Sibayan, Elyza R.

Natural Resources Law

JD2

September 13, 2016

Case Digests

1. Calub vs CA, GR No. 115634 April 27, 2000

Facts: On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles,
containing illegally sourced lumber which were being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by Jose Vargas
and being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by Manuela Babalcon, respectively.
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper
documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load
of lumber at the DENR-PENR Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to
accept the receipts. Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before
the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, for violation of Section
68 [78), Presidential Decree 705.
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from
the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave
coercion, but was dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again
apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army in Samar. It was
again loaded with forest products. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a
certain Abegonia, and several John Does, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as
amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the
Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all
other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was Pagarao
who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio
Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles
with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court
granted the application for replevin. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining
Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in
the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor
vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured place
and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the
Supreme Court. In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to
respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition.
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere
seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended
by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate

court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order
the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that
purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that
matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such
regulation, the appellate court said.
The Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the
DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings
and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners failure to comply with the procedure laid
down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners
counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the
replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject
vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis. Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in
petitioners claim that private respondents complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Respondent
court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles were
validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application
for replevin, is a suit against the State.
Ruling: Petition is granted.
(1) Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the
crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject
vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing
authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn,
were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised
Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the
ones charged by the public prosecutor.
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents
that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved
vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order
No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the
Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure,
Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody
of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the
second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and
applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension
for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and
hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with
law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an
action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody
of the law, and not otherwise.

(2) Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit
against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the
State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies
only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.
In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them
in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing
and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority.
There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the
DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor Generals line
for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall
that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for
dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it.
2. Lalican v. Vergara, GR No. 108619 July 31, 1997
Facts: On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner
Epifanio Lalican, Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. At
their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that
the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber
and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is
sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He
added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents
required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be
quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to
determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the
word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position
of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one
could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The
prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law.
On September 24, 1991, the lower court, guided by the principles that penal laws should be
construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an
Order quashing the information.
The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the
Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just
any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to
pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out
of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.
Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented
Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the
certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two
jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the

fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber
origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one
point to another.
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of
"timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of
"lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the
acts penalized under that section.
Issue: (1) Whether lumber is included in the defined acts prohibited in Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry
Code?
(2) Whether Sec. 68 of PD 705 is constitutional?
Ruling: The petition is devoid of merit.
(1) To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the
law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so
interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or
contravene the plain words of the law. After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass
lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber.
(2) With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court
consider,[24] this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the
requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case, this Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other
grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law.
The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country,
considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more
specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must
be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare
and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution
only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation
of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one
considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law
have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.
3. Pallada vs People of the Philippines GR No. 131270 March 17, 2000
Facts: Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and
trading.
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the company's
warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof
that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L.
Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not,
however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long
been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come
from a licensed sawmill operator. Jo spped

The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted 29,299.25 board
feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day, September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber,
consisting of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE stockyard
in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure order was served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as
general manager of the company, but he refused to acknowledge it.
On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber. Company president
Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a
suspension of the operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed with the
court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion was denied.[5] Accordingly, the
remaining lumber was confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized.
As before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders issued by the DENR officers.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as assistant
operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and
Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of 68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended.
As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which, on October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for
lack of proof of his participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized lumber.
Issue: Whether timber includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their
attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of the companys possession of the
lumber
Ruling: The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed
timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in
that case that the phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in 68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only
those who possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable,
while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is whether
separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin
are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products. As already noted, the opening paragraph of
BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is
required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have
uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of
Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the
numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter.
4. People of the Philippines vs Dator, GR No. 136142, October 24, 2000
Facts: It appears that on October 29, 1993, Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, and SPO1 Necitas Bacala, were on board a police patrol vehicle heading towards
Barangay San Rafael, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Upon reaching Barangay Laboon of the same municipality,
they noticed a Isuzu cargo truck loaded with pieces of lumber bound toward the town proper of Maasin.
Suspicious that the cargo was illegally cut pieces of lumber, Police Station Commander Rojas maneuvered
their police vehicle and gave chase.
Upon catching up with the Isuzu cargo truck, they ordered the driver, accused Benito
Genol, to pull over. Benito Genol was left alone in the truck after his companions hurriedly
left. When asked if he had the required documents for the proper transport of the pieces of
lumber, Genol answered in the negative. Genol informed the police authorities that the pieces of

lumber were owned by, Pastor Telen, while the Isuzu cargo truck bearing Plate No. HAF 628
was registered in the name of Southern Leyte Farmers Agro-Industrial Cooperative, Inc.
(SLEFAICO) which is a local cooperative. Consequently, Police Officers Rojas and Bacala
directed Benito Genol to proceed to the Maasin Police Station, Maasin, Southern Leyte for
further investigation.

On November 5, 1993, Forest Ranger Romeo Galola was fetched from his office at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Maasin, Southern Leyte by SPO1 Necitas Bacala to
inspect the pieces of lumber that were confiscated on October 29, 1993 in Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern
Leyte from Pastor Telen. Galola and his immediate supervisor, Sulpicio Saguing, found that the cargo
consisted of forty-one (41) pieces of Dita lumber and ten (10) pieces of Antipolo lumber of different
dimensions with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet.
Subsequently, SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt. he defense denied any liability for the

crime charged in the Information. Pastor Telen, a utility worker at the Integrated Provincial Health Office,
Southern Leyte for nineteen (19) years, testified that he needed lumber to be used in renovating the house
of his grandparents in Barangay Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte where he maintained residence. Knowing
that it was prohibited by law to cut trees without appropriate permit from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Telen sought the assistance of a certain Lando dela Pena who was an
employee at the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Dela Pena accompanied Telen to the office of a certain
Boy Leonor, who was the Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte. Leonor did not approve
of the plan of Telen to cut teak or hard lumber from his (Telen) mothers track of land in Tabunan, San Jose,
Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, Leonor allegedly allowed Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only.
According to Telen, Leonor assured him that a written permit was not anymore necessary before he could
cut the Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of his mother, provided the same
would be used exclusively for the renovation of his house and that he shall plant trees as replacement
thereof, which he did by planting Gemelina seedlings.
Pastor Telen appeared before Bert Pesidas, CENRO hearing officer, in Maasin, Southern Leyte for
investigation in connection with the confiscated pieces of lumber. Telen had tried to contact Officer-inCharge Boy Leonor of the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte after the confiscation of the sawn lumber on
October 29, 1993 and even during the investigation conducted by the CENRO hearing officer for three (3)
times but to no avail, for the reason that Boy Leonor was assigned at a reforestation site in Danao, Cebu
province.
Alfonso Dator, was the accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., a local cooperative engaged in
buying and selling abaca fibers. Dator testified that on October 29, 1993 at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, a
certain Vicente Sabalo, accompanied by their company driver, Benito Genol, proposed to hire the Isuzu
cargo truck owned by SLEFAICO, Inc. to haul pieces of coconut lumber from Barangay San Jose to
Barangay Soro-soro in Maasin, Southern Leyte. He readily acceded to the proposal inasmuch as the owner
of the alleged coconut lumber, according to Sabalo, was Pastor Telen, who is a long time friend and former
officemate at the provincial office of the Department of Health. Besides, the fee to be earned from the
hauling services meant additional income for the cooperative.
At about 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, Dator met the Isuzu cargo truck of
SLEFAICO, Inc. at the Canturing bridge in Maasin, Southern Leyte, being escorted by a police patrol
vehicle, heading towards the municipal town proper. At the municipal hall building of Maasin, he learned
that the Isuzu truck was apprehended by the police for the reason that it contained a cargo of Dita and
Antipolo lumber without the required permit from the DENR. He explained to the police authorities that the
Isuzu cargo truck was hired merely to transport coconut lumber, however, it was impounded at the
municipal building just the same. Due to the incident Dator lost his job as accounting manager in
SLEFAICO, Inc.

