Quick digests by me:

1. Aldaba v. Comlec
Facts: Ra 9561 seeks to create leg district for Malolos City. IN an
undated certify by Regional director of NSO it was shown that by
year 2010, population of Mun. of Malolos will be 254,030. As of May
2000, population is 175,291.
IssueL WON RA 9591 is unvonsitutional for violating Section 5(3),
Article VI? Yes. An undated certify from RD of NSO is without legal
effect since RD Miranda has no basis and authority to issue Cert.
Certifications on demographic prjections can only be issued if proj
declared official by National Statistics Coordination Board. Here, no
ceritif.
Also, only certify on dempgraphic projection can be issued by NSO
Administrator. Here, Regional Director Miranda not shown to be
auth.
INtercensal population prohection must be as of middle of year.
Here, reference date was may 1, 1990 but projection was for 2010.
Besides, mathematically, projections seem unrelaisitc.
2. Aquino v. Comelec
Facts: RA 9716 seeks to reapportion province of Camarines Sur.
Before, Camarines sur had 4 districts. First district had 417,304
inhab. Following enactmentof RA 9716, first dist was divided into 2
districts thereby making 5 districts na.
Now petitiones contend that splitting the 1st district created
districts that are less than 250K contravening consti.
Held:Constitutional. Ass hekd in Mariano where Makati was
convered into city, it ruled that makat can still add an addtl district
since it already met 250k reqt. It does not need to increase to
another 250K to guarantee district.
PROVINCE is entitled to a rep regardless of population. (province
pwede)
3. Navarro v. Ermita
RA 9355- An Act creating the Province of Dinagat islands. Plebiscite
yielded a yes with the approval of people from both the mother
province of Surigao del Norte and the province of Dinagat Islands.

RA 9355 is challenged as unconstitutional since it only has a land

area of 802.12 sq,km and population of 106,951. This does comply
with Sec 10, Art.X of Consti which provides that the creation of
prov, city, mun, brgy should be in accordance with local govt code.
Court declared RA 9335 as unconsti. For failure ot meet population
and land area. Mroeso, the decision declares null and void the
provisions on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations of the LGC
which provides that the land area requirement does not apply when
the proposed province is composed of one or more islands; since
such exemption is not present in Article 461 of LGC.
Held: Article 9(2) of LGC-IRR is valid.
Creating LGUs:
1. Barangay= income and population; land area not requisite
2. Mun, cities, provinces- income, population and land area
a. Mun and cities- if lgu consists of one or more islands,
exempt form land area requirement
b. Prov= exemption is not present in law; but in IRR of
LGC, exempt from land reqt if province consists of
one or more islands
1. Income= 20M annual income, certif. by DoF;
AND
2.
1. Contiguous territory- 2000 sq.km as
certify by Lands Mgt Bureau ;or
2. Population- at least 250K inhabitants
as certify by NSO
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should
apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact,
considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago,
there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would
form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most
cities or municipalities.
Dissent of Carpio: Here, assuming na pwede nga, Dinagat only met
income requirement. But did not meet territory or population.
Dapat at least two reqs. Moreover, it is clear why exemption
withheld from porvinces since rpovinces are the largest political
and corp subd of local gov and geographic absis form which mun,
cities and another prov. will be carved out.
3. Bagabuyo v. COMELEC

RA 9371 increases CDOs legislative districts from one to

two.Comelec issued a resolution to implement No. 9371. Petitioner
wants to nullify both RA 9371 and the Comlec resolution since
unconst. For failing to provide for a PELBAISITE which is allegedly
indispensible for the division or creation of LGU.

rendering service or accepting commission on armed forces of

foreign country.

Held: petition is wrong. Plebiscite is only needed for the creation of

LGU. Not needed for apportionment and reapportionment which is
what happened here. CDO remains one city as it did not divide into
two political and corporate units/territories. Effects is merely to
enhance voter rrepreataion by giving more say in Congress (2 from
CdO) and in Sangguniang Panlungson (16 all in all, 8 each)

Held: Cruz is a natural born citizen. When he was repatriated by

taking oath of allegiance, he reverted back to his original status
which was NBC.

Creation v. Apportionment/Reapportionment
Creation/division/merger/abolition/alternation of boundaries of LGU(1) compliance with reqs in LGC; and (2) plebiscite by maj vote.
(Article X, Section 10)
Apportionment/Reapportionment- allocation of seats in leg body in
prop to population; change in leg disticts brought about change in
population as mandated by equality of representationno
plebiscite reqt; (Article VI, Section 5)
Legislative district v. LGU
Leg. District- political unit but not a political subdivision through
which functions of govt are carried out; NOT a corporate unit so a
strict does not act for an in behald of people comprisiong it; merely
delineates the area occupied by people who will choose a
representative in their national affairs;
A district does not have own chief executive (unlike provgov; city/mun-mayor;brgy-punong brgy) Congressmena is to
ensure voice of people is heard. NOT to oversee the affairs
of leg. District; no elgal personality; no capacity to act.
LGU- political AND corporate units. Possess legal personality
4. Bengson v. HRET
Citizenship of Teodoro Cruz is in question. Cruz was natural-born
citizen of PH born in Tarlac of Filipino parents. However, he enlisted
in US Marine Corps without consent of RP and took oath of
allegiance of US. SO he lost his citizenship under Commonwealth
Act No. 62 which provides that Filipino can lose his citizenship by

Pet (losing candidate in elections) asserts that he cannot run since

no longer NB Filipino and had to reacquire by repatriation.

Two ways to acquire citizenship:

a. by birth-natural born citizen
b. by naturalization-naturalized citizen
Two ways to reacquire citizenship:
a. naturalization lengthy process; To be naturalized,
executor only after 2 years from promulgation that court
is satisfied during intervening period that applicant:
a. has not left PH
b. dedicated to lawful calling or profession
c. no conviction of offense or violation of govt
d. did not commit any act prej. To interst of nations
b. repatriation (Cruz did this) taking an oath of
allegiance to RP and registering oath in Local Civil
Registry of place where person resides or last resided;
Can be used in the ff. instances when citizenship was
lost:
a. desertion of armed forces
b. services in armed forces of allied forces in WWII
c. service in armed forced of US at any other time
d. marriage of Filipino woman to alien
e. political economic necessity
c. direct act of Congress
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
a natural-born Filipino.
5. Aquino v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed Cert. of Candidacy for Rep. for
Second Leg District of Makati City. In the COC, his residence was in
Palm Village Makati but duration of residency was only 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, filed a petition to dq

Aquino since it failed to meet residency period of 1 year. He

amended to 1 year and 13 days. Presented a lease contract.
Comelec dismissed dq case. During 1995 elections, petitioner won!
Comelec en banc issued another resolution reversing itself
declaring pet Aquino as dq.
Held:
To qualify as candidate for representative, must prove that he has
established domicile of choice and not just residence. While Consti
requires that person be a resident of a district, residence for
election law purposes is synonymous with domiciled.
Where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home," 21 where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is
that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for
the purposes of election law.
Purpose of requiring this is to exclude strangers and newcomers
unfamiliar with needs of community from taking advantage of
favorable circumsntaces existing in that community for electoral
gain.
In case, Aquino in his COC for 1992 elections indicated that he was
resident of Tarlac for 52 years preceding election. Birthplace is
Tarlac like his parents. He merely presented lease agreement of
condominium unit in Makati City.
Intention to establish permanent home in Makati is NOT shown
since he only leased, and did not buy. Lease indicates intention to
reside but does not connote permanency; he even testified that he
really just wanted to stay in Makati for one year since he had other
residence sin manila or qc.
While property ownership is not indicia of right to vote or to be
voted upon, fact that he has other residences with short time
resident of Makati plus fact that his domicile in Tarlac means that
his lease agreement was only to meet residence reqt under Consti
and NOT to establish domicile of choice.
Assertion that he transf. domicile from tarlac to Makati= nope!
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. o successfully effect a change of
domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
Clear and positive proof must be shown.

Claim that legally impossible to impose one year resid reqt in newly
created political district lacks basis since a new political district is
not created out of tin air. Carved out from existing location like
here, munic. of Makati.

2. Marcos v. Comelec, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her CoC for Rep. of
First District of Leyte. Residency=7 months. A petition for dq filed
for failing to meet 1 year residency reqt. She amended her coc
chaning seven months to since childhood and reasoned that it was
an honest misinterpretation/mistake. 7 months refers to actual stay
in Tolosa, Leyte (place of actual residence whre she was forced to
register instead of claimed domicile of Tacloban)
Held: Marcos met the residency requirement.
-It is the fact of residence, and not a statement in the certificate of
candidacy which is decisive in deciding won individual has satisfied
the residency requirement in consti.
-

In election law, residence is synonymous with domicile.

Domicile includes twin elements: (1) fact of physical
presence in fixed place; and (2) animus manendi or
intention of returning there permanently.

One does not lose domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. DO not lose domicile when pursing
profession, study; greener pasters; even registering as a voter for
convenience does not mean that he lost domicile since despite
registration, animum revertendi to his domicile is still there.
While Marcos was born in Manila, she grew up in Tacloban where
she studied and reached adulthood there. Even during her
husbands presidency, she kept close ties with her domicile of
origin by celeb. her birthday and other sig. milestones there.
It is contended that Tacloban is not domicile of origin since not born
there and only moved there until she was eight years old. Wrong.
1. Minors follow domicile of parents. Tacloban is domicile of
origin of marcos even if born in Manila since domicile once
acquired, is retained until new one is gained.

2. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. TO effect change in

domicile, one must demonstrate by clear and positive proof.
All three must concur
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Hence, it cannot be argued that she lost domicile of origin by
operation of law when she married Marcos since the Civil Code
provision that provides that the husband fixes the residence refers
to ACTUAL RESIDENCE and not domicile. This is to promote unity in
family. Hence, when Imelda married Marcos,she followed the
ACTUAL RESIDENCE of Marcos. But she did not lose her domicile of
origin but merely gained a new home.
Even assuming arguendo that she gained new domicile after
marriage and only acquired the right to choose a new one after
Marcos death, her acts such as writing letter to PCGG to
rehabilitate ancestral house in Tacloban to make them livable for
Marcos Family supports intention to go back,
3. Domino v. COMELECPetitioner Juan Domino filed COC for rep of Lone leg district of
Province of Sarangani in 1998 elections indicating that he resided
in constituency for 1 yr and 2 months. However, petitioner to deny
due course was filed beore comelec on the ground that he is not a
resident or a registered voted of province of sarangani. Comelec
dqd candidate for lack one year res reqt since in Voters Registration
Card, his address was Ayala Heights, QC. He also ran for
congressman in 3rd distrct of QC in 1995 elections.
Held: Did not meet residency reqt
In qualif. For suggrage and for elective office, residence means
domicile which is (1) intention to reside in fixed place; AND (2)
personal presence in place with conduct indicative of that
intention . Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons,
one intends to return
Principle regarding domcile:
(1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and
(3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time

Domino says that pursuant to his lease of a house and lot in

Sarangani, he established his actual and physical presence thereat.
However, actual and phys. Is not in itself suff to show he
transferred resindence there. TO establish new domicile, (1) bodily
presence; and (2) intent to make it fixed and perm. place of abode.
Lease contract entered in Jan. 1997 does not support change of
domcile. While lease contract may be indicative of intention to
reside in Sarangani it does not endanger the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of orig. domicile. Plus, his lack of
intention to abandon residence in QC is shown by registering as
voter there. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does
give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this
case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. The fact
that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a strong
factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
Later, he bought house he was renting on Nov. 4, 1997, sought
cancellation of prev. reg in QC on oct 22, 1997 and transfer of reg
from QC to sarangi- falls short of resid. Reqt in consti na 1 year.
(May 11, 1998 election)

4. Perez v. COMELEC
Aquinaldo filed CoC for rep of 3rd district of Cagayan in May 11,
1998 elections. Pet for dq since was not resident of district for at
least one year since he is resident of Gattaran, Cagayan.
Held: Met requirement. 7 years siya there condering he was
governor from 1988 to 1998. Since governor, convenient for him to
maintain res. In Tuguegarao since capital of province of Cagayan.
Fact that he is registered voter in Gattaran is not proof that that he
is not domiciled in another district. registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to
have abandoned or lost his residence. Also not important that when
he filed COC in 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections as provincial
governor, he was resident of Gattaran. (note: for
governor=residency in province, NOT distrcit) Plus, fact of actual
resid. Prevails over what is written on coc.

Proof resident of Tuguegarao: 1. Affid of owner of resid. Apartment

in tug, 2. Contract of lease of apart; 3. Marriage cert; 4. Cert of live
birth of daughter; 5. Various letters to Aguinaldo and family
5. Fernandez v. HRET
Danilo Fernandez filed for candidacy as rep of first leg district of
province of laguna. His address was Villa Toledo Subdiv, sta. rosa,
laguna. Pet. To deny due course was filed on the ground that he
was res. Of Pagsanjan, Laguna which was located in 4 th district and
also because he maintained another house in Cabuayao, Lagauna
which is outside 1st dist.
Held: Met 1 year resid. Reqt.
To dq him, evidence presented was COC for various positions in
previous elections indicting Pagsanjan, Lag as resident statement
in COC that place of birth is Pagsanjan, Laguna. However,
Fernandez has shown that while domicile of origin was pagsanjan
laguna, he became resindent of sta. rosa laguna as of feb 2006.
a. extended lease contracts for townhose in villa de Toledo
and certf of pres. Of homeowners assoc that resid. Since
feb 2006; affid. Of neighbots
i. diff from Aquino and Domino where candidate was dq
since lease was only to fulfill the residency reqt. and for
no other material reason.
b. Certify of attendance of children in schools in sta. rosa
c. DTI certify. Of business to show that Fernande and wife
operate business in Sta. Rosa since 2003
Fact that brgy health workers failed to see him in house does not
mean not residence. Consti does not require person to stay in
house 24/7.
Nothing wrong if he transacted business and received vistors in
Cabuyao house, instead of Sta.Rosa res. there is nothing in the
residency requirement for candidates that prohibits them from
owning property and exercising their rights of ownership thereto in
other places aside from the address they had indicated as their
place of residence in their COC.
Also, fact that formal defects in lease contract(lack of
notarization)does not nullify transaction.
Fact that he owns properties in other places like pagsanjan and
cabuyao but only leases in sta. rosa does not mean no resid.

-nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which

require a congressional candidate to sell a previously
acquired home in one district and buy a new one in the
place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a
congressional seat in that other district.
-plus not required to own property; otherwise, only moneyed
can run and poor ones cannot; unconstitutional.
5. Tagolino v. HRET
Involved here is Richard Gomezs CoC when he ran for cong for 4th
legislative district of leyte. But an opposing candidate prayed that
Richars CoC be denied due course or cancelled for failing to meet
the 1 yr resid. Reqt. Because he was a resident of Greenhills, San
Juan. Comelec first division granted the petition without qualif
thereby disqualifying Richard gomez. Lucy gomez filed Coc as
office substitute.
Issue: WON there was valid substitution? No since a valid CoC is a
condition sine qua non for substitution
Undisputed is the fact that Richard was dq to run in May 10, 2010
election since he failed to comply with 1 yr resid. Requirement.
Confusion stemmed from the use of DISQUALFIED by comelec
resolution. But note that basis for disqualification was
cancellation of coc for failure to comply with residency reqt. Noncompliance with such carried with denial of due course to CoC
Petition for dq v. petition to deny due course/cancel cert. of
candidacy
a. DQ- candidates possession of perm. resid. Status;or
commission of acts of disqualification (election offenses, not
penal laws); NOT in question ang elig. Reqts.
a. If dq=still considered to have been candidate but not
allowed to continue
b. Denial of due course/cancellation of COC- lack of relevant
qualification + misrepresentation of material qualif.
a. Effect of cancellation never a candidate at all. CoC
is void ab initio
6. Reyes v. COMELEC
Facts: Regina Ongsiako Reyes filed CoC for position of rep of lone
district of Marinduque. File da petition to deny due course or cancel
coc since she is a resident of Bauan, batangas (resid of husband.
Not a resid. of Baoc, Marinduque. Hence, she did not meet the one
year residency requirement. Also she was a holder of an American

passport which she continued to use until June 30, 2012. Unless she
can prove that she availed of priv under RA 9225 by being dual
citizen and that she made valid sworn rencuniation of AM-citzen,
she remains ineligible to run and hold office.
Held: She is not resid. Of Marinduque.
When someone reacquires Filipino citizenship under RA 9225, he
must still show that he chose to establish domicile in PH and period
of residency shall b counted from the time he made it his domcile
of chouce.
Here proof that she met one year req and never abandoned Boac,
Marinduque was the fact that she served as Provincial
Administration from jan 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But this fact
alone is not suff to prove one year resindency ret. She never
regained domicile in Marinduque since she remains as American
citizen (no oath of allegiance ot RP and did not make personal and
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship). No amount of her
stay in locality can sub the fact that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in USA.
FILLING IN OF VACANCIES
1. Lucero v. COMELEC
Facts: Lucerto (leg. Dis. Of northern smar)was down by 204 votes
to Jose Ong. But this tally did not include the results of certain
precincts. There were allegedly abnormalities in election
particularly in precinct 7 were ballots were not canvassed. Also,
prec. 16s ballots were not counted due to missing electoral
returns. And in prec. 13, boxes were snatched. COMELEC after a
manifestation filed by Lucero, ordered the holding of a special
election on precinct 13. (1 year and 10 months after elections)
Held: In case of special elections, there is no need to fill in vacancy
unless the Congress decides to do so. In other words, if there is
vacancy, it is not mandatory to have a special election. But if there
is a failure of elections, Congress MUST FILL in the vacancy.
Here comelec did not err in holding the special elections. Under
OEC, 2 reqs for special elections: (1) failure of elections; and (2)
failure will affect results of elections. Comelec said that there was
failure since boxes were snatched and since 213 votes ang for prec.
13.

Intent na bawal one year before regular election is to avoid

expense when less than a year away, election na. However, in this
case, imimnal costs lang since limited to only precict no. 13.
Sec 11.
1. People v. Jalosjos
Facts: Romeo Jalosjos is a member of Congress (Congressman) who
is confined at national penitentiary since his conviction for
statutory rape(2 counts)and acts of lasciviousness (6 counts) is
pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge duties despite his concivtion of a non-bailable offense. He
argues that sovereign electorate chose him of first district of
Zamboanga del Norte=mandate of sovereign will.
Issue: WON members of Congress can be exempt from statute
which apply to persons in general?
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement
of obedience rather than exemption. History of privilege shows that
such has always been restrictively applied.
For offenses punishable for MORE than 6 years, no immunity from
arrest. Fore offenses 6 years and below, enough that Congress is n
session(no need to be actually attending sessions/meetings).
He argues that he needs to attend sessions as underscored by Sec
16(2) of Art. VI of COnsti which says that house needs a quorum to
do business and absent members may be sanction for nonattendance. However, members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if reason for absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
While emergency of compelling temporary leaves are allowed to all
prisoners, this is up to the discretion of auth. Or court orders. What
Jalsojos seeks is not emergency in nature. Allowing him to attend
sessions and committee meetin 5 days a week virtually makes him
a free man. This elevates hi to a status of a special class making a
mockery of correction system.
He says that he wants his constituents to be heard=mandate of
people Nope. Perfomrance of leg. and essential duties of public
office is not an excuse to free a person validly in person. Congress

continues to function even in his absence. Never has the call of

duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification. Position of
congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement.
Being a detainee, Jalosjos should NOT have been allowed to do the
following acts: 1. He is provided with office at the administration
building in new bilibid prison where he attends to his
consitutents.2. while under detention, files bills and resolution; 3.
Receives salaries.
2. Trillanes v. Pimentel
Facts: Antonio Trilalnes IV was charged with coup detat under 134A of the RPC following the Oackwood incident. (where armed
soldiers stormed into Oakwood Apartment and publicly demanded
the resignation of PGMA). While udner detention, he won a set in
the Senate to commence on June 30, 2007. He filed a motion with
RTC requesting that he be allowed to attend all functions of senate,
go set up working area in detention place with telephone and
internet access, give interviews, be allowed to receive members of
media who wish to interview him. TC denied this.
Held: Not allowed.
Trillanes argues that his case is diff from Jalsosjos since in Jalosojos,
there was conviction, and for him, he was always detained. Moreso,
Jalosjos was convicted for crimes involving moral turpitude while
coup detat was political offense and an expression of legitimate
girevances. Arguments have NO MERIT. COnsti provides that when
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua (i.e. coup
and rape), not bailable when evidence of guilt is strong.
While it is true that in Maceda, the court rule that prisioners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
cannot engage in any business or occupation, Jalosjos says that
accused can accomplish legislative results somehow. However, the
presumption of innocence does not carry full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
Trillanes claim of DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION: A public official
can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor.

However, this does not apply to criminal case plus in this case,
there is no prior term to speak of. More so, it is clear that election
or re-election does NOT obliterate a criminal charge since voters
elected him to senate with full awareness of limitations on his
freedom faction and with knowledge that he could only achieve
legislative results within the confines of prison.
3. Jimenez v. Cabangbang
Facts: Defendant Bartolome Cabangbang is a member of the House
of Repreentatives. A complaint for damages was filed against him
for an allegedly libelous open letter addressed to the President
wherein he said that members of the AFP were under the control of
planners although they might be unaware of it. Cabangbang filed
mtd on the ground that letter is not libelous and even if it is, it is a
privileged communication.
Held: Not libelous; but note that it is NOT a privileged comm.
Letter does not fall under the phrase speech or debate therein. It
was an open letter written when Congress was NOT in session and
had caused such letter to be published in newspapers of gc. IN
causing the communication to be published, he was NOT
performing his official duty, either as member of Congress or any
committee thereof.
Privileged speech/debate involves utterance of congressman in the
performance of their official functions like: speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the
acts in question
4. Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
Facts: Pobre asked that disbarment and other proceedings be taken
against Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago for speech delivered in
Senate floor where she said that she was irate and foaming in
mouth, suicidal, wanted to spit on the face of CJ Panganiban, calling
members of SC idiots, etc. This was in connection with the unjust
act of the Judicial Bar Council (JBC) for only considering incumbent

justices of the SC as qualified to be nominees for nomination as SC

CJ. Defensor-Santiago claims that the communication was a
privileged speech based on Sec. 11, art. 6 of the Consti.
Held: Privileged speech
Purpose of legislative privilege/ parliamentary immunity to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success and not let it degenerate
into a polite but ineffective debating forum. But parliamentary nonaccountablity is not for their own benefit but to enable to them, as
representative of the people, to perform functions without fear of
being made responsible in courts. Protect members of congress
from government pressure and intimidation which will influence the
decision-making of Congress.
Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not
destroy the privilege. Courts will not interfere with congress in the
manner they perform their functions. It is the disciplinary authority
and the voters who can properly discourage and correct such
abuses in the name of parliamentary immunity.
Nevertheless, as a member of the bar, Court expresses deep
concern regarding her language since this was in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. However, while the Rules of
Senate enjoins Senators fro using improper or offensive lang.
against another senator of any public institution, senate president
did not take disciplinary action against her. She violated rules of her
own chambers but peers did not impose sanctions on her.
Sec 13. Disqualification
1. Liban v. Gordon, 2009
Facts: Petiton to declare Richard Gordon as having forefeited his
seat in senate since he was the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
Held: Did not forefeit seat in senate. PNRC is a non-profit, donorfunded organization. Geneva Convention establishes it as a
voluntary organization; it is private organization performing public
functions.
In MR(2011), Court declared that sections of the PNRC Charter that
were declared void must stay. By requiring PNRC to organize under
Corp. code loses sight of PNRCs special status under Intl.

humanitarian law designed to assist state in discharging obligation

under Geneva convention.
To ensure its autonomy, neutrality and indep, PNRC cannot be
owned and controlled by government. Plus, it is primarily financed
by contributions form private indiv and private entitiels. It is not
under the control of PNRC since only 6 out of 30 members of PNRC
Board of Fov are appointed by members of the Philippines.
Moreover, the presdinent does not appoint the chariman of PNRC.
Hence, pnrc chairman is not official or employee of executive
branch. Hence, not being a government official or employee, PNRC
chairman does not hold a government office or employment.
Therefore, he did not forfeit seat in congress.
Section 14
1. Puyat v. De Guzman
Facts: In the election of the directors in the private corporation IPI,
the Acero group alleged that the stockholders votes were not
properly counted. Quo wrranto proceedings were instituted at the
SEC. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pamabansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for
respondent Acero. Puyat group objected on constitutional grounds.
He withdrew appearance but later filed a motion to intervene on
the basis of his ownership of 10 IPI shares.
Held: Intervening on the basis of protecting 10 shares is still
covered by the prohibition.

Section 16
1. Avelino v. Cuenco
Facts: Senator Tanada requested that he be deliver his privilege
speech on the next session day to formulate charges against then
Senate President Avelino. During such session day, quorum was
presnt since all asenators were present except 2. Petitioner Avelino
delayed appearance and with the help of his followers in Senate,
employed delaying tactics to prevent Tanada from delivering his
speech. He then left session hell with 6 other senators. The rest of
the Senate stayed but later 2 left eventually. In order not to
paralyze the functions of the Senate, the Senate president Protempore Arrans continued the session during which Tanada
delivered his priv. speech and during which the SP was declared
vacant. Cuenco was then designated as Acting Pres. Of Senate.

Held: SC has no jd over subject matter in view of separation of

powers. Controversys political nature and the consti grant of
senate to elect its own president should not be taken over by the
judiciary.
Assuming that SC has jurisdiction, the Court ruled that the rump
senate was a continuation of the validly assembled 22 senators
and that there was quorum in session.
Yes it was continuity of morning session- That a minority of 10
senators left does not prevent the other 12 senators from passing a
resolution with their unanimous endorsement. (note: answer diff if
approved only by 10 or less)
There was a quorum=majority for transaction of business. TWELVE
out of TWENTY THREE MEMBERS constitutes quorum
a. dthe minutes say so
b. at the beginning of session, there were at least 14
senators
c. IN view of absence from COUNTRY of Sen. Confesor,
Consti saying majority of each house shall constitute quorum does
not mean ALL members of the house. There is difference bwhen
you say majority of the house. Since this requires a less number.
An absolute majority (12) of all members of Senate less one
constitutes majority for purpose of a quorum. Even if 12 did not
constitue quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one.
2. Datu Michael Bas Kida v .Senate of the Philippines
Facts: Section 1, Article 17 of RA 9054- an act to streghten and
expand ARRM provides that before it may be repealed or amended,
a vote of 2/3 will have to be complied with. Petitioners assail laws
that amend 9054 for failing to comply with 2/3 vote and plebiscite
reqt.
Held: Supermajoity vote requt is unconstitutional
Even assuming that the laws in question did in fact amend 9054,
the supermajority (2/) voting reqt has to be struck down since it
gives RA 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by demanding
more than what the Consti demands. Under Section 16(2) of art. 6,
as long as majority of HR or Senate are present, these bodies have
quorum to do business and hold a session Within a quorum, a
vote of majority is sufficient to enact law or approve acts.

