#12

Kapunan vs Court of Appeals

Facts: The petitioners, Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi charges with the killing of KMU
Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver Leonor Alay-ay.
On June 1986 Olalia and Alay-ay dead body was found. The murder case of Olalia is a
controversial case during that time, Oliala is a profile individual being the Chairman of the KMU
at the time of his death..
On Nov. 1998, private respondents Feliciano Olalia and Perlina Alay-ay, filed a complaint letter to
Department of Justice for the alleged complex kidnapping and killing of Olalia and Alay-ay
against Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi and other men and officers of Phil. National Police
and the AFP.
Sec. Serafin Cuevas, the Secretary of Department of Justice, created a Panel that were tasked to
conduct a preliminary investigation of Olalia case.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss in Department of Justice on the ground that the Amnesty
granted to them by the National Amnesty Commission extinguishes their criminal liability under
Proclamation 347 issued by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos entitled, Granting of Amnesty to the rebels,
insurgents and all other persons, who may or may be committed crimes against public order and
crimes committed in furtherance of political ends.
The petitioners filed a motion for certiorari.
Issues: Whether or not the amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi, extinguishes their criminal
liability in Olalia case?
Held/Ruling:
The Panel created by the Department of Justice refused to consider the defense of Amnesty of
the petitioners on the ground that the document presented pertaining to the Amnesty failed to
show that the Olalia murder case was one of the crimes for which the amnesty was applied for.
The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition, finding no grave of abuse of discretion on the
Panel created by the DOJ, The Appelate Court refused to rule on the applicability of Amnesty
issued to Kapunan and Legapi.
Finally the Supreme court s dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the Amnesty
granted to Kapunan and Legaspi pertains only to the crimes against rebellion and not covered
crime of murder Olalia and Alay-ay case.
PURPOSE OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

The admission that human institution are imperfect and that there are infirmities in the
administration of justice and executive clemency is an instrument for correcting these
infirmities and for mitigating whatever harness might be generated by a too strict
application of the laws.

THE POWER OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IS NON-DELEGABLE POWER AND MUST BE

EXERCISE BY THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

Cannot be granted before conviction

Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment
Cannot be granted for violation of election laws, rules and regulations without the
favourable recommendation of COMELEC
Granted of amnesty must be with the concurrence of the majority of all members of the
Congress

PARDON NATURE AND LEGAL EFFECTS

Pardon is an act of grace or an act of pure generosity of the executive and he can give or
withdraw it before the Pardon is completed. No legal power can compel the executive in
giving the Pardon. Pardon requires acceptance for the protection of the welfare of the
recipient.
Looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is abolishes or forgives the punishment for the reason it does not

work the restoration of the rights to hold public office or right of suffrage unless the rights
expressly restored by the pardon.
When the pardon is full, in the eye of the law the person is innocent and as if never
committed the offense, it makes him, as it were, a new man and gives him a new credit
and capacity.

Effects:

It does not absolve civil liabilities for an offense

Does not restore public offices already forfeited, although eligibility

AMNESTY- grant of general pardon to a class of political offenders either after conviction or
even before the charges are filed.
OTHER FORMS OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
1. Reprieves
2. Commutations
3. Remission of Fines and forfeitures
A reprieve postpones the execution of an offense to a future day certain
commutation is a remission of a part (or a cutting short) of the punishment; a substitution of a
lesser penalty for the one originally imposed. (People v. Vera)
Remission of fines and forfeitures entails non-collection of money or property lawfully
adjudged but it does not have the effect of returning property already in the legal possession of
the government or a third person.

Parole" refers to the conditional release of an offender from a correctional institution after he has served the minimum of
his prison sentence;
"Executive Clemency" refers to Reprieve, Absolute Pardon, Conditional Pardon with or without Parole Conditions and
Commutation of Sentence as may be granted by the President of the Philippines;
Reprieve" refers to the deferment of the implementation of the sentence for an interval of time; it does not annul the
sentence but merely postpones or suspends its execution;
"Commutation of Sentence" refers to the reduction of the duration of a prison sentence of a prisoner;
"Conditional Pardon" refers to the exemption of an individual, within certain limits or conditions, from the punishment
which the law inflicts for the offense he had committed resulting in the partial extinction of his criminal liability;
Absolute Pardon" refers to the total extinction of the criminal liability of the individual to whom it is granted without any
condition. It restores to the individual his civil and political rights and remits the penalty imposed for the particular
offense of which he was convicted;
"Petitioner" refers to the prisoner who applies for the grant of executive clemency or parole;
"Parolee" refers to a prisoner who is released on parole;
"Pardonee" refers to a prisoner who is released on conditional pardon;
"Client" refers to a parolee/pardonee who is placed under supervision of a Probation and Parole Officer;

