What is the "logic" in Buddhist logic?

By R. Lance Factor
Philosophy East and West
Volume 33,no.2 (April, 1983)
P.183-188
(C) by University of Hawaii Press

P.183
The history of Indian logic is usually divided into
three periods, Old Nyaaya (circa 250 B.C. ) ,
Buddhist logic (sixth century A.D.) and New Nyaaya.
The
Buddhist
logic
text,
Nyaayaprave`sa
(Introduction
to Logical
Methods) , had great
influence upon Indian and Chinese Buddhism and also
among
the
Jains.
As
a
pivotal
work, the
Nyaayaprave`sa has received critical attention from
historians of religion, philologists, philosophers,
and logicians. As with all advances in scholarship,
there is controversy over interpretation, but in the
case of Buddhist logic, the controversy cuts to the
very heart of the issue of whether Buddhist logic is
in any recognizable contemporary sense a "logic."
The received view holds that Buddhist logic bears
very close similarities to syllogistic forms and
that it can be represented and analyzed by standard
deductive
techniques.(1) A much different
and
opposing view has been argued by Professor Douglas
Daye in a series of papers. Daye maintains that "...
the descriptive utility of mathematical logic with
early Nyaaya texts has simply been overrated";(2)
that although the Nyaaya texts contain metalogical
rules
for
evaluating
the
"legitimacy
or
illegitimacy" of arguments, the distinction between
validity and invalidity does not apply;(3) that
Nyaaya models are not inferences but "formalistic
explanations"; and that "... Buddhist logic is not
deductive, nor can it be formally valid nor is it an
inference."(4)
The cumulative effect of these claims is to
assert that Buddhist logic is not a "logic" at all,
at least not in any sense which is recognized by
Western
philosophers.
There
is
a
radical
incompatibility between the Nyaaya methods of logic
and those of the Prior Analytics or Principia
Mathematica. Of course, there will be differences,
possibly very great differences, between any two
traditions so diverse as fourth century (B.C.)

Greece and sixth century (A.D.) India, but are we to

go so far as to say that the Nyaaya does not contain
inferences? The radical incompatibility thesis is, I
maintain, a mistake; moreover, it is a mistake which
can readily be uncovered by examining the typical
Nyaaya inference scheme. Of the notion that a Nyaaya
scheme
could be a
"formalistic
explanation"
without being an inference, I shall say very little
because I do not see how anything which functions as
an explanation could not involve inferences of some
kind or other. It is important to know whether the
Nyaaya scheme is deductive or not, and if it is,
whether all of its parts are essential to the
deduction. I will demonstrate that there are two
ways of reading the Nyaaya form: one which is
straightforwardly deductive and a second which is
best understood by what the American pragmatist,
C.S.
Peirce,
and
later
Norwood
Hanson,
call "retroduction."
To begin with, consider
example from the Nyaaya:(5)

this

representative

1. pak.sa (thesis) Sound is imprrmanrne

2. hetu (mark or Reason) property of being produced

Because

of

its

P.184
3.
4.
5.

d.r.s.taanta (Exemplification)--Whatever is
produced, is impermanent
sapak.sa (similar case)- As with a pot, and
so forth
vipak.sa (dissimilar case)- As (not with the
case) of space, and so forth

Tachikawa proposes the following scheme for what

he calls the "three-membered Indian syllogism:(6)
6.
7.
8.

There is property p in locus L

(because) there is property q (in L).
Wherever there is property q, there
property p, as in locus w

is

Clearly, if this schema is reversed, (8) and (7)

become premises for a valid deductive inference of
(6) as the conclusion. The reverse of our example
becomes an instance of modus ponens.
9.

d.r.s.taanta
Whatever is
impermanent.
10. hetu - Sound is created.
11. pak.sa - Sound is impermanent.

