8th

International
Conference on Argumentation

July 1-July 4, 2014

University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands

 Authors 2014

ISBN 978 90 361 0450 0

Sic Sat
International Center for the Study of Argumentation
Amsterdam

CONTENTS

Preface
Mark Aakhus & Marcin Lewinski
Toward Polylogical Analysis Of Argumentation: Disagreement Space In
The Public Controversy About Fracking

Scott Aikin & John Casey

Dont Feed The Trolls: Straw Men And Iron Men

12

Derek Allen
The Very Idea Of Ethical Arguments

22

Rodica Amel
The Synthetic Function Of Doxastic Dialectics

32

Jos ngelgascn
What Could Virtue Contribute To Argumentation?

43

R. Jarrod Atchison & John LLewellyn

Dont Drink That Water!: The Role Of Counter-Intuitive Science In
Conspiracy Arguments

50

Sharon Bailin & Mark Battersby

Conductive Argumentation, Degrees Of Confidence, And The
Communication Of Uncertainty

58

Michael J. Baker
The Integration Of Pragma-Dialectics And Collaborative Learning
Research: Argumentation Dialogue, Externalisation And Collective
Thinking

69

V. William Balthrop & Carole Blair

Controversy, Racial Equality, And American World War I
Cemeteries In Europe

78

Natalia Barebina
Interpersonal Argumentation Through The Context Of Distributed
Cognition: The Case Of Christian Sermon

85

Michael D. Baumtrog
Delineating The Reasonable And Rational For Humans

94

Sarah Bigi
Can Argumentation Skills Become A Therapeutic Resource? Results From
An Observational Study In Diabetes Care

102

J. Anthony Blair
What Is Informal Logic?

113

Marina Bletsas
The Voices Of Justice - Argumentative Polyphony And Strategic
Manoeuvring In Judgement Motivations: An Example From The Italian
Constitutional Court

124

Emma Frances Bloomfield & Kari Storla

Evolutionary Arguments In The Birth Control Debate: Casuistic Shifting
In Conservative Rhetoric

136

Dmitri Bokmelder
Cognitive Biases And Logical Fallacies

147

David Botting
Reasons Why Arguments And Explanations Are Different

154

Antonio Bova
A Study Of Undergraduate And Graduate Students' Argumentation In
Learning Contexts Of Higher Education

173

Emanuele Brambilla
On The Benefits Of Applying Argumentation Theory To Research On The
Simultaneous Interpretation Of Political Speeches

186

Ann E. Burnette & Wayne L. Kraemer

Meeting The Demands Of A Changing Electorate: The political Rhetoric
Of Julian Castro And Marco Rubio

199

Begoa Carrascal & Miguel Mori

Justification And Effectiveness: Critical Thinking And Strategic
Maneuvering

209

Annalisa Cattani
A Reason That Desires, A Desires That Reasons Participatory Art And
Guerrilla Advertising

221

Martha S. Cheng
The Sliding Scales Of Repentance: Understanding Variation In Political
Apologies For Infidelity

234

Ioana A. Cionea & Dale Hample

Dialogue Types And Argumentative Behaviors

245

Daniel H. Cohen
Missed Opportunities In Argument Evaluation

257

Alexandra Corral Edmonds

Isocrates Moral Argumentation

266

Rubens Damasceno Morais

A Case Study Of Argumentative Assimilation

278

Kamila Debowska-Kozlowska
Partially-Successful Persuasion In Task-Dialogues

289

Aaron Dicker & Geoffrey D. Klinger

A Poem Without Words: Visual Argumentation And The Photography
Collections Of The Black Panther Party

300

Marianne Doury & Pascale Mansier

The Psychiatrization Of The Opponent In Polemical Context

310

Michel Dufour
Dialectic And Eristic

320

Claudio Duran
The September 11, 1973 Military Coup In Chile And The Military Regime
1973-1990: A Case Of Social And Political Deep Disagreement.

332

Justin Eckstein & Sarah T. Partlow Lefevre

Politicizing Tragedy: Third Order Strategic Maneuvering In The Response
To Mass Shootings

345

Lindsay M. Elllis
The Ubiquity Of The Toulmin Model In U.S. Education: Promise And
Peril

356

Gu Erhuo
How Mental Develops In Kenre Dueling

367

Jeanne Fahnestock
Arguing in the Grooves: Genre and Language Constraints in Scientific
Controversies

372

Norman Fairclough
Dialectical Reasoning In Critical Social Analysis And Critical Discourse
Analysis

396

Victor Ferry
How To Blame In A Democracy?

407

Eveline T. Feteris
The Role Of Pragmatic Argumentation Referring To Consequences, Goals
And Values In The Justification Of Judicial Decisions

414

Maurice A. Finocchiaro
Ubiquity, Ambiguity, And Metarationality: Searching For The Fallacy Of
Composition

426

James B. Freeman
Identifying The Warrant Of An Argument

435

Rodolfo Gaeta & Nelida Gentile

On The Persuasive Power Of The Best Explanation Argument

448

Anca G
The Strategic Function Of Argumentative Moves In Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) Reports

455

Michaela A. Gilbert
Rules Is Rules: Ethos And Situational Normativity

467

G.C. Goddu
Towards A Foundation For Argumentation Theory

475

Vadim Golubev
Western And Russian Media Coverage Of The Ukrainian Crisis: An
Emotional Commitment Or Bias?

483

Jean Goodwin
Climate Scientist Stephen Schneider Versus The Sceptics: A Case Study Of
Argumentation In Deep Disagreement

489

Kira Goudkova & Tatyana Tretyakova

The Matrix For The 21st Century Russian Education

498

Sara Greco
Argumentation From Analogy In Migrants Decisions

506

Ronald Walter Greene & Jay Alexander Frank

Missiles As Messages: Appeals To Force In President Obamas Strategic
Maneuverability On The Use Of Chemical Weapons In Syria

518

Allison Hailey Hahn

Disruptive Definition As A Method Of Deterritorialization In Modern
Argumentative Contexts

526

Michael David Hazen

Testing The Relationship Between Argument And Culture

534

Thierry Herman
A Plea For A Linguistic Distinction Between Explanation And Argument

544

Edward A. Hinck, Shelly S. Hinck, William O. Dailey, Robert S. Hinck &

Salma I.
Cultural Differences In Political Debate: Comparing Face Threats In
U.S., Great Britain, And Egyptian Campaign Debates

554

David Hitchcock
The Linked-Convergent Distinction

569

Michael H.G. Hoffmann

Changing The Practice Of Knowledge Creation Through Collaborative
Argument Mapping On The Internet

578

Robert Hmmer
A General Rule For Analogy

590

Constanza Ihnen
Negotiation Versus Deliberation

598

David Isaksen
Internal Logic: Persuasive Form And Hierarchy In Kenneth Burke

610

Sally Jackson
Deference, Distrust, And Delegation: Three Design Hypotheses

616

Justine Jacot, Emmanuel Genot & Frank Zenker

Logical Validity, Bounded Rationality, And Pragma-Dialectics: Outline Of
A Game-Theoretic Naturalization Of Classically-Valid Argumentation

626

Jeroen Jansen
Creating Disagreement By Self-Abasement. Apologizing As A Means Of
Confrontational Strategic Maneuvering

639

Henrike Jansen
I Did Not Do It, Because I Would Not Do It: Defending Oneself Against
An Accusation

648

Jeffrey W. Jarman
The Failure Of Fact-Checking

657

Henrik Juel
The Persuasive Powers Of Text, Voice, And Film - A Lecture Hall
Experiment With A Famous Speech

668

Justin Kirk
Mitt Romney And Ideological Enthymeme In Denver: Obamacare And
Its Functions

679

Hideki Kakita
Fine Arts As Visual Argument: Optical Argument In Discourse,
Technology And Paintings

690

Takayuki Kato, Takeshi Suzuki & Suzuki Masako

A Strategic Maneuvering Analysis Of The Japans First Internet Election
In 2013

703

Mariam Keburia
Analyzing Political Discourse In Georgia: A Critical Discourse-Analytical
Perspective On Political Imageries And Means-Goal Arguments

712

Zornitsa Keremidchieva & Vera Sidlova

Political Argument And The Affective Relations Of Democracy:
Recovering Vaclav Havels Theory Of Associated Living

722

Gabrijela Kisicek
The Role Of Prosodic Features In The Analysis Of Multimodal
Argumentation

730

Jens Kjeldsen
Where Is Visual Argument?

741

Susan L. Kline
The Effect Of Interpersonal Familiarity On Argumentation In Online
Discussions

749

Harm Kloosterhuis
Institutional Constraints Of Topical Strategic Maneuvering In Legal
Argumentation. The Case Of Insulting

764

Takuzo Konishi
Classifying Argumentation/Reasoning Schemes Proper Within The New
Rhetoric Project

772

Marcin Koszowy & Michal Araszkiewicz

The Study Of Reasoning In The Lvov-Warsaw School As A Predecessor Of
And Inspiration For Argumentation Theory

783

Erik C.W. Krabbe & Jan Albert van Laar

Thats No Argument! The Ultimate Criticism?

793

Manfred Kraus
Arguments By Analogy (And What We Can Learn About Them From
Aristotle)

805

Tone Kvernbekk
Evidence-Based Practice: Evidence Set In An Argument

815

Niilo Lahti
Shameful Corinthians A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis Of 1 Corinthians
6:1220

825

Alain Ltourneau & Marielle Pauz

Argumentative Moves In An Inquisitive Context About Psychological
Harassment In The Workplace: A Case Study In Qubec

836

Marcin Lewinski
Practical Reasoning And Multi-party Deliberation: The Best, The Good
Enough And The Necessary

851

Celso Lpez & Ana Mara Vicua

Pragma-Dialectical Rules And The Teaching Of Argumentation In
Philosophy For Children

863

Esperanza Morales-Lpez
Discourse, Argumentation And Constructivist Approaches: Analysing
Discourses Of social Change

873

Margherita Luciani
The Evaluative And Unifying Function Of Emotions Emerging In
Argumentation: Interactional And Inferential Analysis In Highly
Specialized Medical Consultations Concerning The Disclosure Of A Bad
News

882

Christoph Lumer & Serkan Ince

Islamic Theological Arguments An Epistemological Systematisation

896

Fabrizio Macagno
A Means-End Classification Of Argumentation Schemes

907

Roseann M. Mandziuk
Gender And Generative Argument: Locating The National Womens
History Museum In The Landscape Of Public Memory

920

Maurizio Manzin & Serena Tomasi

Ethos And Pathos In Legal Argumentation. The Case Of Proceedings
Relating To Children

930

Danny Marrero Avendao

An Epistemic Theory Of Argumentation For Intercultural Argumentative
Dialogues

942

Ivanka Mavrodieva
Argumentation In Bulgarian Political Virtual Forums And Social
Networks

951

Ingrid Mayeur & Loc Nicolas

Epideictic As A Condition Of Disagreement

961

Johanna Miecznikowski & Elena Musi

Verbs Of Appearance And Argument Schemes: Italian Sembrare As An
Argumentative Indicator

979

Maureen C. Minielli
The Role Of Ethos In Presidential Argument By Definition

986

Gordon R. Mitchell & John Lyne

Argument Operators And Hinge Terms In Climate Science

998

Silvia Modena
Euro: Past Arguments For The Contemporary Debate On European
Currency

1009

Junya Morooka & Tomohiro Kanke

Historical Inquiry Into Debate Education In Early 20th Century Japan:
The Case Of Intercollegiate Debates In Yben

1019

Mika Nakano
The Method Of Peer Evaluation For Argument: The Learning Process Of
Japanese College Students

1030

Douglas Nio & Danny Marrero

The Agentive Approach To Argumentation: A Proposal

1039

Cristian J. Noemi
Reasoning And Argumentative Complexity

1045

Hiroko Okuda
The Legacy Of The U.S. Atomic Superiority, Supremacy And Monopoly:
Dispelling Its Illusion In Barack Obamas Berlin Speech

1052

Paula Olmos
Story Credibility In Narrative Arguments

1058

Fabio Paglieri
On What Matters For Virtue Argumentation Theory

1070

Edward Panetta
Access Denied: Crafting Argumentative Responses To Educational
Restrictions On Undocumented Students In The United States

1080

Sachinidou Paraskevi
Argumentative Strategies In Adolescents School Writing. One Aspect Of
The Evaluation Of Students Written Argumentative Competence

1090

Marijan Pavnik
The Symbolic Meaning Of Radbruchs Formula; Statutory (Non-)Law And
The Argument Of Non-Law

1108

Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont, Francesco Arcidiacono, Stephanie Breux,

Sara Greco & Celine Miserez-Caperos
Knowledge-Oriented Argumentation In Children

1118

Roosmaryn Pilgram
Ethos And Authority Argumentation: Four Kinds Of Authority In Medical
Consultation

1130

Piotr H. Lewinski
Death Penalty For The Down's Syndrome Polish Cultural Symbols In
Discussion About IVF And Abortion

1142

Christian Plantin
A Dictionary Of Argumentation / Un Dictionnaire De LArgumentation

1153

H. Jos Plug
Transparency In Legal Argumentation: Adapting To A Composite
Audience In Administrative Judicial Decisions

1160

Gilbert Plumer
A Defense Of Taking Some Novels As Arguments
1169
Chiara Pollaroli
The Argumentative Relevance Of Rhetorical Strategies In Movie Trailers

1178

Eugen Octav Popa

Suppositions In Argumentative Discussions: A Pragma-Dialectical
Solution For Two Puzzles Concerning Thought Experimentation

1193

John L. Price
Obama And The 2011 Debt Ceiling Crisis: The American Citizen And The
Deliberative Power Of the Bully Pulpit

1202

Pierre-Yves Raccah
Linguistic Argumentation As A Shortcut For The Empirical Study Of
Argumentative Strategies

1211

Chrysi Rapanta & Merce Garcia-Mila

Current Trends In Educational Research On Argumentation. What Comes
After Toulmin?

1224

Henrique Jales Ribeiro

Karl Poppers Influence On Contemporary Argumentation Theory

1233

Georges Roque
Persuasion,Visual Rhetoric And Visual Argumentation

1241

Robert C. Rowland
The Sequester And Debt Ceiling Talks Of 2013: A Case-Study Of The
Liberal Public Sphere

1255

Francisco Javier Ruiz Ortega, Oscar Eugenio Tamayo Alzate &

Conxita Mrquez Bargall
Changes In The Use Of The Question When Teaching To Argue In
Sciences

1267

Marta Rzepecka
Argumentation In Ronald Reagans Presidential Campaign Commercials

1272

Camilla Salas
When Argumentative Discourse Evolves In A Legal Context: A Discursive
Approach Of Formal Testimony In A Swiss Criminal Court

1279

Lineide Salvador Mosca

Conflict And Tension: The Discursive Dissonance At The UN

1289

Benot Sans
Should We Teach Epideictic?

1297

Flemming Schnieder Rhode

Euphoria And Panic Bubbles In Presidential Debate Evaluations

1305

Jan Henning Schulze

Think Twice: Fallacies And Dual-Process Accounts Of Reasoning

1313

Menashe Schwed
Argumentation As A Rational Choice

1320

Marcin Selinger
A Formal Model Of Conductive Reasoning

1331

Harvey Siegel
Argumentative Norms: How Contextualist Can They Be? A Cautionary
Tale

1340

A.F. Snoeck Henkemans & J.H.M. Wagemans

Reasonableness In Context: Taking Into Account Institutional Conventions
In The Pragma-Dialectical Evaluation Of Argumentative Discourse

1350

Viktor Tchouechov
Theory Of Argumentation: The Argumentological Twist Is Necessary

1360

Danile Torck
About An Emotion, Indignation, And Its Argumentation. The Case Of The
Argumentum Ad Selectivum

1369

Assimakis Tseronis, Charles Forceville & Melle Grannetia

The Argumentative Role Of Visual Metaphor And Visual Antithesis In
Fly-On-The-Wall Documentary

1380

Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen & Bert Meuffels

The Disguised Ad Baculum Fallacy Empirically Investigated - Strategic
Maneuvering With Threats

1396

Frans H. van Eemeren

Bingo! Promising Developments In Argumentation Theory

1408

Ekaterina Vargina
Argumentation In Hierarchical And Non-Hierarchical Communication

1429

Zsfia Vrkonyi
Self-Argumentative Words: The Case Of Nature And Natural

1436

Lev Vasilyev
A Cognitive Style Parameter Of Argumentation

1445

Anton Vesper
A Mediator As A Pragma-Dialectical Critical Designer Of Acceptance

1451

Laura Vincze
How To Put It Vaguely

1459

Jacky Visser
A Formal Perspective On The Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Model

1471

Douglas Walton & Marcin Koszowy

Two Kinds Of Arguments From Authority In The Ad Verecundiam Fallacy

1483

Chen Wei
The Possibility Of Visual Argumentation: A Point Of View

1493

Mark Weinstein
Cognitive Science And The Model Of Emerging Truth

1505

David Cratis Williams, Marilyn J. Young & Michael K. Launer

Rule Of Law, Freedom, And Democracy: Domestic And
International Building Blocks Of Contemporary Russian Political
Ideology

1516

Harald R. Wohlrapp
Some Considerations Concerning Pragmatism And Dialectics In
Argumentation Theory

1527

Xiaojing Wu
Consideration On The Notion Of Reasoning

1540

Yun Xie, Dale Hample & Xiaoli Wang

Chinese Understanding Of Interpersonal Arguing: A Cross-Cultural
Analysis

1541

Olena Yaskorska
Recognising Argumentation In Dialogical Context

1555

Marta Zampa
Arguing With Oneself In writing For The News

1567

David Zarefsky
Argumentation In Lincolns Gettysburg Address

1580

Frank Zenker
Denying The Antecedent Probabilized: A Dialectical View

1589

Janja mavc
Interplay Of Implicitness And Authority: Some Remarks On Roman
Rhetorical Ethos

1599

PREFACE

The Eighth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
(ISSA), held in Amsterdam from 1 July to 4 July 2014, drew again more submissions
for presentations than any ISSA Conference before. After a strict selection procedure,
320 scholars were invited to present their papers at the Conference. In addition, the
Conference attracted some 200 interested colleagues and students who attended the
presentations and took part in the discussions.
The 2014 ISSA Conference was, like previous ones, an international meeting place for
argumentation scholars from a great variety of academic backgrounds and traditions,
representing a wide range of academic disciplines and approaches: (speech)
communication, logic (formal and informal), rhetoric (classical and modern),
philosophy, linguistics, (critical) discourse analysis, pragmatics, law, political science,
psychology, education, religious studies, media studies and artificial intelligence.
During the conference, papers were presented on academic argumentation, analogy
argumentation, argument and computation, argument schemes, argumentation and
cognition, argumentation and criticism, argumentation and culture, argumentation and
epistemology, argumentation and ethics, argumentation and finance, argumentation and
media, argumentation and norms, argumentation and probability, argumentation and
religion, argumentation and speech acts, argumentation and style, argumentation in the
public sphere, argumentation structures, argumentative strategies, critical discourse
analysis, critical thinking, debate, definitions, education and learning, empirical
research, ethos and pathos, fallacies, historical backgrounds, interpersonal argument,
legal argumentation, medical argumentation, multimodal argumentation, narrative
argument, political argumentation, political argumentation and national transitions,
political discourse, practical argument, the Perelman approach, the Toulmin approach,
theoretical issues and visual argumentation. In the opinion of the editors, the
Proceedings of the Eighth ISSA Conference reflect the current richness of the
discipline.
The Proceedings of the Conference are published on CD ROM by Rozenberg
Publishers. For the readers convenience, in the Proceedings the papers are arranged in
the alphabetical order of the authors surnames.
The four ISSA board members, Bart Garssen, David Godden, Gordon Mitchell and
Francisca Snoeck Henkemans served as editors of the Proceedings. The editors were
helped in their reviewing by members of the Department of Speech Communication of
the University of Amsterdam. In addition, we received invaluable assistance in
preparing the Proceedings from our research assistant Eugen Popa. We thank him very
much for his help in getting the manuscripts ready for publication. Last but not least, we
would like to thank our publisher Auke van der Berg for the production of these
Proceedings.

For their financial support of the conference, the editors would like to express their
gratitude to the Dutch-Belgian Speech Communication Association (VIOT), the City of
Amsterdam, Springer Academic Publishers, John Benjamins Publishers, the
International Learned Institute for Argumentation Studies (ILIAS), and the Sciential
International Centre for Scholarship in Argumentation Theory (Sic Sat).
20 November 2014

Bart Garssen, ILIAS & University of Amsterdam

David Godden, Old Dominion University
Gordon Mitchell, University of Pittsburgh
Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, ILIAS & University of Amsterdam

Toward Polylogical Analysis Of Argumentation: Disagreement

Space In The Public Controversy About Fracking
Mark Aakhus & Marcin Lewinski
School of Communication and Information
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
USA
aakhus@rutgers.edu
ArgLab, Institute of Philosophy, FCSH
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Portugal
m.lewinski@fcsh.unl.pt

ABSTRACT: This paper offers a new way to make sense of disagreement expansion from a polylogical
perspective by incorporating various places (venues), players (parties), and positions (standpoints) into the
analysis. The concepts build on prior implicit ideas about disagreement space by suggesting how to more
fully account for argumentative context, and its construction, in large-scale complex controversies.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, controversy, deliberation, disagreement space, fracking, polylogue.

1. INTRODUCTION
Deliberation in the contemporary globalized, mediated environment presents an
opportunity for reflecting on method in argument analysis. As we have argued before
(Lewiski & Aakhus, 2014), one key conceptual issue is this: while multi-party and
multi-position argumentation (polylogue) is prevalent, the analytic apparatus in
argumentation studies tends toward dialectical analysis of dyadic disagreements. Such an
analysis is posited on a set of often tacit assumptions about argumentation: it typically
takes place in a fixed and definable setting where two parties (proponent vs. opponent)
exchange reasons and criticisms in order to justify (or refute) some standpoint over which
they disagree. Argumentation is thus presumed to be a communicative activity which
expands along the lines of a disagreement space co-constructed by the two parties
through their argument-relevant speech acts (see Jackson, 1992; van Eemeren et al.,
1993, pp. 95ff.).1
In this paper, we propose how to make sense of disagreement expansion from a
polylogical perspective by incorporating various places (venues), players (parties), and
positions (standpoints) into the analysis. We use a case about transporting oil by train
drawn from the broader controversy about extraction of shale gas and oil resources using
hydraulic fracturing (fracking), to which various players (e.g., companies, federal
1

There is nothing inherent in the disagreement space concept that limits it to the dyadic presumption.
Indeed, a close look at the examples and analysis in van Eemeren et al. (1993), especially chapters 5-7,
suggests that disagreement space is a discourse-centric phenomenon that can incorporate many parties and
positions (see Aakhus & Vasilyeva, 2008). We develop this intuition in our present paper.

regulators, local communities, environmentalists, professional associations) contribute

their conflicting views and arguments. In this way, the controversy develops as a
polylogue, which is discourse (logos) among many (poly), that is, a dia-logue more
complex than simple di-logue (discourse between two) typically used to model and
analyze argumentation (Lewiski, 2014). The paper contributes to argumentation theory
by developing polylogical analysis, which is important for advancing understanding of
large-scale, multi-party argumentation (Aakhus & Lewiski, 2011).
2. ARGUMENTATION ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC CONTROVERSIES OVER ENERGY
PRODUCTION
To see how the dyadic assumptions about argumentation hide the polylogical character of
disagreement expansion in public controversies, we consider some analyses of
argumentation over energy production, as it is a constant source of contemporary public
controversy. The economic, social, political, and environmental impacts of various
technologies (coal, natural gas, oil, nuclear power, hydropower, wind and solar energy,
etc.) are hotly debated between all the parties involved: from producers, distributors, state
regulators, environmental groups, consumers, to local communities affected by energy
production.
A good example of such a controversy extensively analyzed with the tools of
argumentation theory is Royal Dutch Shells involvement in the oil production in Nigeria
in the 1990s (van Eemeren, 2010, Ch. 6; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, 2002;
Johnson, 2002; Leff, 2006; Tindale, 1999, Ch. 5). Among the key issues of this public
debate was Shells cozy relationship with the Nigerian military regime, its lack of
concern for the environment and local communities and, in particular, its alleged
complicity in the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, a prominent Nigerian dissident and
environmental activist. Shell decided to manage these issues by publishing an advertorial
Clear thinking in troubled times in major world newspapers in November 1995 - which
served as the basis for analyses mentioned above.
In their pragma-dialectical analysis, van Eemeren & Houtlosser clearly identify
the complexities of the argumentative situation in this case. Shell addresses the general
public with an attempt to refute the accusations leveled against the company by
campaigners such as Greenpeace. Therefore: Dialectically speaking we have here two
opposing parties Shell and the campaigners and a third party the public that is
supposedly neutral (2002, p. 148). Later, using an updated terminology, van Eemeren
argues that the skeptical general public is Shells primary audience accessed via an
ostensible argument with the oppositional secondary audience, the campaigners. Indeed,
careful management of disagreement with the two is a crucial element in Shells
strategic maneuvering at the confrontation stage (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 169). This is
achieved by dissociating the general public [...] from the campaigners who reacted
against Shells involvement in Nigeria. [...] This strategic separation between the public
and the campaigners has the advantage to Shell that the company can treat the public as a
possible ally (pp. 169-170).
The pragma-dialectical study meticulously analyzes the textual and contextual
elements in Shells advertorial, and precisely reconstructs the structure of its arguments.
Yet, despite openly conceding there are (at least) three parties to the controversy, and that

this fact is one of the main vehicles for Shells strategic maneuvering, pragma-dialectics
still relies on a dyadic model of communication. For instance, in the dialectical profiles
of the reconstructed discussion between Shell and its opponents, the primary audience
the general public merges with the secondary audience the campaigners into a
single category of opponents, presumably to clear room for a dyadic dialectical analysis
(van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 171-173). We see this as a blind spot, which significantly
weakens the purported goal of the entire analysis: the determining of the strategic
function of argumentative moves in this controversy (van Eemeren, 2010, Ch. 6; see
Lewiski & Aakhus, 2014).
What is evident in Shells advertorial is argumentative dynamics that goes beyond
a simple dyadic clash between a proponent and an opponent. There are, instead,
numerous distinct groups which might oppose, doubt, or be concerned with Shells
position. Tindale makes this clear in his analysis of the case: Shell can expect a wide
audience ranging from the hostile to the sympathetic to the indifferent (1999, p. 127).
While the indifferent largely correspond to the neutral general public in van Eemerens
analysis and the hostile are the campaigners, Tindale discusses yet another subgroup
of principal interest for Shells argument: the sympathetic, but concerned members
of the business community, particularly investors in the company, who have an economic
interest in the issue (1999, p. 127). Interestingly, for Tindale, Shells argumentation is
heavily driven by the appeal to the business component of its audience, entirely left out
from van Eemerens study: A bottom-line position that permeates the discourse is that
Shell has no expectation of pulling out from Nigeria. The companys future economic
success in the region rests in part on convincing investors of this. (1999, p. 128).2
With this rhetorically-based analysis, we arrive at an understanding of a
disagreement where at least four parties play a part: Shell, anti-Shell campaigners, Shells
concerned investors, and the general international public. This, arguably, is still a
simplification. One can easily see Shells competitors in the region, the Nigerian
government, potential litigants (Saro-Wiwas family), affected communities in Nigeria,
and legal authorities in Nigeria and Holland (Shells headquarters) as other possible
stakeholders/players/parties in this very controversy.3 If Shells text indeed has been
constructed with care and deliberation (Tindale, 1999, p. 127), then we can reasonably
expect that such (actual or potential) sources of doubt and disagreement have been
carefully and deliberately managed in this one-page message.
The analyses of energy production controversies based on dyadic assumptions
thus hide important complexities of argumentation as it happens in public controversies.
Most notably, there are many players claiming a stake in the production process and its
consequences, which leads to many positions being advanced and refuted in many places
where energy production is carried out and discussed. If we want to analyze and evaluate
2

Johnson (2002, p. 41) and Leff (2006, p. 203, n. 2) both make a similar argument in their analysis of this
case. Indeed, looking from the perspective of the strategic objectives of a modern corporation, the entire
argumentation in Shells advertorial is eventually subordinate to its claim of future economic success.
Shell is addressing various stakeholders with complex argumentation, stating that they are a growing and
socially responsible company which, therefore, is worth dealing with, whether as an investor, government,
business partner, community member, activist, or customer.
3

In an endnote, Tindale himself recognizes that we can imagine other interested subgroups, and mentions
Shells competitors and Nigerian expatriates opposing the government (1999, p. 215, n. 1).

such a controversy for what it is a multi-party dispute, that is, multi-party

argumentative interaction we need a model of such an interaction. We call this model a
polylogue. If the aim of argument analysis is only to assess the rationality of a single
argument or evaluate the maneuvers of a particular arguer, then dyadic assumptions
might suffice. However, public controversies are dynamic, multi-party activities that
unfold over time in a variety of places. Such controversies often take on a particular form
of life that is in turn constitutive of the content, direction, and outcomes of the very
matters and activity that gave rise to the controversy in the first place (e.g. Schn & Rein,
1994). Understanding the logic of an argument or the reasonableness of a particular move
by an actor is necessary but wholly insufficient for establishing an argumentative analysis
of the controversy. What is needed is an argumentative understanding of the logic of the
controversy, which can be developed through analysis of the polylogical expansion of
disagreement.
3. RECONSTRUCTING ARGUMENTATION AS POLYLOGICAL EXPANSION OF
DISAGREEMENT
3.1 Public controversies as polylogues
Some basic assumptions of argumentation theory are still greatly shaped by the way legal
proceedings are conducted a lasting influence that began with Aristotle and was
perpetuated in the work of Toulmin (1958) and Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969).
Argumentation happens in a fixed venue (court of law), has pre-defined rules and a cast
of characters, and amounts to a dyadic clash of two contradictory positions (guilty vs.
innocent in a criminal trial) sustained by two confronting parties (accuser vs. accused).
The analysis of Shells advertorial using the pragma-dialectical model is a good example
of this approach.
We argue that public controversies such as oil production and transportation quite
clearly break these assumptions. The venues are constantly shifting and are strategically
selected, designed, and argued about; players are numerous and fluctuating; and positions
do not amount to a dyadic contradiction but rather involve a set of multiple contrary
standpoints. In this way they become polylogues, that is, dialogues other than simple dilogues, or dyadic interactions. This, in itself, is unremarkable, given that most public
interactions are in fact multilateral. What is remarkable, though, is that argumentation
theory applies its dyadic, legally-inspired models to capture the strategic shape and
rational quality of such polylogues.
Our main argument is that such complex situations quite typical for public
controversies cannot be easily fit into the simple dialectical framework consisting of
an opponent facing a proponent. As we argued before (Lewiski & Aakhus, 2014), it is
possible for some localized episodes of argumentative exchanges, but it does not add up
to an adequate account of the entire multi-party dispute. Similarly, the somewhat static
and asymmetric rhetorical account of an arguer qua speaker facing (possibly multiple)
audience(s) does not do full justice to the interactive discursive dynamics of an ongoing
public dispute of this sort (Lewiski & Aakhus, 2014).

3.2 Activity breakdown and the emergence of argumentation

A breach or breakdown in human activity provides an important point of entry for
argumentation analysis as suggested in the pragmatic theory of argument advanced by
Jackson and Jacobs (e.g. Jacobs, 1989). Argumentation from their perspective is not a
standalone activity or practice but is woven into the very tapestry of communication.
Central to their theory is that argument functions as repair in human activities that is,
argument arises because it functions as a method for repairing the content or process of
some ongoing activity. The activity in which people engage offers the natural grounds for
raising doubts, objections, and disagreement as well as for proof and justification (e.g.
Jackson & Jacobs, 1981). Moreover, the substance and direction of any human activity is
subject to the capacity of participants, and any third-parties or systems, to jointly manage
the shape of the disagreement space through the relevant or digressive design of their
argumentative moves (Jacobs & Jackson, 2006). While Jackson and Jacobs develop their
account within settings of interpersonal argumentation, we find that the insight is
remarkably scalable to any human activity (e.g. Aakhus, 2013).
Our point of entry into our current reflection on method for polylogical analysis is
a news story published in the New York Times on January 25, 2014 entitled Accidents
surge as oil industry takes the train (Krauss & Mouawad, 2014). Unlike Shells
advertorial, this is not a dramatic and carefully crafted piece of rhetoric but instead a
news story reporting on a turning point event. By selecting this text, we move away from
focusing on an exceptional speech or a speaker towards a text that openly reflects on the
social, political, and technical infrastructure that enables large-scale coordinated human
activity. This is important for polylogical analysis, which seeks to articulate not only the
arguments made but the argumentative activity and the function of arguments and
argumentation in human activities. Since the text used here reports a breach or
breakdown in human activity, it provides the analyst a form of infrastructural inversion
where what is otherwise taken-for-granted in human activity as normal and unnoticed is
exposed and made temporarily strange and ready for examination (see Bowker & Star,
1999). Among other important methodological concerns for analyzing argument,
infrastructural inversion is a method for a pragmatic analysis such as advocated by
Jackson and Jacobs. In particular, it draws analytic attention to making visible how
argumentative activity is embedded within broad human activities and how
argumentation shapes and is shaped by the conduct of human activity.
3.3 Exploding trains
Fracking (or: hydraulic fracturing) is a method of extracting natural gas and oil (the so
called shale gas and oil) from deep layers of shale rock. It consists of an older
technology and a new technology. The older technology involves fracturing rock by
injecting high-pressurized liquids (water with added chemicals and sand) and thereby
releasing the gas and oil trapped there. The newer technology involves drilling that can
maneuver in nearly any direction rather than simple vertical drilling of prior eras. This
method has been recently used on a massive scale in the USA, increasing its oil
production by 50% (from 2008 to 2013). This has turned the USA into one of the biggest
gas and oil producers in the world and changed the availability of petroleum resources for

consumption around the world. Because of this, the fracking business has been hailed as
the chief agent of the USAs energy security, a job creator, and provider of cheap energy
to American industry and consumers. Yet concerns remain. There are environmental
hazards (documented cases of water pollution, methane emissions, micro-earthquakes,
etc.), questions about the actual economic impact on local communities, and shifts in
energy policy and investment away from non-carbon based energy sources.
Consequently, there is an ongoing public controversy over frackings economic,
environmental, social, and political impact that stretches from local communities around
extraction sites to USAs oil-driven global politics.
An important but overlooked aspect of shale oil and gas production is its
transportation. Fracking takes place in new areas otherwise disconnected from traditional
oil and gas production pipeline infrastructure. Hence a massive surge in the amount of oil
shipped by rail: from 9,500 carloads in 2008 to 400,000 in 2013 (4,200% more). Not
unexpectedly, rail supplies can hardly keep up with the increasing demand for efficient
and safe large-scale transportation. Tragic accidents occur, such as the explosion of a
train in Quebec, Canada, in July 2013 which killed 47 people. In 2013 alone, there were
more spills than in the entire 1975-2012 period (Krauss & Mouawad, 2014). One of such
major spills occurred in the town of Casselton, North Dakota, on December 30, 2013
where a train carrying crude oil crashed into a derailed grain train causing a major fire
and oil spill. This has been a widely reported accident that further fueled the public
debate about the safety of shale oil production and transportation.
Shale gas and oil production is a massive human undertaking made up of an
interconnected web of activities coordinated through communication across time and
space through many kinds of venues. The text of the news story thus opens up the
landscape of the controversy and makes visible many parties and their beliefs and
opinions about how the transportation of shale oil should be conducted. It is these beliefs
and opinions that get drawn out and into the explicit discourse about transporting oil. The
argumentative activities through which disagreement space around human activity is
expanded and contracted can be understood by examining its possible venues, parties to
the disagreement, and contended positions.
4. ANALYSIS
4.1 Places
The news account reveals many places, or venues, where disagreement about the
transportation of shale oil is managed. The news story provides some insight into and
appreciation of a labyrinth of venues that are connected in more-or-less relevant ways
around the matter of transporting shale oil.
There are five venues that stand out in the account. First, there is reference to
informal public encounters, such as Kerrys Kitchen where residents gather for gossip
and comfort food especially the caramel rolls baked fresh every morning.4 Second, there
is reference to formal closed disciplinary meeting between principal actors in shale oil
4

All quotations in the analysis are from New York Times report Accidents surge as oil industry takes the
train (Krauss & Mouawad, 2014).

transportation: Railroad executives, meeting with the transportation secretary and

federal regulators recently, pledged to look for ways to make oil convoys safer
including slowing down the trains or rerouting them from heavily populated areas.
Third, there is reference to formal private meeting where negotiations between the
industry representatives and regulators take place: After the recent meeting with
regulators, the American Petroleum Institute pledged it would share its own test data
about the oil, which they have said is proprietary. Fourth, there is reference to private,
informal deliberation: Adrian Kieffer, the assistant fire chief, rushed to the accident and
spent nearly 12 hours there, finishing at 3 a.m. When I got home that night, my wife said
lets sell our home and move, he said. And, finally, there is the news story itself which
points to a privately structured public media space for communication about the incident.
While it is not possible to offer an extensive analysis of these venues referred to in
the news story, it is important to note that the juxtaposition of these venues in the account
suggests that there is no one institution, field, sphere, or conversation that defines and
contains the disagreement. Instead we begin to see a complex infrastructure of venues
where those with a stake in the shale oil production and transportation engage each other.
Each venue is a means for argumentation to repair the breakdown in the shale oil
production and transportation caused by the explosion. Each venue suggests
argumentative conduct aimed at the various doubts, differences, and disagreements
brought to life by the derailment and explosion.
While conventional pragmatic analysis of argumentation has begun to take into
account the rules of the settings where argumentation happens by considering the formal
argumentative activity types characteristic of various institutions (e.g. legislative
assemblies in political argumentation), conventional pragmatic analysis treats these as
stable social structures to better understand the arguments and maneuvers of particular
actors within the setting. By contrast, the news account offers an infrastructural inversion
that draws into light the dynamic relationship of venues that is otherwise tacit, taken for
granted, and even hidden from plain sight. From this vantage point, an analyst begins to
see the varying ways disagreement expands through the creative struggle among the
parties to pursue and place argumentation. There are concerns by industry and
government over where best to handle the issues, whether through formal judicial
proceedings or, as in the present case, a private disciplinary meeting among regulators
and industry. This may illustrate a form of venue shopping where parties seek the most
favorable place to handle a difference (e.g., Pralle, 2003). There are concerns by industry
over the information available about oil and gas production and, in the present case, there
may be a form of venue entrepreneurship where some participants seek to strategically
alter some rules of engagement, such as when an industry representative worked with
government to create a site where industry controls the dissemination of official industry
information to stakeholders. Closer analysis of additional background may also reveal
efforts at venue creation where parties seek to create an entirely new place to engage in
argumentation. Thus, venues become part of the argumentation as parties seek to shape
and discipline the pursuit and expansion of disagreement by selecting, altering, or
creating venues for argumentation.

4.2 Players
The initial framing of the controversy in the New York Times news report is noticeably
dyadic. The journalist is clearly trying to put in motion some simple adversary dialectics
between oil producers and their critics: In the race for profits and energy
independence, critics say producers took shortcuts to get the oil to market as quickly as
possible without weighing the hazards of train shipments. Such two-sidedness has
become a landmark of modern journalistic writing as a vehicle for impartiality and
comprehensiveness (Cramer, 2011).
In its entirety, however, the news story reveals a complex network of distinct
players and their multilateral, rather than bilateral, relations: local residents (coffee shop
owner, firefighters), North Dakota state authorities (state governor), federal safety
officials (National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB chair) and regulators (Federal
Railroad Administration, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
Department of Transportation, DoT Secretary), third-parties (former administrator of the
PHMSA, rail transport consultant), and industry groups (Association of American
Railroads, The Railway Supply Institute, American Petroleum Institute). At a certain
level of abstraction, one can of course extract some basic disagreement between the proside (producers) and the contra-side (critics). This, however, is not a level interesting to
an argument analyst who wants to understand the logic behind taking up particular
lines of disagreement, design of arguments and criticisms, as well as constraints and
affordances a given social or institutional role carries. Since these differ, so do different
players positions and arguments. Take for example the difference between federal
safety officials and regulators. The former are tasked with investigating the causes of
accidents and suggesting adequate recommendations. The latter are to develop and
implement concrete and binding regulations, something they do in negotiation with all the
parties involved, including the industry. Regulators might be, then, critics of the
producers but likely in a way different than safety officials are. Similarly, local
residents, who care for the safety and well-being of their communities, cannot be taken to
constitute one argumentative party with the state authorities concerned with having a
sustainable, revenue-generating business at home. The former argue that we should slow
the production, and the trains, down, the latters first priority was improving tank cars
so that, supposedly, they can better serve the burgeoning oil business. Both, then, take up
some disagreement with producers regarding the way oil is produced and transported,
but take it into a markedly different direction.
To conclude, there appears to be no Public or Opponent in the classic rhetorical or
dialectical sense instead, the controversy involves a variety of stakeholders, as
determined by those who call-out and make claims on actions of others.
4.3 Positions
The multilateral network of relations among the players makes it hard to reconstruct this
controversy in dyadic terms also at the level of positions various players defend. Again,
the dyadic tendency of argumentation theory would guide us into seeing it as, basically, a
two-sided disagreement. The main bone of contention would be the activity of shale oil
and gas production. One the one hand, we would get those who claim, Yes, lets frack as

much as we can!, on the other those who would want to ban fracking altogether (clearly,
there are actual players who claim just that arguments of some oil industry actors vs.
radical environmentalists). Then, however, we quickly notice a variety of mediating yes,
but positions: from YES, lets frack, but improve slightly the drilling technology so that
less spills occur to yes, lets conditionally frack BUT ONLY IF other sources of energy
are unavailable. The disagreement space becomes populated with all kinds of
incompatible positions and arguments that do not easily fit the simple pro-con divisions.
The New York Times report indeed reveals a complex, polylogical network of
disagreements on the issue of transporting oil by train. The Railway Supply Institute, an
industry group representing freight car owners, defends their current practices by
maintaining that existing cars already provide substantial protection in the event of a
derailment. This position is challenged by another industry group, Association of
American Railroads (companies that manage the railroads). According to them, tank cars
should be retrofitted with better safety features or aggressively phased out. Their
arguments for this position seem purely prudential without safer transportation, oil
business will not grow as expected; in the words of a former administrator of the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration: Producers need to understand that railcar safety can become an impediment to production. Additionally, as other third-party
consultants claim, railroads and car owners can no longer ignore the liabilities associated
with oil trains, which could reach $1 billion in the Quebec accident.
Now, these disagreements within the oil transportation business are just a side
dish in the broader controversy. The main courses are made of opposition from
government, local communities, as well as environmentalists (not referred to in this very
report). Federal safety officials have warned for more than two decades that these cars
were unsuited to carry flammable cargo, and their arguments are based in concerns over
citizens and environmental safety, rather than prosperous business. Finally, local
communities have a distinct position of their own: because they need now to restore
shattered calm and confidence, [m]ost people [in Casselton] think we should slow the
production, and the trains, down. They thus question not just the technical details of
production and transportation, but rather the very rationale for these activities. This puts
their position in opposition to all the above-mentioned, including the federal officials who
might not be doing enough to protect the common people.
In this way, disagreement is not limited to contradiction. Accordingly, the
expansion of disagreement space is not limited to a dyadic dynamics between two
contradictions; instead, it involves a polylogical network of multilateral relations.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we highlight how to make sense of disagreement expansion from a
polylogical perspective by incorporating various places (venues), players (parties), and
positions (standpoints) into the analysis. By articulating positions, disagreement
expansion can be seen as something generated by players attempting to manage an
interconnected web of commitments relative to their multilateral relations to others.
Disagreement is not limited to contradiction. By articulating players, disagreement
expansion can be seen as co-constructed through the calling-out actions of multiple
players and the anticipation of being called-out. Disagreement is not limited to

contending with one other party and thus argumentative strategy is not limited to message
design but is opened to communication design as it is found in the variety of instruments
for communication which parties develop to manage their role in a complex web of
relationships. By articulating venues, disagreement expansion can be seen as something
that happens through a network of communicative activities that develops in the course of
managing broader human activities. The content, strategies, and parties to argumentation
are not necessarily limited to the demands of one kind of communicative activity but are
often relevant to and implicated in other communicative activities in the network.
Disagreement is not limited to one given, fixed place but finds its way into a variety of
places and often motivates the reconfiguring or invention of places for argumentation.
Thus, by articulating the polylogical expansion of disagreement space, argumentation
analysis can engage the logic of controversies rather than taking context to be given or
treating it as static for other analytic aims.
While disagreement space has been treated as a dialectical product from a dyadic
perspective, the original conceptualization affords a polylogical analysis. It is not an
inherently dyadic concept and the concept needs to be developed to address complex,
contemporary argumentation. By introducing particular analytic concepts (positions,
players, and places) for reconstructing disagreement expansion, we are suggesting that
the reconstruction of argumentation can more fully take into account the infrastructure for
communication, which makes argumentation possible, at a variety of scales. Moreover,
we are articulating a means to account for how argumentative contexts are constructed
and become a conscious target for strategic construction in order to shape human sensemaking about broad human activities. For those interested in moving argumentation
analysis beyond the assessment of a single argument or the evaluation of the maneuvers
of a particular arguer, such conceptual and methodological considerations are needed (see
Aakhus, 2013; Aakhus & Lewiski, 2011; Lewiski & Aakhus, 2014).

REFERENCES
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Aakhus M., & Lewiski, M. (2011). Argument analysis in large-scale deliberation. In E. Feteris, B.
Garssen, & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Keeping in Touch with Pragma-Dialectics (pp. 165
183). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Aakhus, M., & Vasilyeva, A. (2008). Managing disagreement space in multiparty deliberation. In F. H. van
Eemeren & B. Garssen (Ed.), Controversy and Confrontation: Relating Controversy Analysis with
Argumentation Theory (pp. 197-214). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Bowker, G. C., & Star, S. L. (1999). Sorting things out: Classification and its consequences. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Cramer, P. A. (2011). Controversy as news discourse. Springer: Dordrecht.
Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1993). Reconstructing argumentative
discourse. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (1999). Strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse. Discourse
Studies, 1(4), 479497.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic manoeuvring: Maintaining a delicate balance. In F.
H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and Rhetoric: The Warp and Woof of
Argumentation Analysis (pp. 131159). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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Jackson, S. (1992). Virtual standpoints and the pragmatics of conversational argument. In F.H. van
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Jacobs, S. (1989). Speech acts and arguments. Argumentation, 3(4), 345-365.
Jacobs, S., & Jackson, S. (1981). Argument as a natural category: The routine grounds for arguing in
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Jacobs, S., & Jackson, S. (2006). Derailments of argumentation: It takes two to tango. In P. Houtlosser &
M. A. van Rees (Eds.), Considering Pragma-Dialectics (pp. 121-133). Mahwah: Lawrence
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Leff, M. (2006). Rhetoric, dialectic, and the functions of argument. In P. Houtlosser & M. A. van Rees
(Eds.), Considering Pragma-Dialectics (pp. 199-210). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Lewiski, M. (2014). Argumentative polylogues: Beyond dialectical understanding of fallacies. Studies in
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11

Dont Feed The Trolls: Straw Men And Iron Men

Scott Aikin & John Casey
Department of Philosophy
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN 37240
USA
Department of Philosophy
Northeastern Illinois University
5500 N.St.Louis
Chicago, IL 60625
USA

ABSTRACT: The straw man fallacy consists in inappropriately constructing or selecting weak (or
comparatively weaker) versions of the opposition's arguments. We will survey the three forms of straw men
recognized in the literature, the straw, weak, and hollow man. We will then make the case that there are
examples of inappropriately reconstructing stronger versions of the opposition's arguments. Such cases we
will call iron man fallacies.
KEYWORDS: Iron man fallacy, Straw man fallacy, Weak man fallacy

1. INTRODUCTION
As some of recent work has shown, there is more to the problem of straw manning than
the distortion of an opponents argument. Some forms of straw man, such as the weak
man, rely on accurate, even scrupulously accurate, depictions of arguments for criticism.
Other forms, such as the hollow man do not actually involve representations of anyones
actual argument or view. Nonetheless, these strategies, and others to be discussed here,
are dialectically problematic for much of the same reasons the distortion form of straw
man is, in that they, to use some metaphorical language, misrepresent the dialogical lay of
the land. We will argue here that two further features complete the account of the
fallaciousness of the straw man: (1) a move to close the argument with the straw man
victim (and those with similar views) and (2) a move to paint the straw man victim as
unworthy of being taken seriously. What makes the varieties of straw man fallacious can
also be used to show that not all forms of straw men arguments ought to be considered
fallacious. Finally, the considerations that distinguish fallacious from non fallacious
straw men also uncover a related phenomenon, iron manning, or the practice of making
an opponents argument stronger than it is. We will argue that there are both appropriate
and fallacious versions of this tactic.
2. VARIETIES OF THE STRAW MAN
Our aim in this section is to show that (1) there is a variety to the straw man, (2) theres
more involved in the phenomenon than manipulation of commitments ploys, and (3) that
non fallacious, but formally identical variations of each of these forms exist.

12

2.1 The representational form of straw man

Lets call the textbook form of the straw man the representational form. This consists
in the first instance distortion of an opponents argument, followed by a decisive
refutation. Consider:
APA
Philo: A lot of people have suggested that the American Philosophical
Association amend the practically obligatory Eastern APA interview
on account of the expense, inconvenience, and stress for all involved.
Sophia: Come now Philo, I hardly think that completely abandoning the
system is desirable, so we ought to reject their suggestions.
APA meets the basic schematic requirements for the straw man in that we have (1) two
arguers and (2) criticism of one by the other. We can also tell that the criticism here
hinges on the representation of the first arguers position. The first arguer maintains that
the APA ought to amend the Eastern APA hiring process because it is expensive,
inconvenient, and stressful for everyone. But the second arguer attacks a related, but
substantially different claim, namely that abandoning the system is ridiculous. Philo not
suggested that the system be completely abandoned; rather, she has suggested that the
APA amend the process. Sophia has misrepresented Philo's view, and dismissed the
misrepresentation as weak.
2.2 The weak man
Consider another variation of the straw man argument. Call it the weak man. In its broad
outlines, the weak man consists in (1) selecting the weakest of an opponents actual
arguments, (2) actually defeating it, and (3) then drawing or implying deeper conclusions
about the argument or the arguer in question. Consider the following exchange:
Locavorism
Serenity: The culinary and ecological movement known as locavorism
maintains that favoring sustainably and ethically raised local and
seasonal produce is superior to the more dominant industrial model.
After all, it does not depend on petroleum-intensive fertilizer, its not
transported across the country (or the world in many cases), and it
sustains local agricultural economies.
Archer: The claims of the locavorism movement are ludicrous, the alleged
fuel savings in food transportation amount to very little if any overall
petroleum savings. Locavorism is loco.
In this case, the locavore maintains that a number of different reasons independently and
convergently support the single conclusion that locavorism is a wiser policy than high
intensity industrial agriculture. The critic singles out one of them, the alleged fuel
savings, and refutes it, implying he has dealt a blow to the argument as a whole. The
locavorism critic might even have an especially decisive and sound argument, but even

13

granted that, much would remain to consider in favor of locavorism. The weak manner
hopes to exaggerate the importance of the weak argument, but barring that, he can focus
critical scrutiny on the ideological fellow travelers of the person making the weak
argument
2.3 The hollow man
In a third variation of the straw man, one invents an entirely fictitious and decisively silly
position, attributes it to a purportedly real, but vaguely defined opponent, knocks it
down, and thereby suggests the opposition isnt worthy of rational discussion. The tell
for this version of the straw man, is often the infamous some say or some might say
phrase that obscures the identity and therefore absolves the speaker of the charge of lying.
Many of you are likely familiar with the controversy surrounding Rush Limbaugh's
tendency to make jarring remarks. Unsurprisingly many have rushed to his defense.
Among them was the Wall Street Journals Peggy Noonan:
Peggy Noonan
Why would the left be worse? Let me be harsh. Some left-wing men think they
can talk like this because they're on the correct side on social issues such as
abortion. Their attitude: I backed you on the abortions you want so much, I
opposed a ban on partial birth. Hell, I'll let you kill kids at any point until they're
15, I'm cool. And that means I can call women in public life t - s, right?
Because, you know, I think of them that way. (WSJ 3/16/2012)
Like the weak man, the hollow man does not involve distorting any argument so much as
inventing an entirely new one. In this example, Noonan does not bother to identify the
bearer of the view other than to say that some left-wing men think this.
3. ARE THERE LEGITIMATE USES OF THE STRAW MAN?
The various schemes of straw men are defined by the way one arguer represents the
views of another: badly, selectively, or falsely. The question is whether one can badly,
selectively, or falsely represent someones views without being guilty of fallacy.
Consider: it would be very hard to teach philosophy without employing some
variation on the straw man scheme frequently and energetically. With regard to this
reason, Ribiero notes that (2008) that distortions formally identical to straw man
distortions occur frequently in the classroom from pedagogical need: (1) historical
interest, (2) pedagogical ease, (3) and practical availability. There seems, in fact, to be an
intuitive case for using the various schemes of the straw man pedagogically.
Representational straw men might be employed to drive home particular pedagogical
points. A teacher of music, for instance, might exaggerate the bad habit of her music
student:
Music Teacher
Music teacher to student: you need to work on your intonation. At the moment it
sounds like a tortured cat.

14

The teacher has distorted the students behavior by hyperbole, but the point is to fix the
students awareness on her poor intonation. A similar case might be made for the other
two straw man ploys. A weak man might be used as practice.
Gay Marriage
Brad: Ive heard quite a number of arguments against gay marriage in the
conservative press lately.
Angelina: I have too. I heard one particularly bad one from a blogger at
RedState.com:he argued that if homosexuals are allowed to marry,
nothing would prevent him from marrying his box turtle.
Brad: Wow, thats hilarious.
In this example, Brad signals that there are several arguments against gay marriage. We
can imagine that some are better than others. Angelina responds by attacking what is
likely to be weakest of them, a kind of textbook version of the slippery slope fallacy.
Answering it first improves further discussion.
For a hollow man case, continue our pedagogical consideration. Open just about
any introductory logic text, and one will find the exercise sections full of arguments few
sensible people would make (though we're often disabused of this notion). Its just easier,
however, to do it this way, for the point of the fallacy exercise is to get at the form of
argument, not to pin failings on specific people.
Though all of these examples fit the straw man ploy in its various forms, none of
them are in our view fallacious. In Music Teacher, the instructor attacks an exaggerated
version of the students performance to highlight a difficult to appreciate pedagogical
point. In Gay Marriage, Angelina goes straight for the weakest of the arguments for the
anti-gay marriage position, and so weak mans that view. But she does not draw the
inference that this view is representative of the best of the opposition. Weak manning
sometimes serves the dialectical purpose of clearing away weak arguments, which
nonetheless may have a lot of adherents, and which nonetheless occupy much in demand
dialectical space.
These representative, but non fallacious, straw man ploys highlight two important
features about what makes most straw man arguments fallacious in the first place. The
fallaciousness does not primarily consist in the distortion of someone elses argument (as
in the representational straw man), in the purposeful selection of the weakest of
someones arguments (as in the weak man), or finally in the invention of weak arguments
or arguers (as in the hollow man); all of these can be very useful dialectical tools. What
makes these tactics fallacious is how they are deployed. The varieties of straw man are
fallacious if they are deployed (1) to close off argument prematurely and (2)
illegitimately impugn an opposing arguers competence. So, for instance, the hollow man
is fallacious when one makes up an idiotic argument, knocks it down, in order to suggest
that the opposition, however vaguely defined, lacks sufficient critical skill, as in the
Peggy Noonan example above. Such peoples views are unserious and not worthy of
further consideration. The other two examples show a similar tendency to tar the target
with an accusation of a bad argument. In APA, the arguer is alleged to have made an
extreme suggestion; in Locavorism, the arguer is alleged to be insufficiently reflective or

15

to associate with insufficiently reflective people.

4. IRON MANNING
If what makes the varieties of straw men fallacious is their exclusionary, or closing,
function, then it is easier to distinguish fallacious cases of straw manning from non
fallacious ones.
The fallaciousness of strawman arguments is indexed to context. Views or
arguments that warrant careful consideration in one situation may not deserve them in
another. This means at times it may be permissible (and necessary) to exclude some
views from consideration on the basis of cursory arguments. In other words, while
fallacious straw men involve the exclusion of arguments or arguers from justly deserved
consideration, in light of the function of the straw man to distort over time, there is good
reason to think that unreasonably or overly charitable interpretations of arguments (of
arguers) can also qualify as fallacious. Its certainly fallacious, in other words, to distort
a persons argument in order more easily to it knock down (and malign the person as a
competent arguer); however, by parity of reasoning, a charitable distortion to present an
unserious arguer as serious is equally problematic. We call this the iron man. Consider
the following cases.
4.1 Eric Cantor
Eric Cantor is the Republican Majority Whip in the House of Representatives. In an
interview with Leslie Stahl on CBS's 60 Minutes (1/1/2012), Stahl asked Cantor to square
the fact that Ronald Reagan raised taxes during a recession with the current Republican
Party view--allegedly inspired by Reagan--that taxes ought never to be raised. In
response, Cantor denied that Reagan ever raised taxes. His spokesperson interrupted the
interview, alleging that Stahl did not have her facts straight. She did. Coming to Cantor's
defense, one blogger (Jim Hoft) made the following claim:
Stahl, was not being honest. When Ronald Reagan took office, the top individual
tax rate was 70 percent and by 1986 it was down to only 28 percent. All
Americans received at least a 30 percent tax rate cut. Democrats like to play with
the numbers to pretend that Reagans [sic] tax increases equalled [sic] his tax cuts.
Of course, this is absurd.
Unfortunately, Steve Benen at the Washington Monthly continued to
misrepresent Reagans record on tax cuts. Its just soooo difficult for liberals to
understand that tax cuts work. Sad.
Notice that Hoft has offered a different and (much more defensible) view on behalf of
Cantor: on aggregate, taxes were lower after Reagan's years in office than before. This
was not the point under consideration. The net effect of this is to distort the proper
evaluation of Cantors claim and Stahls criticism.

16

4.2 Westboro Baptist Church

The Westboro Baptist Church is known for demonstrating at the funerals of fallen
soldiers. At their protests, they hold up signs alleging that the death of the person is
Gods punishment for the tolerance of homosexuality in America. In light of this,
consider the following exchange.
Sally: The Westboro Baptist Church boycotted my local synagogue, carrying
signs that say God hates fags. Their views are patently ridiculous; far
from even the fringe of conservative Christianity. People should just ignore them.
Priscilla: Yes, but arent they really suggesting that our fate as a nation is
bound up with the moral fibre of the American people? As we lose our
sense of commitment, steadfastness, and courage, we will not realize our plans.
Priscilla raises some interesting points, but they are vaguely related to the actual content
of the Westboro Churchs protests and Sallys objection. The question is whether these
particular arguments from the Westboroites deserve consideration. And so iron-manning
can be an occasion for broader discussion, but one iron mans so that we do not have to
discuss this particular argument.
4.3 Philosophy student I
We have discussed above how teaching philosophy to undergraduates often depends on
strategically employed, non-fallacious straw men. As it is necessary sometimes to straw
man views, it is also necessary to iron man the students view. With this in mind, imagine
the following teacher-student exchange.
Alfredo: Rawls Original Position seems impossible to me. I mean, how are we
to know what sorts of things well be interested in if we dont know anything
about ourselves?
Professor Zoccolo: Thats an interesting point, Alfredo, youre suggesting that
Rawlss Original Position does not take cognizance of how we are constituted by
our social relations. Thinking them through abstractly seems problematic.
Alfredos view certainly trends communitarian, but it would be a stretch to suggest that
this is what he meant. Unlike the previous cases, however, iron-manning Alfredo shows
him how to improve his contributions to the discussion.
4.4 Philosophy student II
The norm of iron-manning student views can yield good results. It shows students how
to improve their thoughts. However, it can yield classroom disaster, as it can encourage
more poorly stated views. Iron-manning the student makes it such that the teacher does
the work in crafting the views. Moreover, time in the classroom is too short to take all

17

the off-the-wall views seriously. Sometimes, iron-manning undercuts a serious

classroom. Consider:
Professor Barleycorn: Descartes argument in the First Meditation is that very
little of what we take ourselves to know securely is certain. It may all be a dream.
Or it may all be an illusion of a very powerful demon.
Bradley: Dude! I had a dream like that one night that I was in the clutches of
an evil demon. And he made me do things like terrible things to chickens.
And then, when I woke up it was all true. The terrible stuff to chickens stuff,
that is. That was all after I drank too much cough syrup with my beers. Did DayCart have a Robitussin problem?
Bradley is way off base. For sure, his weird story deserves a moment of reply, but it is
best for all involved that a lengthy analysis of Bradleys views on the matter arent
devoted class time. Some views are best left unexamined. Next time, Bradley should
read. And lay off the syrup.
5. DISCUSSION
From these cases, the basic form of iron man argumentation can be discerned. First, as a
dialectical form, the iron man requires two speakers, A and B. A proposes some
argument a and/or some position p. But a and p are not defensible. B takes up with As
case with a reconstruction, a* and p*, that given the state of dialectical play are
(comparatively more) defensible. Often this strategy is done for the sake of an onlooking
audience, C, which may be interested in As views or the issue of whether that p. So far,
again, we can see that there is a dialectical distortion, just as there is with straw-manning,
but instead of degrading the opponents argument (as with the straw man), the opponents
case is improved. Hence our term iron man.
There are compelling epistemic reasons to regularly iron man ones opposition, as
the truth will come out in contexts of maximally responsible and detailed argumentation.
Since our epistemic objectives in argument are truth and its understanding, the most
intellectually robust opponent is the best, and if one does not encounter but must
construct such an opponent, then so be it. Moreover, there are ethical (and political)
reasons why iron-manning may be appealing. At its core, iron-manning is a form of
interpreting others communicative acts with charity. The demands of recognition, further,
for underrepresented groups obtain so that their interests can be heard and have effect.
Iron-manning is in the service of this. Finally, again, there are pedagogical reasons why
iron-manning may be required.
So what, then, could be wrong with iron-manning? We hold that there is a fallacy
of inclusion for the same reason that there is a fallacy of exclusion.
Let us return to the cases. As we saw with Philosophy Student II, there are
pedagogical reasons why iron-manning can be objectionable, as the point of class
discussion is for students to improve their own views, not having it done for them. It is
here that we begin to see the trouble with some forms of iron-man: in taking some poorly
articulated views seriously, improving them and submitting them to scrutiny, one makes

18

an investment of time and intellectual energy. The trouble is that there are many
investments that are unwise. Consider, further, a feature of discussion after content
presentation. There is evidence now that suggests that rude or irrelevant online
comments after a posting or story actually distort reading comprehension of the original
piece. That is, the more comments that dont get the original point you are exposed to or
the more rude comments in the discussion thread, the less likely it is that you will,
afterwards, correctly recall the details of the posting. This is now being called, The
Nasty Effect. Derailed discussion not only is a waste of time, but it is miseducation.
Now consider the strategic use of iron-manning with the Eric Cantor case. The
trouble is not with improving the view per se, but with the way the improvement is
deployed. In this case, (a) the iron man is presented as Cantors view, and (b) thereby it is
used as evidence that Stahl is (and liberals generally are) fact challenged. But this is a
distortion not only of Cantors position, but of Stahls, too. By iron-manning Cantor, one
straw-mans Stahl, his critic. Her criticisms now seem off-target and ill-informed, when
they, in fact, were not.
These two elements of iron-manning converge. When one iron mans a poorly
presented view, one may encourage those who have posed the view by taking them
seriously, and thereby impugn their critics. Again, sometimes this is appropriate, as some
views need time and patience for their development and some speakers require maximal
charity in interpreting their communicative acts. But sometimes it is inappropriate, as
one can be held hostage by these speakers. On blog comment threads and chatboards,
there are many who are uninformed and contribute with unhinged criticism. They are out
to hijack discussion, to hold forth, to be the center of attention. These are, in internet
lingo, trolls. Taking the trolls seriously, interpreting them with charity, and responding to
them thoughtfully yields only grief. One must not feed the trolls.
Indeed, too often philosophers and informal logicians overlook the fact we very
often find ourselves having to evaluate just this argument from this arguer, even if this
argument could be stronger, or this arguer could use some help. We have argued here that
even charitable alterations of arguments or arguers distort the dialectical landscape are
often unacceptable, for exactly the same reason why straw-manning is unacceptable.
The only difference is that the straw man excludes arguments worth listening to; the iron
man includes arguments not worth listening to. In all, weve identified a few rough
criteria for knowing when iron-manning is fallacious:
1. When it is clear that the argument to be reconstructed is not likely to be either relevant
or successful.
2. When it is clear that the improvement of and response to the argument will take more
time than is allotted, and there are other, more clearly salient, issues.
3. When, even if 1 & 2 do not obtain (that is, when there may be something relevant and
there is plenty of surplus time and energy), it is clear that responding to this speaker
under these circumstances encourages further badly formed arguments.
4. When the positive reconstruction of the argument (iron man) in question yields misportrayal of the arguments prior critics as attacking a straw man.
This rough set of criteria are, in the end, an overlap of (a) issues in cognitive economy
(maximizing epistemic efficiency), and (b) issues in maintenance of a properly run

19

dialectical field. We hold 1&2 are epistometric questions, and 3&4 are dialectical
questions. Hence, the basic thought that sometimes feeding the trolls is (a) a waste of
time and energy, and (b) it ultimately isnt anything but bad for the way we argue.
6. CONCLUSION
We have argued in this paper that the dialectical phenomenon known as straw manning is
much more varied than many accounts suggest. In the first place, straw manning
involves more than simple distortion. It also includes forms of selection (weak manning)
and invention (hollow manning). Second, not all instances of straw manning are
fallacious. Finally, and somewhat ironically, charitable variations on an argument suffer
from the same failings as fallacious straw men, though their mistake lies in the inclusion
of arguments deserving of exclusion.

REFERENCES
Aikin, Scott and John Casey. (2011). Straw Men, Weak Men, and Hollow Men. Argumentation, 25, 87-105.
CBS News, 60 Minutes . (2012). Interview with Eric Cantor. http://www.cbsnews.com/830118560_162-57348499/the-majority-leader-rep-eric-cantor/?tag=contentMain;cbsCarousel
Bizer, George Y., Kozak, Sirel M., and Holterman, Leigh Ann (2009). The Persuasiveness of the
Straw Man Rhetorical Technique. Social Influence, 4, 216-230.
Drum,Kevin. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2006_08/009324.php
Elliot, Deborah. (2011). "GOP Splits up for Weekend Conferences." NPR Weekend Edition.

http://www.npr.org/2011/06/18/137265773/gop-splits-up-for-weekendconferences
Govier, Trudy (1997). A Practical Study of Argument, 4e. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Lewinksi, Marcin (2011). Towards a Critique-Friendly Approach to Straw Man Fallacy
Evaluation. Argumentation, 25, 469497
Ribeiro, Brian (2008). How Often Do We (Philosophy Professors) Commit the Straw man
Fallacy? Teaching Philosophy, 31, 27-38.
Talisse, Robert and Scott Aikin (2008). Two Forms of the Straw Man.Argumentation, 20, 34552.
Talisse, Robert and Yvonne RaleY (2008). Getting Duped: How the Media Messes with Your
Mind. Scientific American Mind. January/February.
Tindale, Christopher (2007). Fallacies and Argument Appraisal. Cambridge University Press.
Van Eemeren, Frans, Rob Grootendorst, and Francisca Snoeck Henkenmans (2002).
Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Van Eemeren, Frans, Rob Grootendorst (2004.) A Systematic Theory of Argumentation.
Cambridge University Press.
Van Eemeren, Frans, Rob Grootendorst (1992). Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies.
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Van Eemeren, Frans and Houtlosser, Peter (2007). The Contextuality of Fallacies. Informal
Logic, 27, 59-67.
Van Laar, Jan Albert (2008). Room for Maneuver When Raising Critical Doubt. Philosophy
and Rhetoric, 41, 195-211.
Walton, Douglas (1989.) Informal Logic. Cambridge University Press.
Walton, Douglas (1996). The Straw Man Fallacy. Logic and Argumentation. Ed. Johan van
Bentham, Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, and Frank Veltman. Amsterdam: Royal
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, North Holland. 115-28.
Walton, Douglas (1998). Ad Hominem Arguments. University of Alabama Press.

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Walton, Douglas and Fabrizio Macagno (2010). Wrenching from Context: The Manipulation of
Commitments. Argumentation, 24, 283317
Walton, Douglas and Krabbe, Eric (1995). Commitment in Dialogue. Albany: State University of
New York Press.
Walton, Douglas; Reed, Chris; Macagno, Fabrizio (2008). Argumentation Schemes. Cambridge
University Press.

21

The Very Idea Of Ethical Arguments

Derek Allen
Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5R 2M8
derekallen@trinity.utoronto.ca

ABSTRACT: If non-cognitivism is true, an ethical argument cannot be a sequence of propositions as

traditionally understood. I take steps towards developing an account of ethical argument that, as far as it goes,
is, I believe, compatible with a particular version of non-cognitivism, namely expressivism.
KEY WORDS: attitudinal consistency, attitudinal relevance, attitudinal validity, cogency, expressivism, noncognitivism, propositionalism.

1. INTRODUCTION
I begin with an account of non-cognitivism:
According to non-cognitivism, there are no moral facts or truths. Moral judgements dont attempt
to, and dont ever, state facts. Their purpose isnt to describe any sort of moral reality. Instead, they
serve as expressive vehicles, primarily giving vent to our emotions, prescribing courses of action, or
expressing our non-cognitive commitments. As such, they arent the sort of things fit to be considered
either true or false. (Shafer-Landau, 2003, p. 18)
[F]or non-cognitivists, there is nothing that can make moral judgments true no moral facts or
moral reality that they could possibly correctly represent, nothing they are true of (ibid., p. 20, note 8).
Starting from the idea that there is no moral reality that agents are trying to appreciate or depict in
their moral judgements, non-cognitivists have analyzed such judgements as the expression of noncognitive states (ibid., p. 153).

This last point is worth emphasizing. Non-cognitivists dont start with the claim that
moral judgments are expressive vehicles; rather, their expressive analysis of moral
judgments is their alternative to the view that the purpose of moral judgments is to describe
some sort of moral reality, and is motivated by their metaphysical claim that there is no such
reality.
If, as non-cognitivism holds, moral judgments (or ethical judgments I will use
these terms interchangeably) are neither true nor false, then they arent propositions as
traditionally understood, for as traditionally understood a proposition is either true or false,
and this is the view I will take here.
If ethical judgments arent propositions, then ethical arguments arent arguments in
what Woods, Irvine, and Walton (2004) call the narrow sense, namely sequences of
propositions, one of which is the arguments conclusion, the rest of which are the
arguments premisses (p. 2). There are more than a few textbooks which take arguments as
such to be propositional. If arguments as such are propositional, then ethical arguments are
22

impossible if noncognitivism is true. On one view, this is a problem for textbooks that take
arguments as such to be propositional; on another view, its a problem for non-cognitivism.
The philosopher Michael Smith takes it to be a problem for non-cognitivism. In a
critique of the non-cognitivism of moral irrealists (who deny that there are beliefindependent moral truths), he says that the whole business of moral argument and moral
reflection only makes sense on the assumption that moral judgments are truth-assessable
(Smith, 1993, p. 403). Now it certainly seems that moral judgments are truth-assessable, for
it makes sense to say of a moral judgment such as slavery is wrong that it is true that
slavery is wrong, or that it is false that slavery is wrong. Thus, the philosopher Simon
Blackburn, who is a highly sophisticated non-cognitivist, speaks of what he calls the
propositional grammar of ethics (Blackburn, 1985, p. 6). If moral judgments dont express
propositions, then their propositional grammar is misleading. Suppose it is misleading, and
that non-cognitivism is true. Are ethical arguments nevertheless possible? In this paper, I
will develop an account of ethical argument that, as far as it will go, is, in my view,
compatible with what I will take to be a particular version of non-cognitivism, namely
expressivism.
2. EXPRESSIVISM AND PROPOSITIONALISM
According to Parfit (2011), moral expressivists hold that [w]hen we claim that some act is
wrong, we are not intending to say something true, but are expressing our disapproving
attitude toward such acts (p. 380). In more general terms, expressivism, as I will understand
it, holds that the utterance of a moral judgment is the expression of an attitude.1 (I will make
this characterization more precise below.) Further, since expressivism (as I understand it) is
a version of non-cognitivism, its analysis of (the utterance of) moral judgments is motivated
by the (non-cognitivist) claim that there are no moral facts and no moral reality that moral
judgments purport to describe.
I will follow Alex Grzankowski (2012) in taking attitudes to be intentional mental
states and in taking a mental state (or other phenomenon) to be intentional if (and only if) it
is about something (p. 4). Some, if not all, attitudes are propositional. Propositional
attitudes are intentional mental states which have propositions for their objects (ibid., p. 5).
According to Grzankowski, theorists interested in intentional states have focused
almost exclusively on [propositional attitudes], some even explicitly maintaining that all
intentional states are propositional attitudes (ibid., p. 1). If attitudes are intentional mental
states, and if all intentional states are propositional attitudes, then all attitudes are
propositional; if this is the case, and if the (sincere) utterance of a moral judgment is the
expression of an attitude, then the object of the attitude expressed is a proposition. But
expressivists (qua non-cognitivists) will say (and here I make more precise my initial
characterization of expressivism) that the attitude expressed in the sincere utterance of a
moral judgment is neither true nor false, and so its object is not a proposition as traditionally
understood. Accordingly, expressivists must either hold that not all attitudes are
1

I take prescriptivism to be a different version of non-cognitivism. Prescriptivism holds that moral judgments
have a prescriptive meaning and a descriptive meaning, and that in virtue of their prescriptive meaning they
prescribe or guide conduct. Prescriptivists can allow that prescriptions express attitudes, and expressivists can
allow that attitudes can be expressed in the form of prescriptions, so there can be common ground between
prescriptivists and expressivists.

23

propositional, or grant that all attitudes are propositional but claim that the object of a
propositional attitude, though it must be a proposition, need not be a proposition as
traditionally understood. I wont consider the second of these options, but I will say
something about the first.
If not all attitudes are propositional, then some attitudes are intentional states whose
objects are not propositions. Thus, to take an example of Grzankowskis, if liking is a nonpropositional attitude, and if a subject likes Sally the object of his attitude is not a
proposition concerning Sally, nor does his standing in a liking relation to Sally depend upon
a propositional attitude (ibid., p. 5).
The view that, on the contrary, all attitudes are propositional, Grzankowski calls
propositionalism. Propositionalists hold that the most fundamental objects of the attitudes
are propositions (ibid., pp. 2-3). Grzankowski distinguishes two versions of
propositionalism. Version A holds that [f]or every attitudinal relation between a subject
and a non-propositional object, there is a propositional attitude or attitudes (of that subjects)
in terms of which it can be analysed (ibid., p. 7). Version B holds that [f]or every
attitudinal relation between a subject and a non-propositional object, there are propositional
attitudes (of that subjects) upon which it supervenes (ibid.).
Grzankowski challenges both versions of propositionalism. He argues that there are
attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do so not in virtue of
relating them to propositions (ibid., p. 1). Examples of such attitudes include loving,
liking, hating, and fearing, though there are probably many more (ibid.). Expressivists will
say that the sincere utterance by a subject of a positive (negative) moral evaluation of a nonpropositional object expresses a positive (negative) attitude (of the subjects) towards the
object. For expressivists who think that not all attitudes are propositional (and I will mean
all and only such expressivists when I speak of expressivists hereafter) the philosophical
issue (following Grzankowski) is whether, for every such attitudinal relation between a
subject and a non-propositional object, (a) there is a propositional attitude (of that subjects)
in terms of which the relation can be analyzed, or (b) there are propositional attitudes (of
that subjects) upon which the relation supervenes.
Expressivists must reject (a), for it is tantamount to analyzing away (positive and
negative) non-propositional attitudes (cf. Grzankowski, 2012, p. 10).
What about (b)? It is a special case of Grzankowskis second version of
propositionalism. He explains that on this version, for S to V y, where V is a psychological
verb such as like or fear and y is a non-that-clause noun phrase (ibid., p. 6), Ss
bearing some or other propositional attitude relation to a proposition concerning y is
sufficient for his V-ing y (ibid., p. 8). Grzankowski argues that propositionalists cannot
meet this sufficiency requirement (ibid., p. 10). No doubt Jim wouldnt like Jackie if he
didnt think she existed, but his thinking she exists obviously isnt sufficient for his liking
of her. Nor, as counterexamples will show, is his believing that Jackie is nice, or his
liking that Jackie is kind (ibid., p. 11). A similar strategy is available to expressivists.
Suppose that S disapproves of factory farming. Presumably she wouldnt do so if she didnt
believe that factory farming is practised, but this belief isnt sufficient for her disapproval.
Nor would be her believing that factory farming is cruel: she might not disapprove of
cruelty, or she might but nevertheless approve of factory farming all things considered.
(Here and below I take cruel to mean causing pain or suffering; cf. The New Oxford
Dictionary of English, 1998.)
24

Suppose, however, that S does believe that factory farming is cruel, and for this reason
disapproves of it. Then her non-propositional attitude of disapproving of factory farming is a
consequence of her having a propositional attitude. It is also a consequence of her believing
(dispositionally if not occurrently) that her belief that factory farming is cruel is a reason for
her to disapprove of it. Is the latter belief sufficient for her disapproval? Not necessarily: she
might believe that she has reason to disapprove of factory farming but not do so or so an
expressivist might elect to argue. But suppose that Ss believing that her belief that factory
farming is cruel is a reason for her to disapprove of it is sufficient for her disapproval. Then
it is possible for a subject to be in a non-propositional attitude in virtue of being in a
propositional attitude state (or states) (Grzankowski, 2012, p. 8). Does it follow that a
moral judgment the sincere utterance of which by a subject is the expression of such a nonpropositional attitude (of the subjects) is a true-or-false proposition? Expressivists can
argue that this does not follow. For (i) it does not follow (expressivists can argue) that there
are moral facts or [a] moral reality that [such a moral judgment] could possibly correctly
represent, [something it] could be true of (Shafer-Landau, 2003, p. 20, note 8). (ii) Nor does
it follow that in uttering such a judgment a subject would be trying, but failing, to describe
something (ibid., p. 20). Expressivists can argue for (i) because it is their denial of there
being a moral reality that motivates their interpretation of (the utterance of) a moral
judgment, not their interpretation of (the utterance of) a moral judgment that motivates their
denial of there being a moral reality (cf. ibid., p. 153). They can argue for (ii) because they
are not error theorists: they do not hold that moral judgments have truth-values but, because
there are no moral facts, are false. (cf. Brink, 1999, p. 588).
3. TOWARDS AN EXPRESSIVIST ACCOUNT OF ETHICAL ARGUMENT
I will take an argument to be an ethical argument just in case it has an ethical conclusion.
On a different view, an argument is an ethical argument just in case it has an ethical
conclusion and at least one ethical premise. On the view Im taking, an ethical argument
may have one or more ethical premises, but this isnt necessary for it to be an ethical
argument. Consider the following argument:
Argument (1):
Factory farming is morally reprehensible because it causes animals to suffer.
This argument apparently depends upon a claim to the effect that a human practice which
causes animals to suffer is morally reprehensible. A claim to this effect may be considered
to be a tacit premise of the argument, or it may be considered to be a background
assumption relative to which the stated premise is positively relevant to the conclusion. The
view that an argument is an ethical argument just in case it has an ethical conclusion leaves
open both of these interpretations.
An ethical conclusion, or an ethical premise, is an ethical sentence. The ethical
sentences with which I will be concerned will be what I will call simple ethical sentences. A
simple ethical sentence, I wish to stipulate, is a sentence that has, or is analyzable as having,
exactly one ethical predicate, in the grammatical sense, which it predicates of exactly one
term. A sentence of this sort evaluates the extension of the term of which its ethical
predicate is predicated. I will refer to the thing(s) comprising this terms extension as the
25

object(s) evaluated by the sentence. The sentence cruel practices are wrong is a simple
ethical sentence in my stipulated sense. It predicates the grammatical ethical predicate are
wrong of the term cruel practices, whose extension comprises all such practices. The
sentence evaluates cruel practices, and so, in my usage, such practices are the objects it
evaluates. I would add that all this remains true, mutatis mutandis, if the sentences ethical
predicate is taken to be its logical predicate, namely wrong.
Expressivists are not at liberty to take an ethical argument, as here defined, to be a
sequence of propositions, but they can take an ethical argument to be a sequence of
sentences, one of which is the arguments conclusion, the rest of which are the arguments
premises and are put forward as reasons for accepting the ethical sentence that is the
arguments conclusion.
When may a person be said by an expressivist to accept an ethical sentence? Here is
a possible answer. A person, S, accepts ethical sentence E, at time t, just in case at time t S
holds towards the object(s) evaluated by E an attitude of the type that, on an expressivist
interpretation, would (defeasibly) be taken to be expressed by an utterance of E.
(Defeasibly, because, for one thing, an utterance of an ethical sentence might be insincere.)
Suppose, then, that an expressivist takes this to be what it is for a person to accept an ethical
sentence, and also takes an ethical argument to be one in which the premises are put forward
as reasons for accepting the ethical sentence that is the arguments conclusion. Then she
may say (and I think should say) that the premises of an ethical argument are put forward as
reasons for holding an attitude of the type that, on an expressivist interpretation, would
(defeasibly) be taken to be expressed by an utterance of that sentence.
Consider again the argument that factory farming is morally reprehensible because it
causes animals to suffer. The arguer treats the premise that factory farming causes animals
to suffer as a reason for accepting the conclusion that factory farming is morally
reprehensible. Expressivists can say that for the arguer to treat the premise as a reason for
accepting the conclusion is for her to have a certain attitude towards the fact (as the arguer
takes it to be) that factory farming causes animals to suffer: it is for the arguer to be
unfavourably disposed towards this feature of factory farming. The arguer might express
this attitude propositionally by saying that this feature of factory farming (namely, the fact
that it causes animals to suffer) matters its morally relevant; more specifically, it counts
against factory farming.
This is an ethical attitude. Can expressivists say that ethical attitudes admit of
justification? I believe they can, and that their best option would be to accept a reflectiveequilibrium account of ethical justification an account that accommodates the expressivist
thesis that (sincere) utterances of ethical judgments express attitudes. On such an account,
the test for justification will be how well a persons ethical attitudes fit with one another and
with her related non-ethical beliefs. A good fit will require consistency, and so a reflectiveequilibrium expressivist will require an account of attitudinal consistency. Here is such an
account. An attitude pair is consistent if there is a possible world in which both attitudes are
fulfilled at the same time, and inconsistent otherwise. Thus, the attitude of favouring
execution for murder is consistent with the attitude of opposing execution for manslaughter
because there is a possible world in which execution is the punishment for murder but not
for manslaughter. In contrast, the attitude of opposing execution for murder is inconsistent
with the attitude of favouring Felixs execution for murder because there is no possible
world in which there are no executions for murder and Felix is executed for murder.
26

There is more to be said about what a reflective-equilibrium expressivism would look like,
or could look like, but I wont say more about this here. Instead, I will apply the account of
attitudinal consistency that I have just presented to the following argument.
Argument (2)
1.
All cruel practices are wrong.
2.
Factory farming is a cruel practice.
Therefore,
3.
Factory farming is wrong.
Assume that at time t S accepts 1 and therefore has a negative attitude towards all cruel
practices; more specifically, let us suppose, S disapproves of such practices. S also accepts
2, and 2 is true. But S rejects 3: his attitude towards factory farming is one of nondisapproval, but not one of indifference; rather, he approves of factory farming.
On these assumptions, at time t S disapproves of all cruel practices but approves of a
particular practice which he believes, correctly, is cruel. Is there a possible world in which
these attitudes are both fulfilled? This depends on whether there is a possible world in which
factory farming is practised but is not cruel. Suppose that it is conceptually impossible for
factory farming not to be cruel; then premise 2 is necessarily true, and there is no possible
world in which factory farming is practised but is not cruel. On this assumption, there is no
possible world in which there are no cruel practices but there is a practice of factory
farming, and so there is no possible world in which the attitude of disapproving of all cruel
practices and the attitude of approving the practice of factory farming are both fulfilled.
Thus, if S were to accept the premises of Argument (2) but reject the conclusion because he
approved of factory farming, then, if premise 2 is necessarily true, there would be an
inconsistency in his attitudes. If S accepts the premises of Argument (2), and if premise 2 is
necessarily true, then S cannot, on pain of attitudinal inconsistency, reject the conclusion if
he does so because he approves of factory farming.
4. THE ACCOUNT CONTINUED
4.1 Attitudinal validity
The preceding example shows that it is possible for an expressivist to have a concept of
what might be called attitudinal validity. Such a concept might be defined as follows for an
ethical argument with at least one ethical premise (as well as an ethical conclusion) and with
at least one true-or-false non-ethical premise and no non-ethical premise that is neither true
nor false. Such an argument is attitudinally valid for S at time t if at time t S cannot, on pain
of attitudinal inconsistency, both accept the arguments premises and reject the conclusion.
This condition is satisfied if and only if Ss rejection of the conclusion would be a
consequence of his having an attitude inconsistent with an attitude his holding of which
explains his acceptance of the (or an) ethical premise of the argument.
Let us apply this account of attitudinal validity to Argument (2). If at time t S were
to reject the arguments conclusion because he approved of factory farming, this attitude of
his would be inconsistent with an attitude (disapproval of all cruel practices) his holding of
which explains (on our previous assumptions) his acceptance of the arguments ethical
premise (all cruel practices are wrong). Thus, S could not, on pain of attitudinal
27

inconsistency, both accept the arguments premises and reject the conclusion, and so the
argument is attitudinally valid for S at time t. But the attitudinal inconsistency would arise
only given our assumption that the arguments non-ethical premise (factory farming is a
cruel practice) is a necessary truth, and this fact prompts the following question: for an
ethical argument to be attitudinally valid for a subject at a time, must it have at least one
true-or-false non-ethical premise that is necessarily true? The answer is no. Consider the
following argument:
Argument (3)
1.
Execution for a conviction of murder is always wrong.
2.
Felix has been executed for a conviction of murder.
Therefore,
3.
Felixs execution was wrong.
Assume that at time t S accepts 1: she disapproves of execution for a murder conviction. She
also accepts 2, and 2 is true. Suppose that S were to reject 3 because she approves of Felixs
having been executed for his murder conviction. A world in which this attitude is fulfilled is
one in which Felix has been convicted of murder and executed. A world in which the
attitude of disapproving execution for a murder conviction is fulfilled is one in which there
are no such executions (and never have been). Since there is no possible world in which
these attitudes are co-fulfilled, they are inconsistent. Thus, S could not, on pain of attitudinal
inconsistency, accept the premises of Argument (3) but reject the conclusion if her rejection
of the conclusion were a consequence of her approving of Felixs having been executed for
his murder conviction. Thus, Argument (3) is attitudinally valid for S at time t. This
analysis assumes the truth of premise 2, but premise 2 is not a necessary truth. Thus, for an
ethical argument to be attitudinally valid for a subject at a time, it need not have at least one
true-or-false non-ethical premise that is necessarily true.
In the preceding discussion, I have assumed the possibility of a persons rejecting
the conclusion of some ethical argument (with an ethical premise) because he holds an
attitude inconsistent with an attitude his holding of which explains his (assumed) acceptance
of the ethical premise. But is this a possibility logically speaking? Could it be, for
example, that at time t a person disapproves of all cruel practices, yet approves of a
particular practice which he believes, correctly, to be cruel? Suppose it could not. Then it
would not be possible for S at time t both to accept the premises of Argument (2) and also to
reject the conclusion as a consequence of his having an attitude inconsistent with an attitude
his holding of which explains his acceptance of the arguments ethical premise; hence, on
my proffered account of attitudinal validity, Argument (2) would be attitudinally valid for S
a time t. And likewise in any such case.
4.2 Attitudinal relevance
An expressivist account of ethical argument will require an account of when the premise(s)
of an ethical argument are (positively) relevant to the conclusion. Plainly, this will not be an
account of (positive) propositional relevance; rather, it will be an account of what I will call
(positive) attitudinal relevance. I will give such an account in a moment. First, however,
recall our earlier stipulation that S accepts ethical sentence E at time t just in case S holds
28

towards the object(s) evaluated by E an attitude of the type that, on an expressivist

interpretation, would (defeasibly) be taken to be expressed by an utterance of E (e.g., an
attitude of disapproval).
Now let E be an ethical sentence and let P be a true-or-false non-ethical sentence.
If S accepts E at time t, she then has a certain attitude towards the object(s) evaluated by E.
If she has this attitude because she believes P, then for her P is positively attitudinally
relevant to E. An expressivist might add that if S accepts E and believes that she does so
because she believes P, then she regards (her belief that) P as her reason for accepting E.
Consider, for example, the following sentences: (1) Factory farming is cruel. (2)
Factory farming is wrong. For an expressivist, a sincere utterance of 2 would be the
expression of a negative attitude towards factory farming. If S accepts 2 she has such an
attitude, and if she believes 1 and accepts 2 because she believes 1, then for her 1 is
positively attitudinally relevant to 2.
Next, consider Argument (2) once again:
1.
All cruel practices are wrong.
2.
Factory farming is a cruel practice.
Therefore,
3.
Factory farming is wrong.
On the present account of attitudinal relevance, for S at time t the premises of Argument (2)
are jointly positively attitudinally relevant to the conclusion if S accepts the conclusion
because she accepts premise 1 and believes premise 2.
To take the account a step further, consider the following example:
Argument (4):
1.
Life imprisonment for murder is a more effective deterrent than the death penalty.
2.
The death penalty has resulted in the execution of wrongly convicted persons.
Therefore,
3.
Life imprisonment for murder is morally preferable to the death penalty.
Counterconsiderations to 3:
a. Life imprisonment for murder is much more costly than the death penalty.
b. The death penalty is a better fit for the crime of murder than the death penalty.
S accepts premises 1 and 2 as true (possibly after doing some research). Each inclines him to
some degree to favour life imprisonment for murder more than the death penalty. Thus, for
S each is positively attitudinally relevant to 3, since he would hold this attitude if he
accepted 3 and did so because (or partly because) he accepted 1 and 2. S also accepts as true
counterconsideration (a), and for him it is negatively attitudinally relevant to 3 because it
makes him less inclined to favour life imprisonment for murder over the death penalty (and
thus to accept 3) than he would be given just (his acceptance of) premises 1 and 2. S doesnt
accept counterconsideration (b) but for him it is nevertheless negatively attitudinally
relevant to 3 because he believes that if he did accept (b) he would be still less inclined, and
perhaps on balance disinclined, to favour life imprisonment for murder over the death
penalty. Upon reflection, he accepts 3 because he accepts premises 1 and 2 as true and
because for him (I shall assume) they outweigh counterconsiderations (a) and (b).
29

4.3 Cogency
An expressivist account of ethical argument will, I shall suppose, include an account of what
it is for an ethical argument to be cogent. Here I will suggest an expressivist account of
cogency (just) for what I will call a Type 1 ethical argument, namely an ethical argument
with at least one ethical premise and at least one true-or-false non-ethical premise and no
non-ethical premise that is neither true nor false. A Type 1 ethical argument is cogent for S
at time t if at time t:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)

S is justified in accepting the arguments ethical premise(s);

S is epistemically justified in accepting as true the arguments non-ethical
premise(s);
and either
the argument is attitudinally valid for S
or
for S, his acceptance of the premises would be sufficient, but not conclusive, reason
for him to accept the conclusion.

Condition (a): S is justified in accepting the arguments ethical premise(s) at time t if, for
each such premise, he is justified by a reflective equilibrium test in holding an attitude of the
type that, on an expressivist interpretation, would (defeasibly) be taken to be expressed by
an utterance of the premise.
Condition (d) is satisfied at time t if and only if (i) were S to accept the conclusion at
time t he would do so because he accepted the premises (in which case for him the premises
would be positively attitudinally relevant to the conclusion) or because he accepted the
premises and for him they were not outweighed at time t by any counterconsiderations then
known to him; and (ii) the argument is not attitudinally valid for S at time t (so that for him
his acceptance of the premises would not be conclusive reason to accept the conclusion).
5. CONCLUSION
I have said nothing about the vexed problem of how, or whether, expressivists can make
sense of sameness of meaning [of an ethical sentence] in asserted and unasserted contexts
(Shafer-Landau 2003, pp. 23-4). (An example of the latter would be the occurrence of an
ethical sentence as the antecedent/consequent of a conditional sentence.) Nor have I said
anything about the no less vexed problem of how, or whether, expressivists can differentiate
between the attitudes expressed in ethical utterances of, for example, the following forms:
x is right, x is permissible, x is supererogatory. (Cf. ibid., pp. 24-25). In these and no
doubt other respects, my proffered expressivist account of ethical argument is incomplete.
Moreover, I do not claim that, even just as far as it goes, it is an adequate account of ethical
argument. My interest, rather, is in whether, as far as it goes, it is compatible with
expressivism, hence an account that expressivists are free to give, and I believe it is.

30

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am indebted to Geoff Goddu and David Hitchcock, whose very helpful comments on the
version of this paper that I presented at the ISSA 2014 conference led me to rethink and
revise the account I gave therein of attitudinal consistency and the account I gave of
attitudinal validity. In light of a further comment by David Hitchcock, I also revised my
account of when a person may be said by an expressivist to accept an ethical sentence.

REFERENCES
Blackburn, S. (1985). Errors and the phenomenology of value. In T. Honderich (Ed.), Morality and
Objectivity. A Tribute to J.L. Mackie (pp. 1-20). London; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Brink, D. (1999). Moral realism. In R. Audi (Ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Grzankowski, A. (2012). Not all attitudes are propositional. European Journal of Philosophy,1-18. Wiley
Online Library: doi/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00534.x.
Parfit, D. (2011). On what matters, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shafer-Landau, R. (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Smith, M. (1993). Realism. In P. Singer (Ed.), A Companion to Ethics (pp. 399-410).Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers Ltd.
Woods, J., Irvine, A., & Walton, D. (2004). Argument:critical thinking, logic, and the fallacies.Toronto:
Pearson/Prentice Hall.

31

The Synthetic Function Of Doxastic Dialectics

Rodica Amel
University of Bucharest

E-mail: ollu@clicknet.ro

1. GENERAL REMARKS
1.1. Remarks regarding doxastic dialectics
At the beginning of our exploration of doxastic (/belief) field (Amel, 1999), we took for
granted the cognitive autonomy of an alternative to epistemic truth, that of doxastic truth,
which we call the persuasive truth1. In contrast with the epistemic truth, which represents
the logical determination of episteme, the doxastic truth represents the ontological density
of doxa, intelligibly perceived in its meaning. We should emphasize the following two
aspects: a. regarding the field of investigation - in our opinion, doxastic dialectics does
not refer to the pre-epistemic stage of truth, but is limited to the field of supersensible
reality (the reality of values), a cognition meaning-oriented; b. regarding participants
bona fide - the condition, in virtue of which doxastic dialectics develops its
investigations, excludes the premise that notices a cleavage of justification, as A.Kasher
calls it2 (1986), namely, excludes any kind of contextually distorted utterance of belief.
The remarks regarding doxastic dialectics are selected from our previous studies
about the respective issue (Amel 1999, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014):
1.
2.
3.

4.

Doxastic dialectics is the exclusive procedure that establishes the fundaments of

axiology.
Generally speaking, the dialectical study of persuasive truth is a kind of semantic
logic, trying to explain how to determine the doxastic meaning.
The semantic logic compatible with the doxastic field is based on a rational
procedure that follows, in hermeneutical terms, the process of understanding (the
meaning), not knowing (the truth).
From the philosophical point of view, the rationality of the meaning investigation
is pursued dialectically in both senses of the concept of dialectics:
a. dialectics as antithetic reasoning, challenging the subjects cognitive
intentionality;
b. dialectics as a formative process, during which the pragmatic subjectivity gets
phenomenological dimension.

1.2. The goal of the present investigation

1. The investigation has in focus the synthetic mechanism of doxastic/belief dialectics.
In the first study about doxastic dialectics (Amel, 1999), we have mentioned three
theoretical functions of doxastic (/belief) dialectics: the dissociative, the justificatory and
the synthetic function.
32

2. Having in view the subjective and rhetorical involvement of the persuasive truth, we
find profitable to approach the rationality of doxastic thinking in phenomenological
terms. With Husserl, belief is a thetic act, namely a speech act in consciousness.
Phenomenology acknowledges the cognitive priority of belief (Husserl, 1931: 301), a
definition that supports our dissociative approach. From cognitive point of view, the
dissociative function proves its importance, because it establishes cognitive intervals
between belief an idea posited in consciousness, doxa the conceptual representation of
the respective idea of value in reason, and opinion corresponding to the discursive,
namely the contingent form of belief. In our previous studies the attention was especially
focused on the mechanism of decidability in doxastic dialectics, by demonstrating that
the justificatory procedure requires operations on the three levels mentioned above.
3. The present investigation, which has in focus only the synthetic mechanism of
doxastic/belief dialectics, will approach a single aspect: the metaphysical
transubstantiation. We intend to explain, in personal terms, this idea which was
mentioned by P.Grice (1991) and to which we have briefly made reference several times.
Initially, the concept of metaphysical transubstantiation gave us the possibility to offer a
general explanation of the dialectical mechanism of doxa. Grices idea supported our
hermeneutical argument: the semantic nature of the truth of beliefs, structured by
antithetic rationality, gets persuasive prestige owing to a paradigmatic transfer: from a
pragmatic paradigm to an axiological one. Due to the phenomenological perspective in
which our enterprise approaches the doxastic dialectics, the concept of metaphysical
transubstantiation will be treated inside the laboratory of the hermeneutical synthesis,
which is the human consciousness. The metaphysical transubstantiation becomes the
explanatory key of the meaning enquiry of beliefs, by revealing the rationality of the
hermeneutical mechanism.
4. For a comprehensive understanding of the doxastic rationality, our demonstration will
develop the thesis in conformity with which belief has a self-referential dimension.
During doxastic dialectics, subjectivity acquires cognitive dimension, progressively
becoming conscious of it. In phenomenological terms, subjectivity represents the origin
of the thinking activity. It holds the power of translating the sensitive matters into
intelligible ones. The beliefs contents, experienced and assumed by the subject/the
speaker in his consciousness, represent thetic acts (acts in consciousness). The reference
to the metaphysical transubstantiation supports the phenomenological explanation of the
MORAL OBJECT3. During the doxastic dialectics beliefs acquire objectivity.
If Grices concept regarding metaphysical transubstantiation is conceived in extenso,
the cognitive dialectics meaning oriented goes through more than one operation of
cognitive synthesis. The self-referentiality of belief is finally crystallized in the form of
the MORAL SUBJECT (=self-consciousness), ontologically reoriented.
5. The deep logic of belief dialectics explains the dynamics of self cognition.

33

2. THE BELIEFS STRUCTURE OF FORCES

2.1. Belief as a speech act
Looking backwards, to reach the origin of the force of belief, we discover the pragmatic
dimension of beliefs/ opinions, in conformity with which we are entitled to say that
beliefs have performative force. Two aspects are important to be mentioned: one
regarding the subject who expresses his beliefs (/utters his opinions), and another
regarding the dialog partner to whom the belief is confessed. In the pre-epistemic stage,
the function of dialectics is to demonstrate that the affirmations contained by the
subjects beliefs are correct.
(1)

I think/ my impression is this child is well developed for his age.

When beliefs refer to a supersensible reality (the substance of values), a normal subject is
extremely careful to justify his position as a locutor, and to explain the partner and to
himself what reason he has to affirm a certain opinion about a moral reality. He is ready
to offer explanations that could support his utterance.
(2)

(I believe) this boy is very wise: Do you know what he once said to me?
Errando discitur!
- He knows Latin?
- I am wondering less he is using Latin aphorisms to give himself airs -, but it is
astonishing to see a child reflecting about his own behavior, trying to improve it
etc.

The self-referentiality of the utterance that contains a belief is explained by the subjective
dimension of beliefs. We plead for an interpretative power of subjective thinking which is
governed by both pragmatic and introspective rationality. A rational speaker, conscious
of the Principle of Uncertainty characterizing doxastic thinking, becomes responsible for
what he says. The speaker is a problematizing subject. His thinking, antithetically4
developed, engenders a self-reflective attitude. His words are oriented towards his own
mind in order to measure the extension of the meaning he intends to formulate.
As we have already mentioned: with Husserl, belief is a thetic act, namely a speech act
in consciousness. The dissociative function of dialectics stimulates the subjective
reflection.
(3)

- This child knows very well what he wants: he has personality.

- You think personality means to be voluntary, self-willed or obstinate ?
- I have said: he knows what he wants.
- In my opinion, personality means to have power of discernment.
- You mean moral personality, but there are people who have pragmatic
personality.

In an axiological dispute, the subjects cognitive intention is stimulated by the partners

discursive position, helping him to clarify his own thoughts.
34

The ideal reality of axiology becomes the object of a moral reflection, during which
consciousness assumes the sense of this reality by self-reference. We call the respective
cognitive act - moral reflection, an inner experience, deprived from ethical involvement.
The original power of self-reflection becomes performative: cogito ergo sum ergo loquor.
That is our definition of belief (see Amel, 1999). The premise of the self-referentiality of
beliefs motivates the conclusion that beliefs, as acts in consciousness, assure the original
burst of languge5.
It is insufficient to say: beliefs affirm that and that. The subjects selfreferentiality engenders the subjects will to manifest himself and to impose the
meanings of his words on the dialogue partner. Any belief has the intention to utter a
verdict, which means that beliefs have the illocutionary force to institute reality, a reality
that should be followed or avoided. The illocutionary force of expressive acts is not
contested, but their validity is. While during epistemic dialectics the Principle of
Rationality requires proofs which can validate the referential route of a verdict, during
doxastic dialectics interlocutors appeal to semantic/ hermeneutic proofs, an enterprise
which is not deprived of rationality. Hermeneutics can justify the subjective authority to
promote a sense by four such proofs: original, paradigmatic, normative, generative6. In
our prior studies about doxastic dialectics, we have developed some of them.
2.2. Dialectical proofs within doxastic cognition
a.

The original proof is given by the self-referentiality of the belief-speech act. To

assume a sense in consciousness means to promote a sense by the authority of
being experienced in ones own mind.

b.

The paradigmatic proof is given the moment the principle of Uncertainty calls
upon a Principle of Transcendence, when the self-reference of belief is raised to a
categorical position, able to prepare its conceptualization. The doxastic
conceptualization is a synthetic (or constitutive) operation, having a justificatory
target. By arriving at this stage, the role of dialectics is to raise the dispute up to
the metalanguage level (see the above example: 1 vs. 2, 3), in order to consolidate
the paradigmatic grounds of believing by or in axiological categories. During this
process the MORAL OBJECT may find its determination:

(4)

What do you mean by being wise, with reference to a child? What do you
precisely mean by wisdom?

The moral object becomes the doxas a posteriori referent. The interval engendered by
the dissociative function of dialectics between doxa and belief is temporarily recovered,
due to the validity of paradigmatic proofs; but their validity is only probable. Doxastic
dialectics is a creative not a regulative process. It is language dependent, and the
persuasive truth remains a question of permanent meaning inquiry7.
c.

The normative proof was less mentioned by us in our previous studies regarding
doxastic dialectics. All the hermeneutic investigations that support the logic of
doxa, namely that of the persuasive truth of values, are normatively oriented.
Categorical proofs extend hermeneutics by many associative operations, including
35

d.

even an inquiry of Zeitgeist. At this stage, doxastic dialectics tries to consolidate

the axiological hierarchy, universally valid.
What we mean by generative proof will be explained in the following chapter.

3. METAPHYSICAL TRANSUBSTANTIATION
3.1. Grices argument
Grices idea concerning the metaphysical transubstantiation is an argument in favor of
the metaphysical objectivity of values (Grice 1991: 35). It represents the procedure for the
redistribution, but not the invention, of properties. For example - properties accidentally
meant for humans become essential properties of a new psychological type called persons
(cf. idem, 114).
Grices argument concerning the metaphysical transubstantiation corresponds to
what we define as being the paradigmatical proof, an argument regarding the axiological
consciousness of a (speaking) subject. The way Grice demonstrates the objectivity of
values is equivalent to our interpretation of the MORAL OBJECT, a transfer from a
pragmatic quality into a phenomenological dimension of belief. Because belief is a
cognitive act in consciousness, self-referentiality gets rational authority, able to validate
the grounding arguments of value8. Our original and paradigmatic arguments represent
the objectifying terms of belief, and they drive dialectics toward its semiotic stage. The
process could be equated to Grices finalist arguments. From this perspective, his demand
for absolute values becomes rational. See the stages of metaphysical defense, established
by Grice: 1. (There are) cases in which a value concept ... is attached originally, or
directly to a given bearer; 2. If the concept of value is to be authentic and not merely
Pickwiking in character, then it is required that it be supported by a kind of finality
which extends beyond the overlap with a mechanistically substitutable finality; 3. That
metaphysical house-room found for the notion of absolute value is a rational demand
(cf. Grice, 1991:116-117).
3.2. The two levels of metaphysical transubstantiation
With Grice who is looking for a proof that could support the objectivity of value the
metaphysical transubstantiation represents the transfer from humans to persons. In our
interpretation, the relevance of that proof is moral, by its power to objectify the inner
sense of human consciousness.
The persuasive truth of supersensible reality could not be proved other way than
by making it intelligible in the form of a conceptual synthesis. From a phenomenological
point of view, the cognitive synthesis passes through two levels of metaphysical
transubstantiation: conceptual (an axiological category) and semiotic. Actually, there is
more than one operation of transubstantiation: the axiological/ moral sense the sense
of the self the sense of human condition the existential sense, culminating by a
semiotic expression. From a comprehensive perspective about belief, the target of
doxastic dialectics is not limited to the stage when the moral content is objectified. The
MORAL OBJECT is transubstantiated into a MORAL SUBJECT (=the self36

consciousness), which represents the becoming reality/ object of the self. The deep logic
of belief dialectics explains the dynamics of self cognition. The rationality of this type of
cognition, which examines a dynamic object, is given by a generative proof. Therefore,
in this subchapter we shall extend the explanation in this direction.
a. The metaphysical transubstantiation opens two dialectical movements, such as we
have mentioned at the beginning of our commentary: one, trying to establish the clear
conceptual definition of axiological ideas, and another, during which the formative
impulse of consciousness is triggered. In both these directions, the subjects crystallize in
their consciousness the conditions for a better evidence of self-referentiality. The
synthesis of the moral objects (axiological ideas), could be considered, in Grices terms,
a rational demand, in conformity with which the subjectivity becomes a moral person.
The major difficulty in bringing paradigmatical proof begins when the
metaphysical transubstantiation acquires phenomenological dimension. This is the
moment when the categorical sense of a value is acquired by subjects consciousness.
The paradigmatical proof is a dilemmatic moment. The moment of doxas
conceptualization opens the inner infinity of the dialogue, as Gadamer said, actually a
metadialogue. During the metadialogue, the dialogue partners try to settle the semantic
difference between similar concepts, having in view that each of them is relevant for a
different level of consciousness (psychological vs. spiritual; temperamental vs. spiritual
etc.)
(5)

What is the difference between pride and dignity?

What is the difference between the polemic inflammation and the intellectual
passion?
Etc.

The correct conceptualization of doxa is hindered by frequent hesitations with reference

to particular situations. In the collective mentality these metadialogues are considered
semantic exercises, but actually they are phenomenological tests. Due to the conceptual
oppositions displayed during doxastic dialectics, the subjects moral reflection establishes
level oppositions - in usual terms called values hierarchy -, helping to crystallize the
structure of the self. The subject, in his hermeneutical inquiry, should be prepared to
avoid social prejudices, which are very persuasive, because otherwise the
hermeneutical effort would be deprived of moral relevance.
(6)

In the Romanian public mentality, deeply infused by a specific skepticism, called

bclie (a kind of Engl. tongue in cheek), a self-controlled responsible person is
qualified as an idiot, a conformist fellow.

Doxa, as a concept, represents the linguistic shape of the supersensible object of value,
the idea that this concept should name. Frequently, doxastic concepts are mistakenly
defined, even mixed up with dogma, because of a lack of clear distinction between
philosophy and ideology. For a correct definition of the value ideas, doxastic dialectics
opens its large field of debates, all trying to consolidate the moral and spiritual
representation of life9.
37

b. Generally speaking, the metaphysical transubstantiation has spiritual fundaments.

Subjectivity is a moral agent, having the power to spiritualize the life people live in. The
effort to establish the clear inventory of abstract concepts has more than a logical
target, that of offering authoritative arguments for individual definitions.
(7)

When we are listening to Beethovens 5th Symphony, the following question may
be asked: Does it express a Teutonic/ heroic feeling or does it open a
metaphysical/sublime vision? The real question regards the two opposite concepts,
the meaning of which is developed in mind.

The formative structure of consciousness is intentionally SELF-oriented. The MORAL

OBJECTs become the inner objects of reference, due to which the MORAL SUBJECT
finds its structural fundaments and acquires objectivity. The world of the Ego is in
continuous extension. The moral becoming is looking for a sense/ a direction in life.
There is a natural tendency to get an answer to the big existential mystery, a cognitive
process that includes the art / the entire human creation into it. The art productions are
considered the generative proof of believing, the highest step of understanding, inside
which the consciousness is crystallized in a symbolic vision. The figurative meanings
associated to each name of contiguous objects represent only the beginning. The human
language reflects this tendency:
(8)

Bridge, door or window, circle, light and darkness, different animals etc.

These examples are part of long series of symbols to which the mythical thinking makes
reference. Subjectivity is cognitively troubled to decode the language of life, as the poet
said: to read the world and to understand it. To read the world by inventing scenarios,
allegories, cryptograms, etc., means to find an interpretative language that has generative
power, due to which doxa extends its moral dimension. The human second play is the
symbolic form which concentrates the idea of the human condition and in which the
contiguous first game (= the everyday life) reveals its meaning.
The formative power of subjectivity was largely debated by art criticism.
Cassirers Philosophy of Symbolic Forms offers the best argument of what we define as
the semiotic transubstantiation of axiological universe. The Romanian philosopher,
Gabriel Liiceanu, begins his complex analysis of the semiotic nature of art productions
with a definition of the symbol in the same terms we have explained the metaphysical
transubstantiation. Each general consideration regarding symbolic productions is
compelled to consider the double foundation of symbolic work in the human mind: the
need to visualize the abstract and the need to transcend the visible (2005, 7). In the
same book, we have found an argument regarding the objectifying function of the
symbolic forms. The artist, by his introspection, is able to instantiate the inner perception.
G.Liiceanu, based on the book of Brsch-Supan/Jhnig, Gaspar David Friedrich,
Mnchen, 1973, p.14, says:

38

(9)

The problem in these pictures isnt what the characters, hypnotized by the
horizon, actually see, but what we see, looking at them. And we see what
Friedrich says: The look which transpierces the profoundness of the landscape is
turning back towards the inner self (of the person who is looking, and whom we
see from behind) (p.190).

A superficial explanation may say that the metaphysical transubstantiation leading to

symbolic forms is due to a linguistic transfer: from a referential (literal) language to a
semiotic (figurative) one. From cognitive point of view, the symbolic forms wrap up the
beliefs in such a way that the deep vision receives ontological substance. The synthetic
power of symbolic forms has several degrees of concentration, in conformity with the
subjects cognitive clear-sightedness. The most important thing that occurs during the
semiotic transubstantiation is the creative effort to reach the level of exemplariness. The
metaphysical transubstantiation is part of a subjective dynamics, governed by the same
principle of rationality which, during the epistemic process of the creation of theoretical
models, affirms: the theoretical model should be consistent (in our terms relevant),
exhaustive (comprehensive) and simple (concise).
It is the moment to remind what L.Hjelmslev said (1947:11) referring to the goal
of a scientific theory: The aim of a theory is to elaborate a procedure in conformity with
the principles of the theory ... The description shall be free of contradiction (selfconsistent), exhaustive, and as simple as possible. (p.11)
The generative proofs offer the authority or stand under the authority of an
interpretative key - a doxastic archetype. The semiotic force of a doxastic archetype is the
result of a gradual synthesis operated within the moral contents.
4. CONCLUSION
The synthetic function of doxastic dialectics, more than the other two -dissociative and
justificatory, assures the ontological fundaments of ethics and aesthetics. The moral sense
represents an immanent condition of beliefs, their ontological density. A comprehensive
view about Grices concept allows us to see in the process of the metaphysical
transubstantiation the formative will of subjectivity to get an integrated vision of life.
The inner necessity of the Ego to crystallize its self represents the cognitive challenge of
mans consciousness. In creating a virtual image of human condition, the subjectivity has
the power to project, in conceptual and semiotic forms, a reality of a second degree.
4.1. Belief as a reason to adopt a certain attitude (social or metaphysical)
This seems to be a pragmatic axiom. If we reopen the commentary about the beliefs
structure of forces, the rationality of the projecting power of beliefs becomes obvious
(a persuasive truth).
(10)

I believe in the power of ideas to change things

(M.Dascals saying, in G.Scarafile, 2010: 18).

39

From philosophical perspective, Marcelo Dascals saying and many similar formulations
emphasize the point where beliefs and behavior are connected: I believe (my belief is):
ideas (beliefs) have force.
The transubstantion of the pragmatic sense into the moral sense/object represents
only the beginning of a complex synthesis of the moral subject (=the object of self
consciousness). The competence of subjectivity to establish a clear definition of values
and their hierarchical disposition is part of the becoming process of the self. The final
cause of self consciousness is to be able to refer to oneself as being a categorical instance
looking for a sense in life, for a direction, for a correct, ethical action.
The opposition moral object vs. moral subject, presented above, is not identical
with Grices opposition human vs. person, but represents a cognitive extension of Grices
rational demand. The cognitive gain, offered by the synthetic function during the double
metaphysical transubstantiation, emphasizes the power of subjectivity to be the point of
an active articulation of thinking. One should not neglect that the synthetic function of
doxastic dialectics has normative consequences. After a serious confrontation between
generative and normative proofs, the MORAL SUBJECT acquires ethical legitimacy.
Whether this legitimacy is disputable or not is another theoretical/ philosophical problem.
4.2. To read the world and to understand it
This is an intuitive remark of spontaneous hermeneutics. With this formulation we are in
the neighborhood of the Heideggerian hermeneutics, which was the point of departure of
the approach we have chosen regarding doxastic dialectics.
Our argumentation in favor of a progressive abstraction of doxa, encourages the
idea that the laic hermeneutics of beliefs is a rational way to follow the persuasive truth.
An interesting similarity between the laic hermeneutics of doxa - developed by us
through several metaphysical transubstantiations and the hermeneutics of sacred texts
supports the same conclusion. See the way the Judaic hermeneutics explains the meaning
of the sacred texts:
The Judaic hermeneutics of Torah (the Bible) establishes four methods of
interpretation, all united under the acronym pardas: pshat plain (interpretation), remez
allusive (a kind of intertextuality), drush homiletic and sod esoteric10.

NOTES
1

The conceptual power of the syntagm persuasive truth hit us while reading Parmenides Poem (I, 28-30):
You must hear about all things, both the still heart of persuasive truth, and the opinions of mortals, in
which there is no true conviction.
2
There is a cleavage of justification. The speaker may be asked both for the grounds of his belief, that
what he has asserted does hold, and for the reasons he has had for saying what he believes to be the case.
(Kasher 1986: 286). See also Amel (1994). Pragmatic reasons (such as the cleavage of justification), and
especially phenomenological ones determine us to mention the theoretical importance of the dissociative
function of doxastic dialectics (Amel, 1999) (see further on).
3
This is the moment of intersection between pragmatics and phenomenology. Due to this intersection, the
philosopher establishes the point where the argumentative intentionality is related to cognitive
intentionality (see here the phenomenological concept of intentionality: It belongs as a general feature to
the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of something Husserl, 1931:119) The inner
experience of meaning becomes a rational entity an OBJECT - for/in consciousness.

40

The antithetic thinking is a structural function of both rationality and perception. See Gadamers remark
about Socrates art of conversing: an exercise of thinking in opposites (198o: 93). See also the eloquent
title of Jacqueline Sudaka-Benazrafs book about Paul Klees illustrations to Voltaires writings, Car le
blanc seul nest rien.
5
Language is the house of Being/ Die Sprache ist das Haus des Sein (See Heidegger, Humanismus,
1957: 24; 1959:166). Cf. Heidegger (1976: 313): Im Denken das Sein zur Sprache kommt. Die Sprache
ist das Haus des Seins. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch.
6
In this theoretical context, generative is meant in Chomskian and not Aristotelian sense (See the
Aristotelian four causes of a phenomenon: generative, formative, final and material).
7
There is a productive ambiguity, the multiplicity of interrelated aspects of meaning, which articulate the
field of knowing (Gadamer, 1980: 111). See also: Gadamers interest regarding the Platonic turn to
discourse (idem), Gadamers affirmation le dialogue en tant que dmarche hermneutique (1976: 229),
and Gadamers general idea about the inner infinity of the dialogue.
8
The cognitive power of self-referentiality can be proved by Heideggers affirmation regarding the
foundational position of subjectivity: Die Subiectivitt ist die wesenhafte Gesetzlichkeit der Grnde,
welche die Mglichkeit eines Gegenstandes zu reichen kann (1977: 137).
9
Inevitably, a doxastic philosopher is a prisoner of language. The provisional scheme of interpretation
(when opinions are delivered) cannot overcome the argumentative ability of the thinker, and, consequently,
the persuasive truth is frequently obscured by preconceived meanings that are associated to basic
concepts (Amel, 1999: 11). See also: Gadamers philosophy concerning the hermeneutical circle (1976,
1977).
10
HaRav Menahem Hacohen, Introduction, (1996: 5). See also: What is common to all the faces of Torah
is their beauty, which gratifies those who want to enjoy the fruits of the tree of knowledge and breathe the
flavor of the pardes of Torah (idem).

REFERENCES
Amel, R. (1994). Relevance and justification. Semiotica, 102, 1/2, 71-88.
Amel, R. (1999). Doxastic Dialectic. The Persuasive Truth. Revue Roumaine de Linguistique, XLIV (1-4),
3-12.
Amel, R. (2008). Sign Systems Reference Systems. Kodicas/ Code, 31 (1-2), 59-68.
Amel, R. (2009). To Use Signs vs. to Invent Signs. In Eero Tarasti (Ed.), Communication: Understanding/
Misunderstanding. Proceedings of the IASS/AIS (I, pp.33-43). Tartu: Greif.
Amel, R. (2011). The Probable and the problem. In F.H.van Eemeren, B.J.Garssen, J.A.Blair and
C.A.Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference ISSA, (pp.9-17).
Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Amel, R. (2013). Listening and the well-tempered Controversy (With reference to intercultural exchange).
At the XXII World Congress of Philosophy (International Association for the Study of
Controversies), 4-10 Ausgust 2013, Athens.
Amel, R. (2014). Speakers Meaning. With Reference to Marcelo Dascals Book Mashav Ha-Ruah. In
Riesenfeld Dana & Scarafile Giovanni (Eds.), Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the
Ethics of Communication, (pp.101-112). Springer: Berlin.
Gadamer, H-G. (1976). Vrit et mthode (Etienne Sacre, Trans.). Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1977).Vom Zirkel des Verstehens. In Kleine Schriften, IV. Tbingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1980). Dialogue and Dialectic. Eight Hermeneutical Studies in Plato (P.Christopher
Smith, Trans.). New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Grice, P. (1991). The Conception of Value. Oxford: Clarendon.
Hacohen, HaRav Menahem. (1996). Torat Am (The Bible for everybody; interpretations), Tel Aviv: Modan.
Heidegger, M. (1957). Der Satz vom Grund. Tbingen: Neske Verlag.
Heidegger, M. (1959). Unterwegs zur Sprache. Tbingen: Neske Verlag.
Heidegger, M. (1976). Brief ber den Humanismus, Gesamtaugabe, Band 9, pp.313-369. Frakfurt: M
Vittorio Klostermann
Heidegger, M. (19771, 19972). Der Satz vom Grund. Gesamtausgabe, vol.10. Fankfurt am Mein: Vitttorio
Klosterman

41

Hjelmslev, L. (1963). Prolegomena to a Theory of Language (Fr. J. Whitfield, Trans.). Madison:

University of Wisconsin Press
Husserl, Ed. (1931). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (W.R.Boyce Gibson, Trans.).
London: Georg Allen.
Kasher, A. (1986). Justification of speech, acts and speech acts. In Semantic Theories and Natural
Language, E.Lepore & B.Richards (Eds.) 283-305. New York: Academic Press.
Liiceanu, G. (2005). Om i Simbol (Man and Symbol). Interpretri ale simbolului n teoria artei i filozofia
culturii. Bucureti: Humanitas
Scarafile, G. (2010). (Ed.) A Crua palavra. Conversation with Marcelo Dascal. Raleigh: Lulu Press.
Sudaka-Bnazraf, J. (2008). Car le blanc seul nest rien. Paul Klee illustrateur de Voltaire. Neuchtel :
Ides et Calendes.

THE SYNTHETIC FUNCTION OF DOXASTIC DIALECTICS

ABSTRACT
Regarding the synthetic function of doxastic dialectics, the present investigation will
approach a single aspect: the metaphysical transubstantiation. We intend to explain, in
personal terms, this idea which was introduced by P. Grice (1991) and to which we have
briefly made reference several times. Grices idea supports our hermeneutic argument:
the semantic nature of belief, crystallized by the dialectical mechanism of controversy,
acquires persuasive prestige owing to a paradigmatic transfer: from a discursive paradigm
to an axiological one. The demonstration will develop the thesis according to which belief
has a self-referential dimension.

42

What Could Virtue Contribute To Argumentation?1

Jos ngelgascn
Departamento de Lgica, Historia y Filosofa de la Ciencia
Universidad Nacional de Educacin a Distancia (UNED)
Spain
jagascon@bec.uned.es

ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that a virtue approach to argumentation would not commit the ad hominem
fallacy provided that the object study of our theory is well delimited. A theory of argumentative virtue should not
focus on argument appraisal, but on those traits that make an individual achieve excellence in argumentative
practices. Within this framework, argumentation theory could study argumentative behaviour in a broader sense,
especially from an ethical point of view.
KEYWORDS: ad hominem, arguers, ethics, informal logic, pragma-dialectics, virtue.

1. INTRODUCTION
A virtue approach, characteristic of ancient ethical theories, such as Plato's, Aristotle's and the
Stoics', is agent-based instead of act-based; it does not assess the moral value of isolated
actions performed by an individual, but focuses instead on the character and traits of an
individual that make her either virtuous or vicious. Within this paradigm, the crucial question
is not What should I do in this situation? but What kind of person should I be?.
Virtue ethics revived in the second half of the 20th century, attracting interest to the
notion of virtue from within other fields than ethics. The most remarkable success is the case
of virtue epistemology. Arguably, several of the virtues proposed in virtue epistemology
such as intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance and, most conspicuously, fairness in
argument evaluation (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 114) are not only epistemic but also intellectual
in a broad sense, and thus it should come as no surprise that this approach has finally caught
the attention of argumentation theorists.
The idea of developing a virtue approach to argumentation was proposed by Andrew
Aberdein (2014, 2010, 2007) and Daniel Cohen (2013, 2009). Cohen has stressed the
importance of the social and ethical dimensions of argumentation and he has warned against
the mistake of focusing too narrowly on arguments as products and arguing as a procedure.
His idea of the admirable conduct of arguers involves much more than logic and dialectic, it
ought to stem from virtues, inculcated habits of mind (2013, p. 482). Aberdein, on the other
hand, has addressed in detail an obvious objection that could be raised against a virtue
approach to argumentation: Would not any agent-based appraisal of argumentation commit
the ad hominem fallacy?
In this paper I argue that the discussion about whether a virtue approach to
argumentation could deal appropriately with argument appraisal is misleading. As I will show,
the discussion misses the point of what a virtue approach really has to offer. A virtue
approach should consider the importance of arguers themselves. In my view, a virtue
argumentation theory could provide us important insights only insofar as we stop focusing
1

Supported by Research Project FFI2011-23125, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and
Competitiveness.

43

narrowly on arguments. I will argue that a virtue approach to argumentation is not only
possible but also desirable, provided that we have a clear understanding of what it involves.
2. WHAT'S THE POINT OF A VIRTUE APPROACH?
When Aberdein (2010) proposed the development of a virtue theory of argumentation, he
identified several difficulties that such an approach would have to tackle. A major problem is
the accusation that a virtue approach to argumentation would commit the ad hominem fallacy.
A virtue approach to argumentation would involve the assessment of arguments on the basis
of the arguer's traits, and that sounds pretty much like the definition of ad hominem argument.
The question, then, has been whether the appraisal provided by a virtue argumentation theory
would be an instance of legitimate or illegitimate ad hominem.
Aberdein correctly argues that, although in the past all ad hominem arguments were
considered fallacious without distinction, most argumentation theorists accept nowadays that
many instances of this kind of argument are actually legitimate. How could we distinguish
between those instances of ad hominem argument that are legitimate and those that are not?
The answer, according to Aberdein, is provided precisely by virtue argumentation theory
(2010, p. 171):
Virtue theory may contribute a simple solution: negative ethotic argument is a legitimate move precisely
when it is used to draw attention to argumentational vice. (Similarly, positive ethotic argument would be
legitimate precisely when it referred to argumentational virtue.)