In contrast, the said provision requires 2/3 votes of members of HR

and Senate,voting separately, to amend RA 9054. This is higher
than what consti requires for passage of bills. Ti restrains plenary
powers of congress to amend, revise and repeal laws it has passed.
While a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a
limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the
passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and
flexibility.
3. Arroyo v. De Venecia
Facts: Petitioners are members of the HR who challenged the
validity of RA 8420(sin taxes) since it was passed in violation of the
rules of HR and therefore a violation of the Constitution. It is said
that the Speaker of the House De Venecias representation that the
law was passed properly is false.
Held: Courts cannot inquire on won rules of House were complied
with. It will only come in if Constitutional rights or private rights are
violated.
Here, it is clear that was what was violated in the enactment of RA
8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the house, NOT the
consti requirement of enactment of law. In fact, it is not claimed
that there was no quorum but that Rep. Arroyo was prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
Court cannot inquire into allegation that in enacting a law,
Congress failed to comly with its own rules absent a showing that:
(1) there was violation of consti provision; or (2) rights private
indivudals are violated.
Congress can make rulesf for as long as they do not violate consti
or fundamental rights. There rules are merely procedural and they
may actually be waived or disregarded by the leg. Body if it pleases
when the requisite number of members have agreed on a particular
measure. No court has ever declared an act of congress void on the
ground that it did not comply with the rules of procedure that the
congress made itself.
4. Osmena v. Pendatun
Facts: Petitioner Sergio Osmena asked for the annulment of
resolution of Special Committee of the HR on the ground that it
infringed his parliamentary immunity. During his speech, Osmena
said that the president was being bribed without proof to show the

same. On that ground, special committee declared osmena guilty of

disorderly behavior.
Held: Although Section 15 of Article VI provides that HR shall not be
questioned for any speech or debate in ant other place, meaning
they are exempt from prosecution or civil action, this does not
mean that they cannot be questioned by Congress itself.
The Rules of the House empowers HR to hold a member responsible
for words spoken in a debate. He says that such power was waived
when they took up other matters before passing the resolution
declaring him guilty of disorderly behavior. However, thec COutrs
have no jurisdiction to interfere in matters like this.
Moreover, Osmena questions won speech constituted disorderly
behavior. Court ruled that;l.c the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behavior because for one, consti conferred
jurisditino uon it. And two, it is a matter that depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House known best and cannot
be depicted in black and white when presented to the Courts for
adjudication. Besides determining so would be abridging the
separation of powers. The judicial dept has no power to revise even
the most arbitrary and unfair action of legislative in pursuance of
the power committed exclusively to the leg department by consti.
5. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Case for alleged violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act was filed against MDS for willfully, unlawfully and criminally
approving the application for the legalization of the stay of certain
aliens whne she was acting as the Comission of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. The SB suspended her for 90 days
from her position as senator and other govt position she may be
holding.
Held: SB has authority to order preventive suspension of MDS. The
order of suspension by the SB is different from power of Congress
to discipline its members under the Constitution. The suspension
under the Consti is a PUNITIVE measure upon an erring members.
As for the preventive suspension imposed by SB, it is NOT a penalty
but a preliminary, preventive measure. The sep. of powers did not
exclude members of congress from RA 3019 .
6. US v Pons

Facts: Pons was charged with c rime of illegal importation of opium

along with two others. They were each found fuilty of crime and
sentenced to prison for 2 years with fine. Pons seeks for the
reversal of his conviction on the ground that the court erred in
finding that the guilt of Pons was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
It is said that Act No. 2381, under which Pons is punished if found
guilty, was passed on March 1, 1914 and not Feb 28, 1914. Feb 28,
1914 was the last day of the special session of Philippine
Legislature and so Act No. 2381 shoul dbe void.
Issue: Can courts look into leg journals to determine the date of
adjournment even when such journals are clear and explicit? No.
Held; The journal says that the legislature adjourned at 12 midnight
of Feb 28, 1914. This settles the question. Pons is saying that it did
not adjourn at mn of feb 28 but on march 1 but then he will be
relying on extraneous evidence which will necessarily rely on the
memory of witnesses. As opposed to legislative journals which are
the acts of the government or sovereign itself. Inquiring into the
VERACTIY of these journals would be violating the constitution as it
violates the separation of powers.
7. Casco vs Gimenez
Facts: Central bank issued Circular No. 95 fixing a uniform margin
fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner engaged in
the manufacture of synthetic glues sought the refund relying on the
Resolution of MB. Auditor refused to refund but Casco says that
exemption of law for urea formaldehyde should mean urea and
formalehyde.
Held: Only urea formaldehyde as a finished product is exempt.
While it is true that the bill approved in congress contained AND
between urea and formaldehyde, with Casco citing statements
made on the floor of senate during consideration of the bill, it
should be noted that INDIVIDUAL STATEMENT do not necessarily
reflect the view of the Snate nor do they indicate the intent of the
HR. Besides, the enrolled bull which uses urea formaldehyde is
conclusive upon courts and if there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by congress and approved
by executive, the remedy is amendment or curative legislation.
NOT BY JUDICIAL DECREE.
8. Astorga v. Villegas
Facts: In question is RA 4065(Revised Charter of manila) It was
originally a House Bill which was then forwarded to the Senate.
Substantial amednemnts were introduced by the Senate and such

amendments were approved by the Senate. HR signifized approval

and caused them to be printed. Printed copies were then certified
and attested by the Sec of HR, Speaker of HR, sec of senate and
Senate Pres. Copies were then sent to the President for approval.
However, mayor reacted and this made Sen. Tolentino realized that
HB 9266 signed into law was a wrong version of the bill as it did not
embody the amendments introduced by Senate. So Pres. Withdrew
the said president.
Held: RA 4065 never became law.
Under the enrolled bill theory, the jud. department, pursuant tot
respect due to coequal and independent departments, should
accept as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated. If the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, courts may look into the
journals and other records of Congress for proof of its enactment.
(silent if attestation s present)
Note that the lawmaking process of congress ends when bill is
APPROVED by both houses. The certification does not add to validiy
of bill or cure any defect present upon passage. However, the
question is what would be the effect of absence of attestation as
are sult of disclaimer and consequently no enrolled bill to speak of,
evidence to determine won bill has been enacted should be entries
in the journal.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the
journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This
Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No.
9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by
both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law,
which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This
We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the
face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by
the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this
Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification

and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences
not intended by the law-making body.
9. Abakada v. Ermita
Facts: Involved here are the constitutional infirmities in the passage
of RA 9337 (VAT). One of the issues raised was that the bicameral
conference committee did not comply with the rules of both
houses.
Held: Adhering to he enrolled bill doctrine, courts should decline to
go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The creation of the
bicameral conference committee was in response to a problem not
addressed by a consti provision i.e.e where both houses of congress
are in disagreement over the changes or amendments introduced.
Leg branch can formulate and implement its own rules to discipline
members and how it conducts its business. If change is desired in
the practice of the BCC< it must be sought in Congress since this
question is not covered by any consti provision.
Section 17
1. Angara v Electoral Commission
Facts: Jose Angara prays for the issuance of writ of prohibition to
prohibit the Electroal Commission from taking further cognizance of
protest filed by Pedro Ynusa against election of pet. As member of
National Assembly in the district of Prov. of Tayabas. National
assembly by resolution has confirmed election of Angara on Dec. 3,
1935. Electoral commission by resolution adopted Dec. 9, 1935
setting as last day of filing protests against election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly. Question is
won electoral commission can take cognizance of protest
notwithstanding confirmation of national assembly that angara is
member of na.
Held: the Electroal Commission is a constitutional organ created for
the purpose of determining all contests relationg to the election,
returns and qual. Of members of the National Assembly. That this
power was lodged in electoral commission and not to NA means
that electoral commission is the sole judge of all contests reting to
ERQ.
Purpose of creating an EC was to have an independent
constitutional organ to pass on all contests relating to ERQ devoid
of PARTISAN INFLUENCE or consideration. This would be frustrated
if national assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules

regarding the manner of conducting said contests. Confirmation of

NA of election is not essential before such member may discharge
duties as member of NA. It is closest to Legislative being under
Article VI, but separate from NA.
Hence, EC was acting within the leg. Exercise of its consti
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of protest.
2. Reyes v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner is asking the court to affirm the jurisdiction of the
HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon her qualifications. She
says that comelec has no jurisdiction over her since she was
already duly proclaimed as winner and already took her oath of
office for the position of member of HR for cong. District of
Marinduque. She claims that HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to election, returns and qualfications of the members of the
HR.
Held: COMELEC retains jurisdiction
1. HRET does not acquire jd over issue nnless petition is duly
filed with tribunal. Not averred here.
2. Jd of hret begind when candidate is considered a member of
the hr. A candidate is considered a member of the hr when
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and
assumed office as member of HR. Concurrence of three
must be present.
In this case, Reyes is not yet a member of the house of members
because she has NOT YET ASSUMED OFFICE. Under consti, the term
of office of member of HR begins only at noon on the 30th of June.
Until such time, COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
u
In her attempt to comply with second reqt of oath, petitioner said
that she took oath before Hon. Belmonte Jr (speaker of House) But
under Rules of HR, an oath to be valid must (1) before the speaker
of the house and (2) in en session. While efore Belmonte, not
during plenary or in open session.
Besides, before her proclamation, the comelec en banc already
disposed of the issue of her lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency.
3. Vera v. Avelino
Facts: Because of the terrorism and violence in the provinces of
Pampanga, nueva ecija, bulacan and tarlac, it is alleged that the

voiting results in said regions do not reflect the free expression of

peoples will. Hence, Senate when it convened said that petitioners
who were among those who received highest number of voted
proclaimed by comelec, shall not be seated or sworn as members
of senate (Pendatun resolution).
Issue: WON senate has power to suspend or postpone admittance
of petitioners? Yes
Held: Not all of the NAs function over election and qualification of
its members were vested in the Electoral Commission. Only
electoral contests relating to the election, return and qualification
of members are transferred. Election contests relates to statutory
contests in which a contestant seeks to oust the intruder AND have
himself inducted into the office. For instance, when a man is
elected in congress who previously sentenced in Bilibid for estafa,
Electoral Commission has no jurisdiction since there is no election
contest. When a member of the house raises a question as to the
qualif. of another, this does not mean there is a election contest
since the former does not seek to substitute the other.
Hence, House/senate still retains authority to defer oath taking
since such is not within power of ER.
4. Guerrero v. Comelec
Facts: Ruiz seeks to declare Farias as a nuisance candidate since
she failed to certificate of candidacy for the position of
congressman. BG is that Farias filed COC substituting candidate
Chevylle Farias who withdrew on April 3, 1998. Ruiz said that Farias
cannot validly substitute since Chevylle was not official candidate
of LAMMP but was an indep. Candidate. Ruiz alleged that another
person cannot sub for indepent candidate. Now she questions the
fact that COMELEC did not exercise jurisdiction over the issue and
alleges that question of substitution should not be within the jd of
HRET
Held: Question on substitution is within jurisdiction of the HRET.
Whether Farias validly substit. Chevulle is best addressed to the
HRET. Pet. Argues that HRET only assumed jd when there is a vlid
proclamation and when proclamation is null and void, there is no
proc at all and mere assumption of office does not deprive comelec
of power to declare nulltity. But this is wrong. An electoral contest
where validy of proclamation of wining candidate who took oath of
office is raise is best addressed to HRET.
The contention that the certificate of candidacy is a statutory reqt
being required under the Omnibus election code does not mean

that it is outside the hret since qualifications should not be

qualified by the term constitutional.

members shall constitute quorum if not less than three including

one justice.

5. Abayon v. HRET
Facts:
Bayon was first nominee of Angat Tayo party list which won a seat
in HR. Respondents filed a petition for quo warrant with HRET
questioning the eligibility of pet. Abyon for a party-list seat on the
ground that Angat Tayo Party list did not represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors. Abayon herself was also not qd
since she did not belong to marg and uner. Sectors since she was
wife of incumbent congressman. Same story for Palparan who was
the first nominee of Bantay party list group.

Held: Mass dq cannot be done since this would permit the contest
to be decided by only three members of the tribunal-all judiciary. IN
effect, this is repugnant ot the consti since is is clear that the SET
have JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE components and that both share
the duty to deceide all contests relating to the election, return and
qual of Sentors. 2:1 ratio of Senators to Justice shows that
legislative component cannot be excluded from participation
without violating consti.

Abayon and Palaparan say that HRET has no jd over their qual. as
nominees of their respective party lists on the ground that it is the
party list that takes a seats in HR not them as individuals.
Held: HRET has jd to determine the qualification of a party-list
nominee if he is bona fide member of party or org.
Although it is the party list that is voted, it is not the org that sits in
HR. It is the party list repts who are elected into office. The party
list nominees are the elected members of the HR. Both district reps
and party list reps are treated in like manner. Same salaries, same
term limits, etc.
The Party-List System act provides that a nominee must be a bona
fide members of party or org. While the authority to preliminarily
determine fitness of nominee belongs to party that nominated him,
where there is an allegation that the party chose a dq nominees to
become party list rep in HR, it is the HRET who has jd. Note that
once an elected members is proclaimed and takes oath, election
contests are within jd over HRET.
6.Abbas v. SET
Facts: Petitioners filed before SET an election contest against 22
candidates of the LABAN Coalition who were proclaimed senators.
Petitioners filed with SET a motion for dq of senator-members from
hearing case on the ground that they were interested parties to the
case. However, SET denied this motion for dq. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners argue that considerations of justice and fair play require
the mass disqualification sought. They propose an amendment to
tribunals rules where more than 4 memebrs are dqs, remaining

In this case, no one can substitute in senate since there is mass

disq. In effect, duty is abandoned. Framers of consti were not
unaware of the possibility of an electin contest that would involve
all 24 senators6 of whom sitting in SET. Consti has no scheme for
setline unusual situation.
This is not to say that no senator-member can inhibit or dq from
sitting in case before SET. Every member as his conscience dictates
may refrain from participation. What iSC is saying that in light of
consti, SET cannot function absent the entire membership of
Senators and that no amendment of its rules can confer on 3
members of Justice alone the power of a valid adjudication of set.
Hence, set was orrect in dismissing pet for dq filed by petitioners.
6. Bondoc v. Pineda
Facts: Pineda (Laban) and Bondoc (Nacionalista) both ran for
position of Represenative for the fourth district of Pampanga.
Pineda won and was proclaimed the inner. Bondoc filed a port
before the HRET. The re-examination of the ballots resulted in the
Bondocs lead over Pineada. Congressman Camasura (Laban),
along with the Sc justices and Cong. Cerilles in favor of Bondoc as
winner of contest. Cong. Camasura told the Laban Sec Reg
regarding his vote which he casted according to the dictates of his
conscinence. In effect, the Laban Sec Gen informed the speaker of
the house of the ouster of Cong. Camasura from Laban for
disloyalty. Consequently, the HR rendered a decision to remove
Cong. Camasura from the HRET. A petition was filed by Bondoc to
annul the decision of the House of Rep. that withdrew the
nomination of Cong. Camasura as part of the HRET.
Held: Resolution of HRET withdrawing Camasura on the ground of
disloyalty is unconstitutional.

The House of Repreenattives is NOT allowed to interfere with the

disposition of an election contest in the HRET through reorganizing
the representation in the tribunal of the majority party. It hsoul dbe
noted that instead of equal representation as held in the 1935
constitution, under the 1987 consti., members of the HRET are to
be chosen based on PROPORTIONAL representation.
That the HRET Is the SOLE judge means it has exclusive jurisdiction
of contests and was created to function as a NONPARTISANT court
although 2/3 of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body
in a sea of politicians. To exercise its jur, HRET must be
INDEPENDENT and its judgment is NOT to be shared with the
Legislature nor with the Court. The EC is a body separate and indep
of the legislature, and when acting within the limits of its authority,
while composed by a majority of the members of the leg, is a BODY
SEPARATE from and independent of the legislature. Judiciary may
also not interfere when HRET is acting within the limits of its
authority. SC only has jd over HRET for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to its as
the sole judge of all election contests relating to erq.
Disloyalty is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the
HRET. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be NONPARTISAN. They must discharge function with complete
detachment, impartiality and even independence from the political
party to which they belong. Hence, the HR committed gadalej when
it expelled Camasura from HRET for casting a conscience vote.
Plus, HR violated Camasuras security of tenure. HRET members are
entitled to sec of tenure and membership may not be terminated
except for just cause i.e. expiration of members congressional
term, death, perm. disability, resignation from political party he
represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political
party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be
expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty"
short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another
political group. As the records of this case fail to show that
Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of
another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the
HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to
security of tenure.
7. Lerias v. HRET
Facts: Lerias and Mercado both ran for the position of
Congressman in the lone district of Southern Leyte. Mercado was
proclaimed the winner. Lerias contended that the in 4 precicnts in

the muncip. of Libagon, her votes were reduced by 100 votes in

each precinict, totaling a reduction of 400 votes. Should her claim
for voted by sustained, she would overcome the 146 winning
margin that Marcado has. Toprove her contention, lerias submitted
original copies of the certify. of canvass of the mun. and prov. board
of canvassers. She also submitted the ORGINAL COPY OF ELECTION
RETURNSnfor mun. board of cancassers of Libagon. On the other
hand, Mercado only relid in the Xerox copy of the certificate of
canvass of Comelec. HRET rejected the ER and sustained the Certif.
of canvass.
Held: HRET IS WRONG! In an election contest where what is
involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each
candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are BALLOTS. If
not ballots, ELECTION RETURNS. Where it is determined that actual
voting took place,the RT must be accorded PRIMA FACIE status as
bone fide results of the voting. The COmelec and HRET can only
reject ER when they are OBVIOUSL manufactured or fake. Is it he
part alleging that they are tampered who must prove this.
Moreso, what is presented before HRET is origainl copy of E, and
CoC is only Xerox. Under rules of evidence, Xerox copy inadmissible
as secondary evidence since not under the exceptions. That being
said, Lerias should be declared the winner.
Judicial review of decision of HRET is possible in the SCs exercise of
extra-ordinary jurisdiction can be used when HRET committed
gadalej in its decision
Sec. 18
1. Daza v Singson
Facts: After the 1987 congressional elections, the HR proportionally
apportioned its 12 sets in the CoA among the several political
parties. One of those chosen was petitioner Daza who was chosen
as a representative of the Liberal Party. However, political party
LABAN was reorganized resulting in a political realignment in the
HR as members of Liberal transferred to LABAN. AS a result, 159LABAN; 17-Liberal. HR then withdrew the seat occupied by DAza
and gave it to one from Laban. Petitioner says that he cannot be
removed because his election thereto is permanent and that Laban
is not a duly regilstered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.
Held: HR has the right to change its representation in the CoA to
reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the POLITICAL
ALLIGNMENTS of its membership. Such changes must be

permanent and do NOT include temporary alliances or factional

divisions that do not involve the severance of political loyalties and
formal disaffiliation or permanent shifts of allegiance from one
political party to another.
Petitioner is wrong in saying that a party, even if registered, must
still pass the test of time to prove permanence. Under this theory,
even the liberal party would be denied representation (when it won,
liberal was only 4 months old and yet no question was raised as to
its right to be represented).
SC has jusridiciton over this case since this a legality, not the
wisdom of the manner of filioing the CoA is not a political question.
Besides, even the question ere political In nature, it woul d still
come within the SCs power of review under the expanded
jurisdiction which gives the SC the auth to determine if gadalej was
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
2. Coseteng v. Mitra
Facts: After the congressional elections on May 1987, there were
many candidate from different political parties. One of which was
petitioner Coseteng, only candidate from political party KAIBA.
Coseteng wrote to the Speaker of the House that she be appointed
as member of the CoA. Her request was endoreses by 9 other
congressmen but this was unheeded. Coseteng now claims that the
members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were
not chosen on the basis of proportional representation.
Held: The members of HR in CoA were chosen based on prop.
Representation.
House composition: LDP-160 79% round up to 80% of House.-->
80% of 12 is 9.6 or 10. The remaining 2 is to be given to LP, the
next largest party in the House, and to KBL, the principal opposition
party in the House. Other political parties are bound by the
majoritys choices. While KAIBA is also considered an opposition
party, its lone member only consists of 0.4% of House. So, not
entitled to a seat in CoA> TO claim prop membership in CoA, a
political party must at least have 8.4% oh house membership i.e at
least 17 congressmen.
The endorsements of 9 other cong. are of no moments since they
are not members of her party and they signed identical end. In
favor of her rival.

Members of CoA were nominated by respective floor leaders(not

party), and were elected by HOUSE (not party).
3. Guingona v. Gonzales
Facts: Senator Romulo(LDP) and Senator Tanada(LP), in a petition
for prohibition, are sought to be preclude form assuming the
position as members of the CoA on the ground that doing so will be
in violation of the Consti.prov that mandates proportional
representation. The mathematical formula based on prop
repreentaiton of each political party is as follows:
(No. of senators in a political party x 12 seats)/total
number of senators
As a result, there are fractional quotients. LDP was entitled to 7.5
members. (NPC=0.5; LAKAS-2.5; LP-1.5) 8 members of the LDP
were nominated to CoA. But this was objected to since this would in
effect deprive other parties of their 0.5 share.
Issue: what to do with the 0.5 to which each part is entitled? Do not
covert into whole as this reduce others share thereby violating rule
on proportional representation. The election of sen. Romulo(LDP)
reduced rep of one party.
To be entitled to seat in CoA, here are guidelines:
1) In the Senate, political party or coalition must have at least two
duly elected senators for every seat in the Commission on
Appointments.
2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in
the Senate, a political party/coalition with a single senator in the
Senate cannot constitutionally claims seat in the Commission.
It is NOT mandatory to full all 12 slots for senators in CoA. Besides,
the CoA can rule by majority vote. Presence of at least 13 members
*under the rules of CoA) constitutes as quorum na. Hence, CoA can
still transact business even with only 10 senators elected thereto
for as long as quorum in CoA still exists.
That said, election of sen. Romulo and sen. Tanada is in violat. Of
constitutional prov. requiring proportional representaiton and is null
and void.
Sec. 21
1. Senate v. Ermita (EO 464)

Facts: Senate invited various officials from executive department to

appear as resource speakers in a public hearing for the railway
project of North Luzon Raliways Corporation. Sen. President Drilon
received a letter from Executive Secretary Ermita that he was
requesting for the postponement of the hearing regarding the
NorthRail project to afford officials time to study and prepare for
various issues. However, Drilon dnied such request as it was sent
belatedly. Likewise, the pResdient of the nORth Luzon Railiway Corp
requested that the same hearing be postponed. On sept. 28, 2005,
the Prsident issued EO 464 which ensured the principle of
separation of powers with respect to leg. Inquiries in aid of
legislation. Pursuant to the EO 464, officials of the Executive Dept
will not be able to attend inquiries in aid of leg. Without the consent
of the president. In fact, Ge.Senga informed Sen. Bianzon of the
Committee on National Defense that no officer of AFp was auth by
pres. To appear. Despite such communications, the investigation
pushed through with only 2 AFP officials attending. For defying Pres.
Arroyos order, these two officals were relived from military posts
and made to face court martial proceedings.
Petitioner taxpayers prayed for the nullification of EO 464 as it is
unconstitutional for depriving Congress of the information in
possession of executive officials.
Held: Inquiries in aid of legislation(sec 21, art 6) v. inquiries during
question hour(sec. 22, art.6)

executive officials. The power is coextensive with power to

legislate.
Notably, there are exemptions to the power of inquiry such as those
falling under the rubric of executive privilege. Executive priv,
whether asserted against congress, courts or pblic, is only
recognized in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. A claim may be valid depending on the ground to justify
it. A claim for privilege must be clearly asserted. Congress has the
right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is
so, and that the President has not overturned that determination.
Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested
information could be classified as privilege
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to
Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely
implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement
that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully
insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It
severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

Moreover, Section 3 and Sec 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated as

it virtually provides that once the head of office determines that a
certain
information is privileged, such determination is PRESUMED
In aid of leg (21)
Inquiries during question hour
(22)
to
bear
the Pres authority and therefore, has the effect of
Aim is to elicit information to be used for
Obtain information in pursuit of
prohibiting
the official from appearing before Congress, subject only
legislation
Congress oversight function
to
the
express
pronouncement of Pres that it allows the appearance
Appearance in mandatory i.e. anyone
Congress may only request appearance
of
such
counsel.
In effect, pres. can assert executive privil. to
may be summoned
withhold information by mere silence.
Except:
Pursuant to a separation of powers,
President;
Department Heads, as alter egos of the
Members of the Supreme Court
Pres, may not appear without the
2. Gudani v. Senga
permission of the President. (exemption
Facts: Petitioners are high-ranking officials of the AFP. Sen.
Exception: Valid claim of executive
only applies to Department heads
privilege
everyone with cabinet rank) Biangzon invited them to appear at a public hearing before the
Senate Committee on Natl Defense and Security regarding the
allegations of massive cheatings in the 2004 elections(Hello Garci
aufio excerpt). EO 464 was issued by PGMA enjoining officials of the
The power of inquiry is essential to the legislative function. It
executive department from appearing in any leg. Inquiry without
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
her approval. Notwithstadning the EO and lack of consent, 2
respecting the condition which the legislation is intended to affect
officials of the AFP appeared before the Senate Committee and so
or change. Experience has shown that mere request of information
they were charged with violating Article of War 65 on willfully
is unavailing and so some means of compulsion is essential to
disobeying a superior officer. Petitioners characterized the directive
obtain what is needed. Power of inqury is broad enough to cover

of PGMA as a gag order which violated the principle of sep. of

powers as it interferes with Senates inquiry in aid of legislation.
Held: Pres. As the commnder in chief, had the power to prevent a
member of the armed forces from testifying before leg. Inquiry.
However, Congress has remedies under law to compel the
appearance of military officer against the consent of the Pres. A
military officials who is summoned by Congress may be compelled
by the PResidnent but if pres is no inclined, president may be
commanded by JUDICIAL ORDER to compel attendance. And pres.
Has to faithfully comply.
Notably, petitioners are NOT charged for violating EO 464 but for
violating the direct orer of Gen. Senga not to appear before the
senate committee. This is important since this is not a matter of the
president exercising her executive privilege, but a matter of
exerting her role as a commander-in-chief of the AFP.
The constitution reposes authority, control and supervision of the
AFP to the Pres, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces.
It is axiomatic that pursuant to the chain of command and military
discipline, military officers have the right to restrict the speech and
movement of their juniors. Here it was clear that the 2 afp offials
even asked prior permission to travel from Baguio to Manila to
attend the hearing.
As ruled in Senate, the Pres may NOT issue a BLANKET requirement
of prior consent on exec. Officails summoned by leg to attend cong.
hearing. Executive priv must be invoked. However, the ability of
the President to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but
on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to
control the actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief
are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.
So if AFP are torn between heeding to the call of Congress and
directives of Pres as commander in chief, AFP must listen to the
commander in chief. However, congress can always ask remedy for
courts for courts to ask Pres.to tell afp members to attend.
BUT THEN AGAIN: Would court allow it? Constitutional provisions
are in danger. Consequence of courts compelling co-equal branch
of government to do this and let members disobey the orders of the
Chief of staff.

3. Neg.O. II Lec Coorp v. Sang. Panlungsod (nature and

essence)
Facts: What is assailed is the validity of the subpoena by the ad hoc
committee of the sangguniang panlungsod of Dumaguete to
petitioner NORECO in connection with pending legislation regarding
the operation of public utilities in Dumaguete City. Petitioner says
the Sangguniang Panlngsod of Dumaguete has no power to compel
attendance and to order arrest of witness who disobey subpoena
Held: Sang. Panlungsod of Dumaguete has no power to issue
subpoena and no contempt power as well.
There is a difference between powers of Congress as repository of
legislative power under the Consti and those that may be exercised
by legislative bodies of the local government units which possess
delegated legislative power.
As seen in the case of Arnault, Congress has to the power to punish
non-members for legislative contempt to preserve authority and
dignity. The power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to legislative function. Leg body cannot legislate wisely
without information respecting conditions which legislating is
intended to affect r change. Since mere requests for information
have shown to be unavailiang, there must some form of
compulsion. The contempt power of congres7766s is incidental to
the exercise ofleg power since how can leg obtain knowledge if it
cannot require the disclosure? In the sep. of powers, each
departments authority was contemplated to be full and complete.
How can it be full and complete when it will have to resort to
judicial dept for every act of defiance?
There is no express provision in the LGC that grants lgu the power
to subpoena witness and p non-embers for contempt. These powers
are judicial in nature and cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power. These are not incidents of performance of leg.
Functions. To allow them to do without statutory basis would violate
doctrine of separation of powers.
SP of Dumaguete may only invite resource persons who are
WILLING to supply information which may be relevant to enact the
proposed ordinance. This investigation does NOT inclsude within its
ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by any electric
cooperative of the conditions of its electric franchise.

4. Standard v. Senate
Facts: Petitioners seeks the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the Senate
Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies to
proceed with inquiries in aid of legislation. This was in connection
with the complaints against Standard Chartered Bank for allegedly
defrauding hundred of Filipinos thru the sale of unregistered
securities in the form of high-risk mutual funds.

Moreover, Moscow incident can create ripplies in relation of Phil and

Russia since dela paz went ther ein official capacity. Since PH is a
state party to UN Convention against corruption and UN convention
against transnational org. crime, the Moscow incidence might
reflect countrys compliance with obligations under these
conventions. Committee can properly inquire as to the source and
purpose of these funds.

