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By Rassa Robles

The government has captured the hive but the angry bees have escaped and are
regrouping to attack.
A Moro National Liberation Front official said right after the fall of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Fronts Camp Abubakar following President Joseph Estradas All-Out War
in 2000

To get an estimate of the costs, lets look at the All-Out War


that then President Joseph Estrada launched in the year 2000.
Ordinarily, the cost of this kind of internal conflict is shrouded in secrecy.
But in 2005, the United Nations sponsored a ground-breaking study entitled the Philippine
Human Development Report. For the first time, a team led by Arsenio Balisacan examined
the costs of conflict. Dr. Balisacan is Dean of the University of the Philippines School of
Economics and Executive Director of the Philippine Center for Economic Development.
Among the advisers for this Report was former Economic Planning Secretary and UP
economics professor Solita Collas-Monsod.
The cost in terms of body count
The study found that during Estradas two and a half-year presidency, 471 Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) rebels and 222 government soldiers were killed.
We can presume that most of the fatalities occurred during the 2000 All-Out War.
In addition, during the same period, the MILF claimed 92 rebels were injured while the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reported 270 injured or 431 injured from both sides
of the conflict.
There is no accounting here of civilians killed in the crossfire.
During last weeks Basilan clash between MILF rebels and government soldiers, 19 soldiers
and at least five rebels and were killed.

An All-Out War would considerably increase that body count. And if one goes by the Year
2000 figures, total body count could reach several hundreds.
If the objective of a new All-Out War is to avenge the deaths last October 22 of the 19
soldiers, would the death of several hundreds more in such an operation be worth the cost?
You know what? The Christian majority in the country has always frowned upon and thought
the concept of rido or vengeance killings among southern Philippine clans weird and
barbaric. Wouldnt avenging the deaths of the soldiers be like a state-sponsored rido?
An All-Out War would also have serious collateral damage on the citizenry
At the height of Estradas All-Out War in mid-2000, the number of refugees fleeing from the
conflict swelled to 800,000 non-combatants. Imagine the trauma of leaving behind almost
everything you own and had worked for because of the fighting.
An All Out War in Basilan could, however, result in a much lesser number of refugees
(called Internally Displaced Persons or IDPs) because the island population there is only
half a million.
Still, is it worth disrupting the lives of so many thousands? And would the military be
breeding more rebels this way?
The formation of MILF camps in Basilan was an offshoot of Estradas All-Out War
Estrada is rightly credited for dismantling the MILFs main headquarters, Camp Abubakar,
and several other smaller camps. These had for years been a huge embarrassment and
affront to the Philippine government and its sovereignty.
The gains of the All-Out War, however, turned out to be temporary. Other camps have
sprouted in place of Camp Abubakar. And one of those camps is the one in Al-Barka,
Basilan, near where the deadly firefight took place last week.
I was interviewing Allan Pisingan of the Basilan Human Rights Network and Bantay
Ceasefire yesterday. I asked him why the MILF now has a camp in Basilan. As far as I knew,
the traditional stronghold of the MILF was central Mindanao, never Basilan.
He told me that the MILF gained a foothold on the island after angry Muslims rallied to the
call of jihad by the late MILF Chairman Hashim Salamat in response to Estradas 2000 AllOut War.
After Camp Abubakar fell and Estrada celebrated his military victory by holding a lunch of
beer and lechon (roast pork) there which angered and insulted the Muslims I got to talk
to the late Angelo Reyes who was then the Armed Forces Chief of Staff. He predicted that
the rebels would switch to guerrilla warfare but I believe only the hard-core would do it.
The problem was, he could not say how many of the MILF were hard-core.
At that time, Congressman Roilo Golez also expressed misgivings over capturing Camp
Abubakar. The former navy official warned that a wounded tiger fights more fiercely.
An official of the Moro National Liberation Front, which signed a peace pact with the
government in 1996, put the problem in perspective. He told me then:
The government has captured the hive but the angry bees have escaped and are regrouping to attack.

Soon enough, they did by bombing the LRT on Rizal Day that yearend, killing 14 and
injuring 100 commuters. That LRT bomb also hurt the national economy and instilled a
sense of fear and helplessness in the nations capital.
The violent cycle has gone on and on and on.
Economic costs of an All-Out War
Neither the military nor the government has ever disclosed how much a massive military
operation costs taxpayers. This has always been shrouded in mystery. But we can presume
that the government diverts funding to these unbudgeted events.
For Estradas All-Out War, the military deployed at least two marine and two infantry
battalions, or the equivalent of around 2,400 men, not just for days but for at least over a
month. Think how many bullets and bombs they needed.
In Basilan, an M14 bullet can be bought in the black market for P30 each; while an M16
bullet for P25 each, according to Allan Pisingan. Each M14 magazine can hold from 10 to
30 bullets. Given these kinds of figures, Estradas All-Out War must have been horribly
expensive.
That particular war, however, had little direct impact on the national GDP, the UN-sponsored
report concluded. Because in the first place, Mindanao islands contribution to the GDP is
not particularly large from the viewpoint of the national economy. It comprises only around
half a percentage point of the national GDP.
But the report also cited a paper written by Schiavo-Camp and Judd on the Mindanao
conflict. The authors argued that an All-Out War in Mindanao would have a larger implicit
economic cost in this manner:
There is anecdotal but persuasive evidence from the international investment banking community that the
troubles in the island have adversely affected the image of the country as an investor-friendly venue. This
is consistent with the evidenceto the effect that capital flight is a main result of civil conflict, with capital
repatriation following a settlement of the conflict.
In the case of Mindanao, however, such capital flight (limited by the low level of the initial capital) has
been compounded by a failure to attract the equity investment that could be expected based on the areas
location and factor endowments investment which was deflected to other areas in East and Southeast
Asia.

