds
in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed instrument, and one incised wound was caused by a
sharp object. Four (4) of the stab wounds were considered fatal.
16

17

18

The next day, the police invited Peamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement. Peamante
described to SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the person he saw leaving Barbies parlor.
19

Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3 Casimiro at the
police station. Chavez was then 22 years old. His mother told the police that she wanted to help her son who
might be involved in Barbies death.
20

21

22

SPO3 Casimiro informed them of the consequences in executing a written statement without the assistance of a
lawyer. However, Chavezs mother still gave her statement, subscribed by Administrative Officer Alex
Francisco. She also surrendered two cellular phones owned by Barbie and a baseball cap owned by Chavez.
23

24

The next day, Peamante was again summoned by SPO3 Casimiro to identify from a line-up the person he saw
leaving Barbies house/parlor that early morning of October 28, 2006. Peamante immediately pointed to and
identified Chavez and thereafter executed his written statement. There were no issues raised in relation to the
line-up.
25

26

On the other hand, Chavez explained that he was at home on October 27, 2006, exchanging text messages with
Barbie on whether they could talk regarding their misunderstanding. According to Chavez, Barbie suspected
that he was having a relationship with Barbies boyfriend, Maki. When Barbie did not reply to his text message,
Chavez decided to go to Barbies house at around 1:00 a.m. of October 28, 2006. Barbie allowed him to enter
the house, and he went home after.
27

28

29

30

On August 19, 2011, the trial court found Chavez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide:
31

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @ NOY
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Further, he is ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim, Elmer Duque y Oros the sum of 75,000.00 as death
indemnity and another P75,000 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

32

30

On February 27, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. Chavez then filed a notice of
appeal pursuant to Rule 124, Section 13(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, elevating
the case with this court.
33

34

35

This court notified the parties to simultaneously submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. Both parties filed
manifestations that they would merely adopt their briefs before the Court of Appeals.
36

In his brief, Chavez raised presumption of innocence, considering that the trial court "overlooked and misapplied
some facts of substance that could have altered its verdict." He argued that since the prosecution relied on
purely circumstantial evidence, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt on the part of Chavez. In this
case, even if Peamante saw him leaving Barbies house, Peamante did not specify whether Chavez was
acting suspiciously at that time.
37

38

39

As regards his mothers statement, Chavez argued its inadmissibility as evidence since his mother was not
presented before the court to give the defense an opportunity for cross-examination. He added that affidavits
are generally rejected as hearsay unless the affiant appears before the court and testifies on it.
40

41

Chavez argued that based on Dr. Salens findings, Barbies wounds were caused by two sharp bladed
instruments, thus, it was possible that there were two assailants. It was also possible that the assailants
committed the crime after Chavez had left Barbies house. Given that many possible explanations fit the facts
that which is consistent with the innocence of Chavez should be favored.
42

43

44

On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not indispensable when the prosecution is
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Chavez. The circumstantial evidence presented before the trial
court laid down an unbroken chain of events leading to no other conclusion than Chavezs acts of killing and
robbing Barbie.
45

46

On the argument made by Chavez that his mothers statement was inadmissible as hearsay, plaintiff-appellee
explained that the trial court did not rely on, and did not even refer to, any of the statements made by Chavezs
mother.
47

Finally, insofar as Chavezs submission that Dr. Salen testified on the possibility that there were two assailants,
Dr. Salen equally testified on the possibility that there was only one. The sole issue now before us is whether
Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
48

We reverse the decisions of the lower courts, but find Chavez guilty of the crime of homicide.
I
Chavez was found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person guilty of robbery
with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed. . . .
49

Chavez invokes his constitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecutions evidence is
purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral certainty of guilt.
50

The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused:

31

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
51

The lower courts found that the circumstantial evidence laid down by the prosecution led to no other conclusion
than the commission by Chavez of the crime charged:
In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing that the accused robbed and fatally stabbed the
victim to death, nonetheless, the Court believes that the following circumstances form a solid and unbroken
chain of events that leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that accused Mark Jason Chavez y
Bitancor @ Noy committed the crime charged, vi[z]: first, it has been duly established, as the accused himself
admits, that he went to the parlor of the victim at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 28 October 2006 and the
accused was allowed by the victim to get inside his parlor as it serves as his residence too; second, the victims
two (2) units of cellular phones (one red Nokia with model 3310 and the other one is a black Motorola) without
sim cards and batteries, which were declared as part of the missing personal belongings of the victim, were
handled to SPO3 Steve Casimiro by the mother of the accused, Anjanette C. Tobias on 05 November 2006
when the accused voluntarily surrendered, accompanied by his mother, at the police station: third, on 28 October
2006 at about 2:45 oclock in the morning, witness Angelo Peamante, who arrived from his work, saw a person
holding and/or carrying something and about to get out of the door of the house of the victim located at 1325 G.
Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and trying to close the door but the said person was not able to successfully
do so. He later positively identified the said person at the police station as MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR
@ NOY, the accused herein; and finally, the time when the accused decided on 27 October 2006 to patch up
things with the victim and the circumstances (Dr. Salens testimony that the body of the victim was dead for more
or less twelve (12) hours) when the latter was discovered fatally killed on 28 October 2006 is not a co-incidence.
The prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial evidence, that the accused had
indeed killed the victim.
52

Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even its
conclusions derived from the findings, are generally given great respect and conclusive effect by this court, more
so when these factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
53

Nevertheless, this court has held that "[w]hat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery
with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offenders intent to take personal property before the killing,
regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried out." In cases when the prosecution failed to
conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be
convicted of robbery with homicide.
54

55

The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts, as quoted previously, do not satisfactorily establish an
original criminal design by Chavez to commit robbery.
At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned by Chavezs mother in her statement as follows:
Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni Barbie at
kasabay ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic] ni Barbie na kanyang
kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.

32

Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sabahay ay
inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.
At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon
City.
Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang nakasugat
sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.
Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan
lamang. (Emphasis supplied)
56

However, this statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary value, since Chavezs mother was never
presented as a witness during trial to testify on her statement.
57

An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the infliction of no less than 21 stab
wounds in various parts of Barbies body.
58

The number of stab wounds inflicted on a victim has been used by this court in its determination of the nature
and circumstances of the crime committed.
This may show an intention to ensure the death of the victim. In a case where the victim sustained a total of 36
stab wounds in his front and back, this court noted that "this number of stab wounds inflicted on the victim is a
strong indication that appellants made sure of the success of their effort to kill the victim without risk to
themselves."
59

This court has also looked into the number and gravity of the wounds sustained by the victim as indicative of the
accuseds intention to kill the victim and not merely to defend himself or others.
60

In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, homicide is committed in order "(a) to facilitate the
robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime." 21
stab wounds would be overkill for these purposes. The sheer number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it
difficult to conclude an original criminal intent of merely taking Barbies personal property.
61

In People v. Sanchez, this court found accused-appellant liable for the separate crimes of homicide and theft for
failure of the prosecution to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the
victim:
62

But from the record of this case, we find that the prosecution palpably failed to substantiate its allegations of the
presence of criminal design to commit robbery, independent of the intent to commit homicide. There is no
evidence showing that the death of the victim occurred by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The
prosecution was silent on accused-appellants primary criminal intent. Did he intend to kill the victim in order to
steal the cash and the necklace? Or did he intend only to kill the victim, the taking of the latters personal
property being merely an afterthought? Where the homicide is not conclusively shown to have been committed
for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was not proven at all, there can be no conviction for
robo con homicidio.
63

II
This court finds that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Chavez for the separate crime
of homicide.

