BINALAY VS.

MANALO
A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not the alluvial process
contemplated in Art. 457. The accumulation of the soil deposits must be slow
and hardly imperceptible in order for the riparian owner to acquire ownership
thereof. Also, the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of the rivers (or the sea coast).

two are connected. [Note: The CA applied the ruling in Govt of the Phil
Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, which was actually inappropriate because
the subject matter in this case was a lake so that the definition of a bed was
different.]

ISSUE:
FACTS
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge Taccad from 2
different people (the latters daughter and from an earlier purchaser). These
lots were later consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45 hectares. The lot
was beside the Cagayan River, which, due to flooding, would place a portion
of the land underwater during the rainy season (September to December).
On sunny days, however, the land would be dried up for the entire dry
season (January to August). When a survey of the land was conducted on a
rainy month, a portion of the land that Manalo bought was then underwater
and was thus left unsurveyed and excluded from Lot 307.

Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion

RULING: No.
The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of the heavy rains
that cause the highest ordinary level of waters of the Cagayan River during
the rainy season. The depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered
property of public domain.
The SC observed the following:

The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a
certain point to form two braches (western and eastern) and then unites at
the other end, further north, to form a narrower strip of land. The eastern
branch of the river cuts through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy
season. The unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the bed of the eastern
branch. Note that the fork exists only during the rainy season while the
island/elongated strip of land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry
and perfect for cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary depth.
The strip of land in the middle of the fork totaled 22.7 hectares and was
labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated by
the eastern branch of the rivers fork.

a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct examination depict the
depressed portion as a river bed. The dried up portion had dike-like slopes
(around 8m) on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are
vertical and very prominent.

Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to the
submerged portion of the land to which it is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et
al) who possess the Lot 821, on the other hand, insist that they own it. They
occupy the other edges of the lot along the river bank (i.e. the fertile portions
on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural products) and also
cultivate the western strip during the summer.

d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the land he actually
bought. It is difficult to suppose that such a sizable area could have been
brought about by accretion.

Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on,
he filed a complaint for quieting of title, possession, and damages against
petitioner. The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot
821 and Lot 307 cannot be considered separate and distinct from each other.
They reasoned that when the land dries up for the most part of the year, the

b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo bought the land. It
was called Rio Muerte de Cagayan.
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because article 420
of the civil code states that rivers are property of public dominion. The word
river includes the running waters, the bed, and the banks. [The seller never
actually owned that part of the land since it was public property]

More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfied.
These are: 1) that the deposition of the soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or
sea); and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of the rivers (or the sea coast). The accretion shouldve been attached
to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion
lies on the bank of the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite it
across the river. Aside from that, the dike-like slopes which were very steep
may only be formed by a sudden and forceful action like flooding. The steep

slopes could not have been formed by the river in a slow and gradual
manner.

G.R. No. L-31163

URBANO
vs.
JOSE
C.
PABLO
TIONGSON
BULACAN, appellants.

November 6, 1929
SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,
BERNABE,
and
THE

ET
PROVINCIAL

AL., defendants.
SHERIFF
OF

VILLA-REAL, J.:
The following facts were conclusively proved at the trial:
On March 20, 1928, there were deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse
by the plaintiff Urbano Santos 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay and by Pablo
Tiongson 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of the same grain.
On same date, Pablo Tiongson filed with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan a complaint against Jose C. Bernabe, to recover from the latter the
1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay deposited in the defendant's warehouse. At
the same time, the application of Pablo Tiongson for a writ of attachment was
granted, and the attachable property of Jose C. Bernabe, including 924
cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were
attached, sold at public auction, and the proceeds thereof delivered to said
defendant Pablo Tiongson, who obtained judgment in said case.
The herein plaintiff, Urbano Santos, intervened in the attachment of the
palay, but upon Pablo Tiongson's filing the proper bond, the sheriff
proceeded with the attachment, giving rise to the present complaint.
It does not appear that the sacks of palay of Urbano Santos and those of
Pablo Tiongson, deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse, bore any marks
or signs, nor were they separated one from the other.
The plaintiff-appellee Urbano Santos contends that Pablo Tiongson cannot
claim the 924 cavans and 31 kilos of palay attached by the defendant
sheriff as part of those deposited by him in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse,
because, in asking for the attachment thereof, he impliedly acknowledged
that the same belonged to Jose C. Bernabe and not to him.
In the complaint filed by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C. Bernabe, civil case
No. 3665 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, it is alleged that said
plaintiff deposited in the defendant's warehouse 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of

palay, the return of which, or the value thereof, at the rate of P3 per cavan
was claimed therein. Upon filing said complaint, the plaintiff applied for a
preliminary writ of attachment of the defendant's property, which was
accordingly issued, and the defendant's property, including the 924 cavans
and 31 kilos of palay found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were attached.
It will be seen that the action brought by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C.
Bernabe is that provided in section 262 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the
delivery of personal property. Although it is true that the plaintiff and his
attorney did not follow strictly the procedure provided in said section for
claiming the delivery of said personal property nevertheless, the procedure
followed by him may be construed as equivalent thereto, considering the
provisions of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the effect that "the
provisions of this Code, and the proceedings under it, shall be liberally
construed, in order to promote its object and assist the parties in obtaining
speedy justice."
Liberally construing, therefore, the above cited provisions of section 262 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the writ of attachment applied for by Pablo
Tiongson against the property of Jose C. Bernabe may be construed as a
claim for the delivery of the sacks of palay deposited by the former with the
latter.
The 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay belonging to the plaintiff Urbano
Santos, having been mixed with the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay
belonging to the defendant Pablo Tiongson in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse;
the sheriff having found only 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay in said
warehouse at the time of the attachment thereof; and there being no means
of separating form said 924 cavans and 31 1/2 of palay belonging to Urbano
Santos and those belonging to Pablo Tiongson, the following rule prescribed
in article 381 of the Civil Code for cases of this nature, is applicable:
Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or
dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in
the latter case the things cannot be separated without injury, each
owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part
belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or
commingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, we will take the
proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay which were attached and sold,
thereby giving Urbano Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 thereof,

and Pablo Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value
thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and Pablo
Tiongson is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff Urbano Santos the value of
398.49 cavans of palay at the rate of P3 a cavan, without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 104813 October 21, 1993

HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA, NAMELY: PLACIDA S. OLVIGA, VIRGILIO
OLVIGA, LOLITA OLVIGA, CARMENCITA O. ALPUERTO and JEANETTE
OLILA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELITA R. GLOR, SERILINA G.
JAMON, EMELITA G. MADELA, EMAN G. MANALO, MYRNA GLOR,
FELIPE GLOR, GAUDENCIO GLOR and CORNELIO GLOR, respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 30542, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Calauag, Quezon ordering the defendants, heirs of Jose Olviga (petitioners
herein), to reconvey the land in dispute to the plaintiffs, heirs of Cornelia Glor
(now private respondents),and to pay attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
This case started as an action (Civil Case No. C-883) filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon by Angelita Glor and her children against the
heirs of Jose Olviga for reconveyance of a parcel of land, measuring 54,406
square meters (5.44 has), more or less, known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the
Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision.
The court, after due trial, rendered judgment in favor of the private
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and considering the foregoing judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the PLAINTIFFS and against the defendants as heirs
of Jose Olviga to reconvey the land in dispute to the plaintiffs as heirs of
Cornelio Glor Sr.; condemning the defendants jointly and severally to pay
the plaintiffs attorneys fees of P5,000.00 plus the costs of the suit. The
counterclaim interposed by defendants is dismissed. ( p. 12, Rollo.)
The judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the defendants who
raised several factual issues regarding possession and fraud, as well as legal
issues involving prescription and purchaser in good faith, but the appellate
court dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
It was established by the evidence on record that the land in question was, in
1950, still forest land when Eutiquio Pureza, then only twelve years old, and
his father cleared and cultivated it. In 1954, they introduced improvements