Petitioners are saying that committed acted with gadalej since it

was conducting an investigation, NOT in aid of legislation, but to
determine won scb was seeling unregistered foreign securities

Also, Sen. Santiagos verbal commant to arrest pet with senates

written order was signed by 10 senators with senate pres. sign in
accordance with senate rules. Plus, PH senate already published its
rules of proced. Gov. inquiries I aid of leg in 2 newspapers of gc.

Held: This was an inquiry in aid of legislation since it was conducted

to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the
future. The emre filing of a criminal or administrative complaint
before a court or qj body does not automatically bar the conduct of
a legislative investigation.
Moreover, petitioner questions that fact that it was held in
contempt without legal basis. Court said that Congress has
contempt power based on principle of self-preservation. Contempt
power is sui generis because is does NOT attach to the discharge of
legislative functions per se, but it attaches to the sovereign
character of the legislature as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government. Hence, leg had every right to
right to request for assistance from Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation to prevent witness form leaving country.
5. De la Paz v. Senate
Facts: 8 PNP Officers went to Russia to attend a General Assembly.
One of the officers, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by local auth.
at Moscow airport for failure to declare that he had 105K euro
(6.9m) in his luggage and 45K euro (2.9M) in his possession. They
were detained in Moscow for questioning but were then allowed to
return to PH with money confiscated. Upon arrival, they were
subpoenad by Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Pets quest.
Jd of committee since warrant of arrest was issued without requsite
sig. of majority of committee and that senate rules were invalid
since not published as required in the Consti.
Held: Senate Committee has jurisdiction. Pursuant to the grant of
leg to determine it own rules, senate can alter or modify these rules
any time as they may see fit, subject only to imperatives of
quorum, voting and publication.

6. Romero v. Estrada
Facts: Petitioner Reghis Romero II was invited by the Senate
Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Devt in
connection with its investigation on the OWWA funds in the Smokey
Mountain Project (for senate to determine if migrant workers act
should be amended to prtect owwa funds in future). Romero asked
that he be excused but this was denied. A subpoena ad
testificandumw as sent to him directing him to appear and testify.
Petitioner claims that the subject matter of the investigation is sub
judice owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition.
Held: The subject matter is no longer in sub judice. Under the
subjudice rule, comments and dislcosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings are restricted to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court or obstructing the administration of justice.
Violation of this might render one liable for indirect contempt.
(Dapat no extraneous influences. Matters should be uninfluenced
by bias, prejudices or sympathies)
Here, it is no longer sub judice since Court denied with finality
motion f Chavez in chavez case. Hence sub judice issue is moot and
acemedemic. Besides, even if Chavez were still pending, it will not
bar continuance of committee investigation since a legislative
inves. In aid of legislation is different from court proceedings.
Court proceedings settle actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants and involing demandable rights On the other
hand, iial are tools to enable the leg body to gather information and
legislate wisely and effectily. Notably, on-going judicial proceedings
do not preclude conressional hearings in aid of legislation as ruled
in SCB wherein the mere filing of a criminal or admiin. Claims
should not bar the conduct of leg. investigation.

While sabio and scb refer to pending crim and admin cases, it
should also apply to appealed cases and special civil action
awaiting final disposition before course.
7. Garcillano v. House
Facts: Hello Garci tapes where PGMA allegedly instructed COMLEC
Commissioner Garcillano to manipulate in her favor the results of
2004 presidential elections. In the HR. Escudero delivered priv
speech Tale of Two Tapes which set in motion congressional
investigation regarding the issue. During such inquiry, several
versions of the wiretapped recording surfaced. Petitioner Garcillano
filed a petion for prohib with TRO to restratin House Committees
from using illegally obtained wiretapped conversations. It stopped.
But then 2 years after, senateor lacson delivered priv speech the
lighthouse that brought darkness to provide the truth regarding the
tapes.
Congress wanted to file bills for the regulation of sale of
wiretapping equipment. Hence, it was recommended that a senate
investigation in aid of leg be conducted to look into the role of PNP,
ISAFP in alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.
Held: Intervenor Sagge says that his right to due process was
violated since he was summoned to attend hereing without be
arrpised of his rights since no publication of Senate Rules of
Procedure governing inquiries in aid of leg.
Courts grants petition regarding non-publication. Senate cannot be
allowed to continue with inquiry without duly published rules since
this will violate consti reqt as sec 21 requires publication of rules of
procedure. Senate admits that its rules were only publcished in np
of gc in 1995 and 2006. But with respect to those whose term
commenced on 2007 no publication at all.
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate
of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing
inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from
the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held
every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term.
Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem
fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate,
are therefore, procedurally infirm.

Since term of 12 senators expire ever three years, less than a

majority of Senators continue into the next Congress. On that note,
Senate is not a continuing legislative body.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main
rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until
they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously
absent from theRules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall
take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets
of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on
legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The
Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its
legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished
business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring
that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the
Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each
Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that
the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they
are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its
main rules regarding effectivity

8. Neri v. Senate
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Neri testified before Senate Committee On
Acountability of Public Officers and Investigations regarding the
NBN Project, which was awarded by the DOTC to ZTE. He disclosed
the COMELEC chariman abaolos offered him 200M in exchange for
approval of NBN project. He said that he informed PGMA regarding
the bribery attempt but she allegedly instructed him not to accept
the bribe. He refused to answer the ff. questions invoking
executive privilege:
1. WON PGMA followed up on NBN project
2. WON she directed him to prioritize it
3. WON she directed him to approve it

Held:
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres
to the Office of the President. It exists to protect public interest, not
to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is
to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of candid,
objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of
information between the President and his/her advisers in the
process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in
the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the
Constitution. The confidentiality of the Presidents conversations
and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of
judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to
privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public
interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of
governmental powers.
- there is a presumption in favor of presidential communications
privilege.
Elements of Executive Privilege:
1. A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
"Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of
something, the concentrated essence of substance.24 On the other
hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be
delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility
remains with the obligor.25 The power to enter into an executive
agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to
secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall
submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before
contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the
executive nature of the power.

the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by

respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a
member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of
the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official
family.
3. The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely
based on a generalized interest; and in balancing
respondent Committees and the Presidents clashing
interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987
Constitutional provisions on government transparency,
accountability and disclosure of information.
The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
specified presidential communications privilege in relation
to diplomatic and economic relations with another
sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter
stated:
The context in which executive privilege is being
invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of
China. Given the confidential nature in which this
information were conveyed to the President, he cannot
provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not
require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a
coordinate and co-equal department.

2. B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down

precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not
conclusive.

It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the
Presidents communication with her advisor. The NBN Project
involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was
actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the
Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the
agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are
matters which China will surely view with particular interest.

Not every person who plays a role in the development of

presidential advice, no matter how remote and removed
from the President, can qualify for the privilege. In the case
at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of

Priv. character of diplomatic negotiations The secrecy of

negotitations with foreing countries is not violative of the consti
provision on freedom of speech, freedom of press, or freedom of

access to info. An essential characteristic of displomacy is is

confidential nature. Delegates from other countries come and
tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their
differences with other countries and with other
delegates; they tell you of what they would do under
certain circumstances and would not do under other
circumstances If these reports should become public
who would ever trust
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of
respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in
aid of legislation, not the peoples right to public
information. This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed
Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down
in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress" and "neither does the right to information grant a citizen
the power to exact testimony from government officials." As
pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the individual
citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here
are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was
no prior request for information on the part of any
individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to
blur the distinctions between the Legislature's right to information
in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public's right to
information.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed
Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from
inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from
them is to respect matters that are covered by executive
privilege.
-

Committee failed to show the communication elicited by 3

questions are cirtical to exercise of their functions:
o

Committees argue that questions are important for

the discharge of their leg functions in rel to three
pending senate bills and to curb graft and corruption.

Executive privilege is subject to balancing against other

interests and it is necessary to resolve the competing
interests in a manner that would preserve the essential
functions of each branch. We conclude that when the ground

for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought

for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the
fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized
assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal
trial. (US vs. Nixon)
In case at bar, court is NOT confronted with a courts need for
fact to adjudge lablity in criminal case. Rather, it deal with
Senates need for info in rel to leg functions. he burden to show
this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to
intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order
to gather information which, according to said respondents,
would "aid" them in crafting legislation.
Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the
conflicting claims between the Executive and the Legislative
Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive
presidential communications privilege.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be
stressed that respondent Committees need for information in
the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances
when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is
because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight
function of Congress.44 And if this is the primary objective of
respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions
covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that
their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any
event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a
legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent
Committees investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the
Constitution.
CONCLUSION: Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it
must be stressed that respondent Committees need for
information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling
as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in
nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is
merely an oversight function of Congress.44 And if this is
the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the
three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict
their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not
oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and
corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress,

respondent Committees investigation cannot transgress

bounds set by the Constitution.
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees
are, they cannot assume the power reposed upon our
prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are
liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role
played by each official, the determination of who should be
haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with
conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially
the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the
Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial
agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in
itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate
task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted
solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those
investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power
to expose for the sake of exposure.
9. Arnault v. Nazareno
Facts: Jean Arnault represented the attorneys-in-fact of Ernest Burt,
a non-resident American, who received sums from the Philippine
Government in the transaction of the two estates known as
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates.
The Senate formed a committee to investigate the irregularity of
the government in paying to Burt the sum of 1.5M for his alleged
interest of only 20K in the estate. Jean Arnault was one of the
witnesses. He was asked to whom he paid the 440K to. Arnault
said he could not remember and later claimed his right against selfincrimination. He was punished for contempt by the Senate
Committee. Now Arnault questions the power of the senate
committee to do so saying that it immaterial and will not impede
the legislative process.
Held: The senate committee has power to punish for contempt.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the j dog a
legislative body, the investigating committee has the power to
require a witness to answer any question pertinent to the inquiry,
subject to his right against self-incrimination.
The inquiry to be within jd of leg body
a. must be material or necessary to the exercise of
power i.e. to legislate, to expel a member; and

b. every question which the investigator is empowered to

coerce a witness to answer must be MATERIAL or
PERTINENT to the subject of the inquiry or investigation.
However, every question need NOT be material to any
proposed legislation. The materiality of the question
must be determined by its DIRECT RELATION to any
proposed legislation.
RATIO: Lack of necessity for leg action and the form or
character of action are determine by the sum total of
the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of information elicted
from a single question.
However, the fact the leg body has jd or power to make inquiry
does NOT preclude courts from corrective clear abuse of discretion
such as when questions are not pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.
Here, the question is pertinent- in fact he very objective of the
investigation.
Nevertheless, if the subject of the investigation before the
committee is within the range of leg inquiry and the proposed
testimony of witness relates to that subject, obedience to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
-WON Senate has authority to commit someone for a term beyond
its period of legislative session? YES. Senate, being a continuing
body whose members are elected for a term of 6 years and so
divided that seats of only 1/3 become vacancy every 2 years, 2/3
always continuing into the next Congress save for vacancies that
occur thru death or resignation. For HR, elected for term of 4
years., can give authority to its committees during recess after the
expiration of a congress.
. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during
recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any
proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very
purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative
body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative
functions.

3. claim of right against self-incrimination Since according to the

witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's
verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim
that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
10. Sabio v. Gordon
Facts: Pursuant to Section 4(b) of EO 1 which created the PCGG, no
member of the PCGG shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any jud, leg or admin proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance. Its constitutionality is being
questioned as it impedes the Senates power to conduct legislative
inquiry under Sec 21, Art. 6 of Cons.
MDS introduced Senate Resolution No. 455 directing an inquiry in
aid of leg for the anomalous lossess of POTC, PHILCOMSAT, PHC for
alleged imporopriaties of its BoD. Sabio, the chariman of the PCGG
was invited to be one of the resource persons. He declined citing
Section 4(b) of EO 1.Subpoean ad testificandum was issued
requiring chairman sabio and other pcgg commissioners to appear.
They did not appear. Gordon cited order saying they will be cited in
contempt if they fail to appear. Chairman Sabio was detained in
Senate premises.
Held: Section 4(b) is repealed by the 1987 consti and the
petitioners are ordered to comply with subpoena ad testificandum.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is
needed." T
PCGG not exempted under Consti. Congress power of inquiry is so
broad that it encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws and other proposed laws. It
even extends to government agencies created by congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of congress to
regulate or abolish. PCGSS belongs to this class.
Section 4(b) also violates consti provision on public office being a
public trust.

Notably, Section 21, art 6 says rights of those invited shall be

respected.
a. Right to privacy claim In evaluating violations of right to
privacy, ask:
a. WON person exhibited reasonable expectation of
privacy
b. If yes, won that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion
Case: No violation here. Inquiry focuses on pets acts in the
discharge of their duties as officers and directors of
corporations. plus, there corporation have govt interest.
b. Right against self-incirimation note that it may only be
invoked when incriminating question is being asked. Here,
no way of knowing since they never showed up.
Section 22:
1. Senate v. Ermita
Section 23
1. Sanlakas v. Exec Secretary
Facts: 300 Junior officers and AFP stormed into Oakwood Premiere
Apartments in Makati City demanding the resignation of the Pres,
Sec of Defense and Chief of PNP. Because of such, President issued
Proc. No. 427 and General Order NO. 4 declaring a state of rebellion
and calling out AFP to suppress rebellion.
Aug 1, 2003, pres lifted state of reb. Thru PO 435. IN the interim,
petitioners were filed challenging validity of PN. 427 and GO 4 on
the ground that declaration of state of rebellion was an exercise of
Congress emergency powers thereby impairing the lawmakers
legislative powers.
Held: That was NOT an indirect exercise of emergency powers. In
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out armed forces, Pres
was merely exercising a wedding of her powers of Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief. These are purely executive powers
vested on Pres by Section 1 and 18 of Article 7.
When pres called out armed forces, the declaration of a state of
rebellion was a superfluity. It only gave notice to the nation that
such states exists and that armed forces were called to prevent it.
To exercise the call out power under Section 18 of art VII( when
Pres as cic whenever it becomes necessary may call out the armed

forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

rebellion; suspend writ of habes corpus; power to declare martial
law), Pres need not make a declaration of a state of rebellion.
However, in HC and ML, consti requires concurrence of 2
conditions: (1) actual invasion or rebellion; (2) public safety
requires exercise of scuh power. BUT these are not required for
exercise of calling out power.
Note that the commander-in-chief powers are so broad and are not
limited to what are expressely enumared in article on Exec
Depatment and in scattered provisions of the Consti. Hence, Pres
has power to declare state of rebellion based on her powers as
chief executive and from her being the commander-in-chief.
Note that a declaration of state of rebellion, like state of martial
law, does not diminish consti.rights. It does NOT suspend operation
of Consti or suspend the priv. of habes corpus.
2.David v. Arroyo
Facts: There are 7 consolidated petition for certiorari and
prohibition alleging that PP 1017 and Gen Order No. 5 issued by
PGMA was issued in gadalej.
Background:
-20th anniv of EDSA PEOPLE POWER I, issued PP1017 declaring a
state of national emergency by virtue of her powers vested by
section 18, art 7 of consti , commanding afp to maintal law and
order throughout the PH and prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence and any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all lawas, decress, regulation prom by her as
provided for in sect 17, art 12 of consti
Bases of declaration:
1. elements in political oppositions have conspirated with
authroitarians of extreme left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and
right(military adventurists) trying ot bring down president.
Claims of leemnts recklessly magnified in media and
adversely affecting economy. iN other words, conspiract of
some military officer, lefists insurgists of NPA and members
of political oppositions
examples:
- One week after declaration of state of national emergency, and
after all pets filed, she lifted PP 1017 and issued Proc No 1021
stating that state o fnational emergency ceased to exist. In that

said Proc, she said that by virtue of Gen ROder No 5 and 6which
were issued onbasis of Prc No. 1017, AFP and PNP directed to
matianin law nd aorder and they effectively did so.
Issue: WON there was factual basis in the exercise of her power?
Held: They failed ot show that Pres arroyoes exercise of claling out
wer by sisueing PP 1017 is bereft of factual bases
NOTE: It it incumbent upon pet to show that pres decision is
TOTALLY BEREFT OF FACTUAL BASIS. Failure to do so, the court
cannot take an independent investigation.
IN the SGs consolidated comment and memorandum, there was
adetailed narration of event with supporting repors froming part of
the recors:
1. ESCAPE OF MAGDALO GROUP
2. AUDACIOUS THREAT OF MADALO-D-DAY
3. DECFECTION IN MILITARY PARTICULARLY PHILIPPIN MARINES
4. Reporving statements from comunit leaders
5. Minutes of the intelligence reports and secuit forup of Phl
amry hsowing alliance between NPA and Army
Hence, Court is convices that pres was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for milirary aid
B. Dosctrines of Politivl Theoirsts on the power of the Pres in times
of emergency
1. John Locke (THEORY OF PREROGATIVE) IN times of danger
to nation, law by leg may be inadeq to the promptness of
action needed to avert catstrohe. Hence, crown retains a
prerogative to act accdg to discretion for public good,
without the proscription of law and sometimes even against
it
2. Jean-Jacque Rousseau need for temporary suspension of
democratic processes of govt in time of emergency;
inflexibility of law can be disastrous; SUPREME MAGISTRACY;
unwilling to reply on appeal to havan; he relued upon tenure
of office to avaoid perpetuation of dictartorship
3. John Stuart Mill- ARDENT DEFENSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVT in case of extreme necessity, there is assumption of
absolute power int eh form of TEMPRARY DICTATORSHIP
4. NIcollo Machiavelli unlike others, seeks to incorporate into
the consti a REGULRIZED sstem of STANDBY EMERGENCY
POWERT OT BE INVOKED with SUITABLE CHECKS and control

in times of national danger. He gives emergency powers but

with CONSTITUTIOANL RESTRAINS.

-in case, pres due to her vast intelligence netweork is in

best positon to determine if condiions are present or not

Contemporary political theoirts have adopted the DOCTRINE OF

CONSTIUTIOANL DICTAROTRSHIP:
a. Watkins okay lan absolutism for as long as there
are mechanisms to protect established insiutions
form the danger of permanent injury in a period of
temporary emergeyc and is followed by prompt
return to the previous form of political life: 2 key
elemtsn of prolem of meregency governance:
(1) Increasing administrative powers of
executinve
(2) At the same time, imposing limitations upon
tha tpowers

-under claling out power, pres may summon armed forces to aid in
suppress lv,in,reb. This involves ORDINARY POLICE ACTION . Every
act that goes beyond the Pres calling-out pwer is considered illegal
or ultra vires. So pres must b careful.

IN SUM: To solve one real problem in emergency ogvenrance:

allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the
Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be
exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under
effective limitations and checks.

As held in Sanlakas: basis was Section 4,

chapter 2, Book II of Revised Admin Code
of 1987: Acts of the President fixing a
date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the
existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force
of an executive order.

Relied on Sec 18, Art VII and Se

Art XII (states extraordinary po
take over privately-owned publi
and business affected with pub

Merely an act declaring a status or

condition of public moment or interest;
harmless, without legal singigance,
deemed not written

Not deemed harmless, without

significance

PHILIPPINE SETTING NA:

In drafting 1987 consti- comm wnted to crate a gov in the concept
of Justice Jacksons BALANCED POWER STRUCTURE. None has
monopoly of pwer int time of emergency, Each brachn is given a
role as limitation.
CONTI BASIS OF PP 1017:
Three imoportant provisions of PP 1017:
First provision:
by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection
or rebellion
-callig out powergrants pres as commander in chief a sequence of
graduated powers: (most to the leaset nenign)
1. calling out power
2. power to suspend priv of writ of hc
3. power to declare martial law
In IBP v Zamora, only criterion for calling out power is when it
bcome necessary to prevent or suppress la less violence,
invasion or rebellion.

Difference between pres. authority to declare state of rebellion (as

in the case of Sanlakas) and the authroiy to proclaim a state of
national emergency.
Declare state of rebellion
Emanates from power as chief executive

Proclaim state of national

emeregency
Form commander-in-chief

Some say PP 1017 was dec of marital law but it is not so since in
the wording, she was invoking her calling out power. Dec of martial
law is warning to ciicanes that military power has bene called upon
to assist in maintence of law and order and tha thwile meregcen
lasts, they must, upon pain or arrest, not commit any acts that will
render more the diff the restoration of order. Justice Mendoza
further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without
judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of
news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of
Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the
President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid
declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.

Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a

declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to
assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest

so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.

Second provision:
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; (AKA TAKE CARE POWER)

Pet calim that inclusion of sec 17, art XII was encroachment of legs
emergency powers:

As executive, role is to enforce laws. But what is assailed is to

enforce ofbsenceience ot laws PROMULGATED BY ME PERSONALLY.
It is clearly a lifted from Proc NO 1081 from marcos that palced
counry uner martia law. That was the calseu that activated that leg
power of Marcos.

Disctinction between pres auth to declare state of national

emeregency and exercise emeregency powers:
Declare state of national emergency
Sec 18, art VII (clear grant)

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by

two-thirds of both Houses in join
assembled, voting separately, s
the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.

Is Presidnent granted an ORdaince power under admin code of

1987? SHE CANNOT ISSUE DECREES similar to marcos. Her
ordiance power is limited to issuance of exec orders, admin order,
proclamation, memorandum order, memo circuulars, general or
special orders.

(2) In times of war or other na

emergency, the Congress may
authorize the President, for a lim
period and subject to such restr
it may prescribe, to exercise po
necessary and proper to carry o
declared national policy. Unless
withdrawn by resolution of the C
such powers shall cease upon th
adjournment thereof.

Hnec,e PP 1017 is unco as far as it grants PGMAauth to promulgate

decrees. Only leg can do this.
Netiehr mrtia law nor a state of rebellion nor state of meregenc
can justiy pres arroyo exerics eof leg power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws
through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority
to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot
call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as
customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws
on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the
military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to
suppress lawless violence.
Third provision:
as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency. (POWER TO TAKE OVER)

Exercise emeregency po
Sec 23, Article VI

It is clear that Arroyo can declare state of

national emeregency even in the
absence of Congressional enactment

Exercise of emeregency powers

oer or privately owned public ut
business affected with pi, requ
delegation from Congress

GR:Congress is repository of em
powers as seen in sec 23(2) aut
delegate such to Pres.
Exception: Due to grave emereg

(1)There must be a war or o

emergency.

(2) The delegation must beHeld:

for The deployment of AFP and PNP was not by itself an exercise
of emergency powers udner Section 23, art 6. Here, pres. did NOT
a limited period only.
PROCLAIM national emergency. She merely proclaimed state of
(3) The delegation must beemergency in three places mentioned.
to such restrictions as the Congress
Moreover, she need not act pursuant to a law authorizing her to
may prescribe.
exercise eo powers since consti. itself vests pres. \ to call out afp to
(4) The emergency powers prevent
must beor suppress lawless violence. (Sec 18, art7)
exercised to carry out a national
It is true that courts may inquire into the factual bases of Pres
policy declared by Congress.
exercise of power, but it will respect judgment on the matter unless
it was attended by gadalej. Pres as CIC has vast intelligence
network to gather informaiton, some of which are highly
confidential. ON the spot decisions may be imperative to aver loss
of life or property. In case, not shown that declaration of state of
Sec 17, art 12 is an aspect of ermegncey power. Thus it refers to
emeregency was without factual bases. They simply alleged that
power of CONGRESS, NOT PRESIDENT. WON pres can exercise
since not all areas under ARMM were palced under SoE, it follow
power depends if CONGRESS ELEGATES IT TO HIM PURSUANT TO
that take over of entire ARMM had no basis.
LAW>. Seciton 17s emeregeny=tsunami, huurcane, typhoon.
However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President
express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP
to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3)
to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules
that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President,
in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned
public utility and private business affected with public interest.

3.Ampatuan v. DILG Sec

Facts: PGMA issued Proclmation No. 1946 a day after the massacre
of 57 men and women, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to suppress lawless
violence. She also issued AO 273 which transferred the
supervision of the ARMM from Office of the Pres to the DILG. Later
AO 273-A which amended wording delegating supervision.
These are questioned saying no basis to declare state of
emergency and an invalid exercise of emergency powers so
declared unconstitutional.

Note that imminence of violence between ampatuan and

mangudadatu clans cannot beignored. TO pacify peoples fear, pres
had to take preventive action. Calling out afp was control
proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle armed groups..
Sec. 24
1. Tolentino v. Sec of Finance
Facts: Questioned here is the constitutionality of RA 7716 which
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system. One of the
grounds raised is that it violated Section 24, Article 6 of the Consti.
on the ground that it did not originate exclusively in the HR
because it was a consolidation of two distinct billsH No. 11197
and S No. 1630. After 2 verson gone thru conference committee,
house approved the conf committee which for all practical purposes
was the senate bill. It is argued that shall originate is qualified by
the word exclusively.
Held: Does not violate. The consti prov means that the house alone
can INTITIATE the passage of revenue bill in such that if house
does not intitiate one, no revenue law will be passed. But once
House has approved the revenue bill and passed it on to senate,
senate can completely overhaul it by amendment, or amendment
by substitution. Senate is NOT BOUND to retain the essence of what
house has approved.

