Property Cases

Saenz vs. Hermanos

No. 2085
Facts: Saenz and Hermanos owns adjoining
lots. The latter built a house out of strong
materials where its side was less than two
meters from petitioners lot. He also built
windows on that side which the trial court found
to be less than one meter from the dividing line
of Saenzs lot. Invoking Articles 581 and 582 of
the Civil Code, petitioner claims that defendant
cannot construct his house and open his
windows without conforming to the law.
However, the trial court ruled in favor of
defendant. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not defendant has a claim
for an easement of light and view.

Held: The Court held that defendant cannot.

The way he constructed his house and his
windows is prohibited as under Article 582 the
1

structure being less than two meters from the

dividing point of petitioners lot. But he can
avail of the easement of light and view
provided under Article 581 in so much that he
will build his windows at a 30 centimeters
square dimension with an iron grate embedded
in the wall and a wire screen.
JUDGMENT REVERSED.

EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY

GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., Respondent
G. R. No. 189755
FACTS
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer
of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto
Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts
with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to
Marcelo over several parcels of land in the
Subdivision including the receivables from the
lots already sold.
2

As
the
successor-in-interest,
Marcelo
represented to lot buyers, the National Housing
Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water
facility is available in the subdivision. The said
water facility has been the only source of water of
the residents for thirty (30) years.
In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11,
Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099
was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes
died.
Petitioner,
wife
of
Hermogenes,
subsequently wrote to the respondent Association
demanding the removal of the overhead water
tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused
and filed a case before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo
Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving
heirs of Hermogenes.
The HLURB ruling was in favor of the
respondent Association. One of the things it
affirmed was the existence of an easement for
water system/facility or open space on Lot 11,
Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep
3

well and overhead tank are situated. However, on

appeal
before
the
HLURB
Board
of
Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11,
Block 5 was not an open space
ISSUE
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy
Glen Loop is considered an open space as
defined in P. D. 1216.
RULING
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is
considered an open space. The Court used the
basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem
generis to determine whether the area falls under
other similar facilities and amenities since P. D.
1216 makes no specific mention of areas
reserved for water facilities.
Ejusdem generis states that where a general
word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class,
the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include or to be restricted to things akin to or
resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those
specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the
Court found out that the enumeration refers to
4

areas reserved for the common welfare of the

community. Therefore, the phrase other similar
facilities and amenities should be interpreted in
like manner.
It is without a doubt that the facility was used
for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic
necessity, without which, survival in the
community would be impossible.
WOODRIDGE SCHOOL, INC., and MIGUELA
JIMENEZ-JAVIER, Petitioners, v. ARB
CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 157285
The use of the subdivision roads by the general public
does not strip it of its private character. The road is not
converted into public property by mere tolerance of the
subdivision owner of the public's passage through it.

Petitioner Woodridge School is the usufructuary

of a parcel of land in the name of spouses
Ernesto T. Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas. Its
co-petitioner, Miguela JimenezJavier, is the
registered owner of the adjacent lot to that of
Woodridge.
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Respondent ARB Construction is the owner and

developer of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in Bacoor,
Cavite, which is composed of four phases. Phase
1 of the subdivision was already accessible from
the Marcos Alvarez Avenue. To provide the same
accessibility to the residents of Phase II of the
subdivision, ARB constructed the disputed road
to link the two phases.
Petitioners properties sit right in the middle of
several estates: Phase 1 of Soldiers Hills
Subdivision in the north, a creek in the east and
Green Valley Subdivision in the farther east, a
road within Soldiers Hills Subdivision IV which
leads to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue in the west,
and Phase III of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the
south.
Petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as
indemnity for the use of the road. ARB refused
the offer and fenced the perimeter of the road
fronting the properties of petitioners, thus, cutting
off petitioners access to and from the public
highway.