33

First, the alibi of Chavez still places him at the scene of the crime that early morning of October 28, 2006.
The victim, Elmer Duque, went by the nickname, Barbie, and he had a boyfriend named Maki. Nevertheless,
Chavez described his friendship with Barbie to be "[w]ere like brothers." He testified during cross-examination
that he was a frequent visitor at Barbies parlor that he cannot recall how many times he had been there. This
speaks of a close relationship between Chavez and Barbie.
64

65

Chavez testified that he went to Barbies house at 1:00 in the morning of October 28, 2006 to settle his
misunderstanding with Barbie who suspected him of having a relationship with Barbies boyfriend:
MARK JASON CHAVEZ was a friend to the victim, Barbie, for almost three (3) years and the two (2) treated
each other like brothers. The latter, however, suspected Mark Jason of having a relationship with Maki Aover,
Barbies boyfriend for six (6) months, which resulted in a misunderstanding between them. Mark Jason tried to
patch things up with Barbie so thru a text message he sent on the evening of 27 October 2006, he asked if they
could talk. When Barbie did not reply, he decided to visit him at his parlor at around 1:00 oclock in the morning.
Barbie let him in and they tried to talk about the situation between them. Their rift, however, was not fixed so he
decided to go home. Later on, he learned that Barbie was already dead.
66

This court has considered motive as one of the factors in determining the presence of an intent to kill, and a
confrontation with the victim immediately prior to the victims death has been considered as circumstantial
evidence for homicide.
67

68

Second, the number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie strengthens an intention to kill and ensures his death.
The prosecution proved that there was a total of 22 stab wounds found indifferent parts of Barbies body and that
a kitchen knife was found in a manhole near Chavezs house at No. 536, 5th Street, San Beda, San Miguel,
Manila.
69

The Court of Appeals recitation of facts quoted the statement of Chavezs mother. This provides, among others,
her sons confession for stabbing Barbie and throwing the knife used in a manhole near their house:
Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni Barbie at
kasabay ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic] ni Barbie na kanyang
kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.
Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sa bahay ay
inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.
At ang isang piraso ng kwintas nakinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon
City.
Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang nakasugat
sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.
Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan
lamang. (Emphasis supplied)
70

Even if this statement was not taken into account for being hearsay, further investigation conducted still led tothe
unearthing of the kitchen knife with a hair strand from a manhole near Chavezs house.
71

Third, no reason exists to disturb the lower courts factual findings giving credence to 1) Peamantes positive
identification of Chavez as the person leaving Barbies house that early morning of October 28, 2006 and 2) the
medico-legals testimony establishing Barbies time of death as 12 hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus,
narrowing the time of death to approximately 1:00 a.m. of the same day, October 28, 2006.
72

73

34

All these circumstances taken together establish Chavezs guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
homicide.
III
There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him." Thus, when a person has possession of a stolen property,
he can be disputably presumed as the author of the theft.
74

75

Barbies missing cellular phones were turned over to the police by Chavezs mother, and this was never denied
by the defense. Chavez failed to explain his possession of these cellular phones. The Court of Appeals
discussed that "a cellular phone has become a necessary accessory, no person would part with the same for a
long period of time, especially in this case as it involves an expensive cellular phone unit, as testified by Barbies
kababayan, witness Raymond Seno[f]a."
76

77

78

However, with Chavez and Barbies close relationship having been established, there is still a possibility that
these cellphones were lent to Chavez by Barbie.
The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised when SPO3 Casimiro testified during crossexamination that the police made no markings on the cellphones, and their SIM cards were removed.
Q: But you did not place any marking on the cellphone, Mr. witness?
A: No, sir.
Atty. Villanueva: No further questions, Your Honor.
Court: When you received the items, there were no markings also?
Witness: No, Your Honor.
Court: The cellular phones, were they complete with the sim cards and the batteries?
A: Theres no sim card, Your Honor.
Q; No sim card and batteries?
A; Yes, Your Honor.
Q: No markings when you received and you did not place markings when these were turned over to the Public
Prosecutor, no markings?
A: No markings, Your Honor.

79

The other missing items were no longer found, and no evidence was presented to conclude that these were
taken by Chavez. The statement of Chavezs mother mentioned that her son pawned one of Barbies necklaces
["At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa
Quezon City" ], but, as earlier discussed, this statement is mere hearsay.
80

In any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of the stolen items. The lower court made
no factual findings on the value of the missing items enumerated in the information one Nokia cellphone unit,
one Motorola cellphone unit, six pieces ladies ring, two pieces necklace, and one bracelet.
81

35

At most, prosecution witness Raymund Senofa, a town mate of Barbie, testified that he could not remember the
model of the Motorola flip type cellphone he saw used by Barbie but that he knew it was worth 19,000.00 more
or less. This amounts to hearsay as he has no personal knowledge on how Barbie acquired the cellphone or for
how much.
82

These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the allegation that Chavez stole the missing personal
properties of Barbie.
It is contrary to human nature for a mother to voluntarily surrender her own son and confess that her son
committed a heinous crime.
Chavez was 22 years old, no longer a minor, when he voluntarily went to the police station on November 5, 2006
for investigation, and his mother accompanied him. SPO3 Casimiro testified that the reason she surrendered
Chavez was because "she wanted to help her son" and "perhaps the accused felt that [the investigating police]
are getting nearer to him." Nevertheless, during cross-examination, SPO3 Casimiro testified:
83

84

85

Q: Regarding the mother, Mr. witness, did I get you right that when the mother brought her son, according to you
she tried to help her son, is that correct?
A: That is the word I remember, sir.
Q: Of course, said help you do not know exactly what she meant by that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It could mean that she is trying to help her son to be cleared from this alleged crime, Mr. witness?
A: Maybe, sir.

86

Chavezs mother "turned-over (2) units of Cellular-phones and averred that her son Mark Jason told her that said
cellphones belong[ed] to victim Barbie. . . [that] NOY was wounded in the incident and that the fatal weapon was
put in a manhole in front[sic] of their residence." The records are silent on whether Chavez objected to his
mothers statements. The records also do not show why the police proceeded to get his mothers testimony as
opposed to getting Chavezs testimony on his voluntary surrender.
87

At most, the lower court found that Chavezs mother was informed by the investigating officer at the police
station of the consequences in executing a written statement without the assistance of a lawyer. She proceeded
to give her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her sons confession of the crime despite the warning. SPO3
Casimiro testified during his cross-examination:
88

89

Q: Do you remember if anybody assisted this Anjanette Tobias when she executed this Affidavit you mentioned?
A: She was with some neighbors.
Atty. Villanueva
Q: How about a lawyer, Mr. Witness?
A: None, sir.
Q: So, in other words, no lawyer informed her of the consequence of her act of executing an Affidavit?
A: We somehow informed her of what will be the consequences of that statement, sir.

36

Q: So, you and your police officer colleague at the time?

A: Yes, sir.

90

The booking sheet and arrest report states that "when [the accused was] appraised [sic] of his constitutional
rights and nature of charges imputed against him, accused opted to remain silent." This booking sheet and
arrest report is also dated November 7, 2006, or two days after Chavez, accompanied by his mother, had
voluntarily gone to the police station.
91

The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda rights, which
require that:
. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will
be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to
have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided
before any questioning if he so desires.
92

The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the statement that any
waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing and in the presence of counsel."
93

The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins "when the police investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into
custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements."
94

It may appear that the Miranda rights only apply when one is "taken into custody by the police," such as during
an arrest. These rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from the pressures of a custodial setting:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick
captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial
setting itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts
from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions
were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanours as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies. (Emphasis supplied)
95

Republic Act No. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law."
96

97

This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their
Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being
questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure, he may have been
compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station.
This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt that Chavez
is guilty of the crime of homicide, and not the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On the service of Chavezs sentence, the trial court issued the order dated November 14, 2006 in that "as
prayed for, the said police officer is hereby ordered to immediately commit accused, Mark Jason Chavez y
Bitancor @ Noy to the Manila City Jail and shall be detained thereat pending trial of this case and/or until further
orders from this court." The order of commitment dated September 28, 2011 was issued after his trial court
conviction in the decision dated August 19, 2011.
98