Ethotic arguments that is, ad hominem arguments, those whose reasons refer to the ethos of
the arguer are therefore legitimate provided that they point to the arguer's argumentational
virtues and vices. This seems like a plausible solution. However, this view has been
challenged by Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury (2013). They concede that, in certain
circumstances, an individuals character may be relevant in deciding whether to believe what
he says, and thus that there are legitimate ad hominem arguments. But they point out that
legitimate ad hominem arguments are those that provide reasons not to believe a claim, and
that ad hominem arguments that provide reasons to reject an argument are never legitimate (p.
26).
Bowell and Kingsbury's criticism draws our attention to an important distinction. It
explains why the ad hominem problem appears to be such a great obstacle to developing a
virtue approach to argumentation, whereas it has not been so for virtue ethics and virtue
epistemology. Two levels can differentiated in which ad hominem arguments may take place.2
In the first level, which we could call practical or argumentative, an arguer puts forward an
ad hominem argument in order to support or undermine the acceptability of a claim; that is, an
individual argues for or against a given standpoint. In the second level, which can be called
theoretical or meta-argumentative although not only theorists but also the arguers
themselves may operate in this level, the ad hominem argument is used for the purpose of
showing the soundness or unsoundness of another argument.
Admittedly, argumentation theorists who argue for the legitimacy of (at least a subset
of) ad hominem arguments tend to focus on those arguments that aim to undermine the
credibility of witnesses or experts in order to show that their claims should not be believed
merely because they say so. But, as Bowell and Kingsbury say (p. 26):

Paula Olmos called my attention to these two levels of discourse.

44

Legitimate ad hominem arguments provide reasons to doubt the truth of a claim on the basis of facts
about the person making it. It is commonly supposed that it is never reasonable to reject an argument on
the basis of such facts, however.

Nonetheless, Aberdein (2014) presents several examples of arguments in which facts about
the arguer are used as reasons to doubt the soundness of other arguments, and that are
arguable legitimate instances of ad hominem arguments. I will not discuss those examples
here. The overview given above of the debate about the legitimacy of a virtue approach to
argumentation suffices, for my purpose here is to argue that the terms of this debate are
misleading. The kind of virtue approach to argumentation that is assumed in this discussion is
not, in my view, what we should seek.
I regard virtue approaches as having the agent his or her character not only as its
grounds or basis, but also as its main interest. We could gain some insight into this question
by taking a look at other virtue approaches. Virtue ethics has provided a greater insight into
the nature of character, virtue, and education, than into which actions are right and which ones
are wrong. As for virtue epistemology, although it has admittedly provided a certain kind of
analysis of knowledge and beliefs, it is the subject's epistemic virtues the area on which it has
actually cast light. Hence, why not take an interest also in arguers themselves? This is the
motivation that, in my view, should lead to a virtue approach to argumentation. Virtue
argumentation theory should be a theory of arguers.
Bowell and Kingsbury argue that virtue argumentation theory does not offer a
plausible alternative to a more standard agent-neutral account of good argument (2013, p.
23). They may be right; the appraisal of arguments and the study of the soundness of
arguments may well be a task which is most accurately and efficiently performed by act-based
theories. I agree with Aberdein that there are some instances of ad hominem arguments
meta-argumentative, or arguments of the kind that provide reasons to believe that another
argument is unsound that are legitimate. However, the examples provided by Aberdein still
leave us very little ground for a virtue theory of argumentation. It seems that we do not have
at our disposal the theoretical resources which are necessary for the development of a
complete virtue theory of the soundness of arguments.
A virtue approach, therefore, might be of little use for assessing the soundness of
arguments. However, in my view, that is not the appropriate task for a virtue theory of
argumentation. As I envisage it, a virtue approach would have many more benefits, of which
the appraisal of arguments is probably the least significant. If we move from our current focus
on arguments to an interest in arguers, this would have the benefit of allowing us to undertake
a broader and richer study of argumentation. As I will show in the next section, such study
could provide important ethical and educational insights for argumentation theory.
3. ARGUMENTATION IN A BROAD SENSE: ETHICAL INSIGHTS
We, as arguers, produce much more than just arguments understood as logical-epistemic units.
There is much more to assess than merely the soundness of arguments. When we argue, we
communicate in a certain way, we use some words and not others, we are respectful or
disrespectful, we are willing to change our mind or stubbornly protect our beliefs, we make
our interlocutor feel free to express herself or we intimidate her. Furthermore, we can argue
too much or too little, at an opportune or at an inopportune moment.

45

All these are examples of behaviours that take place in the context of argumentative
discussions and depend on the arguers character. These are precisely the kind of issues that a
virtue theory of argumentation could (and should) address. The study of argumentation is not
just about soundness, and argumentation is not merely a way to propagate true beliefs or
reduce false beliefs. Argumentation is, first and foremost, a social activity of a special kind; it
is, as Daniel Cohen put it, a way of participating in the community (2013, p. 475).
As in any other social activity, the behaviour of the participants can serve to promote
or to damage those values and practices we most appreciate, not only inherently
argumentative values such as reasonableness (Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004) or honesty,
but also social values in a broader sense, such as equality, fairness, or democracy. Hence, an
arguer will be considered virtuous not only when the arguments she puts forward are sound
and her interventions comply with the procedural rules of a model of good argumentation
such as the pragma-dialectical model, but also when she behaves in every respect in a way
that promotes good social practices and increases others welfare.
There lies the importance of a virtue approach to argumentation. The soundness of an
argument is doubtless an important topic, but it is not enough to grasp all the implications of
the practice of argumentation. An approach that addresses the issues related to the arguers
behaviour, which ultimately depends on the arguers character, would be able to address
these needs.
If we are interested in analysing that kind of features of argumentation, then we should
obviously take into account the ethical implications of argumentation. The necessity of an
ethical approach to argumentation has already been stressed by Vasco Correia (2012, p. 225):
The point to be made here is that arguments may be correct from a logical and dialectic
perspective and nonetheless unfair and tendentious.
Correia stresses the great value of a virtue approach to prevent bias in argumentation, a
key issue with which logical and dialectical approaches cannot deal accurately. Moreover, a
virtue approach could have practical benefits (pp. 233-234):
The advantage of developing argumentational virtues, by contrast with the intentional effort to be
impartial, is that these virtues tend to become a sort of second nature [...] that allows us to reason in
fair terms almost effortlessly, without a conscious and persistent effort to remain impartial.

Let me illustrate the kind of insights that an ethical approach could provide with an example,
taken from the 2005 film Thank you for smoking. In the following scene, Nick Naylor,
protagonist of the film, is speaking with an elementary school student:
Kid: My Mommy says smoking kills.
Nick Naylor: Oh, is your Mommy a doctor?
Kid: No.
Nick Naylor: A scientific researcher of some kind?
Kid: No.
Nick Naylor: Well, then shes hardly a credible expert, is she?

Both by informal logic standards and by pragma-dialectic standards, Naylor's intervention

seems pretty good. With his accurate questions, he succeeds in rebutting the kid's argument,
which is admittedly very weak, without violating any of the rules for a critical discussion nor
any of the ten commandments for reasonable discussants (Eemeren and Grootendorst,
2004). The questions that Naylor asks in fact refer to one of the critical questions that have
been proposed by informal logic for assessing arguments from authority: given an expert E
and a proposition A, Is E an expert in the field that A is in? (Walton 2006, p. 88). This
46

example shows that Nick Naylor is no doubt a skillful arguer and knows how to apply the
principles of informal logic.
Nevertheless, I believe there is something wrong with Naylor's interventions. I find at
least two major problems with Naylors intervention:
(1) Naylor is a well-informed adult, and as such he surely knows that there is a considerable
amount of evidence which supports the kids standpoint that smoking kills. Naylor is not
defending any standpoint, he is merely calling into question the kids argument. Nevertheless,
Naylor should have pointed out to the kid, as a matter of honesty, that there are better
arguments supporting her position than the one she produced.
(2) By rebutting the kids argument, Naylor is undermining her confidence in the belief that
smoking kills. Given the way Naylor puts his counter-argument and the kids early age,
the lesson that she will probably learn is not that, although she has a point, her argument
should be improved, but simply that smoking does not cause death. And this, from an ethical
point of view, is problematic to say the least.
These problems show exactly the kind of issues into which a virtue argumentation theory
could give us an insight. I hope this example suffices to show that a virtue approach would
provide a different perspective from those of informal logic and pragma-dialectics. Although
such an approach is unlikely to prove useful for appraising the soundness of arguments, it
would allow us to find solutions to problems which most of us could not even see before.
In order to allow for analyses like this one, we need to adopt an ethical point of view,
and, as the following example will show, in a properly understood virtue approach the ethical
issues arise naturally. However, in order to achieve this enterprise, we first need to abandon
our narrow focus on arguments as independent entities.
4. EXAMPLE OF AN AGENT-BASED APPROACH
Wayne Brockriede (1972) sketched a brief analysis of three types of arguers that seems to me
like the perfect example of an agent-based approach. He drew an analogy between arguers
and romantic partners, classifying arguers into three types. Brockriedes metaphor is all the
more adequate for my purposes because he classified arguers according, not to the kind of
arguments they put forward, but to their behaviour. The three kinds of arguers are:
(1)

The rapist: He wants to maintain a position of superiority. His main goal is to force
assent, to conquer by the force of the argument.

(2)

The seducer: He operates through charm or deceit. The seducer tries to charm his
victim into assent by using tricks and fallacies.

(3)

The lover: He acknowledges the other person as a person and wants power parity. The
lover asks for free assent and criticism, and he is willing to risk his very self in the
discussion.

47

Brockriede concluded that the (p. 9):

argument has another function as important as any intellectual creation of the truth of a situation, and
that is the personal function of influencing the fulfillment and growth of the selves of the people in the
transaction.

Brockriedes metaphor strikes me as very insightful and relevant to the defence of a virtue
approach to argumentation for one reason: although the author does not state it explicitly, the
paper implies that both rapists and lovers put forward sound arguments. It's not the soundness
of their arguments what differentiates them but their character and behaviour. This entails
that an act-based approach such as informal logic would not be apt to distinguish
between both types of behaviour; all it can do accurately is identify seducers, who do make
use of tricks and fallacies. The difference between rapists and lovers does not lie in the kind of
arguments they produce but in whether they treat the other as a peer or as an inferior being,
whether or not they are willing to accept criticism even to ask for it and question their
core beliefs, whether they see the practice of argumentation as an opportunity to grow or as an
opportunity to conquer. For this reason, Brockriede says (p. 1):
I maintain that the nature of the people who argue, in all their humanness, is itself an inherent variable
in understanding, evaluating, and predicting the processes and outcomes of an argument.

Of course, I am not arguing for the adoption of Brockriede's classification in particular. The
importance of that classification lies actually in two assumptions that support it. First, an
agent-based approach has, by its very nature, ethical implications. Ethical analyses fit
comfortably in and arise naturally from any virtue theory. Second, an act-based
approach, one focused on evaluating the argument, cannot be enough. We need a virtue
approach for a complete and thorough understanding of the argumentative practice and its
ethical implications.
5. CONCLUSION
The ongoing debate on the feasibility of a virtue approach to argumentation has focused on
whether such an approach would be a useful tool for argument appraisal. Given a specific
argument, the question is whether a virtue theory of argumentation could provide an
assessment of its soundness. However, as I have argued, we must admit that this is not the
task that a virtue approach is designed to do. Informal logic is focused on the study and
assessment of arguments, and a virtue approach should not be developed just to undertake the
very same task. Instead, a virtue approach would give us the opportunity to adopt a different
point of view, without which the study of argumentation cannot be considered complete.
As stated in the introduction, the crucial question for a virtue approach is not What is
the right thing to do in this situation? but rather What kind of person should I be?. The
motivation for developing a virtue approach is precisely this question: What kind of arguer
should I be? Being a virtuous arguer involves much more than just producing sound
arguments, it involves things that go beyond the scope of informal logic and pragmadialectics, and the ethical implications of the argumentative practice are among these things.
That is what makes a virtue approach to argumentation interesting and necessary.
A virtue theory of argumentation will not come just to keep talking about soundness.
Instead, it will provide insights into the argumentative practice that we were lacking, and
perhaps could not even notice before.
48

REFERENCES
Aberdein, A. (2007). Virtue argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, and B. Garssen
(Eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation
(pp. 15-19). Amsterdam: SicSat.
Aberdein, A. (2010). Virtue in argument. Argumentation, 24(2), 165-179.
Aberdein, A. (2014). In defence of virtue: the legitimacy of agent-based argument appraisal. Informal Logic,
34(1), 77-93.
Bowell, T. and J. Kingsbury (2013). Virtue and argument: taking character into account. Informal Logic, 33(1),
22-32.
Brockriede, W. (1972). Arguers as lovers. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 5(1), 1-11.
Cohen, D. H. (2009). Keeping an open mind and having a sense of proportion as virtues in argumentation.
Cogency, 1(2), 49-64.
Cohen, D. H. (2013). Virtue, in context. Informal Logic, 33(4), 471-485.
Correia, V. (2012). The ethics of argumentation. Informal Logic, 32(2), 222-241.
Eemeren, F. H. v. and R. Grootendorst (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Walton, D. (2006). Fundamentals of critical argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.2
Zagzebski, L. T. (1996). Virtues of the Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.

49

Dont Drink That Water! : The Role Of Counter-Intuitive Science

In Conspiracy Arguments
R. Jarrod Atchison & John LLewellyn
Communication Department
Wake Forest University
United States of America
atchisrj@wfu.edu

ABSTRACT: In this essay, we focus on one of the most persistent examples of the intuitive validation of
conspiracy type of argumentthe conspiracy theory that claims that fluoridating public water supplies is
an attack on public safety. We argue that the controversy surrounding water fluoridation highlights the
potential for conspiracy proponents to supplant complicated phenomena with intuitive observational data
used to support the opposite of the scientific consensus.
KEYWORDS: conspiracy theories, counter-intuitive arguments, water fluoridation

1. INTRODUCTION
How could President Kennedys head move backward if he was shot from behind? How
could the American flag wave on the moon if there was no atmosphere to move it? How
could the Twin Towers have collapsed on 9/11 at the speed of free fall if there were no
bombs in the buildings? Although these three conspiracy theories span decades of history
and locations to the moon and back, they all share a common argumentative feature: they
rely on intuition to argue against the scientific explanations for the complicated
phenomena involved. In this essay, we focus on one of the most persistent examples of
this intuitive validation of conspiracy type of argumentthe conspiracy theory that
claims that fluoridating public water supplies is an attack on public safety. We argue that
the controversy surrounding water fluoridation highlights the potential for conspiracy
proponents to supplant complicated phenomena with intuitive observational data used to
support the opposite of the scientific consensus.
2. COUNTER-INTUITIVE SCIENCE: THE CHALLENGE OF COMPLICATED
EXPLANATIONS FOR A COMPLICATED WORLD
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the primary definition for intuition is the
action of looking upon or into; contemplation; inspection; a sight or view (intuition,
2014). Although that definition helps highlight the importance of observation for
intuition, the entry includes another definition that demonstrates the strategic advantage
of deploying intuition-based arguments in a public controversy. The alternate definition
for intuition is, The immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without the
intervention of any reasoning process (intuition, 2014). Appeals to knowing the world
without the intervention of any reasoning process are antithetical to the basic tenets of the

50

scientific method which prioritize a rigorous process of reasoning, not the immediate
apprehension of an object.
History is replete with examples of the tension between intuition and science.
Indeed, some of the most famous scientific discoveries were initially rejected because
they defied the intuition of the day. For instance, the notions that the Earth is round and
that it orbits the Sun not only defied appeals to intuition but also generated immense
public controversy (Whitehouse, 2009). There have been numerous scholarly works
dedicated to explaining the history of scientific findings that are counter-intuitive
including Julian Havils Impossible?: Surprising Solutions to Counterintuitive
Conundrums which chronicles paradox after paradox which have counterintuitive
solutions that often defy public and scholarly acceptance (Havil, 2008). Our argument
here is that conspiracy theories are a special type of argumentative discourse that exploits
the tension between intuition and science to generate and sustain public controversies.
This pattern of discourse can result in substantial changes to public policy in favor of
intuition rather than science. We will now turn to controversy surrounding water
fluoridation as an example of this argumentative strategy in action.
2.1 The water fluoridation controversy: a case study in counter-intuitive science
On January 25, 1945, the City of Grand Rapids, Michigan, began a public health
intervention to prevent cavities and tooth decay by adding fluoride to its public water
supply. The experiment was based on a set of medical research findings that had started
in 1901 by a dentist named Dr. Frederick McKay who was initially interested in helping
diagnose and solve a medical condition that comes from consuming too much fluoride
called fluorosis (The Story of Fluoridation, 2014). In the process of studying the
condition, Dr. McKay with the help of other dentists, discovered that one of the positive
benefits of consuming fluoride was that it reduced the likelihood that people would
experience cavities and tooth decay. The key question became: How much fluoride
should a person consume to gain the medical benefits without risking the negative health
implications that come with fluorosis? A group of researchers, including the head of the
Dental Hygiene Unit at the United States National Institute of Health, came to the
conclusion that a fluoride level of 1.0 parts per million was a safe amount of fluoride to
add to the water supply (The Story of Fluoridation, 2014).
With the research in hand, the City Commission of Grand Rapids voted to become
the first city in the world to add fluoride to the public water supply to help prevent
cavities and tooth decay. Over the next 15 years, researchers tracked the cavities and
tooth decay present in the citys residents, including 30,000 school children. The results
were astonishing. The children born after fluoridation had 60% fewer cavities and the
treatment also reduced permanent adult tooth decay by 35% (American Dental
Association Council on Access, 2005). The results were so impressive that cities across
the United States started adding fluoride to their public water sources. Today, nearly 170
million people drink from public water systems that are fluoridated (American Dental
Association Council on Access, 2005). According to the National Cancer Institute:
fluoride can prevent and even reverse tooth decay by inhibiting bacteria that produce acid in the
mouth and by enhancing remineralization, the process through which tooth enamel is rebuilt
after it begins to decay. (National Cancer Institute, 2012)

51

The success of the public health intervention is also, in part, due to the relative costs
involved. According to the American Dental Association, for most cities, it costs only 50
cents a person per year to fluoridate the water supply and every $1 invested in water
fluoridation saves $38 in dental treatment costs (American Dental Association Council
on Access, 2005).
After evaluating both the effectiveness of the intervention and the relative costs
involved, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention declared that
water fluoridation was one of the Ten Great Public Health Achievements of the 20th
century (Center for Disease Control, 1999). In addition to that impressive designation,
fluoridation has also received the endorsement of 95 major medical organizations
including the Academy of General Dentistry, American Association for the Advancement
of Science, American Association for Dental Research, American Association of
Community Dental Programs, American Association of Dental Schools, the American
Dental Association, the Centers for Disease Control, and the National Cancer Institute
(Barrett, 2002). One might think that the historic success of the intervention and the
widespread medical endorsement of the practice would make this treatment one of the
least controversial public health decisions that a local government could confront. After
all, unlike public smoking bans, prohibitions on the use of trans fats, or even restrictions
on the size of soft drinks, there are no major corporate interests negatively affected by the
practice of fluoridation. In fact, the very people that would reap the greatest economic
benefit from an increase in cavities and tooth decay, dentists, are among the most vocal
proponents of fluoridation.
While our assessment of the motivations involved may be persuasive, the more
complicated truth is that fluoridation has been and continues to be one of the most
controversial public health interventions of the past 60 years. In just the past two years,
approximately 68 cities across the globe have decided to abandon fluoridation including
major American population centers like Portland, Oregon (Communities Which Have
Rejected Fluoridation Since 1990, 2012). How, then, has it been possible for a practice
that is so widely accepted and praised in the scientific community to become so
controversial and ultimately to be rejected by communities across the globe? We believe
that part of the problem rests in the argumentative obstacles surrounding the counterintuitive nature of the science. Namely, how could it possibly be good for us to consume
a toxic substance that is often scraped from industrial waste and then added to our public
water supplies? In the next section we analyze how conspiracy proponents have crafted
arguments based on intuition to help convince local governments that the complicated
nature of the scientific explanations for the phenomena is in reality a cover-up for the fact
that fluoride is a direct attack on the public health of their communities.
3. DEFEATING FLUORIDATION WITH APPEALS TO INTUITION
As is the case with most conspiracy theories, there is no single author or text that is the
sole authority on the subject. Instead, conspiracy arguments circulate through a variety of
discourse communities. As a result, our analysis cannot account for every conspiracy
argument that has been lodged against fluoridation. There are, for example, arguments
that fluoridation was used by the Nazis in the concentration camps; that fluoridation was
52

a clever way to deal with the industrial waste from our nuclear weapons program; and
that the fact that the government hired the godfather of public relations, Edward Bernays,
to create a pro-fluoridation public health campaign proves that the goals were nefarious
from the start. Although some of these arguments also include appeals based on intuition,
we have focused our presentation today on the arguments that fluoridation is an attack on
the public health of the population.
Our review of the conspiracy arguments reveals three sets of objections to the
safety of fluoridation that are rooted in appeals to intuition. First, conspiracy theorists
attack fluoridation by amplifying the worst case scenarios associated with consuming too
much fluoride. Upon initial inspection, this argument makes intuitive sense. After all, Dr.
McKays original research was an attempt to diagnose and cure the molten teeth of
communities in Colorado that were consuming too much fluoride and suffering from
fluorosis. Rather than engaging in the complicated science of determining what the
appropriate level of fluoride consumption is, conspiracy theorists argue that these worst
case scenarios are ipso facto proof that there is no safe level of fluoride in the water. For
example, most of the anti-fluoride conspiracy theorists point to an infamous industrial
accident in 1943 when a DuPont factory spilled a massive amount of fluoride into the
local environment. According to the conspiracy theorists, the fluoride spill resulted in the
death of poultry, sickened horses, destroyed a peach crop, produced high levels of
fluoride in the blood of the local people, and resulted in cows [that] became so crippled
they could only crawl on their bellies to graze (Water, n.d.). We are not attempting to
defend the DuPont spill, but we do think that it is important to point out that objecting to
the practice of controlled fluoridation because of an uncontrolled industrial accident that
had nothing to do with fluoridating the public water supply is a tenuous argument at best.
We do not deny that arguments based on the worst case scenarios of mass
fluorosis have an intuitive appeal, but the more complicated scientific method explains
why these types of arguments are dangerous for the public decision-making process.
There are scientific debates over the appropriate amount of fluoridation. Some argue that
over time people have started consuming more fluoride from sources outside of the public
water supplynamely toothpaste which includes a greater amount of fluoride today than
in 1945. The refusal of the conspiracy proponents to engage the scientific discussion and
instead to focus on the worst case scenarios as a justification for doing away with all
fluoridation is an appeal to the public and government officials to make impulsive
decisions based on intuition rather than to engage in the complex deliberation that comes
with assessing scientific risk.
The second set of arguments based on intuition focuses on alternative uses of
fluoride to amplify the publics belief in the toxic nature of the substance. For example,
one conspiracy theorist writes, sodium fluoride is a dangerous poison and has been a
primary active ingredient in a wide variety of insecticides and fungicides (Tracey,
2012). There are other conspiracy websites that list the major manufacturing companies
and their products with captions that emphasize how ridiculous it would be for a parent to
feed those products to their children. Once again the intuitive appeal is unscientific but
persuasive: why would you put something into your body that is so damaging that it is
used to kill other organisms?
The answer, of course, is that the science associated with fluoride and proper
dosing is more complicated than that disturbing description suggests. At face value, not
53

every active ingredient in a pesticide is the ingredient that is actually doing the killing.
Whitney Cranshaw, a professor at Colorado State University, does not even list fluoride
in his review of the major active ingredients used in pesticides and insecticides
(Crenshaw, 2013). More importantly, fluoride is a naturally occurring mineral that is
found in different levels of almost all water sources. The fact that it is used in a variety of
other ways does not in itself demonstrate that the mineral is dangerous. In fact, the
practice of fluoridation often involves removing excess fluoride from the public water
supply to make sure that it is at safe levels. The conspiracy theorists intuitive arguments
rest on an apparently self-evident appeal that the more natural the water is, the healthier it
will be without any discussion of the fact that the fluoride discovered in the people of
Colorado came from the natural water supply they were using and not from some
industrial additive. The complicated truth is that when a local government votes to end
the process of fluoridation it may, in fact, be increasing its residents consumption of
fluoride.
The third set of intuition-based arguments acknowledges the naturally occurring
nature of fluoride, but challenge the practice of fluoridation because it involves
purchasing sodium fluoride from major industries. These conspiracy theorists are
obsessed with pointing out that sodium fluoride is a byproduct of major industrial
processes and those industrial manufacturers are making money from an industrial
byproduct that they would otherwise have to pay to dispose of properly. They argue that
since these industries benefit from selling their industrial waste to public water utilities
they are invested in skewing the health data and/or covering up the true health effects.
Here is an example of one of these arguments:
fluoride is a toxic byproduct in the manufacture of nuclear arms, aluminum, cement, steel, and
phosphates. Millions of tons of this poison are produced every year. Imagine the cost of containing
and disposing of those mountains of waste every year. Its in the billions. But what if lobbyists
from these industries could present scientific studies paid for by the industries, and provide for a
continual stream of media presentations about the health benefits of fluoride, and create
unimaginably lucrative positions for research and education within the American Dental
Association and the AMA, and do all these things in a consistent and unending way, year after
year? What are the economic advantages of that? Simple: instead of paying money to dispose of
toxic waste, money could now be made by selling fluoride to the water companies of the nation.
Theyll use the public water supply as a sewer for industrial wastes. And now with these new
billions added instead of subtracted, theres plenty to go around, for everyone involved. Out of the
Red, into the Black. Somewhere Machiavelli smiles. (Water, n.d.)

This argument involves an intuitive appeal to public perceptions of industrial waste and
the motivations of large corporations. The simplistic narrative, however, that since
fluoride is purchased from corporations then those corporations must be directly involved
in skewing the scientific data is overly reductionist at best. Assuming that municipalities
want to fluoridate their water supplies, it would be far more expensive to engage in the
process of creating fluoride solely for the purpose of fluoridating the water supply rather
than using the industrial byproduct. The assumption that the American Dental
Association and the 95 other health organizations that have endorsed fluoridation are all
in league with big business is a classic conspiracy argument, but loses its persuasiveness
when the audience moves beyond the initial shock of its intuitive appeal and into the
pragmatic reality of the difficulty in covering up such a conspiracy. Although it is
54

difficult for many people to accept, it is possible that a win win situation involving
major corporations and local governments is, in fact, also in the best interest of the public
at large.
4. CONCLUSION: TRAINING ADVOCATES TO ARGUE AGAINST CONSPIRACY
INTUITION APPEALS
The world is confronting a greater and greater number of controversies surrounding
complex scientific phenomena. As the controversies grow, conspiracy theorists have
successfully inserted themselves into the public deliberation process. From global
warming to vaccines to peak oil, conspiracy theorists have used arguments based on
intuition to disrupt and short circuit deliberation involving complex science. A recent
study conducted by a group of social scientists at the University of Chicago found that
49% of respondents believe at least one conspiracy related to medicine (Oliver & Wood,
2014). It further found that 37% of the respondents agreed, The Food and Drug
Administration is deliberately preventing the public from getting natural cures for cancer
and other diseases because of pressure from drug companies (Oliver & Wood, 2014).
We believe that there is no way around the fact that the people responsible for explaining
and defending the more complex scientific explanations for societal practices need
training in how to argue against appeals based on intuition.
Analyzing the public discourse surrounding the conspiracy over fluoridation
reveals three areas of argument studies that advocates would benefit from understanding.
First, we believe that advocates need to master the science of the controversy while
focusing on translating that science into arguments relevant for public deliberation.
Scientists are often very careful in a public setting. They are more likely to use hedging
statements and talk in terms of risk. Both practices are helpful for the scholarly study of a
phenomenon, but, with rare exception, they do not translate well into public deliberation.
In other words, scientists are so careful about drawing conclusions that their arguments
appear weaker when contrasted to the powerful pathos appeals that accompany the
objections based on claims rooted in intuition. The fact that the anti-fluoride arguments
are based on intuition makes them more accessible and thus more appealing to the
audience.
Second, we believe advocates need to be prepared to argue by analogy. Relying
on scientists as public advocates is helpful, but they are often reluctant to engage in a
discussion of analogous scientific controversies because it is beyond their area of
expertise. In the water fluoridation controversy, for instance, there are too few advocates
for fluoridation prepared to argue based on the analogy to chlorine which is a substance
that is also toxic if consumed in an extreme amount, but that few people can deny has
helped prevent a widespread set of diseases. The conspiracy proponents who insist that
fluoridation is simply not natural and therefore a threat to public health will struggle to
explain how public water utilities should deal with cholera, typhoid fever, and hepatitis
all of which have been remedied through chlorination (Water Quality and Health Council,
2003). To argue from an analogy, however, requires the advocate to be prepared to speak
to issues beyond their immediate expertise.
Finally, we believe advocates need to construct stronger defenses of the scientific
consensus. The global warming controversy and the fluoridation controversy share the
55

rhetorical dilemma that the scientific community does not really consider either of them
to be a legitimate controversy. There are, of course, a small number of scientists who
resist the consensus and therefore are venerated by conspiracy theorists. If, however, a
local government official is listening to a presentation on a complicated scientific
phenomenon that has reserved scientists on one side and passionate arguments from
intuition on the other side, the advocates of science need to be articulate about the
advantages of preferring the scientific consensus in public policy. This goal is a difficult
task that is growing more difficult by the day as interpretations of science become more
politicized. Failure to defend the institution of science encourages crucial policy
decisions to be based on The immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without
the intervention of any reasoning process.
In conclusion, we want public advocates to continue to fight the good fight on
crucial scientific controversies. In fact, by following our three recommendations we hope
advocates will learn to fight the better fight. It is work that is often very challenging and
comes with all of the sets of difficulties associated with debating strong-willed
conspiracy proponents. As communities continue to struggle with complex scientific
phenomena, there will be more opportunities for conspiracy theorists to engage in public
controversies so we hope that advocates of science will take the conspiracy arguments
seriously. It is easy to mock them for their inadequate treatment of science, but mocking
cannot deny the fact that these appeals to intuition have succeeded in 68 cities around the
globe.

REFERENCES
American Dental Association Council on Access, P. A. (2005). Fluoridation Facts. American Dental
Association .
Barrett, S. (2002, August 28). Organizations That Support Fluoridation. Retrieved from Dental Watch :
http://www.dentalwatch.org/fl/orgs.html
Center for Disease Control . (1999, 4 2). Ten Great Public Health Achievements -- United States, 19001999. Retrieved fromMorbidand Mortality Weekly Report :
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00056796.htm
Communities Which Have Rejected Fluoridation Since 1990. (2012). Retrieved from Flouride Action
Network: http://fluoridealert.org/content/communities/
Crenshaw, W. (2013). Classes of Pesticides Used in Landscape/Nursey Pest Management . In C. S.
University, IPM of Midwest Landscapes: Tactics and Tools for IPM (pp. 42-44). The University
of Minnesota .
Havil, J. (2008). Impossible?: surprising solutions to counterintuitive conundrums. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
intuition. (2014, September). Retrieved from Oxford English Dictionary:
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/98794?redirectedFrom=intuition#eid
National Cancer Institute . (2012, 2 21). Fluoridated Water. Retrieved from National Cancer Institute at the
National Institute of Health: http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/fluoridated-water
Oliver, E., & Wood, T. (2014). Medical Conspiracy Theories and Health Behaviors in the United States.
JAMA Internal Medicine, 817-818.
The Story of Fluoridation. (2014, February 26). Retrieved from National Institute of Dental and
Craniofacial Research :
http://www.nidcr.nih.gov/oralhealth/topics/fluoride/thestoryoffluoridation.htm
Tracey, J. (2012, June 23). Poison is Treatment: The Campaign to Fluoridate America. Retrieved from
Global Research, Centre for Research on Globalization: http://www.globalresearch.ca/poison-istreatment-the-campaign-to-fluoridate-america

56

Water. (n.d.). Retrieved from The Doctor Within : http://www.thedoctorwithin.com/water/water/

Water Quality and Health Council . (2003). Drinking Water Chlorination: A Review of Disinfection
Practices and Issues . Water Quality and Health Council.
Whitehouse, D. (2009). Renaissance Genius: Galileo Galilei & His Legacy to Modern Science . New York,
NY: Sterling Publishing Company, Inc.

57

Conductive Argumentation, Degrees Of Confidence, And The

Communication Of Uncertainty
Sharon Bailin & Mark Battersby
Faculty of Education
Simon Fraser University
Critical Inquiry Group
2568 W. 1st Avenue
Vancouver, BC, Canada V6K 1G7
bailin@sfu.ca
Capilano University (retired)
Critical Inquiry Group
2416 W. 14th Avenue
Vancouver, BC, Canada V6K 2W5
mbattersby@criticalinquirygroup.com

ABSTRACT: The paper argues that there is an epistemic obligation to communicate the appropriate degree
of confidence when asserting conclusions in conductive argumentation. Contrary to the position of some
theorists, we argue that such conclusions frequently are, and should be expressed with appropriate
qualifications. As an illustration, we discuss the case of the Italian scientists tried for failing to convey to
the public appropriate warnings of the risks of the earthquake in LAquila.
KEYWORDS: conductive argumentation, judgment confidence, expression of uncertainty

1. PROLOGUE
On April 6, 2009, a magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck LAquila, Abruzzo, resulting in
considerable devastation and the death of 300 people. Seven Italian officials and
scientists were subsequently put on trial for manslaughter. The accusation was that
scientists presented incomplete, inconsistent information which falsely assured the public
and caused the deaths of 30 residents. The usual practice when an earthquake was likely
was for residents to sleep outside, but it was alleged that because of the assurance, these
individuals remained in their houses and were killed in the quake (Ashcroft 2012). The
prosecution argued that the assessment of risk communicated to the public was
unjustifiably optimistic and that lives could have been saved had people not been
persuaded by the assurances to remain in their houses (Hooper 2012). In 2012, the
scientists were found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to six years in prison.
We will return to this case later. We have no intention to try to evaluate its merits,
but we shall examine the issues it raises regarding the obligation to communicate an
appropriate degree of certainty or uncertainty in ones judgments.
2. INTRODUCTION
This paper begins by making the argument that a degree of uncertainty is an unavoidable
aspect of conductive argumentation. The arguments which comprise instances of
58

conductive argumentation vary in terms of the degree of support that they provide for
their conclusions; for this reason the strength of the judgments warranted by particular
instances of conductive argumentation will vary as well. We argue, further, that this
variability imposes an epistemic requirement on arguers to apportion the confidence of
their judgment to the strength of the reasons. Moreover, because of the dialectical nature
of argumentation, there is the additional requirement for arguers to communicate the
appropriate degree of certainty or uncertainty when making judgments in the context of
an argumentative exchange.
3. ARGUMENTATION AND UNCERTAINTY
The traditional focus for the philosophical study of argumentation has been individual
arguments, in terms of both their structure and their evaluation. The model of argument
which has been dominant has been deductive argument, i.e., an argument whose premises
entail the conclusion. Provided that the premises are true, the conclusion follows with
certainty. Uncertainty may, of course, still arise with respect to the truth of the premises.
This requirement of inference certainty does not, however, fit a great deal of
actual argumentation, as has been pointed out by theorists since the inception of the
Informal Logic movement. In probable reasoning, for example, the conclusion does not
follow necessarily but only with some degree of probability (Blair & Johnson 1987, p.
42). The situation is similar for inductive reasoning: Inductive inferences vary from
weak to strong; there is no all-or-nothing critique such as valid-or invalid available
(Blair & Johnson 1987, p. 42).
Theorists have, however, been increasingly broadening their focus from
exclusively individual arguments to the entire enterprise of argumentation.
Argumentation can be conceptualized as a socio-cultural activity (Hitchcock 2002, p.
291) which is dialectical in the sense that it involves an interaction between the arguers
and between the arguments (Blair & Johnson 1987). This focus is much broader than the
making of individual arguments. Rather, arguments are put forward, criticisms and
objections offered, responses proposed, and, frequently, revisions made to initial
positions (Bailin & Battersby 2009). It is this practice of argumentation that is our focus
here, and in particular the practice of conductive argumentation (or conductive
reasoning). By conductive reasoning we are referring to the process of comparative
evaluation of a variety of contending positions and arguments with the goal of reaching a
reasoned judgment on an issue (Battersby & Bailin 2011). Such judgments are generally
based on the weighing of both pro and con considerations.
The focus of many theorists working in the area is, however, on individual
conductive arguments rather than on conductive reasoning. Conductive arguments are, as
Govier puts it, arguments in which premises are put forward as separately and nonconclusively relevant to support a conclusion, against which negatively relevant
considerations may also be acknowledged (Govier 2011, p. 262). In our view, however,
viewing conductive reasoning in terms of individual arguments fails to due justice to the
dialectical nature of argumentation (Battersby & Bailin 2011). In addition, attempting to
make conductive reasoning fit into the traditional model of argument structure has
resulted in unnecessary conundrums, for example how to analyze counter-considerations
(are they premises? counter-premises?) or how to diagram these anomalous types of
59

arguments. Our focus, in contrast, is on conductive reasoning more broadly. According to

this perspective, the structure of conductive argumentation is viewed in terms of a
balancing of competing arguments and claims rather than as a single argument.
4. UNCERTAINTY IN CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENTATION
There are a number of reasons why conductive argumentation does not lead to
conclusions which can be asserted with epistemic certainty. These include inferential
uncertainty, the inherent uncertainty of particular claims and judgments, the openendedness of the reason-giving process, and variability in the weighing of pro and con
considerations. Because of these factors, the degree of certainty with which conclusions
of conductive argumentation can justifiably be held will vary.
Inferential uncertainty is a feature of conductive reasoning just as it is with
inductive reasoning. Given that particular claims are true, there is still the question of
how much support they give to the conclusion.
The uncertainty has also to do with the inherent uncertainty of particular claims
and judgments which go into the reasoning process. The likelihood of factual claims is an
important factor in evaluating their weight as the greater the likelihood of the claim, the
more weight it can add to the conclusion. Likelihood is, however, often difficult to
determine. To compound the difficulty, any argument leading to a judgment about what
to do must also take into account future states of affairs which are usually even less
certain than judgments about current states of affairs. What one can do in both these cases
is to use the available information, history, contextual factors, and statistical tools to
make reasoned judgments. And in the area of moral issues, while there are some widely
accepted general moral principles, their application in particular cases inevitably creates
some degree of uncertainty, the degree depending on the strength of the supporting
arguments (Battersby & Bailin 2011).
The uncertainty arises also from the nature of conductive reasoning itself. One
important factor is the open-endedness of the reason-giving process. Competent
conductive reasoning requires laying out the dialectic the arguments on various sides of
the debate, as well as objections to the arguments and responses to the objections. No
survey of arguments will be exhaustive, however. The possibility always exists that
additional reasons and arguments will be put forward which might affect the outcome of
the reasoning (Battersby & Bailin 2011). This being said, the more extensive the review
of the available evidence and argumentation, the stronger the support for the resultant
judgment.
Uncertainty also comes in due to the process of weighing the various reasons pro
and con. There is sometimes variability amongst arguers in the evaluation of the
comparative strength of evidence and arguments on different sides of an issue and
disagreement about the appropriate weight to be apportioned to various considerations.
This is not to say that weightings are (primarily) subjective. Weightings can be justified
(or criticized) by appeal to objective factors and considerations (e.g., the likelihood of
claims, appeal to widely shared values and principles,). Nonetheless, there may not be
consensus on how some considerations should be weighted and there may be more than
one judgment which is defensible given the context (Battersby & Bailin 2011).

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Because of the uncertainty of particular claims, the variability in the evaluation of the
comparative strength of evidence and arguments, the different weightings given to
various considerations, and the open-endedness of the reason-giving process, an instance
of conductive reasoning can, at best, offer good reasons and strong support for a
conclusion but not certainty.
This does not mean, however, that it is not possible to make warranted judgments
in instances of conductive reasoning. Guidelines exist for making reasoned judgments
and criteria exist for their evaluation (Battersby & Bailin 2011). What it does mean is that
there will always be some uncertainty with respect to the judgments emerging from the
process of conductive argumentation and that the strength of the judgments warranted by
particular instances of conductive argumentation will vary.
5. CONFIDENCE IN JUDGMENT
The strength of the evidence and argumentation in support of conclusions in conductive
argumentation will vary from case to case (Battersby & Bailin 2011). In some cases the
evidence for a particular judgment may be overwhelming. There are, for example, very
strong reasons to believe that smoking causes cancer or that the enslavement of human
beings is morally unjustifiable. In other cases the weight of reasons may favour a
particular judgment but not without significant opposing reasons or counter
considerations. Claims about the causes of climate change might fall into this category. In
still other cases, the reasons may be insufficient for reaching a judgment, for example in
debates about life on other planets. Thus, in robust argumentation, warrant is usually a
matter of degree.
Engaging in the process of argumentation imposes certain epistemic requirements
on arguers: that they present arguments justified by the available evidence, address
appropriate objections and provide reasonable responses, and revise their initial position
when warranted. But the variability in the degree of support for different judgments also
imposes an additional requirement on arguers: that they apportion the confidence of their
judgment to the strength of the reasons. Not all judgments warrant an equal level of
confidence. It is important to be clear that we are not referring to subjective confidence
how confident an individual may happen to feel about a judgment, but rather rational or
warranted confidence the level of confidence that is justified by the reasons and
evidence.
The following is a schema which we have developed to represent the level of
confidence warranted by different weights of reasons:

A very confident judgment is warranted when the weight of reasons clearly

supports the judgment.
A reasonably confident judgment is warranted when the weight of reasons
strongly supports the judgment but there are still strong countervailing
considerations.
A tentative judgment is warranted when the weight of reasons is not
overwhelming but is supportive of one position, and we can make a judgment on
balance.

61

A suspended judgment is warranted when the reasons for different positions are
closely balanced or when there is insufficient evidence to make a judgment.
This schema has similarities to the categorization used for classifying the strength
of causal inferences in science (US Department of Health, 2006).

These four levels of judgment confidence are not discrete but can be seen as marking
positions along a continuum. The categorization allows for a range of possibilities in
between.
Apportioning ones confidence in a judgment to the strength of the reasons is
always epistemologically significant. It is when there is a need to act on the basis of our
judgments, however, that the issue of how justified our confidence is in our judgments
becomes crucial. The greater the consequences of action (or inaction), the greater the
need for a level of argumentative support that warrants a confident judgment. A useful
comparison can be made to legal judgments. In criminal cases, where there is a great deal
at stake (freedom versus imprisonment, or even life versus death), the standard of proof is
beyond a reasonable doubt, which requires a level of evidence sufficient to warrant a very
confident judgment. In civil matters, where there is usually less at stake, the standard of
proof is usually balance of probabilities, which clearly requires only an on balance
judgment.
6. DEGREES OF CERTAINTY OR UNCERTAINTY
The fact that argumentation is dialectical imposes yet a further requirement on arguers. It
is not just a matter of apportioning ones confidence in a judgment to the strength of the
reasons. There is also a requirement to communicate the appropriate degree of certainty
or uncertainty when making judgments in the context of an argumentative exchange.
There are many ways in which ones confidence in a judgment and hence the
degree of certainty or uncertainty may be expressed:

A very confident judgment implies a high level of certainty and would be marked
linguistically by such phrases as I am very confident that, it is clear that,
theres little doubt that, the evidence strongly indicates that.
A reasonably confident judgment implies a moderately high level of certainty and
might be indicated by such phrases as I am reasonably sure that, it seems very
likely that, the evidence by and large indicates that.
A tentative judgment implies some degree of uncertainty, although not enough to
preclude making a judgment. A tentative judgment may be indicated by such
phrases as it appears on balance that, the weight of evidence tips somewhat in
favour of, my tentative conclusion is that.
A suspended judgment implies a high level of uncertainty and would be indicated
by such phrases as there is not enough evidence to make a judgment, the
reasons on both sides seem equally balanced, the judgment will have to be
deferred until more evidence is available, the jurys still out on this.

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7. AN OBJECTION
Curiously some theorists have denied that conductive arguments can have a conclusion
that expresses uncertainty. In a recent posthumous publication, Adler argues against the
claim that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion in a
conductive argument:
The claim that I dispute is that once the conclusion is drawn, the counter- considerations continue
to diminish its support (Adler 2013, p. 4).

As a consequence:
the conclusion of a Conductive Argument is characteristically detached and accepted without
(epistemic) qualification (Adler 2013, p. 6).

And further:
Let me summarize my reasons for taking Conductive Argument to characteristically lead to
unqualified conclusions that are accepted and asserted (Adler 2013, p. 6).

If we understand him correctly, he is arguing that if we are asking an interlocutor to

accept our conclusion, then we are always asking him to accept the conclusion without
the modifiers of all things considered, on balance, it is very likely that etc.
It is significant that Adlers objection is framed in terms of conductive arguments
while we frame the issue in terms of conductive argumentation. The difference in framing
is important in terms of the consideration of his objection, a point to which we shall
return.
We would maintain that qualified conclusions are common in conductive
argumentation. In arguments for factual claims, expressing uncertainty is not unusual,
e.g., The forecast notwithstanding, it looks like it might rain. Even though he doesnt
like parties, Tom is a good friend so hell likely come to my birthday party. There are
many fine contemporary authors, but she is probably the best of her generation. The
communication of the degree of certainty of findings is also a common practice in the
kind of argument to the best explanation exhibited in scientific reasoning and scientific
reports. The following excerpt from an IPCC assessment report on climate change
explains the confidence levels used in the report:
The degree of certainty in key findings in this assessment is based on the author teams evaluations
of underlying scientific understanding and is expressed as a qualitative level of confidence (from
very low to very high) and, when possible, probabilistically with a quantified likelihood (from
exceptionally unlikely to virtually certain). Confidence in the validity of a finding is based on the
type, amount, quality, and consistency of evidence (e.g., data, mechanistic understanding, theory,
models, expert judgment) and the degree of agreement. SPM-2

The following examples from the report illustrate the use of these confidence levels:
(1)

It is virtually certain that globally the troposphere has warmed since the mid-20th century. More
complete observations allow greater confidence in estimates of tropospheric temperature changes
in the extratropical Northern Hemisphere than elsewhere. There is medium confidence in the rate

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of warming and its vertical structure in the Northern Hemisphere extra-tropical troposphere and
low confidence elsewhere. {2.4} PSM-4
(2)

It is likely that anthropogenic influences have affected the global water cycle since 1960.
Anthropogenic influences have contributed to observed increases in atmospheric moisture content
in the atmosphere (medium confidence), to global-scale changes in precipitation patterns over land
(medium confidence), to intensification of heavy precipitation over land regions where data are
sufficient (medium confidence), and to changes in surface and sub- surface ocean salinity (very
likely). {2.5, 2.6, 3.3, 7.6, 10.3, 10.4} SPM-13

Although Adlers argument seems to be directed toward conductive arguments in general

(the conclusion of a Conductive Argument is characteristically detached ), many of
his examples involve practical reasoning, where the conclusion is a decision or
recommendation about whether to act. Apparently, he would reject a conclusion that we
should probably do X. Yet, in practice, we do often qualify a recommendation by we
should probably, on balance the best thing to do seems to be, there are good reasons
to etc.
Given the frequency of qualified conclusions in conductive argumentation, one
might wonder what Adlers reasons are for denying their possibility. The basis of his
argument is a logical one that in order for a conductive argument to be cogent, i.e., in
order for its conclusion to be correctly accepted as true, the conclusion must stand on its
own.1 His focus is on cogent arguments, that is arguments that end inquiry. The
alternative for Adler is not qualified conclusions but rather suspended judgment.
It is here that the problem of viewing conductive argumentation in terms of
individual arguments becomes manifest. Adlers analysis has some plausibility when
applied to examples such as the classic argument offered by Wellman: Although your
lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movies because the picture is ideal
for children and will be gone by tomorrow (Wellman 1971, p. 67). Most of the examples
offered by Adler, however, (e.g., mandated health care insurance, stricter rules to restrict
immigration, building nuclear power plants) are instances of complex, dialectical
argumentation. (Indeed, the distinction between conductive arguments and conductive
argumentation is one that Adler himself appears, in places, to acknowledge: Adler, p. 2,
footnote 1). In such cases, it is inappropriate to expect certainty (for all the reasons
outlined above). It is inappropriate to expect conclusions that are true. What we can
expect, instead, are judgments that have varying degrees of support.
Adlers argument does have some prima facie plausibility in that for practical
arguments, either we should act, we should not act, or we simply do not know what to do.
Indeed, it does seem that when we decide to do something, we have detached the
decision from the reasoning through our commitment to action. But the detachment is in
effect a pragmatic detachment which does not necessarily indicate unqualified
confidence, nor will it necessarily end inquiry. On fairly straightforward practical issues,
for example which camera to buy, making a decision will likely mark the end of the
inquiry. But this may simply be because the action is a fait accompli and does not
necessarily indicate a high level of confidence that we have made the right choice. With
1 Surprisingly given his thesis, Adler does acknowledge that there are loads of arguments that end with
qualified conclusions, including, plausible or, more equivocally, the best explanation is (p. 7). But the
rest of his argumentation leads us to believe that he would reconcile this apparent contradiction by asserting
that such arguments are not cogent, i.e., they are not arguments which can be put forward for acceptance.

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more complex issues, however, even once an action has been taken, inquiry does not
necessarily end, e.g., the U.S. government has made a decision with respect to mandated
health care insurance, but the debate has certainly not ended.
It seems to be Adlers view that it is only detached, unqualified conclusions that
discern or advance and settle new or interesting or important truths, that are worth
believing for ourselves or for our audience. They increase our information and expand
our corpus of beliefs (Adler 2013, p. 6). We would argue, on the contrary, that it is
appropriately qualified conclusions that really add to our justified beliefs. We are
justified in holding our beliefs on such issues with varying degree of confidence
commensurate with the strength of the support. Janes belief that there should be
government mandated health care insurance is one she may hold with considerable
confidence given the strength of the reasons in favor and the weakness of the reasons
against. She may hold the belief that we should not build nuclear power plants with
considerably less confidence given the force of the reasons for as well as against. Adler
seems to hold that only unqualified conclusions put arguers and inquirers in a position
that is appropriate to guide further judgments and action (Adler 2013, p. 6). We would
argue, on the contrary, that appropriately qualified conclusions are, in fact, more
reasonable guides to action. The conclusions of conductive argumentation are judgments
and it is a requirement of reasonableness that such judgments should reflect the degree of
support provided by our reasons.
8. COMMUNICATING CONFIDENCE AND CERTAINTY
We have been arguing, then, that there is a requirement to apportion ones confidence in
a judgment to the strength of the reasons in support of the judgment. We would argue,
further, there is also an epistemic and moral responsibility to communicate the
appropriate degree of certainty or uncertainty when making judgments in the context of
an argumentative exchange. This responsibility arises from the dialectical and interactive
nature of conductive argumentation. According to Johnson, that an exchange is
dialectical means that as a result of the intervention of the Other, ones own logos
(discourse, reasoning, or thinking) has the potential of being affected in some way
(Johnson 2000, p. 161). In other words, the reasoning and judgments made by others can
and often should affect my reasoning and judgments and form part of the basis for my
actions. Just as offering well justified judgments in the context of an argumentative
exchange can contribute to others holding better justified beliefs and undertaking better
justified actions, so also can communicating ones judgments at the appropriate level of
confidence. Acknowledging uncertainty or confidence as part of ones judgment or
decision to act can inform others of how much confidence you or they should have in the
judgment. Communicating a judgment at an inappropriate level of confidence, for
example with more confidence than is warranted by the evidence, may contribute to other
interlocutors holding beliefs or acting in ways that are poorly grounded.
This responsibility is especially significant when one is in a position of epistemic
authority. Experts have an obligation to provide reasons for their judgments, however in
contexts requiring expertise, recipients of the judgment are often not in a position to
assess the reasoning in any detail. These judgments are generally accepted largely on the
basis of trust in the expertise and reliability of the authority. Thus the level of confidence
65

that is expressed in the judgment is an important aspect of the information communicated

in the judgment. Returning to the IPCC report, it would be have been misleading if the
report had omitted the confidence levels in their various finding. This is especially
important as such judgments often form the basis for decisions regarding action, or may
themselves be recommendations for action. Compare the following judgments by a
physician: (1.) I have carefully evaluated all the evidence and would not recommend
surgery. It is my judgment that it would not help. (2.) I have carefully evaluated all the
evidence and would not recommend surgery. It is my judgment that surgery is very
unlikely to help and the surgical procedure is very risky. But I cannot be 100% confident
because there have been a few similar cases where it appears that a surgical invention
may have helped to prolong life. To offer the same conclusion without an indication of
the confidence level would be a misleading way of putting forth ones conclusion. In
cases where the argument leads to a somewhat uncertain conclusion based on a balancing
of conflicting considerations, failure to indicate the presence of these considerations is an
epistemic failure. Given that the purpose of conductive argumentation is to consider
countervailing considerations and yet come to a reasonable conclusion, failure to
communicate the degree of justification or certainty that the arguments provide also
violates basic norms of communication.
9. THE LAQUILA CASE
The trial of the Italian scientists and officials in the LAquila earthquake case is a
pertinent one to examine with respect to the issue of the communication of certainty or
uncertainty. The earthquake had been preceded by a swarm of small quakes, and the
charge against the defendants was that they did not do their duty in communicating the
likelihood of a major earthquake to the citizens of L'Aquila.
One of the scientists tried, Enzo Boschi, the then-president of Italy's National
Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology, is said to have compared the situation to a large
quake that struck L'Aquila in 1703. Boschi is alleged to have said at a meeting in
L'Aquila on March 31, 2009, "It is unlikely that an earthquake like the one in 1703 could
occur in the short term, but the possibility cannot be totally excluded." In a press
conference after the meeting, Department of Civil Protection official Bernardo De
Bernardinis, also a defendant, is quoted (and on video record) as saying that the situation
was normal given the context, posing "no danger," and urging residents to relax (Pappas
2012).
The details of the case are complex and include allegations of political pressure,
and of misrepresentation of material. We have no intention to try to evaluate the merits of
the case, nor are we in a position to do so. Nonetheless some of the issues raised are
pertinent to our discussion. The statements of both Boschi and De Bernardinis would
have been grounded in the knowledge that earthquake swarms are very common in
seismically active regions such as Abruzzo but only a very small percentage are
precursors to major quakes. In fact, seismologists claim that it is virtually impossible to
predict major earthquakes. Yet we can note a difference in the level of certainty
communicated in the two judgments. Boschis judgment that a major earthquake was
unlikely could be characterized as a reasonably confident judgment, but in alluding to the
possibility of such a quake, it communicated a degree of uncertainty in the judgment. De
66

Bernardinis, in contrast, seemed to be making a very confident judgment that there was
no danger of a major quake. His judgment made no reference to the possibility, slight
though it may have been. The risk was indeed very low, but not non-existent. Thus his
pronouncement, communicated to the public, that there was no danger was
epistemically overly confident, expressing an unreasonable degree of certainty.
The scientists and officials in question were considered epistemic authorities and
the level of certainty communicated by them to members of the public appears to have
affected the publics actions. A local investigator, Inspector Lorenzo Cavallo, is quoted as
saying: "The Commission calmed the local population down following a number of earth
tremors. After the quake, we heard people's accounts and they told us they changed their
behaviour following the advice of the commission (Watt, S. 2011). This account is
corroborated repeatedly by witnesses testifying at the trial (Billi 2013).
The specifics of this particular case are complex and contested, and it would be
inappropriate and imprudent to attempt to pass any judgments. One thing that we do think
that the case demonstrates, however, is a strong recognition of the responsibility to
communicate the epistemically appropriate degree of certainty or uncertainty in our
judgments. It is unreasonable, (epistemically inappropriate) to make or hold a judgment
without the appropriate degree of uncertainty given the evidence. It is, in addition, a
communicative and perhaps a moral failure to communicate a judgment without the
appropriate expression of epistemic uncertainty.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
We would like to thank Monica Bhattacharjee for her contribution to the preparation of
this paper.

REFERENCES
Ashcroft, H. (2012, Nov. 20). LAquila Earthquake shaking the scientific community. Retrieved from
http://www.bangscience.org/2012/11/laquila-earthquake-shaking-the-scientific-community/
Bailin, S. & Battersby, M. (2010). Reason in the balance: An inquiry approach to critical thinking. Whitby,
Ont.: McGraw-Hill.
Bailin, S. & Battersby, M. (2009). Inquiry: A dialectical approach to teaching critical thinking. In J. Ritola
(Ed.), Argument cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 8 CD-ROM. Windsor, ON: OSSA.
Battersby, M. & Bailin, S. (2011). Guidelines for reaching a reasoned judgment. In J. A. Blair & R. H.
Johnson (Eds.). Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning (pp. 145157).
London: College Publications.
Billi, M. (2013). Sentenza. Tribunale di LAquila. Sezione Penale. N.253/2010 R.G.N.R. Retrieved from
http://processoaquila.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/sentenza-grandi-rischi-completa-1.pdf
Blair, J. A. & Johnson, R. H. (Eds.). (2011). Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible
reasoning. London: College Publications.
Govier, T. (2011). Conductive arguments: overview of the symposium. In J. A. Blair & R. H. Johnson
(Eds.). Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning (pp. 262-276). London:
College Publications.
Hitchcock, D. (2002). The practice of argumentative discussion. Argumentation, 6, 3: 287-298.
Hooper, J. (2012, Oct. 22). Italian scientists convicted for false assurances before earthquake. Retrieved
from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/22/italian-scientists-jailed-earthquake-aquila
Johnson, R H. (2000). Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Pappas, S. (2012). Scientists on trial for failing to predict Italian quake. Retrieved from
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failing-predict-italian-quake/#.U3J_LF69zw2
US Department of Health and Human Services. (2006). The Health Consequences of Involuntary
Exposure to Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the Surgeon General. Retrieved from
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44324/
Watt, S. (2011, Sept. 16).Scientists in the dock over LAquila earthquake. Retrieved from
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Wellman, C. (1971). Challenge and response: Justification in ethics. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
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The Integration Of Pragma-Dialectics And Collaborative Learning

Research: Argumentation Dialogue, Externalisation And
Collective Thinking
Michael J. Baker
Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Telecom ParisTech & Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
France
michael.baker@telecom-paristech.fr

ABSTRACT: This paper describes extensions of pragma-dialectical theory for analysing learning processes
in students argumentation dialogues. It is argued that although pragma-dialectics is the most appropriate
theory in this context, it needs to be psychologised by the consideration of additional discursive,
dialogical, epistemological, interpersonal and affective dimensions of dialogue. In conclusion, prospects for
new rapprochement between argumentation theory and psychology are discussed.
KEYWORDS: collaborative learning, argumentation dialogue, pragma-dialectics, psychology,
externalisation principle

1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, a specialised subfield of collaborative learning research
(Dillenbourg, Baker, Blaye & OMalley, 1996) has emerged, called collaborative
argumentation-based learning (see, for example, the collective works: Andriessen &
Coirier, 1999; Andriessen, Baker & Suthers, 2003; Muller Mirza & Perret-Clermont,
2009). Its general aims are to understand how and what students could learn (apart from
argumentation competencies themselves) from engaging in pedagogical activities based
on argumentation, such as debates, writing argumentative texts, or joint problem-solving
that involving spontaneous phases of argumentative interaction. However, collaborative
argumentation-based learning research has been mostly carried out either on the basis of
everyday notions of what argument is, or else by drawing on a limited set of
argumentation theories (e.g. the model of Toulmin, 1958) that that are not necessarily
well adapted to the task at hand, i.e. analysing argumentative interaction.
This paper explores the relevance and utility of the pragma-dialectical theory of
argumentation (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984) for analysing students
argumentation dialogues in a way that brings to light interactive learning processes. I
propose firstly that the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is the most appropriate
approach to analysing students argumentation dialogues given quite simply that it
is a theory of argumentation in dialogue, and that the components of the theory are
generally applicable to the data. Secondly, I propose that in order to understand
collaborative arguing to learn, within a specific domain, notably with respect to
conceptual elaboration, a broad pragma-dialectical framework is also well fitted to the
task, provided that additional dimensions of social interaction are taken into account. For
the empirical support of the relevance of these dimensions to analysing students
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argumentation dialogues, this paper draws on the authors previously published work (for
example, Baker, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2009) on the analysis of corpora of students problem
solving dialogues in physics, biology and geography,
In the first section below, the main components of pragma-dialectics are discussed
with respect to their degrees of correspondence with processes at work in students
argumentation dialogues. In the ensuing section, additional dimensions of dialogue that
need to be taken into account in educational situations beyond the pragmatic and the
dialectical are described, in relation to interactive learning processes. In conclusion,
relations between pragma-dialectics and psychology are discussed, together with the
extent to which the set of dimensions of dialogue discussed in the paper could be
combined in a coherent theoretical and methodological approach.
2. COMPONENTS OF THE PRAGMA-DIALECTIC MODEL AND THEIR
CORRESPONDENCES WITH STUDENTS ARGUMENTATION DIALOGUES
For reasons stated in introduction, the components of the pragma-dialectical model do
provide an appropriate general framework for understanding how students
argumentation dialogues have potential for learning. However, each of the components
needs to be psychologised (or naturalised, to use the terminology of Grize, 1982,
1996) in order to understand relations between dialogue and (changes in) thinking. As
discussed in conclusion, pragma-dialectics explicitly eschews consideration of
psychological change outside the dialogue. Below, each of the following main
components of the pragma-dialectical model are discussed (stages of discussion, speech
acts and perlocutionary effects, rules of conduct for reasonable argumentation, and
methods for reconstructing argumentative discourse) in terms of their correspondences
with the reality of students argumentation dialogues.
Confrontation phase. This phase usually does not exist in students dialogues: students
often just move straight into opening and argumentation; or if the confrontation phase
does exist, it is often reduced to a repetition of the same proposal with repeated refusals
to accept.
Opening phase. In students problem-solving dialogues, dialectical roles are unlikely to
be so clear as those of proponent and opponent, with their strong degrees of
commitment. This is because in a learning situation, given that knowledge is supposed to
be under co-construction, it is not realistic for students to have clear commitments to the
tentative solutions that they propose (Nonnon, 1996). In pedagogical debates, concerning
issues where personal value systems are at stake (e.g. ecology), such commitments can
occur, and typically, students views become more polarised. But in more scientific
domains, such as physics, students may often shift from opponent to proponent roles, for
a given thesis, as they explore around the question.
Argumentation phase. Without specific pedagogical preparation asking students to
read texts, multimedia materials on the topic, analyse possible arguments, in short, to
invent or activate their arguments this phase may often be very short indeed, simply

70

because students are not able to find arguments with respect to topics which are new to
them (i.e. to be learned).
Concluding phase. In students dialogues, this phase is often simply left out: the students
just stop arguing, moving onto something else. Perhaps interpersonal relationships
between adolescents preclude making explicit who has won or lost? Adolescent
cultures may even preclude conflict and argumentation altogether, being more oriented
towards what young people share (such as taste in rock music, hair and clothes styles)
rather than what divides them (Pasquier, 2005).
In sum, the main phases of pragma-dialectics are in fact relevant and useful for
analysing students argumentation dialogues, provided one bears in mind that the phases
can be more or less extended (or even deleted), depending on the more global
pedagogical sequence in which the argumentation dialogue occurs. Extensive preparation,
and framing or scripting of the debate will often be required in order to elicit
argumentation at all.
There are two main questions with respect to perlocutionary effects (convincing,
belief, acceptance, ) of argumentative speech acts: what is the nature of students
attitudes in argumentation dialogue? And, how do attitudes change as a result of
argumentation dialogue?
Along with Edwards (1993), I would concur that the question what do children
really think? when they engage in dialogue is either unanswerable or else meaningless:
the relation between language and thought is not so simple (see the conclusion to this
paper). Even with interview techniques, or questionnaires, we cannot escape the circle of
dialogue (despite methodological precautions, interviews and experiments are also social
encounters); and what is expressed in dialogue by each interlocutor is a function of
mutual adaptation as well as individual thought. What students really think is not the
point of dialogue analysis: the point is what interlocutors do and say, and how this
evolves.
This view is coherent with the meta-theoretical principle of externalisation in
pragma-dialectics; but this does not mean that psychology is necessarily external to the
dialectical process since, under a suitable analytical approach, dialogue is collective
thinking. The theory of learning in and by argumentation dialogue that would be coherent
with pragma-dialectics would therefore be one of stabilised evolution of the nature of
dialogue, across situations.
But this view is not incoherent with the very idea of cognitive and dialogical
attitudes. Thus the philosopher of language L. Jonathan Cohen (1992) has proposed a
distinction between belief and acceptance: belief is a disposition to think or feel (it can
not be decided upon), acceptance is a decision to reason with what is proposed by the
interlocutor, to take it as a premise, as far as it goes. This seems to correspond better
with students engagement in collaborative problem solving, where since by
hypothesis or design, we are concerned with learning situations none of the students
really knows the answer and so can not adopt a firm standpoint.
The second question mentioned above was: how do attitudes change as a result of
argumentation dialogue? One approach to answering this question is to record individual
students opinions regarding a thesis before debating, together with their arguments, then
71

to ask individuals to update their views (opinion, arguments) in the light of a debate
(Baker, 2003, 2009). The changes before and after can be correlated with characteristics
of the debates. Results show that students changes in attitudes are almost never as clear
as dialectical theories would like: one never sees students straightforwardly dropping
their proposals once refuted, nor does one see them straightforwardly accepting
successfully defended proposals of their opponents. Students may, of course, be
constrained to concede or accept, on the scale of a specific argumentation sequence; but
usually, each student will persist in maintaining his or her own views, throughout the
dialogue. In other terms, it takes more than a short argumentation sequence, whatever its
characteristics, to change deep-seated views. It is possible that this relates to the
maintenance of the self, as a relatively stable self-construction: what would a person be
like who radically and irrevocably changes his or her fundamental beliefs, on the basis of
every dialogue they engage in? Beliefs surely change over a longer period of time than
the usually short interactions that are considered in educational research. But changes do
occur, and they are usually much more subtle than definitive acquisition or abandonment
of proposals: for example, realising that what one thought was true for certain might not
be, or maintaining ones position, but in a more open, subtle, nuanced form, that
recognises possible counter-arguments. Unwillingness to lose face (Brown & Levinson,
1987) by admitting defeat is also an explanatory factor of the persistence of views across
dialectical outcomes.
With respect to the famous ten commandments of pragma-dialectics (van
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, pp. 151-175), two questions arise in this context: do
students dialogues largely conform to these rules? And, what is the nature of the rules
themselves? The following dialectical rules are particularly relevant:

participants must be able to freely state their views obviously, in larger

groups, it is is rarely the case that all participants can freely express their views,
for reasons because of production blocking;
attacks must be defended this is a rule that is generally followed and
explicitly enforced (otherwise, someone is likely to say well, what do you have
to say to that?). An exception often occurs in the case of simple conflicts, where
one student simply refuses to accept a proposal, without giving reasons;
attacks must not be repeated they often are repeated, but in a reformulated
way, which can be positive for learning to the extent that it corresponds to
negotiation of meaning of key domain concepts.
dialectical outcomes must be made explicit this is rarely followed, probably
because of the need to preserve face, to not too explicitly push home the victory
and make the other look stupid; usually, the students just stop, think again and
move onto something else.

In sum, it is difficult to reply definitively to the question do students argumentation

dialogues generally conform to the ten pragma-dialectical commandments?, because of
the necessarily limited number of cases that can be analysed. The main rule that is
respected is the one concerning the necessity to defend against attacks. But then, if this is
not respected, there could probably be no argumentation dialogue at all. This may relate
to the second question mentioned above, concerning the nature of pragma-dialectical
72

rules. According to dialogic logic (Barth & Krabbe, 1982), the purpose of dialectical
rules is to ensure convergence on a determinate outcome (a winning or losing proposal)
in the most efficient way. But if it is generally the case that the rule requiring defenses
against attacks is the most basic or fundamental, then this amounts to the necessity for
achieving agreement on what type of dialogue (Walton & Krabbe, 1995) is being
engaged in (argumentative). In other terms, pragma-dialectical rules can be seen as
special cases of a general cooperative contract, according to which, as everyone
knows, you should not waste other peoples time (e.g. by stalling), and you should
generally put the group objective finding the most acceptable solution before
personal misgivings.
Finally, the aim of reconstructing argumentative discourse is to uncover the
pragma-dialectical structure from the inter-discursive texture, for the purposes of
evaluating it (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993). This involves, for
example: deletion (of repetitions, of parts irrelevant to argumentative structure); addition
(of missing premisses and reasoning); permutation of the linear structure towards an
argumentative structure; substitution (of clearer expressions of ambiguous statements).
But it is possible that the deleted parts are those where the factors that are most
important for learning may reside. These include processes of negotiation of meaning of
proposals (e.g. in repeated attacks in a reformulated form) that, whilst they can be used to
abusive ends (such as avoiding the issue, or defeat), constitute the principal vehicles of
conceptual change.
In summary, although pragma-dialectics is the most appropriate theory of
argumentation for understanding collaborative argumentation-based learning, each of its
components needs to be transformed, or psychologised, for this purpose. Nearly all
stages of discussion can be omitted by students, and even the argumentation phase itself
often depends on preparatory activation of arguments. Students cognitive and dialogical
attitudes are characterised by weak commitment and volatility, given that it is difficult to
adopt firm stances with respect to knowledge that is undergoing co-construction in the
learning situation. Only the most basic pragma-dialectical rule, requiring defense against
attack, is generally respected.
Certainly, such a large gap between what students argumentation dialogues and
the pragma-dialectical model is not a criticism of that model, since it aims to be both
descriptive and normative. Rather, it indicates the necessity for research on collaborative
argumentation-based learning to integrate other dimensions of dialogue, beyond the
pragmatic and the dialectic, into a coherent theory and model of learning in and by
argumentation dialogue. These additional dimensions, discussed below, include the
discursive negotiation of meaning, the interactive regulation of emotions and the nature
of the interpersonal relation.
3. OTHER DIMENSIONS THAT NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FOR
ARGUING TO LEARN
Pragmatic and dialectical dimensions of students dialogues are at the heart of
collaborative argumentation-based learning. They relate to pragmatic (perlocutionary)
effects of argumentation dialogue mentioned above (change in view) in relation to
dialectical processes and outcomes, and to learning to engage in such types of interaction
73

(learning of dialectical rules and strategies). But in order to study a broader range of
attendant learning processes, five other dimensions need to be considered, as follows.
The epistemological dimension refers to the nature of what is being discussed
within a particular domain based on perception in the current situation, on reasoning,
having a particular social origin (e.g. what the teacher previously said) or across
specific domains for example, scientific versus socio-technical domains. It is
important in determining how students attitudes are likely to change (epistemic
entrenchment: Gardenfrs, 1988) and the weight that will be given to arguments. In
addition, in scientific domains, students have difficulty in achieving coherence (cf.
knowledge in pieces, to use diSessas, 1988, formulation), whereas with respect to
societal issues, value systems and ideologies come into play, in which case, these systems
will be more resilient to change and must be considered as wholes.
The discursive dimension concerns the ways in which work is done on cognition
through language, by the performance of cognitive-linguistic operations (Grize, 1982;
Vignaux, 1988) in dialogue. This includes making new conceptual distinctions (argument
by dissociation), reformulating, generalising, predicating, inferring, and so on. Interactive
pressures relating to verbal conflicts of opinions may particularly stimulate this.
The dialogical dimension concerns the interplay of socially inscribed discourse
genres, the more or less reformulated expression of what one has already heard
(Bakhtine, 1977). Learning in educational dialogue can be seen, at least partially, as the
appropriation of, or the articulation between, students everyday discourse genres and
school genres (Wertsch, 1991), such as the very specific genre argumentative discourse
(e.g. Baker, Bernard & Dumez-Froc, 2012).
The interpersonal dimension refers to the relationship between students, more or
less friendly, as well as their different social identities (e.g. male or female) influence the
extent to which they can and will deepen verbal conflicts, possibly endangering their
relationships (e.g. Kutnick & Kington, 2005).
The affective dimension is highly important in the case of argumentative
interactions, given the threat to the interpersonal relation imposed by the thematisation of
verbal conflicts. Affective regulation will interact with knowledge co-elaboration and the
determination of the argumentative outcome (Baker, Andriessen & Jrvel, 2013). Affect
enters into the very heart of argumentation, in that the choice of argumentative strategy
(direct defense, or else attack the attack?) has been shown, experimentally, to correlate
with the extent to which the attack is perceived as aggressive (Muntig & Turnbull, 1998).
Therefore, in order to understand the full range of types of learning processes and
outcomes relating to students argumentation dialogue, it is necessary to study the
relations between the seven dimensions of dialogue described above (pragmatic,
dialectical, discursive, epistemological, dialogical, interpersonal and affective). This
enables the study, in relation to the ongoing pragma-dialectical process (relating to
change in view), of conceptual learning (discursive dimension), broadening of the field of
knowledge taken into consideration (epistemological dimension), the appropriation and
articulation of school and everyday discourses (dialogical dimension), as well as the
influence of the interpersonal relation, with all the affects that will be associated.
The integration of such dimensions into a coherent theoretical approach is, I
believe, possible and useful, but would constitute a major research programme. It would
require at least the integration of pragma-dialectics with theories of belief revision and
74

cognitive dissonance, theories of discourse, of Bakhtinian dialogism, of interpersonal

relations, facework and emotion. But that is what would be required in order to more
fully understand the learning potential of engaging in argumentation dialogue.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have discussed the extent to which the normative aspect of pragmadialectical theory is descriptive with respect to students argumentation dialogues, and the
additional dimensions of dialogue that would need to be integrated with this theory in
order to come to a fuller understanding of the learning potential of these types of
dialogues. By way of conclusion, I shall mention a few more general considerations on a
theoretical level, in terms of the possible marriage between argumentation theory and
psychology, beginning with the view from argumentation theory. I propose that
argumentation theory has a too restricted view of the psychology to which it could relate:
other discursive, dialogical psychologies could make a better fit.
The role of psychology in relation to argumentation theory is seen by the new
rhetoric (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, p. 12: my translation) as follows:
The theory of argumentation, aiming, thanks to discourse, to obtain an efficacious action on minds,
could have been treated as a branch of psychology. () The study of argumentation would thus
become one of the objects of experimental psychology, where varied argumentations would be
tested with varied groups of listeners, sufficiently well known so that one could, on the basis of
these experiments, draw conclusions of a certain generality.

This is learning from argument as accepting or acquiring theses by being persuaded by

arguments. But as described above, argumentation, whether in discourse or dialogue, can
have many more varied effects on speakers, hearers and interlocutors; for example, it can
change the way they conceptualise the domain of discourse, or broaden their perspectives
on the range of points of view pertaining to a debate, or even enable them to appropriate
the discourse genre. In other terms, this vision of the role of psychology in relation to
argumentation is too restricted.
Turning to pragma-dialectics (Van Eemeren, Groodendorst & Snoeck
Henkemans, 1996, pp. 276-277),
[t]he study of argumentation should not concentrate on the psychological dispositions of the
people involved in an argumentation, but on their externalized or externalizable
commitments.

But this vision of argumentation and psychology depends on a view that psychology is
only concerned with the inner mental states of individuals. Such a distinction between
language and thinking has been largely criticised by philosophers of language
(Wittgenstein, 1978, 109e, 339):
[t]hinking is not an incorporeal process which lends life and sense to speaking, and which it would
be possible to detach from speaking, rather as the Devil took the shadow of Schlemiehl from the
ground.

75

Some recent psychological theories also call into question such a vision, in considering
dialogue itself as a process of collective thinking (e.g. Allwoods, 1997, theory of
dialogue as collective thinking; the discursive psychology of Harr and Gillett, 1993;
Fernyhoughs, 1996, Vygotskian theory of thinking as internalised dialogue; or Lave and
Wengers, 1991, theory of situated cognition and learning). According to these
approaches, private thoughts whilst their existence is intersubjectively undeniable
have nevertheless no role to play in the analysis of thinking in and by dialogue, unless
they become intersubjectively known, and influence the course of the dialogue itself.
Lapidary statements of this position would be: the thinking is in the dialogue, or even
dialogue is collective thinking. There is therefore no necessity to expel thinking from
pragma-dialectics, or to restrict it to direct effects of persuasion. In other terms, the
relations between argumentation, dialogue, thinking and learning do not have to be only
conceived in terms of the outer as the province of argumentation and the inner being
relegated to psychology, because there are psychologies that aim to cross-cut the
inner/outer divide.
The analysis of students argumentation dialogues, integrating the seven
dimensions described above, would therefore constitute at the same time an analysis of
public, externalised commitment and of the evolution of thinking, learning, as a collective
process. This would form the basis for a new rapprochement between argumentation
theory and psychological theory.

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Controversy, Racial Equality, And American World War I

Cemeteries In Europe
V. William Balthrop & Carole Blair
Department of Communication Studies
University of North CarolinaChapel Hill
United States of America
vwb@email.unc.edu
Department of Communication Studies
University of North CarolinaChapel Hill
United States of America
cblair1@email.unc.edu

ABSTRACT: Approximately two million U.S. soldiers were deployed to the Western Front during WWI.
The vast majority of those killed were repatriated to the United States and buried in racially segregated plots.
Still, nearly 32,000 remain in U.S. cemeteries in Europe which are not segregated by race. Controversy may
arise over the transgression of boundaries and borrow from both discursive and nondiscursive arguments.
These integrated cemeteries constitute an argument grounded in materiality against racial segregation.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, American cemeteries, controversy, distribution of the sensible, material
argument, nondiscursive argument, Rancire, World War I.

1. INTRODUCTION
The American Expeditionary Force deployed more than two million U.S. soldiers to the
Western Front during World War I. Despite the desire of many to leave the nearly 80,000
American dead in overseas cemeteries, the vast majority were repatriated to the United
States at the request of next of kin. Many of them were buried in U.S. national cemeteries,
Arlington National Cemetery for example, and, following accepted practice, were placed
in racially segregated plots. Still, not all were returned and nearly 32,000 remain in eight
U.S. cemeteries in Europe (six in France, one in Belgium and one in England). There was
one remarkable difference between the cemeteries: Those in the U.S. were racially
segregated, while those in Europe were racially integrated.
This essay examines this occurrence as a significant moment in the controversy over
racial equality. Goodnight (1991, p.2) notes that controversy may arise over the
transgression of boundaries and borrow from a broad range of both discursive and
nondiscursive argument. We contend that the presence of integrated cemeteries in Europe
constitutes an oppositional, material argument against the then accepted practice of racial
segregation. We also believe that Jacques Rancires (2004, p. 1) concept of the
distribution of the sensible offers valuable insights into the function of this
nondiscursive argument.

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2. U.S. CEMETERIES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SENSIBLE

Goodnight (1991, p. 2) observed that, Controversies permeate contemporary life, and,
along with Olson (Olson & Goodnight, 1994, p. 249), placed them at those sites of
struggle where arguers criticize and invent alternatives to established social conventions
and sanctioned norms of communication. Certainly controversies flourished about
American participation in World War I, including whether the United States should even
enter the war. But some of the most interesting had to do with the relations between
African American and white soldiers, black Americans role in the military, and the
obligations and limitations of citizenship vis--vis African American soldiers. African
American newspapers routinely reported on, challenging and praising as appropriate, such
practices as separate training for African American troops, the replacement of black
officers by whites, and the performance of black units such as the highly decorated 93rd
Division which was attached to French forces, and so on. Ultimately, approximately 10
percent of the nearly 4 million American men in military service during this period were
African American.
Even in the aftermath of the war, racial tensions, quite strong prior to American
entry into the War, remained a significant factor as segregation and white supremacy
became more strongly entrenched. The military reflected civilian attitudes as a review
board at Fort Meade, for instance, denied the request from an African American officer to
remain on active duty with the regular army, stating that he was unqualified by reason of
the qualities inherent in the Negro race and that Negroes are deficient in moral fiebr
[sic], rendering them unfit as officers and leaders of men (Colored officers and the
regular army, 1919, p. 4). Although this ruling was later overruled by the Secretary of
War, it nevertheless reflected the broader cultural milieu.
As bodies of U.S. soldiers were repatriated to the United States at the request of
their relatives, racial segregation was the norm, even in death. As Francis (2003, p. 222)
observed, a cemetery can be viewed as a collective representation, a sacred, symbolic
replica of the living community that expressed many of the communitys basic beliefs and
values. That reflection of contemporary social practices was affirmed in an account of
construction plans for the World War I section at Arlington National Cemetery: At the
eastern point the Negro soldiers are to be buried; the graves for the white soldiers begin at
the other end of the ground (Commission of Fine Arts, 1920).
Given these practices, it seems astonishing for the U.S. cemeteries abroad to have
been racially integrated and even more so for that decision to have been made by the U.S.
Army. At the time of the Armistice in November, 1918 there were approximately 2,400
American burial places in Europe (Smith, 1926). Following repatriation, the remaining
soldier dead were concentrated into eight permanent cemeteries. From the beginning, no
question existed but that these cemeteries were to fulfill an important function beyond
simply the disposal of bodies. The Assistant Secretary of War noted (Hayes, 1920) that,
the work of beautifying them may be pushed forward speedily, in order that they may serve alike as
a symbol of the Nations gratitude to its departed sons and a demonstration to all peoples for all
time of Americas response to a great threat.

The War Department invited representatives from the Commission of Fine Arts to provide
guidance for the beautification of the cemeteries, and the Gold Star Fathers Association
79

(Bentley, 1922, p. 51) recommended that, suitable objects of art and architecturebe
producedand erected in each of said cemeteries to depict the ideals for which American
heroes have fallen and to inspire thereby the people of Europe with the lofty and unselfish
purpose of America in waging war on foreign soil.
It is here that Rancires (Rockhill, 2004, p. 57) notion of the distribution of the
sensible, or the system of divisions and boundaries that definewhat is visible and
audible within a particular aesthetic-political regime, offers important insights. The U.S.
cemeteries constitute an argument about American sacrifice and artistic standards. Their
logic of demonstration is indissolubly an aesthetic of expression (Rancire, 1999, p. 57).
These artistic practices, as Rancires notes (2004, p. 13), are ways of doing and
making that intervene in the general distribution of ways of doing and making as well as
in the relationships they maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility. These
cemeteries made American sacrifice visible and formed new relationships with European
audiences. The fact that they were racially integrated meant that they were able to continue
their public diplomacy mission even as charges were leveled during the Cold War about
Americas racial practices by the Soviet Union. One can only imagine the political
embarrassment that would have ensued in the twenty-first century had those cemeteries
been segregated.
3. U.S. CEMETERIES AS MATERIAL, OPPOSITIONAL ARGUMENT
That leads, we believe, to another important function of the overseas cemeteries. They
constituted a strong oppositional argument to the practice of racial segregation in
American cemeteries and, implicitly, against the cultural practices which sanctioned that
segregation. No clear, consistent practice seemed to exist regarding the arrangement of
graves in the early, temporary cemeteries. In some, officers and enlisted soldiers were
separated as were white and Negro troops. In others, all were buried regardless of rank,
race and whether they served honorably or not (United States Senate, 1923). Nevertheless,
as concentrations into the permanent cemeteries began, the question of re-arrangement of
the graves was taken up by the Graves Registration Service (GRS). As the Cemeterial
Division in the Office of the Quartermaster General noted in November 1920,
the principle has been laid down by the War Memorials Council and approved by the Secty [sic] of
War to the effect that there shall be no segregation of bodies in our permanent cemeteries overseas,
on basis of military commission or rank, etc. (Office of the Quartermaster General, 1920).

As Lt. Thomas North (North, n.d., p. 19), ABMC, working with the GRS as permanent
cemeteries were being finalized, noted, the remains were interred without distinction of
rank or race according to the regular patterns designed by the landscape architects of the
AGRS. In a remarkable silence in the archives, no indication exists as to who made the
final decision to integrate the cemeteries, although evidence does indicate that the GRS
was diligent in assuring that no identifying markers of race were visible prior to the
installation of the permanent headstones of carrara marble. A 1924 memorandum (Canty,
1924) to the caretaker of the Oise-Aisne American cemetery ordered that the inscription
on one temporary cross be changed to read Unknown U.S. Soldier instead of Unknown
Colored Man.
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Equally surprising, given the state of race relations in the United States, was the relative
absence of audible controversy surrounding this practice within the domestic public
sphere. Congressman Bland (1919, p. 4), from Indiana, did testify before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs that, White and colored are buried alike, no discrimination
having been shown. Even in the Hearings on Alleged Executions (United States Senate,
1923, p. 493), Senator Watson attacked the practice of burying the dishonored dead,
those identified as having died by execution, among those who served honorably, but was
notably silent on the racial question:
Senator Watson. Were the negroes as a rule buried in the same cemetery as the whites?
Capt. Wynne. Yes, sir; they were all soldiers.
Senator Watson. That is all. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. (Wynne, 1922, p. 493)

Even the mainstream press (Bodies of men hanged buried beside heroes, 1922, p. 1;
Attacks military burials in France, 1922, p. 10) reported the exchange with a focus on
those hanged for unmentionable crimes while still noting that blacks and whites were
buried together, including the remark that all were soldiers. Years later, protesting the
segregated trips at Government expense to Europe for Gold Star Mothers (those who had
lost husbands or sons during the war and whose bodies remained in Europe), the Baltimore
Afro-American (Jim crowing the dead, 1930, p. 1) commented that, In some French
cemeteries Negro troops were buried in segregated areas. It is perhaps that the potential
controversy on this issue was too strong to broach in a serious public debate (Splichal,
2006, p. 109).
Even if no audible social controversy existed domestically over the practice of
integrating military cemeteries in Europe, the presence of Negro graves buried among
their white compatriots nevertheless constituted a powerful oppositional argument to the
practice in both civilian and military domestic cemeteries. Olson and Goodnight (1994, p.
252) noted that,
nondiscursive arguments usher into the public realm aspects of life that are hidden away, habitually
ignored, or routinely disconnected from public appearance. By rendering these aspects noticeable
and comment-worthy, performed arguments expose social conventions as unreflective habits and so
revalue human activities.

Just as these cemeteries redefined the distribution of the sensible in terms of relations
between the United States and the European allies after the War, so, too, did these
cemeteries reconstitute the political subject in terms of race relations. Those who created
the integrated cemeteries in Europe were, following Rancire (2009a, p. 24), political
performers
who have the peculiar role of inventing arguments and demonstrationsin the double, logical
and aesthetic, senses of the termsto bring nonrelationship into relationship and to give place to
the nonplace. This invention is performed in forms that are not metapolitical forms of a
problematic content, but forms of materialization of the people.

81

Rancire (2010, p. 39) further maintains that,

Political argumentation is at one and the same time the demonstration of a possible world in which
the argument could count as an argument, one that is addressed by a subject qualified to argue, over
an identified object, to an addressee who is required to see the object and to hear the argument that
he [sic] normally has no reason either to see or to hear. It is the construction of a paradoxical
world that puts together two separate worlds.

The presence of integrated cemeteries put together two separate worlds creating a different
kind of common sense where visibility was conferred upon those formerly invisible and
where those formerly invisible were now aware of their visibility. The headstones of white
and black American soldiers, sharing the same field of honor, demonstrated the possibility
to construct different realities, different forms of common sensethat is to say, different
spatiotemporal systems, different communities of words and things, forms and meanings
(Rancire, 2009b, p. 102). These cemeteries, in contrast to Arlington, shift the role of
African Americans from those who are visibly marginalized (the invisible?) to those who
are equally present with all other American soldiers. The totality of American sacrifice is
now visible, not just to Europeans as the War Department intended, but to all Americans
including African-Americans. The visible presence of Black soldiers headstones now
integrates them irrefutably into the national narrative. As Kirt Wilson (1995, p. 206) wrote
concerning Radical Republicans account of American history during Reconstruction that
included Blacks role in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812 and the Civil War,
They identified the nation and its success with the courage of black soldiers; moreover, they implied
a link between the two races. In the radicals rhetoric, blacks and whites were alike because they
shared a history and a loyalty to the United States. Just as both races had red blood, both had shed
that blood for the countrys sake.

This new distribution of the sensible permitted by the cemeteries help[s] create the
fabric of a common experience in which new modes of constructing common objects and
new possibilities of subjective may be developed. (Rancire, 2010, p. 142). It creates,
in other words, new configurations between the visible and the invisible, and between the
audible and the inaudible, new distributions of space and timein short, new bodily
capacities (Rancire, 2010, p. 139).
4. CONCLUSION
As Goodnight (2005, p. 27) observed,
The focal issues of a period may shift, but once initiated controversies do not so much die out as
become dormant, only to reappear in more virulent form later, when small changes unsettle the
balances of well-known paths of argument.

The absence of overt public controversy over domestic segregated military cemeteries
during the inter-War period came to an abrupt conclusion when then the War Department
was planning for the repatriation of African American soldiers from World War II. As The
Chicago Defender (War department continues segregation, 1947, p. 10) reported, the
Quartermaster Generals Office ordered that, Present regulations, procedures and policies
82

pertaining to segregation of grave sites in national cemeteries will be continued. Those

policies required that separate sections would be developed for white officers, black
officers, white enlisted men, and black enlisted men, according to the Baltimore AfroAmerican (Burial rule changed by war department, 1947, p. 12). Following a national
uproar within the African American community and protests to the War Department,
Secretary of War Robert Patterson overturned the Quartermaster Generals office. He
directed that
no distinction be made between the location of graves of officers in new sections of national
cemeteries. The policy of providing uniform burial facilities without distinction as to rank or race of
deceased veterans will be effected progressively as new sections are laid out (Army drops caste
system in cemeteries, 1947, p. 5).

Although it would still take more than a decade before the Department of Defense
implemented the policy fully (MacGregor, 1981, n.p.), the common sense of racial
equality seemed a bit more plausible than when the overseas cemeteries were integrated
immediately after World War I. The argument forwarded by those cemeteries, however,
showed the possibilities of new and different relations between political subjects and
citizensa new distribution of the sensible.

REFERENCES
Army drops caste system in cemeteries. (1947, April 24). The Washington Post, p. 5.
Attacks military burials in France. (1922, January 18). The Washington Post, p. 10.
Bentley, F. (1922). American battle monuments commission. Hearings before the committee on foreign
affairs. House of Representatives. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Bland, O. (1919). Authorizing the appointment of a commission to remove the bodies of deceased soldiers,
sailors, and marines, from foreign countries to the United States and defining its duties and power.
Committee on foreign affairs, House of Representatives. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
Bodies of men hanged buried beside heroes: Watson scores point in scandal inquiry. (1922, January 18).
Chicago Daily Tribune, p. 1.
Burial rule changed by war dept. (1947, May 3). Afro-American [Baltimore, MD], p. 12.
Canty, D. (1924, October 6). Memorandum to caretaker, Oise-Aisne American Cemetery. Historical Files,
Oise-Aisne American Cemetery.
Colored officers and the regular army. (1919, May 17). The Broad Axe [Chicago, IL], p. 4.
Commission of Fine Arts (1920, May 19). Memorandum to the commission. National Archives, RG 66.
Commission of Fine Arts, Project Files, 1910-1952, Entry 17, Box 4.
Francis, D. (2003). Classics reviewed: Cemeteries as cultural landscapes [review easy]. Mortality, 8, 222227.
Goodnight, G. (1991). Controversy. In Argument in controversy: Proceedings of the Alta conference on
argumentation (pp. 1-13). Annandale, VA: National Communication Association/American
Forensic Association.
Goodnight, G. (2005). Science and technology controversy: A rationale for inquiry. Argumentation and
Advocacy, 42, 26-29.
Hayes, R. (1920). The care of the fallen: A report to the secretary of war on American military dead
overseas. National Archives, RG 66, Commission of Fine Arts, Project Files, 1910-1952, Entry 17,
Box 3.
Jim crowing the dead. (1930, March 8). The Afro-American [Baltimore, MD], p. 1.
MacGregor, J., Jr. (1981). Integration of the armed forces 1940-1965. Washington, DC: Center of Military
History. Project Gutenberg ebook.

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North, T. (n.d.) One soldiers job. Unpublished manuscript. American Battle Monuments Commission
European Office, Garches, FR.
Office of the Quartermaster General (1920, November 20). Index sheet, synopsis of letter to M. Tuck.
National Archives, RG 92, Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, Cemeterial
Division, 1917-1922, 293.8 Subject & Location to (A-B), Entry 1941, Box 25.
Olson, K., & Goodnight, G. (1994). Entanglements of consumption, cruelty, privacy and fashion: The social
controversy over fur. The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 80, 249-276.
Rancire, J. (1999). Dis-agreement: politics and philosophy. (J. Rose, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University
of Minnesota Press.
Rancire, J. (2004). The politics of aesthetics: The distribution of the sensible. (G. Rockhill, Trans.).
London: Continuum.
Rancire, J. (2009a). Aesthetics and its discontents. (S. Corcoran, Trans.). Malden, MA: Polity.
Rancire, J. (2009b). The emancipated spectator. (G. Elliott, Trans.). London, Verso.
Rancire, J. (2010). Dissensus: on politics and aesthetics. (S. Corcoran, Ed. and Trans.). London:
Continuum.
Rockhill, G. (2004). Jacques Rancire's politics of perception [Translators introduction]. In Rancire, J. The
politics of aesthetics: the distribution of the sensible (pp. 1-6). London: Continuum.
Smith, W. (1926, February 4). Letter to the quartermaster general. American Battle Monuments Commission
European Office, Historical Files, Box 8.
Splichal, S. (2006). Manufacturing the (in)visible: power to communicate, power to silence. Communication
and Critical/Cultural Studies 3, 95-115.
United States Senate (1923). Alleged executions without trial in France. Special committee on charges of
alleged executions without trial in France. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
War department continues segregationeven after death. (1947, April 19). The Chicago Defender, p. 10.
Wilson, K. (1995). And equality for all: The foundations of African American civil rights argument. In
Argumentation and valuesproceedings of the Alta conference on argumentation. Washington,
DC: National Communication Association/American Forensic Association.
Wynne, C. (1923). Alleged executions without trial in France. Special committee on charges of alleged
executions without trial in France. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

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Interpersonal Argumentation Through The Context Of Distributed

Cognition: The Case Of Christian Sermon
Natalia Barebina
Department of foreign languages
Baikal National University of Economics and Law.
Russia
svirel23@rambler.ru

ABSTRACT: According to the biocognitive paradigm, communication is joint activity aimed at creating a
consensual domain of interactions, including linguistic interactions. Applying this approach to the study of
interpersonal argumentation gives an opportunity to view language in communication as a part of social
and physical environment. The most important component of this environment is socially and subjectively
conditioned values, patterns of social behavior. We argue that the aforesaid component is an implicit
constituent element of persuasion.
KEYWORDS: Communication, the Coordinative Function of Language, Distributed Cognition, Ethos,
Strategic Maneuvering, Topos.

1. BACKGROUND
In a vast literature argumentation is considered as a rationally organized type of
discourse. Primarily, it is analyzed from the point of view of the persuasive function of
argumentative speech. Secondly, it is often seen as a means to resolve a difference of
opinion. For the present purposes, the notable feature of argumentation is that it is seen as
verbal and social activity, or behavior. In this regard, issues focusing on speech
communication seem very promising as a way to tackle such problems in the study of
argumentation as the production and interpretation of argumentative speech, its
understanding, the problem of context, individual argumentative competence. However,
despite the wealth of literature on argumentation studies, scholars specializing in speech
communication don't often seem to be working from a clear and common perspective
(Eemeren, 1996, p. 191). So, the aim of this paper is (1) to introduce a new approach to
linguistic research in argumentative interactions which is closely connected with
communicative and cognitive science, and (2) present a method of analysis illustrated by
examples of arguments from the Bible.
2. THREE GENERATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Application of a cognitive approach to argumentation theory requires some justification.
Even though speech act theory, Gricean theory, conversation analysis, discourse analysis
are firmly established and well-known frameworks, they can hardly be described as
cutting-edge, especially after the cognitive turn in linguistics circa 1990. Thus, accepting
the linguistic component and using appropriate methodology, argumentation theory
should take working of language science.

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One can speak of three generations of cognitive science (Howard, 2004; Kravchenko,
2009a; 2009b; Steffensen, 2012) in the context of its impact on linguistics.
The first generation is characterized as the cognitive science of the Disembodied
and Unimaginative Mind. That is a research program pursued in classical artificial
intelligence and generative linguistics which draws its descriptive apparatus from set
theory and logic (Howard, 2004, xii). According to this program language is a fixed
system of symbols, or a code in which every sign form expresses a certain meaning (or a
set of related meanings) attached to it (Kravchenko, 2008, p. 54).
The second generation is characterized as the cognitive science of the Embodied
and Imaginative Mind. It rejects set theory and logic to pursue putatively nonmathematical formalisms like prototype theory, image schema, and conceptual metaphor
(Howard, 2004, xii). Language in second generation cognitive science is understood as a
kind of cognitive activity (such as one individual speaking to another) that arises from
mental processes. In this regard sender`s utterances trigger neural happenings in
rescepient`s brain (with Steffensn (2012) expression).
Generally, a cognitive approach to the study of argumentation focuses on the
nature of argumentation mechanisms causing the change in the mental state of the
addressee of the argumentative message. Hample (1985) proposes to focus on the
cognitive dimension of argument the mental process by which arguments occur within
people. According to Sergeev (1987), a system of arguments is the product of mental
activity of a subject of conviction expressed by the language of inner representations.
Baranov (1990) provides a detailed description of argumentation interaction as a process
of knowledge acquisition using the computer metaphor and analyzes the possibility of
changing the mental state of an addressee by means of natural language argumentation.
Likewise, Briushinkin (2009) treats argumentation as mental action intended to change
the world model of the addressee. There are researches devoted to cognitive models of
conscious and various cognitive procedures formalization. Oswald (2007) analyzes the
problem of interpretation of an argumentative message, showing the inadequacy of
Speech Act Theory suggesting that some module of meaning construction be construed.
Korb, McConachy and Zukerman (1997) attempt to build a cognitive model of
argumentation based on probabilistic modeling of natural reasoning.
The presented researches emphasize the common feature of the first two
generations in cognitive science. That is described by Kravchenko (Kravchenko, 2009b,
p. 103) tendency to consider cognitive ability with the connection of mental activity only
within the heads of individuals, or at least, within their bodies (internalist account). The
function of language in this view is to transfer messages (thoughts, meanings, intentions)
from sender to receiver, which are input-output systems (the conduit metaphor). On
this view communication is a process in which one expresses what one thinks or feels so
that others can know what one thinks or feels, thus, meaning is seen as a function or
translation of expression. This viewpoint is seriously criticized in contemporary research
as invalidating many linguistic models. O`Reilly and Munakata (2000, p.14) associate
this approach with introspections into conscious aspects of human cognition which are
proverbial tip of the iceberg floating above the waterline, while the great mass of
cognition that makes all of this possible floats below, relatively inaccessible to our
conscious introspections.

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The Third Generation of cognitive science (The imaged and simulated brain in terms of
Howard) influenced by biological theory of cognition (Maturana, 1970) has emerged in
recent years. Unlike its two predecessors, this direction treats cognition as integrated
processes that take place, not only in the human brain, or body, but also in its
extracorporeal environment. As such, social aspect of cognition is important. Proponents
of this wave of cognitive science deny that language is a tool or symbolic code for the
transfer of thoughts, rather they emphasize its embodiment and co-actionality: concrete
bodily actions, whether it involves the visible parts of the body (gestures), the invisible
but not inaudible parts (voice), or the extra-bodily environmental resources (Steffensen,
2012, p. 514). Communication, to use the terminology of the biologically oriented
paradigm for the study of cognition and language (Maturana, 1980; Clark, 1997;
Kravchenko, 2008; 2012), is not exchange of information; rather, it is joint activity aimed
at creating a consensual domain of interactions, including linguistic interactions or
orienting behavior (the dancing metaphor). Maturana`s concept of languaging,
(Maturana, 1987) as a consensual domain of interactions emphasizes that the most
important function of language is coordination.
There are publications which can be considered as contribution to the cognitive
approach for the study of argumentation from the third wave of cognitive science
perspective. Gilbert coins the notion interpersonal argumentation (Gilbert, 1997; 2003).
Even though the researcher doesn`t distinguish his understanding of argumentation as
cognitive related, as will be shown later, Gilbertian approach allows us to examine
arguments from the abovementioned viewpoint.
Guillem (2009) examines socio-cognitive aspects of argumentative
communication and raises the issue of inequality of written and oral communication.
According to the author the fact that arguing can be equated to reasoning, therefore,
does not mean that it is a purely internal process that takes place within the individuals
minds and thus cannot be observed. As explained by Guillem, such forms of social
cognition as shared attitudes, ideologies, norms and values are crucial from the point of
view of their influence on forming arguments and their perception (Guillem, 2009,
p.730).
Kolmogorova (2013) explores semiotic basis of interpersonal argumentation. The
author detects three levels of its objectification on the base of empirical material
cognitive-linguistic argumentation, social-speech argumentation, and personal
argumentation (Kolmogorova, 2013, p. 124).
Cognitive mechanism of counterargumentation in the sphere of mediation practice
with applying methodological principles of social autopoesis is offered by Barebina
(2013).
3. DISTRIBUTED COGNITION AND INTERPERSONAL ARGUMENTATION
Biological theory of cognition is attended by many scientific directions such as
synergetics, autopoesis conception, social systems theory, biolinguistics, biosemiotics,
and distributed cognition theory.
Researchers of distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995; 2001; Cowley, 2009) argue
that cognitive processes are extended through material artifacts, social interaction and are
distributed across time and space, allowing humans to coordinate their interactional
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behavior in their cognitive niches on the cultural, historical and time scales. Thus, the
distributed language view focuses on language as a key aspect of social (dialogical)
activity distributed over different time scales. It is a framework that involves the
coordination between individuals, artifacts and the environment.
Gilbert suggested the name interpersonal argumentation for the hybrid approach
under discussion for studying all aspects of social influence in verbal interactions. He
demonstrates that a narrow understanding of argument as necessarily linguistically
explicable is incorrect, thus, argument must be understood as a broad and open
practice (Gilbert, 2003). The notion of interpersonal argumentation refers to arguments
which are considered as not isolated statements, but representations of human attitudes,
emotions, beliefs, intuitions as opposed to construing arguments as autonomous sets of
assumptions and premises. The suggestion that several components emotional, visceral
(physical) and kisceral (intuitive) are vital to argumentative communication because
they affect both arguments and results allows us to analyze interpersonal argumentation
as a phenomenon closely related to distributed cognition.
Applying this approach to the study of interpersonal argumentation gives an
opportunity to view language in communication as part of the social and physical
environment. This environment refers to various artifacts, gestures, audible and visual
signals, graphics, symbols of computer technologies. All these constitute the environment
of modern human being. The most important component of this environment is socially
and subjectively conditioned values, patterns of social behavior, stereotypes which are
distributed across the members of a social group in space and time. We argue that the
aforesaid component is an implicit constituent element of persuasion which can be
investigated through the category of topos as a part of argumentative discourse.
4. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The concept of strategic maneuvering as the subject of substantial and systematic
theoretical research offers a method of analyzing how the arguers tries to reconcile
aiming for the most beneficial effect with being reasonable (Eemeren, 2010; Rees, 2009;
Zarefsky, 2008). As stated in (Eemeren, 2010, p. 93) strategic maneuvering always
manifests itself in argumentative practice (emphasis added B.N.) in the form of choice
on three levels: the choice from the available topical potential, adaptation to audience
demand, and the use of presentational devices.
The suggestion that the framework of topos is structured by modi of logos, ethos
and pathos in the practice of interaction within a particular communicative context as a
social system and realized in most cases by the language use allows us to analyze
interpersonal argumentation from the viewpoint of distributed cognition. The implicit
structure forming the category of topos as a basis of argumentative behavior corresponds
with the three fundamental characteristics of distributed cognition identified by
Hutchings (Hutchins, 2001): cognition is 1) distributed across the members of a social
group, 2) involves coordination between internal and external (material or environmental)
structures, 3) distributed through time in such a way that the products of earlier events
can transform the nature of related events.
This understanding of argumentative speech through the concept of distributed
cognition may be illustrated using arguments from the Bible. The Bible is frequently
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interpreted as the Infallible Word of God which is spread in the Christian society. The
assumption that the Bible is a gospel message, transformed by people many times allows
to consider this book as both: ideal and material cognitive artifact. This is an artifact of a
special kind. It is unique because it has cultural models, ethic norms, patterns and
schemes of behavior, images and scenarios that are socially and subjectively significant.
The Bible is a part of the human socio-cultural environment. By stating this, we mean
that a great amount of topoi from the Scripture is widely represented in such lexical and
phraseological units of the language as proverbs, interjections, quotes, catch phrases,
names, and historical places. Here are some examples:
(1)

Spare the rod and spoil the child (Those who withhold the rod hate their
children, but the one who loves them applies discipline (Proverbs 13:24));

(2)

As you sow so shall you mow (Dont be deceived. God is not mocked, for
whatever a man sows, that he will also reap (Galatians 6:7));

(3)

by sweat of one`s brow (By the sweat of your face will you eat bread until you
return to the ground, for out of it you were taken (Genesis 3:19));

(4)

Golgotha (Carrying his cross by Himself, He went out to a place called Skull
Place (in Aramaic, Golgotha) (John 19:16-18));

(5)

a prophet without honour (A prophet is not without honour, save in his own
country and in his own house (Matthew 13:57)).

Bibleisms from the Gospel are constantly used in speech, in literature, in headings of
articles and book titles, as well as in politicians` performance. Scriptural symbols, images
of Jesus, pectoral crosses, ikons, and gestures were and are also part of everyday life.
This internal structure (in Hutchin`s terms) can be described as an experience of inner
communication with the Bible which is different for each person. Thus, we can
investigate the second type of distributed cognition the coordination between external
and internal structures. The Biblical subjects can be considered as a corpus of topoi which
have their spatial and temporal scale. Using the Biblical word, the arguer can appeal to
ethical standards, traditions, code contained in the ethos of the Bible as a part of the
topos. It gives an opportunity to effect the addressee through appealing to authority of the
Bible (using authoritative arguments in classical taxonomy). Intellectual, semantic,
historical component potentiates various strategies of argumentation.
The conception of strategic maneuvering enables us to analyze how the arguer
uses the topical potential of the Bible and its presentational devices (direct quotation,
lexical and phraseological units) to reach the most satisfactory outcome of argumentative
speech.
The result of argumentative speech depends on how the field of audience
interaction with the Bible is formed. Arguments from the Bible addressed to an audience
of mixed religious beliefs (non Cristians and non believers), are somewhat able to affect
it. As shown above, the domain of interaction with the biblical texts to a greater or lesser
extent, has been formed as part of the human social environment. However, such
89

arguments can be considered as a guide to action for deeply religious people, and they
believe that the Word of God changes human way of thinking.
We will analyze the argumentative passage of Christian sermon When Hope Is
Dead, Hope On!. The author William E. Sangster was one of the great British Methodist
preachers of the 20th century. This message was preached for the British people during
the most difficult periods of the World War II.
(6)
1

Many people think of hope as a poor, precarious thing, an illusion, a vanity, a

disease of the mind. The cynic has said, He, who lives on hope, will die starving.
Cowly said, Hope is the most hopeless thing of all. The soldier is apt to turn
bright promises aside with a despondent question, What hopes?. Schopenhauer,
5 the distinguished German philosopher, looked upon hope as the bait by which
nature gets her hook in our nose, and makes it serve her interests, though they may
not be our own. That is the common assessment of hope in the world a poor, vain,
deceptive thing.
But hope is not so thought of in the New Testament. Paul makes Faith, Hope, and
10 Love the cardinal virtues of Christendom. And now abideth faith, hope, love. He
speaks also of the patience of hope and of hope that maketh not ashamed. All
through the New Testament, hope is spoken of in that same high way. The author of
the Epistle to the Hebrews bursts out into that daring paradox, A hope both sure
and steadfast.
15 Now, how did this sharp contrast arise? An illusion: a steadfast reality. A dream: a
fact. A disease of the mind: a cardinal virtue. Hope cannot be both. Is the world
right, or the New Testament? Is it a bit of folly or is it precious beyond price? What
is the solution of the dilemma?
The answer is not difficult. They are talking of different things. There is a higher
20 and a lower hope. There is a genuine quality and a counterfeit. There is a real
article and a substitute. There is gold and there is gilt.
Let us look at each of them in turn (http://www.newsforchristians.com/classics.html)

In accordance with the chosen method of analysis we will show how the arguer
strategically uses the topical potential, adapts his message to the views and preferences of
the audience and exploits some presentational devices. Analytically, four stages can be
distinguished both in an argumentative dialogue and a monologic message. The presented
passage is a confrontation stage in which a difference of opinion manifests itself through
an opposition between one or more standpoints.
4.1. Strategic maneuvering evaluating.
From the available topical potential the arguer selects the most appropriate topos for the
audience under the circumstances which is connected with the theme of hope.
One of the presentational devices is an antithesis arising from contraposition of
two opponents opposing (World and New Testament) in regard to how hope should be
understood. The author forms a kind of argumentative dialogue (lines 1-14) between the
first side members (people, cinic, soldier, scientists) and the second one (Apostle Paul,
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the text of New Testament, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews). Among the other
presentational device one can note a hypothetical question and the antithesis on the
phrasal level (line 4-18).
The statements from the first group are put forward as arguments (line 1-4) for
better adapting the chosen topos, while the arguer mentions an entire audience, each
member of which can be the author of these statements. A slight shift towards rhetorical
aim is being traced, that is, strategic maneuvering in regard to the position of this party,
known as Hasty Generalization fallacy. Dialectically it is not correct to posit that the
common assessment of hope in the world as a poor, vain, deceptive thing based on
the opinions of people listed is totally accepted. However, in accordance with the
objectives of the article, it is more interesting for us to analyze the strategic use of topical
potential of the sermon. The theme chosen by Sangster rather presupposes an appeal to
emotions and intuition (ethos) than to logic (logos). It is known that there are several
hundred topoi in the Bible related to the theme of hope These topoi are a kind of figures
of scenes with their spatial and temporal scales. This allows the author, by quoting from
the Scripture, to expand the topical potential of the sermon so as to form a series of
disagreements between the two groups (An illusion: a steadfast reality. A dream: a fact.
A disease of the mind: a cardinal virtue) and perform the aim of argumentative message
at the given stage.
Obviously, the purpose of the whole speech is to convince the audience to think
and act in a certain way and also to renew and strengthen their faith.
Realization of the third principle of the distributed cognition phenomenon, when
earlier events, mentioned in the Books of the Scripture affect the subsequent events in
people`s life, is clearly seen using this example.
5. CONCLUSION
Going back to the purposes of the article, we claim that the presented approach still
requires a thorough scientific reflection. However, we can say that it opens a new vista of
argumentation study in the aspect of communication. For instance, the biocognitive
paradigm and in particular the theory of distributed cognition offers an alternative to
transmission model of communication and dissolves the traditional divisions between the
inside/outside boundary of the individual and the socium/cognition distinction.
An important conclusion is the fact that the fields of argumentation studies and
communication studies have much to gain from one another. The biocognitive theory and
its accompanying research areas have strong explanatory potential in explaining the
issues in the argumentative communication functioning in various fields of human
activities. The argumentative discourse by virtue of its tough addressing presents a
fruitful ground for investigation the language orienting function.
We argue that ethos, which is realized in the socially and subjectively conditioned
values, shared by members of a community, patterns of behavior, some stereotypes,
images while being one of the constituent of the category topos, is also an implicit
component of persuasion in interpersonal argumentation.
It is noteworthy that the concept of strategic maneuvering, which postulates that
in the argumentative discourse the arguer`s goal to win the debate, to convince the

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audience is always traced, confirms the conclusion of even a radical variant of

biocognitive theory concerning the adaptive function of language.

REFERENCES
Baranov, A.N. (1990). A Linguistic Theory of Argumentation (a cognitive approach). [Doctoral
dissertation]. Moscow : Russian Language Institute (In Russian).
Barebina, N.S. (2013). Counterargumentation in the Discourse of Mediation. In G.M. Kostyushkina (ed.),
Conceptual Systematization of Argumentation (pp. 124-191). Irkutsk : ISLU (In Russian).
Briushinkin, V.N. (2009). A Cognitive Approach to Argumentation. RATIO.ru. 2. Available at:
http://www/ratio.albertina.ru. (In Russian).
Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, MA : The MIT
Press.
Cowley, S.J. (2009). Distributed language and dynamics. Pragmatics & Cognition, 17(3), 497-507.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., Snoeck Henkemans, A.F., Blair, J.A., Johnson, R.H., Krabbe,
E.C.W., Plantin, Ch., Walton, D.N., Willard, Ch. A., Woods, J., Zarefsky, D. (1996).
Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory. Handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary
developments. Mahwah, N.J. : Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse. Amsterdam: John
Benjamins Publishing Company.
Gilbert, M.A. (2003). But why call it an Argument?: In Defense of the Linguistically Inexplicable. Informal
Logic, 25. Available at: http://www.yorku.ca.
Gilbert, M.A. (1997). Coalescent Argumentation. Mahwah : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Guillem, S.M. (2009). Argumentation, metadiscourse and social cognition: organizing knowledge in
political communication. Discourse & Society, 20 (6), 727-746.
Howard, H. (2004). Neuromimetic Semantics: Coordination, quantification, and collective predicates.
Amsterdam : Elsevier.
Hample, D. (1985). A Third Perspective on Argument. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 18, 1-22.
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press.
Hutchins, E. (2001). Distributed cognition. The International Encyclopedia of the Social and behavioral
Sciences (pp. 2068-2072). Amsterdam : Elsevier.
Kolmogorova, A.V. (2013). Place and Role of Argumentation in Cognitive Processes. In G.M.
Kostyushkina (ed.), Conceptual Systematization of Argumentation (pp. 54-124). Irkutsk : ISLU (In
Russian).
Korb, K.B., McConachy, R., Zukerman, I. (1997). A cognitive model of argumentation. Proceedings of the
19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. (pp. 400-405). Melbourne : Monash
University.
Kravchenko, A.V. (2008). The Cognitive Horizon of Linguistics. Irkutsk : BNUEL (In Russian).
Kravchenko, A.V. (2009a). About traditions, linguistics and cognitive approach. Horizons of contemporary
linguistics : Tradition and Innovation (pp. 51-65). Moscow : Languages of Slavic Cultures (In
Russian).
Kravchenko, A.V. (2009b). Language and mind: A bio-cognitive view. In H. Gtzsche (ed.), Memory,
Mind and Language (pp. 103-124). Newcastle upon Tyne : Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Kravchenko, A.V. (2012). From the Language Myth to the Ecology of Languaging. Proceedings of the 1st
International conference on Interactivity, Language and Cognition (pp. 16-17). Odense :
University of Southern Denmark.
Maturana, H.R. (1970). Biology of Cognition. Biological Computer Laboratory Research Report BCL 9.0,
Urbana, IL : University of Illinois.
Maturana, H.R., Varela F. (1987). The Tree of Knowledge. The Biological Roots of Human Understanding.
Boston : Shambala Publications.
Oswald, S. (2007). Argumentation and Cognition : Can Pragma-Dialectics Interplay with PragmaSemantics? Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines, 1 (1), 148-155.

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Rees, M.A. van (2009). Strategic maneuvering with dissociation. In F.H. van Eemeren (ed.), Examining
Argumentation in Context : Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering (pp. 25-41). Amsterdam :
John Benjamins Publishing Company.
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Understanding the Mind by Simulating the Brain. MIT Press Cambridge, MA, USA.
Sergeev, V.M. (1987). Cognitive models in investigation of thinking: structure and ontology of knowledge.
Intellectual Processes and their Modeling (pp. 179-195). Moscow : Science (In Russian).
Steffensen, S.V. (2012). Care and conversing in dialogical systems. Language Science, 34, 513-531.
Zarefsky, D. (2008). Strategic Maneuvering in Political Argumentation. Argumentation, 22, 317-330.

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Delineating The Reasonable And Rational For Humans

Michael D. Baumtrog
ArgLab - IFL
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Portugal
baumtrog@fcsh.unl.pt

ABSTRACT: The notions of rational and reasonable have much in common but are not synonymous.
Conducting a review of the literature points to (at least) two distinct but related ideas as well as a middle
grey area. This paper investigates and compares some characterizations of these notions and defends the
view that focusing on reasonableness is best for those interested in human instances of reasoning and
argumentation.
KEYWORDS: argumentation theory, consistency, human, rational, reasonable.

1. INTRODUCTION
Glenn Greenwald, while speaking of his and his colleague Lauras initial gut instinct
affirming the credibility of the leaker who would later be revealed as Edward Snowden,
explains that, [r]easonably and rationally, Laura and I knew that our faith in the leakers
veracity might have been misplaced (2014, p. 13). Greenwald then goes on to offer
reasons for this claim, such as not knowing the leakers name, recognizing the possibility
that the leak could be an attempt at entrapment, or that the leaker could be someone just
looking to ruin their credibility. As an accomplished journalist, author, and former
litigator, Greenwald is no stranger to recognizing the importance of words, their
definitions, and how they are received by his audience. Thus, I suspect he articulated the
possibility of his and Lauras error on both reasonable and rational grounds for a reason,
even though he does not provide an explanation regarding the difference between them.
As van Eemeren and Grootendorst have pointed out, [w]ords like rational and
reasonable are used in and out of season in ordinary language. It is often unclear
exactly what they are supposed to mean, and even if it is clear, the meaning is not always
consistent (2004, p. 123). Accordingly, the point of this paper is to investigate some of
the differences between the ideas of the reasonable and rational from a philosophical
perspective, but which I hope will also sound reasonable to the everyday language user.
In what follows I will argue that there is some consistency in the two related but distinct
ideas which emerge across a variety of texts. I will further argue that the notion of the
rational is typically narrower than the notion of the reasonable and that those interested in
investigating human reasoning and argumentation ought to focus on reasonableness. In
order to proceed, I will start the second section by reviewing some characterizations of
the notion of rationality. The third section, then, will discuss the notion of the reasonable,
followed by a comparison of the two ideas in the fourth section. The conclusion will
summarize the arguments presented and indicate avenues for future research.

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2. THE RATIONAL
These days, discussions of the meaning of rational and what it is to be rational or to
think or act rationally, commonly occur in economic and philosophical circles. While
clearly there is not time enough to cover all of the conceptions of rationality which have
been offered, in what follows I will use a general discussion provided by Amartya Sen
which allows for easy connection to other views.
In his introduction to the book Rationality and Freedom, Sen notes that there are
three common views of rationality described as rational choice. They are 1) internal
consistency, 2) self-interest maximization, and 3) maximization in general. Internal
consistency is described as the assessment of the relation between choices in different
situations, comparing what are chosen from different sets of alternatives entirely in terms
of the choices themselves (2002, pp. 19-20). In other words, they are internal in the
sense that they require correspondence between different parts of a choice function,
without invoking anything outside choice (such as motivations, objectives and
substantive properties) (p. 122).
Leaving aside discussion of the term internal from the economic literature, the
notion of consistency is crucial for some explanations of rationality found in philosophy.
For example, consistency is a dominant idea in what has been referred to as formal
deductive logic, mathematical logic, or the introductory level of these topics, baby logic.
All of these views support the notion that an argument is considered rational to the extent
that the premises are true and the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises
(Johnson, 2012, p. 121). This consistency is ensured through the application of formally
valid rules of logic, demonstrable through the use of truth tables and other theoretical
apparatus.1
In terms of dialogue logic, rationality is also evaluated according to consistency.
In the basic case of a simple question and answer dialogue that only permits yes or no
answers, The questioners objective is to force the answerer to affirm a proposition that
implies the denial of some proposition that he or she had earlier answered (Blair, 1998,
p. 327). In other words, the questioner attempts to have the answerer provide inconsistent
answers.
Finally, John Broome also highlights the importance of consistency to rationality
as a matter of requirement. For Broome, the property of rationality is defined by the
requirements of rationality, so listing those requirements is the way to describe it (2013,
p. 149). Importantly, while he admits to providing only an incomplete list of
requirements, his first four requirements of synchronic rationality (attitudes at a single
time) have to do with consistency and deduction (pp. 149ff). For example, the
requirement of No Contradictory Beliefs says that rationality requires of N that N does
not believe at t that p and also believe at t that not p (p. 155).2 As well, as the Modus
Ponens Requirement states that Rationality requires of N that, if N believes at t that p,

It should be noted that premise consistency is not a necessary condition for entailment. This has
been clearly shown via the fact that any conclusion can be derived from a contradiction.
2 In addition to the admitted incompletion of the list, it is also important to note Broomes flexibility
on the formulation of the differing requirements. For example, he says about this requirement I
would not object to weakening the formulae in some suitable way (2013, p. 155).
1

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and N believes at t that if p then q, and if N cares at t whether q, then N believes at t that
q - in short, that Modus Ponens holds (p. 157).
Returning now to Sens discussion, given the difficulty in assessing the
consistency of choices without invoking an outside principle, Sen claims that it is the
second view of rationality that has dominated contemporary economics (2002, p. 22).
Rationality on this view is the intelligent pursuit of self-interest wherein the individual
may value anything, but in this view he chooses entirely according to his reading of his
own interests (p. 23). One main difficulty with this view of rationality is the observed
fact that people often work in cooperation and in situations counter to self-interest. For
example, people often refrain from littering even if no one is around who might judge
them if they were seen. A further problem is that such a view of rationality, because it
comes from economic models, is focused on behaviour and action, i.e. practical reasoning
and it says very little about the beliefs people come to, or their theoretical reasoning.
The third commonly held view, maximization in general, allows for people to act
in cooperative and morally good ways - for example, by working toward a maximization
of social welfare (p. 37). Such morality is, however, far from necessary. As Sen points
out, maximizing behavior can sometimes be patently stupid and lacking in reason
assessment depending on what is being maximized (p. 39). For this reason, as well as
the reasons above,3 Sen rejects these three views as providing a sufficient account of
rationality, even though he grants maximization in general the role of a necessary
condition.
Instead, Sen champions a much broader view of rationality, interpreted, as the
discipline of subjecting ones choices of actions as well as of objectives, values and
priorities to reasoned scrutiny as the need to subject ones choices to the demands of
reason. (p. 4). On this view, rationality is not a formula or an essentialist doctrine, but
rather, uses reasoning to understand and assess goals and values, and it also involves the
use of these goals and values to make systematic choices (p. 46). Thus for Sen,
rationality extends as far as, and into all the domains, that reason does.
Placing reason and reasons at the centre of rationality is relatable to another
description of rationally found in argumentation theory, namely Johnsons theory of
Manifest Rationality. Building upon Siegels view that, [w]e need an account of
rationality which recognizes various sorts of reasons and which provides insight into the
nature and epistemic force of reasons, and which affords the possibility of the rational
scrutiny of ends (1988, p. 131), Johnson describes rationality as the disposition to, and
the action of, using, giving, and-or acting on the basis of reasons (2000, p. 161).
Providing reasons, for example as a premise conclusion complex, is what Johnson calls
the illative core. The correct employment of the illative, however, is not by itself
sufficient for rationality (p. 165). The important role of scrutiny referred to by both Sen
and Siegel also appears under the title of the dialectical tier. Both the illative core and the
dialectical tier are a part of argumentation and rationality becomes manifest through
argumentation.
Argumentation on this view is teleological and dialectical, that is, is aimed at the
rational persuasion of another. Argumentation, then, embraces, increases, and exhibits
As well as a number of others which are not crucial for our purposes here but are worthwhile
nonetheless.
3

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rationality while depending on the mutual rationality of an Other. This Other, is the
source of reasoned scrutiny and responding to them is a central feature of manifest
rationality (pp. 159-164). Although Johnson does not say it explicitly, it seems then that
on this view one can be considered rational to the extent to which they accurately
function with both the illative core and dialectical tier of argumentation.
Both Siegel (pp. 127ff.) and Johnson (2000, p. 14) explicitly highlight that
understanding rationality in this way is important for allowing moral considerations into
descriptions of rationality and thus overcoming the instrumental conceptions of
rationality outlined earlier. For them, rationality is more than finding the most efficient
means to your end. It is about the appropriate use and appropriate scrutiny of reasons and
reasoning in all of the fields they may be used.
So much for our limited discussion of rationality. The notion of the critical
scrutiny of another provides a nice link, however, with one of the most prominent views
of reasonableness found in argumentation theory, the pragma-dialectical view developed
by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, the topic to which we now turn.
3. THE REASONABLE
As one of the most well-known theories of argumentation in the world, the pragmadialectical theory places the notion of reasonableness at its core. After rejecting the
geometrical (formally logical) approach and anthropological (audience relative)
approach, van Eemeren and Grootendorst defend the critical-rationalist view of
reasonableness which proceeds on the basis of the fundamental fallibility of all human
thought (2004, p. 131) and attributes value both to the formal properties of arguments
and to the shared knowledge that is necessary to achieve consensus (p. 129).
Reasonableness on this view is achieved though conducting a critical discussion aimed at
the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits. Together, these characteristics
mean that any topic of disagreement is open for discussion and reasonableness is
determined according to how well or poorly the ideal model for a critical discussion is
followed. Thus, reasonableness is viewed as a gradual concept (p. 16).
Further, critical-rationalists hold that the dialectical scrutiny of claims in a
critical discussion boils down to the exposure of (logical and pragmatic) inconsistencies
(p. 132). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are clear, however, that [a] procedure that
promotes the resolution of differences of opinion cannot be exclusively confined to the
logical relations by which conclusions are inferred from premises. It must consist of a
system of regulations that cover all speech acts that need to be carried out in a critical
discussion to resolve a difference of opinion (p. 134). Broadening the ground for
regulations to all speech acts allows for extra-logical instances of unreasonableness,
sometimes known as informal fallacies, such as the use of force.
The discussion above regarding rationality touched upon what has been referred
to here as the geometrical view. We have also now just reviewed the basics of the
critical-rationalist" position, leaving us still to review what has been called the
anthropological view. This view, attributed most commonly to Perelman and Perelman
and Obrechts-Tyteca places the audience at the center of the notion of reasonableness,
thus earning it the title anthropological. What is reasonable, then, is audience
dependant. Perelman states, a rule of action defined as reasonable or even as self-evident
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at one moment or in a given situation can seem arbitrary and even ridiculous at another
moment and in a different situation (1979, p. 119). As we can also gather from this
quote, in addition to the flexibility of the audience as determiner of reasonableness, the
speaker must also be flexible with any rules of reasonableness. Thus, both rules and
audience are context sensitive and play a role in determinations of reasonableness. On
this view, the reasonable man, says Perelman, is a man who in his judgements and
conduct is influenced by common sense (p. 118).
Nevertheless, on this view reasonableness is not so relativistic as to remain empty,
since if everyone is reasonable, or has common sense, then to be reasonable is to search,
in all domainsfor what should be accepted by all (ibid). Reasonableness carries across
instances because what is reasonable must be a precedent which can inspire everyone in
analogous circumstances (p. 119. See also, Tindale, 2010)
4. COMPARISON
After reviewing such an array of viewpoints, a few comparative observations can be
made. First, the first view of rationality, internal choice, seems to be in hard opposition to
the last view of reasonableness, dubbed the anthropological view. Indeed, Perelman
seems to have had this view of rationality in mind when he declared that, [t]he rational
corresponds to mathematical reason, for some a reflection of divine reasons, which grasps
necessary relations (p. 117). However, the two middle views presented, manifest
rationality and critical-rationalist reasonableness, do not seem nearly as far apart.
What then are the characteristics of comparison from which we can assess the
distance in views? Given this literature review a few characteristics stand out more
clearly than others. The first is consistency. While a whole book (or more!) could be
written about the role of consistency in notions of the rational and reasonable, I will limit
that discussion here to only say that it seems to me that consistency is the God of
rationality, but only a god for reasonableness. In other words, on the far side of notions
of rationality, if consistency is violated, then immediately so too is rationality. On the far
side of reasonableness, however, if consistency is violated, it may constitute pause for
concern or questioning, but it far from immediately dismisses a positive evaluation of
reasonableness.
The second characteristic is humanity. On the far side of rationality, humanity
makes no appearance. Logic is true regardless of if there is a human mind to think it, or
err in it. One of rationalitys greatest advantages is its independence from human
fallibility. In this realm, calculations trump creativity and deduction holds in all possible
worlds. On the other side, reasonableness should contribute to the idea of the human
(Tindale, 1999, p. 202) and the idea of the human involves moral considerations crucial
to reasonableness but nearly absent in rationality (see Boger, 2006).
When we move in from the ends, however, things are not so clear. Indeed there
are aspects of Johnsons theory of Manifest Rationality which clearly overlap with what
has here been described as reasonableness. On the other side, the pragma-dialectical
critical-rationalist view of reasonableness shares some clear overlap with some aspects
which have here been identified under the title of rationality. For Johnson, manifest
rationality calls for scrutiny which opens the door for morality, both of which are foreign
to the far side of rationality but welcomed in reasonableness. For pragma-dialectics, the
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rigid dictate to attempt to meet ideal rules and the focus on consistency, rings closer to
the notions of rationality we have discussed than to those found on the far side of
reasonableness (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 16, 132).
Aside from being an interesting literature review, one might wonder why this
matters for those working on reasoning and argumentation. Part of my interest in the
topic began as response to the questions I received after telling people I was working on
practical reasoning evaluation. For some, that meant I was working on topics like
decision theory as found in economics. On this view, clearly the universal reach of
mathematical reason holds the superior position for evaluating decisions over the
fallibility of mere human thought. And there is much credit to such a view. For others, it
meant I was studying psychology, and how dare I feel pompous enough to offer advice
on what counts as reasonable, especially across a variety of contexts! And there is
something to this view as well. One of the lessons I took from these sorts of comments is
that the same words indicate for people very different ideas.
I then thought, given that argumentation theorists call their theories, or at least
describe the results of argumentation evaluation, rational and/or reasonable, perhaps there
is some consensus there. As I hope to have shown, that is not entirely the case. While I
have argued that a few general trends can be identified, many of the authors seem content
to either use the terms interchangeably or to offer stipulative definitions meant only to
hold for that individual work. Although I acknowledge the big gray area in-between the
terms, I still think as a community we can be at least a little more precise and consistent.
For example, if our work is more focused on human aspects, we can try to stick to
reasonableness. If we are less concerned with the human experience, we stick with
rationality.
One main reason for holding this position is because, as I also hope to have
illustrated above, the human divide seems to already be a prominent aspect in much of
the literature. So, going with the flow and keeping the term reasonable for that idea seems
more efficient than needlessly fighting the tide. Another reason, however, is because of
how I see the relationship between reasonableness and rationality.
I agree with Rigotti and Greco Morasso when they state that reasonableness
exceeds rationality, as it also involves a more comprehensive and more articulated
attitude of the human reason (2009, p. 22). This means that the rational and the
reasonable are not always in conflict. Indeed, I also agree with Perelmans sentiment
(1979, pp. 121-22) that when the rational and the reasonable mutually support each other
there is no problem. But when fidelity to the spirit of a system leads to what seems to be
an unacceptable conclusion, accounting for the human components of the system may
justify rejection of its suggestion in favour of a more reasonable alternative.
5. CONCLUSION
Back to Greenwald. Using our observations, can we explain why he would use both
rationally and reasonably to explain why his faith in the authenticity of his then
unknown leaker might have been misguided? According to our discussion it could be
argued that since faith is not a rational enterprise, but a human one, and it was faith that
he had in the leaker, he recognized that faith as irrational. Faith, which it can be
reasonable to have, is then also rejected based on the reasons he provides. i.e., the
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possibility of being entrapped or having been set up in an attempt to ruin his credibility.
Thus, both rationally and reasonably his faith in the leakers veracity may have been
misplaced.
Given that we have only scratched the surface of such a big, but I think important
topic, there are many areas for future work. Due to space and time, I have knowingly
omitted some very common views on rationality and reasonableness that will have to be
addressed in future work - for example, scientific notions of rationality and legal/political
notions of reasonableness. A future work could study the extent to which those notions
are in congruence with the observations made here.
To conclude: In this paper I have argued that two distinct but related notions of
the rational and the reasonable exist. Further, because of how different these ideas can be,
it wold be helpful to consistently distinguish between them. I have characterized them
based upon observations from a variety of sources where the ideas are commonly
employed. The two main observations I have drawn from these characterizations is that
while consistency can be viewed as the God of rationality, it is only one of many
contributing factors to a notion of human reasonableness. In other words, inconstancy can
be reasonable, but it is never rational. The other related observation is that reasonableness
is predominantly a human characteristic while rationality remains largely abstract.
Finally, while there are already invaluable works and no doubt crucial works still to be
done in the realm of rationality, it seems that those most interested in the human
experience of argumentation ought to keep the expanded notion of the reasonable in mind
as they continue to conduct their research.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
Special thanks to Christopher Tindale for spurring my interest in the topic. Many thanks
also to all of the members of ArgLab for their patience and supportive discussion as my
ideas continue to develop. In addition, during the presentation I benefited from very
helpful comments from David Hitchcock, Hans Hansen, Dan Cohen, and David Godden.
I would also like to acknowledge the support of IFL-Nova for the grant FCSH/IFL
PEst-OE/FIL/UI0183/2013 which has helped fund my research.

