PRELIMINARY FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT FAR 004 / 2003 Rev. B.

Subject:

YN Refinery 800 kVA Transformer Failures.

Investigating team:

Mirko Castillo, Fernando Guilln, Manuel Vergara.

Date:
July 16, 2003.
________________________________________________________________
1. ABSTRACT.
This is the Root Cause Failure Analysis report of the YN Refinerys arc furnaces electrical
feeding systems 800 kVA transformer that failed first on June 20; after the transformer was
repaired a second failure occurred on June 30.
2. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION.
2.1 Transformer description. The 800 kVA transformer is located in the Keegor 700 kVA
arc furnace electrical feeding system, see Fig N 1 the drawing N E 004 34 01, Rev.
0 which shows the single line diagram. The failed transformer characteristics are as
follows:
Make:
Model:
Rated power:
Transformer ratio:
Nominal intensity:
Nameplate:
Protection:

Keegor, manufactured by Onan.

BS171.1970 Trans, Dyn 11.
800 kVA
4.16 / 1.00 kV
111 A / 462 A
Does not specify if the transformer has been designed to work at
altitudes required by our operations.
Neither internal electric nor overheating protection have been
provided. The transformer does not have breather.

2.2 Electrical protection system. The arc furnace electrical feeding system protecting
devices are shown in Fig. N 1:
Stage 1. The 800-kVA transformer secondary circuit or 1.00 kV power circuit has
protection against:
Overloads provided by the 630 A main circuit breaker that was set at 10x, that is
6,300 A
Short-circuits provided by 400 A main fuses.
Stage 2. The 800 kVA transformer primary circuit or 4.16 kV power circuit has protection
against short-circuits provided by 200 A fuses.
Stage 3. Protection against overloads and delayed short-circuit are provided by Digitrip
3000 relay, set at 350 ms.

Stage 4. Protections against overloads, delayed short-circuits and ground failure are
provided by a Digitrip 3000 relay, set at 350 ms.
Fig. 2. Single-line diagram showing protecting devices.

POND
Multilin
745C

12 MVA
22.0 / 4.16 kV

DIG 3

Stage 4

DIG 2

Stage 3
DIG 1

200 A Fuses

Stage 2

800 kVA Transformer

4.16 / 1.00 kV
630 A Circuit Braker
Stage 1

700 kVA Transformer

Arc Furnace

2.3 Operating instructions of the Keegor 700-kVA arc furnace. The relevant operating
instructions related to the transformer failure included in the manufacturers Operating
Instructions E 004 34, Rev. A, are the following:

2.3.1

At the smelting beginning, the current control shall be made by manually lowering
or raising the electrodes for getting the 700-kVA transformer secondary current
into the 1,700 A 1,900 A range. After the current stabilization change to
automatic mode required in which a 1,500 A current is normally drawn.

2.3.2

All tap changing shall be done off-line by switching-off the main contactor before
changing tap settings, otherwise damage to the contact points on the tap changing
contactors will occur.

2.4 Preventive maintenance requirements of the Keegor 700 kVA arc furnace electric
system. The information in the manufacturers Preventative Maintenance Instructions, E
004 34, Rev. A, establishes the following:
2.4.1

Transformer maintenance requirements.

2.4.1.1 Prior to each smelt the oil level shall be checked and topped-up as necessary.
2.4.1.2 Monthly. Check all connection for tightness. The transformer breather shall be
inspected for moisture content; replace as necessary.
2.4.1.3 Annually. Transformer oil testing for conductivity, moisture, etc. purify or
replace as necessary.
2.4.2

Control panels. The following check shall be carried out monthly:

2.4.2.1 All terminal connections for tightness.

2.4.2.2 All moving components on contactors to ensure free movement.
2.4.2.3 All contact points on contactors and relays for cleanliness and wear.
2.4.2.4 Check and replace bottles as necessary.
3. FAILURE DESCRIPTION.
4.1 Failure Event N 1: Occurred on June 20; the following items failed:

The 800-kVA transformer primary and secondary windings went to ground.

Secondary winding burned.
Two main fuses in the 1.00 kV power circuit burned.
Digitrip 3000 relay, electrical protection stage 3 opened.
.
4.2 Failure Event N 2: After the transformer was repaired a new failure occurred on June
30; the following items failed:
The 800-kVA transformer primary and secondary windings went to ground.
Main contactor burned.
Two ancillary contactors burned.

