GOITIA VS CAMPOS-RUEDA

VDA. DE MIJARES VS VILLALUZ

FACTS: In January 1915, Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were
legally married in Manila and thereafter lived together in Calle San
Marcelino for about a month. Petitioner went back to her parents
because of the following reasons: 1) Defendant demanded her to
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on her genitals; 2) Defendant
made other lewd demands; 3) Defendant maltreated petitioner by
word and by deed on the ground that the latter refused to do any
of defendants demands other than legal and valid cohabitation.
Petitioner filed an action against her husband for support outside
their conjugal domicile.
ISSUE: WON defendant may be compelled to render support to his
wife
HELD: Yes. Campos Rueda was held liable to support his wife.
Upon termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership
is formed between the spouses. The reciprocal rights arising from
this partnership is governed by the law and controlled by the state
or government, upon principles of public policy for the benefit of
society as well as the parties. Because marriage is a social institution
vested with public interest, the contracting parties may not
terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they
make. Campos Rueda cannot, by his wrongful acts, be relieved of
the duty to support Goitia as imposed by law. Where a husband,
through is wrongful, illegal and unbearable conduct drives his wife
away from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of
her departure to sever the law concerning marital relations and
repudiate his duties thereunder.
//ART (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his
option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or
by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the
right to the same.
ART 152 gives the instances when the obligation to give support
shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not
one of them.

//art 2-3 FC
ISSUE/S:
WON marriage of Mijares and Villaluz is valid.
HELD/RULING:
Yes. All the essential and formal requisites of valid marriage under
Arts 2-3 of FC were satisfied and complied with:
a. Legal capacity of the contracting parties
b. Consent freely given
c. Authority of the solemnizing officer
d. Valid marriage license

SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
FACTS: Silverio, fled a case in the Regional Trial court of Manila to
change his first name which is Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex
from male to female in his birth certificate. Silverio alleged that he
is presently a transsexual male, he is born male but thinks and acts
like a female. RTC awarded in his favor his prayer, stating that it is
in line with justice and equality.
In this case, the republic through the Office of Solicitor General, filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals stating that there is
no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was later denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not change of name and sex is allowed by reason
of reassignment of sex.
HELD: No. The court held that no law allows the change of entry in
the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment.
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations.
It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this
connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code Provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
The determination of a persons sex at the time of birth, if not
attended by error, is immutable. It held that while petitioner may
have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. But there is no
such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and
its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner will
have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences, i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations and substantially affect the
public policy in relation to women in laws such as the provisions of
the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code, etc.

MARIATEGUI VS CA
FACTS: On June 26, 1953, Lupo Mariategui died without a will.
During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages.
With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, he begot four children.
With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married
sometime in 1930. They had three children. Felipa Velasco
Mariategui died in 1941. At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui
left certain properties which he acquired when he was still
unmarried. These properties are described in the complaint as Lots
of the Muntinglupa Estate.
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second
marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they
adjudicated unto themselves a lot of the Muntinglupa Estate.
Thereafter, the Lot was the subject of a voluntary registration
proceedings filed by the adjudicatees and the land registration court
issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Subsequently,
the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot, for
which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the
respective parties.
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa
Velasco filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming
that Lot together with other Lots owned by their common father,
Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of the Lot to their
co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their
respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the
estate of their deceased father.
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the CA on the ground that the
trial court committed an error in not finding that the parents of the
appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were lawfully
married, and in holding that they (appellants) are not legitimate
children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their
inheritance.
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui,
including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third
marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition
of real properties who eventually acquired transfer certificates of
title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed
the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional
rights over said estate?
HELD: Yes, with respect to the legal basis of private respondents'
demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Supreme
Court held that the private respondents are legitimate children of
the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been
lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the
declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who
testified that when (his) father was still living, he was able to
mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community
to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this
effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does
not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed
to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa.

Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate
children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the
civil registrar or a final judgment or by the open and continuous
possession of the status of legitimate child. Evidence on record
proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacintos
birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article.
Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein
was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other
private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172
but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY
FACTS: Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge $ernando Domagtoy
on the grounds of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the
knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida
Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida
left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been
heard for almost seven years. The said Judge likewise solemnize
marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The Judge holds
his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said
wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 4050km away.
ISSUE: WON the marriages solemnized are void
HELD: First marriage, void and bigamous there being a subsisting
marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was
gone for 7 years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that in
the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the CC (ART 41?) for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Second marriage, voidable because Sumaylo and del Rosario, the
latter only made a written request where it should have been both
parties as stated in ART 8 of FC. Their non-compliance did not
invalidate the marriage, however Domagtoy may be held
administratively liable.
ARANES VS OCCIANO
FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge
with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated
23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial COURT of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on
Feb. 17, 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her
late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
When her husband passed away, since the marriage was a nullity,
petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was
not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. In
his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he
was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to
solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having
been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17
February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty
walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which
is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo
then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in
Nabua, to which request he acceded. Reviewing the records of the
case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this

Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January

2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
ISSUE: WON marriage is valid.
HELD: In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent
judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His
act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance
of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating
the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted for
solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In
People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of
validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
GERONIMO VS CA
Facts: Petitioner contends that the marriage between Graciana
Geronimo (his sister) and oppositor Antonio A. Esman was null and
void since there was no marriage license issued to the parties at the
time the marriage was celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that
a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros shows
that the marriage license number was not stated in the marriage
contract and that the marriage contract itself does now show the
number of the marriage license issued. Moreover, marriage license
number 5038770 which was issued to the deceased and the
oppositor by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued
to Pateros before the marriage was celebrated but to Pasig in
October 1959.
On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised
by petitioner are mere concoctions; that a close scrutiny of the
aforementioned documents would show that except for the phrases
"not stated" and "not recorded" the two certified copies of the
marriage contract issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now
Metro Manila) and the Parish Church of San Roque were the same
as the certified copy of the marriage contract which was attached
to the original petition which named the oppositor as the husband
of the deceased; that petitioner simply asked that these phrases be
incorporated to suit his ulterior motive; that even the omission of
the marriage license number on the Registry of Marriages in the
Local Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof
that no marriage license was actually signed on January 7, 1955 to
Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; and that the marriage
license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros are printed by the
Bureau of Printing with serialized numbers and distributed to
various provinces or municipalities thru proper requisitions which
serial numbers even if already used in the printing of the marriage
license forms in the past years are used again in the printing of the
same forms in the succeeding years.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage was valid?
Ruling: It may be conceded that the evidences presented of the
petitioner-appellant do not bear the number of the marriage license
relative to the marriage of Graciana Geronimo and the herein
oppositor-appellee. But at best, such non-indication of the number
could only serve to prove that the number was not recorded. It
could not be accepted as convincing proof of non-issuance of the
required marriage license.
On the other hand, the marriage license number does appear in the
certified archives copy of the marriage contract. The non-indication
of the license number in the certified copies presented by the
petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the issue
of the validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing
in the law which requires that the marriage license number would
be indicated in the marriage contract itself.
In Conclusion there was a valid marriage license issued, error in the
recording of the serial number of the license does not tantamount
to an invalid marriage.

SEVILLA VS CARDENAS
FACTS: There are two facts given by both the plaintiff and the
respondent:
-There was a Civil Marriage contracted in the City Hall of Manila
-Thereafter a Religious Ceremony was conducted in Quezon City
-Plaintiff averred that he was forced to enter into marriage with the
respondent
-Respondent averred that the plaintiff and took her away from her
parents and arranged a wedding for them
-Plaintiff alleges that he did not procure a marriage license
-Due to irreconcilable differences, plaintiff and respondent were
separated, thereupon plaintiff obtained a divorce decree and
subsequently married in the US
-It was attested by different witnesses that it was the plaintiffs
family that arranged the marriage.
-RTC declared the marriage void for lack of a marriage license,
because they found out that there was no existing license on record
-CA reversed the decision due to the fact that it was not
substantially proven that there was no marriage license issued.
There were erratic problems with regard to the records because
records were not found due to the absence of the handling officer.
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in
accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of
the marriages in question?
HELD: SC agrees with the ruling of CA the absence of the logbook is
not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License. It can also
mean, as SC believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just
cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to
search for the said logbook, SC cannot easily accept that absence of
the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of
the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and
lived together for several years producing two offsprings, now
adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another
individual sometime in 1991.We are not ready to reward petitioner
by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and
in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.
Petition is Denied. Judgment of CA is affirmed by SC.
DE LORIA VS FELIX
Facts:
Fact appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific,
these two persons lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera
Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In
the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory,
Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two
young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named
Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited and persuaded her to
go to confession.
They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of
Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living

