Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232

From Insecurity to Uncertainty:

Risk and the Paradox of
Security Politics
Oliver Kessler and Christopher Daase'
The changing contours of conflicts, wars, and crises with and
after the end of the Cold War have led to a semantic shift: Not
the avoidance of threats, so the argument goes, but the management of risks characterizes contemporary security practices. By juxtaposing the well-known security "dilemma" with
the new "security paradox," this contribution argues that a
redefinition of "uncertainty" and "probability" is constitutive
for this semantic shift. We argue that new security concerns
like terrorism have (re)introduced "unstructured" uncertainty
as the rationale for new security practices. To conceptualize
this re-opening, we propose a topology of risk, uncertainty, and
probability theories that highlights the multiple and conflicting logics of security policies currently at play. KEYWORDS: risk,
security paradox, security dilemma, uncertainty, terrorism
Until the end ofthe Cold War, both the theory and practice of security policy focused predominantly on interstate conflicts defined by
immediate military threats. The changing contours of conflicts,
wars, and crises with and after the end of the Cold War opened the
door for broader security concerns wherein it became increasingly
clear that military threatsin the traditional sensewere no longer
the most eminent problem of world politics.
A flrst response was found in a broadening of the concept of
security itself. The focus on military questions was increasingly augmented by economic, ecological, and cultural concerns.i Another
approach was to reformulate the kind of danger that security policy addresses. Not threats, but risks dominate the security agenda, it
Oliver Kessler: Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld. E-mail: oliver.kessler@unibielefeld.de; Christopher Daase, Department of Political Science, University of
Munich. E-mail: Christopher.DaaseSlrz.uni-muenchen.de

211

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From Insecurity to Uncertainty

was argued, thus redefining tbe task of security policy to proactively

prevent or mitigate possible harm.2
By relocating tbe security dilemma problmatique in the semantic
field of risk, probability, and uncertainty, we seek to argue two
things: (1) that the security dilemma, which dominated the security
discourse during the Cold War, frames the security problmatique in
very specific ways by assuming that uncertainty is always well
defined; (2) that new security concerns like terrorism have undermined this logic by introducing new, unstructured, and undefined
uncertainties. We describe tbis cbange as a transformation from tbe
security dilemma to a security paradox.
Within the security dilemma, actors know that the available
options lead to equally suboptimal outcomes. Thus, there is no better way for action, but the option of nonaction is equally problematic. A paradox, by contrast, is the situation in which the condition
of possibility is also tbe condition of impossibility. So wbile security
policy provides security, it also creates insecurity. Tbe dilemma and
the paradox differ in their consequences. An actor facing a dilemma
has to make a decision and face the consequences. An actor facing a
paradox makes a decision and is still thrown back to tbe original position, which has deteriorated through the actor's action.^
By providing a reconstruction of contemporary changes on the
basis of systems theory, we differ from those contributions to the new
risk literature that argue in the traditions of Ulrich Beck and Michel
Foucault,* a literature that has gained momentum with the advent of
terrorism and the uncertainties and threats associated with it.^
Analyzing terrorism from a world risk-society perspective highlights dynamics that, according to Beck,6 expose the false promises
of neoliberalism.'' The catastrophic features of the attacks highlight
the "incalculability" of terrorism, and the very organization of terrorists in networks contradicts the logic of international politics as
"border" management between states. Therefore, according to Beck,
terrorism as a new kind of global risk breaks out of the spatial and
temporal conditions of the nation-state.^ As a consequence, traditional categories lose their meaning: What happened on 9/11 represents a fundamental shift in the political vocabulary of inside-outside,
of solidarity and territory. Their old meaning no longer captures the
current situation as the attacks were neither crime nor war, neither
public nor private. Consequently, we do not even have a language to
conceptualize the basic problemsdespite the fact that the silence of
words was quickly replaced by a war machinery and gross simplification of enemy images, constructed by governments and intelligence
agencies without and beyond public discourse and democratic participation.^

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213

A different approach to risk has emerged from writings inspired

by Michel Foucault.'O The emphasis is less on the evolutionary contours of contemporary society but on power understood as govemmentality, on how particular ways of thinking and representing risks
shape subjects and subjectivity. By treating life as being segmented
into various fields in which specific "technologies of the self shape
the subjects, Foucault seeks to make visible the hidden assumption
of modernity itself: a separation between power and reason. While
reason is about the emancipation of the self, about freedom and
necessity, power is usually described in terms of domination, as the
capacity to pursue one's interests despite resistance.
By seeing knowledge and power as irremediably linked, Foucault analyzes the ways in which power constructs identities and
"reason." In this sense, as Aradau and van Munster have recently
argued, terrorism gives rise to a new dispositif thzt imposes a new
truth regime." While risk analysis traditionally focuses on authority of knowledge and statistical technologies in shaping the future,
terrorism surpasses these technologies. Rather, the rationality of catastrophic risk translates into policies that actively seek to prevent
future catastrophesthat is, policies that try to control the future
via the precautionary principle.
This new risk paradigm links four rationalities that stand behind
the current fight against terrorism: "zero risk, worst case scenario,
shifting burden of proof and serious and irreversible damage. "12 This
new risk paradigm leads to an extensive surveillance system targeted
against one's own population, blurring the distinction between
"potential terrorists" and "innocent neighbors." Their interpretation
differs from Beck's approach insofar as
if Beck saw the insurability and incalculability of risks as the limit
of govemmentality, a pretence supported by expert systems, a Foucauldian approach understands precautionary risk as a dispositif
that attempts to "tame" the limit and govern what appears to be
ungovernable.13
As different as these two approaches are, they both highlight interesting aspects of how terrorism has introduced new uncertainties
and dangers that challenge and transform both the modern political
project of the nation-state and the traditional means of deterrence
and dtente as the specific states' policy to assess, address, and communicate those uncertainties. Applying systems theory, we certainly
share this conviction. By understanding security as a "system," however, we differ from Beck by focussing not on substantive risks but on
their semantic construction; and from Foucault by concentrating