4. FAILURE BACKGROUND.
4.1 First 800 kVA transformer failure.
4.1.1

June 17. The following occurrences were reported:

4.1.1.1 One of the 4 A fuses of the ancillary circuit for 1.00 kV power circuit electric
measurements were burned.
4.1.1.2 The main contactor only activated when the operator select the tap A 1; for
other tap selections the contactor did not work.
4.1.1.3 The 1.00 kV / 0.11 kV current transformer was damaged due to overheating;
the electric measurement of the 1.00 kV power circuit was not possible.
4.1.2

June 18. The following occurrences were reported:

4.1.2.1 An internal failure of the voltmeter selector switch was found.

4.1.2.2 Fuses repaired with copper wires.
4.1.2.3 Contac points of contactor C9 were burned; it was necessary to take the
contact points of contactor C11 to repair the contactor C9, but at the same time
the tap settings A 3, B 3 and C 3 were left out of service due to the lack
of spare parts.
4.1.2.4 Review of the refinery arc furnace required.
4.1.3

June 20. The following occurrences were reported:

4.1.3.1 Two 400 A main fuses were burned in the 1.00 kV power circuit.
4.1.3.2 The Multilin 745 relay of the 12 MVA, 22.00 / 4.16 kV transformer located in
the YN pond which gives electrical supply for the arc furnace recorded the
event of a steep current increase that reached 3,300 A in 4.16 kV for 8 ms.
4.1.3.3 The 800-kVA transformer primary and secondary windings went to ground.
4.1.3.4 Log out / tag out procedure application for transformer dismounting and
repairing.
4.1.3.5 Review of the refinery 800-kVA transformer problems.
4.2 Second 800 kVA transformer failure.
4.2.1

June 28. After the 800 kVA transformer repairing the transformer was installed
and left connected without load until the following day.

4.2.2

June 29. The following occurrences were reported:

4.2.2.1 The arc furnace was started at 5:00 am and worked for an estimated period of
5 hours.
4.2.2.2 At 10:30 am the electrician stopped the process to set the 630 A main circuit
breaker to 7x in order to provide a better protection of the 1.00 kVA power

circuit. But the main circuit breaker opened for settings lower than 10x so it
was left in this last setting.
4.2.2.3 The main contactor and two coarse windings contactors were found burned.
4.2.3

June 30. The following occurrences were reported:

4.2.3.1 The 1.00 kV main circuit breaker and the failed coarse windings contactors
were replaced. The contactors electric insulation and the operating sequence
were verified.
4.2.3.2 It was proved that a voltage of 1.00 kV was in the 800 kVA transformer
secondary.
4.2.3.3 When the arc furnace was started again a electric failure of the system
occurred due to the fact that the primary and secondary 800 kVA transformer
windings were to ground.
4.3 Service restarting after the second repairing.
4.3.1

July 9. The repaired transformed arrived to YN Refinery and it was connected to

the arc furnace electrical system. Two Digitrip 3000 relays were installed in both
primary and secondary electrical circuits of the 800 kVA transformer; the settings
of these relays as well as the Multilin 745 relay located in the 12 MVA
transformer located in the pond were lowered in order to provide a better electrical
protection. The 480 V tension for ancillary circuits was taken from an independent
system for not affecting the arc furnace electric system.

4.3.2

July 11. When the arc furnace feeding system was powered to start the smelting
process a failure was detected in the contactor panel; there was a short-circuit in
the contactor C5 of the transformer coarse windings due to a bottle loss of vacuum
failure; this contactor was a used one in the two previous failures -and the
contact points gap were nor measured. The IR Thermal Imaging recorded this
event; see Fig. N 3, and the necessary replacements were done as well as the
ground checking of all the electric system. The contactor C5 was replaced and the
arc furnace system is presently working without problems.
Fig. N 3. Cable overheating in
contactor C5 due to a shortcircuit produced by a loss of
vacuum in one of the contactor
bottles. This contactor is
located in the 700-kVA
transformer coarse winding
control system.

5. DATA COLLECTION.
5.1 Commissioning data.
5.1.1

The Yanacocha New Refinerys Turnover Packages Pre-ops checklist shows in

the instrumentation / electrical checklist of the smelting furnace dated April,
2002 that the wiring and wiring test were successfully terminated.

5.1.2

In the above-mentioned file there are no records regarding measurements of the

systems during operations; i.g. transformer temperature levels, et.