37

Chavez has been under preventive detention since November 14, 2006, during the pendency of the trial. This
period may be credited in the service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended:
1wphi1

ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. Offenders or accused who
have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance
of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following
cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender
voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his
sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall
be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if
the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this
paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if
the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the
rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged
with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the
accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
99

V
Finally, this court laments that object evidence retrieved from the scene of the crime were not properly handled,
and no results coming from the forensic examinations were presented to the court. There was no examination of
the fingerprints found on the kitchen knife retrieved from the manhole near the house of Chavez. There were
no results of the DNA examination done on the hair strands found with the knife and those in the clutches of the
victim. Neither was there a comparison made between these strands of hair and Chavezs. There was no report
regarding any finding of traces of blood on the kitchen knife recovered, and no matching with the blood of the
victim or Chavezs. The results of this case would have been rendered with more confidence at the trial court
level had all these been done. In many cases, eyewitness testimony may not be as reliable or would have
been belied had object evidence been properly handled and presented.
100

We deal with the life of a person here. Everyones life whether it be the victims or the accuseds is
valuable. The Constitution and our laws hold these lives in high esteem. Therefore, investigations such as these
should have been attended with greater professionalism and more dedicated attention to detail by our law
enforcers. The quality of every conviction depends on the evidence gathered, analyzed, and presented before
the courts. The publics confidence on our criminal justice system depends on the quality of the convictions we
promulgate against the accused. All those who participate in our criminal justice system should realize this and
take this to heart.

38

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor
alias "Noy" is hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the separate and distinct crime of
HOMICIDE. Inasmuch as the commission of the crime was not attended by any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, accused-appellant Chavez is hereby SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Accused-appellant Chavez's period of detention shall be deducted if consistent with Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201565

October 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO
a.k.a. "EDEL EUTIQUIANO a.k.a. ESTONILO," ITCOBANES "NONONG NONOY ITCOBANES," ESTONILOat large, TITING GALI BOOC-at large, ITCOBANES-at ORLANDO large, TAGALOG MATERDAM a.k.a.
"NEGRO MATERDAM," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ," Accused,
vs.
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDE LB RANDO ESTONILO
a.k.a. "EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES a.k.a. "NONONG ITCOBANES," and CALVIN DELA
CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ," Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this appeal, accused-appellants Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. (Carlos, Sr.), Mayor Reinario Estonilo (Rey),
Edelbrando Estonilo (Edel), Eutiquiano Itcobanes (Nonong), and Calvin Dela Cruz (Bulldog) seek liberty from the
judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila, which found them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime ofMurder with Direct Assault in Criminal Case No. 05-238607.
1

The above-named accused-appellants, along with four others, namely: Nonoy Estonilo (Nonoy), Titing Booc
(Titing), and Gali Itcobanes (Gali), and Orlando Tagalog Materdam (Negro) were all charged in an Information
dated July 30, 2004 that reads:
2

That on or about April 5, 2004 at 8:00 oclock in the evening thereof, at Celera Elementary School, Brgy. Villa
Inocencio, Municipality of Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the performance of his duty being the
District Supervisor of public schools, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body which caused his
instantaneous death.
6

On November 8, 2005, the prosecutor filed an Amended Information, which provides:

8

39

That on or about April 5, 2004, at Celera Elementary School, Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality of Placer,
Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court of Masbate, the abovenamed accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR. and MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce their co-accused, EDELBRANDO
ESTONILO AL[I]AS "EDEL ESTONILO[,] " EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES AL[I]AS "NONONG ITCOBANES[,] "
NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, GALI ITCOBANES, ORLANDO MATERDAM Y TAGALOG ALIAS "NEGRO
MATERDAM[,]" [and] CALVIN DELA CRUZ AL[I]AS "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ[,]" who were all armed with
firearms, to attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the
performance of his duty being a District Supervisor of public schools, by then and there shooting the latter, hitting
said FLORO A. CASAS on the different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter. When they were arraigned on November 9, 2005, the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. On the same date, the RTC issued a pre-trial order which stated, among others:
9

a) Upon request by the prosecution, the defense admitted the following:

1. The identities of the five (5) accused present;
2. As to the jurisdiction of this Court, there was an Order from the Honorable Supreme Court asto
the transfer of venue;
3. The fact of death of Floro A. Casas;
4. That the victim Floro A. Casas at the time of his death was a District Supervisor of the
Department of Education.
b) However, upon request by the defense, the prosecution did not admit that Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo,
Sr. and Mayor Reinario Estonilo were not at the scene of the incident during the incident.
10

The prosecution presented nine witnesses, namely: Elsa Q. Casas (Elsa), the victims wife; Felix Q. Casas
(Felix), the victims son; Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco (Dr. Francisco), the Municipal Health Officer, Placer, Masbate;
Senior Police Officer 4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. (SPO4 Lepatan), Placer Police Station; Serapion M. Bedrijo
(Serapion), employee of Municipal Councilor candidate Boy dela Pisa; Carlo S. Antipolo (Antipolo), a resident of
Placer, Masbate; Diego L.Casas (Diego), cousin of the victim; Rosalinda V. Dahonan (Rosalinda), a resident of
Placer, Masbate; and Servando P. Rosales (Servando), former employee of Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. The
testimonies of the foregoing witnesses consisted of the following:
11

Felix narrated that on April 4, 2005,the day before his father, Floro Casas (Floro), was gunned down, he was
with the latter and some teachers at the Celera Inocencio Elementary School, Placer, Masbate; that they were
working on the closing ceremonies to be held the following day; that one Ranio Morales called on Floro and told
him that Mayor Carlos, Sr. wanted to see him at his (Ranio) house; that Floro and Felix went to see Mayor
Carlos, Sr.; that when they saw Mayor Carlos, Sr., he showed them (Floro and Felix) a program of a celebration
of the Federation of 7th Day Adventist that contained the names of the governor, the congressman, and Placer
mayoralty candidate Vicente Cotero (Cotero), as guests of the said activity; that Felix asked his father why
Coteros picture was so big while Mayor Carlos, Sr.s name was not mentioned in the program; that Floro replied
that he cannot help it because Cotero paid for the program; that the answer angered Mayor Carlos, Sr. and he
scolded Floro; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. said "you are now for Cotero but youre only Estonilo when you ask for my
signature to sign the voucher. This is up to now that you will be the supervisor of Celera"; that Floro responded
"when are you a superintendent when you dont have any scholastic standing. Just look if I will still vote for your
son"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. replied "lets see if you can still vote"; and that the following day, Floro was shot to
death.
12

40

But prior to the April 4, 2005 incident, Felix recounted that on December 10, 2003, upon invitation of Nonoy, he
joined the latters group for a drinking spree at a videoke bar; that they talked about the death of one Titing
Villester; that Nonoy told Felix that "brod, do not be afraid, because others are supposed to be afraid [of] us
because they believe that we were the ones who killed Titing Villester" that afterwards Felix and the group were
fetched at the videoke bar by Edel, a messenger of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that they were brought to the house of
one Bobong Baldecir (a nephew of Mayor Carlos, Sr.) in Daraga; that uponarriving thereat, Rey uttered "its good
that Dodong (Felixs nickname) is with you; that Nonoy then said "who would not [be] otherwise, his father would
be the next victim after Titing Villester"; that Rey then turned to Felix and said, "its very important that your
father is with us because a District Supervisor has a big [role] in the Comelecs choice for those teachers who
would become members of the Board of Election Inspectors"; that Felix clarified that Rey was then the 2004
mayoralty candidate for Placer, Masbate; and that Felix went along with him since he was in Daraga, the
bailiwick of the Estonilos.
13

14

On cross examination, the counsel for the accused tried to discredit Felix by questioning him on why it took him
a long time to execute an affidavit relative to his fathers killing. Felix explained that he went to Cebu to stay
away from Placer, which is under the Estonilos jurisdiction. The defense confronted Felix of a criminal case
against him for illegal use of prohibited drugs, for which he was out on bail.
15