created

is

Why is this instance of modus ponens a matter of

dispute? The incompatibilists point out that the
relationship between the thesis (pak.sa) and the
justification (hetu) is always expressed in the
Sanskrit ablative case and that this relationship
cannot be represented or translated as the English
"therefore" (or ergo). Its best translation is
"because."
Thus, for
the incompatibilist, the

primary objection to identifying the Nyaaya scheme

as a deductive inference is the familiar one of
ordinary
language philosophers
who resist the
translation of expressions as `q because p' into `p
) q' on the grounds that the causal or explanatory
meaning
of
"because"
is
lost
in
the
truth-functional conditional.
This
objection
has force, but
one
must
distinguish
between
the
assertion
that
truth-functional connectives preserve or capture the
meaning
of `q because p' and the claim that
truth-functional
connectives
can
represent
a
deductive relationship between propositions within
the Nyaaya scheme. It is the latter which the
received view upholds: it is the former which the
incompatibilist vehemently opposes. The issue is not
joined, because surely one can maintain that there
is a deductive inference in the inversion Nyaaya
scheme without maintaining that it captures the
meaning of or even approaches synonymy with the
original. In sum, the issue between the received
view and the incompatibilist pivots on the former's
willingness to invert the Nyaaya form and read it as
a valid deduction and the latter's insistence that
the form cannot be so reversed without losing the
special relationship of the hetu. Given the merits
of both views and given the fact that both positions
are not explicit contradictories of one another,
there is a way to understand the Nyaaya scheme which
allows both sides to have their cake and eat it too.
I believe that the three-membered Nyaaya is best
understood
as
a
retroductivc
inference.
A
retroduction, as it has been described by C. S.
Peirce and
P.185
Norwood Hansonl is a pattern of reasoning which
leads from some phenomenon or perception to an
explanatory hypothesis of that phenomenon. Its form
is not truth-functional nor are the relationships of
that premises completely rulegoverned. Peirce said,
"It must be remembered that retroduction, although
hampered very little by logical rules, nevertheless,
is logical inference, asserting its conclusion only
problematically or conjecturally...."(7)
Retroduction does have a recognizable pattern,
and indeed it is very close to the three-membered
syllogism of Indian logic. Its form, according to
Peirce, is:
12. The surprizing fact Q is observed.
13.

But if P were true, Q would be a matter of

course.

14. Hence, there is reason to suspect

true.
As a schema, for retroduction we have:
(12') q

that P is

(13') q because p
(14')p
which is isomorphic with that of the Nyaaya (that
is, pak.sa, because hetu and d.r.s.taanta; hence
there is evidence for the pak.sa). The similarity
(sapak.sa) and dissimilarity (vipak.sa) cases serve
as further evidence in support of the explanatory
justification.
The philosopher of science, Norwood Hanson,
argued that retroduction was a "logic of discovery"
which led to deductive-nomological explanations.
Like Peirce, Hanson pointed out that the reversal of
a retroduction was a deductive inference 'q, q
because p', becomes 'p, if p, then q, hence q'. The
notion of reversal" or inverting" a retroduction is
not a technique or rule of formal logic, but rather
a simple psychological description of changing the
order of premises.
If the three-membered syllogism is retroduction
and
if
a
retroduction
is
part
of
a
retroductive-deductive pair, one should expect to
find internal evidence for the presence or absence
of a deductive fragment. To return to the Nyaaya and
its commentary on this three-membered syllogism, is
there
internal
evidence
to
treat
it as a
retroduction-cum-deduction? A crucial
point
of
philological interpretation is the function of the
ablative "because"
and the meaning of "hetu"
itself. The weakness of the standard view is that it
disregards the special features of the ablative
"because"
and
translates
the
three-membered
syllogism as if it contained conditionals. Following
Daye, I suggest that that move is too hasty, and
that we must regard the ablative "because" as an
operator connecting the hetu and d.r.s.taanta to the
thesis. Since the Sanskrit ablative expresses a
relation
of
physical
or conceptual
removal,
separation, distinction, or origin, it was used to
convey the notion of causal explanation. This fact
gives prima facie evidence for interpreting it in
the sense of "a reason for." Such an understanding
is reinforced by the meaning of "hetu," which is the
name of the explanatory part of the threeP.186
membered syllogism. According to Tachikawa, "hetu"
primarily means 'reason'.(8) This is solid ground
for reading 'q because p' as: 'p is the reason for
q', 'p is the explanatory hypothesis for q', or even
the Peircean 'if p were true, q would be a matter of
course'.
Beyond
points
of translation, one of the
strongest
reasons for seeing the three-membered
syllogism
of
the
Nyaayaprave`sa
as
a
retroduction-deduction
is the existence of the
five-membered
syllogism
in the earlier Nyaaya
tradition, particularly the Nyaaya Suutra.(9) The
five-membered syllogism of the Nyaaya Suutra is
perfectly symmetrical between its three initial

retroductive steps and its two culminating deductive

steps:
15. Thesis(pratij~naa)
for
fire on the mountain.