5.2 Operating conditions. According to the electric load diagram took on May 15 and 16 on
the MCC electrical feeder, the demand is 780 kW at 0.87 power factor; see Fig. N 4. On
June 28, the power measurements for the 1.00 MVA transformer for the 480 V control
circuit were done showing a demand of 110 kW. Consequently the peak demand in the
800-kVA transformer is 670 kW. Taking into account the above mentioned power factor
the rated transformer power is 696 kW and the transformer load factor is 96 %.
Fig. N 4. Load diagram.

5.3 Visual Inspection.

5.3.1

Installation. When the arc furnace electric feeding system was analyzed, the
following problems were found:

5.3.1.1 The protection against ground failure of one of the Digitrip 3000 relay
identified as stage 3 in the protection system - was not connected. The relays
were set to open at 350 ms after the short-circuit current detection.
5.3.1.2 There was found a wiring misconnection between contactor C10 and C11.
5.3.1.3 The 700-kVA transformer over temperature protecting system was partially
connected; only the light and sound alarm was operating but the relay for
opening the main contactor was not.
5.3.2

Instruments readings.

5.3.2.1 The Multilin 745 relay of the 12 MVA, 22.00 / 4.16 kV transformer located in
the YN pond which gives electrical supply for the arc furnace recorded the
event of a steep current increase that reached 3,300 A in 4.16 kV for 8 ms.
5.3.2.2 The delta winding trip counter of the 700-kVA transformer delta winding
overload (identified as E2) recorded 327 openings at the failure moment.
5.3.2.3 The temperature reading in the maxi-meter of the 700-kVA transformer
reached 82 C.
5.3.3

Physical evidences analysis.

5.3.3.1 Most of physical evidences were completely damaged to the point that no
sequence-of-events can be established, however the damage seems to be the
consequence of several tripping events; see Figs. N 5 and 6.

Fig. N 5. The main contactor and

its cover after the failure.

Fig. N 6. Two ancillary

contactors after the failure.

5.3.3.2 Due to the slag spatter, the insulation of the electric cables of the arc furnace
electrodes bus-bar were damaged as well as the limit switches of the
inspection doors beneath the arc furnace these requires to be repaired and
some controls located on the left of the arc furnace control panel; see Figs. 7
and 8.
Fig. N 7.
Damage of
the junction
box of the
inspection
doors limit
switch due to
slag spatter.

Fig. N 8.
Damage of a
selector
switch
located in the
main control
panel due to
slag spatter.

5.4 Oil transformer analysis. (Still waiting for results).

5.5 Personnel Interviews.
5.5.1

Electrician N 1.

5.5.1.1 The electricians were resetting the 700-kVA transformer delta winding
overload relay (E2). The openings of this relay begun after 4 months of the
system operation. There are no records of the resettings, dates, overload causes
and analysis.
5.5.1.2 Regarding the 700 kVA transformers oil overtemperature protecting system,
only the light and sound alarm was operating but the relay to open the main
contactor was not due that the cable N 558 according to drawing E 004 34
03, Rev. 2, 700 kVA Arc Furnace Control Circuit was not provided.
5.5.1.3 The 1.00 / 0.11 kV transformer that feed the 1.00 kV power circuit electric
measurement system failed due to the fact that there was a short-circuit in the
voltmeter selector switch.
5.5.1.4 The setting of the main circuit breaker was selected to be at 10x since the
commissioning of the project.

5.5.1.5 An error in the wiring of the contactor C11 produced a voltage unbalance in
the arc furnace electric system; see voltage readings in Table N 1.
Table N 1. Data taken from the arc furnace electrical system showing voltage
unbalance.

5.5.2

Operator N 1.

5.5.2.1 There were no problems when the operators selected the 800 kVA transformer
taps A - 3, B - 3 or C 3 since the beginning of the project.
5.5.2.2 The electrician reset the delta winding overload relay all the times it was
necessary. This relay opened mainly during the first stage of the smelts and the
operating personnel called the electricians to reset the relay. The operating
personnel did not reset the relay due to safety reasons; the contactor panel has
circuits powered at 1.00 kV.
5.5.2.3 The transformer tap selection was done by switching-off the main contactor.
The system does not allow the do this in a different way since the system is
switched-off immediately.
5.5.3

Operator N 2.

5.5.3.1 One electrician showed the operating personnel how to reset the overload
relays when tripping.
6. PROBABLE CAUSES.
6.1 First failure event.
6.1.1

Inadequate operation of the 700-kVA arc furnace.