16

On March 28, 2006, the prosecution presented two witnesses, Dr. Ulysses Francisco yPedrano and SPO4
Restituto Lepatan, Sr. The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulation of facts relative to their
testimonies.
[Stipulation of Facts on Dr. Ulysses P. Franciscos testimony:]
1. That Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, a Municipal Health Officer of Placer, Masbate, is expert in medicine;
2. That he was the one who conducted the Post-Mortem Examination on the dead body of Floro Casas y
Baronda on April 6, 2004 at Katipunan, Placer, Masbate;
3. That in connection with his examination, he prepared the Post Mortem Examination Report, marked as
Exhibit "F," the printed name and signature of Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, marked as Exhibit "F-1";
4. That he also prepared the Certificate of Death, marked as Exhibit "G" and the Sketch of a Human
Body, marked as Exhibit "H";
5. The veracity and truthfulness of the Post-Mortem Findings indicated in the Post-Mortem Examination
Report; and
6. In the course of the examination of the victim, the said witness recovered three slugs: the 1 st slug
was marked as Exhibit "I," the fragmented slug as Exhibit "I-1," and the metallic object consisting of two
pieces of Exhibit "I-2."
[Stipulation of Facts on SPO4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr.s testimony:]
1. That there exists a Police Blotter in the Record/Blotter Book of the Placer, Masbate Police Station
relative to the shooting incident that occurred on April 5, 2004 at Celera Elementary School. Said Police
Blotter was requested to be marked by the prosecution as Exhibit "J";
2. That said witness prepared the Police Report dated April 17, 2004 relative to the blotter written on the
Blotter Book. Said Police Report was requested to be marked as Exhibit "J-1" and the signature of Sr.
Police Officer IV Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. as Exhibit "J-1-a";

41

3. The existence of the Police Blotter as appearing in the Blotter Book page number 325. Said Police
Blotter book page 325 was requested to be marked as Exh. "K" and the bracketed portion thereof as
Exh. "K-1."
17

According to Dr. Francisco, Floro sustained gunshot wounds caused by more than one firearm based on the
sizes of the slugs recovered and that some of them were fired at close range. The counsel for the accused
waived his cross examination.
18

Prosecution witness Serapion testified that while he was printing the name of Municipal Councilor candidate Boy
dela Pisa on the street facing the Celera Elementary School on the night of April 5, 2004, he heard gunshots
coming from inside the compound of the school; that after two or three minutes, he saw more or less six persons
coming out of the school; that he was able to identify three of them as present in the courtroom: Edel, Nonoy,
and Nonong; that he saw the six men approach Mayor Carlos, Sr.s vehicle, which was parked near the school;
that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey came out of a house nearby; that upon reaching the vehicle, Serapion heard
Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos, Sr. "mission accomplished, sir"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered Nonoy and his group
to escape, which they did using two motorbikes towards the direction of Cataingan; and thereafter, that Mayor
Carlos, Sr. and Rey drove towards the direction of Daraga.
19

During his cross examination, the defense tried to discredit Serapion by confronting him with the fact thathe has
a pending criminal case for frustrated murder and that he was out on bail. Antipolo testified that on April 5,
2004, he was riding his motorcycle and passing by the gate of the Celera Elementary School when he heard
gunshots and someone shouted that Floro was shot; that he stopped, alighted from his motorcycle, went to the
gate, and saw four persons holding short firearms; that he identified Nonoy and Negro as the two who fired at
Floro about seven times; that he identified Edel and Nonong as the two other gun holders; that at that moment,
Gali shouted "sir, thats enough, escape!"; that Gali was accompanied by someone named Ace, Titing and
Bulldog; that right after Gali shouted for them to escape, all of them hurriedly left the school compound; that he
saw Mayor Carlos, Sr.s pick-up vehicle arrive soon thereafter; that Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Negro alighted
from the vehicle and watched the proceedings; that he heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "leave it because its already
dead"; and that afterwards, the police officers arrived.
20

21

In an attempt to discredit Antipolo, the defense counsel confronted him with a criminal case against him for
homicide of one Edgardo Estonilo (brother of accused-appellant Edel) that happened on October 30, 2005.
22

Elsa was presented to testify on the probable motive for the killing of Floro, the circumstances surrounding the
killing and its discovery, their family background, her husbands line of work, how she felt on their loss, and the
expenses relative to his killing. She testified that she heard there were people who were jealous of Floros
position because he could bring voters to his side during election time; that Placer mayoralty candidate Cotero
donated medals for the 2003-2004 closing ceremony of the entire district of public schools; that during the
closing ceremony, the donors name was announced, which angered then Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that when Floro
was processing a voucher worth P70,000.00, Mayor Carlos, Sr. refused to sign the same and even threw the
voucher on the floor saying "let this be signed by Vicente Cotero"; and that Floros cousin, Diego Casas, helped
Floro secure the Mayors signature by ensuring Mayor Carlos, Sr. that Floro was for him, and only then did
Mayor Carlos, Sr. agree to sign the voucher.
23

24

Diego L. Casas corroborated Elsas testimony relative to the fact that he helped Floro secure Mayor Carlos, Sr.s
signature on the voucher.
25

Rosalinda testified that at 7:00 a.m. on April 10, 2004, Mayor Carlos, Sr. went to her house and told her that he
would kill her husband following Floro; that she was shocked and scared, thus, she went to the Placer Police
Station and reported the incident; that she went to see her husband, who was then campaigning for mayoralty
candidate Cotero, and informed him of what happened; and that she went to Elsas house and informed the
latter of the threat.
26

42

Servando attested that at about 7:00 a.m. on April 1, 2004, he was in the house of Mayor Carlos,Sr. together
with said Mayor, Nonong, Edgar Estonilo, the group of Bulldog, Negro, Alias "S" [Ace], Rollie, Nonong, Edel, and
Gali; that he witnessed Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas"; that Servando later learned that the
mayors men were unsuccessful in their goal because Floro was no longer in Barangay Taberna, where they
intended to execute the mayors order;and that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his men again planned to kill Floro at
Celera Elementary School on April 4, 2004.
27

During cross examination, the defense confronted Servando with the latters Affidavit of Retraction, which he
executed on June 14, 2004. The affidavit contained a withdrawal of his Sinumpaang Salaysay taken on May 30,
2004 at the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Camp Bonny
Serrano, Masbate City relative to the criminal complaint for direct assault with murder filed against Mayor Carlos,
Sr. and his company. He was also asked about two criminal charges filed against him in Cebu relative to
violation of Republic Act No. 9165, illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On re-direct
examination, Servando narrated that Mayor Carlos, Sr.s nephew, Bobong Baldecir, fetched him from his house
and he was brought to the house of Mayor Carlos, Sr. in Daraga; that from there, he was brought to Atty. Besario
in Cebu; that Atty. Besario informed him about the Affidavit of Retraction that he was supposed to sign, which he
did not understand as it was written in English; and that he clarified that the contents of the affidavit was not his
but those of Bobong.
28

29

The defense on its part called to the witness stand Jesus Baldecir, Jr. (Jesus/Bobong), Quirino D. Calipay
(Quirino), and the five accused-appellants.
Jesus denied Servandos allegation that he (Jesus) forced him to sign the Affidavit of Retraction. Jesus narrated
that Servando gave word that he (Servando) wanted to meet him (Jesus); that upon their meeting, Servando told
him that he wanted to retract his sworn statement because Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his company did nothing
wrong; that Jesus, Servando and Servandos wife went to Cebu to meet Atty. Besario; that while traveling,
Servando told him that was evading the men of Governor Go, Vicente Cotero and Casas because he feared for
his life; that during the meeting Atty. Besario prepared the affidavit and translated it to Cebuano dialect; that
afterwards, Jesus, Servando and Servandos wife went to the Capitol so that Servando could sign it before the
prosecutor; that Jesus, Atty. Besario, Servado and his wife, and Dante Estonilo (another nephew of Mayor
Carlos) went to Manila to meet with the media; that the media asked Servando whether he was forced to sign, or
was given money or reward to sign the affidavit of retraction, Servando replied in the negative; and that the
purpose of the press meeting was to present Servando and show that he was not kidnapped.
30

