FELIPE V LEUTERIO [G.R. No.

L-4606 (May 30, 1952)]

Nature:
Special Civil Action
Ponente:Bengzon
Facts:
March 12, 1950: Benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in
Naga with 8 contestants and 5 judges (Felipe -chairman) where 1st
prize was awarded to Nestor Nosce and 2nd to Emma Imperial
Four days after, Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges
protesting the verdict, and alleging that one of the Judges had
committed a mathematical mistake which was refused. She then filed a
complaint in CFI.
The grades given by judges were tallied and the contestant receiving
the lowest number (1 was highest) got 1 st prize. Nosce and Imperial
both got the lowest number of 10. The chairman, with the consent of
the board, broke the tieawarding 1st honors to Nosce and 2nd to
Imperial.
For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms contained
blank spaces in which, after the names of the rival orators and their
respective orations, the judge could not jot down the grades he
thought the contestants deserved according to "Originality",
"Timeliness", "English", "Stage Personality", "Pronunciation and
Enunciation" and "Voice". From such data he made up his vote.
Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of 94 and therefore
should rank 3rd place in Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3 from
Rodriguez, her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten, with the
result that she copped first place in the speaking joust.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of
the board of judges of an oratorical competition
Held: NO
Rationale:
The important thing is Rodriguez' vote during and immediately after
the affair. His vote in Exhibit 3 definitely gave General place No. 3 and
Imperial place No. 4. His calculations recorded on Exhibit 3 were not
material. In fact the Chairman did not bother to fill out the blank
spaces in his own form, and merely set down his conclusions giving
one to Imperial, 2 to Benavides etc. without specifying the ratings for
"Voice", "English", "Stage Personality" etc. In other words what counted
was the vote.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the
Word apply the highest tenets of sportmanship: finally of the referee's
verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are

supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success by striving

their utmost: the prizes are SECONDARY.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because
theirs was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that
privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they
were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters
or referees or judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a
long period affords some reason for doubting the existence of the right
sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion must
have often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being
loath to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the
generally accepted views thereon.
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the
respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a
remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general
jurisdiction. The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that
Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at
all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong
do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal
principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a
contestant has NO right to the prize unless and until he or she is
declared winner by the board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are
instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or
malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then
her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges
who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other
judges.
Dispositive:
Reversed
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner vs. ROMEO A. JADER,
respondent.
FACTS:
Romeo Jader took his law proper at UE from 1984-88. During the first
semester of his last year in law school, he failed to take the
examination for Practice Court I in which he obtained an incomplete
grade. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade
given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988, which was approved
by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He
took the exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave him a
grade of 5.

His name was still on the tentative list of candidates for graduation.
Likewise, his named appeared in the invitation for the commencement
exercises, which was held on April 16, 1988. When he learnt of his
deficiency, he dropped from his Bar Review classes thereby made him
ineligible to take the bar exam.
He filed a civil suit against UE for damages because he suffered moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, and sleepless nights due to UEs negligence. The
petitioner denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to
believe that he completed the requirements for an LlB degree when his
name was included in the tentative list of graduating students. The
court ruled in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not UE be held liable for damages to the
respondent.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
The court ruled that the petitioners liability arose from its failure to
promptly inform the result of the examination and in misleading
respondent into believing that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation. However, while petitioner was guilty of
negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latters actual
damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded
moral damages. As a senior law student respondent should have been
responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those
pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of CA is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay the sum of Php 35, 470
with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of
the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Php 5000 as attorneys
fees and the cost of the suit. The award of moral damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COURT OF
APPEALS
43 SCRA 657 Civil Law Torts and Damages Human Relations
Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code Negligence
Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of
the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). However, at the end of the telegram were
the following:
The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto
sued RCPI for damages based on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code,
which provides:

ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Facts:
In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign
Loreto and that the attached message was an insider joke between
RCPI employees, which was not meant to be attached. RCPI also
disclaimed liability as it insisted it should be held liable for the libelous
acts of its employees.
Loreto however averred that his employees read the said message and
it affected greatly his business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor
of Loreto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
liability of RCPI is predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate
court. The cause of action of private respondent is based on Articles 19
and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as respondents breach of contract
thru negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not being sued for its
subsidiary liability.
RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary
steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident now
complained of. The company had not imposed any safeguard against
such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not
speak well of its concern for their clienteles interests. Negligence here
is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its
employees. RCPI should be held liable for the acts of its employees. As
a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its business through its
employees. It cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its
employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable directly for the acts of its
employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive the general public
availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy.
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X.
VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez arranged their marriage
to be held on September 4 of the same year. The bride-to-be has been
devoted with all the preparations for their wedding. However, two days
before their marriage, Paking left a note that they must postpone the
marriage for his mother was against it. A day before their wedding,
Paking wrote again that the wedding shall push through. Worse, Paking

did not show up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be publicly

humiliated.
The breach of promise to marry made by Velez prompted Wassmer to
file a civil suit against the former. Velez never filed an answer, thus,
awarding moral and exemplary damages to Wassmer.
Velez appealed on the court and stated that he failed to attend the
wedding day because of fortuitous events. He also insisted that he
cannot be civilly liable for there is no law that acts upon the breach of
promise to marry. He also contested the award of moral and exemplary
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral or exemplary damages may be awarded
in a breach of promise to marry suit.
HELD: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
Howver, Wassmer has already made preparations for the wedding.
Velezs failure to appear on the wedding day is contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy which is embodied on Article 21 of the
Civil Code. Under the law, the injured party is entitled to moral
damages as well as to exemplary damages because Velezs acted in
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner (Article 2232) in breaching his
promise to marry Wassmer.

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS

respondent
Facts:
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later
she became an insurance underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23
years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with each other. Since
1953, both had a refular intimate and sexual affair with each other. In
1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry
Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The next
month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named
Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to
recognize his daughter with Soledad and for damages due to

Franciscos breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The trial court

ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court and even increased the award of damages. The Court of
Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages because he
seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to
satisfy his sexual desires that being, the award of moral damages is
proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws
for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per
se. The Court of Appeals based its award of damages on Article 2219 of
the Civil Code which says in part that Moral damages may be
recovered from (3) Seduction, xxx However, it must be noted that
the Seduction being contemplated in the said Civil Code provision is
the same Seduction being contemplated in Article 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code. Such seduction is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of
criminal seduction) Soledad given the circumstances of this case.
Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a better job
experience and a better job overall than Francisco who was a mere
apprentice. Further still, it was admitted by Soledad herself that she
surrendered herself to Francisco and that she wanted to bind by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy.
ARTICLE/TOPIC:
ARTICLE 1352

Effect of Illegality of Cause

CASE TITLE:
BATARRA vs. MARCOS, 7 Phil. 156
CASE FACTS
:
G.R. No. 2929, December 7, 1906
FAUSTA BATARRA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO MARCOS,
defendant-appellant
Facts:
This is about a trial upon a complaint filed by the plaintiff, before the
court, to recover damages for breach of promise of marriage by the
defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant inducing/impelling the plaintiff
to submit herself to sexual relation with him on account of such