Hence, it is the bill which must originate from house. The law itself
is a product of the total bicameral legislative process (product of
both senate and house)
A bill, orginiating in the House, may undergo extensive changes in
the Senate that there result may be a rewriting of the whole.
Hence, as a result of senate action, a distinctbill may be roduced.
Insititng that the bill that orgainates from house would deny the
senates power to concur with and propose amendment. This would
violate the coequality of legislative power of 2 houses.
Theory that limiting senates power with respect to revenue bills to
compensate for its grant of treaty-ratifying power is of no moment.
Powers involved are different. Here what is involved is alegistlative
power that consti vests in the congress which is composed of both
the house and the senate. Treaty-ratifying power is the exercise of a
check on the executive power, and it is not an exercise of
legislative power.
What the consti means is that the initiative for filing revenue tariff,
or tax bills must come from HR on the theory that since HR are
elected from districts, member of HR are more sensitive to the local
needs and problems. Senators who are elected at large approach ht
problems from the national perspective.
Consti does NOT prohibit the Senate from filing a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of bill from house, as long as action by
senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of House Bill.
When there results a third version emereging out of a conference
committee Thid version is considered an amendment in the
nature of a substitute. This is allowed provided that the third
version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate Bills.
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a
conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate
bill. 17 If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of
one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose
several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the
nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to
the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report
was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress
to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge
that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third
legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 18

2. Pascual v. Sec of Public Works

Facts: Pascua, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, institution action for
declaratory relief on the ground that RA 920 An act appropriating
funds for public works contained an item of P85K for construction
of feeder roads which were nothing but projected and planned subd
roads not yet constructed wthin the Antonio Subdivision which was
privately owned by respondent Zulueta (a member of Senate).
Thereafter, Zulueta donated that feeder roads to Pasig, Rizal. But
then this donation violated the consti provision prohibiting
members of congress from being directly or indirectly financially
interested in any contract with govt. It is argued that construction
of projected feeder roads will enhance value of subd as it relives
Zulueta from constructing subd. Roads at his own expense.
Held: Generally, leg. Is without power to appropriate public revenue
for anything but a public prupose. It is the essential character of
the DIRECT OBJECT of the expenditure which must be examined. It
is not he magnitude of the interest to be affected or the degree to
which the general advantage of the community. The INCIDENTAL
BENEFITS to the public or to the state, WHICH RESULS from the
promotion of PRIVATE INTEREST and the prosperity of PRIVATE
enterprises or business, does not justify the use of public money.
Taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and not
for adv. Of private individuals. The test of the constitutionality of a
statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is
designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the
furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each
advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.
It is of no moment that the feeder roads were then donated five
months after the approval of the appropriation. The validity of a
statute depends upon powers of Congress AT THE TIME OF ITS
PASSAGE OR APPROVAL, not upon events after or subsequently
thereto. jbh
Sec. 25
1. Garcia v . Mata
Facts:
Being questioned is the constitutionality of Section 11 of Special
Provisions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines of RA 1600.
Petitioner Esuebio Garcia was an officer of the AFP on inactive
status. Pursuant to RA 1382, he had a total of 9 yrs, 4 mos and 12

days of accumulated active commissioned service in the AFP. This

was short of the 10 yr requirement of the law in order to be
reverted back to active status. However, pursuant to RA 1600 and
when such took effect, pet already had 10 yrs, 5 mo and 5 days in
the armed forces. Accdg to RA 1600, par.11, the reversion back to
inactive status was prohibited for those who have at least 10 yrs of
accum. Service.
Respondents argue that par 11 of RA 1600 was unconstitutional
since had no relevance or pertinence to the budge in question or to
any appropriation item contain. This was a rider, which is prohibited
by the Consti.
Held: Par 11 of RA 1600 is unconstitutional for being a rider, hence
petitioner Garcia cannot compel that he be reverted to active
status.
RA 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the government
for fiscal year 1956-57. Par 11 on the other hand refers to the govt
policy of calling to duty and the reversion to inactive status of
reserve status. It was a non-appropriation items in an appropriation
measure in violation of the consti prohibition against riders to the
GAA. It was a new and completely unrelated provision attached to
the Approp. Act.
It also violates the consti provision that provides that no bill may be
enacted into law that embraces more than one subject, which shall
be expressed in title of bill. In determining if a provision is
embraced in subject, reasonable doubt should be in favor of
validity. If not clearly embraced, provisions are inoperative. While
the title is not required to be an index to the body of the act, it is
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the GENERAL subject
and all provisions are germane to the general subject this consti
prov was to intended to preclude the insertion of riders in
legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject
matter of the bill.
2. Farinas v. Exec. Secretary
Facts: In question is Section 14 ( a repealing clause) of RA 9006.
Sec 14 repeals Sec 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code and
sec 10 and 11 of RA 6646. Sec 67 of OEC provides that any elective
officers, national or local, other than the one he is holding in perm.
cap, except for P and VP, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Sec. 14 is
said to be a rider since RA 9006s title is An act to enhance the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections

through fair election practices. In its dec. of principles, it says that

bona fide candidates for any public office shall be from any form of
harassment and discrimination.
Held: Section 14 is NOT A RIDER of RA 9006. The objectives of RA
9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Sect 67 of
the ORC. TO require that the repeal of Sec 67 be expressed in its
title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Sec 67 which imposes limitation of
elective officers, to other provisions of RA 9006 which deals with
the lifting of the ban of use of media for election propaganda does
not violate the one subject-one title rule.
Having a single general subject, as indicated in the title, may
contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse, as long
as they are NOT INCONSISTENT TO THE GENERAL SUBJECT, and
may be considered in FURTHERANCE OF SUCH SUBJSECT by
providing the method and means for carrying out the general
subject.
As held in the deliberation for RA 9006, it was said that Section 67
of the OEC is a form of harassment or discrimination. And it was
said at the to level the playing filed, RA 9006 should cover it and it
should not be considered a rider.
While the repeal of sec 67 may be considered bad policy, policy
matters are not eh concern of the court as it is within the exclusive
dominion of the political branches of govt. Whether an enactment
is wise or unwise, is outside judicial cognizance.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the consti directive that subject
of a bill should be embraced in its title is to APPRISE the
LEGISLATORS of the purpose, nature and scope of its provisions,
and prevent the enactment into law matters which have not
received notice, action and study of the legislators and public.
Here, it cannot be claimed that legs were not apprised of the repeal
of Sec 67 since this was comprehensively deliberated by the
members of the house.
3. Belgica v. Ochoa
Facts:
Prok barrel is an appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and securely primarily to bring money to a reps
district. Some call this legislative control of local appropriations. In
the Philippines, Pork Barrel is referred to as lump-sum

discretionary funds of members of the leg. However, it has

been shown that this now includes certain funds of the Pres such as
the :
b. Malampaya Funds marcos enacted a law to set up
a special fund to help intensify, strengthen and
consolidate govt efforts for the exploration,
exploitation and dev of indigenous energy resources
vital to economic growth.
c. Presidential Social Fundscreated under the Charter
of PGCOR; special fund administered by Presidential
Mgt staff thru which Pres provides direct assistance
to PRIORITY PROGAMS And PROJECTS not funded
under the regular budget. Sources form share of govt
in the gross earnings of the PAGCOR
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, LGUs are implementing agencies if
they have the technical capability to implement the projects.
Legislators were also allowed to identify programs or projects,
except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside
of his leg district provided he secures the written concurrence of
the legislator of the intended outside-district, as endorsed by the
speaker of the house. Finally, a realignment of PDAG funds,
modification and reversion or project identification, as well as
requests for release of funds, were all required to be endorsed by
the House Committee on Appropriation and the Senate Committee
on Finance, as the case may be.
Controversies: presidents uses Pork Barrel to gain congressional
support.
- Former Marikina City Rep blew the whistle and said legislators
earned much in the form of kickbacks. However, because of lack of
evidence in 2004, petition to declare PDAF as enacted in the 2004
GAA as unconstitutional was dismissed. However, in 2013, NBI
began its probe into the allegation that govt has been defrauded of
P10 billion for 10 years by syndicate using funds from the prok
barrel to fund ghost projects. (JLN Corporation-swindled billions
using approx. 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. NGOs were
supposedly recipients of PDAF funds, whistle blowers declare that
money was diverted to Napoles private accounts.
As for the Presidential Bork Barrel, it was alleged that at least 900M
form royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project in
Palawan intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries went to dummy
NGO.

Now the Pork Barrel System is sought to be declared

unconstitutional.
Held:
It is argued that the Pork barrel violates the separation of powers
PreliminariesDefinition of terms:
1. Pork barrel System-collusion between the Leg and Exec
branches to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their
offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its
distribution. There are two kindsCongressional Prok barrel
(PDAF) and Presidential Pork Barrel (Malampaya and PSF)
a. Lump-sum funds are allocated thru appropriations
process to an individual officer
b. The officer is given sole and broad discretion to
determine how funds will be used
c. Guidelines on how to spend funds are vague,
overbroad or inexistence
d. Projected funds are intended to benefit a definite
constituency in a particular part of the country and to
help political careers of disbursing official by yielding
rich patronage benefits
2 kinds of lump-sum, discretionary funds:
1. Congressional Pork Barrel- lump-sum discretionary fund
where legislators, individually or collectively, are able t
effectively control certain aspect of funds utilization thry
various post-enactment measures. (petitioner consider PDAF
as under 2013 GAA as cong pork barrel since it is a postenactment measure that allows leg to wiled collective
power)
2. Presidential Prok Barrel- lump-sum discretionary fund
allowing the Pres to determine the manner of its utilization.
MAIN DISCUSSION NA:
- pursuant to sep ofpowers, leg has no authority to execute or
construe the law, exec has no power to make or construe
law, and judiciary has no power to execute or construe law.
There is violation of sep of powers when there is undue
encroachment on domain of another.
- The enforcement of the national budget primarily contained
in GAA is a function constitutionally assigned to the
EXECUTIVE BRANCH. Leg should not cross over the filed of
implementing national budget.

Congress role in Consti: when congress deliberates or acts

on the budget proposal of the President. After that, congress
formulates an appropriation act making sure no money may
be paid from treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law. Upon arrival and passage of
GAA, Congress law making role ends and from there,
exe role of implementing the national budget beginds. Note
thought that congress may still exercise oversight function
which is a mechanism of checks and balances. POSTenactment measure beyond oversight is bawal. Postenactment measures must be limited to scrutiny and
investigation.

HOWEVER, notwithstanding the sep of powers, there are system of

checks and balances. Example is the pres power to veto an item
written into approp, revenue or tariff bull submitted to him by
congress for approval aka. BILL PRESENTMENT. (Section 27(2) of
Art. 6.
Justification of Presitem veo rests on policy goals such as to
prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restriction on leg, and
foretigy execs role in budgetary process. For pres to exercise item
veto, there must be proper item which is the object of veto. An
item= particulars, details and distinct and severable parts of the
approp.of bill. Item in appop bill is a specific appropriation of
money, not some gen. prov of law in an approp bill.
Hence, for pres to exercise power of item veto, the gaa must
contain specific appropriations of money. Also, an item of approp
must be an item characterized by SINGULAR
CORRESPONDENCE=an allocation of a specified singular amount
for a SPECIFIED singular purpose aka line item. Example of line
item- calamity fund, contingent und, intelligence fund=approp
which state a spec amount for spec purpose.
ALSO an approp may be validly apportioned into component
percentages or values. However, note that each percentage or
value must be ALLOCATED for it own corresponding purpose in
order to be considered a LINE ITEM.
A valid appopr may even have a SEVERAL RELATED PRUPOSES that
under accounting and budgeting prupose is considered as ONE
PURPOSE like MOOE (maintenance and other operating
expense)=suff specific for pres item veto.

HENCE, special purpose funds and discretionary funds are

subject to item veto-power for as long as they follow the
rule on singular correspondence.
With regard to special purpose funds, Section 25(4), art 6 of
Consti requires that special appropriation bills shall specific
the purpose for which it is intended and shall be supported
by funds actually available as certify. By national treasurer.
With regard to discretionary funds, section 25(6), art 6
requires that said funds be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and
subject to such guidelines may be prescribed by law.
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations
which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped
as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such
appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both
the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of
the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple
purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation
law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money and
hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As
a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he
finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the
entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate
purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such
arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering
that the implementing authority would still have to determine,
again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual
purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the
implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative
prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system
where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislators
identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies
the President the chance to veto that item later
on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the
President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the

Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the
demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum
appropriations are essential to financially address situations which
are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the
decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is
constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded. 214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only
appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would
be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own
discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget
within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents power of
item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described
system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the
entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with
his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
3. Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification
feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally
flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lumpsum appropriation above-characterized.
In particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would
be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple
purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials,
construction of roads, flood control, etc.
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the
actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily

indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the

Presidents power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting
scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors
from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in
more stringently auditing the utilization of said
Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by
line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project,
and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of
similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting
system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for
future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the
Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the
matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even
commendable ends.218

4. Demetria v. Alba
Facts:
Assailed is the constitutionality of Section 44 of PD 1177 of Budget
Reform Decree of 1977 as it allows the illegal transfer of public
funds.
Held: There is a LIMITED leeway of the prohibition of transferring an
appropriation for one item to another. The purpose and conditions
for wchih the funds may be transferred were specified i.e. transfer
may be allowed to augment an item and such transfer may be
made only when there were saving from another item in the
appropriation fo the concerned govt branch or const. body.
Upar 1 of Sect 44 unduly over extends the privilege granted to the
Pres since it allows the latter to INDISCRIMINATELY TRANSFER funds
from one dept, bureau, office or agency of the Exec dept to any
prograp, project or activity of any dept, bureu office included in the
GAA without regard as to won the funds to be transferred
are SAVINGS in the item from which the same are to be
taken. Also NOT limited for the purpose of AUGMENTING
THE ITEM TO WHICH TRANSFER IT TO BE MADE.
Law completely disregards the standards set in consti=undue
delegation of leg power. It also goes beyond the tenor thereof.

For rules in approp. and disposition of public funds=prevent the

danger of misapp. Of funds. Safeguards to restrict.
5. Liga v. COMELEC
Facts: Liga ng mga Brgy is an organization of brgys, question what
they perceive as threatened illegal transfer, disbursement and use
of public funds in a manner contrary to consti and the law relative
to the conduct of the forthcoming brgy elections. They claim that
GAA of 1994 where only 137M were aprop by congrees for 1994, by
early 1994, congress made assesstment that it woul dinsuff. To
defray the cost of holding the elections. To augment the amount,
pets allege that comelec threeanted and are about to transfer
amounts sources from exec and leg branches of govt to coemlec.
(from DILG, from, Countryside Devt Fund, from Internal Revenue
Allotment of Provinces, Cities and Muns)
Held:
The truth of the matter, according to respondents, is that the said
reports were mere unofficial proposals or suggestions made in the
process of searching for funds for the said elections but which were
later discarded by the proponents themselves.
Moreover, respondents maintain that funds of local government
units may also be used to help defray the cost of the forthcoming
barangay elections. For authority, they cite Opinion No. 51, s. 1994
of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, dated 19 April 1994,
issued upon request from the COMELEC, wherein the former takes
the view that under Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code, local
government units are required to appropriate funds for barangay
elections.
The validity of the aforesaid COMELEC resolution is not at issue in
the petitions before us. What is in issue here is the existence or
lack of factual basis on whether or not the impleaded public
respondents are attempting, or intending to effect the transfer of
funds which would be in direct contravention of Sec. 25(5), Art. VI,
of the Constitution.
Undoubtedly, the threat to pursue the scheme, if ever there was
one, existed only in newspaper reports which could have misled the
general public, including the petitioners, into believing that the
same emanated from unimpeccable sources.

The Court acknowledges that petitioners have displayed vigilance

and acted with the best of intentions when they filed the present
petitions. Yet, it would have been more prudent for them to have
first obtained an official statement or at least confirmation from
respondents as to the veracity of the reports contained in the said
news item which could itself have been quoted out of context by
the reporter concerned or simply abbreviated to meet the day's
deadline.
6. Sanchez v. COA
Facts: Under the GAA of 1992, DILG was given the amount of 75M
for DILGs Capability Building Program. It was for the training and
technical assistances of the lgus. However, the Project Director of
the Ad Hoc Task force for inter-agency coordination to implement
local autonomy porposed to constitute a shamrock type task force
tto deign programs, stratetegize and prepare modules fo ran
effective program of local authonomy. This Ad Hoc Task Forces
estimated expense was at 2.3M for 6 months. The proposal was
accepted by Deputy Exec Secretay and attested by DILG Secretary
who therafter issued a memorandum for transfer and remittance to
the Office of the President of the sum of 300K for operation
expenses of task force and an another addl amount of 300K.
Amounts were taken from the Capability Building Program Funds.
Although there was liquidation of first 300K, no liquidation for
second 300K.
These were then disallowed by the department auditor during postaudit. COA affirmed disallowance on the ground that there s no
legal basis for transfers as the Funds was meant ot be implemented
by the Local Govt ACademny. Plus, transfer of funds udner Sec
25(5) may be made only be persons mentions and NOT REDELEGATED being alreadya delegated authority. Plus, it was also a
trust fund so it may only be used for the specific purpose it was
created.
Held: COA is right. COA has power to ascertain won public funds
were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended.
Various theories here: 1) No actual transfer of funds so to resolve
propriety of disallowance, evaluate if purpose of funds was violative
of RA 7180;
2) there was actual transfer of funds won criteria in Sec 25(5) was
followed?

Pursuant ot the exchange between Justice Puno and COA

commissioner, there was indeed a transfer of funds from the DILG
to the Office of the President, but that such transfer was for a
public purpose. So now that its settled that there is a transfer, did
it comply with Section 25(5) of Conti? Nope
1. WHO CAN TRASNFER? Only those enumerated can transfer
funds
a. While individual memebrs of Congress may
determinet he NECESSITY of the realignment of
saving in the allotments for operating expenses since
they are int eh best position to know won there aer
saving and that there are deficiencies in other items
that need augmentation, it is the Senate Pres and the
Speaker of the House who shall approve the
realignment.
In this case, the transfer was not exercised by the Pres. but
only at the instance of the Deputy Executive Secretary.
While DILG Sec had corroborate the intitiative of Dep Exe
Sec, it was no authorized by President. Moreover, even the
Pres himself COULD NOT have vaildly authorized the
transfer.
2. WHEN CAN THERE BE TRANSFER
a. There must be savings in the programmed
appropriation of the transferring agency
i. Actual savings is a sine qua non to valid
transfer form one govt ageny to another. It
must exist PRESENTLY IN FACT, as opp to
something merely theoretical, possible,
potation.
ii. i.e. CH can only transfer funds when there are
actual savings from unfilled positions in
judiciary
b. There must be an existing item, project or activity
with an appropriation in the receiving agency to
which saving will be transfer
The Pres, CJ, SP, SoH, Heads of CoC, need NOT first prove
and declare the existence of saving before transferring
funds. As held in the case of Philconsa, they shall only
APPROVE the realignment of saving but before giving their
stamp of approval, they have to show that:

a. Funds to be realigned or transferred are actually

savings in the items of expenditures from which
the same are to be taken; and
b. The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of
augmenting the items of expenditure to which
said transfer or realignment is to be made
In this case, there were NO SAVINGS as time of transfer.
Note that the transfer were done within the first two quarter
of fiscal year 1992, first trsanfer on Jan. 31, 1992 since the
1992 GAA took effect only on Jan 1, 1992! Also, 1992 GAA
only provided appropriation for maintence and other
operating expenses in the Capability Building pOrgram, and
non for Personal services i.e. salaries and wages. By the
nature of maintence and operating expenses, saving may
only be determined at the end of the year, IN contrast,
saving from personnel services may be determined at the
opening of fiscal year in the case of unpaid compensation
due to unpaid compensation.
Considering that GAA did not provide for approp for
personal services, savings from vacant position which
pertain to personal services may not be considered
savings which can be transferred.
Moreso, the 1992 GAA forecloses the use of saving from the
Funds for purposes other than those for it was stbalished i.e
acquire equipment, except motor vehicles.
Also there was no item for augmentation in the approp for
the office of the prsdient at the time of transfer. To say that
existing items I the approp of pres was already in need of
agumentation as early as Jan 31, 1992 is putting the cart
before the horse.t
With the foregoing considerations, it is clear that no valid
transfer of the Fund to the Office of the President could have
occurred in this case as there was neither allegation nor
proof that the amount transferred was savings or that the
transfer was for the purpose of augmenting the item to
which the transfer was made.

7. Belgica v. Ochoa supra

8. Araullo v. Aquino

July 1, 2014:
Main digest:
Main controversy: the Disbursement Acceleration program (DAP)
violated Sec 29(1), art 6 which says that a no money shall be paid
out of treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law. It is
said that the DAP allows the executive to allocate public money
pooled from programed and unprogrammed funds of its various
agencies in guise of the pres exercising his auth to transfer funds
under 25(5) .
-controversy precipitated by privilege speech of Sen jingoy Estrada
that he had been allotted additional 50M along with other members
of Senate as INCENTIVE for voting in favor of impeachment of CJ
Corona.
-in reponse, DBM secretary abad issued public statement
rexplaining that funds released to senators was apart of DAP
(program of DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic expansion) he clarified that funds realeased to
sentors based on their letter of request for funding; funds
udner DAP usually taken from:
a. unreleased appropritations under Personnel
service
b. unprogrammed funds;
c. carry-over appropriations unreleased from
previous year
d. budgets for slow-moving items or projects that
were realigned to support fast-disbursing projects
-DBM sid that it had lega bases to use savings for DAP: sec
25(5); sec 49(auth to use saving for certain purposes) and
sec 38(suspension of expenditure appropriations) of admin
code of 1987; GAA
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law."
-Budget is the financial plan of the government or master plan
of the government
-Philippine Budget Cycle (4 phases) Each phase is separate from
others but they overlap during implentation of budget during
the budget year

a. Budget preparation
-commenced thru issuance of BUDGET CALL by DBM which contains
budget paramters, policy guidelines and procedures to aid
government. Two kinds of budget calls:
i. National budget call- addressed to all agencies, inclusing
state universities and colelges
ii. Corporate budget call- addressed to GOCCs and GFI(govt
financial institution)
-

following issuance of budget call, various depts. And

agencies submit respective agency budget proposals to
DBM. DBM consolidated agency budgets into NEP national
Expenditure Prgram and BESF Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Finacning. NEP and BESF submitted to pres for
approval. Once done, congress prepares BUDGET
documents to be submitted to congress. Budget documents
consist of:
o Presidents Budget Message, through which the
President explains the policy framework and budget
priorities
o the BESF, mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution,6which contains the macroeconomic
assumptions, public sector context, breakdown of the
expenditures and funding sources for the fiscal year
and the two previous years; and
o NEP.

Public expenditures class into two categories:

a. capital expenditures or outlays- usefulness lasts for more
than one years
b. current operating expenditures- purchase of goods and
services in current consumption the benefit of which
does not beyond the fiscal year.
a. Personal services (PS)
b. Maintenance and other operating expenses
(MOOE)
Public expenses also group according to function:
(1) economic development expenditures (i.e., expenditures
on agriculture and natural resources, transportation and
communications, commerce and industry, and other
economic development efforts);
(2) social services or social development expenditures (i.e.,
government outlay on education, public health and
medicare, labor and welfare and others);

(3) general government or general public services

expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the general government,
legislative services, the administration of justice, and for
pensions and gratuities);
(4) national defense expenditures (i.e., sub-divided into
national security expenditures and expenditures for the
maintenance of peace and order) and
(5) public debt.75
Pbulic expenses also divided according to nature:
a. general fund
b. special fund
c. bond fund
Public REVENUE
a. general income
b. specific income
b. Budget legislation aka Budget Authorization Phase From time
Congress receives pres budget up to approval of Pres of GAA
-

pres budget initially assigned to HR approprtions committee

on first reasons. Then HR drafs General Approp Bill. GAB
approved on third reasing before it sends its version to
Senate.
Senate then conducts its own comitte hearings on GAV. To
expendite, it may conduct comitte hearing with HR delibs.
Snate version of GAB is likewise approved in third reading.
HR and Senate then constitute apeanleach to sit in
Bicameral COngrence Committee to discuss and harmonize
conflicting porvisions.
o Harmonized provs then repented to President for
approval
o Pres reviews GAB and prepeares veto message where
budget items are either:
a.subjected to direct veto or
b.identified for conditional implementation

c. Budget execution
-primarily the function of DBM tasked to perform the ff:
=to use programs and guidelines for release of funds
-prepare an allotment and cash release programs
-to release allotments
-to issue disbursement authorities
-DBM prepares:

-allotment release program> sets limit for allotment issued in

general and toa specific agency
b.cash release program fixes monthly, quarterly and annual
disbursement levels
Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations,
are issued by the DBM. Allotments are lesser in scope than
appropriations, in that the latter embrace the general legislative
authority to spend. Allotments may be released in two forms
through a comprehensive Agency Budget Matrix (ABM),94 or,
individually, by SARO.95
Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become
authorized to incur obligations96 on behalf of the Government in
order to implement their PAPs. Obligations may be incurred in
various ways, like hiring of personnel, entering into contracts for
the supply of goods and services, and using utilities.
In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the
DBM issues a disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated
in payment of the obligations
d. Accountability
Ensures that the government funds have been effectively and
efficiently utilized to achieve the States socio-economic
goals. It also allows the DBM to assess the performance of
agencies during the fiscal year for the purpose of
implementing reforms and establishing new policies.
An agencys accountability may be examined and evaluated
through (1) performance targets and outcomes; (2) budget
accountability reports; (3) review of agency performance; and
(4) audit conducted by the Commission on Audit(COA).
NATURE OF DAP
-according to world bank, economic growth would reduce if govt
continues underspending. Economic Hence, the DAP was crated to
be STIMULUS package to fast-track public spending and push
economic growth by investing on high-impact budgetary PAPS to be
funded from saving generated during the years and from
unprgrammed funds. Hence, DAP was product of PLAIN EXECUTIVE
POLICT MAKING to similar economy. It would accelerate govt
spending by:
a. streamlining implementation process thru clustering of
infrastructure project of DPWAH and deped

b. front loading of PPP project due for implementation

The DAP thus proved to be a demonstration that expenditure was a
policy instrument that the Government could use to direct the
economies towards growth and development.112 The Government,
by spending on public infrastructure, would signify its commitment
of ensuring profitability for prospective investors. 113 The PAPs
funded under the DAP were chosen for this reason based on their:
(1) multiplier impact on the economy and infrastructure
development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3) translation
into disbursements.114
all the issuances showed how the DAP was to be implemented and
funded, that is
(1) by declaring "savings" coming from the various departments
and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments and
withdrawing unreleased appropriations;
(2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and
(3) applying the "savings" and unprogrammed funds to augment
existing PAPs or to support other priority PAPs.
Contention: congress did not enact a law to establish the
DAP or authorize the disbursement of funds to implement
the DAP. Sabi nila there must be enabling law for validity.
SC: No law is necessary for adoption and implementation of
DAP because it is neither a fund nor a n appropriation. It is
a PROGRAM or an ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM of
PRIORITIZING SPENDING. Adoption of DAP was by virtue of
auth as Chief Executive to ensure that laws ere faithfully
executed.
- DAP was deigned to simulat economy thru accelerated spending.
Executive was main actor during budget execution stage udner
mandate to faitfully eecute laws. Pres has sufficient discretion
during execution of budget to adapt budget to changes in countrys
economic situation. He could adopt a plan like DAP for the purpose.
He could pol, savings and identify the PAPs to be funds under Dap.
The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification
of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been
already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the
GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power
vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.

Only with respect to 25(5), art 6:

Facts: The constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) and related issuances of the DBM implementing the
DAP are being questioned. One of the issues is won it violates
section 25(5), art 6 of the consti insofar as:
(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments withdrawn from government agencies as
"savings" as the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the
provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;
(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or
programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive
Department; and
(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in
the GAAs.
Held: Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated
allotments under the DAP are NOT SAVINGS. Hence, the use of such
appropriates contravene Section 25(5), Art 6 of Consti.
d. Although executive discretion and flexibility are
necessary in the execution of the budget, any transfer
of appropriated funds should conform to Section
25(5),Article VI of the Constitution
-congress cannot anticipate all issues that may come
into play one budget reaches execution stage.
Hence, executive discretion is necessary to achieve a
sound fiscal administration. Heads of offices, spec.
the pres, require flexib. In operation to enable them
to make adj to meet work goals, ot meet unforeseen
events. Flexibility comes in the form of policies that
exec may adopt during budget execution pahse. DAP,
stragety to impove pHs economic position, is a poicy
Pres decided to carry out to fulfill mandate under
GAA.
-in funding of current acitvities, projs, and programs,
the GR is that the budgetary amount contained in
appropriations bill is the extent congress will
determine as sufficient for budgetary allocation for
the proponent agency. Only exception is 25(5) giving
certain indiviudals aith to transfer appropriations.

e. Requisites for valid transfer of appropriated funds under Sec

25(5), art 6. The following must CONCUR:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices;
-not self-executing provsions ang 25(5) so needs
implementing law. GAA should expressly authorize transfer
of funds. GAA of 2011 and 2012 did not carry the phrase
for their respective offices needed to authorize only
transfer of funds within their offices. In effect, it allowed
transfer of funds from saving to augment ANY itsem in
GAA even if item beleonged to an office OUTSIDE the
executive. This contravenes consti.
-2013 GAA inserted this phrase but lacked other 2 reqs
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated
from the appropriations for their respective offices;
and
- Principles to bear in mind:
a. Congress wilds the power of the pruse. Congress decides
how budget will be sent, what PAPs to fund, and amount of
money to be spent for each PAP.
b. The executive, is expected to faithfully implement the
PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and to limit the
expenses within the allocations, unless exigencies result to
deficiencies for which augmentation is authorized, subj. to
conditions provided by law
c. By making the pres power to augment operative under
GAA, congress recognizes the need for felixbility in budget
execution. Hence, Congress diminishes its own power of the
purse by delegating a fraction of its power to thee xecutive.
But exec cannot overrise its auhtoirt as exec cannot exceed
delg. Auth
d. Savings should be actual. Actual=real or substantial.
Something that exists presently in facts; as opposed to
something that is theoretical, possible potential or
hypothetical.
These principle show that savings must be construed strictly
AGAINST expanding the scope of the power to augment.
Hence, power to augment is to be used only when the

purpose for which the funds had been allocated were

already satisfied, or the need for such funds had
ceased to exist, for only then can there be savings.
In case, DBM declares that part of the saving under DAP
were from pooling of unreleased or unallotted
appropriations. But declaration of DBM by itself does not
state the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or
unalloted appropriations as savings. The fact alone that the
appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere
description of the status of the items as unalloted or
unreleased.
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased
or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the
items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet
ripened into categories of items from which savings
can be generated.
Appropriations have been considered "released" if
there has already been an allotment or authorization
to incur obligations and disbursement authority.
This means that the DBM has issued either
an ABM (for those not needing clearance), or
a SARO (for those needing clearance), and
consequently an NCA, NCAA or CDC, as the
case may be.
Appropriations remain unreleased, for
instance, because of noncompliance with
documentary requirements (like the Special
Budget Request), or simply because of the
unavailability of funds. But the appropriations
do not actually reach the agencies to which
they were allocated under the GAAs, and have
remained with the DBM technically speaking.
Ergo, unreleased appropriations refer to
appropriations with allotments but
without disbursement authority.
For us to consider unreleased appropriations as
savings, unless these met the statutory definition of
savings, would seriously undercut the congressional
power of the purse, because such appropriations had
not even reached and been used by the agency
concerned vis--vis the PAPs for which Congress had
allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled

positions in its plantilla and did not receive an

allotment and NCA for such vacancies, appropriations
for such positions, although unreleased, may already
constitute savings for that agency under the second
instance.
Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were
encompassed by the first part of the definition of "savings"
in the GAA, that is, as "portions or balances of any
programmed appropriation in this Act free from any
obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of the
definition was further qualified by the three enumerated
instances of when savings would be realized. As such,
unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately
declared as savings without first determining whether any of
the three instances existed. This signified that the DBMs
withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded the
definition of savings under the GAAs.
Justice Carpio has validly observed in his Separate
Concurring Opinion that MOOE appropriations are
deemed divided into twelve monthly allocations
within the fiscal year; hence, savings could be generated
monthly from the excess or unused MOOE appropriations
other than the Mandatory Expenditures and Expenditures for
Business-type Activities because of the physical
impossibility to obligate and spend such funds as MOOE for
a period that already lapsed. Following this observation,
MOOE for future months are not savings and cannot
be transferred.