REFERENCES
Blair, J. A. (1998). The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument. Argumentation, 12, 325-339.
Boger, G. (2006). Humanist Principles Underlying Philosophy of Argument. Informal Logic, 149-174.
Broome, J. (2013). Rationality Through Reasoning. Wiley Blackwell.
Greenwald, G. (2014). No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State.
Signal.
Johnson, R. (2000). Manifest Rationality. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Johnson, R. (2012). Informal Logic and Its Contribution to Argumentation Theory. In J. Riberio (Ed.),
Inside Arguments: Logic and the Study of Argumentation (pp. 117-138). Newcastle upon Tyme:
Cambridge Scholars Press.
Perelman, C. (1979). New Rhetoric and the Humanities. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Rigotti, E., & Greco Morasso, S. (2009). Argumentation as an Object of Interest and as a Social and
Cultural Resource. In N. Muller Mirza, & A.-N. Perret-Clermont (Eds.), Argumentation and
Education: Theoretical Foundations and Practices (pp. 9-66). Dordrecht: Springer.
Sen, A. (2002). Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Siegel, H. (1988). Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education. New York: Routledge.

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Tindale, C. W. (1999). Acts of Arguing: A Rhetorical Model of Argument. Albany: State University of New
York.
Tindale, C. W. (2010). Ways of Being Reasonable. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 337-361.
van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Can Argumentation Skills Become A Therapeutic Resource?

Results From An Observational Study In Diabetes Care
Sarah Bigi
Department of Linguistic Sciences and Foreign Literatures
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milano
Italy
sarah.bigi@unicatt.it

ABSTRACT: The paper describes results from an observational study on argumentation in the medical
setting, which show how and why argumentation skills can become a useful therapeutic tool in chronic
care. The results of the study show that the therapeutic goals of chronic care are strongly linked to dialogic
activities such as argumentation, explanation, decision making and information giving. The article
discusses how doctors argumentation skills can be improved, especially in the crucial phase of shared
decision making.
KEYWORDS: argumentation schemes, chronic care, decision making, doctor-patient communication,
medical argumentation.

1. INTRODUCTION
When we consider the relationship between the study of argumentation and the
professions, the legal domain is probably the one in which the usefulness and
applicability of argumentation skills for the achievement of professional goals is the
clearest. Such link between the effective use of argumentation and professional goals,
however, has not been as clear in other professional domains, such as the medical one.
The medical profession has developed in a such a way that for a long time it did
not seem particularly relevant for physicians to be also good communicators and to have
particular argumentation skills (see, Moja & Vegni, 2000; Roter & Hall, 2006). The trend
of patient-centered care has progressively eroded the paternalistic, biomedical paradigm,
collecting evidence to show that when communication between doctors and patients is
good, significantly better clinical outcomes are reached. However, it has also been
observed that there is still lack of evidence as to exactly which aspects of communication
correlate positively with clinical outcomes (Epstein and Street, 2011).
The therapeutic goals of chronic care are to: educate, counsel and motivate
patients. In spite of these goals, it is common to talk with medical doctors and discover
that, for example, many of them cannot describe the difference between the activities of
information giving and argumentation. It is also common for many of them to not
understand immediately why argumentation skills should be useful to them in the first
place. An interesting study conducted by the Association of Italian Diabetologists
(Musacchio & Zilich, 2013) revealed that diabetes doctors in Italy overestimate the
effects of information-giving and are highly frustrated by the fact that after having
provided a large and fairly detailed amount of data, patients still do not adhere to
prescriptions or suggested behaviors. I observed a similar kind of problem when
conducting individual interviews with medical staff at a diabetes outpatient clinic in Italy:
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the members of staff felt they were conducting rather accurate and complete shared
decision-making phases with their patients, but videorecordings collected during the
consultations revealed that this was not always the case.
In considering both the goals of chronic care consultations and this disconnect
between what doctors do and what they think they are doing, the specific question I
address in this paper is if and how argumentation skills could become actual therapeutic
tools in the chronic care consultation.
I address this issue by presenting results from an observational study on
argumentation in doctor-patient consultations in a diabetes care setting. The aim of the
paper is to show that consciously mastering certain argumentation skills could actually
become a significant resource for chronic care doctors in their effort to achieve the
therapeutic goals of the consultation with their patients. On a more theoretical level, the
results of the analysis show that real-life data are necessary to argumentation scholars as
a basis to define more specifically the role argumentation can play in a specific context as
opposed to other discursive activities, such as explanation, information giving, or others.
2. THE STUDY
The data I present in the following sections were collected within the framework of an
observational study conducted at a diabetes outpatient clinic in northern Italy1. The study
was aimed at collecting data and insights on the most frequent communicative and
argumentative patterns in doctor-patient encounters in an Italian chronic care setting. The
clinic is part of the Italian public system and patients are referred to the clinic by their
general doctors.
Participants
All the members of the medical staff at the clinic participated in the study: three medical
doctors, specialized in diabetes care; two professional nurses, specifically trained for
diabetes care; and one dietician. I also recruited 20 patients among the ones assisted at the
clinic: 10 men and 10 women affected by Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus, whose ages ranged
between 60 and 90. All of them had been assisted at the clinic for more than 5 years and
they were chosen randomly. An informed consent was obtained from all the patients
involved in the study and from all the members of staff at the clinic.
Data collection
Every time the recruited patients came in for a visit, their encounter with the health care
providers was videorecorded. This resulted in an uneven distribution of the recordings for
each patient. The recording went on for 21 months and resulted in a collection of 60
videos, for a total of about 1.800 minutes of recorded material.

The projects website can be found at: https://sites.google.com/site/docpatcommpro/ On the projects

results, see Bigi 2014.
1

103

Analysis
For the aims of the study, I proceeded by first describing the consultations according to
the following phases: 1. opening; 2. record updating; 3. discussion of therapy or of eating
habits/physical examination; 4. assessment; 5. shared decision making on therapy
modifications/dietary recommendations/prescription of new exams; 6. closing. These
phases have been identified by slightly modifying Byrne and Longs (1976) famous
representation of the medical consultation to adapt it to the specific features of the
encounter in diabetes care.
Given the specific clinical and therapeutic aims of each phase, in my analysis of
the argumentative practices I focused on phase 5, where it was more likely for
argumentation to be used. More specifically, I analyzed the process of shared decision
making as an instance of deliberation dialogue (Walton and Krabbe, 1995; Walton, 2006;
Walton et al., 2010; Walton, 2010). As in deliberation dialogues, also in this part of the
interaction the parties aim is to answer the question: what should we do?2. Deliberation
dialogues usually develop in three stages: opening, argumentation and closing.
In the opening stage the parties agree on a common goal and acknowledge that
action is needed to achieve it. In the argumentation stage, the parties conduct a discussion
on which course of action is the best way to reach the common goal. During the
discussion, new information is often introduced, which can bring the parties to alter their
original proposals and formulate new ones. In the concluding stage, the parties agree on
one proposal for action, which in the model is supposed to be a joint action, while in the
case of medical encounters it is usually something that will be carried out by the patients.
For the description of the argumentation schemes, I followed the approach
proposed in Walton (1996, 2006), Walton & Reed (2002), and Walton, Reed & Macagno
(2008).
The next section draws on the results of such analysis to answer the question
central to this paper: if and how argumentation skills can become therapeutic tools in the
chronic care encounter. I first describe the results of the analysis that refer to the
occurrence of the argumentation stage in interactions. I then report a few examples of
doctors argumentation and a few examples of patients replies to doctors. Especially in
the case of patients responses, the examples show that identifying argumentation is not
always straightforward, calling for a wider and deeper analysis of the kind of
communication activities that are performed by the interlocutors.
3. THE RESULTS
The results presented here are a subset from a detailed analysis of 31 out of the 60 videos
collected during the observational study. The analyzed videos concern patients talking
with doctors or with the dietician. These interactions differ in many ways from the ones
with the nurses, which I analyze and describe separately in a paper in preparation.
2

In my analysis, I did keep in mind the fact that deliberation dialogues often overlap with informationseeking dialogues and persuasion dialogues, but I am not giving a detailed account of this overlap in this
paper. An article discussing the use of the deliberation dialogue as a useful model for the interpretation and
analysis of this phase of interactions in the medical context has been submitted by the author to a scientific
journal and is currently under review.

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The argumentation stage

Only in 3 cases out of 31 it is possible to describe an actual argumentation stage, in which
doctor and patient both contribute to the discussion by putting forward alternative
proposals to achieve a certain shared goal (Walton et al., 2010). In most of the other
cases, doctors argue in favor of a generic line of conduct e.g., you should exercise
more, or you should lose weight without engaging with their patients in a discussion
on specific action items. In a minority of cases, there is no argumentation stage because
the patients diabetes is within acceptable ranges and there seems to be no need to change
neither the therapy nor the patients behaviors.
Doctors argumentation schemes
In my data, doctors argumentation is realized most frequently by arguments from
positive/negative consequences, from means to end, and from cause to effects.
In the following example3 of an argument from positive consequences, doctor and
patient are discussing about things to do to prevent episodes of hypoglycemia, which is a
very dangerous complication deriving from the sugar in the blood dropping below certain
levels and causing patients a variety of serious symptoms, among which are trembling,
dizziness, sweating, loss of consciousness, emotional instability, or aggressiveness. The
most effective remedy when the patient starts feeling the first symptoms is to eat some
sugar, but what if the crisis happens while driving, on the street, in a store? The doctor
argues as follows:
(1)

You should always carry a sugar sachet in your wallet and not in the pocket of
your trousers, because nobody leaves the house without their wallet, but you do
change your trousers from time to time, so if you keep the sugar in your wallet
you will never forget it

The following is an example of argument from negative consequences, in which the

dietician explains to the patient why she should be careful about eating croissants or
similar food too frequently:
(2)

Croissant is not ideal for you because it is very rich in sugar and fat, and since
you need to lose a bit of weight, this does not help you. If you happen to eat it on
special occasions, its ok. But if it happens every day, it is not ok

The argument from means to end in my data occurs almost exclusively to argue in favor
of better performed self-monitoring of blood glucose and in favor of always bringing the
glucometer and self-monitoring journal to the encounter. In the following example, the
doctor has noticed that the patient is writing in his journal very different (lower) values
from the ones that have been recorded in the glucometer. She presupposes (but does not
3

All examples have been translated by the author from the original data in Italian.

105

verify explicitly) that the patient is trying to hide the very high values from her and reacts
with the following argument:
(3)

I dont know if you made a mistake or if you wrote down a different value [],
but what you write in your journal is for yourself, its not for me. Is this clear? We
are collaborating. In this moment I am working together with you to help you feel
better and have a better health. If you do not show all the information, I cannot
help you improve

In another case, the patient asks the doctor if it is really necessary for him to take the
insulin three times a day, implicitly suggesting that maybe he could take less. The doctor
uses an argument from causes to effects in response to the patients question:
(4)

Yes, because insulin controls your blood sugar. If you were not taking insulin
your values would be above 400, which can be really damaging for you

There are also a few cases in which the doctors reason in favor of or against a certain
explanation provided by patients to make sense of a phenomenon. In these cases, again,
one frequent argument is the one from causes to effects, as in the case below, where the
patient complains that ever since he started taking insulin he has seen a weight loss of 10
kilos. The doctor does not agree:
(5)

You did not lose weight because of the insulin you are taking, but because the
management of your diabetes is not perfect yet. When diabetes is not well
controlled, you lose weight.

In very few cases, I have observed the use of the argument from waste (Walton 1996).
This argumentation scheme is based on the concept that wasting resources or efforts is
negative, as in the following example, in which the doctor observes that the patient has
worsened and comments:
(6)

Its such a pity because you had improved last time

The implicit point the doctor is making is that the patient could have done a better job at
keeping his diabetes under control, because now he has wasted all the effort made
previously.
Patients responses
As reported in many other empirical studies on doctor-patient consultations, also in my
data patients are not the ones who do most of the talking. However, they do participate
and one dimension of this participation that is particularly relevant to the point of this
paper regards the motivations patients offer for their behaviors, in response to doctors
noticing a worsening of their diabetes.
Most frequently, these motivations are either offered at the very beginning of the
consultation, in the opening phase, or when the doctor asks to see the tests and the self106

monitoring; at other times, they come up during the discussion about lifestyles, after the
doctor has looked at the general situation and has begun to conduct a deeper analysis of
single behaviors.
The motivations patients offer mostly have to do with social events or conditions
that somehow get in the way of a proper management of the diabetes. Below I report a
few examples:
(7)

I havent always taken my therapy nor done the self-monitoring properly in the
past few months because my husband has been very sick and I had to take care of
him

(8)

I havent done the self-monitoring because I have spent a couple of months with
my family in Calabria [in the South of Italy] and people were always offering me
good things to eat, so then it was not the case to measure my blood glucose

(9)

I have been traveling often lately and when I travel I let myself go a little and I
dont do the self-monitoring the way I should

(10)

With the job I have, its difficult for me to eat properly and to do the selfmonitoring when Im at work

(11)

Ive stopped going to the gym because I got lazy

A different set of motivations refer to other conditions affecting the patient that impacted
on the quality of diabetes self-management:
(12)

A couple of months ago, I broke my arm, I was so upset, I had to undergo

rehabilitation, so I just set aside the diet and the self-monitoring

(13)

I have been to the Emergency Room three times last month and maybe that
impacted on my diabetes

(14)

I have had a flu earlier this month and I think that caused my sugar values to
become higher

4. DISCUSSION
I now turn to discuss the results of the analysis in view of the question I set out to answer:
can argumentation skills become a therapeutic resource?, by highlighting how and why
argumentation in this kind of encounters could be improved.
First, the analysis showed that a complete and effective argumentation stage is
almost always missing in the interactions. Literature on shared decision making in the
medical encounter has shown a high positive correlation between the presence of shared
decision making and patient outcomes, especially patient self-efficacy (Heisler et al.,

107

2013; Lafata et al., 2013; Epstein and Gramling, 2013)4. As the model of the deliberation
dialogue shows, effective shared decision making is based on the ability to use
argumentation as a means to support or criticize proposed lines of conduct, therefore it
would be crucial for medical doctors to become aware of the process and be able to
activate it and conduct it in ways beneficial to patient active participation.
Secondly, in the previous section I reported a description of the argumentation
schemes that are frequently used by the doctors in my data. I dont think these
argumentation schemes pose problems of acceptability or validity, but I believe that in
some cases they do at least open questions regarding their effectiveness. If we consider
the argument from positive/negative consequences, we know it presupposes agreement
between the parties on what is considered positive or negative, on what is considered
better or worse. In the data, discussions on value hierarchies never emerge and the value
of good health above everything else is taken for granted. This may be correct in a
general sense, but diabetes is a disease that does not have particularly annoying
symptoms until it is too late. It is likely that patients tend to underestimate the risks
connected to their condition because actually they are feeling pretty good, and therefore
the possibility of eating a croissant (example (2)) every now and then in practice is
placed above the value of good health, simply because the risk connected to eating the
croissant is underestimated. This hypothesis is supported by empirical research in the
field of psychology, showing that in making decisions people tend to underestimate the
probabilities of failure of complex systems, believing that it is more likely for one part at
a time to stop functioning (among others, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Unfortunately
uncontrolled diabetes will impact on eyes, heart, kidneys and nerves all at the same time,
leading to the systems complete failure in the long run. Therefore, also in this case, the
awareness of the importance of agreement on values as a precondition for the
effectiveness of the argument from positive/negative consequences seems to be a skill
that is lacking and that could be very useful to doctors.
Regarding the use of the argument from means to end, the question arises whether
the importance of the end is actually shared by the parties. In example (3), the doctor
argues that the patient should report in his journal his exact values, because otherwise she
in her capacities of doctor and counsellor will not be able to help him appropriately.
This end may not be shared by the patient, who might have an understanding of the
doctors role as that of a controller rather than a helper. Indeed, in a few other
encounters the patients expressed quite clearly their perception of the doctor as the person
who not only guides but also controls them. Evidence needs to be collected regarding
patients perceptions of doctors authority in order to determine the effectiveness
potential of the argument from means to end used in this way.
The argument from cause to effect is often necessary as a means of patient
education: but are causal relations regarding scientific phenomena always understood by
patients? Examples (4) and (5) provide rather clear causal correlations, but would it help
the patient to understand why and how insulin keeps the blood sugar down? Or why and
how uncontrolled diabetes makes him lose weight? Maybe it would, at least according to
researchers in education, who show that understanding is at the heart of behavior change
(Asterhan and Schwartz, 2009). Other scholars in the same field have also collected
4

Self-efficacy is defined as patients understanding of their condition and treatment, and patients selfconfidence in their own self-care abilities (Heisler et al., 2002).

108

evidence to show that understanding is not improved by listening to explanations about

phenomena but by talking about phenomena and their causes (De Vries, Lund and Baker,
2002).
Finally, I point out an analytical difficulty that emerged in relation to the description of
doctors argumentation practices. There are many cases in the data in which it is very
difficult to decide whether we are looking at instances of argumentation or explanation.
Typically, these are cases in which patients are not doing well clinically and have not
adhered to the recommended behaviors (correct self-monitoring; lifestyle changes). In
almost all of these cases, the doctors assess the situation and then start providing
information about the causal relations between the correct behavior and the possibility to
achieve a better health condition, while the patients remain silent. From the point of view
of the analysis, the difficulty is posed by the fact that in order to describe these causal
relations as instances of explanations or argumentation we would need to know what the
doctor had in mind, i.e. if she presumed to be addressing a misunderstading in which
case her response would function as an explanation or a disagreement in which case,
her response would function as an instance of argumentation.
Also regarding the examples showing patients responses to doctors, a similar
question arises: should patients responses be accounted for as instances of
argumentation? If so, which are the standpoints being supported or criticized? Are
patients casting doubt on the doctors points of view or are they doing something else?5
If we take examples (7) to (11) and consider them in the context of the
interactions in which they occur, it is very difficult to describe them as moves aimed at
casting doubt on the doctors claim that the self-monitoring has not been done correctly,
that the diet needs to be followed more accurately, or that exercising more is necessary.
Rather, they look more like instances of dispreferred responses, i.e. turns in which a party
is in a position to provide the response that is considered to be contrary to the
interlocutors expectations (Pomerantz and Heritage, 2013; Pomerantz, 1984).
Are the patients therefore not arguing? And if not, what are they doing? My
understanding is that patients in these cases are using argumentation but not with the aim
of making a conceptual point, rather in favor of behaviors that can be generally defined as
incorrect, except in the specific circumstances described in each case. What the patients
seem to be saying is that since the contextual conditions in which they found themselves
had temporarily changed a behavior that would normally have been considered as
unacceptable could be excused. This strategy probably has a main face-saving function
and the doctors must be somehow aware of it because they seldom press the patients to
admit that their behaviors were actually not excusable. Instead, they either change the
subject, or just put forward rather generic recommendations to behave differently from
now on. In spite of being socially preferred, perhaps this kind of reaction from the doctors
is not the most functional to the attainment of the therapeutic goal of patient education,
because the special conditions the patients in examples (7)-(11) describe are precisely the
kind of conditions in which one should keep his/her diet, exercise and self-monitoring
even more under control. A potential misunderstanding of the nature of their disease
underlies these patients motivations, but the doctors do not seem to perceive it and they
do not address it.
5

I thank Nanon Labrie and Fabrizio Macagno for inspiring discussions on this specific topic.

109

As regards the other set of examples, (12)-(14), I consider them different from the
previous ones because they aim at describing a relation of cause-effect between an
additional health condition and a change in the sugar values. They look more like
explanations and indeed in these cases the doctors responded by accepting them and
providing argumentation to support them, thus fulfilling their goal of patient education.
In summary, the set of examples regarding patients responses shows patients
arguing that in certain specific circumstances a normally unacceptable behavior could be
accepted. In other words, patients show how their lifeworld is impacting on the selfmanagement of their diabetes, disclosing important information in relation to their
lifestyles. The potential for an instructive and constructive discussion on what is the best
line of conduct even in those exceptional circumstances is there, but doctors rarely see it
and take advantage of it.
Finally, in many cases, patients accounts for their behaviors are provided at the
very beginning of the consultation or just as the doctors are beginning to analyze the
patients clinical picture. These cases are very interesting because they are usually
preceded by some form of self-accusation, which triggers always the socially preferred
reaction of the doctors who immediately disagree with the self-accusation (Pomerantz,
1984). The problem is that this social game seems to distract the doctors from their
clinical goal, which is to assess the reasons why the patient believes s/he has not behaved
properly. This almost never happens, and the patients are excused but not further
questioned about their behaviors.
Limitations
The observational study on which this paper is based has of course a few limitations.
First, it did not aim at quantitative representativeness. The data were collected in only one
clinic and a somewhat peculiar one, as it is not the norm for diabetes doctors in Italy to be
working in such a big team of professionals.
Secondly, the medical staff at the clinic had all had some training at different
moments in their professional life on patient-centered care or communication with
patients. It would be interesting to observe the communication practices of doctors with
no such training.
I did not have the possibility to collect feedback from the patients regarding their
perceptions on the encounters with the doctors, which would also have been interesting
for a deeper understanding of the dynamics within the encounter.
Finally, it was not always possible to place the videocamera so as to make it
totally unobtrusive. The videos give the impression that this did not substantially alter the
spontaneity of the interactions, but of course this cannot be proved in any way and it may
well be that without the camera in place the persons involved would have behaved
differently.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Can argumentation skills become a therapeutic resource? Could argumentation skills
become a normal professional asset for chronic care doctors? I believe even the limited
results reported in this contribution point in the direction of an affirmative answer to
110

these questions. Becoming aware of and mastering argumentation skills could actually
provide chronic care doctors with crucial tools for the achievement of therapeutic goals
that almost entirely depend on the quality of communication during the encounter with
patients.
Interestingly, by looking at argumentation practices from this perspective can also
inspire argumentation scholars to improve and refine their methods of analysis. The
analytical challenge I faced when trying to make a clear-cut distinction between instances
of argumentation and explanation reveals the necessity for the young field of medical
argumentation to take a closer look at the context of interaction it is studying, in order to
describe its relevant features and the criteria to identify and evaluate the instances of
argumentation within its boundaries.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
The study described in this article was partly supported by a Research Fellowship granted
by the Faculty of Linguistic Sciences and Foreign Literatures of the Catholic University
of Milano (Italy) for the year 2012. For their ready collaboration, kindness and
willingness to make the interdisciplinary effort involved in the project, I wish to thank
Dr. Nicoletta Musacchio and her staff at the diabetes outpatient clinic ICP, in Cusano
Milanino: Dr. Annalisa Giancaterini, Dr. Ilaria Ciullo, Dr. Augusto Lovagnini, nurses
Silvia Maino and Rosana Gaiofatto, and dietician Laura Pessina. The author is currently
developing her research on argumentation in the medical field thanks to a grant from the
Italian Ministry for University and Research (MIUR FIR 2013, Grant: RBFR13FQ5J)
for a project titled, Healthy Reasoning. Strategies and Mechanisms of Persuasion in
Chronic Care, which will be conducted in collaboration with the Italian Association of
Diabetologists (AMD).
I am particularly grateful to the speakers and the audience in my ISSA panel on
Medical Argumentation for their insightful comments, which improved a previous
version of this paper.

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What Is Informal Logic?

J. Anthony Blair
Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric
University of Windsor
Canada
tblair@uwindsor.ca

ABSTRACT: In this keynote address at the eighth ISSA conference on argumentation I describe the emergence
of two themes that I think are key to the constitution of informal logic. One is the development of analytic tools
for the recognition, identification and display of so-called non-interactive arguments. The other is the development of evaluative tools for assessing deductive, inductive, and other kinds of arguments. At the end I mention
several current interests of informal logic.
KEYWORDS: argument analysis, argument appraisal, informal logic, non-interactive argument, reasoning appraisal

1. PREFATORY REMARKS
Good morning.
If you consider this years ISSA keynoters, you cant help but get the impression of a
kind of Aristotelian trivium of argumentation theoryrhetoric, dialectic and logic. Professor
Fahnestock represents rhetoric. Professor van Eemeren represents dialectic (at least the Pragma- version of it). So Professor Blair must represent logic. Alas, I am no logician, as my
friends are quick to tell me. What I will try to do is represent informal logic, which is a somewhat different kettle of fish.
I must insert here two unplanned remarks. First, as you know, Frans van Eemeren did
not represent dialectic in particular in his address yesterday. Instead, he took the point of view
of an eagle flying high above, surveying the argumentation forest belowalbeit a Pragmadialectical eagle. Today, in contrast, I will be taking the point of view of a sparrow, surveying
just one species of tree in the forest.
Second, in case you have read it in the conference program, you will know that, along
with Ralph Johnson, I am credited with inventing and developing informal logic. I would be
happy to take that credit. However, there are some dozens of other people, several of whom
are in this room today and many who have stood on this dais at earlier ISSA conferences, who
would rightly take exception. What about me? they can say. No, informal logics rise and
development are due to the contributions of many scholars, and no one or two people can take
credit for it. And in my talk this morning, of course, I speak only for myself.
2. INTRODUCTION
What motivated my topicWhat is Informal Logic?is my difficulty in coming up with a
one or two sentence answer whenever someone asks me, What IS informal logic, anyway?
or What exactly is informal logic?

113

Its not easy to say what informal logic is. Im not entirely happy with the latest definition by
Johnson and me that is quoted in the chapter on informal logic in HATthe Handbook of Argumentation Theory, which is the successor to FAT, Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory.
(By the way, the HAT chapter on informal logic is excellent.) Also, Im quite unhappy with
several features of the informal logic entries in the on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy and The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. But instead of itemizing my differences, I want to use this occasion to spell out what I
take informal logic to be.
I will do this by telling the story of two themes that feature in its development and that
I think are central to what constitutes informal logic.
A word of warning before I start. You need to be wary of the notion that in the term
informal logic, the word informal means informal and the word logic means logic.
Its like the use of the term football north of Mexico. In the USA and in Canada, the games
called football dont much call for the players to control a ball with their feet. Informal logicians use variables, and talk about argument schemes, which are quasi formal. So informal
logic is not strictly-speaking informal. And if you understand by logic the study of axiomatized deductive systems, informal logic is not logic. There is a story about how informal
logic got its name, but it sheds no light on what informal logic is, so I wont tell it today.
3. BACKGROUND
Let me start with a bit of background.
Informal logic, from the beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, has been motivated by
goals of philosophy classroom instruction. Its subject matter was reasoning and arguments.
And the enterprise was normative. The objective might be to improve reasoning or critical
thinking skills, or to assess the logic of everyday discourse. Reasoning and critical thinking
skills were seen to be skills in judging the probative value of ones own reasoning and of others arguments. Assessing logic was seen as recognizing, interpreting and evaluating the probative value of arguments. The telos of the enterprise was the formation of justifiable cognitive and affective attitudes, and the assumption was that understanding the norms of cogent
reasoning and arguments, and acquiring some skill in their application, will contribute to that
end.
The value in question was and is epistemic or probative meritnot communicative or
rhetorical merit. A logically good argument, on this view, contributes to justifying adopting
the attitude in questionbe it a belief, a judgement, a disposition to act, an emotion, or whatever. Whether such justification is in some casesor alwaysrelative to audiences or circumstances was and is an open question.
We focused, in the beginning, on the arguments found in the print media: in newspapers and magazines. We did so for several reasons. For one thing, these were not the artificial
arguments of traditional logic textbooksarguments that were designed to illustrate elementary valid argument forms or for practicing the use of truth tableslike this one from Irving
Copis Symbolic Logic (1954):
If I work then I earn money, and if I dont work then I enjoy myself. Therefore if I
dont earn money then I enjoy myself.

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Those examples sent the wrong message to the students, who wanted to improve their ability
to understand and assess the arguments used in public life. So the arguments we used for
teaching purposes were about the topical issues of the day. They thereby served to demonstrate that arguments are thought to make a difference. Their content might be expected to be
familiar to students and of interest to them, and the course would not have to presuppose technical background knowledge. Short examples could be found in letters to the editor; slightly
longer ones in editorials; and even longer ones in opinion columns. One wag said we were
teaching newspaper logic.
If you need a label for such writings, you might call them non-interactive (see Govier 1999). While targeting some set of readers, the writer is not engaged in a face-to-face dialogue with anyone. The writer might be responding to previous comments and the arguments
might anticipate and respond to various kinds of objections. So the text can be dialectical.
However, any direct interplay is between the writer and that commentator or objector, not between the writer and just any reader. In the early days, informal logicians did not think to take
these non-interactive pieces to be conversations or dialogues. Later, some were attracted to the
view that such texts might fruitfully be modeled as having salient properties of two-party conversational interactions. Others, however, resisted that model as misleading for non-interactive
contexts.
As teachers of what we originally thought of as practical or applied logic, we were interested in guiding our students in assessing the logic of the reasoning employed in the arguments expressed in these non-interactive writings. To do so required recognizing the presence
of arguments and getting at their features. Hence, the first task was to devise guidelines to aid
in finding and extracting arguments, and then displaying them for critical examination. The
second task was to assess their cogency, either from the point of view of an onlooker or from
the point of view of the target audience.
4. ANALYSIS
I want to talk a bit about what we came to see as required to get at the arguments. This is the
first theme in informal logics development. In a few minutes I will turn to the second theme,
the question of the logical norms to be used in judging the arguments cogency.
We quickly learned that sending students off to find arguments requires them to recognize that a communication might well be serving other purposes. Often it will consist of just a
report or a description or a non-argumentative narrative. Sometimes the text is confused or
confusing, so that its unclear whether its author intends to be arguing. Sometimes the text
makes some gestures in the direction of arguing, but on any interpretation the authors reasoning is muddled.
So it turns out that the interpretive tasks of argument recognition and identification, on
the one hand, and argument assessment, on the other hand, while theyre distinguishable, are
not independent. Thats because whether the author may be taken to be presenting an argument can depend on whether an at-least plausible argument can be attributed to what he or she
has written. That can depend on whether there are sentences that may plausibly be taken to be
functioning in probative support relationships with other sentences. So the recognition and
identification of arguments in such writings can require the logical assessment of argument
candidates.

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To recognize the presence of argument in non-interactive texts, we found that it helps to identify what might be called the rhetorical situation of the text. Doing so includes, when possible,
noting such features as the identity of the author, the authors ethos, the intended audience, the
occasion, the venue, the surrounding circumstances, the authors objectives, any applicable
institutional norms, and the function of the discourse. It also helps, we found, to identify what
might be called the dialectical environment of the text. Here I have in mind such things as debates, disagreements, controversies and so on surrounding the authors topic; alternative positions to the authors view; and any particular opponent with whom the author has a history of
dispute.
It also helps to have some knowledge of the habitats of arguments in general, such as
locations of controversies or other contexts where burdens of proof arise. It requires knowing
the signs of arguments, such as illation-indicator terms, qualifiers and hedging expressions,
plus an appreciation of their fickleness. And it can help to have a sense for what counts as a
reason in the subject-matter in question.
(By the way, speaking of fickle illative terms, have you noticed the non-illative use of
so that has become widely used by experts interviewed in the media? Theyll start off their
explanations with a so: So, our study shows that ... . It seems to function like taking a
breath before speaking.)
So, having recognized the presence of argument, next is the identification of the argument. Weve established that its a bird making those noises in the bushes, but what kind of
bird is it? Identifying the argument means identifying its parts and their functions, and identifying its structure. Here are to be set out the reasons, broken down into premises, and the
claims, identified as their conclusions. Qualifications and hedging are to be noticed. We debated the distinctions among patterns of direct support such as linked, convergent, cumulative,
and chained or serial. (And I see from the conference program that this is still a live issue.)
Also, aside from direct support for the main conclusion, what various defensive supporting
functions might be being served? We distinguished among defending a premise against an
objection, defending a premise-conclusion link against an objection, arguing against alternatives to the conclusion, and defending the conclusion against arguments directly opposing it.
Some called for, or allowed for, the reformulation of parts of the authors original text so that
the roles of given sentences in the argument can be made more evident. And some argued that
unexpressed but assumed or needed components have to be identified and inserted. It also
helped here to have some familiarity with the subject matter.
Having developed guidelines to help understand the argument, we sought ways to portray that understanding so the argument could be methodically assessed. Many developed
premise and conclusion numbering conventions that designate any sentences place in the
structure of the argument and/or its function in the argument. As well, many developed tree
diagram conventions that do the same jobs. In my experience, often students who can easily
master the numbering conventions have trouble working with tree diagrams, and vice versa, so
having both seems pedagogically useful.
These tasks of recognition, identification, and display lead up to the assessment of arguments in non-interactive texts. The guidelines help any assessor to gain an understanding of
the arguments and so be in a position to judge their probative merits.
By the way, the need to formulate such guidelines does not belong to informal logic in
particular. It belongs to any approach that undertakes to analyze the arguments in noninteractive texts. Still, one thread in informal logic is the generation of practical advice for the
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recognition, identification and display of arguments in non-interactive discourse. This thread

was and is practice-driven; and workable and economically teachable guidelines were and are
its objective.
5. APPRAISAL
I now turn to the second theme that Im claiming characterizes informal logic, namely the logical appraisal of these arguments.
To judge the logical merits of an argument, two kinds of decision are needed. Number
one: how acceptable are the reasons? And number two: how well justified are the inferences
from the reasons to the claims?
Some informal logicians, me among them, have thought that these questions can be
asked from at least the following two perspectives. One perspective is that of an addressee or
target of the argument. This can be a person or group to whom the author is directing his or
her argument. Or it can be anyone who is interested in the argument because he or she wants
to decide whether to accept its conclusion. An addressee would be someone trying to decide
on a course of action, such as how to vote, whom the arguer is trying to win over, or shed be a
scientist presented with evidence for a novel theory in her field, who wants to decide whether
to give it credence. The other perspective is that of an onlooker. By an onlooker I mean someone who can detach himself or herself from interests or commitments touched by the argument, and who is in the position of judging how well the arguer makes his or her case to the
audience in question. An onlooker would be a teacher grading a students essay or a referee
for a submission to an academic journal, each of whom has to decide how well the author has
made his or her case relative to the burden of proof thats appropriate in the circumstances.
5.1 Premise acceptability
Let me first say a word about the informal logic criterion for the appraisal of reasons.
Any inference made in reasoning, or invited in an argument, is clearly only as good as
what it starts from: namely, its reasons, expressed through its premises. Now, you must understand that most nascent informal logicians had been trained in the analytic philosophy of the
mid-twentieth century, according to which good premises are true premises. So it required a
break with our upbringing to abandon this tradition and follow some of Charles Hamblins arguments in his 1970 monograph, Fallacies. Hamblin proposed that, for cogency, the truth of
premises alone is not sufficient, since premises would have to be not only true but also known
to be true. And truth is not necessary, either, he said, since reasonably probable premises
would be good enough (see Hamblin 1970, Ch. 7). However, not many informal logicians
went all the way with Hamblins dialectical conception. According to it, the appropriate criterion (both necessary and sufficient) for premises is that they be accepted, in the sense that they
be commitments of the addressee of the argument. But theres a problem for non-interactive
arguments addressed to a diverse or unknown audience: whose commitments are we talking
about? Furthermore, in some cases there are propositions available for use as premises that are
obviously true and known by all concerned to be true. But in the absence of obvious truth,
many informal logicians opted instead for the criterion that the premises at least must be worthy of acceptance, that is, be acceptable. Of course, then the question is, What counts as acceptability? That is, what makes claims that are used as premises in reasoning or arguments
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worthy of acceptance, and by whom? Informal logicians have made serious, even booklength, attempts to answer that question.
5.2 Logical assessment: Deductive validity and inductive strength
Besides the acceptability of the reasons, there is the assessment of the consequence relations
the premise-conclusion linksof reasoning and arguments.
Our thinking about premise-conclusion relations developed along the following lines.
Our education in analytic philosophy meant that our basic training in logic, a training almost
everyone shared, was in the symbolic logics of the dayat a minimum, formal propositional
logic and predicate logic. These are logics of the deductive inference relation called validity.
To use formal methods to test the inference relations of arguments in a natural language for
deductive validity requires that the arguments be translated into standard logical form. However, doing so requires an understanding of standard logical form. Wed have to teach our students some propositional and predicate logic before they could even interpret these newspaper
arguments. Moreover, we discovered that reformulating the newspaper texts usually required
simplifying their sentences and thus changing the sense of the arguments. And finally, when
inspected for conformity to the established rules of inference of deductive logic, such arguments often proved to be deductively invalid, even when, independently, they seemed to be
cogent.
One hypothesis suggested to explain this last anomaly was that the arguer was making
unexpressed assumptions, which, once added to the stated argument as additional premises,
would render it deductively valid. The trouble is that, in many cases, the candidates for such
needed missing premises are patently false. Often, a plausible arguments deductive validity
could be saved only by adding problematic or false assumptions to it.
Of course many of these arguments were not intended to be deductively valid, but instead, to be inductively strong. Thus arguments in support of causal explanations, statistical
generalizations from samples to populations, inductive analogies, and so on, could have their
conclusions well-supported by their premises even though they were deductively invalid. So
the options became that an argument with acceptable premises would be logically cogent if it
were either deductively valid or else, if deductively invalid, if it were inductively strong.
5.3 The deductive/inductive dichotomy challenged
An early question debated in the informal logic community was whether deductive validity
and inductive strength are the only criteria for logically respectable inferences from reasons to
claims. That is, are all arguments either deductive or inductiveis the deductive-inductive
dichotomy exhaustive?
To be sure, that dichotomy can be made exhaustive by definitional fiat. Inductive reasoning can be defined as any reasoning that is not deductive. But the plausibility of this dichotomy relies on assuming a very broad conception of induction. For logicians, however, inductive reasoning provides support for its conclusions in degrees of probability specifiable
numerically, or it is reasoning that relies on the assumption that experienced regularities provide a guide to un-experienced regularities. Here, for instance, is a passage from the introduction of the article on inductive logic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Hawthorne
2014):
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This article will focus on the kind of ... approach to inductive logic most widely studied by philosophers and logicians in recent years. These logics employ conditional
probability functions to represent measures of the degree to which evidence statements
support hypotheses. This kind of approach usually draws on Bayes' theorem, which is a
theorem of probability theory, to articulate how the implications of hypotheses about
evidence claims influences the degree to which hypotheses are supported by those evidence claims.
Well, that is a not a broad conception of induction. It leaves out reasoning in which probability
in the sense of plausibility or reasonableness is the appropriate qualifier or where it makes no
sense to express the strength of support as a numerical probability. It leaves out reasoning that
relies on reasons other than experienced regularities. Denying that the deductive-inductive dichotomy is exhaustive implies that there can be logically good reasoning that is deductively
invalid and to which the norms of induction narrowly defined do not apply.
Two examples were proposed early on in the informal logic community to show that
some reasoning doesnt seem to fit either the deductive or the narrow inductive category. One
example, due to John Wisdom (1991), was the reasoning or the argument that Govier (1999)
has called a priori analogy. Heres an example:
Ellens essay merits a high grade by virtue of the lucid clarity of its organization and
expression, the thoroughness of its argumentation and the cogency of its arguments.
Jays essay is similarly clearly organized and expressed, its argumentation is similarly
thorough and its arguments similarly cogent. So Jays essay merits a similarly high
grade.
Generalized, this is the reasoning that, when a certain property belongs to something
by virtue of that things satisfying certain criteria to a given extent, and another thing
of the same sort as the first one is judged also to satisfy those criteria to a similar extent, then one may infer that the property in question belongs to the second thing as
well.
The premises of cogent reasoning or arguments from a priori analogy do not deductively entail
their conclusions, because the second thing might have, besides the stated qualifying properties, others that disqualify it from having the feature in question. (Maybe Jays essay was
submitted well after the due date, and was not on the assigned topic.) Since it cant be known
in advance what all the possible disqualifiers are, a list of them cannot be built into the criteria.
Moreover, such reasoning or arguments are not narrowly inductive either, for there is no basis
for assigning a numerical probability to their conclusions. Nor are they arguments from known
regularities.
The other example, due to Carl Wellman (1971), is what he called conductive reasoning. Its also known as balance-of-considerations reasoning. Here is an example:

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The blueberries for sale today are ripe, fresh and wild, and I adore wild blueberries; so
I should buy them. On the other hand, theyre outrageously over-priced and I dont really need them; so I shouldnt buy them. But I can afford them, and I need to indulge
myself just now. So, everything considered, I should buy them.
In such reasoning, the reasoner takes one set of considerations to favour a claim, and at
the same time takes another set of considerations to tell against that claim. The reasoner judges one set to outweigh the other, and on that basis judges the claim to be acceptable or unacceptable.
The premises of cogent balance-of-considerations reasoning or arguments dont entail their
conclusions, because new information can tip the balance in the other direction, thereby affecting the legitimacy of the inference to the main conclusion. (For example, my wife tells me that
there is no room in the refrigerator for the blueberries, or that she has already bought some.)
But these are not narrowly inductive arguments either. There is no basis for assigning a numerical probability to the reasonableness of my decision to buy the blueberries. And again,
there is no argument from known regularities here.
Based on examples like these two, many informal logicians concluded that its false
that all reasoning is either deductive or narrowly inductive. Some reasoning requires other criteria of inference appraisal than deductive validity and, for instance, statistical probability.
5.4 General tools for assessing inference strength
Most informal logicians did not address the question of what this other kind of reasoning is,
beyond the judgment that it is not deductive and not narrowly inductive. Their motivation was
classroom instruction, and the immediate need was useful teaching tools. So they adopted,
adapted or invented various general methods of inference appraisal. These supposedly apply to
reasoning and arguments of any sort, whether they are intended to be deductively valid, or inductively strong, or to belong to neither of these two categories.
At least five such methods turn up in the informal logic literature. Ill describe each of
them very briefly.
5.4.1 Fallacy theory
One early proposal was that an argument free of fallacies is probatively sound, and in particular, its consequence relation is fine so long as it is free of inferential fallacies. This answer
leads straight to fallacy theory, and that was an early preoccupation of informal logicians. That
fact led some people, understandably but mistakenly, to identify informal logic with the study
of informal fallacies.
A broad consensus emerged that fallacies are not patterns of mistaken reasoning. Rather, they are errors in the sense of misfires or misuses of otherwise legitimate patterns of reasoning. What distinguishes the informal logic approach to fallacies is that not all fallacies are
viewed as dialectical or rhetorical misdemeanors: many are seen as particular errors of reasoning. Some are confused deductions, some hasty inductions, and some other types of malfunctioning reasoning. I need to add that there are some informal logicians who deny that the concept of fallacy has any legitimate application.
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5.4.2 Acceptability, relevance, sufficiency

Another general method of assessment is to use the triad of Acceptability, Relevance and SufficiencyARS. Acceptability, as I have already noted, is a criterion for premises. Relevance
and sufficiency are criteria for the adequacy of the link between premises and conclusion: the
reasons offered must be probatively relevant to the conclusion, and they have to supply
enough of the right kinds of evidence to justify accepting it.
Its been argued that relevance is redundant, since sufficiency already presupposes it.
You cant have enough evidence unless what you count as evidence is already relevant. That is
true. However, peoples arguments sometimes include irrelevant premises. Those have to be
identified and set aside before judging the sufficiency of the relevant ones that remain.
Sufficiency has become seen to require not only reasons that directly support a claim
but also those that support it indirectly, by way of refuting or weakening objections or criticisms of various kinds. How far that indirect support should go is a matter that continues to be
debated.
The ARS criteria are general, in that deductively valid and inductively strong reasoning
and arguments, as well as those with other kinds of good consequence relations, all will pass
their test. They have been widely adopted as teaching tools and their introduction has led to
scholarly reflections on all three concepts.
Some people, again mistakenly, identify informal logic with the ARS method of argument assessment.
5.4.3 Inference warrants
Some informal logicians have been attracted to Stephen Toulmins (1958) concepts of warrant
and backing as an account of what justifies reasoning and argument inferences in general. The
idea is that any particular inference relies on a general rule or warrant that licenses inferences
of that sort. An inference is justified provided that its warrant is itself defensible, that is, can
be backed up if questioned. Although Toulmin did not emphasize this point, a warrant can be a
deductive rule of inference, such as modus ponens, or an inductive principle, as well as such
things as rules of practices. So warrant justification is general too.
An obvious objection to this approach is that the backing of a warrant is itself an argument, thereby involving an inference that must rely on another warrant that can be backed up
if questionedand so there begins an infinite regress. A reply to this objection is that, while
an infinite regress of warrants and backings is in principle possible, in practice, in short order
one arrives at backing that is either clearly solid or obviously dubious.
5.4.4 Testing by possible counterexamples
A fourth general method that informal logicians have used for evaluating the inferences of reasoning and arguments is testing them by means of counterexamples.
The method is to think of considerations that are consistent with the given reasons but
inconsistent with the claim being inferred or argued for. Depending on whether any such
counterexamples are conceivable, and if so, either probable or plausible to some extent, the
reasoning can be determined to be deductively valid, or invalid but with some degree of inductive strength, or invalid but more or less reasonable.
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This method is only as good as the assessors ability to imagine possible counter-examples and
the accuracy of their judgements of the possibility, probability, or plausibility or reasonableness of such counter-examples. This ability often depends on subject-specific knowledge
about the topic of the reasoning or argument in question.
5.4.5 Reasoning or argument scheme theory
I call the fifth method, argument scheme theory. Douglas Walton is one theorist who has
proposed an account of non-deductive, non-inductive kinds of reasoning. According to Walton
(1996), such reasoning is presumptive. That is, it is reasoning that establishes, or shifts, a burden of proof. A general approach for assessing deductive, inductive and presumptive reasoning, according to Walton and others, is the use of reasoning or argument schemes.
A reasoning or argument scheme is a generalization of a token of reasoning or argument. I gave examples of two such schemes earlierthe schemes for reasoning by a priori
analogy and the scheme for balance-of-considerations reasoning.
Such generalizations can be deductive, inductive or presumptive. Scheme theorists
think it is reasonable to accept the conclusion of an instance of such a scheme as the consequence of its premises, so long as the questions that test its vulnerable featuresthe so-called
critical questionsare answered satisfactorily in the given case.
These five methodsfreedom from inferential fallacy; the sufficiency of relevant offered reasons; justification by an adequately-backed warrant; passing the test of counterexamples; and being an acceptable instance of a reasoning schemeare all general methods
of assessing the inferences of reasoning or arguments. That is, they apply to reasoning or arguments with supposed deductive validity, or inductive strength, or other kinds of cogency.
Whether these five initiatives are compatible, equivalent or otherwise related, whether they are
correct, and whether the list is exhaustive, all remains to be seen.
6. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, AND CONCLUSION
So far I have described two themes that have animated informal logic. One is the development
of guidelines for the analysis of the reasoning in non-interactive arguments. The other is the
articulation of generally applicable methods for evaluating the reasoningthat is, the reasons
and the inferencesexhibited in arguments. My contention is that these are the principal defining threads of informal logic. Fortunately, for me, and for you, I dont have time to defend
that assumption on this occasion. I just have time to add a few footnotes.
One footnote is that informal logicians came to realize that, although they had started
out analyzing arguments in non-interactive texts for teaching purposes, what they are also interested in is the logic of the non-deductive, non-narrowly-inductive reasoning employed in
any arguments, in whatever setting they are communicated (whether a dialogue, a group discussion, or a speech), by whatever mode they are communicated (whether orally or in writing,
visually, or mixed-modally), for whatever purpose they are communicated (whether for persuasion, or disagreement resolution, or communication repair, or justification, or any other
purpose), and with whatever subject-matter they are concerned.
A second footnote is that, belatedly, at least some informal logicians have come to appreciate the need to understand the rhetorical functions of communication in order to recog-

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nize and identify arguments, and in order to understand the nature and force of the reasoning
expressed in them.
And a final footnote: I hope it is clear that informal logic does not aim to account for
all the pragmatic and communicative properties of arguments. Nor is it a theory of argumentation, understanding by such a theory an account of the dynamics of, and the norms for, various
kinds of exchanges of arguments for various purposes. It does not address the psychology, sociology, or politics of exchanges of arguments. If informal logicians happen to take up such
topics, as some do, they do so flying other colours, such as argumentation theorist.
Well, it is high time for me to stop. By now I hope you can see why I have difficulty
conveying an understanding of what informal logic is in a couple of sentences. If you will allow my remarks this morning to stand as a long footnote, my summary would run as follows.
Informal logic is the combination of two related things. It is the development and justification
of practical guidelines for recognizing, identifying and displaying the reasoning expressed and
invited in arguments, especially arguments found in non-interactive discourse or other modes
of non-interactive communication. And it is the development and justification of the probative
norms applicable to the reasons, and applicable to the non-deductive, non-inductive inferential
links, employed in the reasoning that is expressed or invited in any argument.
Thank you.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
My thanks to Fellows at the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric for critical comments on, and suggestions for improvements of, earlier drafts of this
address, including Hans Hansen, Catherine Hundleby, Leo Groarke, Marcello Guarini,
Bruno Leclercq, Christopher Tindale, and especially Ralph Johnson and Robert Pinto.
REFERENCES
Copi, Irving M. (1954). Symbolic logic. New York: The Macmillan Company.
Govier, Trudy (1999). The philosophy of argument. Newport News, VA: Vale Press.
Hamblin, C.L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen.
Hawthorne, James (2014). "Inductive logic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/logic-inductive/>.
Toulmin, Stephen N. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Walton, Douglas N. (1996). Argument schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Wellman, Carl (1971). Challenge and response, Justification in ethics. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern
Illinois University Press.
Wisdom, John (1991). Proof and explanation, The Virginia lectures (ed. by Stephen F. Barker). Lanham. MD:
University Press of America. (Originally delivered at the University of Virginia in spring 1957.)

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The Voices Of Justice

Argumentative Polyphony And Strategic Manoeuvring In
Judgement Motivations: An Example From The Italian
Constitutional Court
Marina Bletsas
Department of Romance Studies
University of Bonn
Germany
marina.bletsas@uni-bonn.de

ABSTRACT: Combining the ScaPoLine (Nlke, Flttum, & Norn, 2004; Nlke, 2009, 2011, 2013) with
the (extended) pragma-dialectical approach (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984; 2004; van Eemeren 2010),
I suggest a reconstruction of judgement motivations as critical discussions between a plurality of voices
conveyed even in one and the same sentence. In particular, I present some illustrative examples of
polyphonic strategic manoeuvring from a landmark judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court: n.
440/1995.
KEYWORDS: Critical discussion, Italian Constitutional Court, legal discourse, polyphony, Pragmadialectics, ScaPoLine, strategic manoeuvring.

1. INTRODUCTION
When reading legal texts such as judgement motivations, one encounters a plurality of
voices carrying different views on the issue at stake. This happens not only quite
unsurprisingly at a textual level, but also at the micro-level of the utterance (cf. Nlke,
2009, p. 12). With Nlke (2009, p. 12), I focus here on polyphonie en langue, conue
comme le produit des lments de la langue susceptibles de favoriser une certaine lecture
polyphonique de la parole. I maintain that the use of such polyphony has an
argumentative significance and that this can lead to reconstruct such apparently
monological texts as fully fledged critical discussions permeated by the striving for
rhetoric efficiency known in Pragma-dialectics as strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren,
2010). In other words, I suggest focusing on argumentative polyphony in judicial
motivations and looking at it from the angle of rhetoric efficiency, since, as van Eemeren
(2010, p. 153) pointedly writes, it is the ample room left for strategic maneuvering [that]
is, in fact, the basis of the legal profession.
The matters addressed in the present contribution are of methodological order and
can be broken down into two questions:

Can an integration of the pragma-dialectical and a polyphonic approach provide

useful insights into argumentation analysis?
Does polyphony account for strategic manoeuvring in judgement motivations?

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The fundamental suggestion put forward is therefore the integration of two theoretical
pillars: the (extended) Pragma-dialectics on the one hand (see among others van Eemeren
& Grootendorst, 2004; 1992; 1984; van Eemeren, 2010), and the linguistic polyphonic
approach known under the acronym ScaPoLine which stands for Thorie SCAndinave
de la POlyphonie LINguistique on the other hand (see among others Nlke, Flttum &
Norn, 2004; Nlke, 2006; Nlke, 2013).
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 The first pillar: Extended Pragma-dialectics
I will not dwell largely upon the first pillar here, since it is the specialty of the Institution
hosting the conference from which the present volume results. Only two aspects are to be
briefly recalled to the readers mind: the ideal abstract model of a critical discussion, in
which argumentation and standpoint are staged, and the rhetorical component present in
argumentation.
The former is articulated in four stages: a confrontation stage, where protagonists
put forward a standpoint while antagonists cast doubt upon it, thus establishing a
difference of opinion; an opening stage, where the common ground of the parties is
established; the actual argumentation stage, where arguments are advanced in support of
a standpoint; finally, the concluding stage, where the difference of opinion is either
overcome or maintained (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 57-68). The four stages
take place when a discussion about a difference of opinion begins; it is however
important to keep in mind that Pragma-dialectics acknowledges the complexity of real
life interactions by making clear that the logical order pictured above seldom coincides
with the chronological one in a discussion, and that some stages of a critical discussion
often take place implicitly. This is for example typical of the opening stage, which can
mostly be elicited by the fact that a protagonist holding a standpoint directly proceeds to
argue for it and were they not to, it wouldnt strike anyone as surprising if they were
challenged to do so.
On its way towards a resolution of a difference of opinion, the critical discussion
thus described is invariably carried by both a dialectical and a rhetorical component at
every single stage. While the former component aims at reasonability, the latter strives
for effectiveness. Extended Pragma-dialectics tackles the matter by christening this
component strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren, 2010) and pointing out its three
simultaneously present aspects: presentational devices, topical potential and audience
demand.
2.2 The second pillar: ScaPoLine
The second theoretical pillar is represented by a linguistic theory of polyphony developed
by a French-speaking group of Scandinavian Romanists around Nlke and indebted to
Ducrots linguistic approach. The Scandinavian Theory of Linguistic Polyphony deals
with the plurality of points of view, abbreviated with POV in English (Nlke, 2006)
communicated through an utterance. This theory is an utterance oriented, semantic,
discoursive, instructional and structuralistic theory originally inspired by the Ducrotian
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approach (1984a; 1984b), which it aims at formalizing in order to prciser les

contraintes proprement linguistiques qui rgissent linterprtation polyphonique [specify
the strictly linguistic constraints governing the polyphonic interpretation] (Nlke, 2009,
p. 15).
A certain language parochialism has likely prevented the Scandinavian Theory
not unlike its Ducrotian precedents from expanding far beyond the French-speaking
field of Romance studies. Such borders have only just begun to be removed by sporadic
non-French publications: in The semantics of polyphony (and the pragmatics of
realization) (2006), Nlke introduces the English-speaking readership to the theory,
while in Types of Discourse Entities in ScaPoLine (Nlke, 2011, p. 58), he specialises
in the images of the persons who are created by the speaker and the persons who
inhabit the discourse. Dendale (2006, 2007) contributes to the propagation of the theory
to the English-speaking audience by presenting and confronting it with other polyphony
frameworks, namely Ducrots (1984a; 1984b), Bress (1998; 1999) and Kronnings
(1996). For other languages, one might refer to Gvaudan (2008), who explains Ducrots
and the ScaPoLines approaches to polyphony on the basis of German examples. If the
theoretical framework of ScaPoLine deserves a broader consideration, so does its
application to different natural languages, such as Italian. Considering the relatively few
non-French papers on the subject, it will not be superfluous to give a brief account of
basic concepts of the ScaPoLine in this contribution as well.
The ScaPoLine theory distinguishes first of all between polyphonic structure,
which deals with linguistic coding, and polyphonic configuration, which has to do with
utterance meaning. From a logical perspective, the polyphonic structure precedes the
configuration, since it is composed of instructions for the configuration and thus yields
semantic constraints on the interpretation. But to gain insight into the structure, the
starting point cannot but be the configuration (cf. Nlke, 2006, p. 145).
The polyphonic configuration is to be attributed to an entity named locutor as
constructor (LOC) for its property of presenting the elements composing the polyphonic
configuration. These are: LOC as a constructor itself as well as any copy of the locutor as
a discourse entity, namely the locutor as a virtual source of a point of view (Nlke,
2006, p. 148), also called utterance locutor (cf. Nlke, 2009, p. 23); the points of view
(POVs); the discourse entities (DE) and the utterance links1 (cf. Nlke, 2013, p. 26). It is
possible for the elements of the configuration to be coded in the linguistic form and
therefore be part of the polyphonic structure, but this is not necessarily the case.
The POVs (cf. Nlke, 2013, pp. 3233) are semantic units constituted by a
source2 X, instantiated by a discourse entity, and a judgment upon a content p, which
might here tentatively be qualified as of facts or actions. The POV form is expressed as
[X] (JUGE (p))
where the judgement, lacking specific indicators to the contrary, is by default one of
truth. The POVs can be either simple or complex, in which case they will be either
relational as in a typical argumentative link, where a POVARG is put forward in support of

In Nlke (2006), unlike in Nlke (2011), more confusingly for the English-speaking reader, enunciative
links.
2
The sources are variables corresponding to the utterers (nonciateurs) of Anscombre and Ducrot: cf.
among others Nlke (2011, p. 64).

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a POVSTP or hierarchical, when the judgement is made upon one or more different

POVs.
The DE (cf. Nlke, 2006, pp. 147, 149-150; 2013, pp. 26-32) are semantic entities
that can be held responsible for the points of view. They are constructed images of the
discourse referents and relate to the LOC as string puppets to their master, to use Nlkes
efficient metaphor (cf. 2009, p. 23). In ScaPoLine special attention is paid to the
speakers role, whose images can be distinguished as the following basic DE:

the textual locutor (L), i.e. the source of a POV that the speaker had prior to [the]
utterance act, and which is still held (Nlke, 2006, p. 155); L can be constructed
by LOC as a L at another point in time (cf. Nlke, 2013, p. 27);
the utterance locutor (l0), i.e. the source of a POV which is held hic et nunc in the
utterance3; l0 exists only in the present utterance (cf. Nlke, 2013, p. 27);
the locutor of the utterance (lt), i.e. the source of a POV held at the moment of the
utterance construction and who is, in fact, an l0 at a different point in time (cf.
Nlke, 2013, p. 28).

In addition, it is useful to present the represented locutor (RL), a discourse entity

introduced to explain reported speech (cf. Nlke, 2013, p. 52), which is a type of what is
known as external polyphony because of the presence of DE different from the locutors
images (cf. Nlke, 2013, p. 36)4.
Besides the speakers POVs, ScaPoLine also takes into consideration POVs of the
addressee (text addressee [A] and utterance addressee [at]), and of thirds. The latter can
be individuals either textual thirds [T] or utterance thirds [t] as well as collective
entities such as the LAW or an impersonal voice named after the French indefinite
pronoun ON (cf. Nlke, 2013, pp. 30-32)5.
The utterance links (cf. Nlke, 2013, pp. 3335) finally connect the discourse
entities to the points of view. They can be of responsibility, as in an unquestioned
statement, or of non-responsibility, in which case they will be either of refutation, as in a
negation, or of non-refutation, as in indirect speech.
As far as the polyphonic structure is concerned, I shall confine myself to reporting
two principles that apply to it (cf. Nlke, 2006, p. 152): on the one hand, the polyphonic
structure necessarily contains at least one simple POV; on the other hand, the link
between locutor and at least one POV is of responsibility.

The utterance locutor is always responsible for the highest POV in a hierarchical point of view structure.
This is why sentence adverbials, for instance are the utterance locutors responsibility.[] An analogous
difference between the t-locutor and the utterance locutor is that while the POVs of the latter may be shown
(in Wittgensteins sense) [], those of the former can only be said (or narrated). (Nolke 2006, p. 155)
Following Wittgensteins distinction (1969, 4.022 & fol.), this amounts to saying that the POVs of the lt
can always be considered in terms of truth, but not the POVs that are merely shown: as such, they cannot be
subject to discussion.
4
As opposed to external polyphony, internal polyphony takes place when an utterance conveys both the
POV of L and the POV of locutor0.
5
ON is rendered in Nlke (2006, p. 156) as VOX PUBLICA, in Nlke (2011, p. 66) as ONE. In my opinion,
it is better left untranslated, as in Dendale (2006, p. 13), due to the useful semantic ambiguity of the French
pronoun, which can be translated in English into both one and they.

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2.3 Argumentative acts between Pragma-dialectics and ScaPoLine

Starting from the pragma-dialectical understanding of argumentation as a communicative
and interactional complex speech act linked to the (complex) speech act of a standpoint it
means to defend (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; 1984), argumentative acts
stricto sensu are here understood as relational POVs linking standpoint-POVs (=POVSTP)
to argument-POVs (=POVARG)6. The link between the two is part of LOCs construction
and is therefore to be traced back to LOC even if it can apparently be attributed to another
locutors image: in fact, even this image is LOCs creation. In other words, since LOC
decides what elements of the polyphonic configuration to stage and in what way, it is
LOC who is held responsible for the utterance and any argumentative acts occurring
through it (cf. Nlke, 2013, p. 34).
3. ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYSIS
I now suggest an intertwinement of Pragma-dialectics and ScaPoLine by using some
examples from a judgement of the Italian Constitutional Court, specifically number
440/1995, regarding the constitutional legitimacy of art. 724, clause 1, it. Poenal Code, on
blasphemy (it. bestemmia)7. This judgement was a milestone in the development of
religious discourse in Italy, as it meant a shift in the jurisprudence and argumentation of
the Court, resulting in the abolishment of the special treatment reserved for Catholicism
in the punishment of blasphemy. For its intervention in the law, the aforesaid judgement
is regarded in the legal community as a manipulative one (cf. Casuscelli, 2005, p. 4).
The constitutionality issue was raised by the court of Milan. In the motivation of
judgement 440/1995, the final question the Constitutional Court is confronted with is:
Should the norm of article 724, clause 1 it. Poenal Code (religious blasphemy) be
declared unconstitutional? The outcome will of course depend on the answer to the
question: Is the norm constitutionally legitimate? The answer to the latter in turn will be
decided by the courts position on two possible arguments for constitutional illegitimacy
which can be formulated as follows: Is the norm indeterminate according to art. 25 of
the Italian Constitution8? and Is the norm discriminatory according to art. 3 and art. 8 of
the Italian Constitution9? In the argumentation supporting the answer to the latter, the
6

This is not to say that a simple standpoint cannot be endowed with argumentativity in a Ducrotian sense
but to deepen this matter here would go beyond the scope of this contribution.
7
The norm text of art. 724, clause 1, it. Poenal Code reads: Chiunque pubblicamente bestemmia, con
invettive o parole oltraggiose, contro la divinit o i simboli o le persone venerati nella religione dello Stato,
punito con la sanzione amministrativa pecuniaria da euro 51 a euro 309. [The person who publicly utters
blasphemy against the Divinity or Symbols or Persons revered in the state religion shall be punished by a
financial administrative sanction of 51 and up to 309 .]
8
Art. 25 co. 2 Costituzione della Repubblica italiana: Nessuno pu essere punito se non in forza di una
legge che sia entrata in vigore prima del fatto commesso. [No punishment may be inflicted except by
virtue of a law in force at the time the offence was committed.]
9
Art. 3 co. 1 Costituzione: Tutti i cittadini hanno pari dignit sociale e sono eguali davanti alla legge,
senza distinzione di sesso, di razza, di lingua, di religione, di opinioni politiche, di condizioni sociali e
personali. [All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex,
race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions.]
Art. 8 co. 1 Costituzione: Tutte le confessioni religiose sono egualmente libere davanti alla legge. [All
religious denominations are equally free before the law.]

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deciding court raises a further matter, namely: What is the object of legal protection of
the norm?
Concentrating on the judgement part concerning constitutional indetermination,
i.e. chronologically the first matter the court seeks to solve, I will now introduce some
examples to show how, through the identification of the polyphonic configuration, it is
possible to reconstruct the chosen argumentative extracts as critical discussions and
identify polyphonic means specific to single natural languages in this case, Italian.
To this end, I name the various POVs relevant for the reconstruction of the critical
discussion after its four stages. Therefore, the standpoints from which the discussion
starts in the confrontation stage will be POVCONF(i) and POVCONF(ii). The various speech
acts that can take place in the opening stage are abstractly represented as POVOP. The
arguments in support of POVCONF(i) and POVCONF(ii) shall be POVARG(i) and POVARG(ii). If
an argument becomes, in turn, a standpoint, it shall be marked as such as well
(POVARG/STP). Different numeration systems are given to different argumentation
structures (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 86-92): 1, 2, 3 for subordinate
argumentation, i.e. when argumentation is made of various arguments supporting each
other and finally the standpoint; i, ii, iii for multiple and coordinate argumentation, i.e.
respectively when multiple arguments support the standpoint independently from each
other and when they function jointly. The latter joint function is signalled by an
ampersand. The conclusive speech act will be named POVCONC. The integrated model
proposed can be outlined as in Tab. 1:

The judgement upon the propositional content of a POV shall be given in the analytical
tables of the following paragraphs through the explicitly verbalised markers found in the
text. Otherwise, a judgement of truth is to be assumed, according to the ScaPoLine
principles.
3.1 Confrontation Stage coded through REPORTED-DUBITATIVE SPEECH
In the first example, the confrontation stage of a critical discussion is rendered through
the polyphonic use of reported-dubitative speech. On a macrolevel, example (1) stems
from the confrontation stage in which the court of Milan puts forward a standpoint as to
the indetermination of the contested measure.10 This standpoint of the court of Milan is
10

It is to note that, although the standpoint the norm is indeterminate will ultimately be refuted by the
Constitutional Court, the argumentation in its support is given in great detail. Since the LOC holds the
power to present the referents by constructing the images at will, there must be a reason why LOC indulges
in this long construction of a complex critical discussion even though in the end it doesnt revolve around
the question that will be decisive in the constitutionality matter (i.e. its discriminatory nature). One of the

129

outlined here as having been said (cf. example (1): si sostiene che) by a RL: Inside this
passage of reported speech, the beginning of a critical discussion is staged in the
italicized utterance in example (1) around the question if the alleged indetermination
stems from specific arguments:
(1)

Si sostiene [] che, poich la norma impugnata sanziona [] chi pubblicamente bestemmia []

contro la Divinit o i Simboli o le Persone venerati nella religione dello Stato, e poich il
Protocollo addizionale dellAccordo di modifica del Concordato lateranense [] prevede
testualmente il venir meno della religione cattolica come sola religione dello Stato italiano, ne
conseguirebbe [] la indeterminatezza della fattispecie penale.
[It is maintained that, since the contested norm sanctions the person who utters blasphemy against
the divinity or the Symbols or Persons revered in the State religion, and since the Supplementary
Protocol to the Modifications Agreement
of the Lateran Concordat provides verbatim that the catholic religion as sole religion of the Italian
State be abolished, it would follow that the legal paradigm is indeterminate.]11

RL puts forward a complex standpoint, constituted by an argumentative POV and marked

as such both by the fact that it is subsequently argued for and by the introductory verbum
putandi sostenere (en. to maintain), while L questions it. This confrontation stage is
carried besides by the assertive verb sostenere, which concerns POVCONF(i) by the
condizionale mood in its present tense, which has here a twofold function:

on the one hand, as condizionale riportivo, it reports a protagonist voice

maintaining that certain arguments follow a certain standpoint (POVCONF(i)) and
on the other hand, it casts doubt upon (and challenges) POVCONF(i) through an
ideal antagonist (condizionale dubitativo) (cf. Patota, 2006, p. 116).

As can be clearly seen in Table 2, we have a complex polyphonic structure in which three
POVs (POVSTP1, POVARG(i)(i) and (POVARG(i)(ii)) that form a coordinate compound
argumentation are related and, in turn, are subject to the judgement of a different source:
L responds to the POV of RL, thus setting off to become the antagonist in the subsequent
argumentation stage: it is noteworthy that L does not question the arguments in defence
of the first standpoint POVSTP1 (the legal paradigm is indeterminate), which arguments
the protagonist RL has already given in POVARG1(i) (blasphemy against the State religion
is punished) & POVARG1(ii) (the State religion was abolished). It is rather the soundness of
the relation between arguments and standpoint, which constitutes a new, hierarchical,
standpoint (POVCONF(i)), that is being challenged in POVCONF(ii). So in one sentence a
potential critical discussion is begun, and then interrupted by another one. The difference
reasons can be found in a long discursive tradition of judicial texts according to which it is first the
arguments and standpoints that will not be accepted that are put forward, only eventually followed by the
voice that set things right. The staging of critical discussions between POVs through reported speech
(which means a partial, selective construction of other voices than the speakers) entails also the possibility
to attribute wrong argumentation to other sources than the image of the LOCs self. On the other hand, the
detailed argumentation attributed to different sources in defence of the standpoint the norm is
indeterminate, which is theoretically accepted as argument for the standpoint the norm is unconstitutional,
means that the reader has the time to get used to the final standpoint of the unconstitutionality of the norm.
11
In this operative translation, I have kept as close as possible to the Italian original even at the cost of the
English grammaticality, if it helped to render the polyphonic means used in Italian.

130

of opinion is thus shifted from the macro-question: Is the norm indeterminate? to a subquestion: Does the indetermination of the norm follow from the given arguments (which
per se constitute common starting points between protagonist and antagonist)?
These POVs can be distributed following the critical discussion scheme of
Pragma-dialectics as in Table 2, in which the role of the condizionale is reported as well:

The condizionale is a typical means for LOC to stage the confrontation stage of a critical
discussion in a monological text, because it implies neither a refutation nor a
responsibility link, but only a non-refutation utterance link between the locutor and the
POV attributed to a third, which is reported. Thus, the reader expects an argumentation
either for or against a standpoint, and there is then room either for the acceptance or the
refutation of said standpoint.
3.2 Confrontation & Concluding Stage through NEGATIVE + DUBITATIVE SPEECH
Example (2) gives an instance of a compound confrontation and concluding stage in the
same utterance. The critical discussion revolves here around the matter expressed in the
final standpoint, placed at the very beginning of the utterance and once more constituted
in turn by a standpoint and arguments subordinately linked to it. For concision, we shall
focus only on the marked part of the extract and operate under the assumption that the
source of the POVCONF(i) and of POVCONC is L.
(2)

N la censura potrebbe superarsi ritenendo che la norma denunciata continui a riguardare la

religione cattolica come confessione religiosa pi diffusa del Paese - mutuando lespressione dalla
sentenza n. 14 del 1973 della Corte costituzionale - poich non verrebbe ora in discussione la ratio
della norma incriminatrice, bens la sua (sopravvenuta) incompatibilit con il principio di
tassativit.
[Neither could the censure be overcome considering the contested norm as still regarding the
catholic religion as the most widespread religion of the country borrowing the expression from
the judgement n. 14 of 1973 by the Constitutional Court for it would not be the ratio of the
incriminating norm that is in question, but rather its incompatibility with the taxativity principle.]

Again, we have the condizionale presente that opens the res dubia carrying two POVs
(POVCONF(i) and POVCONF(ii)) and introduces to the confrontation stage. RL questions
POVCONF(i) in POVCONF(ii) through the condizionale dubitativo. The argumentation stage
follows, signalled by poich.12 This leads to the outcome of the critical discussion,
12

It is noteworthy that the internal argumentation of POVCONF1, namely POVARG1,1/STP2 and POVARG1,2, are
implicitly accepted by the parties as arguments for POVSTP1. Insofar this acceptance is part of the
negotiation of the common starting points in the opening stage.

131

reached in the concluding stage: the refutation of POVCONF(i), which is anticipated at the
very beginning of the sequence condensed in the negative particle n. It is noteworthy
that negation implies a refutation, a non-responsibility link between POVCONF(i) and the
discourse entity linked to it, but that the entire passage of example (2) is actually reported
speech: through reported speech a non-refutation link is built between LOCs image
(which can be traced back to the extralinguistic institution of the Constitutional Court)
and the whole argumentation. This supports the hypothesis that the whole critical
discussions are included in the long motivation of the judgment to slowly lead the
audience towards acquaintance with and acceptance of the final standpoint.
The mentioned stages of the critical discussion can be reconstructed as in Table 3:

The negation is strategically placed at the beginning of the sequence and right before
POVSTP1, thus orienting the audience and anticipating the outcome of the macro-discussion
in the end the censure cannot, indeed, be overcome, as the Constitutional Court will
decide: the norm is (if only partly) unconstitutional. Of course, a concluding stage stricto
sensu cannot take place in a monological text, but this is in fact also part of the strategic
manoeuvring: the arguments are staged as if an actual discussion was taking place, where
the interlocutor can explicitly accept or refute a standpoint in the end.
3.4 Argumentation Stage through QUOTED SPEECH
In example (3) the argumentation stage is conveyed by a quotation. The voice quoted is
that of the Constitutional Court at another point in time:
(3)

A sostegno della censura, nellordinanza si riportano brani di precedenti pronunce di questa Corte
che sono consistiti in espressi inviti al legislatore, non ancora accolti, per una revisione della
disciplina in vista dellattuazione del principio costituzionale della libert di religione ), dal
momento che la limitazione della previsione legislativa alle offese contro la religione cattolica
non pu continuare a giustificarsi con lappartenenza ad essa della quasi totalit dei cittadini
italiani.
[In support of the censure, the order reports passages of former rulings by this Court, which
consisted in explicit requests addressed to the legislator to revision the discipline [], since the
limitation of the legal prevision to the offences against catholic religion can not continue to be
justified with the fact that virtually the entirety of the Italian citizens is religiously affiliated to it.]

132

In POVCONF(i) it is maintained by a RL that the norm must be censured. POVCONF(i) is not

explicitly challenged, but reveals itself as the final standpoint of the passage at the
beginning of the argumentation stage, which involves arguments for an implicit
POVCONF(ii) of another RL maintaining the contrary of POVCONF(i). In POVSTP1/ARG(i)1 the
argument for POVCONF(i) is that the legislator should revision the discipline; at the same
time, this is a standpoint supported by a subordinate argument: the complex POV STP1/ARG(i)2,
according to which the argumentative POVARG(ii)1 justifying the limitation of the legal
prevision to the offences against Catholicism (POVSTP1/ARG(ii)1) with the well-known (ON)
affiliation to it of the majority of Italians (POVARG(ii)2) and altogether supporting the
implicit POVCONF(ii) (the norm must not be censured) is not justified.
Quoted reported speech is used here for accepting and not for refuting a
standpoint, as is attested to by the fact that it is syntactically integrated in the speech of
the hierarchically superior locutor, without inquit, which implies sticking to the
epistemically assertive indicative. Interestingly enough, the quoted utterance is presented
here as an argument for the critical discussion attributed to the Court of Milan, whose
standpoint will be refuted, as seen. But it is also a decisive argument for the final
declaration of unconstitutionality and it is strategically already reported at the beginning
of the judgment, functioning as a material starting point.
Table 4 can serve as a reconstruction of the critical discussion stage:

Direct speech, which implies the construction of the locutors representation with all its
locutors properties, as a mimed LOC (cf. Nlke, 2013, p. 56), is only used for two
discourse entities in the analysed judgement: the third-person-DE LAW (which in this
judicial text is to be taken as a stricto sensu reference; e.g. POVSTP1/ARG(ii)1) and the images
of the locutor at a given moment in the past. These voices are thus integrated in the
utterance supporting the point of view of the utterance locutor. This strategy is applied
throughout the judgement and it is particularly evident how it is meant to support the final
decision of unconstitutionality when the DE involved is an image of the same
extralinguistic subject instantiating the decision of judgement 440/1995: in fact, the new
decision is staged as not so new after all, given that the voices of the same referent in the
past back it up.

133

4. CONCLUDING
In summary, I believe that the integration of the polyphonic approach into the pragmadialectical can enrich the latter with an analysis apparatus that allows going beyond the
universal perspective inherent to the pragma-dialectical approach. The polyphonic theory
suggested here can in fact help to identify antagonistic voices coded in one and the same
utterance as well as stages of an ideal critical discussion coexisting in one and the same
utterance and this while showing the specific linguistic means responsible for such
phenomena, which may differ in various natural languages. Moreover, a systematic
application of the ScaPoLine to a discursive tradition can highlight the patterns of
strategic manoeuvring polyphony used: in the judgement taken into consideration in the
present paper, polyphony could be identified as a manoeuvring by means of
presentational devices, but other aspects of strategic manoeuvring are still to be taken into
consideration through further research.

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135

Evolutionary Arguments In The Birth Control Debate: Casuistic

Shifting In Conservative Rhetoric
Emma Frances Bloomfield & Kari Storla
Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California 90089
ebloomfi@usc.edu, storla@usc.edu

ABSTRACT: We use dramatism to explore the birth control controversy and how it complicates conservative
agent-focused arguments. Conservatives borrow from evolutionary discourse and argue that females are not
agents. They are agents-minus that are irrational and subordinate to the scene. To remain loyal to underlying
religious values, conservatives situationally abandon, rather than permanently stretch, their focus on the agent.
This casuistic shifting enables conservatives to undermine female agency while remaining within their
idealistic framework.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, birth control, Burke, casuistic shifting, conservative rhetoric, gender, human
origins, rhetoric, War on Women

1. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled on Burwell v Hobby Lobby and decided on
whether for-profit companies would be required to cover birth control on health insurance
plans under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Part of the argument against this mandate is
that offering birth control as a preventative measure is seen as tantamount to supporting
abortion and thus violates the owners religious beliefs. Hobby Lobby founder David Green,
the plaintiff in the Supreme Court case, said, These abortion-causing pills go against our
faith, and our family is now being forced to choose between following the laws of the land
that we love or maintaining the religious beliefs that have made our business successful and
supported our family and thousands of our employees and their families (Rovner, 2014,
para. 14).
The Supreme Court ruled that Hobby Lobby and other privately held companies
claiming religious exemption do not have to cover employee birth control costs. This ruling
appealed to the free exercise clause and stated that the fines levied on businesses that would
not provide coverage for contraceptives would be a substantial burden on business owners
(Schwartz, 2014, para. 2). No matter the medical purpose for which it might be used, birth
control will now become more expensive for some females whose employers can opt out of
covering birth control without punitive government measures. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg,
in her dissent, noted that females will now experience the burden of cost barriers operated
to block many women from obtaining needed care (Ohlheiser, 2014, p. 3-4). The Supreme
Court ruled that it is worse to constrain the choices of business owners (to deny birth control
on religious grounds) than to constrain the ability of females (to access birth control).
In general, conservatives were in favor of the Hobby Lobby decision. But, in
favoring the outcome, conservatives had to rhetorically establish the humanness of
businesses and the non-humanness of females. Arguments that undermine individual agency
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are not often the territory of conservatives. Instead, conservative arguments about
economics, political advocacy, and social issues such as gay marriage, often advocate
unconstrained, individual choice. People can pull themselves up by their bootstraps, support
themselves without government intervention, and choose their sexuality (Cloud, 1996;
Brummett, 1979). Conservatives are more likely than liberals to use agent-focused
arguments that produce responsibility and culpability for the individual without a concern
for mitigating circumstances (Bloomfield & Sangalang, forthcoming). Conservative rhetoric
is often linked to idealism, the power of the mind, and the unwavering support for political
independence (Brock, 1990).
Birth control arguments are inherently complicated for conservatives, because they
prompt a shift in rhetorical emphasis away from the agent. Glorifying the power of the
female as an agent with the power to control her own body would be to support access to
birth control. Some conservative rhetoric has abandoned the argumentative resource of the
agent and has instead shifted to a scenic focus. Emphasizing the scene links to the ideology
of materialism that undermines the power of the agent and reduces them to an agent-minus
status (Brock, 1990).
This seemingly contradictory shift can be illuminated through Burkes pentad. The
pentad is a useful heuristic tool for mapping how various emphases inform arguments and
ideologies. Burke (1945/1969) argued that the way people use language and the parts of the
pentad they emphasize, reveal underlying loyalties to a subtle, personal test of propriety
(p. 237). Abandoning a certain focus challenges the common stake in some unifying
attitude of the person (Burke, 1945/1969, p. 237). Pentadic ratios are difficult to change as
this change represents a large effort to adjust ones worldview (Burke, 1945/1969; Brummett
1979). Brummett (1979) argued that, Life makes sense for most of us as we repeatedly
explain experience to ourselves and others with one term or ratio (p. 252). When new
information challenges this guiding ratio, the entire framework is questioned. If the new
information is accepted and incorporated, a new identity is formed by its inclusion in a new
and adjusted guiding framework.
Although this shift may seem contradictory when considering associations between
conservatives and idealism, this inquiry argues that an overarching commitment to certain
values can trump loyalty to argumentative resources. This temporary shift is only reflective
of a deeper need to remain loyal to religious and moral ideologies. Furthermore, the brief
borrowing of scenic language is not meant to remove females from responsibility. Scenic
language, then, is only used as a temporary argumentative tactic as opposed to representing a
stretching of the conservative framework and worldview. The rhetorical adjustment within
the birth control controversy challenges the universal applicability of casuistic stretching and
prompts further inquiry into this unique rhetorical situation. We propose the term casuistic
shifting to reflect the only temporary incorporation of new information that does not stretch
or permanently adjust a framework. Casuistic shifting serves a starting point to explore the
nuances of contemporary, polarized argument where new orientations are rejected and
abandoned as quickly as they are adopted.
A series of proposed laws and vitriolic statements from conservative politicians, a
few of which will be discussed in further detail, have prompted the phrase, The War on
Women (ACLU 2014; Rosenthal, 2012). This phrase represents a prominent and ongoing
struggle to argue for womens rights against a changing, argumentative community. The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (2014) defines the War on Women as a phrase that
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describes the legislative and rhetorical attacks on women and womens rights taking place
across the nation (para. 1) In particular, many of these attacks have focused on reproductive
rights and healthcare (Miller, 2012; Rosenthal, 2012), and are often associated with
conservatives. While the phrase War on Women gained considerable cachet in 2012,
neither the idea of a War on Women nor the metaphors used in its arguments are novel; they
are continuations of older struggles for womens rights (Faludi, 1991/2006; Solinger, 2005).
This inquiry employs generalized terms such as conservatives and liberals for the
sake of simplicity, but recognizes that these are not fully generalizable labels. The terms
male and female are used similarly; this is an indication of the ways in which sex is most
commonly discussed in birth control discourse, rather than a reinforcement of sex or gender
binaries or essentialisms. We will analyze prominent conservative statements that serve as
indicators of a trend in conservative rhetoric. These exemplars are not meant to be inclusive
of all conservative rhetoric, but instead highlights of an emerging pattern in the use of
argumentative rhetoric.
These conservative statements will be analyzed using the metaphor of human origins.
The evolution and creationism controversy encompasses themes also present in the birth
control debate: the dichotomy between agent and scene, action and motion, and organism
and machine. Human origins arguments mirror the inclusion or exclusion of religious
influence in the creation and maintenance of human life. Creationism maps easily onto
agent-focused arguments and evolution maps easily onto scene-focused ones (Bloomfield,
forthcoming). This comparison helps us interrogate the difficulty in shifting between
pentadic ratios and their corresponding ideologies.
2. RATIOS IN THE HUMAN ORIGINS CONTROVERSY
When forming arguments to support claims, people will draw from resources that fit within
their guiding ideology and framework. Brummett (1979) argued that ideologies motivate
and guide political rhetoric and give it purpose (p. 251). An ideology thus supplies the
argumentative foundation for the creation and maintenance of a political identity. Choices
made in alignment with this ideology become self-consistent because they influence future
choices through the screen or filter that is created.
Preferencing certain facets of the pentad creates a ratio that determines who or what
should be blamed for the performance of an act. Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (1993) and
Ling (1970) argued that emphasizing a dangerous scene or a wrong place, wrong time
situation undermines the responsibility of the agent for an act. Emphasizing the agent,
however, can heighten the agents complicity and responsibility, such as touting ones food
choices as responsible for ones health (Bloomfield & Sangalang, 2014). Ascribed to
idealism, conservatives tend to draw from the power of the agent to support conservative
claims. Black (1970) argued that these associations are not arbitrary, but instead point to a
beckoning archetype that can be used by a critic to move between ideology and the
language that embodies it (p. 199). Idealist arguments often emerge from conservatives
because they support an overarching framework that syncs with the conservative ideology.
Part of this ideology is informed by the conservative origin narrative or cosmology.
OLeary (1994) argued that a groups cosmology creates proper definitions for the elements
of the pentad (p. 25). Creationism and evolution are cosmologies that reflect emphases on
the agent and the scene, respectively (Bloomfield, forthcoming). A belief in creationism, or
that humans were created in their present form through supernatural intervention,
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emphasizes the individual as divinely inspired and in the image of a deity. People act and
control their environment, which was created for them by God to inhabit, conquer, and use.
Human life is inscribed with ultimate culpability for situations and actions. Conservative
rhetoric tends to pull from this religious origin story, and conservatives are the party most
strongly associated with religious values, the Moral Majority, and religious followers
(Domke & Coe, 2010).
Liberal arguments tend to draw from the scene, emphasize mitigating circumstances,
and support assistance to others. Burke (1945/1969) argued that individuals are reduced to
an agent-minus status where they are never completely removed from their ability to act, but
they are heavily or overwhelming influenced by their environment, circumstances, and
scene. The agent-minus is not a rational being that weighs choices or has a purpose; the
agent-minus instead merely reacts to stimulus and responds to its environment.
Although conservatives share the same pentadic emphases and argumentative
framework of creationists, they abandon those idealist arguments in the birth control
controversy. To remain faithful to the power of the agent that guides their view of economics
or government intervention would be to support female autonomy. For many conservatives,
this violates an underlying religious and moral framework that requires female abstinence
and chastity. Idealist arguments would require conservatives to emphasize the rationality,
autonomy, and decision-making power of females over their environments and bodies. This
is a possibility that conservatives are trying to avoid and thus cannot draw from their
traditional argument resources. Instead, they borrow from evolutionary language that
emphasizes the scene. Females are transformed from being purposefully created and
empowered individuals that are capable of rational decision making to being agents-minus.
Conservatives and the government, then, must protect females by making decisions for them.
Conservatives primarily rely on metaphor to construct the female as a non-agent or
agent-minus. To more fully explore these metaphors, prominent conservative statements will
be analyzed. These metaphors attack and undermine the character of females and their ability
to make decisions about their bodies. They work by changing the female body from being
classified as a human to two other non-human states. Females are constructed into animals or
machines. If females are not humans, then they do not have agent status and are not
complicit in the agent:act ideology typical of conservative rhetoric. Rhetoric, Burke
(1945/1969) argued, stands at the boundaries of contradictions and explores how
definitions, meanings, and symbols are negotiated (p. 19). These two conservative
redefinitions of female as agent-minus reconstruct the notion of what it means to be female,
what females are capable of doing, and whether they can be considered public and political
figures capable of decision making.
3. FEMALES AS AGENT-MINUS
In the narrative of evolution, the scene is the controlling pentadic aspect. An animals
environment determines its action and ultimately, whether it will live or die. The animal
itself does not evolve, but simply responds to its environment, irrationally, and only with the
purpose to survive in order to pass on its genes. The physical environment, the presence or
absence of food and predators, and changes in group dynamics affect the animals mortality
more than the animal itself. This emphasis gives the scene control of the evolutionary
process, which makes evolution purposeless, thoughtless, and random. Creationism,
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however, imparts intelligence and control to the mind over the environment to make rational
and purposeful decisions. Humans can interact with and change their environment.
The language of motion, animality, and evolution has been applied to females
seeking birth control. One aspect of animality is the inability to choose or restrict sexual
partners. In an evolutionary world that is motivated by the proliferation of offspring, the urge
to procreate is a driving force. The libido of animals is focused only towards quantity and
frequency with the purpose of procreation. These themes of animal-like sexuality emerged in
conservative pundit Rush Limbaughs response to Sandra Flukes request for birth control
subsidies at a Congressional hearing. Limbaugh called her a slut 78 times, mimicking the
quantity and frequency of irrational sex: She's having so much sex she cant afford the
contraception (Limbaugh, quoted in Mirkinson, 2012, para. 6). This statement reduced
Fluke, and all females, to their uncontrollable sexual libidos and positioned them as only
interested in casual sex. The adoption of evolutionary language reduced females to animals
that are powerless to their sexual appetites to the point of fiscal irresponsibility.
Limbaughs comment echoes older arguments about birth control. With the
introduction of reliable hormonal birth control methods in the 1960s, females became seen
as seriously deficient choice makers at fault for any unintended pregnancies [because of
their] laziness, stupidity and reluctance (Solinger, 2005, p. 170). Single women, women
of color, and poor women were seen as especially irresponsible and unlikely to make rational
reproductive choices. Often, the only acceptable use of birth control is when males have the
decision-making power.
Conservative arguments that are for birth control under specific circumstances
similarly frame females as animals who cannot rationally decide for themselves. Unlike sex
outside of marriage, sex within marriage is seen by a conditionally pro-birth control
contingent of Catholics as being noble rather than something that is perform[ed] blindly
and instinctively (Foss, 1983, p. 35). Sex within marriage is a choice and human action
rather than an animal motion; for this reason, married couples should be able to choose
contraception since this is a way of exercising their God-given free will. Notably, however,
any decision that could be construed from a Catholic viewpoint as an acceptable use of birth
control is only capable of being made in conjunction with a male. While obviously this subgroup of Catholics is not representative of all conservatives, nor does this take into account
non-married and non-heteronormative couples, it illustrates how males are the ultimate
decision makers and actors, while females are reduced to mere animals and movers.
Females are also framed as non-human machines. On August 20th, 2012,
Representative Todd Akin (R-MO) said, It seems to be, first of all, from what I understand
from doctors, its really rare. If its a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut
the whole thing down (Moore, 2012, para. 3). Akins comment became an exemplar of a
lack of public knowledge about birth control, the female body, and rape. The thinking,
feeling, and acting organism was replaced with the motion of a machine that can shut down
harmful processes. The symbolic system of language was replaced with 0s and 1s, and the
mind was separated from the robotic body. Faced with a legitimate rape, the body simply
reacts and performs motion. Machines cannot think and are only programmed. More
recently, Akin defended his controversial legitimate rape comment, claiming that he was
referring to the connection between stress and fertilization (Marcotte, 2014). This comment
framed the female body as a machine that is programmed to perform in certain ways, for
example:
140

if (rape) {
pregnancy=shut down from stress;
} else {
pregnancy=blessing;
}
This code constructs females as producing output that is the natural consequence of input
they receive, rather than emerging from rational thought.
The metaphor of females as non-human agents-minus focuses on motion instead of
action. Action, for Burke (1945/1969), is the performance of motion inscribed with symbolic
purpose. Only rational agents (or humans) can perform action because they are the only
animals with symbol systems capable of commenting on their existence. If females are
animals or machines, then they are non-communicative and devoid of language. Females,
subsequently, do not have the symbolic capabilities that males have and are therefore
silenced, even in debates where the discussion is about the agency of their own bodies.
Females cannot form arguments, justify themselves, or be capable of verbal or physical
action.
Females were silenced in the precipitating events to Limbaughs comments. The
2012 Congressional hearings on birth control included panels composed entirely of males,
and Fluke was initially denied as a potential participant. The female gender is a defining
identity, whereas males can be fully human and only descriptively male in their status as
political participants (Ray, 2007). Conservative arguments construct females as non-human
animals and machines, who only occupy agent-minus status. Akins legitimate rape
comment argued that females are incapable of deciding whether they were raped or not.
Females may say they were raped but they lack the symbolic capabilities to decide this,
leaving only their bodies motion and response to genetic input as acceptable proof. Females
are stripped of their rational decision-making power because they are re-framed as
sexualized animals and irrational machines.
4. CASUISTIC SHIFTING
Casuistic stretching is a foundational Burkean concept that helps critics interrogate
worldviews, how they change, and the arguments they construct. Applying casuistic
stretching to the birth control controversy, however, misrepresents the incorporation of scene
in conservative arguments. The concept of stretching assumes that the scene will remain a
part of the conservative worldview. It is, of course, impossible to completely separate the
aspects of the pentad (Burke, 1945/1969). However, for conservatives to abandon a focus on
the agent and idealism would be to sacrifice their very identity. The focus on the scene,
therefore, can only be temporary if the conservative party is to remain intact. This is, in part,
why conservatives must emphasize the scene to justify their stance on birth control; they are
also bound to their emphasis on religious and moral values. To remain true to anti-choice
rhetoric is also to deny rational decision-making power to females, resulting in a necessary
shift in argument strategy. The ideology still remains unchallenged and is returned to in
order to justify the overall conservative position on issues.
Despite the use of metaphors that question the agent-status of females, conservatives
have tried to brand themselves as the party for females. Former Republican presidential
nominee Mike Huckabee said:
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Our party stands for the recognition of the equality of women and the capacity of women. Thats not a
war on them. Its a war for them. If the Democrats want to insult the women of America by making
them believe that they are helpless without Uncle Sugar coming in and providing for them a
prescription each month for birth control because they cannot control their libido or their reproductive
system without the help of the government, then so be it. (Blake, 2014, para. 2 & 4)

Huckabee claimed that the conservative party is actually in support of the capacity of
females. This capacity does not extend to the ability to decide about health, however,
illustrating an important nexus of the agent- and scene- focus. Although ascribing females
non-agent status through the repetitive use of metaphors, Huckabee still stands by the
idealist ideology. He asserts that females are equal and capable and argues that it is the
Democrats that undermine their abilities. His quotation reframes the situation so that the
government is providing birth control as a crutch for the uncontrollable, sexual urges of
females. What this reveals, however, is that Huckabee believes that the urges of females are
irrational and uncontrollable; it is because of the Democratic Partys evil that females cannot
control themselves. At first, his words can seem like they bolster females agent-status, but
they still embrace the scenic focus on female irrationality. This quotation represents the
subtle shift back and forth between agent and scene.
While claiming to stand for the equality of women and the capacity of women,
Huckabee is actually denying females agent status. They are portrayed as vulnerable to the
Democrats arguments. The supposed scene of Uncle Sugar handing out birth control pills
is acknowledged, but females are ultimately to blame for their inability to control
themselves. While the scene is what is making them believe that they are helpless, it is not
what is ultimately at fault; females choosing to believe this is. In other words, females
become the agents responsible for the current situation in regards to birth control. They are
agents who are simply making the wrong decisions, rather than non-agents or agent-minuses
who are scenically reduced into being incapable of rational decision making.
Another example of casuistic shifting comes from the recent National Right to Life
Convention. Conservative radio host and speaker Joy Pinto argued that the real War on
Women was not attacks on birth control but was instead birth control itself. According to
Pinto, women have bit the apple and believed the lie that it is acceptable and not
immoral to use contraception. While Pinto acknowledged scenic elements such as the culture
and institutions that promote the lie of birth control, blame is laid on women. Importantly,
Pintos use of the phrase bit the apple (an allusion to the Biblical story of Eves temptation
with the Tree of Knowledge and humanitys subsequent fall from grace) is an important
indicator of a casuistic stretch rather than a casuistic shift. Ultimately, blame still falls on
women, who are incapable of making rational choices. According to both the temptation of
Eve and Pintos account of birth control, females who seek information and equality,
whether from the Tree of Knowledge or from birth control, are at fault for the moral
degradation of the world today.
Conservative rhetoric puts females agent status in flux. It is simultaneously
trumpeted, undermined, forgotten, overshadowed, and blamed in the birth control
controversy. These mixed messages work as a rhetorical strategy themselves by appealing to
various frameworks and their views of the female. They all unite in their support of antichoice policies but interpret the role of females differently. Conservatives have rhetorically
re-defined how females should be considered in terms of their actions, beliefs, and attitudes.
This re-definition crosses ideological lines strategically to polarize the birth control
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controversy. Casuistic shifting is an important contribution to interrogating the polarized

nexus of the current controversy. The need to appeal to fringe opinions and the centers
wavering disloyalty has created new argument strategies that purposefully isolate one
segment of the voting population.
It is not clear, however, that this strategy is isolating the female vote. Though the
gender gap in voting has increased in recent elections (Gender Gap, 2012), there has also
been an increase in visibility of conservative females that oppose the feminist movement.
They are working to redefine what it means to be female and advocate for female issues.
Hosts on Fox & Friends discussed rebranding feminism so that it more closely aligns the
female role with traditional biblical views. Guest Gina Loudon, owner of the conservative
site PolitiChicks, argued that the new feminists:
want less government in their lives, they want to make their own decisions, they want freedom to
choose for their children and their families. Thats what women really want. And they also want real
men. We love real men. (Taibi, 2014, para. 6)

This new phase of updating feminism focuses on equating the struggle for female
empowerment with what is actually a reduction of female choice. Similar to Huckabee, the
host connects female choice with conservative policies. This trumpeting of agency, however,
is only allowed by choosing conservative, traditional, and role-related (e.g., wives and
mothers) aspects of being female.
What these examples share in common is the casuistic shift from agent to scene to
hyper agent. These shifts are temporary and contingent on the needs of a particular
argument. Where a casuistic stretch is a move to a new framework, a casuistic shift is simply
a short-term visit. From the standard conservative starting point of an agent-focused
framework, the shift is made to scenic language so as to attribute females with agent-minus
status. Almost immediately, however, a turn is made which makes females hyper-agents,
responsible for creating that same scene to which they were previously described as being
vulnerable. The offering of choice and agency comes with the baggage of pre-determined
decisions in order for females to be real women. The traditional idealist approach to
arguments, therefore, is inherently laden with removing agent-status from females. This shift
is not applied to other arguments nor does it undermine their ability to claim the language of
the agent. The shift, instead, represents a temporary strategy to appeal to certain segments of
the population that ascribe to the importance of the agent and hold immense and unshakeable
loyalties to anti-choice policies.
Faludi (1996/2001) argued that there is a repeating historical pattern of a retaliation
against women whenever there is a perceived gain in womens rights, which could, in part
explain the perceived need for such an argumentation strategy. In the 1980s and 90s, this
backlash took the form of adopting much of the language of female empowerment but using
it to promote conceptions of women and femininity that ran counter to the message of the
1970s feminist movement. For example, media accounts often portrayed women who tried to
have it all as being unsatisfied and depressed, instead finding themselves happier and more
fulfilled when they stayed at home to take care of their house, husband, and children.
Conservative arguments against birth control follow much of this same pattern. In an
effort to counteract made by the advent of hormonal birth control and its argumentative
sphere, conservatives adopt the language of that argumentative sphere (i.e., they make the
casuistic shift to a more agent-focused argumentative track, allowing that females can have
143

agency). Once they have reversed the gains they see as harmful, however, they quickly shift
away from that tactic and return to their original underlying pentadic framework. In other
words, changing conservative arguments about birth control do not represent a change in
ideology, but rather a desire to return to an earlier time and reverse changes in the world that
have already occurred.
5. CONCLUSION
When she read about the 2012 Congressional birth control hearings, Senator Patty Murray
remarked that attending the hearing:
was like stepping into a time machine and going back 50 years. Its a picture that says a thousand
words, and its one that most women thought was left behind when pictures only came in black and
white. (quoted in Miller, 2012)

While obviously things have changed in that time, the fact is that so many of the arguments
and the metaphors that undermine women remain. Strides have been made in areas of
equality, but the birth control controversy illuminates the ongoing struggle to consider
females as capable of rational decision making. Females are very much still second-class
citizens; institutional structures, similar to racial ones (Cloud, 1996), serve as obstacles to
their realization and consideration as political beings. The birth control controversy provides
evidence for the continuing rhetorical problems of womens rights and female advocacy.
Furthermore, this controversy illuminates an important intersection of argumentation,
rhetoric, and womens studies that echoes long-standing gender divides in America.
Conservative rhetoric makes use of an argumentative strategy that undermines the
agent-status of women despite conservatives idealist ideology. They adopt evolutionary
language and a scenic focus to compare females to animals and machines. In doing so, they
empower other agents, such as the government, to restrict their choices to manageable,
moral, and rational options. Conservatives do not casuistically stretch their idealism to
include the scene permanently. Instead, evolutionary language is used only to displace the
female as a rational decision maker while simultaneously blaming her for those
irrationalities.
The War on Women serves as one example of a casuistic shift in conservative
arguments. Evolutionary language is adopted so as to frame the issue scenically; women are
attacked as being irrational and thus incapable of being agents. There may be other instances
where such a temporary argument strategy results in a shift in ideology rather than a stretch.
In this case, however, casuistic stretching allows us to better account for the apparent
rhetorical inconsistencies in conservative rhetoric. The Hobby Lobby decision has reignited
the attention paid to religious and conservative argumentative strategies in regards to the
birth control controversy, which is an ongoing nexus of deliberation that engages politics,
sexuality, health, gender, and religion. In this deliberation, conservatives have attempted to
lay new deliberative grounds instead of highlighting the power of the agent as is their
traditional strategy, both responding and contributing to political polarization. This
argumentative shift illuminates contemporary rhetorical strategies and how they incorporate
issues of agency and agent-status in issues of gender.

144

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Cognitive Biases And Logical Fallacies

Dmitri Bokmelder
Independent researcher
Irkutsk, Siberia, Russia
bokmelder@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: Cognitive biases indentified in psychology are indications of imperfect reasonableness of

human minds. A person affected by a cognitive bias will reason wrongly without realizing it.
Argumentation theory should take the findings of cognitive psychology into consideration for two main
reasons. First, the biases registered by psychologists will help create a more comprehensive inventory of
fallacious reasoning patterns. Second, some cognitive biases may help explain why a person is reasoning
fallaciously.
KEYWORDS: cognitive biases, fallacious reasoning patterns, psychology, unreasonableness.

1. INTRODUCTION
We know that a speaker may use some of the reasoning patterns called fallacies in order
to manipulate her opponent, or to mislead the audience present at the discussion. For
instance, an illegitimate appeal to the experts status or a straw man can be used as purely
sophistical devices that presumably may help the speaker win the debate. We also know
that a person can reason fallaciously without realizing that shes actually doing so. For
instance, she may be affirming the consequent or using an undistributed middle term in a
syllogism while not realizing that she is, in fact, committing a logical fallacy. In such
cases we usually put it down to poor logic in the reasoner. However, with the help of a
few examples Ill show that some reasoning errors are committed not because the
arguers mind lacks in logic, but because it is abundant in psycho-logic. As the human
mind is a multifaceted structure, our choice of argumentation patterns can be determined
not only by logic or lack of it but also by our psychology. In other words, I want to
argue that if a speaker is reasoning wrongly it may be not because of bad intent, and not
because his logical machine breaks down, but because his psychological machine is in
gear.
Cognitive psychology identifies several dozen cognitive biases, which are
replicable pattern(s) in perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical
interpretation, or what is broadly called irrationality1. (This and other quotations that
describe cognitive biases below are taken from the Wikipedia list of cognitive biases; see
Footnote 2.) I think argumentation scholars should incorporate these findings of cognitive
psychology into their research for several reasons. First, some cognitive biases resonate
well with the logical fallacies argumentation theorists know of, and to no surprise: both
are, in fact, improper reasoning patterns that occur systematically. Moreover, references
to such reasoning patterns as wishful thinking, gamblers fallacy, Texas sharpshooter
1

Although Id prefer the word unreasonableness as I like to preserve the word rationality to talk about
mathematical, abstract thinking which Im not talking about here.

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fallacy, bandwagon effect, and some others can be found both in the lists of cognitive
biases and in the lists of fallacies2. However, logic and psychology look at bad reasoning
from different angles, and even though many cognitive biases are somehow related to the
fallacies we are familiar with, the descriptions of the former can sometimes give a wider
perspective on, and/or a deeper insight into the reasoning patterns argumentation scholars
are accustomed to being aware of.
A second reason why more should be learnt about cognitive biases is that one
must realize that a person may well be expressing a biased view without ever wanting it
to be biased, without even knowing that it is biased. Walton, Reed and Macagno describe
an argumentation scheme called argument from bias (Walton et. al., 2008, pp. 154-169),
but when talking about this scheme the authors seem to use the word bias which is
admittedly an ambiguous word to mean a conscious, intentional bias, as in the phrase
institutional bias, for example. However, if an arguer is affected by a cognitive bias, she
will commit a fallacy unconsciously and unintentionally. I think it is important to
distinguish between appeals to conscious and unconscious bias because a) such appeals
will have different rhetorical functions and b) dialectical evaluation and methods of
criticism of arguments from conscious and unconscious bias will also be different.
Apart from this, learning more about cognitive biases will have some pedagogical
implications. If one goes deep into the subject, she will probably see that it is not enough
to teach her students logic, rhetoric, and dialectic if she wants to make good reasoners of
them. She may want to teach them some cognitive psychology as well. In my opinion,
argumentation theory must join forces with psychology in discovering how judgments are
formed in the human mind.
2. EXAMPLES OF COGNITIVE BIASES CONSONANT WITH LOGICAL
FALLACIES
In this section I will provide several examples of cognitive biases that are consonant with
logical fallacies. Logicians register the Fallacy fallacy when the conclusion of an
argument is claimed to be false on the grounds that the argument in its support is
fallacious. Psychologists, in their turn, register the Belief bias an effect where
someones evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the believability
of the conclusion (see, for example, Stupple et. al., 2011). These two reasoning patterns
are opposites of each other. In other words, they appear to be mirror reflections of one
another. However, psychologists dont know about the Fallacy fallacy while logicians are
unaware of the Belief bias. At the same time, it cant be denied that we often encounter
this fallacious reasoning pattern in everyday communication: This one is a good
argument because it supports the conclusion I endorse. Thus, a piece of knowledge
generated in the field of cognitive psychology can evidently be of use to an
argumentation theorist compiling a list of logical fallacies.
Logicians also know of the cherry-picking (or suppressed evidence) fallacy while
psychologists point out to the Confirmation bias the tendency to search for or interpret
information in a way that confirms ones preconceptions (see, for example, Lewicka,
1998). When an argument critic accuses someone of cherry-picking he means that his
2

For example, compare these two lists from Wikipedia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fallacies

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opponent (or collocutor) intentionally selects the evidence that supports her conclusion
while intentionally ignoring (suppressing) the evidence that contradicts it. (Cherrypicking is a common argumentative tactic among linguists, for example. They put
forward a general claim about some aspect of the language and then give examples of
language use that support this claim. In so doing, they often suppress counterexamples
that would undermine the claim. This argumentative strategy is rightly regarded as a way
of cheating.) However, with the help of some experiments psychologists show that a
person can indeed be selective in providing evidence for a claim without ever knowing
she is being selective. In other words, this person can be honestly in error. The
imperfection of our cognitive apparatus may be causing the errors in our reasoning not
bad intentions.
A few more examples of consonance between cognitive biases and logical
fallacies in even less detail. Theres a bias called Anchoring effect a common
human tendency to rely too heavily, or anchor, on one trait or piece of information
when making decisions (see, for example, Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Theres also a
Halo effect a cognitive bias whereby the perception of one trait (i.e. a characteristic
of a person or object) is influenced by the perception of another trait (or several traits) of
that person or object (see, for example, Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Both of these biases
are related to the part/whole fallacies but they take these patterns of reasoning at a
different angle: rather than explaining their fallaciousness by absence of logic they
explain it by natural presence of psycho-logic in the human mind. Besides, the Anchoring
effect can help account for the persuasiveness of the Outstanding example fallacy.
Thus, knowledge in cognitive psychology may sometimes allow the argumentation
theorist to understand why certain fallacies can be effective persuasive devices.
The Hindsight bias, sometimes called the I-knew-it-all-along effect, the
tendency to see past events as being predictable at the time those events happened (see,
for example, Mazzoni & Vannucci, 2007) is consonant with the Historians fallacy in
the sense that the reasoner relies on the knowledge she has in the present when judging
about events that took place in the past. Stereotyping expecting a member of a group
to have certain characteristics without having actual information about that individual
(see, for example, Judd & Park, 1993) has a lot in common with inductive fallacies such
as hasty generalization. The Projection bias the tendency to unconsciously assume that
others share ones emotional states, thoughts and values (see, for example, Sheppard),
and the False consensus effect the tendency for people to overestimate the degree to
which others agree with them (see, for example, Gilovich, 1990), are both consonant
with, though a bit different from, the Psychologists fallacy. There are other examples of
this kind too, and if argumentation theorists read more about cognitive biases they will be
able to enlarge the existing lists of fallacious reasoning patterns and have a better
understanding of why logically bad reasoning can at times be persuasive.
3. CONSCIOUS vs. UNCONSCIOUS BIAS
In this section I will discuss the differences in rhetorical functions and dialectical roles of
appeals to conscious and unconscious bias that the speakers opponent in a critical
discussion may appear to have. In their monograph Argumentation Schemes Walton,
Reed, and Macagno describe a bias ad hominem scheme that is formalized as follows:
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Premise 1: Person a, the proponent of argument is biased.

Premise 2: Person as bias is a failure to honestly take part in a type of dialog D, that is a part of.
Premise 3: Therefore, a is a morally bad person.
Conclusion: Therefore, should not be given as much credibility as is would have without the
bias (Walton et. al., 2008, p. 338).

When discussing arguments from bias (ibid., pp. 154-169) the authors seem to have in
mind appeals to conscious bias only. It is true that a person may have this kind of bias
her institutional position, social status, or association with a certain group can be making
her reason in a prejudiced way. The following anecdote will serve as an illustration of a
communicative situation where an appeal to conscious bias would be justified, in my
opinion.
Once I was accompanying a Swedish ecologist, Lars, to a meeting with the
Irkutsk aluminium plant administration. They spread on the table for us the wind rose
(wind direction map) for the area, and it quite expectedly showed that the major winds
blew away from the city and, therefore, brought no pollution from the plant to it. When
Lars and I discussed the meeting afterwards, we both were very skeptical about the
trustworthiness of the wind rose wed seen: we knew the plant administrators couldnt
have shown us anything different. We doubted the honesty of our interlocutors. We knew
they could have fabricated the data to deceive us.
Now let us imagine that meeting was held in public. Suppose Lars would say to
the plant bosses: Of course your wind rose shows what it shows: as company
administrators you could never publicly admit that the plant is polluting the air in the
city. For the audience present this utterance would probably constitute a cause to doubt
the administrators sincerity. For the administrators themselves it would probably
constitute a cause for some irritation: they would be angry with the Swede because hes
shaken the audiences trust to them. Such an appeal to bias is of course an ad hominem
argument and without doubt it contains an attack on the opponents moral qualities. I
must note here that Douglas Walton insists that any ad hominem argument must contain a
premise (or a sub-conclusion) arguer a is a morally bad person, because in any of its
disguises this argument is some kind of attack on the opponents personality. I disagree
with this proposition for the reasons given below.
Let us consider a different situation. Imagine that I put forward a hypothesis and
cite some data that confirm it. Suppose now that my collocutor brings forward some
evidence that clearly contradicts my hypothesis. What should my reaction be? Should I
feel angry with him? Not at all! I will realize that because I liked my hypothesis so much,
because I so much wished it to be true, I got blinded by the confirmation bias. So instead
of being angry Ill be grateful to my collocutor because hes rescued me from a
potentially erroneous conclusion. And how would the audience react should they be
present at this exchange? If in the course of a public discussion one of the participants
manages to show that her opponent is unknowingly biased, this should not evoke
suspicions about his moral qualities. Instead, the audience would probably pity the poor
lad, and thus even develop some sympathy to him. Havent you ever felt pity for a
colleague who is wrong but he just cant see it?
Id like to stress that the basic logical structure of arguments from bias will always
be the same, no matter if it is an appeal to conscious or unconscious bias. Such arguments
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will always remain ad hominem arguments showing that the opponents view (or his
argumentation) is one-sided. However, appeals to conscious and unconscious bias are
different in at least three other respects. First, an appeal to conscious bias is a hostile
move in the sense that it is often used to raise suspicions about the opponents sincerity or
honesty. Therefore, formalization of this argument must have arguer a is a morally bad
person as one of the premises. On the other hand, an appeal to unconscious bias is a
friendly move as it doesnt attack the opponents personality. Instead it is an act of
charity because it can save the opponent from an erroneous conclusion by showing that
his psychology is playing a trick on him and making him reason wrongly. Even though
such argument will still be an ad hominem, its formalization should not have arguer a is
a morally bad person among the premises. The second difference is that the addressee of
an appeal to conscious bias will most probably be annoyed with this argument, while the
addressee of an appeal to unconscious bias should be grateful to his interlocutor. The
reaction of the addressee is important to consider because the discussion may take two
drastically different routes: it will probably become antagonistic in the first case and
cooperative in the second. Finally, in a public discussion, appeals to conscious and
unconscious bias will evoke different feelings in the hearts of the audience: it may grow
distrustful to the argument addressee in the first case and sympathetic in the second. It
goes without saying that one has to bear in mind the differences in the rhetorical
functions of different arguments. An appeal to a conscious bias may be instrumental in
winning the discussion while an appeal to a cognitive bias can be helpful in arriving at
the right conclusion as the result of the discussion.
4. CONCLUSION
I think the most important lesson an argumentation scholar can learn by studying
cognitive biases is that the human mind is only imperfectly reasonable. We can be
logical, yes. But at times we can also be psychological. If my reasoning is poor, it may be
not because I lack certain skills or abilities but because my thinking process is distorted
by some inherent, natural features of my mental organization. By pointing out numerous
instances of unreasonable human behavior, cognitive psychology does us all great
service: we now can get rid of our illusions about the maximum achievable amount of
reasonableness in humans.
Reading about cognitive biases will have some pedagogical implications, too. To
make good reasoners of our students it is apparently not enough to teach them logic,
rhetoric, and dialectic. When we talk to them about fallacies, we do it for a clear purpose:
we hope that they will try to avoid bad reasoning patterns when making up their own
arguments, and that they will be able to spot such patterns in the reasoning of others. I
believe we must talk to students about cognitive biases for exactly the same purpose. If a
person is aware that her mental apparatus is liable to malfunctions of certain types, she
will be better armed against falling into traps of her own psychology. Of course, selfreflection is not an easy task and neither is psychological analysis of others. And of
course, cognitive biases are not tangible or measurable things, not even clear-cut notions.
But replicable experiments show that some such biases do exist and knowing about them
will certainly help account for the causes of poor reasoning in some instances. Moreover,
it may help eliminate these causes thus improving the overall quality of reasoning.
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In conclusion Id like to reemphasize why I believe argumentation scholars should take

into consideration the relevant research in cognitive psychology. First of all, we must
remember the fact that the human mind is not only logical but psychological too. Some of
the unreasonable actions people carry out result not from their poor logic but from their
rich psychology. To be frank, Ive always felt that some reasoning patterns described as
informal fallacies are rooted in the human psychology. Take wishful thinking, for
example. In my opinion, it is wrong to say that the utterance I want it to be true,
therefore, it is true lacks logic. It is so transparently anti-logical that the apparatus of
logic is simply inadequate for its interpretation. Instead, a reference to the psychological
side of the human mind can explain how a reasoning pattern so appallingly illogical
may exist at all: it comforts me to think its true, therefore, I will think its true. Or take
the Bandwagon fallacy: Everybody believes it (or does it), therefore, I must believe it (or
do it) too. Thats psychology at work, or herd instinct maybe, but its not a logical
breakdown. If argumentation theorists know more about cognitive biases they will be
better equipped to say why a person is reasoning and behaving wrongly.
Besides, learning about the biases will help compile a more comprehensive
inventory of fallacious reasoning patterns. Some cognitive biases are formalizable in the
same fashion Douglas Walton and some other authors formalize argument schemes. For
instance, the reasoning pattern affected by the Belief bias can be formalized as follows: I
share proposition p that argument A supports; therefore, A is a good argument. The
Anchoring effect can have the following form: Object O has property P; P has positive
(negative) value; therefore, O has positive (negative) value.
Other reasoning schemes affected by cognitive biases are apparently more
difficult to formalize (the Confirmation or the Hindsight bias, for example), but Im sure
theorists can find ways to deal with such instances too. In any case, if they study
cognitive biases and compare them to the fallacies they know, they will have a better
chance to understand how the healthy brain may malfunction.
Of course one shouldnt forget that psychology is a purely argumentative science
in the sense that all the conclusions psychologists make are liable to refutation. Indeed,
when reading about cognitive biases I failed to be convinced by some arguments that I
found. Well, after all, psychologists are liable to the Psychologists fallacy by definition.
Besides, there are controversies among cognitive psychologists about the existence and
classification of many biases just the way there are controversies among argumentation
theorists about the fallacies. So caution must be taken when analyzing what psychology
has to say. At the same time, no-one is in a better position to evaluate the quality of
arguments than scholars of argumentation.

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REFERENCES
Gilovich, T. (1990). Differential construal and the false-consensus effect. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 59 (4), 623634.
Judd, C. M., Park, B. (1993). Definition and assessment of accuracy in social stereotypes. Psychological
Review, 100 (1), 109128.
Lewicka, M. (1998). Confirmation bias: Cognitive error or adaptive strategy of action control? In M. Kofta,
G. Weary & G. Sedek (Eds.), Personal Control in Action: Cognitive and Motivational
Mechanisms (pp. 233255). Springer.
Mazzoni, G., & Vannucci, M. (2007). Hindsight bias, the misinformation effect, and false autobiographical
memories. Social Cognition, 25 (1), 203-220.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alteration of
judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35 (4), 250256.
Sheppard, S. Basic psychological mechanisms: Neurosis and projection. The Heretical Press. Retrieved on
May 03, 2010.
Strack, F., & Mussweiler, T. (1997). Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms of selective
accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73 (3), 437-446.
Stupple, E.J.N., Ball, L. J., Evans, J. St. B. T., & Kamal-Smith, E. (2011). When logic and belief collide:
Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model. Journal of
Cognitive Psychology, 23 (8), 931941.
Walton, D., Reed, C. & Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation schemes. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.

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Reasons Why Arguments And Explanations Are Different

David Botting
Institute for the Philosophy of the New
IFILNOVA, FCSH
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
26-C Av. de Berna
LISBON, PORTUGAL
1069-061
E-mail: davidbotting33@yahoo.co.uk

ABSTRACT: Trudy Govier defends the distinction (elsewhere taken for granted) between arguments and
explanations. I will discuss what making the distinction really amounts to and try to show that the kind of
distinction she wants to make between products (rather than between speech-acts whose distinctness from
each other is uncontroversial) is under-motivated. In particular, I will show that her discussion of Hempel's
covering law model is a terminological muddle.
KEYWORDS: argument, deductivism, explanation, Govier, justification, prediction, Stephen Thomas

1. FOUR AMBIGUITIES IN SETTING THE PROBLEM

In this section I want to narrow down what the distinction between arguments and
explanations would amount to.
One might wonder whether defence is at all necessary, since argument and
explanation are not synonyms and nobody takes them to be such. The issue, rather, is
what the distinction is a distinction between and what notice we need to take of it.
Kasachkoff (1988, p.25) instructively puts it this way:
What we are faced with, then, is a dispute not about whether there is a distinction between
explanations and justifications: a distinction between them is maintained not only by those who . . .
hold that we should analyze explanations and justifications differently, but also by those who claim
that at least for purposes of critical examination and evaluation explanations are NO different
from justifications. What, then, is the point of contention? It is whether the (admitted) distinction
between explanations and justifications provides a reason for treating them differently. . . . . It is
beside the point to argue against holders of this latter position that there is a difference between
explanations and arguments, for their position does not deny this point. It is only the difference
these differences make which it calls into question.