with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both

parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both
agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bedridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the
Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage
with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis, Carmen Ordiales and
Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January
29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death
was not to be denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in
Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this
complaint to compel defendant to an accounting and to deliver the
properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana
de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced
heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up
his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the
court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed
and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to
consider the legal question-which they amply discussed in their
petition and printed brief whether the events which took place
in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and
binding marriage.
Issue: W/N the marriage was celebrated in Articulo Mortis?
Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract"
constitute a cause for nullity?
Ruling:
Yes. There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to
solemnize marriage. There is also no question that the parties had
legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before
Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took
each other as husband and wife."
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage
license; but it requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it.
Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of
a marriage license. The first practically substitutes the latter. Now
then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable
(under Act 3613) this marriage should not also be voidable for lack
of such affidavit.
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30
enumerates the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign
the marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites
for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and
their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by the
declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife" which in this case actually
occurred
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish
to the parties copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and
punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his obligation to
see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would
not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of
annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had
been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of
Manila and its environs.
// Yes. There is no question about the officiating priest's authority
to solemnize marriage. There is also no question that the parties had
legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before
Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took
each other as husband and wife."
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage
license; but it requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it.
Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of
a marriage license. The first practically substitutes the latter. Now
then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable
(under Act 3613) this marriage should not also be voidable for lack
of such affidavit. In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in
sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for annulment of
marriage.

Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.

VDA. DE CHUA VS CA
Facts: Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A.
Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her. On May 28, 1992,
Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of
Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City
a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons
and properties of the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its
dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the
decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of
Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court
was not the proper forum to settle said matters. The petitioner
failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the
evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage
contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto
L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of DavaoCity;
Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City
indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City;
Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the
status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the
decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was
Davao City.The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the
validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was later
appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein
respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their
ruling on the validity of the marriage of Antonietta Garcia to
Roberto Chua.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the
appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed
to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife
of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract
which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title,
Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents
cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has
submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned
that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the
judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly
disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which
she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule,
together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original
marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner
should have presented. Failure to present it as evidence would
make the marriage dubious.
MADRIDEJO VS DE LEON
Facts: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but
one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de
Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana
Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births
of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917,
a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was
named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by
Pedro Madridejo. On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan,
Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the
father. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was
married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the
parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, July 9, 1920,
leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the
plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second
husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of
May, 1928. Lower Court ruled that the marriage of Madridejo and
Perez was valid and the Melecio Madridejo was legitmated by that
marriage. Appellant (Gonzalo de leon) contends that trial court
erred in declaring that the marriage in question was valid and that
Pedro Madridejo was legitimated by that marriage.
Issues: Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro
Madridejo is valid
Whether or not the marriage subsequently legitimated Melecio
Madridejo