Also the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the

pooling of unreleased appropriation were bereft of legal support.
They cannot be considered as impoundment as well. Impoundment
refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend
funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or
obligate budget authority of any type." Impoundment under the
GAA is understood to mean the retention or deduction of
appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in
case of unmanageable National Government budget deficit.
The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP
should not be regarded as impoundment because it entailed only
the transfer of funds, not the retention or deduction of
appropriations.

The balances of continuing appropriations shall be reviewed as part

of the annual budget preparation process and the preparation
process and the President may approve upon recommendation of
the Secretary, the reversion of funds no longer needed in
connection with the activities funded by said continuing
appropriations.
The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring
unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings
prior to the end of the fiscal year.
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item
in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices.
Hence, the items to be augmented must be provided in the GAA. an
appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be deficient
before it could be augmented from savings.
Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven
evidence packets, we conclude that the "savings" pooled under the
DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any
appropriations in the pertinent GAAs.
lthough the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized
to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws
(which included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to
unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute his
own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful
to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend
pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from Congress.
It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that
has the final say on matters of appropriations.180For this purpose,
appropriation involves two governing principles, namely:
(1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies
received from whatever source by any part of the
government are public funds;" and
(2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting
expenditure of any public money without legislative
authorization."181

To conform with the governing principles, the Executive cannot

circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP
by resorting to either public or private funds. 182 Nor could the
Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an increase in
the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for
another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both
appropriations will thereby be violated.

The decision of the Court has underscored that the exercise of the
power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being
an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be
limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the
purpose.14 Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their
management will also be strictly construed against expanding the
scope of the power to augment.15

Moreover, cross-border augmentations from savings are

prohibited by the Consti

Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the

Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of their
prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from
unduly transgressing Congress power of the purse.16

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border

transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5), supra, disallowing
cross border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers,
whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section
25(5), supra.
"for their respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has delineated
borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one
office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in
the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we
call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border
augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5),
supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President;
the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of
Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with
respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with
respect to their respective Chairpersons.
he records show, indeed, that funds amounting to P143,700,000.00
and P250,000,000.00 were transferred under the DAP respectively
to the COA and the House of Representatives.185 Those transfers of
funds, which constituted cross-border augmentations for being from
the Executive to the COA and the House of Representatives
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border
transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5), supra, disallowing
cross border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers,
whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section
25(5), supra.
Feb 2015 MR
Strict construction on the accumulation and utilization of savings

Hence, regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP,

and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of
stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices under the
DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the
Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the
funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced
from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA,
as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section
25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws,
even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined
and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must
be carried out through legal methods.17
Respondents contend, however, that withdrawn unobligated
allotments and unreleased appropriations under the DAP are
savings that may be used for augmentation, and that the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments were made pursuant to
Section 38 Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code; 18 that
Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative
Code are consistent with Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution, which, taken together, constitute "a framework for
which economic managers of the nation may pull various levers in
the form of authorization from Congress to efficiently steer the
economy towards the specific and general purposes of the
GAA;"19 and that the Presidents augmentation of deficient items is
in accordance with the standing authority issued by Congress
through Section 39.
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 25. x x x x x x x

5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
xxxx

Section 38 refers to the authority of the President "to suspend or

otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency,
or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations
Act." When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds,
savings are not automatically generated until it has been
established that such funds or appropriations are free from any
obligation or encumbrance, and that the work, activity or purpose
for which the appropriation is authorized has been completed,
discontinued or abandoned.

Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative

Code provide:

It is necessary to reiterate that under Section 5.7 of NBC No. 541,

the withdrawn unobligated allotments may be:

Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. - Except

as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and
whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the
President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is
authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of
funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized
in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal services
appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.

5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of the

agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were
withdrawn;

Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover

Deficits.Except as otherwise provided in the General
Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations
authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and
projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the
approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other
item of the regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of
new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be
funded from budgetary savings except when specifically authorized
by law: Provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are
transferred from one program or project to another within the same
department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts
appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred,
without, however increasing the total outlay for personal services of
the department, office or agency concerned. (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)
xxx
We now clarify.

5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other existing

programs and projects of the agency/OU; or
5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects of any
agency and to fund priority programs and projects not considered
in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented
during the current year.
Although the withdrawal of unobligated allotments may have
effectively resulted in the suspension or stoppage of expenditures
through the issuance of negative Special Allotment Release Orders
(SARO), the reissuance of withdrawn allotments to the
original programs and projects is a clear indication that the
program or project from which the allotments were
withdrawn has not been discontinued or abandoned.
Consequently, as we have pointed out in the Decision, "the purpose
for which the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet
fulfilled, or did not yet cease to exist, rendering the declaration of
the funds as savings impossible."21 In this regard, the withdrawal
and transfer of unobligated allotments remain unconstitutional. But
then, whether the withdrawn allotments have actually been
reissued to their original programs or projects is a factual matter
determinable by the proper tribunal.
Also, withdrawals of unobligated allotments pursuant to
NBC No. 541 which shortened the availability of
appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays, and those which

were transferred to PAPs that were not determined to be deficient,

are still constitutionally infirm and invalid.
At this point, it is likewise important to underscore that the
reversion to the General Fund of unexpended balances of
appropriations savings included pursuant to Section 28
Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code22 does not
apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which
include the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Audit, Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights, and
the Office of the Ombudsman. The reason for this is that the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the CFAG
x x x contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and
utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their
needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess
and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the
highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of
the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the
Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we
need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to
Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the
Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only

those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his
own Departments appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot
serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the
DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the
Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so
long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.
In this connection, the respondents must always be reminded that
the Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform. No
act that conflicts with the Constitution can be valid. 24 In Mutuc v.
Commission on Elections,25therefore, we have emphasized the
importance of recognizing and bowing to the supremacy of the
Constitution:
x x x The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether
proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a
postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to
the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the
topmost rung in the legal hierarchy.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman

must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge
of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme
Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which
the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. x x x23

The three departments of government in the discharge of the

functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on
guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or
formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws
cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying
the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is
called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the
validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of
adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the
Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure
that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition
of its being the supreme law.

On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain

text of Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it allows
the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular
appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of
any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other
item of the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the
mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the

Also, in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,26 we have

reminded that: The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked.
It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and by which
these powers are distributed among the several departments. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest

officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must

remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It
cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of
situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of
government and the people who run it.27
3.
The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent
provisions in the GAA
The respondents posit that the Court has erroneously invalidated all
the DAP-funded projects by overlooking the difference between an
item and an allotment class, and by concluding that they do not
have appropriation cover; and that such error may induce Congress
and the Executive (through the DBM) to ensure that all items
should have at least P1 funding in order to allow augmentation by
the President.28
At the outset, we allay the respondents apprehension regarding
the validity of the DAP funded projects. It is to be emphatically
indicated that the Decision did not declare the en masse
invalidation of the 116 DAP-funded projects. To be sure, the Court
recognized the encouraging effects of the DAP on the countrys
economy,29 and acknowledged its laudable purposes, most
especially those directed towards infrastructure development and
efficient delivery of basic social services.30 It bears repeating that
the DAP is a policy instrument that the Executive, by its own
prerogative, may utilize to spur economic growth and development.
Nonetheless, the Decision did find doubtful those projects that
appeared to have no appropriation cover under the relevant GAAs
on the basis that: (1) the DAP funded projects that originally did not
contain any appropriation for some of the expense categories
(personnel, MOOE and capital outlay); and (2) the appropriation
code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond
with the program specified in the GAA. The respondents assert,
however, that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to
create allotment classes within an item. What is required is for
Congress to create items to comply with the line-item veto of the
President.31
After a careful reexamination of existing laws and jurisprudence, we
find merit in the respondents argument.

Indeed, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term

item that may be the object of augmentation by the President, the
Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and
the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v.
Ochoa,32 we said that an item that is the distinct and several part of
the appropriation bill, in line with the item-veto power of the
President, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not
be only general provisions, thus:
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily
follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of
the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains
to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of
the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary
of Justice of the Philippine Islands, the US Supreme Court
characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in
itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
(Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to
ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item
veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and notonly
"general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation
must be an item characterized by singular correspondence
meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified
singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." This
treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its
definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures
that the President may discernibly veto the same.
Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund,
Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations
which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then
be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully
subject to item veto.
Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly
apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is
crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for
its own corresponding purpose for such component to be

considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio

correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several
related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice
considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other
operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be
deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the Presidents item
veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds
would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of itemveto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence
as herein discussed. x x x (Emphasis supplied)33

The respondents assail the pronouncement of unconstitutionality of

cross-border transfers made by the President. They submit that
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution prohibits only the
transfer of appropriation, not savings. They relate that cross-border
transfers have been the practice in the past, being consistent with
the Presidents role as the Chief Executive.35

Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the

Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the
appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or
allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the
Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of
augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class.
In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over
an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that
expense category belongs to.

5.

Further, in Nazareth v. Villar,34 we clarified that there must be an

existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure
with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the
purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item
in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of
public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation
purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the
Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility
allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to
unforeseeable contingencies.
Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the
cave at that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may
be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings.
Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects had appropriation
cover and were validly augmented require factual determination
that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions
under Rule 65.
4.
Cross-border transfers are constitutionally impermissible

In view of the clarity of the text of Section 25(5), however, the

Court stands by its pronouncement, and will not brook any strained
interpretations.

Unprogrammed funds may only be released upon proof that the

total revenues exceeded the target
Based on the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs, the respondents contend
that each source of revenue in the budget proposal must exceed
the respective target to authorize release of unprogrammed funds.
Accordingly, the Courts ruling thereon nullified the intention of the
authors of the unprogrammed fund, and renders useless the special
provisions in the relevant GAAs.36
The respondents contentions are without merit.
To recall, the respondents justified the use of unprogrammed funds
by submitting certifications from the Bureau of Treasury and the
Department of Finance (DOF) regarding the dividends derived from
the shares of stock held by the Government in government-owned
and controlled corporations.37 In the decision, the Court has held
that the requirement under the relevant GAAs should be construed
in light of the purpose for which the unprogrammed funds were
denominated as "standby appropriations." Hence, revenue targets
should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we
would be dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. We have even
cautioned that the release of unprogrammed funds based on the
respondents position could be unsound fiscal management for
disregarding the budget plan and fostering budget deficits, contrary
to the Governments surplus budget policy.38
While we maintain the position that aggregate revenue
collection must first exceed aggregate revenue target as a
pre-requisite to the use of unprogrammed funds, we clarify

the respondents notion that the release of unprogrammed funds

may only occur at the end of the fiscal year.
There must be consistent monitoring as a component of the budget
accountability phase of every agencys performance in terms of the
agencys budget utilization as provided in Book VI, Chapter 6,
Section 51 and Section 52 of the Administrative Code of
1987,which state:
SECTION 51. Evaluation of Agency Performance.The President,
through the Secretary shall evaluate on a continuing basis the
quantitative and qualitative measures of agency performance as
reflected in the units of work measurement and other indicators of
agency performance, including the standard and actual costs per
unit of work.
SECTION 52. Budget Monitoring and Information System.The
Secretary of Budget shall determine accounting and other items of
information, financial or otherwise, needed to monitor budget
performance and to assess effectiveness of agencies operations
and shall prescribe the forms, schedule of submission, and other
components of reporting systems, including the maintenance of
subsidiary and other records which will enable agencies to
accomplish and submit said information requirements: Provided,
that the Commission on Audit shall, in coordination with the
Secretary of Budget, issue rules and regulations that may be
applicable when the reporting requirements affect accounting
functions of agencies: Provided, further, that the applicable rules
and regulations shall be issued by the Commission on Audit within
a period of thirty (30) days after the Department of Budget and
Management prescribes the reporting requirements.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) and the Commission on Audit (COA) require
agencies under various joint circulars to submit budget and
financial accountability reports (BFAR) on a regular basis, 39 one of
which is the Quarterly Report of Income or Quarterly Report of
Revenue and Other Receipts.40 On the other hand, as Justice Carpio
points out in his Separate Opinion, the Development Budget
Coordination Committee (DBCC) sets quarterly revenue targets for
aspecific fiscal year.41 Since information on both actual revenue
collections and targets are made available every quarter, or at such
time as the DBM may prescribe, actual revenue surplus may be
determined accordingly and eleases from the unprogrammed fund
may take place even prior to the end of the fiscal year.42

In fact, the eleventh special provision for unprogrammed funds in

the 2011 GAA requires the DBM to submit quarterly reports stating
the details of the use and releases from the unprogrammed funds,
viz:
11. Reportorial Requirement. The DBM shall submit to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance separate quarterly reports stating the releases from the
Unprogrammed Fund, the amounts released and purposes thereof,
and the recipient departments, bureaus, agencies or offices, GOCCs
and GFIs, including the authority under which the funds are
released under Special Provision No. 1 of the Unprogrammed Fund.
Similar provisions are contained in the 2012 and 2013 GAAs. 43
However, the Courts construction of the provision on
unprogrammed funds is a statutory, not a constitutional,
interpretation of an ambiguous phrase. Thus, the construction
should be given prospective effect.44
ON OPERATIVE FACT:

The policy behind the operative fact doctrine is consistent with the
idea that regardless of the nullification of certain acts and practices
under the DAP and/or NBC No. 541, it does not operate to
impute bad faith to authors, proponents and implementors
who continue to enjoy the presumption of innocence and
regularity in the performance of official functions and
duties. Good faith is presumed, whereas bad faith requires the
existence of facts. To hold otherwise would send a chilling effect to
all public officers whether of minimal or significant discretion, the
result of which would be a dangerous paralysis of bureaucratic
activity.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Xxx
the respondents now urge that the Court should extend the
presumption of good faith in favor of the President and his officials
who co-authored, proposed or implemented the DAP. 47
xxx
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the
deliberations, the doctrine of operative fact does not always apply,

and is not always the consequence of every declaration of

constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked only in situations where
the nullification of the effects of what used to be a valid law would
result in inequity and injustice; but where no such result would
ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional law is totally
ineffective should apply.
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of
operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be
undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the
validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents
and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of
good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their
criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.48 (Bold
underscoring is supplied)
The quoted text of paragraphs 3 and 4 shows that the Court has
neither thrown out the presumption of good faith nor imputed bad
faith to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP. The
contrary is true, because the Court has still presumed their good
faith by pointing out that "the doctrine of operative fact xxx cannot
apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP,
unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the
proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and
other liabilities." Note that the proper tribunals can make "concrete
findings of good faith in their favor" only after a full hearing of all
the parties in any given case, and such a hearing can begin to
proceed only after according all the presumptions, particularly that
of good faith, by initially requiring the complainants, plaintiffs or
accusers to first establish their complaints or charges before the
respondent authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP.
It is equally important to stress that the ascertainment of good
faith, or the lack of it, and the determination of whether or not due
diligence and prudence were exercised, are questions of fact.49
The want of good faith is thus better determined by tribunals other
than this Court, which is not a trier of facts.50
For sure, the Court cannot jettison the presumption of good faith in
this or in any other case.1wphi1 The presumption is a matter of
law. It has had a long history. Indeed, good faith has long been
established as a legal principle even in the heydays of the Roman
Empire.51In Soriano v. Marcelo,52 citing Collantes v. Marcelo,53 the
Court emphasizes the necessity of the presumption of good faith,
thus:

Well-settled is the rule that good faith is always presumed and the
Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person,
inter alia, to observe good faith which springs from the fountain of
good conscience. Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have
acted in good faith in the performance of his duties. Mistakes
committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear
showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. "Bad faith" does not simply connote bad
moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It
partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of selfinterest or ill will for ulterior purposes.
The law also requires that the public officers action caused undue
injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. x x x
The Court has further explained in Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. v.
Trinidad-Lichauco: 54
We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions of "good faith"
or "regular performance of official duty", yet these presumptions
are disputable and may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence. Many civil actions are oriented towards overcoming any
number of these presumptions, and a cause of action can certainly
be geared towards such effect. The very purpose of trial is to allow
a party to present evidence to overcome the disputable
presumptions involved. Otherwise, if trial is deemed irrelevant or
unnecessary, owing to the perceived indisputability of the
presumptions, the judicial exercise would be relegated to a mere
ascertainment of what presumptions apply in a given case, nothing
more. Consequently, the entire Rules of Court is rendered as excess
verbiage, save perhaps for the provisions laying down the legal
presumptions.
Relevantly, the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP,
being public officers, further enjoy the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their functions. This presumption is necessary
because they are clothed with some part of the sovereignty of the
State, and because they act in the interest of the public as required
by law.55 However, the presumption may be disputed.56

At any rate, the Court has agreed during its deliberations to extend
to the proponents and implementors of the DAP the benefit of the
doctrine of operative fact. This is because they had nothing to do at
all with the adoption of the invalid acts and practices.

withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased

appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year
without complying with the statutory definition of savings
contained in the General Appropriations Acts; and

7.

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the

Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices
outside the Executive.

The PAPs under the DAP remain effective under the operative fact
doctrine
As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act
carries with it the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where
nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the
operative fact doctrine may apply.57In so ruling, the Court has
essentially recognized the impact on the beneficiaries and the
country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the
nullification of the P144.378 Billions58 worth of infrastructure
projects, social and economic services funded through the DAP.
Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of nullifying these projects
by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts and practices
under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAPfunded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. For this
reason, we cannot sustain the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and SUBJECT TO THE FOREGOING
CLARIFICATIONS, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the respondents, and DENIES the Motion
for Partial Reconsideration filed by the petitioners in G.R. No.
209442 for lack of merit.
ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of the Decision promulgated
on July 1, 2014 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for
certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and
practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National
Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of
powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the
implementing agencies, and the declaration of the

The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds

despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that
the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for noncompliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General
Appropriations Acts.

Sec. 26
1. Cordero v. Cabatuando
Facts: IN question here are the constitutionality of Sections 19 and
20 of RA 2263 which amend Secs 53 and 54 of RA 1199 (The
agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.). The objection is that
section 19 which authorizes the Sec of Justice acting thru a tenancy
mediation division, to carry out a national enforcement program
including the mediation of tenancy disputes, is NOT expressed in
the title of the bill of RA 2263-- AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINE.
Helld: Provisions are not riders since they are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title of bill. Consti reqt is met as
long as the law has a single general subject as in this case
agricultural tenancy act. And the amendatory provisions no matter
how diverse, as long as they are NOT incosnsitent with the general
subject, will be regarded as valid.
COnsti provs regarding titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed to cripple the power of leg. The reqt that the subject of
an act be expressed in its tittle should receive a REASONABLE, not
technical construction. It is sufficient if title be comprehensive
enough to reasonable include the gen object which a statue seeks
to effects, without expressing each and every end and means

necessary or convenient for accomplishing the purpose. The title

need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
Plus, the amendatory provisions only transfer the function of
representing indigents to the DOJ. No change of set-up, just
transfer of fucntions. More so, after enactment of RA 2263,
functions rep. indigent from DoLabor actually transferred to DoJ by
virtue of memo circular of DoL.
2. Philconsa v. Gimenez
Facts: PHILCONSA, a non-profit civic organization questions RA
3836 insofar as it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of
vacation and sick leaves to Senators and Representatives and to
elective offiails of Congress. It is said that provisions on retirement
are not expressed in the title of the Bill AN ACT AMENDING
SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX (186), AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX (3096).
It is argued that the titles gives no inkling or notice to public
regarding retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick
leaves to memebrs of Congress.
Held: Title of RA 3836 is void since it is not germane to subject
matter of act of CA 186.
Note that under 3836, the retirements benefits are granted to the
memebrs of the GSIS who have rendered at least 20 years of
service regardless of age. This is related and germane to CA 186.
On the other hand, RA 3836 refers to members of Congress and to
elective officers who are non members of the GSIS. Providing
retirement benefits to these individuals is not germane to CA 186.
Hence, the portion of the amendment regarding retirement
benefits for members of Congress is not related to the
subjected of CA 186 as it relates to retirement benefits of
GSIS members.
The prupsoe of reqy that subject of Act should expressed in its title
are:
(1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and
(2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have
the opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if
they shall so desire

The requirement that the subject of the act be expressed in its title
is explained in the case of Central vapiz v Ramirez where the CA
2784 aka Public Land Act was limited to application of lands of
public domain and cannot include private agric lands. The provision
of consi to express subject matter of act is not merely directory to
Congress, but it is MANDATORY. Hence, it is the duty of this court to
declare voud any statute not condorming ot this consti prov.
3. Alalayan v. NPC
Facts: Pets Alalayan and Philippine power and Devt Company are
franchise holders of electric plants in laguna and they question the
validity of Section 3 of the Amendatory act RA 3043 AN Act to
Further Amend CA 120
Sec. 3 reads that National Power Corporation is hereby authorized
to represent and transact for the benefit and in behalf of the public
consumers, and it shall in any contract for the supply of electric
power to a franchise holder require as a condition that the franchise
holder, if it receives at least fifty percent of its electric power and
energy from the National Power Corporation, shall not realize a net
profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus
two-month operating expenses. The National Power Corporation
shall renew all existing contracts with franchise holder for the
supply of electric power and energy, in order to give effect to the
provisions hereof. In the event that the net profit as verified by the
Public Service Commission should exceed the said twelve percent,
the public Service Commission shall order such excess to be
returned pro rata to the customers either in cash or as credit for
future electric bills."
Held: No violation of the consti provision that bills enacted into law
shall embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof
It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and logrolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered
enactments.17 Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular
matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of
the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional
provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider
being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
Petitioner Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to is such a
rider.
The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a
complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all

parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its

title.18 More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of
a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation
to be amended, there being no need to state the precise
nature of the amendment.19
the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of
an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the
same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise
or fraud upon the legislator
4. Insular Lumber company v. CTA
Facts:
Insular Lumber Company (NY corp) is auth. Forest concessioner in
PH. It purchased oil and fule for its operations on which specific tax
was paid. Company therafter filed a claim for refunds pursuant to
Sec 5 of RA 1435. But this was denied by CIR since claim of
pricivilage of partial tax refund under said law was limited to a
period of 5 years. Hence, oil bought after period was subejc to full
tax. Company filed pet for review with CTA which ruled that
operation of sawmill is diff from operation of forest concession, and
refund prov under sec 4 of RA 1435 only allowing partial refund to
forest concession cannot be extended to oper of sawmill.
Nonetheless, CTA did not allow full refund due to prescription.Now
CIR says CTA erred in not holding that sec 5 of RA 10435 is null and
void for being unconsti. Hence, no legal basis for claim dapat.
Held: It is CONSTITUTIONAL!
The title of R.A. No. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing
The Highway Special Fund." The Commissioner contends that the
subject of R.A. No. 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund.
However, Section 5 of, the Act deals with another subject which is
the partial exemption of miners and loggers.
Argument of CIR: partial exemption on which the Company based
its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the
aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease
rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.

We find no merit in the argument. Republic Act No. 1435 deals with
only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the
necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the
imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The
proviso Id. Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from
the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to
specific tax on oil and fuel is NOT a deviation from the general
subject of the law.
The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is
to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might
completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature,
scope and consequences of the law or its operation. 2 This does not
seem to this Court to have been ignored in the passage of Republic
Act No. 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full
debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its
complete subject was held by Congress which passed it. 3
Furthermore, in deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged to
be defectively titled, every presumption favors the validity of the
Act. As is true republic in cases presenting other constitutional
issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional whenever
possible. Where there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of either
the title, or the Art, the legislation should be sustained. 4 In the
incident on hand, this Court does not even have any doubt.
5. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board
Facts:
In question is Section 10 od PD 1897 entitled An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board as it imposes a tax of 30% on the
gross receipts payable to the local govt=a ride and not germane to
the subject matter of the law. NOTE videograms include
(videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation)
Held: It is NOT a rider
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the
purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every
sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall
accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%)

shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;

PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be
shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan
Manila Commission.
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the
DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax
provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general
subject and title. As a tool for regulation 6 it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the
DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of
the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from
Preambles 2 and 5, supra.
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn
around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been
subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of
approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram
establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of
the movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and
500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an
additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same
time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms;
Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting
the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the
Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include
the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all
its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in
the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 7
6. Phil Judges Assn v Prado
Facts:
In question is Sec 35 of RA 7354 (R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act
Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the
Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith.") as
implemented by the Philippine POsal Corporation thru Circular No.

92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privileges from the

SC, CA, RTC, mTC, MunTc, and Land Regsitration Commission and
its Registers of Deeds. Petitioners are memebrs of the lower course
who feel that their official functions will be affected. They assail RA
7354 as its titel embraces more than one subject and does not
express its purposes.
Held: Section 35 which withdraws the franking privileges is NOT a
rider. where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is
the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the
subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be
briefly expressed in its title.
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders,
executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby
repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth
Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087
and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and
that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and
conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use
thereof.
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "logrolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no
intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly
and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people,
through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually
made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order
that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition
or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act,
and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there
is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley

writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly
connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same
subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is
valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject.
It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act
and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of
previous legislations connected therewith." 4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such
repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it
is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to
be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if
the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by
implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such
rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor
practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from
some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal
objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of
its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law
Sec. 27
1. Abakada v. Ermita
Facts: Wuestioned ehre is RA 9337 which is about the VAT. One of
the petitions filed questioned the stand-by authority of the
president to increase the VAT to 12% as this amounts to undue
delegation of leg power and claims that such auth granted by \ is a
violation of the no-amendment rule upon last reading of a bill as
laid down in Art 6, Sect 2(6) of consti.
Issue: WON BCC exceeded its authority
Held:
Consti provides that each house may determine its own rules of
proceddings. Hence, pursuant to this, each house provided for the
creation of Bicameral Congerence Committee In response to a
problem where two houses of congress are n disagreement over
changes or amendement introduces by the other hose ina leg bill
(issue not addresses by the Constitution). Here, it is not being
questioned won rules creating bcc are unconsti. Instead, it is asked

won bcc strictly complied with the rules of both houses thereby
remaining within jd of Congress.
Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct it won
business and it is sole concern of Congress to instill discipline
among members of conference committee if it believes it violates
rules. Even expaneded jd of SC cannot apply to questions regarding
INTERNAL OPERTIONS OF CONGRESS. Hence, if change is desred in
practice of BCC, go to Congress since this is an internal rule.
But to put minds at east that no blatant irregularities were
committed by BCC< SC says that there were indeed
disagreements. 1) what rate of VAT; 2.whether only VAT imposed on
electricty gen, tras and dsitrib companies should not be passed on
to consumers. 3. What manner input tax credit should be limited.
4.Won nirc provs on corporate income taxes, percentage, franch.
and excise taxes should be amended.
Hence, there being difference, BCC was mandated by rules to act
on these differences. To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing
porviisons, BCC ,by:
(a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or
Senate bill,
(b) decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the
provisions in the Senate bill would be carried into the final
form of the bill, and/or
(c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing
provisions.
BCC only tried to harmonize and did not intend to inject any prov
that was wholly foreign to the subject. The stand by authority in
favor of president whereby rate of 10% were ot be retained until
certain conditions arise appears to be COMPROMSIE to bridge the
difference in rate of VA propo by 2 houses.
The no pass on provision was deleted altogether since vat is a pass
on tax.
With regard to input tax to be credited, BCC came to a
COMPROMISE on the % rate of limitation or cap of suc input tax.
As to amendetment to NIRC< BCC adopted version of senate.
In other words, all changes made by BCC were germae to subjects
of the provisions referred to it for reconciliation. Hence, no gadaelg.