Kasachkoff, like Govier and like most who write on this subject, thinks that the matter is to
be settled by showing that there are different normative constraints on the two things being
evaluated; all that is then required to establish the distinction is an example of something
that is successful as an explanation but unsuccessful as a justification, or vice versa.
Let us break this down a little more. At one extreme, explanations and justifications
have precisely the same criteria of evaluation, that is to say that the same normative
constraints are operative, and so it is not necessary to decide for purposes of critical
examination and evaluation whether a piece of reasoning represents explanation or
justification. Slightly weaker, but still adequate for denying any purpose to making the
distinction, would be the case where explanations and justifications have different criteria
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of evaluation, but these criteria were such that they were co-extensive, that is to say that
they gave the same verdict of goodness or badness irrespective of whether a piece of
reasoning is taken to represent explanation or justification. To put it in terms of reasons, if
the reasons given are always equally successful in providing an explanation and an
argument, then there is no purpose for making the distinction, even if we supposed that the
reasons functioned in different ways in the reasoning.
At the other extreme, explanations and justifications have different criteria of
evaluation, so it is always necessary to make the distinction prior to proper evaluation of
the reasoning. Not only is there no reason to suppose that a piece of reasoning will be good
when evaluated as an explanation because it is good when evaluated as a justification or
vice versa, but in fact this is never true; the criteria are incompatible. This, as indicated, is
an extreme view and not one that I think anybody holds it is not the view of Govier or
Kasachkoff. They hold to a weaker version where the criteria are not incompatible and
thus it is possible in principle for the same reasons to satisfy both sets of criteria. Not only
is it possible in principle but it actually occurs in practice1 there are some questions for
which the same reasons will perform both roles. Nevertheless, if there is some question for
which this is not so, then this is a reason for the claim that explanations and arguments are
different. I will call this the Identity Question.
However, I am not convinced that this is adequate, and I would like to point out
four ambiguities.
Firstly, there is an act-object or process-product ambiguity in the terms
explanation and justification. The acts of explaining and justifying are speech-acts, and
it seems quite possible to follow the lead of McKeon (2013) in taking the distinction to be
between the acts rather than the objects, and then difference in success is explained by the
speech-act of explaining having conditions that the speech-act of justifying does not. Then,
the only thing that counts for evaluation of the object is how well the reasons support the
claim; furthermore, if all reasons-claim relations are deductive or can at least be
represented in some logical system or other, then it is the object as a logical structure that
concerns us normatively and that we need to evaluate. On the other hand, defenders of the
distinction may still claim that there is a distinction between the objects or products
themselves even if these objects have the same logical structure this does not prevent
them from being conceptually distinct, and for this reason from having different norms.
One way of putting this is to say that defenders of the distinction may accept the act-object
distinction yet still defend a distinction between objects as a type-token distinction.2 It is
no small task to determine whether the norms in question are norms for the successful
performance of a speech-act or the goodness of the object.
Secondly, there is an ambiguity in the word argument that motivated my shift to
speaking of justification above. In the logical sense of the word, argument is just an
abstract object, propositions arranged in a particular structure that exhibits logical interrelationships between them, by evaluating which according to well-known canons of logic
1 Wright (2002) describes classes of why-questions where the distinction seems to fade or even vanish
completely.
2 Since he thinks that any distinction must be a structural one, McKeon (2013) fails to appreciate this kind of
defence and much of his discussion is lacking for this reason. Johnson (2000, pp.98-99) rejects a structural
definition of argument for the very reason that it lacks the resources to make the distinction between
argument and explanation that he rather takes for granted it must. So, saying that there is the same structure
is not in itself sufficient for the conclusion that the structures should be evaluated in the same way.
Nevertheless, his proposal that the distinction is one between acts is certainly live.

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we are able to judge whether the argument is good. A piece of reasoning is good if and
only if the reason supports the claim. The goodness of the reasoning can be evaluated by
reconstructing it as an argument and evaluating the argument (by showing that it is valid, if
the argument is deductive). It is another sense of the word argument that seems to be
being distinguished from explanation in this literature. In arguments, premises are stated
in an attempt to prove, or justify, a conclusion, says Govier (1987, p.159). Justification
and proof are then considered to be synonyms for argument in the sense at issue. The
claim that explanations are distinct from arguments is then the claim that explanations are
distinct from justifications.3 As we have already seen, this leaves open the question
whether it is a distinction between products.
Thirdly, I wish to note an ambiguity in the title itself. Govier takes herself to be
giving reasons why arguments and explanations are different, but what kind of whyquestion does she take herself to be responding to? A request for a justification that
arguments and explanations are different or a request for an explanation of why they are
different? Nobody denies that these are different questions, but do they need different
answers? Do the reasons Govier gives serve to answer both questions? If they do, and are
equally good for both purposes, then the topic question of this paper is at least one
instance where, whatever the conceptual distinctions between justifying something and
explaining something, the object we use to argue and explain, that is to say, the reasons we
give are the same. Govier (1987, p.171) allows that after a justification has shown that you
should believe something, sometimes the very same reasons will help you understand why
it is true. Presumably she feels that the chapter under discussion falls into that category.
Fourthly (though not strictly an ambiguity), there is also another question that our
topic question might be confused with, and that is Can an informal logician make the
distinction between an argument and an explanation in a given piece of discourse?
Sometimes they obviously can, for instance, when the speaker begins with Let me
explain: . . ., or is the response to the question Explain why . . . But most of the time it
will not be so simple, for it is only rarely that we explicitly use in discourse the
illocutionary verbs that identify the speech-act that we are performing, and rarely that we
explicitly request an explanation rather than just asking a why-question that is
interpretable as a request for an explanation or for an argument. So let us suppose that the
context of the discourse does not solve this. Also, it is not to be solved by appeal to
specialized knowledge in the domain of which the discourse is a part, for what we have
then is not informal logic but applied epistemology of the particular discipline.4 If an
informal logician can make the distinction between an argument and an explanation for a
given piece of discourse then they must do so by appeal to linguistic indicators that they
find in the discourse itself and perhaps common knowledge that is not domain or
discipline-specific. The question Can a distinction be made in practice? I will call the
Analysis Question. If it cannot be done if the distinction cannot actually be made then
the tenability of the distinction becomes a rather academic exercise. It is important,
therefore, that we should be able to answer yes to this question.

3 This greatly complicates Goviers discussion of Hempel, for Hempel uses argument in the logical sense,
but talks also of prediction in a way that suggests that all predictions are proofs, but does not claim that all
proofs are predictions. Discussion of this point will appear later.
4 Writers like Weinstein and McPeck reject informal logic for this kind of reason, in favour of disciplinespecific epistemology. For discussion see Johnson (2000, pp.260-68 & pp.298-309)

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Before going on to Goviers defence of the distinction, it is worth pointing out that there is
one fairly trivial sense in which all justifications are explanations. When I give my reasons
for thinking that something is true then I am also explaining firstly why I think that it is
true and secondly (often) the normative fact that everybody (or at least everybody who
accepts my premises) should think that it is true. What I am not necessarily doing is
explaining why it is true. Note that in each case the conclusion or explanandum is slightly
different, i.e., p, I believe that p, everybody should believe that p. The reasons are different
too. If I am asked why I believe that q I might answer that I believe that p and I believe
that pq, and that I believe that q must be true if p and pq are true; the logical principle
modus ponens here becomes a principle of rationality telling me what I should believe
given other things I believe. If I am asked why q is true, though, beliefs dont come into it
and I will say only that p and pq are true, and that q must be true if p and pq are true.
2. GOVIERS REASONS: A DEFENCE OF THE DISTINCTION
Govier (1987, p.159) starts by pointing out that linguistic indicators like thus,
therefore, since, and because occur equally in arguments and explanations, and that
some sets of statements are interpretable either way. How does this affect our questions?
It seems we have reason to answer, provisionally at least, negatively to the
Analysis Question; linguistic indicators do not on their own favour interpretation as an
explanation or an argument. If informal logicians are to make the distinction after all (or at
least to make the distinction prior to the evaluation5) then this is only on the provision that
common knowledge has the resources for doing so.
We have reason also to answer negatively to the Identity Question, for whether it is
an explanation or an argument that is requested, any answer that we can give in discourse
will be reasons that are linked together by these kind of indicator words, and unless there is
a semantic difference between these words as they occur in arguments and explanations
i.e., these indicator words are ambiguous then the object that we get out of the discourse
by analysis will be the same both logically and semantically, irrespective of whether it is
analysed as an explanation or as an argument. I can find nowhere that Govier claims that
these words are ambiguous.6 This seems to imply a token-identity between explanations
and justifications, at least in so far as informal logicians are able to determine the token
through analysis of the linguistic indicators. It also implies that it is the product that is in
question, for this is what we can get from analysis of a text. So, the defence of the
distinction depends, as I suggested above that it must, on establishing the necessity of a
type-distinction, which is to say, on establishing different normative standards for the
products.

5 I make this qualification because we will see later Govier evaluate an analysed text as both an argument
and as an explanation, and then using the Principle of Charity to give the text the interpretation under which
it comes out best. For instance, if it comes out as a bad argument when evaluated as an argument but as a
good explanation when evaluated as an explanation, Govier seems prepared to say that it is an explanation
rather than an argument.
6 It seems to me that you might make a case for the therefore of an explanation requiring backing by a
generalization, whereas the therefore of a justification does not. This would be a qualified acceptance of
Hitchcocks thesis that all uses of therefore have this kind of backing as part of their semantics (Hitchcock,
2011) and that therefore is ambiguous after all. Govier does not take this view here.

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Govier next discusses the claim of the deductive-nomological model that all explanations
are arguments, or at least, that it is a particular type of argument in which one premise is a
covering law. There are actually two claims here that Govier might be referring to but
which she fails to distinguish; in fact, the discussion of this issue in the informal logic
literature is something of a terminological muddle. The first is that explanation in the
object sense is an argument in the purely logical sense of the word argument, though
with certain additional logical features that distinguishes them from other arguments; not
every argument, or even every valid argument, can be used as an explanation. The second
is that explanation in the object sense is structurally identical to prediction.
These are quite different claims as the following excerpt from Hempel and
Oppenheim (1948, p.137) shows:
If a proposed explanation is to be sound, its constituents have to satisfy certain conditions of
adequacy, which may be divided into logical and empirical conditions. . . .
I. Logical conditions of adequacy.
(Rl) The explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans; in other words, the
explanandum must be logically deducible from the information contained in the explanans . . .
(R2) The explanans must contain general laws, and these must actually be required for the
derivation of the explanandum. . . .
(R3) The explanans must have empirical content; i.e., it must be capable, at least in principle, of test
by experiment or observation. . . .
II. Empirical condition of adequacy.
(R4) The sentences constituting the explanans must be true. . . .

The appeal to logical deducibility in (R1) has the result that a good deductive-nomological
explanation must be a valid deductive argument, and (R4) has the result that this argument
is also sound. So, a good deductive-nomological explanation just is a sound deductive
argument that also satisfies (R2) and (R3). Hempel would understand All explanations are
arguments as saying only that all explanations are arguments in the logical sense (whether
deductive for deductive-nomological explanation or statistical for inductive-statistical
explanation) that comply with certain additional yet still logical criteria, principally the
subsumption of the conclusion under a covering (universal or statistical) law. This has
nothing yet to do with justifications.
Continuing (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948, p.138):
. . . Let us note here that the same formal analysis, including the four necessary conditions, applies
to scientific prediction as well as to explanation. The difference between the two is of a pragmatic
character. If E is given, i.e., if we know that the phenomenon described by E has occurred, and a
suitable set of statements Cl, C2, . . . , Ck, L1, L2, . . . , Lr, is provided afterwards, we speak of an
explanation of the phenomenon in question. If the latter statements are given and E is derived prior
to the occurrence of the phenomenon it describes, we speak of a prediction. It may be said,
therefore, that an explanation is not fully adequate unless its explanans, if taken account of in time,
could have served as a basis for predicting the phenomenon under consideration. Consequently,
whatever will be said in this article concerning the logical characteristics of explanation or
prediction will be applicable to either, even if only one of them should be mentioned.

This is the second claim referred to above. If we take a prediction that something will
occur as a proof that it will occur (if the explanation is sound), then this seems to be what
Govier wishes to distinguish from an explanation. It is important to note that Hempel does
not deny a pragmatic difference between explanation and prediction; the identity he
proposes is structural it is the same object that is used to explain as to predict, and the

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features that make it a sound explanation when used to explain also make it a sound
prediction when used to predict. Also note that Hempel is explicitly referring here to
scientific prediction. Because the scientific explanation is adequate if and only if the
scientific prediction is adequate or perhaps we might say would have been adequate or
successful if the premises were given and taken account of before the explanandum event
we do not need to make the distinction in order to evaluate them.
An interesting point is that the structural identity thesis can be defended even if we
deny that the structure involved is a logical argument or inference. What underpins the
identity of explanation and prediction is the claim that reasons do not explain unless the
conditional probability of the explanandum being true given the truth of those reasons is
greater than 0.5, i.e., it is more likely to be true than false, and the closer this probability
gets to unity the better the explanation and the more reliably we can predict that the
explanandum event will occur. If it is less than 0.5, then it is not more likely to occur than
not and we would not predict that it would occur. Obviously, deductive entailment is a
limiting case where given the premises the conclusion must be true. Deductive and
statistical arguments represent the relevant modal facts, but it is these facts themselves that
underpin the identity thesis. Mellor (2006), denying that explanations are inferences,
nevertheless endorses the identity thesis on the basis of this probability. However, against
Mellor I would say that what we are attempting is not a conceptual analysis of explanation
but merely a theoretical explication of its normativity; once it is agreed that deductive and
statistical arguments actually can represent the relevant modal facts, that is all we need to
determine whether the explanation and/or prediction is good or not, simply by evaluating
the argument.
It should be obvious that the big question is whether reasons can explain whether
an explanation can be good without making its explanandum more likely than not. This
is an issue that will come up later. Instead, Govier pursues a course that is actually
orthogonal to the structural identity thesis as Hempel proposes it. There is a difference,
Govier says, in the pragmatic direction of an argument (proof/justification/prediction)
and in the direction of the certainty shift.7 She cites Nozick approvingly:
A proof transmits conviction from its premises down to its conclusion, so it must start with premises
(q) for which there is already conviction; otherwise, there will be nothing to transmit. An
explanation, on the other hand, may introduce explanatory hypotheses (q) which are not already
believed, from which to deduce p in explanatory fashion. Success in this explanatory deduction may
lend support and induce belief, previously absent, in the hypothesis. [Nozick (1981, p.14) cited in
Govier (1987, p.162)]

This is odd in a number of ways. For one thing, Nozick is not here denying the structural
identity of a proof and an explanation. Slightly before the excerpted segment, Nozick
(1981, p.13) writes in perfect harmony with Hempel: Even if (deductive) proof and
(deductive) explanation have the same abstract structure . . . the pragmatics of the two
activities differ. For Nozick as for Hempel, there are pragmatic differences, but these are
differences between the two activities and not between the objects, which have the same
structure.

7 It is not just Govier; distinguishing arguments and explanations on pragmatic grounds is the orthodoxy in
informal logic, e.g., Groarke and Tindale (2004, pp.20-24).

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For another thing, Nozick does not say that the conclusion of an explanatory argument
shifts its certainty to the premises of the argument, as Govier seems to think; what shifts
the certainty is the additional fact that the explanatory deduction is successful. It has the
form:
(1)
F
(2)
E is the (best) explanation for F.
Therefore, probably
(3)
E
It is premise (2) that does the work here, and this premise is a comment on the explanatory
argument E, therefore F and not the argument itself or an element thereof. This, Govier
(1987, pp.169-70) says, is an argument, not an explanation. So we do not here have a case
where the explanandum shifts certainty to the explanans.
There is, of course, a sense in which we might say that the truth of a derived
consequence shifts certainty onto the premises it was derived from. Thus, we say that
when a prediction has been confirmed (e.g., by observation) that this also confirms the
explanans or whatever it was derived from. That is to say,
(1)
F
Therefore, probably
(2)
E
might itself be considered an argument in Goviers sense and it is certainly true that we
might give F as a reason for believing E. Clearly this is not an explanation since it is not F
that explains E but the other way round, but nor is it a scientific prediction. Hempel
advocates both the structural identity thesis and confirmation, and is clearly not
inconsistent to do so. All that this shows is that Goviers sense of the term argument is
wider than Hempels sense of the term scientific prediction.
All Goviers talk about pragmatic direction and certainty shifts has actually nothing
at all to do with the structural identity thesis and is orthogonal to the Identity Question; we
could concede these and still claim that the products are identical. What she needs to show
is that the differences that everybody admits to are not simply differences between
activities (Nozick) or speech-acts (McKeon) but actually differences in the products. I
suggested above that she could concede that these products are token-identical, but argue
that we must make a type-distinction between them. Recall that the Identity Question
asked not only whether there was a question for which the same reasons could be given as
an answer, but whether those reasons were equally good for both purposes. Goviers task,
then, is to show that they are not, in general, equally good.
This is getting ahead of ourselves, though. Goviers next attack is on Stephen
Thomas four reasons for abandoning the distinction between arguments and explanations
for pedagogical purposes. Thomas does not deny that there is a distinction, or that informal
logicians can make it, but seems to be saying only that comparatively unskilled informal
logicians cannot make it (hence it should be abandoned for pedagogical purposes). This
is a version of the Analysis Question. More important is his deflationary claim that there is
actually no point in making it, for what we are really evaluating in either case is the

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reasoning involved, i.e., how well the reasons support the conclusion. If this is so then it
amounts to answering negatively to the Identity Question. Thomas uses the term
argument to cover both justifications and explanations simply because they both contain
reasoning (Thomas, 1981, pp.11-14) and it is the reasoning that we seek to evaluate.
Thomass first reason is that sometimes our discourse is explanatory and
justificatory at the same time and on the same interpretation: An argument that x is true
may also constitute an explanation why X is true (Govier, 1987, p.163). According to
Govier, Thomas argues that making a distinction between argument and explanation
amounts to saying that explanation falls outside the scope of what can be evaluated by
logic, and correctly points out that we can claim that explanations are logically evaluable
without assimilating them to justifications. The existence of some discourses that are
explanatory and justificatory at the same time and on the same interpretation is not
sufficient to deny the viability of making a conceptual distinction.
If this is Thomass argument then Goviers response seems valid. But as far as I
can tell Thomas makes no comment on the scope of logic beyond the fact that it is
concerned with reasons and reasoning, and as already noted above he does not deny the
viability of making a conceptual distinction between explanations and justifications. He
only means that we do not need two separate evaluations, since the justificatory discourse
is good if and only if the explanatory discourse is good; there is simply no point in making
the distinction, as far as the informal logician is concerned. We do not have to treat them
differently, to use Kasachkoffs phrase:
. . . [I]n relation to real-life discourses, the distinction between justifications and explanations is
neither sharp nor exclusive. Some discourses cannot be clearly categorized as one or the other, and
many discourses seem to be both an explanation and a justification at the same time. However, this
need not worry the reader of this book, because in either case the word because and its synonyms
are classified as inference-indicator words, and the discourse in which they appear in either case is
counted as an argument. (Thomas, 1991, p.14)

Perhaps also the explanatory discourse need be good only in the trivial sense of explaining
why I think or believe something [mentioned in the first section and in Wright (2002,
p.37)]. If so, Govier is arguing past Thomas. Her point that the distinction is not shown not
to be viable simply by the fact that some discourses are good in both ways is valid, but not
one I think Thomas should be taken as denying. The example of discourses that are good
in both ways is meant to respond to the Analysis Question more than the Identity Question.
It is the difficulty of making the distinction that makes Thomass claim that we do not
need to make it in order to evaluate the reasoning so welcome, and if it were not so
difficult this deflationary claim would serve little purpose. So, all I think that Thomas is
trying to establish here is this difficulty, and Goviers criticisms miss their mark.
Thomass second point is that making the distinction relies on extra-logical factors:
function, social purpose, psychological factors. Again, Thomas (according to Govier) is
assuming that arguments are within the scope of logic and that explanations are not. If the
extension of the term argument is relative to these kinds of factors, then either the scope
of logic is also relative to the same factors (Govier, 1987, p.163) or, perhaps, the same
product is sometimes evaluable and sometimes not.
Goviers (1987, p.164) response, once more, is to challenge Thomass assumption
and allow explanations within the scope of logic: To say that pragmatic factors are
required to apply the distinction between arguments and explanations is quite consistent

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with the sort of account Nozick offers, where beliefs of authors and their audiences are
relevant to the issue of whether the intent is to justify or to explain. Once more, Goviers
invocation of Nozick is inopportune, for we have already seen that for Nozick the
distinction is not between the products but between the activities. The point is whether the
intent to explain imports anything distinctive into its product, or to be a bit more precise,
whether it imports anything that would affect its goodness or is relevant to its evaluation,
into its product.8
Again, I see no evidence that Thomas really does make the assumption Govier
accuses him of making. His main objective, here just as in his first argument, is to raise
problems for answering affirmatively the Analysis Question. But let us suppose that we are
in fact able to make the distinction. The next point is that goodness should not be relative
to these kinds of factors if an argument is good, it cannot become bad just because it is
used for a different social purpose (explaining why its conclusion is true might qualify as
such a purpose) or because the arguer loses faith in its premises. We only ever need to
evaluate the product as an argument, any distinctions being a distinction between functions
and purposes and not between products.
We see again that the issue actually turns on what we are evaluating when we
evaluate arguments and explanations, whether it is the product itself or an act, and, if it is
the product, whether this a distinction we can make on the basis of common knowledge.
This difficulty for the Analysis Question is emphasized in Thomass fourth argument
where he says that pragmatic factors are often not revealed by the text. Again, this is
related to the Analysis Question. Granted there is a distinction of some kind between
argument and explanation (which nobody denies), there is no point trying to make it if it
cannot be made (because of the vagueness of the linguistic indicators) and would make no
difference to its evaluation or goodness even if it could be made.
Thomass third argument is that explanations are regarded as arguments in the
hypothetico-deductive model. Thomas says that this means they can be evaluated by the
same logical criteria because they contain the same reasoning. Govier (1987, p.164)
responds: The idea that logic should encompass the appraisal of the reasoning used in
explanation can be accepted without renouncing the distinction between explanation and
argument. Again, the real issue is what kind of thing this is a distinction between. As said
earlier, if there are different normative criteria for evaluating the products are involved,
then there must be a type-distinction between the products. What Govier needs to show is
that there are some good arguments that are bad explanations and some bad arguments that
are good explanations, and she gives several examples meant to show precisely this.
Her first example is this (Govier, 1987, p.164):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Jones is a liberal.
Jones is fat.
Jones is a bachelor.
Therefore,
Jones is a fat, liberal bachelor.
Therefore,
There are fat, liberal bachelors.

8 Govier writes here almost as if what she means is the acts after all, but this is not open to her since, going
back to the Analysis Question for a moment, whatever it is that we evaluate must be extracted from the
discourse by linguistic indicators and common knowledge, which is to say that it must be a product.

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This is a valid argument that nobody, Govier says, would claim to be a good explanation
it does not answer the question of why there are fat, liberal bachelors (although it does
explain why the one offering the argument thinks that there are).9 Hempel would agree
since it does not meet the requirement (R2) that requires one premise to be a law, and
Govier (1987, p.165) herself says that subsumption under law would provide what is
lacking. Still, it does show what Govier intends to show, namely that not all arguments are
explanations of the same conclusion, and that explanation has criteria that arguments as
such do not. This claim, Govier acknowledges, is trivial and uncontroversial.
Govier (1987, p.165) takes her next example from Salmon:
(1)
(2)

(3)

Doctor Smith has predicted that Susan will catch the measles.
Doctors are almost always correct when they predict that children will catch
the measles.
Therefore,
Susan will catch the measles.

This is a good inductive argument but in no way explains why Susan catches the measles.
However, although I agree that this is a good inductive argument in the logical
sense of the word argument, there is a disanalogy between the relationship between the
premises of this argument and its prediction that Susan will catch the measles and the
relationship between the premises of an argument and its prediction as it occurs in
deductive-nomological, or even inductive-statistical, explanation. In the latter case the
premises are used to make the prediction, and could be said to be that which makes the
prediction. This is not so in the example above it is not (1) and (2) that makes the
prediction that (3). It is Doctor Smith that makes the prediction that (3) as stated by (1)
and (2) then says something about that prediction bearing on its likelihood of being true
(doctors track-record for measles prediction). Thus, it is quite different from the similar
looking:
(1)

(2)

(3)

The measles virus causes measles to occur more often than not in those
exposed to it who have not had measles before or been vaccinated against
measles.
Susan has been exposed to the measles virus and has not had measles before
or been vaccinated against measles.
Therefore,
Susan will catch the measles.

Only the latter argument is a good scientific prediction; the former is not a prediction at all
but a justification of a prediction. Note that both arguments are statistical, but only in the
second is the statistical premise a covering law.

9 One might wonder whether this actually is a good argument, since it simply repeats in its conclusions what
was in the premises and it is precisely these kinds of arguments that Govier is wont to claim are not real
arguments. However, since the premises do seem to be given in an attempt to prove, or justify, a
conclusion in line with Goviers definition, I will not press this issue.

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Consider this argument:

(1)
(2)

(3)

Susan is presenting what looks like Koplik spots.

When children present what looks like Koplik spots they almost always
have the measles.
Therefore,
Susan has the measles.

(2) is a so-called law of co-existence Koplik spots are reliable indicators of measles. But
should we treat this as a covering law, as something that satisfies (R2), or is it more like
the track-record premise in Salmons example? Is it possible to say that Koplik spots make
the prediction in a similar way in which we said this of Doctor Smith in Salmons
argument? Hempel treats causal laws and laws of co-existence on a par, but this
infamously leads to asymmetries where the height of a flagpost is explained by the length
of its shadow and a storm is explained by the fall of barometric pressure in a barometer. It
would take me too far afield to discuss these matters. I only offer the possibility of saying
that laws of co-existence do not explain or predict, but only justify predictions.10
In her next example she notes that in retrodictive inductive arguments facts that are
true now can be used to argue that something occurred in the past but cannot explain it; for
instance, the use of fossilized remains to substantiate claims about our prehistoric past and
the use of archaeological remains to substantiate claims about ancient civilizations
(Govier, 1987, pp.165-66). Govier (1987, p.166) then generalizes this result, claiming that
there are many cases where we have good evidence and reasons for thinking that
something is the case that do not explain why it is the case.
I find this curious. Certainly, when a prediction, or retrodiction for that matter, is
established (because the prediction is validated by observation or because a retrodiction is
corroborated by other independent evidence, for example) then that fact is evidence for the
truth of the premises, but we would not expect it to either explain or predict the premises.
As I have already said, confirmations are not predictions, and this has nothing to do with
the structural identity thesis. We would here be arguing from the conclusion to the
premises, whereas both explanation and prediction argue from the premises to the

10 This is a distinction that is made in Hanson (1959) but applied there, in my view, wrongly, for Hanson
considers all predictions that are made by covering law explanations to be justifications of predictions. The
following might help to identify precisely what is meant when we speak of an argument making a prediction:
One should, strictly speaking, always speak of explanatory and predictive arguments, or explanatory and
predictive uses of the argument-schema, if only to avoid at the outset the objection that some predictions are
not the results of inference and hence have nothing connected with them that could function as explanations
(e.g. the predictions of oracles, clairvoyants, and so on). Whilst in a generic sense a prediction is simply an
assertion about the future, we are here concerned with scientific prediction, and this is essentially bound up
with the idea of an inferential basis, in the sense that a prediction qua assertion must be connected with some
other statements which provide a rational basis for asserting the prediction. (There will obviously be room
for dispute about what constitutes such a rational basis, but this is an overarching problem.) Providing the
point is kept in mind, no harm is done by speaking indifferently of the symmetry of explanatory and
predictive arguments or of uses of an argument-schema or simply of explanation and prediction. (Suchting,
1967, pp.42-43 fn. 5)

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conclusion.11 Perhaps Govier would say that her only point is that we would call this a
good argument but not a good explanation. On these modest terms she succeeds. I would
say only that the type of inductive argument that confirmation theory studies is not one we
would expect to be a good explanation, but is in fact the converse of the explanatory and
predictive relation.
Govier seems aware that she has not actually touched the structural identity thesis,
for she concedes that the Hempelian can accept all these things and would say that it is
only explanations that comply with (R1) to (R3) that are structurally identical to
predictions. In other words, none of these counter-examples really count because they do
not include a law among their premises. If this is so, then all arguments that are good
explanations should be good predictions. However, Govier (1987, pp.166-67) gives an
example to show even this much to be false:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Smith is a Communist sympathizer.

Cuba is a Communist state.
Therefore,
Smiths account of conditions in Cuba is flawed and biased.

As an argument this is fallacious ad hominem, as Thomas concedes, so he should not, if he

thinks that the criteria of evaluation are the same, think that the explanation is good. Yet, if
we consider (3) as an explanandum that is already known, then (1) and (2) provide a very
plausible explanation of that fact. We can see (1), (2) therefore (3) as an inductivestatistical explanation that explains (3) by making it probable.
It is not clear to me that this is a bad argument. For one thing, we normally speak
of ad hominem argumentation when accusations of bias are made regarding the premises
and not, as here, when it is in the conclusion. That Smith is biased is a claim that is either
likely given the premises or it is not; it depends on an unstated statistical premise
concerning the veracity of accounts of Communist states by Communist sympathizers. But
the same unstated premise seems to be tacitly appealed to in the claim that (1), (2)
therefore (3) is a good inductive-statistical explanation (which, in the absence of a
statistical premise is not a statistical argument at all) that explains (3) by making it
probable, but by making it probable it seems that this succeeds to the same extent in
proving that Smith is biased. Even if we do count it as an ad hominem it is not obvious that
it is fallacious, since all that it is really saying is that Smith is likely to say sympathetic
things about Cuba whether they were true or not. The explanation is as good or bad as the
argument.
Smith seems to be a counterpart to Jones. In the Jones example, the argument was
good but the explanation bad. In the Smith example, the argument is (allegedly) bad but
the explanation good. I want to note one thing with regards to the Analysis Question
regarding both of these examples. It is not that Govier makes the distinction between
explanation and argument prior to evaluating the example; no linguistic indicators, no
common knowledge, no empirical data at all seems to favour one interpretation over the
other or is appealed to in making the distinction. In the end it is the Principle of Charity
that makes the distinction. Rather than making a distinction prior to evaluation, Govier
11 Perhaps Govier is still under the confusion over the certainty shift earlier alluded to. McKeon (2013) too
seems to see the whole debate as pivoting on the difference between evidential reasons (confirmations) and
explanatory reasons.

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essentially evaluates the example under both interpretations and then makes the distinction
on the basis of the evaluation, charitably attributing that interpretation under which the
example turns out good. I mention this only as an observation, for I do not think adversely
affects Goviers argument unduly, for we can probably relax the requirement that says that
the distinction must be made prior to the evaluation.
Sometimes we explain something even without making it probable. This means
that explanation can get by with a weaker statistical premise than prediction. To this end
she cites Scrivens well-known paresis example where we explain why somebody got
paresis by pointing to the facts that they had syphilis and that only syphilitics get paresis,
even though it is only a very small percentage of syphilitics that contract paresis and so we
do not make getting paresis probable. Salmon gives a similar argument. These (unlike
Goviers earlier examples) are serious challenges to the structural identity thesis; the
statistical facts involved seem to be very weak evidential reasons to think that something
will happen but good explanatory reasons for why it happened, given that it did.
Hempels response is that this is not a good explanation. Realizing that there will
be cases where what appear to be good explanations will not be such as to have allowed
the prediction of their explanandum event, Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, p.139) say:
Many explanations which are customarily offered, especially in pre-scientific discourse, lack this
predictive character, however. Thus, it may be explained that a car turned over on the road
because one of its tires blew out while the car was travelling at high speed. Clearly, on the basis
of just this information, the accident could not have been predicted, for the explanans provides no
explicit general laws by means of which the prediction might be effected, nor does it state
adequately the antecedent conditions which would be needed for the prediction. . . .
In some cases, incomplete explanatory arguments of the kind here illustrated suppress parts of the
explanans simply as obvious; in other cases, they seem to involve the assumption that while the
missing parts are not obvious, the incomplete explanans could at least, with appropriate effort, be so
supplemented as to make a strict derivation of the explanandum possible. This assumption may be
justifiable in some cases, as when we say that a lump of sugar disappeared because it was put into
hot tea, but it is surely not satisfied in many other cases. Thus, when certain peculiarities in the
work of an artist are explained as outgrowths of a specific type of neurosis, this observation may
contain significant clues, but in general it does not afford a sufficient basis for a potential prediction
of those peculiarities. In cases of this kind, an incomplete explanation may at best be considered as
indicating some positive correlation between the antecedent conditions adduced and the type of
phenomenon to be explained, and as pointing out a direction in which further research might be
carried on in order to complete the explanatory account.

Hempel here seems to be suggesting that such explanations are not really explanations, or
at least not scientific explanation, but are at best incomplete explanations which when
completed would allow the prediction of the explanandum event; being syphilitic does not
explain why someone contracted paresis, and will not until it is explained why some
syphilitics get paresis and others do not. This is a research question that, by considering the
given explanation to be already good, might have been deemed unnecessary. The
appearance of a good explanation is because of the pragmatic reason that it names a
relevant difference that someone who did not already know that it is only syphilitics who
get paresis might find informative indeed, it is essentially Mills Method of Differences.
Also, we see Hempel say that symptoms and indicators do not suffice for a prediction.
In a similar vein, Mellor (2006, pp.232-33) argues that explanation is ambiguous.
Something is an explanatory reason and can be given in response to a request for
explanation as long as it raises the probability of the explanandum events occurring; but
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only if, when conjoined with background knowledge, the probability of the explanandum
events occurring is close to unity can we claim to have a good explanation. Like Hempel,
Mellor seems to be saying that when we cite an explanatory reason this is really elliptical
for a much longer statement that we may or may not know how to complete, but that we
are justified in giving it as a reason and as providing explanation as long as it is positively
statistically correlated with the explanandum.12
Still, maybe Hempel and Mellor are too casual with our linguistic intuitions here,
and later Hempel relaxed the conditions on inductive-statistical explanations in response to
these kinds of objections. However, I wonder whether this really helps Govier, for once it
is raised that the goodness or apparent goodness of an explanation or explanatory reason
depends on pragmatic and contextual factors, the issue of whether these factors are part of
the evaluation of the product is also raised. Pragmatics governs a kind of activity, and not
the product, and the pragmatic goodness of one is not necessarily the rational goodness of
the other, although a good and complete explanation should be good whatever the
pragmatic and contextual factors. Do our linguistic intuitions track the appropriateness of
giving a reason as a speech-act, or the goodness of the resulting product?
Kasachkoff (1988, p.26) cites an example from Thomas: Everybody has needs.
You dont fill mine. So Im splitting. Thomas says that it is unnecessary to decide
whether this is a justification or an explanation because all we need to evaluate is how well
the reasons support the conclusion. Kasachkoff (1988, pp.26-27) disagrees:
If you know that the author of the above discourse is not leaving, an explanation of why she is
leaving would not make any sense; if you know that she is leaving, a proof that she is leaving is
beside the point.
Now, saying that an argument is either beside the point . . . or else that the argument fails to make
sense, is to make an evaluation of its success.

The kind of success that Kasachkoff seems to be referring to here is perlocutionary

success, but this is not a kind of success that can make a proof less good. Suppose that I
prove Pythagorass Theorem to you, and then you tell me that you already knew this. In a
sense my proof was a waste of time, but this does not make it any worse as a proof; it is as
good as it ever was, and cannot become bad because of psychological facts about you. As I
said earlier when discussing Thomas, what should not be relative to pragmatic and
contextual factors is the goodness of arguments and explanations; it is no problem that
where and when the distinction between arguments and explanations is to be drawn is
relative to these factors. Kasachkoffs analysis of this example only seems to reinforce the
thought that the distinction is between speech-acts.
Govier does not seem to realize this issue or provide us means to decide between
these options. This seems to be only exacerbated in the next section where Govier (1987,
p.168) explains why explanation and argument are different: justifying evidence
appropriate for showing that something is the case is not in general appropriate for
explaining why it is the case. Their appropriateness is tied to the different function of the
social processes for which they are typically used. Arguments are used for rational
persuasion, and even when not used this way because the conclusion is not in doubt, this

12 Salmon claims that explanatory reasons can also be negatively correlated with the explanandum; the
condition is instead statistical relevance. Govier does not discuss this, so nor will I.

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does not alter the basic asymmetry between arguments and explanations. But this
asymmetry seems to be between the social processes, not the products.
Given all this, Govier concludes that arguments and explanations are not, in
general, the same. She asks then whether there are particular arguments and particular
explanations that are the same, considers some of Thomass examples, and by examining
the pragmatic direction of each determines whether they are arguments, explanations, or
both. For example, she decides that one of the examples13 is an argument because it does
not seem plausible to suppose that the audience knows its conclusion in advance of being
given the argument. She then notes that, once this conclusion has been established, the
very same argument does explain why the conclusion is true:
The very same claims show both that the conclusion is true and why it is true. The same passage
constitutes both argument (justification) and explanation, as Thomas maintained. This can happen
because the justifying premises are also statements that are appropriate to explain the fact that is in
the conclusion. The audience would, however, have to be convinced of the truth of the conclusion
before an explanation as to why it was true would seem necessary. (Govier, 1987, p.171)

Here she concedes, as we noted in section 1, that there are occasions where argument and
explanation are at least token-identical and which are equally good as arguments and as
explanations. This is, of course, quite consistent with their criteria of evaluation being
different; it is simply that the same reasons can satisfy both sets of criteria. In
consequence, it is also consistent with there being a conceptual distinction between
arguments and explanations, which depends on there being different criteria.
Another of Thomass examples gives convergent reasons for the conclusion. Here
too, she allows that these reasons can also be good explanatory reasons, albeit the
explanation is not a deductive-nomological one. These concessions, she notes quite
correctly, only shows that these passages are good by the criteria of both explanation and
argument and not that these criteria are the same. In fact, they cannot be the same, for then
this would follow for all passages and it would be impossible for there to be good
arguments that are bad explanations and vice versa (Govier, 1987, pp.172-73). We see that
Govier does not propose the kind of extreme view that denies that any good arguments can
also be good explanations, or vice versa.
In her final section, Govier notes that we do make this distinction in real life.
Sometimes when we ask why or somebody asks us why, we consider a justification to be
the appropriate response, and sometimes we consider a justification to be beside the point
or to involve a misunderstanding of the question and it is an explanation that is called for.
What we consider the response to be will affect how we consider it, and this includes the
addition of missing premises. She gives the example of someone saying that he believes in
God because he learnt religion at his mothers knee. Is this because explanatory or
justificatory? We can add in a missing premise on either interpretation:
(REASON) I learned religion at my mothers knee.
(MISSING EXPLANATION) People usually persist in believing those things that they
learn at their mothers knee. That is (the cause) why I believe God exists.
(MISSING ARGUMENT) Most of what people learn at their mothers knee is true.
Therefore, (probably) God exists.
13 This is example B (Govier, 1987, p.170).

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Govier (1987, 174) suggests that this works better as an explanation and that in most
contexts it makes little sense to ask for a justification.
Note that this is not an explanation of why something is true but of why the speaker
believes it, which we have already said is a trivial sense of explanation and certainly not
the one pertinent to Hempel. Note also that construed as an argument it is not a prediction
but a justification of a prediction. So, this is not a counter-example to the structural identity
thesis, firstly because it is neither a real explanation nor a real argument in the senses
discussed, and also because, anyway, the structures are different, since there are different
conclusions, and consequently (it should come as no surprise) different missing premises
that we need to add to complete these enthymemes. What is slightly more surprising is that
even after completed in the most charitable way possible the explanation of why the
speaker believes something still seems that much more plausible than the justification.
This is an illusion, however. Supposing that the statistical claim made in MISSING
ARGUMENT is true the justification does confer a high probability on Gods existence
(relative to the given grounds) and is, for this reason, a good argument; the reason it
appears not to be is because of information that we know (about the unreliability of certain
classes of truth-claims) but that is not including among the premises. This is just the nonmonotonicity of statistical arguments and what Hempel calls the structural ambiguity of
inductive-statistical explanations; what is highly probable relative to one set of premises
may be highly improbable relative to another set of premises, even when this second set of
premises has been produced simply by adding a further premise to those already present.
As in the Communist sympathizer example, the appearance of being a bad argument is
deceiving.
Govier (1987, p.174) concludes:
Noting how the inserted material differs in these cases and how the conclusion of the argument
differs from the statement of the explanandum, we can see that the argument/explanation distinction
retains considerable epistemic and practical significance. The force of why questions and
because answers varies, depending on whether we deal with a request for an explanation or a
justification. Different claims are differently relevant, and different standards of success apply. To
be sure, reasoning is used both in explanations and in arguments. Without the full context, some
responses could be taken as either one or the other. Nevertheless, the distinction retains its
pragmatic significance, and the pragmatics of the matter are related to our logical and epistemic
appraisal of the result.

But here the inserted material is different simply because the conclusions are different. It is
true that we can respond to some requests for justifications with confirmations and
justifications of predictions, and these are not identical to explanations. But the only
genuine explanations that may not, perhaps, be genuine justifications, are those whose
statistical premises do not confer high likelihood on their conclusions. This is an old point
that Govier has nothing original to add to; everything else she says fails to make the
distinction as a distinction between objects.
3. CONCLUSION
What do we mean when we say that explanations and arguments are different? As
Kasachkoff says, nobody denies this. Nobody denies that the intention to explain and the
intention to justify are different intentions. Since communicative intentions are related to

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the illocutionary force, the distinctness of the speech-acts of explaining and justifying are
also different, as all must agree. All can agree also that they have different perlocutionary
effects: understanding in the case of explanation, justified belief in the case of justifying.
All can also agree that understanding has different conditions to justified belief; to
understand why something is so is not only to have a justified belief that it is so but also,
plausibly, to grasp the modal fact that it must be so, given other conditions. If any
normative difference between the speech-acts comes down to a difference in conditions of
perlocutionary success, then it seems as if all good explanations should provide good
reasons for believing that the explanandum is true and that it must be true. Consequently,
all good explanations would be good arguments, although not all good arguments would
be good explanations.
Furthermore, there would be no need to make the distinction between explanations
and arguments, for whatever claims (including the modal claims) are made, the reasons
would either support those claims or not, and this is a matter of logically evaluating the
product. As Thomas says, for the purposes of evaluating the reasoning we would need only
to establish whether the reasons support the claim or not, and would not need to make the
distinction between the products of explanation and justification, but only if at all between
the acts when, using charity (often post-evaluation, as we have seen), we attribute
communicative intentions to the arguers.
When we say that there is a distinction between explanations and arguments, and
that it is a (type-) distinction between the objects rather than the acts, this can only be
because there are good explanations that are not good arguments. All of the talk about
pragmatic directions and certainty shifts is quite compatible with the distinction being
between acts and is thereby irrelevant for evaluating the goodness of the reasoning
involved; both Nozick and Hempel concede that there is this difference without conceding
that it is a difference between the products. Another red herring is the fact that we often
cite evidence as our reasons for believing something but this evidence does not explain
why something is so. This is obviously true, but shows only that observing that something
is so is not to observe that it must be so.
However, if we conjoin our evidence with a law (even a law of co-existence) to
argue for another particular statement, then this would justify belief in the modal claim
involved. In this case, arguments that satisfy Hempels (R1) to (R3) would be
explanations, and would be good explanations to the extent that they justified the modal
claim, i.e., to the extent that the law confers a high conditional probability. It is because of
this high probability that there is an identity of explanation and prediction, and not because
explanation has a particular logical form; we can claim a structural identity even without
committing to any particular type of structure.
If Hitchcock (2011) is right, then this is so for all arguments after all, since
according to him the semantics of therefore wherever it appears contains implicit
reference to a generalization that backs counterfactuals, which seems near enough to a law
as to make no difference. However, I am not sure that Hitchcock is right about this, and
this is not the place to argue the issue. I say only that if you want to explain not only why
you do believe something but the normative fact that you should, you need some kind of
law to support the modality involved. I would not like to say, and nor would Hempel, that
all arguments obey (R1) to (R3). It is no problem in making a distinction between
explanations and arguments that do not obey (R1) to (R3), since we can make a distinction
between arguments that do and arguments that do not obey (R1) to (R3). I think we can

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agree with Govier that there is this distinction, and several of her examples illustrate it, but
this distinction is not a pragmatic distinction at all but a logical distinction, (R1) to (R3)
being logical conditions. The interesting and controversial question is whether it is
worthwhile, in Kasachkoffs sense of meaning that we have to treat them differently,
distinguishing between explanations and arguments that do obey (R1) to (R3).
Saying that there are good explanations that are not good arguments turns out to be
tantamount to saying that there are reasons that are good explanations but do not confer a
high probability on the outcome. It should be noted that this applies to statistical-inductive
explanation only and consequently does not affect the claim that all good deductivenomological explanations are good predictions, and it should be noted also that it is
deductive-nomological explanations that Nozick (1981, p.13) refers to in the excerpt
previously mentioned. This is a very old point made by Scriven in his famous paresis
example and which is appealed to by Govier.14 It is typically conceded that there is a pretheoretical intuition that we explain paresis in a patient by giving as a reason that he had
untreated syphilis. The problem is what exactly to do with this intuition. In his early
responses to Scriven, Hempel explained away this intuition on pragmatic grounds, while
Mellor does the same on semantic grounds. Scriven and Govier take the intuition at facevalue as a counter-example to the covering law model. But by doing this they seem to
concede that the goodness of an explanation depends on the kind of pragmatic and
psychological factors that Thomas says should not enter into the evaluation, and perhaps
cannot be gotten by analysis of the discourse given the resources the informal logician has
at his disposal. My feeling is that it makes sense to talk of the goodness (i.e., felicity) of a
speech-act as depending on such factors, but less plausible to talk of the goodness of the
product as depending on such factors; Goviers appeal to Nozick for help only hinders her
in showing the distinction to be a type-token distinction rather than (or as well as) an actobject distinction.
What is the result of all this? For all that Govier says, the distinction between
explanation and argument is a distinction between the speech-acts and does not need to be
made if the argument is as Hempel describes it. Nobody denies that these acts are different.
Therefore, I think the burden of proof is on the defenders of the distinction to show that the
distinction is to be made in the place and in the way that they make it. I do not think they
have met this burden of proof. Equally, I do not pretend to have proved that the only
distinction is between the acts or that it is impossible to make a type-token distinction in
the products. As I pointed out at the outset, it is extremely difficult to know how to decide

14 Another example put to me when I presented this paper is the following: we can explain why Usain Bolt
is the best sprinter on the grounds that he has the best genetic endowment, the best training, etc. But we have
not justified the claim that he is the best sprinter, for which we need to appeal to the races he has won, etc.
Without this, it might be thought, we can say that he is a good sprinter, but not that he is the best; it is a
different set of facts that we need to appeal to in order to warrant use of the evaluative term best.
Do we explain why Usain Bolt is the best sprinter on the grounds of having the best genetic endowment etc.?
Only, I think, by appeal to the statistical premise that those who have the best genetic endowment etc. will be
the best sprinter. This is disguised in the current case because best in best genetic endowment simply
means genetic endowment most conducive to being the best sprinter. With the addition of this statistical
premise, the same reasons do also justify the claim that he is the best sprinter. It is true that we can give
reasons for him being the best sprinter that do not appeal to such things but only to, e.g., the races he has run,
and these reasons will not explain why he is the best. But such reasons amount to inductive confirmations
that he is the best sprinter, and I have said that confirmations are distinct from explanations and
justifications. All these distinctions are logical distinctions.

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between them. Hempel does not deny these pragmatic factors, but mentions them himself
they reflect different ways we may use an argument.
Has Govier succeeded in giving reasons why explanation and argument are
different? I dont think so. She does not succeed in persuading me to believe that there is
the kind of difference that she wants to endorse, for everything that she says is compatible
with and can be explained by a distinction between the acts that everybody already
accepts. For the same reason, she does not succeed in explaining why they are different,
for all the differences she names could be differences between the acts. And if the
differences between the objects are simply differences between different kinds of
arguments between those that do and those that do not satisfy (R2) and (R3) then it is
not very interesting, for we are still evaluating the explanation as the kind of argument that
it is. It is not a distinction that means that we have to treat them differently. At most, she
succeeds in telling us what some of the differences are, not what they are differences
between, or, in the interesting cases, what differences the differences make.

REFERENCES
Govier, Trudy. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris Publications
Groarke, Leo and Tindale, Christopher. (2004). Good reasoning matters! 3rd edition. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press
Hanson, Norwood Russell. (1959). On the symmetry between explanation and prediction. The Philosophical
Review, 68 (3), 349-358
Hempel, Carl G. and Oppenheim, Paul. (1948). Studies in the logic of explanation. Philosophy of Science, 15
(2), 135-175
Hitchcock, David. (2011). Inference claims. Informal Logic, 31 (3), 191-228
Johnson, Ralph. (2000). Manifest rationality: a pragmatic theory of argument. Mahwah, New Jersey:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Kasachkoff, Tziporah. (1988). Explaining and justifying. Informal Logic, 10 (1), 21-30
McKeon, Matthew W. (2013). On the rationale for distinguishing arguments from explanations.
Argumentation, 27 (3), 283-303
Nozick, Robert. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Suchting, W. A. (1967). Deductive explanation and prediction revisited. Philosophy of Science, 34 (1), 41-52
Thomas, Stephen N. (1981). Practical reasoning in natural language 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall
Wright, Larry. (2002). Reasoning and explaining. Argumentation, 16 (1), 33-46

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A Study Of Undergraduate And Graduate Students' Argumentation

In Learning Contexts Of Higher Education
Antonio Bova
Department of Psychology
Utrecht University
Netherlands
A.Bova@uu.nl

ABSTRACT: This study sets out to examine to what extent the arguments used by undergraduate and
graduate students refer to scientific notions and theories related to the discipline taught in the course. The
results of this study indicate that only graduate students advance arguments that refer to scientific notions
and theories strictly or somehow related to the discipline taught in the course, whereas undergraduate
students typically advance arguments based on common-sense knowledge and previous personal
experience.
KEYWORDS: Argumentative Strategies, Higher Education, Pragma-Dialectical Approach, Qualitative
Research, Student-Teacher Interaction

1. INTRODUCTION
In the learning contexts, argumentation is not a heated exchange between rivals that
results in winners and losers, or an effort to reach a mutually beneficial compromise;
rather it is a form of logical discourse whose goal is to tease out the relationship between
ideas and evidence (Duschl et al., 2007, p. 33). Argumentation enables students to
engage in knowledge construction, shifting the focus from rote memorization of notions
and theories to a complex scientific practice in which they construct and justify
knowledge claims (Kelly & Chen, 1999; Sandoval & Reiser, 2004). Notwithstanding,
current research indicates that learning how to engage in productive scientific
argumentation to propose and justify an explanation through argument is difficult for
students. Thus, empirical research that examines how students generate arguments has
become an area of major concern for science education research.
The present study intends to provide a further contribution to the line of research
on student-generated arguments. It specifically focuses on the learning context of higher
education and sets out to investigate the arguments used by undergraduate and graduate
students in Developmental Psychology during the disciplinary discussions with their
teacher and with their classmates, i.e., task-related discussions concerning the discipline
taught in the course. In particular, the objective of the present study is to verify the
following two hypotheses:
1.
2.

"Undergraduate students draw their arguments from common sense and personal
experience more often than graduate students".
"Graduate students put forth arguments that refer to scientific notions and theories
strictly or somehow related to the discipline taught in the course, i.e.,
Developmental Psychology, more often than undergraduate students".
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These two hypotheses will be verified by means of a small-scale corpus study, and this
certainly limits the generalizability of the results obtained by the present. A larger
database would probably permit more quantitatively reliable data for certain statistical
relationships, thus drawing conclusions of general order. However, the careful study of a
small number of conversations will allow a more penetrating data-close analysis of the
argumentative dynamics in the classroom. In order to focus on the arguments used by
students, the object of investigation will be the argumentative discussions between
students and teacher, as well as among students, occurring during their ordinary lessons,
rather than an ad hoc setting created to favour the beginning of argumentative
discussions. Tools developed in argumentation theory will be useful in this respect as
they can be employed to respond to this need. The analytical approach for the selection of
the students arguments is, in fact, the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical
discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 2004).
The paper is structured as follows: in its first part, a concise review of the most
relevant literature on argumentation in learning contexts of higher education will be
presented. Afterwards, the methodology on which the present study is based and the
results of the analyses will be described. In the last part of the article, the results and the
conclusions drawn from this study will be discussed.
2. ARGUMENTATION STUDIES IN LEARNING CONTEXTS OF HIGHER
EDUCATION
The studies focusing on the argumentative practices in higher education have brought to
light relevant insights in the fields of education and argumentation theory. In particular,
two main lines of research need to be distinguished within these studies.
The first line of research aims to single out the cognitive skills that can be
improved through argumentative practices in the classroom. Overall, the results of these
studies indicate that favoring argument debates in the classroom can enhance students
motivation and engagement (Chin & Osborne, 2010; Hatano & Inagaki, 2003), and help
them detect and resolve errors (Schwarz et al., 2000). A series of other studies have also
shown that engagement in constructing arguments enhances students knowledge by
promoting conceptual change (e.g., Nussbaum & Sinatra, 2003; Wiley & Voss, 1999),
and that the engagement in argumentative small- or large-group discussions improves
conceptual understanding (Andrews, 2009; Alexopoulou & Driver, 1996; Mason, 1996,
2001).
The second line of research aims at investigating students argumentative skills,
and how such skills can favor or disfavor the learning process. In this respect, the role of
argumentation in the academic context is currently stressed by a growing literature that
emphasizes how students rarely use criteria that are consistent with the standards of the
scientific community to determine which ideas to accept, reject, or modify. For example,
the work of Hogan and Maglienti (2001) and Linn and Eylon (2006) suggests that
students often rely on inappropriate criteria such as the teachers authority or consistency
with their personal beliefs to evaluate the merits of a scientific explanation. This research
suggests that students rarely use criteria based on theories and scientific models. Other
research suggests that students often do not use sufficient evidence (Sandoval &
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Millwood, 2005) or struggle to understand what counts as evidence (Sadler, 2004).

Moreover, McNeill and Krajcik (2007) found that if students are confronted with large
amounts of data, they often encounter difficulties differentiating between what is relevant
and what is irrelevant.
Within the research strand on students argumentative skills, a series of studies
devoted attention to the problem of constructing students knowledge, taking into account
their previous beliefs (Macagno & Konstantinidou, 2013; Sampson & Clark, 2008; Driver
et al., 2000; Jimnez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Kelly & Takao, 2002). For instance,
Alexander, Kulikowich, and Schulze (1994) have shown that previous knowledge in the
domain is a significant predictor of comprehension of the arguments advanced in support
of a scientific theory. In a case study analysis of argumentative discourse among high
school science students, von Aufschnaiter et al. (2008) suggest that the quality of
argumentation itself is mediated by students prior knowledge and familiarity with the
content. Thus, high-level argument requires high-level knowledge of the content.
According to the authors, students can engage effectively in argumentation only on
content and levels of abstraction that are familiar to them. In the same vein, Sadler and
Zeidler (2005) investigated the significance of prior knowledge of genetics for the
argumentation of 15 undergraduate students on six cloning scenarios. The findings of this
study indicated that students with more advanced genetics understanding demonstrated
fewer instances of reasoning flaws, such as lack of coherence and contradiction of
reasoning within and between scenarios, and were more likely to incorporate content
knowledge in their argumentation than students with more a nave understanding of
genetics.
Overall, despite differences in methodology and interpretation, the studies on the
argumentative skills of students in the learning contexts of higher education have had the
merit to show that students are able to understand and generate an argument, and to
construct justifications in defence of an opinion. However, the results of these studies
have also indicated that students often do not base their decisions to accept or reject an
idea on available evidence and appropriate reasoning. Rather, they tend to use
inappropriate reasoning strategies to warrant one particular view over another and distort,
trivialize, or ignore evidence in an effort to reaffirm their own ideas.
The present study intends to provide an innovative and relevant contribution to
the recent literature on student-generated arguments in the learning contexts of higher
education. In the next sections of the paper I will present the research design, as well as
the main results of this study.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data Corpus
The present investigation is based on a corpus of sixteen video-recorded separate lessons
of one Bachelors degree (sub-corpus 1) and one Masters degree course (sub-corpus 2),
constituting about 24 hours of video data. The length of each recording varies from 84 to
98 minutes. The two courses have been selected according to the following criteria:

175

i. similar number of students (about 15 students);

ii. similar disciplinary domain (both courses considered handle themes in the area
of developmental psychology);
iii. both courses are taught by the same teacher in English language.
Sub-corpus 1 consists of 8 video-recorded lessons of the third year elective course
Adolescent Development: Research, Policy, and Practice of the Bachelors degree at
the University College of Utrecht (UCU). Sub-corpus 2 consists of 8 video-recorded
lessons of the first year elective course Human development and developmental
psychopathology of the Masters degree program Development and Socialization in
Childhood and Adolescence (DASCA) at the Utrecht University (UU).
3.2. Population
The sub-corpus 1 is constituted by 14 students, 4 boys and 10 girls. All the students at
the time of data collection were in their early 20s (M = 21.80; SD = 1.80). There was no
significance difference of age between boys (M = 21.89; SD = 2.66) and girls (M =
21.74; SD = 1.20). The sub-corpus 2 is constituted by 16 students, who were all girls.
Most of the students at the time of data collection were in their early 20s (M = 23.00; SD
= 1.60).
Before starting the last lesson of the course (December 2013), both undergraduate
and graduate students were asked (i) to rate in a scale from 1 (none) to 9 (excellent) their
own ability to communicate in English language, (ii) if they had already took an
academic course in Developmental Psychology, and (iii) to rate in a scale from 1 (none)
to 9 (excellent) the level of their previous knowledge in Developmental Psychology, i.e.,
before taking the course. As for the ability to communicate in English language, in a scale
from 1 to 9 the average score of the undergraduate students, according to their own
perception, was M = 8.28, whilst the average score of the graduate students was slightly
lower M = 7.56. The most part of the students did already take an academic course in
Developmental Psychology, both undergraduate (Yes N= 12; No N= 2) and graduate
level (Yes N= 15; No N= 1). In regard to the level of their previous knowledge of the
discipline taught in the course, in a scale from 1 to 9 the average score of the
undergraduate students, according to their own perception, was slightly lower (M = 6.35)
than graduate students (M = 7.25).
4. ANALYTICAL APPROACH
4.1. The Ideal Model of a Critical Discussion
The approach adopted for the analysis is the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical
discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, 2004) that proposes an ideal definition of
argumentation developed according to the standard of reasonableness: an argumentative
discussion starts when the speaker advances his/her standpoint, and the listener casts
doubts upon it, or directly attacks the standpoint. Accordingly, confrontation, in which
disagreement regarding a certain standpoint is externalized in a discursive exchange or

176

anticipated by the speaker, is a necessary condition for an argumentative discussion to

occur.
In the present study, this model is assumed as a grid for the analysis, since it provides the
criteria for the selection of the argumentative discussions and for the identification of the
arguments put forth by students.
4.2. Criteria used to select argumentative discussions
The analysis we present in this paper will be limited to and focused on the study of what
the pragma-dialectical of critical discussion defines as analytically relevant
argumentative moves, namely, those speech acts that (at least potentially) play a role in
the process of resolving a difference of opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p.
73). If there is not a difference of opinion between two parties, therefore, we cannot talk
of an argumentative discussion between them. For the present study, only the discussions
that fulfill two of the following three criteria, one between i.a and i.b and always the ii.,
were selected for analysis:
i.a at least one standpoint concerning an issue related to the discipline taught in
the course put forth by one or more students is questioned either by means of a
clear disagreement or by means of a doubt by the teacher or by (at least) one
classmate,
i.b at least one standpoint concerning an issue related to the discipline taught in
the course put forth by the teacher is questioned either by means of a clear
disagreement or by means of a doubt by one or more students;
ii. at least one student advances at least one argument either in favor of or against
the standpoint being questioned.
The argumentation data for each session were obtained by reviewing both the video
recording and the corresponding transcript. In a first phase, all the argumentative
discussions between students and teacher or among students arisen around an issue
related to the discipline taught in the course that occurred in the corpus of sixteen
separate lessons were selected (N= 94). Subsequently, for the scope of the present study,
I only referred to the argumentative discussions in which at least one student advanced at
least one argument either in favor of or against the standpoint being questioned (N= 66).
4.3. Criteria used to identify and distinguish students' arguments
In order to identify the arguments put forth by students, the analysis is focused on the
third stage of the model of a critical discussion, i.e., the argumentation stage. As stated
by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, p.138), in this stage the interlocutors exchange
arguments and critical reactions to convince the other party to accept or to retract his/her
own standpoint: The dialectical objective of the parties is to test the acceptability of the
standpoints that have shaped the difference of opinion. Accordingly, in line with the
pragma-dialectical approach, we considered as students' arguments only the

177

argumentative moves by students that aim to support, explain, justify and defend their
own position.
Once identified, the arguments put forth by students were distinguished according
to the following two criteria:
- the argument refers to scientific notions and theories strictly or somehow related
to Developmental Psychology (hereafter, SCIENCE ARG).
- the argument refers to students personal experience or to any other information
that does not refer to scientific notions and theories strictly or somehow related to
Developmental Psychology (hereafter, NO SCIENCE ARG).
An example of SCIENCE ARG is the second part (in Italic) of the following discourse by
a student: I think that Piaget's notion that children's development must necessarily
precede their learning is wrong, because according to Vygotsky learning is a social
phenomenon and it come before development. An example of NO SCIENCE ARG is,
instead, the first part (in Italic) of the following discourse by another student: In my
school, bullies were above all rich and spoiled guys. I wouldn't say that bullies typically
come from poor families.
5. RESULTS
Within the total of N= 66 argumentative discussions analyzed, the graduate students
advanced arguments in support of their standpoint more frequently than the
undergraduate students. Overall, the undergraduate students advanced at least one
argument in N= 23 discussions, for a total number of N= 75 arguments (average number
of arguments advanced during an argumentative discussion N= 3.26). These arguments
were in most cases advanced during student to student interactions (N= 51; 68%), whilst
a fewer number of arguments were observed during student-teacher interactions (N= 24;
32%). The graduate students advanced at least one argument in N= 43 discussions, for a
total number of N= 167 arguments (average number of arguments advanced during an
argumentative discussion N= 3.88). Similar to what was observed in regard to
undergraduate students, a higher number of arguments were found in student to student
interactions (N= 95; 57%) than in student-teacher interactions (N= 72; 43%).
A detailed description of the number of arguments put forth by undergraduate and
graduate students is presented below, in Table 1:
Bachelor

Master

TOTAL

Argumentative discussions in which (at least) one

student put forth (at least) one argument

23

43

66

Arguments put forth by students

75

167

242

Average number of arguments advanced during an

argumentative discussion

3.26

3.88

3.66

178

Arguments put forth by students during student to

student interactions

51

95

146

Arguments put forth by students during interactions

with their teacher

24

72

96

Table 1. Contributions of undergraduate and graduate students in argumentative discussions in the

classroom

In order to present the results of this study, a selection of excerpts of talk-in-interaction

representative of the results obtained from the larger set of analyses conducted on the
whole corpus of students arguments will be presented.
5.1. Undergraduate Students Arguments
The analysis of the arguments put forth by the 14 undergraduate students involved the N=
23 argumentative discussions arisen around an issue related to the discipline taught in the
course in which they put forward at least one argument to support their own standpoint,
for a total number of N= 75 arguments. The findings show that in large part the
undergraduate students put forth NO SCIENCE ARG (N= 66; 88%), both in interactions
with their classmates (N= 50 out of N= 51 total arguments put forth in interactions with
their classmates) and with the teacher (N= 16 out of N= 24 total arguments forth in
interactions with their teacher).
In the following example we can see how an undergraduate student (STU2F) put
forth a NO SCIENCE ARG (in Italic in the excerpt) (line 9: there is not a mother that
would accept to kill her son. it is not culture it is the nature of human beings) to oppose
a NO SCIENCE ARG (in Italic in the excerpt) (line 2: otherwise slavery wouldn't have
been permitted. at a certain time at a certain place, it was possible; and line 4: at a
certain time at a certain place, it was possible) previously advanced by one of her
classmate (STU14M) during a discussion favoured by the teacher concerning the cultural
approach and its implications (line 1):
Excerpt 1
Lesson 3. Min. 38:12. Participants: teacher (TEACH), students (STU2F; STU14M).
1.

*TEACH:

according to the cultural approach, all the values, what is right or

what is wrong is cultural specific, they depends on culture [...]
what do you think about this?

2.

*STU14M:

yes, is right. otherwise slavery wouldn't have been permitted

3.

*TEACH:

yes, good point

4.

*STU14M:

at a certain time at a certain place, it was possible

5.

*TEACH:

right

6.

%pau:

2.0 sec
179

7.

*STU2F:

not everything, though

8.

*TEACH:

what?

9.

*STU2F:

not everything is acceptable. there is not a mother that would

accept to kill her son. it is not culture it is the nature of human
beings

[]
In the corpus, undergraduate students put forth SCIENCE ARG almost exclusively in
interactions with their teacher (N= 8 out of N= 9 total SCIENCE ARG put forth in
interactions with their teacher). A clear example of the use of this type of argument is the
following discussion concerning to moral development in adolescence, where it is
possible to observe the following difference of opinion between the teacher and a student
(STU6M): according to the student, adolescents behaviors show to be very often more
mature than adults ones, whilst the teacher clearly disagrees with her students opinion
(line 3: no::) and puts forth an argument in support of her standpoint (line 5:
adolescence typically have more dangerous behaviors than adults). In turn, the student
advances a SCIENCE ARG (in Italic in the excerpt) that refers to the well-known
Kohlbergs theory of moral development in order to support his own opinion (line 6: but
Kohlberg said that adolescents can normally respect authority ad rules, and thats pretty
good). This discussion will continue for several minutes, involving other students as
well.
Excerpt 2
Lesson 4. Min. 59:50. Participants: teacher (TEACH), student (STU6M).
1.

*STU6M:

adolescents behaviors are very often more mature than adultsones

2.

%pau:

3.0 sec

3.

*TEACH:

no::

4.

*STU6M:

oh. yes professor ((laughing))

5.

*TEACH:

adolescence typically have more dangerous behaviors than adults

6.

*STU6M:

but Kohlberg said that adolescents can normally respect authority

ad rules, and thats pretty good

7.

*TEACH:

yes, but []

180

5.2. Graduate Students Arguments

The analysis of the arguments put forth by the 16 graduate students involved the N= 43
argumentative discussions arisen around an issue related to the discipline taught in the
course in which they put forward at least one argument to support their own standpoint,
for a total number of N= 167 arguments. Unlike from what was observed for
undergraduate students, the findings show that slightly more than half of the all
arguments put forth by graduate students were SCIENCE ARG (N= 87; 52%). These
arguments were used a little more frequently in student-teacher interactions (N= 46 out of
N= 72 total arguments forth in interactions with their teacher) than in student to student
interactions (N= 41 out of N= 95 total arguments put forth in interactions with their
classmates).
In the following short example we can observe an argumentative discussion
having as protagonists the teacher and one student, STU10F, occurred during a lesson
centred on the development of identity and personality in adolescence. The teacher
explains that adolescents face a phase in which they are committed to choose their values
and goals for the future (line 1). The student shows to be in disagreement with the claim
made by her teacher, and in turn advances a SCIENCE ARG in support of her opinion (in
Italic in the excerpt) (line 2: some adolescents decide not to choose, according to Marcia
its the identity diffusion, they are not ready to take these decisions). The discussion
continues with the teacher that accepts the argument advanced by her student (line 3:
"this is true, some of them dont) and reformulate her previous claim accordingly (line
4).
Excerpt 3
Lesson 6. Min. 32:15. Participants: teacher (TEACH), student (STU10F).
1.

*TEACH:

during this phase ((adolescence)) they ((adolescents)) have to

decide their goals and values for their future

2.

*STU10F:

some adolescents decide not to choose though, according to

Marcia its the identity diffusion, they are not ready to take
these decisions

3.

*TEACH:

this is true, some of them dont

4.

*TEACH:

they are supposed to choose their values and goals

[]

As far as NO SCIENCE ARG are concerned, graduate students used these arguments
more frequently during student to student interactions (N= 54 out of N= 95 total
arguments put forth in student to student interactions) than during the interactions with
their teacher (N= 26 out of N= 72 total arguments forth in student-teacher interactions). A
clear example of the use of this type of argument is the following discussion, whose
beginning is initially favoured by the teacher, about mental disorders in adolescence and
181

the moment of their actual initiation. Here, it is possible to observe an argumentative

discussions initially involving two students: STU15F and STU1F. According to the first
student, the actual initiation of a mental disorder is before the manifestation, and she
supports her opinion by advancing a NO SCIENCE ARG based on common sense
knowledge (in Italic in the excerpt) (line 2: you need to have a predisposition, because
the genes produce a predisposition to have that:: its before the manifestation). On the
other hand, the second student claims that having a predisposition is fundamental only for
certain mental disorders, not for all of them, since it can still go in multiple ways. In
particular, she supports this claim by also advancing a NO SCIENCE ARG that is based
on her own personal experience (in Italic in the excerpt) (line 3: I know people who were
depressed and now they are not). This discussion will continue for several minutes,
involving other students as well as the teacher.
Excerpt 4
Lesson 2. Min. 24:30. Participants: teacher (TEACH), students (STU15F; STU1F).
1.

*TEACH:

when is an actual initiation of a ((mental)) disorder? is it when you

see some first symptoms or when you see the disorder, when is
really labeled as a disorder?

2.

*STU15F:

you need to have a predisposition, because the genes produce a

predisposition to have that:: its before the manifestation

3.

*STU1F:

its different for disorders. even if you have a predisposition it can

still go in multiple ways. I know people who were depressed and
now they are not
[]

The presentation of different excerpts concerning the types of arguments used by the two
groups (sub-corpus 1 and sub-corpus 2) of students shows an interesting element that can
summarize the argumentative choices (and strategies) used by them with their classmates
and with their teacher. The undergraduate students advance only rarely SCIENCE ARG
(N= 9; 12%), and these arguments very used almost exclusively in student-teacher
interactions. On the other hand, slightly more than half of the arguments put forth by
graduate students were SCIENCE ARG (N= 87; 52%), which were used both in studentteacher interactions (N= 46) and in student-to-student interactions (N= 41). The NO
SCIENCE ARG was instead the type of argument advanced in almost all cases by
undergraduate students (N= 66; 88%), especially in student to student interactions (N=
50).
The Table 2 shows a comparison between the types of arguments advanced by the
two groups of students.

182

Bachelors
Students

Masters
Students

SCIENCE
ARG

in Studentto-Student
Interaction

in StudentTeacher
Interaction

NO
SCIENCE
ARG

in Studentto-Student
Interaction

in StudentTeacher
Interaction

N= 9; 12%

N= 1

N= 8

N= 66; 88%

N= 50

N= 16

SCIENCE
ARG

in Studentto-Student
Interaction

in StudentTeacher
Interaction

NO
SCIENCE
ARG

in Studentto-Student
Interaction

in StudentTeacher
Interaction

N= 87; 52%

N= 41

N= 46

N= 80; 48%

N= 54

N= 26

Table 2. Descriptive frequencies of the types of arguments put forth by the two groups of students

6. DISCUSSION
The findings of this study appear to confirm the two initial hypotheses: 1) "undergraduate
students draw their arguments from common sense and personal experience more often
than graduate students"; and 2) "graduate students put forth arguments that refer to
scientific notions and theories strictly or somehow related to the discipline taught in the
course, i.e., Developmental Psychology, more often than undergraduate students". How
can we explain these results? Among the many reasons than can contribute at different
degrees to explain these results, I want to focus on two aspects that I think are the most
important.
The first reason is the actual students knowledge of the discipline taught in the
course, i.e., Developmental Psychology. Even though the students of both groups according to their own perception - seems to have a similar knowledge in Developmental
Psychology, the observations of the topics treated during the lessons, of the studentteacher and student to student interactions, and the analysis of the arguments advanced by
students has led me to realize that the graduate students had an actual knowledge of the
discipline much higher than undergraduate students, even more than what was claimed in
the answers to my short questionnaire (graduate students M= 7.25 vs. graduate students
M= 6.35).
As we have seen in the excerpt 3, the graduate students showed to be able to use
as an argument a limited, well-specific aspect of a scientific theory in order to support
their own standpoint. Moreover, they were able to engage in critical discussions related
to the different theories that treat certain limited aspects of a certain topic discussed
during the lessons. On the other hand, the knowledge in Developmental Psychology of
the undergraduate students was often limited to a more superficial knowledge of the
discipline. In most cases, their SCIENCE ARG (N= 9) refer to a well-known theory,
however avoiding to mention the correct term of the scientific notion they refer to. For
example, in the excerpt 2 we have seen that a student advanced a SCIENCE ARG that
refers to a well-known psychological theory, i.e., Kohlberg's theory of moral
development (Kohlberg, 1984), claiming that according to this theory adolescents can
183

normally respect authority and rules. Evidently, the student is referring to the "stage four"
of Kohlberg's theory of moral development, however without mentioning it correctly.
The second reason is related to the institutional commitment requested to the
students. From the observations of student-teacher interactions, I noticed that an
argumentative effort by students is requested only at the graduate level, not at the
undergraduate one. Both at undergraduate and at graduate level, it is the teacher that in
most cases favors the beginning of argumentative discussions in the classroom. She does
it by asking questions to her students, inviting them to express their opinions, doubts
about the theories and notions presented during the lesson. However, looking at the
questions used by the teacher to favor the beginning of argumentative discussions, I
observed some differences. At the undergraduate level, the teacher asks open questions to
her students. These are questions can favor a large discussion with and among students,
and they are not focused on limited, specific aspects of a theory, but instead these
questions aim to favor a discussion around a more general topic. The focus of the
discussion is not the single theory, but the more general topic. The following are good
examples of these questions: What are the main reasons leading to episodes of bullying
among adolescents? How can the family relationships affect the adolescent development?
What are the consequences of adolescent drinking and substance use?
At the graduate level, instead, the teacher asks questions that refer to specific
aspects of a certain theory. These questions are often followed by a further Whyquestions asked to the students. Here, the students are expected to provide the reasons at
the basis of their own opinions. The following are good examples of these questions:
What are the most important processes that according to Steinberg explain the fact that
many risk behaviors tend to peak in adolescence? Why? Which developmental
processes can be studied by each of the seven models described by Graber and BrooksGunn and how? ... Why? What are the advantages and disadvantages of a person-centered
approach? Why?
Accordingly, it seems that at the undergraduate level students are (only) requested
to be interested in and curious of the discipline taught in the course by asking questions.
At the graduate level curiosity is not enough. Students are expected to support their
standpoints - and even a mere doubt - by advancing arguments that have to refer to
scientific theories.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
This work was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) [grant
number P2TIP1_148347].
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185

On The Benefits Of Applying Argumentation Theory To Research

On The Simultaneous Interpretation Of Political Speeches
Emanuele Brambilla
Department of Legal, Language, Interpreting and Translation Studies (IUSLIT)
University of Trieste
Italy
emanuele.brambilla@phd.units.it

ABSTRACT: Even though interpreting is to a great extent about the interlinguistic reproduction of
arguments, argumentation theory is almost completely overlooked by interpreting studies, which partly
explains the frequent production of pragmatically inappropriate interpreted texts. Against the theoretical
gap, the paper puts forward a descriptive argumentation approach to political speeches with a view to their
simultaneous interpretation, in the attempt to make the case for a systematic contribution of argumentation
studies to interpretation theory and training.
KEYWORDS: argumentative equivalence, simultaneous interpreting, source texts (STs), strategic
manoeuvring.

1. INTRODUCTION
The omnipresence of argumentation in everyday verbal communication is the hinge of
argumentation studies (van Eemeren et al., 1996, pp. 1-2) and the main reason for their
flourishing, from the classical period to a renewed spate of interest last century. What is
probably less evident and certainly less studied is the fact that the socio-professional
needs of the globalised world repeatedly demand that argumentation be reproduced in
another language to cater for interlinguistic communication needs. In this respect, the
present paper analyses how argumentation is and should be reproduced in interlinguistic
settings requiring the interpreting service.
Argumentation is the dominant mode of discourse in many interpreted
situations (Marzocchi, 1997, p. 182) and interpretation consequently implies a
continuous argumentative interaction, thereby requiring at least an intuitive knowledge of
the appropriate contextual use of arguments on the part of interpreters (Marzocchi, 1997,
p. 184). Notably, when the predominant focus of a communicative situation is on the
discursive attempt to resolve a difference of opinion, the quality of the interpreters
performance is assessed on the basis of his/her ability to convey the argumentative
purpose of the original text, possibly to the detriment of other kinds of equivalence or of
received ideas concerning fidelity (Marzocchi, 1997, p. 183). This particularly holds true
for political argumentation, in which the systematic and subtle implementation of
strategic manoeuvring (Zarefsky, 2009, p. 115) to overcome a conflict between different
lines of action demands specific equivalence standards not only concerning the content of
the message but also its persuasive and ethotic dimensions, which are less important in
other communicative events such as specialist conferences.
However, despite the significant development of argumentation studies in the last
few decades and the argumentative character of several interpreted situations, the extent
186

to which knowledge of argumentation theory by the interpreter could benefit the overall
comprehension of the original or source text and favour the production of the respective
interpreted text has yet to be explored (Crevatin in Marzocchi, 1998, Preface, p. xiv).
More precisely, the growing interest in argumentation has gone mostly unnoticed in
interpreting scholarly settings, in spite of its multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary
nature. This is partly due to the fact that interpreting research is a fairly young and largely
unexplored discipline (Garzone & Viezzi, 2002, p. 2), and the contribution of
argumentation makes up one of most overlooked albeit potentially fruitful domains.
The paper outlines the preliminary findings of a broader PhD project focusing on
the empirical examination of recurrent argument schemes in a multilingual corpus of
political speeches. By harnessing the hermeneutical and contrastive functions of
argumentation analysis (Marzocchi, 1998, p. 8), the study uncovers substantial
differences in speakers adoption of argument schemes, thereby making the case for
enhanced language-specific, argumentation-driven interpreter preparation. In this respect,
the present paper is primarily concerned with the applicability of argumentation concepts
and methods to interpreter training.
The study of political argumentation in interpreting settings entails a specific
focus on simultaneous interpreting, since it is the most widely adopted modality for the
interpretation of political speeches. However, the remarks will also hold true for
consecutive interpreting because, though progressively ousted by the simultaneous
modality, it is still adopted and included in university curricula, and thus fits the trainingoriented rationale of the study. In section 2, evidence of interpreters difficulty in
reproducing the original arguments in the interpreted text is shown and discussed;
sections 3 and 4 will respectively briefly present the reference corpus and illustrate the
methodological underpinnings of the study; section 5 will explore the main findings,
which are eventually discussed in section 6.
2. INTERPRETING AS AN INSTANCE OF POTENTIAL ARGUMENTATIVE
DISSOLUTION
Interpreting is first and foremost a translational activity, involving a source-text induced
target-text production (Neubert, 1985, p. 8). Reflection on the relation between the
source text (ST) and the interpreted text (IT) is therefore inescapable, and the ST-IT
comparison, aiming at determining relations of equivalence and standards of quality, is at
the heart of translation and interpreting studies.
Interpreting can be distinguished from other types of translational activity by its
immediacy:
Interpreting is a form of Translation in which a first and final rendition in another language is
produced on the basis of a one-time presentation of an utterance in a source language.
(Pchhacker, 2004, p. 11)

Therefore, unlike written translation, interpreting is characterised by ephemeral

presentation and immediate production. These severe time and cognitive constraints
intensify in the simultaneous modality, in which the interpreter listens to the ST through
headphones and delivers the IT into a microphone, almost simultaneously, with a slight
delay (dcalage) between message reception and message production. Therefore, the hic
187

et nunc nature of the activity confronts interpreters with the task of constructing a mental
representation of the text as it progressively unfolds. This further challenges the
attainment of an acceptable degree of equivalence, rendering interpreted texts more
prone to substantial pragmatic shifts than translated texts, which are instead supposed to
be produced after careful work. Indeed, what is required in interpreting is not equivalence
in toto, but the equivalence of the communicative function (Viezzi, 1999, p. 147), or
pragmatic quality (Kopczyski, 1994, p. 190) ensuring a high degree of intertextual
coherence (Straniero Sergio, 2003, p. 147) between the ST and the IT.
However daunting, the task can be appropriately performed after the development
of procedural competence (Riccardi, 2005, p. 755) and only by relying on extra-textual
knowledge and anticipation, i.e. prediction based on previously acquired contextual and
discoursal knowledge (Garzone, 2000, p. 73). This means that training and advance
preparation play a major role in determining the success of an interpretation (Gile, 1995,
pp. 144-145), in that they are vital resources making up for the lack of the necessary time
to process a novel text. In other words, professional interpreting is not limited to the
actual oral translation of a speech but covers a larger lapse of time, catering for the
otherwise insufficient minutes or hours interpreters would have qualitatively to perform
an unnatural (Riccardi, 2005, p. 756), extremely delicate and unstable activity,
potentially engendering substantial pragmatic shifts (Colucci, 2011).
Building on its instability and based on the translational needs for compensation
(Harvey, 1995) and reformulation (Falbo, 1999), interpreting has been compared to a
chemical experiment, in which matter and energy remain unchanged before and after the
operation, despite the likely alteration in their distribution (Snelling, 1999, p. 203); matter
may be considered to refer to the propositional content of the original message and
energy is identifiable with the pragmatic force of the ST. However evocative and vivid,
though, the comparison is not a faithful description of the activity, but only a useful
methodological suggestion, because interpreting is not subject to laws of physics; both
matter and energy are systematically threatened by alteration, more often resulting in
dissolution, i.e. omission of text segments or mitigation of the pragmatic force of
statements, and less frequently leading to aggregation, i.e. arbitrary additions and
parallel formulations (Straniero Sergio, 2003, pp. 159-160).
The quantities of matter and energy can be altered by various factors, which may
be said to fall into two categories. On the one hand, there are intrinsic factors
compounding the translational task, among which linearity or the fact that the text
becomes available only gradually (Shlesinger, 1995, p. 193); co-text dependence
(Garzone, 2000, p. 71), leading interpreters to lose sight of the context; and the specific
language combination, posing targeted problems mainly deriving from the different
syntactic rules of the language-pair in question. However challenging, though, these
intrinsic obstacles are gradually overcome through the development of procedural
competence.
On the other hand, there are contextual triggers of matter and energy dissolution
and/or aggregation, and they are all ascribable to the interpreters scarce preparation or
insufficient individual knowledge regarding the topic, the speaker and the type of text
(Riccardi, 1998, pp. 173-174). Unlike intrinsic constraints, these factors have a more
pronounced individual dimension and are directly linked to interpreter training,
particularly to the need gradually to develop the textual and discoursal competence
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(Garzone, 2000, p. 73) enabling interpreters to tackle the speeches with a reasonable
degree of confidence. In this respect, extra-linguistic knowledge-related mistakes can be
considered a direct consequence of the scarce attention devoted to STs in interpreting
studies (Garzone, 2000, p. 69), which is ascribable to a general underrating of pragmatics
(Viaggio, 2002, p. 229) that, especially in the interpretation of political speeches, is partly
determined by a marked neglect of argumentation theory (Marzocchi, 1998).
The consequences of incomplete interpreter curricula and scarce preparation of
the genre, content and ethotic dimension of the ST are evident in the example provided in
Table 1, showing the interpretation of an excerpt of Obamas 2009 Inaugural Address,
broadcast live on Italian television and performed by a professional interpreter. The
example is drawn from CorIT, the television interpreting corpus developed at the
University of Trieste. The Italian interpretation has been retranslated into English and
displayed in the right column.
ST - Obama, Inauguration Speech, 20th
IT retranslation into English
January 2009
Now, there are some who question the
Now, there are a few questions standing
scale of our ambitions, who suggest that
before these ambitions. Our system cant
our system cannot tolerate too many big
tolerate big plans. One always tends to
plans. Their memories are short, for they
forget. Many have forgotten what our
have forgotten what this country has
country has already done, what free men
already done, what free men and women
and women can do when their imagination
can achieve when imagination is joined to
is joined to the will to do good things. And
common purpose and necessity to courage. often did the ground tremble beneath us.
What the cynics fail to understand is that
And now there are problems related to
the ground has shifted beneath them, that
consumption capacity.
the stale political arguments that have
consumed us for so long, no longer apply.
Table 1: Argumentative dissolution in the ST-IT passage
Rather than an experiment, Table 1 looks more like a chemical disaster. Despite the
partially conjectural nature of mistake aetiology in Error Analysis (Falbo, 2002, p. 115),
the origin of a mistake can generally be gleaned with a certain degree of precision during
the comparison between the ST and the IT. All the more so when, as in the above
passage, neither incomprehensible referents nor particular difficulties stand out. In this
particular case, the ST delivery speed was at times considerable and the pressure deriving
from interpreting live the first message of the newly-elected President of the United
States cannot be overlooked. Neither can the peculiarities of TV interpreting; whereas in
conference settings interpreters are generally given the texts of the speeches and therefore
have at least a few minutes to prepare, in televised interpreted events they hardly ever
have the opportunity to see the text (Straniero Sergio, 2003, pp. 169-170). However,
despite being unquestionable compounding factors, information density, unhelpful
employers and excessive delivery speed are not excuses for poor translation, because
their potentially detrimental consequences can be partially obviated by attentive and
selective listening (Palazzi, 2007, p. 264).

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Therefore, given the groundlessness of the above hypotheses, the dissolution of

argumentation is likely to have been triggered by the presence of a straw man argument
in the ST. Since when an opponents position is distorted or exaggerated in a straw man
argument, the effect is often to divert the line of argument to irrelevant issues (Walton,
2004, p. 22), the sudden shift towards irrelevance may have compounded comprehension
and challenged relevant translation. In simpler terms, an interpreter, uninformed of the
exaggerating implications of the straw man, has difficulties in grasping the argumentative
move and may reasonably dread an impending launch of a personal attack by the speaker
or, in Politeness terms, a face-threatening act (FTA) against another politician. Its
translation would require enhanced attention to proper names, politeness strategies and
the careful reproduction of the pragmatic force of the message, exposing the interpreter to
the risk of committing an FTA against him/herself, i.e. staining his/her interpreter
reputation.
This is only an example, but it corroborates the hypothesis that unawareness of
the specific argument strategies adopted by source language speakers is bound to add a
further obstacle to the attainment of a quality interpretation and put the interpreter at a
disadvantage against the rhetorical abilities of politicians.
3. THE CORPUS
The study is based on a recently assembled multilingual corpus that is composed of three
hundred and thirteen political speeches on the current financial and economic crisis,
which are almost equally divided into American, British and French speeches; a hundred
and nine were delivered by Barack Obama, a hundred and one by David Cameron, a
hundred and three by Nicolas Sarkozy and Franois Hollande (respectively fifty-three and
fifty). All the speeches were delivered between 2008 and 2014 and make up a sample of
the discourse on the financial and economic crisis that has monopolised political
communication over the last few years, probably outranking the discourse on the war on
terror, at least in the United States. The speeches have been selected for their being
delivered within international settings requiring the interpreting service (e.g. the G20),
but also national speeches have been taken into account, as they are often chosen for
exam sessions in translation and interpreting faculties.
The corpus has been named ARGO, for its reference to argumentation and after
Ulysses dog because, just as the dog recognised his owner when he returned to Ithaca
twenty years after leaving, the corpus is meant to promote the recognition and
internalisation of recurrent argumentative strategies before the interpretation.
4. THE METHODOLOGICAL SCOPE OF INTERPRETING-ORIENTED
ARGUMENTATION ANALYSIS
The interpreting-oriented argumentation analysis is therefore a ST analysis, having little
to do with the ST-IT comparison and rather aiming at studying the argumentation of
source language speakers with a view to its recognition and reproduction in translation,
with the observation of the interpreters failures in reproducing argumentation patterns
merely serving as a rationale for targeted argumentation analyses.

190

The scope of this peculiar kind of analysis is determined by its specific informative,
profession-oriented needs, which are only catered for by the descriptive study of contentrelated argumentation. More specifically, interest in argumentation in interpreting
research is directed towards the findings of applied studies, focusing on both text analysis
and the didactics of argumentation in the attempt to promote anticipation and enhance the
argumentative competence of interpreter trainees (Marzocchi, 1998, p. 43).
Among all the crucial concepts in argumentation theory (van Eemeren, 2001), the
present research was limited to the detection and description of argument schemes,
because their study provides insights into the generalised content of arguments (Garssen
in van Eemeren, 2001, p. 72) and provides textual and contextual information (van
Eemeren, 2001, p. 20), thereby catering for the descriptive and content-related need of
interpreting research.
Yet, however insightful theoretical dissertations may be, the boundaries of
interpreting-oriented argumentation analysis and the specific focus of the paper are best
explained by means of an example. Take the formal scheme of the argument from distress
(Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008, p. 334):
Individual x is in distress.
If y brings about A, it will relieve or help to relieve this distress.
Therefore, y ought to bring about A.
It is not unrelated to political communication, but the relevance of its internalisation by
the interpreter of political speeches is questionable, as it does not provide him/her with a
particular advantage during the interpreting process, but only gives a content-abstract
indication of what may or may not come up in a speech; moreover, interpreters are not
interested in being told normatively how to argue, because their task is to reproduce the
argumentation of others. Rather, they may benefit from knowing in advance the
contextual implementation of the scheme by a given speaker.
(1)

But it [the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act] will give millions of
families resigned to financial ruin the chance to rebuild. (my emphasis)
(Remarks by President Obama on the Mortgage Crisis, 18th February 2009)

Example (1) is one of the several enthymemic implementations of the argument from
distress that have been found in the American sub-corpus. Particularly, the sentence rests
upon a specific form of the argument, that can be named Argument from Middle-Class
Distress.
The Middle Class is in distress.
If the government implements act x, it will relieve or help to relieve this distress.
Therefore, the government ought to implement act x.
Only content-related schemes have the potential to warn interpreters of the recurrent
topicality of discursive practices legitimising specific political courses of action, like
Obamas recurrent leveraging the middle class topos to gain consensus for economic
policies. In the following section, other examples drawn from the corpus are examined in
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context, highlighting the focus on strategic manoeuvring in political argumentation and

its key role in supplementing the education, background knowledge and procedural
competence of the interpreter.
5. FINDINGS
In pragma-dialectical terms, this chiefly content-related analysis may be described in
terms of highlighting the topical potential of a specific instance of argumentation. The
practice is highly relevant to interpreters needs because, in the light of the predictability
(Zarefsky, 2009, p. 115) of political argumentation, a descriptive account of the schemes
recurrently used by a given speaker in a given context may raise text expectations in the
interpreters minds during the training and/or preparation phases, thereby easing the
inferential and translation processes during the interpretation.
However, the predictability of political argumentation concerns not only the
topical dimension but the whole of argumentation (Zarefsky, 2009, p. 115), therefore also
how it is presented and how it is adapted to audience demands, following the strategic
manoeuvring categorisation (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 93).
Indeed, analysis of strategic manoeuvring in the corpus uncovers several
argument recurrences; particularly, substantial disparities in the speakers adoption of
argument schemes stand out. Unlike Obama, for instance, David Cameron presents
himself as an expert on the economic crisis, but he also uses simple argumentation. For
example, he repeatedly compares the world economy to a global race in which every
country runs alone and aims at winning the race. By doing this, he generally abides by the
following argument scheme:
The UK is running a global race.
It risks being outpaced by other countries.
Therefore, it must run faster than others.
The scheme alone can act as a cognitive support by helping interpreters anticipate the
general content of several speech passages, but highlighting the recurrent presentational
devices associated with the Global Race Argument provides a further and equally helpful
lexico-syntagmatic support, reducing processing and decoding efforts and paving the way
for a higher quality translation. Quite unsurprisingly, fast, quick, speed, win/lose, keep up
with are the recurrent lexical indicators of the scheme, that is also accompanied by vivid
and less predictable sentences like the world is breathing down our neck and in this
global race you are quick or you are dead. Pointing out the presentational devices
typical of a given argument scheme is instrumental, in that it warns interpreters of what
the speaker is accustomed to saying, instead of limiting the research applicability to the
indication of the generalised content of the arguments found in a specific discourse.
However, the sole focus on topical potential and presentational devices is not
enough to give a faithful overview of the speakers argumentative routines, because
Cameron actually does not always resort to the Global Race Argument when dealing with
the world economy: the presence of the argument is considerable only in national
addresses, while in international settings it seems to be replaced by its opposite, that can

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reasonably be named Argument from Multilateral Economic Cooperation. The argument,

shifting the argumentation to a completely different ground, has the following scheme:
We are living in an interconnected world.
Crisis in one country affects all the other countries.
Therefore, cooperation is needed for the sake of world economy.
The context-dependent alternation between the Global Race Argument and the Argument
from Multilateral Economic Cooperation corroborates the pragma-dialectical tenet that
argumentation is systematically adapted to the audience. In this particular case, the
standpoint is adapted, or rather overturned, too because, when dealing with the role of
nations in the world economy, Cameron defends a different standpoint depending on the
relevant audience. From an interpreters point of view, this means knowing in advance
what the speaker generally says (and therefore will probably say) in a specific
communicative context.
The adaptability, culture- and context-based heterogeneity of the above arguments
are substantially confirmed by the analysis of ARGO. It is true that also a few similarities
have been detected among the different sub-corpora, but they concern typically
political arguments, namely the straw man argument, giving the opponents a bad name,
the topos of history (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 80), comparing the present crisis to past
predicaments, and the locus of the irreparable (Zarefsky, 2009, p. 123), urging the
implementation of economic policies. However, apart from these distinctly political
arguments, the speakers generally steer their speeches towards highly different thematic
and argumentative corners, which is, however, also a consequence of the specific national
implications of the global recession. Their choice of argument schemes differs
substantially, as far as topical selection, adaptation to audience demands and
presentational devices are concerned. For instance, in line with his focus on the middle
class, Obama tells vivid stories of the resilience of the American people in the face of the
crisis, showing a predilection for anecdotal arguments (Govier & Jansen, 2011, p. 75)
breaking the flow of rational argumentation.
(2)

When Bryan Ritterby was laid off from his job making furniture, he said he
worried that at fifty-five, no one would give him a second chance. But he found
work at Energetx, a wind turbine manufacturer in Michigan. Before the recession,
the factory only made luxury yachts. Today, its hiring workers like Bryan, who
said, Im proud to be working in the industry of the future.
(State of the Union Address 2012)

Cameron and Sarkozy opt for a more specialist discourse, presenting themselves as
experts on the economic crisis. While Cameron explains the causes of the crisis and the
looming consequences of certain policies with intricate slippery slope arguments
(Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008, p. 114), Sarkozy recurrently adopts an argument that
may be named Argument from Need for Regulated Capitalism, defending the need for
state intervention in the economy, which is perfectly in line with his interventionist
political stance (Mayaffre, 2012, p. 15).

193

(3)

L'ide de la toute puissance du march qui ne devait tre contrari par aucune
rgle, par aucune intervention politique, tait une ide folle. L'ide que les
marchs ont toujours raison tait une ide folle.
The very idea of a free, non-regulated market was a crazy idea. The idea of
markets being always right was a crazy idea. (my translation, my emphasis)
(Sarkozys Speech in Toulon, 25th September 2008)

Rather, Hollandes argumentation heavily relies on the argument from thrift (Reisigl &
Wodak, 2009, p. 105).
(4)

2014, ce sera aussi l'anne de dcisions fortes. [] D'abord, je veux rduire la

dpense publique. Nous devons faire des conomies partout o elles sont
possibles.
2014 will also be the year of tough decisions. [] First, I want to reduce public
spending. We must save whatever we can. (my translation, my emphasis)
(Hollandes New Years Greetings, 31st December 2013)

This is actually and formally an argument from sacrifice, enabling the speaker to
anticipate the persistence of tough economic times and legitimise government policies.
6. CONCLUSION
The length of this paper prevents a thorough listing of the most recurrent schemes, but the
examples are indicative of the variations in the speakers argumentative choices when
faced with the same topic. The analysis shows that the most recurrent argument schemes
in the ARGO corpus are culture-specific and context-dependent, and also personal or
idiosyncratic in some way because, even though they share the same culture and
communicative contexts, Sarkozy and Hollande resort to different argument schemes.
This has specific implications for the interpreter: in the light of the heterogeneity
of arguments and given the interpreters difficulty in processing argumentative passages,
the study suggests that previous knowledge of topic-related and speaker-related argument
schemes renders certain aspects of STs comparatively predictable, and may therefore act
as a cognitive and lexical support during interpretation. This fosters the systematic
adoption of argumentation analysis as a source text research methodology, providing
interpreting research with findings of direct training applicability, potentially enhancing
the communicative skills of interpreter trainees by gradually strengthening their discourse
competence. In this respect, a promising line of research could lie in the extension of the
practice to other political topics, speakers and languages, in the attempt progressively to
build up repositories of data-driven hints on the predictability of political STs.
Moreover, in addition to finding instrumental scope in interpreting research and
training, argumentation theory also provides a theoretical and operational contribution to
interpreting activity, suggesting a particular interpreter approach to ST argumentation in
the attempt to attain an acceptable degree of argumentative equivalence in the IT. Just as
the argumentation analyst takes a differentiated view of manoeuvring rather than viewing
it as a monolithic whole (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 93), the interpreter of argumentative

194

texts ought to see his/her activity in relation to what could be named the Strategic
Manoeuvring Equivalence Triangle.

Figure 1: The Strategic Manoeuvring Equivalence Triangle

In order to recognise and reproduce the speakers illocution and perlocution, thereby
guaranteeing the correct transfer of argumentation patterns, three aspects have to be taken
into account:
- topical coherence, respect for the topical choice made by the source language speaker;
- respect for audience demands, even though the relevant audience may change from the
ST to the IT. For example, in the European Parliament the ST audience corresponds to
the target audience, as all the participants share the same context of situation and the
same communicative interests. Yet, during an interpreting exam, for instance, the IT
audience is composed of interpreting professors who are in charge of assessing the
quality of the students performance. Or, in television interpreting, the audience shifts
from the actual participants in the original event and the TV audience sharing the
language and culture of the speaker to the TV spectators in the target culture, which
renders the activity an example of documentary interpreting as opposed to instrumental
interpreting (Viezzi, 2013, p. 384). However, respect for audience demands is paramount
under any circumstances, because the interpreters task is to show the speakers attitude
towards his/her audience.
- presentational coherence, or the preservation of the ST presentational devices. This
third category is controversial, because the pragma-dialectical notion of presentational
devices encompasses a variety of features that cannot be always reproduced in the IT.
Think of alliteration, that is often bound to perish against the intrinsic differences
between languages. However, its reproduction is not demanded despite the rhetorical
mitigation in the IT, as interpreters are generally dispensed from the task of translating
the untranslatable, to paraphrase Rebouls assertion on the untranslatability of rhetoric
(1991, p. 110). Yet the systematic study of ST argumentation highlights a number of
presentational devices that can be more easily reproduced, such as Obamas recurrent use
of the historical analogy between the crisis and the Great Depression, or Sarkozys and
Camerons habit of appealing to liberal and conservative presumptions (Zarefsky, 2009,
p. 122).

195

Against this background, argumentative equivalence may be viewed as the faithful

reproduction of the features of strategic manoeuvring into the IT. The focus on words and
their contextual meaning, which is inherent in the analysis of strategic manoeuvring, is
certainly not unknown to interpreting studies. For instance, Gile (1995, pp. 35-36)
addresses the interpreters need to pay attention to both form and function in terms of
dealing with content and packaging, while the need to adapt the argumentation to
audience demands may be inferred from Kopczyskis (1994, p. 190) thorough analysis
of the situational variables of interpreted events and the considerable number of studies
on the pragmatic aspects of conference interpreting (Schffner, 1997; Setton 1999).
However, the literature on interpreting lacks a specific focus on argumentation, whose
distinctive features are only tangentially addressed and whose scattered, incomplete and
non-harmonised study stands in the way of its internalisation by interpreters and further
shapes the heterogeneous and often ambiguous metalanguage of interpreting studies
(Gambier, 2008, p. 64). The focus on strategic manoeuvring, instead, provides a
comprehensive and intuitive framework for understanding the threefold notion of
argumentation and, by implication, the importance and nature of argumentative
equivalence between the source and the interpreted text.
This does not mean that the swift internalisation of the notion of strategic
manoeuvring and the superficial study of ST argumentation are destined to solve the
ever-present problems of performing unstable interpreting activity. Rather, the
relevance of the pragma-dialectical approach to STs in interpreting research has to be
sought in its explanatory potential, highlighting the salient features of a given instance of
argumentation, and in its methodological and operational guidance, shedding light on the
best way to transfer the pragmatic and argumentative nuances of STs. This is, in
substance, the contribution of argumentation theory to interpreting research and,
consequently, to the interpreting profession: it promotes matter preservation by
emphasising the ST topical potential; it helps preserve energy by showing the speakers
strategies of adaptation to audience demands; and it promotes both energy and matter
preservation by highlighting the distinctive presentational devices of STs, thereby
preventing chemical disasters.

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Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

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Meeting The Demands Of A Changing Electorate:

The political Rhetoric Of Julian Castro And Marco Rubio
Ann E. Burnette & Wayne L. Kraemer
Department of Communication Studies
Texas State University
San Marcos, Texas 78666
U.S.A.
ab11@txstate.edu
Department of Communication Studies
Texas State University
San Marcos, Texas 78666
U.S.A.
wk02@txstate.edu

ABSTRACT: Rapid demographic changes in the United States have made American Hispanics an
increasingly powerful force in American politics. This paper examines the argumentative strategies of two
rising Hispanic stars of American politics: Democrat Julian Castro of Texas and Republican Marco Rubio
of Florida. This paper analyzes the argumentative strategies that Castro and Rubio use in their 2012 party
convention speeches to build political coalitions with Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters.
KEYWORDS: American Dream, American Hispanic politicians, identification, Julian Castro, Marco
Rubio, narrative, political argumentation, political rhetoric.

1. INTRODUCTION
Rapid demographic changes within the United States mean that the country will soon
have a majority-minority population. One group that has gained prominence during this
demographic shift is American Hispanics, who are becoming a critical political
population and are challenging the demographic hegemony held by white Americans.
This demographic change has also created more opportunity than ever before for
Hispanic politicians on the national stage. While many scholars of political rhetoric have
studied the argumentative strategies used by non-Hispanic political rhetors to gain
support from Hispanic voters, this paper examines how Hispanic politicians reach out to
Hispanic and non-Hispanic audiences in their political arguments.
This paper examines the argumentative strategies of two rising Hispanic stars of
American politics: Democrat Julian Castro of Texas and Republican Marco Rubio of
Florida. Castro represents a state that is already majority-minority and Rubio represents a
state that soon will be. Both politicians made strong national debuts as prominent
speakers for their respective parties during the 2012 presidential campaign. Both Castro
and Rubio have parlayed this success into national political recognition. Julian Castro, as
the youngest mayor of a major American city, is frequently mentioned as a possible
Democratic vice presidential or presidential candidate. Meanwhile Marco Rubio has
become an important conservative Republican voice in the U.S. Senate and is viewed as a
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potential Republican vice presidential or presidential candidate. This paper analyzes the
argumentative strategy of identification that Castro and Rubio use in their public
arguments in order to build political coalitions.
In this paper we first provide a snapshot of the rise of the Hispanic voter in the
United States. Second we discuss how narrative provides opportunities for identification
in political rhetoric. Then we analyze the 2012 convention speeches of Marco Rubio and
Julian Castro, in each case examining their narratives recounting their personal stories,
their relationship to the Spanish language and Hispanic culture, and their respective
tellings of the American Dream narrative. Finally, we consider some implications of
Rubio and Castros identification strategies.
2. THE RISE OF THE HISPANIC VOTER
Hispanic politicians, like all politicians, must adapt to heterogeneous audiences in order
to garner enough support to win elections and serve broad constituencies in large and
diverse settings. Stuckey (2000) described political leadership in a campaign context as
the process of crafting a political coalition large enough [and] diverse enough (p. 453)
to win office and govern. Major demographic changes mean that political rhetors must
adapt to a rapidly changing political landscape. The dramatic increase of Hispanic voters
gives Hispanic politicians a ready constituency; it also means that non-Hispanic
politicians must now seriously consider strategies for garnering Hispanic support. Bowler
and Segura (2012) pointed out that Latinos are undermobilized by the parties, which
suggests that the sky is the limit in terms of the political power they could potentially
wield (p. 136).
As of now, the Democratic Party has made more inroads in attracting Latino
voters than has the Republican Party. The Democratic Party has long relied on a coalition
of minority voters, which includes Latinos. In fact, minority voters have been
fundamental to Democratic electoral success. As Bowler and Segura (2012) observed,
Republicans usually win a majority of the white vote . . . suggesting that minority votes
are essential to Democratic competitiveness (p. 3). While Democrats thus need to
continue to attract minority voters in order to remain electorally competitive, Republicans
face the challenge of trying to expand their base beyond white voters. Bowler and Segura
(2012) also noted that the Republican Partys whites-only strategy will become
electorally unviable over time as demography takes its toll (p. 67). In this context the
continuing growth of the Hispanic population is potentially good news for the
Democratic Party. Both political parties, however, are highly motivated to obtain support
from Hispanic voters.
3. NARRATIVE AND IDENTIFICATION
Scholars of political science and political communication have been studying the
increasing Hispanic demographic within the U.S. and the ways in which political rhetoric
has changed in order to reach Hispanic voters. Much of this literature analyzes the
arguments non-Hispanic (primarily Anglo) political rhetors have made in order to gain
support from Hispanic voters (Connaughton, 2004; Connaughton and Jarvis, 2004;
Cisneros, 2009). Many of these analyses describe the strategy of identification. Rhetors
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using identification try to build explicit or implicit connections between themselves and
their audience members (Connaughton, 2004; Connaughton and Jarvis, 2004). Political
speakers may try to foster an audiences sense of identification with experiences, values,
or self-image. Rhetors may try to articulate these connections overtly in their arguments
or may try to invoke this sense of connection through forms of address, use of pronouns,
or choices of examples. Political communication theorists have long viewed
identification as central to understanding the dynamics of American politics
(Connaughton, 2004, p. 132).
One of the ways of achieving identification is through narrative. MacIntyre (1981)
famously argued that humans are essentially story-telling animals (p. 201) and claimed,
we all live our narratives in our lives and we understand our own lives in terms of
narratives (p. 197). Fisher (1984) challenged communication scholars to consider the
power of narrative not only as a discursive strategy but as a mode of reasoning that
shifted focus away from the formal argumentation, emphasis on rationality, and claims of
technical expertise that Fisher said characterized the rational world paradigm. In the
narrative paradigm that he outlined, people could make and judge arguments according
to good reasons and according to inherently understood standards of narrative
probability and narrative fidelity (Fisher, 1984). Fisher (1987) argued that narrative relied
on Burkes idea of identification. Fisher (1987) wrote, the principle of narrative
rationality is identification rather than deliberation (p. 18). Burke (1969) described
identification as the basis of persuasion. He wrote, You persuade a person only insofar
as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea,
identifying your ways with his (Burke, 1969, p. 55). Thus, people judge narratives based
on the degree to which they can identify with the narratives, or feel that the narratives
have expressed some aspect of their essential truth. McClure (2009) contended that
identification is even more important in the function and assessment of narratives than
Fisher had explicated. McClure (2009) argued that the process of identification can
account for the rhetorical viability of the narratives of identity, subjectivity, and
ideology (p. 202).
At key points of the American electoral process, such as the political parties
conventions, the strategy of identification is especially salient. Stuckey (2005) described
how political rhetors seek to create personal points of connection with voters and why
that is significant. She noted, When we choose a particular sort of person to represent us
collectively, we are declaring more than that we trust this person to walk our dogs or
attend our backyard barbecues. We are also saying that we see ourselves reflected in him
or her (Stuckey, 2005, p. 654). Through the use of narrative and identification, Rubio
and Castro positioned themselves as reflecting American society rather than the CubanAmerican or Mexican-American communities. One narrative that American political
rhetors commonly use is the American Dream. Presumably, Americans of all ethnicities
and political affiliations can identify with aspects of the American Dream, which stresses
political freedoms, an egalitarian economic and political system based on meritocracy,
and the expectation that immigrants can improve their lot for themselves and their
descendants. Rowland and Jones (2011) discussed the unique properties of American
Dream narratives, arguing that the focus of the American Dream is not on perfection
found in the past, but on gradually achieving a more perfect future (p. 131-132).
Moreover, they noted, the heroes present in such stories are not larger than life but
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thoroughly ordinary men and women who do extraordinary things in the society
(Rowland & Jones, 2011, p. 132). In their convention addresses, Rubio and Castro sought
to create identification through their respective American Dream narratives. Furthermore,
in order to foster identification, both elevated their humble forebears to the status of hero.
4. MARCIO RUBIO
Marco Rubio was born on May 28, 1971, in Miami, Florida, to Cuban immigrant parents
who later naturalized as American citizens. He graduated from South Miami Senior High
School in 1989 and attended Tarkio College for one year on a football scholarship. He
attended Santa Fe Community College before finishing his B.S. in political science from
the University of Florida in 1993. He earned a law degree from the University of Miami
School of Law in 1996. At the age of 28 Rubio, a Republican, was elected in a special
election to the Florida House of Representatives. He served in the Florida House from
2000 to 2009 and as Speaker of the Florida House from 2007 to 2009. Rubio ran
successfully for the U.S. Senate in 2010 and began serving his term in January 2011.
Late in 2011, The Washington Post and the St. Petersburg Times reported that
Rubio had been telling audiences an inaccurate version of his parents emigration to the
United States. While Rubio had maintained that his parents were forced to leave Cuba in
1959, after Fidel Castro had come to power, in actuality they had left Cuba in 1956.
Rubio (2011) responded, the Post story misses the point completely. The real essence of
my familys story is not about the date my parents first entered the United States. . . . Or
even the date they left Fidel Castros Cuba forever and permanently settled here.
Instead, he claimed, The essence of my family story is why they came to America in the
first place; and why they had to stay (Rubio, 2011). Rubios response signalled that the
American Dream narrative has vital functions apart from relating accurate information.
Rubio addressed the Republican National Convention on Thursday, August 30,
2012. While his speech was not billed as a keynote speechthere was not an official
keynote speech for the conventionRubio spoke immediately before Republican
presidential nominee Mitt Romney, which was a coveted slot. The media coverage of
Rubios speech treated it as a keynote speech and many compared it explicitly to Castros
Democratic keynote speech.
In his speech, Rubio used personal narratives featuring his grandfather and his
parents. He introduced his speech by saying, In 1980, I watched my first Republican
convention with my grandfather (Rubio, 2012). Rubio (2012) said his grandfather was
born to a farming family in rural Cuba. Childhood polio left him permanently disabled.
Because he couldnt work the farm, his family sent him to school, and he became the
only one in the family who could read. Rubio (2012) continued the narrative of his
familys rise from poverty by describing his parents immigration to the United States:
They emigrated to America with little more than the hope of a better life. Rubio (2012)
added, They never made it big. . . . And yet they were successful. Because just a few
decades removed from hopelessness, they made possible for us all the things that had
been impossible for them. These descriptions of his grandfather and parents reinforced
the American Dreams emphasis on ordinary people doing extraordinary things.
One of Rubios personal narratives concerned the family of Republican
presidential nominee Mitt Romney. Rubio (2012) said the American Dream was
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represented by the story of a man who was born into an uncertain future in a foreign
country. His family came to America to escape revolution. They struggled through
poverty and the great depression. Rubio (2012) explained that this man, George
Romney, nevertheless rose to be an admired businessman and public servant. And in
November, his son, Mitt Romney, will be elected President of the United States. This
narrative showed Mitt Romney in a more personal light by describing the struggles of his
father. The story also made it possible for Americans of all backgrounds to identify with
the affluent Romney because of the Romney familys humble beginnings.
We hypothesized that Rubio and Castro would take time in their speeches to
articulate their understandings of their Hispanic identities and how they fit into the larger
American society. It is notable that in these speeches they did not. Instead they invoked a
distinctly Hispanic identity by occasionally speaking in Spanish or quoting Spanish
remarks made by family members. This is an efficient way to self-identify as Hispanic
and invite identification with other Hispanic citizens while not excluding non-Hispanic
voters. Rubio (2012) recalled, My Dad used to tell us: En este pais, ustedes van a poder
lograr todas las cosas que nosotros no pudimos. In this country, you will be able to
accomplish all the things we never could. This Spanish phrase and its English
translation invited both Spanish-speaking and English-speaking audience members to
identify with Rubio. In this anecdote Rubio also connected his use of Spanish to his
personal narrative and to the narrative of the American Dream.
Finally, Rubio in his speech shared several variations of the American Dream
narrative. Often these narratives reinforced the importance of his personal narratives
about his family. As he remembered his grandfather, Rubio (2012) said, I dont
remember everything we talked about, but the one thing I remember, is the one thing he
wanted me never to forget . . . there was no limit to how far I could go, because I was an
American. He also used the story of his father to express the American Dream. Rubio
(2012) recalled, A few years ago during a speech, I noticed a bartender behind a portable
bar at the back of the ballroom. I remembered my father who had worked for many years
as a banquet bartender. Rubio (2012) reflected that his father stood behind a bar in the
back of the room all those years, so one day I could stand behind a podium in the front of
the room. He continued, That journey, from behind the bar to behind this podium, goes
to the essence of the American miraclethat were exceptional . . . because dreams that
are impossible anywhere else, come true here (Rubio, 2012). It is also critical that the
American Dream be accessible to everyone. Rubio (2012) stressed this accessibility,
arguing, Thats not just my story. Thats your story. Thats our story. Toward the end
of his speech he said, America is the story of everyday people who did extraordinary
things. . . . Their stories may never be famous, but in the lives they lived, you find the
living essence of Americas greatness (Rubio, 2012). Rubio emphasized the ordinary
nature of the characters of the American Dream narrative and thus explicitly sought to
establish identification with every member of the audience.
5. JULIAN CASTRO
Julian Castro was born on September 16, 1974, along with his twin brother Joaquin, in
San Antonio, Texas. His family was Mexican-American. His mother, Maria Castro, was a
political activist in San Antonio who helped found the political party La Raza Unida. Her
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politics instilled in Julian a sense of social responsibility to his community. Castros

father, Jesse Guzman, was also a political activist and a retired math teacher. After
completing high school at Thomas Jefferson High School in San Antonio, Castro and his
brother attended Stanford University where he majored in communications and political
science and graduated with honors and distinction. After graduating the brothers attended
Harvard Law School. Castro ran for City Council after returning to San Antonio from law
school and served on the council from 2001 to 2005. He ran for mayor in 2005 but was
defeated, and then ran again and won in 2009. He was re-elected in 2011 with 82 per cent
of the vote.
On September 4, 2012, San Antonio Mayor Julian Castro delivered the keynote
address at the Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina. At 37 years
old, Castro was the youngest and the first Hispanic speaker to deliver a keynote address
to the Democratic National Convention. Political observers and journalists noted the
significance of his speech. The Guardian reported that Castro was breaking one more
glass ceiling for this rapidly rising demographic force in American politics (Pilkington,
2012).
Like Rubio, Castro shared personal narratives that invited the audience to identify
with the speaker. Castros first narrative detailed his unlikely journey to the convention
floor and the influence of his grandmother (Castro, 2012). He told the story of how his
grandmother moved from Mexico to the United States as an orphan to live with relatives
in San Antonio. Her formative years were difficult and she only went to school through
the fourth grade because, as Castro (2012) explained, She had to drop out and start
working to help her family and that she spent her whole life working as a maid, a cook
and a babysitter, barely scraping by. Castro told how she managed to teach herself to
read and write in English and Spanish. He reminisced, And I can still remember her,
every morning as Joaquin and I walked out the door to school, making the sign of the
cross behind us, saying, Que dios los bendiga. May God bless you (Castro, 2012).
Later Castro explained that he used that phrase to send his daughter off to school.
Castros second personal narrative detailed what he had accomplished as mayor. He
described programs that were implemented to help four-year-olds have access to pre-K
school programs and he explained his concept of Caf College, where students get help
with everything from test prep to financial aid paperwork (Castro, 2012). He continued,
Were investing in our young minds today to be competitive in the global economy
tomorrow (Castro, 2012). In this way Castro indicated that he shared and supported
Americans quest for betterment through education.
Castro used a personal narrative about Republican presidential nominee Mitt
Romney to underscore how the American Dream works. Castro told the Democratic
delegates that Romney advised a group of college students to start their own businesses
by borrowing money from their parents. Castro chided Romney for assuming that all
Americans could pursue the American Dream by relying financially on their parents.
Castro remarked, I dont think Governor Romney meant any harm. I think hes a good
guy. He just has no idea how good hes had it (Castro, 2012). This narrative highlighted
the Democratic criticism that Republicans underestimate the work required to attain the
dream.
Castro also addressed his relationship to the Spanish language and Hispanic
culture. As mentioned previously, we expected both speakers to use more Spanish in their
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speeches. Castro used only one Spanish phrase three times in the speech. The phrase
Que dios te bendiga or God bless you is used once in the beginning of the speech and
twice at the end of the speech. It is interesting to note that Castro, who is second
generation American, did not speak Spanish growing up. His mother spoke English to
them in the home and he took Japanese and Latin in high school. In fact, he had to have a
tutor to teach him Spanish (Gates, 2012). There is an expectation that politicians who
identify as Hispanic automatically speak Spanish. This assumption is incorrect.
Castro also used narratives to convey that the American Dream is obtainable. The
dream narratives functioned argumentatively in the speech by illustrating how ordinary
individuals achieve the dream. The narratives also created identification with Democratic
supporters by associating the dream with the Democrats and Obama. In his first example,
Castros explanation of his grandmothers plight reaching the United States provided one
illustration of the dream:
My grandmother spent her whole life working as a maid, a cook and a babysitter,
barely scraping by, but still working hard to give my mother, her only child, a
chance in life, so that my mother could give my brother and me an even better one
(Castro, 2012).
Castro (2012) concluded:
My grandmother didnt live to see us begin our public service. But she probably
would have thought it extraordinary that just two generations after she arrived San
Antonio, one grandson would be the mayor and the other would be on his way
the good people of San Antonio willingto the United States Congress.
This personal illustration evolved into a generalized version of the American Dream.
Castro (2012) noted that his familys story was not unique or special but that America
made the story possible. America facilitated Castros grandmothers achievement of the
dream. Castro (2012) said that his grandmother believed that opportunity created today
would lead to prosperity tomorrow and would provide the chance for your children to
do better than you did. Additionally, he believed that the attainment of the dream was
not immediate but took time and perseverance. He argued, In the end, the American
dream is not a sprint, or even a marathon, but a relay where each generation passes on
to the next the fruits of their labor (Castro, 2012). Castro (2012) also indicated that the
American Dream was not just an American dream, but a human dream. He argued,
The dream is universal, but America makes it possible (Castro, 2012). Indeed, that
opportunity provided a bridge for Castro to achieve his own dream. Finally, the dream
required responsibility and dedication to the nation. It needed the American spirit to
move from the reality of the narrative to an emotionally charged dream.
6. CONCLUSION
Both Rubio and Castro are rising young Hispanics who must attract non-Hispanic as well
as Hispanic voters to further their political careers. Although they represent different
political parties and would likely argue that their political philosophies are incompatible
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with each others, there are many similarities in the strategies of narrative and
identification that both speakers used in their political convention speeches. Both relied
on personal narratives that invited Hispanic and non-Hispanic audience members to
identify with them. Rubio and Castro also used Spanish in their speeches to signal their
Hispanic identity, but made the Spanish understandable to non-Spanish-speaking
audience members by using only short Spanish phrases and by translating them into
English. And both speakers also shared narratives that personified the American dream.
This dream resonates with the Hispanic and non-Hispanic population.
We note some additional similarities between Rubio and Castros strategies in
their speeches. First, while the reasons for their families immigration and their families
countries of origins were different, Rubio and Castro describe their respective
grandparents as having the same reasons for coming to America. According to their
speeches, Rubios Cuban grandfather and Castros Mexican grandmother wanted future
generations of their families to experience the availability of opportunity. Both forebears
believed that their descendants would be able to improve their lot through hard work and
thereby participate in the American Dream.
Another similarity between the speeches was that Rubio and Castro argued that
the American experience was unique. Rubio (2012) noted, For those of us who were
born and raised in this country, its easy to forget how special America is. But my
grandfather understood how different America is from the rest of the world. Castro
(2012) claimed, My familys story isnt special. Whats special is the America that
makes our story possible. In both cases, the speakers expressed the belief that their
personal success was possible only in America. To audience members whose families
have recently emigrated to the United States, including many Hispanic Americans, this
message could be especially persuasive.
A third common theme was that the success promised by the American Dream
would take more than one generation. According to Rubio, his familys experience
started with his disabled and uneducated grandfathers vision of opportunity, which led to
his parents working in low status retail and food service jobs. But it was the dreams and
hard work of those generations that made it possible for Rubio to achieve his success.
Castros multi-generational narrative was comparable. His grandmother also had no
formal education and worked as a domestic labourer. While she didnt live to see us
begin our lives in public service, said Castro (2012), his grandmother probably would
have thought it extraordinary that just two generations after she arrived in San Antonio,
one grandson would be the mayor and the other would be on his way . . . to the United
States Congress. Castro (2012) characterized this multi-generational phenomenon by
saying, In the end, the American Dream is not a sprint, or even a marathon, but a relay.
Both Rubio and Castro also described the American Dream in terms that were
consistent with Rowland and Joness (2011) observation that American Dream narratives
feature ordinary people who work toward a more perfect future. Rubio recounted how the
Rubio family moved symbolically from the back of the ballroom (his father serving as
bartender) to the podium in the front of the room (Rubio himself speaking to an
audience). And Castro (2012) recounted that his mother fought hard for civil rights so
that instead of a mop, I could hold this microphone. In these invocations of the
American Dream, all people who work hard and believe in the dream are participating in
the dream, no matter how humble their circumstances are. Audience members can see
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themselves as participating in the American Dream regardless of their own status. This
creates more opportunities for people to identify with the speakers narratives.
Finally, in their narratives, both Rubio and Castro presented themselves as the
embodiment of the American story. Stuckey (2005) argued that political rhetors want to
connect with voters on a personal level and that voters want to see themselves reflected
in their politicians (654). Rubio and Castro shared their personal narratives and linked
those narratives to the universal American experience. In the way they shared these
personal narratives, Rubio and Castro conveyed that they are representative of all
Americans, regardless of ethnicity, country of origin, or generation. Potentially all
Americans can identify with them. These political rhetors thus positioned themselves not
as Hispanic politicians, but as American politicians. From this rhetorical standpoint,
they can make the broadest appeal to American voters.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
The authors would like to thank the Texas State University Faculty Senate for providing
funding for this project through the Texas State University Research Enhancement
Program.

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Gates, S. (2012, September 6). Julian Castros Spanish skills: Does it matter that the Latino mayor doesnt
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Rowland, R. C., and J. M. Jones. (2011). One dream: Barack Obama, race, and the American Dream.
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Justification And Effectiveness: Critical Thinking And Strategic

Maneuvering
Begoa Carrascal & Miguel Mori
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science
University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)
Avda. Tolosa 70.
20018 Donostia-San Sebastin. Spain
b.carrascal@ehu.es
I. B. D. Bilintx
Zemoriya, 20.
20013 Donostia-San Sebastin. Spain
mori@irakasle.net

ABSTRACT: Advocates of dialectical perspectives and critical thinking theorists require all the objections
to a standpoint to be considered in order to justify it. Rhetorical attitudes on persuasion seem to contradict
this position. Pragma-dialecticians relieve the tension between justification and effectiveness by strategic
maneuvering. We find it necessary to link the nature of the issue and the degree of uncertainty to the
rhetorical context to adapt the argumentative dialectical procedures.
KEYWORDS: context, effectiveness, justification, persuasion, rhetoric, uncertainty

1. INTRODUCTION
There are different senses of using, and subsequent ways of defining what is meant by
argument. An argument can be defined as a set of statements, one of which, called the
conclusion (thesis, claim, standpoint etc.) is affirmed on the basis of the others. An
argument can also be defined as an act of persuasion intended to cause an interlocutor to
believe that something is the case. Arguing can be seen also as a mutual pursuit of truth
or shared understanding.
By arguing one may try to sustain a well-grounded theory or a settled factual
claim related to some state of affairs unknown to the addressee, but arguing can be also
just a way of thinking about a claim that at the moment is uncertain for both parties in the
discussion. Sometimes it is possible to analytically confirm the adequacy of the claim by
means of sound arguments but in many cases, the justification of a claim may not fulfill
strong epistemic requirements. Nevertheless, in many such cases, a change in the
cognitive environment of the interlocutors can be induced because the acceptance of the
claim can be strengthened as a consequence of the dialectical interchange.
As a consequence of the different approaches to the concept of argument, there
are also different proposals for a theory of argument(ation), with evident tension between
strong epistemic proposals and more holistic approaches that include elements related to
the social component of argumentative practices.
For us, the relationship between justification of the claim, dialectic obligations
and rhetorical strategies, in other words, the relationship between justification and
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persuasion, is context dependent. The role of rhetorical inputs may be minimal in simple
argumentative examples but it grows with the complexity of the argumentation and varies
depending on the audiences and the different issues and contexts.
Certainly, the goal of the argumentation, at least in its explicit agenda, should be
related to epistemic notions such as truth and soundness. However, real argumentations
constitute, in most cases, complex processes in which the issues and the rules to follow
are not so clear. The dichotomy between truth and falsity does not always apply.
Moreover and above all, it does not apply in the cases in which arguing fulfills its most
important function, as in courts of law, in early stages of scientific inquiries, in public
decision-making, in negotiations, conflict resolution and resolution of differences of
opinion, in many everyday discussions or in fields or situations in which the theoretical
standards of science cannot be fulfilled.
2. JUSTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVENESS
For epistemic approaches, justification is a feature that is constitutive of arguments
(Bermejo-Luque, 2010) and the only truly important requirement to evaluate them. From
this point of view, the use of persuasion as a criterion cannot avoid the threat of
relativism and renders epistemic criteria irrelevant.
In our opinion, the relationship between epistemic and persuasive constituents is
complex and the combination of the ideas of epistemic vigilance and of the
argumentative theory of reasoning proposed by Sperber et al. (2010), may help us to
understand it. Sperber et al. maintain that reasoning should be considered as a tool to
persuade others and is a result of the evolution of humans as social beings. Their theory
predicts the preponderance of confirmation bias in the production of arguments but also
the epistemic vigilance of the argumentations of the interlocutors (the search for
incoherencies, false affirmations, errors in the inferences or fallacies).
Even before the ideas of Sperber et al. were made public, empirical researches on
argumentative practice could be used to confirm some of those hypotheses. Deana Kuhn
(1991), for instance, in her survey about argumentative justification of the cause of an
event, finds that only 19-22% of the participants do not regard the evidence they offer as
sufficient to prove the correctness of their theory. The remaining subjects, roughly 80%
of the sample, regard their evidence as proof of the correctness of their causal theories,
irrespective of the actual quality of this evidence.
Sperber et al. think that the use or rhetoric strategies to persuade others in a mixed
argumentative practice may work well to obtain sound epistemic results in many cases,
mainly when the aim of the parties is to reach a proper conclusion:
When people with different viewpoints share a genuine interest in reaching the right conclusion,
the confirmation bias makes it possible to arrive at an efficient division of cognitive labour. Each
individual looks only for reasons to support their own position, while exercising vigilance towards
the arguments proposed by others and evaluating them carefully. This requires much less work
than having to search exhaustively for the pros and cons of every position present in the group (p.
378).

