PHILIPPINEJURISPRUDENCEFULLTEXT

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G.R.No.103119October21,1992
SULPICIOINTODvs.COURTOFAPPEALS,ETAL.
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.103119October21,1992
SULPICIOINTOD,petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSandPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondents.

CAMPOS,JR.,J.:
Petitioner,SulpicioIntod,filedthispetitionforreviewofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals1affirmingintotothejudgmentofthe

RegionalTrialCourt,BranchXIV,OroquietaCity,findinghimguiltyofthecrimeofattemptedmurder.
Fromtherecords,wegatheredthefollowingfacts.
InthemorningofFebruary4,1979,SulpicioIntod,JorgePangasian,SantosTubioandAvelinoDaligdigwenttoSalvadorMandaya's
houseinKatugasan,LopezJaena,MisamisOccidentalandaskedhimtogowiththemtothehouseofBernardinaPalangpangan.
Thereafter,MandayaandIntod,Pangasian,TubioandDaligdighadameetingwithAnicetoDumalagan.HetoldMandayathathe
wantedPalangpangantobekilledbecauseofalanddisputebetweenthemandthatMandayashouldaccompanythefour(4)men,
otherwise,hewouldalsobekilled.
Atabout10:00o'clockintheeveningofthesameday,Petitioner,Mandaya,Pangasian,TubioandDaligdig,allarmedwithfirearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya
pointedthelocationofPalangpangan'sbedroom.Thereafter,Petitioner,Pangasian,TubioandDaligdigfiredatsaidroom.Itturned
out,however,thatPalangpanganwasinanotherCityandherhomewasthenoccupiedbyhersoninlawandhisfamily.Noonewas
intheroomwhentheaccusedfiredtheshots.Noonewashitbythegunfire.
Petitionerandhiscompanionswerepositivelyidentifiedbywitnesses.Onewitnesstestifiedthatbeforethefivemenleftthepremises,
theyshouted:"Wewillkillyou(thewitness)andespeciallyBernardinaPalangpanganandwewillcomebackif(sic)youwerenot
injured".2
Aftertrial,theRegionalTrialCourtconvictedIntodofattemptedmurder.Thecourt(RTC),asaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals,holding
thatPetitionerwasguiltyofattemptedmurder.PetitionerseeksfromthisCourtamodificationofthejudgmentbyholdinghimliable
onlyforanimpossiblecrime,citingArticle4(2)oftheRevisedPenalCodewhichprovides:
Art.4(2).CRIMINALRESPONSIBILITY.CriminalResponsibilityshallbeincurred:
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2.Byanypersonperforminganactwhichwouldbeanoffenseagainstpersonsorproperty,wereitnotfortheinherent
impossibilityofitsaccomplishmentoronaccountoftheemploymentofinadequateorineffectualmeans.
Petitionercontendsthat,Palangpangan'sabsencefromherroomonthenightheandhiscompanionsriddleditwithbullets
madethecrimeinherentlyimpossible.
Ontheotherhand,RespondentPeopleofthePhilippinesarguesthatthecrimewasnotimpossible.Instead,thefactsweresufficient
toconstituteanattemptandtoconvictIntodforattemptedmurder.Respondentallegedthattherewasintent.Further,initsCommentto
thePetition,respondentpointedoutthat:
...Thecrimeofmurderwasnotconsummated,notbecauseoftheinherentimpossibilityofitsaccomplishment(Art.
4(2),RevisedPenalCode),butduetoacauseoraccidentotherthanpetitioner'sandhisaccused'sownspontaneous
desistance(Art.3.,Ibid.)Palangpangandidnotsleepatherhouseatthattime.Haditnotbeenforthisfact,thecrimeis
possible,notimpossible.3
Article4,paragraph2isaninnovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code

where:

...itwasnecessarythattheexecutionoftheacthasbeencommenced,thatthepersonconceivingtheideashould
have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and
finally,thattheresultorendcontemplatedshallhavebeenphysicallypossible.Solongastheseconditionswerenot
present,thelawandthecourtsdidnotholdhimcriminallyliable.5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School,

recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite
impossibleorcarriedoutwithmeanswhichproveinadequate,wouldconstituteafelonyagainstpersonoragainstproperty. 8
TherationaleofArticle4(2)istopunishsuchcriminaltendencies.9

