Intro to Law

Separation of powers
Case: Angara v. Electoral Commission, GR No. L-45081, July 15 1936, 63 Phil. 139
Facts
The petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas. Angara was proclaimed member-elect after having
received the most number of votes. Said election was confirmed by the National Assembly on
December 3, 1935 through resolution (No. 8). On December 8, 1935, respondent Pedro Ynsua
filed a protest before the Electoral Commission against the said election. While on December 9,
1935, the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests.
The petitioner filed before the Electoral Commission, a motion to dismiss the protest
because it was filed out of the prescribed period but such was denied thus, the petition before the
Supreme Court for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua.
Petitioner contends that the resolution of the National Assembly prescribed the period
during which protests against the election of its members should be presented while respondents
argue that the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the
exclusion of the National Assembly and that the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the
Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Issues
1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the case
at bar
2. Whether the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding
confirmation by the National Assembly
Held/Reasoning
1. The court held that it has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the case at bar.
It is true that the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the
theory of separation of powers, however, in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, is vested with the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
2. The Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation and is the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly. Such power was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the
time and manner of filing protests. Furthermore, the confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to
said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental
power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of
the National Assembly should be filed. Therefore, the court held that the Electoral
Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in

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assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against
the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara.
Definition and Nature of a Constitution
Case 1: Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, GR No. 122156, February 3, 1997
Facts
Respondent GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder is to provide
management expertise to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. Only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending
the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price and sent
a manager's check to GSIS who refused to accept. This urged petitioner to file an action for
prohibition and mandamus to prevent the consummation of the sale Renong Berhad. Petitioner
invoked Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution which provides that, In the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified as a part of the national patrimony and that the 51% of the shares of the MHC is part of
the national economy. Thus, petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. However, respondents contend that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is not self-executing and requires implementing legislation(s). It also argues that
Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to natural
resources and only 51% of the equity of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands is being sold. Moreover, the submission by petitioner of a matching bid
is premature since the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching
bid had not yet taken place.
Issues
1. Is Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution self-executing?
2. Should the sale of the 51% of the outstanding shares of MHC be awarded to Renong
Berhad?
Held/Reasoning
1. Yes. The court held that Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is self-executing but the
legislature is not precluded from enacting laws to enforce the constitutional provision so
long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution which is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation deemed written in every statute and contract.
2. No. The court directed GSIS to award the sale of the 51% of the shares of the MHC to the
petitioner. The court explained that the term patrimony pertains to cultural heritage not
only to natural resources. Since Manila Hotels existence is impressed with public interest
and its own historicity is associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood, it has become part of our national economy and patrimony. Furthermore, the
51% of the equity entails control and management of the hotel and such cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands contrary to
respondents' claim. The court also stressed that the Malaysian firm is not yet the winning
bidder. The Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on
qualified Filipinos thus, mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Respondent GSIS must adhere to the

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provisions of the Constitution which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties and impliedly written in the bidding rules under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy.
Definition and Nature of a Constitution
Case 2: Nitafan v. CIR, GR No. L-78780, July 23, 1987
Facts
Petitioners are Judges of the Regional Trial Court who sought to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin respondents, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries. They submit that withholding of taxes from their emoluments or compensation
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "during their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased," to maintain independence of the judiciary.
Issue
1. Are the taxes withheld from the emoluments or compensation of the judicial officers
constitute a decrease or diminution of their salaries?
Held/Reasoning
1. No. The court explained that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to
income tax and that such payment does not fall within the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office as disclosed by the
debates, interpellations and opinions of its framers. The decrease/diminution being
referred to is the rate of compensation of Justices and Judges that Congress is authorized
to fix, such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of
enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval.
Constitutional Construction
No need for construction when the law is clear
Case: Amores v. HRET, GR No. 189600, June 29, 2010
Facts
Milagros E. Amores, in the petition for certiorari, challenged the decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal concerning the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva as representative of the party-list organization Citizens Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC). Petitioner alleged that private respondent was disqualified since he
was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from
CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected
at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections as required under Section 15 of RA No.
7941. Public respondent held that the age qualification applied only to those nominated as such
during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998,
unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector, which
CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not. Regarding private respondents shift of affiliation
from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector, public
respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in
party-list affiliation.
Issue
1. Whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.