However, many theorists think that if persuasion is the main goal of argumentation,
reasonableness and cogency may be at risk. The critical thinking movement tries to
210

protect against this risk and many textbooks stress the need to adopt a critical attitude
avoiding biases. Thus, they recommend moving further away from a simple
epistemologically make sense attitude guided by a strong confirmation bias that may
not change without a deliberate educational intervention (Perkins, Faraday & Bushey,
1991). This critical attitude is characterized by Bailin & Battersby (2010) as openmindedness: acceptance of the possibility of being wrong and thereby the willingness to
consider evidence and views that are contrary to our own (p. 15) and fair-mindedness
that requires us to be as unbiased and impartial as we can when making a judgment(p.
15). While open-mindedness can be seen as the genuine interest in reaching the right
conclusion referred to by Sperber et al. in the above-cited passage, fair-mindedness
presupposes a very strong epistemic requirement that can be contrary to the use of many
persuasive strategies.
Critical thinking education may have an important role in the development of a
more conscious and refined epistemic vigilance and in strengthening the argumentative
skills necessary to make better established justifications. Critical thinking courses help
the students understanding meta-cognitive aspects of the argumentation and train them in
the task of arriving at reasoned arguments on complex issues (Battersby & Bailin,
2011, p. 244). Nevertheless, we think that argumentative instruction should be extended
also to develop capacities to deploy persuasive strategies.
The theoretical notion of strategic maneuvering integrated in the pragmadialectical framework (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009) manifests itself in the choice of
presentational devices, the framing of the issue and the adaptation to the intended
audience in an argumentative situation. This choice facilitates understanding of the
arguments and their reception in a favorable view. Strategic-maneuvering is considered
by pragma-dialecticians as compatible with the rules governing a critical discussion and it
includes part of what we consider rhetorical practice. However, as we will try to show in
the next sections, in the practice or arguing the use of persuasive strategies is not always
fully compatible with the ideal dialectical rules, but it may be the best or the only way to
achieve a rational outcome in a particular situation.
When people engage in arguing to resolve a difference of opinion they implicitly
accept some general principles or rules under which the verbal interaction occurs. In
many cases, participants in a debate or discussion intercalate ground-level arguments
related to the issue under discussion with meta-arguments about the epistemic status of
the premises, the soundness of the inferences, their relevance, the attribution of the
burden of the proof, etc. Moreover, when, for example in the CEDA (Cross Examination
Debate Association) debates in the nineties, meta-argumentative critiques were
discouraged in favor of specific and temporally-bound scenario-based interpretations,
some researchers thought that these limitations constituted an obstacle to creativity and
argumentative self-regulation (Broda-Bahm, 1993, p. 2)
As in the case of the particular rules of the CEDA debates in the nineties, in
sections 4, 5 and 6 we will present more examples to show that consensual standards of
what is argumentatively appropriate may change through time and different
argumentative scenarios, and that apart from very general standards, this adaptation to the
particular context is necessary if we want to be fair in assessing argumentative
exchanges.

211

3. ARGUMENTATION IN CONTEXT
Through the short history of modern argumentation theory, many proposals have stated
that there are different types of argumentative discourse that follow specific norms to
adapt to the particular context in which the discursive activities arise. That is, many
authors think that different contexts of argumentation ask the arguer to use different
cognitive skills and strategies to modulate the requirements of the task.
The antecedents of this debate on context dependency go back to the works of
Stephen Toulmin (1953; 1958). Toulmin maintained that the kinds of data and warrants
to justify a point and the criteria of evaluation of arguments are not universal but fielddependent and that they should be adapted to the particular field in which the argument is
situated. His definition of argument field, however, was not sufficiently clear. Toulmin,
himself, used this term differently throughout his work. In his first proposal in 1958 he
considered that two arguments belong to the same field when the data and the
conclusion in each of the two arguments are, respectively, of the same logical type (p.
14). Further on in the same book, he added to this definition that fields differ because
they address different kinds of problems and, in (Toulmin, 1972) he considered fields as
rational enterprises that could be identified with intellectual disciplines (Zarefsky,
1982; 2014). These diffuse and different definitions resulted in lively discussions in the
70s and 80s that opened the way toward finding a possible definition or different uses of
the notion of field which, as a consequence, contributed to conceptual confusion about
this term. Conflicting definitions and overall confusion led, in the end, to its virtual
disappearance from debates, conferences and literature.
Following Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) rhetorical perspective which
stated that arguments are determined by the audience, McKerrows proposal of
argument communities (McKerrow, 1980) and Goodnights view of spheres of
discourse (Goodnight, 1982) tried to look for a way out of the plurality of perspectives
in field theory.
Goodnight proposed to leave aside the term field due to the difficulties
encountered in fixing its meaning, and to use the more general idea of spheres of
discourse. Without aiming to be exhaustive, he distinguished three main spheres of
argument, the private, the public and the technical. The first one would encompass
roughly all the informal argumentative interpersonal exchanges; the second one, the
discourses related to public or political deliberation; and the third one, all the
argumentation related to the academic disciplines. It is now clear that this new idea and
classification of spheres is not free of problems. Although it is a more general concept
than that of field it is precisely its generality that makes its use difficult if the purpose is
to advance toward a better understanding of particular argumentative practices.
In 1980, McKerrow defined a community as a collective of people interacting in
a space-time continuum that share the same type of discourse and a set of rules for
verbal or non-verbal behavior which are authorized and guided by the uniting rationale
for their common aspirations, and which are observed in the display of their communal
interactions (p. 28). In McKerrows view, communities determined the appropriate
argumentative norms and the evaluative standards that prevail in the community
(Zarefsky, 2014, p. 78). Although the idea of community is interesting, it is also very
vague and difficult to fix with more precision. It underlies, in our opinion, the idea of
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culture, but of different cultures coexisting at the same time, because different
communities intersect each other and members of a community can, at the same time, be
part of another;
van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2005) handle the question of adaptation to the
audience to achieve argumentative success by means of strategic maneuvering. Strategic
maneuvering asks for the observation of the various argumentative activity types
defined as conventionalized entities that can be distinguished by external empirical
observations of the communicative practices in the various domains. They equate those
activity types to Goodnight spheres of discourse (p. 76). The observance of particular
rules in different argumentative activities is important to improve our argumentative
models but by looking at the examples they provide, we think that in some cases, it may
be difficult to integrate particular rules with the observance of the rules of the ideal
pragma-dialectical model. For example, the use of persuasive strategies in a negotiation
might not be fully compatible with many of the ideal dialectical rules (closure, burden of
proof, validity, etc.). However, a particular rhetorical move such as avoiding the more
conflictive points, even if it does not help justify your position, may be good to achieve a
rational outcome.
Recently, Rowland (2008) has maintained that the conflicting approaches to
argument fields were not inconsistent but that they reflected different aspects of what he
prefers to call field practices. As he states:
It now seems obvious that one cannot adequately define the field in which a given argumentative
controversy occurs without a focus on subject matter, audience characteristics, argument forms
found in the area, propositional content, argument models serving as terministic devices to aid
comprehension, disciplinary organizations, the evolution of argument practices, and a
consideration of shared purpose. (Rowland, 2008, p. 242)

Underlying all the previous proposals is the notion that the participants in the
argumentative discussion have to share the same type of discourse, that is, the way to
handle the special terms and references they may use, has to be recognized as endoxa or
shared knowledge to which the interlocutors in the exchange are committed. The same
idea applies to special structural ways of presenting those thoughts in an argumentative
dialog. Moreover, if argumentation is a kind of communicative discourse, argumentative
exchanges are also subjected to communicative general principles. The idea of the
cognitive environment of Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) is, for us (and for some
others, see for example, Tindale, 1999 and Kraus, 2011) an important notion that
represents a minimum common basis for all the above-stated proposals.
Sperber and Wilson define the cognitive environment of an individual as the set of
facts or true beliefs that are manifest to that individual at a given moment. To be
manifest is either to be perceptible or inferable. In a dialog both interlocutors may share
parts of their respective cognitive environments. This shared cognitive environment
includes both participants in the exchange and the shared mutual knowledge that is
manifest to both of them at the time of the utterance, which may include knowledge
relative to the social or cultural group of which they are part.
According to Sperber and Wilson, in all communicative exchanges participants
look for information that may alter or reorganize their respective cognitive environment.
Argumentation is a specific form of communication whose goal is to alter the cognitive
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environment of the addressee by means of reason. If both interlocutors share a large part
of their respective cognitive environment and are willing to discuss a point, the
possibilities for argumentation to work are better because each interlocutor can connect
more easily with the system of beliefs of the other. Kraus (2011) considers this shared
environment a particular kind of community which he calls argument community. For
him, cognitive communities are not fixed entities and their boundaries are neither
universal nor fixed (p. 6) and may realign according to individual cases. This being true
for ordinary cases of argumentation, it is also true that for argumentative exchanges that
arise in institutionalized contexts, a large part of the shared institutionalized environment
may remain fixed. In this way, by being part of the shared context, participants in a
discussion have to adapt their discourses to the institutionalized form of arguing or, in the
words of van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2005), to the institutionalized activity type.
In this respect, Rigotti (2006) emphasizes two relevant dimensions in an
argumentative context, which he characterizes as the institutional and the interpersonal
dimensions. The institutional context refers to the institutional field in which the
interaction takes place and to the activity type in which the participants engage (for
example, adjudication, negotiation, mediation, and public debate, as presented in van
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005). The institutional context dictates the roles of the
interlocutors, who have to adapt to the special requirements of it, make their own
interpretations of the rules to follow, and play their roles in the way demanded by the
institutional situation. The interpersonal context includes a rich network of relationships
between the arguer and the audience. Those relationships are bounded and modulated by
the participation of the interlocutors in a community and a culture. Across both
dimensions there are other contextual sides to be stressed, related to the individual
circumstances of the interaction. We can cite for example, the communication channels
(face to face dialogue, written argumentation, public dissertations, Internet chat), time
constraints, the motivation of the arguer and the presupposed motivation of the audience
to accept the claim (that may change depending on the importance of the claim in their
belief systems or on the impact of its acceptance on their lives), the arguers knowledge
about the topic and about the views of the audience, etc.
These contextual aspects may vary from one argumentative practice to another,
giving rise to different degrees of uncertainty. Contextual considerations and specific
requirements of an argumentative situation, cognitive aspects of the issue and the
adaptation of the participants to the activity type may help us to make the analysis and
assessment of an actual practice more flexible and to give an account of the dynamic
communicational process involved in every argumentative discussion.
To make our point clearer, in the next sections, we will consider briefly examples
of two different scientific disciplines, some features of pro and contra conductive
arguments, and some aspects of argumentative practice oriented to decision-making.
4. ARGUMENTATION IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICES
Many researchers in the field of argumentation and also in mathematics maintain that
almost all of what is done in mathematics is informal in the sense that it is not done in a
purely formal system (see Aberdein, 2009 for references, also Carrascal, 2013). The
discovery part of a proof is possibly the most difficult phase of any mathematical work.
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Proofs arise in dialogical contexts (even when thinking up a proof to convince oneself)
and uncertainty is usually present in the period of discovery of a proof or while looking
for the solution to a problem. On the way to establishing a proof there are conjectures
(that afterwards can be proven wrong), inferential gaps and appeals to intuition (by the
use of diagrams, for example), and the steps are not formalized. In the process of proving,
ordinary forms of argumentation, as in other communicational contexts, are always
present. Plya (1954) stated, that we secure our mathematical knowledge by
demonstrative reasoning, but we support our conjectures by plausible reasoning (p. vi).
As so, controversies occur and are in practice dealt with without fully formalizing them.
For example, Pease & Martin (2012) analyze the Mini-Polymath projects as an example
of collaborative work over the internet to solve demanding problems in mathematics.
They show that 23% of the comments on the problem were made to propose definitions
developed in a variety of ways: analogies, correction of misunderstandings, use of
conjectures, etc.
For the final proof, standards of rigor are specific, and additional requirements of
mathematical practice and proofs are always achieved and checked by the mathematical
community. This does not mean that mathematical products are not communicative
products but that the requirements needed to be considered as proof by the mathematical
community are specific and stricter than those required for ordinary arguments. For
example, notational requirements are a must in mathematical proofs and the deductive
steps of the proof should be verified and presented in a way that can be checked by the
mathematical community. Nevertheless, mathematical proofs are thought out and
presented in different communicative situations that may also demand specific forms of
expression to convince a particular audience. Rhetorical elements to adapt to the situation
are necessary but the special requirements of mathematics for considering a mathematical
product a proof remains.
In the initial stages of any emerging scientific enquiry, not only in mathematics,
uncertainty is also always present. Louise Cummings (2002; 2009) presents a study about
new diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, as a good example of the need
to adapt argumentative procedures to contextual constraints. She argues that possible
informal fallacies such as the argument from ignorance play an important heuristic role in
the application of rational scientific methodology. Argument from ignorance, she
defends, is non-fallacious in these kinds of contexts and helps settle the priorities of the
research, directing projects to a more testable hypothesis. These kinds of presumptive,
non-conclusive arguments are relevant in persuading researchers to take a definite line of
inquiry.
Marcello Pera, a well-known non-relativist philosopher, places rhetoric at the core
of any scientific inquiry:
We have seen that methodological rules have an open texture that can be tightened only through
decisions that have to be well-argued. But making decisions and arguing for them involves
discussing rival views and convincing an audience. This is the fundamental reason why rhetoric
enters into science. (Pera, 1994, p. 51).

Pera assigns to rhetoric the role of adapting methodological rules by means of arguing.
That is, in a scientific enquiry the way to reach a decision should be by giving and asking
for reasons, because methodological rules are open and subjected to interpretation.
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5. CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENTATION AND RHETORIC

The pros and cons type of conductive argumentation that can be found in different
contexts may illustrate the importance of considering the characteristics of the issue in the
evaluation of an argumentative discourse.
A conceptual introduction to conductive argumentation was first proposed by
Wellman (1971; 1975) and it referred mostly to ethical contexts. This conceptualization
was further elaborated by Govier (1999) who advocates its importance in other contexts
such as historical and scientific argumentation. Although almost all components of the
different definitions of conductive arguments are objects of controversy, the existence of
counter-considerations as a part of the argumentative product is the more relevant and
polemical characteristic of this type of argument.
Counter-considerations are different to objections (Govier, 2010). Objections or
presumed objections of the interlocutors need to be accounted for in order to sustain a
claim properly. Counter-considerations are considered part of the argumentation but they
are not to be refuted as the objections and cannot be considered as premises. This fact
makes it difficult to integrate counter-considerations in the structure of the
argumentation.
This difficulty disappears, we think, if we consider the addition of counterconsiderations as rhetorical moves that play a role in the integration of the audience in the
argumentative discussion. Such rhetorical moves can be combined with other linguistic
elements, such as the use of the first person plural or the use of rhetorical questions to
make explicit the character polyphonic of argumentation.
Psychologists studying the development of argumentative skills (Golder &
Coirier, 1996; Golder & Pouit, 2000; Andriessen, 2009), and researchers of the didactic
of argumentation in the classroom (for example, Doltz & Pasquier, 1996; Doltz, 1996;
Douek & Scali, 2000; Douek, 2005) consider arguing as a twofold task in which
justification and adaptation to the addressee are analyzed in the different stages of the
growing process, and are used as criteria to elaborate teaching strategies for the different
ages and subjects. The use of counter-considerations in a dialogical situation may indicate
that the arguers, children or students in classroom settings, are looking at the issue from
different points of view in order to integrate others insights. Rhetorical requirements,
viewed from this perspective, can be considered to correlate with dialectical
requirements. Introducing counter-considerations, the arguer shows that she considers her
claim defeasible and that she is giving the audience space for extended discussion. From
this perspective it can be seen that she respects the opinions of the audience but, at the
same time, the arguer states her conviction that considering all the arguments in favor of
the claim and the related counter-considerations, she may be entitled to maintain her
opinion.
6. JUSTIFICATION AND PERSUASION IN ARGUMENTATION CENTERED ON
CHOICE OF ACTION
Arguing to make a choice in civic decision settings or in more private settings, such as
the individual choice between therapeutic alternatives or investments, has characteristics
216

that are significantly different to argumentation in other settings, as may be the case in
academic controversies. Practical argumentation in informal settings is also different
from argumentation made in institutional contexts.
When we argue to make a decision, the issue is important because, first of all, the
degree of uncertainty is not the same in all the cases in which a decision has to be taken.
Decision-making implies predictions about the future and that depends on some factors
that are partially unknown and out of the control of the people making the decision. For
instance, in the choice of therapeutic alternatives, sometimes the choice can be made by
pursuing protocols that strongly indicate one of two alternatives, but in other cases the
alternative to choose may be uncertain. The evaluation of the results has to be made also
under conditions of uncertainty, the success of a treatment does not mean that the other
alternative would not have been better, and its failure does not mean that the alternative
would not have been worse.
Second, very often the issue has many sides: the desirable outcomes that
constitute the reasons in favor of one decision are often counterbalanced by possible
undesirable consequences that may also be used to reject it or to justify an alternative
decision.
Third, the subjective-objective dichotomy pointed out by Wohlrapp (2008)
presents specific characteristics related to the domain of the discussion through which the
decision has to be made. Personal interests and values often undermine the decision
processes. Values, a relevant aspect of decision-making, are subjective. Certainly, many
reasons for favoring a decision can be related to facts and theories about the world that
can be tested and refined through argumentation. Nevertheless, very often, due to time
and cognitive constraints, decision-making has to be grounded in limited knowledge and
intuitions. Subjective assumptions and suppositions may play an important role due to
material constraints. van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2009) state that as a consequence of
subjective factors, in the resolution stage of a public debate, it is possible that some
members of the audience may change their minds, while others will maintain their initial
positions, because different conclusions may, to some degree, be reasonably justified.
In decision-making, the high degree of uncertainty, the convergence of multiples
factors and the relevance of subjective values and preferences make the role of rhetoric
much more decisive than in other kinds of context. Not only should presentational
devices and audience adaptation be considered; the way of framing the issue may be also
an object of debate, and the construction of the credibility and the status of the
participants always play an important role. If there is room for the justification of
different options, argumentation takes a more intense rhetorical orientation than in other
settings.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Argumentation is a communicative interchange between an arguer and her audience. In
order for the interchange to work, it is crucial that the participants in the interaction
accept the possibility of a change in their system of beliefs.
The persuasion of the interlocutors should be reached by justifying the claim by
means of a discursive game of giving and asking for reasons. Without justification there

217

is no argumentation, but rhetorical strategies or rhetorical maneuvering are always

present in real argumentative practices.
The evaluation of an argumentation should include factors such as the complexity
and nature of the issue and the context, because these factors, among others, determine
the different degrees of uncertainty of an argumentative discussion. If uncertainty cannot
be avoided rhetorical adaptation to the case is unavoidable and more than the product it is
the dynamic process which should be assessed.
The audience plays an important role since argumentative practice is an openended task that can be performed well in many ways but that can go wrong in just as
many. Good or bad instances of an argument are audience-dependent because often the
same argument will be optimal for one audience but inadequate for another.
Rhetorical argumentation has to be considered a rational enterprise (Tindale,
2004; 2009). On many occasions we argue because we hope that by giving and asking for
reasons we can get a clearer and richer understanding of the issue, discard some bad
options, refine errors, build a more accurate and not contradictory set of beliefs, and make
more balanced decisions. As Wohlrapp (2008) states, it is important to dismiss the
dichotomy between procedural and structural dimensions of argumentation to understand
the virtues of arguing in these cases in which an undisputable justification may be
inaccessible. At least in the kind of argumentative contexts in which uncertainty cannot
be avoided, we think, as Tindale (2009) does, that reasonableness arises from the
practices of actual reasoners, it is not an abstract code independent of them that they
consult for corroboration (p. 55).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
This work was partially supported by the FFI 2010-20118 Research Project of the
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.

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A Reason That Desires, A Desires That Reasons Participatory Art And

Guerrilla Advertising
Annalisa Cattani
Fine Art Department, Communication Department.
Academy of Fine Arts Bologna and Ravenna
IULM University, Milan
LABA Rimini
Italy
annalisacattani7@gmail.com

In recent years, many artists have been appropriating the roles of social workers or urban
planners, in order to question and critique the dominant culture by channeling the voices of
the ones who are underrepresented, repressed or left out from political processes.1 They
create Participatory Art, an Art form that involves and engages their audience. Advertising
followed this trend with its Guerrilla Campaigns. It creates unique and provoking
happenings that turns viral provoking a memorable brand experience and in terms of social
advertising, memorable ethic experience.
They seem both following Zygmunt Baumans thesis that it is always easier to focus
on micro-ethics, rather than confront the macro-ethics of the society in which we are
implicated. We are going to analyse the differences between participatory art works and
advertisements using topoi, pragmatic functions and argumentative roles.
Argumentative roles, common places, ethos, guerrilla advertising, logos, participatory
art, pathos, pragmatic function, specific places, happening, monument, flash mob.
Art is no more asked to be contemplated, or just one object to reflect upon, but one action
within society becoming an instrument for a Socratic dialogue, which uses structure and
infrastructures to re-invent them.
A recurrent set of theoretical reference points governs the current literature on
participatory and collaborative art: Walter Benjamin, Michel de Certeau, the Situationist
International, Paulo Freire, Deleuze and Guattari, and Hakim Bey, to name just a few.
Among these, the most frequently cited is the French film-maker and writer Guy Debord, for
his indictment of the alienating and divisive effects of capitalism in The Society of the
Spectacle (1967), and for his theorisation of collectively produced situations. For many
artists and curators Debords critique strikes to the heart of why participation is important as a
project: it rehumanises a society rendered numb and fragmented by the repressive
instrumentality of capitalist production.2 Artistic practice can no longer revolve around the
construction of objects to be consumed by a passive bystander. In this framework, the artist
becomes a non-specialised labourer who can creatively adapt to multiple situations, in
connection to a community, offering a counter model of social unity, often regardless of its
actual politics.
But this attitude towards participation is really something new in Art?
At present we have surely become almost completely alienated from art. We live in a
society where art is primarily a commodity, something people buy instead of make.
Consequently, very few people are actively involved in making art. Because of this general
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lack of participation, many find it difficult to believe that societies have existed in which
literally everybody sang, danced and made their own crafts, all on a daily basis. Active
participation in art has been characteristic of human culture for most of its history, and this
alienation from art is a relatively recent phenomenon. In primitive cultures singing was
virtually interchangeable with speech and done on almost every occasion: social, ritual, work
and recreational. Not to be able to sing or dance was considered such a severe social
handicap. The making of art was a central part of people's lives for most of human history,
until the relatively recent advent of a capitalist, commodity-based culture in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. In that moment the emphasis in art shifted from participants, who could
satisfy their own artistic needs, to specialists, who demanded a paying, non-participating
audience to buy their products'.
It is one of contemporary art main goal to try to reawaken people from this fetishism
transforming art practices into a path against everyday anesthesia. The making of art is an
essential part of our being and of our need to express our feelings and thoughts, joys and
sorrows.
What about advertising?
Not very long time ago advertisements were clearly delineated, different and separate
from art. They were easily recognizable as advertisements and no one expected them to be
anything else. Today, the urban environment includes not only separate instances of art and
advertisements, but advertisements that look suspiciously like art. For example whats the
difference between participatory art and guerrilla advertising?
You might think that the distinction between the two would be obvious. After all, the
goal of advertising is to sell you something, while the goal of art is, quoting Umberto Eco, to
create an open work. Public Art Fight Specific, Audience specific or Social turn states a
political message, subverts a common belief, exists simply for the pleasure of the beholder, or
any number of other reasons. So telling the difference between art and advertisement should
be easy. But what about advertisements where we dont understand whats being promoted or
campaigns where whats promoted suddenly changes amplifying or subverting the original
message?
Lets now see some example analysing them with some rhetorical and argumentative
tools in order to find a way to make a difference.
1. FROM THE MONUMENT TO MEMENTO
As an artist I was asked to create an art work in connection with a small community from
Pianoro, Bologna, who goes and uses a new social centre on a daily basis. To start the
mediation with the inhabitants I decided to apply topoi,3 according to Perelman schemata. In
Perleman and Olbrecht-Tytecas theory, loci are seen as general strategies or rather
catalogues of the habits of mind endemic to a given culture. Topics provide a roadmap, or
starting point, for the discussion of problems and the resolution of difficulties. They are both a
method of problem recognition and a means of problem solution. Invention uses topics to
identify and analyse difficulties placed before an actor. Hence invention and topical reasoning
are essentially pragmatic in nature for they are directed to the solving of problems about what
to do.4
Perleman and Olbrecht-Tyteca framework offers a simplified scheme of the
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classical topoi as they call topoi only the general premises which make possible to ground
values and hierarchies, i.e. the ones that Aristotle studies among the loci of the accident:
quality,quantity, existence, essence, order and person. Using these categories I tried to involve
people from Pianoro not in my personal initiative, but rather in a Socratic dialogue trying to
understand what was important to them, what they wanted to emphasize, in order to grasp
their essence within an art work which was supposed to remain inside the social centre. It
emerged that their personal stories were the things, that more than any other activity, or
material object they wanted in their free time surrounding. As a result they collected their
favourite photos and

(ex.1)
we printed them on the curtain of the centre, (ex.1) melting together their private narratives,
creating an embodied and empathic public sphere. The quantity, represented by the big
amount of pictures collected, helped to build the essence of a community resulting from a
melting pot made of old, young, Italian and foreign people, which is part of Pianoro identity
today.
This project created a good balance among ethos, logos and pathos. In terms of pathos
it promoted compassion in its etymological value, meaning feeling together, sharing
emotion. According to ethos it put on the same level the credibility of the artist and that of the
spectator or in this case the future users of the art work, letting them plan and create together.
For what concerns logos, the semiotic path of the work created a warrant, a general rule in
Toulmins terms, which could be expressed as it follows: Art works should represent the
community in a more direct way, because everyone deserves to be taken as a unique and as a
special person, made of memories and desires
Martha Nussbaum underlines that if there is a project to be put at the centre for the
future is to invest in culture and mediation. The crisis in which we find ourselves is rooted in
the short-term destructive cuts to education and culture. Efficiency, effectiveness and
innovation are directly connected to culture and creativity. We are losing the ability to think
critically, together with the ability to represent the other and the complexity of the world. But
most of all we are losing compassion and empathy5
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According to Martha Nussbaum everyone, in order to be called citizen has to know how to
think critically. In connection with an art work contributing critically to the work means
becoming aware of a process, as well as of the development of the performance. This
awareness approach, however is still quite unusual, most of all towards pre-existing cultural
identities that surround us in our urban reality. Above all the monuments, which have almost
completely lost their reference and their illocutory force. This is a sort of irony of fate if we
take back the etymology of the word monument, obtained from the condensation of the Latin
words monere, which could be interpreted as to warn and manere which means to remain.
Therefore it shouldnt simply denote a cultural object, but a cultural dialectical process which
should create a critical permanent effect, producing continuing reflection on a given person or
event. Unfortunately it is very easy to see how this goal is not achieved, by interviewing any
passer by and asking him\her about this or that historical figure, to see how unknown they
have become to the average citizen. This reflection inspired me to a project in Bolzano, where
I decided to use a monument as a site for a new argumentation.
The artist doesnt create from nothing, he\she transforms dialectically the space adding
new indicators, that, taking back again Sorins Static definitions transform sometimes both
pragmatic function and argumentative role or simply the argumentative role. The pragmatic
function is a conditio sine qua non of the sentence, that in order to communicate must be
recognized as a particular kind of proposition, but its propositional function sometimes is very
different from its argumentative power and intention.
It was previously underlined the fact that the monuments were originally meant as a
sort of personification of a thesis, which should provoke reflection in the mind of the viewer,
like for example the thesis embodied by any monument dedicated to the victims of the war,
which could be verbalized this way: It is a duty to celebrate those who died for the country.
Anyway this argumentative effect has little by little gone lost, leaving marble ghosts watching
us from above, without knowing why. In order to re-establish the original identity, but most of
all the symbolical universal cultural value of a statue in Bolzano I developed the project
Riprendiamoci lAmore (Lets take back our Love). (ex.2)

(ex.2)

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The main square in Bolzano is dominated by the figure of Walther von der Vogelweide a
fascinating marble presence, who is apparently in a familiar way simply called Walther. This
simplification, anyway, took away the real identity of this famous minstrel, letting people
forget that he was one of the most important Minnesaenger of the German Literature, and a
universal poet of courtly love. But this was not the only degeneration of the statue, it often
became the stone of discord in the German-Italian cultural debate. In a bi-lingual city, where
the weight of each linguistic and cultural symbol has a capital importance, the fact that the
most important square is dedicated to a German speaking Literate is sometimes seen as a form
of prevarication.
Asking people and most of all teen agers in the neighbourhood who he was, many of
them didnt know, even if I was well aware that the presence of Walther had caused many
public discussions.
As a first attempt to regain the ethos of Walther von der Vogelweide I used a very
popular pretext: superstition, which under an argumentative perspective could be seen as the
extreme use of the expressive emotional function. I diffused the information among a group of
teen-agers, absolutely not interested, at first, in the figure of Walther, that taking a picture or
simply dedicating him a thought or a message would bring good luck. Suddenly the pedestal
of the statue was overcrowded with people taking pictures and selfies with the poet. Later I
proposed to the city administration to develop a project on Valentines day, in order to create a
moment of shared culture dedicated to the universal value of love. A sound installation gave
German and Italian voice to the statue and some panels, which covered the pedestal, invited
anyone to leave a love message on the plinth with a post it. Seven hundred love messages
were collected within eight hours. (ex.3)

(ex.3)

As a consequence Walther regained name and surname stopping being the German intruder,
and starting being the voice of a performative and patemic loving community.
3. MARIANNE HEIER A DROP IN THE OCEAN
The Norwegian artist Marianne Heier was invited by investors to make a project to
activate Bjrvika, an area in Oslo which was being transformed from an industrial harbour
into Oslos maybe most ambitious residential area. From being associated with hard work, and
also prostitution, this area was supposed to become an area filled with cultural activities,
clubs, and the best contemporary Norwegian architecture. This sort of invitation does present
some problems that are really impossible to ignore. According to the artist the critical
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potential of any project in this situation is necessarily at least partly compromised. However
critical you intend to be, you still end up confirming the structure you meant to criticize,
because the project is proposed within a framework defined and paid for by them. In rhetorical
terms the ethos of the artist tends to converge on the ethos of the art initiatives promoter.
Anyway even if artists are somehow within the frame of the investors they can use this
attention and redirect focus to other problems or parts of the city, and through this create
topics for new discussions. The challenging nature of the situation triggered me.
After considering the various aspects of the situation as carefully as I could, I decided
to accept the invitation says the artist. She decided, in fact, to create a challenging project
connected with the possible loss of the towns historical swimming pools, architectural and
social heritage at the same time, as they represent the Norwegian engagement in training
children since a very young age. Swimming instruction has had high priority in Norwegian
schools during the last half of the twentieth century. It can almost be seen as a part of the
social democratic project. As a fiord country, drowning accidents have traditionally been
common here. Therefore, there was a very specific reason for investing in childrens
swimming abilities. This actually worked, it lead to a large reduction in the frequency of
drowning accidents in Norway. Heier chose to adopt a sort of Robin Hood-strategy
recalling the specific place6 of stealing from the rich, the investors in this case, and giving to
the poor, the increasingly impoverished municipality of Oslo. The initial idea was to
encourage Bjrvika Utvikling AS to reopen Sagene Public Baths, but the budget couldnt
cover it. So she decided to go for a compromise and to open Sagene Bath to the audience just
for one day, in order to focus the attention on the place and on the service that people were
losing and she gave to this action the allusive title A drop in the ocean. (ex.4)

(ex.4)
It was possible to visit the room which contained a sound recording made in another
swimming pool in Oslo which is still in use, so the physical emptiness and dryness of the
space was contrasted and highlighted by a very realistic sound of water splashes, children
playing and jumping. Once again an apparent assertion is transformed into the argumentative
role of critique and recall, making the audience well aware of what they were missing.
Claire Bishops underlines that most of the time participatory projects in the social
field seem to operate with a two fold gesture of opposition and amelioration. They work
against dominant market imperatives by diffusing single authorship into collaborative
activities. Instead of supplying the market with commodities, participatory art is perceived to
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channel arts symbolic capital towards constructive social change. But this has led to a
situation in which socially collaborative practices are all perceived to be equally important
artistic gestures of resistance. It seems that there can be no failed, unsuccessful, unresolved, or
boring works of participatory art, because all are repairing the social bond. While
sympathetic to the latter ambition, I would argue that it is also crucial to discuss, analyse and
compare this work critically as art, since this is the institutional field in which it is endorsed
and disseminated. 7
4. DANTE BEHIND THE FALLING WALL
Lara Favarettos research is balanced between the topics of failure and aspiration. The
memorial form is pointedly evoked in a series that the artist calls Momentary Monuments,
which adopt but also subvert the vernacular of public sculpture. Beginning with a swamp that
she created at the back of the Giardini in Venice to commemorate twenty historical figures,
who have disappeared, and continuing with her sandbagging of a 1896 statue of Dante
Alighieri in a civic square in Trento.8 Even if the idea behind this work could be interesting,
there was an evident lack in participation and mediation.
Favaretto created a wall of sacks that, as a trench, blocked the view of the monument
to Dante. (ex. 5)

(ex.5)
Dante represents the specific place of high culture which is covered in order to be
rediscovered and to make people aware of the loss of cultural identity and of the lack of
investments dedicated to education and research. This big visual speech act in undeniably
engaging, it also reminds of other walls, letting us infere another important thesis which the
artist herself expresses as follows: You should not build walls. They are violent and prevent
the eyes to look beyond them, they force us to an obliged and unavoidable comparison with
our nose.
However, something unexpected happens, the wall collapses, and the work escapes the
will of the artist, but she greets happily the walls fall. Opening up a new combination of
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assumptions the work multiplies its relation to reality. The citizens however dont agree with
this enthusiastic flexibility and they see a lack of engagement and at the same time a waste of
money on a non-working site specific installation. What went wrong? Under an artistic point
of view nothing as this work was even mentioned on a prominent international art magazines:
Artforum as one of the most interesting art works of 2009. But still in Trento public sphere
there is an open wound, there is an evident lack of negotiation. We can only doubtfully
imagine possible alternatives like for example involving the local community asking them to
contribute to build the wall becoming part of the visual metaphor, they might have felt part of
a shared criticism, instead of being just viewers. Each sack could have represented one citizen,
instead of being installed by specialized workers. On the other hand if we stop looking for
consent and just look for feedback we can say that the speech act was simply unlucky, but it
reached its perlocutory effect even if it prevailed the argumentative role of objection and
criticism against the high costs of an ephemeral construction which was perceived as an
unexpected and unprepared vision.
4. MONUMENTS AS TESTIMONIALS
Monuments have recently become the site for social and commercial promotion too. In June
2013, Barcelonas city council shocked residents by renting out the iconic Columbus
Monument to two multinational companies to use as a billboard. They put an enormous
Football Club Barcelona team jersey on the sculpture and began selling athletic shoes and
low-cost trips to tourist destinations in front of the monument.
The advertisement quickly caught the attention of the major TV networks and the most
popular magazines. Enmedio, a radical design collective, noticed that this new spotlight was
worthy of some subversive further argumentative articulation. The first thing they did was call
a press conference at the base of the Columbus Monument and when many journalists
showed up a gigantic yellow balloon suddenly appeared with the words Spain: Champions of
Unemployment written across it in Spanish and English. (ex.6)

(ex.6)

The original commercial message which simply promoted some goods in the name of the
spanish sporting victories, was transformed into a very dialectical social critical hyperboles.
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Nevertheless this was not the result of a shared mediation with the public. The official ad
campaign created widespread media attention, which the Enmedio stunt was then able to
hijack. In order to do so, Enmedio had to do two things well: it had to create a simple image
that could be reproduced easily, and it had to execute the action quickly, before the police
arrived. Both of these objectives were met, and the event was a success. It is questionable if
the effect is going to be long lasting creating self consciousness in the city or just a witty
moment in which the monument becomes a V.I.P. testimonial.
5. FLASHMOBS VS PARADES
Youre walking down the street enjoying some fresh air when all of a sudden a man breaks out
singing and dancing. No, its not a crazy surprise of your friends, youve just been flash
mobbed. Flash mob marketing is popular because its a live act and generates a crowd. Unlike
traditional marketing methods such as billboards and print ads, flash mobs have a tendency to
go viral if done right. One of the most effective flash mob was that dedicated to passengers
landing at Londons Heathrow airport. They were welcomed by an all-singing, all-dancing
flash mob. The unforgettable welcome at Terminal 5 was laid on by T. Mobile who were
filming for the ad. Thousands of passengers were serenaded with a series of songs dedicated
to the specific place of travel and they were all captured on a series of secret cameras. TMobiles Spencer McHugh said: We wanted to create and capture a moment that is so
unique and upbeat that people just want to share it. The communicative and commercial
feedback expected the video to be watched by nearly 10 million people across the UK and
reach more than 2 million households, letting us imagine the economical advantage of the
entire operation. (ex.7)

(ex.7)

229

Analysing the event as a complex speech act we can recognise the performative pragmatic
function, through which the locutor performs instead of saying something and in this case,
thanks to the presence of many singers at the same time, we can speak of a performance that
becomes a big happening involving the audience with a strong expressive emotional function,
totally grounded on pathos. The passenger is not invited to be persuaded, but simply to
become the protagonist of a dedication to humanity, he\she becomes per absurd more a
personification of every man, instead of being a specific person, celebrated and greeted by
perfect strangers. The flash mob celebrates the need of a warmer communication even in an
anonymous place like an airport can be, showing that the telephone company is able to do
miracles in connecting not only people who know each other, but also strangers who become
the source of passionate feeling. Could we speak of participation when our soul is moved
and touched by compassion? And moreover, isnt it dangerous to let the audience reach such
an emotional depth, to disguised it in the end as a fictional sort of candid camera which
promotes a commercial company? Lets take in contrast Marinella Senatore Building
communities practices.
6. MARINELLA SENATORE BUILDING COMMUNITIES
Building Communities is the first museum exhibition of an important selection of projects that
Marinella Senatore has created since 2006. Senatore has been focusing on research about the
involvement of the audience as a key protagonist of her work. The artist describes her role as
that of an activator. I feel that I am part of those processes that see the artist as a director
who has a score through which people negotiate, or contest, their participation, Senatore
says. I seek to put into action an affective exchange that moves from story to story. The tale
itself becomes and exchange and an open laboratory situation, where those who are working
learn something, which they take away with them, along with the memory of having been on
the set. Creating new possibilities for the involvement of the public, the artist has recently
created a series of projects, in Italy and abroad, which are structured as cinematic productions,
workshops, parades and photo shootings, the subject of which includes the creative and
collective process itself. (ex.8)

(ex.8)

230

Involving in an active dialogue a wide number of people, groups and associations large or
small, often outside the art system, Marcella Beccaria writes, Marinella Senatores projects
always construct new and innovative communities, aggregating multiple and heterogeneous
energies. Her process rethinks the possibilities of art as a potent agent of exchange and
cultural growth.9 Senatore organized a public parade, which build a new community around
Castello di Rivoli, from Val Susa to Turin. Apparently the effect could be compared to the
previously analysed T. Mobile flash Mob, in which people were welcomed with singing and
dancing, but whereas in the guerrilla advertising event the spectator remains a spectator, in
Marinella Senatore he\she becomes a protagonist and also one of the authors, becoming part
of a narrative which modifies values, desires, sense of belonging.
7. CONCLUSION
We agree with Claire Bishop that this new proximity between spectacle and participation
underlines the necessity of sustaining a tension between artistic and social critiques and the
need to keep alive the constitutively reflections on quality that characterise the humanities. In
the field of participatory art, quality is often a contested word: rejected by many politicised
artists and curators as serving the interests of the market and powerful elites, but value
judgements are necessary, not as a means to reinforce elite culture and police the boundaries
of art and non- art, but as a way to understand and clarify our shared values at a given
historical moment. Some projects are indisputably more rich, dense and inexhaustible than
others, due to the artists talent for conceiving a complex work and its location within a
specific time, place and situation. The central point is to find ways of accounting for
participatory art that focus on the meaning of what it produces, rather than concentrating only
on the process and one possible way in this sense is starting the analysis with ethos, logos and
pathos, which represent the credibility (ethos) the conceptual articulation (logos), and the
motion of the feelings (pathos). They might appear obvious elements of a formula, but in
reality they are not so obvious. Ethos in particular is highly confused with a false morality, or
with a brand image based on the power of money. To understand the magnitude of this
deterioration it is perhaps the case to define two different perspectives under which Cicero
and Aristotle defined Ethos. The first argued that credibility was to be understood as the
image that you were able to provide for yourself, together with the authenticity of your
personal behaviour. Aristotle, on the other hand, argued that Ethos was the credibility that
you could communicate with your oratorial skills, giving a sort of brand identity, not
necessary coherent with your private life. Which of these two definitions prevail today is quite
obvious, however it is not obvious which of the two attitudes artists want to embrace, most of
all if they are involved in the so called public art social turn. Under the point of view of the
logos, then, I recognize a deep need to create platforms that serve as conceptual devices to
foment dialectical forms of activism and change. But what makes the two previous points so
effective is the pathetic attitude, which becomes the detonator of stories and wonder.
The psychologist Ugo Morelli underlines that the main problem we have today is the
access to knowledge and opportunities. We miss the codes to enter, and this becomes
consequently lack of power of imagination. Alasdair Macintyre points out that modern
reason is no longer able to move to action, because it is a faculty of an isolated individual who
does not recognize his dependence on a cultural dimension of community in which he\she is
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placed. Scitovsky distinguishes between new and comfort: what leads to increases in
happiness is the experience of novelty, but it turns into comfort that soon leads to boredom.
According to this theory, happiness is linked to creativity, which often allows you to make the
experience of novelty and opposes comfort. But what are the ways of creativity? Taking up
again Martha Nussbaum: first of all we need critical thinking: the ability to argue
respectfully with others, to examine the tradition and prejudice with Socratic spirit. Secondly,
we need the history of knowledge. Finally we need the ability to put ourselves in the shoes of
people different from us, class, race and religion.
From this point of view, Participatory Art has carried out these practices as a free form of
expression, creating dialectic engaging art devices. Art does not become simply a subject of
debate, but a real learning medium that offers innovative tools in dealing with issues related to
communal living.
Nicolas Bourriaud argues repeatedly that art is a state of encounter. Pierpaolo
Donati stresses that every relationship is a reality that is immaterial that stands between the
acting subjects, and directs the reciprocal act and consists of subjective and objective elements
which define the distance. Under this perspective the use of pragmatic functions and
argumentative role was very useful to grasp the illocutory force of participatory art and
advertising multimodal processes. The artists and all those who act in this context must first
hearkens and then begin a mediation in order to reduce this distance without eliminating it.
Donati goes further and speaks of relational goods defined as emergent effects of the
action, not the effect of the choices of the actor, or the environment, but the product or effect
of concrete relations, assets that can change the very will of the actors, promoting action and
knowledge through the desire of the novelty, what Aristotle stressed: a reason that desires
and a desire that reasons.

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https://www.academia.edu/771895/On_participatory_art_Interview_with_Claire_Bishop
http://selforganizedseminar.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/bishop-claire-artificial-hells-participatoryart-and-politics-spectatorship.pdf
Topics were deemed to be the means by which arguments are discovered and knowledge is obtained
http://www.dougwalton.ca/papers%20in%20pdf/06arg_reason_patterns.pdf.
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/topics1.htm
Martha Nussbaum, Non per profitto. Perch le democrazie hanno bisogno della cultura umanistica 2014, Il
Mulino, Bologna
http://selforganizedseminar.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/bishop-claire-artificial-hells-participatoryart-and-politics-spectatorship.pdf
http://momaps1.org/exhibitions/view/350

NOTES
1

https://www.academia.edu/771895/On_participatory_art_Interview_with_Claire_Bishop
http://selforganizedseminar.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/bishop-claire-artificial-hells-participatory-art-andpolitics-spectatorship.pdf
3
In Aristotle, topoi have the twofold function of proof and invention, that is, they are regarded as points of view
under which a conclusion can be proved true or false, and as places where arguments can be found.
Topics were deemed to be the means by which arguments are discovered and knowledge is obtained
http://www.dougwalton.ca/papers%20in%20pdf/06arg_reason_patterns.pdf.
4
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/topics1.htm
5
Martha Nussbaum, Non per profitto. Perch le democrazie hanno bisogno della cultura umanistica 2014, Il
Mulino, Bologna
6
according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca a specific place is a recurrent narrative, in similar disciplines.
7
http://selforganizedseminar.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/bishop-claire-artificial-hells-participatory-art-andpolitics-spectatorship.pdf
8
http://momaps1.org/exhibitions/view/350
9
http://moussemagazine.it/marinella-senatore-rivoli/
2

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The Sliding Scales Of Repentance: Understanding Variation In

Political Apologies For Infidelity
Martha S. Cheng
Department of English
Rollins College
United States of America
mcheng@rollins.edu

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the apologies of four US politicians whose marital infidelities were
made public. The paper notes the variations in the use of religious language, representations of the
transgressions, and metadiscourse. These variations can be calibrated to political ethos, the nature of the
transgression, and the amount of repair work required. Thus, generic qualities of the personal political
apology are best interpreted as existing on a sliding scale relative to the situation.
KEYWORDS: Anthony Weiner, Eliot Spitzer, ethos, image restoration, Mark Sanford, Mark Souder,
metadiscourse, political apology, representations of social events, stance.

1. INTRODUCTION
Apologies abound in everyday life as important speech acts that support saving face,
maintaining relationships, improving ethos, and righting wrongs. Over the years
discourse scholars have studied public apologies, identifying various shared
characteristics. They have been particularly interested in how political apology works
rhetorically to repair relations among different parties and repair the image of the one
apologizing.
While the majority of studies have helped define the genre, a few have pointed out
variations in public apologies due to cultural resources and speaker roles. In this paper, I
also investigate variations, but do so by looking at apologies from similar rhetorical
situations. I limit the variables of difference by investigating personal political
apologiesthose made for personal indiscretionsin these cases, marital infidelity by
US elected politicians: Mark Sanford, Eliot Spitzer, Mark Souder, and Anthony Weiner.
These speech events share the same cultural context, speaker roles, transgression, and
mass media dissemination. By limiting the variables of these selected speeches, I sought a
more detailed understanding of the linguistic and rhetorical choices made by the speakers
and thus, a more nuanced understanding of apologetic practices. The analysis revealed
variations in the use of religious language, representations of the transgressions, and the
use of metadiscourse. These differences can be calibrated to the speakers established
political ethos, the nature of the transgression, and the amount of repair work required of
the speaker. I will first provide an overview of apology, then discuss characteristics
shared by the apologies investigated for this study, and finally, I will examine their
variations.

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2. APOLOGY
For the ancient Greeks, apologia referred to an orators speech of self-defense in a trial
(Cooper, 1997). Today, apology is commonly understood as a speech act in which
speakers try to repair the damage done to a relationship by acknowledging and expressing
regret for some perceived offense or failure. An offense can cause doubt in the offenders
ethos along various lines, such as moral integrity, faithfulness to a commitment, or
competency in a given task. According to Lazare, a genuine apology must acknowledge
[the] offense adequately,express genuine remorse, [and]offer appropriate reparations
including a commitment to make changes in the future (2004, p. 9). Such an apology
necessarily places a speaker in a reflexive position in which she is enacting one version of
herself (the one who is sorry) who is commenting on and repudiating another version of
herself (the one who committed the offense), with the hope that the newer apologetic
version is accepted as authentic.
Benoit identified five strategies public figures use for image restoration in
apologies:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

denial,
evasion of responsibility,
reducing offensiveness,
corrective action, and
mortification, which entails admitting the wrongdoing and asking forgiveness
(1997, p. 253).

His last two strategies, corrective action and mortification, are particularly relevant to
public apologies in America with its roots in Protestant Christianity. When studying the
public apologies of several US politicians, Jennifer Jackson argued that the political
apology performance presupposes a doxic acquaintance to the Christian doctrine of
Original sin and the performed Protestant Christian personal testimonial (2012, p. 48).
Such testimonials frame within the single narrative event multiple instantiations of the
Self across time to distinguish between the past sinning Lost Self as Other and the
redeemed present Found Self as that durable Self (Jackson 2012 p. 52). A sinner tells a
story of conversion by admitting wrong, asking for forgiveness, and committing to avoid
future falls.
Similarly, Ellwanger discusses public apologies as stag[ed] conversion
narratives, a metanoia, the Greek term meaning a change of heart, that reconciles the
offender with social ethical standards (2012, p. 309). This performance, he argues, is in
itself a punishment and form of humiliationa penance. Through enacting a metanoia,
the offender reconstitutes her identity to repair her image and relationship with the
audience. Further, the public spectacle of the apology can act as a deterrence to other
potential offenders.
It is important to note that these qualities of apology discussed thus far are
culturally bound. The majority of research on apology has focused on American and
Western European practices. However, several studies have argued that apologetic
practices differ across cultures. For example, Suzuki and van Eemeren (2004) illustrate
that the Japanese have different expectations for apology than do Western Europeans.
Japanese accept a simple statement of sorrow and stepping down from leaders while

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Westerners have a more defensive tradition that does not necessarily require resignation
from a position. Also, in Japan a speakers ascribed ethos, that which derives from
seniority, sex, family background, can be more important in an apology than an achieved
ethos, which is established in speech. Liebersohn et al. compared American and Jewish
apologetic practices through studying apologies by President Clinton and Israeli Prime
Minister Barak. They noted that the public nature of the Protestant confession, and hence
US apologetic practices, does not exist in Judaism. Therefore, Barak instead relied on the
Zionist historical narrative as a rhetorical resource (2004, p. 937).
Through this analysis, Liebersohn et al. explicitly argued against the pretentions
of universality underlying the study of apology (2004, p. 941). In addition to the
dominance of studying Western apologetic traditions, most studies are also focused on
identifying the shared generic qualities of apology. Like Libersohn et al., I would like to
highlight differences among apologies, rather than commonalities. The speech events I
investigate here share many features that reflect what we already know about political
apologies in the US, relying heavily on the Protestant confessional model. However,
despite the similar rhetorical situations, variety still exists among these apologies that
influence rhetorical choices made by the speakers.
3. US POLITICAL APOLOGIES FOR MARITAL INFIDELITY
In 2008, Eliot Spitzer, then Democratic governor of New York and formerly Attorney
General, was found to have frequently visited high-end prostitutes. The next year, Mark
Sanford, then Republican governor of South Carolina, admitted to having an affair with a
journalist from Argentina. Prior to his admission, he had been missing for several days
and lied to his staff about his whereabouts. In 2010 Mark Souder, a Republican
representative from Indiana, resigned after admitting to an affair with a staffer. Finally, in
2011, Anthony Weiner, a Democratic representative from New York, admitted to having
sent sexually explicit texts and images of himself to women, what is popularly called
sexting. He initially denied sending the images, saying his Twitter account had been
hacked.
The analysis studied six texts: Spitzers initial speech admitting to his failings
(Chan, 2008) and his speech several days later stepping down from office (Full Text of
Spitzer Resignation), Sanfords speech confessing to his affair and resigning as the
Chairman of the Republican Governors Association (Transcript: Gov. Mark Sanford's
Wed. afternoon press conference), Souders speech in which he confessed and resigned
from his Senate seat (Verbatim), and two speeches from Weiner, the first in which he
admitted to sending the explicit message (Full Transcript Of Rep. Anthony Weiners
Resignation Speech") and then, like Spitzer, one a few days later in which he resigns his
Senate seat (Full Transcript Of Rep. Anthony Weiners Resignation Speech").
These speeches all echo the Protestant testimonial with their central act of public
mortificationeach speaker admits wrongdoing and explicitly apologizes or asks for
forgiveness. They also signal some corrective action by referencing their efforts to repair
their relationships with their wives, families, and constituents or acknowledging the need
to heal themselves. None of them deny wrongdoing or try to evade responsibility
which would be contrary to a true confession. They also make some reference to religion
or God.
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In addition to mortification and corrective action, they employ some other image
restoration strategiesmost prominently bolstering, a sub-strategy to reduce the
offensiveness of an act. Benoit quotes Linkugel in defining bolstering as any rhetorical
strategy which reinforces the existence of a fact, sentiment, object, or relationship
(1997, p. 258). The speakers bolster their images by reaffirming their commitment to
public service, indicating that despite their private or personal failings that their
desire to serve was sincere and the work they accomplished significant. In his initial
speech, Spitzer opens with
Over the past nine years, eight years as attorney general and one as governor, Ive tried to uphold a
vision of progressive politics that would rebuild New York and create opportunity for all. We
sought to bring real change to New York and that will continue.

Only after this bolstering move does he admit his violation of obligations to my family
and any sense of right and wrong. In similar ways, all the speakers expressed their
sincere commitment to serve their constituents, presenting themselves as true public
servants. Souder, for example states, It has been a great honor to fight for the needs, the
jobs, and the future of this region where my family has lived for over 160 years.
They even characterize their resignations as a way of caring for the office and
their constituents. Sanford didnt resign from office, but as chairman of the Republican
Governors Association. He does this, he says, in order to have the time to repair his
relationship with his family, friends, and constituents. Sanford, then, in not stepping
down as governor, shows he is still committed to public service and that he feels his
affair, though wrong, does not indicate that he is unfit as a governor. Spitzer, though he
says resigning is part of taking responsibility for his actions, he also says he is doing so as
to not disrupt the people work. Souder resigns to save his family from media scrutiny.
And Weiner states that he is stepping down because he has become a distraction.
By bolstering in these ways, the speakers re-present themselves almost as they
were as candidates running for election: idealistic, passionate, hard working, and selfsacrificing. This public persona is juxtaposed with the fallen individual. The personal vs.
public dichotomy is implied or explicitly referenced by each speaker. Their sin does
not, or should not, diminish the good that they have done and still are capable of. And,
they will each be able to heal from this fall. In looking at similar types of speeches,
Jackson argues that through these redemption narratives speakers each generalizes his
individual acts as typical journey of anyone that they are representative of Everymans
fall from grace (2012, p. 55), reminding the audience that politicians are only human and
that all of us, at some time, fall and have to get up. Thus, the bolstering not only helps
restore their image, but also supports the conversion narrative, the metanoia by
juxtaposing the ideal self with the fallen self.
4. VARIATION: RELIGIOUS PRESENCE
Despite the similarities among these apologies for infidelity, significant differences also
exist. The most obvious variation seems to be the amount of religious language used,
which can be related to each speakers political ethos. Although there are exceptions, in
US politics, Republicans are considered the more conservatively Christian and the
Democratic party more secular. Sanfords political ethos, as well as Souders, was

237

grounded in a Republican, conservative Christian tradition. Sanford, an Episcopalian, was

a Southern Republican and member of the religiously conservative group The Family.
Likewise, Souder, a Republican from the Midwest, and evangelical, self-identified and
ran as a religious conservative. To break ones marriage vows, then, is a blow to this
religious grounding of their public images. Their efforts to restore their images, then,
must address this fact. Their metanoia, must be an explicitly religious one.
In his rambling speech, Sanford reflects on Gods laws, which he says are
designed to protect people from themselves. Here he acknowledges he has broken
Gods laws and affirms their wisdom. He further apologizes to people of faith across
South Carolina and claims believe it or not, Ive been a person of faith all my life.
Souder is even more direct in his religious sentiment when he states, I have sinned
against God and later, My comfort is that God is a gracious and forgiving God to those
who sincerely seek his forgiveness as I do. This use of religious references and language
gives presence (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.115ff) to their faith and makes
their repentance a religious one.
For Spitzer and Weiner, both Jewish Democrats, religious faith was less a part of
their public ethos. Therefore, their apologies, though in a form with religious roots, gave
little presence to religion. In his first speech, Spitzer makes no religious allusions. In his
resignation speech, he states From those to whom much is given, much is expected, a
phrase from the New Testament, and in closing asks for prayers for his successor, David
Patterson. Weiner likewise makes no religious references in his first speech. In his
second, his only religious reference is in his closing thought when he states, With Gods
help and with hard work we will all be successful. In comparison to Sanford and Souder,
then, Spitzer and Weiners apologies are not grounded in religious terms. They didnt
need to be since religion was not part of their public ethos. In fact, if they had suddenly
expressed strong religious sentiment in these apologies, their authenticity may have been
questioned. Not surprisingly, then, the presence given to religious sentiment remains
consistent with the political ethos of the speaker. This highlights the fact that image
restoration strategies depend upon, in part, the prior image being restored.
5. VARIATION: REPRESENTATIONS OF TRANSGRESSIONS
A more significant difference exists in how the speakers represent their transgressions. In
some cases the transgression was already known publically (Spitzer), in others there was
suspicion and speculation (Weiner), and others little was known yet by the public (Souder
and Sanford). But in all cases, the speakers, as part of the apology, had to admit to
wrongdoing and therefore, had to represent the transgression in some way. Fairclough
states that when representing a social event, one is incorporating it within the context of
another social event, recontextualizing it (2003, p. 139). This recontextualizing filters
the elements of the social event: it decides what details to include or exclude or
foreground or background, giving presence to some aspects of the situation rather than
others. It also represents the event as more or less abstract, arranges them in a certain
order, and may or may not make additions to the event, such as explanations or
evaluations (Fairclough 2003, p.139).
In the apologies, the representations of transgressions vary in their levels of
abstraction. These differences can be related to the legality of the transgression and with
238

the forthrightness with which the speaker initially dealt with the media and the public in
relation to the transgression. Despite these differences, the representations still all
contribute to image restoration.
First, legality: although prosecution for patronizing a prostitute is rare, Spitzer still
faced possible criminal charges in relation to his use of prostitutes. The Justice
Department was investigating him for possibly breaking several laws: one law involved
transporting someone across state lines for the purpose of prostitution, another involved
how he paid for the prostitutes (he may have engaged in structuring, which means the
money was paid in such a way as to conceal their purpose and source), and finally, he
was also being investigated for possibly using campaign funds for his prostitution
activities. (The Times Answers Spitzer Scandal Questions").
Not surprisingly, then, although he had to admit guilt, he had to do so in a very
generalized way so as to not implicate himself with regards to any of these charges. In his
speeches Spitzer represents his transgressions in two ways: I have acted in a way that
violates my obligations to my family and that violates myor anysense of right and
wrong. And I have disappointed and failed to live up to the standard I expected of
myself. Note that these representations are highly generalizedhe never mentions
prostitutes or even marital infidelity. He could be referring to many types of
transgressiontax evasion, fraud, sexting, an affair. Thus, he admits to an unspecific
wrongdoing, carefully avoiding possibly implicating himself.
Despite being very general, Spitzers representations still assist him in restoring
him image. In the first representation when he says I have acted in a way that violates
my obligations he, while being in the agent position, is still able to slightly distance
himself from the wrongdoing. Using acted in a way instead of simply saying I have
violated my obligations is reminiscent of an old adage hate the sin, not the sinner
which implies that peoples actions are not necessarily reflective of their persons. Also, in
referencing his sense of right and wrong and the standard he expected of himself, he
bolsters his image, reaffirming the values that he stood for as attorney general and
governor. These phrases also allow him to acknowledge his own hypocrisy since in his
previous role as attorney general he prosecuted prostitution rings (Eimicke & Shacknai,
2008).
The other three apologists did not have to worry about possible legal prosecution.1
They were freer to be concrete in representing their transgressions. But, they differed in
how forthright they were in the initial handling of their scandals. The less initially
forthright, the more concrete the representations. Sanford and Weiner clearly complicated
their situations with their lies. Souders case, on the other hand, was fairly simple and
direct: he resigned before the case became widely known by the general public. His
representation is concrete, though not detailed:
I sinned against God, my wife and my family by having a mutual relationship with a part-time
member of my staff.

He also calls it a personal failing and an error. He makes additions to the

representation by stating:
1

Souder might have been investigated by the US House of Representatives for ethics violations, but he
avoided this by resigning.

239

It has been all consuming for me to do this job well, especially in a district with costly,
competitive elections every two years I do not have any sort of normal lifefor family, for
friends, for church, for community.

Although he does not make an explicit connection, through this addition he implies that
reason for his transgression, suggesting that the pressure and isolation led him to have an
affair, thus minimizing the offensiveness of the event. He later says For sixteen years,
my family and I have given our all for this area. The toll has been high. He does not
specify what he means by toll, but this sentence puts him in a victim position, as
suffering a toll with his family. It also implies that the affair itself could be the toll. This
again helps minimize the offensiveness of the event.
The lead-up to the apologies by Sanford and Weiner were less forthright. Sanford
told his staff he was hiking the Appalachian Trail, but his cell phone was turned off and
they were not able to reach him for several days. His wife also could not account for his
whereabouts. This situation lead to speculation and concern by members of the state
Senate and of course, put his staff in a difficult position (Sanford back Wednesday"). He
was, in fact, in Argentina visiting his mistress. Thus, he had secondary transgressions to
address in his speechhis lying to his staff and being unreachable. He represents his
affair in concrete terms:
Ive been unfaithful to my wife. I have developed a relationship with a dear, dear friend from
Argentina. It began innocently as I suspect many of these things do in just a casual email back and
forth in advice on ones life there and advice here. But here recently over this last year it
developed into something much more than that.

Note that although in the beginning of this representation he takes the agent position,
accepting responsibility for the transgression, the narrative that follows provides a causal
explanation that helps him minimize the affair. The relationship, a nominalization,
takes the subject position in the sentences, being the agent that began innocently but
developed into something much more. This narrative, by detailing the process, helps
minimize the offense by making it understandable and relatable, even common. Here we
see how he generalizes his individual acts as a typical journey of anyone (Jackson
2012, p. 55). This characterization of the event is supported by calling his mistress a
dear dear friend. Thus, the affair was not some thoughtless fling with a random woman,
but rather a relationship that developed from friendship. But Sanford also had to
address lying to his staff and causing confusion:
I would also apologize to my staff, because as much as I did talk about going to the Appalachian
Trail, that isnt where I ended up. And so I let them down by creating a fiction with regards to
where I was going, which means that I then in turn, given as much as they relied on that
information, let down people that I represent across the state.

Although this representation of lying is more abstract than that of his affair, it is still
constructed in ways to diminish damage. By saying the Trail isnt where I ended up he
seems simply someone along for the ride, without agency. And he softens the offense by
referring to it as creating a fiction, rather than lying which has a strong negative
connotation.
240

Finally, Weiner had the most sensational transgression and circumstances leading to his
speeches. Not only was sexting relatively new and uncommon, he emphatically denied in
media interviews that he was the source of the pictures. He and his office claimed that his
social media accounts had been hacked. They kept up this ruse for 10 days until he finally
admitted he sent the pictures. Thus, in addition to sexting, he had the added transgression
of lying about it to the media and the public. Because of this, his apologies not only had
to acknowledge his previous self that behaved inappropriately, but also his self who
boldly lied about it. Of all the apologists investigated in this paper, he had the most repair
work to do.
While Weiner is concrete in his representations of both his transgressions, he does
little minimizing. In his first speech he gave a concrete explanation of his sexting by
narrativizing his scandalous tweet and the how he came to cover it up:
Last Friday night, I tweeted a photograph of myself that I intended to send as a direct message as
part of a joke to a woman in Seattle. Once I realized I had posted it to Twitter, I panicked, I took it
down, and said that I had been hacked. I then continued with the story to stick to that story, which
was a hugely regrettable mistake.

In this statement he slightly minimizes the sexting by referring to it as joke, but, unlike
Sanford and Souder, there are no other additions or explanations that help his audience
understand why he was engaging in such behavior or how it came about. The explanation
he does provide only addresses the cover-up and again slightly minimizes by referring to
his panic. After this statement he continues, admitting that he engaged in several
inappropriate conversations conducted over Twitter, Facebook, email and occasionally on
the phone with women I had met online. Notably, he also specifies what he did NOT do:
To be clear, I have never met any of these women or had physical relationships at any
time. He also then refers to his other transgressionthat of lying to the media and the
public: I havent told the truth and Ive done things I deeply regret. In his second
speech he represents his transgression more generally as personal mistakes...and the
embarrassment I have causedthe distraction I have created and the damage I have
caused. Weiner, then, having the most repair work to do, is concrete, but does little
minimization. This lack of minimization is perhaps due to the nature of the transgression.
Unlike having an affair, extra-maritial sexting by politicians is still fairly uncommon and
more difficult to make understandable or relatable.
Overall, investigating the representation of transgressions reveals ways in which
their levels of concreteness or abstraction are related to the forthrightness with which they
initially dealt with the situation. Also, the representations, whether abstract or concrete,
are constructed in ways to support image restoration.
6. VARIATION: METADISCOURSE
The final variation among the speeches I will address is the use of metadiscourse. All the
speakers use some metadiscourse, but its use increases with the amount of repair work
needed, so that Sanford and Weiner employed the most metadiscourse. Metadiscourse is
understood as discourse about discourse, or the unique reflexive capacity of language, as
used by human beings, to have itself as its subject matter" (Martinez Guillem 2009, p.
731).

241

Metadiscourse takes many forms, from explicit guidance to the reader such as let me
first point out to more subtle modality markers. Vande Kopple identifies seven functions
that metadiscourse serves, noting that any instance of metadiscourse could serve more
than one function at a time:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

text connectives (first, next, etc,),

code glosses, which help readers understand specific points,
illocutionary markers, which make explicit what speech act is being
performed,
validity markers, which can be understood as modality markers,
narrators,
attitude markers, which express the speakers feeling toward the text
(e.g. surprisingly), and
commentary which directly dialogues with the reader (1985, p 83-85).

Others have pointed out how these metadiscourse functions contribute to ethos through
positioning (Martinez Guillem 2009, p. 737), alignment, and evaluation (Crismore &
Farnsworth, 1989). Sociolinguists refer to this phenomenon as stance-taking. DuBois
defines stance as
a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of
simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other
subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field. (2007, p. 163)

Thus, when speakers express a judgment through evaluation, they position themselves as
holding certain sociocultural values that either align, or dont, with their audiences.
While all the speeches had some metadiscourse that act as illocutionary markers,
such as Souders It is with great regret I announce that I am resigning, Sanford and
Weiner had more than twice the amount of metadiscourse than Spitzer or Souder. The
additional metadiscourse in their apologies function as attitude and validity markers. The
attitude markers are found in the expressions of desire such as I want and I would
that Sanford and Weiner often use to preface their statements. Sanford is quite repetitive
with the phrases I would and I want: I would secondly say to Jenny; I would
apologize to my staff; And so I want to apologize to my staffI want to apologize
to anybody; I would ask their forgiveness.
In a similar way, Weiner states: I want to thank my colleagues.; I also want
to express my gratitude to members of my staff These speakers could have said I
apologize or I thank, but they add a layer of attitude markers that imply an emotional
stancea desire. Not only is the speaker apologizing or thanking, but he wants to do so.
In addition to these attitude markers, they also employ validity markers. Sanford
says he will lay out the whole story to provide the bottom line; he uses the phrase
bottom line several times throughout his speech. Most notably, he precedes his
admission of an affair with The bottom line is this, implying that other lines or stories
were out there, but his representation is the most accurate and relevant. Weiner uses the
phrase to be clear several times, as in To be clear, the picture was of me, and I sent it.
These instances of metadiscourse are used to affirm the validity of what they are saying.

242

I attribute the higher frequency of metadiscourse, specifically attitude and validity

markers, in Sanford and Weiners apologies to the increased repair work required of
them. They not only had to repair their images because of their infidelity, but since they
mislead people or directly denied the wrongdoing, they also had to repair their
relationship with the public and reaffirm themselves as now telling the truth. Thus, they
strengthen their emotional stance as repentant through attitude markers and use validity
markers to portray their current representations as truthful.
7. CONCLUSION
The apologies of these four politicians are typical of public apologies in the US. They
follow the features of the Protestant confessional testimonial through mortification and
corrective action. These moves contribute to the speakers image repair as does their
bolstering. Despite these similarities, however, variations exist in their use of religious
language, how they represent and minimize their transgressions, and their metadiscourse.
These variations can be related to their political ethos, the nature of the transgression, and
the amount of repair work required. It seems that the nature and severity of the
transgression have the most impact on the variations in these speeches. Also, it appears
that metadiscourse is an especially important resource for speakers whose images are
severely damage. Thus, it is worthwhile not only to look at whether or not a speaker uses
a specific strategy, but also the extent to which they do so, relative to features of the
rhetorical situation they face.

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http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/i-apologize-to-the-public/
Cooper, J. M. (1997). Apology. In Plato: Complete works (pp. 1718). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
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Metadiscourse as a Dimension of Ethos. Rhetoric Review, 8(1), 91112.
Du Bois, J. W. (2007). The stance triangle. In R. Englebretson (Ed.), Stancetaking in Discourse:
Subjectivity, Evaluation, Interaction (pp. 139182). Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins
Publishing Company.
Eimicke, W. B., & Shacknai, D. (2008). Eliot Spitzer. Public Integrity, 10(4), 365379.
Ellwanger, A. (2012). Apology as Metanoic Performance: Punitive Rhetoric and Public Speech. Rhetoric
Society Quarterly, 42(4), 307329.
Fairclough, N. (2003). Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. New York: Routledge.
Full Text of Spitzer Resignation. (2008, March 12). City Room. Retrieved July 14, 2014, from
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Full Transcript Of Rep. Anthony Weiners Resignation Speech - CBS New York. (2011, June 16).
Retrieved from http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/06/16/full-transcript-of-rep-anthony-weinersresignation-speech/
Jackson, J. L. (2012). Gods law indeed is there to protect you from yourself: The Christian personal
testimonial as narrative and moral schemata to the US political apology. Language &
Communication, 32, 4861.
Liebersohn, Y. Z., Neuman, Y., & Bekerman, Z. (2004). Oh baby, its hard for me to say Im sorry: public
apologetic speech and cultural rhetorical resources. Journal of Pragmatics, 36, 921944.

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Martinez Guillem, S. (2009). Argumentation, metadiscourse and social cognition: organizing knowledge in
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OConnor, J., & LeBlanc, C. (2009, June 23). Sanford back Wednesday, his office says. The State.
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Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The New Rhetoric. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
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Suzuki, T., & van Eemeren, F. H. (2004). This Painful Chapter: An Analysis of Emperor Akihitos
Apologia in the Contex of Dutch Old Sores. Argumentation and Advocacy, 41, 102111.
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Transcript: Gov. Mark Sanfords Wed. afternoon press conference. (2009, June 24). Retrieved June 27,
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Vande Kopple, W. J. V. (1985). Some Exploratory Discourse on Metadiscourse. College Composition and
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244

Dialogue Types And Argumentative Behaviors

Ioana A. Cionea & Dale Hample
Department of Communication
University of Oklahoma
United States
icionea@ou.edu
Department of Communication
University of Maryland
United States
dhample@umd.edu

ABSTRACT: Empirical tests of the dialogue types developed by informal logicians have been conducted
recently. In this paper, we further advance this line of research by connecting dialogue types with several
well-established measures in argumentation research: argument frames, argument beliefs, argument
competence, argumentativeness, and verbal aggressiveness. Results indicate participants prefer the
persuasive dialogue to the other types, and dialogues are well predicted by argument competence as well as
the pro-social component of verbal aggressiveness.
KEYWORDS: dialogue types, interpersonal arguments, Walton.

1. INTRODUCTION
The study of dialogues as normative frameworks has primarily been undertaken by
informal logicians (e.g., Walton, 1998; Walton & Krabbe, 1995). Walton (1998)
proposed a new approach to studying propositional commitments and turn-taking moves
that occur during a dialogue. He argued that the concept of dialogue must be tailored so
that it can accommodate (and explain) how individuals argue in their everyday
exchanges. It should prescribe how arguments ought to occur and develop and it should
provide criteria for assessing whether an argument has been used correctly (Walton,
1998).
Walton and Krabbe (1995) and Walton (1998) developed and detailed six main
types of dialogues: persuasion, inquiry, information seeking, negotiation, deliberation and
eristic. These dialogues differ depending on the initial situation that sparks argumentation
and the main goal of engaging in a specific type. Persuasion stems from an open conflict
that parties seek to resolve. Negotiation and the eristic dialogue also stem from an open
conflict, but their goals are different; parties seek a practical settlement in a negotiation
but only a provisional accommodation in an eristic dialogue. Inquiry and deliberation
both stem from an open problem but differ in their main goal: inquiry seeks a stable
resolution, whereas deliberation seeks a practical settlement. Finally, information seeking
stems from an unsatisfactory spread of information and seeks to reach a stable resolution
of the situation1.
1

We have used here the exact terms that Walton and Krabbe (1995) use when describing the initial
situation and main goal of each of the six dialogue types.

245

There is little research that examines these dialogues empirically. Cionea (2011) made a
case that examining these dialogue types in interpersonal relationships can enhance our
understanding of how, when, or why people employ each dialogue in their argumentative
exchanges. Later, Cionea (2013) developed self-report measurement scales and tested
four of the dialogues in the context of romantic relationships. In this paper, we propose
developing measurement scales for the remaining two dialogue types and examining the
associations (if any) that dialogue types may have with other argumentation variables. In
addition, we propose that a seventh dialogue type may be feasibly added to the list
developed by Walton (1998) and Walton and Krabbe (1995): information giving.
Dialogues are a give and take process in which arguers seek information but also give
information to the other party. Thus, we conceptualize this dialogue type as the reverse of
information seeking; instead of trying to seek information from the other person, the
arguer offers information to the other person. The goal of the dialogue and the initial
situation that triggers it are the same as for information seeking.
In what follows we present the results of two studies examining dialogues as
individual preferences that people tend to adopt in their arguments. We describe the goals
of each study, the method we have employed, and our results. We conclude with a
general discussion of what our research unveils about dialogue types and the potential
future directions in which this line of research can be expanded.
2. STUDY 1
The goal of this study was to develop measures for the two dialogue types (inquiry and
deliberation) not previously examined by Cionea (2013) and for the dialogue type that we
propose should be added information giving. To accomplish this goal, we created items
for these three dialogues and assessed their reliability and factor structure.
2.1 Participants
Participants in the study were 189 individuals recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
in the United States. One hundred and twenty one participants were male and 68 were
female, with ages between 18 and 62 years old (M = 31.66, SD = 10.41). Participants
were mostly White (n = 134), followed by Asian (n = 26), African American (n = 13),
Hispanic and/or Latino/Latina (n = 11), and other ethnicities or combinations of the
previous ones. Participants came from all regions of the United States, with the highest
numbers from the Pacific (n = 42), Middle (n = 32) and South Atlantic (n = 34) regions.
Most participants had a college degree (n = 59) or some college (n = 69).
2.2 Procedures
Participants completed an online questionnaire in which they provided consent and
demographic information. They were then asked to think about what they do when they
discuss, argue, or have any dialogue with another person and rate statements measuring
dialogue types on a scale from 0 (absolute disagreement) to 100 (absolute agreement).
Participants were compensated 50 US cents for their participation. The research was
approved by the Institutional Review Board at a West South Central university in the
246

United States.
2.3 Measures
Persuasion, negotiation, information seeking, and the eristic dialogue were measured with
items developed by Cionea (2013). Persuasion dialogue was measured with six items
(e.g., I try to explain my position to the other person or I try to give the other person
reasons for my position), as was the negotiation dialogue (e.g., I try to make a deal with
the other person or I try to come up with an agreement that we can both live with).
Information seeking dialogue was measured with four items, such as I try to find out
more information from the other person and I try to ask the other person for the whole
story. The eristic dialogue was measured with six items, too (e.g., I try to vent or I try
to take the opposite position from the other person).
Seven items for inquiry and seven items for deliberation were developed for this
study. Examples include I try to decide with the other person how we should proceed,
I try to analyze with the other person the consequences of our plan(s), and I try to
weigh the options with the other person for deliberation and I try to find the truth, I
try to insist that we draw logical conclusions and I try to analyze how we move from
facts to the conclusion(s) for inquiry. Four items for information giving were rephrased
from the items for information seeking (e.g., I try to let the other person know more
information or I try to offer the other person the whole story).
2.4 Results
The reliability of each scale was examined based on Cronbachs alpha. The factor
structure for each scale was examined based on confirmatory factor analyses. We relied
on LISREL 9.10 and the maximum likelihood estimation method to assess the model fit
for each dialogue type. We also examined an overall measurement model of all seven
dialogues together. Results are presented in Table 1 below. Based on the corroborated
evidence from these analyses, we eliminated two items: one from the deliberation
dialogue (I try to deliberate with the other person to reach a decision) and one from the
inquiry dialogue (I try to scrutinize all available evidence prior to drawing any
conclusions) which had lower reliability and in which their respective latent factors did
not explain as much variance as they did in the other items.
The results of Study 1 indicate that the scales proposed for measuring peoples
orientation towards the seven dialogue types are reliable and unidimensional. Therefore,
we conducted a second study in which we examined these dialogue orientations in
connection with other argumentative inclinations and behaviors widely used in previous
argumentation literature.
3. STUDY 2
Our main goal in this paper was to examine the dialogue orientations in more depth and
situate them in the argumentation literature. First, we were interested in whether people
show preference for any of the dialogue types. Cionea (2013) found that individuals who
argued about a relational transgression in their romantic relationships tended not to use
247

two of the dialogues: deliberation and inquiry. Is that the case in other contexts?
Additionally, the eristic dialogue may elicit different behavioral responses than
persuasion or negotiation. Cionea, Hoprtean, Hoelscher, Ile, and Straub (2013) found
that people perceived persuasion could be accomplished by discussing things with the
other person, not by quarrelling with others. However, individuals did not perceived
debates and quarrels as significantly different in respect to their roles in peoples lives
and in American society. They also engaged in both when addressing a variety of topics,
such as socio-political issues or entertainment, and they indicated both forms could be
appropriate when arguing with others. These results suggest that people may prefer one
dialogue orientation to another depending on what function they perceive arguing serves
in their lives. So, we investigate this possibility by asking,
RQ1: Do people prefer a dialogue type to others?
A second aspect we were interested in is the relationship between dialogue types.
Cioneas (2013) studies revealed that persuasion, negotiation, and information seeking
tended to be associated with more positive goals, whereas the eristic dialogue was used to
give voice to frustrations and dominance. Cionea, Hample, and Fink (2014) pointed out
the high correlations between persuasion, negotiation, and the information seeking
dialogue, questioning whether people are able to distinguish them in everyday arguments.
Thus, we ask the following:
RQ2: What is the relationship between the seven dialogues?
Finally, our third and main area of interest was to examine the relationship between
dialogue types and other variables studied in the argumentation literature. We decided to
focus on four main areas we believe are pertinent to dialogues. The first one is argument
competence. Initially operationalized by Trapp, Yingling, and Warner (1987), argument
competence captures whether arguers have the appropriate knowledge and skills to
engage others in interpersonal exchanges successfully. The concept has two dimensions:
an effectiveness dimension and an (in)appropriateness dimension. Competence could be a
good indicator of what dialogue type an arguer may choose. Competent and appropriate
arguers are likely to rely on constructive dialogues, such as persuasion and negotiation,
whereas incompetent arguers may rely more on eristic approaches in which they could
enact inappropriate argumentative moves, such as ad hominem attacks or fallacious
reasoning.

248

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
.86
.93
N/A

.03
.04
.03
.06
.05
.05
.07

249

13.48 7
22.52 9
11.32 7

0.30

0.00

9.11

1.00

.04

1.00
.06 .99
.001 .98
.12 1.00

.58

.07
.09
.06

.00

1.00 Perfect fit

.25

.02
.04
.02

.00

.02

Revised Model Fit after Modifications

SRMR
df
p CFI
RMSEA SRMR
2
.13
.85
0.48 1
.49 1.00 .00
.001

Note: N = 305
a
Revised model without items 5 and 6 and with an error covariance permitted between items 1 and 2.
b
Revised model with errors covariances permitted between items 1 and 6 and 2 and 4.
c
Revised model with an error covariance permitted between items 1 and 2.
d
Revised model with an error covariance permitted between items 2 and 3.
e
Revised model with errors covariances permitted between items 2 and 4 and items 5 and 6.
f
Revised model without item 2.
g
Revised model without item 1 and with error covariances permitted between items 2 and 3 and items 5 and 6.
h
Measurement model with all dialogue types and previously implemented modifications for each scale included.

modelh

Table 1
Study 1 Reliabilities and Confirmatory Factor Analyses Fit Indices
Initial Initial Model Fit

Df
p
CFI RMSEA
2
Persuasive
.82
152.30 9
.00 .79 .29
dialoguea
Negotiation
.89
23.31
9
.001 .99 .09
dialogueb
Information
.89
20.79
2
.00 .96 .22
seeking dialoguec
Information
.91
13.02
2
.00 .98 .17
giving dialogued
Eristic dialoguee .85
47.58
9
.00 .95 .15
f
Inquiry dialogue .85
46.77
14
.00 .96 .11
Deliberation
.91
70.31
14
.00 .96 .15
g
dialogue
Measurement
N/A
1059.58 565 .00 .97 .07

The second area we focused on is argument beliefs, initially operationalized by Rancer,

Kosberg, and Baukus, (1992) and further refined by Johnson (2002). Beliefs about
arguing represent cognitive representations of the attitudes and predispositions that
people have in respect to arguing (Rancer, Baukus, & Infante, 1985). For example, if
arguing is believed to be a means of solving conflict, individuals may engage in
arguments with others when trying to address incompatible goals. We propose that
beliefs about arguing offer useful information about peoples tendencies to select specific
dialogue types when arguing with others; what one believes about arguing can predict
what strategies one will adopt when arguing. For example, if arguing is believed to have
dysfunctional outcomes, then individuals may be tempted to rely on an equally
destructive dialogue approach, engaging in the eristic dialogue. We examine the list of
beliefs that Johnson (2002) refined: pragmatic outcomes (i.e., arguing has pragmatic
outcomes, such as resolving conflict), dysfunctional outcomes (i.e., arguing has
dysfunctional outcomes, such as increasing tension), enjoyment (i.e., arguing is a fun
experience), self-concept (i.e., arguing enhances ones self concept, making a person feel
positive), and ego-involvement (i.e., one argues because the topic is important to the
person).
A third area we believed would be relevant to predicting what dialogue
orientation people may take is argument frames (Hample, 2003). Frames are somewhat
similar to beliefs; they reveal what people believe they are doing when they argue with
others. Hample (2005) explained that frames are the initial expectations people have
about arguing and, therefore, they affect the beginning stages of arguing (changes being
possible as an argument progresses). We argue here that these beginning stages are
captured by the dialogue type one is inclined to choose. In other words, frames capture
expectations about arguing that are translated into a specific dialogue orientation to be
enacted in the actual dialogue. We rely here on a revised version of the frames measure
from Hample and Irions (2014) that identifies seven aspects: identity (i.e., arguing
permits displaying ones identity), play (i.e., arguing is a way to have fun with others),
dominance (i.e., arguing is used to enact dominance or gain power), cooperation (i.e.,
arguing is a collaborative enterprise), utility (i.e., arguing serves a utilitarian purpose,
allowing one to achieve what one wants), blurting (i.e., arguing permits people to say
what is on their mind, without filters), and civility (i.e., arguing is a calm, civilized
exchange).
Finally, a fourth area we propose can shed some light on peoples reliance on
specific dialogue orientations consists of two trait variables that have been studied
extensively in argumentation: argumentativeness (Infante & Rancer, 1982) and verbal
aggressiveness (Infante & Wigley, 1986). Argumentativeness is the positive trait,
indicating ones ability to attack others ideas, whereas verbal aggressiveness is the
negative trait, indicating ones tendency to attack other peoples self-concept. Our
reasoning here is that the tendency to approach arguments may lead people to engage in
dialogues that enable them to cultivate this appreciation for arguments, such as
persuasion, whereas the tendency to avoid arguments will be reflected by less arguing,
perhaps even reliance on degenerated forms of arguing, such as quarrels. In terms of
verbal aggressiveness, the pro-social dimension may connect to dialogues that enable this
supportive communication style negotiation or information giving whereas the antisocial dimension may lead individuals to rely on the eristic dialogue. In light of all the
250

considerations explained, we ask:

RQ3: Do competence, beliefs about arguing, argument frames,
argumentativeness, and verbal aggressiveness predict each of the dialogues?
In what follows, we describe the method of our study and the answers to each of these
three research questions.
3.1. Method
3.1.1 Participants.
Participants in the study were 286 undergraduate students at a large West South Central
university in the United States. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 33 years old, M =
19.71, SD = 1.96. One hundred and three of them were male and 183 were female. Most
participants were White (n = 223), followed by Hispanic or Latina/Latina (n = 19),
African-American (n = 14), American-Indian or Alaska Native (n = 11), and some other
ethnicities (n = 19). Most participants were freshmen (n = 101), followed by sophomores
(n = 90), juniors (n = 52), and seniors (n = 40), while three individuals indicated another
class standing. Students came from a variety of majors, including accounting, business,
communication, energy management, health and exercise science, marketing, and public
relations.
3.1.2 Procedures.
Participants were recruited from the departmental research pool, completed an online
questionnaire, and received extra credit for their participation. The online questionnaire
asked participants to provide consent for the research, provide demographic information,
and then answer questions measuring dialogue orientations, argument competence,
argument frames, beliefs about arguing, and argument traits. The research was approved
by the Institutional Review Board of a West South Central university in the United
States.
3.1.3 Measures.
The variables of interest were measured using a scale from 0 (absolute disagreement) to
100 (absolute agreement). Dialogue orientations were measured using the same scales as
in Study 1. Argument competence was measured with 20 items (ten items measuring
effectiveness and ten items measuring inappropriateness) from Trapp et al. (1987).
Beliefs about arguing were measured with 24 items from Johnson (2002): four items
measured pragmatic items, six items measured dysfunctional outcomes, six items
measured enjoyment, four items measured self-concept, and four items measured egoinvolvement2. Argument frames were measured with 54 items from Hample and Irions
(2014): eight items for identity, four items for play, six items for dominance, eight items
2

Due to poor reliability and factor structure problems, self-concept and ego-involvement were dropped
from further analyses.

251

for competition-cooperation, eight items for utility, ten items for blurt, and ten items for
civility. Argumentativeness was measured with 20 items (ten items measuring the
tendency to approach arguments and ten items measuring the tendency to avoid
arguments) from Infante and Rancer (1982). Finally, verbal aggressiveness was measured
with 20 items as well (ten items measuring the pro-social dimension and ten items
measuring the anti-social dimension) from Infante and Wigley (1986). Reliabilities for all
scales are presented below.
Table 2
Study 2 Means, Standard Deviations, and Final Cronbach Reliability Estimates

Persuasive dialogue
Negotiation dialogue
Information seeking dialogue
Information giving dialogue
Eristic dialogue
Inquiry dialogue
Deliberation dialogue
Competence (effectiveness)
Competence (inappropr.)
Positive outcomes beliefs
Dysfunctional outcomes beliefs
Enjoyment beliefs
Identity frame
Play frame
Dominance frame
Cooperation frame
Utility frame
Blurt frame
Civility frame
Argumentativeness approach
Argumentativeness avoid
Verbal aggress. pro-social
Verbal aggress. anti-social

SD

Final

Notes

82.39
72.83
72.61
76.89
35.20
73.28
74.33
74.71
21.71
46.22
49.00
33.08
52.76
32.11
33.31
73.69
46.99
48.01
57.81
46.86
54.02
62.08
33.30

15.65
16.76
20.04
17.95
19.43
18.26
17.75
13.22
17.85
18.64
21.74
26.97
20.43
28.85
25.86
18.05
20.32
20.32
18.81
19.85
20.68
18.69
20.15

.82
.85
.88
.86
.82
.87
.88
.87
.92
.73
.90
.91
.82
.91
.90
.81
.75
.87
.84
.89
.86
.85
.90

Omit items 4,5,6

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Omit item 1
N/A
Omit items 2,4
Omit items 5,6,8
N/A
N/A
Omit items 1,8
Omit items 5,6
Omit item 1
Omit items 2,3,5,9
Omit item 18
Omit items 14,16
Omit item 10
N/A

Notes: N = 286.
Decision to omit items made after confirmatory factor analyses were conducted on each scale.

3.2 Results and Discussion

Our initial interest was to assess whether our respondents preferred one dialogue
orientation to others (RQ1). We conducted a series of within-sample t-tests to compare
adjacent means. Persuasion dialogue, with a mean of 82.39, was the clear preference,
252

differing from the orientation with the next highest mean at p < .001. That dialogue type,
information giving, was in turn significantly higher (p < .05) than interest in deliberation
dialogues. The deliberation, inquiry, negotiation, and information seeking dialogues were
not different from one another. The lowest mean of these (for information seeking) was
significantly higher than that for the eristic dialogue (p < .001). So, our respondents
clearly preferred to take a persuasion orientation; followed by information giving;
followed by deliberation, inquiry, negotiation, and information-seeking; and the least
preferred was eristic dialogue. This result provides some support for Walton and
Krabbes (1995) claim that the critical discussion (what we call persuasive dialogue) is
the most fundamental context of dialogue needed as a normative structure for analyzing
arguments (p. 7). We also notice that this order roughly corresponds to the order one
might supply if ranking the orientations on the basis of social desirability in Western
cultures.
A second obvious matter of interest is the relationship among the dialogue types.
To answer RQ2, we correlated the dialogue orientations. The eristic dialogue was
essentially uncorrelated with the other orientations except for deliberation. This suggests
that eristic and deliberative dialogues may not have been sharply distinct for our
respondents, or perhaps that they saw the differences but assumed that deliberation leads
to intemperate confrontation. Information seeking and information giving were
substantially associated (r = .49), indicating that these were conceptually paired for
respondents, as they ought to have been, given that one of them is simply a rephrased
form of the other. Information seeking and information giving were both strongly
associated with negotiation, deliberation, and inquiry. This is a reasonably perceptive
understanding of the importance of evidence (information) to these constructive sorts of
interactions. The relationship of the two informational orientations to persuasion was also
positive but noticeably weaker than for the other constructive dialogues. A possible
implication is that respondents felt that persuasion might also be undertaken by means of
non-evidential resources (although we have no data on this point, such resources might
include power, status, forcefulness, and so forth).
Table 3
Study 2 Dialogue Types Correlations
PD
ND
PD
1.00
ND
.18**
1.00
ISD
.28*** .52***
IGD
.29*** .39***
ED
.03
-.11
ID
.34*** .55***
DD
.35*** .43***

ISD

IGD

ED

1.00
.49***
-.01
.58***
.54***

1.00
.05
1.00
.45*** -.13*
.54*** .00

ID

DD

1.00
.61***

1.00

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

The final key issue concerns the relationships among dialogue orientations and the other
variables that we believed might be explanatory. To answer RQ3, we conducted multiple
regressions in which we predicted each dialogue orientation by the other variables in
Table 2. Here we report only the statistically significant predictors in equation form,
253

using standardized regression weights. All the multiple regression models were
statistically significant at p < .001.
Persuasion dialogue = .20 Competence effectiveness - .20 Argumentativeness
avoid + .16 Verbal aggressiveness pro-social (adj. R2 = .10)
Negotiation dialogue = .18 Competence effectiveness + .22 Verbal aggressiveness
pro-social - .21 Play + .14 Cooperation (adj. R2 = .27)
Information-seeking dialogue = .27 Competence effectiveness + .23 Verbal
aggressiveness pro-social -.22 Dominance (adj. R2 = .22)
Information-giving dialogue = .27 Competence effectiveness + .26 Cooperation .14 Blurting (adj. R2 = .20)
Eristic dialogue = .47 Competence inappropriateness + .15 Argumentativeness
avoid + .22 Verbal aggressiveness anti-social -.18 Dominance + .19
Blurting (adj. R2 = .43)
Inquiry dialogue = .37 Competence effectiveness + .17 Verbal aggressiveness
pro-social (adj. R2 = .31)
Deliberation dialogue = .26 Competence effectiveness + .31 Verbal
aggressiveness pro-social + .13 Cooperation + .15 Utility (adj. R2 = .36)
The predictions varied in the degree to which the dialogue orientations were predicted,
ranging from adjusted R2s of .10 to .43. Even 10% of the variance in a dialogue
orientation was a substantial result, and some of the other adjusted R2s were very
encouraging, considering that no correction for measurement unreliability was made.
Competence and the pro-social dimension of verbal aggressiveness significantly
predicted several dialogue types (persuasion, negotiation, information seeking, inquiry,
and deliberation). Some other variables added to the individual predictions for each
dialogue. For example, the tendency to avoid arguments negatively affected ones intent
to engage in persuasion, which is a reasonable result given that persuasion would involve
actually engaging with the other person. Negotiation presupposed cooperation, working
with the other person as the frame of mind with which arguers approached it, again a
reasonable expectation. So did deliberation, which suggests this dialogue is also
perceived as a cooperative endeavour, and information giving, which implies a desire to
work with the other person if one is to provide information. In addition, deliberation has a
utilitarian frame associated with it, potentially due to its desired outcome of reaching a
settlement. Interestingly, information giving was positively associated with blurting,
suggesting some information sharing may be spontaneous, unfiltered, and unplanned.
These results point to the importance that other-oriented variables (such as effectiveness,
inappropriateness, or cooperation) have in the selection of dialogue types that involve the
other person as well, such as negotiation or deliberation.
The eristic dialogue was strongly predicted by a self-report of inappropriateness
in arguing, a preference to avoid arguing, an interest in being antisocial, and a willingness
to blurt. It was contraindicated by an interest in asserting dominance. The avoidance
impulse might be explained by a recent finding of Wright and Roloff (2014) that
defensiveness and rumination about conflict were associated with both avoidance
impulses and the desire to exact revenge on the other person.

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4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined dialogue types in an effort to expand knowledge about the ways in
which individuals use these argumentative strategies in their everyday exchanges. We
tested self-report measures for each of the seven dialogues, and establish some needed
connections with other argumentation variables. We conclude that dialogue types can be
reliably measured based on the scales proposed by Cionea (2013) and the scales we have
proposed here. More important though, we have found interesting associations with other
variables that can help predict what dialogue orientation(s) people may prefer or rely on
when they argue with others.
In general, individuals seem to prefer some dialogue types over others, with
persuasion being the clearly preferred one. Several argumentation views and behaviors
are important in predicting constructive dialogues. Peoples self-report of their
effectiveness in argumentation was a positive predictor for every dialogue type except the
eristic one. The pro-social subscale of the verbal aggressiveness instrument also
contributed positively to peoples attraction towards most of the constructive dialogue
types. These two findings suggest that self-confidence and a set of appropriate
argumentative intentions were fundamental to preference for the constructive dialogue
types. The negative regression weights for argument avoidance, playfulness, dominance,
and blurting reinforce this conclusion, as do the positive weights for cooperation and
utility. The eristic orientation was predicted by a contrasting set of variables, one that is a
conceptual fit to eristic interaction: it is inappropriate, antisocial, and undisciplined. Thus,
our results identify suggest clear patterns exist in individuals argumentative behaviors,
patterns that consist of related variables and inclinations.
Our study is not without limitations. First, our Study 2 population consisted of
undergraduate students, which means results should be interpreted with this sample in
mind. The relationships identified may or may not be replicable with other populations,
but that is an area of research that future studies should pursue. Second, we asked
participants to indicate what dialogue orientations they adopted in general when arguing.
Participants responses may reflect general tendencies that people develop, but there may
also be differences in the immediate orientations that people adopt in a specific
circumstance, depending on a variety of factors, such as the topic of argument, the other
person, and the environment in which arguers are. Such possibilities should be examined
further. Finally, these dialogue orientations may constitute only the initial approaches that
individuals have but that change as an argumentative exchange evolves. Future research
should specifically focus on actual interactions between people and mapping out not only
opening moves, but also shifts in dialogues and mixed dialogues.

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understanding of the dynamics of close relationships. Cogency, 3, 93-105.
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relationships. Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertation and Theses database (UMI No. 3587414).
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Hample, D. (2005). Arguing: Exchanging reasons face to face. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hample, D., & Irions, A. (2014). Arguing to display identity. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Infante, D. A., & Rancer, A. S. (1982). A conceptualization and measure of argumentativeness. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 46, 72-80. doi: 10.1207/s15327752jpa4601_13
Infante, D. A., & Wigley, C. J. (1986). Verbal aggressiveness: An interpersonal model and measure.
Communication Monographs, 53, 61-69. doi: 10.1080/03637758609376126
Johnson, A. J. (2002). Beliefs about arguing: A comparison of public-issue and personal-issue arguments.
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argumentativeness: Implications for training in argument and conflict management.
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Trapp, R., Yingling, J., & Warner, J. (1987). Measuring argumentative competence. In F. H. van Eemeren,
R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation: Across the lines of discipline
(pp. 253-261). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Foris.
Walton, D. (1998). The new dialectic: Conversational contexts of argument. Toronto, Canada: University
of Toronto Press.
Walton, D. N., & Krabbe, E. C. W. (1995). Commitment in dialogue: Basic concepts of interpersonal
reasoning. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Wright, C. W., & Roloff, M. E. (2014). When hurt continues: Taking conflict personally leads to
rumination, residual hurt and negative motivations toward someone who hurt us. Communication
Quarterly, 62, 193-213. doi: 0.1080/01463373.2014.890118

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Missed Opportunities In Argument Evaluation

Daniel H. Cohen
Department of Philosophy
Colby College
USA
dhcohen@colby.edu

ABSTRACT: Why do we hold arguers culpable for missing obvious objections against their arguments but
not for missing obvious lines of reasoning for their positions? In both cases, their arguments are not as
strong as they could be. Two factors cause this: adversarial models of argumentation and the permeable
boundaries separating argumentation, meta-argumentation, and argument evaluation. Strategic
considerations and dialectical obligations partially justify the asymmetry; virtue argumentation theory
explains when and why it is not justified.
KEYWORDS: argumentation evaluation, virtue argumentation.

1. INTRODUCTION: AN ODD ASYMMETRY

There is a curious asymmetry in how we evaluate arguments. On the one hand, it is taken
as fair game to point out obvious objections to a line of reasoning that have not been
anticipated. Arguments that fail to do this are not as strong as they could be and should
be. Elementary critical thinking textbooks and advanced argumentation theorists all agree
that the failure to criticize an argument for failing to take relevant and available negative
information into account would be critically culpable. Of course, arguments that fail to
take relevant and available positive information into account are also not as strong as they
could be and should be, but those same voices are curiously silent on this omission. The
failure to criticize arguments this way is so routine that it largely goes unnoticed, and
when it is noticed, it is apparently regarded as acceptably strategic. Following
Finocchiaro 2013 (p. 136), the question can be put very simply: Why are unanticipated
objections culpable omissions but missed opportunities are not?
In the first part of this paper I propose an explanation for the presence of this odd
asymmetry, including how it arises, why it can seem natural and comfortable from one
perspective, why it can seem artificial and discordant from another perspective, and why
the difference has not even registered on other perspectives. In the next sections, I offer a
partial justification for this asymmetry by reference to arguers dialectical roles and
obligations which put significant roadblocks in the way of offering positive and
constructive criticism. Strategies are then proposed for overcoming them, leading, first, to
the conclusion that the virtues approach to argumentation evaluation is especially well
suited to accommodating and explaining the phenomena in question. However, those
same considerations also lead to the conclusion that the fundamental insight of virtue
argumentation that a good argument is one in which the arguers argue well has to be
qualified in two substantial ways. The crucial analytic element for understanding this
largely invisible problem about evaluating arguments is recognizing that the critical
evaluation of arguments cannot be independent of the critical evaluation of arguers all
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the arguers, not just the proponents and opponents. And, in addition, the value of an
argument is not simply the sum of the values contributed by its arguers, so virtuous
arguers can be only a necessary but not sufficient condition for good arguments. Finally,
the entire exercise forces us to rethink what we mean be a good argument.
2. THE CURIOUS INCIDENT OF THE MISSED GAMBIT.
Let me begin with a parable about a noble chess player.
It is the final match of a chess tournament between two intensely competitive
grandmasters. One is an older, distinguished player who has devoted his whole life to the
game of chess and the pursuit of the championship. He has risen to the highest ranks in
the world, but he has fallen just shy of the top on several previous occasions. This may be
his last chance. His opponent is much younger, but the defending champion. She is
brilliant, even audacious, but sometimes erratic a daredevil of a player who managed
to control her bold style of play long enough in the previous tournament to take the
crown. The series of games leading up to this one has included some epic games that will
be studied and analyzed for years to come. It has also included some stinkers, games
marred by rash attacks, sloppy defenses, and failed gambits. Now, at a crucial juncture in
play, the young champion is about to make a daring but in fact very flawed move. The
older player sees, leans forward, and whispers, Dont do it. He pauses, then whispers
again, this time through tears in his eyes because he realizes what he is doing Dont do
it. You have a much stronger move over there. It will be a better game, a more interesting
game, a worthy game.

I am afraid for how the story must end, but what are we to say of this chess master? That
he was very, very good at chess, of course, but also that he knew chess intimately, and
had an immense respect for the game, and perhaps, in the end, he may have loved chess
too nobly. His love of chess got in the way of his skill at chess. A noble chess master,
certainly, but a great chess player?
And now imagine the same scenario between two arguers, rather than two chess
players: two eminent philosophers in debate, perhaps, or two heavyweight politicians
arguing in a public forum. What are we to say of noble arguers who respect
argumentation so much that they strengthen their opponents hands? Would we really
want to say that they are not good arguers on that account?
I will assume that we do not want to say that, so we are left with this question:
why isnt the argumentative counterpart to missing the good move on any of the
standard lists of fallacies? Part of the reason may be that it does not fit neatly into the
standard conception of a fallacy: it is not an error in reasoning (both Kelley 2013 and
Copi, Cohen, and McMahon 2011, the two best-selling introductory logic textbooks are
among the many texts that use this exact phrase to define a fallacy). Neither is it a
procedural violation, a mistake in reasoning, nor a form of argument that gains
assent without justification (van Eemeren and Grootendoorst 1984, Govier 2010).
However, it arguably does qualify as a discussion move which damages the quality of an
argument (van Eemeren, Grootendoorst, and Snoek-Henkemans 1996) and it certainly
counts as a common mistake that people tend not to notice (Govier 2010).
I think we have something like the case of Silver Blaze, the one that Sherlock Homes
solved because of the curious incident of the dog in the night, namely that the dog didnt
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bark: it was an inside job. And just to be clear: we argumentation theorists are the dog
that didnt bark here.
3. EXPLAINING THE ASYMMETRY: THE D.A.M. MODEL.
The most important and most easily identifiable factor at work in establishing and
sustaining this asymmetry is the Dominant Adversarial Model the DAM account
for arguments. When we conceptualize arguments as essentially agonistic, we cast our
fellow interlocutors as opponents and enemies rather than as colleagues or partners in
argumentation. Often they are in fact just that, of course, because some arguments really
are zero-sum scenarios, so your gain is my loss, but since not all arguments are like that,
the agonistic element is not in fact an essential element.
If an argument is conceptualized as essentially adversarial and elevated to
something like verbal warfare, then two principles of action take hold. First, no holds are
barred in all-out war. All is fair, so withholding suggestions for improving your
opponents argument is completely justified from a strategic point of view. Second,
pointing out favorable but missed lines of thought would be giving aid and comfort to the
enemy. It is not simply that withholding that information is advisable and permitted, but
that providing that information is all but forbidden because it would be tantamount to
treason! We may not have to think of arguments as wars but it can be very hard to escape
the ways of thinking imposed by that DAM account.
I think that goes a long way to explaining why we do not expect arguers to offer
that kind of helpful criticism of their fellow arguers arguments, but it does not explain
why the topic has been so consistently ignored by the textbooks and literature of critical
thinking and argumentation theory. We also need to explain this curious incident of the
theorists who have not barked at the failure to offer constructive criticism.
Part of an answer comes from the tension between trying to respect critical
neutrality and offering constructive, i.e., helpful, criticism. Outside critics who suggest
better lines of attack transgress in two ways: they become part of the argument rather than
remaining safely on the level of meta-argumentation and in so doing, they violate the
principle of critical impartiality. That lands us in a dilemma:
Q: If neither the proponents nor the opponents in arguments, nor impartial critics
observing it from outside, are in an appropriate position to give that kind of
positive criticism, who is?
The best way to analyze and understand this phenomenon is through the different roles in
arguments and the different expectations that accompany those roles.
4. THE ROLES ROLES PLAY.
Arguing is not a single, homogenous activity. There are many different ways to
participate in an argument. Arguing for a standpoint is not the same as arguing against it,
which is not the same as raising objections to its supporting line of reasoning. The
different roles have different goals, they require different skill-sets, and they follow
different rules which generate different expectations.
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The roles we assume in an argument are fluid, which makes separating them difficult.
They often overlap in messy ways practically, functionally, and temporally. We may start
out in the proponents primary logical task of arguing for a position but then find
ourselves in the subsidiary, dialectical task of defending it against objections or revising it
in light of those objections, and then we might end up as an opponent arguing against a
contrary position. Similarly, objecting to a pro-argument, another opposition role,
presupposes argument evaluation, a critics activity. As van Radziewsky 2013 notes, the
transitions are continual, effortless, and seamless. Still, no matter how intertwined the
roles may be in practice, they are conceptually distinguishable in theory, and making
those distinctions has payoffs for analyzing arguments.
Judges, third parties arbiters, audiences, and kibitzers should also be counted as
participants in an argument if only because biased judges, incompetent referees,
meddlesome kibitzers, and bad audiences are all quite capable of ruining an argument.
Since they do contribute to fully satisfying, optimally successful arguments (in the sense
of Cohen 2008, 2013), they have some stake in the outcome of the argument. Consonant
with the DAM account, these roles can be referred to collectively as the noncombatants in an argument, and there is some merit in that terminology: it highlights
their subsidiary roles and secondary involvement, and insightfully imports from the
cluster of concepts surrounding wars the idea that there could be collateral damage
from arguments. For the present purposes, however, it will be better to think of them as
more like a supporting cast: extras who have their own parts to play and their own
contributions to make (following Cohen 2013).
One of the roles that arguers routinely fill is that of being a critic, an argument
evaluator. As a first pass, we might say that arguers engage in the argument while
argument evaluators make judgments about the argument, and thus are actually operating
at the level of meta-argumentation. This is not a distinction that will stand up to close
critical scrutiny, but it serves as a start for the purposes at hand.
The transitions between argument roles include transitions into and out of each
and every one these non-combatant or supporting roles. Arguers can and do assume the
roles of interested audiences, disinterested judges and juries, and even uninterested
spectators. Above all else, arguers inevitably and routinely become argument critics.
What makes this so important is that argument evaluation is supposed to be a neutral
activity, so stepping into that role involves assuming an air critical detachment
attachment and impartiality, even for the most partisan participants. More often than not,
of course, it is a hollow pretense, but the presumption is still there. The problem is that
even the assumption of impartiality seems incompatible with aiding either side in a
dispute while pointing out missed opportunities is constructive criticism. It helps its
target. It appears to be at odds with the role of argument evaluator. Im the judge. Its
not my job to provide the arguers with their arguments.
5. RULES FOR ROLES
That brings us to the duties and principles governing argument roles and the expectations
that they generate.
Missed opportunities are failures on the part of proponents, the arguers
constructing positive arguments for some conclusion. They are sins of omission, as it
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were, rather than sins of commission, and so they may be less noticeable, but since they
are ways that arguments fall short, it is incumbent on argument evaluators to identify
them. The failure to point them out is a critical failure, not a partisan arguers failure.
What emerges, then, is a more or less natural division of labor and division of
expectations for the participants in arguments:

Proponents are expected to find good reasons for their positions, so they can be
criticized when they do not.
Opponents are not expected to point those reasons out for them when they dont,
so they cannot be criticized for remaining silent.

If neither the proponents nor the opponents in arguments can be expected to point out this
argumentative failure, who can? This is a problem

Critics are expected to note missed opportunities, so they should be open to

criticism for their silence on that score.
Judges, juries, and audiences do have critical roles, so they can be expected to
take note of missed opportunities, but they are not expected to point them out and,
in many cases, expected to remain neutral, i.e., not to interfere and to refrain from
pointing them out.

For most observers and non-principals in arguments, there are either no expectations for
positive contributions or else positive expectations for no-contributions. They are like
referees in a sporting event: the only time they get much attention is for unwanted
contributions to the action.
Unfortunately, a workable schema of expectations for proponents, opponents,
observers, and critics cannot be that simple. On the one hand, the expectations of those
engaged in the critical assessment of arguments conflict with imperatives of impartiality
and non-interference. Critics are supposed to be above the fray rather than active
participants in the argument. On the other hand, the argument roles are fluid and
everyone involved in arguments is constantly moving in and out of the critics role.
We have reached an impasse. Were it not for the expectations of impartiality and
non-interference, critics could be held responsible for failing to note missed
opportunities, but there are those expectations of impartiality. Since critics are the only
ones from whom we can positively expect that criticism, there is no place from which
that kind of assessment can be made. And yet there are occasions when that kind of
critical assessment really does need to be made. What we need to address, then, is the
question of when the imperative for impartial but thorough critical assessment can
outweigh the prohibitions against partisan non-interference.
One final complication further muddies the waters of the proposed schema of
expectations: arguers are critics. The line between argumentation and metaargumentation is so permeable as to virtually disappear: an argument for a position is
simultaneously a meta-theoretic endorsement of that argument; the same is true for
simply accepting that argument; on the other hand, not accepting an argument, whether
by raising an objection or offering a counterargument, also implicates a meta-theoretic
judgment, namely that the argument fails or that there is a stronger argument against it;
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conversely, most meta-argumentation evaluations can, and often ought, be included in the
object-level argumentation (The inter-changeability of dialectical, rhetorical, and metaargumentative approaches to argumentation is the over-arching thesis developed in
Finocchiaro 2013). No matter their primary roles, all parties involved in any way in an
argument also have the standing to be argument evaluators. Whether or not all critics are
participants in arguments and for the record, I do think there are good reasons to count
them as such all arguers are critics. That is a role participants cannot avoid.
Thus, arguers are subject to the impossible imperatives imposed by the
contradictory expectations that arise from the complication of having to fill different roles
in arguments.
It will prove helpful to look at this problem through the lens provided by virtue
argumentation theory.
6. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES
The problem comes down to finding space from which to provide positive and
constructive critical engagement. Positive and constructive critical engagement is a
complex concept whose constituents do not fit together easily. On the one hand,
constructive critical engagement is easy enough: pointing out fallacies, missteps, and
other errors qualifies, but those common critical moves are not positive, in the relevant
sense. They can be constructive insofar as they strengthen the critiqued argument by
pointing out its weaknesses, but not by pointing out greater alternative strengths. On the
other hand, positive and constructive critical evaluation is also conceptual unproblematic:
it is the kind of criticism that can be safely offered from a distance without worrying
about violating neutrality, rather than as a real-time, on-site engagement. The challenge is
to combine them.
The main culprit is the DAM account of argumentation. It creates the asymmetry
in allowable and expected criticism by making adversariality the essential, defining
feature of argumentation and defining all of the roles within arguments accordingly, viz.,
by their role in the conflict. Even within that framework, however, arguers are constantly
moving in and out of the different argumentative roles and occupying several roles at the
same time. An arguer is a very divided self. Because of that, proponents, opponents,
and neutral third-parties all have possibilities for positive and constructive critical
engagement, but they all have significant obstacles to overcome.
The obstacle for proponents is practical: critical self-evaluation is just plain hard.
It is always more difficult to spot weaknesses in arguments with which one agrees, and
apart from some special circumstances (e.g., lawyers representing clients, insincerity, and
reductio argumentation), proponents tend to agree with their own arguments. The
epistemic and cognitive blind-spots that prevented an arguer from seeing the missed
opportunity in the first place may well still be in place, so, to use Wittgensteins example,
self-critique is often no better than checking a news-story about which one is skeptical by
buying another copy of the same newspaper (Wittgenstein 1953, 265). Moreover, we
can be undone by our own skills in argumentation here because the better we are at
giving reasons for our beliefs a skill that encompasses both prior deliberation and its
often indistinguishable counterpart, post facto rationalization the harder it will be to

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detect some flaws in our reasoning, especially the difference between reasoning and
rationalization (Kornblith 1999, pp. 277, 278).
There are a couple of strategies for proponents to get around the obstacle to noting
when they themselves miss an opportunity. Critical self-reflection may work to some
extent. We exercise different skills-sets in constructing arguments than we do in
evaluating arguments, so if we engage in the salutary but difficult task of turning a
critical eye to our own arguments, the new perspective might help us notice things about
our argument that were not as visible in constructing the argument. That is, we can take
advantage of our ability to transition between argumentative roles. Of course, merely
exchanging a proponents hat for a critics hat will do nothing to ameliorate any of the
problems with personal bias, skewed data selection, cognitive blind spots, or
rationalization that may have caused the omission in the first place. Critical self-reflection
does not come with any guarantees of success.
Despite the limitations of this particular attempt at argumentative multi-tasking,
the strategy to try a new perspective on ones reasoning is well grounded. So, if there are
limits to what we as proponents can do with our own arguments, call for re-enforcements:
fellow proponents teammates in argument, as it were to provide a more detached
critical perspective on our reasoning. Professionally, we all know this: it is the reason
why we might ask friends to read drafts of our manuscripts. There may be more to be
gained from more hostile criticism, but missed opportunities are more likely to be noted
by allies. Again, there are limits to how well this can work, as well as to its real-time
availability in specific arguments, but even the possibility does mean that the obstacle is
not insuperable.
The apparent obstacle for critics to overcome is the principle of neutrality and
non-interference, but there are actually two principles here: neutrality and noninterference are different critical values. They ground different imperatives and those
imperatives apply to distinguishable roles in arguments. The principles are easily
separated in the context of team sports. Spectators may be as partisan as they like but
cannot interfere, During intra-squad scrimmages, coaches will interfere for training and
pedagogical purposes but they will properly remain neutral. It is referees during actual
games who must abide by both neutrality and non-interference. All those possibilities
have counterparts in arguments.
The first category encompasses interested but not-directly involved spectators.
The second is a little trickier but the obstacles to neutral critical involvement are more
real than imagined. Any constructive contribution that helps one side will be resented by
the other side and taken as a violation of neutrality. The asymmetry comes into especially
high relief here because pointing out stronger lines of reasoning that are not presented
rather than fallacious or mistaken parts of the existing, presented argument is pro-active,
giving the appearance of partisanship. The appearance is deceiving. The distinct
imperatives of neutrality and non-interference are not contradictory. After all, pointing
out missed opportunities is one of the great joys of kibitzing (see Cohen 2014). Kibitzers
are the back-seat drivers of arguments, those observers who offer unsolicited, unwanted,
and, in the common conception, unhelpful advice. Good kibitzers, however, will offer
good advice. Kibitzers who do not point out missed opportunities are not doing their jobs.
Kibitzers are quite capable of being completely impartial, at least insofar as they can be
equally annoying to everyone.
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The obstacle for opponents is the hardest to overcome: the adversarial element in DAM
argumentation. In zero-sum contests, opponents cannot reasonably be expected to help
out their adversaries. Therefore, to do so is above and beyond the call of any of the
imperatives deriving from ones role as an opponent or any of the ancillary roles one
assumes along the way in pursuing the opponents primary goals. And yet, thinking back
to the noble chess player, there is certainly something praiseworthy in helping out ones
opponents. Johnson (2007) distinguishes dialectical excellence from the simple
dialectical adequacy that comes with fulfilling ones duties; Finocchiaro (2013, p. 175)
glosses this as a distinction between dialectical virtues and dialectical obligations.
What they are getting at is the idea of an action that is very good to do but not something
that we are expected or required to do. Actions that have value independent of any
imperatives are, in word, supererogatory.
7. CONCLUSION: VIRTUES AND VALUES IN ARGUMENTATION
The concept of supererogation poses severe theoretical challenges for argumentation
theory, so despite its apparent attractiveness and applicability here, it should resisted. In
ethics, the concept applies to actions that are valuable but not obligatory. It implies that
there are actions that are good enough to satisfy the demands of morality even though
there are better actions available. Thus, although the only actions we are under any
obligation to perform are good actions, the converse fails: there are good actions we are
not obligated to perform. We have to detach the ethical concepts of good actions from
actions we ought to do. What we end up with is two axes for moral evaluation: one scale
for those good things which ought to be, and another for those whose goodness does not
have consequences for mandated action.
The same consequences appear in when it comes to evaluating arguments. In
order to make sense of the value of such positive constructive criticism as volunteering
better lines of reasoning, we would need to acknowledge two different measures. Some
virtues of arguers make them better arguers, but other virtues contribute to the quality of
the argument. And it would seem that there could be a tension between the two sets of
virtues. The virtues of the noble chess player leading to his supererogatory actions may
well result in better games of chess, but they do so at the expense of his chess prowess.
Wouldnt the same situation be entirely possible in arguments?
The answer is, yes, of course, but only if one is stuck within the DAM account of
argumentation that identifies good arguers with winning arguers and good arguments
with winning arguments. But those are linear, impoverished concepts. Their focus is too
narrowly on the product, arguments-1 in the terminology of OKeefe (1977). They miss
the larger picture. The DAM account cannot make any sense of arguers who walk away
from an argument having had their positions changed, either by winning or losing or
listening and learning, and declaring it a good argument on that account.
In the case of the noble chess player, it is not easy to reconcile the qualities of character
the virtues behind his supererogatory acts and the skills that make him a good chess
player because the measure of final appeal in evaluating skill at chess is success at chess,
and the final measure of evaluating success at chess is winning chess games. The
situation is not the same when it comes to argumentation. We can still say that the
measure of final appeal in evaluating skill at argumentation is success in arguments, but
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we do not have to acquiesce to the DAM idea that the final measure of evaluating success
at arguing is winning arguments. That is something worth an argument.
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Isocrates Moral Argumentation

Alexandra Corral Edmonds
Department of Communication
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA, United States, 15260
alexandra.corral.edmonds@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: Two of Michael Calvin McGees unpublished manuscripts hint at how the ancient Greek
philosopher Isocrates developed a perspective on argumentation that may be useful for contemporary
analysis of public affairs. The first manuscript describes Isocrates as a cultural surgeon who operated
using moral argumentation. The second manuscript suggests how individuals may repair cultural faults
using moral argumentation. Through rhetorical analysis of Spanish 15-M protest logoi, this paper explores
the critical utility of Isocratic moral argumentation.
KEYWORDS: Isocrates, Michael Calvin McGee, social movements, protest, 15-M, rhetoric, public
argument, argumentation

1. INTRODUCTION
How may an understanding of argumentation scholar Michael Calvin McGees use of the
term moral argumentation inform the analysis of modern-day protest activity?
Exploration of this question promises to enrich understanding of this term and shed light
on how argumentation by twenty-first century protestors may contribute to the processes
of deliberation and unity formation. McGee first describes moral argumentation in the
first of his two unpublished manuscripts on the topic of Isocrates (McGee 1986, 1998). In
this manuscript, Isocrates: A Parent of Rhetoric and Culture Studies, McGee provides
no direct definition of moral argumentation; however, some preliminary understandings
may be extrapolated from McGees use of the term by reading this paper in tandem with
the second manuscript, Choosing A Poros: Reflections on How to Implicate Isocrates in
Liberal Theory. Although the term moral argumentation has been employed in other
philosophical contexts, McGee inflects it in a unique and particular way that warrants
further study (Habermas 1984, 1988, 1990, 1996). This paper aims to (re)construct the
meaning of McGees moral argumentation to support a case study of protest logoi (i.e.,
reasoned arguments, such as protest slogans) by the Spanish protest group 15-M.
2. MORAL ARGUMENTATION
In the first manuscript, Isocrates: A Parent of Rhetoric and Culture Studies, McGee
argues that Isocrates argumentation may be characterized as the skill and talent of
discovering how best to apply values to a given circumstance [emphasis added] (McGee
1986). McGees definition attributes an implicit and intrinsic moral component to
Isocrates form of argumentation, which is signaled by McGees use of the term values,
a word that connotatively and denotatively carries ethical and moral implications (McGee
1986). McGee contends that for Isocrates, engaging in or performing moral
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argumentation encouraged right action (McGee 1986). McGee asserts that Isocrates
stated that moral knowledge could be obtained through studying the history of public
address, which also serves as a history of virtue in action (McGee 1986). By public
address, McGee most likely gestures to the classical Greek understanding of the term,
encompassing a variety of speeches (e.g., forensic, epideictic, deliberative, encomiastic)
that were traditionally delivered at the law courts, in political assemblies, and on
ceremonial occasions at public festivals (Ilie 2009, p. 833; McGee 1986). Thus, inherent
in McGees description of this acquisitional process is the salient role history plays in
obtaining moral knowledge, which is further articulated in the manner in which
Isocrates constructed arguments (McGee 1986).
According to McGee, Isocrates used the exercise of reason (i.e., logismo) to
arrive at logoi (i.e., reasoned arguments), a process which in the case of Isocrates
involved transforming historical knowledge into present action (McGee 1986; Poulakos
2008, p. 87). In essence, history provides a collection of topoi (i.e., argument schemes)
that may be mimetically altered through logismo to arrive at logoi (van Eemeren 2010,
pp. 101103). McGee further nuances Isocrates use of logos by arguing that Isocrates
established the possibility of performing [] surgery on culture, due to his use of
logos, citing as evidence his ability to create logoi that had the potential to move a group
of Athenians to re-define their Being [] from the ideology of Being-in a polis (I am
Athenian) to an ideology of Being-In a linguistically-defined culture (I am Greek)
(McGee 1986). Further developing this line of thought, McGee propounds that Isocrates
was not a cultural diagnostician but rather a surgeon, an assertion that McGee
evidences through highlighting that Isocrates did not compose dialogues that illustrated
how to find faults in a culture as had Plato, but rather left examples of employing
principles of moral argumentation to model for positive cultural change [emphasis
added] (McGee 1986). McGee concludes this manuscript by proposing that we use
Isocrates oeuvre as resources to see cultural faults and to perform the surgery necessary
to repair them (McGee 1986).
In the second manuscript, Choosing A Poros: Reflections on How to Implicate
Isocrates in Liberal Theory, McGee further develops his characterization of Isocrates
form of argumentation through a discussion of the identificatory effects of his logoi
(McGee 1998). McGee argues that Althussers orientation to identification is
analogically closest to Isocrates orientation to his audiences and thus identifies an
important conceptual component to understanding the effects of Isocrates logoi,
interpellation (McGee 1998). Before exploring Isocratean interpellation in greater
depth, it may be useful to briefly discuss Althusserian interpellation to allow for a proper
contrast of these two forms of hailing.
Louis Althusser introduced the concept of Ideological State Apparatuses
(ISAs) in his 1970 essay, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes toward an
Investigation), built upon the Marxist conception of the State or the State apparatus as a
repressive apparatus that functions as a repression machine which perpetuates
bourgeoisie domination over the proletariat and articulates State power (Althusser 2008,
pp. 11, 14, 1617). By contrast, the State Apparatus itself contains institutions (e.g., the
army, police, and government) that operate through violence (Althusser 2008, pp. 1617).
Ideological State Apparatuses are a number of realities which present themselves in
the form of distinct and specialized institutions (e.g., political, legal, and educational
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systems, the family, religion, and culture) that function by ideology (Althusser 2008, pp.
1617). The critical difference between Ideological State Apparatuses and what Althusser
refers to as the (Repressive) State Apparatus lies in their functioning, with the former
relying primarily upon ideology and only secondarily through repression and the latter
functioning in the complete inverse (Althusser 2008, pp. 1819). To illustrate how
ideology, defined as the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the
mind of man or a social group functions in the life of the individual, Althusser
introduces the concept of interpellation (Althusser 2008, pp. 32, 40). Althusser predicates
his conceptualization of interpellation on the premise that ideology exists as a result of
the category of the subject, given that ideology is destined for concrete subjects
(Althusser 2008, pp. 4445). Following this assertion, Althusser propounds that the
category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the
function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects (Althusser
2008, pp. 4445). To describe how ideology constitutes subjects, Althusser contends that
it operates by recruiting subjects from individuals or by transforming individuals into
subjects through interpellation or hailing (Althusser 2008, p. 48). In order to illustrate
this action, Althusser provides an example of a police official exclaiming, Hey, you
there! to an individual on the street, compelling him or her to turn around, and by virtue
of this action, he or she is interpellated into a subject (Althusser 2008, p. 48).
In the second manuscript, McGee argues that Althusser understood interpellation
to be a power of the State and consequently always [a] negative action, which sharply
contrasts with the positivity McGee attributes to Isocratean interpellation (McGee
1998). McGee describes Althusserian interpellation as evil [and a] virtually demonic
action in contrast to the good Isocratean interpellation, which he terms positive
interpellation (McGee 1998). For Althusser, the existence of ideology and
interpellation of individuals as subjects are the same thing, therefore, according to
McGee, Althusser sees an erasure of subjectivity by contrast to Isocrates, who views
subjectivity as a hard-won acquisition [a] realization of the possibility of Being a
subject (Althusser 2008, p. 49; McGee 1998). McGee couches his argument by stating
that there exist many reasons to justify his use of the term interpellation vis-a-vis
Isocratean rhetoric and cites the following three reasons: 1) both discuss political
struggle, 2) both study callings, and 3) both understandings of calling are tied to the
theory and praxis of power (McGee 1998). McGee concludes this manuscript with a
discussion of how contemporary Liberalism has given way to the the individual, who
has contributed to Western political and cultural fragmentation (McGee 1998). For
McGee, the individual is a cultural [fault] of modern democracies, citing America as
a geographical region where this phenomenon may be observed (McGee 1998). As such,
McGee proposes looking to Isocrates for solutions to repair 21st century disunity by way
of Isocratean interpellation and argues that it may produce a positive becoming of the
collective, rather than a negative ceasing-to-be of the individual (McGee 1998).
To summarize, upon piecing together elements from both of McGees
manuscripts, a definition of moral argumentation begins to emerge, one that speaks of
moral argumentation as a particular kind of argument practice that exhibits particular
characteristics (McGee 1986). It would appear that for McGee, Isocrates moral
argumentation involved the [communicative] process of transforming topoi of the past,
through logismo, into logoi that appropriately addressed the given oratorical
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circumstances of the present, producing logoi that had the potential to produce two
differing types of interpellative calls. These two types of callings were designed to
interpellate either a group of individuals or an individual to engage in a specific
deliberative action, yielding a particular communicative outcome. In the case of the
individual, this would entail inspiring the individual to engage in dissoi logoi (i.e., the
internal practice of pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue)
in order to form wise judgments (Mitchell 2010, p. 108). In contrast, the deliberative
action for a group of individuals would be synerchesthe (i.e., a form of interactive
collective inquiry and deliberation that leads to the formation of wise judgments and
unity) (Mitchell & McTigue 2012, pp. 92, 96; Mitchell 2010, pp. 108109, 111, 2011, pp.
6263). McGees definition may be better understood by contextualizing it in the
pedagogical program of Isocrates, as this will illustrate the manner in which McGees
definition re-articulates pedagogical touchstones and values from Isocrates paideia (i.e.,
educational program) and provide greater clarity to McGees definition of Isocrates
moral argumentation, which will henceforth be referred to as Isocratic moral
argumentation. The following figure provides a visual representation of the structure and
components of Isocratic moral argumentation.