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b)
ineffectual.10
Thattheoffensecannotbeproducedbecausethecommissionoftheoffenseisinherentlyimpossibleofaccomplishmentisthefocus
of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an

impossiblecrime.
Legalimpossibilityoccurswheretheintendedacts,evenifcompleted,wouldnotamounttoacrime.13Thus:
Legalimpossibilitywouldapplytothosecircumstanceswhere(1)themotive,desireandexpectationistoperforman
actinviolationofthelaw(2)thereisintentiontoperformthephysicalact(3)thereisaperformanceoftheintended
physicalactand(4)theconsequenceresultingfromtheintendedactdoesnotamounttoacrime.14
Theimpossibilityofkillingapersonalreadydead15fallsinthiscategory.
Ontheotherhand,factualimpossibilityoccurswhenextraneouscircumstancesunknowntotheactororbeyondhiscontrolprevent
theconsummationoftheintendedcrime.16Oneexampleisthemanwhoputshishandinthecoatpocketofanotherwiththe

intentiontostealthelatter'swalletandfindsthepocketempty.17
Thecaseatbarbelongstothiscategory.Petitionershootstheplacewherehethoughthisvictimwouldbe,althoughinreality,the
victimwasnotpresentinsaidplaceandthus,thepetitionerfailedtoaccomplishhisend.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In Peoplevs.LeeKong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill,

aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a
different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to
kill.Itheldthat:
Thefactthattheofficerwasnotatthespotwheretheattackingpartyimaginedwherehewas,andwherethebullet
piercedtheroof,rendersitnolessanattempttokill.Itiswellsettledprincipleofcriminallawinthiscountrythatwhere
thecriminalresultofanattemptisnotaccomplishedsimplybecauseofanobstructioninthewayofthethingtobe
operatedupon,andthesefactsareunknowntotheaggressoratthetime,thecriminalattemptiscommitted.
InthecaseofStrokesvs.State,19wheretheaccusedfailedtoaccomplishhisintenttokillthevictimbecausethelatterdidnot

passbytheplacewherehewaslyinginwait,thecourtheldhimliableforattemptedmurder.Thecourtexplainedthat:
ItwasnofaultofStrokesthatthecrimewasnotcommitted....Itonlybecameimpossiblebyreasonoftheextraneous
circumstance that Lane did not go that way and further, that he was arrested and prevented from committing the
murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no
application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by outside interference or
becauseofmiscalculationastoasupposedopportunitytocommitthecrimewhichfailstomaterializeinshortithasno
applicationtothecasewhentheimpossibilitygrowsoutofextraneousactsnotwithinthecontroloftheparty.
In the case of Clarkvs.State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In

disposingofthecase,thecourtquotedMr.JusticeBishop,towit:
Itbeinganacceptedtruththatdefendantdeservespunishmentbyreasonofhiscriminalintent,noonecanseriously
doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen
depthsofthepocket,etc.,whatwassupposedtoexistwasreallypresentornot.Thecommunitysuffersfromthemere
alarmofcrime.Again:Wherethethingintended(attempted)asacrimeandwhatisdoneisasorttocreatealarm,in
otherwords,exciteapprehensionthattheevilintentionwillbecarriedout,theincipientactwhichthelawofattempt
takescognizanceofisinreasoncommitted.
InStatevs.Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside.

However,atthatmoment,thevictimwasinanotherpartofthehouse.Thecourtconvictedtheaccusedofattemptedmurder.

TheaforecitedcasesarethesamecaseswhichhavebeenrelieduponbyRespondenttomakethisCourtsustainthejudgmentof
attemptedmurderagainstPetitioner.However,wecannotrelyuponthesedecisionstoresolvetheissueathand.Thereisadifference
betweenthePhilippineandtheAmericanlawsregardingtheconceptandappreciationofimpossiblecrimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable.
Whereas,intheUnitedStates,theCodeofCrimesandCriminalProcedureissilentregardingthismatter.Whatitprovidedforwere
attemptsofthecrimesenumeratedinthesaidCode.Furthermore,insaidjurisdiction,theimpossibilityofcommittingtheoffenseis
merelyadefensetoanattemptcharge.Inthisregard,commentatorsandthecasesgenerallydividetheimpossibilitydefenseintotwo
categories:legalversusfactualimpossibility.22InU.S.vs.Wilson 23theCourtheldthat:
...factualimpossibilityofthecommissionofthecrimeisnotadefense.Ifthecrimecouldhavebeencommittedhadthe
circumstancesbeenasthedefendantbelievedthemtobe,itisnodefensethatinrealitythecrimewasimpossibleof
commission.
Legalimpossibility,ontheotherhand,isadefensewhichcanbeinvokedtoavoidcriminalliabilityforanattempt.InU.S.vs.Berrigan,
24theaccusedwasindicatedforattemptingtosmugglelettersintoandoutofprison.Thelawgoverningthemattermadethe

