Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7

Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:
On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It
was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable means for securing
the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died while in transit.
This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed
because neither was it said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under Philippine
laws, like the ships involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus,
the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of
the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when
the ship settled from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas,
In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts:
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the
American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had
invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated
all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from
the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for
the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if
they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all
other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory
has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to
presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not
be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments.

In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him.
The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED
MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as
the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the
same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction
upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of
nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself
against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of
paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Mabanag vs. Vito

[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed separate opinion
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress
following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower
House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had
been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a
consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned within the computation
of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for
prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives,
and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of
the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the
restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the
judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification
of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme
intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of
(only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to
amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution
itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be
needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of a ratification.

MUTUC VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He alleged that respondent Commission on Elections
gave his certificate of candidacy due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound system and loud speakers.
According to him, this violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech. Petitioner filed a case against Commission on elections seeking a writ of prohibition
and at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. The respondent argued that this authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act.
Issues:
Was the prohibition imposed by respondent a violation of the right to freedom of speech of the petitioner?
Ruling:
Supreme Court ruled that there was absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such ban in the light of the doctine of ejusdem
generis. The respondent commission failed to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. The Constitution prohibits abridgement of free speech or a free press.
According to the Supreme Court, this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information
to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What the respondent Commission did was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against
which this constitutional right is directed.
The respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order
banning the use of political taped jingles.

Planas vs. Commission on Elections

[GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]; also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs. Comelec [GR L-35940], Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941], Ordonez vs.
National Treasurer of the Philippines [GR L-35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs. Comelec [GR L-35953], Jimenez vs. Comelec [GR L-35961],
Gonzales vs. Comelec [GR L-35965], and Hidalgo vs. Comelec [GR L-35979]
Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs as recapitulated, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate opinions
Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which was amended by Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved on 24 August
1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on 10 November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention
began to perform its functions on 1 June 971. While the Convention was in session on 21 September 1972, the President issued Proclamation 1081 placing the
entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, 30
November 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after, or on 7 December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-35925,
against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law
because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered
by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress," and "there is no proper submission to
the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform
the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical actions were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the
postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until 7 January 1973, when
General Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on 15 January 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order 20,
moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of 17 December 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081 for purposes of free and open
debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the events relative to the postponement of the plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from
deciding the cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was,
pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on 22 January 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree 73 was that the
President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of
the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on
Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed an
"urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged in said motion, "that the President
subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions; and that
thereafter it was later announced that 'the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose [1] The New Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law; [3] The

holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the original date of
January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial
Law.
Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73.
Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the
authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than
that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving
said issue.
Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the Convention.
Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time
being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held
at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify.
Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution.
Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not been
explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners in
L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion
of January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a
transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering the
surrounding circumstances, that instead of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which to
move in the premises.
Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this: (1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the
legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and Concepcion, or 6 Members
of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said
Decree. (3) On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the
petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. (4) Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971
Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar
and Antonio hold the same view. (5) On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a
plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated
under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo,
Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily
preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. (6) On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed:
[a] Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are of the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not
been properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b] Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution based on the
referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate
drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should he recognized as
legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935
Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d] Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the
Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a
question of fact." (7) On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in
the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No.
L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the
legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he
believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are dismissed,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary 50 SCRA 30

Ponente:
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
The Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
A Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines was approved on August 24, 1970 and began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
On September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day,President Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 73, submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor, as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on
January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said
respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court, upon the grounds, inter alia, that said
Presidential Decree has no force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the
ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in
Congress and there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and
assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution and temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.
The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite
would be held were known or announced officially.
In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.
L-35948 filed an urgent motion, praying that said case be decided as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.
The Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said urgent motion and manifestation, not later than Tuesday
noon, January 16, 1973 and set the motion for hearing on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.
While the case was being heard, the President issued Proclamation No. 1102.
ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities. The said Citizens Assemblies were established to broaden
the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national
issues.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142, as a Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for
himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to
restrain said respondents and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present
Constitution referring to that of 1935. Javellana alleged that the President ordered the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet,
and that the latter are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution. He construed that the President is without
authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; to approve the proposed Constitution; proclaim the ratification; and that the election held to ratify the
proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.
The Issue:
1
Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question?
2
Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to
the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
3
Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? (acquiesced permission given by
silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)
4
Are petitioners entitled to relief?
5
Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