such as, coconut trees, jackfruit, mangoes, avocado and bananas. When the
area was released for disposition, the Bureau of Lands surveyed the same in
1956 in the name of Eutiquio Pureza. Since then, the land has been known
as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Godofredo
Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga then living with the latter, protested the survey
but without respect to a one-half-hectare portion "sa dakong panulukan ng
Amihanan-Silanganan." This protest or "tutol" (Exh. B) of Godofredo Olviga,
brother of petitioners Virgilio Olviga and Lolita Olviga Olila, is of public record
in the Bureau of Lands (Exh. B). In said document, Godofredo Olviga
expressly admitted that the lot belonged to Eutiquio Pureza, except the 1/2
hectare portion claimed by him (Godofredo) which was included in the survey
of Pureza's Lot 13.
In 1960, Eutiquio Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot 13. Without
his application having been acted upon, he transferred his rights in said lot to
Cornelia Glor in 1961. Neither the homestead application of Eutiquio nor the
proposed transfer of his rights to Cornelio Glor was acted upon by the
Director of Lands for reasons that the records of the Bureau of Lands do not
disclose.
In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral
proceeding, in fraud of the rights of Pureza and his transferee, Cornelio Glor
and his family who were the real and actual occupants of the land.
What must have happened as found by the Court of Appeals, is that since
Cornelio Glor, Sr. was sickly, and his wife (now widowed) Angelita Glor, was
unschooled, they failed to follow up Pureza's homestead application over Lot
13 in the cadastral proceedings in the Municipal Court of Guinayangan Public
Land Subdivision, Pls-84, Case 1 (Philcusa-Foa). In fact, they were not
aware of the proceedings. Angelita Glor testified that no notice was ever
posted on Lot 13 about the proceedings nor did the barangay captain, tell her
about them. Neither did she receive any notice from the court sheriff or any
court employee. This non-posting of the hearing of the cadastral hearing on
the land, or in the barangay hall, was confirmed by petitioner Virgilio Olviga
himself who testified that he did not notice any papers posted on the property
in question (tsn, October 18, 1990, pp. 83-84). On the other hand, petitioner's
father Jose Olviga, claimed both Lots 12 and 13, which are adjoining lots, in
the same cadastral proceedings. He falsely omitted in his answer mention of
the fact that other persons were in possession of, and claiming adverse
interest in, Lot 13 and that the land had been surveyed for Eutiquio Pureza,
the former occupant who sold his interests to private respondents' parent.
Cornelio Glor, in 1961. Glor was Olviga's neighbor. As a result, both Lots 12
and 13 were declared as uncontested in the name of Jose Olviga (Exh. 7),

and were registered in his name in 1967 in Original Certificate of Title, No. 012713 (Exh. 5). In 1971, Olviga requested that OCT No. 0-12713 be split into
two (2) TCT's, one each for the two (2) lots. TCT Nos. T-103823 and T103824 were issued for lots 12 and 13, respectively. Jose Olviga later
transferred Lot 13 to his son-in-law, Jaime Olila and daughter, Lolita Olviga
resulting in the cancellation of TCT. No. 241314 in the names of the spouses
(Exh. 3).
It was also established that the spouses Jaime Olila and Lolita Olviga Olila,
were not innocent purchasers for value of the land from their father, and have
never been in the possession. The Glors and their predecessor-in-interest
(Cornelio Glor Sr., and Eutiquio Pureza) were the ones found to be in
possession of the property.
From said finding, and conclusions, the appellate court in its decision dated
January 13, 1992, resolved the issues presented, thus:
. . ., whether or not plaintiffs' action is really one for quieting of title that
does not prescribe; or assuming that their demand for reconveyance of
the lot in question prescribes in ten years, being based on an implied
trust, whether their cause of action should be counted from the date of
the issuance of the late Jose Olviga's title over said lot in 1967 and has,
therefore, already prescribed, or whether the prescriptive period should
be counted from the date plaintiffs acquired knowledge of said title
sometime in 1988.

question filed on April 10, 1989, or in less than a year after they learned
of the issuance of a title over said lot to Jose Olviga, predecessor-ininterest of defendants, has not yet prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is AFFIRMED in toto,
with costs against defendants-appellants. (pp. 48-51, Rollo.)
Petitioners now seek a review of the above decision. They allege that the
present action has already prescribed; (2) the Court of Appeals erred when it
ruled that the private respondents' cause of action accrued not in 1967 but in
1988; (3) that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that
private respondents as mere homestead transferees cannot maintain an
action for reconveyance; (4) that the Faja and Caragay-Layno cases have no
bearing and direct application to the case at bar; and (5) that private
respondents have not proven by preponderance of evidence their ownership
and possession of the disputed land.
With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of
times before an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the
date of registration of the deed of the date of the issuance of the certificate of
title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this
rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since
if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to
the property, does not prescribe.

The first question should be answered in the affirmative. . . .

xxx xxx xxx
But even assuming that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance, being based
on an implied or constructive trust, prescribes in ten years, the lower
court again correctly ruled that their cause of action should be
considered to have accrued not from the date of registration of the title of
Jose Olviga, defendants' predecessor-in-interest, over the lot in question
in 1967, but only from the time the plaintiffs learned of such title in 1988. .
...
xxx xxx xxx
All in all, therefore, the court a quo did not err in holding that plaintiffs'
action against defendants-appellants for the reconveyance of the lot in

In the case at bar, private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest

were in actual possession of the property since 1950. Their undisturbed
possession gave them the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity
to determine the nature of the adverse claim of petitioners, who in 198
disturbed their possession.
The other issues raised in the petition are factual.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly based their findings of tact
on the testimonies of the parties and their witnessess. It can be said
therefore that those conclusions are based on substantial evidence. No
cogent reason exists to disturb them. As reiterated in a long line of decisions,
it is beyond the province of this Court to make its own findings of facts
different from those of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(Vda. de Cailles vs. Mayuga 170 SCRA 347; New Owners/Management of

TML Garments, Inc. vs. Zaragosa, 170 SCRA 563). In petitions for review of
decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to
a review of questions of law, except when the findings of fact are not
supported by the records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a
serious abuse of discretion (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 307;
Samson vs. CA, 141 SCRA 194; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705). The case
at bar does not fall under the exceptions.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the petition for review is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102909 September 6, 1993

SPOUSES
VICENTE
and
LOURDES
PINGOL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO N. DONASCO,
namely: MELINDA D. PELAYO, MARIETTA D. SINGSON, MYRNA D.
CUEVAS, NATIVIDAD D. PELAYO, YOLANDA D. CACERES and MARY
DONASCO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The material facts of this case are simple and undisputed.
Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral
Survey of Caloocan, with an area of 549 square meters, located at Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 7435 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. On 17
February 1969, he executed a "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF
OF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND" in favor
of Francisco N. Donasco which was acknowledged before a notary public.
The parcel of land referred to herein is Lot No. 3223 and the pertinent
portions of the document read as follows:
That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY
THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY (P20,530.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, the VENDOR hereby these
presents SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY by way of Absolute
Sale the one-half (1/2) portion, equivalent to Two Hundred
Seventy Four and point Fifty (274.50) square meters, to
VENDEE, the above-mentioned property, his heirs, assigns
and successors-in- interest;
That the VENDOR hereby confesses and acknowledges the
receipt of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS from
VENDEE as advanced (sic) and partial payment to the
above-cited consideration of the Sale herein mentioned,
leaving therefor a balance of Eighteen Thousand and Five
Hundred Thirty (P18,530) Pesos to be paid in several equal
installments within a period of six (6) years, beginning
January, 1970;