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From Insecurity to Uncertainty

not on the distinction of power and knowledge but knowledge and

non-knowledge.14
In our view, risk names both the very boundary of the unknown
and the known and the particular mode in which the unknown is
translated into knowledge and policies.i^ How the unknown is
framed and conceptualizedthat is, how uncertainties and enemies
are presented as risksdetermines what kind of knowledge regime
and thus power relations might evolve as soon as this style of thinking is applied in practices of governance. The fight on terror does
not just introduce the precautionary principle but also the idea of
prevention as new risk paradigms. From this perspective, the notion
of risk highlights that "security" is an empty concept. As much as we
strive for it, it appears to be an unreachable ideal. Exactly because
security is understood as a "system" that needs to reproduce itself,
the system not only generates security but also new insecurity, which
then can be "securitized. "16
To propose this framework, we pursue it in three steps. The first
section shows how a particular notion of "insecurity" is constitutive
for the security dilemma and how terrorism has invalidated it. During the Cold War, the paradoxical relation between security and insecurity was mainly conceptualized as a security dilemma. It reduced
a complex predicament to a simple confiict situation of two power
maximizing actors. The end of bipolarity and the advent of "terrorists" as new nonstate actors have made this conceptualization obsolete as neither the game nor the other actor, two prerequisites of
the security dilemma, can be treated as a given. Terrorism, in other
words, has reopened Pandora's box and broadened the range of
perceived dangers to the realm of "uncertainty."^''
To conceptualize this reopening, the second section develops a
topology of risk, uncertainty, and probability theories. Here we
argue that the end of the Cold War has changed the problmatique of
security policy from the management of insecurity to the management of uncertainty. From this perspective, security policies articulate
multiple notions of uncertainty and thus different ways in which
uncertainty can be absorbed into manageable risks. In the third section, this topology then serves as the background for understanding
the differences between the security dilemma and the new security
paradox that defines the multiple and conflicting logics of security
policies currently at play In other words, security politics today basically consists in a fight between institutionalizations and kinds of
knowledge that represent four different approaches to probability.
At the same time, however, the current fight against terrorism can
be understood as the attempt to "close" Pandora's box again and
pull back terrorism and associated uncertainties to the logic of the

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215

security dilemma. This tension between the security dilemma and

new uncertainties provides the rationale of the current fight between various logics.

Security Dilemma
Uncertainty always served as an important "variable" for explaining
prevailing insecurity within international relations. Within realist
thought, uncertainty is predominantly analyzed in the context of
the security dilemma. As John Herz explains:
Groups or individuals . . . must be, and usually are, concerned
about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or
annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain
security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and
more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others.
This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them
to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure
in such a world of competing unity, power competition ensures,
and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.'^
In contrast to Morgenthau's anthropological realism, John Herz
pointed to a structural condition. The security dilemma roots in
anarchical political relations rather than in biological or anthropological condition.19 When there is no central authority that could
function as the fixer of signs, uncertainty about the motives or intentions of other states gives rise to paradoxical dynamics: An attempt
to increase one's security will ultimately lead to higher insecurity of
other actors, will stimulate counterreactions, and will leave everybody worse off in the end.2O
This structuralist conception of the security dilemma paved the
way for analyses inspired by game theory,2i which ultimately set the
boundaries of how the security dilemma was and still is predominantly understood.22 In this setting, the problem of order is recast
in terms of interstate cooperation. To reach a stable equilibrium, it
is sufficient for states to form expectations over other states' intentions and motivations.23 The conditions of (im)possibility of cooperation between states are based on mutual expectations on the
basis of structural conditions represented by the payoff matrix.
Assuming that each state acts rationally, the limits of form and
extent of state cooperation are determined by those structural imperatives. Of course, the equilibrium can change within the game
due to a changing set of expectations or a change in the payoff
matrix, but the game itself is ontologically prior to those expectations

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From Insecurity to Uncertainty