Issue: (1) Whether a written permit is needed if a verbal permission had been granted?
(2) Whether proof of value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is indispensable?
Ruling: (1) The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo
and Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of
the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found.
Appellant Telen contends that he secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the
DENR-CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte before cutting the lumber, and that the latter purportedly assured
him that written permit was not anymore necessary before cutting soft lumber, such as the Antipolo and
Dita trees in this case, from a private track of land, to be used in renovating appellants house, provided that
he would plant trees as replacements thereof, which he already did. It must be underscored that the
appellant stands charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, a special
statutory law, and which crime is considered mala prohibita. In the prosecution for crimes that are
considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has been violated. The motive or
intention underlying the act of the appellant is immaterial for the reason that his mere possession of the
confiscated pieces of lumber without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations gave rise to his criminal liability.
In any case, the mere allegation of the appellant regarding the verbal permission given by Boy
Leonor, Officer in Charge of DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte, is not sufficient to overturn the
established fact that he had no legal documents to support valid possession of the confiscated pieces of
lumber. It does not appear from the record of this case that appellant exerted any effort during the trial to
avail of the testimony of Boy Leonor to corroborate his allegation. Absent such corroborative evidence, the
trial court did not commit an error in disregarding the bare testimony of the appellant on this point which is,
at best, self-serving.
(2) The appellants contention is untenable. It is a basic rule in criminal law that penalty is not an
element of the offense. Consequently, the failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence in support of its
allegation in the Information with respect to the value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is not necessarily
fatal to its case. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as appearing
in the official transmittal letter of the DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte addressed to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of the same province, is P23,500.00 which is alleged in the Information. However, the
said transmittal letter cannot serve as evidence or as a valid basis for the estimated value of the
confiscated pieces of lumber for purposes of computing the proper penalty to be imposed on the appellant
considering that it is hearsay and it was not formally offered in evidence contrary to Section 34 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court.
5. PICOP v. Calo, GR No. 161798, October 20, 2000
Facts: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its officers, rendered three
Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001, and April 6, 2001, by virtue of which petitioner was
designated a DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances within its
concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) containing Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree
Plantation. The MOA provided, among others, that field validation/verification of applications for Certificates
of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR, the local government unit

concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to these Memoranda, petitioners security personnel were deputized as
DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the commission of
illegal logging and the forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.
In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP, through its
security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its concession and tree plantation
area, violators who loaded the illegally cut trees in trucks and other forms of conveyance, such as
carabaos, for transport out of the plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were
kept in PICOPs impounding area.
On June 18, 2001, private respondents Eduardo Casia, Rogelio Castillo, Uldarico Casinginan,
Eladio Galano, Catalino Virtudazo, Ricardo Balad-on, Joel Villareal, Tiburcio Impuerto, Hilario Fernandez,
Andrea Vasquez, Spouses Remelito Codera and Marilyn Ranoso-Codera, and Florio Josafat, Jr., for
himself and in representation, by way of a class suit, of the members of the UNITED FARMERS
ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG (UFAB), filed a complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for issuance of
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City against the DENR Regional Office XIII (CARAGA) and/or its Regional Executive Director
Elias C. Seraspi, Jr., Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) of Surigao del Sur,
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City and/or their respective PENR Officers, Community Environment and
Natural Resources Offices (CENRO) of San Francisco, Bunawan, Lianga and Bislig and/or their respective
CENR Officers, and herein petitioner PICOP/Wilfredo D. Fuentes.
Private respondents-complainants were some of those apprehended by PICOPS security officers
transporting without any permit several hundred cubic meters of falcata logs allegedly grown in petitioners
plantation. The logs, trucks and other forms of conveyance on which they were carried were confiscated
and kept in petitioners impounding area. Private respondents alleged in their complaint that the Memoranda
dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 and the MOA dated May 25, 2001 were illegal
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. They sought to have the Memoranda declared null
and void for this reason and also sought to restrain the DENR and all those acting for and in its behalf,
including herein petitioner, from enforcing or implementing said Memoranda.
The RTC upheld the validity of the Memoranda. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition.
Issue: (1) Whether PICOP is a proper party-in-interest?
(2) Whether the PICOP has the obligation to keep the apprehended forest products, tools and
conveyances?
Ruling: Petitioners arguments do not convince us. The petition should be denied
(1) It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest products
and conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing
agreements, which need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial
court. As observed by the Court of Appeals, any interest petitioner has in the confiscated
properties is dependent on the outcome of the proceedings before the CENRO-Bislig and the
Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. The issue of ownership and possession
of the confiscated products still has to be determined in those proceedings.
(2) Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the apprehended logs and
conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of the DENR pursuant to the
assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner merely holds the confiscated products and
conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative or criminal proceedings
regarding said products are pending. The trial court noted that the confiscated vehicles were

already subject of administrative proceedings before the CENRO-Bislig and criminal complaints
before the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. There were also letters or
notices to petitioner from officers of the CENRO and the Office of the Government Prosecution
requesting the release of some of the conveyances to their owners.