It is a long practice of giving BCC ample latitude for compromising

differences.
It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its
report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the
House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an
amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason
why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as
an amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long as such
amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the
approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of
the legislative department. The charge that in this case the
Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber
is thus without any basis.
MOREOVER, pets argument that the practice where bCC is allowed
to add or delete provs after bills passed 3 reading is circumvention
of the no-amendment rule. NO MERIT. No-amendment rule refers
only to procedure of each house with regard to bills inititated in
each house, BEFORE BILL IS TRANSMITTED TO THE OTHER
HOUSE FOR ITS CONCURRENCE OR AMENDMENT.
Absurd results if changes to a bill are barred after one house has
voted since this would deprive the other house of its consti power
to amend or introduce changes to the bill. Thus, Sec 26(2) cannot
meant hat introduction by BCC of amendment and modifs is
prohibited.
As held in the case of TOlentino, the no-amendment rule only refers
to bills introduced for the fist time in either house of Congress and
NOT TO THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT. There is no
requirement that the Committees Report must have undergone
three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there
would be no end to the negotiation since each house may seek
modiciation of the compromise bill.
2. CIR v. CTA
Facts: Involved here is Section 191-A of RA 6110 which is about the
collection of caterers tax. IN the case of CIR vs Manila Hotel this
was declared legal and overruled CTA which declared that it was
illegal since sec 43 of HB 17839 which carried that prov was vetoed
by Pres. Marcos when bill was presented to him and congress did
not take any step to override veto. SC in that case uled that CTA
failed to examine the law which has always imposed 3% caterers
tax on opeartors of restos.

Now court is faced with identical question: WON presidential veto

referred to the ENTIRE SECTION or merely to the imposition of 20%
tax on gross receipts of operators of restos, refresh parlors or bards
within the premises of a hotel, motel or resthouse.
Priv resp is Manila Golf and Country Club with gold course and
clubhouse, lounge bar and dining room for exclusive use of
members and guests. It claims to be exempt from payment of priv
tax were it not for sec 191-A of RA 6110 aka Omnibus tax Law
which imposes Caterers tax.
Held:Section 191-A is valid and enforceable and Manila God must
pay.
The presidential veto merely referred to the inclusion of hotel,
motel and resthouses in the 20% caterers tax bracket ad NOT TO
WHOLE SECTION.
CTA opined that president could not veto words or phrases in bill
but only an ENTIRE ITEM. What CTA meant by ITEM was ENTIR
SECTION. Court disagress. But assuming it be so, it would also be in
petitioners favor since the inteffectula veto of pres rendered the
hwole of 191-A as not having been vetoed at all.
Court agress with SG that inclsion of hotels, motel and resthouses
in the 20% caterers tax brackets are ITEMS in thsmeslves and so
pres has power to veto. An item in revenue bill does NOT refer to
an ENTIRE ECTION imposing a particular kind of tax. Rather, it
refers to the subject of the TAX and TAX ATE.
IN the portion of rev ibll that actually imposes a tax, a section
identifies the tax and enumarte the perosns liable with tax rate.
Constuing the words ITEM as referring the HWOLE secon ties the
press hand in choosing either to approve the WHOLE SECTION of
expense including prov he deems unacceptable or VETO THE
ENTIRE ECTION at the exense of foreigng collection of that kind of
tax altoeher.
3. Gonzales v. Macaraig
Facts:
President vetoed Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriation Bill and its
counterpart Section 16 in the 1990 Appropriation Bill.

"SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of

Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced
by Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the
President in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to
Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been
disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or
increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other
purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any
purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall
be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no
corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this Act."
President vetoed Section 55 and Section 16 since they
violated the consti authroity given by president to augment
funds within his office under Section 25(5), art6 of the
Philippine Constituion.
Arguments of petitioners:
a. pres line veto as regards an appropriation bill is limted to
ITEMS and does NOT cover provisions, so exceeded auth
when she vetoes secs 55 and sec 16 which are provisions;
b. when pres objects a provision of an approp bill, she cannot
exercise item-veto but should veto entire bill
c. item-veto power does not carry with it power strike out
conditions or restriction in viol of sep of powers
Argument of Solictor General: Petitioners has a political remedy
whcihw as to override the veto. Moreso, Section 55 is a rider
because it is extraneous ott he Appropriations act hence, it
merits the presidential veto.
Held:
As regards sec 27, art 6 of consti:
Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before
it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of

all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all

such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by
yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed
it.
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the
President and if exercised would result in the veto of the
entire bill, as a general rule.
"(2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object."cralaw virtua1a
Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power
or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over
a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill.
As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an
item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power
given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an
Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the
same item.
Item veto first came into being under the 1935 constitution which
says that a when a provision of an approp bills affects one or more
items, pres cannot veto prov without vetoing the particular items to
which it relates. consti. THIS SHOULD NOT MEAN that it pres is now
disallowed to veto a provision.
Item v. Provision
1. item- particulars, details, distinct and severable part of the
bill; an indivisible sum of money dedicated to stated
purpose
Elimination of express reference to veto a leg provision in the 1987
Consti does not mean pres cannot veto a provision. It only
eliminated that part to pronounce that basic principle that a distinct
and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto.
Besides, in the true sense of the term, PROVISION in ana pprop bill

is LIMITED IN ITS OPERATION TO SOME PARTICULAR APPROPRIATION

TO WHICH IT RELATES, and does not relate to the entire bill.
INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS
Even assuming arguento that provisions are beyond executive
power to veto, Sections 55 and Section 16 are NOT provisions in the
budgetary sense of the term. As held in Sec 25(2), art 6 of the
consti: No provision or enactment shall be embraced ina a gen.
appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
provision therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited
in its operation to the operation to which it relates.
In this case, Section 55 and Section 55 do NOT meet the
requirements of what constitutes a provision for the following
reasons; in effect, they are inappropriate provisions that should be
TREATED AS ITEMS in relation to the Pres power to veto.
1. The vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or
distinctive appropriation as they apply to ALL items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Approp BIll
2. The disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found
in the approp bill so you will have to look at original
recommendation by president
3. Vetoed sections are mere expressions of Congressional
policy
Congress cannot deprive the president of his veto power by
CAREFUL PLACEMENT.
ANOTHER ARGUMENT: Petitioners say that congress can impose
conditions in appropriation bill and that Pres cannot veto
conditions.
SC: It is true that Leg has power to include in the appropriations bill
qualifications, conditions, limitations or restriction. More over,
excutive cannot veto condition of an appropriation while allowing
the appropriation itself to stand. (As held in the case of Bolinao, the
veto of a condition in the approp bill which does not include a veto
of the items to which the condition relates is invalid and without
effect)
However, for the rule to apply, the restriction must such in the real
sense of the term and not matters which are more properly dealt
with in a separate legislation. Resitrcition must exhibit a connection
with money items in BUDGETARY SENSE. The test is
appropriateness.

Sections 55 and 16 are artfully drafted to appear as conditions. But

in truth, they are GENERAL LAW MEASURES more appropriate for
substantive and separate legislation. They partake the nature of a
curtailment on the power to augment from saving. They are
general porivsions of law in an appropriation bill.
Hence, Veto is appropriate since it limits pres power to transfer
savings and augment deficient items.
If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto
powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid
down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be
overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[1], supra). But Congress made
no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Petitioners argument
that the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing to override"
(citing Bolinao) has lost force and effect with the executive veto
having been herein upheld.
4. Philconsa v. Enriquez, August 19, 1994
Facts:
General Approp. Bill of 1994 was passed and approved by both
houses. It imposed conditions and limitations on certain
appropriations in the proposed budget submitted by the Pres. It
also auth. some members of congress to identify projects in the
pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective
budgets. This was presented to Pres for consideration and approval.
Pres singed into law and on the say day, he delivered his
PRESIDENTIAL VETO MESSAGE, specifying provisions which he
vetoed on which he imposed conditions. Congress did not override
veto.
Petitioners were filed questioning the constitutionality of the
presidential veto on certain provisions. NOTE that where the veto is
claimed to have been in excess of the authority of the pres, there is
an issue a to won the president impressible intrusion of the
executive in the domain of the legislature.
Held:
Countrywide development fund= constitutional; makes equal the
unequal;
Pets claim that power given to congress to propose and identify
projcets to be funded by CDF is an encroachment by leg on
executive power.

SC: Spending power or power of the purse belongs to Congress,

subject only to veto power of Pres. Pre may propose budget but
final say on matter of approp is lodged with Congress.
In law, CDF was for infrastructure, purchase of ambulance and
computers and other priority projects it was Congress that
determined purposes for appropriation. Under CDF, executive
function involved implementation of the priority projects specified.
Authority given to members is only to PROPOSE and IDENTIFY
projects to be implemented by the president. Hence, these are
merely RECOMMENDATORY. Pres must examine won proposal of
congress falls within specific items of expenditures for which the
fund was setup and only if qualified does he next determined won
they are in line wit other projects planned for the locality.
CDF recognizes the individual members of Congress, far more than
the pres, are more knowledgeable about the needs of respective
constituents and priority given each project.
On Realignment of allocation for operation expenses=consti;
members only determine NECESSITY of realignment of saving in the
allotments for operating expenses
Contention: Gaa prov that allows a member of congress to realign
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category
violates Sec 25(5), Art VI of the Consti (transfer only by senate pres
and speaker of the house).
But here, under the Special Provisions, members of Congress only
determine the necessity of the realignment of the asvings
in the allotments for operating expenses. Since they are in
the best position to know won there are savings available and won
there are deficiencies in other items of operating expenses that
need augmentation. However, it is the speaker of thehouse and the
Senate President who shall approve the realignment. Before
giving approval, SP and SoH must show that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually
savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are
to be taken; and
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of
augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or
realignment is to be made.
Approp for education is not the highest funding=consti
Contention: A higher amount was appropriated for debt service by
Congress than that for the DECS. They say this violates sec5(5) of

article 14 of consti which provides that state shall assign highest

budgetary priority to education.
Held: True there is a constitutional mandate to assign highest
budgetary priority to education. But this does NOT mean that hands
of Congress are hamstrung that it is deprived of power to respond
to imperative of national interest and for attainment of other state
objectives.
As can be observed, since 1986, budget for education has tripled to
improve public school system. Compensatin for teachers doubled.
DECS has highest budgetary allocation among all
departments=clear compliance with consti mandate.
Having faithfully complied therewith, congress has power to
appropriate funds for debt.
IMPORTANT PART NA UNDER SECTOIN 27!
On the presidential vetoes
General Issue: Won president can issue provisions of an
appropriation bill
In Gonzales, the court ruled a restrictive interpretation that states
that a pres may NOT veto a provision without veteoing the entire
bill has the following effects:
a. disregards the basis principle that a distinct and severable
part of a bill may be subject of a separate veto.
b. It also disregards the Constitutional mandate that any prov
in the gaa shall be limited in its operation to which it relates
(25(2), art 6. A provision in a gaa is limited in its operation
to some particular appropriation to which it relates. It does
not relate to the entire Bill.
Henry v Edwards- Congress cannot include in a gen approp bill
matters that should be more properly enacted in SEPARETE
LEGISTLATE. If it does that, the INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION inserted
is treated as an ITEM, which can be vetoed by president in the
exercise of item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the
appropriation for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in
excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an
"inappropriate" provision referring to funds other than the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act
of 1991.It is also an attempt to repeal the Foreign borrowing Act

and EO 292 and to reverse the debt payment policy. The repeal of
these laws should be done in a separate law, NOT in the
approp law.
Presumption of constitutionality of a veto, the same way there is
presumption of constitutionality of act of congress.
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a
part of the legislative process. Thats why found in art 6 not art 7.
Hence, there is sound basis of presumption of validity of veto.
Burden shifts on those questioning the validy to show that is use
violates the Consti.
Concepts:
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the
entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI,
Sec. 27[1]).
Exception: The exception to the general veto power is
the power given to the President to veto any
particular item or items in a general appropriations
bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing,
the President must veto the entire item.
History and ratio of item-veto: The legislative practice of inserting
provisions, including conditions, restrictions and limitations, to
items in appropriations bills. Hence, under the 1935 Consti, when a
provision of an approp. bill affects one or more items, Pres cannot
veto the provision without vetoing the particular item to which it
relates. (Provision: When a provision of an appropriation bill affect
one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the
provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or
items to which it relates ) In other words, pres can veto separately
items and also provisions. While the 1987 Constitution did not
retain the sentence, it added that
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates (Art. VI, Sec. 25[2]).
In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that sentence of
Section 16(2) of the 1935 Constitution in the 1987 Constitution
should not be interpreted to mean the disallowance of the
power of the President to veto a "provision".

As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can

include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to
the appropriation to which it relates," the following are considered
as INAPPROPRIATE PROVISINS which can be vetoed separately
from an item:
a. any provision which does not relate to any particular
item, or
b. which extends in its operation beyond an item of
appropriation,.
c. unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are
intended to amend other laws
- these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.
These are matters of general legislation more appropriately
dealt with in separate enactments. Congress cannot by law
establish conditions for and regulate the exercise of powers
of the President given by the Constitution for that would be
an unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative.
Rationale of doctrine of inappropriate provisions:
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp
constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither
can the legislature deprive the Governor of the
constitutional powers conferred on him as chief executive
officer of the state by including in a general appropriation
bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation.
The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general
legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful
placement of such measures in a general appropriation bill,
thereby forcing the Governor to choose between:
a. approving unacceptable substantive legislation or
b. vetoing "items" of expenditures essential to the
operation of government.
The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from
executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power
over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law
measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations
on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be
permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions
of a co-equal branch of government in contravention of the
separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow
the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the
Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of substantive
legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the
Constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this

result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate

provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be
treated as "items" for purposes of the Governor's item veto power
over general appropriation bills.
. . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner
as to encumber the general appropriation bill with vetoproof "logrolling measures", special interest provisions which
could not succeed if separately enacted, or "riders",
substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to
insure passage without veto
Rulings on the following vetoes:
a. Special provision of item on debt service VOID VETO
a. Pres vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special
Provision of the item on debt service without vetoing
the Php86B appropriation for debt service. Argument
of petitioners is that president cannot veto the
special provision on debt service without vetoing the
entire amount of P86B should
Use of the Fund. The appropriation
authorized herein shall be used for
payment of principal and interest of
foreign and domestic
indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any
payment in excess of the amount herein
appropriated shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the
Congress of the
Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no
case shall this fund be used to pay for the
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators
-These provisions are germane to and have a
direct connection with the item on debt
service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the
power to specify how the money shall be spent. The
said provisos, being appropriate provisions,
cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of
said provisions is void.

b. we are sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of

the item on debt service only with respect to the
proviso therein requiring that "any payment in excess
of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subject
to the approval of the President of the Philippines
with the concurrence of the Congress of the
Philippines
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision
applicable to the appropriation for debt service
insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount
appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate"
provision referring to funds other than the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General
Appropriations Act of 1991
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt
to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse
the debt payment policy. As held by the Court
in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done
in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
b. Revolving funds of State Universities and Colleges- VALID
VETO
a. What: authorization of use of income and creation,
operation and maintence of revolving funds;
b. Reason for veto: use of income of government
agency shall accrue to general fund of government
c. Note others enjoyed privilege by virtue of law
authorizing the practice
c. 70% (admin), 30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance for
DPWH= void VETO
a. what: prov that specified that 30% maxium rato of
wrok to be contracted for maintence of national
roads and bridges
b. Reason fro veto: many pap require degree of
flexibility to ensure succesul operations
c. VOID VETO because it is an appropriate provsions. It
is NOT alien to the appropriation for road mainetence
since it spefieid how itesem shall be spent
d. Purchase of medicine by AFP= VOID VETO

a. What: prucahs eof medicines shall comply with

formulary in National durg policy of DoH
b. Reason for veto: there must be transition period for
adoption and smooth implementation of AFP
c. VOID bec app provisions since it is advertence of
Congress in light of generics act of 1988. It is related
and insepratable from approp item on purcahses of
medices by AFP so pres cannot veto prov without
vetoing the item
e. Purchase of military equipment VALID VETO
a. What: requires prior approval of congress for release
of modernization funds
b. Reason: violates the non-impairment of contract and
alters intent of afp to cover military equipment
deemed necessary
c. Ratio: valid VETO because the requirement that pres
must submit all purcahses of military equip to
congress for approval is a congressional or
legislative veto whre leg can block or modify admin
action taken under a statute. It is legislative control
in the implementation of law. It may be negative
(requiring disapproval of exec action); or affirmative
(req. approval) This is an invalid oversight and
violates sep of powers.
i. Any provision blocking an administrative
action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval of executive acts must be
incorporated in a separate and substantive
bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate"
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
were properly vetoed.
f.

use of savings to augment AFP pension funds= valid veto

a. What: authorizing chief of staff to use savings in afp
to agument pension and gratuity funds
b. Reason: auth to transf limited to enumerated officials

g. Deactivation of CAFGU- Valid since veto of a provision in an

appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other
laws
a. Required deactivation of members before payment of
separation pay appropriated
b. Ratio: deactivation should be done accdg to his
timetable, seeing conditons of peace and order

c. Argument why void ang veto: Directive of pres is

tantamount to administrative embargo of
congressional will to implement constis command to
dissolve the CAFGU. Pres cannot impair or withhold
expenditures authrozed by congress when netither
approp act or law authorizes impounding.
(Impoundment refers to a refusal by the
President, for whatever reason, to spend funds
made available by Congress. It is the failure to
spend or obligate budget authority of any type)
Principal sources of authority to impound:
i. authority to impound given to him either
expressly or impliedly by Congress.
ii. the executive power drawn from the
President's role as Commander-in-Chief.
iii. the Faithful Execution Clause.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws
requires that the President desist from implementing the law
if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given
is when through efficient and prudent management of a
project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is
sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire
amount budgeted in the law
We do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress
intended to deny to the President the right to defer or
reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU
members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the
intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for
such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing
laws on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again
we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be
used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No.
1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
h. Conditions on appropriation for SC, Ombudsman, COA, CHR,
What: Pres actually approved the conditions of congress.
Here, it is claimed that pres vioalated indepence and fiscal
authonomy of the above.
Held: the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed
in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto

Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that

additional or indirect compensation can only be given
pursuant to law.
In the second place, such statements are mere reminders
that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in
accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be
treated as superfluities.
he President imposed the conditions saying that the
operalization of these provisions are subject to GUIDELINES
issued by president OKAY LANG.
these are mere reminders that the implementation of the
items on which the said conditions were imposed, should be
done in accordance with existing laws, regulations or
policies. They did not add anything to what was already in
place at the time of the approval of the GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the President said that
the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue.
Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined
whether they are proper or inappropriate. The issuance of
administrative guidelines on the use of public funds
authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the
President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17)
Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has
the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to
carry into execution the law
5. Belgica v. Ochoa
Sec. 28
1. CIR v Lingayen Gulf
Facts:
Facts: Lingayen Gulf Eletric power is an electric power plant that
serves two municip. In the province of Pangasinan pursuant to a
franchise granted to it by the municipal councils., franchise granted
was also approved by Pres. BIR demanded 19K of deficicency
franchise tax at the rate of 5% under NIRC, INSTEAD of the lower
rate of 2% prescribed in municipal franchise (RA 3483). CTA ruled
that 2% tax under RA 3483 should apply. Now CIR assails the
constitutionality of section 4 of RA 3843 for violating the uniformity
and equality of taxation clause since other taxpayers similarly

situated were subject to 5% franchise tax under NITC, hence

discrimonatory.
Held: It is valid and should be applied retroactively since RA 3843
expressly provides for retroactivity.
A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject of it is found.
Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class
shall be taxed alike The Legislature has the inherent power not only
to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax
exemptions have never been deemed violative of the equal
protection clause. 1
The orginal law Act no 3636 was replaced by RA 3843 and the
powerplant was one of those identified as falling within that class of
powerplants which are entitled to tax reduction. The wisdom of
usch law cannot be inquired into by the Court.
Moreso, the 5% franchise tax under the NIRC was NEVER intended
to hve universal application. Under NIRCE, it is expressly allowed
that the taxes be paid lower than 5% when the charter granting the
franchise of grantee says so. Also, RA 3843 imposed a lower tax
and made it IN LIEU of any and all taxes thus leaving on room for
doubt regarding the legislative intent.
Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are
in the nature of private contracts. They do not constitute a part of
the machinery of the general government. They are usually
adopted after careful consideration of the private rights in relation
with resultant benefits to the State ... in passing a special charter
the attention of the Legislature is directed to the facts and
circumstances which the act or charter is intended to meet. The
Legislature consider and make provision for all the circumstances of
a particular case.
2. Abra Valley College v. Aquino
Facts: Abra Valley college is an educ corp which filed a case seeking
to nullyify the Notice of Seizure and notice of sale of its lot and
building in Bangued, Abra for non-payment of real estate taxes and
penalties. The provincial treasurer issued such notices for the
satisfaction of the real taxes thereon. The munic maor of Abra
offered highest bid and so cert of sale was issued to him.
Petitioners are questioning this alleging that they are exempt from
taxation. In the stipulation of facts, it was clear that petitioner was
a school recognized by government and that it more than 1k

students all in all. The question to be answered is won lot and

building are used exclusively for educational pruposes. COntentino
here is that it is not since the second floor of building is used by the
Director of school and his schoolfor residential pruposes; and that
the ground floor of college building is used for commercial prupsoes
since it is used and rented by a commercial establishment called
the Northern Marketing Corporation.
Held: Half of the taxes be returned to petitioner but only half since
ground floor is used for commercial purposes which is not under
the concept of incidental use.
YMCA of Manila vs. Collector of lnternal Revenue-this Court while it
may be true that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house
and maintains a restaurant for its members, still these do not
constitute business in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but an
institution used exclusively for religious, charitable and educational
purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation.
Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte-this
Court included in the exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent
lot and another lot formerly used as a cemetery. It was clarified that
the term "used exclusively" considers incidental use also. Thus, the
exemption from payment of land tax in favor of the convent
includes, not only the land actually occupied by the building but
also the adjacent garden devoted to the incidental use of the parish
priest. The lot which is not used for commercial purposes but
serves solely as a sort of lodging place, also qualifies for exemption
because this constitutes incidental use in religious functions.
exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or
educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually
indispensable' therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430), but
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as
in the case of hospitals, "a school for training nurses, a nurses'
home, property use to provide housing facilities for interns, resident
doctors, superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff,
and recreational facilities for student nurses, interns, and residents'
such as "Athletic fields" including "a firm used for the inmates of
the institution.
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the
property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution,
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more
liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively

used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section

22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable
emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of
the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of
the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for
residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find
justification under the concept of incidental use, which is
complimentary to the main or primary purposeeducational, the
lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education.
df
3. John Hay Peoples Alternative Colation v. LIM
Facts: Being assailed is the constitutionality of presidential
proclamation 420 (creating john hay special economic zone
pursuant to RA 7227 aka Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992). Under RA 7227, BCDA Bases Conversion and Development
Authroity was created. It also crated Subic SEZ which was granted
tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses from local
and national taxes. Under RA 7227, the president was expressly
given the authority to create thru EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION,
subject tot eh concurrence of the LGUs directly affected, other SEZs
in the areas covered by the Clark Military reservate, waalalce air
station in La Union, and in Camp John Hay.
BDA entered into MoA with provate respondent to form a joint
venture preparatory to development of Camp Hin Hay. Baguio City
passed resolution in reposnse to actions taken by BCDA and asked
BDA toe exclude all brangays located wthin Camp John hay from
the coverage of plan for its development. It asked BCDA to sign a
waiver of its owenrehip over barangays in the military reservation.
BCDA agreed to some but rejected others stressing the need to
declare Camp John Hay as a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full
development.
Sangguniang passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to
determine the real estate tazes which may be collcted from real
proeprties of Camp John Hay to guide the sangguniang to
determine is posiigon on won camp john hay may be declared a
SEZ. Sangguniang was of the view that such a declaration would

exempt the camps property and economic activity from local or

national tax.
A month later, sangguniang passed resolution supporting the
issuance of president rampos seeking to declare hectares of camp
john hay as SEZ. Hence, Pres Ramos issued Procmation No 420
establishin a SEZ on portion of camp john hay. Under 420, John Hay
Sez was exempted from tax. But petitioner say there is no grant of
exemption under RA 7227 for SEZs that ARE YET TO BE
ESTABLISHE, unlike in Subic SEZ which was expressly granted tax
exmpetion and investment incentives. Hence, pets say that grant of
tax exemption to John Hay SEZ contravenes Art 6, sec 28(4) of
consti which provides that no law granting any tax exemption shall
be passed without the concurrence of the majority of congress.
Held:Grant of tax exemption and other priv by Proc No 420 is void.
It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic
SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption,
investment incentives and the like. There is no express extension of
the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the
time via presidential proclamation.
The deliberations of the Senate confirm the exclusivity to Subic SEZ
of the tax and investment privileges accorded it under the law.
While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the
creation and success of SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the
grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The
incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic
SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no
support therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the
John Hay SEZ find support in the other laws specified under Section
3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant before
the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment of R.A. No.
7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is
one of tax exemption. It is the legislature, unless limited by a
provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt
any person or corporation or class of property from
taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.
[42]
Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for
specific tax exemptions,[43] or local governments may pass
ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.[44]

The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the

Constitutions imposition that a law granting any tax exemption
must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress.[45] In the same vein, the other kinds of privileges
extended to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for
Congress to legislate upon.
Contrary to public respondents suggestions, the claimed
statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be
manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on
which it is based; it must be expressly granted in a statute
stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.[46] Tax exemption
cannot be implied as it must be categorically and unmistakably
expressed.[47]
If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ
the same tax exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it
would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.
This Court no doubt can void an act or policy of the political
departments of the government on either of two grounds
infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. [48]
This Court then declares that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of
tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for
being violative of the Constitution. This renders it unnecessary to
still dwell on petitioners claim that the same grant violates the
equal protection guarantee.
4. Lung Center v. QC
Facts:
Lung cnter isa on-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of
PD 1823. It is the registered owner of land in quezon avenue.
Erected in the middle is a hospital called Lung Center of the
Philippines. Space on ground floor is leased to private parties for
canteen and small store spaces and to medical or professional
practitioners who use the same private clinics for patients whom
they charge for prof service. One of entire are on left side f blf is
vacant and idle; while big portion on right said leased for
commercial purposes to privat enterpirse elliptical orchids and
garden centers.
Pet acceps both paying and non-paying parients and renders
medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. It
also receives annual subsidies from the government. Botht he aldn
and hospital building were assessed for real property taxes. Pet
calimed for exemption from rp taxes on the ground that under the

constitution, section 28 (3) , art 6 of consti. It says that 60% of

hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and a
majority of operations is for charity patients. Tis was contested by
LBAA of QC on the ground that real proeprties were not actually,
directly and exclusively used for charitable purpsoes hence not
entitled to real property tax exemptions.
Held: Lung center is a charitable insituttion within context of consti
BUT it is NOT a exempt from real property taxes for real properties
that it leases to private entities that are not actually, directly and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. Portions of the land leased
to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to
private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other
hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions
of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying,
are exempt from real property taxes.
To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity
or not, the elements which should be considered include:
- the statute creating the enterprise,
its corporate purposes,
its constitution and by-laws,
- the methods of administration,
the nature of the actual work performed,
- the character of the services rendered,
- the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and
- the use and occupation of the properties.[11]
In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift, to be
applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an
indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and
hearts under the influence of education or religion, by assisting
them to establish themselves in life or otherwise lessening the
burden of government.[12] It may be applied to almost anything that
tend to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man. It
embraces the improvement and promotion of the happiness of
man.[13] The word charitable is not restricted to relief of the
poor or sick. The test of a charity and a charitable organization
are in law the same. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or
not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as
charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private
advantage.
Under PD 1823, petitioner is a non-profit non-stock corp to be
administered under the Office of the President. Organized for the
welfare and ebenfit of Filipino people to combat high incidence of

lung and pulmonary disease in PH. Hence, medical services of pet

are public in general and all walks of life are covered.
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its
character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it
derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or
confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the
government, so long as:
- the money received is devoted or used altogether to
the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and
- no money inures to the private benefit of the persons
managing or operating the institution
The money received by the petitioner becomes a part of the trust
fund and must be devoted to public trust purposes and cannot be
diverted to private profit or benefit.[23]
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive
donations. The petitioner does not lose its character as a
charitable institution simply because the gift or donation is
in the form of subsidies granted by the government.
Even if et is charitable institution, its rp taxe are not exempt from
rp taxes since these are not actually, directly and exclusively used
for charitable purposes.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption
from tax are construedstrictissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and
exemption is the exception. The effect of an exemption is
equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a claim for exemption
from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language
in the law too plain to be mistaken.[ It can never be implied from
the language that will admit any other reasonable construction.
Under PD 1823, it is clear that pet does NOT enjoy any property tax
exemption priv for its real proeprties and its building constructed
thereon.If that were the intention, it should have been among the
enumeration of tax exempt privileges under setion 2 (i.e income
and gift taxes) It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The exemption must not be so enlarged by construction since the
reasonable presumption is that the State has granted in express
terms all it intended to grant at all, and that unless the privilege is

limited to the very terms of the statute the favor would be intended
beyond what was meant.[31]
Section 28(3), art 6 only refers to PROPERTY TAXES only. what is
exempted is not the institution itself . . .; those exempted from
real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually,
directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in
order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to
prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable
institution; and
(b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and
EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes.
Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of
others; debarred from participation or enjoyment; and exclusively is
defined, in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively.
[40]
If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it
is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to
taxation.[41] The words dominant use or principal use cannot be
substituted for the words used exclusively without doing violence to
the Constitutions and the law.[42]Solely is synonymous with
exclusively.[43]
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property
for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual
application of the property itself to the purposes for which
the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the
income from the real property that is determinative of whether
the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.[44]
The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the
entirety of its real property is actually, directly and exclusively used
for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for
the treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services
to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are
being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a
canteen. Further, a portion of the land is being leased to a private
individual for her business enterprise under the business name
Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. Indeed, the petitioners
evidence shows that it collected P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991
and P1,679,999.28 for 1992 from the said lessees.

Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to

private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased
to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes.[45]On
the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital
and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or
non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.
Sec. 29
1. Guingona v. Carague
Facts: A total of 233.5B was allocated in automatic appropriation for
debt service. ON the other hand, only around 27B was allocate for
DECS. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is
authorized by RA 4860 as amended by PD 81, PD 1177, and PD
1967.
Rep. Act 4860 entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND
CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE
NECESSARY TO FINANCE APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PURPOSES APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR
Petitioners seek to declare the unconstitutionality of portions of
these specific laws and restrain the disbursement for debt service
pursuant to these laws. One of the questions raised was won these
decrees were violative sec 29(1), art 6 of the COnsti? They are
saying that this is an undue delegation of power.
Held: The laws here are complete in all their essential terms and
conditions and have sufficient standards indicated. In special
provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the
language employed whether in the past or in the present.17
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be
nothing left to delegate when it reaches except to enforce it.
The legislative intention of RA 4860 as amended by PD 1177 and
PD 1967 is that the amount needed to be automatically set aside to
enable the RP to pay principlal, interst taxes and other normal
banking charges onloands, credits or indebtedness incurred when it
shall be come due without the need to enact a separate law

appropriating funds as the need arises. This is to enable the

law to make PROMPT PAYMENT and/or advances for all
loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the
country.
While these decrees do not the state the specific amount to be
paid, which is necessitated by the very NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
SOUGHT OT BE ADDRESS< the amounts are made certain by
LEGISLATIVE PAREMTERS provides in the decrees. The Executive is
not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed
for debt servicing.
The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes
and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other
evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets
incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become
due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation
as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the
books of the Treasury.
The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases:
1. Budget preparation.
-tasked upon the Executive Branch
-covers the estimation of government revenues, the
determination of budgetary priorities and activities within
the constraints imposed by available revenues and
by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities
and activities into expenditure levels.
-starts with the budget call issued by the Department of
Budget and Management.
Each agency is required to submit agency budget
estimates in line with the requirements consistent
with the general ceilings set by the
Development Budget Coordinating Council
(DBCC).
-With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the
macro-economic projections of interest rates (e.g.
LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and
foreign financing, estimates debt service levels.
-Upon issuance of budget call, the Bureau of Treasury
computes for the interest and principal payments for the
year for all direct national government borrowings and other
liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization.

Congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the

budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process established
by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be
paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law.
Debt service is not included in the General
Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor
already exists under RA No. 4860 and 245, as
amended and PD 1967. Precisely in the fight of this
subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts
and PD for debt service, Congress does not concern itself
with details for implementation by the Executive, but largely
with annual levels and approval thereof upon due
deliberations as part of the whole obligation program for the
year. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot
be said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on
whose part lies the implementation or execution of the
legislative wisdom.

3. Budget Execution.
-Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget
process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting.
The establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities, the continuing review of government fiscal
position, the regulation of funds releases, the
implementation of cash payment schedules, and other
related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle.
-Release from the debt service fired is triggered by a
request of the Bureau of the Treasury for allotments
from the Department of Budget and Management, one
quarter in advance of payment schedule, to ensure prompt
payments.
The Bureau of Treasury, upon receiving official
billings from the creditors, remits payments to
creditors through the Central Bank or to the Sinking
Fund established for government security issues
(Annex F).
4. Budget accountability.
-The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual
performance and initially approved work targets,
obligations incurred, personnel hired and work

accomplished are compared with the targets set at the

time the agency budgets were approved.
-There being no undue delegation of legislative power as
clearly above shown, petitioners insist nevertheless that
subject presidential decrees constitute undue delegation of
legislative power to the executive on the alleged ground
that the appropriations therein are not exact,
certain or definite, invoking in support therefor the
Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution under which the
case of State v. Moore, 69 NW 974, cited by petitioners, was
decided.
Unlike the Constitution of Nebraska, however, our
Constitution does not require adefinite, certain, exact
or "specific appropriation made by law."
- Section 29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits
any of these words and simply states:
Section 29(l). No money shall be paid out of
the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that
provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall
be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential
decrees.
In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may
be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations)
as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by
enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said
appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms.
-The Congressional authorization may be embodied in:
a. annual laws, such as a general appropriations
act or
b. in special provisions of laws of general or
special application which appropriate public funds for
specific public purposes, such as the questioned
decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly
appears from the language employed whether
in the past or in the present.17
Thus, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, President Corazon C. Aquino submitted to Congress
the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the Fiscal

Year 1990. The proposed 1990 expenditure program covering the

estimated obligation that will be incurred by the national
government during the fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion. Of the
proposed budget, P86.8 is set aside for debt servicing as
authorized under P.D. 1967 and R.A. 4860 and 245, as
amended.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D.
No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful
authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or
otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely
complying with the duty to implement the same.
Q: what if law is passed and they put up school that will employ all
the various preachers, ministers from the different government
institutions already embedded in the bureaucracy and they become
resource persons to run that academy. And they will be tasked to
lecture and earn income. They have budget for that academy. Is
this violative of the fact that you will expose civil servants to be
more sensitive to the needs of the religious purpose. So every civil
servant has to go to school so that they will be exposed to the lives
of those from different religions?
A:
2. Belgica v. Ochoa supra
Q: What is a special purpose fund?
3. Philcoco v Republic
Summary: Coco Levey funds are taxes collected to rehabilitate the
coconut industry. Note that taxes, aside from raising revenue, can
also be used to rehabilitate an industry. Hence, these taxes must be
used for a public purpose only. However, pursuant to the
questioned provisions of law, the funds raised i.e. The Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry
Development Fund were categorized by the very laws that
created them as NOT being special funds. However, this is contrary
to their very nature because if you look at the public policy behind
the creation of these funds, it is to benefit the WHOLE COCONUT
INDUSTRY and not just the coconut farmers. It should be noted that
when these taxes were collected, as similarly held in the case of
Gonzales, these are not for the beneficial ownership of the farmers.
This is for the whole industry. Hence,when the laws creating these
funds said that these funds can be used for the purchase of UCPB
shares which were then to be distributed to private farmers, this in

effect was a reclassification of the special fund to a private fund.

This is uncosntiutianl because under the law, special funds for a
public purposes like coconut levy funds (as can be gleamed from
the fact they are deposited in the Philippine National Bank as a
separate trust fund, instead of the National Treasury) can only be
used for the special purpose it was created. The balance should
then revert back to the general fund. This was not the case as
provided for by law. In fact, the laws that created the funds
expressly stated that these special funds shall not revert back to
the general fund.

Sections 1 and 2 of P.D. No. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D.

No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468, are
unconstitutional.

accord with the present social economic plans and

programs of the Government, all collections and
levies which the [PCA] is authorized to levy and
collect such as but not limited to the [CCS
Levy] and the [CIDF] shall not be considered or
construed, under any law or regulation, special
and/or fiduciary funds and do not form part of
the general funds of the national government
within the contemplation of [P.D.] No.
711. (Emphasis supplied)
A similar provision can also be found in Article III, Section 5 of P.D.
No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468, which We shall
later discuss in turn:
P.D. No. 961

MAIN RULING: The coconut levy funds can only be used for
the special purpose and the balance thereof should revert
back to the general fund. Consequently, their subsequent
reclassification as a private fund to be owned by private
individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755,
961 and 1468 are unconstitutional.

HELD:
Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 reads:
Section 2. Financial Assistance. To enable the
coconut farmers to comply with their contractual
obligations under the aforesaid Agreement, the
[PCA] is hereby directed to draw and utilize the
collections under the [CCSF] authorized to be
levied by [PD] No. 232, as amended, to pay for
the financial commitments of the coconut
farmers under the said agreement and, except
for [PCAs] budgetary requirements , all collections
under the [CCSF] Levy and (50%) of the collections
under the [CIDF] shall be deposited, interest free,
with the said bank of the coconut farmers and such
deposits shall not be withdrawn until the the bank
has sufficient equity capital ; and since the
operations, and activities of the [PCA] are all in

Section 5. Exemptions. The Coconut Consumers

Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry
Development Fund as well as all disbursements
of said funds for the benefit of the coconut
farmers as herein authorized shall not be
construed or interpreted, under any law or
regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or
as part of the general funds of the national
government within the contemplation of P.D. No.
711; nor as a subsidy, donation, levy, government
funded investment, or government share within the
contemplation of P.D. 898, the intention being that
said Fund and the disbursements thereof as
herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut
farmers shall be owned by them in their own
private capacities.[100](Emphasis Ours)
P.D. No. 1468
Section 5. Exemptions. The [CCSF] and the [CIDF]
as well as all disbursement as herein
authorized,
shall
not
be
construed
or
interpreted, under nay law or regulation, as
special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the
general funds of the national government within
the contemplation of PD 711; nor as subsidy,
donation, levy government funded investment, or
government share within the contemplation of PD

898, the intention being that said Fund and the

disbursements thereof as herein authorized for
the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be
owned by them in their private capacities.
[101]
(Emphasis Ours.)
In other words, the relevant provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, as
well as those of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468, could have been the only
plausible means by which close to a purported million and a half
coconut farmers could have acquired the said shares of stock. It
has, therefore, become necessary to determine the validity of
the authorizing law, which made the stock transfer and
acquisitions possible.
To reiterate, it is of crucial importance to determine the validity of
P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in light of the constitutional
proscription against the use of special funds save for the purpose it
was
established.
Otherwise,
petitioners
claim
of legitimate private ownership over UCPB shares and indirectly
over SMC shares held by UCPBs subsidiaries will have no leg to
stand on, P.D. No. 755 being the only law authorizing the
distribution of the SMC and UCPB shares of stock to coconut
farmers, and with the aforementioned provisions actually stating
and holding that the coco levy fund shall not be considered as a
special not even general fund, but shall be owned by the farmers in
their private capacities.[102]
xxx
The issue, therefore, in COCOFED v. PCGG turns on the legality of
the transfer of the shares of stock bought with the coconut levy
funds to coconut farmers. This must be distinguished with the
issues in the instant case of whether P.D. No. 755 violated Section
29, paragraph 3 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as to
whether P.D. No. 755 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power.
Clearly, the issues in both sets of cases are so different as to
preclude the application of the law of the case rule.
The coconut levy funds are
in the nature of taxes and
can only be used for public
purpose. Consequently, they
cannot be used to purchase

shares of stocks to be given

for
free
to
private
individuals.
Indeed, We have hitherto discussed, the coconut levy was imposed
in the exercise of the States inherent power of taxation. As We
wrote in Republic v. COCOFED:[109]
Indeed, coconut levy funds partake of the
nature of taxes, which, in general, are enforced
proportional
contributions
from
persons
and
properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty for the support of government and for all
public needs.
(a) They were generated by virtue of statutory
enactments imposed on the coconut farmers
requiring the payment of prescribed amounts. Thus,
PD No. 276, which created the Coconut Consumer[s]
Stabilization Fund (CCSF), mandated the following:
a. A levy, initially, of P15.00 per
100 kilograms of copra resecada or its
equivalent in other coconut products,
shall be imposed on every first sale, in
accordance
with
the
mechanics
established under RA 6260, effective at
the start of business hours on August
10, 1973.
The proceeds from the levy shall
be deposited with the Philippine
National Bank or any other government
bank to the account of the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund, as a
separate trust fund which shall not
form part of the general fund of the
government.
The coco levies were further clarified in
amendatory laws, specifically PD No. 961 and PD No.
1468 in this wise:
The Authority (PCA) is hereby
empowered to impose and collect a
levy, to be known as the Coconut

Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy, on

every one hundred kilos of copra
resecada, or its equivalent delivered to,
and/or purchased by, copra exporters,
oil millers, desiccators and other endusers of copra or its equivalent in other
coconut products. The levy shall be
paid by such copra exporters, oil
millers, desiccators and other endusers of copra or its equivalent in
other coconut products under such
rules and regulations as the Authority
may
prescribe.Until
otherwise
prescribed by the Authority, the current
levy being collected shall be continued.
Like other tax measures, they were not
voluntary payments or donations by the people. They
were enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal
sanctions, as provided under PD No. 276:
3. Any person or firm who
violates any provision of this Decree or
the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, shall, in addition to
penalties already prescribed under
existing administrative and special law,
pay a fine of not less than P2,500 or
more
than
P10,000,
or
suffer
cancellation of licenses to operate, or
both, at the discretion of the Court.
Such penalties were later amended thus: .
(b) The coconut levies were imposed pursuant
to the laws enacted by the proper legislative
authorities of the State. Indeed, the CCSF was
collected under PD No. 276.
(c) They were clearly imposed for a public
purpose. There is absolutely no question that
they
were
collected
to
advance
the
governments avowed policy of protecting
the coconut industry. This Court takes judicial
notice of the fact that thecoconut industry is one of

the great economic pillars of our nation, and

coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading
position among the countrys export products.
Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues
to support the government, but also to provide
means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization
of a threatened industry, which is so affected
with public interest as to be within the police power
of the State.
Even if the money is allocated for a special
purpose and raised by special means, it is still
public in character. In Cocofed v. PCGG, the Court
observed that certain agencies or enterprises were
organized and financed with revenues derived from
coconut levies imposed under a succession of law of
the late dictatorship with deposed Ferdinand Marcos
and his cronies as the suspected authors and chief
beneficiaries of the resulting coconut industry
monopoly. The Court continued: . It cannot be
denied that the coconut industry is one of the
major industries supporting the national
economy. It is, therefore, the States concern to
make it a strong and secure source not only of the
livelihood of a significant segment of the
population, but also of export earnings the
sustained growth of which is one of the
imperatives of economic stability.[110] (Emphasis
Ours)
We have ruled time and again that taxes are imposed only
for a public purpose.[111] They cannot be used for purely private
purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. [112] When a
law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give
undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of
private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the
requirement of public purpose.[113] In Gaston v. Republic Planters
xxxx the Court amply reasoned that the Stabilization Fund must be
utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar industry, and all its
components, stabilization of the domestic market including
foreign market, the industry being of vital importance to
the countrys economy and to national interest.[117]

Similarly in this case, the coconut levy funds were sourced

from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and 582,
among others,[118] with the end-goal of developing the entire
coconut industry.[119] Clearly, to hold therefore, even by law, that
the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be
used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals
in their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the
rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.
Needless to stress, courts do not, as they cannot, allow by
judicial fiat the conversion of special funds into a private fund for
the benefit of private individuals. In the same vein, We cannot
subscribe to the idea of what appears to be an indirect if not
exactly direct conversion of special funds into private funds, i.e., by
using special funds to purchase shares of stocks, which in turn
would be distributed for free to private individuals. Even if these
private individuals belong to, or are a part of the coconut industry,
the free distribution of shares of stocks purchased with special
public funds to them, nevertheless cannot be justified. The ratio in
Gaston,[120] as expressed below, appliesmutatis mutandis to this
case:
The stabilization fees in question are levied by
the State for a special purpose that of financing the
growth and development of the sugar industry and all
its components, stabilization of the domestic market
including the foreign market. The fact that the
State has taken possession of moneys pursuant
to law is sufficient to constitute them as state
funds even though they are held for a special
purpose.
That the fees were collected from sugar
producers,[etc.], and that the funds were
channeled to the purchase of shares of stock in
respondent Bank do not convert the funds into
a trust fund for their benefit nor make them
the beneficial owners of the shares so
purchased. It is but rational that the fees be
collected from them since it is also they who
are benefited from the expenditure of the
funds derived from it. .[121] (Emphasis Ours.)
In this case, the coconut levy funds were being exacted from
copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators and other end-users of

copra or its equivalent in other coconut products. [122] Likewise so,

the funds here were channeled to the purchase of the shares of
stock in UCPB. Drawing a clear parallelism between Gaston and this
case, the fact that the coconut levy funds were collected from the
persons or entities in the coconut industry, among others, does not
and cannot entitle them to be beneficial owners of the subject
funds or more bluntly, owners thereof in their private
capacity. Parenthetically, the said private individuals cannot own
the UCPB shares of stocks so purchased using the said special
funds of the government.[123]
Coconut
levy
funds
are
special public funds of the
government.
Plainly enough, the coconut levy funds are public funds. We
have ruled in Republic v. COCOFED that the coconut levy funds are
not only affected with public interest; they are prima facie public
funds.[124] In fact, this pronouncement that the levies are
government funds was admitted and recognized by respondents,
COCOFED, et al., in G.R. No. 147062-64.[125] And more importantly,
in the same decision, We clearly explained exactly what kind of
government fund the coconut levies are. We were categorical in
saying that coconut levies are treated as special funds by the very
laws which created them:
xxx
Moreover, the Court, in Gaston, stated the observation that the
character of a stabilization fund as a special fund is emphasized by
the fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine National
Bank [PNB] and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which
may be paid out only in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.[128] Similarly in this case, Sec.1 (a) of P.D. No. 276 states that
the proceeds from the coconut levy shall be deposited with the
PNB, then a government bank, or any other government bank
under the account of the CCSF, as a separate trust fund, which
shall not form part of the governments general fund. [129] And even
assuming arguendo that the coconut levy funds were transferred to
the general fund pursuant to P.D. No. 1234, it was with the specific
directive that the same be treated as special accounts in the
general fund.[130]
The coconut levy funds can
only be used for the special

purpose and the balance

thereof should revert back
to
the
general
fund.
Consequently,
their
subsequent reclassification
as a private fund to be
owned by private individuals
in their private capacities
under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and
1468 are unconstitutional.
To recapitulate, Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987
Constitution, restating a general principle on taxation, enjoins the
disbursement of a special fund in accordance with the special
purpose for which it was collected, the balance, if there be any,
after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer forthcoming, to
be transferred to the general funds of the government, thus:
Section 29(3).
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a
special purpose shall be treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the
purpose for which a special fund was created has
been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall
be transferred to the general funds of the
Government. (Emphasis Ours)
Correlatively, Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 clearly states that:
Section 2. Financial Assistance. To enable the
coconut farmers to comply with their contractual
obligations under the aforesaid Agreement, the [PCA]
is hereby directed to draw and utilize the collections
under the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund
[CCSF] authorized to be levied by [P.D.] 232, as
amended, to pay for the financial commitments of
the coconut farmers under the said agreement. and
the Coconut Industry Development Fund as
prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 582 shall not
be considered or construed, under any law or
regulation, special and/or fiduciary funds and
do not form part of the general funds of the
national government within the contemplation of
Presidential Decree No. 711. (Emphasis Ours)

Likewise, as discussed supra, Article III, Section 5 of both P.D. Nos.

961 and 1468 provides that the CCSF shall not be construed by
any law as a special and/or trust fund, the stated intention
being that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to
coconut farmers in their private capacities.[131] Thus, in order to
determine whether the relevant provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961
and 1468 complied with Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987
Constitution, a look at the public policy or the purpose for which the
CCSF levy was imposed is necessary.

As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted the CCSF to

advance the governments avowed policy of protecting the coconut
industry.[132] Evidently, the CCSF was originally set up as a special
fund to support consumer purchases of coconut products. To put it
a bit differently, the protection of the entire coconut industry, and
even more importantly, for the consuming public provides the
rationale for the creation of the coconut levy fund. There can be no
quibbling then that the foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 276
intended the fund created and set up therein not especially for the
coconut farmers but for the entire coconut industry, albeit the
improvement of the industry would doubtless redound to the
benefit of the farmers. Upon the foregoing perspective, the
following provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 insofar as they
declared, as the case may be, that: [the coconut levy] fund and the
disbursements thereof [shall be] authorized for the benefit of
the coconut farmers and shall be owned by them in their
private capacities;[133] or the coconut levy fund shall not be
construed by any law to be a special and/or fiduciary fund,
and do not therefore form part of the general fund of the
national government later on;[134] or the UCPB shares
acquired using the coconut levy fund shall be distributed to
the coconut farmers for free,[135] violated the special
public purpose for which the CCSF was established.
In sum, not only were the challenged presidential
issuances unconstitutional for decreeing the distribution of the
shares of stock for free to the coconut farmers and, therefore,
negating the public purpose declared by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to
stabilize the price of edible oil [136] and to protect the coconut
industry.[137] They likewise reclassified, nay treated, the coconut
levy fund as private fund to be disbursed and/or invested for the
benefit of private individuals in their private capacities, contrary to

the original purpose for which the fund was created. To compound
the situation, the offending provisions effectively removed the
coconut levy fund away from the cavil of public funds which
normally can be paid out only pursuant to an appropriation made
by law.[138] The conversion of public funds into private assets was
illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by these provisions. Clearly
therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468
are unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the
Constitution. In this context, the distribution by PCA of the UCPB
shares purchased by means of the coconut levy fund a special fund
of the government to the coconut farmers, is therefore void.
We quote with approval the Sandiganbayans reasons for declaring
the provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 as unconstitutional:
It is now settled, in view of the ruling in Republic v.
COCOFED, et al., supra, that Coconut levy funds are
raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of
the State; that they are levies imposed by the State
for the benefit of the coconut industry and its
farmers and that they were clearly imposed for a
public purpose. This public purpose is explained in
the said case, as follows:
. c) They were clearly imposed for a
public purpose. There is absolutely no
question that they were collected to
advance the governments avowed
policy of protecting the coconut
industry.
Taxation is done not merely to raise
revenues to support the government,
but also to provide means for the
rehabilitation and the stabilization of a
threatened industry, which is so
affected with public interest as to be
within the police power of the State, as
held in Caltex Philippines v. COA and
Osmea v. Orbos.
The avowed public purpose for the disbursement of
the CCSF is contained in the perambulatory clauses
and Section 1 of P.D. No. 755. The imperativeness of
enunciating the public purpose of the expenditure of

funds raised through taxation is underscored in the

case of Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, et al, supra, which held:
As regards the legal feasibility of
appropriating public funds for a private
purpose the principle according to
Ruling Case Law, is this:
It is a general rule that the legislature
is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public
purpose it is the essential character of
the direct object of the expenditure
which must determine its validity as
justifying a tax, and not the magnitude
of the interests to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage
of the community, and thus the public
welfare may be ultimately benefited by
their promotion. Incidental advantage
to the public or to the state, which
results from the promotion of private
interests and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not
justify their aid by the use of public
money. 25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris
Secundum in the following language:
The
test
of
the
constitutionality of a statute
requiring the use of public
funds is whether the statute is
designed to promote the
public interests, as opposed
to the furtherance of the
advantage
of
individuals,
although each advantage to
individuals might incidentally
serve the public. (81 C.J.S. p.
1147)

Needless to say, this Court is fully in

accord
with
the
foregoing
views. Besides, reflecting as they do,
the
established
jurisprudence
in
the United
States,
after
whose
constitutional system ours has been
patterned,
said
views
and
jurisprudence are, likewise, part and
parcel of our own constitutional law.
The gift of funds raised by the exercise of the taxing
powers of the State which were converted into
shares of stock in a private corporation, slated for
free distribution to the coconut farmers, can only be
accorded constitutional sanction if it will directly
serve the public purpose declared by law.[139]
Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, as
well as PCA Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1975
(PCA AO 1), and Resolution
No.
074-75,
are
invalid
delegations of legislative
power.
Petitioners argue that the anti-graft court erred in declaring
Section 1 of PD 755, PCA Administrative Order No. 1 and PCA
Resolution No. 074-78 constitutionally infirm by reason of alleged
but
unproven
and
unsubstantiated
flaws
in
their
implementation. Additionally, they explain that said court erred in
concluding that Section 1 of PD No. 755 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it authorizes the PCA to
promulgate rules and regulations governing the distribution of the
UCPB shares to the farmers.
These propositions are meritless.
The assailed PSJ-A noted the operational distribution nightmare
faced by PCA and the mode of distribution of UCPB shares set in
motion by that agency left much room for diversion. Wrote the
Sandiganbayan:
The actual distribution of the bank shares was
admittedly an enormous operational problem which
resulted in the failure of the intended beneficiaries to
receive their shares of stocks in the bank, as shown

by the rules and regulations, issued by the PCA,

without adequate guidelines being provided to it by
P.D. No. 755. PCA Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 1975 (August 20, 1975), Rules and Regulations
Governing the Distribution of Shares of Stock of the
Bank Authorized to be Acquired Pursuant to PCA
Board Resolution No. 246-75, quoted hereunder
discloses how the undistributed shares of stocks due
to anonymous coconut farmers or payors of the
coconut levy fees were authorized to be distributed
to existing shareholders of the Bank:
Section
9. Fractional
and
Undistributed Shares Fractional
shares and shares which remain
undistributed
shall
be
distributed to all the coconut
farmers who have qualified and
received equity in the Bank and
shall be apportioned among
them, as far as practicable, in
proportion to their equity in
relation to the number of
undistributed equity and such
further rules and regulations as
may hereafter be promulgated.
The foregoing PCA issuance was further
amended by Resolution No. 074-78, still
citing the same problem of distribution of
the bank shares.:
Thus, when 51,200,806 shares in the bank
remained undistributed, the PCA deemed it proper to
give a bonanza to coconut farmers who already got
their bank shares, by giving them an additional share
for each share owned by them and by converting
their fractional shares into full shares. The rest of the
shares were then transferred to a private
organization, the COCOFED, for distribution to those
determined to be bona fide coconut farmers who had
not received shares of stock of the Bank. .
The PCA thus assumed, due to lack of
adequate guidelines set by P.D. No. 755, that it had

complete authority to define who are the

coconut farmers and to decide as to who
among the coconut farmers shall be given the
gift of bank shares; how many shares shall be
given to them, and what basis it shall use to
determine the amount of shares to be distributed for
free to the coconut farmers. In other words, P.D. No.
755 fails the completeness test which renders it
constitutionally infirm.
Regarding the second requisite of standard, it is
settled that legislative standard need not be
expressed.
We observed, however, that the PCA [AO] No. 1,
Series of 1975 and PCA Rules and Regulations 07478,
did
not
take
into
consideration
the
accomplishment of the public purpose or the national
standard/policy of P.D. No. 755 which is directly to
accelerate the development and growth of the
coconut industry and as a consequence thereof, to
make the coconut farmers participants in and
beneficiaries of such growth and development. The
said PCA issuances did nothing more than provide
guidelines as to whom the UCPB shares were to be
distributed and how many bank shares shall be
allotted to the beneficiaries. There was no mention of
how the distributed shares shall be used to achieve
exclusively or at least directly or primarily the aim or
public purpose enunciated by P.D. No. 755. The
numerical or quantitative distribution of shares
contemplated by the PCA regulations which is a
condition for the validly of said administrative
issuances. There
was
a
reversal
of
priorities. The
narrow
private
interests
prevailed over the laudable objectives of the
law. However, under the May 25, 1975 agreement
implemented by the PCA issuances, the PCA acquired
only 64.98% of the shares of the bank and even the
shares covering the said 64.98% were later on
transferred to non-coconut farmers.
The distribution for free of the shares of stock
of the CIIF Companies is tainted with the abovementioned constitutional infirmities of the PCA
administrative issuances. In view of the foregoing, we

cannot consider the provision of P.D. No. 961 and P.D.