HELD:
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the
parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to
the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo
mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law
for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of
a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential
requisites.
In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not
been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either
voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and
therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.
TENEBRO VS CA
FACTS:
In 1990, Veronico Tenebro, petitioner, married private complainant
Leticia Ancajas. They lived together until the later part of 1991, then
Tenebro told Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes, in 1996. He showed her a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes, thereafter left their
dwelling, reasoning that he will leave her to co-habit with his
first/legal wife Villareyes. Later Ancajas learned that Tenebro yet
again contracted a marriage, this time with Nilda Villegas. After
ascertaining with Villareyes the truth about her (villareyes) marriage
with Tenebro, Ancajas filed a bigamy case against petitioner.
Tenebros contention was that since there was no actual marriage
ceremony, his marriage with Villareyes was not valid. He alleged he
simply signed the marriage contract so that Villareyes can claim the
allotment from his salary as a seaman. Moreover, he stated that,
through the help of his brother, he had verified that said marriage
to Villareyes was not in the records of the Civil Register of Manila.
The RTC, despite Tenebros arguments, found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. He appealed, but the CA
affirmed the lower courts decision. In the meantime, Tenebros
marriage to Ancajas had been declared null and void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. In his petition to the Supereme
Court, Tenebro added to his contention that with the declaration of
his marriage to Ancajas as void ab initio, he, hence, cannot be
charged for the crime of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro can still be liable for contracting a
bigamous marriage, even then such marriage had already been
declared void ab intio on the ground of psychological incapacity
HELD:
Yes, Tenebro can still be held liable for committing bigamy. All the
elements of the crime of bigamy are present in the instant case.
Article 239 of the RPC, states the following as the elements of the
crime of bigamy: 1) that the offender has been legally married; 2)
that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the CC; 3) that he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage; and 4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
It has clearly established by the prosecution that Tenebros
marriage to Villareyes was valid. As such valid marriage was
subsisting when he contracted marriage with the private
respondent-- the second marriage being valid if not for the previous
marriage, Tenebro had committed bigamy. That the marriage
between petitioner and private respondent was subsequently
declared as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity
is beside the point, since such declaration would not retroact to the
date when the marriage was contracted. The court ruled that
petitioner cannot use this to free himself from criminal liability.
Article 239 of the RPC criminalizes: any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings;. The straightforward text of the law
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.

ATIENZA VS BRILLANTES
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De
Castro with whom respondent Judge was cohabiting with.
Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that
while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965)
before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage
for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of
Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony
with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage
license. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil
rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith
and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his
first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent also
argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not
apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965
and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the
second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family
Code.
ISSUE:WON Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at
bar.
HELD: Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of
the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws. This is particularly true with
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40
to his case.
// Under the FC, there must be a judicial decl. of the nullity of a
previous marriage bef. a party thereto can enter into a 2nd
marriage. (Art. 40.) Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into
after the effectivity of the FC regardless of the date of the first
marriage. Said art. is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance w/ the
NCC or other laws." (Art. 256, FC.) This is particularly true w/ Art. 40
w/c is a rule of procedure. Resp. has not shown any vested right that
was impaired by the application of Art. 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
GARCIA VS RECIO
Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy alleging
respondent was not legally capacitated to marry her on January 12,
1994 because of his prior subsisting marriage to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen. Respondent claimed that petitioner knew of his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He had obtained
adivorce decree as proof of his legal capacity to marry petitioner in
1994.
While the suit for the declaration of nullity was still pending,
respondent, who had become a naturalized Australian citizen in
1992, secured a divorce decree in Sydney, Australia for the
dissolution of his marriage with petitioner on the ground that the
marriage had irretrievably broken down. This was recognized by
the trial court in rendering its assailed decision that deemed the
marriage between respondent and petitioner ended not on the
basis of respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry but
on the basis of the divorce decree (Australian divorce) obtained by
respondent.
Petitioner argues that the divorce decree may only be given
recognition in this jurisdiction upon proof of existence of (1) the