example, there

is

16. Reason (hetu)- The mountain smokes.

17. Exemplification
(d.r.s.taata) Wherever
there is smoke. there is fire, as (for
example) on the hearth in the kitchen.
18. Recapitulation of the reason (upanaya) - The
mountain smokes.
19. Conclusion (nigamana) There is fire on the
mountain.
If one were to picture this pattern as an isosceles
triangle, one side would represent the retroduction
from [15] the pratij~naa reasoning through the [16]
hetu to [17] the d.r.s.taanta, and the opposing side
of the triangle would represent
the deduction
beginning with [17] the d.r.s.taanta to [18] upanaya
and inferring the nigamana.
The French Indologist Rene Guenon pointed out
that after the appearance of the Nyaaya Suutra,
there were two abridged forms of the five-membered
syllogism, (10) in which either the first three
[15-17] or the last three [17-19] parts appeared
alone. Gutnon also pointed out that the latter
abridgment resembles the syllogism of Aristolle; the
former abridgment, of course, is precisely the one
found in the 6th century Nyaayaprave`sa and indeed
the same smoke-fire example occurs there also. Given
the interpretation
I have offered, it is not
surprising that there should be two abridgments of
the five-membered syllogism. One abridgment captures
the retroductive move; the second captures the
deductive move.
Deduction and retroduction are
inversions of one another, and they can be separated
by positioning the property-locus statement. One
abridgment reasons from the thesis statement to an
explanatory generalization; the other abridgment
deduces the thesis from the generalization. The
Buddhist logicians Mere quite emphatic about which
abridgment they favored. The Nyaaya quite explicitly
says, "We say that these three statements make the
members
of the syllogism
and no more! "(11)
Tachikwa's gloss on this statement indicates that it
is an assertion that only three statements are
necessary for an inference.
We may conclude that what "inference" primarily
meant to the Buddhist logicians was "reasoning to an
explanatory causal hypothesis"; however, it would be
wrong
to further
conclude
that they had no
appreciation of the
P.187

deductive abridgment. To them logic was a means of

bringing others to a recognition
of particular
statements; it was an upaaya, a heuristic teaching
device.
The
retroductive
abridgment
of
the
five-membered syllogism clearly teaches in the sence
that it brings the hearer to an awareness of a causal
or conceptual connection. The deductive abridgment
does not "teach" in this sense because like all
deductions
its
conclusion
does
not
contain
information nor already found in the premises, Thus,
from the standpoint of an upaaya the retroductive
inference is enough, or, as the author of the
Nyaayaprave`sa put it, "...these three members make
the [retroductive] syllogism and no more."
A further point in favour of reading the Nyaaya
inference schema as a retroduction is that it makes
the remainder of the manual on logical methods,
especially
the detailed
sections on kinds of
fallacies, more intelligible and enljghtening. More
than two thirds of the text covers identification
and classification of fallacies, but none bear any
resemblance to the formal fallacies of deduction
such as affirming the consequent or denying the
antecedent, nor does the system resemble Western
notions of an informal fallacy.
Fallacies
of
irrelevance such as the ad hominem or post hoc
propter hoc call attention to the lack of support
between premises
and putative
conclusion.
In
Buddhist logic the classification of fallacies does
not attempt to circumscribe the ways premises can be
irrelevant; on the contrary it fives criteria for
grading the strength or weakness of the explanatory
hypotheses. This is precisely what is required for
retroductive accuracy. Weak hypotheses emerge in
three circumstances: (1) the hetu is unrecognized by
proponent or opponent, (2) the hetu is inconclusive,
or (3) it is contradicted. Inconclusive hetus are
those which are not supported by further evidence
from
the similarity
and dissimilarity
cases;
contradicted
hetus are those which
prove the
opposite of the pak.sa. Such a contradiction is
established by deducing the opposite property-locus
assertion. A hetu can fail to be recognized, that
is, it can fail as a teaching device by not making
the auditor (or speaker) aware of the connection
between the assertion statement and its warranting
hetu. Thus, when hypotheses fail to be understood,
they engender fallacies of recognition, but when they
fail in evidential support they engender fallacies
of contradiction or inconclusivity. On the whole,
this
classification
of fallacies
reflects
a
sophisticated, but also a commonsensical, means of
evaluating hypotheses. It is open textured as
retroductive reasoning must be, and more importantly
it does not attempt (as the Western notion of fallac
does) to classify fallacious reasoning as a kind of
deductive argument gone awry.
In this paper I have attempted to enlarge the
dialogue about the nature of Buddhist logic by
arguing that it is essentially retroductive. As
philosophers
and
psychologists
continue
to