But during his cross examination, Jesus admitted that his nickname was Bobong, and that Mayor Carlos, Sr.
ishis uncle; that he is one of the accused in the criminal case for the kidnapping of Servando; and that it was
Dante (Dante) Estonilo who arranged for the meeting with the media, and who served as Servandos and his
wifes companion, while he was with Atty. Besario. During his turn, accused-appellant Mayor Carlos, Sr. testified
that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 hewas in a house near the Celera Elementary School attending a
birthday party; that while thereat, he heard successive gunshots and went out to ride his vehicle so he could
check the source of the gunshots; that when he reached the school gate someone informed him that Floro was
gunned down; that he did not see the victim because according to the people it was boarded in a jeep and
brought to the hospital; and that he and his son, Rey, confirmed that they were at the school minutes after the
incident.
31

32

During cross examination, Mayor Carlos said that he and Floro were close friends; that he learned that he and
his son were suspects in Floros killing five months after the incident; that he confirmed that Rey and Calvin dela
Cruz were with him while inquiring about the shooting at the school; and that he denied having met Felix on April
4, 2004, seeing Rosalinda after April 5, 2004, or that Servando was his bodyguard.
33

Accused-appellant Rey testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 he was in his house and was planning
to campaign at Barangay Matagantang, Placer, Masbate; that on his way to said barangay, he passed by Celera
Elementary School and noticed his fathers vehicle, and that there were several people thereat; that he stopped

43

and stayed in the school for a few minutes, and then proceeded to meet his candidates for counselors at Ranios
house; and that afterwards, they all went to Barangay Matagantang.
34

On cross examination, Rey expressed that this criminal case may be politically motivated because his
opponents could not attribute anything to him since he won as mayor.
35

Quirino narrated that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he and his family were having supper at their house located
in front of Celera Elementary Schools guardhouse, when they heard gunshots; that they immediately laid down,
while Quirino ran across the road and took cover at the school fence; that he peeped through the fence and saw
three persons firing a gun; that he could not identify them or their victim because it was a bit dark; that after 10 to
20 seconds, hewent back home; that a certain Joel Alcantara and his companions went to him asking him to go
with them inside the school, once inside the school, they saw Floro lying face down; that he took the liberty to go
to the police headquarters located five minutes away; and that when he and the Placer Chief of Police arrived at
the school, he noticed Mayor Carlos, Sr. standing near the gate.
36

For his part, accused-appellant Nonong testified that in the evening of April 5, 2004 he was engaged in a
drinking spree in Nining Berdidas house at Barangay Pili, Placer, Masbate; and that he stayed in her place until
11:00 p.m.
37

During his cross examination, accused-appellant Nonong acknowledged that Mayor Carlos, Sr. is his uncle and
Rey is his second cousin; that he was not Mayor Carlos, Sr.s bodyguard, but admitted that he handled the
latters fighting cocks; and admitted that Barangay Pili is 40 to 45 minutes away from the poblacion of Placer.
38

Edel related that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he was sleeping in his house when Rey called him to go to
Ranios house in Placer, Masbate for a meeting; that their group passed by Celera Elementary School and saw
that there were plenty of people, one of whom was Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that their group stopped to inquire about
what happened, and learned that Floro was gunned down; and that he and his group stayed for about five
minutes and left.
39

Accused-appellant Bulldog was also presented in court and confirmed that he was with Mayor Carlos, Sr. and
his wife attending a birthday party near the Celera Elementary School; that they went to the school to check on
what happened and learned that Floro was shot; and that they did not stay long and went home to Daraga.
40

During cross examination, he denied that he was the bodyguard of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; and that he was merely
accompanying the latter to help in pushing his vehicle in case the starter failed to work.
41

After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo
of its March 30, 2009 Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR.,
MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO alias "EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO
ITCOBANES alias "NONONG ITCOBANES," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ alias BULLDOG DELA CRUZ" GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder with Direct Assault under Article 248 and Article 148 in
relation to Article 48 all of the Revised Penal Code and each of said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.
As civil liability pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the aforesaid sentenced the accused are all
hereby ordered to solidarily indemnify the family of the victim Floro Casas in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00). Likewise, by way of moral damages, the said accused are furthermore ordered to solidarily
pay the said family the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
The accused are, however, credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they have been
denied.

44

Let this case be archived as against the accused NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, and GALIITCOBANES
who have warrants of arrest issued against them but still remain at large, pending their arrest/s.
As to the accused ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM ALIAS "NEGRO MATERDAM," separate trial is
necessary considering that he was only recently arrested when the trial of this case as to the other accused was
already about to end.
42

The RTC gave credence to the eyewitness account of Antipolo and the corroborating testimony of Serapion, who
were both present at the school grounds during the shooting incident. The RTC pronounced that the evidence on
record showed unity of purpose in the furtherance of a common criminal design, that was the killing of Floro.
Accused-appellants Nonoy and Negro were the gunmen, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong served as
backup gunmen. Accused-appellant Bulldog, and accused Gali, Titing and one alias Ace served as lookouts.
43

The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to have ordered their co-accused to kill Floro
based on the testimony of Servando, who was present when the group planned to kill Floro. Thus, the RTC
concluded that Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is a principal by inducement. And accused-appellant Rey conspired with his
father. In sum, the prosecution was able to establish conspiracy and evident premeditation among all the
accused-appellants.
44

The accused-appellants defense of alibi and denial did not withstand the positive identification of the
prosecution witnesses. The accused appellants claimed that they were somewhere else in Placer, Masbate
when the shooting took place. However, they were not able to establish the physical improbability of their being
in the crime scene at the time of the shooting. The RTC was convinced that the motive for the murder was due to
Floros support for mayoral candidate Vicente Cotero. Since the victim was a district supervisor of public schools,
the RTC convicted the accused appellants of the complex crime of murder with direct assault.
45

All five accused-appellants appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC
erred in concluding that motive was duly established, in appreciating the prosecution evidence and disregarding
the salient points of the defense evidence, and in convicting the accused.
46

In its May 12, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision. The dispositive
part thereof reads:
47

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appealed is denied. The Decision dated 30 March 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the penalty imposed
upon accused-appellants shall simply be reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties and that the award of
civil indemnity is increased to Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00).
48

The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the RTC considering that the RTC
had observed and monitored at close range the conduct, behavior and deportment of the witnesses as they
testified. The Court of Appeals corrected the penalty imposed, and explained that reclusion perpetua is an
indivisible penalty which should be imposed without specifying the duration.
On June 29, 2011, the accused-appellants moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its
November 8, 2011 Resolution. Unsatisfied, the accused-appellants appealed their case before this Court.
49

50

51

This Courts Ruling

The accused-appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the criminal case on the following
assignment of errors: the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in (1) giving credence and weight to the
prosecution evidence, (2) finding that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants, and (3) finding the
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the prosecution evidence.