After failing to settle the matter amicably,

petitioners jointly filed a complaint in the RTC to
enjoin ARB from depriving them of the use of the
disputed subdivision road and to seek a
compulsory right of way after payment of proper
indemnity. The RTC rendered its decision in favor
of petitioners relying on the ruling of the Supreme
Court in White Plains Association, Inc. vs.
Legaspi (193 SCRA 765) stating that the
government automatically becomes the owner of
the subdivisions roads the moment the
subdivision plan is approved, and thus is open to
public use without any need for compensation.
Respondent ARB elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the Trial
Courts decision and stating that the ruling of the
Supreme Court in the 1991 case of White Plains
Subdivision is not applicable as it was not
similarly situated as in the present case. However
the appellate court went on to rule that a
compulsory right of way exists in favor of
petitioners as there is no other existing adequate
outlet to and from petitioners properties to the
Marcos Alvarez Avenue other than the subject
existing road lot belonging to ARB. In addition, it
7

awarded P500,000 to ARB as compensation for

the wear and tear that petitioners use of the road
would contribute to.
Unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court,
petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme
Court arguing that ARB is not entitled to be paid
any indemnity since the contested road lot is a
property of public dominion pursuant to Article
420 of the Civil Code because the disputed road
falls under the category of others of similar
character which is the last clause of Article 420
(1). Hence, it is a property of public dominion
which can be used by the general public without
need for compensation.
Petitioners also assert that their initial offer of
P50,000 should be sufficient compensation for
the right of way. Further, they should not be held
accountable for the increase in the value of the
property since the delay was attributable to the
stubborn refusal of ARB to accept their offer.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the disputed road is a property of
public dominion pursuant to the last clause of

Article 420 (1), and, as such, is not a valid subject

for legal easement.
2. Whether the offer of petitioners amounting to
P50,000 is a sufficient compensation for their use
of the road.
DECISION:
With regard to the first issue, The Supreme Court
says, no. The Court held that the road lots in a
private subdivision are private property, hence,
the local government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to
be utilized as a public road (Abellana, Sr. v. Court
of Appeals). Otherwise, they remain to be private
properties of the owner developer.
The use of the subdivision roads by the general
public does not strip it of its private character. The
road is not converted into public property by mere
tolerance of the subdivision owner of the public's
passage through it. The local government should
first acquire them by donation, purchase, or
expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public
road. In the present case, since no donation has
been made in favor of any local government and
9

the title to the road lot is still registered in the

name of ARB, the disputed property remains
private.
With regard to the second issue, the Supreme
Court again says, no. In order to be entitled to a
legal easement of right of way, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment
of proper indemnity; (3) The isolation was not due
to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate
and; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate. In the
present case, all of the requisites are present
except for number two.
The appellate and trial courts found that the
properties of petitioners are enclosed by other
estates without any adequate access to a public
highway except the subject road lot which leads
to Marcos Alvarez Avenue. Although it was
shown that the shortest distance from the
properties to the highway is toward the east
across a creek, this alternative route does not
provide an adequate outlet for the students of the
proposed school.
10

The Civil Code categorically provides for the

measure by which the proper indemnity may be
computed. Under Article 649, paragraph 2, it is
stated:
Should this easement be established in such a
manner that its use may be continuous for all the
needs of the dominant estate, establishing a
permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist
of the value of the land occupied and the amount
of the damage caused to the servient estate.
Having settled the legal issues, the Supreme
Court ordered the remand of the case to the trial
court for the reception of evidence and
determination of the limits of the property to be
covered by the easement, the proper indemnity to
be paid and the respective contributions of
petitioners.
The petition was PARTIALLY GRANTED.

11

Amor vs. Florentino, et al.

No. 48384
Facts:
Maria Florentino, owner of a house and a
warehouse, bequeathed her house and lot to
Gabriel and Jose Florentino, and the
warehouse and lot to her niece Maria
Encarnacion Florentino upon his death. IN
1911, Maria Encarnacion later sold her
inheritance to Severo Amor. In 1938, he
destroyed the old warehouse to build a twostory house. On the same year, respondents
filed an action to prohibit petitioner from
building a higher structure as it would obstruct
the light and air that passes through the four
windows to the house. Pending the decision of
the trial court, Amor continued building the
house. Finding that an easement was
established but that the construction of the new
building was almost complete, the court denied
the writ for preliminary injunction. Upon appeal,
12

the Court of Appeals, upheld the constitution of

the easement at the time of Marias death
which in 1892 and ordered Amor to remove any
obstruction from the easement of light and view
on the windows and abstain from building the
new structure.
Issue: Whether or not an easement was
constituted on the four windows of the
inherited property.
Held:
The Court held that an easement of light and
view was constituted on the four windows by
the time the heirs inherited the property for
upon acceptance of it, they tolerated the
existence of an easement by the way of the
four windows. The Court affirmed appellate
courts decision that a title to the easement was
acquired because of its continued existence
upon partition of property to heirs and did not
stipulate to the contrary as under Article 541 of
the Civil Code.