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Held/Reasoning
1. Applying the plain meaning rule or verba legis, the Court held that private respondent
was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector in the May 2007 elections because at that time he was
already more than 30 years of age and he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least
six months before the election. The law states that a nominee of the youth sector must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. There is also no reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees
nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution in 1987. Furthermore, Section 15 of the said act clearly covers changes in
both political party and sectoral affiliation and a nominee who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new
sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections.
Constitutional Construction
Verba Legis
Case: Francisco v. HRET, GR No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003
Facts
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution which directed the
Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice and
seven Associate Justices. Then, the House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment
complaint was sufficient in form but insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, another
impeachment complaint was filed with the alleged results of the legislative inquiry accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all House
Members. Thus resulting to the petitions alleging that the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year."
Issue
1. Whether the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice violated the oneyear time bar rule.
Held/Reasoning
1. The court in applying the well-settled principles of constitutional construction ruled that
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. was
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. Under the principle
of verba legis, where the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, it is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed
in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. The Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review. Moreover, there exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the

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Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat

another."
Constitutional Construction
Ratio legis est anima
Case: Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 83896, February 22, 1991
Facts
Petitioners alleged that Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino is
unconstitutional. They argue that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII which prohibits
members of the Cabinet and other public officials from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure. Respondents maintain however that the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284
does not apply to ex-officio positions but only to the holding of multiple positions which are not
related to or necessarily included in the position of the public official concerned. According to
petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government
are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of
Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII. Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IXB on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in
general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII
which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies or assistants.
Issue
1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional
Held/Reasoning
1. The Court held that in construing a Constitution, it should bear in mind the object sought
to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. In the
light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. In restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to
not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
Constitutional Construction
Ut magis valeat quam pereat
Case: Chiongbian v. De Leon, GR No. L-2007, January 31, 1949
Facts
This is a petition seeking to permanently prohibit respondent Customs Officials from
cancelling the registration certificates of petitioner's vessels, and respondent Philippine Shipping
Administration from rescinding the sale of three vessels to petitioner. The primary basis for
respondents' and intervenor's acts is the allegation that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and

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therefore not qualified by law to operate and own vessels of Philippine registry. The Philippine
Shipping Administration also alleges that petitioner violated the contract of sale of three vessels
executed between them, on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said
contract that his father was a naturalized Filipino citizen.
In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the herein petitioner
William Chiongbian, was elected to and held the office of municipal councilor of the town of
Plaridel, Occidental Misamis. It is also shown and admitted that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was still a minor. Therefore, upon the adoption of the
Constitution, Victoriano Chiongbian, father of herein petitioner, having been elected to a public
office in the Philippines before the adoption of the Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by
virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein
petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3
(Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of
said Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule of our jurisprudence that a
legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his father.
It is argued by respondent that this privilege of citizenship granted by subsection 2
(Article IV, Constitution) is strictly personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee.
Their arguments are: first, the subsection was adopted by the Constitutional Convention merely to
grant Filipino citizenship to Delegate Caram and thus obviate the possibility of a non-Filipino
signing the Constitution as one of its framers; second, the original draft of said subsection 2
contained the phrase "and their descendants," which was deleted from the final draft, thus
showing that this privilege of citizenship was intended to be strictly personal to the one who had
been elected to public office and did not extend to his descendants.
Issue
1. Whether or not petitioner William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen
Held/Reasoning
1. The Court held that he is a Filipino citizen. With regard to the first argument, it may be
said that the members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering
that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms,
not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document .
They adopted said provision fully cognizant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as
provided in subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission of
citizenship in such a particular case, they would have so clearly stated. The second
argument of respondents is similarly untenable. The mere deletion of the phrase "and
their descendants," is not determinative of any conclusion. It could have been done
because the learned framers of our Constitution considered it superfluous, knowing full
well that the meaning of such a phrase was adequately covered by subsection 3. Deletion
in the preliminary drafts of the Convention are, at best, negative guides, which cannot
prevail over the positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution. Respondents'
allegation that the petitioner violated the contract of sale with the Philippine Shipping
Administration on the ground of misrepresentation was not deliberate but an error which
any person not versed in the law is prone to commit. It is clear that petitioner merely
meant that his father was a Filipino citizen by operation of law and not by birth.

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Constitutional Construction
Applicability of rules of statutory construction to constitutional construction
Case: Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003
Facts
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)1 suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming
that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition
as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Issues
1. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
2. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and
the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress?
3. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section
25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate
without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of
the Constitution?
Held/Reasoning
1. The Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of Filipinos reside
abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no small measure to
the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as the choice of this
countrys leaders is concerned. Its framers realized that under the laws then existing and
considering the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting
overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems especially
because the Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters. Thus,
Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the
inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any
problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest
number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional
Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee
voting.
2. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a
power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on
the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the
power to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution
as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee

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Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the
winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in
the hands of Congress.
3. By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to
"issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this
Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act." This provision of law follows the
usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law the legislature
grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations
implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that
agency in its particular field of operation.47 Once a law is enacted and approved, the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may
spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to
review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend
the IRR of the COMELEC. The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power
to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and VicePresident which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.