as the basic categories of the gamethat is, who is an actor, who

can act under what conditions, and so forthneed to be given prior
to the interaction of the actors themselves.24
This primary focus on individual motives also sets the boundaries of explaining change in international relations (IR)which
can occur in two principal ways. First, states' intentions can vary,
which means there can be a change of psychological variables
whether other states are basically satisfied with the status quo or
whether they change their "tyP^ ' Although this change is not easily
detectable, its correct estimate is crucial for systemic stability. The
rich empirical research the security dilemma stimulated is packed
with examples wherein misperceptions brought about instability.
Second, the cost-benefit structure, the payoff matrix, can change
due to changes in military technology altering the offensive-defensive
balance or the meaning of geographical boundaries.25 What the
interaction between agents cannot change, however, is the identity of
the agents themselves.
Although it is not possible to feel fully secure, the logic of the
security dilemma provides the conceptual background from which
the deterrence and dtente strategies are derived. For deterrence
(and for dtente, for that matter) to work, both the deterring and
the deterred state need to know which the potential military, political, propagandistic benefits are and what exact punishment might
be highly sensitive. That is, the cost and benefit functions of political actions, the epistemological question of qualities, of context, and
the determination of the "currency" need to be already answered.
Security policy thus takes place in a predefined context. Even if the
particular type or the payoff matrix of the opponent is not known
entirely, this nonknowledge is framed, tamed, and made known
insofar as associated "uncertainties" are well defined within a given
context.26
In the case of terrorism, information about actors and their
motives is not easily available and is hard to assume. An irritating
moment of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.,
apart from the shocking devastation and loss of life, was exactly the
preliminary nonexistence of an identifiable actor, lacking any political requirements that would go beyond the act itself. It is extremely
difficult to deny a potential gain if there is neither an actor nor a
common "currency. "27 Whereas somebody might deny the
exchange of prisoners to deny a potential benefit, the symbolic
power of the tumbling World Trade Center cannot be "denied."
The profit lies in the act itself. If one needs to avoid terrorist acts to
avoid a benefit of the terrorist act, the deterrence logic does not
work.

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217

Equally difficult proves to be the punishment of terrorists. Terrorist groups are organized in such a way as to exactly not represent
a strategic objective.28 As a network, they may have a leader, but no
government; a field of activity, but no territory; a supporting crowd,
but no people. They are only barely institutionalized, and their differentiation and organizational logic works horizontally rather than
vertically. Even if parts of the network might be destroyed, the network itself can regenerate itself rather quickly. In this context, the
logic of deterrence by military retaliation and physical harm might
prove to be extremely difficult to enforce.29
This might be the reason why states are often inclined to link
terrorists to actors who are like themselves by focusing on states that
"harbor" terroristsso-called sponsor states. The assumption of state
responsibility allows invocation of the traditional categories of military thought and conventional deterrence theory. States are conventional enemies: At least they have an address. The difficulties in
determining terrorists and the choice to focus on sponsor states
illustrates that deterrence requires a secured knowledge about the
perceived threat, against which it is directed. Most of all, it needs a
threat, a reason for a threat, and a currency to evaluate the threat.
The latter especially does not apply. Therefore, the dynamics that
terrorism generates are beyond the constitutive boundaries of the
security dilemma. The kind of uncertainty the security dilemma
addresses is not the kind of uncertainty we can observe in the context of terrorism. Terrorism addresses and alters exactly the limits
the Cold War security regime rested upon. Therefore, we propose
to open up the question of the contemporary meaning of security
to different notions of uncertainty. The next section proposes a topology to establish four concepts of uncertainty in relation to risk.

Risk, Uncertainty, and Probability

Theories of probability can be characterized by two distinctions:
aleatoric vs. epistemic probabilities and objective vs. subjective probabilities. Aleatoric-probability theories define probability in ontological terms based upon distributions and repetitive events. Epistemic
probabilities put epistemology before ontology and define probability for single events. Characteristically, epistemic interpretations
always define probability with reference to a particular stock of
knowledge. Proponents of objective probability theories locate probability relations outside the human mind. Probabilities can thus be
"discovered." Subjectivists deny the objective existence of probabilities, but assume them to be "ascribed," "invented," or "possessed."

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From Insecurity to Uncertainty

Probability is thus a subjective judgement and not a property of the

decision problem. Combining these categories allows us to form a
two-by-two matrix (see table).
Probabilities
Aleatoric

Epistemic

Objective

Relative
Frequency

Logical
Probability

Subjective

Subjective
Probability

Social
Probability

The theory of relative frequency evolved from the work of Venn,

Borel, Helm, Reichenbrach, and Nagel, and in particular Richard
von Mises.30 Defmed as relative frequency of an attribute within
sequences, probability is seen to be a property of the objectively
given world and based upon distributions and frequencies. To know
relative frequencies is to know something ofthe world. According to
this view, probability makes neither any reference to subjective judgment nor to knowledge: Oxygen and gravity do not change their
characteristics because we have more information about them at
our disposal. This position bases its philosophy of science on ontological monism and scientific realism, where contingency is understood to be an ontological concept and predominantly framed in
terms of randomness and distributions accessible to scientific inquiry. The uncertainty that actors face is ultimately structured: Although we may not know whether the dice will show a six or a three,
we know possible states ofthe world and the probability distribution.
Representatives in social science can be found in methodological
individualism of expected utility theory, classic Marshallian microeconomics, and the empiricism of econometrics.
The subjective counterpart, known as subjective probability theory,
defines probability as the degree of belief in a given proposition and incorporates debates about Bayesian conditionalizaon,^' (subjective)
expected utility theory,32 and psychometrics.^s These approaches share
the view that probability is not "discovered" but ascribed to situations.
However, these approaches assume that situations are well defined
before any judgment takes place. Processes of worid disclosure are prior
to probability theory proper, with the consequence that the degree of
belief is further analyzed in aleatoric terms. The basic methodologies
of probability extraction are based on bets, where probability finds its
final form as a ratio of expected utilities.* Hence, just like in roulette