3. ISOCRATIC MORAL ARGUMENTATION

The first component of McGees Isocratic moral argumentation relates to the process of
studying and mimetically transforming historical topoi into logoi for present and future
action, a process articulated in many of what Isocrates terms moral treatise[s] (Isocrates
1928d, sec. 37). Isocrates paideia was in perpetual engagement with history, as it
served as a cultural text from which topoi were extracted, modified, and improved upon,
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in order to address the given oratorical needs of a situation (Isocrates 1928a, sec. 96100,
1928c, sec. 811, 1928d, sec. 1124; 3235, 1928e, sec. 3438, 1929a, sec. 8284,
1929b, sec. 8284, 1945d, sec. 711). Isocrates did not wish for his students to be
shameless babblers and merely repeat per verbatim the same things which [had] been
said in the past, but rather to surpass them (Isocrates 1929a, sec. 8284, 1945d, sec. 7
11). This rhetorical practice is most clearly described in Panegyricus: For the deeds of
the past are, indeed, an inheritance common to us all; but the ability to make proper use
of them at the appropriate time, to conceive the right sentiments about them in each
instance, and to set them forth in finished phrase, is the peculiar gift of the wise
(Isocrates 1928c, sec. 811). Isocrates paideia highlights three important nuances in the
creation of new logoi from historical topoi. First, this process must not be performed in a
hasty manner, but rather, as described in Antidosis, through the critical exercise of
reason or reasoning (i.e., logismo), which leads one to be mistaken less often in ones
course of action (Isocrates 1929a, sec. 290293). Second, one should endeavor to
mimetically alter and exceed what has been said in the past and not blindly copy
(Isocrates 1929a, sec. 290293). Third, one must not neglect to be mindful of the kairos
(i.e., timing) of the moment, in order to allow for the effective delivery of logos (Isocrates
1928c, sec. 811). Thus, the first component in the process of Isocratic moral
argumentation may be understood as an argument creation phase that leads to the second
phase: the delivery of logoi.
These newly created logoi have the potential to create two differing types of
interpellative calls depending on the audience (i.e., individuals or an individual), which is
where a salient distinction arises with regard to how the interpellative component of
Isocrates logoi functioned. This distinction relates to the disjuncture that occurs with
regard to the eventual Communicative Outcome of the audience-specific interpellative
calls. Logoi destined for an audience comprised of individuals were composed in such a
way that they would interpellate that group of people to engage in a particular
Deliberative Action called synerchesthe, an important capability of Isocratic logos that
is highlighted in a section of Nicocles or the Cyprians, referred to as the hymn to logos.
In this passage, logos was offered as the reason we escaped the life of wild beasts []
come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and [] there is no
institution devised by man which the power of [logos] has not helped us to establish
(Isocrates 1928b, sec. 67). The hymn to logos reveals that for Isocrates, logos is
intrinsically linked to humanity and, through the cultivation of logos, citizens may assist
their city in making wise choices through engaging in reasoned political debate
(Morgan 2004, p. 145). Isocrates acknowledged that logos could be a source of social
unification or disagreement, and as such, produce centripetal or centrifugal effects
(Haskins 2004, p. 97; Mitchell & McTigue 2012, pp. 9293). Consequently, Isocrates
instructed his students to deliver logos in such a manner that their performance would be
capable of spurring synerchesthe, which would serve as a source of social unification,
binding the demos together into a political community (Poulakos 2008, p. 16). Isocrates
described three related actions that indicate how the unity formation of synerchesthe may
be invoked through coming together deliberatively: first, collective inquiry; second,
deliberation; and third, alliance formation (Mitchell & McTigue 2012, p. 92; Poulakos
2008, p. 19). In essence, logoi composed for individuals produced an interpellative call
that could spur the Communicative Action of synerchesthe, leading to the
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Communicative Outcome of forming wise judgments through deliberation and creating

unity among those participating in the collective deliberation of a given inquiry.
In contrast, the second type of interpellative call produced through Isocratic moral
argumentation is the call directed toward the individual alone. The Deliberative Action
produced by these logoi has a distinct Communicative Outcome that is best represented
in Isocrates letters To Alexander, To the Children of Jason, To Archidamus, and To
Demonicus and Nicocles or the Cyprians, wherein one may observe the manner in which
logoi are constructed to interpellate the individual into engaging in the Deliberative
Action of dissoi logoi (Isocrates 1928b, sec. 710, 1928d, sec. 3235, 1945a, sec. 35,
1945b, sec. 1619, 1945c, sec. 69; 913). This particular communicative action (i.e.,
dissoi logoi) highlights a pervasive component in Isocrates paideia: debate. Protagoras
of Abdera, a key teacher of Isocrates, practiced a politically-infused program of education
based on dissoi logoi and argumentative practice (Smith 1918, pp. 197199, 202203).
Isocrates, having been influenced by Protagoras argumentative-focused pedagogy,
interpellated those whom he advised and instructed them to engage in this Deliberative
Action in order to arrive at the Communicative Outcome of forming wise judgments.
In To Demonicus, Isocrates describes his paideia as one that teaches students how they
may win repute as men of sound character [and] improve their moral conduct
(Isocrates 1928d, sec. 37). For Isocrates, engaging in dissoi logoi enabled wise decision
making and consequently lead to improved moral conduct (Isocrates 1928d, sec. 37).
In Nicocles or the Cyprians, Isocrates contends that we regard as sage those who most
skillfully debate their problems in their own mind and similarly, in To the Children of
Jason, nothing can be intelligently accomplished unless first [] you reason and
deliberate (Isocrates 1928b, sec. 710, 1929a, sec. 253256; 256259, 1945c, sec. 69).
The aforementioned passages elucidate the importance of internal deliberation to arriving
at a well-formulated judgment and the ultimate Communicative Outcome of the
interpellative call directed at the individual. Thus, one may understand Isocratic moral
argumentation as the creation of argument(s) that produce(s) nuanced interpellative calls,
depending on the audience, to engage in differing communicative actions that result in
the formation of wise judgments and, in the case of a group of individuals, also unity.
Isocratic moral argumentation is a particularly useful hermeneutical tool for
examining how protest argumentation carries the potential to create unity among protest
group members. In both of McGees unpublished manuscripts related to Isocrates, he
gestures toward the utility and insightful perspective that may be gained through
considering Isocrates concepts as resources that may aid in the analysis of
contemporary political rhetoric (McGee 1986, 1998). Similarly, argumentation scholar
Gordon Mitchell has also drawn upon Isocratean concepts for the contemporary study of
diverse deliberative settings (Mitchell & McTigue 2012; Mitchell 2010, 2011).
Furthering this theoretical approach, in order to elucidate the hermeneutical merit of
Isocratic moral argumentation, this paper performs a case study of the Spanish protest
group 15-Ms protest logoi from the summer of 2011, in order to illustrate how this type
of argumentation may be performed to create a positive Becoming of the collective
amid the contemporary milieu of fragmentation (McGee 1986). A particular angle of
inquiry will focus specifically on how historical topoi were transformed into logoi used
by 15-M to interpellate people into their protest acampadas [encampments], where they
engaged in synerchesthe and ultimately created unity.
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4. 15-M
In the summer of 2011, Spain had a youth unemployment rate of 45%, out of which
650,000 were below the age of 30 and neither worked nor studied (Taibo 2013, p. 156).
This growing group of young people is referred to as the ni-ni, ni estudia ni trabaja
[neither-nor, neither studies nor works] (Roseman 2013, pp. 401402; Santos Blzquez
2013, p. 386). In 2011, the Spanish labor market presented multiple challenges for young
people, such as being paid in dinero negro [off the books] and providing an abundance
of contratos-basuras, which are employment contracts that pay low salaries and have a
tendency to engage in illegal treatment toward employees (Taibo 2013, p. 156).
Concurrently, in the public university system, a visible deterioration in the quality and
accessibility occurred with the onset of the large hike in tuition fees and scholarship
cutbacks (Perugorra & Tejerina 2013, p. 427; Taibo 2013, p. 156). Difficulties also
abounded in the Spanish economic sector, which was experiencing a financial crisis due
to a number of factors (e.g., the bursting of the Spanish real-estate bubble and the
international financial crisis) (Castaeda 2012, p. 310; Corts 2013, p. 66; ltet 2011,
pp. 41, 45; Pino 2013, pp. 234235; Royo 2009, p. 28). Amid this economic, social, and
political turmoil, the internet-based Spanish platform Democracia Real YA! [Real
Democracy NOW!] issued a nationwide call for mobilization through social media, to be
held on May 15, 2011 (Morell 2012, p. 387; Perugorra & Tejerina 2013, p. 428; Serrano
Casado 2012, pp. 27, 30). This demonstration was set to occur one week prior to the
elecciones municipales [municipal elections] and those of the comunidades autnomas
[autonomous federal regions of Spain], in order to protest issues such as corruption of
the political parties, high unemployment levels, and governmental mismanagement of
the economic crisis (Cedillo 2012, pp. 573574; Jimnez & Estalella 2011, p. 20; Serrano
Casado 2012, p. 27).
Demonstrations occurred in over 50 Spanish cities, with the participation of
hundreds of thousands of Spanish citizens (Ceisel 2013, p. 159; Perugorra & Tejerina
2013, p. 428; Serrano Casado 2012, p. 29). Following the close of the demonstration on
May 15, 2011, in Madrids Puerta del Sol, a group of over 30 individuals continued their
protest by spending the night in the plaza, a decision that would mark the formation of the
protest group known as 15-M and the creation of Acampada Sol [Sol Encampment]
(Jimnez & Estalella 2011, p. 20; Romanos 2012, p. 186). Thereafter, Madrids
acampada was replicated across Spain and, in acts of solidarity, in international cities,
such as London and Paris (Juventud Sin Futuro 2011, p. 82; Velasco 2011, pp. 2425,
33). A key factor that likely contributed to the growth and size of transnational
acampadas were 15-Ms logoi.
Two of 15-Ms protest logoi (i.e., slogans) will be examined to highlight how 15M engaged in the first phase of Isocratic moral argumentationthe transformation of
historical topoi into new logoi. One European social movement in particular had a
significant influence on 15-Ms arguments: the French May 68 protests (Feixa, Snchez
Garca, Soto, & Nofre 2013, p. 199; Pedret Santos 2011, p. 98). 15-M transformed the
two following topoi from May 68 into new protest logoi: Enragez-vous [Become
outraged] and Ne prenez plus l'ascenseur, prenez le pouvoir [Stop taking the elevator,
take the power] (Bussetti & Revello 2008, pp. 44, 78). The first May 68 topos,
Enragez-vous [Become outraged], was transformed via logismo into Indgnate ya, sin
272

lucha nadie te escucha [Become outraged now, without a fight no one hears you]
(Garca 2011). This example illustrates how 15-M transformed the affective rage from the
May 68 topos into an argument that channeled this emotion into a multifaceted
interpellative call of affect, identity, and action. 15-Ms argument calls individuals to
change their affective state to one of outrage, to become an indignado, and to move into
action (i.e., participate in 15-Ms acampadas).
The second May 68 topos, Ne prenez plus l'ascenseur, prenez le pouvoir [Stop
taking the elevator, take the power], was transmuted to Sin tele, sin cerveza, toma la
plaza con cabeza [Without TV, without beer, take the plaza with intelligence] (Velasco
2011, p. 69). This transmutation elucidates the manner in which 15-M borrowed with
subtle modification May 68s juxtaposition of passivity and action, such as changing
take the power to take the plaza. It should be noted that in this May 68 logos, no
direct instructions are provided with regard to how one should take the power,
rhetorically producing an interpellative call lacking direction. 15-M, by contrast, provides
explicit instructions to take the plaza, where, in reality, power is not what was taken,
but rather created through occupation.
The two examined protest logoi demonstrate how 15-M created interpellative
logoi from May 68 topoi to call individuals to their acampadas, thereby increasing their
growth and sustaining high participation rates. It should be noted that 15-M
acknowledged their connection to May 68 during the acampadas and created a logos that
expressed how they understood themselves in relation to this antecedent movement. In
Acampada Sol, a 15-M poster read Esto no es mayo del 68: nosotros vamos en serio
[This is not May 68: we are serious], highlighting 15-Ms desire to surpass May 68
(Velasco 2011, p. 47). This action evokes a key component of Isocratic moral
argumentation: surpassing or exceeding the actions of the past. This very point has also
been noted by political science scholar, Juan Carlos Monedero, who argues that this
protest logos is evidence that 15-M has learned from the past (Monedero 2012, p. 128).
The abovementioned logoi, in addition to many others, produced Interpellative
Calls that brought multitudes of individuals to 15-Ms acampadas, wherein protestors
were perpetually engaging in the Deliberative Action of synerchesthe, as 15-M
practiced a culture of debate in their acampadas. Evidence of this culture may be
observed in the manner in which virtually all of 15-Ms decisions were made through
collective deliberation in asambleas [assemblies] (Bentez Martn 2013, p. 47). One 15-M
protestor described the asambleas as, un espacio de debate al principio, muy importante,
se nos llamaba goras, porque era espacio de discutir ideas de trabajar, adems poner
en comn ideas muy contrarias [in the beginning, a space for debate, it was very
important, we called it the agoras, because it was a space to debate working ideas, and put
in agreement conflicting ideas] (Cabezas 2011, p. 198). There were multiple asambleas
of varying sizes and topic matters that met with differing levels of frequency and
duration, depending on the needs of an acampada (de la Rubia 2011, p. 160). In addition,
working groups and commissions formed and held asambleas on a wide range of topics
such as: feminism, healthcare, politics, economics, the maintenance and infrastructure of
acampadas, and internal coordination (de la Rubia 2011, pp. 160166). This description
of 15-Ms culture of debate exemplifies the second component of the second phase of
Isocratic moral argumentation: Deliberative Action. Given that synerchesthe was an

273

unavoidable argumentative practice in the acampadas, two Communicative Outcomes

ensued: 1) wise judgment formation and 2) unity formation.
In the acampadas, 15-M created a space where wise judgment formation
became a collective, participatory, deliberative goal, evidenced in a guide created by the
Commission of Dynamism from Acampada Sol on the topic of popular assemblies (Ruiz
Trejo 2013, p. 29; Torres Lpez et al. 2011, pp. 6989). In this text, the commission
describes an asamblea as follows: un rgano de toma de decisiones participativo que
busca el consenso [y] los mejores argumentos para tomar la decisin ms acorde
[a participatory decision making entity that looks for consensus [and]... the best
arguments in order to make the most appropriate decision] (Torres Lpez et al. 2011, p.
70). This statement demonstrates that 15-M understood the purpose of collective
deliberation as an argumentative practice that would lead to making the best and most
appropriate decision. Intrinsically imbedded in 15-Ms conceptualization of the
asamblea is an argumentative ideal articulated in Isocratic moral argumentation: the
arrival at wise judgment via deliberation with oneself or, in the case of 15-M, with a
group of individuals through synerchesthe.
Through practicing deliberative argumentation, protestors who participated in the
acampadas were also able to create unity among one another, the second
Communicative Outcome of Isocratic moral argumentation for groups of individuals.
15-M protestors and scholars alike have commented on the unity the acampadas created
(Caero Ruiz 2013, p. 101; Costa-Snchez & Pieiro-Otero 2012, p. 1463; Garca Espn
2012, p. 300). To illustrate, one protestor from Madrids acampada said that it alumbr
una comunidad [en] que se hizo autntica unidad orgnica [illuminated a community in
which authentic and organic unity was formed] (Mora, Esteban, & G. Rubio 2011, p. 96).
This quote further substantiates the assertion that the argumentative practices of the
acampada contributed to the creation of unity among protestors and thus reflects a
Communicative Outcome of Isocratic moral argumentation.
5. CONCLUSION
This case study has considered how 15-M, engaging in what might be called Isocratic
moral argumentation, borrowed May 68 topoi to create new protest logoi. Isocratic
terminology helps explain how these new logoi served as Interpellative Call[s] to
attract individuals to 15-Ms acampadas to engage in the Deliberative Action of
synerchesthe. In the acampadas, synerchesthe produced two Communicative
Outcomes: wise judgment formation and the creation of unity among protestors. These
insights illustrate how contemporary protest activity can be understood as argumentative
phenomena, through the application of a theoretical framework grounded in
argumentation theory and classical Greek rhetoric.
Future application of this argumentative practice could involve an examination of
other social protests groups that have been influenced by 15-M (e.g., the 2011 Greek
Indignant Citizens Movement and the American Occupy Wall Street movement). Such an
investigation would provide greater insight into the transnational impact of 15-Ms
argumentative practices and allow for the study of the application of Isocratic moral
argumentation in differing national contexts.

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In addition, future scholarship concerning Isocratic moral argumentation could also

examine how the dynamics of this form of argumentation could be altered when practiced
in a virtual format. A study that examines the use of Isocratic moral argumentation in a
virtual asamblea would be a particularly salient area of future investigation, given the
exponential rise of social media use by social movements within the past ten years.
Isocratic moral argumentation and the conceptual framework it introduces to the study of
social movement argumentation demonstrate the enduring salience and relevancy of
implicating Isocratean concepts in modern-day contexts.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
It is with immense gratitude that I acknowledge the guidance and support of Dr. Gordon
R. Mitchell.

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A Case Study Of Argumentative Assimilation

Rubens Damasceno Morais
University of Braslia
Braslia Brazil
70.770-680
r.damasceno.morais@uol.com.br

ABSTRACT: We show a type of argumentative assimilation, a phenomenon that emerges in legal deliberations
between judges, in a Court of appeals in Brazil. By refusing the dichotomy between persuasion and conviction,
we explore the idea of adhesion, which helps us to better understand the data. The purpose of the study is to
identify the textual marks that witness the conflict resolution in the moments when a judge absorbs the
standpoint of others magistrates.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, assimilation, conflict, convince, deliberation, interaction, persuade, standpoint,
stasis, tribunal.

1. PERSUADE OR CONVINCE?
In argumentation and rhetorical studies, a well-known dichotomy between persuade and
convince associate the former to emotions - thus, according to a widely shared
understanding, to the unreasonable, and the latter to reason. About the etymology of the
word persuade, Plantin says: to this family also belongs the name Peith, the name of
Aphrodite (or maybe her companion), goddess of beauty, seduction and persuasion (Dic., art.
Persuader, Convaincre/we translate). After reviewing the history of the word persuasion,
Danblon shows that the meaning of that word was always linked to the idea of enchantment,
magic, incantation: we were always afraid of the effects of persuasion, since his origins. Its
power of seduction, compared to that of a femme fatale, destructive of the reason of the social
network, was seen with terror and fascination (2005, p. 8/we translate). For Perelman, the
demonstrative evidence, that one analyzed by formal logic, is more than persuasive, it is
convincing (1999, p. 106/ we translate).
Nevertheless, in this paper I will not consider the opposition between these concepts as
problematic as some would consider, given that we are not convinced (or should we say
persuaded?) that this distinction is analytically relevant. In fact, I agree with some
contemporary authors, like M. Angenot, to whom the conceptual dissociation represented by
these words sounds a little ambiguous and artificial (2008, p. 93). We sustain this position
because that distinction seems hardly applicable in the analysis that will be presented here.
Thus, we will employ these concepts more flexibly, considering that the difference between
being convinced and being persuaded is not clear, especially in terms of mental processes
that take place on such occasions. In Plantins words, most discussions about rhetorics
employ the words persuade and convince like synonyms (idem). Hence, considering the
absence of consensus in that regard, it is worth showing the solidarity between these
approachs (convince/persuade) instead of their polarities and antagonisms.
We will reason in terms of function or strategic value of a word or even of an oral
expression used in a conversation, especially if we consider that in the legal world our
context of analysis , the motivations and constraints operating on judges, and the resulting
judicial mentality, are ignored (Posner, 2008, p. 377). Moreover, it is never clear when the
persuasion process is attained (Nettel, 2011, p. 1359), which makes it more challenging to
study this dichotomy. Therefore, rather than opposing persuasion and conviction, we prefer to
278

treat these as interchangeable concepts, i.e, like synonymous. According to Meyer, the good
rhetoric will ever merge conviction and persuasion (2008, p. 34/we translate). Hence, in the
analysis below it makes more sense to talk about adhesion to an argument (and not about
persuasion or conviction) at times of conflict resolution among magistrates.
It is known that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas New Rhetoric already had the
ambition to understand the reciprocal influence of speeches in some types of audiences in the
dynamic of persuasive discourses. In that sense, our interest is, to some extent, to examine the
manifestations of adhesion vif et chaud (Cornu, 2005, p. 252), i.e., in the exact moment
that it appears in Xs speech, during some deliberations and observe mechanisms of resistance
used in times of conflict of opinion. Although the debate presents moments of alliances and
convergence of opinions, our primary interest in the analysis is the change of mind of the
interlocutors during deliberation, in the moment of announcing their legal standpoints.
Therefore, in the dialectical and argumentative reasoning presented by the judges, we will try
to reveal the tracks of adhesion in the magistrates discourse since we are interested in
surveying the moment when controversy among them is resolved, i.e., the moment where X
changes their mind and accepts Ys standpoint. In other words, we seek to identify the moment
where a magistrate adheres to another magistrates speech and displays some textual marks
that bear witness to the resolution of the stasis1.
About the context of this research, it is important to point out that, although the
magistrates do not have a declared aim to influence (persuade/convince) their colleagues
during a deliberation, it is obvious that they seek consensus. It looks evident that it is
unanimity and not the majority of votes that would evidence the alignment of the group
and, consequently, the cohesion of the participants, the legal experts, during a legal debate.
That is the reason why I will try to present the process of argumentative assimilation in this
paper, which is a reflection of adhesion to the standpoints of the judges during a deliberation.
2. THE PRINCIPLE OF ARGUMENTATIVE ASSIMILATION
Adhesion, like the output of an argumentative process, with an interactional feature, will be
called assimilation in this paper. And the word used to describe the result of that discursive
operation is a prolific one since the term refers to various phenomena from different fields,
such as psychology, biology, physiology, pedagogy, sociology, theology, military, law,
linguistics and even reasoning in general2. This word has been seen even as a synonym of
the word amalgam in some French dictionaries3. In fact, given its sense in this article, that
word would be considered the counterpart of the amalgame about which Doury (2003)
speaks. In other words, in our analysis that kind of amalgam has rather a positive connotation,
because, as we will show, during a deliberation among judges, one opponent ends up
merging his standpoint to that of his antagonist in the debate. Contrary to the amalgam
being considered as a fallacy or a sophism, here that kind of occurrence is situated in the
domain of the irenic, and not in the territory of the conflicting, which certainly changes the
argumentative value attached to this concept.
According to our data, the magistrates adhesion to a different standpoint is noted in
moments that a divergence of opinions (stasis) was not solved with the obvious manifestation
1

According to Plantin (Dic. Art. stasis/forthcoming), the notion of stasis (stase) stems from a medical technical
concept. That means a blockage in the flow of blood in the body. Transposed to the argumentation and interaction
universe, this word (stase) means a conflict of opinions, a dispute that would block a good dialogue between
parties.
2
Le Trsor de la Langue Franaise - TLF, art. Assimilation.
3
See the virtual French dictionary CRISCO - http://www.crisco.unicaen.fr/

279

of agreement (I agree with you, I follow you) or other kind of agreement manifestations,
which are very common in such cases of legal deliberation. We observed that there were
original types of concessions, developed through a kind of incorporation of the other
magistrates words, a kind of deglutition of the other judges arguments, representing a
perlocutionary effect in moments of legal controversy. That kind of argumentative ascendancy
is the result of the incorporation of Xs arguments for Y, which indicates an impromptu
change in the judges disposition during the debate. In the process of assimilation investigated
here, the persuaded/convinced debater (magistrate) eventually demonstrates his/her adhesion
to their antagonists standpoint just by reproducing arguments, keywords or phrases that had
been pronounced by the antagonist minutes before, during the deliberation.
The incorporation of Xs arguments for Y, i.e., the process that we call assimilation,
follows four moves, according to our observations:
1.
2.
3.
4.

One judge (proposant)4 presents his legal arguments justification;

One discordant judge contests the arguments presented (opposant). In that way, a type
of stasis appears during the deliberation;
The discordant judge resists to the arguments presented by the other magistrate by
presenting counter arguments;
The discordant judge capitulates and expresses his adhesion to his antagonists
arguments by repeating their words, which shows that an assimilation or a kind of
outcome took place during the deliberation.

We will try to show in the analysis the moment where the argumentative barriers between two
debaters collapse, before one of them shows a change is his standpoint and impromptu
abandons the role of antagonist, played during the debate until that instant. In the Telephone
Company case, we will note that one of the judges (REV) ends up repeating his opponents
arguments (RAP), which results in what we will call an argumentative assimilation process in
that analysis.
2.1 The Telephone Company case
In the Case of the Telephone Company, a Brazilian tribunal rules an appeal filed by a
telephone company (Appellant) against a decision issued by a judge in that same tribunal. In
the excerpt that we will now show, we observe a conflict of legal opinions between two
magistrates: the rapporteur (RAP) and a second magistrate expert (the reviewer of the case REV). The discordant opinions are about the qualification of the facts. In the trial presented,
we will see that three judges, in deliberation, in Second Instance, award damages in a lawsuit
involving moral injury. In general, it is difficult for judges to evaluate moral damage cases,
because the Brazilian law does not provide clear guidelines for the evaluation of such cases
(Reis, 2010). For that reason, it is very common to have long debates among magistrates when
a controversial case is being judged, during qualification of the case (the characterization of a
moral damage) and, afterwards, during definition of the amount of compensation (the price).
The case presented here is a polemical debate between RAP and REV about the
defendants conduct and the injuries caused to a client and the particular circumstances. Here,
the judges deliberate about a supposed abuse of rights and threats made to a client by the
company that repeatedly called her to pay for a service that had not been delivered. The way
4

According to Plantin (1996 and others), one debater is opposant (opponent) when one plays the role of
antagonist in a debate. To the contrary, one would be the proposant or the tiers. In that way, he talks about three
possible roles (rle actantiel).

280

that the disagreement is settled in the next sequence will help us to illustrate the assimilation
process, an argumentative and interactive fact. In that debate, after a long controversy, the
judges finally reach a consensus, despite their conflicting opinions. That way, we seek to show
that the process of adhesion has perlocutory effects.
We have divided the sequence in three parts for a better understanding of the analysis:
Telephone Company Case: 3 stages of analysis5
1rst part
Divergence between RAP X REV
nd
2 part
justifications of the Rapporteur judge
3rd part
Argumentative assimilation

l. 80 to 105
l. 106 to 133
l. 134 to 151

1rst part
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

REV
RAP
REV
RAP
REV
RAP
REV
RAP
REV
RAP
REV
RAP

REV

RAP
REV
RAP
REV

=sir what is the amount that is being awarded/

two thousand
considering that the defendants conduct wasnt
considered fraudulent do you think that/
I consider that: that: euh:\
xxxxxxx I know your thinking about that kind of case:\=
=that is not changing the amount [((unintelligible))&
[((unintelligible))
& no because::\=
=(that means) not to award a moral damage if it had not been
fraudulent=&
=yes
&conduct isnt it/
no in that kind of case and for me that question
here is al-already changing these amounts when the sum of money
is very significant or on the contrary
when that is irre[levant\
[but I am not talking about the amount I
am talking about the particular circumstances of the case
of the telephone company the principles of civil lawsuits&
I see
&do you think that in that case the injury would be considered
moral damage/
ye:s\ yeah and it is for that reason that I told eh that
now I can see otherwise that kind of situation&
huum

2nd part
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

RAP

&because in that case I consider that the defendants conduct

was an abuse of rights your conduct didnt respect the
plaintiffs consumer rights and whats more the company
called insistently and threatened the client many times
even when the plaintiff had already claimed in court
at ((identification)) about these facts and inconveniences
in fact she had already contacted the service provider verbally
and in writing to explain the problems without any solution

We adopted the transcription conventions of the ICAR laboratory (Interactions, Corpus, Apprentissages,
Reprsentations) in France.

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114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

REV
RAP

she had already shown proof of purchase with a receipt but

the defendant #didnt stop# threatening and what I see here
is that ah-ah that we wouldnt not consider that (#this is
an illicit act) an abuse of rights a reprehensible act by the
telephone company because the client had to pay for a service
that hadnt been started yet or delivered and a- something
would be done to alleviate the serious suffering and anxiety
unjustly caused
to that woman isnt it/ and I want to say that I see that kind
of situation in another way now of course we cant generalize
because of <((different intonation)) and it is for that
reason that I emphasized> ah: when we talk about telephone
companies that kind of abuse is very common/ we judge that
every day I mean the companies dont respect consumers even
if they ask to cancel the service contract they continue
to send the bills/ and to refund the money paid is hard and&
((clearing the throat))
&I I see that question differently now in that sense now
I am moving my way to understand that and the company is not
allowed to do that with the client that situation must have a
legal consequence and the plaintiff may claim compensation\

3rd part
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

REV

RAP
REV

indeed xxx if I put myself in the consumers place I guess

that she-she had been suffering a kind of psycHOLOGIC terror
being intimidated and: experiencing an inconvenient suffering:&
ummh
&that: eh-eh is likely to claim a moral compensation/ than your
honor
knows my way of interpreting that and eh eh like your honor we cant generalize but I
understand that if the company d-doesnt
unsubscribed her
name in the unit of credit protection #there is no moral
damage# but in that specific case I go with your argumentation
in that case there was in a redundant way of say there was an
abuse abusive if we can say that and why that was abusive
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
((unintelligible)) in fact if the company eh continues to
pursue the client if they continue to threaten harass the
client even
without her registration in the unit of credit that would
have caused serious anxiety social humiliation or a kind of-of
mental anguish and suffering that would be translated into a
kind of moral damage than with these considerations I adhere to
your vote to the vote of your honor

The assimilation occurs only in cases of transitory conflict (stase rversible), in situations of
divergent opinions, i.e., when a magistrate is unable to immediately convince/persuade the
others. In figure 1 two judges are represented in diverging opinions (RAP and REV). The
curved line represents the conflict between them. The third circle represents the judge who
participates in the deliberation, but who does not diverge from his colleagues.

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2.1.1 Divergence between RAP X REV

Divergence between RAP and REV begins in line 80, when REV suddenly interrupts the RAP
to ask him the amount that had been awarded (=sir what is the amount that is being
awarded/). In fact, the conflict of opinions becomes clear when the same magistrate delivers
his interlocution: considering that the defendants conduct wasnt considered fraudulent do
you think that/ (l.82-83). It is clear that REV addresses many questions about RAPs
interpretation of the case. Indeed, REVs interruptions are interesting in that analysis because
they show that in a context of argumentative interaction vif et chaud the kind of
reactions by X is determined by the way Y argues (strategies, kind of arguments etc.). In that
first part, REV makes his divergence of interpretations clear about the qualification of the
Telephone Company case (occurrence or not of moral damage). He reinforces his opinion
when he insists6, on lines 97-99: [but I am not talking about the amount I am talking about
the particular circumstances of the case of the telephone company the principles of civil
lawsuits & and &do you think that in that case the injury would be considered a moral
damage / (101-102). The strongest moment of divergence of opinions ends on line 105,
when REV makes an almost inaudible huum before the rapporteur judge reacts to this
participation.
To sum up, RAPs interventions witness, at a first glance, that the judge resists
agreeing with the arguments given by the Rapporteur. We can summarize this in table 1:
Table 1: REVs arguments
REV (opposant)
80
=sir what is the amount that is being awarded/
82-83
considering that the defendants conduct wasnt considered fraudulent do you think
that/
89-90
=(that means) not to award a moral damage if have not been fraudulent=&
97-99
[but I am not talking about the amount I am talking about the particular circumstances
of the case of the telephone company the principles of civil lawsuits &
101-102 &do you think that in that case the injury would be considered moral damage /
105
hum

We chose not to transcribe all the arguments presented by REV because of space limitations. Nevertheless, as
we will see, RAP will repeat all his principal arguments subsequently.

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2.1.2 Justifications of RAP

In that part of the sequence (l.106 to 133), we show the Rapporteurs response to the
objections made by REV. We see in the Rapporteurs words the source of the arguments that
will be used by REV. It is the moment of the deliberation where the RAP tries to eliminate the
resistance that had just been presented by his colleagues deliberation. In fact, the magistrate
tries to impose his point of view, reiterating some of the arguments that had been presented
minutes before. Table 2 shows that
Table 2 : Rapporteurs justifications and conclusion
Rapporteur: justifications + conclusion
106
I consider that the defendants conduct was an abuse of rights
117-118 (#this is an illicit act) an abuse of rights a reprehensible act
125-126 that kind of abuse is very common/ we judge that every day
108-109 and more the company called insistently and threatened the client many
times
115
the defendant #didnt stop# threatening and
122-125 of course we cant generalize because of <((different intonation)) and that
is for that reason that I emphasized> ah: when we talk about telephone
companies that kind of abuse is very common/>
126-128 the companies dont respect the consumer even if the client asks to cancel
the service contract they continue to send the bills
119-120 something would be done to alleviate the serious anxiety unjustly caused
to that woman isnt it/
132-133 [conclusion] that situation must have a legal consequence and the
plaintiff may claim a compensation/
It should be noted that these arguments had already been used by RAP during the presentation
of his own interpretation. Practically, the judge only repeats the argumentation that he had
already presented in a repeated and insistent manner. Finally, the judge ends his
reasoning/justification when he categorically states that the situation must have a legal
consequence and that the plaintiff would claim legal compensation, i.e., moral damage
(l.132-133). In fact, we represent this instant as the moment that the judge once again tries to
justify (and maybe convince/persuade) the other judge of his standpoint. That is, the moment
in which RAP reacts to the criticism made by REV. As we will see in the next part, REV, in a
certain way, will succumb and will adhere to the argumentation presented by his interlocutor.
He will absorb the arguments that are being insistently repeated by RAP, in a moment of
silence and apparent rumination of RAPs arguments, which precedes his textual marks of
adhesion to the others discourse, what we call argumentative assimilation. REV seems to
have reflected before he textually expresses the marks of his adhesion to the arguments
advanced by the Rapporteur. In short, it is the negotiation before the "absorption" of the actual
arguments of the opponent. We represent that step of the interaction as follows, in figure 2:

284

The figure above shows the moment where the barriers (stasis) between the two debaters
begins to fall, before that REV expresses a change in his disposition and adheres to the
justifications emphatically presented by RAP as will be shown later.
2.1.3 Argumentative assimilation
The next excerpt shows that REV suddenly abandons the role of opponent that hed been
playing until now as shown in the first part, and begins to express in his speech that he has
absorbed the arguments that the Rapporteur had picked up. In that impromptu
argumentation, he repeats the other judges arguments (proposant), thus evidencing that an
assimilation took place in his speech, which allows us to understand that the potential to
persuade is only the acceptability of certain discursive forms (Plantin 1990, p. 104), as can be
observed in REVs speech. We illustrate that in table 3:
Table 3 : REVs textual marks of the argumentative assimilation
REV: Textual marks of the argumentative assimilation (see italics)
134-136 indeed xxx if I put myself in the consumers place I guess that she-she had been
suffering a kind of psycHOLOGIC terror being intimidated and: experiencing an
inconvenient suffering
138
&that: eh-eh is likely to claim compensation
138-142 your honor knows my way of interpreting that and eh eh like your honor I
understand that if the company has not registered her name in the unit of credit
protection #there is no moral damage# but in that specific case I go with your
argumentation
143-144 in that case there were in a redundant way of say there was an abuse abusive if we
can say that and why that was abusive
145-150 ((unintelligible)) in fact if the company eh continues to pursue the client if they
continue to threaten harass the client even without her registration in the unit of
credit that would have caused serious anxiety social humiliation or a kind of-of
mental anguish and suffering that would be translated into a kind of moral damage

150-151 than with these considerations I adhere to your vote to the vote of your honor
The arguments (words, phrases) that are reproduced in table 3 show that the answer given by
REV was very favorable to the arguments that had been employed by the judge Rapporteur.
Therefore, REV accepts all the arguments proposed by RAP, as shown in the table below.
During that part of REVs speech, he finishes by repeating RAPs arguments, which attests to
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the accomplishment of the process of argumentative assimilation of RAPs speech/arguments

(the winner in the debate). This process suggests that the words of the rapporteur judge
showed an illocutionary force, to use the words of Austin (1970). In that moment, we can
establish a connection with the studies in the field of Pragmatics, because we examine, here,
the effects of Xs discourse in Ys decision. Hence, we see that even a legal speech among
magistrate experts who have no stated interest to persuade/convince their colleagues shows
an argumentative dimension. For ease of understanding, we summarize the process of
assimilation in the table 4:
Table 4 : Argumentative assimilation (outcome)
Argumentative assimilation
Speech of RAP that
will be assimilated by REV
I consider that the defendants conduct was
an abuse of rights your conduct/l. 106-107

REVs assimilation
(outcome)

(#this is an illicit act) an abuse of rights a

reprehensible act of the telephone
company/l.116-118

in that case there were in a redundant way of

say there was an abuse abusive if we can say
that and why that was abusive/l.143-144

that kind of abuse is very common/ we judge

that every day/l.125-126
the company called insistently and
threatened the client many times/l.108
but the defendant #didnt stop# to
threatening and what I see here/l.114-115
I see that kind of situation in another way
now of course we cant generalize because of
<((different intonation)) and that is for that
reason that I emphasized> ah:/l.121-124

and a- something would be done to alleviate

the serious suffering and anxiety unjustly
caused to that woman isnt it//l.119-121

if the company eh continues to pursue the

client if they continue to threaten and harass
the client even without her names inscription
in the unit of credit that would have caused
serious anxiety social humiliation/l.145-148
eh eh like your honor we cant generalize
but I understand that if the company ddoesnt unsubscribed her name in the unit of
credit protection #there is no moral damage#
but in that specific case I go with your
argumentation in that case/l.139-143
indeed xxx if I put myself in the consumers
place I guess that she-she had been suffering
a kind of psycHOLOGIC terror being
intimidate and: experiencing an inconvenient
suffering:& /l.134-136
that would have caused serious anxiety
social humiliation or a kind of-of mental
anguish and suffering that would be translated
like a kind of moral damage/l.147-150
[conclusion] :that: eh-eh is likely to claim a
moral compensation\ /l.138

[conclusion] that situation must have a legal

consequence [moral damage] and the plaintiff
may claim a compensation\/l.132-133
that would be translated into a kind of moral
damage than/l.149-150

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As we can examine in table 4, the second column shows that REV ends up 'absorbing' the
arguments presented by RAP (words in italic). It should be noted that REV, who played the
rle actantiel of opponent at the beginning of the deliberation, succumbed by the end of the
deliberation and is beaten by the force of the speech/arguments of the rapporteur. It should
also be noted that the ratification produced by REV is different from the ratification by which
the other magistrate simply says "I agree", without arguing to support his point of view. In
fact, although REV has tried to resist the Rapporteurs arguments, he comes to absorb the
arguments of his antagonist, and finally adheres to his opponents arguments. Indeed, REV
ends up repeating the opponents arguments, which, minutes before, he tried to defeat.
We can represent the process of argumentative assimilation as shown in the figures 3 and 4:

To conclude the analysis, we really do not know exactly if REV has been convinced or if has
been persuaded by the rapporteur judge. As we attempted to show, that dichotomy
(convincing versus persuading) is not always unambiguous. As shown in the excerpt at hand,
however, REV has adhered to the Rapporteurs speech, as shown in the comparative chart.
Hence, REVs reversal opinion points out that the legal order remains to a large extent, is
powered and is modified due to its self-reflexive dimension, which allows for a continual
reinterpretation of its normative mechanism (Stamakis, 1995, p.211).

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Austin, J. L. (1970). Quand dire, cest faire - How to do things with words. ditions du Seuil.
Boyer, A. (1995). De usu argumentorum in HERMES - Cognition, Communication, Politique - N. 15 (VOL.
I), Paris.
Cornu, G. (2005). Linguistique juridique. ditions Montchrestien, Paris.
Danblon, E. (2005). La fonction persuasive Anthropologie du discours rhtorique : origines et actualit.
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Doury, M. (2003). Lvaluation des arguments dans les discours ordinaires - le cas de laccusation
damalgame. Langage et socit, 9-37.
Meyer, M. (2008). Principia Rhetorica une thorie gnrale de largumentation. Librairie Arthme Fayard.
Nettel, A. L. (2011). The enthymeme between persuasion and argumentation - 7 ISSA.
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Plantin, C. (1990). Essais sur largumentation. Kim, Paris.

Plantin, C. (1996). Largumentation. Le Seuil (Mmo), Paris.
Plantin, C. Dictionnaire de largumentation (Forthcoming)
Posner, A. R. (2008). How judges think. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. London, England
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Stamakis, C. M. (1995). Argumenter en droit une thorie critique de largumentation juridique. Publisud, Paris.

288

Partially-Successful Persuasion In Task-Dialogues

Kamila Debowska-Kozlowska
Faculty of English, Department of Pragmatics of English
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan
Poland
kamila@wa.amu.edu.pl

ABSTRACT: This paper aims to show that the idea of the acceptance of the modified standpoint of an
agent by the other party allows to describe his partial success in terms of his persuasive wants. I explain
that the modified standpoint of an agent arises from the specific mental topic which belongs to, what I call,
the Beneficial Cognitive Model. A qualitative study verifying the modified standpoint in relation to an
attitude continuum of an agent is presented.
KEYWORDS: attitude, cognition, continuum, dialogue, mental topic, persuasion, social-psychology,
standpoint, success

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a qualitative study that discusses the achievement of partial success in
persuasion. A socio-psychological perspective on persuasion is applied. Persuasion is
perceived as a successful intentional effort at influencing anothers mental state through
communication (OKeefe, 2002, p. 5, see also Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991, p. 127).
Applying Reardons (1991, p. 4) words, the focus is on the partially changed persuadee
position, not the full desired change in persuadee position. As shown in Illustration 1,
the effect achieved in most persuasive attempts is not the change in the persuadee
position from Position A to the full desired Position C. The most commonly obtained
effect of persuasion is the change from Position A to Position B:
Illustration 1: The change in the persuadee position after a persuasive attempt (Readon, 1991, p. 4)
Initial
Persuadee
Position

Position A

Partially
Changed
Persuadee
Position

1 2 3

Position B
Change

Full Desired
Change in
Persuadee
Position

1 2 3

Position C

This paper considers a change or a modification of an initial position of a persuadee in a

persuasion dialogue and the way the persuader evaluates the change or modification in
terms of his successfulness. The definition of a persuasion dialogue used here is the one
proposed in Debowska-Kozlowska (2014, p. 326). A persuasion dialogue is thus defined
as a dialogue in which a conflict between human agents with respect to their points of
view arises at the beginning of the talk and the agents have the shared, global goal of
resolving the conflict. Additionally, as part of this definition, at least one agent has the
289

persuasive aim to convince the other party to accept an opposing point of view. The
persuasive aim is defined here as a private goal of an agent to win an argument by
making the other party accept the view of the agent. The definition of the persuasive aim
adopted in this paper derives from the works of the representatives of the pragmadialectical school (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002; van Eemeren 2009) and Walton
(1995; Walton & Krabbe 1995). Van Eemeren (2009) emphasises that the rhetorical
successfulness of an agents argumentation relates to the acceptance of his standpoint by
the other party at the end of a critical discussion1. For Walton (1995; see also Walton &
Krabbe, 1995, p. 68), an agent realises his persuasive aim if he tracks the commitments
ascribed to the other partys propositions and uses the acquired knowledge to present the
most convincing arguments. If the other party finally adopts the standpoint of the agent,
then persuasion is evaluated as successful. The pragma-dialectical and Waltonian
perspectives on the realisation of the persuasive aim provide for two types of the effects
of persuasion: fully successful persuasion and fully unsuccessful persuasion. In the case
of the first effect, a change of a point of view of the other party occurs. In the case of the
second effect, no change of a point of view of the other party takes place. In DebowskaKozlowska (2014), I offered a supplementation to the existing standard approaches of
pragma-dialectics and Walton which covers the nuances of partially and over-successful
persuasion. This paper explores the nuances of partially-successful persuasion. It aims to
show that the idea of the acceptance of the modified version of the original standpoint of
an agent by the other party allows to describe his partial success. The qualitative study of
persuasion task dialogues is performed to substantiate the claim.
In section 2, the paper draws the relation between the pragma-dialectical notion of
a standpoint and the socio-psychological notion of an attitude. Furthermore, section 2
discusses an attitude direct measurement technique of the semantic differential evaluative
scale which was applied in the present study. Section 3 discusses the Beneficial Cognitive
Model of the mind of an agent which is essential for defining the notion of the modified
version of the original standpoint. Moreover, section 3 explains in what way the notion of
a prime attitude of an agent is related to the notion of his original standpoint in a
persuasion dialogue. Finally, section 3 shows why the modified version of the original
standpoint of an agent belongs to his latitude of acceptance of the acceptance-rejection
continuum of an attitude (see Burgoon et al., 1994, pp. 204-205). Section 4 explains the
methodology of the actual study of specific task dialogues in which the participants were
encouraged to realise their persuasive aims. A qualitative analysis of two selected
examples of the task dialogues aiming at persuasion is presented.
2. THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL NOTION OF A STANDPOINT AND THE SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL NOTION OF AN ATTITUDE
This paper relies on the pragma-dialectical definition of the notion of a standpoint which
is described as an (externalised) attitude on the part of a language user in respect of a
certain opinion (van Eemeren & Grootedorst, 1984, p. 5). The notion of an attitude used
in the definition has its origins in social-psychology. The socio-psychological concept of
an attitude is perceived, as OKeefe (2002, p. 6) indicates, as a persons general
evaluation of an object (where object is understood in broad sense, as encompassing
1

In Walton (1995, pp. 1819), a critical discussion is treated as a subspecies of a persuasion dialogue.

290

persons, events, products, policies, institutions, and so on). The concept of an attitude
object is seen as a target of an evaluative judgment. Attitude object relates thus to any
kind of an issue to which a positive or negative reaction is expressed. The sociopsychological notion of an attitude is applied in this paper to describe how evaluative
thinking and reasoning of a participant of a persuasion dialogue monitors his perception
of the effect of the dialogue.
Three main types of attitude measurement techniques are distinguished in social
psychology: direct attitude measurement techniques, quasi-direct attitude measurement
techniques and indirect attitude measurement techniques2. In the actual study presented in
section 4, a direct attitude measurement technique was used. The aim of the measurement
in a direct attitude measurement technique is not hidden from a participant of a study
since it involves a direct evaluative judgment of an attitude object from the participant.
No need for the redirection of participants attention from the aim of the measurement
was required in the actual study presented in section 4. A direct attitude measurement
technique was preferred over quasi-direct attitude measurement techniques such as Likert
scale to avoid acquiescence bias (see Friborg et al., 2006). A semantic differential
evaluative scale was applied as a direct assessment. The participants knew that after
placing their responses on an evaluative scale they would take part in dialogues based on
the results of the pretest. However, the nature of the tasks in which the participants would
be involved during a recording session was not revealed to the participants prior to the
recording to avoid the confirmation bias (see e.g. Oswald & Grosjean, 2004).
Semantic differential (SD) scale was designed by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum
(1957) to measure the semantic meaning of objects and concepts. The semantic meaning
measured in the semantic differential scale referred to connotations of nouns. In
contemporary socio-psychological research on persuasion, the scale has been adopted to
measure peoples attitudes to attitude objects (OKeefe, 2002, Friborg et al., 2006). The
three dimensions of a concept or an object commonly measured in SD scales are
Evaluation, Potency, and Activity (Heise, 1970, p. 235). To obtain a concepts profile, the
three dimensions need to be applied. Since the present study is not concerned with a
measurement of a concepts profile but a specification of persons attitudes towards a
number of objects, the measurement was restricted to an evaluative dimension in most of
the cases. A single scale might be applied for the measurement of an attitude object but
not a total concepts profile (cf. OKeefe, 2002, p. 7).
3. AN ATTITUDE CONTINUUM AND A MODIFIED VERSION OF A
STANDPOINT IN DEFINING PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL PERSUASION
In Social Judgment Theory (Sherif et al., 1965, see also Mallard 2010), an attitude is not
perceived as a simple negative-positive or favourable-unfavourable judgement. The
original position of a communicator on a certain issue is described as a prime attitude.
Social Judgment Theory (SJT) distinguishes not only the prime attitude to an issue but
also other positions related to the issue which the communicator might evaluate as
acceptable (cf. Burgoon et al., 1994, p. 204). In SJT, the evaluation of an attitude object is
related to an attitude acceptance-rejection continuum.
2

For the description of the three kinds of attitude measurement techniques, see OKeefe (2002, pp. 7-16)

291

For instance, the prime attitude of a communicator about the issue of payment for
university education in the UK could be that university education should generally be free
in the UK. Within the latitude of acceptance of the communicator there might be the
positions that (1) university education should be free for the UK citizens and that (2)
university education should be free for ethnic minorities but not the position that
university education should be free for the students of Cambridge University. Despite the
fact that Social Judgment Theory indicates that there might be more than one position of
one communicator on a given issue, it does not specify how the positions which fall into
the latitude of acceptance of the communicator are cognitively processed by him in a
persuasion dialogue. Therefore, in Debowska-Kozlowska (2014), the Beneficial
Cognitive Model is discussed which allows to explain how the cognitive processing of
the persuasive wants and desires allows for the evaluation of the effect of a persuasion
dialogue. The conception of the Beneficial Cognitive Model (BCM) helps to indicate that
partially successful persuasion relies on the notion of the modified version of the original
standpoint of an agent. BCM shows that the modified version of the original standpoint of
the agent is not his prime attitude about a given issue but it still falls into his latitude of
acceptance on his attitude acceptance-rejection continuum.
BCM describes a mental entity which comprises those wants and desires which
pertain to the persuasive aim of agent i. BCMi,t is defined as a set of beneficial mental
topics which help agent i resolve the conflict of opinion but only in his favour
(Debowska-Kozlowska, 2014, p. 332). The notion of a topic in the definition refers to a
mental conception in the mind of a participant of a persuasion dialogue. The mental
conception might become any statement, e.g., an assertion, a question, a standpoint or an
argument, when it is publicly expressed. The reason behind emphasizing that topic in
BCMi,t is a mental entity is to show that its origin does not go back to the Aristotelian
notion of topos (Aristotle, 1955, 1959) or Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)s notion
of locus which are described as rules or instructions for the composition of
argumentation or commonplaces on which argumentation rests (c.f. Garssen, 2001).
BCMi,t allows to draw a distinction between mental topic t and other mental
topics (e.g. t1, t2, t3) which might be activated in the mind of agent i during a persuasion
dialogue. The notion of topic t is defined in BCMi,t as a potential standpoint of an agent i
which does not become his real standpoint until agent i publicly declares his attitude with
reference to topic t. Publicly declared attitude to topic t by agent i manifests his prime
attitude. Other mental topics which belong to BCMi,t are defined as satisfying,
advantageous, salient and essential points for agent i in terms of his persuasive wants and
desires. All the topics belonging to BCMi,t are called prototype topics. The topics are
prototypical in terms of satisfying the persuasive wants of agent i.
Prototype topics might be activated by assertions, challenges or arguments in a
persuasion dialogue when agent i publicly ascribes commitments to them. Dialogue 1
below was discussed in Debowska-Kozlowska (2014, p. 337) to show that an
advantageous point concerned with the persuasive aim of agent i might be activated by
agent i himself3:

In Debowska-Kozlowska (2014, pp. 333-334), the examples of dialogues are presented in which a
prototype topic for agent i is activated by the move of agent i.
3

292

Dialogue 1
John_1 I have said many times that I want a nuclear power station to be built in Poland.
Ann_2 I definitely dont want to have it in Poland. The government is considering building a
nuclear power in arnowiec or Choczewo. These are highly populated areas. If a nuclear power
exploded there, then it would pose a serious threat to the land on which the people live.
John_3 But there are restricted areas in Poland far away from the populated areas.
Ann_4 OK, so lets built the nuclear power station in these non-populated, desolate areas in
Poland.

In dialogue 1, the standpoint on which Ann and John agree in move Ann_4 is not the
original standpoint of John. The original standpoint of John is a verbal manifestation of
topic t I want a nuclear power station to be built anywhere in Poland and his prime
positive attitude to topic t. In move John_3, John activates the topic concerned with
building a nuclear power station in a non-populated area. If John treats the topic as an
allowable, acceptable alternative then it is a prototype topic for him. In such a case, after
move Ann_4 is expressed, John achieves a certain degree of success in terms of his
persuasive wants and desires.
The scenario presented in dialogue 1 is in agreement with the definition of
partially successful persuasion provided in Debowska-Kozlowska (2014). The version of
topic t applied in the definition is verbalised as a qualified standpoint, a variation (a
modified version) of the original standpoint of an agent on which both agents need to
agree:
Partially successful persuasion dialogue for topic t and agent ia persuasion dialogue in which
agent i and the opposing agent i do not agree on the original topic t but agree on the version of
topic t which is logically implied by the original topic t or pragmatically implicated by the implicit
warrant of agent is argument and is generated by the implicature which arises from both t (i.e. the
original standpoint of agent i) and the activated prototype topic from BCMi,t.
(Debowska-Kozlowska, 2014, p. 332)

In dialogue 1, move John_3 But there are restricted areas in Poland far away from the
populated areas is an argument presented by John in favour of the standpoint I want a
nuclear power station to be built anywhere in Poland. The implicit warrant of the
argument is that A nuclear power station could be built in a restricted area in Poland far
away from the populated areas. The modified version of the original topic t on which the
agents agree in move Ann_4 is that a nuclear power station should be built in a nonpopulated, desolate area in Poland. The modified version of topic t is pragmatically
implicated by the implicit warrant of the argument expressed in move John_4. The
version of topic t on which the agents agree is thus generated by the strong implicature
that emerges from the activated prototype topic from BCMi,t and the original topic t.
The next sections of the paper aim at the verification of the notion of the modified
version of topic t (and its verbal manifestation, that is, the modified version of an original
standpoint) on the basis of the study which involved the recording of task dialogues
focused on convincing the partner to adopt a different standpoint on an issue.

293

4. THE STUDY
4.1 Research question and hypotheses
The following research hypotheses were empirically tested with reference to a persuasion
dialogue:
Hypothesis 1: The attitude to a given attitude object revealed in the pretest of the
semantic differential evaluative scale is confirmed by the initial communicative acts
expressed by a given participant of a dialogue.
Hypothesis 2: The interaction between an agent and the other party who has a different
prime attitude might reveal an attitude continuum of the agent.
Hypothesis 3: If attitude continuums (of the speakers attitudes) are observed, then there
is a chance that the speakers might achieve an agreement on specific aspects of their
opinions.
Hypothesis 4: If a speaker achieves an agreement on some aspects of his opinion (but not
on the other aspects of his opinion) with another speaker, then there is a chance that he
evaluates the persuasive process as partially successful for him.
Those four hypotheses were investigated in the qualitative analysis of the research
material. The pretest of the semantic differential evaluative scale and the recording of
tasks dialogues were performed to provide the answers for the first and second
hypothesis. The direct open and close-ended questions and the posttest of the semantic
differential evaluative scale were used to obtain the answers to the third and fourth
hypothesis. In terms of the verification of the conception of the modified version of topic
t, the fourth prediction was the most essential.
4.2 Method
Participants
The 9 participants of the qualitative study were native speakers of Polish who were
highly proficient in English. They were MA students of the MA full-time specialisation
Language and Communication in Media and Politics at the Faculty of English at Adam
Mickiewicz University in Poznan in Poland. The participation in the recording was one of
the credit requirements for the course Persuasion and the Mass Media which was
conducted by the author of the paper. The participants age varied from 23 to 27.
Design and Procedure
Since the definition of the persuasion dialogue involves a conflict between opinions, it
was required that the participants be matched with their opponents for each of the
recording session. The attitudes of the students to attitude objects were measured in a
period from a week to a month before the recording. In this way, the partners with
different attitudes to a given attitude object could be matched for each task dialogue. The
attitude measurement prior to the recording allowed to pair students with different
attitudes to a given attitude object and, in this way, to prevent them from role-playing and
provide for a more natural emergence of a persuasive aim.
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The direct attitude measurement technique of a semantic differential evaluative scale was
applied as a pretest. The attitudes to thirteen attitude objects were measured. The attitude
objects were the controversial issues which the students discussed in their speaking
classes during their undergraduate and graduate studies of the English philology (cf.
Felton et al., 2009). Thus the students were familiar with all the attitude objects. The
issues which they had to evaluate on the semantic differential evaluative scale involved:
the European Union, Poland in the European Union, cell phones, gay marriage in Poland,
gay adoption in Poland, vegetarianism, social networking, animal testing, eating meat, the
mass media, education in Poland, the Internet and cosmetic surgery. The pairs of the
adjectives with an opposing meaning (e.g. good-bad, negative-positive, fair-unfair) were
applied for each scale as in the example shown below which asks a student to place a
check mark (a tick) or an X mark (a cross) at the point on the scale that best represents his
judgment:
animal testing
bad
useful
desirable
unnecessary
unpromising
positive

____:____:____:____:____:____:____
____:____:____:____:____:____:____
____:____:____:____:____:____:____
____:____:____:____:____:____:____
____:____:____:____:____:____:____
____:____:____:____:____:____:____

good
useless
undesirable
necessary
promising
negative

Numerical values were assigned to the particular scale points by the investigator. The
extreme positive point was valued as 7. The extreme negative point was valued as 1. The
score for the most positive attitude was 42. The score for the most negative attitude was
6.
There were 9 seven to ten minute recording sessions of task dialogues based on
the results of the pretest of semantic differential evaluative scale. Two types of
instructions were used for two different students for each of the recording sessions. Both
types of the instructions involved a disputative condition although the condition was not
disclosed to the students. Each student took part in two recording sessions with two
different partners on two different issues (except for one student who took part in two
dialogues with two different partners but on the same issue of cell phones).The
participants needed to follow specific instructions which involved: presenting their
viewpoints, asking the interlocutor about his/her viewpoint, analysing the speech of the
interlocutor to see whether a conflict of viewpoints was present, trying to resolve the
conflict, defending their viewpoints, trying to convince their partner to their viewpoint.
The instructions for two different speakers differed with respect to the first and second
task but the common points of both tasks were to present a viewpoint and provide initial
reasons for the viewpoint. The third and fourth task were the same in two types of
instructions and were concerned with a persuasive aim. After the recording of task
dialogues the students were asked to answer direct closed and open-ended questions such
as: (1) What is your position on the issue after participating in the dialogue?, (2) Have
any aspects of your position changed after participating in the dialogue?, (3) Which
aspects of your position have changed after participating in the dialogue?

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All the task dialogues and the answers to direct closed and open-ended questions were
audio-recorded by the use of the Audacity software which is a free, open-source software
available online. After answering direct closed and open-ended questions the students
took a posttest of the semantic differential evaluative scale which referred to the
discussed attitude object.
4.3 Qualitative analysis
In Table 1, the results of the pretest and posttest of the semantic differential evaluative
scale pertaining to all task dialogues are collected.
Table 1: The results of the pretest and posttest of the semantic differential evaluative scale
Dialogue
number
Persuasion
dialogue 1
Persuasion
dialogue 2
Persuasion
dialogue 3
Persuasion
dialogue 4
Persuasion
dialogue 5
Persuasion
dialogue 6
Persuasion
dialogue 7
Persuasion
dialogue 8
Persuasion
dialogue 9

Issue/attitude
object
Cell phones
Social
networking
Animal testing
Mass media
Mass media
Animal testing
Social
networking
Cell phones
Animal testing

The results of the pretest and posttest of the semantic differential

evaluative scale
Speaker 1 Pretest: 31
Speaker 2 Pretest 28
Posttest: 27
Posttest 28
Speaker 3 Pretest 31
Speaker 4 Pretest: 15
Posttest: 29
Posttest 21
Speaker 5 Pretest: 42
Speaker 6 Pretest: 6
Posttest: 25
Posttest: 28
Speaker 7 Pretest: 27
Speaker 1 Pretest: 20
Posttest: 24
Posttest: 20
Speaker 8 Pretest: 34
Speaker 4 Pretest: 25
Posttest: 33
Posttest: 25
Speaker 7 Pretest: 28
Speaker 8 Pretest: 19
Posttest: 34
Posttest: 19
Speaker 5 Pretest: 41
Speaker 9 Pretest: 35
Posttest: 35
Posttest: 31
Speaker 6 Pretest: 34
Speaker 2 Pretest: 28
Posttest: 26
Posttest: 28
Speaker 3 Pretest: 12
Speaker 9 Pretest: 26
Posttest: 20
Posttest: 28

The qualitative analyses performed below is based on two selected examples from table
1, namely persuasion dialogue 3 and persuasion dialogue 9. Those dialogues were chosen
for the analysis since the results of the pretest indicated that the prime attitude of the
participants on the issue of animal testing differed significantly. In the case of persuasion
dialogue 3, the results of the pretests revealed the most positive attitude of speaker 5 to
the issue of animal testing (42 points) and the most negative attitude of speaker 6 to the
same issue (6 points). In the case of persuasion dialogue 9, the results of the pretests did
not reveal extremely discrepant positions. Still, the difference between the pretests of
speaker 3 (12 points) and speaker 9 (26 points) was 14 points.
Since the focus of the qualitative analysis in this paper is on the textual material,
the applied transcription of task persuasion dialogues is simplified. The transcription does
not involve punctuation marks. There is also no indication of simultaneous utterances,
contiguous utterances, intervals within and between utterances, an extension of sound
or syllable, stopping fall in tone, a continuing intonation, a rising inflection, rising
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and falling shifts in intonation, etc. I believe that the verification of the four hypotheses
does not require the analysis of non- and para-verbal aspects of interaction at this point.
At the beginning of persuasion dialogue 3, the prime attitudes of speaker 5 and
speaker 6 revealed in the pretests of semantic differential evaluative scale are confirmed
in their communicative acts. Lets assume that speaker 5 is called Adam and speaker 6 is
called Bob4:
Adam_1: ok so when it comes to tests on animals i believe that even though its quite controversial
because some living creatures are often suffering and are tested and are injected with many
substances i believe that test on animals should be carried out because it helps people to develop
vaccines antibiotics drugs many other medical means so to say i also believe that testing on
animals shouldnt be done if there is another way of testing a drug or a substance
Bob_2: i agree that it may be very very helpful for people to test drugs on animals first before
using them on humans but on the other hand we should take into account that many of those tests
that are carried out on animals try to produce substances that are never to be used on humans so it
is like treating the animals badly with no future possible uses of this drug

The utterance I believe that test on animals should be carried out expressed in move
Adam_2 is the verbal manifestation of topic t to which a positive attitude is adopted by
Adam. However, at the end of Adams contribution, the utterance I also believe that
testing on animals shouldnt be done if there is another way of testing a drug or a
substance suggests that the positive attitude to animal testing is the prime attitude of
Adam and an attitude continuum to the issue is revealed. Bob in move Bob_2 refers
indirectly to his negative attitude to animal testing. However, we can also observe Bobs
attitude continuum when he says I agree that it may be very very helpful for people to
test drugs on animals first before using them on humans. The answers provided to the
direct closed and open-ended questions by Adam and Bob reveal that an agreement on
specific aspects of their opinions has been achieved. The recorded responses to the openended question which indicate the mutual agreement are presented below:
The open-ended question: Which aspects of your position changed after participating in the
dialogue?
Adam: well i believe that bob is a very good person to have a conversation with he presents his
points of view in a way that is not offensive and i believe that we reached a mutual agreement he
presented his point of view and i agreed to that but also he took into consideration my opinions
and didnt have any objections
The open-ended question: Which aspects of your position changed after participating in the
dialogue?
Bob: maybe not changed but they were complemented by adams opinions so there were no points
of total disagreement but there were just ideas added to maybe somehow bit contradictory but not
mutually excluding so i think that my viewpoint didnt change but something was added to that

The results of the posttests of the semantic differential evaluative scale reflect the
answers provided to the direct closed and open-ended questions. The attitude score for
Adam in the posttest is 25. The attitude score for Bob in the posttest is 28. The difference
of 3 points confirms that the speakers agreed on a certain modified version of their
original standpoints. Although neither of them adopted the prime attitude of the other
4

The real names of the participants of the study have been changed to preserve their anonymity.

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party to the issue, the modified version of the standpoint on which they agree is within
the latitude of acceptance of both speakers. Therefore, the persuasion process might be
evaluated as partially successful for each of them.
The analysis of persuasion dialogue 9 reveals that persuasion might be partially
successful for one speaker and fully successful for another. The difference between the
pretest and posttest of speaker 9 is subtle. The attitude score of speaker 9 in the pretest is
26 and in the posttest 28. The result of the posttest of speaker 9 might even suggest that
through the interaction with speaker 3 his prime attitude has been strengthened. The
difference between the results of the pretest and posttest of speaker 3 is significant. The
attitude score of speaker 3 in the pretest is 12 and in the posttest 20. However, the
answers of speaker 3 to the open-ended question after the recording of the task dialogue
do not indicate that she totally quitted her original standpoint that animal testing
shouldnt be done:
The open-ended question: Which aspects of your position changed after participating in the
dialogue?
Speaker 3: this position that animal testing can be used for something that there is a purpose why
we are using animals for tests i see his [speaker 9s] point that we dont have any alternative ways
to test drugs [in their initial phase] still i think that it is unethical but i see that unfortunately for
now we dont have any other way to test drugs [in their initial phase]

The belief of speaker 3 that testing animals is unethical is adopted by speaker 9 although
speaker 9 does not reveal a change of his prime attitude in the answers to direct close and
open ended questions. The agreement of speakers on the particular aspects of their
opinions leads to the resolution of the conflict. The modified standpoint on which
speakers agree refers more to the prime attitude of speaker 9 but still appears to be within
the latitude of acceptance of an attitude continuum of speaker 3. Thus the result which
speaker 3 achieves is a partially successful persuasion.
5. FINAL REMARKS
The qualitative analyses confirmed the four research hypotheses. Additionally, some
general features of the nature of the modified version of the original standpoint of an
agent needed for defining partially successful persuasion emerged due to the qualitative
analyses (of which examples were presented in section 4):
1.
2.

the modified version of the original standpoint of an agent on which both agents
agree belongs to the attitude continuums of both speakers
the implicature which generates the modified standpoint needs to arise from the
original standpoint of an agent and the topic or the topics which are evaluated as
prototype by both of the agents

With respect to the second feature, the analysis revealed that agents involved in a
persuasion dialogue have different Beneficial Cognitive Models in their minds but at least
one prototype topic in their distinctive BCMs needs to be the same for persuasion to be
evaluated as partially successful for them.

298

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A Poem Without Words: Visual Argumentation And The Photography

Collections Of The Black Panther Party
Aaron Dicker & Geoffrey D. Klinger
Department of Communication. Ball State University.
Muncie, Indiana, USA, 47306
Dicker.aaron@gmail.com
Department of Communication and Theatre
DePauw University
Greencastle, Indiana, 46135
Klinger@depauw.edu

ABSTRACT: The 40th anniversary of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defenses founding in 2006 brought a
renewed interest in an important organization within the Civil Rights Movement. Since the anniversary, two new
collections of photography, by Howard Bingham and Stephen Shames, have been published that create
discontinuities in the dominant historical narrative surrounding the organization. This essay draws on Cara
Finnegans work on visual rhetoric to advance our understanding of the transformative power of the image.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, Bingham, Black Panther Party, image, photography, Shames, visual rhetoric.

1. INTRODUCTION
Non-dominant narratives often clash with conventional traditions and interpretations. Take, for
example, the civil rights and counterculture movements of the 1960s and 1970s. These
movements were comprised of smaller groups, charismatic leaders, and single events that helped
to define their broader contributions. While a dominant historical narrative developed in these
cases, new artifacts have been recently published that reveal new wrinkles in the movements
history. When new artifacts create non-dominant narratives that challenge previous assumptions,
audiences are afforded the opportunity to reevaluate accepted historical narratives and frames.
This essay argues that new, contradictory artifacts invite audiences to reconsider dominant
historical narratives and reconfigure these narratives to reflect a deeper understanding of a
unique and important moment in history.
2. ARTIFACTS AND FRAMEWORK
To illustrate the dynamic involved here, this essay carefully explores new artifacts that challenge
traditional interpretations of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP). Considered highly
controversial, the BPP changed the direction of the black power movement within the United
States during its existence from 1966-1982 (Jones, 2006). Recently, two previously unpublished
collections of photographs, Howard L. Binghams Black Panthers 1968 (Bingham, 2009) and
The Black Panthers (Shames, 2006), have emerged after the 40th anniversary of the
organizations founding by students Huey Newton and Bobby Seale. These artifacts provide new
insight and problematize the existing BPP narrative.

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It is important to note that historical narratives are multilayered with several overlapping and
sometimes contradictory meanings. Additionally, access to primary historical sources is limited.
Young audiences intrigued by the tumultuous rhetoric of civil rights and counterculture can only
look to books, recordings, and other secondary sources to understand these unique and
compelling rhetorical situations. In other words, their experience with this history is mediated.
Inevitably, the introduction of new artifacts provides audiences with the opportunity to
reevaluate the inherited historical narrative.
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Many scholars have investigated different aspects of the Black Panther Party using rhetorical
analysis. Primary investigation into the BPP has been through three contexts: individuals, the
group as a whole, and media representation. Scholars have focused on individual BPP leaders to
study their rhetorical techniques and implications. Recent works have focused on the rhetoric of
Huey Newton, the more radical of the co-founders (Avril, 2012; Johnson, 2004). Avril (2012)
analyzes Huey Newtons 1973 autobiography Revolutionary Suicide for the theme of black
masculinity utilizing three concepts, authenticity, performance, and experience, to gain better
understanding of how Newtons rhetoric influenced the BPPs rhetoric. Avril pays particular
attention to how Newtons use of black masculinity is reflected in his opinions of motherhood
and struggle, and she compares Newtons rhetoric to that of female panthers Angela Davis and
Elaine Brown (p. 13). Avril also focuses on Newtons word choice to separate the working
class from the middle class (p. 17-19).
Johnson (2004) focuses on Newtons 1970 address to the Revolutionary Peoples
Constitutional Convention. She applies the jeremaidic tradition to the speech and concludes that
the speech should be understood as an Afro-American jeremiad (Johnson, 2004, p. 17-18).
Newtons address debuts a philosophy that will be later called revolutionary
intercommunalism, or the belief that communities should orient themselves in a communal
stance as opposed to an individual stance, and that this stance must be in opposition to current
power structures (p. 19). This philosophy is linked into a core discussion of American hypocrisy
as well as how intercommunalism must be revolutionary as a result (p. 22-23). Both Avril and
Johnson use analysis of an individuals rhetoric to speak about the entire organization.
Next, scholars use rhetorical analysis to look at the organization as a single entity (Bloom
and Martin, 2013; Gatchet & Cloud, 2012; Ogbar, 2004; Rhodes, 2007; Spencer, 2005). Bloom
and Martins (2013) book Black Against Empire provides a comprehensive history of the
founding of the BPP and its first few years as an organization. The book focuses on the human
relationships formed between the different leaders of the party, as well as how individual leaders
influenced chapter members. In contrast, Ogbars (2004) book Black Power: Radical Politics
and African American Identity takes a systems approach to the early rise of the BPP. Ogbar
(2004) chooses to focus on the leadership as a single unit whose rhetoric influenced the general
population. The book focuses on rhetorical positions taken by the larger organization,
specifically, examining how those rhetorical positions affected three different levels: community
members, the government, and larger society.
Rhodes (2007) book Framing the Black Panthers: The Spectacular Rise of the Black
Power Icon provides context into how the Panthers became media subjects in the eyes of the
national and international community. The book examines how the Panthers utilized their
newfound fame to their benefit by primarily focusing on the Free Huey campaign (Rhodes,
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2007, p. 116-144). This fame helped to influence Oaklands political landscape. Spencer (2005)
makes special note of the importance of the Free Breakfast Program on the local community and
how Oakland politics since have had to utilize social welfare platforms to become elected. She
notes that, Two of the Panthers most important and perhaps most overlooked contributions to
the Black Freedom movement were their attempts to nurture oppressed peoples political
consciousness and revolutionize their daily personal and political praxis (Spencer, 2005, p. 313314). The effectiveness of these actions has been emulated to this day in California.
Gatchet and Clouds (2012) essay acts as a bridge between understanding the group as a
whole and understanding the medias depiction of the Black Panthers. They use an examination
of multiple leaders in the BPP to outline two distinct rhetorical devices. First, they explained
BBP identity creation around the concept of self-defense (Gatchet and Cloud, 2012, p. 2-6). The
Black Panther Party utilizes the biblical story of David and Goliath to depict the oppressed
members of the black community as David. David is both oppressed, and at the same time
armed, ready, and willing to defend himself for the greater good of the community. In addition,
their analysis includes the rhetorical paradox between oppression and militancy (p. 6-10). This
article shifts its focus into media framing by analyzing how these two creations are represented
in two major news publications (p.10-14). Gatchet and Cloud claim that the media skewed the
role of the David identity to delegitimize the Panthers.
Finally, scholars use rhetorical analysis to examine media framing of the BPP and its
actions (Fraley & Lester-Roushanzamir, 2004; Davenport, 2010; Lule, 1993; Lumsden, 2009).
The most interdisciplinary of the three categories, the artifacts are analyzed with a criticalcultural lens to dissect how the media portrayed single aspects of the Party such as the death of a
leader (Fraley & Lester-Roushanzamir, 2004; Lule, 1993) and the role of media repression to
undermine the BPP (Davenport, 2010). Most noteworthy, Lumsdens (2009) rhetorical criticism
analyzes articles from the Black Panther, the BPPs primary publication that reached thousands
of readers. Lumsden focuses on portrayals of black womanhood within the publication. By
focusing on womanhood, Lumsden provides a different perspective into an organization that is
viewed as hyper-masculine. She writes that the Black Panther portrayed woman as both
militarily strong and elaborated on their expectations of sexual equality (p. 906). Strong
women helped to create a stronger community, a key emphasis of the BPP.
The current literature on the Black Panthers neglects new artifacts recently added to the
historical narrative, and undervalues normative elements of visual rhetoric. Lumsdens article
provides a limited examination of photographs and cartoons that appear in the Black Panther
newspaper, but examine them more as vehicles of propaganda.
4. CRITICAL METHOD
This essay seeks to provide an analysis of photographic collections, utilizing visual rhetorical
analysis, that reveal different viewpoints yielding the best investigation for a contemporary
audience. Visual rhetorical analysis is defined as a mode of inquiry, defined as a critical and
theoretical orientation that makes issues of visuality relevant to rhetorical theory (Finnegan,
2004a, p. 198). Finnegan (2004a) contends that visual rhetorical analysis is best used when
trying to understand photography as rhetoric. Visual rhetoric forces the rhetor to explore
understandings of visual culture in light of the questions of rhetorical theory, and at the same
time encourage us to (re)consider aspects of rhetorical theory in light of the persistent problem of
image (Finnegan, 2004a, p. 198). The goal of this analysis is to more vigorously integrate
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images in the rhetorical history as central aspects of the narrative instead of supplementary
additions.
Scholars have presented many approaches to visual rhetoric (Finnegan, 2004a; Foss,
2005; Hart and Daughton, 2004; Moriarty, 2005), which combine to create a full-bodied
analysis. Moriarty (2005) discusses the threefold nature of the sign, the interpretant, and the
object. This adds an additional dimension to photographs by including the image, the caption,
and other written text surrounding the image as one object for rhetorical analysis. This enhances
the data gathering process. Hart and Daughtons (2004) inquiry into ideological force (p. 189)
and significant tensions (p.192) push the critic to create cohesive narratives throughout the
criticism, linking images together to establish a holistic narrative. Foss (2005) contends that there
are three ways for a rhetorical perspective to be applied to an image (p. 145-147). First, the critic
needs to analyze the nature of the image. Second, the critic should analyze the function of the
image. Third, the critic must evaluate the normative implications of image. This triangulation
allows the critic to cover all fundamental aspects of visual rhetorical analysis.
Finnegan focuses on how to conduct visual rhetorical criticism of photography. She
outlines three moments in the life of the image that must be accounted for when discussing the
rhetoric of photography (Finnegan, 2004a, p. 199). First, production accounts for how the image
came to exist (p. 200). Second, reproduction accounts for the current representation of the image
to the audience (p. 204). Third, circulation accounts for how the narrative established by the
photography fits into the overall historical discourse (p. 208). All three moments in time pose
unique questions regarding the photographic artifact. Taken together, they provide the frame for
examining the selected photography collections.
4.1 Production
The first moment in the life of the image is production, the time leading up to its current
positioning in the status quo. Essentially, production asks the critic to assess what brought these
photographs into existence. This inquiry into the past informs the critic of the history of an image
and provides insight into possible discontinuities within historical narrative. Furthermore, since
these specific collections were taken decades before publication, it is important to understand
what brought these bound collections into production. In short, understanding the past of the
artifacts will help the critic understand the present.
The American 1960s was a time of great political upheaval and civil unrest. The death of
a great black power figure Malcolm X in 1965 proved to be a catalyst for change. Inspired by his
passing, two college students, Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, decided to create a new
organization rooted in the ideals Malcolm X championed. In 1966 Newton and Seale founded the
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense to create a change for the repressed African American
minority in the United States (Bloom & Martin, 2013). The newly created BPP expressed the
opinion, mainly driven by the rhetoric of Newton (Avril, 2012), that the loss of this great orator
left a void in the struggle for African American equality. Malcolm Xs extremist rhetoric acted to
provide greater momentum for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.s rhetorical position of nonviolent
resistance (Johnson, 2004). Specifically, Malcolm X championed self-defense among black
communities that the BPP felt was non-existent in Oakland at the time of his death. As such, the
BPP was created to fill this void.
Violent crime in minority communities was on the rise, and an increase in police brutality
further fueled violence in the community (Gatchet and Cloud, 2012). The original purpose of the
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BPP was to act as a citizen police force within African American communities. As opposed to
vigilantes, the BPP would patrol neighborhoods and prevent crime through armed presence.
Shortly after their inception, the BPP evolved their mission to follow the police to make sure that
they were following proper protocol and not discriminating against blacks (Lumsden, 2009).
Lumsden also adds that the BPP did not simply act as a paramilitary force, they set up classes to
instruct the community in proper gun safety and teach about how the government violated
personal constitutional protections.
The Black Panthers gained national media recognition on May 2nd, 1967, when they
staged a public demonstration at the California State Assembly to protest a pending act that
would severely restrict a citizens rights to bear arms in public (Gatchet & Cloud, 2012). In a
speech delivered by Bobby Seale on that day, the BPP outlined its ten point program that called
for the end to police brutality, as well as the release of all black prisoners who were convicted by
all-white juries (Davenport, 2010). Many aspects of the BPP attracted the American people to
become fascinated with the Panthers. Visually, the Panthers unique uniform of leather jacket, a
black beret, dark jeans, and black army boots created a notable strong, unified presence (Shames,
2006). Rhetorically, the BPP used extremist rhetoric to denounce a governments established
institution of justice enforcement as unjust and corrupt.
Three years after the beginning of national media attention the BPP began a shift in
rhetorical focus. After serving a two-years for the fatal shooting of John Frey, Huey Newton was
released from federal prison in 1970. Upon his release, Newton started to develop the BPP into a
political organization (Heath, 1976). First, the Panthers started to seek political office. Second,
the BPP undertook a vast initiative to start free breakfast programs across the nation for school
age children. At its peak in the early 1970s, Panther breakfast programs fed upwards of 250,000
children across the country daily (Theoharis & Woodard, 2005).
The intense and mostly critical media attention devoted to the Black Panther Party
attracted in two different photographers to document the organization in action. Gilbert Moore
explains how he came to work on the assignment of the Black Panthers with the budding
photographer Howard Bingham (Moore, 2009). Since Moore was only one of two black writers
for LIFE Magazine, and the only one not on assignment at the time, he was given the task of
teaming up with photographer Howard Bingham to follow the BPP during the year of 1968 (p.
66). Bingham was relentless in his pursuit of the craft, taking hundreds of pictures during the few
months of the duos stay with the BPP. With full funding, the duo followed top leaders of the
Black Panthers. Since the magazine contacted the BPP to publish its story, the Panthers regulated
the access granted to Moore and Bingham. After the assignment was complete, the two left
California and returned to their New York headquarters. Ultimately, LIFE Magazine did not
publish the story both journalists spent countless hours creating without providing concrete
reasoning for its decision.
Stephen Shames took a different path in his photography. In the foreword, Shames (2006)
states that his quest to photograph the Black Panthers rose organically out of his interest in the
organization when he started taking personal pictures in 1968. When a major publishing
company offered Shames the prospect of a book contract, Shames decided that he would journey
cross-country, from California to New York, taking pictures of the BPP in major chapters over
the course of 1970. Unlike Bingham who primarily focused in California, Shames took
photographs of chapters in Oakland, Los Angeles, Chicago, Toledo, Philadelphia, and Boston
(Shames, 2006, p. 8). Shames free-flowing agenda and unofficial Panther membership allowed
the photographer to gain access to very intimate shots. Further, since Shames began his road trip
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in 1970, he had the opportunity to photograph Huey Newton after his release from prison.
During his travels, he formed personal relationships with many members of the Panther
leadership, including Newton, Bobby Seale, and David Hilliard. Eventually, upon reaching New
York City, Shames would discover that the book deal had been a ruse, and the majority of his
photos would go unpublished for decades.
The 40th anniversary of the Partys founding in 2006 generated renewed interest in a
recorded history of the organization. Shames close relationships with individual Panthers helped
to privately fund the publication of a collection, with the majority of the donations coming from
former members including even the books foreword by Bobby Seale (Shames, 2006). In
contrast, Binghams career blossomed after his stint capturing the Panthers on film. Bingham is
most famous for his photographs or, and for co-authoring Muhammad Alis autobiography
(Bingham, 1993). Finally, in 2009, private collectors helped to fund a book of Binghams BPP
photographs (Bingham, 2009).
Both Bingham and Shames were instructed from an outside publishing source to take
photographs, but ultimately, the initial promises of publication did not come to fruition. Both
collections sat relatively dormant, hidden from public eye for forty years. Binghams publication
is used to display the photographers artistic merit to the public. Shames publication is directed
from the inner community to share photographs with the public. In both cases, the intended
audience is the current generation who may not be familiar with all three parties (Bingham,
Shames, and the BPP). Production offers understandings of how Bingham and Shames came to
create their photography collections.
4.2 Reproduction
The contemporary critic uses the history of an artifact to understand the artifacts present.
Reproduction focuses on what the artifact is made to do in the contexts in which we discover
them (Finnegan, 2004a, p. 204). Analysis of this time in the life of the artifact focuses on the
ways that the arrangement of the image, text, and caption work to create shared meaning in each
photography collection. In addition, it is important to note commonalities and differences among
themes within each collection. All aspects of each work must be understood including, but not
limited to, introductions, forewords, photograph and caption placement, and articles.
Both collections are relatively equal, in terms of physical size and quantity of the
photographs. Each book begins with a foreword from the author explaining how they came about
gaining their respective assignments to take photos and how they went about those assignments.
Also, both books have additional forewords from close friends commenting on the collection.
Binghams forward, from close friend Bernard Kinsey, focuses on the quality of the photographs
(Bingham, 2009, p. 16). It is worth noting that Shames foreword is from BPP co-founder Bobby
Seale, which adds legitimacy to the collection (Shames, 2006, p, 11-13). Parallel to the foreword,
each book has an afterword that is themed around the photographer or the content respectively.
Furthermore, the most direct point of comparison is the representation of the ten-point plan in
each book. Each book has opted to include a version of the BPPs plan. Bingham chose to
include the shortened version of the ten-point plan distributed as a pamphlet (Bingham, 2009, p.
35). Shames includes additional text delivered by Bobby Seale at the California General
Assembly (Shames, 2006, p. 14-15). Here, Shames uses a more detailed text to create stronger
connections between the audience and the Panthers. By doing so, Shames presentation of the

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ten-point plan becomes is unique from the rest of the collection insofar as it is the one time
where Shames book contains more text than Binghams book.
The primary difference between the collections is the captions. This difference is twofold
in placement and content. Shames book (2006) utilizes full-page pictures and opts to place all
the captions at the end, away from their respective photographs (Shames, 2006, p. 146-150).
These captions range anywhere from one to four sentences and provide details explaining any
important individuals. Sometimes these captions provide quick information; just enough to
understand what is going on in the photograph such as Huey P. Newton poses with three
women at a rally in DeFremery Park. Oakland, 1971 (p. 148). Other captions explain additional
details not provided in the picture such as Bobby Seales campaign car during his run for mayor
of Oakland. The election was held on April 17, 1973. Seale lost. Oakland, 1973 (p. 150). By
placing the captions at the end, Shames lets his audience evaluate the photographs on their own
merit with little formal intervention in the image. In other words, he lets the picture do the
talking. Once the audience accesses the image, the extra information from the removed caption
focuses the message on a context of time, where the image represents more than just a single
moment, but is part of a story.
Binghams book (2009) takes an opposite approach to captions. Instead of saving the
captions to the end, guest writers explain a series of pictures using lengthy paragraphs. Each
short entry covers a series of three to ten photographs. An example of this is the section titled
Black Power Rally (Bingham, 2009, p. 22-34) which includes text on page 23, explaining the
seven pictures on the surrounding pages. These entries are very detailed and include discussion
regarding photographic technique, which Shames did not. Each picture is centered on the page
and includes a caption at the bottom. These captions are very short, never more than a sentence,
and typically include just names and locations and little else.
Picture order is dissimilar between the two collections. Shames provides neither text nor
content order to his photos. The audience drifts from photo to photo with no order or caption to
intervene with the experience of discovery and analysis. Contrary to this, the organizational
pattern of Bingham is driven by thematic sections centered either on a person, such as Kathleen
Cleaver (Bingham, 2009, p. 38-43), or a location, such as DeFremery Park (p. 106-125).
Primarily, this organizational pattern acts as Binghams introduction to each person and location,
almost as if each section is a different roll of film. This allows Bingham to drive conceptual
stories through each miniseries of photographs. These stories outline the humanity of the
individual leaders within the BPP.
Both photo collections share some similar tensions. Each book features very few pictures
of police officers, and in instances where they do appear, they are never portrayed in a flattering
manner. Binghams fourth picture (Bingham, 2009, p. 8-9) displays officers holding wooden
batons as if they are standing guard, protecting an unseen group of people possibly from the
Panthers. The photograph is given no caption. Police officers are portrayed as the enemy of both
the Panthers and public in general.
As a response to police brutality, the BPP adopted the ideograph of the raised fist to
display solidarity and power within the black community. The Panther fist is commonly held at
rallies, but rarely outside of public spaces. This helps to establish that the leadership held
celebrity lives; lives where they represent a persona and personal times where they only have to
be themselves, such as in their homes. Shames captures Bobby Seale and his wife holding their
son in a loving embrace (Shames, 2006, p. 130-131) showing his audience that important party
members still found time to focus on their families.
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Moreover, it is important to note that no photographs include a Panther holding a gun. There are
two possible explanations for this decision by both artists. This could have been an intentional
decision to exclude the hyper masculine from their photographs to show a more humanistic BPP.
On the other hand, this could have been a decision passed down from the publisher.
Significantly, this directly contradicts the dominant historical narrative of the Black Panthers as
gun toting thugs.
The photographs significantly differ in their portrayal of romantic relationships. Bingham
shares photographs of Eldridge and Kathleen Cleaver multiple times throughout his book. His
photos of the duo are very business-oriented, as if they devoted their entire lives to the cause of
the Panthers. In a photograph depicting Kathleen reading while Eldridge stands behind her.
There appears to be little romantic attachment. The photograph focuses on the content of the
reading materials instead of the two as a romantic partnership.
In contrast, Shames photographs portray strong work/life balance and deep romantic
relationships within the BPP. Two photographs showcase David Hilliard (one of the Panthers
prominent members and Chief of Staff at the time of the photograph) with his wife, Pat. The
photograph on the left page shows David working on layout selection for The Black Panther
magazine in the Oakland BPP office. David is in deeply concentrated, focused on his work,
portraying the intense level of commitment to the organization often represented in the media.
This photograph is juxtaposed by the photograph on the right capturing David and his wife
engaging in a moment of intimacy. Pat sits on Davids lap, as the couple closes their eyes, about
to kiss. It is important that these photographs are placed next to each other, representing
work/life balance.
Further, the two collections differ regarding their portrayal of masculinity within the
organization. One photograph from Binghams work is captioned Bobby Seale leading Black
Panther drills Oakland, CA (see Appendix A). The picture captures Seale dressed in full Panther
uniform as he instructs male members, also in full uniform. The Panthers stand in line at military
attention listening to Seale lead drills. The photograph uses linear directionality to place the
focus on the importance of Seales body language. Seales facial expression illustrates power and
his hand gesture, pointing at the ground, shows the importance of the Panthers paramilitaristic,
masculine organization centered on strong, African American men. Bingham sparsely features
women in his photographs and chooses not to include children as a focal point. An opposing
understanding of the BPP and masculinity is presented in Shames work. Outside St. Augustines
Church in Oakland, Shames captures two Panthers standing guard. While the male Panther on
the left holds no organizational significance, the female Panther on the right represents an
important aspect of the organization. Claudia Grayson, better known as Sister Sheeba within the
BPP, was a strong member, known for her role of enforcement. Here, Sister Sheeba represents
equality of women within the BPP, as she shares her role equally with her male counterpart.
Sister Sheeba becomes just as important, if not more important, for the organization and is
perhaps the main focal point of the photograph.
Also, Shames captures the importance that children in the movement. One photograph
displays children standing at attention in a classroom. Similar to Binghams photograph of
Bobby Seale leading drills with male adults, the classroom scene shows young children dressed
in uniform ready to receive instruction. There are differences in height, age, and sex of the
children. The photograph illuminates the integral nature of childhood education within the
greater movement, as the BPP stressed that children are the future of the nation. Many of
Shames photographs feature children including one selection depicting young girls holding
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protest signs in public (Shames, 2006, p. 36). This nurturing aspect of the Panthers directly
contradicts the predominant narrative of the Party as an organization predominately comprised of
adult males. These collections challenge typical media representations of the Panthers as
disorganized and menacing radicals from impoverished Oakland.
4.3 Circulation
It is important to understand the similarities and differences in reproduction to better understand
how these narratives fit into the overall historical discourse of the Black Panther Party.
Circulation asks the critic to analyze the significance that the production and reproduction of the
images have to the broader historical narrative. Bingham uses his collection to focus on the roles
carried out by the Panther leadership, highlighting individuals and the struggles they encounter in
their lives. He does this by using textual narrative and picture sequencing to drive his book in a
very intentional direction. An audience member would view this collection to mean that the BPP
was an organization driven by sophisticated individuals who stood with strong convictions and
pushed a very public agenda. Alternatively, Shames uses his collection to convey a sense of
community and happiness within the BPP. Shames lack of organizational pattern, multiple
photographs of diverse groups, and decision to save captions to the end of the collection immerse
his audience in the chaos of a social movement with its diverse struggles and relationships.
These narratives add new and sometimes contradictory perspectives to a preexisting
narrative. By providing narratives that encompass both viewpoints of the outsider (Bingham) and
the insider (Shames), the audience gains an understanding of the depth and complexity of the
BPP. Todays younger audiences were not in Oakland during the time of the BPP, and so they
must use these collections as new avenues to assess the dominant narrative regarding the BPP,
one that typically demonizes the Black Panthers.
5. CONCLUSION
We live a world increasingly dominated by images. Rhetorical criticism and argumentation
theory have been slow to adapt to this fact. Recently, however, Visual rhetoric has become a
minor theme in rhetorical studies (Finnegan, 2004b, p. 234). This essay contributes to this
growing body of scholarship, and pushes the parameters of more traditional, text based
approaches to argumentation. In so doing, it is important to note that visual rhetoric should not
be conceived as a unique genre of rhetorical artifact (rhetoric than is visual), but as a project
of inquiry that considers the implications for rhetorical theory of sustained attention to visuality
(Finnegan, 2004b, p. 235).
In the case at hand, when audiences juxtapose the two recently released photography
collections of the BPP, they realize that non-dominant narratives do not have to follow the same
path. There is not one countervailing interpretation, or method of presentation that is correct.
The way these stories are told, through the primary medium of the image, invite multiple
interpretations of this important moment in history. While both collections challenge the
dominant historical narrative on many fronts, they do so in remarkably unique ways, and with
different vehicles, frames, and modalities in communicating their stories.

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REFERENCES
Avril, C. (2012). Race, gender and class in the autobiography of Huey P. Newton. Nordic Journal of English Studies
11(2), 5-35.
Bingham, H., (2009) Howard L. Binghams Black Panthers 1968. Crist, S., & Fowler, G. (Eds.). China: AMMO
Book, LLC.
Bingham, H. (1993). Muhammad Ali: A thirty-year journey. Simon &Schuster.
Bloom, J., & Martin, Jr., W.E., (2013). Black against empire: The history and politics of the Black Panther Party.
Berkley, CA: University of California Press.
Davenport, C. (2010) Media bias, perspective, and state repression: The Black Panther Party. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Gatchet, A.D., & Cloud, D.L., (2012). David, Goliath, and the Black Panthers: The paradox of the oppressed
militant in the rhetoric of self-defense. Journal of Communication Inquiry, XX(X), 1-21.
Finnegan, C.A. (2004a). Doing rhetorical history of the visual: The photograph and the archive. In C.A. Hill, & M.
Helmers (Eds.), Defining visual rhetorics (p.195-214). C.A. Hill, & M. Helmers (Eds.). Mahwah, N.J.:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Finnegan, C.A. (2004b). Review essay: Visual Studies and Visual Rhetoric (p.234-256). Quarterly Journal of
Speech 90 (2), 234-56.
Foss, S.K. (2005). Theory of visual rhetoric. In Handbook of visual communication: Theory, methods, and media (p.
141-152). K. Smith, S. Moriarty, G. Barbatsis, & K. Kenny (Eds.). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc.
Fraley, T., & Lester-Roushanzamir, E. (2004). Revolutionary leader or deviant thug? A comparative analysis of the
Chicago Tribune and Chicago Daily Defenders reporting on the death of Fred Hampton. The Howard
Journal of Communication, 15, 147-167
Hart, R.P., & Daughton, S. (2004). Modern Rhetorical Criticism (3rd ed.). Allyn & Bacon.
Heath, G.L. (Ed.), (1976). The Black Panther leaders speak: Huey P. Newton, Bobby Seale, Eldridge Cleaver and
company speak out through the Black Panthers official newspaper. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press,
Inc.
Johnson, D. (2004). The rhetoric of Huey P. Newton. Southern Journal of Communication, 70(1), 15-30.
Jones, C.E. (2006). Recovering the legacy of the Black Panther Party through the photographs of Stephen Shames.
In Shames, S., The Black Panthers photographs by Stephen Shames (p. 138-145). Italy: Aperture
Foundation, Inc.
Lule, J. (1993). News strategies and the death of Huey Newton. Journalism Quarterly, 70(2), 287-299.
Lumsden, L. (2009). Good mothers with guns: Framing black womanhood in the Black Panther, 1968-1980.
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 86(4), 900-922.
Ogbar, J.O.G. (2004). Black power: Radical politics and African American identity. Baltimore, MD: The John
Hopkins University Press.
Moore, G. (2009). The Black Panthers. In Howard L. Binghams Black Panthers 1968. Crist, S., & Fowler, G.
(Eds.). China: AMMO Book, LLC.
Moriarty, S. (2005). Visual semiotics theory. In Handbook of visual communication: Theory, methods, and media
(p. 227-241). K. Smith, S. Moriarty, G. Barbatsis, & K. Kenny (Eds.), Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc.
Rhodes, J. (2007). Framing the Black Panthers: The spectacular rise of a black power icon. New York, NY: The
New Press.
Shames, S. (2006). The Black Panthers photographs by Stephen Shames. Italy: Aperture Foundation, Inc.
Spencer, R.C. (2005). Inside the Panther Revolution: The Black Freedom Movement and the Black Panther Party in
Oakland, California. In Theoharis, J., & Woodard, K. Groundwork: Local black freedom movements in
America. (p. 300-317). New York, NY: New York University Press.
Theoharis, J., & Woodard, K. (2005). Groundwork: Local black freedom movements in America. New York, NY:
New York University Press.

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The Psychiatrization Of The Opponent In Polemical Context

Marianne Doury & Pascale Mansier
Laboratoire Communication et Politique
C.N.R.S.
France
marianne.doury@cnrs.fr
Laboratoire Communication et Politique
INSERM
France
pascale.mansier@yahoo.fr.

ABSTRACT: A variant of the ad hominem argument amounts to challenging the opponents mental health.
Semi-technical designations borrowed from psychiatric paradigms (such as autistic, paranoiac, hysterical)
are thus appealed to in order to qualify the opponent. Based on three examples from polemical discussions
on political issues, we investigate what kind of behaviour triggers such accusations, how they are justified,
and how they are handled by the speaker to whom they are addressed.
KEYWORDS: ad hominem argument, disqualifying strategies, mental pathologies.

1. INTRODUCTION
The present paper deals with the lexical dimension of some argumentative devices more
specifically, it focuses on the ad hominem use of terms like paranoiac, schizophrenic,
autistic, hysterical, or mythomaniac. All these terms are originally issued from
esoteric bodies of knowledge pertaining to psychiatry. In France, they have been
disseminated, beyond their technical use in expert fields, to ordinary discourses, in the
political domain as well as in everyday conversations.
In their technical use, these terms designate specific mental pathologies. As such,
they should not convey any negative judgment1. When used in ordinary interactions, they
nevertheless often serve as pejorative devices aiming at disqualifying a person. Some
linguistic arguments support this claim. French language offers specific discursive
patterns which may change almost any item into an insult. Thus, in espce de X and
sale X2, X has an offending dimension because of its insertion within such phrases,
whatever its initial meaning. Even a neutral, descriptive word may work as an insult
when obeying such a pattern. However, even if any word may be turned into an insult
owing to such discursive patterns, the words that are intrinsically marked as pejorative
are much more likely to be used that way.

At least, not more than terms referring to non-mental pathologies, such as cancer, pharyngitis or diabetes:
such words clearly point to physiological dysfunctions, but they do not convey any disqualifying
assessment of the person who suffers these pathologies.
2
English you X you or "you fucking / dirty / lousy X may be considered as rough equivalents for
espce de X or sale X.

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If one uses a search engine like Google in order to investigate the frequency of phrases
like espce de parano or sale autiste, it appears that they are quite common.
Examples 1 and 2 illustrate such offending uses of these terms. In example 1, the
administrator of a blog reacts to a participant accusing him of committing censorship
unduly by calling him espce de parano:
(1)
On se calme le Bauju, pas la peine de monter sur tes grands chevaux, il n'y a pas de censure []
Ton commentaire n'avait plus lieu d'tre, espce de parano, alors je l'ai scratch. Tu ne l'avais pas
vu?3
Lets calm down Bauju, there is no use getting on your high horse, there was no censorship []
Your commentary was pointless, you paranoid, so I erased it. Didnt you see that?

In example 2, a teenager expresses his hatred for one of his teacher, calling her autistic:
(2)
Il etait une fois , dans ce qu'on ose appeler un lycee , une prof de sciences economiques et sociales
[] qui etait bizare....cette chos.. heu , femme ( on va dire ca comme ca..) avait des petites manies
: se mettre les doigts dans le nez , se les lecher , puis elle s'habille bizarement avec un petit bonnet
bleu en laine [] ....pi lorsqu'elle parle , elle doit reformuler sa phrase au moins 10 fois avant
d'en sortir le bon exemplaire : C EST UNE PUTAIN D AUTISTE DE MERDE !!! [] : SALE
AUTISTE DE MES DEUX T'AS INTERET A ME METTRE 12 A MON DST SINON JE TE VOLE
TON SAC A ROULETTE DE MERDE4
Once upon a time, in what they dare call a high school, an economics teacher [] who was
bizarre this thing- oups, woman (lets call her that way) had little manias: put her finger into her
nose, leak them, she gets dressed in a strange way with a small blue woolly hat [] and when she
speaks she has to rephrase her claim at least ten times before getting a correct copy of it: shes a
fucking shitty autistic person! [] you autistic you, youd better give me 12 for my exam
otherwise I will steal your rolling bag.

In both cases, the use of the qualifications paranoid or autistic is supported by the
mention of behaviours (hastily interpreting an action as censorship, wearing a blue
woolly hat) presented as characteristic of the corresponding pathologies. In these
sequences paranoid and autistic obey an offending objective. However, in what
follows, we will examine examples where these terms are not to be analysed as mere
insults but as having an argumentative dimension, and more specifically, as part of an ad
hominem argument. We will first indicate what we mean by ad hominem argument, and
justify our categorizing the examples we will account for as pertaining to this argument
scheme. We then will identify the specific argumentative functions that may be achieved
by the adjectives hysterical, paranoid and autistic in polemical contexts. We will
conclude on what such argumentative uses of terms labelling mental pathologies tell us
about the perception of mental disease in our society.

3
4

http://parapentesaintevictoire.blogspot.fr/2014/05/panneau-retour.html
http://www.tromal.net/conte/view.php?urlHistoCount=3623

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2. AD HOMINEM ARGUMENT
First and foremost, an ad hominem argument is an argument. In the examples that we
will analyse, calling the opponent hysterical, paranoid or autistic does not
necessarily support any explicit conclusion. But even when no reasoning of the type:
X claims that p.
X is schizophrenic / autistic / hysterical
Hence, p should not be accepted.

is made explicit, we consider that the disqualification of the opponent that these
adjectives achieve has an argumentative function because of contextual reasons.
The three examples we will examine pertain to political discourse. They appear
within what Christian Plantin (2010) would call an argumentative situation. According
to Plantin, an argumentative situation is governed by an argumentative question (should
the government implement Measure M?, for instance) which may receive opposing
answers, each of them being supported by arguments (Im for M because arg.1,
arg.2), or (Im against M because arg.3, arg.4). In an argumentative situation, any
statement should be understood as part of an answer to the argumentative question which
structures the discussion, whether it is presented as such or not. The question, writes
Plantin, should be seen as an interpretative magnet which polarizes all the contributions
that fall into its attraction field (2010: 33; translation is ours). In this perspective, the
three adjectives which appear in the examples we will focus on are to be interpreted as
personal attacks aiming at disqualifying, beyond the person of the opponent, the thesis
that he supports. Hence they embody abusive ad hominem arguments.
We consider the use of terms issued from psychiatry, like hysterical,
schizophrenic, autistic, as a subtype of a more general type of ad hominem arguments
aiming at presenting the opponent as belonging to a debased fraction of humanity. Of
course we do not assume that this fraction really is debased, but rather that the use of
such qualifications as personal attacks suggests that for the arguer, in some way, it is.
Other variants of this general scheme consist in some cases in designating the adversary
as an animal5, as a female (when addressing a man6), as or a child or a teenager (when
addressing an adult7).
Example 3 displays simultaneously some of these disqualifying strategies. It is
drawn from a French political newsgroup, and it combines the psychiatric and the
animalistic variants of the ad hominem disqualifying strategy:

As when Anne-Sophie Leclre, a National Front candidate for the 2014 local elections, compared French
Attorney General Christiane Taubira to a baboon.
6
Contesting the manliness of the opponent is a very common disqualifying strategy. It transpires from the
revolting but nonetheless frequent injunction addressed to a boy in tears: Dont cry, you look like a girl!
7
As when, during the Gayet Gate, Manuel Valls suggested that Franois Hollande behaved like a
retarded teenager; https://fr.news.yahoo.com/closer-fran%C3%A7ois-hollande-agi-quot-adoattard%C3%A9-quot-103503108.html

312

(3)
Ce forum est essentiellement un exutoire pour une poigne d'autistes qui y dversent leurs dlires
d'illumins, leurs lucubrations psychotiques ou leurs ructations de primates.8
This newsgroup is mainly an outlet for a handful of autistic individuals who pour therein their
cranks deliriums, their psychotic pipe dreams or their primates eructations.

3. HYSTERICAL
The first term originally issued from psychiatry we will examined in this paper is the
adjective hysterical. Hysterical is frequently used in polemical contexts in order to
qualify a whole debate, the communicative behaviour of one participant in the discussion,
or the discussant himself. In context, hysterical refers to heated exchanges,
characterized by a highly emotional tone.
In the context of a political discussion, pointing to the emotional dimension of
ones contribution amounts to disqualifying it as irrational and potentially biased.
Even if the originally Freudian meaning of hysterical seems to be somewhat
remote from its present uses in political discussions, accusing the opponent of being
hysterical still suggests that he has lost control over his own communicative behaviour.
Hence the conditions for a rational discussion are not fulfilled, and the opponents
argument does not deserve any serious examination.
Furthermore, the accusation of loss of control is not the only vector of
disqualification of the opponent. The adjective hysterical is deeply marked by the
specific historical situations in which it was used, as the analysis of example 4 will show.
Example 4 is drawn from the French debate that preceded the adoption of the socalled mariage pour tous law, opening the marital institution to same-sex persons.
During a particularly heated parliamentary session, Christian Jacob, who opposes the law,
accuses Sergio Coronado, who supports it, of being hysterical9:
(4)
M. Christian Jacob. Jpense quon pourrait: profiter/ euh je le: dis mes (.) mes collgues de la
majorit/ qui pourraient profiter (.) agrablement de la: coupure du dner/(.) pour reprendre/ (.)
un peu leurs le leurs esprits/ (..) [protestations dans lAssemble] ttendez\ (.) les les les attaques
(..) qui ont t les vtres/ vous savez/ (.) on peut avoir de vrais di- diffrences/ (.) et: et dailleurs
jai apprci le ton/ avec lequel Patrick Bloche (.) sest exprim tout lheure/ (.) nous sommes en
dsaccord/ (.) Total\ XX (.) MAIS/ (.) il la fait avec euh beaucoup de dignit/ avec des
CONvictions qui sont les siennes/ (.) et quon accepte que lon puisse sexprimer dla mme faon/
(.) sans t soumis (.) des invectives voire de lHYStrie/ (.) de lHYStrie/ (.) de par certains
collgues/ je pense vous [montrant SC de la main] (.) mon cher coll/gue (.) mais si/ (.) ces
propos (.) vous napportez (.) RIEN au dbat/ (.) vous navez pas/ dargument/ (.) vous zhurlez/
vous tes dans lhystrie totale/ (.) et je pen/se quil faut profiter du moment du djeuner/ pour se
calmer\ (.) je- du dner\ (.) [puis sadresse Mme la Ministre]
I think we could take advantage Im addressing my colleagues in the majority who could
pleasantly take advantage of the dinner break to come to their senses [protests in the Assembly].
Wait, you have been the ones who made these attacks, you know, people may have important
differences of opinion, and by the way I appreciated the way Patrick Bloche expressed his position
a few minutes ago, we deeply disagree but he expressed his convictions with much dignity, and
8
9

fr.soc.politique
Christian Jacob, president of the UMP Group at the French National Assembly, February 1 st, 2013.

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people should accept that we express ourselves in the same way, without suffering abuses or even
hysteria, hysteria from some colleagues, Im thinking of you [pointing to Sergio Coronado] my
dear colleague, yes yes, these words, you make no valuable contribution to the discussion, you
have no argument, youre just yelling, youre totally hysterical, and I think one should take
advantage of the dinner break to calm down.

Nothing, in Sergio Coronados offending turn, accounts for such an attack, either in what
is said, or in the tone in which it is said: it is by no way more emotional or heated than the
contributions of the other participants.
Regardless of its factual adequacy, Christian Jacobs attack may be understood, as
suggested before, as a strategy aiming at shifting the discussion, from the criticism of the
opponents arguments, to its very person. Such a strategy may prove useful when no
simple refutation is available. It may also be seen as obeying other logics, in connection
with the history of the usage of the terms hysteria and hysterical in various contexts
in France. It is what is suggested by Sergio Coronado, who reacts to Jacobs charge with
hysteria as follows:
(5)
Sergio Coronado : en fin dsance tout lheure/ (-) euh le prsident euh Jacob/ ma ::: (.) se
dirigeant vers moi/ ma qualifi/ dhystrique\ [] mais jme suis interrog\ pourquoi ma-t-il
qualifi dhystrique puisque : (.) jfais un peu dhistoi/re (.) et jme suis rappl/ en effet/ que (.)
le mot hystri/que servait qualifier/ euh (.) notamment en priode de trou/ble pour les dnigrer/
(.) euh par exemple : les suffragettes/ (..) par celles et ceux qui taient opposs euh (.) au droit
dvote des femmes/ (.) a a servi qualifier euh Simone de Beauvoir/ au moment dla publication
du deuxime sexe/ (..) ou enco/re les trois cent quarante troissalo/pes (.) lors euh de la publication
du manifes/te pour le droit lavortement\ (..) jme suis dit pourquoi tre qualifi par ce terme/ (.)
alors que je nsuis NI une suffragette/ ni Simone de Beauvoir/ (.) ni encore/ une fem/me
demandant le droit/ lavortement\ (.) alors je (.) je suis revnu/ euh (.) euh au dix-neuvime
si/cle [] notamment aux travaux clini/ques (.) dans la foule dCharcot/ et je me suis rappl en
effet (.) et je pense que (.) cest a que faisait rfrence sans doute le prsident Jacob/ (.) qu
lpoque/ (.) lpo/que le mot dhystrique servait (.) servait videmment de (.) qualifier
TOUtes les femmes/ (.) toutes les femmes sont potentiellement hystri/ques vous lsavez (.) cher
coll/gue (.) hein/ (.) et une catgorie trs particulire dhommes\ (..) [] (.) les invertis\ (..) les
invertis\ (..) alors (.) cher/ prsident Jacob\ (.) vous auriez pu t plus franc/ (.) et faire co :mme
dans les cours dco/le me traiter dp/d\ (..) voil/ (.) cette inju/re (.) qui fait tant de mal
notamment aux jeunes qui dcouvrent leur sexualit/ (.) je tiens vous rassurer\ (.) cher prsident
Jacob (.) jassu/me (.) jen suis fier/ (.) et je nai pas (.) du tout (.) envie draser les murs/ (.)
malgr/ (.) vos/ (.) injures\ (..) jaimerais simplement dire (.) au prsident Jacob/ (.) que ce type
dinvectives (.) au sein dcette assemble/ (.) nhonore (.) ni vot grou/pe (.) ni les travaux (.)
aujourdhui (.) de lAssemble Nationale/ (.) jai hon/te (.) pour ceux/ (.) qui profrent ce ty/pe (.)
de propos (.) cest vrai que lheure est un peu tardi/ve et jai limpression/ (.) que vos nerfs
commencent lcher\ (.) merci
Sergio Coronado : earlier at the end of the session, President Jacob, addressing me, called me
hysterical. [] I wondered, why did he call me hysterical?, and as I am fond of history, I
remembered that the word hysterical was used to disqualify people in troubled circumstances,
for instance it was used to denigrate suffragettes by those who opposed womens right to vote; it
was used to denigrate Simone de Beauvoir as she published Le deuxime sexe; or it was used to
denigrate the three hundred and forty three bitches when they published the manifesto for the right
to abortion. And I wonder, why did Jacob call me hysterical, since I am neither a suffragette, nor
Simone de Beauvoir or a woman claiming the right to abortion. So I went back to nineteenth
century [] and I remembered the clinical works in the tradition of Charcot, and in fact I
remembered and I think thats what Jacob was referring to that at that time, the word
hysterical was addressed to all women as you know, all women are potentially hysterical, you

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know that, dear colleague and hysterical was also applied to a certain category of men,
namely, homosexuals; yes, homosexuals. So, dear President Jacob, you could have been more
frank, and, as children do in the schoolyard, you could have called me a fag. Here it comes, this
insult that causes so much pain to young people who discover their sexual orientation. I want to
reassure you, dear President Jacob, I assume my sexual orientation, I am proud of it, and I dont
feel like hugging the walls despite your insults. I just want to tell President Jacob that such
invectives, within this Assembly, do not honor either your group, or the work that the National
Assembly has been doing today. I feel ashamed for those who utter such words. True, it is late, and
I feel youre losing your nerves.

Puzzled by the adjective hysterical, the use of which he deems unfounded, Coronado
connects it with former uses: it was used against the suffragettes, that is, the feminine
supporters of womens right to vote, to disqualify them; it was used against Simone de
Beauvoir as she published her book Le deuxime sexe, which was considered a feminist
manifesto; it was used against the feminine activists who claimed the right to abortion.
Sergio Coronado finally mentions that the diagnosis of hysteria was made for a specific
category of male individuals, namely, homosexuals. On that ground, he suggests that
Jacobs accusation of hysteria amounts to calling him a fag: vous auriez pu t plus
franc/ (.) et faire co:mme dans les cours dco/le me traiter dp/d.
In the context of a discussion on a law that opens marriage to same-sex persons,
charging someone with homophobia is a way of bluntly disqualifying his contribution to
the debate as irretrievably biased.
Example 5 is interesting in that it illustrates how the hysterical qualification,
when applied to an opponent in a polemical discussion, may be a means of disqualifying
his position as emotional and biased. It also shows how a specific context (here, the
discussion of the law opening marriage to same-sex persons) may activate some semantic
features associated to hysterical in what Sophie Moirand (2007) would call a collective
discursive memory.
4. PARANOID
French paranoaque (and its shorter version parano), or English paranoid, is
another term issued from psychiatry, and entering some ad hominem attacks.
Example 6 is part of an interview of Marine Le Pen, an extreme-right politician,
by the left-wing journalist Pascale Clark on France-Inter radio station. At the end of the
interview, by way of closing, Pascale Clark always broadcasts a musical piece chosen by
her guest. Marine Le Pen chose a song by Laurent Voulzy, the lyrics of which were
written by Alain Souchon, entitled Jeanne. This song is about a contemporary man who
claims his love for a medieval women named Jeanne. The song does not explicitly refer
to Jeanne dArc, but irresistibly evokes her. Whereas the interview should end with the
song, Pascale Clark takes the floor and cites the lyrics of Belle-Ile en mer, another song
by Voulzy/Souchon, and specifically, a brief sequence which evokes Voulzys feeling of
rejection as a mixed-race child grown up in France10. Though Pascale Clark does not
explicitly charge Marine Le Pen with racism, it clearly is the way the latter interprets the
quotation by Pascale Clark of Belle-Ile-en-mers lyrics. She then strives to force the
10

Moi des souvenirs d'enfance / En France / Violence / Manque d'indulgence / Par les diffrences que
j'ai

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journalist into avowing what she intended by quoting this song. Pascale Clark resists,
calling Marine Le Pen paranoid11:
(6)
MLP : ouais (.) non non mais attendez madame (.) moi/ (.) trs objectivment\ (.) euh euh que
votre: (.) la manire dont vous balancez vot petite vanne la fin/
PC : cest pas une [va:/nne (.) je rappelle les paroles dune belle chanson
MLP :
[a veut dire quoi\ a veut dire que vous maccusez (.) ben oui/ madame mais
quest-ce a veut dire quoi quelque part vous maccusez dquoi\
PC : mais de rien/
MLP : mais si/ si\ jai bien vu votre petit air pinc genre [jsuis contente de moi/ (.) jai balanc
PC :
[mais arrtez mais vous tes parano/ mais
MLP : [une ptite vanne
PC : [vous tes parano/ le monde entier est contre vous:/ cest juste les paroles que jrappelle/
cest tout/
MLP:
PC:
MLP:
PC:
MLP:
PC:

yes, no but wait Madam, the way you hurl your little dig at me in the end
that is no dig, Im just evoking the lyrics of a beautiful song
what does it mean? It means that you are accusing me, yes Madam, but what does it
mean, you are accusing me of what?
Im not accusing you of anything.
oh yes you are, I saw your stiff face, meaning I feel pleased with myself, I had a little
dig at her
stop that, you paranoiac! You paranoid, the whole world is against you Im just
evoking some lyrics, thats all

Example 6 is typical of the use of the adjective paranoid as a disqualifying means. It

enables Pascale Clark to suggest that Marine Le Pen is not grounded in suspecting that
the quotation of Belle-Ile-En-mers lyrics was an indirect way of accusing her of being
a racist. Beyond that, parano suggests that this faulty interpretation of Pascale Clarks
intention by Marine Le Pen is due to a mental pathology (you are parano), which leads
her into interpreting innocent words as personal attacks (the whole world is against
you).
The diagnosis of paranoia applied to the opponent gives clearance to the speaker
of the personal attacks he may make: he does not have to answer for them while taking
profit of their devastating potential.
However in this specific case, the strategy fails. If you want to rebut your
opponents accusation of your having committed a personal attack by suggesting that he
is paranoiac, you should be able to propose an alternative credible interpretation for what
you said. Here, no doubt that Pascale Clarks alternative interpretation of what she did
(Im just evoking the lyrics of a beautiful song) is a poor one, and cannot support Marine
Le Pen being charged with paranoia.
5. AUTISTIC
The last case we will handle briefly here is the autistic adjective, and more specifically,
its use to qualify the government. In such cases, autistic often works as a quasisynonym for deaf. Example 7 is from Thierry Lepaon, the General Secretary of a left11

Marine Le Pen interviewed by Pascale Clark, Le 7/9, France Inter, 19 April 2012.

316

wing trade-union (the CGT). Lepaon criticizes Hollandes government for not defending
the interests of the working classes12.
(7)
Les patrons ont pris loffensive, ils ont loreille de ce gouvernement. Plus il cde aux patrons,
moins les salaris sont audibles. Ce gouvernement est autiste de son oreille gauche, il entend bien
droite.
Bosses have taken the offensive, they caught the governments ear. The more the government lets
them have what they ask, the less audible the workers get. This government is autistic from the left
ear, it hears perfectly well from the right side.

The same day when Lepaon made this statement, a commentator expressed a similar
criticism of French government in similar terms on the blog of a French magazine13:
(8)
Le gouvernement du Parti Schizofrne est devenu autiste de l'oreille gauche et n'coute qu'avec
celle de droite le Medef, le Cac 40, et les agences de notations Standard & Poor's et Cie...
The Schizophrenic Party Government became autistic in its left ear and listens only with its right
ear to Medef [right-wing union], to the CAC 40 [Paris Stock Exchange], to rating agencies
Standard & Poors and Co

More generally, the adjective autistic is applied to any opponent that you fail to win
over to your cause and who resists the arguments hes addressed. This strategy also
appears in example 9 by Jean-Claude Gaudin, Marseille Citys Mayor, who deems the
government to be autistic because it does not satisfy his claimings on the reform of school
timetables14:
(9)
Le gouvernement est autiste. La Ville de Marseille a demand un moratoire sur les rythmes
scolaires. Il a t refus. Elle a propos un plan de dveloppement du soutien scolaire. Il a t
refus.
The government is autistic. Marseille city asked for a moratorium on the reform of school
timetables. Its demand was rejected. It proposed a plan for developing support classes. Its demand
was rejected.

Gaudins declaration elicited reactions on Twitter pointing to the adjective autistic, the
pejorative use of which is considered inelegant in the following tweets:
(10)
Tweet 1 : mre d'enfant autiste et entendre le mot autiste tout va au gouvernement et ds les cours
d'cole: STOP!
Tweet 2 : autiste n'est peut tre pas le mot le plus dlicat ....
Tweet 3 : On pourrait dire... sourd, mais c'est aussi un handicap.
Tweet 4 : L'utilisation du handicap comme une injure. Classe.

12
13

Thierry Lepaon, General Secretary of the CGT, on RMC radio station, 29th October 2013.
Dingo 117, 29th October 2013, www.marianne.net
14
La Provence, 12th June 2014.

317

Tweet 1: mother of an autistic child and hearing the word autistic all day long used by politicians
and in schoolyards: STOP!
Tweet 2: perhaps autistic is not the most delicate word
Tweet 3: You could saydeaf, but its also a handicap.
Tweet 4: Using the handicap as an insult. Elegant.

To sum up, in polemical contexts, integrating adjectives issued from psychiatry into ad
hominem attacks may be shown to fulfil specific argumentative functions. Accusing the
opponent of being hysterical is a way of disqualifying his position as emotionally biased,
and enables one to dismiss a conflicting view without having to discuss it. Accusing the
opponent of being paranoid enables one to make a personal attack without assuming the
responsibility for such a disputable argumentative move, while taking profit of the
devastating effect it may have. At last, calling the opponent autistic when he does not
come to your point is a way of dismissing his resistance to your arguments as being a
mere symptom of a mental pathology, which enables you not to acknowledge your
argumentative failure.
Whereas such qualifications undoubtedly serve disqualifying strategies, they are
somehow toned down by the fact that they do not claim that the opponent is motivated by
malevolent intentions: if he is wrong, its not his fault, its because he is mentally
disabled, in one way or another.
6. CONCLUSION
Our present and preliminary study was concerned with only three words, and will be
developed further. The use of mental disorder subtypes outside the psychiatric field will
be examined from the medical point of view, to both interrogate the reasons and the
meanings of using such specific vocabulary, not only to categorize but actually to
undermine the opponents discourse. We will address the reasons of using psychiatric
words, in preference to words in relationship with physical impairments, such as he or
she must be deaf not to understand or is he or she blind not to see the evidence? When
a medical term is used outside its obvious diagnosis field, one can question why this word
is used and not another one (given that hundred mental disorders are now recognized by
academics) and what is conserved from the original definition and what comes from the
common sense or from the lay persons understanding of a specific mental disorder.
Our post-modern society is considered to be biologically and genetically-oriented.
In parallel, ones mental health is often questioned and analyzed. For some authors,
policy-makers lean heavily and wrongly upon psychiatry to define norms and pseudorelevant behaviour (Gori and Del Vogo 2008). For others, emotions are being used for
economical purposes by pharmaceutical firms (Lane 2009). Whatever the reasons, the
number of mental disorders medically recognized has been steadily increasing over the
years15. Mental illness terms -outside the medical field- are not only applied to

15

The American society of psychiatry has published several manuals for diagnosing mental disorders. The
last one (DSM 5), published in May 2013, lists over 600 hundred different disorders
(http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx).

318

individuals but are also used to characterize concepts or theories: for example, it was said
that economy was autistic16 or that the French society was schizophrenic17.
Such uses outside the medical field are paradoxical, because of the many public
campaigns aiming at de-stigmatizing persons suffering from mental disorders. For the
past twenty years, most western countries, including France, have launched media
campaigns to emphasize that people suffering from mental disorders are normal
persons. To name a few of these de-stigmatization campaigns, the World Psychiatric
Association has launched Open the doors about schizophrenia18 worldwide; Time to
change claims to be England's biggest programme to challenge mental health
stigma and discrimination19; in France, the FondaMental association aims at
explaining mental illnesses to the lay person20. However, all these initiatives have
not prevented the use of psychiatric terms to depreciate ones opponents.
Therefore our study will be a key for understanding how French society is mentallyoriented, specifically in political interactions.

REFERENCES
Gori, R and del Vogo, M-J. (2008). Exils de lintime. La mdecine et la psychiatrie au service du nouvel
ordre conomique. Paris : Denol.
Lane, C. (2009). Comment la psychiatrie et lindustrie pharmaceutique ont mdicalis nos motions.
Paris : Flammarion.
Moirand, S. (2007). Les discours de la presse quotidienne. Observer, analyser, comprendre. Paris: PUF.
Plantin, C. (2010). Les instruments de structuration des squences argumentatives. Verbum, XXXII-1, 3151.