6. Ysmael v. The Deputy Executive Secretary, GR No. 79538

Facts: In 1986, at the start of President Corazon Aquinos administration, petitioner sent letters to the Office
of the President and to the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) seeking the reinstatement of its timber
license agreement (TLA No. 87), which was cancelled in August 1983 along with nine other concessions,
during the Marcos administration. It alleged that after the its TLA was cancelled without being given the
opportunity to be heard, its logging area was re-awarded to other logging concessionaires without a formal
award or license, as these entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Marcos.
The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the
Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so
demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten
concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. It also emphasized the fact that there was currently
a total log ban being imposed on the subject areas.
After the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, but the petition
was denied on the ground that the appeal was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in
the MNR. Hence, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors.
Ruling: The refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine
in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have, upon their finality, the force
and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions
and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered
by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction
Petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law for attacking the validity of these
administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter to the newly appointed Minister
of the MNR requesting for reconsideration, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was
concerned.
More importantly, the assailed orders of the MNR disclose public policy consideration, which
effectively forestall judicial interference. Public respondents, upon whose shoulders rests the task of
implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an
ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses
issued, under the previous dispensation. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under their special technical knowledge and training.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it
can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and
do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest

products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause.
The Court expresses its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license
agreements to a number of logging concessionaires. Should the appropriate case be brought showing a
clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of concerned officials with respect to the implementation of this
public policy, the Court will not hesitate to step in. However, in this case, the Court finds no basis to issue a
writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.
Petition is dismissed.
7. Bon v. People of the Philippines, GR No. 152160 January 13, 2004
Facts: Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, together with Rosalio Bon. Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, Virgilio Bon, Alejandro Jeniebre,
Jr. and Rosalio Bon entered a plea of Not Guilty to the crime charged.
Prosecutions evidence shows that Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza owns a titled agricultural land
under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving
information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut and sawed into lumber by her administrator
and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. On February 7, 1990,
Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one
of the [b]arangay [t]anod[s], Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate Teresita Dangalan-Mendozas
complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian Lascano, Manuel
Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita DangalanMendoza. During their investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees: four (4) Narra trees, one
cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the stumps x x x. On the land, Virgilio Bon
admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in
January, 1990, he sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.; Alexander
Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza for Illegal Cutting of Trees
repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and found four stumps of trees. Scaling the four stumps, it was his
estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters or 4,315 board feet, with a value of P25,376.00.
In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. They were
convicted in the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Issue: (1) Whether an extrajudicial admission is admissible in evidence?
(2) Whether the prosecution is credible and sufficient?
Ruling: The Petition has no merit.
(1) In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had heard
petitioner admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as
hearsay for three reasons. First, they were indisputably present and within hearing distance when he
allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their
own perception.
Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually
made by petitioner, not necessarily that the matters stated therein were true. On this basis, a statement
attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule.
[15] Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto[16] ruled that evidence regarding the making of such

statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the
admission of Dangalans testimony, because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been
held that when parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they are deemed to have waived their right to do
so; thus, it may be admitted.
(2) It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not
the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.[33] Conviction may
be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain
that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following
elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
8. Chu v. Tamin, AM No. RTJ-03-1786 August 28, 2003
Facts: Complainant alleged that on 9 September 1999, Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer Michael F. dela Cruz (CENRO dela Cruz) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Region IX, applied for a search warrant with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz claimed that complainant
was in possession of forest products of dubious origin in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705[1] (PD 705), as amended. On the same day, respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 364
ordering the seizure of several pieces of mangrove lumber from complainants fishpond in Bulawan, Payao,
Zamboanga del Sur. On the strength of the warrant, CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law enforcement
agents, seized from complainant 576 pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove specie) with an estimated value
of P183,790.
On 22 September 1999, complainant obtained from Branch 23 a copy of the complete records of
the issuance of Search Warrant No. 364, as certified by Branch Clerk of Court Ma. Asuncion PabataoLumapas (Clerk of Court Lumapas). On 24 September 1999, complainant again obtained, for the second
time, a copy of the complete records of the case, also certified by Clerk of Court Lumapas. These certified
copies did not contain any transcript of respondent judges examination of CENRO dela Cruz or his
witnesses as required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus,
complainant filed this administrative complaint.
Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent judge issued, under
questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation of PD 705. Complainant recalled that on
10 November 1998, respondent judge issued four search warrants against him (Search Warrant Nos. 281
to 284), authorizing the seizure from his compound of pagatpat lumber worth more than P1.5 million.
Complainant alleged that the records of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of the required
examination of witnesses. Complainant therefore moved to quash the four warrants. Respondent judge,
however, denied the motion on the ground that he had in fact conducted such examination but the record of
the deposition was misfiled in another case folder through inadvertence.
In response to the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of this Court to comment
on the complaint, respondent judge, in his Second Indorsement (Indorsement) dated 16 December 1999,

denied complainants allegations. Respondent judge asserted that at around 1:15 p.m. of 9 September
1999, he personally examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), allegedly a witness of CENRO
dela Cruz, before issuing the warrant in question. He claimed that a transcript of the examination was
included in the records of Search Warrant No. 364. However, he forwarded the records to the OCA on 30
September 1999 in connection with his request for the transfer of the case to the RTC, Branch 24, in Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur (Branch 24). In lieu of the original copy, respondent judge attached to his Indorsement
an alleged computer printout of the transcript, claiming that the time and date of its encoding was verifiable
in the computer files in his office.
Due to the conflicting factual allegations of the parties, the Court directed the Executive Judge of
the RTC of Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur to: (1) verify from Branch 23 whether respondent judge
examined any witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364; and (2) secure from Clerk of Court Lumapas
her explanation on the apparent discrepancy between the copy of the records of Search Warrant No. 364,
as forwarded by respondent judge to the OCA and as obtained by complainant.
In his Report, dated 30 July 2001, RTC Pagadian City Executive Judge Franklyn A. Villegas
(Executive Judge Villegas) stated that he verified the records of Search Warrant No. 364 in Branch 23. He
found on page 5 of the records a copy of the transcript of the examination conducted by respondent judge
on one Reynaldo Cuaresma. He attached in his report the explanations of respondent judge and Clerk of
Court Lumapas.
In his explanation, dated 11 July 2001, respondent judge reiterated the claim he made in his
Indorsement of 16 December 1999 that he examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma before issuing Search
Warrant No. 364. He explained that the records of the case contained a copy of the transcript of the
examination. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first time, that the legal researcher in his office
who prepared the duplicate copy issued to complainant on 22 September 1999 failed, through pure
inadvertence, to recopy such transcript. Respondent judge attributed such omission to the fact that at that
time, the pages of the records were not yet physically paged. He claimed that the pages were numbered
only upon preparation of the records for transmittal to Branch 24 the following week. He further asserted
that the copy of the transcript in question was numbered page 5. Branch 24, however, refused to accept the
referral of the case. Thus, respondent judge forwarded the records to the OCA with a request for their
transmittal to Branch 24. The OCA later returned the records to respondent judge as their proper custodian.
The OCA found the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and recommended a fine as penalty.
Issue: Whether respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law?
Ruling: The report of the OCA is well-taken. Respondent judge explained that in issuing Search Warrant
No. 364, he complied with the rule that he must personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses. Respondent judge stated, however,
that the certified copies of the records obtained by complainant did not include the transcript of his
examination because the clerical staff in his office who prepared the certified copies inadvertently failed to
do so. This explanation fails to persuade us.
Respondent judges own Clerk of Court certified twice, first on 22 September 1999 and later on 24
September 1999, that the 29-page copy of the records obtained by complainant constitutes the entire
record of the matter.[10] This renders improbable respondent judges claim that the transcript already
formed part of the records but the legal researcher in his office inadvertently missed it in preparing the copy
obtained by complainant on 22 September 1999. The alleged legal researcher, who presumably also
prepared the second certified copy, could not have committed the same mistake, twice in a row, within two
days of each other. Curiously, in his Indorsement of 16 December 1999, respondent judge did not point to
his legal researchers negligence as the cause for the discrepancy. Neither did respondent judge state that

