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The petitioner calls upon the court to subject all laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, executive orders, and administrative orders being enacted to be published first in the Official
Gazette as well as a fifteen day period before said law can be made valid in accordance to Article 2 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official Gazette is a requirement for its
For the people to have a reasonable amount of time to learn about certain laws or decrees being enacted
by their government, sufficient appropriation of time and publication is necessary. According to Article 2 of
the Civil Code, all laws must be given 15 days upon its publication in the Official Gazette for itto be
enacted. This is to give sufficient time for the people to learn of such laws as well as to respect their right to
be informed. The respondents however brought up the fact that the Official Gazette may not be the most effective
medium for the people to be educated of certain new laws given its erratic publication dates as well as its
limited number of readers, with lieu of more potent mediums of instructions such as newspapers of
general circulation because of its wide readership and regular dates of printing. The court nevertheless
rules that such periodicals are not what is required by the Civil Code and such amendments are left to the
legislative branch of the government. Having said this, the court finds in favor of publishing all laws,
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, executive orders, and administrative orders
with a 15 day leeway, or unless stated, for them to take into effect.
Phil Veterans Bank Employees vs. Vega
In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the
Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila, Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB Employees Union
filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.
On January 2, 1992, R.A. 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) was signed into law by then Pres.
Corazon Aquino and was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. This law sought the
rehabilitation of the PVB which means that Congress mandated that the PVB be not dissolved.
However, the liquidation judge, Judge Benjamin Vega, did not immediately stop the liquidation
proceeding. In fact he went on with it.
When questioned, Vega argued that R.A. 7169 did not immediately take effect and that it only took effect
15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or on March 10, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Benjamin Vega is correct.
HELD: No. R.A. 7169 provides in its effectivity clause that:
Sec. 10. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
As a rule, laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. However, the legislature has the authority to
provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided. Hence, it is clear that the
legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No.
7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law
became effective on said date.

Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then
it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official
Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992.

Cawaling vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806which
created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.On August 16,
2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "ActCreating The City Of
Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province
Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of
Bacon andSorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed
the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite.Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present
petition for certiorariseeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:A. The December
16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval
of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; andB. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal
requirement of twenty (20) day extensive informationcampaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No.
8806 unconstitutional ,contending, inessence, that:1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging
two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local GovernmentCode of 1991 (in relation to
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipalityor a cluster of
may be converted into a component city"; and2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a)
creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolitionof the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby
violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed bySection 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city
may be created only byconverting "a municipality or a cluster of
," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806has done.
(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.(2) WON there exist a
"compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order tocreate the City of
Sorsogon(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1),
Article VI of theConstitution(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase
"Amunicipality or a cluster of
Barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simplyone of the
M o d e s by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the
Merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay
in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local
government unit through a division or a m e r g e r of existing local government units is
recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division
shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
Alalayan vs. NPC

In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred
Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was passed. This
law amended the charter of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043 provides
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said
provision.They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title of the
amending law nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to
increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3 was not germane to
RA 3043.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire
into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
Tolentino vs. Sec of finance
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the
House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1 st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in
that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the
HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated
in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must
come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own
version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns
a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to
adopt his over what has been done.

[G.R. No. 127686. July 23, 1998]
FACTS: Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled Adoption of Computerized IdentificationReference System on the
following grounds:
1.) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law and not amere administrative
order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress tomake laws, and
2.) It impermissibly intrudes the citizens constitutional right of privacy.
ISSUE: Does the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right toprivacy?
HELD: Yes, the Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because
its scope is too broad and vague that will put peoples right to privacy in clear and
present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the
information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and
other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enableunscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the rightagainst selfincrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures

Dar vs. Sutton

This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision
andResolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,respectively,
which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and voidfor being violative of
the Constitution.
The case involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been
devotedexclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing
agrarianreform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)
their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as theComprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coveragefarms used for raising
livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an
en banc
decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, theCourt ruled that lands devoted to livestock and
poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land and declared as unconstitutional
certain provisions of the CARL insofar as theyincluded livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of this, respondents filed withpetitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their
landholding was devotedexclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate,
inspectedrespondents' land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding.
Herecommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS andrequested
the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored such

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portionsof
private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15,1988 shall be
excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to beexcluded, the A.O. fixed
the following retention limits,
: 1:1 animal-land ratio and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of
cattle shall likewise be excludedfrom the operations of the CARL.

On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as finaland
irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entirelandholding is
exempted from the CARL.

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partiallygranting the
application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying theretention limits outlined
in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for grazing purposes,
and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure.Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents'
landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, contending that their entire landholding should beexempted as
it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Said motion was denied. Respondentsfiled a notice of appeal
with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and
validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock indetermining
the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s.
1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising landsexcluded from the coverage of
agrarian reform. The OP affirmed the impugned order. On appealto CA, the CA ruled in favor of
respondents and declared A.O. No. 9, Series of 1993 as void.
Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum retention
for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional?
The impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulatelivestock
farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximumretention limit for
their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 ConstitutionalCommission show a clear intent to
inter alia,
all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms
case that livestock, swine andpoultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or
treefarming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in
thisenterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures andfacilities,
drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts andgenerators,
extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipmentlike bio-gas and
digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevatedwater tanks,
pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenance.

Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by theConstitution
from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing theassailed A.O.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute byCongress
without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of theprevious law. On the
other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after

the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881which amended certain provisions of the
CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definitionof the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial
farming" by dropping from its coverage landsthat are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swineraising. With this significantmodification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian
laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage
of agrarianreform.

It is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of
theConstitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform toand be
consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order andthe provisions of
the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR wasproperly stricken down as
unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyondthe scope intended by the 1987
St. Martin Funeral vs. NLRC
G.R. 130866
September 16, 1998
295 SCRA 494
Regalado, J.:
Respondent Aricayos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. There being no
employer-employee relationship between the two, petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Arcayos
appealed to NLRC cotending errors of the labor arbiter.
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over NLRC appeals?
First established in 1972, decisions of NLRC were declared to be appealable to the Secretary of
labor and, ultimately to the President. But under the present state law, there is no provision for appeals
from NLRC decisions. The court held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts
of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though not right of review is given by statute,
that the purpose of jurisdiction review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that is part of the checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust jurisdictions.
Subsequently under RA 7902, effective March 1995, the mode for judicial review over NLRC
decisions in that of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The same confuses by declaring that the CA
has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of SC, including the
NLRC decisions.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of BP 129 to supposed appeals from NLRC
to SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. All
such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as appropriate
forum for the relief desired.
Case remanded to CA.