13

They acquired a title to the easement, upon

toleration of the existence of the easement
which was an implied contract to the
continuation of the easement, by way of
prescription. Further, petitioner cannot allege
that he was an innocent purchaser because
he was duty bound to ascertain that the
property he bought was bound to an easement
of light and view and easement of altius non
tollendi. Whether or not the original owner died
on 1982 or 1885 which he alleged, still the
easements remains to be constituted when he
bought the property of Maria Encarnacion.
DECISION AFFIRMED
Art. 541 Art. 621
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO. INC. V CA
FACTS: Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein
private
respondents
Sergio
Valdez
etc.
purchased from Feliciana Santillan a parcel of
unregistered land with an area of one hectare, 34
ares and 16 centares, located in Barrio
Dayhagon, Medellin, Cebu. He took possession
14

of the property and declared it for tax purposes in

his name. Prior to the sale, however, the entire
length of the land from north to south was already
traversed in the middle by railroad tracks owned
by petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc.
(hereafter Bomedco). The tracks were used for
hauling sugar cane from the fields to petitioners
sugar mill. When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. passed
away in 1948, herein private respondents
inherited the land. However, unknown to them,
Bomedco was able to have the disputed middle
lot which was occupied by the railroad tracks
placed in its name in the Cadastral Survey of
Medellin, Cebu in 1965. The entire subject land
was divided into three. However, Lot No. 954, the
narrow lot where the railroad tracks lay, was
claimed by Bomedco as its own and was
declared for tax purposes in its name.
It was not until 1989 when private respondents
discovered the aforementioned claim of Bomedco
on inquiry with the Bureau of Lands. Through
their lawyer, they immediately demanded the
legal basis for Bomedco's claim over Cadastral
Lot No. 954 but their letter of inquiry addressed to
petitioner went unheeded, as was their
15

subsequent
demand
for
payment
compensation for the use of the land.

of

respondent heirs filed a Complaint for Payment

of Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession
of Real Property and Damages with Application
for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction
against Bomedco before the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu. Respondent heirs alleged that, before
she sold the land to Valdez, Sr. in 1935, Santillan
granted Bomedco, in 1929, a railroad right of way
for a period of 30 years. When Valdez, Sr.
acquired the land, he respected the grant. The
right of way expired sometime in 1959 but
respondent heirs allowed Bomedco to continue
using the land because one of them was then an
employee of the company.
On the other hand, Bomedcos principal defense
was that it was the owner and possessor of
Cadastral Lot No. 954, having allegedly bought
the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior to
the sale of the property by the latter to Magdaleno
Valdez, Sr. in 1935. It also contended that
plaintiffs claim was already barred by prescription
and laches because of Bomedcos open and
16

continuous possession of the property for more

than 50 years.
ISSUE/ HELD: Whether or not petitioner acquired
ownership of the easement through prescription.
NEGATIVE. 30-year extraordinary prescriptive
period had not yet been complied and there was
neither laches.
Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, these
receipts showed that all petitioner had was
possession by virtue of the right of way granted to
it. Were it not so and petitioner really owned the
land, petitioner would not have consistently used
the phrases central railroad right of way and
sugar central railroad right of way in its tax
declarations until 1963. Certainly an owner would
have found no need for these phrases. A person
cannot have an easement on his own land, since
all the uses of an easement are fully
comprehended in his general right of ownership.
An easement or servitude is a real right,
constituted on the corporeal immovable property
of another, by virtue of which the owner has to
refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do,
something on his property, for the benefit of
another thing or person. It exists only when the
servient and dominant estates belong to two
17

different owners. It gives the holder of the

easement an incorporeal interest on the land but
grants
no
title
thereto.
Therefore,
an
acknowledgment of the easement is an
admission that the property belongs to another.
Having held the property by virtue of an
easement, petitioner cannot now assert that its
occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of an
owner. Neither can it declare that the 30-year
period of extraordinary acquisitive prescription
started from that year.
The mere expiration of the period of easement in
1959 did not convert petitioners possession into
an adverse one. Mere material possession of
land is not adverse possession as against the
owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such
possession is accompanied by the intent to
possess as an owner.There should be a hostile
use of such a nature and exercised under such
circumstances as to manifest and give notice that
the possession is under a claim of right.
The only time petitioner assumed a legal position
adverse to respondents waswhen it filed a claim
over the property in 1965 during the cadastral
survey of Medellin. Since then (1965) and until
the filing of the complaint for the recovery of the
18