That after computing the above-mentioned equal

installments, the VENDEE agrees and undertakes to pay
unto the VENDOR a monthly amount equivalent to Two
Hundred Fifty Seven (sic) and Thirty Six Centavos (P257.36)
within a period of Seventy One (71) months and on the
Seven Two [sic] (72) month, the amount of (P257.44) as the
last and final installment thereof;
That the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in the
payment of the installment due the same shall earn a legal
rate of interest, and to which the VENDOR likewise agrees;
That the VENDEE undertakes to pay unto the VENDOR the
herein monthly installment within the first five (5) days of
each month and the same shall be made available and to be
paid at the residence of the VENDOR, payment to be made
either directly to the VENDOR, his wife or his authorized
representative or factor;
That in case of partition of the above-described property
between herein VENDOR and VENDEE the same shall be
divided into two (2) equal parts, the VENDOR gets the
corner facing J. De Jesus and Malolos Avenue and the
VENDEE shall get the portion with fifteen 15 meters frontage
facing J. De Jesus Street only. 1
Pursuant to the contract, Donasco paid P2,000.00 to Pingol. The one-half
portion, designated as Lot No. 3223-A, was then segregated from the mother
lot, and the parties prepared a subdivision plan (Exhibit "C") which was
approved by the Land Registration Commission. 2
Francisco immediately took possession of the subject lot and constructed a
house thereon. In January 1970, he started paying the monthly installments
but was able to pay only up to 1972.
On 13 July 1984, Francisco Donasco died. At the time of his demise, he had
paid P8,369.00, plus the P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance of
P10,161.00 on the contract price. 3 Lot No. 3223-A remained in the
possession of Donasco's heirs.
On 19 October 1988, the heirs of Francisco Donasco filed an action for
"Specific Performance and Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary

Injunction" against the spouses Vicente and Lourdes Pingol (petitioners

herein) before the RTC of Caloocan City. The action was docketed as Civil
Case No. 13572 and raffled off to Branch 125 of the said court.
4

In their complaint, the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) averred that

after the death of their father, they offered to pay the balance of P10,161.00
plus the stipulated legal rate of interest thereon to Vicente Pingol but the
latter rebuffed their offer and has "been demanding for a bigger and
unreasonable amount, in complete variance to what is lawfully due and
payable." They stated that they had "exerted earnest efforts to forge or reach
an amicable and peaceful settlement with the defendants" for the payment of
the property in question but to no avail. They further alleged that the
defendants were committing "acts of forcible entry and encroachment" upon
their land and asked that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain
the defendants from the acts complained of.
Plaintiffs then prayed that the defendants be ordered, inter alia:
a. . . . to accept the amount of P10,161.00, more or less,
plus the stipulated legal rate of interest due thereon, as full
and complete payment of the balance for the agreed
price/consideration on the one- half (1/2) portion of the
parcel of land . . .; [and]
b. . . . to execute the final deed of sale on the one-half (1/2)
portion of the lot . . . in accordance with the partition
reflected in the survey and subdivision plan, . . . . 5
6

In their answer with counterclaim, defendants admitted the execution of the

aforementioned deed of sale, the segregation of the portion sold and the
preparation and approval of the subdivision plan, but set up the following
special and affirmative defenses: (1) plaintiffs' cause of action had already
prescribed; (2) the deed of sale embodied a conditional contract of sale "as
the consideration is to be paid on installment basis within a period of six
years beginning January, 1970"; (3) the subdivision plan was prepared on the
assumption that Francisco Donasco would be able to comply with his
obligation; (4) when Francisco died, he had not fully paid the total
consideration agreed upon; and (5) considering the breach by Francisco of
his contractual obligation way back in 1976, the sale was deemed to have
been cancelled and the continuous occupancy of Francisco after 1976 and
by his heirs thereafter was by mere tolerance of Vicente Pingol. They then

asked that the plaintiffs be ordered to vacate the premises and to pay them
attorney's fees and a reasonable compensation for the use of the land.
In their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, 7 the plaintiffs pointed out that
there is no provision in the deed of sale for its cancellation in case of default
in the payment of the monthly installments and invoked Article 1592 of the
New Civil Code. They specifically denied the allegations in the counterclaim.
The issues having been joined, the case was then tried on the merits.
On 22 January 1990, the trial court rendered a decision 8 dismissing the
complaint and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants P350.00 as
reasonable monthly rental for the use of the premises from the filing of the
complaint, P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. It
held that: (1) the deed of absolute sale in question, marked and offered in
evidence as Exhibit "A," is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale, since
Vicente Pingol had no intention to part with the ownership of the loan unless
the full amount of the agreed price had been paid; (2) the contract was
deemed to have been cancelled from the moment the late father of the
plaintiffs defaulted in the payment of the monthly installments; (3) title and
ownership over the lot did not pass to Francisco Donasco and his heirs since
the contract to sell was never consummated; and (5) assuming, arguendo,
that the plaintiffs have a cause of action for specific performance, such action
had already prescribed since the complaint was filed only on 19 October
1988 or more than ten years from the time that they could have lawfully
demanded performance. 9
Plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where the appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 25967. On 12 November 1991, the said court
rendered a decision 10 reversing the appealed decision and decreeing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one is rendered:
(1) Ordering appellee-vendor Vicente Pingol to accept the
sum of P10,161.00, plus the legal interest due thereon from
the date of institution of this action on October 19, 1988;
(2) Upholding the validity of the "DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE OF ONE- HALF (1/2) (of) AN UNDIVIDED PORTION
OF A PARCEL OF LAND" (Exh. A), and by virtue and on the

strength of which declaring the "Heirs of the Deceased

Francisco N. Domingo" as the owners of the 274.50 sq. m.
land, denominated as Lot 3223-A, (LRC) Psd-146255 under
the technical description (exh. D) and reflected in the Plan of
Subdivision Survey which was approved By Commissioner
of Land Registration on August 13, 1971 (exh. C),
representing one-half portion [of] lot 3223, situated at the
corner of Malolos Avenue and G. de Jesus St., Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City, and covered by TCT No. 7435 of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City (exh. B); and

that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming
effective. 15
A perusal of Exhibit "A" leads to no other conclusion than that it embodies a
contract of sale. The plain and clear tenor of the "DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL
OF LAND" is that "the VENDOR hereby . . . SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY
by way Absolute Sale the one-half (1/2) portion . . . to the VENDEE . . . his
heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest." That the vendor, petitioner Vicente
Pingol, had that clear intention was further evidenced by his failure to reserve
his title thereto until the full payment of the price.