investigate the conceptual and factual aspects of

hypothesis formation, the study of Buddhist logic
will increase in importance because, unlike other
logical
treatises, the
Nyaayaprave`sa
is
an
historyically significant document about ways of
reasoning
and
misreasoning
to an explanatory
hypothesis.
P.188
NOTES
1. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Material for the Study
of Navya-Nyaya Logic, Harvard Oriental Series, vol.
40 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951);
Hajime Nakamura, "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means
of Symbolic Logic," Indogku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu 7
(1958) :
375-395;
J.
F.
Staal,
"Means
of
Formalization of Indian and Western Thought," Logic,
Metlzodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings
of the XIIth International Congress of Philosophy,
Venice, 1958;
H.
Kitagawa, "A
Note
on the
Methodology in the Study of Indian Logic," Indogaku
Bukkyogaku
Kenkyu 8 (1960) : 380-390;
S.
S.
Barlingay, A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic
(Delhi: National
Publishing
House, 1965) : A.
Charlene S. McDermott, An Eleventh-Century Buddhist
Logic
of "Exists, " Foundations
of Language,
Supplementary Series, vol. 2 (Dordrecht, Holland: D.
Reidel, 1970); B. K. Matilal, The Navya-Nyaaya
Doctrine of Negation, Harvard Oriental Series, vol.
46 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1968): and
particularly Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in
Indian Philosophical
Analysis, Janua Linguarum,
Series Minor, 111 (Mouton: The Hague, 1971).
2. Douglas Daye, "Metalogical Incompatibilities
In the Formal
Description
of Buddhist
Logic
(Nyaaya)," Notre Dame Journal of Logic 28, no. 2
(1977): 231.
3. Douglas Daye, "Empirical Falsifiability and
the Frequence of Dar`sana Relevance in the Sixth
Century Buddhist Logic of Sankaravamin," Logique et
Analyse 86 (June 1979): 221.
4. Douglas Daye, Comparative Issues in Buddhist
and Angle-European
Formal
Logics
(unpublished
manuscript), p. 121.
5. Musashi Tachikawa, trans., "A Sixth Century
Manual
of Indian Logic (the Nyaayaprave`sa) ,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, no. 2 (1971): 114.
6. Ibid., p. 115, Norwood R. Hanson, Patterns of
Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1958), pp. 93-105.
"Is There A Logic of Discovery," Current Issues
in Philosophy of Science, edited by H. Fergland and
G. Maxwell (New York: Holt-Rinehart & Winston,
1961), pp. 20-35. Also Aristotle, Prior Analytics II,
25.

7. C. S. Peirce, Collected Works (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1933), vol. 1, p. 188.
Also vol. 6, pp. 522-28.
8. Tachikawa, p. 116.
9.
A. B. Keith,
(Oxford: 1921), p. 21.
Suutra at 200-450 A.D.

Indian Logic and Atomism

The author dates the Nyaaya

10. Rene Guenon, Introduction generale a l'etude

des doctrines hindous(Paris: 1930), pp. 226-227.
11. Tachikawa, p. 122.