45

In essence, the defense disagrees with the disposition of the Court of Appeals affirming their conviction for
murder with direct assault on the ground that some of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses constitute
circumstantial evidence, and that the prosecution was not able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal fails.
After a review of the record of the case, this Court sustains the conviction of the accused-appellants for murder
with direct assault.
The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses on the witness stand and
weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as a witness testifies
before it. It is, thus, no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy,
as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they
testify.
52

This Court had nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records but found no indication that the trial and the
appellate courts overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of this
case. The trial court and the appellate court did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, particularly of Antipolo who was an eyewitness to the crime.
Antipolos testimony did not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency that could possibly detract from
his credibility. He identified the accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro as those who fired at Floro about
seven times, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding their firearms. He also
witnessed accused Gali shouting to the gunmen to stop and escape. He narrated that after all the accused left,
Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Materdam arrived aboard the mayors vehicle. He also heard Mayor Carlos said
"leave it because its already dead." From his direct and straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as to the
identity of the culprits.
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a person
was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
53

54

In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was killed; (2) Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey,
Edel, Nonong, and Calvin were five of the nine perpetrators who killed him; (3) the killing was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by prosecution eyewitnesses, Servando and
Antipolo, as well as treachery as below discussed; and (4) the killing of Floro was neither parricide nor
infanticide.
Of the four elements, the second and third elements are essentially contested by the defense. The Court finds
that the prosecution unquestionably established these two elements.
For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence which when joined together point to the
accused-appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro. It was Floros support for Vicente
Cotero, who was Reys opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate. Second, the prosecution was able
to establish that the accused appellants planned to kill Floro on two separate occasions. The prosecution
witness, Servando, was present in Mayor Carlos, Sr.s house when they were plotting to kill Floro. He also heard
Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas." Third, Antipolo was an eye witness to the killing. His testimony
was corroborated by another witness, Serapion, who testified having seen the accused-appellants leaving the
school a few minutes after he heard the gunshots. Serapion also recounted having heard one of them said
"mission accomplished sir," after which, Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered them to leave.

46

Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. The
testimony of the eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of the commission of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may
be established by inference. It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence
of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Here, the circumstantial
evidence consists of the testimonies of Servando and Serapion. Servando was present when Mayor Carlos, Sr.
ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether this order was executed can be answered by relating it to Antipolos
eyewitness account as well as Serapions testimony.
55

56

As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness, Servando, testified that he was
present on the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning to kill Floro. His categorical and
straight forward narration proves the existence of evident premeditation.
Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be present, two elements must concur: (1) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In this case, accused-appellant Nonoy
and accused Negro successively fired at Floro about seven times and the victim sustained 13 gunshot wounds
all found to have been inflicted at close range giving the latter no chance at all to evade the attack and defend
himself from the unexpected onslaught. Accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding
their firearms to insure the success of their "mission" without risk to themselves; and three others served as
lookouts. Hence, there is no denying that their collective acts point to a clear case of treachery.
Defense of denial and alibi
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must fail in light of the positive
identification made by Antipolo and Serapion. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be
brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused as in
this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. The accused-appellants
alibis that they were at different places at the time of the shooting are negative and self-serving and cannot be
given more evidentiary value vis--vis the affirmative testimony of credible witnesses. The accused-appellants,
the victim, and the prosecution witnesses reside in the same municipality and are, therefore, familiar with one
another. More so, that the two principal accused in this case are prominent political figures. Therefore, the
prosecution witnesses could not have been mistaken on the accused appellants identity including those who
remained at large.
57

Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the
facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the
accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime
scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to
satisfy the above-quoted requirements. In fact, Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his other co-accused, except for Nonong,
admitted that they were near the school before the incident and at the school minutes after the killing took place.
Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants at the school, and/or
for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be, unnoticed.
58

Penalties
On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that they should be held
accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados

47

contra la autoridad o sus agentesunder Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants committed
the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person
was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a
person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the
offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.
In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer, Masbate, thus, was a
person in authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that there was direct assault just because Floro
was a person in authority, this Court clarifies that the finding of direct assault is based on the fact that the attack
or assault on Floro was, in reality, made by reason of the performance of his duty as the District Supervisor.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the
complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty should have been
death. Plus the fact that there exists an aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is death. But the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by
Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines"; thus, the
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The Proper Indemnities

As to the proper monetary awards imposable for the crime charged, modifications must be made herein. The
award of P100,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages is proper to conform with current
jurisprudence.
1wphi1

59

Further, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance either as qualifying or generic, an award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Thus, conformably with the above, the
legal heirs of the victim are also entitled to an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
60

61

Lastly, an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded, to
earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
62

At this point, notice must be made that on January 28, 2014, the Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison informed
this Court of the death of accused-appellant Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. on January 9, 2013. In view thereof, the case
against deceased Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is hereby ordered dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 12, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04142, affirming the Decision dated March 30, 2009, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 45, in Criminal Case No. 05-238607, finding accused appellants REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO,
EDELBRANDO "EDEL" ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO "NONONG" ITCOBANES, and CAL VIN "BULLDOG" DELA
CRUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder with Direct Assault, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages is increased to P100,000.00 each, in addition
to P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the imposition of 6% thereon as legal interest upon finality of this
Court's Decision.

48

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 189644

July 2, 2014

NEIL E. SUYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CHIEF PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICER, DAGUPAN CITY,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 27 March 2009, which
affirmed the Orders dated 31 March 2006 and 26 June 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City.
The RTC found that Neil E. Suyan (petitioner) had violated the conditions of his probation and thus, ordered that
his probation be revoked. The instant petition likewise assails the Resolution dated 9 September 2009 , which
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision dated 27 March 2009. The facts
as found by the CA are summarized as follows:
1

On 27 October 1995, an Information was filed against petlt10ner, charging him with violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425. During arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge. The RTC
thereafter proceeded with trial.
5

On 22 November 1995, petitioner was convicted of the crime, for which he was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) years of prision correccional and to pay the costs. On even date, he filed his application for probation.
On 16 February 1996, the RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period of six (6) years. While on probation,
petitioner was arrested on two occasions, more specifically on 2 September and 20 October 1999 for violating
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425. Two separate Informations were filed against him, both of which were
filed with the RTC of Dagupan City. One of these cases was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-03073-D before
Branch 43 (Branch 43 case), and the other case as Criminal Case No. 99-03129-D before Branch 41.
6

On 1 December 1999, Atty. Simplicio A. Navarro, Jr. (Atty. Navarro), then the Chief Probation and Parole Officer
of Dagupan City, filed a Motion to Revoke Probation (Motion to Revoke). Atty. Navarro alleged that petitioner
has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation. The former further alleged that petitioner
was considered a recidivist, whose commission of other offenses while on probation was a serious violation of
the terms thereof .Atty. Navarro also pointed out that petitioner was no longer in a position to comply with the
conditions of the latters probation, in view of his incarceration.
8

On 15 December 1999, the RTC issued an order revoking the probation of petitioner and directing him to serve
the sentence imposed upon him. It denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
10

11

12

Aggrieved, on 6 April 2000 petitioner filed a Rule 65 Petition with the CA (first CA case), wherein he assailed
the revocation of his probation. He argued that he was denied due process as he was not furnished with a copy
of the Motion to Revoke; and when the motion was heard, he was not represented by his counsel of record.
13

14

15

49

On 2 January 2006, the CA in its Decision, granted the Rule 65 Petition by annulling and set aside RTCs
revocation of petitioners probation. The CA ruled that the trial court had not complied with the Probation Law
and the procedural requisites for the revocation of probation under the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and
Procedures, enumerated as follows:
16

17

1. No fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations was conducted by the Probation Officer. 2. The
Probation Office should have reported to respondent court the result of said investigation, if any, upon its
completion.
3. There was no Violation Report under P.A. Form No. 8, the contents of which are enumerated under
Section 38 of the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.
4. No warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court after considering the nature and seriousness of
the alleged violations based on the report, if any.
5. The petitioner should have been brought to respondent court for a hearing of the violations charged,
during which petitioner with the right to counsel should have been informed of the violations charged
and allowed to adduce evidence in his favor.
The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, for the purpose of affording
petitioner his right to due process pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 968, and the Revised Rules on
Probation Methods and Procedures.
In compliance with the CA Decision, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke. On 17 February
2006, a Violation Report dated 13 February 2006 was filed by the Dagupan City Parole and Probation Office
recommending the revocation of probation. The Violation Report provides in part:
18