(3) Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

11

The Court of Appeals ruled that the deed of sale in question reveals the clear
intention of Vicente Pingol to part with the ownership of the one-half portion
of the land by way of an absolute sale; that the failure to fully pay the agreed
price was not a ground for the cancellation of the sale; and that the plaintiffs'
action is imprescriptible since it is akin to an action to quiet title to property in
one's possession. 12
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the defendants,
hereinafter referred to as the petitioners, filed this petition for certiorari on 9
January 1992. Plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as the private respondents,
filed their comment thereto on 10 September 1992 to which the petitioners
filed a reply 11 November 1992. We gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, 13 which they
subsequently complied with.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred:
The decisive issue in this case is whether Exhibit "A" embodies a contract of
sale or a contract to sell. The distinction between the two is important for in a
contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing
sold, whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement, ownership is reserved in
the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract
of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless
the contract is resolved or rescinded, whereas in a contract to sell, title is
retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment being
a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event

In Dignos vs. Court of Appeals, 16 we held that a deed of sale is absolute in

nature although denominated as a "Deed of Conditional Sale" where there is
no stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved in the
seller until the full payment of the price, nor is there a stipulation giving the
vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails
to pay within a fixed period. Exhibit "A" contains neither stipulation. What is
merely stated therein is that "the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in
the payment of the installments due the same shall earn a legal rate of
interest, and to which the VENDOR likewise agrees."
Furthermore, as found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of the parties,
contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that an
absolute deed of sale was intended, by the parties and not a contract to sell:
[P]ursuant to the deed, the vendor delivered actual and
constructive possession of the property to the vendee, who
occupied and took such possession, constructed a building
thereon, had the property surveyed and subdivided and a
plan of the property was prepared and submitted to the Land
Registration Commission which approved it preparatory to
segregating the same and obtaining the corresponding TCT
in his name. Since the sale, appellee continuously
possessed and occupied the property as owner up to his
death on July 13, 1984 and his heirs, after his death,
continued the occupancy and possession of the property up
to the present. Those contemporaneous and subsequent
events are demonstrative acts that the vendor since the sale
recognized the vendee as the absolute owner of the property
sold. All those attributes of ownership are admitted by
defendants in their answer, specifically in paragraphs 7 and
9 of their special and affirmative defenses. 17

The contract here being one of absolute sale, the ownership of the subject lot
was transferred to the buyer upon the actual and constructive delivery
thereof. The constructive delivery of the subject lot was made upon the
execution of the deed of sale 18 while the actual delivery was effected when
the private respondents took possession of and constructed a house on Lot
No. 3223-A.
The delivery of the object of the contract divested the vendor of the
ownership over the same and he cannot recover the title unless the contract
is resolved or rescinded pursuant to Article 1592 of the New Civil Code which
provides that:
In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have
been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time
agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take
place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the
period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract
has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act.
After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not find that a notarial or
judicial rescission of the contract had been made. Although Vicente Pingol
asserts that he had declared to Francisco Donasco that he was cancelling
the contract, he did not prove that his demand for rescission was made either
judicially or by a notarial act.
Petitioners fault the respondent Court for holding that the action of the
petitioners is not barred by the statute of limitations. They argue that the
private respondents' action, being based upon a written contract, has
prescribed since it was brought only in 1988 or more than ten years from the
time when the latter could have lawfully demanded performance. 19
We disagree.
Although the private respondents' complaint before the trial court was
denominated as one for specific performance, it is in effect an action to quiet
title.
That a cloud has been cast on the title of the private respondents is
indubitable. Despite the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the
execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract,
the petitioners adamantly refused to accept the tender of payment by the

private respondents and steadfastly insisted that their obligation to transfer

title had been rendered ineffective.
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment
thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements
thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had
refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee has an
absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality
to bring an action to quiet title. 21
Prescription thus cannot be invoked against the private respondents for it is
aphoristic that an action to quiet title to property in one's possession is
imprescriptible. 22 The rationale for this rule has been aptly stated thus:
The owner of real property who is in possession thereof may
wait until his possession is invaded or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right. A person claiming
title to real property, but not in possession thereof, must act
affirmatively and within the time provided by the statute.
Possession is a continuing right as is the right to defend
such possession. So it has been determined that an owner
of real property in possession has a continuing right to
invoke a court of equity to remove a cloud that is a
continuing menace to his title. Such a menace is compared
to a continuing nuisance or trespass which is treated as
successive nuisances or trespasses, not barred by statute
until continued without interruption for a length of time
sufficient to affect a change of title as a matter of law. 23
Private respondents shall, however, be liable to pay the legal rate of interest
on the unpaid balance of the purchase price from the date default or on 6
January 1976, when the entire balance should have been paid, pursuant to
the provision in the deed of sale.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the Decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED. As modified, the interest on the unpaid balance of
P10,161.00, at the legal rate, shall be computed from 6 January 1976. Upon
the payment by the private respondents to the petitioners of the said amount
and the interest thereon, the latter are ordered to deliver Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 7435 to the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City who shall cancel
the same and issue two new transfer certificates of title in lieu thereof, one of
which shall be in the name of the herein private respondents covering Lot

No. 3223-A and the other in the name of the petitioners covering the
remainder of the lot.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111141 March 6, 1998

MARIO
Z.
TITONG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO
LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO,respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with
an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and
declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate
occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their hired laborers,
forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately two
(2) hectares; and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership.
Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed
property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had
purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, 2 Pablo Espinosa on August
10, 1981.
In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner 3,
asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years
until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to private respondent Victorico
Laurio. 4 This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had worked on the
land even before its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the
land sold to Espinosa and what of petitioner's property was the old Bugsayon
river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he
instructed Lerit to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of
water to the lowland at the southern of petitioner' s property, thus converting
the old river into a riceland. 5
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts:
He denied petitioner's claim of ownership, recounting that the area and
boundaries of the disputed land remained unaltered during the series of
conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. According to him, petitioner
first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
2916, 6 which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was
bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by property under
the ownership of Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by Potenciano
Zaragoza; and on the West by property owned by Agapito de la
Cruz. 7Private Respondent then alleges that, on December 21, 1960,
petitioner sold this property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after
which Tax Declaration No. 5339 8 was issued in her favor. In compliance with
their mutual agreement to repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the

property by way of sale 9 on August 24, 1962 and then declared it for
taxation purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5720. 10 However,
the property remained in petitioner's hands for only four (4) days because, on
August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa 11 who then declared it in his name
under Tax Declaration No. 12311. 12 Consequently, the property became a
part of the estate of Pablo Espinosa's wife, the late Segundina Liao
Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs executed an instrument
denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale"
whereby the 5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold
to private respondent 13 in consideration of the amount of P5,000.00.
Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private
respondent. In all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the
property remained exactly the same as those appearing in Tax Declaration
No. 2916 under petitioner's name.
It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were
made of the disputed property. The first survey 14 was made for petitioner,
while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As
anticipated, certain discrepancies between the two surveys surfaced. Thus,
contrary to petitioner's allegation in his complaint that he is the owner of only
3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of
Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining
to Espinosa, was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5
hectares sold by petitioner to him. Apprised of the discrepancy, private
respondent filed a protest 15 before the Bureau of Lands against the first
survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the municipal
trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended of the instant
case. 16
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his
mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate
of the deceased Leonida Zaragoza, 17 the heirs adjudicated unto themselves
the 3.6-hectare property of the deceased. The property involved is described
in the instrument as having been declared under Tax Declaration No.
3301 18 and as bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by
Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon River and on the West by
Benigno Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No. 8723 was
issued to petitioner for his corresponding share in the estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the
extrajudicial settlement 19 petitioner's share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It
therefore appeared to private respondent that petitioner encroached upon his
(Laurio's) property and declared it a part of his inheritance. 20 The
boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the North by
Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by property

owner Espinosa, and on the West by property owner Adolfo

Titong. 21 Private respondent accordingly denied that petitioner had diverted
the course of the Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from
Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug 22 because the land was immediately
sold to Espinosa shortly thereafter. 23
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents,
declaring him as the true and absolute owner of the litigated property and
ordering petitioner to respect private respondents' title and ownership over
the property and to pay attorney's fees, litigation expenses, costs and moral
damages.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On
motion for reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason
that the lower court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for
quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the
circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid
or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title
to real property or any interest therein.
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud,
doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real
property. 24The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title
must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding." Under the maxim expresio mius est exclusio alterius, these
grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these
reasons may not be considered valid for the same action. 25
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have
had no other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint
failed to allege that an "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding" beclouded the plaintiff's title over the property involved.

Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein), together

with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the
southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same.
He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney's fees. He prayed that,
aside from issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private
respondents and their hired laborers from intruding into the land, the court
should declare him "the true and absolute owner" thereof. Hence, through his
allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the
property were private respondents' alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for
an action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.
When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it
would have become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary
dispute. The answer alleged, among other matters, that petitioner, "in bad
faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently had the land in question
included in the survey of his land which extends to the south only as far as
the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural and common boundary
between the properties." 26 Moreover, during the hearing of the case,
petitioner proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence
showing what he considered as the boundary of his property which private
respondents perceived as actually encroaching on their property. In this
regard, the following pronouncements of the Court are apropos:
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid
one for quieting of title, still, the instant petition for review on certiorari must
fail.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed
normally unless the same are palpably unsupported by the evidence on
record or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of
facts. 28 Upon an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident
reason to depart from the general rule.
The courts below correctly held that when petitioner "sold, ceded, transferred
and conveyed" the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of
ownership and possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were
transferred to the latter. In the same manner, Espinosa's rights of ownership
over the land ceased and were transferred to private respondent upon its
sale to the latter. This finds justification in the Civil Code, as follows:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting
parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to

deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a

price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights
in the thing sold. 29 In the case at bar, petitioner's claim of ownership must of
necessary fail because he has long abdicated his rights over the land when
he sold it to private respondent's predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioner's claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through
possession for more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While
Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that "(o)wnership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession of ten years," this provision of law must be read in conjunction
with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ". . . (o)rdinary
acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with
just title for the time fixed by law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is
not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a
period of tea years unless such possession was acquired con justo tilulo y
buena fe (with color of title and good faith). 30 The good faith of the
possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. 31 For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. 32
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just
title. As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's admitted acts of
converting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter
claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of
others and therefore "tantamount to bad faith." 33 To allow petitioner to
benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non
oritur actio (no man can allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing).
Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over
the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that
"(o)wnership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title
or of good faith." Petitioner's alleged possession in 1962 up to September
1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned
twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year
requirement mandated by Art. 1137.

Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan
prepared upon his request, 34 the tax declaration in his name, 35 the
commissioner's report on the relocation survey, 36 and the survey
plan. 37Respondent court correctly held that these documents do not
conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained
and so a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of
land. 38 A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an
instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in which
a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common
estate. 39Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the
survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to
ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession. 40
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands
in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act,
as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private
surveyors send their original field notes, computations, reports, surveys,
maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of Lands for
verification and approval. 41 A survey plan not verified and approved by said
Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and
authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in
evidence without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does
not signify that the courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit
evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each
other. This Court cannot alter the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the
credibility accorded to evidence presented by the parties. 42
Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even
persuasive evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax
declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of
ownership.43 It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. 44 Because it
does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one's
ownership. 45 Moreover, the incompatibility in petitioner's tax declaration and
the commissioner's report as regards the area of his claimed property is
much too glaring to be ignored. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that
petitioner's property has an area of 3.2800 hectares while the totality of his
claim according to the commissioned geodetic engineer's survey amounts to
4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585 square
meters. On the other hand, private respondent's claimed property, as borne
out by Tax Declaration No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate
equivalent of the 5.2433-hectare property as shown by the commissioner's
report.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED

and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This
Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

The Facts

SO ORDERED.

"Spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam were the original

registered owners of a parcel of land with three-door apartment, located at
No. 9, 1st Street BBB, Marulas, Valenzuela City. Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-71316 was issued in the names of spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and
Candelaria Edrosalam.

G.R. No. 156171 April 22, 2005

Spouses
RICARDO
and
FERMA
vs.
ANASTACIA CRISTOBAL, Respondent,

PORTIC, Petitioners,

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An agreement in which ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to
pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price is known as a
contract to sell. The absence of full payment suspends the vendors
obligation to convey title. This principle holds true between the parties, even
if the sale has already been registered. Registration does not vest, but
merely serves as evidence of, title to a particular property. Our land
registration laws do not give title holders any better ownership than what they
actually had prior to registration.

The facts were summarized by the appellate court as follows:

"On October 2, 1968, spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria

Edrosalam sold the subject property in favor of [petitioners] with the condition
that the latter shall assume the mortgage executed over the subject property
by spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam in favor of the
Social Security System.
"[Petitioners] defaulted in the payment of the monthly amortizations due on
the mortgage. The Social Security System foreclosed the mortgage and sold
the subject property at public auction with the Social Security System as the
highest bidder.

The Case

"On May 22, 1984, before the expiration of the redemption period,
[petitioners] sold the subject property in favor of [respondent] in consideration
of P200,025.89. Among others, the parties agreed that [respondent] shall pay
the sum of P45,025.89 as down payment and the balance of P155,000.00
shall be paid on or before May 22, 1985. The parties further agreed that in
case [respondent] should fail to comply with the conditions, the sale shall be
considered void and [petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent] of whatever
amount already paid.

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

challenging the January 29, 2002 Decision 2 and the November 18, 2002
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 66393. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"On the same date, [petitioners] and [respondent] executed a Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage whereby [petitioners] sold the subject property
in favor of [respondent] in consideration of P80,000.00, P45,000.00 thereof
shall be paid to the Social Security System.

"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered ORDERING
defendant-appellant to pay the unpaid balance of P55,000.00 plus legal
interest of 6% per annum counted from the filing of this case. The ownership
of defendant-appellant over the subject property is hereby confirmed.

"On July 30, 1984, spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam,
the original owners of the subject property, sold the subject property in favor
of [respondent] for P50,000.00.

"No pronouncement as to costs."4

"On the same date, [respondent] executed a Deed of Mortgage whereby

[respondent] constituted a mortgage over the subject property to secure
a P150,000.00 indebtedness in favor of [petitioners].

In the challenged Resolution,5 the CA denied petitioners Motion for Partial

Reconsideration.

"[Respondent] paid the indebtedness due over the subject property to the
Social Security System.

"On August 6, 1984, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-71316 in the names of
spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam was cancelled and
in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113299 was issued in the
name of [respondent].
"On May 20, 1996, [petitioners] demanded from [respondent] the alleged
unpaid balance of P55,000.00. [Respondent] refused to pay.
"On June 6, 1996, [petitioners] filed this instant civil case against
[respondent] to remove the cloud created by the issuance of TCT No. T113299 in favor of [respondent]. [Petitioners] claimed that they sold the
subject property to [respondent] on the condition that [respondent] shall pay
the balance on or before May 22, 1985; that in case of failure to pay, the sale
shall be considered void and [petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent] of the
amounts already paid; that [respondent] failed to fully pay the purchase price
within the period; that on account of this failure, the sale of the subject
property by [petitioners] to [respondent] is void; that in spite of this failure,
[respondent] required [petitioners] to sign a lease contract over the apartment
which [petitioners] occupy; that [respondent] should be required to reconvey
back the title to the subject property to [petitioners].
"[Respondent] on her part claimed that her title over the subject property is
already indefeasible; that the true agreement of the parties is that embodied
in the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage; that [respondent]
had fully paid the purchase price; that [respondent] is the true owner of the
subject property; that [petitioners] claim is already barred by laches." 6
After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City rendered this
judgment in favor of petitioners:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates on this
case as follows:

3.) The Court hereby DENIES damages as claimed by both parties." 7

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals opined that the first Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
embodied the real agreement between the parties, and that the subsequent
Deeds were executed merely to secure their respective rights over the
property.8 The
MOA
stated
that
Cristobal
had not fully paid the purchase price. Although this statement might have
given rise to a cause of action to annul the Deed of Sale, prescription already
set in because the case had been filed beyond the ten-year reglementary
period,9 as observed by the CA. Nonetheless, in conformity with the principle
of unjust enrichment, the appellate court ordered respondent to pay
petitioners the remaining balance of the purchase price. 10
In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioners contended that their
action was not one for the enforcement of a written contract, but one for the
quieting of title -- an action that was imprescriptible as long as they remained
in possession of the premises.11 The CA held, however, that the agreement
between the parties was valid, and that respondents title to the property was
amply supported by the evidence.12 Therefore, their action for the quieting of
title would not prosper, because they failed to show the invalidity of the cloud
on their title.
Hence, this Petition.13
The Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our
consideration:
"(1) Whether or not the [petitioners] cause of action is for quieting of title.

