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1 INTRODUCTION
As many modem maintenance practices, the reliability centered maintenance (RCM) concept originated within the aircraft industry. RCM has now been applied with considerable
success for more than 20 years; Iirst within the aircraft
industry, and later within the military forces, the nuclear
power industry, the offshore oil and gas industry, and
many other industries. Experiences from these industries
show significant reductions in preventive maintenance (PM)
costs while maintaining, or even improving, the availability
of the systems.
According to the Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) RCM is:
a systematic consideration of system functions, the
way functions can fail, and a priority-based consideration of safety and economics that identifies
applicable and effective PM tasks.
The main focus of RCM is therefore on the systemfuncdons, and not on the system hardware.
Traditional maintenance plans are often based on a combination of recommendations from manufacturers, legislation and company standards, and-to a minor extentmaintenance models and data (see Fig. 1).
Many companies are faced with laws and regulations
related to personnel safety and environmental protection
that set requirements to their maintenance strategies. The
oil companies operating in the Norwegian sector of the
North Sea are, for example, required to test well barriers
according to regulations by the Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate.
*Author to whom correspondence
marvin.rausand@protek.ntnu.no
122
M. Rausand
Legislation and
company standards
.
;_--________________-___
I1
Malntsnancs
)1
8
I
i
models and data
L__________
__----____J
Manufacturers
rscommendations
.
Maintenance
tasksartdintatws
2 WHAT IS RCM?
RCM is a technique for developing a PM program. It is
based on the assumption that the inherent reliability of the
equipment is a function of the design and the build quality.
An effective PM program will ensure that the inherent reliability is realized. It cannot, however, improve the reliability
of the system. This is only possible through redesign or
modification.
The application of PM is often misunderstood. It is easy
to erroneously believe that the more an item is routinely
maintained, the more reliable it will be. Often the opposite
is the case, due to maintenance-induced failures.
RCM was designed to balance the costs and benefits, to
obtain tbe most cost-effective PM program. To achieve this,
the desired system performance standards have to be specified. PM will not prevent all failures, and therefore the
potential consequences of each failure must be identified
and the likelihood of failure must be known. PM tasks are
chosen to address each failure by using a set of applicability
and effectiveness criteria. To be effective, a PM task must
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Study pillion
System selection and definition
Functional failure analysis (PPA)
Critical item selection
Data collection and analysis
PMECA
Selection of rn~nten~~e actions
~te~in~ion
of maintenance intervals
Preventive maintenance comparison analysis
Treatment of non-critical items
Implementation
In-service data collection and updating
123
hf. Ruusand
Protectivefunctions - The functions intended to protect
people, equipment and the environment. An example of a
pmtective function is the pmtection provided by a prossum
safety valve on a pressure vessel.
The next step is a functional failure analysis (RFA) to identify and describe the potential system failure modes. In most
of the RCM references the system failure modes are denoted
Znte~ace~tio~
These fu~ons
apply to the interfaces between the item in question and other items. Tbe
interfaces may be active or passive. A passive interface is
for example present when an item is a support or a base for
another item.
Supetjhousjknctions - According to Moubray4: Items
or components are sometimes encountered which are
completely superfluous, This usually happens when
equipment was modified frequently over a period of years,
or when new equipment has been overspecified.
SuperiIuous functions are sometimes present when the
item was designed for an operational context that is different
from the actual operational context. In some cases failures
of a superfluous function may cause failure of other
functions.
The various functions may also be classified as follows.
On-line ~~~~~
- These are functions operated either
continuously or so often that the user has current knowledge
about their state. The termination of an on-line function is
called an evident failure.
Q&line functions - These. are functions that are used
intermittently or so infrequently that their availability is not
known by the user without some special check or test. An
example of an off-line function is the essential function of
an emergency shutdown (EBD) system. The te~ination of
an off-line function is called a hidden failure.
fu~tio~Z failures.
An important type of failures is the so-called aging failures, i.e., failures whose probability of occurrence increases
with time, as a result of processes inherent in the item17.
Aging failures are also called weurout failures.
The aging failure is sometimes a gradual failure, meaning
that the performance of the item is gradually drifting out of
the specified range. In other cases the aging failure will be
sudden. The inherent resistance of the item may gradually
be reduced until a failure occurs. The performance of the
item may in such cases be perfect until the failure occurs.
The functional failures may be recorded on a specific
FFA work-sheet, which is rather similar to a standard
FMECA work-sheet. An example of an FFA work-sheet is
shown in Fig. 2.
In the first column of Fig. 2 the various operational modes
of the system are recorded. For each o~~~on~ mode, all
the relevant system functions are recorded in column 2. The
performance requirements to each function, like target
values and acceptable deviations are listed in column 3.
For each system function (in column 2) all the relevant
functional failures are listed in column 4. In columns 5-8
a criticality ranking of each functional failure in that particular operational mode is given, The reason for including
the criticality ranking is to be able to limit the extent of the
further analysis by ~s~g~~ng insigni~c~t functional failures. For complex systems such a screening is often very
important in order not to waste time and money.
The criticality must be judged on the plant level, and
should be ranked in the four consequence classes:
0 S: Safety of personnel
0 E: Environmental impact
c-w
Fig. 2. Example of an
l
l
FFA worksheet.
A: Production availability
C: Material loss (costs)
125
l
l
In many cases the failure rate will be an increasing function of time, indicating that the item is deteriorating. In other
cases the failure rate may be decreasing, indicating that the
item is improving. There are also cases where the failure
rate is decreasing in one time interval and increasing in
another. For repairable systems, the situation may be even
more complex with a time de~ndent rate of occurrence of
failures (rocof)t5.