the pages of the contents of the folder of Search Warrant No. 364 were unnumbered when complainant
requested for copies. What he stated in his Indorsement was that the records contained a copy of the
transcript but the same was already forwarded to the OCA.
If, as respondent judge claims, he personally examined a certain Cuaresma as the witness of
CENRO dela Cruz, he should have secured the affidavit of Cuaresma. Respondent judge should also have
secured the affidavit of the unnamed legal researcher who allegedly prepared the copies of the records
obtained by complainant. Respondent judge failed to secure their affidavits to corroborate his claims. Lastly,
respondent judge should have shown Executive Judge Villegas, during the latters investigation, the
magnetic (hard disk) copy of the transcript allegedly stored in his office computer. These omissions bolster
complainants claim and correspondingly weaken respondent judges defense. As it is, other than
respondent judges bare claim that he examined a certain Cuaresma, the only proof on record in his favor is
an unsigned computer printout of the alleged record of the examination. Considering that any one can
easily create and print out such document, it does not suffice to exculpate respondent judge from
administrative liability.
We uphold the OCAs findings that respondent judge, who had earlier professed ignorance of the
rule in question, failed either to examine any witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364 or to reduce
the examination in writing. His omission renders him liable for gross ignorance of the law. When the law is
so elementary, such as the provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court on search warrant
issuance, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
9. Oposa v. Factoran, GR No. 101083 July 30, 1993
Facts: The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then
Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the
massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rain-forest.They further asserted that
the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful
ecology. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter
of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.
Ruling: The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be
heard.Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn.
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the rhythm and harmony
of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys
forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. This landmark case has been

ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest, not just
for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
10. People of the Philippines v CFI of Quezon, GR No. L-46772
Facts: The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished
under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines. On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2)
grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does
not conform substantially to the prescribed form. On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the information
on the grounds invoked (pp. 32-42, Rollo), The reconsideration sought was denied on August 9, 1977
Issue: (1) whether or not the information charged an offense; and
(2) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: Petition is granted.
(1) When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2 [a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in
the law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958]; People v. Abad, L-55132, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA
57).
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or
removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected
or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted
by the state.
The Order dismissing the complaint concluded that the information was defective because:
. . ., it is noted that the Information alleges that the cutting, gathering and carrying away of the logs were
done without the consent of the owner of the land. While the prosecution admits that timber is a forest
product that belongs to the state, the information, however, fails to allege that the taking was without the
consent of the latter, for which reason the Information is patently defective. (p. 39, Rollo)
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be
noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland
registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can
grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber
products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands
While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest
products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private
ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership
of the land includes everything found on its surface.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the
failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that
it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.

(2) Section 80 of PD 705 covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer may commence a
prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest
officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who has committed or
is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation
when an offense described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee
and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the forest
officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official authorized
by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary informations in court.
The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D.
705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged
commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint
was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal.
The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
because the information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in
Section 80 of P.D. 705. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that:
. . ., the authority given to the forest officer to investigate reports and complaints regarding the commission
of offenses defined in P.D. No. 705 by the said last and penultimate paragraphs of Section 80 may be
considered as covering only such reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned
to the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development, or any of the
deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence. Such
interpretation becomes cogent when we consider that the whole of Section 80 deals precisely with the
authority of forest officers or employees to make arrests and institute criminal actions involving offenses
defined in the Decree.
Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the
Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or
misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged
with the commission of the crime.
11. People of the Philippines vs Que GR No. 120365, December 17, 1996
Facts: The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate
number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information,
members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo
Avenue in Laoag City. On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1
Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the
corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with
plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson
Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the
cargo. SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed,
accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs.
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate of
lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5)
certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to
present any of these documents. All he could show was a certification[7] from the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut

slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San
Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial
capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force that there were
sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.
At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three
CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut
slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the
tanguile lumber.[10] When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they
counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet
(8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50.
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The RTC convicted them.
Issue: (1) It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as amended by EO 277
for possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere
possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and regulations which required
certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest products.
(2) The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused against
unlawful searches and seizures.
(3) The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused under
custodial investigation.
Ruling: Petition is without merit
(1) Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those laws and
regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested
interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life
to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of
possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies
the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Accused-appellants
possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section
68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products
and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of
such forest products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of
P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest
laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR.