foreign law allowing absolute divorce, and (2) the alleged divorce
decree itself.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven; and
(2) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated
to marry petitioner.
Held:
(1) Yes. The divorce decree has to be admitted in evidence with
theregistration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the
Family Code in order to prove the divorce as a fact and prove its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it for our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. However, compliance with the
registrationrequirements is no longer binding to respondent for he
has acquired Australian Citizenship and therefore, he is no longer
bound byPhilippine personal laws. Respondent submitted the
divorce decreeand was rendered admissible by the trial court as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Autralia and accorded
weight by the judge.
(2) No. The court held that respondents presentation of a decree
nisi or an interlocutory decree-a conditional or provisional judgment
of divorce showed that the divorce obtained may have been
restricted; it did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to
remarry according to national law. Respondent also failed to submit
a Certificate of Legal Capacity together with the application for a
marriage license required by Article 21 of the Family Code which
would have been admitted as a prima facie evidence of his legal
capacity to marry. The Court finds no absolute evidence that proves
that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
NOLLORA VS PEOPLE
Facts: Nollora contracted a subsequent marriage with Rowena on
December 8, 2001. Nollora was still married to Jesusa (private
complainant), and their marriage was solemnized on April 6, 1999
at the IEMELIF Church in Bulacan.
Nollora contented that on January 10, 1992, he converted to Islam,
so that he is allowed to marry 4 wives under the Islam belief. Being
that Jesusa was not Muslim, her consent is not needed if he decided
to marry another wife.
Issue: Is Nollora guilty of bigamy?
Held: Yes, he is guilty of bigamy. The elements of bigamy are
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of
bigamy.
(1) Nollora is legally married to Jesusa;
(2) Nollora and Jesusas marriage has not been legally dissolved
prior to the date of the second marriage;
(3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to
Rowena; and
(4) Nollora and Rowenas marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior
marriage.
Both marriages were not contracted in accordance with the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, or PD 1083. Under Muslim laws, any Muslim
husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so
doing, shall notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his
family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the
wife or wives. Should any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration
Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wifes

consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article

27, decide whether or not to sustain her objection
To quote the trial court: Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying
his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply
with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not
even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages,
indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith,
said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry
anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is
clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to
just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are
requirements that the Sharia law imposes, that is, he should have
notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of
said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that
notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of
no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia
law. It is the Sharia Court that has this authority.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states
that [i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the
[Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive
Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply.
Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim
that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law.
Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his
civil status is single. Moreover, both of Nolloras marriage contracts
do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of
the declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an
essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient
proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy.
REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS
Facts: 22 October 2004
- Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage
with Register No. 2004-1588.
6 December 2006
- Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of
her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and,
therefore, null and void ab initio - Albios stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the
sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never
again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for
citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception.
Issue:
W/N their marriage was a marriage made in jest rendering it void?
W/N there was a vice in consent (fraud) rendering it voidable?
Held & Ratio
1. No. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound
in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent
to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their objective, considering
that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present. 2. No Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 may be considered as
fraud. - Only the injured party (Article 47) may raise this question.

In this case there is no injured party since both of them conspired

to make this deal.
MARTINEZ VS TAN
Facts
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice
of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the
defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage.Lower
court ruled ruled in favor of the defendant Angel Tan that Tan and
Martinez were married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidence supporting this
were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of defendant that he
and plaintiff appeared before the justice of peace along with their
witnesses (by Ballori and Esmero), testimony of Esmero that he, the
defendant, plaintiff and Ballori appeared before the justice of peace
and signed the document, the testimony of Ballori who also testified
to the same effect, and the testimony of the bailiff of court that
defendant, appellant, justice of peace and two witnesses were all
present during the ceremony.
Issue
Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the
25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the peace
Held
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the
complaint is affirmed.
The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive
statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they
asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The
document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of
the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice,
the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were
produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the
justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which
certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized
the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace
declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the
contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this
case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had
contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her,
which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite
in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document
which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the
same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were
able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the
contents of the document which they signed; and under the
circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that
what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.
DE CASTRO VS DE CASTRO
FACTS: Reinel and Annabelle met became a couple in 1991. They
applied for a marriage license in September 1994. When the couple
went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license
had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the
wedding despite of absence of marriage license, they executed an
affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years. They got
married on the same day. However, they did not live together as
husband and wife. In November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a
daughter, and supported the child on her own. Annabelle then filed
a complaint for support against petitioner before the RTC Pasig. In
her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner
and that the latter has a responsibility or obligation to financially
support her as his wife and their child. Reinel denied that they are
married and claimed that the marriage is void ab initio because the
affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that he was only forced
by Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the
pregnancy without marriage may bring her. The trial court ruled
that the marriage is not valid because it was solemnized without a

marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural

father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.

impliedly admitted the same when he did notquestion the absence

of a marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

PEOPLE VS BORROMEO
Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana
& Elias Borromeo told Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that
Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada told
her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told
his father and together, they went to Susanas hut. There they found
Susanas lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling
incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accusedappellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and validly
married, he should only be liable for homicide and not parricide.
He thinks such because there was no marriage contract issued on
their wedding day and after that. However, in his testimony, he
admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in
a chapel by a priest.