19

20

D. CASE SUMMARY
At the outset of his probation period, probationer showed manifested negative attitude by incurring absences
and not attending rehabilitation activities despite constant follow-up by his supervising officers. He continued
with his illegal drug activities despite counselling and warning from this Office.
Obviously, probationer has failed to recognize the value of freedom and second chance accorded him by the
Honorable Court, his conduct and attitude bespeaks of his deviant character, hence he is unworthy to
continuously enjoy the privilege of probation.
On 22 March 2006, the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence. A Certification dated 23January
2006 (Certification), issued by Manuel Z. de Guzman, was offered as evidence to prove that petitioner had
been convicted in the Branch 43 case (one of the two cases subsequently filed against him, as stated earlier);
and that he had served his sentence from 30 September 2000 until his release, by reason of the expiration of his
maximum sentence on 8 September 2003.Thereafter, petitioner filed his Comment on the Formal Offer without
disputing the Certification.
21

22

On 31 March 2006, the RTC issued an Order revoking the probation. It ruled that it had granted petitioner due
process by affording him the full opportunity to contest the Motion to Revoke; but that instead of rebutting the
Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of a violation report when his probation was first
revoked. The RTC further held that there was positive testimony and documentary evidence showing that
petitioner had indeed violated the conditions of his probation. He never rebutted the fact of his commission of
another offense and conviction therefor while on probation. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
denied.
23

24

25

27

50

26

Aggrieved, petitioner again filed an appeal with the CA. This time, he alleged that he had been deprived of his
constitutional right to due process when his probation was ordered revoked. He further alleged that he had not
been given ample opportunity to refute the alleged violations committed by him while on probation. The
probation officer did not conduct a fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations, and, consequently,
petitioner was not furnished any results. After considering the nature and seriousness of the alleged violations,
the RTC did not issue any warrant for his arrest, as he had not been afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence
in his favor with the assistance of his counsel.
28

29

30

With regard to the specific grounds for revocation, petitioner claimed that the evidence adduced against him did
not refer to the grounds cited in the Motion to Revoke, but instead, the evidence referred to alleged violations of
Condition Nos. 3, 9 and 10 of the Probation Order.
The CA denied his appeal. With regard to the procedural issues discussed in the assailed Decision, it ruled that
petitioner was afforded due process. A full-blown trial was conducted precisely to allow him to refute the
allegations made in the Motion to Revoke. It held further that petitioner wasted this opportunity when, instead of
rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of such a report
when his probation was first revoked. It added that the procedural infirmities in the Motion to Revoke were cured
when the RTC conducted a hearing in accordance with the directive laid down in the First CA Case.
With regard to the substantive issue of revocation, the CA ruled that, for having been apprehended twice for the
commission of two offenses similar in nature, petitioner violated one of the conditions prescribed in the Probation
Order. He even admitted to having served out his sentence for those offenses.
Aggrieved yet again, petitioner filed an appeal with this Court. On procedural grounds, he alleges that there was
no fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations conducted by the probation officer, and thus no results were
furnished him. Likewise, no warrant of arrest was issued by the RTC. Neither was he afforded any opportunity to
adduce evidence in his favor with the assistance of counsel.
On substantive grounds, petitioner alleges that he already showed repentance after his conviction. In his first
case, he readily admitted his accountability by pleading guilty to the charge. Thus, he was convicted and he
subsequently applied for probation. He further alleges that, of the two cases filed against him, one was ordered
dismissed; he has already served his sentence for the other. Since then, no derogatory information has been
received either by the probation office or the trial court. Petitioner points out that he has already reformed his
ways and is thus entitled to the grace of law. He contends that the CA should have ordered him to resume his
probation pursuant to the positivist theory adopted in our criminal justice system.
ISSUE
The sole issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether the probation was validly revoked.
THE COURTS RULING
We rule that the probation of petitioner was validly revoked.
On the procedural grounds, we do not subscribe to his contention that his right to due process was violated after
the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in compliance with the directive of the
CA. Based on record, he had ample opportunity to refute the allegations contained in the Violation Report.
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of his
case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. When the party
seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it was by his own
fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must fail.
31

32

51

We adopt the ruling of the CA in that petitioner squandered his own opportunity when, instead of rebutting the
allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of any such report when his
probation was first revoked.
On substantive grounds, we believe that there was sufficient justification for the revocation of his probation.
Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his sentence for
another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct violation of
Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly outlined in Section 11 of the Probation Law.
1wphi1

33

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the probation
order ineffective. Section 11 states:
Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at which time the
court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any
of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he shall serve the penalty
imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking the probation of petitioner and ordering him to serve the
penalty for the offense for which he was placed on probation.
As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the terms and
conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this privilege. Regrettably, petitioner
wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside prison bars, and must now suffer the
consequences of his violation. The Court's discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant
probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under
appropriate circumstances.
34

35

36

37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 27 March
2009 and Resolution dated 9 September 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 95426 are both AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 206832

January 21, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is an Appeal filed by accused-appellant Alfredo Morales y Lam (Morales) assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04287.
1

52

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 in Criminal Case Nos. 7534-7535, finding the accused Morales guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
In the Criminal Case No. 7534, Morales was charged with illegal sale of shabu as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality or Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another person one (1) heat scaled transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, which gave positive result to the test for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
3

In the Criminal Case No. 7535, Morales was charged with illegal possession of shabu as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control three (3) heat-scaled transparent sachets each
containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, which gave positive results to the test for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
4

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged.

The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in the cases of illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The trial court relied on the categorical statements of the prosecution
witnesses as against the bare denials of the accused. The presumption or regularity of performance of duties
was upheld in the absence of any improper motive on their part to testify falsely against the accused. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7534, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime or Sale or Dangerous Drug (Violation of Section 5, 1st par., Article II, R.A. 9165) and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500, 000.00).
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7535, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of POSSESSION of DANGEROUS DRUG (Violation of Section 11, 2nct par., No. 3,
Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Twelve Years (12) years
and one (1) day to Twenty (20) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
6

Upon appeal, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court. It upheld the presence of all the elements
of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs, and preservation of the corpus delicti of the crime
from the time they were seized and presented in court. The procedural steps required by Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165 were liberally construed in favor of the prosecution in view of the preservation of integrity and
identity of the corpus delicti. Conformably, the finding on the presumption of regularity of performance of duties
was affirmed in the absence of ill-motive on the part of the police officers.
On 29 August 2012, a Notice of Appeal was filed by Morales through counsel before the Supreme Court.
7

While this case is pending appeal, the Inmate Documents and Processing Division Officer-in-Charge
Emerenciana M. Divina informed the Court that accused-appellant Morales died while committed at the Bureau
of Corrections on 2 November 2013 as evidenced by a copy of Death Report signed by New Bilibid Prison
8

53

Hospital's Medical Officer Ursicio D. Cenas. The death of accused-appellant Morales pending appeal of his
conviction, extinguishes his civil and criminal liabilities.
Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code:
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. x x x x
Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction by the lower courts.
However, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. No civil liability needs
extinguishment.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 2 November 2013, the appeal of accused-appellant Alfredo Morales y
Lam from the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04287 affirming
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 in Criminal Case Nos. 7534-7535
convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby declared MOOT and
ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 192912

June 4, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DEMOCRITO PARAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The Court resolves the appeal of the accused-appellant Democrito Paras from the Decision dated February 2,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR.-H.C. No. 00465. The appellate court affirmed the
Decision dated October 18, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case
No. TCS-2729, which found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape.
1

The prosecution charged the accused-appellant of committing rape against AAA, a 17-year old girl, allegedly
committed as follows:
3

That at noon in March 1996 or for sometime subsequent thereto, in [XXX] and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with the use of a gun of unknown caliber, by force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA] against the latter's will
and as a result of which the latter became pregnant, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party.
4

54

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. In the trial that ensued, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of AAA, Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Field Officer Ma. Pamela
Jusay, and Dr. Marcelo Pilapil, the physician who physically examined AAA. The defense thereafter presented
the testimonies of the accused-appellant and his mother, Luisa Paras.
5