#13 http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/dec2000/gr_135385_2000.html
http://jeanneguian.blogspot.com/2014/10/gr-no-135385-case-digest.html
G.R. No. 135385 Case Digest
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa
vs National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Facts:
Petitioners view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over
natural resources to indigenous peoples. They argue that IPRA and its implementing rules will
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources, in violation of the regalian doctrine of the Constitution.
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Notes:
Puno: "When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical
concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural
precepts on state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law
cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This
Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all,
the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the constitutional mandate of protecting the
indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave
historical injustice to our indigenous people."
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which
traces its origin to native title.
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous
societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social
and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited
the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on
two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural
welfare.
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by

themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group

ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not
limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, widen farms and tree lots."
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two
modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands
and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.
Article 12
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or
it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands
and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according
to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may
lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by
purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of forest
lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest
lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law.
The Congress shall provide for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in
endangered forests and watershed areas.

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies
and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common
good so demands.
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
#14 http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/apr2005/gr_139325_2005.html
http://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2015/02/mijares-v-ranada.html
G.R. No. 139325

April 12, 2005

Lessons Applicable: In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:

May 9 1991: a complaint was filed by ten Filipino citizens representing a class of 10,000
members who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention,
torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime with the United
States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate)
US District Court and Affirmed by US CA: awarded them $1,964,005,859.90
Petitioners filed Complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment
Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct
filing fees paying only P410
Petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of
pecuniary estimation
RTC: estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately P472 and dismissing the
case without prejudice
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

ISSUE: W/N the enforcement of a foreign judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation

HELD: NO. (But belongs to "other actions not involving property") petition is GRANTED.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in
personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the
thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of
a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title
However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts
on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the
enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the
purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the

presumption of its validity. Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body,
the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.
There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the
enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned
the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential
difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. Extensive litigation is thus
conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the
other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign
judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of
jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact
or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal
systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of
preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard
against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by neverending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the
Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: "rest and quietness." If every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.
Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of
a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts
The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus
placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. It is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving
as it does, "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of
filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a
clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.

#15 http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_168338asg_2008.html
http://philippineconstitutionallawdigests.blogspot.com/2012/02/francisco-chavez-vs-raul-m-gonzalesand.html
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)
PUNO, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes
involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and
Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters
that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held
liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes
were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations found to have caused
the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government
like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use
their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The
NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci taped conversations by radio
and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster
sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among
others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled
responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and
the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
II.

THE ISSUES

1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a
form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as
against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the minority) in
granting the petition insofar as respondent Secretary Gonzalezs press statement was concerned.
Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ.
Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in the minority) in granting the
same insofar as NTCs press statement was concerned.]
1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally
to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech
and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. [T]he great evil which
government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the antiwiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary
showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an
altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the
wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the
wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable
whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kindsand doubtless, some of them
provide norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a persons private
comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their
violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In
fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging
whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the
violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by
the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the
press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to
determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be
misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously
prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to
prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a
preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to
offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the
exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the antiwiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced
in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were
made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent
Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the
regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an
act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official
circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result
in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are
acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right
to free speech and press.

#16 http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169838_2006.html
http://marxyaun.blogspot.com/2010/07/bayan-et-al-vs-eduardo-ermita-et-al-gr_10.html
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006 DIGEST
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines
and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in
on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a
public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails
the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place
of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful
cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by
the government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies
against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot
pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on
February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy
resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly
those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of
September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically

Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes
a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the
press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights
represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional
rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in of
grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of
the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of
the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate
compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of
at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty
(30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit
shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza
in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore,
Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of
maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it
and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED
in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED