SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and
REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, whats in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any other name would smell as sweet?
This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which challenges, on pure questions of law, the
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, datedSeptember 13, 1994[1] in JDRC Case No. 2964. Said court
is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the
prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y
Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and
Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition [2] to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the
jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be
adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor
was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor
adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and
by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private
respondents residence.[3]
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995,[4]petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of
the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions
should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of herein
private respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance
with respect to his natural parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known as Aaron Joseph Munson y
Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of the petition on March
10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of the Rules
of Court, and shall be annotated in the record of birth of the adopted child, which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, where the child was born. Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t) herewith. [5]
At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by petitioner regarding the fitness of herein
private respondents to be adopting parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor. The
records show that the latter have commendably established their qualifications under the law to be adopters, [6] and
have amply complied with the procedural requirements for the petition for adoption, [7] with the findings of the trial
court being recited thus:
To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for
hearing (Exh. A) was published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of
general circulation (Exhs. B to E and submarkings). x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory record (Exhs. K to V); and are physically
fit to be the adoptive parents of the minor child Kevin (Exh. W). Their qualification to become the adoptive parents of
Kevin Earl finds support also in the Social Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through Social Worker Luz Angela
Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly individuals. They are found physically healthy,
mentally fit, spiritually and financially capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran a.k.a Aaron Joseph.
Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly share their time, love and attention to him.
They are ready and willing to continuously provide him a happy and secure home life.
Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his
new environment. His stay with the Munsons during the six months trial custody period has resulted to a close bond
with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs.
Van Munson be legalized.[8]
It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court, when sufficiently buttressed by
legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court. [9] Accordingly,
we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the court below granting the petition for adoption.
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly as follows: (1) whether or not the
court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee
embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he additionally granted the
prayer for the change of the given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings
which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by
distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to
change the given or proper name of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted separately,
and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with. [10]
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on adoption have been
observed, but not those for a petition for change of name. [11] Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the
change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural
consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and
since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should
accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. [12]
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of
suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related
causes of action in a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction
of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met. [13]
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of name in view of the natural
interest of the State in maintaining a system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of justice.
[14]
Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and
interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant proceeding. [15]

On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly,
it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and meticulous observation of the
requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that
neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the petition for change of name under said
rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil
rights nor engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any
immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It stands to reason that there is no way that the
state or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earls first name. In fact, to obviate any
possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with
the petition for adoption.[16]
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to
use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters,
except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted
shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adopteessurname to follow that of the adopter which is the
natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court,
in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it
was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter
a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely
upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an
adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this
case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to
vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, [17] and shall continue to be so used until the court
orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial
change in ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory
procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping
with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such
change)[18]
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein, If a
change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the
person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be
changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name
is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the
Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only

upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the
change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish
a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the
civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is
indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. [19] It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its
role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks the change
of name of the adoptee,[20] all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition
sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be
procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under
the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on the
pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al.[21] and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al.[22] is misplaced.
A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefore, appear to be called
for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. [23] It is the
union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same
complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. [24]
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several
distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in
the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting
and might under applicable joinder rules be joined. [25] Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to
avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without
prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed. [26]
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present
Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not
violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and
character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject
matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and
litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum
cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights
of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related
controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as
practicable,[27] with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice. [28]
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which
could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a
standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit
joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. [29] While the rule
allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the
problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon
regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. [30]

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties [31] and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented. effectively
disallows unlimited joinder.[32]
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a
petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions,
nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which
conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual
unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and
purpose, are different from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These
two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed
adopters fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99
Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is
looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name
(Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for neither action is
dependent on the other.[33]
The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed only if the actions show a
commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2,
Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for
adoption and an action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other and do not arise out
of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed adopters
fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and
compelling grounds supporting the change requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of
reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that
the proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a common
ground, thus the joinder would be improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in one petition, private respondents rely
upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment).
We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the fact of intimacy and relatedness of the
issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an absentee is obviously intertwined with
the action to transfer the management of conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship was
deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to recover the land subject of partition and distribution
proceeding. However, the commonality of relationship which stands out in both cases does not characterize the
present action for adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme
Court did not indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for further proceedings, granting leave to
amend the pleadings and implead additional parties-defendants for a complete determination of the controversy
(Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the more emphasizes that although joinders are generally
accepted, they are not allowed where the conditions are not satisfactorily met. [34]
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete determination of
all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one petition. As
already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect to the prayer for
change of name of the adoptee.The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive

joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent
issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to
suits or actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken
up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al. ,[35] the Court clarified the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action:
The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is no positive provision of law or any
rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to join all his causes of action and bring them at one and the same
time. Under the present rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite several causes of
action although they may be included in one of the classes specified.This, therefore, leaves it to the plaintiffs option
whether the causes of action shall be joined in the same action, and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his
failure or refusal to do so. He may always file another action based on the remaining cause or causes of action within
the prescriptive period therefor. (Italics supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal
construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and adopted
by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some
excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times encounter in
procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely
designed to ensure its proper dispensation. [36] It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of
Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business.[37]
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience
of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly
and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but,
indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the
prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. [38]
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly
administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness,
caprice, or whimsicality.[39] We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al. that:[40]
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights
in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law and adjective law are
contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is
much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each
other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is
equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or
a rule of court.
xxx xxx xxx
x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed. x x x. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the
Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the
issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes

substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the court. In such situations, the courts are
empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules. [41]
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by following the
reglementary procedure for the change in the proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard
put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit. Nor is the
said change of such urgency that would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that
stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering its natural interest in the
methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance, of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply with the
procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to
the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the
action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy.
[42]
They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by agreements between
or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience. [43]
In Garcia vs. Republic,[44] we are reminded of the definiteness in the application of the Rules and the importance of
seeking relief under the appropriate proceeding:
x x x The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or misapply one procedure for another lest
we create confusion in the application of the proper remedy.
Respondent judges unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving stability of procedure is to be
deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being unsupported by
both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted manner in which he adjudicated this case may be
characterized as a regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for change of name without citing or
proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the adoptees
baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known since he came to live with private
respondents.[45]
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the grant of adoption, the subject
minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name
given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name as prayed for in the petition, so they
claim, merely confirms the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives. This
largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth,
and that they, as adoptive parents, have as much right as the natural parents to freely select the first name of their
adopted child.[46]
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on this point in this manner:
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child as it is only the
surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification purposes in a
birth certificate by a woman who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by
petitioners upon the grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth. [47]
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of respondent judge and must thus
set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is a word or combination of words by which he is
known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in

speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a
name. The name of an individual has two parts:
The given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected
by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. [48]
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the civil register. The official name of a person
is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. [49] And once the name of a person is
officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no
person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest
of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. [50]
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change
of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. [51] For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376
of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official
name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in
rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity. [52]
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to
the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and
to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is,
his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show
proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change. [53]
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of name:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when
the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. [54]
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name, under
which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned.[55] For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name. [56] Neither does the fact that
the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to
legally authorize a change of name. [57] A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is
known in the community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be
recognized as his real name.[58]
The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings of long accepted wisdom and
applicability. The only grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been
baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that it was the name by which
he had been called and known by his family, relatives and friends from the time he came to live with private
respondents.[59] Apart from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the
justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or established by private respondents. The legal bases chosen
by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the
adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be to
countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon. [60]
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed order that
(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child as it is only
the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law x x x.

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification purposes in a
birth certificate by a woman who had all the intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph
by petitioners upon grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra, painfully
misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at bar. In the Wong case, therein
petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption
granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching the age of majority, he filed a
petition in court to change his surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption. He adduced
proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him embarrassment and isolation from friends and relatives in view of
a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, thereby
hampering his business and social life, and that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name
sought. This Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere incident in, rather than the
object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given name, and the legal consequences
thereof in view of the adoption were at issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose
with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the imperative necessity of seeking relief
under and through the legally prescribed procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:
Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being named for the first time by his
natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by his natural parent, and such
name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case, there is no
dispute that natural parents have the right to freely select and give the childs first name for every person, including
juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, 1987
edition, page 721). In the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private respondents, in their capacities as
adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor adoptee after such right to name the child had already been
exercised by the natural parent. Adopting parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right asserted
by private respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a
privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds. [61]
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent
purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that
the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, [62] should be understood in its
proper context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of
law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the child
presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered,
regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes
the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when, for
the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the
so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for
the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably
considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the
adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without prejudice to, private
respondents privilege to legally change the proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is
exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict
compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally
adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a
change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-16761. October 31, 1964.]
JOHN M. MILLER and EMILIO ESPINOSA, JR., applicants-appellees, v. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL.,
oppositors; ANSELMO IRENEA, ARTURO DE LA CRUZ, DOMINADOR MANGCAO, LUCAS FRANCISCO,
CIPRIANO SEQUILLO, PEDRO TAGALOG, PONCIANO GARCIA, RODOLFO DE DIOS, ET AL., private oppositorsappellants.
A.P. Mayor & C.P. Mayor for private oppositors-appellants.
E. Espinosa, Jr. & J. Ma. Francisco for applicants-appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; REQUIREMENT OF VERIFYING OPPOSITION; WAIVED BY APPLICANTS PROCEEDING WITH TRIAL
WITHOUT OBJECTION. Where the applicants for registration of land proceeded with the trial, presented evidence and
rested their case, without objecting to the unverified oppositions, and only after the first witness of the private
oppositors had testified and applicants counsel had cross- examined him, was lack of verification brought up, it is held
that the applicants had failed to invoke the requirement of verification under Sec. 34 of Art 496 seasonably, and that
by that time the applicants had waived the said defect.
2. ID.; ID.; UNVERIFIED OPPOSITIONS SUFFICIENT TO CONFER STANDING IN COURT. Unverified oppositions in land
registration proceedings are sufficient to confer standing in court to oppositors, who may be allowed to verify their
oppositions, especially where said defect is deemed waived by the applicants failure to invoke said requirement
seasonably.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate which after survey, appeared to contain 411 hectares as per plan PSU143798 was applied for registration in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18, 1956 by John M. Miller and
Emilio Espinosa, Jr.
After notice and publication, initial hearing was held on June 20, 1957. The Director of Lands and Bureau of Public
Highways filed written oppositions. Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed verbal oppositions. All persons,
except the abovementioned oppositors, were declared in default on July 8, 1957.
On July 24, 1958 applicants started presenting evidence and the private oppositors were given five days to file written
opposition (Tsn., p. 5). Of the 35 oppositors 28 filed written but unverified opposition on July 29, 1958. On August 20,
1958 applicants finished adducing evidence and rested their case.
On August 27, 1958 the private oppositors presented their first witness. After his cross-examination, counsel for

applicants called the courts attention to the lack of verification in the opposition filed by the private oppositors and
moved to dismiss the same.
The private oppositors offered to verify their opposition. After parties had filed memoranda, the court issued an order
on January 13, 1959 dismissing the unverified opposition, without pronouncement as to costs (Rec. on App., p. 26).
Motion for reconsideration was denied by order dated November 18, 1959. The private oppositors have appealed from
both orders.
The requirement of verifying oppositions in land registration proceedings is based on Sec. 34 of Act 496
"Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the
return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the
application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and
shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf."cralaw virtua1aw library
Applicants failed to invoke this provision seasonably. Without objecting to the unverified opposition, they proceeded
with the trial, presented evidence and rested their case. Only after the first witness of the private oppositors had
testified and applicants counsel had cross-examined him, was the defect of lack of verification brought up. By that
time, applicants had waived the defect
"An objection to A want of verification must be seasonably made. . . . The objection must be taken before trial . . . The
question cannot properly be raised by an objection to the introduction of evidence.
x

"Lack of, or defect in the verification of a pleading may be waived by the adverse partys failure to make a proper and
timely objection thereto . . . Where a party proceeds with the case as though his adversarys pleading were verified, he
waives the lack of verification of such pleading.
x

"The act of . . . proceeding to trial on the merits without objection, is generally a waiver of all uncertainties,
ambiguities, irregularities, formal defects, or faults or defects of any kind in the pleadings of the adverse party.
x

"By . . . going to trial without objection, . . . a party may waive the right to urge that his adversarys pleading is not
subscribed or verified . . ." (46 G. J. S. 1120, 1129, 1133, 1137.)
Applicants contend that the defect could not be waived because it resulted in the private oppositors lack of standing
in the case from the start.
This Court has already held unverified oppositions sufficient to confer standing in court to oppositors. In Malagum v.
Pablo, 46 Phil. 19, a written opposition not made under oath was dismissed by the lower court. When oppositors
sought from this Court mandamus to have their opposition reinstated, this Court denied the same for the reason that
petitioners "had appeared in the case, had therefore standing in court, and the order excluding their answer was in
effect a final determination of their rights" so that appeal and not mandamus was their proper remedy.
In Nicolas v. Director of Lands and Camungao, L-19147-8, December 28, 1963, the lower court dismissed a petition for
review of its judgment adjudicating the land to an applicant, filed by an oppositor who was not notified of the hearing,
for the reason that
"In the first place, the opposition filed by him was not a valid opposition because it was not sworn to as required by the
Land Registration Act. It was simply a written appearance. In other words, he failed to file his answer in due
form."cralaw virtua1aw library
On appeal this Court held
"The written appearance with opposition presented by petitioner herein, on November 7, 1951 (R.A.) was a valid one,
and sufficient to give him legal standing in court and would entitle him to notice, as a matter of right. The lower court
erred in choosing to ignore the written appearance with opposition, which was a substantial compliance with the law,
that requires a formal answer."cralaw virtua1aw library
For purposes of record, the private oppositors should be allowed, as they had requested, to verify their opposition
because, in any event, the supposed defect is deemed waived.

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside and the case is remanded to the court a quo for further
proceeding, without cots. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.

FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154953
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., Promulgated:
Respondent. June 26, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in totothe 16 December 1999 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of
Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-635.

The Antecedent Facts

This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424,
Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.

On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of
Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to
6794,[4] and in the 18 October 1999 issue of Peoples Journal Taliba, [5] a newspaper of general circulation in
thePhilippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the
Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land. [6] All adjoining owners and all
government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing. [7]

On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the
Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of thePhilippines represented by the Director of Lands
(petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order [8] of General Default against the whole world except
as against petitioner.

During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court
gave Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his written opposition. [9] Carandang failed to file his
written opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order[10] dated 13 December 1999, the trial court
reinstated the Order of General Default.

During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony
Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondents Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo
Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado
Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.

The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse,
open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy
was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation
covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave
Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the
land was adjudicated to one of Antonios children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). [11] On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the
land to respondent.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.

The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity
and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts

showed that respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June
1945, which possession converted the land to private property.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby
adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan
Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of
Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,
a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal office at
19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting the
application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied
with the period of possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista
and Torres are general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should
have been presented to corroborate Evangelistas testimony.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts Decision.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of the possession and occupation of the land stemmed not
only from the fact that he worked there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically
neighbors. On Evangelistas failure to mention the name of his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of
Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The
Court of Appeals also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunatos relation to Kabesang
Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelistas statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of the
land after Kabesang Puroys death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and
disposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small community. On the matter of
additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the
sole witness testimony.

The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only testifying on the fact that he
had caused the filing of the application for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.

Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its
Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation
despite the following:

1.

2.

Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive,

and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or
earlier; and
Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land. [13]

The Issues

The issues may be summarized as follows:

1.
2.
3.

Whether the land is alienable and disposable;

Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and
Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable

Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the
public domain.

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the
State.[14] The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. [15]

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The 3

June

1997 Certification

(CENRO), Batangas City,

[16]

by

the

Community

Environment

and

Natural

Resources

Offices

certified that lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome,

Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under
Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925. The second certification[17] in the
form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management
Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project
No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified onDec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582.

The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, [18] dated 30 May 1988, delineated the
functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR.Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues

certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,
[19]

dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988.DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the

CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the
PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. [20] In this case, respondent
applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square
meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO
No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land
classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;
Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and
Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.

Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;
Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;
Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public
infrastructure projects; and
Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure
projects.

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial
court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for
land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government
officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial
court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that
the land is alienable and disposable.

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached
an official publication[21] of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer, such as entries made by the Civil Registrar [22] in the books of
registries, or by a ship captain in the ships logbook. [23] The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even
records of public documents.[24] The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no
probative value.[25] Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their
mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. [26] Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute
proof of the facts stated therein.[27] Here, Torres, a private individual and respondents representative, identified the
certifications but the government officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the
certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value. [28] The contents of the certifications are
hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications. [29] Torres did not
prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey
whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.

Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR
Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification
Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it
became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that the blue print plan merely serves to
prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way
certify the nature and classification of the land involved. [30] It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer
on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient
proof of the lands classification. [31] However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would explain the
discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to
the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan,
and the Geodetic Engineers certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did
not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of
classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications submitted by respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner

Petitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner
alleges that Evangelistas statement that the possession of respondents predecessors-in-interest was open, public,
continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of
possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the
land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.

We agree with petitioner.

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked
on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroys land. The Court of
Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of Kabesang Puroys possession of the land stemmed
not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically neighbors. [32] The Court of
Appeals observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to
understand that people in the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of such
familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a
vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of public knowledge
to them.[33]

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the
exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small
community. He did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelistas testimony is
contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by
Fortunato who was one of Antonios children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelistas testimony.

The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs
corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that
respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of
respondents acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their
possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.

The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. [34] Respondent did not present any credible
explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were
allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the
presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain
in this case.

We agree with petitioner.

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to
the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.Citizens of the Philippines may
lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by
purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[35] the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public
domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural
land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no
longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the

prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. [36] The Court
explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only
through lease. x x x x
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited
the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could
have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987
Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of
a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is
registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in
the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing breakup of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from
acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the
constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public
domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own
as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a
corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient
vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a
limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is
safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable
public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way
to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public
domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional
ban.[37]

In Director of Lands v. IAC,[38] the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired
from members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme
when the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations
or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The
Court ruled that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962 , and thus
Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural
lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares. [39]

In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the
period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property. The
Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) x x x shall be conclusively

presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title x x x. No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete.
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public
Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of
this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by
Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against
said corporations holding or owning private land. x x x.[40] (Emphasis supplied)

Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the land x x x was already private
property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme. In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997
from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired
the land from Porting, the land was not yet private property.

For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the
corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of
title to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at
least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,[41] the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question had
already been converted to private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-ininterest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of
the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution
against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through lease (Article XIV,
Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the
public domain but private property.

What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration
to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the
statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the
corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual
can avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from
acquiring lands of the public domain.

Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine in Director of
Lands. Republic Act No. 9176[42] (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land Act[43] and extended the period for the

filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend
beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this
period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,
further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section
Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but
this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this
Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as
having been filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and
disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for
registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the
excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private
corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes,
of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become
private land by operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was
already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and
the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case
No. T-635. We DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203384, January 14, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SPS. JOSE CASTUERA AND PERLA CASTUERA,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 26 March
2012 Decision2 and 14 August 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85015, affirming the 31
January 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, Iba, Zambales, in Land Registration Case No. RTCN-92-I and denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The Facts
Andres Valiente owned a 3,135-square meter land in Barangay Siminublan, San Narciso, Zambales. In 1978, he sold
the property to respondents Jose and Perla Castuera (Spouses Castuera). On 21 May 2003, the Spouses Castuera filed
with the RTC an application5 for original registration of title over the property.
The Spouses Castuera presented three witnesses to support their application. The three witnesses were (1) former
barangay captain and councilman Alfredo Dadural, (2) Senior Police Officer 2 Teodorico Cudal, and (3) Perla Castuera.
All witnesses testified that the Spouses Castuera owned the property.
The Spouses Castuera also presented documentary evidence to support their application. The documents included tax
receipts and an advance plan6 with a notation, Checked and verified against the cadastral records on file in this office
and is for registration purposes. This survey is within the Alienable and Disposable land proj. No. 3-H certified by
Director of Forestry on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No. 669 Sheet 1.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the
application for original registration.
The RTCs Ruling
In its 31 January 2005 Decision, the RTC granted the application for original registration of title over the property. The
RTC held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the evidence submitted by the applicants, they have shown preponderantly that they are the lawful owners in fee
simple and the actual possessors of Lot 6553 of the San Narciso Cadastre. They are entitled therefore to a judicial
confirmation of their imperfect title to the said land pursuant to the provisions of the new Property Registration Decree
(PD 1529).7

Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. The Spouses Castuera attached to their appellees brief a
certification8 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
stating:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the tract of land situated at Brgy. Siminublan, San Narciso, Zambales containing an area of
ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (1847.00) SQUARE METERS as shown and described in this sketch as
verified by Cart. Nestor L. Delgado for Sps. Jose Castuera and Perla Castuera was found to be within the Alienable or
Disposable, Project No. 3-H, certified by then Director of Forestry, manila [sic] on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No. 669,
sheet No. 1.9
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its 26 March 2012 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. The Court of Appeals held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides for the instances when a
person may file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of land:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of first Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Accordingly, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove the following:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Section 14(1) of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed.
Applying the foregoing in the present case, We find and so rule that the trial court is correct in granting appellees
application for original registration of the subject land. A scrutiny of the records shows that there is substantial
compliance with the requirement that the subject land is alienable and disposable land. It bears to emphasize that the
Advance Plan has the following notations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Checked and verified against the cadastral records on file in this office and is for registration purposes.[]
This survey is within the alienable and disposable land proj. no. 3-H certified by Director of Forestry on June 20, 1927
per LC Map No. 669, Sheet 1.
In Republic v. Serrano, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the trial court and this Court that the parcel of land
subject of registration was alienable and disposable. It held that a DENR Regional Technical Directors certification,
which is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal
requirement:
While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable
character of the land applied for,
the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan
submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates
that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925.[]
The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It bears noting that
no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents
applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no substantive rights
which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents.
While in the case of Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Supreme Court overturned the grant by the lower courts of
an original application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO certification is not
enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[]Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for
land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
However, in the recent case of Republic vs. Carlos R. Vega, et al., as an exception to the strict application of the
stringent rule imposed in the above pronouncement that the absence of these twin certifications justifies a denial of an
application for registration, the Supreme Court, in its sound discretion, and based solely on the evidence on record,
may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a
positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from
the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court
prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.

It must be noted that the present case was decided by the trial court only on January 31, 2005, prior to the above
pronouncement[.] We believe that the same rule shall apply to the present case allowing the registration of the subject
property as there is substantial compliance with the requirement that the land subject of registration is an alienable
and disposable land. Besides, appellees had attached to their appellees brief a Certification from the DENR-CENR
Office issued on December 2, 1999, which states the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the tract of land situated at Brgy. Siminublan, San Narciso, Zambales containing an area of
ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (1,847) SQUARE METERS as shown and described in this sketch as
verified by Cart. Nestor L. Delgado for Sps. Jose Castuera and Perla Castuera was found to be within the Alienable or
Disposable, Project No. 3-H, certified by then Director of Forestry, Manila on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No 669, Sheet
No. 1.10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 14 August 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Petitioner raises as issue that the advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and
disposable character of the property.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable character of the
property. The Spouses Castuera, as applicants for registration of title, must present a certified true copy of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretarys declaration or classification of the land as alienable and
disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,11 citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,12 the Court
held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy
of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as
proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the Presidents proclamation must be
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of such official record. These facts must be established to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.13
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the 26 March 2012 Decision and 14 August 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85015. Respondents Jose and Perla Castueras application for
registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 210341, July 01, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSEFINO O. ALORA AND OSCAR O. ALORA,Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 5 December 2013
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99280, which denied the appeal of the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner) and affirmed the 3 July 2012 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31 of San Pedro,
Laguna (RTC) in LRC Case No. SPL-0697-10.cralawlawlibrary
The Facts
On 6 May 1969, spouses Pedro and Rafaela Alora sold a parcel of land with an area of 12,710 square meters, located in
Barangay San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna to their sons Josefmo O. Alora and Oscar O. Alora (respondents) for
P5,000.00.2 This parcel of land is more particularly described under Plan Psu-119876, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 24-0017-00507.3 The parties to the sale executed a Deed of Conveyance dated 8 May 1969.
On 6 June 2010, respondents filed a verified application for registration of title before the RTC, which was docketed as
LRC Case No. SPL-0697-10. Oscar, who was in the United States, authorized his brother Josefino to represent him in the
proceedings, under a Special Power of Attorney dated 26 November 2010.
In the application, respondents claimed that they purchased the parcel of land, and that they had no knowledge of any
mortgage or encumbrance or any person having any interest over the same property. 4 They further claimed that they
had been planting crops on the parcel of land from 1969 to 2010. The approved plan showed six lots which
respondents intended to develop as a commercial property.5
The respondents further claimed that they paid all taxes on the property and registered the Deed of Conveyance with
the Registry of Deeds and Assessor's Office, and had traced back the tax declarations of their predecessors-in-interest
from 1935. The parcel of land originally belonged to Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and was transferred to Pedro
Salandanan. Subsequently, Salandanan conveyed the property to Pedro Alora, respondents' father.
In order to prove that the parcel of land was disposable and alienable, respondents submitted the following as
evidence:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Certification dated 17 May 2010 issued by Jovito Oandasan, Chief of Forest Management Service of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) which stated that the parcel of land is part of "Alienable and Disposable (A & D) land under Project No. 10-A,
per BFD Land Classification Map No. 3004 certified and declared as such on September 28, 1981."; 6

2. Land certification mark 304 consisting of sheets 1 and 2 from the National Mapping Resource Information Authority
(NAMRIA) which bears a certification that the areas set aside are alienable and disposable for cropland and fishpond
development under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1627 dated 28 September 1981; 7
3. Certified copy of the polyester film copy (SEPIA) of approved Plan Psu-119876 dated 20 April 1949; 8
4. Certified technical description of Plan Psu-119876; 9 and
5. Certification in lieu of Geodetic Engineer's Certificate for Registration Purposes.10
Respondents were also able to present the following documents:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Certified photocopies of Tax Declaration Nos. 1794, 2206 (dated 28 December 1950), 2352 (dated 22 January
1952) and 2381 (dated 28 January 1952) issued to Colegio de San Jose, Inc.;
2. Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property executed by Colegio de San Jose, Inc. in favor of Pedro Salandanan and N.V.
Sinclair;
3. Certified photocopy of Tax Declaration No. 2466 issued to Pedro Salandanan on 17 December 1952;
4. Certified copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro Salandanan in favor of Pedro Alora dated 22
September 1953;
5. Certified photocopy of Tax Declaration No. 2946 issued to Pedro Alora on 21 December 1964;
6. Official Receipt No. 3820443 dated 18 March 2010;
7. Copy of the Deed of Conveyance dated 8 May 1969 executed by Pedro Alora in favor of respondents;
8. Certified photocopy of Tax Declaration No. 8707 issued to respondents in 1985;
9. Official Receipt No. 8594515 dated 14 September 2010;
10. Duplicate original copy of Tax Declaration No. 017-0592 issued to respondents in 2000;
11. Certified photocopy of Tax Declaration No. 0017-000507 issued to respondents in 2006; and
12. Official Receipt No. 9454614 dated 9 February 2010. 11
The following persons also testified to support respondents' claim:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Jovito Oandasan, Chief of Forest Management Service of CENRO;
2. Rodolfo Gonzales, Special Investigator I of the DENR, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO),
Los Banos, Laguna;
3. Engineer Marlon Climaco, a licensed Geodetic Engineer;
4. Rolando Rosal, one of respondents' helpers; and
5. Respondent Josefino Alora.12
Oandasan testified that as chief of CENRO, his professional duties included issuing certifications as to the status of
lands. He also claimed that the subject parcel of land is alienable and disposable under BFD Land Classification No.
P004 released on 28 September 1981, and that he was able to secure a land certification mark 304 from the NAMRIA
which bears a certification stating that the areas set aside are alienable and disposable for cropland and fishpond
development under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1627 also dated 28 September 1981. 13
Gonzales testified that he was tasked with investigating public land applications. He conducted an ocular inspection of
the property as well as examined documentary evidence relating to respondents' application. Gonzales' report stated
that the property is "not within a previously patented title or any public land application or administrative title." 14
Petitioner, through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose De Leon, Jr., did not present any evidence to oppose the
application.15
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The dispositive portion of the Resolution dated 3 July 2012
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and
decrees a parcel of land (subdivided into Lots 1 to 6), as shown on Plan Psu-119876 situated in Barangay San Vicente.
San Pedro, Laguna containing an area of 12,710 square meters in favor of and in the names of Josefino O. Alora and
Oscar O. Alora.