6.1.1.1 Transformer tap selection without switching of the main contactor. The
manufacturer Operating Instructions E 004 34, Rev. A, warns about doing
the transformer tap changing without switching-off the main contactor;
damage to the contact points on the tap changing contactors would occur due
to the remaining electric energy en the transformer. The currents drawn by this
misoperation could be high enough to damage the contactors vacuum bottles
or reduce the electrical insulation resulting in a ground failure.
6.1.1.2 Lack of current control. The current drawn in initial smelting stages done in
manual mode - shall be set into the 1,700 A 1,900 A range by raising or
lowering the electrodes. The overload is backed by the high temperature
readings in the 700-kVA transformer and the overload relays trips that reached
327 events.
6.1.2

Inadequate electrical maintenance of the contactor panels.

6.1.2.1 Lack of contactors contacting points maintenance. The manufacturer

Preventative Maintenance Instructions, E 004 34, Rev. A, requires that on
a monthly basis all contact points on contactors and relays for cleanliness and
wear. Using contactors with worn contacting points would produce
overheating and the electrical insulation might be reduced to unsafe values.
6.1.2.2 Lack of contactors bottles inspection. The manufacturers Preventative
Maintenance Instructions, E 004 34, Rev. A, requires that on a monthly
basis the vacuum bottles shall be checked and replaced as necessary. Using
vacuum bottles without checking the dielectric strength might result in the loss
of vacuum producing electrical arcs and short-circuits in the system.
6.1.2.3 Lack of floor maintenance control. The electrician required in the shift
notebook two days prior to the first failure that the arc furnace electrical
problems should be addressed.
6.1.3

Inadequate electric protecting devices design and settings.

6.1.3.1 The Digitrip 3000 relays of the 4.16 kV power circuit see in paragraph 3.2,
stages 3 and 4 - to protect the 800 kVA transformer were set at 350 ms instead
of being set to open at high instantaneous currents values. In the first failure
the Multilin 745 relay located at the pond opened at 8 ms but the 800-kVA
transformer had already failed without protection that should have acted if the
relays would have been set appropriately.
6.1.3.2 The 800-kVA transformer does not have neither internal electric protection nor
thermostat for over temperature protection, consequently it is exposed to
failures due to the lack of a complete set of protecting devices.
6.1.3.3 The wiring misconnection in the contactor C10 and C11 that produced the
voltage unbalance overloading at the same time one of the phases.

6.2 Second failure event.

6.2.1

There was not a root cause failure analysis of the first event so the failure mode
might have been still present in the arc furnace electric system in spite that this
operated for a 5.50-hours period.

6.2.2

The contactor C5 - which failed in the operation restarting on July 11 - could have
been failed since the first failure and not detected. This contactor is located in the
700 kVA transformer coarse windings.

6.2.3

Measures for improving the electric protecting system and monitoring the electric
parameters were not taken.

7. ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION.

7.1 The operating and maintenance context.
7.1.1

There is direct evidence of system overloading due to the relays trip counters and
700-kVA transformer oil overtemperature but there is no direct evidence of
following tap changing sequence or working in manual mode all the time. It is
important to mention that there are no maintenance records to ensure that the
contactors were in good conditions prior to the failure; this could have helped to
isolate the operating failure mode.

7.1.2

Lack of 700 kVA arc furnace electric system maintenance program:

7.1.2.1 Transformers.
7.1.2.2 Control and contactor Panels.
7.1.2.3 Electric protecting devices.
7.1.2.4 Spare parts program.
7.1.2.5 Poor floor control: report, report analysis and countermeasures taken.
7.1.2.6 Lack of procedures for relay resetting in which the overload analysis shall be
done prior to energizing the electric system.
7.2 Direct causes.
7.2.1

Lack of appropriate electric protecting devices.

7.2.2

Relay missetting. The Digitrip 3000 relays were set to open with delay that
surpassed time that the real failure event took.

7.3 Contributing causes. The contactors C10 and C11 miswiring led to voltage unbalance
that produced one overloaded phase. This will cause a loss in the electric systems
insulation and a non-immediate failure in both 700 and 800 kVA transformers.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS.
8.1 Short term recommendations.
8.1.1

Procedures.