1.) The Court hereby orders the quieting of title or removal of cloud over the
[petitioners] parcel of land and three (3) door apartment now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113299 of the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan City and Tax Declaration Nos. C-018-00235 & C-031-012077
respectively, of Valenzuela City;

"(2) Whether or not the [petitioners] cause of action has prescribed." 14

2.) The Court hereby orders the [respondent] to reconvey in favor of the
[petitioners] the parcel of land and three (3) door apartment now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113299 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City after reimbursement by the [petitioners] of the amount actually
paid by the [respondent] in the total amount of P145,025.89;

This Courts Ruling

The main issue revolves around the characterization of the parties

agreement and the viability of petitioners cause of action.

The Petition has merit.

Main Issue:

Nature of the Action: Quieting of Title or

Enforcement of a Written Contract
Petitioners argue that the action they filed in the RTC was for the quieting of
title. Respondents demand that they desist from entering into new lease
agreements with the tenants of the property allegedly attests to the fact of
their possession of the subject premises. 15 Further, they point to the
existence of Civil Case No. 7446, an action for unlawful detainer that
respondent filed against them,16 as further proof of that fact. Being in
continuous possession of the property, they argue that their action for the
quieting of title has not prescribed.17
On the other hand, respondent joins the appellate court in characterizing the
action petitioners filed in the RTC as one for the enforcement of the MOA.
Being based on a written instrument, such action has already prescribed,
respondent claims.18 She adds that petitioners could not have been in
continuous
possession
of
the
subject property because, under a duly notarized lease agreement, they
have been paying her a monthly rental fee of P500, which was later
increased to P800.
Two questions need to be answered to resolve the present case; namely, (1)
whether Cristobals title to the property is valid; and (2) whether the Portics
are in possession of the premises, a fact that would render the action for
quieting of title imprescriptible.
Validity of Title
The CA held that the action for the quieting of title could not prosper, because
Cristobals title to the property was amply supported by evidence.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title
to real property or any interest therein."

Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in

rem.19 Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an
action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant.20 However, unlike
suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the
parties.21
Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an
action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also be
availed of by a person other than the registered owner because, in the Article
reproduced above, "title" does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer
certificate of title.22 Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property
does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title. As will be shown later,
petitioners have not turned over and have thus retained their title to the
property.
On the other hand, the claim of respondent cannot be sustained. The transfer
of ownership of the premises in her favor was subject to the suspensive
condition
stipulated
by
the
parties
in
paragraph 3 of the MOA, which states as follows:
"3. That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the
FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the ownership of the above described
parcel of land together with its improvements but the SECOND PARTY
BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly rentals due on the first
door (13-A) of the said apartment;"23
The above-cited provision characterizes the agreement between the parties
as a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership is retained by the
vendors, the Portics; it will not be passed to the vendee, the Cristobals, until
the full payment of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive
suspensive condition, and failure to comply with it is not a breach of
obligation; it is merely an event that prevents the effectivity of the obligation
of the vendor to convey the title. 24 In short, until the full price is paid, the
vendor retains ownership.
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest
ownership
in
her.
Neither
did
it
validate
the
alleged absolute purchase of the lot. Time and time again, this Court has
stressed that registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of,
title. Our land registration laws do not give the holders any better title than
that which they actually have prior to registration. 25
Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to
acquire a new title. Good faith must concur.26 Clearly, respondent has not yet
fully paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid, she

cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded from asserting ownership
against petitioners. The appellate courts finding that she had a valid title to
the property must, therefore, be set aside.
Continuous Possession
The issue of whether the Portics have been in actual, continuous possession
of the premises is necessarily a question of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule
that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial
evidence, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal.27 This Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the CAs findings
sustaining those of the trial court, which held that petitioners had been in
continuous possession of the premises. For this reason, the action to quiet
title has not prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the RTC of Valenzuela City in Civil Case No. 4935-V-96, dated
September 23, 1999, is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168222

April 18, 2006

SPS. TEODULO RUMARATE, (deceased) and ROSITA RUMARATE;

deceased TEODULO RUMARATE is represented herein by his
Heirs/Substitutes,
namely,
ANASTACIA
RUMARATE,
CELSO
RUMARATE, MARINA RUMARATE, ROMEO RUMARATE, GUILLERMO
RUMARATE, FIDEL RUMARATE, MERLINDA RUMARATE, MARISSA
RUMARATE, CLEMENCIA RUMARATE, SANCHO RUMARATE and
NENITA
RUMARATE, Petitioners,
vs.
HILARIO
HERNANDEZ,
JOAQUIN
HERNANDEZ,
SALVADOR
HERNANDEZ, BENJAMIN HERNANDEZ, LEONORA HERNANDEZ-LAZA,
VICTORIA
HERNANDEZ-MERCURIO,
RODRIGOHERNANDEZ,
BERNARDO HERNANDEZ, LOURDES HERNANDEZ-CABIDA, MARIO
SALVATIERRA, ADELAIDA FONTILA-CIPRIANO, and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the May 26, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57053, which reversed and set aside the
March 31, 1997 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon,
Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964, declaring petitioners as owners of Lot
No. 379 with an area of 187,765 square meters and located in Barrio
Catimo,3 Municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Quezon.
The facts show that on September 1, 1992, petitioner spouses Teodulo
Rumarate (Teodulo) and Rosita Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance of
real property and/or quieting of title with damages against respondent heirs
of the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. 4 Teodulo averred
that Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and cultivated by his godfather,
Santiago Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live with the
Rumarate family in San Pablo City. Between 1923 and 1924, Santiago and
the Rumarate family transferred residence to avail of the land distribution in
Catimo, Guinayangan, Quezon. From 1925 to 1928, Santiago occupied Lot
No. 379 cultivating five hectares thereof. Before moving to Kagakag, Lopez,
Quezon in 1929, Santiago orally bequeathed his rights over Lot No. 379 to
Teodulo and entrusted to him a copy of a Decision of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tayabas dated April 21, 1925 recognizing his (Santiago)
rights over Lot No. 379. 5Since Teodulo was only 14 years old then, his father