HELD: The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed

so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from
the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
REPUBLIC VS DAYOT
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on
November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a
sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On
August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for
bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office
of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on
July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and
his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid
considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the
marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts
of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab
initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe
and may be raised any time.
MALLION VS ALCANTARA
Facts:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking
adeclaration of nullity of his marriage with Editha Alcantara due
topsychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition.As the
decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a
declarationof nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his marriage
was null and voiddue to the fact that it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license.
Issue:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of
nullity onthe ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent
petition fordeclaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage
license?
Held:
Res judicata
1
applies.Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same
cause of actionwhich is the nullity of marriage. When the second
case was filed based onanother ground, there is a splitting of a cause
of action which is prohibited. Heis estopped from asserting that the
first marriage had no marriage licensebecause in the first case he

Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a

marriage void?
Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image
of being married, are presumed married unless proven otherwise.
This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore, the
validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the
requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent.
The absence of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the
same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation
of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of
marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the
celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not
one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed
decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to
30,000.
ABBAS VS ABBAS
In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of
Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to
participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the
Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the
ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage
contract signed by Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who
celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the
alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
which states that the marriage license, based on its number,
indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to
someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no diligence to
search for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas
(for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another
municipality).

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void
ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of
marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil
registrars certification enjoyed probative value as her duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor
of the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this
presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it
conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage license issued to
him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to
Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3) of the Family Code also
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from
the beginning.
ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA
FACTS: Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of
marriage against Rosita Alcantara alleging that on December 8, 1982
he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went
to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a fixer who
could arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev. Navarro.
They got married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went
through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on March
26, 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured
in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham,
as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to
Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the
said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.
Restituto prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to
cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite;
that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children; that
Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: Yes. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is
the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. Restituto cannot insist on the absence of a marriage
license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the
court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the
marriage contract between the parties reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local
civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is
precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita
Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued
to the parties herein. Restituto, in a faint attempt to demolish the
probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, the
Supreme Court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to annul
the marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties,
and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the
validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal

requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The
presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
PEOPLE VS ODTUHAN
Facts: On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo Odtuhan married Jasmin
Modina. On October 28, 1993, he also married Eleanor Alagon. He
later filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage with Modina. The RTC granted
respondents petition
and declared his first marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the
meantime, private complainant Evelyn Alagon learned
of respondents previous marriage with Modina and
thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
Respondent moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1)
that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished. The RTC held that
the facts constitute the crime of bigamy. There was a valid marriage
between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having
been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with
Alagon. It further held that neither can the information be quashed
on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because
the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the
modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent appealed to
the CA on certiorari and it concluded that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in denying
respondents motion to quash the information, considering that the
facts alleged in the information do not charge an
offense. Issues: 1. Whether or not the motion to quash by
respondent is proper
2. Whether or not the courts judgment declaring respondents first
marriage void ab initio extinguished respondents
criminal liability Held: 1. No. A motion to quash information is the
mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its
face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the information. In this case however, there is sufficiency of the
allegations in the information to constitute the crime of bigamy. It
contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) that respondent is legally married
to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally
dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondents evidence showing the courts declaration that h
is marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning should not
be considered because matters of defense cannot be raised in a
motion to quash. It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges
at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial.
2. No. Respondents claim that there are more reasons to quash the
information against him because he obtained the
declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint
for bigamy against him is without merit. Criminal culpability
attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and
from that instant, there is already liability. The time of filing of the
criminal complaint or information is material only for determining
prescription. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The petition on review on ceritorari is granted. The CAs decision is
set aside and the case is remanded to the RTC.