In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the
forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O.
277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents
as malum prohibitum.
(2 and 3) The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court in
People vs. Bagista, thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be
subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a
search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right
shall, among others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving
vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellants truck. A
member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler
truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two
weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue,
they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos
Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in
between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumbers supporting documents,
accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence
of probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellants truck even without a warrant. Thus, the
258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove
the guilt of accused-appellant.
12. Roldan vs Madrona, GR No. 152989, September 4, 2002
Facts: Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of about 60,000 square meters covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. TP-331 which he bought from a certain Ildefonso O. Maglasang.

On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and
poultry farm in his property. While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly informed by
some employees from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he could
proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was still awaiting approval. Consequently,
petitioner proceeded with the cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway.He used the cut logs as
materials to build his chicken cages.
About three weeks later, representatives of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and personnel from the
Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner's place,
allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was conducted. The logs were not
confiscated but were entrusted to a barangay kagawad since there was allegedly no search warrant at that
time. Several days thereafter, the CENRO group and ISAFP returned, this time armed with a search
warrant and proceeded to confiscate 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled
timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.
Consequently, on September 21, 2001, a complaint for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as
amended was filed against herein petitioner by CENRO before the City Prosecutor of Ormoc City. A
warrant for the arrest of petitioner was then issued by the court a quo. In view thereof, herein petitioner filed
with the trial court a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and the recall of his warrant of
arrest.
Issue: (1) whether the owner of a private land, the petitioner in this case, is criminally liable under Section
68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property
(2) whether the owner of the private property is administratively liable under Sec. 14 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property and
just used them for his own agricultural purposes therein
(3) whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to the petitioner considering that the
same were not transported out and merely used for his own agricultural purposes.
Ruling:
(1) YES, he is still liable. Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that the violators of
the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code were referred to only for the purpose of determining the imposable penalties and not to define acts
which constitute qualified theft.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,

implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis
supplied)
The said law does not even distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts
under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material in determining the culpability
of a person is whether or not the person or entity involved or charged with its violation POSSESSES THE
REQUIRED PERMIT, LICENSE OR AUTHORIZATION FROM DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or
collects timber or other forest products.
(2) The aforementioned administrative order considers the mere act of transporting any wood product or
timber without the prescribed documents as an offense which is subject to the penalties provided for by law.
As to the defense of petitioner that he never transported the logs out of his property, suffice it to say that
such is a factual issue which this Court under Rule 45 cannot determine. We are limited to resolving
questions of law.
Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the "Revised Guidelines in the Issuance of Private Land
Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit," provides:
SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood products covered by these regulations which
are transported without the prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to
confiscation in favor of the government and shall be disposed in accordance with laws, rules and
regulations governing the matter.
DENR Officials found issuing defective certificate of origin and other transport documents required in this
Order shall be subject to suspension without prejudice to the imposition of other penalties as may be
warranted by extant Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations.
(3) Any pronouncement thereon at this point would be premature as the guilt of the petitioner has not been
legally established. The records of the case indicate that trial on the merits is still in progress. Hence, this
Court is not in a position to speculate on or prescribe the courses of action or remedies the petitioner may
avail of under the aforementioned law. Well-entrenched is the rule that this Court is not duty bound to
render advisory opinions.
13. DENR vs Yap (Boracay Landowners) GR No. 167707, October 8, 2008
Facts: Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. On April 14, 1976, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island,
which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. On November 10, 1978, then
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,
caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of
the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82
dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and
PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y.
Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 382 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial.
They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not
place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No.
705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership. During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the
following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay
Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the
coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years
ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes. The parties
also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed
any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial
and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.
Issue: Whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.
Ruling: Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No.
705. PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as
public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands
are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution
reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming
such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land
is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call
for proof. Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable
and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or
forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation
No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.