helped him cultivate the land. 6 Their family thereafter cleared the land, built a
house7 and planted coconut trees, corn, palay and vegetables thereon. 8 In
1960, Santiago executed an "Affidavit (quit-claim)" 9 ratifying the transfer of
his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo. Between 1960 and 1970, three
conflagrations razed the land reducing the number of coconut trees growing
therein to only 400, but by the time Teodulo testified in 1992, the remaining
portions of the land was almost entirely cultivated and planted with coconuts,
coffee, jackfruits, mangoes and vegetables.10 From 1929, Teodulo and later,
his wife and 11 children possessed the land as owners and declared the
same for taxation, the earliest being in 1961. 11
In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta, respondents predecessors-in-interest, were able to obtain a title over
Lot No. 379. He did not immediately file a case against respondents because
he was advised to just remain on the land and pay the corresponding taxes
thereon.12
Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that on November 11, 1964,
Santiago sold the questioned lot to their parents, the spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, for P9,000.00. 13 Respondents alleged that on
April 21, 1925, the CFI of Tayabas rendered a Decision written in Spanish,
declaring Lot No. 379 as a public land and recognizing Santiago as claimant
thereof in Cadastral Proceeding No. 12. However, no title was issued to
Santiago because he failed to file an Answer. Spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta filed a motion to re-open Cadastral Proceeding No. 12,
alleging that though no title was issued in the name of Santiago, the same
decision is, nevertheless, proof that Santiago was in possession of Lot No.
379 since 1925 or for more than 30 years. Having succeeded in the rights of
Santiago, the spouses prayed that Cadastral Proceeding No. 12 be reopened and that the corresponding title over Lot No. 379 be issued in their
name. On September 13, 1965, the CFI of Tayabas rendered a decision
adjudicating Lot No. 379 in favor of the spouses, in whose name Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1184414 was issued on the same
date.15 Cipriano Hernandez planted coconut trees on the land through the
help of a certain Fredo16 who was instituted as caretaker. In 1970, Fredo
informed Cipriano Hernandez that he will no longer stay on the land because
there are people instructing him to discontinue tilling the same. 17
After the death of the spouses,18 respondents executed a deed of partition
over the subject lot and were issued TCT No. T- 237330 on June 28, 1988 in
lieu of OCT No. O-11844.19

Respondent Joaquin Hernandez (Joaquin) testified that in 1964, he

accompanied his father in inspecting the lot which was then planted with
coconut trees.20 Thereafter, he visited the land twice, once in 1966 and the
other in 1970. From 1966 up to the time he testified, his family declared the
lot for taxation and paid the taxes due thereon. 21 Joaquin explained that after
the death of his father in 1971, he no longer visited the land and it was only
when the complaint was filed against them when he learned that petitioners
are in actual possession of the property.22 He added that his siblings had
planned to convert Lot No. 379 into a grazing land for cattle but decided to
put it off for fear of the rampant operations then of the New Peoples Army
between the years 1965-1970.23 1avvphil.net

5. Ordering the Register of Deeds for Quezon Province in Lucena

City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-237330 and to issue
in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in favor of plaintiff Rosita Victor
Rumarate and the substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the deceased plaintiff
Teodulo Rumarate, in accordance with law and settled jurisprudence;
and
6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.24

2. Declaring that herein defendants [heirs] of spouses Cipriano

Hernandez and Julia Zoleta have no better rights than their
parents/predecessors-in-interest, they having stepped only on (sic)
their shoes;

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 26, 2005,

reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that Teodulo did
not acquire title over Lot No. 379, either by donation or acquisitive
prescription; that Teodulos bare allegation that Santiago orally bequeathed to
him the litigated lot is insufficient to prove such transfer of ownership; and
that even assuming that the property was truly donated by Santiago to
Teodulo in 1929, or in the 1960 Affidavit, said conveyance is void for not
complying with the formalities of a valid donation which require the donation
and the acceptance thereof by the donee to be embodied in a public
instrument. Both requirements, however, are absent in this case because in
1929, the alleged donation was not reduced to writing while the purported
1960 donation was never accepted in a public document by Teodulo. The
appellate court thus surmised that since it was not established that Santiago
donated Lot No. 379 to Teodulo, it follows that the latter also failed to prove
that he possessed the land adversely, exclusively and in the concept of an
owner, a vital requisite before one may acquire title by acquisitive
prescription. In conclusion, the Court of Appeals ruled that even assuming
further that Teodulo had a right over the property, his cause of action is now
barred by laches because he filed an action only in 1992 notwithstanding
knowledge as early as 1970 of the issuance of title in the name of spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. The decretal portion of the decision
states:

3. Declaring that the plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and substitute

plaintiffs-[heirs] of the deceased Teodulo Rumarate are the true, real
and legal owners/or the owners in fee simple absolute of the above
described parcel of land;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The

assailed March 31, 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag,
Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.

4. Ordering the defendants to convey the above-described parcel of

land to plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and to the substitute plaintiffs
(heirs) of the deceased Teodulo Rumarate;

SO ORDERED.25

On March 31, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.
It held that since the latter possessed the land in the concept of an owner
since 1929, they became the owners thereof by acquisitive prescription after
the lapse of 10 years, pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, when
Santiago sold the lot to respondents parents in 1964, the former no longer
had the right over the property and therefore transmitted no title to said
respondents. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, to wit:
1. Declaring that the parcel of land (Lot No. 379 of the Cadastral
Survey of Guinayangan, Cadastral Case No. 12, LRC Cadastral
Record No. 557), situated in Brgy. Katimo, Tagkawayan, Quezon had
been fraudulently, deceitfully and mistakenly registered in the names
of the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta;

Hence, the instant appeal.

The issue to be resolved is to whom should Lot No. 379 be awarded? To

petitioners who possessed and cultivated the lot since 1929 up to the
present, but do not have a certificate of title over the property, or to
respondents who have a certificate of title but are not in possession of the
controverted lot?
In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the parties so that the complainant and those claiming
under him may be forever free from any danger of hostile claim. 26 Under
Article 47627 of the Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which
appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a
cloud is thereby cast on the complainants title to real property or any interest
therein. Article 477 of the same Code states that the plaintiff must have legal
or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter
of the suit.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.28
In Evangelista v. Santiago,29 it was held that title to real property refers to that
upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or
the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a
rule, assert a right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.
In the instant case, we find that Teodulos open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years vested him and his heirs title over the said lot.
The law applicable at the time Teodulo completed his 30-year possession
(from 1929 to 1959) of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner was Sec.
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, effective June 22, 195730 which provides:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands

of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act (now Property
Registration Decree), to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been, in continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant,
without necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and the land ceases to
be part of the public domain. The confirmation proceedings would, in truth be
little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such conversion already effected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete. 31
In the instant case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the
testimony of Teodulo and his witnesses that his (Teodulos) possession of the
land since 1929 was open, continuous, adverse, exclusive, and in the
concept of an owner. It is a settled rule in civil cases as well as in criminal
cases that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial
courts are given great weight and highest degree of respect by the appellate
court considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.32

A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that Teodulo

possessed and occupied Lot No. 379 in the concept of an owner. Since
1929, Teodulo cultivated the controverted land, built his home, and raised his
11 children thereon. In 1957, he filed a homestead application over Lot No.
379 but failed to pursue the same.33 After his demise, all his 11 children, the
youngest being 28 years old,34 continued to till the land. From 1929 to 1960,
Santiago never challenged Teodulos possession of Lot No. 379 nor
demanded or received the produce of said land. For 31 years Santiago never
exercised any act of ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed
that he is no longer interested in asserting any right over the land by
executing in favor of Teodulo a quitclaim.
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated the land as
owner thereof since 1929. While the oral donation in 1929 as well as the
1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to Teodulo are void for non-compliance
with the formalities of donation, they nevertheless explain Teodulo and his
familys long years of occupation and cultivation of said lot and the nature of
their possession thereof.
In Bautista v. Poblete,35 the Court sustained the registration of a parcel of
land in the name of the successors-in-interest of the donee notwithstanding
the invalidity of the donation inasmuch as said donee possessed the property
in the concept of an owner. Thus
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it
involves an immovable property and the donation was not made in a public
document as required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with
Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does
not follow that said donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive
prescription when on the strength thereof the donee has taken possession of
the property adversely and in the concept of owner.
It follows therefore that Teodulos open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 for 30 years, or from 1929 to 1959
in the concept of an owner, earned him title over the lot in accordance with
Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Considering that Lot No. 379 became the
private property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had no more right to sell the
same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta in 1964.
Consequently, the latter and herein respondents did not acquire ownership
over Lot No. 379 and the titles issued in their name are void.