SO ORDERED.16
The RTC stated that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. Thus, the applicant
bears the burden of proving "through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable based on a positive act of the government." 17 The RTC also cited Sections 14 and 48 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529 which provide that an application for land registration must fulfill three requisites: (1) the land is
alienable public land; (2) the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and(3) the applicant's possession must be under a bona fide
claim of ownership.18
The RTC held that while Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.19 clearly stated that "the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records," the applicable doctrine is that inRepublic v. Serrano:20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx However, in the case of Republic v. Serrano, which is [on] all fours with this case, the Court held that a DENR
Regional Technical Director's certification, which is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence,
constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirements. Applying the said precedent, this Court finds that a
DENR Regional Technical Director's Certification annotated on the subdivision plan and attested to by the CENRO and
DENR official representatives declaring under oath that the property subject of this application is within the areas set
aside as alienable and disposable for cropland and fishpond development under Forestry Administrative Order No. 41627 dated 28 September 1981 constitutes sufficient compliance with the above-stated requirements. 21
The RTC also held that the applicants had satisfactorily shown that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, adverse, and notorious possession of the property under a bona fide claim of ownership
for the period required by the Property Registration Decree.22
Thus, petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an appeal before the
CA.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the CA
Petitioner argued that the RTC erred in applying the doctrine in Republic v. Serrano,23 which was decided on 24
February 2010, and the applicable doctrine is Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. which was decided on 26 June 2008
and has been reiterated in subsequent cases.
The CA, however, denied the appeal. The court a quo cited the case of Republic v. Vega,24 which harmonized the
conflicting rulings in Republic v. Serrano and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. InRepublic v. Vega, this Court ruled that
the doctrine enunciated under Republic v. Serrano applies pro hac vice and "it does not in any way detract from our
rulings in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that public
land is alienable x x x."25The CA based its ruling on the express declaration in Republic v. Vega, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As an exception, however, the courts in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on record
may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a
positive act of the government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition
from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently pending before the
trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications. 26 (Underscoring and boldfacing in
the original)
Hence, the instant petition.cralawlawlibrary
The Issues
Petitioner alleges that:
1. The CA erred in holding that respondents were able to substantially establish that the subject parcel of land is
alienable and disposable; and
2. The CA erred in holding that the respondents were able to sufficiently prove that they and their predecessors-ininterest were in possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.cralawlawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is granted.
To reiterate, under Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx
Thus, applicants for registration must prove the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
In order to prove that the parcel of land is part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, respondents
rely on the certification issued by the CENRO. The issue is whether this is sufficient evidence to show that the subject
parcel of land falls within the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain.
Petitioner claims that the CA and the RTC should have applied our ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., which
was promulgated on 26 June 2008. In that case, we held that applicants for land registration must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. If this standard were to be applied in the instant case, the CA decision should be overturned because
respondents failed to present a certified classification from the DENR Secretary. Petitioner argues that the standard
inRepublic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. has been applied in more recent decisions of this Court.
The CA, however, did not follow the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. Instead, it followedRepublic v.
Serrano (decided on 24 February 2010) and Republic v. Vega (decided on 17 January 2011). In Republic v. Serrano, we
allowed the approval of a land registration application even without the submission of the certification from the DENR
Secretary. As this ruling presented an apparent contradiction with our earlier pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., we sought to harmonize our previous rulings in Republic v. Vega. We then said that the applications for
land registration may be granted even without the DENR Secretary's certification provided that the application was
currently pending at the time Republic v. Vega was promulgated. Since respondents' application was pending before
the RTC at the time Republic v. Vega was promulgated, the CA ruled in favor of the respondents, despite the lack of
certification from the DENR Secretary.
Admittedly, we declared in Republic v. Vega that trial courts may grant applications for registration despite the
absence of a certification from the DENR Secretary. It should be emphasized, however, that Republic v. Vega applies on
a pro hac vice basis only. After Republic v. Vega, we pointed out inRepublic v. San
Mateo27 that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial court rendered its decision on November 13, 2003. way before
the rule on strict compliance was laid down in T.A.N. Properties on June 26, 2008. Thus, the trial court was merely
applying the rule prevailing at the time, which was substantial compliance. Thus, even if the case reached the
Supreme Court after the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, the Court allowed the application of substantial compliance,
because there was no opportunity for the registrant to comply with the Court's ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the trial
court and the CA already having decided the case prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
In the case here, however, the RTC Decision was only handed down on November 23, 2010, when the rule on strict
compliance was already in effect. Thus, there was ample opportunity for the respondents to comply with the new rule,
and present before the RTC evidence of the DENR Secretary's approval of the DENR-South CENRO Certification. This,
they failed to do.
In the instant case, the RTC Resolution was issued on 3 July 2012, after the promulgation of Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. Thus, following our ruling in Republic v. San Mateo, the rule requiring certification from the DENR
Secretary should be applied.
It is important to emphasize that the more recent case of Republic v. Spouses Castuera,28 decided on 14 January 2015,
applied the rule in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. without any qualification.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 5 December 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
99280 and the 3 July 2012 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31 of San Pedro, Laguna in LRC Case No. SPL0697-10 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.