subject land before the RTC of Cebu in 1989,

only 24 years had lapsed. Since the required 30year extraordinary prescriptive period had not yet
been complied with in 1989, petitioner never
acquired ownership of the subject land.
Neither can petitioner find refuge in the principle
of laches. It is not just the lapse of time or delay
that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which,
through due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had either
abandoned or declined to assert it.
Records show that respondent heirs only learned
about petitioners claim on their property when
they discovered the inscription for the cadastral
survey in the records of the Bureau of Lands in
1989. Respondents lost no time in demanding an
explanation for said claim in their letters to the
petitioner dated March 1, 1989 and April 6, 1989.
When petitioner ignored them, they instituted their
complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City on June 8, 1989.
Petitioner contends that, even if it failed to
acquire ownership of the subject land, it
19

nevertheless became legally entitled to the

easement of right of way over said land by virtue
of prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code:
Continuous and apparent easements are
acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements
are either continuous or discontinuous according
to the manner they are exercised, not according
to the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications of the existence of such easements.
Thus, an easement is continuous if its use is, or
may be, incessant without the intervention of any
act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it
is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and
depends on the act of man, like the easement of
right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered
discontinuous because it is exercised only if a
person passes or sets foot on somebody elses
land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or
persons, an easement of right of way of railroad
tracks is discontinuous because the right is
exercised only if and when a train operated by a
person passes over another's property. In other
words, the very exercise of the servitude depends
20

upon the act or intervention of man which is the

very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad
tracks does not in any way convert the nature of
an easement of right of way to one that is
continuous. It is not the presence of apparent
signs or physical indications showing the
existence of an easement, but rather the manner
of exercise thereof, that categorizes such
easement into continuous or discontinuous. The
presence of physical or visual signs only
classifies an easement into apparent or nonapparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of
way) and a window (which evidences a right to
light and view) are apparent easements, while an
easement of not building beyond a certain height
is non-apparent.
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for
the passage of petitioners trains denotes the
existence of an apparent but discontinuous
easement of right of way. And under Article 622
of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements,
whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by
title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never
acquired any title over the use of the railroad right
of way whether by law, donation, testamentary
21

succession or contract. Its use of the right of way,

however long, never resulted in its acquisition of
the easement because, under Article 622, the
discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way
can only be acquired by title and not by
prescription.
To be sure, beginning 1959 when the original 30year grant of right of way given to petitioner
Bomedco expired, its occupation and use of
Cadastral Lot No. 954 came to be by mere
tolerance of the respondent heirs. Thus, upon
demand by said heirs in 1989 for the return of the
subject land and the removal of the railroad
tracks, or, in the alternative, payment of
compensation for the use thereof, petitioner
Bomedco which had no title to the land should
have returned the possession thereof or should
have begun paying compensation for its use.

Valisno vs. Adriano

No. L-37409
Facts:
Valisno bought the parcel of land owned by
Adrianos sister Honorata. It was planted with
22

fruits and vegetables and which adjoins

Adrianos land on the bank of the river. Both
lands were inherited from defendants and
vendees father Eladio. When it was sold, the
land has irrigation from the Pampanga River
through a canal 70 meters long traversing
Adrianos land. He now leveled a portion of the
canal which prevented the flow of water and
deprived Valisno of cultivating his land. He filed
complaint for deprivation of water rights in the
Bureau of Public Works and Communications
and it ordered Adriano to rebuild the irrigational
canal. But this he did not do and instead
Valisno constructed it by his own money. He
also filed for payment of damages against
defendant in the trial court. However, the
Secretary
of
Public
Works
and
Communications dismissed the complaint as
the water rights granted to Eladio in 1923,
which was conveyed to Valisno in the sale,
ceased in 1936 or 1937 for its non-use. No
water right then was transferred to his heirs,
and so Valisno did not acquire such water right.
The trial court, invoking the Irrigation Law, held
that Valisno has no right to pass through
23

Adrianos land to draw water from the river, and

the decision of the Bureaus Secretary is final
unless an appeal was taken from within 30
days.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the
Irrigation Act shall apply in the resolution of
the controversy.
Held:
The Bureau has already said in its decision that
issue concerning servitude of waters shall be
governed by the Civil Code and such special
laws if the code provides no guidelines thereof
as provided under Article 168 of the code.
Concerning the dispute on water servitude,
since the irrigation canal was built at the time of
the lands conveyance to Valisno, he obtained
therefrom an equivalent title to the water rights
from Honorata to continue using it as provided
for under Article 624. Such water right was
passed to him, as well as improvements to
Honorarias property, at the time of the
conveyance.
24

APPEALED DECISION SET ASIDE.