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219

or a lottery, the manifestation of a future present can be described in

terms of possible states ofthe world and a probability distribution over
these various states. The subjective part therefore shares the aleatoric
character of uncertainty. The difference is just that probabilities do
not refer to lawlike regularities of the world but to lawlike regularities
of the mind. Ultimately, uncertainty is given in a structured manner.
The only knowledge necessary to act rationally is to "calculate" correctly and not be misguided by psychological "tricks" the human mind
might play. With the setting well dened, the way in which contingency can manifest is also fixed and known.
Summarizing the aleatoric approach, both approaches share the
basic ^Mantow conceptualization of probability and consequently
many ontological and epistemological assumptions. Both believe
events are indefinitely repeatable, that probabilities refer to lawlike
regularities that can be analyzed objectively, and that the observer is
detached from the observed decision problem. For both approaches,
the way contingency arises is well known, allowing for the treatment
of uncertainty in terms of risk.
The logical theory breaks with many of the basic presumptions of
aleatoric probability theory. The fullest account has been provided
by John Maynard Keynes where he defines probability as a logical
relation between propositions.^s Keynes is not interested in theoretical knowledge derived from first principles and necessary and
certain rules of inference. Keynes is interested in knowledge of the
praxis where data is subject to multiple possible interpretations. He
therefore replaces necessity by contingency and inscribes probability
in the basic rules of logic to fuse probability with induction. Probability is not part of the world but part of our engaging with the
world. Relative frequencies may influence our judgment but do not
determine it. He therefore defines probability as a relation between
propositions, as a relation between a stock of knowledge entailed in
premises and a conclusion. However, Keynes saw probabilities
through their logical nature as objectively given, like platonic forms,
to which human beings would have access via intuition or "direct
acquaintance."36 Probability is thus the degree of rational belief to
support a conclusion, given available knowledge.
The definition of probability is framed in single terms with explicit reference to available knowledge. New evidence does not lead
to some "updating" but gives rise to a completely new situation incomparable with the previous one. On the basis of this Platonism,
he could support both propositions: that probability only has meaning when defined by a particular stock of knowledge, but when that
is fixed, probability is nevertheless objective.
With this framework, Keynes was able to introduce qualitative
judgments as endogenous parts of probability theory. He was able to

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From Insecurity to Uncertainty

derive the conditions under which formal representation of probability is legitimateand where it fails. To introduce qualitative judgments that preceded measurement, Keynes had to treat the possibility of numerical probabilities in much more restrictive terms
than aleatoric probability approaches would suggest. The bifurcation of logical space in terms of absence/availability of probability
measures later informed his distinction of risk and uncertainty. As
the famous quote goes:
By uncertain knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to
distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable.
The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty;
nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the
expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. . . . The sense in
which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or
the position of private wealth owners in the social system in 1970.
About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form
any calculable probability whatsoever. We simply do not know.^'?
In uncertain situations, actors would fall back on sentiment and conventions to form their judgments. As Keynes noted:
We are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions affecting the future, whether personal or political or economic, cannot
depend on strict mathematical expectation, since the basis for
making such calculations does not exist; and that it is our innate
urge to activity which makes the wheels go round, our rational
selves choosing between the alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling back for our motive on
whim or sentiment of chance.^^
As a consequence, uncertainty describes situations where standard
criteria of rationality are not applicable.
The difference to the subjective-aleatoric counterpart is on the
level of model theory. Within the subjective-aleatoric probability,
probabilities refer to an already given model that "mirrors" reality.
For Keynes, there is a plurality of possible models and actors have to
actively choose one model and live with the contingency that there
is a further possible alternative that might turn out to be a "better"
or the "right" one. Contingency, in other words, is an epistemic concept directed at those processes by which we structure the world.
The model or world is consequently not given or logically prior to
actors' interactions, but their product. This framework is able to
incorporate qualitative changes where one model is replaced by
another one.

Oliver Kessler and Christopher Daase 2 2 1

The subjective-episUmic positionsocial probabilityshares much

of logical theory's criticism of aleatoric theories. However, it differs
from logical theory in that it deprives probability of any objectivity.
Rather, it seeks to investigate the social conditions for probabilistic
statements. The difference between the objective and the subjectiveepistemic position is the incorporation of language as part of the
social world itself: Subjective-epistemic positions assume that all
things are constituted by language and that the social world is selfreferentially constituted by theories and communication. Objectivists
still hold on to objective criteria, an extralinguistically given world,
and concise boundaries. The difference between the subjective and
objective can thus be understood in terms of Wittgenstein's linguistic turn.39 Searching for its foundations, logic does not point at logic
but at the social conditions of cognition. As society, however, can be
described only from within society, there is no basis on which we
could describe society objectively. Neither the use of categories nor
concepts are objectively in the sense of ahistorically given. Thus, as
social and semantic change is a mutually dependent process, there is
no possibility to provide an ahistoric definition of probability.
This holds true especially for mathematical concepts, as shown
by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Ian Hacking: They have a history,
too.- Analogously, the meaning of the concepts of contingency,
risk, and uncertainty change with their "language game.""*! By focusing on the social conditions of statements, this approach highlights
the specific institutional setting in which contingency can materialize. This institutional setting is, however, not something given, but
is embedded in and reproduced by social practices.42 At the same
time, as the agent-structure debate has shown, the institutional setting is constitutive for the way in which subjects experience themselves. Here, as Luhmann noted, "the momentary given that fills experience at any time always and irrevocably refers beyond itself to
something else."43 Experience always points to further alternatives
in which the present could have materialized. In this sense, the
notion of uncertainty is linked to the intersubjective construction of
meaning and the experience of subjectivity. Just as Keynes distinguished uncertainty from risk to observe those qualitative judgments by which we structure the world, so does uncertainty here refer to a plurality of worlds that endows the present with a necessary
contingency.
Summarizing this discussion, these four positions are based on
two principal metaphors: the bet in aleatoric probability theory and
the "discussion" or "argument" in epistemic approaches. In the former, probability refers to either natural or psychological regularities
that "exist" independent ofthe individual subject. In the latter, probabilities result from the interaction and communication between