actcriminalifdonewithoutknowledgeandconsentofthewarden.Inthiscase,theoffenderintendedtosendaletterwithout
thelatter'sknowledgeandconsentandtheactwasperformed.However,unknowntohim,thetransmittalwasachievedwith
thewarden'sknowledgeandconsent.Thelowercourtheldtheaccusedliableforattemptbuttheappellatecourtreversed.It
heldunacceptablethecontentionofthestatethat"eliminationofimpossibilityasadefensetoachargeofcriminalattempt,
as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern
view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus,
followingtheprincipleoflegality,nopersoncouldbecriminallyliableforanactwhichwasnotmadecriminalbylaw.Further,
itsaid:
Congresshasnotyetenactedalawthatprovidesthatintentplusactplusconductconstitutestheoffenseofattempt
irrespectiveoflegalimpossibilityuntilsuchtimeassuchlegislativechangesinthelawtakeplace,thiscourtwillnot
fashionanewnonstatutorylawofcriminalattempt.
Torestate,intheUnitedStates,wheretheoffensesoughttobecommittedisfactuallyimpossibleoraccomplishment,theoffender
cannotescapecriminalliability.Hecanbeconvictedofanattempttocommitthesubstantivecrimewheretheelementsofattemptare
satisfied.Itappears,therefore,thattheactispenalized,notasanimpossiblecrime,butasanattempttocommitacrime.Ontheother
hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime neither for an
attemptnotforanimpossiblecrime.TheonlyreasonforthisisthatinAmericanlaw,thereisnosuchthingasanimpossiblecrime.
Instead,itonlyrecognizesimpossibilityasadefensetoacrimechargethatis,attempt.
ThisisnottrueinthePhilippines.Inourjurisdiction,impossiblecrimesarerecognized.Theimpossibilityofaccomplishingthecriminal
intentisnotmerelyadefense,butanactpenalizedbyitself.Furthermore,thephrase"inherentimpossibility"thatisfoundinArticle
4(2)oftheRevisedPenalCodemakesnodistinctionbetweenfactualorphysicalimpossibilityandlegalimpossibility.Ubilexnon
distinguitnecnosdistingueredebemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment.AndunderArticle4,paragraph2oftheRevisedPenalCode,suchissufficienttomaketheactanimpossiblecrime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a
supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally
liableforanact"whichwouldbeanoffenseagainstpersonsorproperty,wereitnotfortheinherentimpossibilityofitsaccomplishment
..."Inthatcaseallcircumstanceswhichpreventedtheconsummationoftheoffensewillbetreatedasanaccidentindependentofthe
actor'swillwhichisanelementofattemptedandfrustratedfelonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
PetitionerguiltyofAttemptedMurderisherebyMODIFIED.WeherebyholdPetitionerguiltyofanimpossiblecrimeasdefinedand
penalizedinArticles4,paragraph2,and59oftheRevisedPenalCode,respectively.Havinginmindthesocialdangeranddegreeof
criminalityshownbyPetitioner,thisCourtsentenceshimtosufferthepenaltyofsix(6)monthsofarrestomayor,togetherwiththe
accessorypenaltiesprovidedbythelaw,andtopaythecosts.
SOORDERED.
Feliciano,RegaladoandNocon,JJ.,concur.
Narvasa,C.J.,isonleave.

Footnotes
1Peoplevs.Intod,C.AG.R.No.09205,August14,1991JusticeFidelP.Purisima,Ponente:JusticesEduardoR.
BengzonandSalomeA.Montoya,concurring.
2TSN,p.4,July24,1986.

3Records,p.65.
4Guevarra,CommentariesontheRevisedPenalCode15(4thed.,1946).
5Albert,Ibid.
6Albert,Ibid.
7Albert,Ibid.
8Albert,Ibid.
9GrogorioandFeria,CommentsontheRevisedPenalCode76(Vol.I,1sted.1958).
10Reyes,TherevisedPenalCode,90(Vol.I,11thed.,1977).
11Reyes,Ibid.
12Reyes,Ibid.
13U.S.vs.Berrigan,482F.2nd.171(1973).
14U.S.vs.Berrigan,Ibid.
15Aquino,TheRevisedPenalCode,(Vol.I,1987).
16U.S.vs.Berrigan,supra,p.13.
17U.S.vs.Berrigan,Ibid.
1821L.R.A.626(1898).
1921L.R.A.N.S.898(1908).
2017S.W.145(1888).
2171S.W.175(1902).
22U.S.vs.HENGAWKAKROMAN,39L.Ed.2d.874(1974).
23565F.Supp.1416(1983).
24Supra,n.13.
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