Quimen vs. CA
G.R. No. 112331
Facts:
Private respondent Yolanda Oliveros bought
the lot belonging to his uncle Antonio Quimen,
a land without access to the road public, with
an inducement by her petitioner Aunt Anastacia
that she will give her a right of way on her
adjoining property for P200 per square meter.
When Yolanda offered Anastacia the payment,
the latter refused to accept denying the promise
of right of way to her once she bought the
property. Yolanda filed an action with a prayer
of right of way through Anastacias property.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding
that the space at the back of her fathers house
which a store was situation was the better right
of way because it is shorter than that of
Anastacias property. But the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision saying that respondent
has the right of way through petitioners
property and as it was the one which will cause
25

the least damage and detriment to the servient

estate.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has a
right of way through petitioners property.
Held:
The Court held that she has. Article 650 of the
Civil Code provides that the right of way must
be the one which has the shortest route and
which will cause the least damage and
detriment to the servient state. Though the
easement to petitioners property in the case at
bar is longer than the one located at the back of
respondents house which has a store blocking
it, the requirement that it can bring the least
prejudice to the servient estate must prevail
over the shortness of the route to the public
highway. The less damage will be incurred not
as when the store made of strong materials
should be removed. More so, the conditions for
a valid grant of right of way through petitioners
property, which are:

26

1. the dominant estate is surrounded by

other immovables without an adequate
outlet to public highway
2. the dominant estate is willing to pay the
proper indemnity
3. the isolation was not due to the acts of
the dominant estate
4. the right of way being claimed is the least
prejudicial to the servient estate
are met by the circumstances at hand.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Villarico vs. Sarmiento

G.R. No. 136438
Facts:
27

Petioners lot was separated from the Ninoy

Aquino Avenue, a public highway, by a strip of
land belonging to the government. The
department of Public Works and Highways
constructed stairways thereon for people to
have access to the highway. In 1991,
respondents build a house on that portion of
government
land
and
constructed
establishments for commercial purposes. In
1993, petitioner acquired title over the 74.30
square meter of that government land by
exchange of real property and such was
registered to his name. He now instituted
accion publiciana as against respondents to
assert his right of way which was blocked by
reason of the structures they built thereon. The
trial court ruled that he was not deprived a right
of way and that he could use another street as
passageway. The Court of Appeals held the
same.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has a right
of way over the land under the possession
of respondents.
28

Held:
The Court held that he has none. Article 420 of
the Civil Code provides that government land
cannot be subject of commerce nor can be
burdened by any voluntary easement.
Therefore, petitioner cannot claim his right of
way over the land under possession by
respondents. Also, he cannot use accion
publiciana as a remedy to obtain a right of
way. However, he can have a claim against
respondents on the portion already conveyed to
him by the government.
JUDGMENT
MODIFICATION.

AFFIRMED

WITH

29

National Power Corporation vs. Tiangco

G.R. No. 170846
Facts:
Private respondents Aurellano, Lourdes, and
Nestor Tiangco are owners of the 152, 187
square meter land in Tanay, Rizal where 19,
423 of which was sought to be expropriated by
the National Power Corporation (NPC). The
petitioner, which is a government-owned and
controlled corporation, was authorized to
acquire private property and to exercise the
right of eminent domain by its charter Republic
Act 6395. It negotiated with respondents about
the sale of that portion of their land planted with
fruit-bearing trees but to no avail. And so, on
30

November 20, 1990, NPC filed an expropriation

complaint before the trial court of Tanay, Rizal.
The trial court issued a condemnation order
granting the NPC the right to take possession
of the property. After the valuation for the just
compensation presented by parties, the trial
court ruled that NPC has to give P40,959 to
respondents as payment of just compensation
based on 1984 tax declaration of the land and
P324,750 for compensation for improvements
on the land expropriated with legal interest.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the just compensation of the land was to be at
P116,538 as from 1993 tax declaration and the
compensation for the land improvements be at
P325,025.
Issue: Whether or not the valuation for the
just compensation be based at the 1984 or
1993 tax declaration, and
whether or not NPC should pay for the value
of the land or only 10% of the lands market
value as under Presidential Decree 938.
Held:
31

The Court held that the value of the just

compensation for the land should be
computed for its value at the time of its
talking which was in 1990 when NPC filed for
the expropriation proceedings and should not
be based in the 1984 or 1993 tax declarations.
Also, since the burden on the property by way
easement of right of way is perpetual in nature
where NPC can expand the structure it is going
to build, expropriator should pay for the
value of the land sought to be expropriated
and not only for the 10% of its value.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS.