Interestingly, respondents adopted the theory that Santiago acquired title

over Lot No. 379 not from the April 21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas
which merely recognized his rights over said lot, but from his more than 30
years of possession since 1925 up to 1964 when he sold same lot to their
(respondents) predecessors-in-interest, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta. On the basis of said claim, said spouses filed an action for,
and successfully obtained, confirmation of imperfect title over Lot No. 379,
pursuant to Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
However, the records do not support the argument of respondents that
Santiagos alleged possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 is in the nature
contemplated by the Public Land Act which requires more than constructive
possession and casual cultivation. As explained by the Court in Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court:36
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation."
Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention
of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the wordoccupation, it seeks to delimit the allencompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the
words open,
continuous,
exclusive and notorious,
the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under
paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not
be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel,
in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:
"x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in
Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also Rosales vs.
Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should be observed that the
application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject
to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among
these qualifications is one particularly relating to the size of the tract in
controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the
claimant. While, therefore, possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession, possession under paragraph 6 of
section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act
No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign
or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over
an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership,
while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction x x x."

Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court noted:

"x x x The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and
visiting it every once in a while, as was done by him, does not constitute acts
of possession."
In the instant case, Santiagos short-lived possession and cultivation of Lot
No. 379 could not vest him title. While he tilled the land in 1925, he ceased to
possess and cultivate the same since 1928. He abandoned the property and
allowed Teodulo to exercise all acts of ownership. His brief possession of Lot
No. 379 could not thus vest him title. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium
transferre quam ipse habet. No one can transfer a greater right to another
than he himself has. Hence, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta
and herein respondents did not acquire any right over the questioned lot and
the title issued in their names are void, because of the legal truism that the
spring cannot rise higher than the source.37
Furthermore, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta cannot be
considered as purchasers in good faith because they had knowledge of facts
and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry.38 The Court notes that Santiago was not residing in Lot No. 379
at the time of the sale. He was already 81 years old, too old to cultivate and
maintain an 18-hectare land. These circumstances should have prompted
the spouses to further inquire who was actually tilling the land. Had they
done so, they would have found that Teodulo and his family are the ones
possessing and cultivating the land as owners thereof.
In the same vein, respondents could not be considered as third persons or
purchasers in good faith and for value or those who buy the property and pay
a full and fair price for the same 39 because they merely inherited Lot No.
379 from spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.
Then too, even if Santiago acquired title over Lot No. 379 by virtue of the
April 21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas, and not on account of his
alleged 30-year possession thereof, we will still arrive at the same
conclusion. This is so because the declaration of this Court that petitioners
are the rightful owners of the controverted lot is based on Teodulos own
possession and occupation of said lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, regardless of the manner by which Santiago acquired
ownership over same lot.

On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for quieting of
title is imprescriptible, as in the instant case, where the person seeking relief
is in possession of the disputed property. A person in actual possession of a
piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and
that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid
of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and its effect on his title. 40 Considering that petitioners
herein continuously possessed Lot No. 379 since 1929 up to the present,
their right to institute a suit to clear the cloud over their title cannot be barred
by the statute of limitations.
Neither could petitioners action be barred by laches because they
continuously enjoyed the possession of the land and harvested the fruits
thereof up to the present to the exclusion of and without any interference
from respondents. They cannot therefore be said to have slept on their rights
as they in fact exercised the same by continuously possessing Lot No. 379.
On the contrary, we find that it is respondents who are actually guilty of
laches. Though not specifically pleaded, the Court can properly address the
issue of laches based on petitioners allegation in the complaint that "[n]either
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta x x x nor [herein respondents]
had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to said parcel of land from
the date of their registration of title in November, 1965 up to the
present."41 Such averment is sufficient to impute abandonment of right on the
part of respondents. At any rate, laches need not be specifically pleaded. On
its own initiative, a court may consider it in determining the rights of the
parties.42
The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier constitutes
laches. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned it or declined to assert it. While it is by express provision of law
that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an
enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from recovering
possession of property by virtue of laches.43
In applying the doctrine of laches, we have ruled that where a party allows
the following number of years to lapse from the emergence of his cause of
action without enforcing his claim, laches sets in: 36 years; 12 years; 50

years; 34 years; 37 years; 32 years; 20 years; 47 years; 11 years; 25 years;

40 years; 19 years; 27 years; 7 years; 44 years; 4 years; and 67 years. 44
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct of a party on the basis of which the
other party seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting ones rights, despite
having had knowledge or notice of the other partys conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on
the part of a party that the person against whom laches is imputed would
assert the right; and (4) injury or prejudice to the party asserting laches in the
event the suit is allowed to prosper.45
All these elements are present in this case. Petitioners continuous
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 should have prompted the
respondents to file an action against petitioners, but they chose not to.
Respondents cannot deny knowledge of said possession by petitioners as
they even asserted in their Answer that in 1970, Teodulo ousted the tenant
they (respondents) instituted in the lot. From 1970 up to the filing of
petitioners complaint in 1992, or after 22 years, respondents never bothered
to assert any right over Lot No. 379. Respondent Joaquin Hernandez
testified that he and his siblings had a plan to convert the land into a grazing
land for cattle but decided to put it off for fear of the rampant operations of
the New Peoples Army between the years 1965-1970. However, even after
said years, respondents took no step to implement their plan. Worse, among
the siblings of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta who are all
living in the Philippines,46 only Joaquin Hernandez visited the land and only
thrice, i.e., once in each years of 1964, 1966 and 1970. Thereafter, not one
of them paid visit to Lot No. 379, up to the time Joaquin Hernandez testified
in 1996,47 despite the fact that two of them are living only in Calauag,
Quezon; one in Agdangan, Quezon;48 and two in Lucena City.49 Neither did
they send a notice or correspondence to petitioners invoking their right over
the property. From all indications, the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta as well respondents, have neglected Lot No. 379. Were it not for
this action instituted by petitioners in 1992, their conflicting claims over the
property could not have been settled. It goes without saying that to lose a
property that has been in the family from 1929 up to the present, or for 77
years will certainly cause irreparable pecuniary and moral injury to
petitioners, especially so if the same ancestral land will be lost under most
unfair circumstances in favor of respondents who appear to have no real
interest in cultivating the same.

Finally, payment of taxes alone will not save the day for respondents. Only a
positive and categorical assertion of their supposed rights against petitioners
would rule out the application of laches. It means taking the offensive by
instituting legal means to wrest possession of the property which, however, is
absent in this case. Respondents payment of taxes alone, without
possession could hardly be construed as an exercise of ownership. What
stands out is their overwhelming passivity by allowing petitioners to exercise
acts of ownership and to enjoy the fruits of the litigated lot for 22 years
without any interference.
In sum, the Court finds that Lot No. 379 should be adjudicated in favor of
petitioners.
One last point. Notwithstanding this Courts declaration that Lot No. 379
should be awarded in favor of petitioners, their title over the same is
imperfect and is still subject to the filing of the proper application for
confirmation of title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, where the
State and other oppositors may be given the chance to be heard. It was
therefore premature for the trial court to direct the Register of Deeds of
Lucena City to issue a certificate of title in the name of petitioners.
Nevertheless, the imperfect title of petitioners over Lot No. 379 is enough to
defeat the certificate of title issued to respondents. 50
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the May 26, 2005 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in C.A. GR. CV No. 57053, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The March 31, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag,
Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964, awarding Lot No. 379 in favor
petitioners and ordering the cancellation of respondents Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T- 237330, is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATIONdeleting the
trial courts order directing the Register of Deed of Lucena City to issue a
certificate of title in the name of petitioners.
SO ORDERED.