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From Insecurity to Uncertainty

different actors. These two metaphors allow for a differentiation of

two rather distinct meanings of risk and uncertainty. Aleatoric probability theory assumes the future to be well definable through the
matrix of possible states of the world, payoffs, and probabilities. In
this sense, uncertainty is always structured and understood in terms
of "risk" and instrumental rationality. Even in situations of complete
ignorance, one can still assign equal probability to each possible state
of the world and then maximize expected utility. Epistemic
approaches differ substantially as uncertainty is defined in terms of
an absence of probability relations.^^ Of course, objective and subjective epistemic approaches differ on the objectivity of probabilistic
statements and the role of conventions and institutions. While logical
theory assumes that uncertainty can be reduced to riskand is interested only in the way in which this occursthe subjective-epistemic
approach sees uncertainty as constantly regenerated, a dialectic of
uncertainty absorption and creation. In both approaches, however,
uncertainty is unstructured and designates a different rationality than
risk. The kind of knowledge to process and deal with individual nonknowledge is of a different kind than instrumental rationality. Using
this discussion on risk, uncertainty, and probability, the next section
argues that today's paradoxical dynamics result from the colliding
logics of those different notions of risk and uncertainty'.

Risk and the Security Paradox

The last section established four ways in which probability can be
framed with important repercussions for the kind of contingency
and uncertainty one is observing. This part pursues two objectives.
We first link those four positions to specific security policies and
then use those four policies to reconstruct contemporary dynamics.
In the light of our discussion of probability, deterrence is based
on an understanding of uncertainty that allows for the same instrumental rationality we find in situations of risk. There are no ontological or epistemological differences between uncertainty and risk.
Of course, there are important differences between the objective
and subjective variantsand thus the insights of game theory, on
the one hand, and more psychologically oriented literatures on cognitive frames and misperception, on the other. However, the logic
of deterrence can be described in terms of probability theory.
Within the context of the security dilemma, stability was recast
in terms of interstate cooperation where the structural conditions of
colliding individually "rational" strategies structures the form and
the extent of state cooperation. Uncertainty in this context arises in

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223

terms of other actor's intentions and expectations. However, and

rooted in its methodological individualist background, uncertainty
in this setting is given in a structured manner,that is, in terms of
risk. It arises within a given game structure that is common knowledge for every player. With reference to probability theory, in other
words, the strategy of mutual deterrence is based on the aleatoric
definition of probability.45 For deterrence to work, the actors and
their intentions and motives need to be "given"though they
might not be directly "known." There has to be a common understanding of who can deter whom by what means and on what basis
(i.e., what is needed is a common ultimate threat from which various
stages of punishment can be developed).
A different understanding of uncertainty can be detected by
looking at the logical and social probability theories that differentiate risk from uncertainty. In this setting, uncertainty names a realm
where common standards of rationality break down, where situations are undefined and unstructured and only over time gain more
fixed contours. As Keynes has pointed out, in these situations actors
would fall back on conventions and norms that would help them in
identifying the situation, which norms to apply, and what kind of
expectations to form. In the framework of epistemic probability theories, two different security policies can be identified: In line with
the "logical theory," security policies turn into a form of risk management.
The objective is to develop means and methods to deal with
uncertainty and reduce it to risk.46 Uncertainty is subsequently
redefined in terms of contingency: One may not know what the
next state of the world exactly is going to be but one can have a
good guess and possibly find some insurance. To calculate risks
does not mean that they can be measured objectively. Not all uncertainties are of quantitative nature and thus understandable within
the common definition of rationality.47 In particular, the evaluation
of risks may vary according to the political interests or cultural contextes If this is acknowledged, the traditional concept of deterministic causality loses its validity. Uncertain political results and uncertain strategies do not follow predetermined laws, but, if anything,
probabilistic laws. Thus, what political scientists can achieve at best
is probabilistic knowledgethat is, knowledge about necessary and
sufficient reasons and causes that may not be able to predict single
events but that do identify the conditions under which the realization of specific events is more or less likely.
If this is accepted, the question of how big the threat of international terrorism currently is can no longer be answered by pointing
to the next terrorist act that will surely happen at some point in the

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From Insecurity to Uncertainty

future. For the fact that the current calm is just the calm before
the next storm is as true as it is trivial. However, exactly such trivial insights that the next terrorist "attack" will happen determine
current security policy discourses. There are two reasons for this.
First, there are two equally inadequate standard models to examine
the risk of terrorism.49 The one inquires into the motivational
structure of terrorist groups and individual terrorists and tries to
extrapolate future attacks from past terrorist activities. The other
attempts to calculate the risk by multiplying expected losses by
their probability of occurrence. The former is preferred by terrorism experts and regional specialists, the latter by decision makers
and security analysts.
The problem of the first method, however, is that it cannot
account for new developments and spontaneous changes in terrorist practices. There is always a first time when new strategies are
used or new targets are selected. Even using planes as cruise missiles in order to destroy skyscrapers was an innovation not clearly
foreseen by specialists, because such behavior was nearly unimaginable at the time. Extrapolation methods to determine terrorism
risks are thus inherently conservative and tend to underestimate the
danger.
The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to
"calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is
defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then
the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of
probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity.^o
The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to
overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences
beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution
of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches
infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there
is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical condition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could
be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be
achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new
condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since
knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely
absent.
The second form of security policy that emerges when the deterrence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It
represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management
framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro-

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225

phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.

Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncertainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, catastrophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major implications for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of
meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.
To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the
formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes happen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action
could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that
can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe
points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "rationality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the
responsibility to provide securityas long as they at least try to preempt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastrophe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was
responsible and whether it could have been prevented.
This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there
are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measuring dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For example, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US
administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of
countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment
of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" currency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the
security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.
Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main problem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate
dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply
nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New
Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that
"most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will
constitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope with
this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,
to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The
decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios . . . in
which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current
events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"
and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They
justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capabilitybased defense planning strategy.53
The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that
even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By constructing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and

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From Insecurity to Uncertainty

brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.
"Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,
the residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Othello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq.
The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the
US government tried to prove was disputed from the very beginning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted,
but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the
main rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection
between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet
possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear
weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld
famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."
This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncertainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where
security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.
Contemporary dynamics in the fight against terrorism seem to
result from a clash of different logics of probability. As Ulrich Beck
has shown, terrorism has altered the meaning of space and time for
the analysis of risk. Spatially, terrorist networks escape the logic of
the nation-state and "diplomacy." Networks are neither private nor
public in the sovereign sense; they represent neither a domestic nor
an international "actor." Temporally, attacks always have a catastrophic element. They are simply faster than mihtary "threats" in
the tradirional sense because they happen without a contextual
warning. In other words, uncertainries associated with terrorism
escape the logic of risk as terrorism alters the very contours of
world politics: It represents a qualitative change that redefines the
very game and reality that states face.^s However, by focusing primarily on "sponsor states" and an "axis of evil," the current fight
against terrorism attempts to reduce the interplay of those various
logics to the imperative of deterrence. It is the attempt to ignore
categorical shifts and its associated uncertainties and replace it by
"traditional security policy." In this sense, the readdressing of terrorism to states that harbor terrorists is then an attempt to invoke
the traditional vocabulary of deterrence and the logic of the security dilemma.
So when we look at terrorism as an issue of "systemic" importance, the fight represents an expansion of "uncertainty to risk"
reasoning to a phenomenon that, from its qualities, belongs to the
realm of epistemic probability theory. Neither the assumprion of
well-defined problem setrings and repeatable events nor the fixarion of the polirical vocabulary or the mutual formation of expectations based on "known" adversaries applies. When read from the
context of probability theory, the current endeavors are subject to

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227

a conflict between intersubjective epistemology and individualist

ontology that manifests itself as a conflict between universal validity
of statements and the particularity of contexts. While the universality argument points to the laws associated with the balance of power,
of deterrence and pursuit of national interests, the contextual dimension points to (self-) reflexivity and contingency of one's own position.
What might be true here might not be true there. Accepting uncertainty would make it imperative to understand the other's position
and engage in a dialogue. However, in a sense, the current fight uses
a universal method to fight a contextual problem.

The article proposed a framework of risk, uncertainty, and probability and argued that we experience an overall transformation from
"insecurity" to "uncertainty."
The insecurity paradigm treats the notion of security as theoretically superior to that of uncertainty and risk. The primary task
of security policy is then the avoidance of risk. Starting from welldenned categories and games, this approach is constitutive for deterrence and dtente as two modes dealing with contingency within
preset games. Positions based on the uncertainty paradigm that sees
a categorical differentiation between risk and uncertainty leave the
confines of the security dilemma behind. Security becomes an
empty concept and politically unachievable. In this context, uncertainty describes an unstructured realm, where standard criteria of
rationality do not apply. Pointing to a possible- and multiple-worlds'
semantic, this approach is interested in how actors actively structure
or construct the world they live in. From this perspective, the current problem is not insecurity deriving from the security dilemma,
but uncertainty deriving from the changing categories of our political vocabulary signifying unpredictable futures and inconsistent
policies.
At the same time, however, the current fight against terrorism is
structured in such a way as to reduce the various kinds of uncertainties and contingencies to the logic of deterrence. Hence deterrence
has not lost any of its actuality; however, by applying this logic in a
context that challenges its constitutive boundaries, it seems as if the
option of dtente has been lost. In other words, what we see is that
the logic of the security dilemma, and its particular semantics of
threat, risk, and security, is used for the framing of terrorism as a
threat. As a consequence, we can identify three dynamics "driving"
today's security policy that result exactly from the conflict between
the intersubjective constitution of threats and the individual ontology
of the deterrence strategy as today's main strategy.