10

In their brief before the Court of Appeals, the prosecution summarized their version of the facts in this wise:
Around noon of March 19, 1996, or subsequent thereto, while the victim [AAA], a house-helper of spouses
Sergio and Heny Agua, was weeding grass using a bolo at her employers farm in [XXX], appellant Democrito
Paras approached her from behind (TSN, July 15, 1999, pp. 6-7). He pulled [AAA] towards the lower portion of
the farm and pointed a short firearm at her mouth. While pointing the gun at [AAA], appellant pulled down her
long pants and panties. Appellant also pulled down his pants and underwear. He laid [AAA] on the grassy ground
and mounted her. He spread [AAAs] legs with his two hands after putting down his firearm. He then inserted his
penis into [AAAs] vagina. [AAA] felt pain (Ibid., p. 8). [AAA] struggled and tried to kick appellant but all proved
futile as appellant was physically stronger (TSN, Nov. 19, 1999, p. 10)[.]
Since [AAA] was afraid of appellant and that she was also afraid to kill a person, she did not strike appellant with
the bolo she was holding (TSN, Jan. 11, 2000, p. 3). Appellant told[AAA] not to shout. He made a push and pull
movement. [AAA] felt appellants organ inside her while she continued to struggle. While struggling, [AAA] even
threw stones at appellant (Ibid. p. 4).
After appellant consummated his bestial lust, he dressed up and fled, while [AAA] went back to the house of her
employers (Ibid.).
Subsequently, [AAA] got pregnant due to the incident. She gave birth to a child who was more than a year old
when [AAA] testified on January 11, 2000. (TSN, Jan. 11, 2000, p. 5)[.]
11

The defense, on the other hand, laid out the following narrative of denial and alibi:
Accused-appellant, Democrito Paras, knows the private complainant because she was the helper at the house
of his elder sister. He vehemently denie[d] having raped AAA. On March 19, 1996, he was at the Lusaran market
to buy dried fish and other household items to be consumed for the whole week because he lived in a mountain
barangay. He could not estimate the distance between Lusaran Market and his house but it would take two (2)
hours of travel time by walking only. It was about 8:00 oclock in the morning when he went to Lusaran Market on
March 19, 1996 and arrived home at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon already. AAA accused him of rape
because of the misunderstanding he had with the husband of his elder sister regarding the mango trees owned
by his mother. AAA is an employee of his brother-in-law, Sergio Agua, whose house is about seventy (70) meters
away from his house. Aside from their houses, there are also other houses, about five (5) of them, located in
their locality. The mango trees were already allocated by his mother to each and every child. One of his brothers
transferred residence to Compostela abandoning the mango trees allocated to him. Accused-appellant took over
the said mango trees and sprayed them with chemicals. However, Sergio Agua also sprayed them and accusedappellant chided him. This made his brother-in-law angry who pulled out his bolo. Thereafter, he told accusedappellant to "beware". After that incident, accused-appellant and Sergio no longer talked about the mango trees.
Aside from this, accused-appellant and Sergio also had a disagreement regarding the five (5) hectares of land
owned by the latters mother. Sergio wanted it divided but accused-appellant objected since he has other
siblings who are still single. Sergio got mad and again threatened accused-appellant to "beware"[.]
12

The Decision of the RTC

In a Decision dated October 18, 2005, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime charged. The trial
court gave credence to the testimony of AAA, finding the same frank, candid, and straightforward. In contrast,
the trial court rejected the accused-appellants defenses of denial and alibi since the same were not
corroborated even by the testimony of his mother, Luisa Paras. The latter merely testified on an alleged feud

55

between the accused-appellant and Sergio Agua, who happened to be the employer of AAA. The RTC
sentenced the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, this Court finds the guilt of the accused DEMOCRITO PARAS to
have been proved beyond peradventure of a reasonable doubt and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of P50,000.00 by way of
compensatory damages plus the amount of P100,000.00 as and for moral damages.
13

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the RTC in a Decision dated February 2, 2010. The
appellate court affirmed the trial courts appreciation of AAAs testimony, which was held to be steadfast and
unyielding throughout the direct and cross-examinations. The testimony of Luisa Paras on the alleged
misunderstanding between the accused-appellant and Sergio Agua was found to be insufficient to overturn the
candid testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-appellant as the malefactor. The Court of
Appeals also brushed aside the accused-appellants arguments of alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in
AAAs testimony, i.e., that AAA could recall the details of the rape but not the birth date of her child and the name
of her neighbor, that AAA did not seize the opportunities given her to save herself, and that the supposed date of
the rape was not clearly established by the prosecution evidence. The appellate court ruled that said
inconsistencies were on inconsequential matters that did not bear upon the essential elements of the crime of
rape. The Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated October 18, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
29, Toledo City, in Criminal Case No. TCS-2729 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
As modified, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape as defined
and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 only as moral damages plus exemplary damages in the amount
ofP25,000.00. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 stands.
14

The Ruling of the Court

The accused-appellant again appealed his case to this Court, arguing that the trial court erred in convicting him
of the crime charged even if his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
15

The appeal lacks merit.

As the accused-appellant was charged to have committed the rape "in March 1996 or for sometime subsequent
thereto," the applicable provision of the law in this case is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The relevant
portions of said statutory provision read:
16

17

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
xxxx

56

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of rape by having
carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The courts a quo relied on the
testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse.
After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the Court finds that AAA was indeed categorical and
consistent in her testimony that the accused-appellant was the one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly
had sexual intercourse with her. We, thus, see no reason to disturb the lower courts appreciation of the
credibility of AAAs testimony. People v. De Guzman teaches that:
18

In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses
and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that
sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The
record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush
of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or
the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in
confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if
tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the
case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.
The Court likewise upholds the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the inconsistencies pointed out by the
accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA, namely, her inability to remember the birth date of her child and the
name of her neighbor, did not destroy her credibility as a witness. These details had nothing to do with the
essential elements of rape, that is, carnal knowledge of a person through force or intimidation. As held in People
v. Maglente :
19

Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for
acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do not affect the credibility of
witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of
time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may even suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth
and have not been rehearsed. (Citations omitted.)
Before the Court of Appeals and this Court, the accused-appellant also capitalized on the findings of Dr. Pilapil that
AAA was already three months pregnant when she was examined on October 7, 1996. If that were the case, the
accused-appellant argued that AAA could have had sexual intercourse sometime in June or July 1996 and not in
March 1996 when the rape was supposed to have been committed. We find that the Court of Appeals correctly
rejected this contention. We had occasion to state in People v. Adora 20 that "authorities in forensic medicine agree that
the determination of the exact date of fertilization is problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty
in determining the actual normal duration of pregnancy." At any rate, we ruled in People v. Bejic 21 that:
Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered
by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the
victim in a truthful manner. (Citation omitted.)
Anent the alleged failure of AAA to defend herself despite having many opportunities to do so, we are not persuaded.
Were iterated in Sison v. People22 that:
[P]eople react differently under emotional stress. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a
shocking incident, especially if the assailant is physically near. The workings of the human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable. In a given situation, some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be

57

frozen into silence. Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or shout for help at the very first opportunity
cannot be construed consent to the sexual intercourse. (Citations omitted.)
Finally, the accused-appellants defenses of denial and alibi also fail to convince the Court. Given that the accusedappellant failed to support the same with strong evidence of his lack of guilt, said defenses cannot prevail over the
positive identification of AAA.
All told, the accused-appellant failed to show that the RTC and the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexually abusing AAA. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. In this case, the accused-appellants use of a gun in the commission of the rape against AAA was
both specifically alleged in the information and proven during the trial of the case. Considering that there was neither
any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua
was properly imposed.23
As to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals properly imposed the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages. On the award of exemplary damages, the same is increased from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence.24
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated February 2, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR.-H.C. No. 00465. The accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
one count of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellant is ORDERED to
pay AAA Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages
awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

58