The report also noted that the resulting deaths would also mean loss of potential income
that could have been generated by the slain combatants for their families. The report
estimated the loss at P69,300 yearly for a soldier killed (based on a privates monthly
salary); and P27,443 per year per rebel killed. The latter is lower in value because the basis
used was the average per capita income of the Philippines as of 2003.
The most telling effect of the continuing conflict in Muslim Mindanao
An All-Out war is a tremendously psychologically draining experience which could affect a
persons health. The UN-funded report decided to correlate the average life expectancy of
residents in the most war-torn areas with those areas where residents seem to live longest.

Apparently, residents live longest in the following five provinces, based on 2003 government
data:
Cebu around 72.6 years old
Pampanga 72.2
Batangas 71.8
Bulacan 71.4
Camarines Sur 71.3
In contrast, residents of the following five strife-torn provinces in Muslim Mindanao seem to
have the shortest average life span:
Basilan 60.6 years old
Lanao del Sur 57.9
Sulu 52.8
Maguindanao 52
Tawi-Tawi 51.2
Wow. Thats a 10-year difference in life expectancy between Cebu and Basilan.
And a 20-year difference between Cebu and Maguindanao where the MILF is centrally
based. And yet the rebels stay there to pursue their dream of a Bangsamoro Homeland
through an armed struggle, despite being the object of several All-Out Wars.
Why Estrada wanted and needed an All-Out War in 2000
It is only by placing Estradas All-Out War in historical context that we can understand why
he did it.
Before launching the All-Out War, the Estrada administration was reeling from several
money scandals and from two humiliating incidents that put it in the global spotlight.
On March 20, 2000, the Abu Sayyaf grabbed 58 students and adults in Basilan and held
them for ransom. The following month on April 22, 2000, the Abu Sayyaf again seized 21
mostly foreign holiday makers from the Malaysian island resort of Sipadan and brought
them to Sulu to be ransomed off.
On top of this, Estradas popularity was tumbling from a fresh batch of scandals. A Catholic
nun, Sr. Christine Tan who then headed the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,
disclosed that 87% or P430 million of the P495 million intended for its charity projects had
been diverted to the offices of President Estrada, his wife, Luisa, and his son, Jinggoy.
Estradas Vice-President then someone named Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo warned that
the fund diversion will result in the waning trust of the people in the government.
It was also around this time that the scandal over alleged insider trading of BW Resources
shares broke into the news, along with two other money scandals implicating top officials
and friends of Estrada.
A P304.9 million contract to buy fire trucks was allegedly cornered by a company that
reportedly used as go-between two movie stars close to the movie actor-turned-President.
Estrada ordered an investigation on the matter.

In addition, reports bared that the chief government lawyer, Solicitor General Ricardo
Galvez, had brokered a deal involving the awarding of 4,689 hectares of a military
reservation in Nueva Ecija to a private individual. Estrada ordered the deal scrapped.
What damaged Estradas presidency the most at this time was the surprising confirmation of
his chief presidential palace aide Aprodicio Laquian of the existence of Estradas midnight
cabinet. Laquian said that:
at 4 oclock in the morning, I am the only sober person in the room [and that] if there is one person who is
sober in the room who would be able to take all of these things that were signed and then hide them in my
record book, then the decision-making will probably be, in the beautiful light of the morning, very rational.

You can read more about Laquians outburst here.


In light of all these, political analysts at that time expressed the belief that Estradas motives
for launching an All-Out War were partly self-serving. He needed to shore up his sagging
presidency.
Six months after Camp Abubakar fell, Estrada himself had been shooed out of office.
Why President Benigno Aquino III does not want nor need an All-Out War
It is true that among all presidents, PNoy has a big stake in keeping peace in Mindanao
after having personally met with MILF chairman Murad Ebrahim and other key rebel leaders
in Tokyo.
That, however, is only part of the reason.
The Aquino administration is about to embark on a bold, ambitious and multi-billion pesos
plan to bring development to Muslim Mindanao using the Autonomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) structure as the vehicle. It is still trying to persuade the MILF to be a
partner in this experiment.
All these will come to nothing with an All-Out War.
But what about justice for the slain soldiers?
This is a question thats been bothering me since the incident. The Republic has to stand by
its soldiers.
This issue has been clouded, though, by the fact that neither the military nor the MILF has
released a comprehensive post-battle report. We are being bombarded by confusing
reports about what happened.
Meanwhile, the Army chief, Lt. General Arturo Ortiz, has already relieved two field
commanders without any explanation.
Amid this confusion, President Aquino is faced with mounting criticism for not acting
decisively and not ordering hot pursuit operations or an All-Out War at once.
And he is insisting on holding the peace.
And so we Filipinos are faced with the question do we give peace a chance or go to war
again?
To many of us, intermittent war in Mindanao has become so much a part of our reality.

A Cebuano named Jr. Kilat rightly pokes fun at this war mentality in his rap song entitled
M16. You can listen to it below:

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