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From Insecurity to Uncertainty

First, as Aradau and van Muster have convincingly argued, it

translates into a dramatic increase of surveillance technologies: In
the fight against terrorism, surveillance functions as an early warning
system that allows identification of potential terrorists and therewith,
and at the same time, is thought to "deter" future attacks. The introduction of private data, video cameras, and biomtrie data is presented as a legitimate means to detect and deter future terrorist
attacks. These measures are introduced on the basis of the precautionary principle thatin our viewis so attractive exactly because
it tries to reduce various kinds of uncertainty to a logic of insecurity.
Second, what is commonly known as the revolution in military
affairs, introduces the same individualist ontology on the level of
military policy: It translates the catastrophic features of terrorism
into a logic of deterrence by actively reshaping the spatial and temporal conditions of military conduct. The strategy is to introduce
technologies that can be remotely controlled without employment
of soldiers. The task is to be ready to "strike back," instantly and at
any time from any place in the world.
However, and thirdly, these measures are based on an unnecesSciry necessity. Presenting terrorism as an objective threat that "exists"
independent of practices might produce a distance between oneself
and "the other." However, it misses out the importance of context
and other means of "risk management" that would require a selfreflective analysis of how "us and them" are constructed in the first
place.
Notes
1. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
2. For a deeper discussion on how risk reshaped questions of security
policy, see Christopher Daase, "Internationale Risikopolitik: Ein Forschungsprogramm fr den sicherheitspolitischen Paradigmenwechsel," in Christopher Daase, Susanne Feske, and Ingo Peters, eds.. Internationale Risikopolitik
(Baden-Baden: Nomos 2002), pp. 9-35.
3. Consider, for example, the famous liar paradox. Epidemides the
Cretan claims that all Cretans are liars. If we believe him, he is a liar and
so we actually cannot believe him. If we do not believe him, he actually tells
the truth and we therefore can trust and believe him. However, that brings
us right back to the original position: x because non-x.
4. On social theory of risk, see in particular Barbara Adam and Joost
Van Loon, "Repositioning Risk: the Challenge for Social Theory," Barbara
Adam, Ulrich Beck, and Joost Van Loon, eds.. The Risk Society and Beyond
(London: Sage, 2000); Robert Boyne, Risk (Buckingham: Open University
Press, 2003); Deborah Lupton, Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Directions
and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Oliver Kessler and Christopher Daase

229

5. See Mikkel V. Rasmussen, The Risk Soety at War: Terrorism, Technology, and Strategy in the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2007); Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, "Governing Terrorism
Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un) knowing the Future" European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 85-115.
6. Ulrich Beck, "The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited"
Theory, Culture, and Sodety 19, no. 4 (2002): 39-55; Ulrich Beck, "The Silence
of Words and Political Dynamics in the World Risk Society," Logos 1, no. 4
(2002): 1-18. See also Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "Reflexive Security: NATO
and International Risk Society," Millennium 30, no. 2, (2001): 285309, and Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "'It Sounds Like a Riddle': Security Studies, the War on Terror, and Risk," Millennium 33, no. 2, (2004): 381-395.
7. Beck, "Terrorist Threat, note 6, p. 47.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 45.
10. Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in Graham Burchell, Golin
Corden, and Peter Miller, eds.. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality

(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Franois Ewald, "Insurance and

Risk" and Richard Castels, "From Dangerousness to Risk," ibid.; Mitchell
Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London- Sage

1999); Lupton, note 4, p. 87.

11. Aradau and van Munster, note 5.
12. Ibid., p. 103.
13. Ibid., p. 107.
14. For a deeper discussion on the constitutive role of nonknowledge
for the formulation of security policy, see Christopher Daase and Oliver
Kessler, "Known and Unknowns in the War on Terror and the Political Construction of Danger," Security Dialogue 58, no. 4 (2007): 411-434.
15. The primary objective of this article is, however, not the question
of which description might be more accurate or what the risk of terrorism
actually "is"; rather, in this article, we provide a reconstruction of today's
dynamics where we use the distinction of risk and uncertainty to highlight
ontological and epistemological assumptions and how these assumptions
are currently made true: Niklas Luhmann, Soziologie des Risikos (Berlin- W de
Gruyter, 1991).
16. Due to space limitations we cannot here discuss systems theory in
detail. We simply apply systems theory, not just talk about it. For a discussion, see Jan Helmig and Oliver Kessler, "Space, Boundaries, and the Problem of Order,"/owrraa/ of International Political Sociology 1, no. 3 (2007)239-250.
17. In our table in the section "Risk, Uncertainty, and Probability"
(below), this will be presented as a broadening from the upper-left quadrant to the entire two-by-two table.
18. John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma "
World Politics, 2, no. 2 (1950): 157.
19. For a deeper discussion of uncertainty and the security dilemma,
see Evan Braden Montgomery, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma:
Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty," International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 155ff.
20. See also Jef Huysmans, "International Politics of Insecurity: Normativity. Inwardness, and the Exception," Security Dialogue S7, no. 1 (2006):

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From Insecurity to Uncertainty

21. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World

Politics SO, no. 2 (1978): 167-214. See also Robert Jervis, "Variation, Change,
and Transitions in International Politics," Review of International Studies 27,
no. 2 (2001): 281-295.
22. Glenn H. Synder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,"
World Politics 26, no. 4 (1984): 461-495; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security
Dilemma Revisited," World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171-201; and Jeffrey W.
Taliaferro, "Security Seeking n"der Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,"
International Security 25, no. 3 (2000-2001): 128-161.
23. Another way in which more security leads to higher insecurity
should be mentioned at this point: moral hazard. As insurers always complain, as soon as some risk like car accidents is insured, the behavior of the
insured person changes negatively. The introduction of seat belts led to
speedier driving, which led to a rise and not a decline in deaths. Economists have shown that moral hazard is due to asymmetric information
between actors: Insurers cannot observe and enforce the driving routines
of their customers. Therefore, they cannot write a contract on the behavior
itself, but only on its consequences. This gives rise to a difference between
collective and individual rationality as social and private benefits and costs
are distributed asymmetrically. If the individual crashes his car, the insurer
has to bear the costs. If he doesn't crash it, he receives the benefits. The
solution to these models is a new contract that establishes some kind of new
insurance of higher order. Either by establishing some enforcement mechanism that can put an end to unwished-for behavior or by rearranging the
set of incentives by introducing dductibles. But for our purposes here, we
do not pursue this line of thought further.
24. Of course, in these games the opponent or his choices might not
be knownas in games of imperfect knowledge. However, even in this setting, and related to the assumption that uncertainty can always be reduced
to risk, it is assumed that a pool of possible types allows for the construction
of higher-order beliefs and thus the transformation of incomplete, imperfect information. See John C. Harsanyi, "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, 1-3; part 1, The Basic Model," Management Sdence 14, no. 3 (1968): 159-182. For his social theory, the best source
is John C. Harsanyi, "Subjective Probabililty and the Theory of Games:
Comments on Kadane and Larkey's Paper," Management Science 28, no. 2
(1982): 120-124.
25. For the offensive-defensive balance, see Jervis, "Cooperation," note
21, pp. 186ff; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the OffenseDefense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security 22, no. 4
(1998): 44-82.
26. For a further discussion on the limits of the Bayesian method, see
Oliver Kessler, "The Limits of Bayesian Thought to the Study of Economic
Institutions," in Wolfram Eisner and Hardy Happani, eds.. New Contributions
in Evolutionary Economics (Northhampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2007).
27. Herfried Mnkler, Die neuen Kriege (Bonn: Reinbeck, 2002), pp.
175ff.
28. Jonathan R. White, Terrorism: An Introdudim (Belmont: West-Wandsworth, 1998).
29. Stephen H. Gotowicki, "Confronting Terrorism: New War Form or
Mission Impossible," Military Review 77, no. 3 (1997): pp. 61-66.

Oliver Kessler and Christopher Daase

231

30. Richard von Mises, Probability, Statistics, and Truth (London: Allen &
Unwin); Ernst Nagel, "A Frequency Theory of Probability,"/owrwa/ of Philosophy 30 (1933): 533-554; Helmut Reichenbach, The Theory of Probability
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).
31. Harsanyi, "Subjective Probability," note 24, pp. 121-122.
32. See, in particular, Leonard Savage, The Foundation of Statistics (New
York: Wiley, 1954).
33. See in particular Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choice, Values, and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
34. Frank P. Ramsey, 'Truth and Probability," in Ramsey, The Foundations
of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, ed., R. B. Braithwaite (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931), pp. 156-198.
35. John M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: Macmillan, 1921),
p. 7. See also Rudolf Carnap, The Logeai Foundations of Probability (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1950).
36. Ibid., p. 12.
37. John M. Keynes, "The General Theory of Employment," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 51, no. 2, pp. 209-223, at 213-214.
38. John M. Keynes, The General Theory ofEmployment, Interest, and Money
(London: Macmillan, 1936).
39. For a deeper discussion see Oliver Kessler, Die Internationale Politische konomie des Risikos (Weisbaden: Verlag fr Sozialiwissenschaften),
Chap. 3.
40. Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975).
41. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1956), 19.
42. John Searle, The Construction of Sodal Reality (New York: Free Press
1995).
43. Niklas Luhmann, "Meaning as Sociology's Basic Concept," in Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990),
pp. 21-79, esp. 25.
44. Tony Lawson, "Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Analysis"
Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 11, no. 1 (1988), pp. 38-65.
45. Of course, there are crucial differences between "objective" and
"psychological" approaches to security politics. A superb discussion is still
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976).
46. Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1984).
47. Wolfgang Bon, Vom Risiko: Unsicherheit und Ungeiuissheit in der Moderne (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsges., 1995).
48. Mary Douglas and Aaron Widavsky Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (London: Routledge, 1982).
49. Richard Falkenrath, "Analytic Models and Policy Prescriptions:
Understanding Recent Innovation in U.S. Counterterrorism," Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism24, no. 3 (2001): 159-181.
50. Brian M.Jenkins, 'Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Veteran Affairs, and International Relations," House Committee on
Government Reform, 106th Session of Congress, October 20, 1999.
51. Paul Davis, Nezu Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much
Is Enough (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1994), p. 140.

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52. James Winnefeld, The Post-Cold War Sizing Debate: Paradigms,

Metaphors, and Disconnects (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1992), p. 15.
53. Paul Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation (RAND MR-1513-OSD) (Santa Mon-

ica, Calif.: Rand, 2002).

54. Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, "Inventing Threats," Bulletin of
the Atomic Sdentists 5^, no. 2 (1998): 33-38.
55. See also Friedrich Kratochwil, "Moles, Martyrs, Sleepers: The End
of the Hobbesian Project," Ethnologia Europaea 33, no. 2 (2003): 57-68.