8.1.1.1 The Manufacturer Operating Instructions.

8.1.1.1.1

Availability of operating instructions to personnel. The manufacturer 4pages-document Operating Instructions E 004 34, Rev. A, shall be
translated to Spanish and placed in the operating area, that is available
to operating personnel.
8.1.1.1.2 Training. The requirement of revising these arc furnaces operating
instructions with the operating personnel on a regular basis shall be
determined.
8.1.1.2 Predictive and Preventive Maintenance. The following recommendations
included in the manufacturer Preventative Maintenance Instructions, E 004
34, Rev. A, shall be implemented:
8.1.1.2.1

Procedure for relay resettings.

8.1.1.2.2

Operating personnel shall call the electrician for relay resetting.

Procedure for relay resettings shall be prepared which shall include
the overload analysis prior to restoring power.
All electricians shall be trained in the use of this procedure.

Transformers.

Prepare checklist of equipment.

Transformer oil level checks and top-ups as necessary prior to each
smelt.
All connections checks for tightness on a monthly basis.
Contract a third party company for transformer oil analysis
services.
8.1.1.2.3

Control Panels. On a monthly basis:

Prepare checklist of equipment.

All terminal connections checks for tightness.
All moving components on contactors checks for ensuring free
movements.
Contactor gap measurements. All contact points on contactors
checks for cleanliness and wear. The gap between the pivot plate
and the bottle stem shall be measured and compared to the

minimum value recommended by the contactor manufacturers. For

instance for a 160 A Cutler-Hammer contactor the gap shall not be
less than 0.010 inch.
Check and replace bottles as necessary. The dielectric strength of
the interrupters shall be checked before the contactor is energized
for the first time and regularly thereafter in order to detect any
deterioration in the dielectric strength of the contact gap as
recommended by the contactor manufacturers. For instance a 160 A
Cutler-Hammer contactor will withstand a 5.5 kV, 60 Hz test across
a 0.075-inch contact gap, which is a normal new gap.
Insulation level measurements. It is necessary to have records of
the insulation resistance between poles and from each pole to
ground. Any unusually low reading or sudden reduction after the
contactor has been in service indicates a possible source of trouble,
and the cause shall be determined and corrected before restoring
power.

8.1.2

8.1.1.2.4

Maintenance Control. The maintenance supervisor and planner shall

read and sign the shift notebooks. The appropriate countermeasures
shall be taken and documented in case of unsolved or partially solved
problems.

8.1.1.2.5

Critical Spare Parts Purchasing. The critical spare parts of the arc
furnace electric system shall be identified and purchased.

8.1.1.2.6

IR Thermal Imaging. The IR Thermal Imaging program shall be

prepared and executed on a regular basis. It is important to take IR data
each two weeks in order to establish a baseline.

8.1.1.2.7

Critical equipment redundancy to be identified and purhased.

Equipment and system upgrading.

8.1.2.1 Modify the setting of the Digitrip 3000 relay located at stage 3 protection,
see paragraph 3.2 - to detect instantaneous short-circuit. (Done).
8.1.2.2 Provide better external electric protecting devices for transformers. This shall
be made by using modern relays like Digitrip 3000; see Fig. N 9. (Done).
Fig. N 9. New Digitrip 3000 relay
has been already installed in the
main control panel to provide better
electric protection to the 1.00 kV
power circuit that feed the 700 kVA
arc furnace transformer.

8.1.2.3 Provide internal electric protecting devices like Buchholz, with thermal
imaging furnished with external thermometers.
8.1.2.4 Investigate the transformers breathing. Provide the breathers with desiccant
material and inert gas inside the transformer instead of air - if necessary.
8.1.2.5 Install steel plates to prevent slag spattering and damage to electric devices
and cables; see Fig. N 10. (Partially done).
8.1.3

Share this information with Projects and Pre-ops representatives.

Fig. N 10. Steel plates were installed in

the lateral sides of the arc furnace to
prevent the slag from spatter and
affecting the electric devices and cables.
The cables insulation was also repaired
with insulating tapes.

8.2 Long Term Recommendations.

8.2.1

Upgrade the arc furnace electric system to have records of all the electrical
variables:

Current drawn in the 700-kVA transformer secondary windings.

Record of consumed kWh. This will also enable us to make follow-ups in
energy savings for upgrading the system.
Possibility to record 700-kVA tap changing.
8.2.2

The arc furnace electric control system should be upgraded to have a complete
automated operation; this would also enable us to record the tap changing
sequence.

8.2.3

The controls related to the moving components of the arc furnace; e.g. electrodes
raising and lowering, should be located in a console in such a way that the
operating personnel be in front of the arc furnace without being necessary to turn
around to operate as actually is done.

END OF REPORT.