Decision and Ratio:

The court was severely divided on the issues raised in the petition but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the
court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and
Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.
1
The Court held that the issue is political and beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.
2
Court held that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated
in only by qualified and duly registered voters. However, it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that

independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by
the Court.
3

On the fourth question, 6 justices voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that The
effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which
considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable.

On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of
the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that As to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the
light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens Assemblies, especially in the manner the votes therein
were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof.
However, the fact that there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual
form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of
them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in
effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections

[GR L-44640, 12 October 1976]; also Guzman vs. Comelec [GR L-44684], and Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-44714]
En Banc, Martin (J): 1 concurs in result, 4 concur in separate opinions, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 2 filed separate opinions
Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the
Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September
1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of
Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date
of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on
16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and
control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced
L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16
October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30
September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on
the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5
October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees
relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.
Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an
election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National
Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National

Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the
nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members
of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all
the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly
upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and
order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the
incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the
interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies
("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed
question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January,
1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution,
that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed
upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in
Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue
of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an
organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any
proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has
nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Occena vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404]
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes
further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion
that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and
filed, respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,
dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This
being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful
purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution
came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is
not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973
Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a
negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the
law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be
stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since
then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year
alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

In RE Bermudez
[GR 76180, 24 October 1986]
Resolution En banc, Per curiam: 7 concur
Facts: In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, Saturnino V. Bermudez, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the
proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides that "the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the 7 February 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of 30 June 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May 1992." Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare
and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel
and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 5 (not 7) of Article XVIII of the
Transitory Provision of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to.
Issue: Whether Aquino and Laurel are the legitimate President and Vice President of the Philippines.
Held: The petition states no cause of action. Bermudez's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public
record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H.
Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of 30 June 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second
paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under
said 1986 Constitution. Mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and
legitimate President and Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Further, the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to
uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives
(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)
En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote concurring and dissenting separate opinions to which 2
concur.
Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings,
superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first
complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3
of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House
of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.
Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The
"moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of
the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in
our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for
in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the

power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for
several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the abovementioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists
no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily,
the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 148334, 21 January 2004]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion to which 3 join
Facts: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution
84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6year term each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution 84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the
election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected
Senators. Resolution 01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the
unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President. Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan)
ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution 01-005. On 20 June 2001, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the petition for
prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Tolentino and Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator
receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, Tolentino and Mojica prayed for the
nullification of Resolution 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Tolentino and Mojica contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without
jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require
senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under
Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial
elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the
votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously
but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of
their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's
standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained
personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.
Issue: Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing to litigate.
Held: Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of
the challenged governmental act. The requirement of standing, which necessarily sharpens the presentation of issues, relates to the constitutional mandate that this
Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the present petition. In questioning, in their capacity as
voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, Tolentino and Mojica assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized grievance is
shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election. Neither have Tolentino and Mojica alleged, in their
capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted
and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that
public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose. On the other hand, the Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give
due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. The Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal
standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure. The Court accords the same treatment to Tolentino and Mojica in the present case in their capacity as voters since they raise
important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in the petition is likely to arise again.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap
elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to
continue holding office after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of
the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for
such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held
and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign,
vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or
petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long
as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on
February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question
(from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which
can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election.
The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect
a new president.

De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the
other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents
be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years
which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also
their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace
them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners
continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired;
and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have
been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on
Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay
Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to
the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x
x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections
1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through
a peoples initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the people
before they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a draft shown to them. The framers also
envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent
or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the
burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The
Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct
and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of
Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735
does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.