Several life models are available. Among these are;
the Weibull distribution, the lognormal distribution, the
Bimbaum-Saunders distribution, and the inverse Gaussian
distribution15. All of these distributions are rather flexible,
and may be used for detailed modeling of specific failure
mechanisms. However, for most applications the class of
Weibull distributions is sufficiently flexible to be the preferred dis~bution. In the rest of this article we will therefore
assume that the time to failure follows a two-parameter
Weibull distribution with shape parameter cx and scale
parameter @15.In some cases the value of the shape parameter (Y may be estimated based on knowledge about the
relevant failure mechanisms, i.e., based on expert judgment.
The operational and reliability data are collected from
available operating experience and from external files
where reliability information from systems with similar
design and operating conditions may be found (e.g., data
banks, data h~d~ks,
field data from own data storage,
rn~uf~~r~s
r~ommendations). The external information available should be considered carefully before it is
used, because such information is generally available at a
rather coarse level.
In some situations there is a complete lack of reliability
data. This is the fact when developing a maintenance program
for new systems. The maintenance program development
M. Rausand
126
that an equipment failure will give the worst case outcome. To obtain a numerical probability measure-, a system
model is required. This will often be inappropriate at this
stage of the analysis, and a descriptive measure may be used.
MlTF
upon demand.
Failure mode
Failure cause
Function
For each operational mode, the MS1 may have several functions. A function of a standby pump is for example to start
Reliability
centered muintenance
Failure mechanism
127
%IUlTF
The MITF was entered on an MS1 failure mode level. It is
also interesting to know the (marginal) MITF for each failure mechanism. To simplify, a per cent is given, and the
(marginal) MTTF may be calculated for each failure
mechanism. The BMTTF will obviously only be an
approximation since the effects of the various failure
mechanisms usually are strongly interdependent.
Failure characteristic
measure
maintenance interval
In this column the interval between consecutive maintenance tasks is given. The length of the interval is determined
in Step 8.
Step 7: Sektion
of Maintenance Actions
128
M. Rausand
Performance
4
100%
0%
Thea&lelII0 befom
Fii
4. P-F curve.
Reliability
centered maintenance
129
.
Is aging Qmamemr
Yes
lo overhaul
(x,1?
feasible?
No
YW
Is the functiin
hiin?
No
m7p
I------
-----I
Nodal
:
found
I
L--___-____-I
;
1
it must be applicable
it must be effective
M. Rausand
130
more isolation
the researchers
A number of
between theory
Relia~ili~
ce~ered
5 DISCUsslON
A high number of dif%rent apptoaches to maintenance are on
the market. It is generally difficult for the plant agent
to decide whether RCM is mom beneficii than for example
(TP?vQ2-? The decision is
Total Productive Map
very important since the in~~n
of a new ~n~n~~
plamring system, like RCM and TPM, will imply a sig~fic~t
cost, and it may take several years before the benefits from the
new system 0~~~s
the initial costs. This interval is, for
example, claimed to be ~~x~~ly
2 years for RCM.
A consequence of inducing
RCM will usually be to
carry out a ~ndamen~l re-evaluation of a wide range of
system support aspects, like training, spares, workshop facilities etc. In the defense area, a policy regime has grown up
during the last 20 years, embracing both system support and
RCM. This regime is called Integrated Logistic Support (ILS)
and is supported e.g., by military standards30. A company
int~ucing RCM may later extend this system to ILS.
The success of RCM relies partly on the av~lability of
efficient and user-f~endly software; both general maintenance m~agement software (MMS), and more specialized
software, e.g., for FF+Aand FMECA, life data analysis, system analysis, and interval selection.
RCM-and the m~nten~ce discipline in general-has a
lot of challenges in the years to come. One of these challenges is connected to condition monitoring, a method that
has become increasingly popular during the last few years.
A lot of complex and expensive condition monitoring equipment has been installed, often without a sound scientific
basis. The ~lationship between a condition me~urement
and the rern~~ng time to failure is in many cases not
fully understood. It is, for example, not obvious that a
minor vibration of a pump is an vocation of a fo~~ming
pump failure. Condition monito~ng has without doubt
reduced the number of criticaf failures, but it is reason to
believe that it also has implied a fair amount of unnecess~
m~nten~ce - and, some of the condition monito~ng
equipment will in addition require substantial m~nten~ce.
These problems should be subject to more detailed research.
In practice it is often difficult to follow prescribed maintenance intervals (even if we are able to decide optimal
intervais in RCM). Failures of important equipment will
inevitably be given priority, delay long-planned activities,
and create a ba&Iog. This bac.kIog may add up and create a
occult
situation for the m~nten~ce dep~ment, and
destroy the whole RCM program.
Another probiem is how to integrate op~~nity
maintenance in an RCM pro~am. ~~~ni~
rn~n~n~ce is
discussed in the literature, e.g., by Dekker and Smeiti~3,
but it is still not obvious how to plan and integrate this
important type of maintenance with RCM.
The RCM approach presented in this articie was developed through extensive discussions with J$rn Vatn, and is
~in~e~nce
131
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&sign and operation pliability. ~~~n~e~e,
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13-21.
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6-12.
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~a~ge~~;
Part 3. I I: RCbl
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ht~:f/namo~~.nawc~.navy.mil.
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Handbook, Naval Sea Systems Come
SKI-~-GIB-~IW
US Department of Defense, W~hin~on
DC
BAIT,
20301, 1983.
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and methods.
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No~egi~
Unive~ity of Science and
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of caption
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{IEVI, Ch. 191, Intetnational El~~~hni~
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132
hf. Rausand
25. Kirwan, B., A Guide to Practical Human Reliabihy Assessment, Taylor & Francis, London, 1994.
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