Preysler, Jr. vs. CA

G.R. No. 158141
Facts:
Petitioner owns lots in the subdivision of private
respondent and owns two lots adjacent to the
latters land. To enter into his two parcels of
32

land, one has to pass through respondents

property. Preysler offered P10,000 as payment
for the easement of the right of way but which
was refused by respondent. He now barricaded
the front gate of Preyslers property so that
petitioner and his family cannot enter their
property through the subdivision. Petitioner filed
a complaint for Right of Way with preliminary
prohibitive injunction before the trial court. It
ruled that respondent remove the barricade and
issued the writ to stop him from obstructing
petitioners entry to his property through the
subdivision. After then, Preysler used the
subdivision to transport heavy equipments and
constructions materials to develop his property.
Respondent moved to dissolve the writ as
petitioners action is a violation to his right to
peaceful possession of his property but the trial
issued maintained its order for respondent to
cease hindering petitioner from entry to his
property with amendments extending to
Preyslers visitors, guests, contractors, and
other persons he authorized entry to
respondents property. Upon appeal, CA lifted
the writ and reinstated the original writ.
33

Issue: Whether or not there was a legal

basis for the issuance of the amended writ
and whether or not the right of way for
petitioner
extends
to
his
visitors,
contractors, workers, and authorized
persons.
Held:
The Court held that there was no basis for the
amended writ and that the right of way granted
under the original writ for petitioners visit and
inspection of his property was the only access
allowed to him. The extension of right of way to
other people connected with petitioner is not
covered under the original writ and cannot be
applied for to amend it to the present writ. But
since there is a need for petitioner to use
respondents property for the ongoing
construction in his property, he should be
granted a temporary easement which is
indispensable for construction of petitioners
property after payment of proper indemnity to
respondent as under Article 656.
34

JUDGMENT MODIFIED. CASE REMANDED

TO TRIAL COURT FOR DETERMINATION OF
INDEMNITY FOR TEMPORARY EASEMENT.

Fabie vs. Lichauco

No. 3598
Facts: Fabie applied for registration of his
property but recognizes an easement in favor
of the estates of respondent and Hijos de
Roxas adjoining to his property. The easement
of right of way and drainage was given by the
Court of Land Registration in favor of the latter
while their claim to easement of light and view.
Lichauco, however, insists that since an
easement of right of way and of light and view
existed at the time where both their properties
then belonged to Juan Bautista Santa Coloma
was sold now as their two separate properties,
those sign of easements became as title for
those easements to continue. The easement of
light and view claimed by Lichauco is
35

constituted on a window of a gallery in her

property.
Issue: Whether or not the gallery from
which the windows are constituted existed
at the time of the division and alienation of
Colomas property.

Held: The documentary evidence presented at

the trial showed that gallery did not existed at
the time of the properties alienation.
Respondent cannot claim an easement of light
of view by virtue of a title for there is no sign of
easement of light and view at the point of
reckoning.
JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED.

Art. 622 sign of easement = title

36

37

Cortes vs. Tu-Tibo

No. 911

Facts: House No. 65 in Calle Rosario, owned

by petitioners wife, is adjacent to House No. 63
belonging to defendant. When the latter raised
the roof of his house, it obstructed House No.
65 from receiving air and light through its
windows. The trial court finds that petitioner did
not in any way prohibited defendant from doing
so. But he claimed that he acquired the
easement of light and view from his constant
and uninterrupted use of the windows for 59
years which is a positive easement where the
38

period for acquisitive prescription begins at the

time of the enjoyment commenced. Defendant,
on the other hand, contends that the easement
is negative and so the reckoning point must
start from the time the prohibition is served
against him. The trial court ruled that easement
is negative. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not easement is negative.