promise of marriage. The judgment was entered in that court in favor

of the plaintiff for the sum of 500 pesos. The defendant excepted to
such judgment and has brought the case here by bill of exceptions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable?
DECISION:
No. The judgment of the court below is reversed and the defendant is
acquitted of the complaint, with costs of the first instance. No costs will
be allowed to either party in this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract, i.e. the promise of marriage with sexual
considerations, is valid?
DECISION:
No
RATIO DECIDENDI:
ARTICLE 1352, Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause,
produce no effect whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to
laws, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The said
promise of the marriage of the defendant to the plaintiff based upon
carnal connection is founded on an unlawful cause and therefore, void
and no action can be maintained by the woman against the man
thereof. In addition, ARTICLE 1306, The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. In this case, the cause (or
consideration) is immoral (contrary to morals)contrary to norms of
good and right conduct evolved in a community.
In addition, the Supreme Court have ruled out that the facts do not
show the commission seduction, as that crime is defined by Penal
Code, because it does not appear that the plaintiff was under 23 years
of age. The judgment cannot therefore, be based upon Article 449 of
Penal Code, which provides indemnification in cases of rape, seduction
and abduction. It cannot be maintained upon the proposition that the
defendant, having failed to perform his promise of marriage, is liable
for the breach of that contract and for damages resulting from his
seduction of the plaintiff, the carnal connection being the consideration
(cause) of the promise. If the criminal intercourse between the parties
was a crime or misdemeanor, the crime or misdemeanor was common
to both parties, and Article 1305 of the Civil Code prevents a recovery.
The same is true if the act did not constitute a crime or misdemeanor.
It was in any event an immoral act and the fault lay with both parties.
By the provisions of Article 1306 of the Civil Code, there can, is such a
case, be no recover by one against the other
Furthermore, nor can there be a recovery under the provisions of
Article 1902 of the Civil Code, A person who by any act or omission

causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be

obliged to repair the damage so done; for the plaintiff voluntarily
participated in the act
APOLONIO TANJANCO V. CA and ARACELI SANTOS
18 SCRA 994
Agreements prior to Marriage
Breach of promise to marry
December 17, 1996
FACTS:
About December 1997, Apolonio courted Arceli both of adult age. That
Apolonio expressed his undying love affection to Araceli also in due
time reciprocated the tender feelings, in consideration of Apolonio
promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Apolonios pleas
for carnal knowledge. Until December 1959, through his protestations
of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having
carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a
child. Araceli informed Aplolonio and pleaded with him to make good
his promises of marriage but instead of honoring his promises and
righting his wrong, Apolonio stopped and refrained from seeing Araceli
since about July, 1959 has not visited her and to all intents and
purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.
ISSUE:
Whether or not man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards
set forth in Art 21.
HELD:
No. Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual passion. The facts stand
out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, Araceli, a woman of
adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Apolonio, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the
idea of seduction. Hence, the courts conclude that no case is made
under Art. 21 of the Civil Code and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the CFI in dismissing the
complaint. The decision of CA is reversed and that of CFI is affirmed.
ART. 21.
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents. 219 SCRA
115

FACTS: Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for

damages against Gasheem Shookat, an Iranian Citizen, of breach of
promise to marry. She said that both of them agreed to marry after the
end of the school semester and the petitioner asked the approval of
her parents. She stated that the petitioner forced to live with him in his
apartments. Respondent was a virgin before she was forced to live with
the Iranian (petitioner). A week before she filed her complaint,
petitioner maltreated, assaulted and asked not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in
Bacolod City.
On the petitioners counterclaim, he said that he never
proposed marriage with the private respondent; he neither forced her
to live with him and he did not maltreat her but only told her to stop
from coming into his apartment because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport. He insisted that he
must be awarded for damages for he suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation due to the complaint of the private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is to be held liable for damages
for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. This court held that where a mans promise to marry is in fact
the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award
of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of fraud and deceit and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. Such act done by the
petitioner is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of
the country. The court ordered that the petition be denied with costs
against the petitioner.
Negotiable Instruments Case Digest:
ALLIED BANKING CORP. V. LIM SIO WAN (2008)
G.R. No. 133179
March 27, 2008
Lessons Applicable: Liabilities of the Parties (Negotiable Instruments
Law)

ALLIED BANK vs LIM SIO WAN (GR No. 133179)

FACTS:
The check was issued to Santos and deposited in the account
Upon
ISSUE:
HELD: ALLIED and METROBANK.
ALLIED:
Art. 1953
Art. 1980.
A
Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market placement,
is entitled to
Lim Sio Wan
The reason why the bank or institution which issued the check was
held partially liable for the amount of the
METROBANK:
When Metrobank indorsed the check in compliance with
THUS, ALLIED AND METROBANK ARE BOTH LIABLE.
60-40 ratio.
FCC: no participation in the negotiation
PRODUCERS