16

Lconomie autiste , Le Monde, 25 June 2012. The author, Marco Morosini, claims that what could
appear to be a courageous voluntarism is actually nothing more than the confirmation of sixty years of
autistic economy. ( Ce qui pourrait paratre un volontarisme courageux n'est que la confirmation de
soixante ans d'conomie autiste)
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/06/25/l-economie-autiste_1723092_3232.html
17
Ezra Suleiman, Schizophrnies franaises, 2008, Paris: Grasset.
18
http://www.openthedoors.com/english/index.html; The WPA International Programme is designed to
dispel the myths and misunderstandings surrounding schizophrenia.
19
http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/
20
http://www.fondationfondamental.org/page_dyn.php?mytabsmenu=1&lang=FR&page_id=MDAwMDAwMDAwOA==

319

Dialectic And Eristic

Michel Dufour
Communication and Media Department
Sorbonne Nouvelle
13 rue Santeuil, 75231 Paris Cedex 05, France
mdufour@univ-paris3.fr

ABSTRACT: The paper discusses theoretical and practical relations between dialectic and eristic. It begins
with the origin of the notion of eristic in Greece. Next, it considers eristic from three points of view. First, it
is seen as an aggressive attitude in the context of an argument. Then, it discusses the philosophical
motivations of some eristic practices in Greece. Finally, the contemporary notions of eristic dialogue and
eristic discussion are considered.
KEYWORDS: Aggressiveness, antilogic, Aristotle, dialectic, dialogue, eristic discussion, eristic, Plato,
Schopenhauer, sophist.

In his monumental Greek Thinkers: History of Ancient Philosophy the Austrian

philosopher and historian Theodor Gomperz (1920) discusses the sentence ascribed by
Diogenes Laertius (1925) to the Greek sophist Protagoras: On every question there are
two speeches, which stand in opposition to one another. This statement would have been
the core of Protagoras Antilogies, his legendary but missing book. According to Diogenes,
Protagoras also wrote an Art of eristic ( which actually was only a part
of the Antilogies if we follow Untersteiner (1949). In a footnote, Gomperz (1920, p 590)
had already expressed a doubt about the very existence of a separate book on eristic:
Nobody ever called himself an Eristic; the term remained at all times one of
disparagement so that the above mentioned title of his book cannot have been of
Protagoras own choosing.
The main point for us is the claim that nobody ever called himself an Eristic. If
this is true, it should also be true of sophists although they were said ready to challenge any
point of view. If Gomperz is right, eristic is a pejorative label that you do not apply to
yourself but only to others. This is not the case with sophist and dialectician, two
names germane to eristic, for Protagoras called himself a sophist and Socrates saw himself
as a dialectician.
In his biography of Euclid of Megara, Diogenes Laertius (1925, Book II) reports
that the members of the Megarian school of philosophy were first called the Megarian,
then the Eristics and later the Dialecticians because of their use of questions, their love of
arguments and their interest in paradoxes. Thus, if Gomperz is right, Eristics was certainly
a nickname. This makes an important distinction of status between eristic and dialectic.
In 1990, on the basis of a systematic study of the electronic Thesaurus Linguae
Graecae, Edward Schiappa reported that the Greek words for eristic, dialectic, rhetoric
and antilogic all originate in Platos writings (Schiappa, 1990; see also Schiappa, 1992,
1999). As far as eristic is concerned, this seems to be a linguistic innovation but based on a
root, eris, which means dispute or quarrel. Kerferd (1981, chap. 5) stresses that, for Plato,
eristic did not only mean an attitude to look for victory in a discussion but also the art
that provides and develops the means to do it. However, it would be wrong to consider this
art as a specific techne since the eristic speaker is ready to use any means to triumph or to
give an impression of triumph. So, although Plato often applies eristic and antilogic to the
same characters, Kerferd suggests that a distinction should be maintained between these
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two words which involve an agonistic attitude. A verbal exchange is antilogic when two
opposite or contradictory discourses (logoi) are applied to the same thing, event or
situation. But, in an antilogic dialogue, the refutation of an opponent can be systematic
without pertaining to a strategy ready to use any means. This point is essential to
understand Socrates position against the sophists: even when he contradicts his
interlocutor, a dialectician does not aim at something like winning but looks for a truth
which may not depend on the result of the dialogue. Although he often refutes his
interlocutors, this makes a major difference between the dialectical inquiry fostered by
Socrates and the love of dispute typical of eristic arguers ready to use any trick to succeed.
There are about a dozen occurrences of words germane to eristic in Plato
(Brandwood, 1976). In the Theatetus (164c), Socrates does not use this word but makes a
distinction between genuine philosophers and agonistic speakers who are only interested in
words. A bit further (167e) he imagines how his fellow sophist, Protagoras, could complain
about Socrates unfair attitude in a previous conversation they had together. Socrates
makes the sophist draw a sharp line between the agonistic strategy of eristic and the
cooperative attitude of dialectic even when it uses refutation (Benson, 1989):
But I must beg you to put fair questions: for there is great inconsistency in saying that you have a
zeal for virtue, and then always behaving unfairly in argument. The unfairness of which I complain
is that you do not distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic: the disputer may trip up his
opponent as often as he likes, and make fun; but the dialectician will be in earnest, and only correct
his adversary when necessary, telling him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault,
or that of the company which he has previously kept.

In the Euthydemus, the young Clinias is going to listen to Euthydemus and Dyonisodorus,
two brothers who have just been introduced as sophists. Socrates accompanies him because
he claims that despite his venerable age he wants to learn their art that he calls eristic
(272c). The two brothers are introduced as fighters. They were experts at wrestling, then at
dispute before a court, and finally:
The one feat of fighting yet unperformed by them they have now accomplished, so that nobody dares
stand up to them for a moment ; such a faculty they have acquired for wielding words as their
weapons and confuting any argument as readily if it be true as if it be false. (272a)

The fact that an arguer is ready to confute any statement, true or false (successfully or not)
may confirm indifference to truth. This kind of attitude is also often associated with the art
of the sophists and Platos use of eristic tends to confirm a proximity between eristic and
sophistic (Nehamas, 1990). However, in the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle makes a set
of distinctions between dialectic, eristic and sophistic. First:
The man who views general principles in the light of the particular case is a dialectician, while he
who only apparently does this is a sophist. (171 b5) The eristic arguer reasons falsely on the
same basis as the dialectician. (171b37)

Thus, for Aristotle (at least in this passage), the difference between the dialectician and the
sophist is a matter of vision of the principles, while between the dialectician and the
eristic it depends on the quality of their reasonings. There is also an important difference of
goals between the sophist and the eristic arguer who, here again, is introduced as a fighter,
but an unfair one:
just as unfairness in an athletic contest takes a definite form and is an unfair kind of fighting, so
eristic reasoning is an unfair kind of fighting in arguments; for in the former case those who are bent

321

on victory at all costs stick at nothing, so too in the latter case do eristic arguers. Those, then, who
behave like this merely to win a victory, are generally regarded as contentious and eristic, while
those who do so to win a reputation which will help them to make money are regarded as sophists
Eristic people and sophists use the same discourse, but not for the same reasons.... If the
semblance of victory is the motive, it is eristic; if the semblance of wisdom it is sophistical (171
b24-31)

This distinction does not preclude that you are both a sophist and an eristic; but if you are
one of them you are not a dialectician, at least in the Aristotelian sense of this term. It is
also noteworthy that Aristotle is talking of the way people are generally regarded. Thus,
his comments could be taken as a testimony of the way the words dialectician, sophist and
eristic were used around the middle of the fourth century. Further, as stressed by Dorion
(1995, p 51) about the status of the Megarian school, it is likely that these terms were
sometimes taken as synonyms at this time.
Taking now for granted that eristic arguing is characterized by the idea that a
discussion is a challenge that you can win, that an eristic arguer systematically tries to
refute his interlocutors by any means and, then, does not care about the truth of the views
they express, I will examine three aspects of this phenomenon. First, it can be seen as an
attitude independent of philosophical, religious or, broadly speaking, ideological
orientations. Second, as suggested by the case of the Megarian school or the views of some
sophists, it can be motivated by elaborated intellectual positions. Finally, I will consider
eristic behavior in the context of a controversial discussion as is the case with Protagoras
antilogies, Platos Euthydeme or the verbal confrontations discussed by Aristotle in the
Topics or the Sophistical Refutations.
ERISTIC ATTITUDES
It is common lore that some people love to argue and have a strong tendency to contradict
their interlocutor in almost any verbal exchange. This suggests that eristic behavior could
be a psychological individual feature, independent of the topic of the conversation. When it
is related to only one kind of topic, for instance religious or political, it is sometimes seen
as indicative of a dogmatic attitude.
Another typical case has been registered in classical texts: young people would be
more prone to an eristic behavior than their elders. This is already reported in Isocrates
Panathenaicus (1929, 26) where Platos rival notes that the new type of education has the
merit to keep the young out of many other things which are harmful and:
Now in fact, so far from scorning the education which was handed down by our ancestors, I even
commend that which has been set up in our own day I mean geometry, astronomy, and the socalled eristic dialogues, which our young men delight in more than they should, although among the
older men not one would not declare them insufferable.

Isocrates testimony suggests that even if young men have a natural slant to eristic, it has
been made more salient by the new education set up by senior citizens. Isocrates does not
deny that arguing is enjoyable but stresses that it is the abuse of eristic that is
objectionable. A similar observation can be found in Platos Republic (VII, 539 b27) where
eristic is not introduced as a kind of dialogue but as a perversion of it:
Socrates: There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for youngsters, as you
may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are
always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppy dogs, they
rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.
Glaucon: Yes, there is nothing which they like better.

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Young people would have fun to imitate those who refute them, probably their masters.
Like Isocrates, Plato suggests that this juvenile behavior is a consequence of the emergence
of the new education, a feature of a new social life. But the analogy made by Socrates with
an animal non-verbal attitude also suggests that it could be generic and natural. Even if
Socrates dialectical refutations or Protagoras antilogic games are possible models for this
juvenile eristic, both passages suggests that young people are excessive in this practice. A
few lines latter, like Isocrates, Socrates stresses the difference with elder people and then
with a more serious practice of dialectic:
Socrates: But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such insanity; he will
imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake
of amusement; and the greater moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing the
honour of the pursuit.

According to Plato, the fact that eristic arguers do not pay much attention to truth can have
sad ethical and epistemic consequences. This kind of game would quickly pave the way to
skepticism because, with the habit to confute and to be confuted, they violently and
speedily get into a way of not believing anything which they believed before. And this
would be the ruin of the whole educational program of the Republic since philosophy and
all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world. This threat from
eristic to philosophy is also at the very heart of the Euthydemus where the two eristic
sophists are said to be old men. Even if young men what about young women? are
especially gifted for this art, this dialogue shows that it is not their prerogative or that their
presumed masters can be worse than them.
Schopenhauers thesis
Schopenhauer wrote his Eristiche Dialektik (Eristical dialectic) in 1831. It is usually
translated into English as The Art of Controversy (Schopenhauer, 1921), a choice which is
unfortunate because eristic and dialectic disappear from the title and, accordingly, their
semantic proximity too. Schopenhauer was clear about it: eristic is a kind of dialectic.
Further, even if you know the original German title, you cannot make a decision about the
main point, namely whether controversy translates eristic or dialectic or both, more
or less identified.
The German version begins with a definition of eristical dialectic, immediately
followed by long footnotes about the differences between logic, dialectic, eristic and
sophistic. These notes have become the first pages of the English translation. When you
replace controversial by eristic, the English translation of Schopenhauers definition
(1921, p 4) comes close to Plato and Aristotles ones:
Eristical Dialectic is the art of disputing, and of disputing in such a way as to hold one's own,
whether one is in the right or the wrong per fas et nefas... (whether right or wrong).

According to Schopenhauer, logic is the science of thought, or the science of the process
of pure reason, then it should be capable to be constructed a priori (p 3). On the other
hand, dialectic can be constructed only a posteriori because it is the manifestation of
the intercourse between two rational beings. Therefore a possible disagreement between
interlocutors is the consequence of the disturbance which pure thought suffers through the
difference of individuality.
Schopenhauer is pessimistic about the way conflicts of opinion can be solved. The
Socratic ideal of a common pursuit of truth by means of a friendly conversation is hardly
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possible in practice. On the one hand, regarded as purely rational beings, the individuals
would necessarily be in agreement (p 3), but, on the other, this possibility is unlikely in
practice because man is naturally obstinate. According to Schopenhauer, the origin of
this stubbornness is simply the natural baseness of human nature (p 5). When two
interlocutors, A and B, perceive that they disagree, A does not begin by revising his own
process of thinking, so as to discover any mistake which he may have made, but he
assumes that the mistake has occurred in Bs. Therefore, every man will insist on
maintaining whatever he has said, even though for the moment he may consider it false or
doubtful (p 6). But he is not ready for a revision of what he has just said because he is
armed against such a procedure by his own cunning and villainy (p 7).
So, according to Schopenhauer, eristic is not an isolated individual behavior or an
attitude typical of specific human groups, for instance young men: it is a natural and almost
universal aspect of human conversations. Schopenhauer may be right that eristic behaviors
or tendencies are quite frequent, but they may be less frequent than he says. You can also
doubt his pessimistic explanation and opt for a more optimistic version saying that there
may be a global epistemic or cognitive benefit for mankind to behave eristically or, at
least, to support a claim when there is strong evidence to the contrary. Schopenhauer
already stresses that an agonistic attitude can prove beneficial during the conversation:
we make it a rule to attack a counter-argument, even though to all appearances it is true and
forcible, in the belief that in the course of the dispute another argument will occur to us by which we
may upset it, or succeed in confirming the truth of our statement. (p 6)

Let us add that it could be beneficial also after the dispute, in the long run, as shown by the
example of cold cases reopened because some defenders resisted the evidence of the guilt
of a sentenced person and finally found new evidence to the contrary, that they suppose
decisive.
Schopenhauer points to the agonistic and sometimes aggressive aspect of eristic
attitudes but does not pay much attention to the playful (Plato) or athletic (Aristotle)
aspect, already stressed by the Ancient and still clear nowadays, for instance in the
behavior of the so-called trolls that you can meet on the social networks of internet. This
suggests a distinction between different kinds of eristic attitudes, depending on whether
they are playful or not, aggressive or not. Schopenhauer supports the strong
anthropological claim that eristic arguing is a global, if not universal, phenomenon, but this
deserves a more systematic empirical study. Hample and his colleagues have begun a
worldwide investigation of it (Hample, 2010; Xie & al., 2013). In their 2010 paper which
reports the results of a research involving about two hundred American students (mostly
women from various ethnic origins) Hample et al. draw a roughly schopenhauerian
conclusion: We believe that the natural strip of arguing behavior is eristic, that at its core
arguing is verbal force aimed at defeat of the other person. One variety of eristic arguing
is arguing for fun, but Hample et al. emphasize an idea already found in Plato and
Aristotles metaphors about the kind of game played by eristic arguers: it lies on a scale
ranging from peaceful sports with clearly stated rules to a war fearing neither god nor man.
In the Euthydemus, Plato says that, before turning to eristic, the two brothers used to
practice pankration, the Greek martial art almost free or rules and are experts in the use of
weapons. Hample et al. (p. 418) only talk of boxing, a more civilized sport:
Entertainment is not normally supposed to be eristic or potentially unpleasant, but our results show
that in the case of arguing, it certainly is. Aggressiveness asserts itself forcefully in the experience of
and awareness of arguing for play. The entertainment character of interpersonal arguing is more
comparable to boxing than to passing the time pleasantly or working on a garden together. In fact,

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we are somewhat disinclined to say that playful arguing is playful at all, since it shows such a
combative nature in our analyses.

ERISTIC PHILOSOPHY
Even if eristic arguing sometimes appears to bloom haphazardly in a conversation, it can
also be motivated by theoretical reasons. If its goal were really to win by any means, i.e. to
silence an opponent, a gun could be the most efficient one. But this seems too radical. So,
an implicit presumption is that not any means make the deal but only any verbal ones. But,
to shout or utter an endless stream of words are also verbal means to try to silence
someone. Thus, a more restrictive presumption is that eristic arguing has something to do
with reasons giving and so, at least broadly speaking, with argumentation. The problem
then becomes the scope of the expression any means in the context of an argument.
As many contemporary scholars I do not agree with the traditional view considering
the so-called great sophists (De Romilly, 1988), namely those who lived at Socrates and
Platos time, as hurried professors ready to support any idea by any means to make fast
money. Even the two sophists of the Euthydemus who seem to belong to a second
generation if they did exist claimed that their eristic attitude was bound to
philosophical positions: they would not be playing just for the pleasure. If Dorion (1995) is
right that Aristotles Sophistical Refutations is especially directed against the Megarian,
this would confirm that the dispute between the Philosophers, represented by Socrates,
Plato and Aristotle, and the Eristics and/or the Sophists is not merely a fight of good
against bad or pseudo philosophy, as the tradition claims. It is a moment of an enduring
debate between philosophical schools.
There are some good reasons to say that the Eleatic philosophy associated with the
names of Parmenides, Melissos and Zeno has had a major influence on the eristic/sophistic
thought. I will only recall a few arguments that support the existence of a filiation between
some ideas, gathered under the name of Eleatic philosophy, and the dialectical practice of
some eristic sophists.
Gorgias is the author of a lost work called On Nature or the Non-Existent. There
remain two partial paraphrases of this text: one can be found in Sextus Empiricus Against
the Professors, the other is an anonymous text called On Melissus, Xenophanes, and
Gorgias. In this last work, Gorgias puts forward three paradoxical theses about being,
knowing and communicability: in short, nothing exists, if something existed we could not
know it, and even if we could know it, we could not communicate it to other people. The
proofs of these astounding claims explicitly refer to the views of Eleatic thinkers like
Melissus and Zeno whom Aristotle held to be the father of dialectic if we believe Diogene
Laertius (IX, 25). According to B. Cassin (1980; 1995), Gorgias theses would be a
logical but paradoxical consequence of some ideas of Parmenides and his followers.
According to Gomperz (1920), the founder of the Megarian school, Euclide,
merely ethicized, if the term is permissible, the metaphysics of Elea (p174) and the
Megarians, as a school, may be described by the term Neo-Eleatics (p 175). The reason
for this philosophical proximity being the Eristics and Eleatic philosophy is their shared
position about what Gomperz calls the problem of predication, namely the possibility of a
plurality of attributes applying to one single being and a plurality of individuals sharing the
same predicate. Like the Eleatic thinkers, the Megarians denied the possibility of a
relation of unity to plurality. In spite of their common tendency to despise empirical
knowledge and their interest for paradoxical arguments, propitious to eristic games
(Wheeler, 1983), the strength of this connection between Eleatic and Megarian thinkers has
been challenged by Muller (1988, p 39).
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Last but not least, in Platos Sophist (1921) the stranger who leads the discussion with
Theodorus to try to define what a sophist is, comes from Elea and is a disciple of
Parmenides and Zeno. Socrates ironically wonders if this man is not a god and, more
precisely, a god of refutation. No, this man is more reasonable than those who devote
themselves to disputation (216 b-c). The Sophist and the Theatetus are also the two main
dialogues where Plato sketches a theory of error, a major subject of disagreement with
some sophists who were said to deny the possibility to be wrong. Here again Parmenides
ghost is lurking around because, according to Socrates, the possibility of a mistake in
opinions and in words (241a) amounts to the ascription of some being to non-being. To
ascribe some being to non-being is impossible according to Parmenides, for non-being is
not (= has no being). This is a central tenet of his Poem where the Goddess condemns the
path of non-being and leaves opened the only path of being. Therefore, a thought or a
saying is always about something, namely some-thing, i.e. some being. Hence, the two
correlated theses that it is impossible to say a falsity, i. e. to say nothing, namely no-thing,
and then to conclusively confute an opponent. A consequence is that a decisive arbitration
of a controversy is not possible: an opponent is fully entitled to claim that he is right to the
detriment of the other. This is why, from the Eristic point of view, victory in a discussion is
not the victory of truth over falsity but the victory of the stronger arguer. All this would
come from the Eleatic thought. This seems to be acknowledged by Socrates when he says
that to take a step in the direction of an ascription of being to non-being is an offense and
even a crime against the old Parmenides (237a; 241a).
Another wind, coming from Heraclitus, seems to have blown on eristic
philosophies. The Heraclitean idea of an always changing world can bring another kind of
support to eristic arguers. A thing that is green today may be red tomorrow, so it can
rightly be said red and non-red. This reasoning has a similarity with the kind of faillibilism
which appears in Schopenhauer. The eristic arguer whom everybody, including himself,
believes to be wrong today (although a Parmenidian eristic arguer should not care about
being wrong since it is impossible) could be right tomorrow (but a genuine Heraclitean
view forbids the possibility of any definitive success). We know that Aristotle denounces
this kind of move in his discussion of the principle of contradiction in On Sophistical
Refutations (167a) or in Metaphysics (1005 b 15-30) where he condemns the sophistic
maneuverings based on the unconditional use of contradictory predicates.
In the Theatetus when Socrates discusses Protagoras maxim that man is the
measure of all things, first interpreted as meaning that each man is the measure of all
things, he explicitly establishes a relation between this view, which opens the path to
eristic conflict, and the philosophy of Heraclitus, Empedocle and many philosophers, but
Parmenides (152e). It is noteworthy that the discussion is limited here to the case of
perceptions. According to Protagoras, the one who says that the wind is cold when the
other says that it is not cold are both right. Socrates does not deny it and Protagoras is right
to say that these two discourses are a case of antilogy. But it may seem difficult to grant, at
the same time, that both speakers are right and that a contradiction is not possible. A way
to avoid this paradox is to claim that both speakers actually say some-thing, hence that
their utterances are neither false nor void, but that they are not talking of the same thing.
After stressing that a verbal opposition is not the same as a mental opposition, that our
tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind (154d), Socrates stresses a pragmatic
contradiction between Protagoras behavior and his philosophical theses for he should grant
that, under his own maxim, people who disagree with him are right.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to dive further into this topic and the disputed
influences of Parmenides and Heraclitus on Greek eristic thinkers. The main point is that,
in Greece, eristic arguing was not always a silly game. Even if it is rooted in human nature
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and sometimes appears spontaneously, at least in Greece, it was also motivated by

philosophical concerns about language, thought and communication.
ERISTIC DISCUSSION
In Commitment in Dialogue, Walton and Krabbe claim that eristic dialogue is a specific
kind of dialogue (1995, p. 76):
Under this title we have assembled all types of dialogue, such as acrimonious verbal exchanges and
private quarrels, that serve primarily as a substitute for fighting (tournaments or duels) as a means to
reach, provisionally, an accommodation in a relationship. As in a fight, the participants are foremost
trying to win. What constitutes winning may differ but is often defined in terms of effects on
onlookers or referees.

This kind of dialogue which is supposed to follow some rules, like tournaments and duels,
would have subtypes. Quarrel is one of them, eristic discussion is another (p. 78):
The eristic discussion is a type of dialogue where two participants engage in verbal sparring to see
who is the most clever in constructing persuasive and often tricky arguments that devastate the
opposition, or at least appear to.

A slightly different approach, without explicit acrimony and onlookers, is also introduced
in Walton (98, p. 181) who, further, uses the expression sophistical dialogue:
Eristic dialogue is a combative kind of verbal exchange in which two parties are allowed to bring
out their strongest arguments to attack the opponent by any means, and have a kind of protracted
verbal battle to see which side can triumph and defeat or even humiliate the other.

More recently, Van Laar gave his own version (2010, p. 390):
Eristic discussion is the kind of game that aims to determine who is the most capable, smart and
artful when it comes to devising and presenting arguments and criticisms.

There are similarities between these contemporary approaches, and also between them and
the various ancient concepts of eristic. But there are also important differences between the
new and the old ones. Let us begin by the similarities.
In these contemporary definitions we find again three features of previous
definitions. First, a common goal: to win. Second, any means with the restriction that
they are, more or less, connected with the practice of argument. Finally, we meet again
sport or military comparisons or metaphors (fighting, tournaments, duels, devastate,
combative, attack, battle, triumph, defeat, humiliate). Van Laar seems to escape this
paradigm but not the idea of a competition to select the best arguer according to criteria to
define.
Now, a characteristic feature of all these contemporary approaches is the parity or
symmetry between the main goal of the interlocutors and between the means they use or
are allowed (Walton) to use. Their common main goal is to win and they are supposed to
use means which are different but framed and, perhaps, evaluated according to the same
criteria or rules. The status of these criteria or rules is a problem. Are they the same as in a
critical discussion as suggested by pragma-dialecticians? Are they specific to each kind of
dialogue? Are they mixed? See Krabbe (2009) for a discussion. But, my main point
remains that in these contemporary views they are the same for both sides.
It is also noteworthy that in Van Laars paper and Krabbe and Waltons definition,
the eristic discussion occurs in front of an audience or in front of onlookers and referees
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who serve as a jury. Thus, it is supposed to follow a common procedural frame: the goal is
collectively fixed like in a tournament or a contest and the parties are allowed to bring
out their strongest arguments. Hence, the interaction can not only be seen as a (collective)
game, it is a game: the participants know they are playing and what game they are playing.
In such a case, it seems easy to identify a discussion as an eristic one.
This scheme fits common situations. For instance, it seems close to the way
Protagoras is supposed to have trained his disciples or similar to the didactical exercises
sometimes played in contemporary argumentation classes, with one player or a team trying
to support a view by any means against an opposing team. You can also find examples in
context which are less obviously playful. Most contemporary democracies have preserved
two Greek institutions, the Assembly and the Court, two places of collective or public talk
which are major symbols of democratic life. In both of these arenas opposition is essential
and its truthfulness counts as a warrant of a regular working. This is why lawyers are
appointed to support a defendant even when everybody claims that he is guilty. This is a
political opposition is essential to democratic life as it is summarized by the French
political saying to the effect that Lopposition soppose (The political opposition has to
oppose the governments policy) which seems massively followed by politicians and
political parties, even if citizens interpret this systematic opposition as a sign of bad faith
or unfairness that may lead to a public disaffection toward politics.
Krabbe (2009) distinguishes two typical attitudes in dialogue: collaboration and
competitiveness. He stresses that even in competitive situations a certain minimal
cooperativeness is needed since otherwise there can be no exchange at all (p. 121). He
adds that arguments are called in as a means to change a situation into a better situation
(p. 122). Who decides that a situation is better, and according to which criterion? By
common standard in an optimal situation the parties would be in agreement. But this
fails to capture the idea that although eristic arguers may be ready to cooperate as long as
common standards serve their personal goals, they are also ready to drop them when they
become hindrances. I think that Van Laar rightly points that if eristic is a specific kind of
dialogue it is not like the others. There is something puzzling, properly para-doxical, i.e.
beyond common expectations, at least in some forms of eristic arguing. Van Laar (2010)
writes: a crucial characteristic of an eristic discussion is that there is less cooperation
than prescribed by the norms of critical discussion1 and the contestants are typically
unwilling to bind themselves to propositions or more detailed procedures (p. 388).
The problem with Krabbes notion of competitiveness introduced to account for the
fact that each party wants to win, is that it can shelter very different attitudes. Even if you
grant the debatable point that in any argument the different parties want to win, the most
classical feature of eristic is the will to win by any means. It is the scope of any means
which is the key, I think, to understand and evaluate eristic arguing even if the working of
this key is not very clear and deserves a closer investigation.
We have seen that the use of sport and military metaphors is as old as the word
eristic. The former ones suggest the idea of a whole range of practices spanning from
athletics to boxing and other martial arts. Sport competitions have frames and rules which
are usually clearly identified and apply symmetrically. But if we shift to the military
paradigm the question of rules become more uncertain. In some sense, you can say that
there is a minimal cooperation in war for the reasons given by Krabbe and war can also be
seen as a kind of competition, especially when it is seen as the continuation of politics by
other means" as Clausewitz said. By other means does not mean by any means. Sometimes
there are codified practices between enemies and attempts to regulate the use of weapons.
1

In the pragma-dialectical sense of the term.

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But we know that in some wars, the enemies are ready to win by any means: the end
justifies the means and there is no need of a jury to decide who won. Collaboration or
competition is not the only choice for eristic arguing: there is a third option, more hostile,
beyond them. Sometimes, eristic appears beyond collaboration and competition.
I think Kerferd (1980, p. 113) is right when he suggests that the distinction between
antilogic and eristic should be maintained on the ground that antilogic is not ready to use
any means while eristic is. Antilogic is closer to sports while eristic is closer to war, with
difficult but interesting limit cases, like duels, gladiators fights and, perhaps, pankration.
It is difficult to say if the definitions of eristic dialogue introduced by Krabbe and
Walton cover the whole field of martial dialogues, namely antilogic and (warlike) eristic
exchanges, two notions which are not always clearly distinguished even in classical
authors. But, if we grant that they are two different kinds of the genus that I have just
called martial (which could still be called eristic if the context prevents any confusion2), it
seems clear that the eristic discussion considered by Krabbe (2009) and Van Laar (2010)
and more generally the regular political and judicial opposition of our democracies is a
matter of antilogic rather than (warlike) eristic: it is soft, open and manifest competition
whereas eristic can be hard, stubborn and concealed. Of course, eristic can bloom in an
antilogic dialogue: a manifest antilogic discussion is sometimes a good prelude to a hostile
eristic overflow.
This seems to be the case in Platos Euthydemus. Walton and Krabbe (1995),
Krabbe (2009), Walton (1998) turn to this dialogue to illustrate their views about eristic
discussion. They mostly focus on its antilogic (and fallacious) aspects whereas I think the
key of this dialogue is rather the warlike eristic behavior of the sophists.
The collective goal of the dialogue seems to be clear: the two sophists claim that an
eristic training could teach virtue to the young Clinias and persuade him to love knowledge
and to practice virtue. Like in a game or a sport, a rule is fixed before the beginning of the
play. It is quite simple: the young boy has just to answer yes or no (276d). But this is a
trick since he knows nothing else about the alleged game. Walton and Krabbe write that in
an eristic dialogue, the initial situation is an unsettled intellectual hierarchy, prompting
a need to test our verbal skills of argumentation to see who is the more masterful. The goal
is to settle the intellectual hierarchy (p. 79). Does this apply to the Euthydemus? I doubt
it because the status of the intellectual superiority is more intricate. The apparently shared
goal is the education of the young Clinias. To reach it, the lad accepts an eristic dialogue
with the two teachers who are supposed to be intellectually superior if Socrates is not
ironical or does not play on words when he says that he wants to study eristic. The sophists
win, but their brilliant victory is so cheap that, from the point of Plato and probably most
readers, they did lose. Platos conclusion seems to be that eristic arguing is certainly not
the right path to knowledge and wisdom, let alone to the education of beginners. The first
intellectual hierarchy is upset.
A major difference between Krabbe and Waltons models of eristic dialogues and
the Euthydemus (at least in the first part) is that this dialogue lacks the parity, the formal
equality that is typical of their models and of antilogic games. A first anomaly, allowed by
the alleged intellectual authority of the sophists, is that they fix the rule of the game. Later,
Socrates will try to break it by asking questions, but the sophists will refuse it because they
stick to their own rule: their opponents are not allowed to ask questions (287 c-d). The
lesson of boxing quickly ends for Clinias who has accepted the rule: knocked out in the
first round. The expected lesson shifted to an unfair competition which is over when it has
hardly begun, much to the delight of the two sophists. The match is a triumph for them, but
2

Just like man can be a generic term including woman and man.

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the lesson is a failure. The two sophists made a decisive step towards eristic when they
decided not to play with Clinias but at his expense. They were already beyond
collaboration and competition.
CONCLUSION
Since the Antiquity, eristic practices have been associated with the use of strength in a
dialectical argumentation. A first necessary condition of eristic is to see a dialectical
exchange as something that you win. But its most typical feature is the readiness to win by
any means that appear relevant to the practice of argument.
Eristic can show two faces depending on whether the arguer uses means which
pertain to the frame of the exchange or not. These two faces appeared in Greece where
theory and practice of eristic arguing was part of philosophical reflections and arguments
about the nature of thought, language and the practice of argument. An antilogic game was
an agonistic verbal game where the participants were supposed to abide by rules. But it
already seemed clear that this did not account for all the agonistic verbal exchanges.
Sometimes arguers did not compete with their interlocutors but play at their expense.
This supports the suggestion that an eristic behavior can be the manifestation of a
primary natural aggressiveness which could abide by rules as long as they serve the desire
to win. But this desire can also be ready to use fallacious strategies. We should, however,
resist a quick association of fallacies with eristic since eristic can do without them.
Systematic refutation too is not a reliable criterion since an eristic behavior can be limited
or occasional, like aggressiveness.
Some contemporary authors claim that eristic dialogues or eristic discussions can
be seen or are a specific kind of dialectical interaction. I have suggested that their views
focus only on one face of eristic, the antilogic one. The distinction between this pacific
version of agonistic verbal exchanges similar to the practice of games or sports, and the
more warlike one, ready to win even by irregular means, could help to clarify the analysis
and evaluation of agonistic arguments.

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The September 11, 1973 Military Coup In Chile And The Military
Regime 1973-1990: A Case Of Social And Political Deep
Disagreement.
Claudio Duran
Philosophy Department
York University
Toronto,Ontario
Canada M3J1P3
claudioduran@rogers.com

ABSTRACT: This paper intends to describe and analyze the argumentation that has taken place in El
Mercurio, Chiles main daily newspaper, both in articles in the printed edition as well as in blogs in the
online edition, during the months of September and October 2013. This argumentation constitutes a case of
social and political deep disagreement. The nature of the disagreement lies in the ways of explaining the
coup and the military regime.
KEYWORDS: blogs, deep disagreement, multi-modal argumentation, pragma-dialectics, strategies for
overcoming deep disagreement.

1. INTRODUCTION
In several conferences of ISSA and OSSA, I have presented a number of papers on
arguments in political propaganda taking the Chilean daily El Mercurio as the source of
the argumentation. The main thrust of these papers is the view that the study of
argumentation in general should include the analysis of emotional, physical and intuitive
arguments as well as logical ones. The paper presented in the 2010 ISSA conference
(Duran, 2010) intended to show that, on the basis of work done in the previous papers,
the psychoanalytic theory of Bi-Logic is in a position to explain some fundamental
aspects of argumentation in agitation propaganda as developed by the press. That paper
concluded with a reflection on the dramatic disagreement in Chilean society about the
causes and circumstances of the military coup, the military dictatorship, and the return to
democracy.
I attended during the 2010 ISSA conference the paper by David Zarefsky on deep
disagreement in argumentation. His views helped me to develop a preliminary
understanding of argumentation possibilities to break the deadlock in Chile through
argumentation techniques as discussed in his paper. Since then I had tried to find material
in El Mercurio that would help me to develop some mechanism to deal with the
disagreement. The social and political idea behind this initial project was that a society
cannot truly function without an undertstanding of the reasons for a major crisis that
divided it into two irreconcilable camps. I found an article in El Mercurio published in
early 2010 by Arturo Fontaine, then Director of CEP (Centro de Estudios Pblicos), a
powerful think-tank representing the views of the highest levels of the entrepreneurial
class in Chile. According to Fontaine, any attempt to discuss the drama of Chile would
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necessarily involve that the supporters of the coup would need to recognize the repressive
nature of the military dictatorship; conversely, those who suffered the repression would
have to accept that the government of President of Salvador Allende ended up terrorizing
the middle classes.
I decided to look into blogs in El Mercurio internet (emol.com) that could deal
with the topic. During the many activities to conmemorate the 40th anniversary of the
coup, the amount of coverage of the coup and military regime has been impresssive, still
within the general frame of deep disagreement. I have focused mainly on articles on the
editorial page of the daily edition and on several internet blogs that deal with the topic.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the argumentation that has taken place in
the blogs.
2. FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF BLOGS.
In order to proceed with the analysis of the argumentation as it appears in the blogs, it
seems necessary to develop a systematic framework. Usually blogs consist of expression
of opinions, or points of view, with no attempt to participate in dialogues. In the case of
the topic of this study, those opinions tend to be very black and white, with the people in
favor of the military regime attacking the other side quite strongly, and viceversa. Ad
hominem fallacies are found frequently, including insults and accusations of evil
motivations. Therefore, what is the reason to develop a systematic framework? It has
been my idea for a long time, that people need a social forum where they could exchange
their views and opinions about economic, political, social issues in a way that could
become interactive. The mass media, especially the press, seem to be an appropriate
vehicle for that purpose..
In his recent recent book Arguing with People, Michael Gilbert (Gilbert, 2014),
introduces a complex model for argumentation among people that includes some core
aspects of the Pragma-Dialectical model of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, combined
with his own theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation, and his understanding of
argumentation as leading hopefully to coalescence. In this context, my thought moved
from the idea of analyzing argumentation in blogs to hopefully, at some point, be able to
propose formally to conduct dialogues along the lines of the new model.
2.1 M. Gilberts model for the study of argumentation
In what follows I introduce the model that has helped to get going in the analysis of
argumentation in blogs in the case of social and political deep disagreement in Chilean
scoiety. At the same time, I discuss David Zarefskys ideas on transcendence of deep
disagreement as they appear in his paper presented at ISSA 2010 (Zarefsky, 2010). A
combination of the ideas of Gilbert and Zarefsky could hopefully produce the model that
I have been discussing above. However, in this paper, the model is to an important extent
used in order to show the limitations of interactions in the blogs. Needles to say, I do not
want to be deterred by such limitations in future work.
In dealing with his purpose of helping people to argue, Michael Gilbert introduces
the idea of stages of argumentation that was developed, as mentioned above, by van
Eemeren and Grootendorst: as is well known, the stages are confrontation, opening,
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argumentation, and conclusion. The novelty in Gilberts approach in this new book, is
that he proposes that these stages should be analyzed in a way that, in each one of them,
one must be clear as to which mode(s) of argumentation is (are) at stake. Thus, the
interaction at the confrontation stage could be in the logical mode combined with, for
example, the emotional mode; or it could be happening at the visceral mode; or kisceral
mode together with the logical mode; or it could be in any one of the modes alone. And
the same thing can happen in the other stages. This way of conceiving arguing adds to the
process of understanding it a much needed complexity.
I believe that both the Pragma-Dialectical and Gilberts approaches to
argumentation are intended, if possible, to lead into coalescence. This idea is very
important in my present study as discussed below. Now, I need to incorporate to this
model some of the key ideas of Zarefsky in the paper mentioned above.
David Zarefsky is concerned with the fact that argumentation assumes a certain
degree of agreement such that, even when there is disagreement, there should be the
possibility of arguing the case. Thus, productive disagreement must have an underlying
stratum of agreement. However, there are situations in which each arguers claims are
based on assumptions that the other arguer rejects. In this case he says [d]eep
disagreement is the limiting condition at which argumentation becomes impossible. He
says that this state of affairs was first characterized by Robert Fogelin (Fogelin, 1985).
I examine Zarefskys views on possible ways of transcending deep disagreement
in what follows, but first I entertain a few thoughts on this problematic issue. Given the
Pragma-Dialectical/Gilbert model articulated above, it seems rather evident that most, or
a great number, of cases of deep disagreement happen at the confrontation stage. Indeed
why to argue if there is no basis of agreement whatsoever. However, lets assume that in
a certain argumentation process, disagreement is found in the opening stage, such that no
agreement is possible as to the rules of the process of arguing: for example, one arguer
believes that only logical rules of arguing are acceptable while the other claims that
emotional rules are paramount. The same could be said about the stage of argumentation.
In either situation, it seems clear that the arguers have to come back to the confrontation
stage. If so, it seems that deep disagreement cases happen basically at the confrontation
stage. Another key issue is the consideration of magnitude or levels or depth of deep
disagreement. Not all cases are necessarily the same. It may happen that one of the
arguers claims, to start with, that s/he disagrees completely with the other arguer; or the
situation could be less radical, and the deep disagreement appears after a few exchanges
in which they find areas of productive exchange.
2.2 D. Zarefskys strategies for dealing with deep disagreement
David Zarefsky discusses four possible strategies for overcoming deep disagreement. He
groups these strategies in pairs under the following headings: inconsistency, packaging,
time, and changing the ground. In its turn, each one of them is divided into two options.
My own take on this insightful proposal is to explore them as potential ways of seeking
productive agreement: therefore, I present them here as I intend to use them in my own
study of deep disagreement in Chilean society. The overall picture is the following:

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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Inconsistency may happen as hypocrisy or circumstancial ad hominem. In

both moves, the attempt is to get inside the opponents frame of reference and
discredit it on grounds of inconsistency. The charge of hypocrisy happens when
the arguer maintains a position which is inconsistent with another one maintained
during the argument. The circumstantial ad hominem option takes place when a
position of the arguer is contradictory to her or his own behavior. Now, in both
cases, the arguer that is seeking an end to the deadlock expects that the
inconsistency can be enough to make the other arguer realize where s/he really
stands.
Packaging is divided into incorporation and subsumption. Incorporation
consists in including the deep disagreed upon issue into a larger package which
also includes things that the other arguer agrees with. Subsumption is a strategy
which seeks to subsume the items of deep disagreement within a larger frame
which can be acceptable to both arguers. In both cases of packaging, the
expectation is to generate agreement around the disagreed topics such that the
arguers may develop some sense of working together.
Time can happen as exhaustion or urgency. Exhaustion refers to cases that
have been very long, tense, and emotionally draining. Urgency refers to a bad
situation generated by a crisis that has undermined the arguers. Of course, a crisis
may lead to exhaustion. The expectation in these two cases is that the arguers
cannot continue in a deadlock that affects their lives so seriously.
Finally, changing the ground could take place as interfield borrowing or
frame-shifting. In interfield borrowing one arguer assumes the field of the other
arguer attempting to find an area of possible productive argumentation. In frameshifting one of the arguers will try to move the argument from one context or
frame to another where both could agree upon. In these two cases the expectation
is to situate the argumentation on a common plane where agreement becomes
possible.

3. ANALYSIS OF BLOGS
In this part of the paper, I examine specific cases of deep disagreement as they have been
found in two blogs in El Mercurio, one in early September and the other one in early
October, both in 2013. At that time, Chile was witnessing a remarkable and painful
explosion of public debate as a consequence of the conmemoration of the 40th
anniversary of the September 11, 1973 coup d etat that deposed the democratically
elected government of Salvador Allende. A number of high level politicians from all
sides of the political spectrum got involved in different ways of commenting or arguing
about the coup and the military dictatorship that followed. President Sebastin Piera, a
right wing politician but with a centrist tradition, made a public criticism of some of the
civilians involved in the government of General Augusto Pinochet. Members of
traditional institutions, including the powerful Catholic Church, were also involved in
this public debate. In this social and political atmosphere, blogs in El Mercurio became a
source of intense and voluminous participation of people representing the two sides of the
deep disagreement. The task is now to examine the two blogs mentioned above.

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Now, this examination of the blogs is undertaken in two main and different, but related,
ways. On the one hand, the blogs are described as they appear face value, with no
intervention of the framework developed above. Then, they are related to the framework
sideways, so to speak: the job is to show possible ways of relating aspects of the
framework to issues presented in the blogs. As mentioned at the beginning, the blogs
consist of viewpoints with no recognition of the need to exchange views in any formal
sense. At the most, they can be evaluated as remaining at the stage of confrontation and
this happens in a crude way, really. At this moment, it is pertinent to introduce a
significant concept that Michael Gilbert discusses in his recent book (2014): his views on
arguing with people have in mind what he calls familiars, that is, people with whom the
arguers are familiar, they know each other well enough. Of course, this concept is at the
other end of what happens in the blogs, to the extent that the participants could be called
unfamiliars. This issue is considered when describing and analyzing the two blogs.
3.1 A personal deep disagreement exchange
Before undertaking the study of the blogs, I believe it is pertinent to discuss one personal
exchange that I had in the late 1980s, when Pinochet was still in power. It involved a
dialogue that I had with a former student whom I met by chance in a coffee shop in
Santiago. He was a member of the upper class in Chile, and a supporter of the coup and
the military regime. When he was my student in the 1960s, we had developed a friendly
relation. Upon greeting each other, he told me how pleased he was to see me back in
Chile, and then, almost immediatley asked me how I felt about the military regime. My
response was that it was a repressive dictatorship with horrible violations of human rights
to which he agreed upon saying that he was sorry about that. He continued saying that he
was truly sorry, but the fact is that Chile had developed economically in a way that, at
some point, democracy would return, and then Chile, as was the case with Spain, would
move politically from the centre right to the centre left, back and forth. He added that in
that situation there would never again be another Allende. I was completely shocked such
that I could hardly articulate anything else. If that dialogue with my former student
indicates something is that perhaps it happened at an earlier stage than confrontation.
Or maybe, that I could not even recognize confrontation. In hindsight, I think that I may
have agreed subconsciuosly with him that that was going to happen, as indeed it has
happened in Chile over the past 24 years! It was an experience that I keep going back to.
I am not sure that I could have entertained an argument with him.
Some reflection about this case is needed before I move to the study of the blogs.
At that time, I did not know much about argumentation theory, my only training had been
since the mid 1970s in informal logic, not enough to know what to do in an
argumentation case like this one. However, the point is a larger one and it involves at
least two issues. One refers to the fact that most people in the world are not familiar with
argumentation theory, so it is practically impossible for them to proceed along the lines
of the framework that I developed above or any other systematic one. Thus, it would be
important to get to know what exactly happens when people argue in general. Is there
some sense of stages? Do they try to come up with rules for the argumentation? Is there
an intuitive sense of all this? Do argumentation theorists, in one way or another, manage

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to articulate formal structures for conducting arguments based on ways that are natural so
to speak?
The second issue involved here relates to the need for educating people formally
since the early stages of the education system. What are argumentation theorists going to
do about this immense challenge? Leaving this sophisticated knowledge only for
meetings in conferences, or writings that go around experts, or for high level teaching in
academic institutions, would miss the very nature of what argumentation theorists have
been doing.
3.2 Analysis of the first blog
Perhaps I should move to the study of the blogs by stating that it is my expectation that
this study could help promote the need to educate people. It may be a long shot, but it is
worth trying.
In the climate of intense public debate in Chile as a consequence of the 40th
conmemoration of the military coup, political leaders of all parties, religious leaders,
educational professionals, and the general public at large got involved in all sorts of
public statements and debates. This was the case of the Bishops of the Catholic Church
who produced a public document on September 9, 2013.
The Bishops state that the society continues to be divided into two irreconcilable
camps, and time has come to search for a true reconciliation. However, they say, in the
present context, unfortunately strong accusations and reproaches tend to predominate.
They continue by stating that the wounds left by the painful events in September of 1973
have not really healed. They claim that truth, justice and reconciliation is the road to a
true understanding. They are also very critical of the abuses of human rights by the
military regime during and after the coup. Finally, they remind people of the role the
Church undertook in the defense of human rights during that regime.
It is possible to characterize this statement of the Church in terms of David
Zarefskys strategy for overcoming deep disagreement called time in the sense of
urgency. The Church makes it clear that the status quo of confrontation is not possible to
maintain any longer.
I have selected two blogs found in El Mercurio for a detailed study. One of them
was originated by an article published by Senator Hernn Larran from the most right
wing party called UDI, Democratic Independent Union. UDI was created during the
military regime in order to provide political support to it. His most important founder and
leader was Jaime Guzmn, a young, prominent intellectual who played a most important
role in the creation of legal, political, and economic structures during the government of
General Pinochet. Larran represents a rather centrist side in this party. The article was
published on September 2, 2013.
The other blog stems from an article published on October 8 by Eugenio Tironi, a
centre-left intellectual from the PPD, Party for Democracy. I selected these two blogs for
several reasons. One reason is the fact that Larran, being in the most right wing party in
Chile, has taken a conciliatory position and in his article he is asking for forgiveness so as
to provide a basis for reconciliation. A second reason for the selection of blogs is that
Tironi, on the other side, represents a clear centre-left position and sometimes is accused
by the more traditional left in Chile as being too bland. His article represents a strong
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criticism of Jaime Guzmns endorsement of the military regime. The point here is that
both politicians tend to the centre of the political spectrum, thus they are more prone to
get engaged in overcoming deep disagreement. A third reason is related to the fact that
one of the bloggers in the Larran article produces a more balanced account of the
Chilean crisis, but paradoxically he loses that balance in the Tironi blog.
The Hernan Larrn blog developed out of his article entitled Las razones de un
perdn (The reasons for asking for forgiveness). In this article Larran states that Chile
still suffers from the profound wounds developed out of the political violence of the
1960s and the three years of the Allende government. He says that there were groups in
the left that were promoting violence. The coup ended with democracy and civil liberties.
However, the military regime, at the same time that developed repression and violation of
human rights, contributed to the creation of a successful economic model. In any event,
after 40 years since the military coup, Chile is still a divided country. He urges people to
come out of this confrontation and try to find a common ground in order to live in peace
and united. He proposes to ask for forgiveness as the way for social healing. He himself
takes this option in the expectation that forgiveness may take people on the road to
reconciliation.
What Larran says here is similar to what Arturo Fontaine expressed in his article
from early 2010. He says that there were groups in the Chilean left that promoted
political violence and, at the same time, he recognizes that the military regime was
repressive. He makes a point though that the regime also helped to promore economic
development in Chile. Certainly, he seems to be putting on the table, some of the most
significant factors of the deep confrontation in Chilean society. From the perspective of
Zarefsky, it is possible to evaluate his position as a case of time with the option urgency,
as well as it happens in the Bishops document.
The analysis of the blog is interesting in several ways. First, very few people
referred in their participations to the most significant point of Larran, that of asking for
forgiveness. More so, even fewer bloggers acknowledged his article in a direct and
explicit way. One of the few who did so was very critical accusing Larran of naivete.
Second, the blog consists of a large number of extremely critical points against the other
side of the social and political divide: in essence, they are expressions of the
confrontation. Third, there are few participants that get involved in exchanges, and when
that happens they are confrontational. Finally, I found, as mentioned above, one set that is
initiated by a blogger who appears balanced in his evaluation of the events in Chile, in a
way somewhat similar to Fontaine and Larran. I proceed then to analyze this particular
exchange attempting as much as possible to refer to the Gilbert/Zarefsky model presented
above.
The blogger, whom I refer to by the initials of his name as JAFM, describes the
situation in the 1970s in Chile as one characterized by the presence in the country of
guerrilla operatives exported by the Cuban revolution, but also by Armed Forces trained
by the United States in the School of the Americas. Also there were Chilean guerrilla
groups. He says that Chile was in fact the reflection of the cold war. He blames the
political class as a whole for the coup. He mentions that it is important to understand,
but not justify the violations of human rights by the military regime. In a second blog,
JAFM expresses his view that Chileans must teach their children to resolve conflicts

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through dialogue and respect for institutions. At the present stage, he values politicians as
opposed to the political class of the 1970s.
One blogger, MEG, agrees entirely with him but does not explain. She does not
mention Hernn Larran, nor forgiveness. Another blogger, AFV, also without reference
to Larran, appears to be in significant agreement with JAFM, to whom he addresses his
participation, but does not acknowledge that he agrees with him. A third participant, MQ,
does not refer to Larran and attempts to defend Allende from the accusation of favoring
armed struggle and inviting Cuban extremists in the country. He blames extreme left
wing parties and groups but not relating them to Allende. He blames the United States
and President Nixon in particular for the coup and makes the point that the USSR did not
have any interest in Latin America beyond Cuba. A fourth blogger, JPRM, negates the
presence of Cuban guerrilla operatives in Chile, and blames the United States as well.
This blogger does not mention Larran or forgiveness. A fifth participant, EJLC, agrees
with JAFM with respect to his historical analysis, but disagrees with him in blaming the
political class of the 1970s. He himself blames Allende, whom he describes as the
Chvez of that time, and his followers who introduced weapons in Chile. Therefore, in
his view, the Armed Forces could not accept that and neither the disastrous economic
situation. This blogger does not mention either Larran or forgiveness. Blogger MQ
accuses the previous blogger EJLC of spreading falsehoods with regards to introduction
of weapons in Chile. A sixth participant, MSOE, mentions Larran indirectly and
metaforically, with no reference to forgiveness. What she says may be of great interest in
the study of blogs, although it is unclear to whom exactly she is referring to. She
mentions that there are three kinds of witnesses: those who saw well but have doubts;
those who did not see well but believe they have seen well; and finally those who saw
nothing but believe that they have seen everything. She also says that something like
this is happening.if Mr Larran lost a good and important part of this story. Finally,
JAFM, the initiator of these exchanges, comes back with a third participation, but not
acknowledgeing any of the participants in the blog that after all he initiated. He presents
now an indirect critical point to Larrans views, by way of saying that no economic
advance can justify the violations of human rights. He insists in criticizing the political
class of Allendes time, but also mentions that his governemnet was not doing anything
to overcome poverty.
There are several conclusions at this stage. The first one is the almost complete
lack of reference to the author of the article to which the blog ows its existence. Of
course, there could not be any dialogue or actual argumentation with him, but at least one
would expect some reference to his ideas, especially given the fact that Larran is writing
about the need to overcome the deep disagreement in Chile. Second, there is deep
disagreement found in this particular exchange in the blog, and no clear sense of further
interactions. Third, even when there is agreement, paradoxically there is no recognition
of it. Thus, fourth, the participants in this exchange seem intended in presenting their
points of view only. Fifth, the fallacy of ad hominen appears here, for example, in
accusations such as that of stating falsehoods. Sixth, the issues raised by MSOE,
assuming that I am correct in their interpretation, may be seen as a sharp description of
the way blogs go around: some bloggers see well but are prepared to doubt; some other
do not see well but believe they do; and then there are those who see nothing and believe
that they have seen everything. MSOE may be stating that there are many bloggers who
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truly do not know what they are saying, but still feel the need to present their views. In
any event, the idea here is that if there could be further interaction, for example taking
into account the Gilbert model, then possibly people could be able to understand each
other in more positive ways.
Finally, from the perspective of the Gilbert model, at the most, the exchanges
remain at the level of confrontation. Looking at them from the point of view of
Zarefskys ideas on breaking the deadlock of deep disagreement argumentation, perhaps
only one of the points by JAFM could be seen as relevant: this seems to be the case,
when he advocates the need to teach children the value of dialogue and respect of
institutions as the way to avoid political violence. I am tempted here to say that this
represents a case of packaging in the subsumption option. I say this because, after all,
JAFM has recognized the same as Fontaine and Larran, the need to look at the negative
aspects of the two sides of the social and political divide. He stops there, but Larran
claims that there ought to be forgiveness. Now, I evaluated his position above in terms of
the case of time in the urgency option, and now I see that looking at JAFMs view
combined with Larrans claim, the packaging possibility seems applicable as well. To be
clear about this: in my own sense here I draw from Fontaine, Larran and JAFMs need to
examine the negative aspects of the left and right side of the deep social and political
confrontation as the basis for overcoming it, therefore, borrowing JASMs idea,
subsuming them under the value of dialogue and respect of institutions.
3.3 Analysis of the second blog
The second blog stems from Eugenio Tironis article entitled Quien perdi? (Who
Lost?) The article refers to the October 5, 1988 plebiscite that the opposition to Pinochet
won, and therefore signalled the beginning of the end of the military regime. According
to Tironi, the real loser in the plebiscite was Jaime Guzmn whose significance as an
ideologist of the regime has been discussed above. Tironi says that the real losers were
Jaime Guzmn and the ideology according to which, in due course, people
accommodate themselves to their economic interests. The article represents a very
critical view not only on Guzmn, but on the whole of the military regime based on its
commitment to neo-liberal economic policies. In his article, Larran mentions that the
military regime was succesful in this sense in Chile. I intend to examine this point below,
but at this stage I should point out that it does constitute a very difficult issue in terms of
deep disagreement.
What is clear is that this article develops a strong criticism of the right side of the
political deep disagreement only, in contrast to the Larran article, as well as Fontaines
view in early 2010, and also the bloger JAFM.
I selected one specific set of exchanges in the blog because in it JAFM
participates with a very strong criticism of Tironi. This set is initiated by blogger EJLC,
also involved in the Larran blog, who criticizes Tironi accusing him of a double moral
standard. He relates Tironi to the communist party in Chile saying that communism has
been involved in serious violations of human rights as was the case in the URSS, North
Korea, Cuba, China, etc. A second blogger, FJGP, responding to EJLC, says that
socialists and communists are the worst violators of human rights in history. A third
participant, CCBC, also responding to EJLC, mentions that there were one hundred
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million people assassinated until 1998 by communists, pending the statistics until now.
At this stage, JAFM intervenes in the exchange, with a strong criticism of Tironi, albeit
not mentioning him explicitly, by stating that it is terribly difficult to argue with people in
the left, because they take unmovable positions no matter what arguments are provided to
them: they keep rejecting and refuting them. He continues by criticizing marxistsocialism on the counts of economic failure, political repression, and lack of respect of
human rights, and he says that that was the doctrine of President Salvador Allende. Had
he succeeded, Chile would be an underdeveloped country, with political repression, and
violation of human rights. Then he shows great apreciation for Jaime Guzmn because he
worked for the establishment of a political system that provided sufficient political
stability that made it possible for international investment in Chile. As a consequence
Chile is today a respected country in the world due to its economic achievements. A fifth
participant, MQ, also involved in the Larran blog, responds to JAFM by questioning if
any country achieved development through neo-liberalism. A sixth blogger, HF, attacks
MQ saying that what he says is absolutely false and provides the names of a number of
countries, including some traditional European developed countries, that succeeded due
to neo-liberalism. Finally, MQ himself responds by saying that HF understands very little
about the topic since he is confusing capitalism with neo-liberalism. He invites HF to
study a bit more the issue so that he realizes that in the countries that HF mentions the
state has played a very important role in economic terms, which is the very opposite of a
neo-liberal approach.
Comparing the analyses of the two blogs, first, in the Tironi one, there is explicit
and clear implicit reference to the author of the article, essentially by way of strong
criticism of Tironi. However, no blogger mentions the main point of who lost in the
plebiscite that Tironi makes. Bloger JAFM comes a bit close to it when he defends
strongly Jaime Guzmn who is the ideologist that Tironi criticizes in his article. Second,
the bloggers who respond to the Tironi critics, do not refer to him directly or indirectly,
but crititize those critics. No further interaction between them proceeds, but there is deep
disagreement present here in the sense of attacks against communism and neo-liberalism.
Third, there is some interaction between the participant who questions JAFM and the one
who responds to him, but very limited in terms of follow up. In any event, this is also a
case of deep disagreement. Fourth, as in the Larran blog, the participants seem just
interested in presenting their points of view. Fifth, I think that what blogger MSOE
expresses in the previous blog with regards to the three kinds of participants, may apply
here: for, given the nature of their participations, it is not clear whether they do really
know the topic they are writing about. However, this may not be fair on my part, for I
have not been an external critic of the objectivity of the participations of the bloggers,
neither of the authors of the articles that originated the blogs. However, a feeling that has
appeared at this stage has become too strong for me to avoid and I come back to consider
it at the end of the paper. Sixth, the fallacy of ad hominem is present in this blog as well,
as it happens in the case of accusations of ignorance.
Finally, from the Gilbert model perspective, exchanges remain at the level of
confrontation as well as in the Larran blog. With regards to the point of view of
Zarefsky, there is no immediate case that could be made for overcoming deep
disagreement in this blog as different from what happened in the previous blog. It is
possible, however, to imagine a situation stemming from the exchange between MQ and
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HF: in this particular exchange, somebody may suggest that a main point would be to
decide factually whether the state has been involved in the countries that HF presents as
successful cases of neo-liberalism. If this were the case, then I would be inclined to
evaluate the possibility of inconsistency as hypocrisy as the strategy to follow to resolve
deep disagreement. The reason is simple to state: HF defends the success of neoliberalism in several countries that he mentions explicitly, and MQ claims that in them
the state has played an important role in economic development, which is the opposite of
neo-liberal doctrine. But, obviously I seem to be imagining well beyond the actual texts
of both bloggers.
However, there is a productive point that could be assessed as positive in the
imaginary case. It concerns the relation between inconsistency in the hypocrisy mode and
changing the ground in the option of interfield borrowing. In the case under examination
here, it seems that there is a clear similarity between both strategies because they do
involve getting inside the other arguer. This is a very promising issue for further
research in the study of strategies for resolving deep disagreement.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The on-going research that is developed in this paper has required the generation of a
systematic framework for the study of cases of deep disagreement as they are manifested
in blogs in the press. This framework could also be potentially used in dialogues with
familiars. As presented above, the framework involves a combination of the
argumentation model suggested in Michael Gilberts book Arguing with People, with the
ideas on strategies in order to overcome deep disagreement discussed by David Zarefsky
in his paper read in the 2010 ISSA Conference. Now, from this perspective, the research
has been able to show that the Gilbert model, as expected beforehand, helps to conclude
that there is no process of real argumentation involved in the blogs that have been
analyzed: at the most, the argumentation happens at the stage of confrontation. Whereas,
somewhat more productive have been Zarefskys ideas in that they have been useful in
suggesting several worthwhile strategies for dealing with deep disagreement. Clearly, the
door has been opened for more research.
However, my overall goal is to apply this framework to the development of
exchanges in blogs. I mean, that perhaps it could be possible to introduce the framework
so that blogs could proceed according to it. Therefore, participants in the blogs could
become able to know about the four stages of argumentation, try to follow them
systematically, and in cases of deep disagreement, perhaps be able to try the strategies
described by Zarefsky. This goal may seem ambitious, even unrealistic, but perhaps
worth trying. Moreover, I see it in line with the need to educate people in general about
the outstanding achievements of Argumentation Theory. One important issue in this
context is the fact that participants in blogs are unfamiliars as opposed to what Gilbert
says concerning the dialogical relation between familiars.
With regards to Gilberts model, I have not dealt in this paper with his theory of
Multi-Modal Argumentation when analyzing the blogs. It seems to me that the exchanges
in the two blogs examined, may be assessed as a combination of the logical and
emotional modes, perhaps the intuitive mode as well. But at this stage, I need to work
more on the ways in which evaluations of the non-logical modes should proceed in the
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case of blogs: indeed there is no clear way of assessing emotions in a systematic way
here. One could, of course, say that given some interactions, it is easy to assume
emotional expressions by analogy to what happens in face-to-face dialogues.
And yet another topic of great significance would be the study of levels or
magnitude of deep disagreement. This issue has only been indicated in a preliminary way
in this paper. There seems to be no question, at least intuitively, that cases of deep
disagreement are not all of the same depth. For example, the question as to the
atrocities committed by the military regime does introduce very deep disagreement when
people who suffered them confront those who supported the regime. Emotions tend to be
extremely high in this case. Comparing that situation with a debate about the states
participation in the economy, it is possible to see that, while in this instance there is deep
disagreement, the case does not reach the emotional level of the previous one.
A related issue needs to be considered now. When presenting my interaction in
the late 1980s with my former student, I said that I was shocked by what he said about
the fact that, since Chile had developed economically, then when democracy would
return, the political scenario would be moving from the centre-right to the centre-left and
vice-versa. Senator Larran mentions in his article that the military regime violated
human rights and at the same time developed a successful economic policy. The bloger
JAFM mentions that economic development cannot be used to justify political repression.
Also, several exchanges between the two sides, as can be perceived in the blogs analyzed,
refer to the relation between economic success and repression. Here lies, in my view, one
of the deepest sources of disagreement still present in Chilean society. For can the left
side of the disagreement be prepared to accept that the military coup and repression was
needed in order to achieve economic well-being?
A further point complicates matter even more. It seems clear that getting rid of the
government of Pinochet was possible by an agreement, whose whole nature is not
known, between the regime and the centre-left coalition that had formed since the early
1980s in Chile. That agreement brought about the plebiscite that made possible to end
the regime. So, there is already some level, not insignificant, of breaking the deadlock
between the two sides: at least, at the level of the political leaderships. One area of
agreement here is the fact that the centre-left coalition would maintain the neo-liberaleconomic policies of the regime. Therefore, the Zarefsky strategy at play here may be
evaluated as time in a combination of exhaustion and urgency, although it could very
well had happened that during the negotiations a number of the other strategies may have
been present.
A final issue relates to the fact that my overall research, since I began the study of
the right wing press in Chile with several colleagues in the 1970s, intended to contribute
to the devopment of a more democratic society. At the same time, we were committed to
an objective and systematic study that should not be interfered by our commitment to a
specific ideological position. This involves to walk a fine line all the time. Thus, since I
am myself a member of the left side of the political confrontation, how would I behave, at
the present stage, if I were to have actual argumentations with people on the other side of
the disagreement? For instance, if I were to meet my student and decide to argue
seriously with him: would I be willing to accept that, given repression, violation of
human rights and everything else, one thing that was positive of the military dictatorship
was their sucessful economic policies?
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Only actual argumentation processes would be able to help in answering that troublesome
question.

REFERENCES
Duran, C. (2011). Bi-Logical Analysis of Arguments in Political Propaganda:
The case of the Chilean Press 1970-1973. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, G.
Mitchell (Eds.), Seventh International Conference of the International Society for the Study of
Argumentation 2011.
Larran, H. & Nez, R. (2013). Las Voces de la Reconciliacin. Santiago: Instituto de Estudios de la
Sociedad.
Fogelin, R. J. (1985). The logic of deep disagreements. Informal Logic, 7, 1-8.
Gilbert, M. (2014). Arguing with People. Tonawanda, NY: Broadview Press.
Gilbert, M (1997). Coalescent Argumentation. Mahwah, NJ: Routledge.
Zarefsky, D. (2011). The Appeal for Transcendence: A Possible Response to Cases of Deep Disagreement.
In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, G. Mitchell (Eds.), Seventh International
Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation 2011.

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Politicizing Tragedy: Third Order Strategic Maneuvering In The

Response To Mass Shootings
Justin Eckstein & Sarah T. Partlow Lefevre
Department of Communication & Theatre
Pacific Lutheran University
Tacoma, Washington
United States of America, 98447
justin.eckstein@gmail.com
James E. Rogers Department of Communication, Media, and Persuasion
Idaho State University
Pocatello, Idaho
United States of America, 83209
partsara@isu.edu

ABSTRACT: In 2012, the U.S. public overwhelmingly supported gun regulations. Yet, Wayne La Pierre
claimed that the U.S. lacked the correct climate for meaningful discussion. In a gesture to the third-order
condition of argumentation, he argued that we must first satisfy other concerns to create the proper climate
for debate. We discuss whether this appeal was a legitimate maneuver or a derailment.
KEYWORDS: affect, commitment, conviction, gun debate, political context, strategic maneuvering, third
order conditions.

1. INTRODUCTION
On December 14, 2012, at around 9:35am a man dressed in black fatigues entered the
Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, Connecticut and perpetrated the worst shooting at
a primary school in U.S. history (Kauffman, 2012, p. A10). Adam Lanza carried three
weapons including, a semi-automatic AR-15 assault rifle made by Bushmaster and
pistols (CNN, 2014, para. 2). Somebodys got a gun . . . . Theyre running down the
hall. Theyre still running, theyre still shooting . . . . Sandy Hook School, please a
trembling voice told emergence services (Susman, 2013, p. A8). In approximately 10
minutes, the shooter had discharged as many as 100 rounds (Kauffman, 2012, p. A10)
killing 26 people including 20 children and 6 adults, and himself (Fifield, 2012, p. 5).
First responders found the hallway strewn with rifle casings, the distinct smell of fired
ammunition in the building, and children and teachers locked in closets and afraid to
open the doors (Susman, 2013, p. A8). This shooting was one of the deadliest in the
United States history and it occurred within 6 months of 3 other massacres. The images
of dead children, mourning parents, and a community ripped apart coupled with the
accumulation of mass shootings brought the nation to a tipping point.
Gun ownership is one of the most affectively charged and political issues in the
United States (Winkler, 2011). After the shooting, a Reuters poll found support for gun
control increased by eight points from 42 to 50 percent supporting the statement, gun
ownership should have strong regulations or restrictions while a CNN poll found 62%
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support for bans on semi-automatic assault weapons and high capacity magazines
(OMalley, 2012, p. 18). These changes in public opinion prompted an opening for a
critical discussion on guns. Lankford (2012) reported,
Overall the frequency of these incidents in the U. S. rose dramatically, with 18 attacks occurring
from 1980-1989, 54 attacks from 1990-1999, and 87 attacks from 2000-2009. Worse yet, over this
time span, the number of attacks resulting in at least five fatalities more than tripled, from 6 highfatality shootings in the 1980s to 19 high fatality shootings in the 2000s. (para. 6)

Not only had the frequency and severity of mass shootings increased enormously over 30
years, it had finally affected the most innocent among us, Americas children. The
climate seemed ripe for reasoned gun reform91% of Americans supported universal
background checks (Light, Feeney, & Kamp, 2013, para. 18; Washington Post, 2013,
para. 4). Yet, a year later, no major reform had been enacted; assault weapons were not
banned; high capacity magazines were not limited; and, background checks were not
expanded. In fact, since Sandy Hook, gun laws have become even more lax.1 In the year
after Sandy Hook, 194 children ages 12 and under . . . were reported in news accounts to
have died in gun accidents, homicides, and suicides (Follman, 2013, para. 2). Perhaps
more chilling Everytown For Gun Safety reported that since Sandy Hook there have been
74 shootings in schools (Chokshi, 2014, para. 1).2 What went wrong? Why did Sandy
Hook fail to provide an opening for gun reform? How did the country fail so dramatically
to enact legislation with such overwhelming support? And, why did public support
decline so rapidly in the face of ongoing violence?
Argumentation scholars are in a prime position to answer these questions. Debate
guides the legal interpretation and promotes legislation on the question of guns. In the
conclusion of his history of gun regulation laws in the United States, Michael Waldman
(2014) of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law wrote,
Law students might be taught that the court is moved by powerhouse legal arguments or subtle
shifts in doctrine. The National Rifle Associations long crusade to bring its interpretation of the
Constitution into the mainstream teaches a different lesson: Constitutional change is the product of
public argument and political maneuvering. (para. 4)

The evolution of legal interpretations of the Second Amendment, illustrates the

importance of public debate and dialogue in shaping our culture and laws. Argumentation
scholars have a duty to praise and chastise strategic maneuvers because these arguments
alter the trajectory of gun laws (Hollihan, 2011).
In this essay, we examine the critical discussion between President Barack Obama
and Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association (NRA). We utilize a framework of
1

For example, Georgia just passed an open carry law that allows citizens to openly carry their guns
anywhere.
2
This number is not without controversythe 74 school shootings is based on defining a school shooting
as an incident involving a gun in an education settings. Gun rights advocates take issue with this definition
and argue a school shooting only occurs if a shooter came with the intent of killing lots of people. Thus,
when an individual comes to a campus with the specific purpose of killing a particular individual, it does
not count as a school shooting. For more over this definitional debate see Binder, M. (2014, June 20). Gun
nuts infuriating craze: Why they want to redefine school shooting. Salon.com
http://www.salon.com/2014/06/20/gun_nuts_bizarre_new_craze_trying_to_change_definition_of_school_s
hootings/

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strategic maneuvering to examine the Sandy Hook inspired debate to evaluate how well
arguers can balance commitments to the procedures for reasonable resolution of a
disagreement with the desire to have their standpoint accepted (van Eemeren, 2010).
Frans van Eemeren (2010) identified three types of maneuvers: 1) topical potential, 2)
audience adaptation, and 3) presentational devices that an arguer can use in the service of
their standpoint. But, if an arguer privileges a commitment to their standpoint over the
norms of a critical discussion, then they derail the conversation. We argue that LaPierre
overcame the commitments of 91% of Americans, because he more effectively
intensified his audiences convictions through strategic maneuvering and derailment.
LaPierres appeal to the anxiety-ridden context of the critical discussion enabled him to
position guns as a necessary condition to freedom. The fear that childrens safety and
freedom is at risk, affectively charges the debate in his favour. Even if Obama won the
most commitments, his followers suffered an intensity deficit. Commitments do not
always translate into action. If an arguer is able to modulate the intensity of beliefs, then
they are likely to prompt action.
2. STRATEGIC MANEUVERING AROUND THE THIRD ORDER CONDITIONS OF
ARGUMENTATION
For a critical discussion to occur, three conditions must be satisfied. The first-order
condition of a critical discussion is the procedure for resolving differences of opinion
the code of conduct for arguers. The second-order conditions are the attitudinal
requirements necessary for a critical discussion to occur. This is the process of
reconciling commitments to a standpoint with commitments to the process of critical
discussion (Hicks and Eckstein, 2012; Hicks, 2007; Mitchell, 2010). The third-order
conditions of argument are the external conditions that must be satisfied for a critical
discussion to occur (van Eemeren and Grootendorf, 2004; van Eemeren, 2010; Hicks and
Eckstein, 2012). Darrin Hicks and Justin Eckstein (2012) elaborated three components to
third-order condition of argumentation: 1) there must be a social and political
environment that supports critical discussion mediating disagreement; 2) a culture of
freedom, autonomy, and equality is necessary to use critical discussion to resolve
conflicts; and finally, 3) there are affective conditions, such as conviction, risk, trust,
required to facilitate critical discussion (pp. 333-334). If these conditions are not met,
then a critical discussion cannot function properly. For instance, if a debate happens in a
political context that does not allow the free and open exchange of ideas, then it would be
difficult to reasonably test a proposition.
In the aftermath of Sandy Hook, President Barack Obama and Wayne LaPierre
leveraged different parts of the conditions to advocate their propositions. For Obama, the
aftermath of Sandy Hook provided the ideal opportunity to pass common sense gun
reforms, because the majority of Americans were mourning the loss of children. In
contrast, LaPierre argued that affective conditions were not appropriate for a critical
discussion because the populace was too sad to make a reasonable judgment. He also
claimed that a critical discussion would violate the cultural norm of equity because it
would unfairly distribute risk.
Obamas argument was that Sandy Hook offered Congress a kairotic moment to
pass gun regulationseven calling his White Paper Now is the Time. It had almost
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been 20 years since The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act and Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act were signed into law. These two pieces of legislation
represented the last time any bill intending to curb gun violence could muster the votes to
pass. Yet, the succession of mass shootings in Oak Creek, Wisconsin; Clackamas,
Oregon; Aurora, Colorado; and Newtown, Connecticut over a 12-month time span drew
into relief the problem of gun violence. Each shooting evoked a mixture of sadness and
fear, sparked a dialogue, and shifted the democratic consensus on gun control. Obama
said,
Over these past five days, the discussion has re-emerged as to what we might do not only to deter
mass shootings in the future, but to reduce the epidemic of gun violence that plagues this country
every single day. And its encouraging that people of all different backgrounds and beliefs and
political persuasions have been willing to challenge some old assumptions and change some longstanding positions. (Obama, 2012, para. 3)

Above all, Obama reconfigured the Sandy Hook massacre as the context to mobilize a
broader campaign against gun violence. The national outrage following the Sandy Hook
shooting unsettled commitments, providing law makers an ideal moment to pass
legislation. Obama leveraged the populations sentiments to advance his standpoint for
comprehensive gun control measures. He hoped that the nations grief could be translated
into meaningful reform.
Obama explained that the majority of Americans are now in favour of common
sense gun reforms, such as universal background checks, banning weapons of war, and
funding more gun violence research. The Majority and Most Americans operated as a
refrain to frame his policy initiative. For instance, he proclaimed,
A majority of Americans support banning the sale of military-style assault weapons. A majority of
Americans support banning the sale of high-capacity ammunition clips. A majority of Americans
support laws requiring background checks before all gun purchases so that criminals cant take
advantage of legal loopholes. (Obama, 2012, para. 8)

The tripartite repetition of the majority, what the Romans would call repetti, was used
to promote his standpoint. According to Jean-Franois Augoyard and Henry Torgue
(2005), the principle role of repetition seems to reside in the offering of marks for the
organization of a complex message (p.93). The positing and return of a term, or a set of
terms, connects the words together sonically into a rhythm. Rhythm has long been a tool
of memory, helping pre-literate cultures transmit information across vast times and
distances (Ong, 1989). Even today, we see the mnemonic power of repetition through the
ubiquitous earwormthose little jingles that get stuck in your head. Yet, rhythm does
more than convey information, it imbues a message with feeling. Different speeds,
pitches, and arrangements modulate listeners moods, inflecting how they interpret
content (Augoyard & Torgue, 2005). Put simply, repetition is a presentational device that
modulates the reception of a message (Eckstein, 2014). For each of his proposals, he had
the full support of the American public. Like other rhetors, this appeal to the majority
was a presentational device indicating if everyone else is doing it, then you should too.
In the context of political deliberation, consensus also signals a political mandate
to act. It pressures congress into acting with their constituents desires. If a policy has
enough support, then a law should be passed. The only thing that could stop legislation
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from passing, Obama warned, is the power of special interest groups working behind the
scenes to thwart legislation. Even 70 percent of members in the National Rifle
Association favoured background checks, Obama claimed. This bit of reluctant authority
buttressed Obamas argument that his plan aligned with the interest of the population.
Thus, if you are not in the majority, Obama argued, then you are allied with special
interest groups that favour profits over people. Obama implored citizens to call members
of congress and ask them whats more importantdoing whatever it takes to get a [sic]
A grade from the gun lobby that funds their campaigns, or giving parents some peace of
mind when they drop their child off for first grade?(Obama, 2013, para. 31). This
bifurcated the audience into either for or against gun control. It foreclosed the middle
space of abstention and forced people to pick a side. And, if they chose to oppose gun
control, then, by implication, they opposed the democratic will of the people.
This created a difficult situation for LaPierre and the NRA, because any argument
offered could be characterized as undemocratic. To circumvent this rhetorical situation,
LaPierre shifted the debate away from the political context to the sentimental and cultural
conditions of the critical discussion. Even if the political conditions favoured political
actions, the affective and cultural conditions eclipsed that mandate. By appealing to the
other conditions accompanying the critical discussion, LaPierre could offer reasons to
suspend dialogue in favour of arming the teachers.
In response to the Obama administrations claims, LaPierre first pivoted the
affective conditions of the critical discussion. He scorned the Obama administration for
instrumentalizing victims of the Sandy Hook massacre to advance a political agenda. For
him, the immediate aftermath of a tragedy was a sacrosanct space demanding respect and
reverence. LaPierre proclaimed, Out of respect for the families and until the facts are
known, the NRA has refrained from comment. While some have tried to exploit tragedy
for political gain, we have remained respectably silent (LaPierre, 2012, para. 2-3). Quite
simply, he argued that people were not in the right frame of mind to rationally evaluate
policy proposalsthe population was grief stricken and did not possess the proper
faculties to adjudicate deliberative matters. Just as it would be unreasonable to hold
anyone to a decision made under duress, people should not be forced to legislate policy
when theyre overcome with emotion. Instead, the populace should have deferred the
discussion until sadness subsided and everyone could confront the question of gun
violence rationally. Underwriting this assumption is the belief that rational policy should
be quarantined from emotion. If policy lasts forever, it should not be grounded in a
fleeting feeling or sentiment. So, even if Obama had the political mandate to pass gun
regulation, this precedent was disqualified because it did not meet the affective conditions
required for reasoned dialogue.
Instead of trying to score political points, LaPierre advocated immediately
securing our schools. LaPierres strategic maneuver to define the topical potential as
school safety allowed him to leverage the problem of security as a necessary condition
that must be satisfied before debate could occur. If security was deferred for any period
of time, the public risked another tragedy. He explained,
Before Congress reconvenes, before we engage in any lengthy debate over legislation, regulation,
or anything else, as soon as our kids return to school after the holiday break, we need to have
every single school in America immediately deploy a protection program proven to work and by
that I mean armed security. Right now today every school in the United States should plan

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meetings with parents, school administrators, teachers, local authorities and draw upon every
resource thats out there and available to erect a cordon of protection around our kids right now.
(LaPierre, 2012, para. 36)

LaPierre used the timing of his speech to his advantage. If he was right that there was
another copycat killer waiting in the wings, and Congress was in recess, they had no
power to address the problem before another possible shooting. Securitizing the schools
would have addressed school safety immediately.
The claim that another killer could strike works through double conditional
reasoning. Brain Massumi (2010) explained, the affect-driven logic of the wouldhave/could-have is what discursively ensures that the actual facts will always remain an
open case, for all preemptive intents and purposes. It is what saves threat from having to
materialize as a clear and present dangeror even an emergent dangerin order to
command action (p. 55). That is, conditional logic attenuates the burden of proof onto
the speaker, because the mere fact an event could happen is sufficient to justify action.
For example, LaPierre asked, Does anybody really believe that the next Adam Lanza
isnt planning his attack on a school, hes already identified at this very moment?
(LaPierre, 2012, para. 18). Each step in the conditional removes the burden of evidence
the fact that there could be another killer does not prove there is another killer. And, the
ascription that such a person would kill presupposes a level of intentionality that is
difficult to prove. Each conflation of the conditional for reasonable, amplifies uncertainty
and infuses it with fear. It is irrelevant what the actual conditions of the debate are; the
conditional potential a threat materializes is sufficient to prompt feelings of dread and
fear. The threat feels so superlatively real that it translates into a felt certainty about the
world, even in the absence of other grounding for it in the observable world. The
assertion has the felt certainty of a gut feeling (Massumi, 2010, p.55). This sort of preemptive logic justifies the use of pre-emptive measures to prevent another school
shooting. The fact is that a double conditional statement means it is always a looming
threat, never resolved. So, even if another Lanza never materialized, he still could. As a
result, LaPierre used fear to intensify his followers commitments to guns.
Additionally, LaPierres arguments were buttressed by the fact that Congress was
on break making the prospect of any solution abstract and uncertain. Hence, any sort of
critical discussion about guns was inappropriate because it unfairly distributed risk onto
the bodies of studentsit was the children that were at risk while the nation decided the
best way to protect them. As LaPierre pointed out numerous times in the speech, Obama
and Congress had the time to discuss and think about guns, because they had the privilege
of being protected by guns. As a result, LaPierres arguments constructed guns as a
necessary component of the third-order conditions of argumentation. If everyone was not
adequately protected with guns, then deliberation could not occur.
3. CONCLUSION
Multiple polls taken after Obamas January address found that at least 91% of Americans
were in favour of universal background checks (CBS News, 2013, para. 1; Saad, 2013,
para. 1; Quinnipiac University, 2013, para. 1). This would appear to be a win for the
Obama administration because most Americans signalled a commitment to gun control.
Yet, nothing was done. Why? The answer resides in the difference between commitment
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and conviction. Although commitments and conviction are related, they are not
synonymous. Commitments are discursive statements of acceptance or rejection of a
proposition; and convictions are the attachments underwriting beliefs (Hicks, 2007;
Godden, 2010). While it is possible to extract a discursive concession from an opponent,
it does not translate into an attitude change. Hence, even though Obama won the most
commitments, LaPierre won the battle for conviction. The lack of any significant gun
reform in the wake of Newtown demonstrates the power of a determined, passionate
minority to overcome the half-hearted, unfocused wishes of a majority (Economist,
2013, para. 6). Indeed, Obama may have attracted numerous supporters, but not nearly as
many with as much vigour as the NRA. LaPierres constellation of propositions simply
resonated with his followers, putting Obama at an affective disadvantage.
In the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, interlocutors strategically
maneuver to define the nature of the disagreement advantageously. The Obama
administration advocated that Sandy Hook was another iteration of a broader gun
violence epidemic. If they won this proposition, then the critical discussion would
gravitate towards the question of gun control. It also allowed Obama to circumvent gun
rights discourse by demonstrating that guns inflict tangible harm. Conversely, the NRA
posited that Sandy Hook was evidence of the dangerous world we live in. If the critical
discussion changed to security, then the NRA could move the debate back to gun rights
and to each persons right to protect their loved ones. Concurrently, both sides
maneuvered around the third order conditions of the critical discussion. For Obama, the
wake of the shooting provided him with a democratic mandate and a kairotic moment to
pass gun control laws. For LaPierre, the conditions of the debate were unfair because they
exploited grief and would leave children vulnerable to another attack.
To evaluate strategic maneuvers that occur in the confrontation stage, Andone
(2012) offered three soundness conditions that must be satisfied for a move to be
legitimate. First, a move must facilitate the progression of the critical discussion. If any
strategic maneuver impedes this progression, then it is a derailment. Second, each reason
should relate to antecedent reasons and maneuvers. Reasons offered that are not germane
to the dialogic exchange risk muddling the discussion and distract from the reasonable
resolution of disagreement. Third, maneuvers must be easily apprehended by both parties
as relevant to the critical discussion. This rule, Andone noted, functions to exclude the
tactical deployment of unclear language to confuse the critical discussion. If any of these
conditions are not satisfied, then an arguer is shirking their commitment to the procedures
of critical discussion.
Obamas use of the Sandy Hook shooting to advocate gun reform was reasonable
because: 1) it propelled the critical discussion; 2) it was relevant to gun violence and 3) it
was a clear presentation of his standpoint. If we dont discuss problems of public concern
when they arise, then when is the appropriate time? If we apply LaPierres accusation that
politicizing tragedy was a derailment to other contexts, it does not make sense. For
example, the decision to make sex offenders information public (to enact Megans Laws)
in the wake of Megan Kankas grisly murder was not met with accusations of politicizing
a tragedy. Just the opposite, the passage of the laws was deemed appropriate and
reasonable. As Arthur Chu (2014) recently remarked in the wake of the Santa Barbara,
CA mass shooting, The only reason to talk about tragedy . . . is to try and prevent bad
things from happening in the future (para. 38). LaPierres appeal to not politicize a
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tragedy was a strategic maneuverif the NRA could defer the debate long enough, then
the affective reside of the tragedy would subside and the audience might be more
receptive to his standpoint. As a result, both commitments and convictions in support of
gun reform would wane. Yet, LaPierres claim was not quite a derailment. He represented
Obamas position as exploiting a tragedy, inviting him perhaps to clarify his proposition
to agree with LaPierre that we should have a conversation about the less politicized
school safety. Thus, LaPierres maneuver was also reasonable because it attempted to
progress the critical discussion, albeit toward the problem space of school safety.
However, LaPierres injunction to suspend the critical discussion and immediately
adopt his proposition was a derailment. Although there are some incidents where a
critical discussion may not be the most appropriate course of action because of an
impending danger, his use of the double conditional logic posited an open ended threat
that justified the permanent suspension of critical discussion. Indeed, the call for
suspension of deliberation in the face of an ongoing systemic threat was a derailment.
The notion that guns preserve the conditions for democracy is a common refrain from the
gun lobby. As the Economist (2013) retrospective on Sandy Hook pointed out,
Attend gun rallies, watch speeches or interview politicians, and it could not be clearer that the
single most potent message of the pro-gun lobby revolves around tyranny, and the idea that
American patriots need to be armed to prevent the government from snuffing out their liberties.
The second amendments right to bear arms, in this telling, underpins all other rights, and any
move to qualify that right amounts to evidence of a liberticide government at work. (para. 18)

This sort of logic acts as a rhetorical trump card to end critical discussions. If guns are a
prerequisite to freedom, then they become codified within the third-order condition of
argumentation. This imbues the topic of gun control with an affective intensity that is
difficult to surmount with reasoned discussion. In short, it renders guns sacrosanct.
Fundamentally, reform was blocked after Sandy Hook because LaPierres
supporters demonstrated greater conviction than the majority of the public who stated
commitment to common sense gun reforms but stayed home demonstrating little or no
conviction in support of reforms. The group Moms Demand Action For Gun Sense In
America (Moms Demand Action) suggested that gun reforms were blocked because the
NRA was a vocal minority demonstrating high levels of conviction. Heather Whaley, a
member of Moms Demand Action in Connecticut, posted a picture of a tally sheet from a
legislative hearing on facebook. She wrote,
Often people ask me . . . why the NRA is able to block efforts at common sense reform. Just after
the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, I testified in front of the CT State Legislature.
The room was packed with NRA members . . . Because there were so few of us on the other side,
one of the guys who worked in the legislative office building showed me this tally sheet. On the
left is a mark for every person who had called in opposed to any reform to our gun laws. Those
calling in asking for change are marked on the right. Keep in mind this was in CT about a month
after the shooting in Sandy Hook. That's why our gun laws are the way they are. (Green, personal
communication, June 26, 2014)

The photo of the tally sheet shows approximately 850 tally marks on the left indicating
NRA supporters who took the time to call their representative opposing reforms. It shows
only three tally marks on the right indicating members of the public calling to support
reforms.
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So what strategy can Obama purse in the future to secure legal reforms? We contend that
Obama and others in favour of reform must shift argumentative strategies to energize
smaller populations who can demonstrate greater conviction in support of gun reforms.
Winning the debate in a public speech is not enough. Argumentation must inculcate
conviction to have any hope of creating change. Without such conviction, supporters will
remain apathetic and will not demonstrate their conviction to elected representatives.
Groups like Moms Demand Action, founded by Shannon Watts after Newtown, have
proven that sufficient conviction can spark reforms. Among numerous campaigns that
borrow from NRA strategies, Sarah Jane Green, a member of Moms Demand Action in
North Carolina, stated that the group successfully lobbied several national chains
including Starbucks, Chipotle, Jack in the Box, Sonic, and Chilis to ban guns on their
premises (personal communication, June 26, 2014).3 Until those who support reform can
instil sufficient conviction in their followers, there cannot be legislative change. Obama
and others supporting reforms must craft arguments that inspire followers to demonstrate
conviction through phone calls to representatives, letters, postcards, demonstrations, and
other strategies. In the current climate, gun reforms only have a chance if those with
greater conviction act. As the NRA has proven, even when only 9% of the public
supports your position, sufficient demonstration of conviction can block congressional
action. President Obama needs to find strategies to increase the conviction of supporters
who can act in effective ways to limit guns (e.g. asking individual businesses to ban guns,
conducting social media campaigns, staging demonstrations, grading representatives on
their gun reform positions, etc.). Only by building a coalition of such activists can Obama
hope to implement widely popular legal reforms.

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Amsterdam: John Benjamins Press.
Augoyard, J., and Torgue, H. (2006) Sonic Experience: A Guide To Everyday Sounds. Montreal; Ithaca,
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CBS News. (January 17, 2013). 9 in 10 back universal gun background checks. CBS Newws.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/9-in-10-back-universal-gun-background-checks/
CNN (2104). Sandy Hook timeline. CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-hooktimeline/
Chokshi, N. (June 10, 2014). Map: There have been at least 74 shootings at schools since Newtown.
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One potential benefit of these strategies is that they bait gun rights extremists into directly revealing
derailment strategies including threats of violence regularly used by gun rights supporters. For instance, the
successes of Moms Demand Action have drawn rhetorical demonstrations of misogynistic violence against
women from gun supporters and direct threats targeted at those demonstrating for change. Making such
rhetorically violent derailments visible may be a step in undermining the credibility of gun rights
extremists. See: Alec MacGillis. (December, 2, 2013). Gun lovers are attacking Newtown activists with
violent, misogynistic messages. The New Republic. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115790/guncontrol-moms-face-misogynistic-violent-online-harassment; and, Mark Follman. (May 15, 2014), Spitting,
stalking, rape threats: How gun extremists target women. Mother Jones.
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Chu, A. (May 29, 2014). Reflecting on nerd culture. On the Media.

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Fifield, A. (December 15, 2012). Fatal shooting of children stuns U.S. Financial Times (London), 5.
Follman, M. (December 10, 2013). At least 194 children have been shot to death since Newtown. Mother
Jones. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/12/children-killed-guns-newtown-anniversary.
Green, S. J. (2014). Personal communication.
Godden, D. (2010). The importance of belief in argumentation: Belief, commitment and the effective
resolution of a difference of opinion. Synthese 172 (3), 397 414.
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Exploring Argumentative Contexts. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Hicks, D. 2007. The New Citizen. The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 93, 358-360.
Hollihan, T. (2011). Democratic argument in a digital age. In R. C. Rowland (Ed.), Reasoned argument and
social change (pp. 5-24). Washington, DC: National
Kauffman, M. (December 15, 2012). We were told to hold each others hands and to close our eyes:
Rampage in Connecticut leaves 28 dead including 20 children at elementary school. Times
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Lankford, A. (July 23, 2012). Are mass shootings becoming more frequentand more deadly? The
Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-adam-lankford/are-mass-shootingsbecomi_b_1695182.html
Light, J., Feeney, L., and Kamp, K. (December 12, 2013). Guns in America after Newtown.
Billmoyers.com, http://billmoyers.com/2013/05/03/gun-violence-since-newtown/
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Ong, W. 1989. Orality and Literacy. New York: Routledge
OMalley, N. (December, 21, 2012). Caught in the crossfire; Newtown aftermath The horror and the shock
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Quinnipiac University. (April 4, 2013). Background checks could lead to gun confiscation, many voters tell
Quinnipiac University National Poll; But 91 percent want universal gun checks
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Waldman, W. (May 19, 2014). How the NRA rewrote the Second Amendment: The founders never
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The Ubiquity Of The Toulmin Model In U.S. Education:

Promise And Peril
Lindsay M. Elllis
English Department
Grand Valley State University
U.S.A.
ellisl@gvsu.edu

ABSTRACT: Secondary and university instructors in the United States rely heavily on the Toulmin model
to teach written argumentation. To date, pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; van
Eemeren 2010) is not a visible presence in American composition textbooks. This session encouraged
writing consultants to ask critical questions not only associated with Toulmin's model but also those of the
pragma-dialectic model of critical discussion in order to improve the critical thinking of writers.
KEYWORDS: composition, critical thinking, critical questions, pragma-dialectics, teaching, Toulmin
model, United States of America, writing

1. INTRODUCTION
Both secondary and university instructors in the United States of America rely heavily on
the Toulmin model to teach written argumentation (Hillocks 2011; Ramage, Bean and
Johnson 2001; Smith, Wilhelm, and Fredricksen 2012). No other theoretical models of
arguments are as prominent in composition textbooks and curricula.
Because of the emphasis on argumentative writing in Common Core State
Standards (newly adopted in many U.S. states), a flurry of new books and curricula on
teaching argumentation have been published in the last five years. One can see how
predominant the Toulmin model is by simply flipping the pages of Teaching Argument
Writing by George Hillocks (2011, xix) and Oh Yeah? Putting Argument to Work Both in
School and Out by Michael W. Smith, Jeffrey Wilhelm, and James Fredricksen (2012,
12). Teachers have questions. They need good resources. The Toulmin model is the
backbone of most argumentative writing curricula in the United States because it meets
real needs. It is helpful because it defines a vocabulary for the elements of an argument;
and it visually illustrates the relationship between claims, data, and warrants. When
facing common problems in writing instruction, the Toulmin model provides a schema
for diagnosis and treatment.
Because student writers struggle to compose written arguments, teachers do need
solid understandings to help students improve. Perhaps the Toulmin model is a popular
frame for argumentative writing curricula because it allows teachers to focus attention on
problems that often occur with key elements of arguments: claim, data, warrant, backing,
qualifiers, and conditions of rebuttal. Helping students to invent and include these
elements in their papers is much of the substance of current argumentation curricula.
In this article, I want to step back and look at this reliance on the Toulmin model
from the distance afforded me by a sabbatical at the University of Amsterdam, where the
pragma-dialectical model of argumentation holds the privileged place that Toulmin's does
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in the U.S.A. (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; Van Eemeren 2010). I am
beginning to wonder whether some of the problems that teachers face when teaching
argumentative writing might be problems not that the Toulmin model can help them to
effortlessly solve, but ones that a reliance on Toulmin might be intensifying.
2. COMMON PROBLEMS
These are the common problems that sound familiar to writing teachers and tutors:

o A student says, "I don't know what to

"What's your topic?"

write about," when asked to write about

a text that she has read.

o A student drafts a text, but the main

"Who would disagree with that?"

claim is a commonplace. It is not

contestable.

o A student states a controversial

"You haven't told me why you believe this."

opinion, but offers no evidence to

support it; he merely restates the
opinion multiple ways.

o A student relies formulaically on a five- "I see you have five paragraphs."
paragraph theme structure: stating a
claim in the first paragraph, giving
three reasons in three subsequent
paragraphs, and restating the claim in
the concluding paragraph.

o A student states a claim and cites others "Can you imagine any objections to this idea?"
who agree, but doesn't acknowledge or
address the complexity of the issue.

o A student states a claim and cites data,

"What does this quote mean to you?"

but doesn't explain how the data

supports the claim. For example, she
includes quotes from a novel in a
literary analysis paper, but does not
offer interpretation.

When coaching student writers who need help addressing these problems, the Toulmin
model is a useful tool for certain things. It helps us to visually remind writers that claims
need support, that support needs to be warranted, and that qualified claims aren't weak,
they are responsible. The Toulmin model is not, however, a heuristic for deliberation. It
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does not describe or assist the process of developing claims by thinking critically through
the implications of possible stances on tough intellectual issues. Stephen Toulmin states
this explicitly. The task he tackled in The Uses of Argument (1958) was to describe how
already-held opinions might be justified logically:
We are not in general concerned in these essays with the ways in which we in fact
get to our conclusion, or with methods of improving our efficiency as conclusiongetters. It may well be, where a problem is a matter for calculation, that the stages
in the argument we present in justification of our conclusion are the same as those
we went through in getting at the answer, but this will not in general be so. In this
essay, at any rate, our concern is not with the getting of conclusions but with their
subsequent establishment by the production of a supporting argument. (16-17)
Because I believe that it is vitally important that we do teach the process of coming to
good decisions, of reasoning one's way to conclusions carefully, I think American
teachers and tutors of writing need to supplement Toulmin's model in our teaching
argument writing toolbox.
3. DIFFERENCES IN WRITING TASKS
In fact, beyond the Toulmin model diagram, a whole field of argumentation studies is
thriving. In the Netherlands, secondary and university level instruction in argumentation
is informed by what is called pragma-dialectics. In the version of pragma-dialectics
developed by Frans van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser (2002) and extended by van
Eemeren (2010), argumentation is defined as the pragmatic marriage of dialectic (the
rational search for the best solution to a problem through dialogue) and rhetoric (the
search for the best available discursive means to one's desired ends). Van Eemeren
(2010) developed the concept of strategic maneuvering in pragma-dialectics to describe
the ways that writers combine dialectical and rhetorical strategies in order to compose
texts that are both reasonable (dialectic) and effective (rhetoric).
I am drawn to pragma-dialectics because it shifts the definition of argumentation
away from claims supported by data, and toward discourse aimed to resolve a difference
of opinion. This changes (it reframes) the tasks of a writer. This reframing was an
epiphany for me. I had been frustrated with the lack of attention to the intellectual work
of developing good claims through the process of drafting argumentative prose. Like
others, I had been particularly irked by the power of the ACT writing test to shape
classroom instruction. The ACT writing test asks students to identify their topic and
invent a main claim very quickly, too quickly, in fact, almost arbitrarily.
Teachers feel intense pressure to teach to this test. Furthermore, the ubiquity of a
Toulmin model-based understanding of argumentation has sanctioned the habit of
beginning with a claim (I know what I believe; don't try to change my mind.) and moving
quickly to brainstorming and organizing support for that claim. Then students keep
moving forward, considering and including any necessary warrants to explain the move
from data to claim, qualifying the force of the claim, and acknowledging possible
rebutting conditions.

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By contrast, the pragma-dialectical model for critical discussion, if used as an argumentwriting heuristic, encourages writers to move through four phases, not necessarily
linearly:

the confrontation stage: identifying a difference of opinion

the opening stage: establishing the terms and common starting points, i.e. the
common ground between those who have the difference of opinion, perhaps the
writer and the reader
the argumentation stage: developing evidence and reasons to support standpoints
and respond to critical questions
and the concluding stage: evaluating the results of this argumentation on the
merits, sometimes moving into a new confrontation stage when a new difference
of opinion within the issue is identified.

This model of critical discussion was developed through a descriptive study of actual
language use understood through the lens of the long philosophical tradition of dialectic.
The purpose of dialectic is to come to the best possible solution to a problem through
discussion.
By contrast, Stephen Toulmin's purpose in creating an argument model was to
offer a critique of mathematical logic as a tool for assessing the strength of practical
arguments. To this end, he looked to the practice of law. "In the studies which follow,"
he says by way of introduction to The Uses of Argument, "the nature of the rational
process will be discussed with the 'jurisprudential analogy' in mind" (7). Why does this
matter? Well, in law, it is not the lawyer's job to choose whether to support the plaintiff
or the defendant. In law, the client chooses the lawyer to represent him, and the lawyer's
job is to find the best available means of defending that client, of strengthening the case.
A student writer, however, unless taking part in some school domain language game in
which the roles are assigned, must develop his or her own standpoint as part of the
composing process. Learning how to come up with a topic and deliberate among
viewpoints when writing academic arguments is central to the endeavour. To this end,
Stephen Toulmin's work is less helpful than others'.
In 1958, Stephen Toulmin wrote The Uses of Argument within the field of
philosophy as a critique of the geometric approach to logical validity. In order to show
that syllogistic reasoning is not the only way to argue logically, Toulmin developed a
visual representation of argument structure. In his introduction, he explained the small
scale of the unit for which he was designing a model: "An argument is like an organism.
It has both a gross, anatomical structure and a finer, as-it-were physiological one.... The
time has come to change the focus of our inquiry and to concentrate on this finer level."
(87) While the book was not influential among philosophers in Britain, its innovative
message was recognized by speech communication scholars in the United States.
Application to written composition followed in subsequent decades. Even though
Stephen Toulmin carefully defined the scope of his work as a description of the smallest
units in arguments that justify pre-chosen claims, his model is currently used to teach the
whole, macrocosmic structure and invention process of written argumentative texts.
This constitutes a four-step retooling of his work: from philosophy to communication,

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from oral discourse to written prose, from microcosmic to macrocosmic structure, and
from description to invention. I think that this has led to confusion.
4. MICROCOSMIC MODEL/MACROCOSMIC APPLICATION
The Toulmin model for understanding the structure of single argumentation--one claim,
supported by one piece of data, whose relevance is explained by one warrant, with one
modal qualifier signalling its degree of force or probability, with one nod to its exceptions
or possible rebutting conditions--this microcosmic structure is used as a curriculum for
teaching the macrocosmic composition of whole essays. This is problematic because the
common expectation for longer argumentative papers is that they include multiple
argumentation supported by subordinate or coordinative argument structures. While it is
true that each claim within more complex argument structures can individually be
examined for explicit or implied warrant, backing, qualifier and conditions of rebuttal,
simply knowing these six elements does not help students to compose well-organized
macrostructures.
5. REBUTTING CONDITIONS ARE NOT REBUTTALS
The definition of several terms are also confusing as a result of this application of
Toulmin's critique of analytic philosophy to the macrocosmic invention stage of written
composition. Confusion exists about the difference between qualifier and rebutting
conditions, as Toulmin defined them, and the bigger units of an argument: qualifications
and rebuttals of rebuttals, and the difference among the terms qualifier, qualification,
rebuttal, condition, exception, and counterargument. We struggle to teach argumentation
well in schools when teachers don't have uniform understandings - or even confidently
unique - understandings of these terms.
Toulmin explains his terms by explicating the following argument:

Following the pattern of the model:

D---->So, Q, C
|
|
Since Unless
W
R
|
B

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He defines his terms thus:

Just as a warrant (W) is itself neither a datum (D) nor a claim (C), since it implies
in itself something about both D and C--namely, that the step from the one to the
other is legitimate; so, in turn, Q and R are themselves distinct from W, since they
comment implicitly on the bearing of W on this step--qualifiers (Q) indicating the
strength conferred by the warrant on this step, conditions of rebuttal (R) indicating
circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set
aside. To mark these further distinctions, we may write the qualifier (Q)
immediately beside the conclusion which it qualifies (C), and the exceptional
conditions which might be capable of defeating or rebutting the warranted
conclusion (R) immediately below the qualifier. (93)
This diagram and its explanation are adapted in multiple and varying ways in writing
textbooks.
There is confusion over the difference between a modal qualifier and a
qualification. The former is a single word such as "presumably" in Toulmin's example,
or probably, maybe, or to indicate strength, definitely. Outside of school, when we ask
for qualifications or ask someone to qualify a statement, we are often asking for fully
articulated conditions of exception. This is closer to what Toulmin called the rebuttal.
In Toulmin's example, the rebuttal is a mention of the hypothetical conditions
under which the claim might not be true: if Harry had, despite having been born in
Bermuda, sometime later become a naturalized American, then he would not be a British
citizen. Confusingly, the word "rebuttal" in common legal discursive practice and
secondary school debate is used to mean a fully articulated counter-argument, or countercounter argument.
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In the teaching of writing in secondary schools, students are often asked to include a
counter-argument and a rebuttal of that counter-argument in their papers. When the
Toulmin model diagram is referenced as an aid to organization, and if teachers are trying
to teach students to add fully articulated counter-arguments, then they may use the word
rebuttal or leave it out and replace it with the word response to describe the act of
undermining the strength of this counterargument in order to maintain the persuasiveness
of their initial standpoint.
Illustrating the potential confusion caused by conflicting definitions of these little
words, in Hillocks' (2011) book on argumentative writing, the word "Rebuttal" appears in
his Toulmin model diagram. However, Hillocks subsequently dispenses with this word
in the body of his text, mentioning it nowhere. Instead of including the concept of
"conditions of rebuttal" that Toulmin includes in his structure, Hillocks teaches teachers
that because argumentation concerns matters of probability, "two other elements are
necessary: qualifications and counterarguments." He encourages the use of qualifying
terms: "probably, very likely, almost certainly, and so forth," staying close to Toulmin's
text. But the use to which he puts counterarguments differs from Toulmin's rebutting
conditions. Hillocks states, "The very idea that we are dealing with arguments of
probability suggests that differing claims are likely to exist," and therefore, if hoping to
make a persuasive argument, writers "would have to make a counterargument." Readers
are left here without a clear explanation. Is the counterargument the summary of the
standpoint and reasons of the imagined audience with whom the writer has a difference of
opinion; or is it an argument whose standpoint is that the reasons or warrants of his
antagonists are weak? Hillocks doesn't say, and this is not clarified for students. What is
clear is a need for more thoroughgoing dialectic, as evidenced by the adaptation to the
Toulmin model not only in the work of Hillocks (2011) but also Williams and Colomb
(2001) and Smith, Wilhelm, and Frederickson (2012). All of these authors supplement
the "rebutting conditions" in Toulmin's actual work with "counterargument" or
"acknowledgment" and "response."
6. THE DIFFICULTY WITH WARRANTS
There is also significant confusion about how to help students learn to identify and to
invent warrants, if the number of articles published in English Journal on the topic is any
indication (Anderson and Hamel 1991; Warren 2010; Hillocks 2010). In Toulmin's
model, the warrant links one's data to one's claim: "These may normally be written very
briefly (in the form of 'If D, then C'); [or they can be expanded] 'Data such as D entitle
one to draw conclusion, or make claims, such as C', or alternatively 'Given data D, one
may take it that C.'" (Toulmin 91). Yet it is rare to find examples of warrants in this "ifthen" form. In their article, "Teaching Argument as a Criteria-Driven Process," Anderson
and Hamel exemplify this difficulty. Their own definitions of warrants and backing seem
at odds with the example they give. Here are their definitions:
Warrant: So what? (Whats the principle or rule being cited to connect the
grounds to the claim?)
Backing: Whats the ultimate principle, theory, or tradition underlying the
warrant? (or, What makes you think so?)
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And here are their examples; notice that the "if-then" statement is listed as backing rather
than warrant:
So what? That isnt fair. I deserve a chance.
What makes you think so? Fairness is an important principle for students to learn
in sports. If students appear to be able to participate effectively, they should be
given a chance to show their competence in a game. (44)
In my experience, possessing a declarative knowledge of the definitions of warrants and
backing does not easily translate into a procedural ability to identify them in everyday
usage. Nor does it help writers to decide when warrants and backing need to be stated
explicitly and when they can be left to readers' implicit understanding.
7. DEFENSIVENESS TRAINING
Fourth (and I think most importantly), I think we in the United States have a systemic
problem that an overreliance on the Toulmin model is not helping us to fix. Teachers feel
pressured to coach students to quickly defend and justify their opinions in order to
succeed on timed writing tests like the ACT. More time seems to be devoted to teaching
the process of justifying opinions (Toulmin's focus) than learning to develop nuanced
positions through a process of critical deliberation. This troubles me because cognitive
scientists tell us that humans have a natural tendency toward confirmation bias--toward
noticing the data that supports beliefs. This is an adaptive strategy for our minds.
Because our five senses can collect more information than we can process, we can only
attend to the information that seems important. Unfortunately, this selection process
tends to blind us to disconfirming evidence. Unless we are taught to slow down, to
actively seek data that might support multiple viewpoints, humans tend not to. It is my
hope that we develop more curricula that treats written argumentation as a means of
critically assessing the strength of opposing viewpoints, that is, argumentative writing as
a tool for coming to conclusions about which answer is the strongest one with regard to
the questions that we ask.
8. CONFERRING EFFECTIVELY
How can pragma-dialectics help teachers to supplement the lack of attention to
deliberation in the Toulmin model? It can provide even more questions to ask of writers,
critical questions to add to the ones offered by Toulmin to help foster the reasonableness
and the strength of argumentation. Rather than simplistically equating argumentative
writing and persuasive writing, pragma-dialectics offers a more nuanced definition.
Argumentative texts are understood as turns of talk in a critical discussion (van Eemeren
and Grootendorst 1984, 1992, 2004). Pragma-dialectics understands the writer to be a
participant in a critical discussion during which he or she tries to support a standpoint
(claim) in the face of the reader's doubts or criticisms. While the aim of resolving a
difference of opinion with one's audience and the aim of persuading one's audience are
similar (because one way to resolve a difference of opinion is to effectively persuade
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one's audience to agree with your standpoint), they are not identical. Pragma-dialectics
(as its name suggests) enriches argumentation by reference to the long tradition of
dialectic, reminding students from the outset that their purpose is to evoke a dialogue, to
try to live up to the ideal of a critical discussion--even if the text has a single author
whose audience is addressed in the imagination as he or she composes.
In Toulmin's The Uses of Argument, he suggests that data is given to support a
claim when an audience asks, "What have you got to go on?" (Smith, Wilhelm &
Fredricksen translate this as "What makes you say so?") Arguers are prompted to
articulate their warrant when asked, "How is that relevant?" ("So what?" ask Smith,
Wilhelm & Fredricksen.) In addition to these questions, there are others that teachers can
use to confer effectively.
At the most fundamental level, "Hows it going?" is the most helpful step to begin
a conversation with students about their work (Anderson 2000). Listening carefully to a
student's answer, writing coaches can determine whether the student has a topic or not.
By thinking through the stages of a critical discussion, writing coaches can help students
to understand their role as interlocutors tasked with identifying and then working to
resolve a difference of opinion. I suggest the following questions for use in writing
conferences.
If a student seems to be working on the confrontation stage:

Whats the issue that you are writing about?

Who is your audience for this paper? Is there an audience other than your
teacher?

Is there a difference of opinion about this issue?

What are the different points of view with regard to this issue?

Which point(s) of view seem(s) best to you?

Who might doubt that opinion or disagree with that point of view?
If the student seems to be working on the opening stage:

When it comes to this issue, what do the possible points of view have in common?

What do you and your readers probably agree about when it comes to this issue?

What are the constraints of your assignment? Does the assignment give clear
instructions about length, genre, and definition of effective writing?1
If the student seems to be working on the argumentation stage:

How is your text going to resolve a difference of opinion?

What reasons can you imagine to support that point of view?

Graded written work within the education domain almost always has both a primary and a
secondary rhetorical context, even if the teacher is the only audience. The teacher or some other
audience may be the interlocutor in a critical dialogue about the issue, but always in the background
is the primary context of schoolingthe issue of a students satisfactory progress toward learning
goals. In effect, every graded assignment asks a student: Are you capable of effectively accomplishing
this composing task? Every assignment handed in asserts the claim: Yes, I am capable of effectively
accomplishing this composing task. The extent to which the composition is effective argumentation
to the secondary rhetorical situation is implicit argumentation in support of the claim to the students
intellectual capabilities.
1

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Are you making a cause and effect argument, a symptomatic argument, or an

argument by analogy?
It sounds like you are making a cause & effect argument;
o will that effect indeed follow? Or could it be achieved more easily by way
of another measure?
o is the effect of the cause really as good or as bad as you assert?
o are there any other good or bad side-effects that will follow?
It sounds like you are making a symptomatic argument;
o is that quality also a symptom of anything else?
o do things like that have other typical characteristics as well?
It sounds like you are making an argument by analogy;
o have you accurately described both of the situations or things you are
comparing?
o have you clarified the resemblance between them?
o are there crucial differences between them? Are there perhaps other
situations or things that better resemble the present case? (Adapted from
van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 101, 102)

If the student seems to be working on the conclusion stage:

Which stance on this issue seems the strongest?

Are the arguments for that standpoint completely persuasive to you?

Do you have any doubts about them?

Have you changed your mind about this issue through the process of writing this
paper?

Did you discover any differences of opinion about sub-issues while you worked
on this paper?

What do you think that readers should consider next in order to understand either
the causes or the consequences of this difference of opinion?
9. CONCLUSION
If teachers of writing were to strategically ask these questions while conferring with
students, the latter would improve not only their persuasiveness (rhetoric), but also their
reasonableness (dialectic). Teachers and tutors can help students not only to support
points of view, but also to determine those points of view though critical thinking.
Eventually, the questions that teachers ask may become the questions that students ask
themselves. Conferring with pragma-dialectic critical questions in mind can help
students to learn which questions to ask themselves during the invention stage of the
writing process to evaluate which claim should be their main claim, which solution,
among all of the possible solutions, should be the one that they advocate.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
I am indebted to all of the members of the Argumentation and Rhetoric research program
at the University of Amsterdam. Thank you for welcoming me so warmly for a year-long
research sabbatical, during which I studied pragma-dialectics. Special thanks go to Bart
Garssen and Jos Plug for agreeing to let me be a visiting scholar, to Annemiek Hoffer
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for managing the details, to all who presented during Friday research colloquia, to Frans
van Eemeren for long lunch conversations, and to Ingeborg van der Geest for sharing her
desk and her friendship.

REFERENCES
Anderson, E. M., & Hamel, F. L. (1991). Teaching argument as a criteria-driven process. English Journal,
80(7), 43-49.
Anderson, C. (2000). How's It Going? A practical guide to conferring with student writers. Portsmouth,
NH: Heinemann.
Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Eemeren, F. H. van & R. Grootendorst (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions: A theoretical
model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion. Dordrecht,
Holland; Cinnaminson, U.S.A: Foris Publications.
Eemeren, F.H. van & R. Grootendorst (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies: A pragmadialectical perspective. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Eemeren, F. H. van & R. Grootendorst (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Eemeren, F.H. van & P. Houtlosser (2002). Strategic manoeuvring. Maintaining a delicate balance. In: F.H.
van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and Rhetoric: The Warp and Woof of
Argumentation Analysis (pp. 131-160). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Hillocks, G. Jr. (2010). Teaching argument for critical thinking and writing: An introduction. English
Journal, 99(6), 24-32.
Hillocks, G. Jr. (2011). Teaching argument writing grades 6-12: Supporting claims with relevant evidence
and clear reasoning. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
Ramage, J., J. Bean, & J. Johnson (2012). Writing arguments: A rhetoric with readings. New Jersey:
Longman
Smith, M., J. Wilhelm, & J. Fredricksen (2012). Oh yeah? Putting argument to work both in school and
out. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
Toulmin, S. E. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Warren, J. E. (2010). Taming the warrant in Toulmin's model of argument. English Journal, 99(6), 41-46.
Williams, J. & G. Colomb. (2001). The craft of argument. New Jersey: Longman.

366

How Mental Develops In Kenre Dueling

Gu Erhuo
Educational College of Sichuan Normal Univerity.,
Chengdu.sichuan.China.
610000.,geh1@163.com.

ABSTRACT: As a verbal-dueling, Kenre is still vitality in Yi area of Southwest China. It is

characterized by poetic wisdom. Kenre is not only a kind of verbal behavior and dialogue art, but also a
way of communication and inheritance. The mode of mental development in Kenre dueling includes
evoking, remembering, deriving, creating, principling and rhyming.
KEYWORDS: Kenre dueling mental Yi minority

Large-scale debating thoughts have occurred in China, India, and Ancient Greek,
which constitute the three ancient debating system. Various Chinese ethnic minorities
also enjoy a long history of debating tradition, among which, the Kenre dialectical
practice of Yi minority is a common example. Kenre is a kind of transliteration
from Yi language, while Ke means utterance and Nre represents removal and
compromising. Together, Kenre means verbal-dueling. The dueling is a direct
dialogue, which centers on some certain object or question with the aim to reach the
correct answer to the object. It ends when one party win the dueling.
SECTION 1: THE FORMULA OF KENRE DUELING
The process of Kenre dueling varies slightly among different Yi areas. It is generally
divided into the first and second halves. The first half follows the procedure: opening
remarks, narration or debating, retrieving the classics, and setting up questions. They
welcome the guests and compliment the other party with polite remarks. This can be
viewed as an impromptu speech to relax the atmosphere and comfort the guests.
The host party: The esteemed guests, your silence worries the guests. How is
everything going in your home? How about the cereal harvest? Does the lady defend
the enemy? Does the lad marry?
The guest party: It is a great honor to attend the ceremony. Everything is fine in my
home. The husbandry is prospers and the crops enjoy a good harvest. The family and
friends are safe.
There is a transitional period called go and have a look. It is somehow a
challenge for debating. It is said that We should like two energetic deer to compete.

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The procedure for the second half is like this: the origin of the epic, the evolution of
the epic, and the narration of the epic history. The first half mainly tests the
participants response ability while the second half is to test the proficiency of the
epics. The words and remarks, like endless bullets, come out from the participants
continuously. The second half is based on the epic named Hnewo Teyyr. The debate
combines the clues and stories to the history events, like creation, immigration, wars,
and settlement, and cultivates lots of hero images.
If the debate reaches a draw, then the riddle or examination session will follow.
This session is for the completion of experience and knowledge. The host party
usually narrates the places he/she traveled, the historic resorts, the beauty of the
people, and the customs exaggeratedly. Finally, one referee (usually a senior
citizen), on behalf of the audience, will make a toast to the participants, which
represents the peaceful compromising. Kenre dueling is somehow a mental sport
inclusive of cooperation and competition.
The popularity of debating in human history is because that it is a unique
dialogue education. Dialogue is the real conflicts between different thoughts, and the
approach for truth exploration and self-recognition. Jaspers (1991) thought that
without considering the social and historical background, education itself can be
divided into the following three categories: scholastic education, master and
apprentice education, and Socratic education. The last one means that there is no fixed
educational model, and the learning party and the teaching party can think freely.
After endless inquiries and questions, students and teachers will find
themselves naive to the absolute truth. Teachers will arouse students sense for
exploration. This kind of spawning induction education is advocated by Socrates. This
educational method will arouse the internal potential of students, instead of putting
too much pressure from the outside (Jaspers, 1991, p. 46). Socrates himself was a
philosopher who practiced this kind of dialogue education.
SECTION 2: THE MODE OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENRE DUELING
Humans mind has the characteristic of bilaterally. Paying a attention to the
realistic life from the perspective of dueling, humans thinking is a process of
cognitive game of inherent dialectic. The real idea is dialogue, which is important
ways for human beings to understand themselves and the world. The real education is
dialogue education. Kenre dueling is a kind of Socratic education. Before activities
dialogu with classic, In activities dialogu with others, After activities dialogu with
himself. The mode of mental development in Kenre dueling includes evoking,
remembering, deriving, creating, principling and rhyming.
Sub-sections 1:.Evoking is the starting of dialogue intentionality in Kenre dueling.

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The essence for Kenre dueling is the competition of abundance of knowledge and
experience. It regards the origin of objects and life experience as the logic evidence.
The debater will always exaggerate the places he/she visited, and the scenery he/she
saw. The debater will always challenge to ask the opponent in a provocative way:
Have you ever been to somewhere? Have you ever seen something?
Sub-sections 2: Remembering is the representing of knowledge in Kenre dueling.
The contents of dueling include the folklore, the oratory skill, the living skill, the
traditional rituals and festivals. It has the moral recognition, innovation, memorizing,
and entertainment. The influence posed by the knowledge to the individual varies
greatly according to individuals interests, hobbies, styles, and abilities. For human
beings, Kenre dueling is a kind of self-education, which is a major means for the
carrying of human culture. Education activity, as a pass of the accumulated
knowledge, is for each individual. As a result, this kind of inheritance will influence
the individual first. This kind of influence is quite different. Under this kind of
influence, people usually want to be known and to be capable (Hu, 1999, p. 315).
Sub-sections 3: Deriving is the projecting of thinking in Kenre dueling.
From the beginning of the argumentive intentionality to the poetic expression, the
using of formula of defense of Kenre dueling is highly. The dueling process is a
process of improvisation. No memory means no creation. The improvisational process
is a conversion process from change to un-change. The categorization and the
specialization are strategies for creating in Kenre dueling
Sub-sections 4: Creating is the generating of thinking in Kenre dueling.
For example, in the greeting between debaters of both sides when they start the Kenre
dueling, change refers to the names or symbols representing characters of things:
pheasants in the Fern grass, caraganas in the bamboo, bears in the forest, deer in the
mountain, honeys in the rocks below, otters in the river front, white dogs in the
courtyard outside, heavy pigs in the courtyard inside, chickens under the eaves, girls
in the house, boys in the sitting room and so on; un-change refers to the functional
words which represent their action: peaceful or not, auspicious or not, hospitable, no
talking and other phatic words, which of function of welcoming the arrival of the
guests.
Sub-sections 5: Principling is the structuring of logic in Kenre dueling.

369

Kenre dueling is a language activity among the participants. Debaters prove their own
viewpoint, overrule the opponents view, and eliminate the controversy through
individual statement or combination of statements. For a long time, either as a
phenomenon or a question, dueling is followed closely by logic, rhetoric, and
pragmatics. This is not only because debate is a common phenomenon and a language
activitity, it also reflects the disparity among individuals. Different thoughts will
continue to advance in the debate and discussion. Two opposite thinking skills have
been established in our mind. The first one is to categorize, and the second one is to
treat each object differently. They also breed the seeds for debate and negotiation. The
categorical logos is always resisted by the individualized ant-logos (Billig, 2011, p.
159).
Sub-sections 6: Rhyming is the expressing of poetic wisdom in Kenre dueling.
Kenre dueling is based on a classical epic named Hnewo Teyyr, which contains 14
chapters including the creation of world. Hnewo is a transliteration of Yi language,
it means verbal passing of knowledge. For the Yi minority, this epic is a chronological
book, which is widely spread and accepted by Kenre dueling. The language is always
exaggerated and innovative.
The Kenre dueling is a process to cultivate the Yi minoritys poetic wisdom of
tracking the origin. In Liangshan area, where Kenre dueling exists, rituals are a
common ingredient for life. The ritual participants exist and divided according to their
blood relation and location. During the rituals, people share the same sorrow,
happiness, and destiny. They dance, sing, and pray together. They also express their
wishes, exchange the information, promote the mutual recognition, and reinforce their
union and harmony. Rituals have an effect on strengthening the social action and tribe
agglomeration. Kenre dueling comes from this kind of ritual life and is marked as an
outstanding feature for public social life. Kenre dueling is an excellent ingredient of
the verbal culture, which should be advocated and further developed. The limit of
blood relation and family boundary should be broken. It should be developed in the
entire nation and whole society. Then, it will influence the whole nation and society in
a higher level. The spirit of collectivism, competition, and union should be fully
exerted, and establish a new sense of honor which means sharing of weal and woe.
This new sense of honor will be rooted in the emotional conciseness of the Yi
minority, and will be a spiritual power for mutual assistance and mutual prosperity.
The spirit for tracking the origin, the system of sharing the same name between the
father and the son together with the poetic thinking and nature, have formed the
cultural tradition of poetic wisdom (Gu, 2011, p. 21)

370

REFERENCES

Billig. M. (2011). Arguing and thinkingA rhetorical approach to social psychology. (K. Li,
Trans.). Tianjin, China: Chinese People University Press.
Gu, E.H (2011). Research on the inheritance mechanism and pedagogical significance of the
Kenre. Chongqing, China:Southwest University.
Hu, D. H. (1999). Educational theory. Lanzhou, China: Lanzhou Education Press.
Jaspers, K. T. (1991). What is education. (J. Zhou, Trans.). Beijing, China: Three Book Store
Press.

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Arguing in the Grooves: Genre and Language Constraints in

Scientific Controversies
Jeanne Fahnestock
Department of English
University of Maryland
USA
fahnestj@umd.edu

1. INTRODUCTION
I want to open with an example of a minor controversy that provides the stunning image
below, and I invite you to consider how you would describe this image in words, without
knowing what it is.

In 2011 the journal Science published a "Report" (their genre label) arguing that amber
nodules found in Late Cretaceous sediments in Canada preserved both dinosaur and bird
feathers (McKellar, Chatterton, Wolfe, Currie, 2011). Bird feathers were not surprising,
but the dinosaur feather identifications were, as the paper mixed claims with different
burdens of proof. Supporting evidence for the dinosaur feather label amounted to
matching structures inferred from sophisticated micrographs of inclusions in the amber
(like that in the image) to a five-stage model of feather evolution. A lengthy supplement
to the print article argued against identifying the inclusions in the two purported dinosaur
specimens as hair or plant material, leaving feathers by the logic of elimination
(McKellar et al., 2011).

372

Five months later a "Technical Comment" challenging the identification of dinosaur

feathers appeared in Science (Dove and Straker, 2012). A "Technical Comment," is a
tightly controlled genre, limited to 1000 words, two figures or tables and 15 references,
restricted to addressing only the core conclusions and methodology of the original
argument, minus any mention of new data or unpublished work not accessible to the
original authors; comments only see publication if their authors have first corresponded
with the original authors (see Information for Authors, 2012). Focusing on the two
putative dinosaur specimens, the two challenging authors cast detailed doubt on the
visual interpretations, proposed that the protofeathers were more likely to be plant
material, and emphasized that without destructive analysis (that is analysis by mass
spectroscopy) the material could not be convincingly identified anyway. The original
authors replied in the Response to Comment genre (McKellar et al., 2012), answering
some of the charges with descriptions of the "taphonomy" or embedding particularities of
the specimens, pointing out that a suggested plant did not exist at the time, and repeating
that destructive analysis of such rare specimens was not possible. And there as far as the
specialist literature is concerned, the matter ended: standpoint - challenge answer.
There was no place in Science for continuing this discussion to a mutually acceptable
conclusion.
This modest disagreement never made it into the news, but the original report
certainly did. Online, Science's own news website correctly reflected the divided nature
of the original report, the much less certain attribution of protofeathers to dinosaurs in
two of the specimens and the less doubtful identification of bird feathers in other samples
(Perkins, 2011). But this distinction did not survive in other online science news sourced
to National Geographic (Photo Gallery, 2011), Wired (Keim, 2011) and Discover
Magazine (Draxler, 2013) where more striking images of the undisputed bird feathers are
associated with (literally are visually contiguous with) verbal claims about dinosaur
feathers.1

The image selected for the Wired web page appears in the original report (McKellar et al., 2011, p. 1621,
Fig 3. F). The discussion in the reports caption and text (pp. 1621-1622) attributes these specimens to Late
Cretaceous birds.