No. 1468 and the implementing regulations issued by
the PCA as valid legal basis to hold that assets
acquired with public funds have legitimately become
private properties. [140] (Emphasis added.)
P.D. No. 755 involves an invalid delegation of legislative
power, a concept discussed in Soriano v. Laguardia,[141] citing the
following excerpts from Edu v. Ericta:
It is a fundamental that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power. What cannot be
delegated is the authority to make laws and to alter
and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the
statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or
not there is an undue delegation of legislative power,
the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness
of
the
measure
enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation,
there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be
hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative
purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations.[142] (Emphasis
supplied)
Jurisprudence is consistent as regards the two tests, which must be
complied with to determine the existence of a valid delegation of
legislative power. In Abakada Guro Party List, et al. v. Purisima,
[143]
We reiterated the discussion, to wit:

Two tests determine the validity of delegation

of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the
delegates authority, announce the legislative
policy and identify the conditions under which
it is to be implemented.
In the instant case, the requisite standards or criteria are
absent in P.D. No. 755. As may be noted, the decree authorizes the
PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks
of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments
of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the acquisition of
such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be
considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single
coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer and,
therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares
shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the
basis as to the number of shares a farmer is entitled to receive
for free are important variables to be determined by law and
cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear
condition as to how the disposition of the UCPB shares or their
conversion into private ownership will redound to the advancement
of the national policy declared under it. To recall, P.D. No. 755 seeks
to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry
and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers
will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and
development.[144] The Sandiganbayan is correct in its observation
and ruling that the said law gratuitously gave away public funds to
private individuals, and converted them exclusively into private
property without any restriction as to its use that would reflect the
avowed national policy or public purpose. Conversely, the private
individuals to whom the UCPB shares were transferred are free to
dispose of them by sale or any other mode from the moment of
their acquisition. In fact and true enough, the Sandiganbayan
categorically stated in its Order dated March 11, 2003, [145] that out
of the 72.2% shares and increased capital stock of the FUB

(later UCPB) allegedly covered by the May 25, 1975 Agreement,

[146]
entirely paid for by PCA, 7.22% were given to Cojuangco and
the remaining 64.98%, which were originally held by PCA for the
benefit of the coconut farmers, were later sold or transferred to
non-coconut farmers.[147] Even the proposed rewording of the
factual allegations of Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.,
reveals that indeed, P.D. No. 755 did not provide for any guideline,
standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares shall be
distributed to the coconut farmers that would ensure that the same
will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of
the coconut industry pursuant to its national policy. The proposed
rewording of admissions reads:
There were shares forming part of the
aforementioned 64.98% which were, after their
distribution, for free, to the coconut farmers as
required
by
P.D.
No.
755, sold
or
transferred respectively
by
individual
coconut
farmers who were then the registered stockholders of
those UCPB shares to non-coconut farmers.[148]
Clearly, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable carte
blanche to distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it
may determine, as well as the full disposition of such shares to
private individuals in their private capacity without any conditions
or restrictions that would advance the laws national policy or public
purpose, present a case of undue delegation of legislative power.
As such, there is even no need to discuss the validity of the
administrative orders and resolutions of PCA implementing P.D. No.
755. Water cannot rise higher than its source.
Even so, PCA AO 1 and PCA Resolution No. 078-74, are in
themselves, infirm under the undue delegation of legislative
powers. Particularly, Section 9 of PCA AO I provides:
SECTION 9. Fractional and Undistributed
Shares Fractional shares and shares which remain
undistributed as a consequence of the failure of the
coconut farmers to register their COCOFUND receipts
or the destruction of the COCOFUND receipts or the
registration of COCOFUND receipts in the name of an
unqualified individual, after the final distribution is
made
on
the
basis
of
the
consolidated IBM registration Report as of March 31,
1976 shall be distributed to all the coconut farmers
who have qualified and received equity in the Bank

and shall be appointed among them, as far as

practicable, in proportion to their equity in relation to
the number of undistributed equity and such further
rules and regulations as may hereafter be
promulgated.
The foregoing provision directs and authorizes the
distribution of fractional and undistributed shares as a consequence
of the failure of the coconut farmers with Coco Fund receipts to
register them, even without a clear mandate or instruction on the
same in any pertinent existing law. PCA Resolution No. 078-74 had
a similar provision, albeit providing more detailed information. The
said Resolution identified 51,200,806 shares of the bank that
remained undistributed and PCA devised its own rules as to how
these undistributed and fractional shares shall be disposed of,
notwithstanding the dearth as to the standards or parameters in
the laws which it sought to implement.
Eventually, what happened was that, as correctly pointed
out by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA gave a bonanza to supposed
coconut farmers who already got their bank shares, by giving them
extra shares according to the rules established on its own by the
PCA under PCA AO 1 and Resolution No. 078-74. Because of the
lack of adequate guidelines under P.D. No. 755 as to how the shares
were supposed to be distributed to the coconut farmers, the PCA
thus assumed that it could decide for itself how these shares will be
distributed. This obviously paved the way to playing favorites, if not
allowing outright shenanigans. In this regard, this poser raised in
the Courts February 16, 1993 Resolution in G.R. No. 96073 is as
relevant then as it is now: How is it that shares of stocks in such
entities which was organized and financed by revenues derived
from coconut levy funds which were imbued with public interest
ended up in private hands who are not farmers or beneficiaries;
and whether or not the holders of said stock, who in one way or
another had had some part in the collection, administration,
disbursement or other disposition of the coconut levy funds were
qualified to acquire stock in the corporations formed and operated
from these funds. [149]
Likewise, the said PCA issuances did not take note of the
national policy or public purpose for which the coconut levy funds
were imposed under P.D. No. 755, i.e. the acceleration of the
growth and development of the entire coconut industry, and the
achievement of a vertical integration thereof that could make the
coconut farmers participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth
and development.[150] Instead, the PCA prioritized the coconut

farmers themselves by fully disposing of the bank shares, totally

disregarding the national policy for which the funds were
created. This is clearly an undue delegation of legislative powers.
With this pronouncement, there is hardly any need to establish that
the sequestered assets are ill-gotten wealth. The documentary
evidence, the P.D.s and Agreements, prove that the transfer of the
shares to the more than one million of supposed coconut farmers
was tainted with illegality.
Article III, Section 5 of P.D.
No. 961 and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468
violate Article IX (D) (2) of
the 1987 Constitution.
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 explicitly takes away the
coconut levy funds from the coffer of the public funds, or, to be
precise,
privatized
revenues
derived
from
the
coco
levy. Particularly, the aforesaid Section 5 provides:

Section
5. Exemptions. The
Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund and the Coconut
Industry Development fund as well as all
disbursements of said funds for the benefit of the
coconut farmers as herein authorized shall not be
construed or interpreted, under any law or
regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or
as part of the general funds of the national
government within the contemplation of P.D.
No. 711; nor as a subsidy, donation, levy,
government funded investment, or government
share within the contemplation of P.D. 898 the
intention being that said Fund and the
disbursements thereof as herein authorized for
the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be
owned
in
their
own
private
capacity.
[151]
(Emphasis Ours)

The same provision is carried over in Article III, Section 5 of

P.D. No. 1468, the Revised Coconut Industry Code:

These identical provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 likewise

violate Article IX (D), Section 2(1) of the Constitution, defining the
powers and functions of the Commission on Audit (COA) as a
constitutional commission:
Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall
have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies,
or
instrumentalities,
including
government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that
have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and
universities;
(c)
other
government-owned
or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;.
[152]
(Emphasis Ours)
A similar provision was likewise previously found in Article XII (D),
Section 2 (1) of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
Section 2. The Commission on Audit shall have the
following powers and functions:
(1) Examine,
audit,
and
settle,
in
accordance with law and regulations, all
accounts pertaining to the revenues and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in
trust
by,
or
pertaining
to,
the
Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned
and
controlled
corporations; keep the general accounts of
the government and, for such period as may
be provided by law, preserve the vouchers
pertaining
thereto;
and
promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations
including those for the prevention of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant
expenditures or use of funds and property.
[153]
(Emphasis Ours)

The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the

responsibility for State audit.[154] As an independent supreme State
auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any
law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution,
[n]o law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government
or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of
public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
[155]
Following the mandate of the COA and the parameters set forth
by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over
the coconut levy funds, being special public funds. Conversely, the
COA has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle
all accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and,
consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using the said
funds. However, declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of
private funds, ergo subject to private appropriation, removes them
from the coffer of the public funds of the government, and
consequently renders them impervious to the COA audit
jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and
1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally-mandated function and
undermine its constitutional independence.
The assailed purchase of UCPB shares of stocks using the coconut
levy funds presents a classic example of an investment of public
funds. The conversion of these special public funds into private
funds by allowing private individuals to own them in their private
capacities is something else. It effectively deprives the COA of its
constitutionally-invested power to audit and settle such
accounts. The conversion of the said shares purchased using
special public funds into pure and exclusive private ownership has
taken, or will completely take away the said funds from the
boundaries with
which the COA has jurisdiction. Obviously,
the COA is without audit jurisdiction over the receipt or
disbursement of private property. Accordingly, Article III, Section 5
of both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down for being
unconstitutional, be they assayed against Section 2(1), Article XII
(D) of the 1973 Constitution or its counterpart provision in the 1987
Constitution.
The Court, however, takes note of the dispositive portion of
PSJ-A, which states that:[156]
2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the
coconut levy funds shall not be considered special
and/or fiduciary funds nor part of the general funds

of the national government and similar provisions

of Sec. 3, Art. III, P.D. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III,
P.D. 1468 contravene the provisions of the
Constitution, particularly, Art. IX (D), Sec. 2; and
Article VI, Sec. 29 (3). (Emphasis Ours)
However, a careful reading of the discussion in PSJ-A reveals
that it is Section 5 of Article III of P.D. No. 961 and not Section 3 of
said decree, which is at issue, and which was therefore held to be
contrary to the Constitution.The dispositive portion of the said PSJ
should therefore be corrected to reflect the proper provision that
was declared as unconstitutional, which is Section 5 of Article III of
P.D. No. 961 and not Section 3 thereof.
NOTES FROM CLASS:
Q: is this purely revenue raising or is this police power measure?
A:
Sec. 30
1. First Lepanto Ceramics v CA
Facts: The Board of Investment (Boi) granted petitioner First
Lepanto Ceramics request to change the scope of its registered
product from galzed floor tiles to ceramic tiles. Oppositor Mariwasa
filed an MR of deicsions and subsequently filed a petition for
review with the CA pursuant to Circular 1-91. CA then issued
a TRO against BOU from implementing its decision. Did not file MR
anymore since question is legal in nature and so it filed petition for
certiorari and prohibition before Supreme Court. Petitioner
questions Circular No 1-91 as it amends or supersedes the appelate
jurisdiction conferred by law upon the SC. Petitioner argues that BP
129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act) and Circular 1-91 (prescribing
rules governing appeals to CA from final decision of CTA and Quasijduical agencies) cannot be the basis of Mariwasas appeal to CA
because the procedure for appeal in such laws runs contrary to EO
226 which provides that decisions of BOI shall be filed directly with
the Supreme Court. Mariwasa counters and says that any
inconsistency between BP 129 and EO 226 has already been
clarified by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court which was enacted
4 years after EO 226 was enacted
BP 129 seeks to provide a uniform procedure of appeal from
decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the bench
and the bar. Also for unclogging the court. BP 129 deals with
change in procedure, the reorganization of the CA, and the
broadening of the jurisdiction of the CA.

However, because of the flaws of the lawmaking system, there are

some deviations form the goal of uniform procedure prescribed
under BP 129. For instance, EO 226 or the Omnibus investment
Code provides that all appeals shall be filed directly with the SC
within 30 days from receipt of decision. The right of appeal
provided in E.O. 226 within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
order or decision is clearly not in consonance with the present
procedure before this Court. Only decisions, orders or rulings of a
Constitutional Commission (Civil Service Commission, Commission
on Elections or Commission on Audit), may be brought to the
Supreme Court on original petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 by
the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days form receipt of a copy
thereof Pursuant to its power to promulgate rules regarding
procedure for all courts, the SC issued Circular 1-91 to prescribe
rules on appeal to CA from decisions of CTA and other qj agencies.
A
Althought a circular is not strictly a law, it has the force and effect
of law. Hence, the argument that EO 226 cannot be appealed
Circular 1-91 because the EO 226 grants a substantive rights is of
NO MERIT. EO 226 only deals with procedural matters (E.O. 226
grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI
and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what
manner such appeal can be brought) which the Court has the
power to regulate.
The right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under
E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91
simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this
agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different
period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make
an incursion into the substantive right to appeal.
More importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of the
exclusions listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final
decisions and interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from the
circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations
Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-judicial
agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or
allowed by statute.
Since in DBP v. CA 13 we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact that
the same is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on

the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no

reason why BOI should be excluded from
Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said law.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82
of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right
to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from
decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be
filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the
Court of Appeals.
Q:Reconcile awith aritlce 8 where there is enumeration of
jurisdiction of supreme court. This does not mean that there is
IMMUTABLE rule that you cannot change what is listed under article
8. BUT when it comes to appellate jurisdiction, you will have to
seek the advice of SC> I t only requires a LAW! Not a consitutitnal
amendment. For all others, you will ahv ot require ac osntitutainl
amendment. But this isonlyspecif cin the increase of appeallate
jurisdiction.
Sec 32
1. SBMA v COMELEC
Facts:RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act
provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone.
Prusuant to Sec 12, it says that subject to the concurrence by
resolution of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo
and Sangguniang Bayan of Muns of Subic, Morong and Hermosa,
there shall be created the SEZ.
The SBs passed their concurrence to RA 7227. However,
repondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companies filed a petition
with Sangguinang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which was a concurrence to RA
7227.
Pursuant to this petition, Sannguniang Bayan of Morong
promulgated requested Congress to amend certai provs of RA 7227.
However, since reposndents were not satisfied witht eh action of
the SB, the respondents resorted to their power of initiative under
the LGC of 1991, Sec 122 which saus that if no favorable action is
taken by sangguniang concerned, proponents thru their duly
authorized and registered reps, may invoke their power of
INTITIATIVE, giving notice to the sanggunian concerned.
Commission en banc denied the petition for local initiative since

subject was merely a resolution and NOT AN ORDIANCE. Private

resps filed a pet for certiorari and mandamus against comelec and
sangguniang bayan of morong to set aside such resolution insofar
as it prevents the provincial elction supervisor of batan from
proceeding with the authentication of the required number of
signature in support of the intitiatiative and gathering of signatures.
On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845,
adopting therein a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum on
certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the
scheduled referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27,
1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848
providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum proposing to annul or repealKapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan".
On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution
No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent
on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment
of a national law
Held:
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but
resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. act as
provided for in Sec 32, art 6 of the Consti includes a resolution. 'an
expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . .
as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also
decrees, edicts, laws, judgement, resolves, awards and
determination
In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of
municipal resolution as the form by which these two new
constitutional prerogatives of the people may validly
exercised. What is at issue here is whether Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form
and substance for submission to the people for their approval; in
fine, whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in
promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848.
The comelec commited gadalej in issuing res no 2848 as it only
made prepartions for a REFERNDUM (27x repeated) but the word
INITIATIVE was NOT MENTIONED at al. The Comelec labeled the
exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to

a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called

"referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of
Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description
"referendum". And yet it was clearly an INTITIAIVE.
Xxx
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a
referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and
Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other,
thus:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments
to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through
a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for
action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject
a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of
two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or
reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve
or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional
assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz[13] defines
initiative as the "power of the people to propose bills and laws, and
to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative
assembly." On the other hand, he explains that referendum "is the
right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure
which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most
cases would without action on the part of electors become a law."
The foregoing definitions, which are based on Black's [14] and other
leading American authorities, are echoed in the Local Government
Code (RA 7160) substantially as follows:

"SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. -- Local Initiative is the legal

process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit
may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.
"SEC. 126. Local Referendum Defined. -- Local referendum is the
legal process whereby the registered voters of the local
government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance
enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction
of the Comelec within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and
cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30)
days in case of barangays.
The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said
referendum."
Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is
resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the
law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance,
resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend
or modify one already existing.
Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the
opportunity to enact the proposal. If its refuses/neglects to do so
within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents
through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local
legislative body concerned.Should the proponents be able to collect
the number of signed conformities within the period granted by
said statute, the Commission on Elections "shall then set a date for
the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be
submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit
concerned x x x".
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body
submits to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for
approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly
enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said
referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction
of the Commission on Elections.[15]
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate,
referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making
body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people
themselves without the participation and against the wishes of
their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of
the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or

enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in

an initiative are understandably more complex than in a
referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either
"Yes" or "No" in the ballot.
[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and
referendum as "powers" or "legal processes", these can also be
"rights", as Justice Cruz terms them, or "concepts", or "the
proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred to in this
Decision.]
From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the
Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority
thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes
but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the
people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially
true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and
should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each
such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised
that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be
submitted to the electorate,"[16] although "two or more propositions
may be submitted in an initiative".[17]
It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary
of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend
assistance in the formulation of the proposition."
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration
and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the
conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the
people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or
change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise
of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue
relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise
of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.
It is the argument of the SBMA that after the sangguniang bayan of
morong gave their resolutions of concurrence, the power to
withdraw such concurrence and to substitute thereofr a condition
concurrence is beyond its power. However, private respon aGarcai
says that a MUNICAPL RESOLUTION is still In its proposal stage and
it not yet an approved law. People can still reject it.
it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec
Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of
discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard
to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or

approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or

lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has
made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by
the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal
in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which
this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in
the exercise of its review powers.
Another question which the parties may wish to submit to the
Comelec upon remand of the initiative is whether the proposal,
assuming it is within the capacity of the Municipal Council to enact,
may be divided into several parts for purposes of voting. Item "I" is
a proposal to recall, nullify and render without effect (bawiin,
nulipikahin at pawalangbisa) Municipal Resolution No. 10, Series of
1993. On the other hand, Item "II" proposes to change or replace
(palitan) said resolution with another municipal resolution of
concurrence provided certain conditions enumerated thereunder
would be granted, obeyed and implemented (ipagkakaloob,
ipatutupad at isasagawa) for the benefit and interest of Morong and
Bataan. A voter may favor Item I -- i.e., he may want
a total dismemberment of Morong from the Authority -- but may not
agree with any of the conditions set forth in Item II.Should the
proposal then be divided and be voted upon separately and
independently?
All told, we shall not pass upon the third issue of ultra vires on the
ground of prematurity.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that (i) our decision in the earlier Garcia case is not
a bar to the present controversy as the issue raised and decided
therein is different from the questions involved here; (ii) the
respondent Commission should be given an opportunity to review
and correct its errors in promulgating its Resolution No. 2848 and in
preparing -- if necessary -- for the plebiscite; and (iii) that the said
Commission has administrative and initiatory quasi-judicial
jurisdiction to pass upon the question of whether the proposal is
sufficient in form and language and whether such proposal or part
or parts thereof are clearly and patently outside the powers of
the municipal council of Morong to enact, and therefore violative of
law.
In deciding this case, the Court realizes that initiative and
referendum, as concepts and processes, are new in our country.We
are remanding the matter to the Comelec so that proper corrective

measures, as above discussed, may be undertaken, with a view to

helping fulfill our people's aspirations for the actualization of
effective direct sovereignty. Indeed we recognize that "(p)rovisions
for initiative and referendum are liberally construed to effectuate
their purposes, to facilitate and not to hamper the exercise by the
voters of the rights granted thereby."[24] In his authoritative treatise
on the Constitution, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. treasures these
"instruments which can be used should the legislature show itself
indifferent to the needs of the people."[25]Impelled by a sense of
urgency, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 to give life and
form to the constitutional mandate. Congress also interphased
initiative and referendum into the workings of local governments by
including a chapter on this subject in the local Government Code of
1991.[26] And the Commission on Elections can do no less by
seasonably and judiciously promulgating guidelines and rules, for
both national and local use, in implementation of these laws. For its
part, this Court early on expressly recognized the revolutionary
import of reserving people power in the process of law-making. [27]

Congress. And no law has yet been passed. It said that while RA
6375 provides for 3 systems of intitaitive (consti, statutes and local
leg) it has no subtitle on initiative for the constitution. Also, it was
said the people intitiative is limited to the amendments to the consi
and not to the revision thereof.

Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable

modes of expressing popular sovereignty. And this Court as a
matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture,
protect and promote their legitimate exercise. For it is but sound
public policy to enable the electorate to express their free and
untrammeled will, not only in the election of their anointed
lawmakers and executives, but also in the formulation of the very
rules and laws by which our society shall be governed and
managed.

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following
the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848

is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The initiative on Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the Commission
on Elections for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing
discussion. No costs.
2. Defensor Santiago v. Comelec
Facts:
Private respondent Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to
amend the constitution to lift lift terms of elective officails by
Peoples Intitaitve. Delfing asked COMELEC to fix the time and ate
for signature gatering and for publication of such in newpapers.
Petitieoners Sen. MDS among others filed sca for prohibition raising
that the constituinal provision on peoples intitative to amend the
constitutional can only be implemented by law ot be passed by

HELD:
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise

of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last
analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while
the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people

cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not

provide for its implementation.

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified

amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act
which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it
possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry
out the initiative...?

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not
cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when
he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"
should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." [38]
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of
proposing amendments through initiative must be more rigorous
and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent
the legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in
proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right would be subject to
legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the
percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of
the proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to
legislation.

xxx
Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise
of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like
the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us
R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a
statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last
minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute
the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
xxx

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to

initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by
the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded
here.

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,

intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution.

MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the

procedures which I have discussed be legislated?

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty
of Congress to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the
right?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.[37]

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified
amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to -- NOT
REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC,
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. The said section reads:

SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under

a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That
section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed
out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power
to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution through the system of initiative. They can only do
so with respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that
this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which
solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and
referendum and appropriately used the phrases propose and enact,
approve or reject and in whole or in part.[52]
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act
defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions
it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5
(Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the
percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative,
the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative
on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It
does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the
provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of
initiative on the Constitution
The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed only strengthens the
conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative

and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and
Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum)
leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on
the scope of
the
initiative
involved,
but
on
its nature and character. It is national initiative, if what is proposed
to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only
Congress can pass. It is local initiative if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the
legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on
Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer
understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms -xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a national legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing

to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there
should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.[53]
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the
subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1)
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by
the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of
the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of
the Commission. (Underscoring supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect
initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies....
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the
COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the
petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for
both national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts under
subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, [54]since
the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative
and referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or
preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the

Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to

enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence
and care in providing for the details in the implementation of
initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby
giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so
on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
xxx
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections,
merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines
initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of
the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite
as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d)
reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of
voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of
effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more
important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus
delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip
service.[57]
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act.[58]
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated
or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari
potest.[59] The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2)
of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section

23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[60]
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising
quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a
form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5
above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there
must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only
if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b)
fixes a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable -- to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.[61] A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected.[62]
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution
is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid
xxx
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should
be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the
cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and
strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with
the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the
right of the people under that system.

3. Lambino v. Comelec
Facts: petitioners commenced the gathering of signatures for an
intitative petition to change the 1987 Constituion (modif secs 1-7 of
art 6; secs 1-4 of art 7 and transitory provisions CHANGING THE
FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERALPRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM)
They filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their intitiative petition. They alleged that petition had
support of at least 12% of all reg voters, with each leg district rep
by at least 3% of its registered voters.
Lambino group prayed that after publication of their petition that
comelc submit the following proposition ina plebiscite for voters
ratification. CEOMEC denied due course to petition invoking
Santiago v comelec declaraing ra 6735 inadequate to impelemt
intiative calsuse on proporalsa s to amend the constition.
Held: Lambino did not compley with basic reqs for consti for
conducting peoples intitiation so no need to visit Santiago
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition," means that there be a draft of the proposed consti
amendement and that it should be ready and shown to the people
before they sign such proposal. Framers enviosed that they sign on
the prosal itself because proponents must prepare the proposal and
pass it around for signature.
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal

on its face is a petition by the people. This means two

essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus,
an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on
the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition
must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that
every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had
seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to
prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing.
oreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of
signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and
failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the
initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state
that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular,
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly
reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign,
and that the people must sign on a petition containing such
full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as
valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as
signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the
people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private
capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not

disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages

and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do
not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents,
or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this
Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of
a signature sheet
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of
the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature
sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text
of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul
Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court
on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people
approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the UnicameralParliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does
not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes
before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly,
the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the
Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause
in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed,
circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signaturegathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they
filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than
candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and
circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or
amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino
Group circulated the amended petition during the
signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly
admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft

petition they filed more than six months later with the
COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other
supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he
could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other
supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court
of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused
the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October
2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner
Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000
copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission
binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt
that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the
proposed changes to the great majority of the people who
signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could
have received with certainty one copy each of the petition,
assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty.
Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each
signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have
circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for
ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000
signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number
of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature
sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be
physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million
signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the
signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories
the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than
one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending
the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon threefourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a

constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's

initiative.
Xxx this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution.
REVISION vs AMENDMENT
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in
the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of
powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision
if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that
adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of
the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
TWO-PART TEST
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not
revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts
have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test.
a. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change
is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion
or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The
court examines only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of the change.
b. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects
of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37
Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a
proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the]
basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change
in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes
that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system
of check and balances."39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino

Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.
Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul
two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the
Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few

specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to
add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications
for the entire document, to determine how and to what
extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a
switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of
its over-all impact on the entire constitutional
structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system
to a unicameral system be because of its effect on
other important provisions of the
Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the

Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the
legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus
constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition
alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-andbalances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system,
involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's
proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes
will radically alter the framework of government as set forth
in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member
of the Constitutional Commission, writes:

Q: There was an attempt on the part of citizens to test section 32.

What was the purpose of the petitioners in the PIRMA decision?
A:
Q: 3 requirements for a successful initiative
A:
i. law on initiative
j. 10% representing the voters
k. representing the 3% of all legislative districts
Q: Can president veto product of intitaive?
A: Only if a law authorizes the president to do so. (book of Bernas)
h