Held: The Court held that easement of light

and view constituted on a window of ones own
wall contemplates a negative easement which
cannot be acquired by prescription as under
Article 538 of the Civil Code but by prohibition
against the servient estate though a formal act.
The indispensable requisite being absent, the
easement of light and view has not been
acquired.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

39

Timoner vs. People

No. L-62050

40

Facts: Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte

Timoner ordered the fencing off of the stalls in
the sidewalks of Maharlika Highway including a
barbershop. These establishments, however,
were recommended for closure for being
harmful to health for failing to follow sanitary
requirements by its Municipal Health Officer.
They were also declared a public nuisance, as
categorized under Article 694, in a civil case,
and the barber shop was never able to reopen
his business. Timoner was, however, charged
guilty of grave coercion. Such decision was
affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the action of

petitioner is constitutive of the criminal act
of grave coercion.

Held: The Court held that it is not. Since the

establishments were proved to be a public
nuisance and that, as mayor, petitioner acted to
abate them, his act of fencing off the stalls
41

within the bounds of his duty as a public officer

performing his duty. More so, the third element
of absence of authority to restrain the will of
another person in the crime of grave coercion is
absent.
PETITIONER ACQUITTED.

Pearl & Dean vs. Shoemart

G.R. No. 148222
Facts: Petitioner is in the business of
advertising display units as light boxes. They
42

obtained a copyright of the illuminated display

units under the trademark Poster Ads. It has
Metro Industrial Services as its manufacturer
for their output. SMI and petitioner agreed for
the formers lease and installation of the latters
light boxes in its branches in Makati and
Cubao. However, only the contract in Makati
Branch was returned. SMI rescinded the
contract for Cubao. Two years later, Metro
Industrial Services manufactured light boxes for
SMI. It also engaged the service of another
corporation to make for itself light boxes. A
sister company of SMI was also found out to
have been using the light boxes with that
design of petitioner. It now filed a case for
infringement of copyright and trademark, and
unfair competition and for damages. The trial
court held respondent guilty of the charges.
However, the appellate court reversed the
decision holding that there was no copyright to
the light boxes themselves but only to the
technical drawing. Hence, the appeal.

43

Issue: Whether or not there was no

infringement of trademark and copyright on
petitioners Poster Ads.

Held: The Court held that there was no

infringement on the trademark Poster Ads
because what petitioner did register was for the
technical drawing of the light boxes alone which
did not extend to the object itself. On the issue
of patent, petitioner did not secure a patent for
the light boxes and therefore, he cannot
prohibit others from using the light boxes
though it may be the same as to what they
fabricate and thus, there is no cause of action
for his complaint.
PETITION DENIED.

AC Enterprises, Inc vs. Frabelle Corporation

GR. No. 166744

44

Facts:
Petitioner owns the Feliza Building
which is sitiated at the rear of the Frabelle
Condominium I which is owned by respondent.
Feliza has 36 exhaust of blowers from airconditioning units on its building which produce
a continuous, intense and unbearable noise
and hot air blasts directed towards the rear of
Frabelle Condiminium. Respondent wrote
requests to petitioner to abate the nuisance but
which was ignored by the latter. Frabelle went
filed a complaint before the Pollution
Adjudication Board. Pending the decision on
the complaint, respondent requested office of
the Makati Mayor to cancel petitioners
business permit. The complaint was directed to
the NCR Environmental management Bureau
and it ruled that there the exhaust on the
blowers were not the sole factor in the noise
pollution. Unsatisfied with the resolution,
respondent filed a complaint for the abatement
of nuisance with a prayer for the issuance of
preliminary and permanent injunction before
the trial court of Malabon City. It ruled that there
is a sufficient cause of action for respondent to
file a complaint and it ruled in the latters favor.
45

Court of Appeals ruled that respondent has the

right to abate the nuisance to protect his
property and proprietary rights against business
losses.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has a
cause of action and RTC has the jurisdiction
over the case.
Held: The Court held that a simple suit for
abatement of nuisance is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC where it is the one which
has the right to declare whether a thing is a
nuisance as under Article 694 of the Civil Code.
More so, having suffered from the nuisance,
respondent has a cause of action where it may
institute an action to abate it as under Article
705 and 706. There is cause of action if there is
a right in favor one party and an obligation not
to violate that right for the other and there is a
breach of that obligation. LGUs are not vested
with the power to declare a thing a nuisance.
PETITION DENIED.
46