373

In these cases, the typical format of the online news report, associating a headline with
one salient image (with or without caption) in a single screen view, contributed to a
misrepresentation of the original argument, as did the well-known practice, across news
genres, of making titles more certain than the content they represent.
Still another difference between the original and news versions of this case brings us back
to the opening question of how to label those items. For reference options, the English
lexicon typically offers alternative labels from more general to more particular terms,
hypernyms to hyponyms (e.g., the more general pet and the less general dog can refer to
the same individual animal). At different points in their argument, the original authors
use all the following terms to refer to the inclusions seen in the amber; here they are
organized according to their level of generality:
filamentous structures - filaments - plumage - feathers - protofeathers - Stage I/II
morphotypes [varieties of protofeathers]
For material that is unidentified but described by its physical shape, filament
seems an appropriate choice, and the authors could have stayed with this or even more
general terms (like inclusion) until they had made the case for their definition. But they
preferred the bottom terms and indeed in their Supporting Online Material, they use the
most specific labels Stage I/ Stage II Morphotype as headings for sections describing the
dinosaur specimens. The refuting authors use filaments a few times but amber
specimens and fibers more often; fibers is also a plausible label for the observed
structures, and, in keeping with their doubts, fiber is less associated with feathers than
filament is.
Of the terms used in the original research report, feather has the widest currency
in general usage, as indicated by its 2368 appearances in the 450 million word Corpus of
Contemporary American English compared to 369 for filament and 0 for protofeather and
morphotype. So not surprisingly, in the everyday register of the news, feather is the
preferred label in summaries of the original research report. But to refer to the embedded
entities as feathers accepts the conclusion, and it further favors selection of those pictures
that look most like canonical feathers as representative images. Here something
analogous to linguistic prototypes, the preference for salient members in a category,
seems to take effect, since what most people think of as a "feather does not look
anything like what the original authors call dinosaur protofeathers or morphotypes. Here
again a genre constraint the use of terms in wider usage in news reports potentially
interferes with the argument.
2. GENRE AND LANGUAGE CONSTRAINTS
This brief look at a minor controversy highlights my topic today: the importance of genre
conventions and the visual and verbal practices that follow from them in argument
production and analysis. Genres, akin to activity-types in Pragma-Dialectics (van
Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2005), reflect recurring and often institutionalized audienceaddress situations, and texts assigned to genres follow the rules for a particular kind of
language game, prescribing, among other features, a prevailing register, ways of
addressing the audience, even different average sentence lengths. In print and online
genres, there is also a visual component to generic stability. Texts in a certain genre are
supposed to look a certain way in page layout and font, and they use visuals in
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predictable ways. Genres also change over time (as we'll see later) and individual
instances sometimes flaunt genre conventions (also coming). Most important in rhetorical
terms, different genres favor arguments in different stases and access different topics and
appeals, and they tolerate different presentational devices in their strategic maneuvering
even as they address different audiences.
How can genres be categorized and labeled? Rhetorical theory offers three broad
metagenres or genera dicendi, the forensic, epideictic and deliberative, and these fit well
over the on-the-ground genres that have convenient labels like the horoscope or the
commencement address or the newspaper editorial. My method is to follow the same
claim through different genres, noting the generic constraints and options and, in some
cases, identifying where problems occur because of them. What I want to do in the
remainder of this presentation is first to discuss types of controversies in the sciences and
how they typically end. Then I will look at three individual controversies, following them
from the specialist literature into different kinds of genres and isolating some of the
stylistic and argumentative features tolerated in those genres. I end with an open question
on how best to characterize what could be called multi-genre arguing.
3. TYPES OF CONTROVERSIES AND THEIR RESOLUTION
But first, the label "controversy" can cover different kinds of contention in the sciences so
some sorting out is needed (Giere 1987; Baltas 2000). I am going to set aside those better
described as "deliberative" or policy controversies, though they involve scientific content,
as for example the debate over whether to publish research on increasing the
transmissibility of the potentially pandemic H5N1 virus (Patterson, et al. 2013). No one
challenged the science, just the wisdom of doing or publishing it. My focus is instead on
disagreements over entities and processes in nature, though these can and often do
involve deliberative consequences (as we'll see). For disagreements over natural entities
and processes, the label controversy can still cover different kinds of contention. It is
sometimes used when different researchers offer competing explanations of a new
phenomenon or one that has resisted explanation. Competing arguments sprang up over
antibody formation in the 1940s (Cambrosio, et al., 2005), over the nature of gene coding
in the 1950s (Judson, 1979), or recently over the origins of the moon (Canup, 2013;
Clery, 2013). In these cases there is consensus about a gap in knowledge that needs to be
filled, if not on how to fill it, and these arguments need not address each other.
Other controversies occur when non-expert publics resist the scientific consensus,
as in the case of the autism/vaccination connection (Oldstone, 2004), or the claim that an
XMRV virus causes Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, a connection that has not survived the
scrutiny of experts though it was held by some patient advocacy groups (Cohen and
Enserink, 2011; Callaway, 2011). It is also called a controversy when an individual
scientist or an isolated research group persists in withholding agreement from the
mainstream, like Peter Duesberg doubting the HIV/AIDS connection (Corbyn, 2012), or
Laura Manuelidis questioning the consensus on prions as the cause of spongiform
encephalopathies (Couzin-Frankel, 2011). Loner holdouts grab media attention, but rarely
change the course of research. There are also cases of challenge and denial mimicking
controversies in their early stages that eventually unravel as cases of fraud, as in the
human cloning scandal of a few years ago (Cyranoski, 2006), or the faked Archaeoraptor
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fossil of a feathered dinosaur (Rowe, et al. 2001). Or an error is discovered, as in the case
of the faster than light neutrinos traced to a loose cable connection in a detector (Reich,
2012).
All these are worth studying, but I am focusing on controversies closer to the
requirements of a critical discussion, like my opening example. These feature a
standpoint and challenge among stakeholders with similar qualifications, who follow
essentially the same rules of evidence, who publish in journals of similar status, and who
proceed in good faith through fully articulated arguments until they "resolve a difference
of opinion on the merits" (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 1; van Eemeren and Garssen, 2013, p.
521).
But it is difficult to isolate or contain controversies at this level of purity and
cleanly resolve them on the merits because they spill out into other forums, publications
and media. Scientists themselves often seek out other genres addressing wider, less expert
audiences to promote their views, and, increasingly, blogs, discussion groups, twitter
feeds and Facebook postings refract the issues and arguments, the way substances with
different refractive indices bend light. Furthermore, since there is a cultural place for
science news with professional science journalists as well as an associated publicity
industry, scientists themselves are not the only arguers involved. High profile science
claims are especially likely to expand into orbiting genres where their claims are
amplified as new, amazing, overturning widely-held beliefs, and having potentially
important consequences.
Furthermore, the options for resolution or closure have some special features in
the sciences (Beauchamp 1987; McMullin 1987), outside the resolution methods of
adjudication, mediation and negotiation identified in pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and
Houtlosser, 2009). The first and second methods, adjudication before a recognized
tribunal and mediation before a neutral third party, are not typically practiced in the
sciences. Though a science court was proposed in the 1970s (Mazur, 1987), there is no
recognized entity issuing binding decisions on the correctness of one knowledge claim
over another. And the case of Lysenko, where state tribunals banned his opponents in the
1940s and then condemned his views in the 1960s, is not one that scientists are eager to
imitate (Graham, 1987). There are of course quasi-adjudicating bodies such as granting
agencies and peer-reviewed journals, and occasionally discipline-based societies may
resolve contentions, as the International Union of Geological Sciences did in 2009 when
it moved the boundary between the Pliocene and Pleistocene by almost a billion years
(Kerr, 2008; Kerr, 2009). Or sometimes a standing committee is assigned or a special
committee is convened to reach a decision on a scientific claim where fraud could be
involved (see the cases of Frank Sauer [McNutt, 2014], or of Marc Hauser [Hauser
report released, 2014]). But these interventions are rare.
The third method, resolution by negotiation, requires each side to make
concessions in order to reach a settlement. But give and take seems an unlikely way to
settle factual disagreements, though there are a few cases that play out like negotiated
settlements. The controversy over whether humans crossed over from Asia to the
Americas early by water or later by land could be settled by accepting multiple dates and
routes (Pringle, 2011), and the controversy over whether dinosaurs were hot blooded or
cold-blooded has a potential bridge in the suggestion that they were something in
between, able to raise their core temperatures but not maintain them (Balter, 2014).
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Given the refraction of science arguments across genres and media, and the relative
inapplicability of resolution by adjudication, mediation and negotiation, how are
controversies in the sciences typically managed or resolved? Direct confrontation of the
contending parties can be avoided. As is the case with other academic specialties,
disagreeing research groups can simply ignore each other and operate in parallel
universes, forming their own societies, publishing in their own journals, and attending
their own meetings. That was the situation in the seventies and eighties between
researchers who did not believe in the kinematics of cell pores and those who continually
postulated them (Fahnestock, 2005), and in physical anthropology between those who
used early methods of DNA analysis and those who considered all the results artifacts of
contamination (Marchant, 2011). There is no pressing need for closure on these matters
as there is in deliberative arguments. In fact it is often preferable if they are left open as
an exigence for further funding.
Yet while arguing in the sciences is in some ways unregulated, it does have one
draconian form of closure and that is the formal published Retraction. A retraction is a
special kind of speech act performed in the written genre of a letter published in the
journal that printed the offending article. Usually the author retracts after an admission of
error (see for example Lee et al., 2013); sometimes retractions do not represent all
authors (Buck, 2010). When none of the authors is willing, the journal may issue a
preemptive "expression of concern" (see for example Alberts, 2011) or, as in the case of
Sauer cited above, take the initiative and issue the retraction itself (McNutt, 2014).
Better than the public shaming of retraction is resolution by disengagement and
silence, perhaps the most common way that controversies end in the natural sciences.
They are abandoned without a formal declaration of victory on one side or any
concession or retraction on the other (McMullin, 1987, p. 81). But while the
disagreement may be dropped by specialists arguing in disciplinary journals, it may be
carried on in other genres and forums, and it is not uncommon for scientists to find other
outlets where controversies can be sustained in different publications over months, years,
and even decades. Such complications across genres are features of the three cases I want
to sample. They involve specialist disagreements refracted in different genres. In each
case, for purposes of illustration, I am going to emphasize one of the attendant genres and
isolate certain language features differing from genre to genre.
3. THE WOODPECKER
I begin with a case that actually involves the violation of genre norms. In April of 2005,
the head of the Cornell University Ornithology Lab, two of his staff and the US Secretary
of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture held a press conference to announce the
rediscovery of the ivory-billed woodpecker, the largest woodpecker species ever to live
in North America and one that had presumably been extinct for over fifty years. On the
day of the news conference, following protocol that press releases should not precede
peer-reviewed publication, a research report on the ivorybill was published in Science
Online and the print article appeared a week later (Fitzpatrick et al., 2005) with
considerable amplification in the genres available in that journal itself including a cover

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image, an editorial from then editor Donald Kennedy, who declared himself a lifelong
birder (Kennedy, 2005), and a "Perspectives" piece by David Wilcove (2005) who had
written an earlier work declaring the ivory-bill extinct and, oddly showing up in the same
issue though without an explicit connection to the woodpecker story, a news piece on
how reliable Cornell's birding volunteers are (Bhattacharjee, 2005).
The title of the Science piece makes the claim with unhedged force: Ivory-billed
Woodpecker (Campephilus principalis) Persists in Continental North America. The
abstract affirms that the bird has been rediscovered and that observations and video
confirm its existence (p. 1460). A significant but unusual stylistic choice in this title is
its use of a full predication, subject and tensed verb. Though this genre convention may
be changing, none of the other research reports in that 2005 issue of Science, or in most
issues, or in any science journal use more than a noun phrase in their titles announcing
their topic. Using a noun phrase allows authors to punt on the modality of their claim
which the use of a tensed verb in a full predication does not allow. So from the start this
argument departed from a genre norm in both the fullness and the unhedged strength of
the claim boldly made in its title.2
How was the case made for the certain existence of this bird in the original
research report? The article explains that after an initial report from a credible
outdoorsman reached the attention of Cornell University ornithologists, via two dedicated
ivorybill hunters, they assembled a team of experienced birders who spent months in
2004 searching narrow strips of bottomland forest in Arkansas. Members of this team
2

There is a substantial literature establishing the prevalence of hedging from science communication
scholars (see e.g., Hyland, 1998).

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reported several individual sightings, and one searcher, almost by accident, caught a
video image of a large bird flying away in the flooded woods. A link to the video and the
testimony of the sightings appear in the Supporting Online Material [SOM] to the Science
article. The typescript format of the sightings gives the particulars of time, place, and
person, but all observers report the same species diagnostic feature in precisely the same
terms: they all saw broad white trailing edges to/of wings. Here as Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca would put it, the instances have been pruned, disciplined into a
groove of figured repetition to underscore their applicability (1969, p. 358), but at the
same time with considerable loss in the impression of spontaneity and therefore
genuineness. At the opposite extreme, preserving spontaneity, the SOM also contains raw
data in the form of the immediate journal entries from the two birders who sparked the
search.

However, again, this evidence is off in the SOM. Personal testimony has great weight
among birders, but it apparently counts less than the video that is the only item of
evidence accessible to outsiders. So its analysis -- requiring a translation into diagrams -occupies most of the main article (see Dove, 2010 analyzing the visual argument in this
case). If one thinks of scientific reports being accessed entirely online, it seems odd to
modularize a case this way. Why are there different levels in this argument, with some
material in the main report and some off elsewhere?
I want to digress for a moment here to observe that the genre of the science article
has been in flux for several years now because of online publishing in both subscription
and open access venues, and because of the relatively recent tendency to offload parts of
an argument into the Supporting Online Materials. In online publishing, the limiting
features of the print journal have been swept away, namely periodicity in publication and
fixed length. An article can appear any time and theoretically at any length online.
(Indeed early PLOS articles were often significantly longer than their print analogues
even 50 pages instead of the usual 3 to 5.) But oddly, SOMS are used even for articles
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that are published only online, creating different sections that are sometimes marked by
differences in formatting, sometimes not. Typically, the Materials and Methods section,
once second in the invariant arrangement of the science article, is now demoted from the
main article, and there is also a tendency to put data in undigested forms in the SOM.
Even as it destabilizes in length and modularity, the genre of the science article
still requires the containing background of a journal as a presumed guarantor of editorial
control and peer review. The notion of the durable journal is oddly on display in an ad
from one of the world's largest for-profit online publishers. Here Hindawi offers images
of the covers of its journals in the aspect ratio of a print publication rather than that of a
computer screen, though these journals have only an electronic existence.

To return to the woodpecker case:

Within a few months, refutations focusing on the video began to appear in print, the first
within months from two Brazilian ornithologists who suggested that the identification of
the bird in the video could only be considered a hypothesis not a certainty (see Jackson,
2006, pp. 7-8); a British researcher also submitted a disagreement with the definitive
identification in 2006, though it was not published until the following year (Collinson,
2007). Most important, Science itself published a "Technical Comment" with David
Sibley of the Sibley bird books as the lead author (Sibley et al., 2006). This challenge
was answered with the expected Response to Comment from the original authors
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2006).
The Sibley group agrees that there is a bird in the video, but the point of
contention comes down to whether that bird is an ivorybill or a pileated woodpecker, a
surviving species almost as big as an ivorybill but lacking that diagnostic white on the
trailing edge of its wings. So as engaged, this controversy occurs in the stasis of
definition and since there are two possibilities, the arguments inevitably use the topic of
opposites, which can be and occasionally was epitomized in the figure antithesis in this
comment and response.3 One side maintains the video bird has the distinctive features of
3

From the Sibley, et al. Response 17 March 2006: The almost complete absence of white is consistent
with the dark dorsal surface of the pileated woodpecker, and not [consistent with] the entirely white
secondaries of the ivory-billed woodpecker.
From the Fitzpatrick et al Response 17 March 2006: The ivory-billed model yielded images strikingly
similar to those in the Luneau video, but comparable images of a pileated model revealed the expected

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the ivorybill; the other side says it does not or that no conclusion is possible. The Cornell
group had anticipated this competition, and their original article reports a flight
simulation using wooden models of each bird that the Sibley group refutes as lacking the
suppleness of a living wing in flight. Yet despite their undermining of the Cornell case,
Sibley and his co-authors do not conclude with a contradiction, "The ivory bill does not
persist"; instead they claim, "Ivory-billed woodpeckers may persist in the southern
United States, and we believe that conservation efforts on their behalf should continue."
(Sibley et al., 2006, p. 4). The only difference between this conclusion and the original
article's title is the little modal auxiliary may. A dimension of this controversy, therefore,
has to do with the response of other experts to the degree of certainty expressed by the
original authors in light of the evidence they offered. Why then did those authors not
hedge their claim?
A possible answer comes from a harsh critique that appeared in The Auk, the
official journal of the American Ornithological Union, six months after the original
report, from Jerome A. Jackson, a woodpecker expert and non-consenting author of an
earlier critique that his fellow authors withdrew. After also making the case for the
likelihood of a pileated woodpecker in the video, Jackson asks why, given the
inconclusiveness of the video, these Arkansas sightings were treated so differently from
similar unconfirmed reports in the past: The answer, I believe, is that it is not necessarily
the quality of the evidence but the attendant publicity and aura of authority associated
with the announcement, that has raised the profile of the Arkansas reports (Jackson,
2006, p. 5). Thus Jackson moves the controversy to the fourth or translational stasis,
turning it into an argument over methods, procedures and conduct violating potent if
undefined standards of science: For scientists to label sight reports and questionable
photographs as proof of such an extraordinary record is delving into faith-based
ornithology and doing a disservice to science (p.10). As Jackson critiques the case, the
Cornell authors had pressing deliberative goals in getting habitat set aside and funding for
continued research, and these action goals led to a necessary overstatement of their core
forensic claim. As Jackson puts this point with wonderfully figured force: [H]ow many
major donors, how many granting agencies, how many government officials would
contribute to the more than $10 million associated with this effort, if the message had
been only There might be Ivory-billed Woodpeckers out there? (p. 10).
As far as the specialist literature is concerned, the woodpecker controversy
disappeared. The original article stands un-retracted though its force has declined
dramatically over time with no further evidence forthcoming. But the case for the
ivorybills survival traveled to other genres, and it is worth asking how the level of
certainty in the bird's survival, so problematic in the expert discourse, was expressed in
these other genres.
Predictably, news outlets covered the woodpecker story extensively. Science
news reports can be seen as essentially forensic arguments at one remove; they
paraphrase others' arguments and, as Jackson observed, the report of confirmation by
black trailing edge and were incompatible with the Luneau video. An approach through figural logic can
certainly be pursued in these controversies (see Fahnestock, 1999), but that is not the agenda in this paper.

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scientists is often accepted at face value by nonscientists (2006, p. 9). So one would
expect that news reports would express the certainty of the ivorybills existence. But
curiously another hedging option is available in news coverage thanks to the language
conventions of the news genre.4 News articles can, and often do, report the speech act of
the original arguers as well as the content of their statement. Consider the difference in
degree of certainty between these headlines from reports on the woodpecker: In the
Swamp, Extinct Woodpecker Lives from the New York Times (Gorman, 2005a), and
Extinct woodpecker found in Arkansas, Experts Say the headline in National
Geographic News online (Owen, 2005). Citing the speech act of a source as in the second
headline has the rhetorical effect of hedging a claim.5 It is like giving the GPS
coordinates of a point of view making it local rather than universal. Of course variants in
the reporting verb (e.g., state vs suggest) and the source cited (e.g., an individual vs an
institution) inflect the degree of the reported claim. But whatever the nuances of
presentation, sourcing a claim as a speech act, routine in news reports, is a form of
hedging.
Another genre that circulates high-profile science stories is the commentary piece,
usually in the form of an editorial or feature story. These arguments represent a shift in
primary rhetorical genre from the forensic to the epideictic as they celebrate the
significance of the discovery. Notable examples include a feature piece by James
Gorman, Found in Arkansas: Hope with Wings (2005b), and an Op-Ed piece in the
The Woodpecker in All of Us, by Jonathan Rosen (2005), both in The New York Times.
These commentary pieces were ecstatic about the announced rediscovery, and they
deserve analysis for their quasi-religious appeals. But as far as the modality of the central
claim is concerned, under the rhetorical exigence of celebrating the significance the
ivorybills recovery, the existence of the bird is taken as certain. We rarely celebrate
probabilities.
Still another genre perpetuated the ivorybill case, and that is the book length
account of the ivorybill rediscovery. The author of The Grail Bird (2005) focusing on the
Arkansas ivorybill was Tim Gallagher, one of the two birders whose early sighting
initiated the extensive search. Another, The Ivorybill Hunters (2007), came from an
academic expert not connected with the Cornell search, Geoffrey Hill of Auburn
University. The resources available for arguing in different genres and their stylistic
correlates are dramatically on view in both these books, but for convenience I am going
to concentrate on Hill's work.
Inspired by the reports from Arkansas and by other informants, Hill and two
graduate students, almost on a lark, went camping and looking for ivorybills in the
panhandle of Florida in 2005. In 2006 Hill's group published an article in the Canadian
journal Avian Conservation and Ecology with the modest title Evidence Suggesting that
4

Hedging options in English have various linguistic correlates, beyond the use of may or sourcing as a
speech act mentioned above: 1. Modal auxiliaries (e.g., may, might, could); 2. Adverbial modification (e.g.,
possibly, probably, almost certainly); 3. Adjectival inflection (e.g., putative, apparent, seeming) 4.
Tentative verbs (e.g., seem, appear, suggest, hypothesize); 5. Phrasal markers of less certain status (e.g., for
the most part, so to say). 6. Sourcing as a speech act (e.g., Experts say, NASA reported that); 7.
Vagueness of scope (e.g., to sustain growth (which could refer to both metabolism and replication); 8.
Attribution of a claim to its support (e.g., the results indicate that).
5
The text of the New York Times article does include speech act attributions, and the Times gave extensive
coverage to the ensuing debate about the birds existence.

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Ivory-billed Woodpeckers (Campephilus principalis) Exist in Florida (Hill et al., 2006).

The evidence consisted of reported sightings, sound recordings of presumably distinctive
knocks and calls, and trees with cavities and feeding signs suggestive of the birds
presence. Most of these items of evidence are carefully hedged in the article: e.g., Twice
we recorded series of putative double knocks that appear to have been produced by two
different individuals (Hill et al., 2006, p. 6). However, in the following year, Hill
published the book-length account of this search that is anything but hedged in its claims
for the ivorybills persistence. By the end of the book, Hill claims an extensive
population of ivorybill pairs along the Choctawhatchee river basin in Florida. In between,
Hill is able to construct support in ways not available in the genre of the research report
but amply available in the extended discursive space and open-ended format of the first
person nature narrative. Nature writing, a vibrant tradition in US literature, is in some
ways a complex multi-genre in itself, but such narratives have some common features:
they are based on a journey or sojourn in a natural setting, filled with encounters and
descriptions of natural kinds, animal, vegetable and mineral, and studded with
informative or moral digressions. Hill's book details the camp established by his graduate
students, their experiences and mishaps, his many trips there, his gear, the setting up of
sound recording stations, his improvised devices, his funding problems, his discussions
with colleagues, and even his judgments of the Cornell case for the ivorybill. The sum of
these narrative parts is a different argument for the bird's existence.
To give one example of the kind of argument that Hill can access in his narrative:
Several episodes in The Ivorybill Hunters recount getting lost in the maze of bog and
hammock along Florida's Choctawhatchee River basin (e.g., pp. 22-30; 74-84; 121-122).
These are tense events with narrative force, but they are also indirect arguments. For one
of the main criticisms against the likelihood of the ivorybills persistence is the loss of its
habitat thanks to drainage and clear cutting in the southern US. So Hill's accounts of
getting lost indirectly establish the extent and inaccessibility of the Choctawhatchee
swamps. The reader is left with the impression that large tracts of ivorybill-friendly
habitat survive and, given the inaccessibility of this terrain, it is not surprising that no one
has found the birds before.
Among other persuasive effects in this genre, the primary sightings of the bird
acquire a textual "presence" in The New Rhetoric's terms that is denied to them by the
conventional requirement for stripped down language in a research report (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, pp. 115-120). The sightings last only a few seconds (Hill, 2007,
pp. 38-39; 40-42; 174-81; 225-227), but they occupy paragraphs of build-up, a sudden
surprising appearance and a shock of excited recognition, followed by justifications as to
why the sighting was not as good as it might have been (view partially impeded, camera
not quickly available, observer in an unstable kayak, etc.). Though compromised and
fleeting, these sightings seem more certain.
Perhaps the strongest appeal of the nature narrative overall is the stylistic choice
of the first person singular I as a grammatical agent, a choice that personalizes the arguer
in ways not directly possible in the scientific literature (though that literature is never
voiceless and the use of the first person plural is now conventional). Of course a firstperson focus could shrink a case to a partial view, but it has compensations. It invites the
readers identification with the texts speaker, in classical rhetorical terms an appeal from
ethos but considerably stronger than what argument scholars usually mean by an ethotic
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argument (see Burke, 1969, pp. 55-59). Through identification the reader participates in
the narrator's process of becoming convinced. Hill in fact portrays himself as highly
skeptical in the beginning, the one to ask hard questions of his young assistants. There is
even a whole chapter devoted to interviewing a rural Arkansas man who claimed to spot
an ivorybill in his backyard and whose account Hill finds less than convincing, leading
him to question his own standards of evidence (pp. 85-95). He engages in digressions
revealing his internal debates over different kinds of evidence (pp. 126-128; 144-147)
and finds much to criticize in the Cornell groups case for Arkansas ivorybills (pp. 43-45,
84, 133-141). He has conversations with experts on distinctive bird calls (pp. 167-170).
He mulls over the literature (pp. 66-67; 71-72), seeks support from a doubting friend and
fellow naturalist (pp. 187-192), tests his evidence with government biologists (pp. 210218). As Hill overcomes his skepticism and hones his case, his conversion narrative
models the process of becoming convinced for his readers.
The arguments available in a book-length treatment like Hill's can be summarized
or paraphrased, as I have just done. But that is not how they are experienced by readers of
its almost 250 pages. The overall length and the division into chapters extend the
narrative pace, and this representation of the passage of time itself argues for the
discovery. A research report presents its arguments synchronically, as though all present
and cogent at the same time, while the narrative presents its arguments diachronically,
developing over time as experienced.
Which of these arguments from the same arguer, the stripped down version
satisfying the genre constraints of the research report addressed to specialists or the
capacious version at book-length addressed to a larger undefined public represents the
best argument that could be made for the Choctawhatchee ivorybills?
4. ARSENIC-INCORPORATING BACTERIA
The next controversy I want to look at also features arguments spilling over into the
available grooves of surrounding genres. It began with a tantalizing announcement from
NASA of a news conference related to the search for life on other planets (NASA, 2010).

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At the conference itself, the lead author of an article in Science, published online at the
start of the conference, reported isolation of a strain of bacteria that could not only grow
in an arsenic-rich environment but could even incorporate arsenic into its DNA in place
of phosphorus, a revolutionary finding, widely covered in the news, suggesting
biochemical processes never before seen on earth (Wolfe-Simon et al., 2010). But six
months later, Science published eight Technical Comments along with the original
authors response, the largest number of such challenges ever published for one paper
(Technical Comments, 2011). A full year later in July 2012, two papers appeared in
Science reporting failed attempts to replicate the results and further tests to show that the
claims of arsenic incorporation were false (Erb, et al., 2012; Reaves et al., 2012).
Publishing negative results is unusual and testifies to the high profile of this controversy.
But these formal, published challenges represented the tip of an iceberg of criticism that
was carried out in other genres, and this time I want to focus on the genre of blog posts
and attached comments, beginning with a blog posted within two days of online
publication by Rosie Redfield, a microbiologist at the University of British Columbia.
Her critique received over 200 comments within a few days, some with further
substantive criticisms (Redfield, 2010). This criticism was picked up by a professional
science journalist, Carl Zimmer, author of Discover Magazine's blog The Loom.
Passing along the criticisms to well known scientists, Zimmer received mostly critical
responses (Zimmer, 2010b) including the assessment, "This paper should not have been
published" which he duly used as the title for a piece in Slate.com (Zimmer, 2010a).
Zimmer's critics and Redfield and her commentators noted that the culturing medium
contained sufficient phosphorus for growth, that the reported methods of DNA
purification were inadequate, that arsenic compounds are unstable in water making it
highly unlikely that they would survive in any cell, and that straightforward procedures
for isolating the DNA and testing for arsenic had not been followed.
Zimmer sent the criticisms he had elicited to the lead and last authors of the paper
soliciting their comments. They responded by refusing to respond, the last author
observing that, "when scientists involved in a research finding published in [a] scientific
journal use the media to debate the questions or comments of others, they have crossed a
sacred boundary (Zimmer, 2010a) The lead author, Wolfe-Simon, also requested that
Zimmer, honor the way scientific work must be conducted. Any discourse will have to
be peer-reviewed in the same manner as our paper was, and go through a vetting process
so that all discussion is properly moderated (Zimmer, 2010a). In short, the authors
refused to debate through other genres, though they had initially used these genres to
circulate their work.
Like an agent provocateur, Zimmer included these no-response comments in his
Slate piece, fueling further arguments (Zimmer, 2010a; for a time line see Zimmer,
2011). Most of those commenting on both his and Redfield's site were annoyed by the
sacred boundary label and vigorously defended post publication peer review conducted
online. For some, blog posts and comments amounted to a new, honest, open, and even
democratic science. A few comments to Redfield and Zimmer dissented, claiming that
the authors should not have been pressured to respond immediately and objecting to
having mob rule equated with peer-review in the Blogosphere since, the Internet is an
incubator for misinformation due to the innate lack of accountability (Zimmer, 2011, p.
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15). So overall the controversy shifted to the issue of how such debates should be
conducted and whether the rapid refraction of commentary on the web represented an
asset or liability to the conduct of science.6 Also on the blogs, with their linguistic license
and occasional flaming, arguments surfaced on the personality, competence, and motives
of the authors, of NASA, of the journal reviewers, and of the bloggers themselves. On the
authors, questions about the quality of their research transferred easily into questions
about their quality as researchers, and indeed Redfield ended her original posting by
asking if the arsenic authors were just "bad scientists (Redfield, 2010, p. 5), a remark
that drew sharp criticism in some comments to her blog.
Given this turn from the research to the researchers, one language feature worth
examining is how agency for the research (i.e., who did what) is characterized in the
formal versus the informal online genres. Here we can back up for a reminder that
English presents its users with a constitutive constraint: sentences need subjects and
verbs, and the predication patterns in English are fixed, Sentences can be stative (using
linking verbs), or have active or passive verbs, or use so-called existential subjects or
cleft constructions. The required subjects of sentences in any of these forms also come
from predictable categories; in science writing these include 1.) human agents 2.) entities
in nature 3.) processes, whether experimental or natural, and 4.) what Susan Peck
Macdonald in her study of academic writing called "epistemic" subjects, namely terms
like data, research, results, etc. (Macdonald, pp. 154-169). Genres differ in their mix of
these, especially where human agents are concerned, and of all the possible permutations,
active verbs attributed to human actors produce the strongest agency.
To attribute actions to human agents, the original research report, following genre
conventions, uses the we of plural authorship. In fact we appears as the subject and
agent in almost 25% of the 97 independent clause predications in the original arsenic
paper, higher than typical, as in this sentence from the abstract: Here, we describe a
bacterium, strain GFAJ-1 of the Halomonadaceae, isolated from Mono Lake, California,
that is able to substitute arsenic for phosphorus to sustain its growth.7 In the technical
comments and the later refutations published in Science, the agency goes to corporate
authorship, but in a conventional locution that actually singles out the lead author: e.g.,
Wolfe-Simon et al. further reported that arsenic was incorporated into the DNA
backbone of GFAJ-1 (Reaves, 2012, p. 470).
In news reports and in online commentary, the agency sometimes went to the
multiple authors but often devolved to Wolfe-Simon alone, a not implausible reduction
because she appeared as the sole speaker in the NASA news conference, and multiple
authors cannot speak as a chorus. The blogs, however, could be relentless in their
personal focus on one responsible agent: Felisa Wolfe-Simon Does NOT Get it
(Bracher, 2011); Felisa Wolfe-Simon (of arsenic infamy) is no more convincing in
person than in print (Eisner, 2011); and "Is Felisa Wolfe-Simon and Alien?" (Redfield,
2011). This personal spin may have been stimulated by the public attention Wolfe-Simon
6

As of September 2011, a Scientific American blogger had collected links to 190 blogs discussing the
arsenic bacteria case (Zivkovic, 2011).
7 Notably this sentence is not hedged, but it is somewhat vague because of the generality of the phrase to
sustain its growth, so the scope of this claim could involve only metabolism as opposed to metabolism and
replication. See fn 4 above.

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received, including a short piece in Glamour (Five-Minute Mentor, 2011) and mention
in Time Magazines 100 Important People of 2011 (Kluger, 2011).
In informal genres, closer in register to everyday conversation, humans as
grammatical agents and therefore human agency, which always involves intention and
responsibility, is common. And while the conventions of assigning agency in scientific
arguments mitigate the personal and construct ethos as institutional or collective, more
popular genres reveal the strong act/person association, tacit in the disciplinary literature,
that underlies the credibility of arguments in the sciences (on the act/person association
see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, pp. 293-316). Because of the attention focused
on the lead author, one more unusual genre appeared in this case: The personal criticism
of Felisa Wolfe-Simon elicited a defense in the form of an apologia, an epideictic subgenre of biography.

In Scientist in a Strange Land Tim Clynes, writing in Popular Science, reports on

extended interviews with a now media-wary Wolfe-Simon, and uses the classic
qualitative stasis defense of remotio criminis, shifting the charge and blaming someone
else in this case NASA public relations officials (Clynes, 2011). This defense is quite
deft, opening with a real event rendered as an allegorical scene of Wolfe-Simon on the
shore of Mono Lake, attacked by gulls and sinking in the mud. It also reconstructs the
research program with GFAJ-1 and the resulting Science article defensively. Responses
to this apologia by bloggers acknowledge its effectiveness (e.g., Koerth-Baker, 2011), but
there are also complaints that it rejuvenates the arsenic case and casts Wolfe-Simon in the
prepared role of the heroic but misunderstood loner (Dobbs, 2011; Zimmer, 2011). The
comments indicate that the believability of the science in the case is crucially affected by
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the reputation of the scientist, and reputation depends in part on the construction of
agency in popular genres.8
5. THE HOBBIT
The final controversy I want to discuss has been the sharpest and the most often reported
as a controversy, and it has involved many more expert-to-expert arguments as well as
media exposure, spinning off book-length popularizations and even NOVA and National
Geographic documentaries. In 2003, Australian and Indonesian archaeologists were
excavating a cave on the island of Flores in the Indonesian archipelago when they came
across a skull, mandible and some limb bones apparently from a single individual (called
LB1) as well as scattered isolated bones later attributed to from seven to thirteen different
individuals.
The LB1 remains presented contradictory features: small stature (approximately 3
and a half feet) and a surprisingly small brain case, about one third that of a modern
human. Tooth eruption and wear indicated an adult and the pelvic shape suggested a
female. The researchers submitted two reports published in Nature with simultaneous
news conferences in Indonesia and Australia (Brown et al., 2004; Morwood et al., 2004).
These received the full apparatus of a major discovery, complete with cover image and an
introductory piece in the same issue, as well as world-wide press coverage.

The reputation/ethos of a person is also constructed by the images of that person in circulation. A
comparison of the image from the press conference with Wolfe-Simon on the far left, and from the photo
accompanying the Popular Science article can be fruitfully compared in terms of the viewing angle from
which the subject is seen. On the possible meaning of such differences in viewing angle, see Kress and
vanLeeuwen, 1996, pp. 146-148.

388

The stakes were high, not only because of the unusual features of the find but also
because the authors argued that LB1, found in sediment dated to between only 18 and 12
thousand years ago, represented a new species in the genus homo. The authors also
speculated that the specimens diminutive size was due to the phenomenon well-known
among animals of island dwarfing, probably from an original population of homo erectus.
Not the find itself but the new species designation has been challenged in print by
different groups with several different lines of argument, among them the common thread
that LB1 is not a new species but a pathologically dwarfed modern human: A leading
Indonesian archaeologist and his Australian collaborators suggested in PNAS in 2006 that
LB1 was a microcephalic modern human related to a local group of pygmies living on
Flores (Jacob, et al., 2006). In 2007 came the argument that LB1 might have suffered
from the genetic disorder Larons syndrome, an hypothesis that could be tested by DNA
analysis, apparently never successfully done (Hershkovitz, et al., 2007). Next in 2008,
another group charged that the specimen suffered from cretinism caused by
hypothyroidism, endemic among the local population (Obendorf, et al., 2008). This
condition, the authors argue, explains some of the anomalous features of the remains such
as a relatively untwisted arm bone compared to modern humans, oddly rooted molars and
a primitive wrist. Meanwhile, other authors have argued against pathological
explanations and, analyzing casts of the skull, the wrist bones and the feet, have
supported the new species designation based on the uniqueness of these features (Falk et
al., 2005; Falk, et al., 2007; Tocheri, et al., 2007; Jungers, et al., 2009). The refuters'
strategy is to take the metrics of anatomical features and to show that they are within the
range of variation of established homo species, albeit of diseased ones; rebuttals take
them out again. Back and forth, these are arguments depending on gradations, on where
the specimens fall on various quantitative scales by having more or less of a certain trait,
and on what constitutes an appropriate scale to begin with.
The language choices in texts from this controversy, in both the original research
reports and the pieces addressed to wider audiences, reveal the same features discussed so
far so -- the term substitutions, the hedging variations, the characterizations of agents and
therefore of agency for the science. However, the linguistic groove I want to examine this
time is a difficult one to trace. It concerns what happens to claims when they fall out of
the main predication and into embedded structures. Embedded structures include
dependent clauses, various phrasal modifiers such as participial phrases or appositives,
and even prepositional phrases. Embedded structures are lower profile places that can beg
the question for the status of their content. Consider these examples of predications, one
containing content inside and one outside what most people would find believable: The
pond froze over. The alien landed. Combining these by demoting one into a subordinate
clause, can subtly alter the status of the backgrounded predication: When the alien
landed, the pond froze over.
When knowledge becomes more taken for granted it can show up in embedded
structures unhedged; presumptions are in effect lodged in linguistic crevices. This
incorporation can occur in stages across a single text since the status of claims tends to
change in the course of an argument. But it can also occur when content travels to texts
that are on allied topics. To appreciate this process of syntactic backgrounding into the
status of taken for granted it is worth taking a look at a rare example of the opposite.
This occurs in an editorial specifically on the Hobbit in 2009 in the New York Times
389

where the claim for its species status is held undecided (Hobbits and Hominids, 2009).

But an article from the New York Times, not on homo floresiensis but on DNA analysis of
ancient remains, contains the following after referencing the existence of the species:
This means that our modern era, since H. floresiensis died out, is the only time in the
four-million-year human history that just one type of human has been alive (Mitchell,
2012). And another article in the same paper on the David H. Koch Hall of Human
Origins at the Smithsonian moves to the same off-hand incorporation: Unlike Darwin,
the hall reminds us, we know that there have been multiple human species, including
Homo floresiensis, Homo neanderthalensis, Homo heidelbergensis, Homo erectus,
Paranthropus boisei, Paranthropus robustus, Australopithecus afarensis and
Sahelanthropus tchadensis (Rothstein, 2010). Homo floresiensis occurs in a participial
phrase here, and more important, it occurs in a series, bracketed with other undisputed
ancient species. Series create arguments for genus inclusion; they construct default
grammatical categories for their members, and the status of the majority of items can spill
over to a problematic item. These examples of backgrounding suggest that embedded in
the grammar means embedded in the culture as endoxa. The particular placement in the
textual series reflects the physical placement of homo floresiensis among other busts
reconstructing fossil hominids in the Smithsonians Hall of Human Origins, depicted in a
photomontage of these busts from the Smithsonian website. (Homo floresiensis is on the
bottom right, staring out at the viewer.) Things that are seen or touched acquire a
390

certainty that is difficult to hedge or defute.

6. CONCLUSION
It is easy to generate data about language, but not always easy to give it meaning. Adding
the filter of genre helps to manage the richness and, at a minimum, tracing the same claim
across genres reveals their conventions and constraints and so sharpens argument analysis
when we stay with the original expression.
But what is the bigger picture here? How should this multi-genre arguing, this
refraction of a case be characterized? On one view, the proliferation is background noise
in an echo chamber, often garbling the original arguments. What counts is the case
following best practices and made in the disciplinary literature to the most qualified
audience. Genres that address larger publics are only better or worse approximations of
the disciplinary argument. But the scientific article is currently changing dramatically,
downplaying replicability conditions and at the same time regressing into undigested
data. Furthermore, scientists themselves write in those other genres to further their views,
and they pay attention to the news reports and websites.
From another viewpoint, the genuine arguing occurs in the larger more public
forums. News reports based on interviews with the authors, commentary pieces, booklength narratives and blogs pull out details relevant to the assessment of the case, details
not mentioned in the research literature -- that there was an leucistic or anomalously
white pileated woodpecker in those Arkansas woods, that a cesium chloride wash is the
standard technique for purifying DNA from a gel, that the author of one of the Hobbit
papers maintained until the last minute that the specimen was ape and not human. The
research literature is too artificial and constrained and what convinces even the specialists
are these often omitted details.
On still another view there is one mega-case that encompasses both the
disciplinary literature and the more public genres. Arguments in the research literature,
under the strictest genre constraints, represent a distilled version of the available
arguments, but the refracting genres give a fuller account, especially the post publication
peer review, of what actually persuades an audience. I have long been a proponent of the
first view, but I am no longer so sure. No matter what the final characterization, attention
391

to genre and language conventions has analytic payoffs in the study of controversies, and
in the spirit of Pragma-Dialectics, it may have normative ones as well.
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396

Dialectical Reasoning In Critical Social Analysis And Critical

Discourse Analysis
Norman Fairclough
Department of Linguistics and English Language
Lancaster University
Lancaster
United Kingdom LA1 4YW
n.fairclough@lancaster.ac.uk

ABSTRACT: Methods of critical social analysis can be understood as deliberative dialectical reasoning
whose main argument type is practical argumentation, with explanation embedded. How then does
dialectical argumentation fit into critical method overall? I address this issue in terms of the relationship
between dialectical argumentation and other facets of dialectic identified within Hegelian-Marxist
dialectics, questioning the assumption in argumentation studies that the two are not connected.
KEY WORDS: critical method, deliberation, dialectic, explanation, practical argumentation

1. INTRODUCTION
In Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) I argued that critical discourse analysis (CDA) needs
to incorporate analysis and evaluation of argumentation because political discourse a
focus for CDA is primarily practical argumentation and deliberation. I also argued that
critical social analysis more generally needs to do the same in order to go beyond just
claiming that discourse may contingently have constructive effects on social reality, to
showing how: discourses provide reasons for/against acting in certain ways, and they may
have constructive effects in so far as practical arguments stand up to critical evaluation,
and lead to decisions, which lead to action, which has transformative effects on reality.
In Fairclough (2013), I also suggested that critical social analysis, including CDA,
is itself (self-evidently) a form of discourse, and that it is centrally a form of practical
argumentation. Thus (practical) argumentation and its analysis and evaluation are
relevant in two ways to critical analysis of political discourse: as a primary feature of the
discourse being analysed, and of the discourse and method - of critical analysis.
In this paper I offer an account of how practical argumentation connects to other
components of the method of critical social science and CDA, how the components are
integrated, in terms of relations between dialectical argumentation and other facets of
dialectic identified within Hegelian-Marxist as well as classical dialectics. One other
component of the method is explanation; another is an orientation to and aspiration to
contribute to transformative action to change existing states of affairs in broadly
emancipatory ways. If, as I propose, the methods of critical social science and CDA have
a dialectical character, in what way are they dialectical, and how might the dialectical
character of argumentation be articulated with other dialectics which are distinguished in
critical social science? Bhaskars work on dialectic (1989, 1993) is especially useful here.
In part this argument is addressed to argumentation theory and analysis, which we draw
upon extensively in the book. Dialectic for argumentation analysts is a facet of
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argumentation alongside logic and rhetoric. Yet a significant tradition in critical social
analysis aims to be dialectical in a wider and broadly Hegelian-Marxist sense. From this
point of view, dialectical argumentation is one form of dialectic amongst others, what
Bhaskar calls epistemological dialectic; there are also ontological, practical and
relational dialectics. What I am suggesting to argumentation analysts is that, in so far as
they are concerned to apply their work in social analysis, they should perhaps consider
how dialectical argumentation relates to these other dialectics. The argument is also
addressed to critical policy analysts (Fairclough 2013): in so far as critique is conceived
in a dialectical way, what is the place of dialectical argumentation within a critical
conception of dialectic? My answer is that we can conceive critical method as dialectical
reasoning: an epistemologically based, which means argumentatively based, constellation
of epistemological, ontological, practical and relational dialectics giving it an
essentially argumentative character.
2. AN EXAMPLE: THE KILBURN MANIFESTO
My argument is of a theoretical nature, but I shall begin with a concrete example and
introduce the main lines of my argument in a practical way.
The Kilburn Manifesto is a critical social analysis written by a team whose core
members Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey, Michael Rustin are critical scholars in various
areas of social science, in which the question of what is to be done, of action to change
existing neo-liberal social reality in emancipatory ways, is accentuated. It is a manifesto
by instalments published in the journal Soundings (from number 53, 2013) and on the
Manifesto website (www.lwbooks.co.uk/journals/soundingd/manifesto.html, see
References for the instalments so far). I have space only for a sketch of my analysis of the
Manifesto and my interpretation of it as a form of dialectical reasoning (see extracts
and annotations in Appendix).
The Manifesto has a layered and embedded character. The first layer is
argumentation for changing the existing neoliberal state of affairs on the basis of critique
and analysis of it, and certain values and goals. It is a form of practical reasoning and
argumentation. The second layer represents how neoliberals have changed the prior social
democratic state of affairs, including their arguments for doing so based upon their own
critique and analysis, values and goals. The third layer suggests the same sort of thing for
social democrats changing the prior state of affairs, but without detail and without
representing their arguments.
I suggest that the method of critical social science (and CDA) can be viewed as a
form of dialectical reasoning, and that the Manifesto is an example. Dialectical reasoning
has the four elements A-D. Its organising form is practical reasoning from Circumstance,
Value, Goal and Means premises to a Claim for action, with explanation embedded
within it.
A.
B.
C.
D.

(Normative) critique of existing discourse

Explanation of discourse as effect and cause in the existing state of affairs
(Explanatory) critique of existing state of affairs
Advocacy of action to change existing state of affairs

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A-D include epistemological (A, C), ontological (D) and practical (D) elements. Both the
first and second layers in the Manifesto include the elements A-D. I have presented
extracts in Appendix 1 in a way which illustrates this, though the elements are presented
as stages (1, 2a, 2b and 3) of dialectical reasoning as I suggest below.
Bhaskar (1993) characterizes the essence of dialectic as absenting constraints on
the absenting of absences. He argues that being includes absence, a necessary
assumption in the move he is making from being to becoming (change). In his terms, the
real includes an unactualized potential as well as what is actual. The actual is
contradictory, and includes ideas (imaginaries) for states of affairs that could and maybe
should but dont presently exist, discourses which are different from those that presently
exist, goods which are different from the ills that actually exist etc. Absences
subsumes all of these. Critique presupposes and is targeted at absences in this sense.
Transformative action (praxis) to change the existing reality, including action for
emancipatory change, seek to absent absences eliminate parts of what exists, replace
it, create new actualities. So procedures for working through flaws, contradictions, the
coexistence of actual states of affairs and imaginaries for possible/desirable new states of
affairs all seen as absences are the basis for transcending them, and achieving better
modes of thought and forms of life. We can gloss Bhaskars formulation as: eliminating
constraints on the correction or overcoming or elimination and replacement of absences.
There are constraints on eliminating absences, and part of the business of dialectic is to
eliminate such constraints.
The Manifesto includes (element B, explanation) analysis of causal relations in
which neoliberal discourse can be both effect and cause cause of both existing states of
affairs and associated ills; it advocates eliminating (absenting) neoliberal discourse
and replacing it with different discourse. This is also a move in eliminating constraints on
the correction of absences: it can contribute to eliminating and replacing (absenting)
existing states of affairs and ills, because the causal efficacy of discourses is a
constraint on doing so.
Dialectical reasoning is an epistemologically-based constellation of
epistemological, ontological, practical and relational dialectics. It is epistemologically
based because it is a form of (primarily practical) reasoning, realized in practical
argumentation and deliberation. It diagnoses through critique, beginning with critique of
discourse, absences in discourse, in states of affairs, and in terms of ills, as a basis for
advocating action to eliminate (absent) such absences. It is we might say focused upon
error and correcting error as a contribution to knowledge. But it also has embedded
within it ontological dialectic, the correction of absences in states of affairs, and is
directed towards practical dialectic, the elimination and replacement of ills; and it
includes relational dialectic, the elimination and replacement of existing relations
(including cause/effect relations) between discourse (and more broadly ideas) and
material facets of existing reality. The Manifesto is not overtly presented in the form
which I have suggested for dialectical reasoning (and will make more explicit in the next
section), for good presentational and rhetorical reasons, but it is an example of dialectical
reasoning which can be reconstructed in accordance with this form.

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3. CRITICAL SOCIAL ANALYSIS (AND CDA) AS A FORM OF DIALECTICAL

REASONING
Critical social analysis is directed towards transformative action to change existing social
reality for the better, i.e. in broadly emancipatory ways. It does not itself constitute such
action, it seeks to support it, it moves towards it. It is a critique of existing social reality,
including discourse, through which it arrives at accounts of existing states of affairs
which, together with particular values and goals, and claims about what actions might
achieve those goals, provide reasons in support of particular advocated lines of action. In
other words, it is a form of practical reasoning. However, this is incomplete. To reach
reasoned conclusions about lines of action also requires explanation of existing states of
affairs.
So the form of reasoning is practical reasoning with explanation incorporated
within it, and can be characterized in terms of four stages corresponding to elements A-D
above. The second and third are labelled 2a and 2b because they both appertain to
explanation. This accords with the basic character of critical method, as I see it: it links
together critique, explanation and action.
*

Stage 1. Normative critique of discourse (including practical argumentation) in

terms of truth, rightness, truthfulness (Habermas).

Stage 2a. Explanation of normatively flawed features of discourse in terms of

features of existing social reality.

Stage 2b. Explanatory critique of aspects of existing social reality, focussed upon
relation between discourse and other elements.

Stage 3. Advocacy of lines of transformative action to change existing reality for

the better (in emancipatory ways).

The main argumentative scheme is practical argumentation. Stages 1 and 2 appertain to

the Circumstances premise, with explanation embedded in the practical argument at this
stage. Stage 3 appertains to the Claim, with reasons for the advocated line of action
being drawn from the Goal (and indirectly the Value) and Means premises as well as the
Circumstances premise. In terms of genre, this is deliberation: critical social analysis is
in dialogue with existing argumentation which it critically evaluates.
3.1 Stage 1: Normative critique of discourse
There is a lot of common ground on Stage 1, the starting point of method. Aristotles
method was to start from phainomena, and from endoxa generally accepted beliefs and
opinions, what people say, ordinary people or the wise (Nussbaum 1986/2001, Evans
1977). We might now say starting from current discourse. Similarly Marxs method Marx begins his critique of political economy from the language, the discourse, of the
political economists, and shows its contradictions, thereby identifying problems which
need to be resolved in systematic inquiry and analysis (Fairclough & Graham 2002).
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CDA also starts from, and critiques, current discourse, and there is also a wider tendency
within critical social analysis to do so. Pragma-dialectics, one of the most influential
current approaches to analysis and evaluation of argumentation, also proceeds from
current discourse existing arguments.
Differences arise over what methods proceed to. Pragma-dialectics proceeds I
think from discourse to discourse from different opinions to shared opinions. But
there is a different view of dialectic in Aristotle as proceeding to, seeking to attain, a
truth of some sort by inquiry (Krabbe 2002), though the precise role of dialectic in the
achievement of truth, its relationship to analytic in Aristotle, is a matter of debate (Smith
1997, p. xviii). And for Marx, as well as CDA and critical social analysis more generally,
dialectic proceeds from discourse to, or towards, truth, in a practical sense: the right thing
to do, the right action to take. In the version of dialectical reasoning I am proposing,
dialectic proceeds from existing discourse and normative critique of existing discourse to
advocacy of a line of action as the right action to take, on the basis of explanation of
existing discourse in terms of existing social reality and explanatory critique of aspects of
existing social reality.
3.2 Stages 2a and 2b: explanation and explanatory critique
Explanation is an essential component of critique with emancipatory aims; we cannot get
from critique of existing discourse, or of social reality more generally, to or towards
emancipation, without explaining their normative flaws; without explanatory
comprehension of existing reality, we have no basis for identifying, deciding upon and
taking, action which may contingently transform existing social reality (Bhaskar 1989,
19931). For instance, we cant assess the likely consequences of action.
Bhaskars position is that beliefs represent/interpret social objects, which is
their epistemological facet and a relationship open to critique, and are both effects and
causes of social objects, which is their ontological aspect and requires explanations.
Therefore (normative) critique alone is not sufficient for critical social analysis, it must
be combined with explanation. Or, in the terms of the following quotation, criticism
(normative critique) needs to be combined with comprehension (begreifen as well as
be- und verurteilen):
This passage [from a text written by David Urquhart] shows, at one and the same time, the
strength and the weakness of that kind of criticism which knows how to judge and condemn the
present, but not how to comprehend it (Marx 1954, p. 474 footnote 1).

Explanation is usually implicitly present in existing frameworks for evaluating

argument (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012): in critical questioning of arguments in terms
of sincerity as possible rationalizations, of truth and rightness, and of consequences of
advocated action. So its not just a matter of bringing explanation in from outside, so to
speak, its also a matter of drawing out what is already present. Embedding explanation
The subject matter of the human sciences includes both social objects and beliefs about those objects
[and] relations [between these aspects] are both causal [ontological, relations of generation] and
cognitive [epistemological, relations of critique]. Only a discourse in which the explanatory, as well as
the critical, condition [causal as well as cognitive] is satisfied can be intrinsically emancipatory
(Bhaskar 1989, pp. 101-2).
1

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in practical argumentation (deliberation) extends the object of critique from (normative)

critique of discourse to (explanatory) critique of existing states of affairs (including
relations between discourse and other elements). So CDA and this is perhaps a general
model for critical social analysis starts from a critique of discourse, but its critical
object is not just discourse but existing social reality, using discourse as a point of entry
into this wider critique.
In the case of rationalizations, Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) adopt Audis
(2006) view that they fail to meet normative criteria for good argumentation and are open
to critical evaluation on those grounds, which is compatible both with a pragmadialectical view of a sincerity condition for speech acts and Habermass view of sincerity
as a precondition for rational discourse. Rationalizations are cases where the reasons that
are offered in support of a claim are not the reasons that support the claim from the
viewpoint of the arguer. An example we discuss in the book (pp. 178 ff.) is Brian
Griffiths - Vice-Chairman of Goldman Sachs International - arguments for paying high
compensation and bonuses to bankers and tolerating the inequality entailed as a means
for achieving the goal of prosperity and opportunity for all. One Guardian readers
response to a report about this was that Griffiths trickle-down argument is a scam for
a bunch of ... greedy incompetent lying bastards to justify their outrageous salaries. This
is normative critique its a scam, a deception, in our terms a rationalization but also
a partly implicit explanation, which is twofold: the real cause of inflated compensation
and inequality is greed; and the cause of the rationalization is the need to provide
justification and to hide the real cause. This is the basis for explanatory critique that
connects stage 2b to stage 3: the state of affairs which allows bankers etc to get away
with such greed and such rationalization is a flaw in existing social reality which should
be eliminated.
Critical evaluation of the premises of arguments in terms of truth or falsity
includes ideological critique, which is a form of explanatory critique: the claim that
inflated compensation leads to prosperity and opportunity for all can be normatively
criticized as untrue, but also explained as necessary to sustain the existing state of affairs,
i.e. as ideological. It can be subjected to explanatory critique: a state of affairs which
requires such untruths is a flaw which should be eliminated.
Another way of critically questioning a practical argument is by showing that the
action advocated in its Claim is likely to produce consequences which undermine
important goals. But claims about what the likely consequences are need to be supported
by explanations of what causes what in the existing social reality.
4. DIALECTICAL CHARACTER OF CRITICAL METHOD
I have already introduced Bhaskars view of the essence of dialectic as absenting
constraints on the absenting of absences and his distinction between epistemological,
ontological , practical and relational dialectics. Epistemological dialectic is concerned
with eliminating (absenting) errors and so advancing knowledge through
argumentation, ontological dialectic is changing (absenting) states of affairs, practical
dialectic is eliminating/replacing (absenting) ills, relational dialectic is
absenting/replacing existing relations between discourse and other aspects of reality.
Bhaskar (1993, p. 3) also claims that in its most general sense, dialectic has come to
401

signify any ... process of conceptual or social ... conflict, interconnection and change, in
which the generation, interpenetration and clash of oppositions, leading to their
transcendence in a fuller or more adequate mode of thought or form of life ... plays a key
role.
Dialectical argumentation and deliberation is epistemological dialectic. Dialectic
as dialogue, dialectical argument, is social interconnection and sometimes conflict in
which different standpoints and arguments are opposed with an orientation to moving
towards the truth and the right thing to do. This may be dialogue in the most basic and
direct sense, face-to-face dialogue, or monologue which draws different standpoints and
argument into indirect dialogue. The opposition or clash between standpoints and
arguments involves a process of normative evaluation of all the standpoints/arguments at
issue. One focus of evaluation is upon contradictions within arguments; the focus more
generally is upon, in Bhaskars (1993) terms, theory-practice contradictions,
contradictions between what is said and what is really the case.
However, setting what is said against what really is the case requires, as I have
indicated in discussing explanation, a shift to ontological analysis, analysis of states of
affairs, which is the basis for explanatory evaluation of states of affairs, with a focus upon
contradictions in them which involves relations between discourse and other elements of
states of affairs. Ontological dialectic is absenting states of affairs, changing states of
affairs to different states of affairs. Our account of practical argumentation in Fairclough
& Fairclough (2012) takes goals in the Goal premise to be imagined possible future states
of affairs which the action advocated in the Claim is advocated as a possible means of
achieving, to replace the existing state of affairs as represented in the Circumstantial
premise. On this account, the epistemological dialectic is articulated with ontological
dialectic: absenting erroneous arguments, including erroneous representations of states
of affairs and erroneous representations of the consequences of action, in favour of better
arguments and representations, is articulated with absenting flawed states affairs
eliminating them and replacing them with other states of affairs which exclude their
flaws.
However, epistemological and ontological dialectic are also articulated with
practical dialectic, with anticipated transformative action to absent ills in the existing
social reality, using ills as a cover term for aspects of it which we have good reasons
which of course have to be provided to see as antithetical to human well-being, the
good society, and so forth. And these three dialectics are articulated with relational
dialectic, absenting existing relations between discourse and other aspects of reality,
replacing them with new relations.
Hence dialectical reasoning as I have construed it can be seen as an
epistemologically-centred constellation of epistemological, ontological, practical and
relational dialectics. It is epistemologically-centred in that what we are talking about,
after all, is a form of reasoning and argumentation. It incorporates practical dialectic not
in the sense that it actually is transformative action to eliminate ills, which it is not, but
in the sense that it anticipates and seeks to serve and be articulated with it. It incorporates
ontological analysis and dialectic not in the sense that it performs such analysis, which it
does not, or in the sense that it changes states of affairs, which it does not, but in the
sense that it necessarily presupposes and draws upon ontological analysis, and in
anticipating transformative action to eliminate ills it also anticipates, seeks to serve and
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to be articulated with the absenting of existing states of affairs and the production of
new states of affairs.
Let me relate this to a particular area of critical social analysis. Policy studies has
made an argumentative turn which recognizes the centrality of argumentation in policy
debate and policy-making, and critical analysis of argumentation in critical policy
analysis. Its concerns are not however limited to argumentation and argumentation
analysis as such, but to how they connect with diagnosis of problems in existing states of
affairs and the overcoming of these problems and the ills associated with them through
changing states of affairs, eliminating and replacing (absenting) existing states of
affairs. Addressing the constellation of epistemological, ontological, practical and
relational dialectics through a focus on dialectical reasoning could therefore be a way of
approaching its concerns.
5. CONCLUSION
Practical, dialectical argumentation is both an important object of critical social analysis,
and its method, in dialectical reasoning. Moreover, dialectical reasoning, through its
deliberative character, incorporates the former into the latter. But dialectical
argumentation is just one facet, an epistemological one, of change and truth arising from
conflict and contradiction through absenting, eliminating and replacing. Other facets
however ontological, practical, relational are brought into the scope of agency, action
and change through dialectical argumentation; so dialectical reasoning is
epistemologically-based.
A genre is a form with a potential which is only partly actualized. The genre of
deliberation can potentially take the form of dialectical reasoning, but it rarely does, the
potential is only partly actualized. I suggest that an aim of critical social analysis, and of
CDA in particular, is to realize, more fully actualize, this potential, both in its own
method and in members methods those of politicians, policy experts, citizens and so
forth. For everyone with an interest in emancipatory change can gain by appreciating:
how discourse (and ideas and beliefs), states or affairs, goods and ills are articulated
together in existing reality; that emancipatory change requires absenting, eliminating
and replacing, all three , and the relations that hold them together; that emancipatory
change can result from critique only via the mediation of explanation. Dialectical
reasoning binds these together in an operational way.
6. APPENDIX: THE KILBURN MANIFESTO
The aim of the manifesto is to focus attention on the nature of the neoliberal settlement,
including the social, political and cultural battles that have attended its emergence and
maintenance and those that might help bring about its demise (Editorial, Soundings 53
2013, p. 4).

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6.1 Stage 1 Normative critique of discourse

The vocabulary we use, to talk about the economy in particular, has been crucial to the
establishment of neoliberal hegemony ... [for instance] the majority of us are primarily
consumers, whose prime duty (and source of power and pleasure) is to make choices.
The so-called truth underpinning this change of descriptions ... is that, in the end,
individual interests are the only reality that matters; that those interests are purely
monetary; and that so-called values are only a means of pursuing selfish ends by other
means. And behind this ... is the idea of a world of independent agents whose choices,
made for their own advantage, paradoxically benefit all. That the world is not like that is
evident. There are monopolies and vastly differential powers. There is far more to life
than individual self interest. Markets in practice need vast apparatuses of regulation,
propping-up and policing ... Moreover, this privileging of self interest, market relations
and choice ... leads inexorably to increased inequality ... (which) is protected from
political contest by another shift in our vocabulary ... liberty ... defined simply as self
interest and freedom from restraint by the state ... has become so much the dominant term
that the resultant inequalities have eviscerated democracy, and the vocabulary of equality
has been obscured from view (Massey 2013).
So neoliberal discourse is normatively criticized because it is (a) a falsification of
existing reality, (b) unjust leads to glaring inequality.
Contradictions of neo-liberal discourse: This assumption of the naturalness of
markets is crucial to the insistence that There Is No Alternative ... one of the ghastly
ironies (is) that we are told that much of our power and our pleasure, and our very selfidentification, lies in our ability to choose (and we are indeed bombarded every day by
choices, many of them meaningless ...), while at the level that really matters what
kind of society wed like to live in, what kind of future wed like to build we are told,
implacably, that ... there is no alternative no choice at all (Massey 2013).
6.2 Stage 2: Explanation
The language we use is one of the sources of the political straightjacket we are in ... this
vocabulary of customer, consumer, choice, markets and self interest moulds both our
conception of ourselves and our understanding of and relationship to the world.
These descriptions of roles, exchanges and relationships in terms of a
presumption that individual choice and self interest does and should prevail are in fact not
simply descriptions but a powerful means by which new subjectivities are constructed
and enforced. ... The new dominant ideology is inculcated through social practices, as
well as through prevailing names and descriptions. The mandatory exercise of free
choice ... of a hospital to which to be referred, of schools for ones children ... is ... also
a lesson in social identity, affirming on each occasion that one is above all a consumer,
functioning in a market.
By such means we are enrolled, such self-identification being just as strong as
our material entanglement in debt, pensions, mortgages and the like. It is an
internalisation of the system that can potentially corrode our ability to imagine that
things could be otherwise. This question of identity and identification, moreover, goes
beyond our individual subjectivities. Everything begins to be imagined in this way. The
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very towns and cities we live in are branded in order to contend against each other,
including internationally, in a world in which the only relationships are ones of
competition.
So, the vocabularies which have reclassified roles, identities and relationships ...
and the practices which enact them embody and enforce the ideology of neoliberalism,
and thus a new capitalist hegemony. Another set of vocabularies provides the terms
through which the system describes itself and its functions. These frame the categories
for example of production, consumption, land, labour, capital, wealth through which the
economy (as a supposedly distinct and autonomous sphere of life) is understood. These
definitions constitute another element of common sense ... As we pointed out in our
framing statement ... the gains made by labour under social democracy proved intolerable
to capital and a backlash was launched. Even mere redistribution could only be allowed
to go so far. And one crucial element ... was the dislodging of the common sense which
underpinned these aspects of the social democratic approach in particular the
commitment to ... equality and the important role of the state and public intervention ... in
achieving this. Changing our economic language was crucial in shifting our world-view
(Massey 2013).
[T]he aim of the rise of neoliberalism was an active undermining of the
economic and political gains made by ordinary people during the post-war socialdemocratic settlement. Its whole point was to engineer a class rebalancing. From this
point of view it has succeeded. And the predictable crisis of its model has now become
grist to its mill: it is being used as a pretext for further restructuring and redistribution
(Massey & Rustin 2014).
Changing the vocabulary (discourse) > dislodging (+ replacing) common
sense (absenting it); replacing identities; replacing social practices > the neoliberal
backlash, a new capitalist hegemony (as a precondition for it, as absenting constraints
on its absenting of absences in social democracy). A complex and not simply unidirectional set of causal relations (e.g. changes in common sense etc > changes in
practices > changes in common sense) connect changes in: discourse, common
sense/identities, practices, structures (hegemony).
6.3 Stage 3: Explanatory critique
Explanations of causal relations slide over into critique of states of affairs (the existing
social reality not just the discourse) in which they obtain e.g. the passage in italics
above. Explanations are part of analysis and are factual claims; but some factual claims
are simultaneously value claims. Bhaskar (1989, p. 101): if we have adequate grounds for
supposing that belief X is false, and that S explains X, then we may, and must, pass
immediately to a negative evaluation of S, and a positive evaluation of action directed at
its removal (absenting).

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6.4 Stage 4: Advocacy of lines for transformative action

An outline of an alternative
It follows from our argument that an economy should be a means for fulfilling social
goals, and not an end in itself, and that a means of deliberating and determining what
such goals should be is essential to democracy. But our political institutions do not
currently serve this purpose. ... Yet there are always cracks in the carapace. Hegemony
has to be constructed and maintained and is thereby always open to challenge. And most
of social reproduction in fact relies on non-financial relations, of trust, care and mutual
responsibility. Not only is not absolutely everything captured, but those other feelings
still resonate and resist (Massey & Rustin 2014).

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Audi 2006
Audi, R. (2006). Practical reasoning and ethical decision. London: Routledge.
Bhaskar, R. (1989). Reclaiming reality. London: Routledge.
Bhaskar, R. (1993). Dialectic: the pulse of freedom. London: Verso.
Evans, J. D. G. (1977). Aristotles concept of dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fairclough, I., & Fairclough, N. (2012). Political discourse analysis. London: Routledge.
Fairclough, N. (2010). Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language. London: Longman.
Fairclough, N. (2013). Critical discourse analysis and critical policy studies. Critical Policy Studies, 7(2),
177-197.
Fairclough, N., & Graham, P. (2002). Marx as critical discourse analyst: the genesis of a critical method
and its relevance to the critique of global capital. Estudios de Sociolinguistica, 3(1),185 229.
Reprinted in Fairclough (2010, pp. 301-346).
Hall, S., & OShea. A. (2013). Common-sense neoliberalism. Kilburn Manifesto, chapter 4. Soundings, 55,
8-24.
Hall, S., Massey, D., & Rustin, M. (2013). After neoliberalism: analysing the present. Kilburn Manifesto
chapter 1. Soundings, 53, 8-22.
Krabbe, E. C. W. (2002). Meeting in the house of Callias: an historical perspective on rhetoric and
dialectic. In F. H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and rhetoric: the warp and woof
of argumentation analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Marx, K. (1954). Capital, volume 1. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Massey, D., & Rustin, M. (2014) Whose economy? Reframing the debate. Kilburn Manifesto, chapter 8.
Rwetrieved from: www.lwbooks.co.uk/journals/soundingsd/manifesto.html.
Massey, D. (2013). Vocabularies of the economy. Kilburn Manifesto, chapter 2. Soundings, 54, 9-22.
Nussbaum, M. (2001). The fragility of goodness: luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy, revised
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Rustin, M. (2013). A relational society. Kilburn Manifesto, chapter 3. Soundings, 54, 23-36.
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How To Blame In A Democracy?

Victor Ferry
Groupe de recherche en Rhtorique et en Argumentation Linguistique (GRAL)
F.R.S.-FNRS
Universit Libre de Bruxelles
Belgium
vferry@ulb.ac.be

ABSTRACT: This paper challenges the view according to which speeches of praise and speeches of blame
perform a similar political function of gathering citizens (around a hero in the case of praise and against a
scapegoat in the case of blame). It is argued that the idea, seldom challenged in literature on epideictic
rhetoric, that blame is merely a reverse mirror of praise, is due to an overemphasis on logos.
KEYWORDS: artistic proofs, blame, catharsis, epideictic, homeostasis, homonoia, praise, rhetoric, violence

1. INTRODUCTION
To introduce my topic, I would like first to present George Kennedy main hypothesis in his
book Comparative Rhetoric (1998). George Kennedy argued that the primary function of
rhetoric in human societies is the preservation of existing social order. As he puts it: The
major function of rhetoric throughout the most of human history has been to preserve
things as they are or to try to recover an idealized happier past (1998, p. 216).
The history of research on argumentation and reasoning can be described as a
struggle against such a natural tendency to conservatism. This history began with sophistic
exercises such as dissoi logoi (twofold arguments)1 and, later, with Aristotles studies on
the various ways one can attack someone elses arguments, the identification of fallacious
arguments and the definition of rules for rational discussion2.
In this quest for tools to correct our reasoning biases, the status of epideictic
rhetoric has always been disturbing. Epideictic speeches, with their depiction of a world
clearly organized between the good people, us, and the bad people, them, appear as a
revival of the nave first steps of our humanity. One might thus understand why
argumentation studies did not pay much attention to epideictic rhetoric: epideictic rhetoric
appears to be nothing but what all of us spontaneously do when we stop struggling against
our natural tendency to conservatism.
Some scholars, however, drew attention on the central role of epideictic rhetoric for
the good functioning of any society, traditional and democratic alike (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, p. 69; Hauser, 1999). Emmanuelle Danblon (2001) even argued
that epideictic rhetoric is not outside of rationality: on the contrary, epideictic speeches, by
maintaining a set of shared values, shape our collective intentionality (Searle, 1995), that is,
our ability to agree and decide collectively. Endowed with such a political function,
epideictic discourses seem worth studying.
In this respect, Aristotles Rhetoric is of little help. Indeed, Aristotle does not
mention any explicit connection between epideictic speeches and the restatement of shared
principles in a community. Aristotle only describes the means by which the orator can
1

On the pedagogical value of dissoi logoi for the training of critical thinking skills, see Danblon (2013, pp.
127-148) and Ferry (2013).
2
I refer here to Aristotles Topics, Sophistical refutations and Rhetoric.

407

perform an effective speech of blame or praise (Rhet., I, 9, 1366a-68b). He does not state
that those blames and praises are means to strengthen common values. Such a political
function of epideictic speeches seems nevertheless plausible in view of human rhetorical
practices.
As far as blame is concerned, looking for a scapegoat seems to be a widely shared
human reaction to a situation of crisis (Patou-Mathis, 2013, pp. 90-96). Along with the
same line, philosophers and psychologists have long analysed the need for human societies,
big and small, to define themselves against outsiders (Freud, 1930; Schmitt, 1932;
Heller-Roazen, 2009; Crisp and Mileady, 2012). As far as praise is concerned, moments of
grief are, then as now, accompanied by instants of harmony around the memory of the
deceased. Remembering the deeds of glorious ancestors also seems to be an ancient and
widely shared means to reinforce the links between the members of a community
(Kennedy, 1998; Barry, to be published).
However, scholars who advocated for a political function of epideictic do not
differentiate praise from blame in their inquiries: praise and blame are perceived as
rhetorical tools to perform a similar political function of gathering citizens (around a hero
in the case of praise and against a scapegoat in the case of blame). The aim of my paper is
to challenge this consensually shared view: by studying a speech of blame I intend to
demonstrate that praise and blame do not have the same political effect.
To do so, I will focus on a case study: Theodore Roosevelts blame of an anarchist
who killed president McKinley in September 19013. At first glance, it would be seducing
to analyse this speech as an instance of a federating function of blame. Indeed an anarchist
is, by definition, out of the community of citizens: he is an atopos. Blaming an anarchist
would offer an opportunity to gather citizens against a scapegoat. However, by looking in
detail to the construction of the three artistic proofs (logos, ethos, pathos) in Roosevelts
speech, I will challenge the very idea of blame as an effective tool to reinforce hearers
adhesion to shared values.
2. BLAME WITHOUT CEREMONY
My first comments have to do with the framework of the speech, with the context in which
the speech took place. Roosevelt issued his blame at the beginning of his first state of the
Union speech, delivered on the 3rd of December 1901 that is, three months after the
president McKinley was shot to death by a young anarchist (a 28 years old steel worker
named Leon Czolgosz).
First of all, it is worth noting that the state of the Union speech is a genuine
institution in the American democracy. State of the Union speech was instituted by the
American constitution and has been delivered almost every year by American presidents
since George Washingtons presidency4. Those speeches have often been an opportunity to
reinforce the feeling of brotherhood between American citizens. To do so, American
presidents use several rhetorical techniques such as idealized stories of the first steps of the
American nation or the narration of the deeds of the founding fathers5. Since Ronald

Roosevelt issued the blame in his first state of the Union address, on the 3rd of December 1901.
The third section of the second article of the U.S. Constitution states that: He the president shall from
time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.
5
The peroration of Lyndon Johnsons 1965 state of the Union speech offers telling examples of those
rhetorical tools. For instance, when saying: It was once barren land. The angular hills were covered with
scrub cedar and a few large live oaks. Little would grow in that harsh caliche soil of my country. And each
4

408

Reagan presidency, American presidents were accustomed to conclude their speeches by

the praise of an everyday hero: an officer of government, a successful businessman, a
brave soldier, all of them embodying cherished American values6. This brings me to my
first point.
Speeches of blame are rare in the body of state of the Union speeches. This might
be due to the fact that praise, contrary to blame, do not necessarily need to be connected to
any particular current event: the state of the Union speech is itself an opportunity to deliver
a speech of praise. By contrast, one does not blame just for the sake of it. In other words, I
would argue that praises are ceremonial while blames are speeches for crisis. As a
consequence, blames might be more spontaneous and more passionate than praises.
With this in mind, I will now turn to the study of the three artistic proofs (logos, ethos and
pathos) in Roosevelts rhetoric.

3. THE ARTISTIC PROOFS

In this section, I intend to provide an explanation of the absence of distinction, in most
literature about epideictic rhetoric, between the political effects of praise and blame. My
claim is that scholars have a strong tendency to focus their attention on logos. Such an
overemphasis maintains the illusion of blame as a reversed mirror of praise. To dispel this
illusion, I will analyse the construction of ethos and pathos in Roosevelts blame. The
diverging political function of praise and blame might thus appear.
3.1 Logos: a symmetry between praise and blame?
As stated above, logos is, in my view, the only feature of the rhetoric of blame that can be
considered as similar to the rhetoric of praise. This similarity, as far as logos is concerned,
is explicitly acknowledge by Aristotle in his Rhetoric. In the 9th chapter of the first book,
Aristotle details the lines of argument one should use in epideictic speeches. Most of those
lines of argument have to do with speeches of praise. At the very end of his chapter,
Aristotle concludes by stating that, in order to produce a speech of blame, the orator only
has to do the contrary of a speech of praise: No special treatment of censure and
vituperation is needed. Knowing the above facts, we know their contraries; and it is out of
these that speeches of censure are made (Rhet. I, 9, 1368a).
Aristotle comment on the symmetry between lines of argument in praise and blame can be
illustrated with Theodore Roosevelts speech. Let us take, for instance, the idea according
to which fine actions are distinguished from others by being intentionally good (Rhet., I,
9, 1367b). As a consequence, the orator must try to prove that our heros noble acts are
intentional (Rhet., I, 9, 1367b). It appears that, in order to blame the anarchist, Roosevelt
used precisely the contrary of this line of argument. For instance, when saying: The
anarchist is a criminal whose perverted instincts lead him to prefer confusion and chaos to
spring the Pedernales River would flood our valley. But men came and they worked and they endured and
they built. And tonight that country is abundant (Johnson, 1965).
6
Ronald Reagan famously concluded his 1982 state of the Union speech by praising a young employee of
government, Lenny Skutnik, who jumped in the water to rescue a woman after a plane crash on Potomac
River. After describing the deeds of this everyday hero, Reagan attempted to spread a feeling of proudness
among his hearers: And then there are countless, quiet, everyday heroes of American who sacrifice long and
hard so their children will know a better life than theyve known; church and civic volunteers who help to
feed, clothe, nurse, and teach the needy; millions whove made our nation and our nations destiny so very
special-unsung heroes who may not have realized their own dreams themselves but then who reinvest those
dreams in their children (Reagan, 1982).

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the most beneficent form of social order (Roosevelt, 1901). The symmetry between praise
and blame works here. The hero deserves praise because, engaged in a situation in which
there was a good and a bad option, he chose the good one. One the contrary, the bad man
deserves blame since he is bound to always make the bad choice because of his perverted
instincts. So far, praise and blame seem to be two sides of a same coin. Let us now turn to
ethos and pathos.
3.2 Ethos: would a phronimos blame?
By now analysing the ethos of the orator issuing a blame, I intend to demonstrate that
blame cannot be considered as the reversed mirror of praise.
Let us begin by analysing the orators ethos in a speech of praise. It has often been
noted that not anybody is legitimate to perform an epideictic speech (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, p. 68; Kennedy, 1998, pp. 42-43; Hauser, 1999): the epideictic
orator must, somehow, be a delegate of political power. I would thus argue that a speech of
praise might reinforce social order because it offers the orator an opportunity to embody
shared values. Indeed, by praising deeds that anybody will consider as praiseworthy, the
orator will strengthen his legitimacy as a delegate of the people: he demonstrates his
respect for the values cherished by his audience. In other words, the harmony between
orators ethos and the ethos of the praised hero might reinforce peoples confidence in their
leaders morality and, thus, maintain social order. Now, my point is that such a way to
maintain trust between members of a society only works with praise and not with blame.
Indeed, in a speech of blame, the harmony occurs between the ethos of the orator and the
ethos of the blamed character. As a consequence, the orator will present himself at odd
with hearers expectations about a truthful ethos. Let me now support my claim by
analysing Roosevelts ethos in his blame. The following quote is representative of his
rhetorical choices:
For the anarchist himself, whether he preaches or practices his doctrine, we need not to have one
particle more concern than for any ordinary murderer. He is not victim of social or political order.
There are no wrong to remedy in his case. The cause of his criminality are to be found in his own
evil passion and in the own evil conduct of those who urge him on, not in any failure by others or by
the State to do justice to him or his. He is in no sense, in no shape or way, a product of social
condition. (Roosevelt, 1901)

I would like to contrast Roosevelts rhetoric with the qualities of the truthful ethos
according to Aristotle:
There are three things which inspire confidence in the orators own character-the three, namely, that
induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense (phronesis), good moral character
(arete), and goodwill (euonia). (Aristotle, Rhet, II, 1, 1378a)

All those qualities are lacking in Roosevelts blame. There is obviously no goodwill in a
speech of blame. In addition, by insisting on the reasons why one should not find any
attenuating circumstances to the criminal, the orator appears as merciless and obsessed:
those features are hardly consistent with a good moral character. Finally, as far as
phroneisis is concerned, the orator seems to be overwhelmed by his anger and thus unable
to make a wise decision. How then could an audience be willing to be governed by such a
leader? Because of fear, possibly. This brings us to the third and last artistic proof: pathos.

410

3.3 Pathos: can we reach homonoia by anger and fear?

Let me begin by an explanation of the way emotions produced by a speech of praise might
contribute to reinforce the links between members of a society. Following Philippe Kreutz
(2001), I would argue that a speech of praise is likely to arise mainly two emotions:
admiration and proudness. Those emotions might create a willingness to follow the heros
example and thus stimulate a disposition to act in accordance with shared values. I would
add to this picture that praise might have a quietening effect: hearers feeling proud of what
they are will not challenge the existing social order. To use a physiological term, I would
say that praise maintains social homeostasis (Damasio, 2003, pp. 176-180): the smooth and
balanced functioning of a metabolism.
On the contrary, blame is likely to raise the anger of the hearers and their impulse
for revenge. I would thus argue that blame is likely to disturb homeostasis. The last
sentence of Roosevelts blame supports this view: The American people are slow to wrath,
but when their wrath is once kindled it burns like a consuming flame (Roosevelt, 1901).
Let me now summarize my analysis. My first point is that seizing the diverging
political effects of praise and blame requires looking beyond logos. My second point is that
praise is a circumstantial discourse; by contrast, blame is a speech of crisis. By this I mean
that it only makes sense to deliver a speech of blame if there is someone to blame. On the
contrary, a speech of praise can be a part of a ceremony, unrelated to current events. This
second point has consequences for the ethos of the orator. In a situation of crisis, such as
the killing of a president, the orator might be genuinely outraged, his rhetoric might be
more spontaneous and out of control than in a speech of praise. Still about ethos, my third
point is that it seems difficult for the orator delivering a blame to build a truthful ethos.
And I would argue that the distance that might thus be established between the orator and
the audience disrupts the sharing of a feeling of brotherhood. Finally, about emotions, I
suggested that praise is pacifying while blame is disquieting.
Starting from this analysis, I would express serious doubts about the opportunity to
use blame as a federative rhetorical tool7. Blame is, in my view, more a symptom of a lack
of control in a crisis situation than a rhetorical tool to face a crisis. This brings me to the
title of my paper: how to blame in a democracy? In other words, is blame worthy of
interest for rhetoricians, as a kind of speech one should teach in rhetorical courses? I will
conclude with a proposal on this issue.
4. CONCLUSION: EXPLORING THE CATHARTIC FUNCTION OF BLAME
To begin with, I shall go back, one last time, to Theodor Roosevelts speech. It is worth
noting that, at the time of the delivery of the speech, the judiciary institution had already
fulfilled its role: the presidents killer had been arrested, his case has been debated in
justice court, a jury decided to sentence him to death and he was electrocuted. Why
blaming a dead man? My interpretation is that Roosevelts need to reopen the anarchists
case in the form of blame illustrates a basic need for an archaic practice of justice: a justice
in which the good people can satisfy their revenge against the bad people. In the long
7

I am aware that there is a strong counterargument to the view expressed above. There are many instances of
political regimes grounded on fear of the leader and on a rejection of the others: blame therefore seems to
be an effective tool to gather citizens. Against this view, I would argue that the emotions from blame, anger
and fear, do not federate citizens in the same way that admiration and proudness do. Political regimes based
on fear of the leader and on the opposition to the others (such as Hitlers Germany, Stalins USSR,
Khomeinis Iran or contemporay North Korea) are more characterized by general mistrust between citizens
(and by massive practices of neighbours denunciations) than by a generalized feeling of brotherhood.

411

history of the domestication of violence by human institutions (Freud, 1930; Pires, 1998;
Pinker, 2011), blame appears as a regressive force. There is, however, a view in which
blame might, on the contrary, contribute to a pacification of society: if blame were to be
used as a tool for catharsis (Aristotle, Poet., vi, 1449b), that is, as a harmless means to
relief hearers from their violence (Tisseron, 1996, pp. 188-191).
We dont have yet any evidence that blame might actually perform such a function.
Psychological studies, so far, gave contradictory results on this issue: observing violence
might increase or decrease observers propensity for violence (Konecni & Doob, 1972;
Leyens, 1977; Scheff & Bushnell, 1984; Scheff, 2007; Gentile, 2013). What would be the
rhetorical features of a blame that would perform a cathartic function? Is there any way in
which blame might be used as a sophisticated alternative to basic violence? Here is an
interesting challenge for a rhetorician.

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Princeton : Princeton University Press.
Barry, A. (To appear). La celebration de la pulaaku dans lpope peule au Fota Jalon. In V. Ferry (Ed.),
Les rhtoriques de la concorde.
Crisp, R. J., & Meleady, R. (2012). Adapting to a multicultural future. Science, 336(6083), 853-855.
Damasio, A. (2003). Spinoza avait raison. Joie et tristesse, le cerveau des motions. Paris : Odile Jacob.
Danblon, E. (2001). La rationalit du discours pidictique. In M. Dominicy & M. Frdric, (Eds.), La mise en
scne des valeurs: La rhtorique de lloge et du blame (pp. 19-47). Lausanne: Delachaux et Niestl.
Danblon, E. (2013). Lhomme rhtorique. Paris: Cerf.
Ferry, V. (2013). The Virtues of Dissoi Logoi. In. D. Mohammed & M. Lewiski, M. (Eds.), Virtues of
Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the
Study of Argumentation, 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-8.
Freud, S. (1930). Le malaise dans la culture. uvre completes (pp. 254-333), vol. xviii, Paris: puf.
Gentile, D. A. (2013). Catharsis and media violence: A conceptual analysis. Societies, 3(4), 491-510.
Hauser, G. A. (1999). Aristotle on epideictic: The formation of public morality. Rhetoric Society Quarterly,
29(1), 5-23.
Heller-Roazen, D., (2009). The enemy of all: Piracy and the law of nations. New-York : Zone Book.
Johnson, L., (1965). Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 4, 1965. Online by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26907
Kennedy, G. A., (1998). Comparative rhetoric: An historical and cross-cultural introduction. New York:
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Konecni, V. J., & Doob, A. N. (1972). Catharsis through displacement of aggression. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 23(3), 379.
Kreutz, Ph. (2001). Lpidictique et les motions. In M. Dominicy and M. Frdric, (Eds.), La mise en scne
des valeurs: La rhtorique de lloge et du blame (pp. 107-134). Lausanne: Delachaux et Niestl.
Leyens, J. P. (1977). La valeur cathartique de lagression: un mythe ou une inconnue?. Lanne
psychologique, 77(2), 525-550.
Patou-Mathis, M. (2013). Prhistoire de la violence et de la guerre. Paris : Odile Jacob.
Pires, A., (1998). Aspects, traces et parcours de la rationalit pnale moderne. In Ch. Debuyst, F. Digneffe,
J.-M. Labadie & A. P. Pires, Histoire des savoirs sur le crime et la peine. Tome II : La rationalit
pnale et la naissance de la criminologie (pp. 3-51). De Boeck: Brussels.
Pinker, S. (2011). Decline of violence: Taming the devil within us. Nature, 478(7369), 309-311.
Pratt, J. (2012). The Epideictic Agn and Aristotles Elusive Third Genre. American Journal of Philology,
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Reagan, R., (1982). Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union,
January 26, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42687.
Roosevelt, Th., (1901). First Annual Message, December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John
T.Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542

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Scheff, T. J., & D. Bushnell, D. (1984). A theory of catharsis. Journal of Research in Personality 18(2), 238264.
Scheff, T. J. (2007). Catharsis and other heresies: A theory of emotion. Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and
Cultural Psychology, 1(3), 98-113.
Searle, J. R. (1995). The construction of social reality. New-York : Simon and Schuster.
Schmitt, C. (1932). The Concept of the Political. Expanded Edition, trans. by G. Schwab, Chicago:
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Tisseron, S. (1996). La catharsis purge ou thrapie? Les cahiers de mdiologie, 1, 181-191.

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The Role Of Pragmatic Argumentation Referring To Consequences,

Goals And Values In The Justification Of Judicial Decisions
Eveline T. Feteris
Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric
University of Amsterdam
Netherlands
e.t.feteris@uva.nl

ABSTRACT: In this contribution I discuss the role of pragmatic argumentation referring to consequences,
goals and values in complex structures of legal justification. From a pragma-dialectical perspective I describe
the stereotypical patterns of legal justification in hard cases and specify the different ways in which these
stereotypical patterns can be implemented in different contexts in which judges give a decision that they
justify by referring to consequences, goals and values.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, argumentation from consequences, goal argumentation, legal argumentation,
legal values, justification of legal decisions, pragmatic argumentation, pragma-dialectics

1. INTRODUCTION
In the justification of their decisions it is not uncommon for courts to use pragmatic
argumentation in which they refer to the consequences of applying a legal rule in a specific
case. In a hard case in which the applicability of the rule is controversial, courts may
argue that the consequences of applying the rule in the standard meaning would be
absurd in light of the purpose of the rule. An example of the use of pragmatic
argumentation referring to undesirable or absurd consequences in such a hard case can
be found in the decision from the US Supreme Court in the famous case of Holy Trinity
Church v. US (143 U.S. 457) from February 29, 1892.1 In this case the Supreme Court had
to decide whether or not the act prohibiting the importation of foreigners and aliens under
contract to perform labour in the United States (chapter 164, 23 St. p. 332) was
applicable to an English Christian minister who had come to the United States to enter into
service of the Protestant Episcopal Holy Trinity Church in the city of New York as rector
and pastor.
According to the United States and the circuit judge the church was in error because
the contract was forbidden by chapter 164, 23, St. P. 332, according to which it is
unlawful for any person to assist or encourage in any way the importation or migration of
any alien or foreigner into the United States to perform labour or service of any kind. The
opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered by justice Brewer, is that this immigration statute
should, in the concrete case, not be applied to the act of the church, although the act is
within the letter of this section (paragraph II). Brewer states that application in the broad
meaning would have an absurd result, that is that the contracts for the employment for
ministers, rectors and pastors would be included in the penal provisions of the act. He
argues that the congress never had in mind any purpose of prohibiting the coming into the
1

For the text of the decision see http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/143/457/case.html.

414

U.S. of ministers of the gospel. He maintains that the meaning of a statute can be found in
the evil which it is designed to remedy, in this case the practice of large capitalists who
contracted their agents abroad for the shipment of great numbers of an ignorant and
servile class of foreign labourers under contracts by which the employer agreed to prepay
their passage and the labourers agreed to work after their arrival for a certain time at a low
rate of wages.
In its decision, apart from a reference to the system of the law and the historical
context of the legislation, the U.S. Supreme Court uses argumentation referring to the
absurd consequences of applying the rule in the standard broad meaning:
a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning
to the words, make it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include
the particular act.
In its evaluation of the consequences the court refers to the purpose of the rule, that is to
prevent the influx of cheap labour under contracts with poor conditions, as it can be
reconstructed from the intention of the legislator in the parliamentary discussion that can
be found in the reports of the committees and the congressional records. On the basis of
this purpose, the court is of the opinion that the consequences would be absurd because
they are not in line with what the legislator intended with the rule.
In a legal context such argumentation referring to the consequences of applying a
rule in a specific case, in argumentation theory also called pragmatic argumentation, plays
an important role because the application of legal rules requires the consideration of the
consequences of the application in light of the purpose of the rule.2 Especially in hard cases
in which applicability of the rule is controversial, it is not uncommon that courts refer to
the consequences of application of the rule in a particular meaning or interpretation in light
of the purpose of the rule as it was intended by the legislator. In the justification of the U.S.
Supreme Court in its decision of the Holy Trinity Church case we see some characteristics
of the use of pragmatic argumentation in legal justification that I want to discuss here. The
first is that pragmatic argumentation is used in a particular kind of difference of opinion, a
so called hard case in which there is a difference of opinion about the applicability of a
legal rule. The standpoints in such a difference of opinion concern the applicability of the
legal rule in different meanings or interpretations. The second is that in such a hard case
pragmatic argumentation always forms part of a complex argumentation. The pragmatic
argumentation is supported by other argumentation in which the (un)desirability of certain
consequences is related to the purpose of the rule as intended by the legislator. Such a
support is necessary because legal rules are a means to achieve certain purposes that are
desirable from a legal, social, economic perspective. In the law, for this reason, the
desirability of the consequences of application of the rule in the specific case must be
evaluated from the perspective of the purpose of the rule.
2

Other terms for this form of argumentation are consequentialist argumentation, and for the negative form
that refers to the unacceptable or absurd consequences of a decision argument from absurdity. See for
example Bustamante (2013), Carbonell (2013), MacCormick (1978, 2005). For a discussion of pragmatic
argumentation in a legal context see Feteris (2002).

415

In what follows, I go into the stereotypical patterns of complex argumentation in which

pragmatic argumentation is used in the context of legal justification in hard cases. I shall
discuss the implementation of pragmatic argumentation in stereotypical patterns of
complex argumentation in legal justification. I explain the dialectical function of the
different parts of the complex argumentation by characterizing them as argumentative
moves that are put forward in reaction to certain forms of critique. Then, I give an
exemplary analysis and explain the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court in the Holy
Trinity case uses pragmatic argumentation by showing how the court instantiates general
stereotypical patterns of argumentative moves in light of the institutional preconditions of
the justification in the context of the specific case. I have chosen this case as an example
because it is one of the few cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court makes an exception to
the standard meaning of a statutory rule. For this reason it gives an extended justification
in which it uses a combination of different forms of argument, among which pragmatic
argumentation referring to the consequences of the application of the rule in light of the
purpose as it was intended by the legislator.
2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTATION IN LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION AS PART OF A STEREOTYPICAL PATTERN OF
ARGUMENTATION
In order to clarify the way in which pragmatic argumentation is implemented in the
context of legal justification in a hard case I proceed as follows. I explain the dialectical
function of the different parts of the justification in terms of argumentative moves that are
put forward in reaction to certain forms of critique that are relevant from a legal
perspective. I explain how the argumentative moves in which the judge reacts to these
forms of critique can be reconstructed as different levels in the argumentation and how
the hierarchical ordering of these different levels results in a stereotypical pattern of
argumentation.
2.1 The argumentation on the first level of the main argumentation: pragmatic
argumentation
A court that refers to the consequences of applying a rule in a particular interpretation
uses argumentation that can be reconstructed as pragmatic argumentation, of which the
legal implementation can be specified as follows in order to do justice to the the
dialectical obligations of a judge.3
1

In the concrete case, rule R should be applied in interpretation R (with an

exception for the specific case)
1.1a In the concrete case, application of rule R in interpretation R leads to result
Y
1.1b Result Y is desirable from a legal point of view

For a discussion of the dialectical role of the judge in legal proceedings see Feteris (2012a).

416

(1.1a-1.1b If in the concrete case application of rule R in interpretation R leads

to result Y and if result Y is desirable, then rule R should be applied in
interpretation R)
Scheme 1: Implementation of the general scheme of pragmatic argumentation in the
context of legal justification
In a hard case in which there is a difference of opinion about the correct interpretation of
the rule, in pragma-dialectical terms the argumentation is put forward in the context of a
mixed dispute in which one party argues that a particular rule R should be applied in the
concrete case in a specific interpretation R and the other party argues that this rule
should be applied in another interpretation R.4 This implies that the main argumentation,
the argumentation on the first level, should reflect the choice between the rival points of
view of the parties in dispute and should therefore reflect the balancing of the two
positions on the basis of desirable and undesirable consequences (Yand Y). In scheme 2
the different components of the complex argumentation on the level of the main
argumentation are represented:
1

In the concrete case, rule R should be applied in interpretation R (with an

exception for the specific case) and not in interpretation R (without an exception)
1.1a In the concrete case, application of rule R in interpretation R leads to result
Y
1.1bResult Y is desirable from a legal point of view
1.1c In the concrete case, application of rule R in interpretation R leads to result
Y
1.1dResult Y is undesirable from a legal point of view
(1.1a-1.1d In the concrete case, if application of rule R in interpretation R
leads to Y, and Y is desirable from a legal point of view, and if
application of rule R in interpretation R leads to Y, and Y is
undesirable from a legal point of view, then rule R should be
applied in interpretation R)

Scheme 2: Pragmatic argumentation in the complex argumentation on level 1: the main

argumentation in legal justification in a hard case
In scheme 2 the arguments 1.1a and 1.1b form an implementation of the positive variant
of pragmatic argumentation and the arguments 1.1c and 1.1d of the negative variant, the
positive variant serves to defend the part of the standpoint that the rule must be applied in
interpretation R, and the negative variant serves to defend the part of the standpoint that

For a description of the structure of various forms of disputes see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992,
chapter 2).

417

the rule must not be applied in interpretation R. The complementing argument in which
the weighing or preference is made explicit can be reconstructed as 1.1a-1.1d.5
2.2 The argumentation on the second and third level of the subordinate argumentation
A judge who puts forward pragmatic argumentation has a dialectical burden of proof for
answering the critical question why result Y/Y is (un)desirable from a legal point of
view. Since legal rules can be considered as a means to attain certain goals that are
desirable from a legal, social, or economic perspective, in the law the desirability or
undesirability (absurdity) of a particular result is evaluated in light of the goal of the rule.
The goal of the rule can be based on the explicit intention of the historical
legislator as it can be found in legislative documents, etcetera (which is called a
subjective teleological interpretation of the meaning of the rule). The court can refer also
to what is called the objective goal of the rule as envisaged by a rational legislator, as
it can be reconstructed on the basis of the rationale of the rule in the context of the law as
a whole (which is called an objective teleological interpretation of the meaning of the
rule).6
To justify that the consequences are acceptable/unacceptable from a legal
perspective, therefore in the justification a second level of subordinate argumentation
should be distinguished that reflects the supporting argumentation justifying the
(un)desirability of the consequences in relation to the purpose or goal of the rule that can
be reconstructed as an answer to the critical question. In legal theory this argumentation
that refers to the goal or purpose is often characterized as argumentation from coherence
with certain legal purposes, goals, policies, principles and values.7 In pragma-dialectical
terms, it can be characterized as a specific form of symptomatic argumentation that is
provided in support of the normative argument 1.1b. It is stated that the result Y has a
particular property that makes it desirable from a particular perspective that is relevant in
that context. Here, in the justification of argument 1.1b, the symptomatic argument forms
a justification of the positive evaluation of the result Y in argument 1.1b. In this case the
fact that result Y is compatible with a particular purpose P (that is intended by the
legislator) is considered as a property that makes that result Y can be considered as
desirable from a legal point of view (and for the justification of 1.1d a similar argument
justifying the undesirability of Y).
On the basis of this characterization the argumentation on level 2 of the
subordinate argumentation can be reconstructed as follows:

For a discussion of a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of weighing and balancing in legal justification

see Feteris (2008c).
6
For a discussion of a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the various forms of teleological
argumentation see Feteris (2008a). For a discussion of the pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the
argumentation in which courts refer to the intention of the (historical) legislator see Plug (2006).
7
See for example Bertea (2005), MacCormick (1978, 2005) for a discussion of argumentation from
coherence.

418

1.1b

Result Y is desirable from a legal point of view

1.1b.1a Result Y is compatible with purpose or goal P
1.1b.1b Purpose P is desirable from a legal point of view
1.1b.1b.1 Purpose P is intended by the legislator/Purpose P is a
rational purpose objectively prescribed by the valid legal
order

1.1d

Result Y is undesirable from a legal point of view

1.1d.1a Result Y is incompatible with purpose or goal P
1.1d.1b Purpose P is desirable from a legal point of view
1.1d.1b.1 Purpose P is intended by the legislator/Purpose P is a
rational purpose objectively prescribed by the valid legal
order

Scheme 3: The argumentation on level 2 of the subordinate argumentation

The argument 1.1b.1b/1.1d.1b, in its turn, can be questioned. This requires a further
justification that provides an answer to the critical question in relation to this argument.
Depending on whether a judge has referred to the purpose intended by the historical
legislator (and thus opting for a subjective teleological interpretation of the rule) or the
rational purpose objectively prescribed by the valid legal order (and thus opting for an
objective teleological interpretation of the rule), in his supporting argumentation he will
have to put forward different arguments.
To justify the compatibility with the intention of the historical legislator, the judge
will have to refer to documents, such as parliamentary discussions, in which this intention
is mentioned.8 To justify the compatibility with the intention of a rational legislator, the
judge will have to refer to goals, principles and values underlying the rule that constitute
the ratio legis, the rationale or purpose of the rule.9 The argumentative pattern on the
level of this argumentation can be reconstructed as follows:
1.1b.1b Purpose or goal P is intended by the legislator/a rational goal objectively
prescribed by the valid legal order
1.1b.1b.1 Purpose or goal P can be found in the following legal documents
(....)/ Purpose or goal P is underlying the following rules, principles and
values of the valid legal order (...)
Scheme 5: Argumentation on level 3 of the subsubordinate argumentation as an answer
to further critical questions
In the preceding sections I have explained the stereotypical patterns of argumentation of
which pragmatic argumentation forms part in legal justification. With this reconstruction
I have clarified the dialectical obligations of a judge who justifies his decision in a hard
8

For a discussion of a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the various forms of teleological

argumentation see Feteris (2008a). For a discussion of the pragma-dialectical reconstruction of
argumentation in which courts refer to the intention of the legislator see Plug (2006).
9
For a discussion of argumentation referring to the ratio legis see Canale and Tuzet (2009).

419

case by referring to consequences of application of the rule in the specific case. These
dialectical obligations define the dialectically relevant moves in the justification of legal
decisions in a hard case: they prescribe the elements of the justification that are necessary
from the perspective of the dialectical role of the judge to account for the different
decisions and choices that have to be made in the discussion process.10
These dialectical obligations make explicit the potential forms of critique that the
judge will have to react to in a satisfactory way in order for his justification to be
acceptable from a legal perspective. To clarify these dialectical obligations I have
translated his legal obligations in terms of the answers that he will have to give to the
different critical questions that can be asked in relation to the different argumentation
schemes that form part of his argumentation on the different levels of the argumentation.
In this way it has become clear that the judge will have to react to several kinds of critical
question.
3. EXEMPLARY ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTATION
REFERRING TO CONSEQUENCES IN LIGHT OF THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE
IN LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
To show how courts may use pragmatic argumentation, and how they instantiate the
general stereotypical patterns of complex argumentation, in this section I give an
exemplary analysis of the way in which in which the U.S. Supreme Court in the Holy
Trinity case uses pragmatic argumentation to justify its decision. I show how the court
implements the general stereotypical patterns of argumentative moves I have described in
the previous sections and I explain how this implementation is influenced by the
institutional preconditions of legal justification. Since in U.S. law the core of the
decision is formed by that part that constitutes the ratio decidendi of the decision that is
important from the perspective of the decision as precedent, I concentrate on the first part
(I-VI) of the decision that ends with We find, therefore... (The text of the relevant parts
is attached at the end of this contribution).
As described in section 1, in the Holy Trinity case the Supreme Court had to decide
whether or not the act prohibiting the importation of foreigners and aliens under contract
to perform labour in the United States (chapter 164, 23 St. p. 332) was applicable to an
English Christian minister who had come to the United States to enter into the service of
the Protestant Episcopal Holy Trinity Church in the city of New York as rector and
pastor. The question was whether, as was decided by the District Court, the contract
signed by the church was forbidden by chapter 164, 23, St. P. 332 according to which it is
unlawful for any person to assist or encourage in any way the importation or migration
of any alien or foreigner into the United States to perform labour or service of any kind.
The Supreme Court decides that the decision of the District Court has to be
reversed because the contract was not forbidden. In its view the rule regarding the
prohibition is not applicable in the specific case because the meaning of the term labour
should be taken in the restricted sense of manual labour, which implies, in the opinion
10

For a discussion of legal justification as part of a critical discussion and the role of the judge see
Feteris (1990, 1993, 2012a).

420

of the Supreme Court, that it does not concern the activities of a Christian minister. The
Supreme Court justifies this interpretation by referring to the purpose of the rule as
intended by the legislator, the U.S. Congress, that is to stay the influx of cheap unskilled
labour:
We find therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be
remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, the reports of
the committee of each house, all concur in affirming that the intent of Congress
was simply to stay the influx of this cheap unskilled labor.
This case constitutes a hard case because different interpretations of the rule are under
discussion, and as the highest court the Supreme Court has to decide which of the
interpretations is correct from a legal point of view. As has been explained in section 2,
such a hard case requires a complex argumentation in which the court must react to
certain forms of criticism. In what follows, in 3.1, I address the justification of the
appropriateness of the use of pragmatic argumentation that is presented in that part of the
justification that begins with It must be conceded that ..... Then, in 3.2, I address the
justification of the application of pragmatic argumentation that is presented in the
following part of the justification that begins with It will be seen that words ..., and
explain how the Supreme Court instantiates the stereotypical pattern of argumentation in
which it refers to the consequences of application of the rule in light of the purpose as it
is intended by the legislator.
3.1 The justification of the applicability of the argumentation scheme of pragmatic
argumentation
The argumentation of the Supreme Court that is put forward to justify the applicability of
the pragmatic argumentation in the concrete case can be found in the parts where the
Supreme Court defends its narrow interpretation R by referring to the absurd
consequences of applying the rule in the broad interpretation R in light of the purpose of
the rule. As has been explained in section 2.2, in this case the Supreme Court has to
defend a standpoint that concerns a preference for an adapted interpretation of the rule
(R) and a rejection of a broad interpretation (R):
1

In the concrete case, rule R should applied adapted interpretation R (with a

narrow interpretation of the term labour that makes an exception for a Christian
minister), implying that the rule does not apply to foreigners who perform labour
as ministers of the gospel, and not in the standard interpretation R, (with a broad
interpretation of the term labour) implying that the rule applies to all foreigners
who perform labour

The court acknowledges that the statute was applicable because the intention of the
legislator was clear, but argued that an exception should be made. The court states that if
the legislator had known the present situation, it would have made an exception for the
concrete case on the basis of the absurd consequences in relation to the purpose of the
rule and the values of the U.S. as a Christian nation. Since the court departs from the
421

acknowledged standard interpretation of the rule and makes an exception for this case, it
had an obligation to justify why this exception is justified.
From a pragma-dialectical perspective the justification offers a good example of
how a court implements the stereotypical pattern of argumentation in hard cases because
the different levels of argumentation are represented. In what follows, for the different
levels of the argumentation distinguished in section 2.2 I explain how the various
arguments are implemented in this case.
On the level of the main argumentation the justification of the Supreme Court can be
reconstructed as a complex argumentation, consisting of the positive and negative variant
of pragmatic argumentation as described in scheme 3 in section 2.2.1. With argument
1.1a and 1.1b the court puts forward pragmatic argumentation in which it refers to the
result of application in interpretation R and states that this result would be desirable (the
desirability is, as will be explained below, defended on a lower level of the
argumentation). With argument 1.1c and 1.1d the court puts forward pragmatic
argumentation in which it refers to the result of application in interpretation R and states
that this result is undesirable (absurd). This result would be that in interpretation R the
contracts for the employments of ministers, rectors and pastors would be excluded from
the penal provisions of the act and that in interpretation R the contracts for the
employments of ministers, rectors and pastors would be included in the penal provisions
of the act.
To justify that result Y is desirable and result Y undesirable, on the level of the
subordinate argumentation the argumentation put forward by the Supreme Court can be
analysed as a reaction to doubt with respect to the first critical question, whether result
Y/Y is (un)desirable from a legal point of view. As has been described in section 2.2, in
its justification the court will have to deal with certain forms of doubt that are relevant
from a legal perspective, in pragma-dialectical terms with the critical questions that are
relevant for the specific implementation of pragmatic argumentation. The argumentation
that the Supreme Court puts forward in defence of argument 1.1b and argument 1.1d,
that the result Y would be desirable and result Y undesirable or absurd, can be
considered as a reaction to the first critical question with respect to the desirability of
result Y and the undesirability of result Y.
In the argumentation consisting of 1.1b.1a and 1.1b.1b the court justifies the
desirability of the result in light of the compatibility with purpose P of the rule mentioned
in the conclusion of the decision that is to stay the influx of this cheap unskilled labour,
pointing out that this purpose is intended by the legislator. In this case the court uses
subjective-teleological argumentation by referring to the purpose as intended by the
historical legislator.
To support argument 1.1b.1b, that purpose P is intended by the legislator, the
court puts forward argumentation referring to certain authoritative sources from which
the spirit of the statute and the intention of its makers can be inferred. First, the court
explains the intention of the legislature by referring to the common understanding of the
words labour and labourers used in the first section of the act and by concluding that
on the basis of the words it is clear that Congress had in mind only the work of the
manual labourer as distinguished from that of the professional man, so that an exception
422

for a Christian minister can be justified because the legislator has intended this (section
III). As a support the court uses a selection of citations from precedents to justify its
interpretation.
Second, the court explains the intention of the legislator on the basis of the
legislative history by referring to the evil which the act was designed to remedy from the
perspective of the situation as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body
(section IV). In the courts view the intent of Congress can be found in the evil the statute
is designed to remedy, which can be found in the contemporaneous events, the situation
as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body. The appeal
to Congress was made to raise the standard of foreign immigrants and to discountenance
the migration of those who had not sufficient means in their own hands (....) to pay their
passage. The court adds that it appears also from the petitions in the testimony before the
committees of Congress that it was this cheap unskilled labor which was making the
trouble, and the influx of which Congress sought to prevent. Finally the court states that
the extract from the report of the Senate committee (...) reveals also that It seeks to
restrain and prohibit the immigration or importation of laborers who would have never
seen our shores but for the inducements and allurements of men whose only object is to
obtain labor at the lowest possible rate, regardless of the social and material wellbeing of
our own citizens, and regardless of the evil consequences which result to American
laborers from such immigration.
In its conclusion the court stresses that all these sources, the title of the act, the
evil which was intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to
congress, the reports of the committee of each house concur in affirming that the intent of
congress was simply to stay the influx of cheap, unskilled labor.
The way in which the Supreme Court instantiates the stereotypical pattern of
argumentation reflects the preconditions for the argumentative activity in legal
justification in the U.S. in the historical context of this decision.
4. CONCLUSION
In this contribution I have explained the role of pragmatic argumentation in legal
justification from a pragma-dialectical perspective. I have characterized legal justification
as an argumentative activity that plays a role in the resolution of legal differences of
opinion in legal procedure. From a pragma-dialectical perspective I have shown how the
stereotypical argumentative patterns of which pragmatic argumentation forms a part can
be reconstructed in terms of the dialectical obligations of a judge. These dialectical
obligations define the dialectically relevant moves in the justification of legal decisions in
hard case: they prescribe the elements of the justification that are necessary from the
perspective of the dialectical role of the judge to account for the different decisions and
choices that have to be made in the discussion process.
Based on the dialectical characterization of the role of pragmatic argumentation
and the obligations of the judge who uses this form of argumentation in a hard case I have
reconstructed the stereotypical patterns of complex argumentation of which pragmatic
argumentation forms part. I have done this by translating the arguments that have to be
given as reactions to various forms of critique that are relevant from a legal perspective. I

423

have reconstructed the stereotypical patterns that are relevant for the justification of the
appropriateness and the applicability of pragmatic argumentation in a concrete case.
By way of illustration I have given an analysis of the argumentation of the U.S.
Supreme Court in such a hard case in which it had to account for an interpretation in
which it departed from the standard literal meaning of the term labour in the context of
a statute. I have explained how the court instantiates in its justification the stereotypical
patterns of argumentation by translating the arguments that are given in terms of the
arguments that form part of the argumentative pattern on the different levels of the
argumentation. In this way I have clarified how the court reacted to the various forms of
critique that it would be problematic to refer to the intention of the legislator and the
purpose of the rule in relation to certain absurd consequences to establish the meaning
of a legal rule.
Further research of the way in which courts maneuver strategically in the
justification of the appropriateness and applicability of pragmatic argumentation must
clarify how courts adapt their choices and presentational devices in light of the
preconditions of the argumentative activity in a particular legal system.11

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Clarendon Press.
Atiyah, P.S. & R.S. Summers (1991). Form and substance in Anglo-American law: A comparative study of
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Bertea, S. (2005). Does arguing from coherence make sense? Argumentation, 19, 4, 433-446.
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11

For a discussion of the strategic manoeuvring in the Holy Trinity case see Feteris (2008b).

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425

Ubiquity, Ambiguity, And Metarationality: Searching For The

Fallacy Of Composition
Maurice A. Finocchiaro
Department of Philosophy
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
USA
maurice.finocchiaro@unlv.edu

ABSTRACT: Ubiquity is the hypothesis that fallacies of composition are ubiquitous; ambiguity the
hypothesis that fallacy of composition has at least three distinct meanings, often confused; and
metarationality the hypothesis that the best places to search for fallacies of composition are metaarguments whose conclusions attribute this fallacy to ground-level arguments. While testing these working
hypotheses, I have found some historically important cases, for example, a step in the theological argument
from design, as critiqued by Hume.
KEYWORDS: argument of composition, composition, compositional argument, design argument, fallacy
of composition, Hume, meta-argumentation, metarationality, parts vs. whole

1. INTRODUCTION
There are both theoretical and practical motivations for wanting to study the fallacy of
composition.
From a theoretical point of view, such a study is a special case of a key and wellestablished branch of logic and argumentation theory. In fact, with some slight but not
much exaggeration, one could reconstruct the past fifty years of this field largely as a
series of footnotes to Hamblins Fallacies (1970), and/or as a series of developments that
culminate organically with Woodss Errors of Reasoning (2013). And, as we shall see,
the fallacy of composition is special not only in the sense of being a specific case of
fallacies, but also in the sense of being especially important.
On a practical level, getting clear about the fallacy of composition seems crucial if
one wants to react intelligently to two of the greatest problems in the world today: global
warming and the world-wide great recession. In fact, at least one philosopher has claimed
that arguments for global warming typically involve an aggregation of temperatures from
particular regions of the world, and to group and average in this way is to commit the
fallacy of composition (Haller, 2002, p. 50); thus, it would seem to be almost a civic
duty for a professional in this field to try to ascertain whether he is right. And with regard
to the on-going great recession, Nobel Prize economist Paul Krugman (2013a) has
blamed its persistence on the austerity policies that have been adopted by most countries
with developed economies, and he has suggested that austerity has been the result of
thinking that one can apply to a national economy the same policies that work for its
constituent parts, such as households and individual firms; and this manner of thinking is
what logicians and argumentation theorists call the fallacy of composition, a label which

426

he himself occasionally uses (Krugman, 2013b). If Krugman is right, then such scholars
have a civic duty to contribute to a clarification of this topic.
2. THE UBIQUITY THESIS
The fallacy of composition seems to be unique among the fallacies, insofar as its
frequency and importance have been widely claimed, perhaps more than for any other
fallacy. For example, in 1826, in the Elements of Logic, Richard Whately explicitly
named and discussed this fallacy, saying among other things:
Fallacy of Composition. There is no Fallacy more common, or more likely to deceive, than the
one now before us: the form in which it is usually employed, is, to establish some truth, separately,
concerning each single member of a certain class, and thence to infer the same of the whole
collectively. [Whately, 1826, pp. 174-75]

Moreover, at least since the epoch-making contributions of John Maynard Keynes

(who died in 1946), economists tend to regard the fallacy of composition as the single
worst pitfall in economic reasoning. They also consider the exposure of it to be the
greatest accomplishment of the modern science of economics. They deem the avoidance
of it the most important lesson one can learn from this science. And such claims are
easily found in the writings of economists of both the left and right wings of the
ideological spectrum, such as Paul Samuelson and Henry Hazlitt.1
However, despite such attention and such claims, scholars in logic and
argumentation theory seem not to have done much work on the fallacy of composition,
although textbooks tend to pay lip service to it.
Sometimes this scholarly neglect of the fallacy of composition is explained and
partly justified in terms of its rarity or infrequency. For example, in the 1973 edition of
his textbook Logic and Philosophy, Howard Kahane has a brief discussion of this fallacy
together with its reverse twin, the fallacy of division. Here are his revealing words:
since non-trivial real life examples of these two fallacies are unusual, textbook examples tend
to be contrived or trivial. Thus one textbook writer gives as an example of the fallacy of
composition the argument that since every part of a certain machine is light in weight, the
machine as a whole is light in weight. [Kahane, 1973, p. 244; cf. Copi, 1972, pp. 96-98]

Obviously, this explanation of the scholarly neglect conflicts with the ubiquity thesis
reported earlier. Thus, the question arises whether the fallacy of composition is common
and important, or uncommon and unimportant. This is largely an empirical question, to
be resolved by following an empirical approach.
1

See, for example, Hazlitt, 1979; Nelson, 1999; Samuelson, 1955, pp. 9-10, 237, 273, 350, 374, 505, 550,
693; Samuelson & Nordhaus 1989, pp. 7-8, 183-84, 399-404, 666-67, 972, 993; and Wray, 2009. Cf.
Woods, Irvine & Walton, 2000, pp. 262-83; Finocchiaro, 2013a. For a revealing and emblematic piece of
evidence, which in the present context may also acquire aspects of so-called cultural tourism, one may view
a sculpture labeled The Fallacy of Composition: it adorns an outside wall of the building of the Faculty of
Economics at the University of Groningen, and it was created in 1988 to commemorate the 50th
anniversary of the foundation of that Faculty and to celebrate Keyness epoch-making contributions to the
science of economics; cf. http://www.rug.nl/science-and-society/sculpture-project/sculpture1998?lang=en,
consulted on July 24, 2012; I owe my first information about this sculpture to Govier (2007; 2009).

427

However, such an empirical investigation cannot be conducted with a tabula rasa, for we
need to be clear about what we mean by fallacy of composition, and also we need to
examine real or realistic material which typically does not come with the label fallacy of
composition attached to it. In other words, we need to be mindful of the fact that
observation is theory-laden, and that the examination of this material must be guided by
some idea of what this fallacy means, and by some idea of what to do with the material
under examination so as to test it for the occurrence of this fallacy. A brief elaboration of
some of these ideas is thus in order.
3. THE AMBIGUITY OF FALLACY OF COMPOSITION
To begin with, it is obvious that we need some understanding of what is meant by fallacy
of composition. Unfortunately, historical and contemporary writings on the topic contain
three notions that are prima facie distinct, but tend to be confused with each other.
First, there is reasoning from premises using a term distributively to a conclusion
using the same term collectively; for example, because a bus uses more gasoline than an
automobile, therefore all buses use more gasoline than all automobiles (Copi, 1968, p.
81). Second, there is reasoning from some property of the parts to the same property for
the whole; for instance, since every part of a certain machine is light in weight, the
machine as a whole is light in weight (Copi, 1968, p. 80). And thirdly, there is
reasoning from some property of the members of a group to the same property for the
entire group; the so-called tragedy of the commons can illustrate this notion, that is, if
one farmer grazes his cattle on the commons, that will be beneficial for him; therefore if
all the farmers graze their cattle on the commons, that will be beneficial for all (Govier,
2009, p. 95).
Now, the association of the second and third notions with each other is very
common. On the other hand, the association of all three is relatively rare, but does occur.
One example may be found in the following textbook definition:
The fallacy of composition consists in treating a distributed characteristic as if it were collective. It
occurs when one makes the mistake of attributing to a group (or a whole) some characteristic that
is true only of its individual members (or its parts), and then makes inferences based on that
mistake. [Halverson, 1984, p. 73]

4. THE METARATIONALITY HYPOTHESIS

Besides this three-fold distinction and the ubiquity thesis, there is a third guiding idea that
needs to be at least mentioned and tentatively stated before we proceed. In a previous
work, I criticized textbook accounts of fallacies, and on its basis I formulated a problem
and advanced an hypothesis. The problem was formulated in terms of the following
questions: do people actually commit fallacies as usually understood? That is, do
fallacies exist in practice? Or do they exist only in the mind of the interpreter who is
claiming that a fallacy is being committed? (Finocchiaro, 1980, p. 334; 1981, p. 15;
2005, p. 113).
Although these were not meant to be rhetorical questions, but rather open
questions that required further investigation, it is perhaps unsurprising that some readers
(e.g., Govier, 1982) did view them as rhetorical questions. Moreover, I did express the
428

suspicion that logically incorrect arguments are not that common in practice, that their
existence may be largely restricted to logic textbook examples and exercises
(Finocchiaro, 1980, p. 333; 1981, p. 14; 2005, p. 111). Thus, some readers thought that I
was claiming that fallacies are merely figments of critics imagination, and are in fact an
illusion (Jason, 1986, p. 92; cf. Govier, 1982).
Later, I tried to be more explicit and constructive about this issue when I
elaborated a general approach to the study of fallacies. One element of that approach was
connected to, and extracted from, Strawsons Introduction to Logical Theory and his
notion of the logicians second-order vocabulary (Strawson, 1952, p. 15); that notion
was extended to include fallacy terminology, since it ordinarily occurs when someone
wants to comment about some logical feature of a first-order expression of reasoning.
This means that the best place to begin with in the study of fallacies, or at least a crucial
phenomenon to examine, is allegations that fallacies are being committed (Finocchiaro,
1987, p. 264; 2005, p. 130).
In this vein, some elaborated the idea that fallacies are more like theoretical
entities such as quarks in physics, rather than like concrete objects such as buttercups in
everyday life (Grootendorst, 1987; Woods, 1988). This elaboration was a constructive
suggestion and critical appreciation, and I am far from denying its viability.
However, I now believe that the project can be articulated more clearly,
incisively, and constructively in light of the notion of meta-argumentation (cf.
Finocchiaro, 2013b; 2013c). That is, I distinguish a meta-argument from a ground-level
argument, and define the former as an argument about one or more arguments, or about
argumentation in general. Then a ground-level argument can be defined as one about
such things as natural phenomena, historical events, human actions, mathematical
numbers, or metaphysical entities. A prototypical case of meta-argumentation is
argument analysis, in which one advances and justifies an interpretive or evaluative claim
about a ground-level argument.
What I am proposing is that we search for fallacies of composition primarily in
meta-argumentation rather than ground-level argumentation. However, this is not meant
in the sense that we should be looking for meta-arguments that commit the fallacy of
composition, but rather that we try to find meta-arguments advancing explicit conclusions
that some fallacy of composition has been committed, i.e., that some ground-level
argument embodies or commits a fallacy of composition. The working hypothesis is then
that, at least as a first approximation, the fallacy of composition is primarily a concept of
meta-argumentation, useful in the context of understanding and/or assessing ground-level
argumentation.
5. HUMES CRITIQUE OF A STEP IN THE DESIGN ARGUMENT
Let us now begin our empirical search for real or realistic material pertaining to the
fallacy of composition. A memorable example of the fallacy of composition occurs in the
design argument for the existence of God, at least according to the critique advanced in
Humes Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. This charge is only one objection in the
complex and multi-faceted criticism which Hume formulates; and correspondingly, it
affects only one particular step of the design argument. Thus, even if cogent, this Humean

429

meta-argument is not the end of the story; nevertheless, it is a crucial element of the overall evaluation of the design argument.
It should be noted that Hume interprets the design argument primarily as
inductive and empirical. In so doing, he is trying to abide by the principle of charity, for
if one were to reconstruct the design argument as deductive and a priori, then according
to Hume it could not even get off the ground, since it would be trying to prove a factual
matterthat God exists and created the universefrom a priori considerations; and this
for Hume is an inherently impossible task.
One version of the design argument is this: the universe was created by an
intelligent designer (called God), because the universe is like a machine, and machines
are made by (human) intelligent designers. This is, of course, an argument from analogy.
Now Hume questions the analogical premise. How could one show that the universe is
like a machine? Well, in Humes own memorable words, spoken through the character
Cleanthes, the answer is this:
look round the world, contemplate the whole and every part of it: you will find it to be nothing but
one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of
subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these
various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy
which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of
means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions
of human contrivanceof human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. [Hume, 1947, p. 143]

This does seem to provide empirical, observational support for the claim that the universe
is like a machine.
However, there are problems with this reasoning. In Humes words, spoken
through the character Philo:
But can you think, Cleanthes, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so
wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture,
machines, and, from their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes?
Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one
of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a
hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular
parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any
propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all
comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn anything concerning
the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known,
afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree? [Hume, 1947, p. 147]

Here, Hume is finding two things wrong with the subargument supporting the claim that
the universe is like a machine. One problem is that although many parts of the universe
are like machines, produced by intelligent design, many other parts (even when orderly
arranged) are produced by natural causes such as attraction and heat. That is, Hume is
charging that the subargument is a hasty generalization. But this is not the only problem;
for even if all parts of the universe were machine-like, we could not be sure that the same
would apply to the universe as a whole. In this second criticism, Hume is charging a
fallacy of composition.

430

Humes criticism of this subargument of the design argument is a meta-argument, and as

such it is open to analysis, interpretation, and evaluation. Note, for example, that Humes
critical conclusion is based partly on an interpretation of the subargument in question,
partly on a definition of the fallacy of composition, and partly on some evaluative
principle. The interpretive claim is a reconstruction of this step of the design argument as
transferring to the whole universe the same property which it claims to be able to observe
in all (or many) of its parts; the property is that of being caused by some intelligent
design. The evaluative principle is that it is illegitimate to transfer any such property from
parts to whole in this case. Hume seems to give two reasons for this evaluative principle:
first, the disproportion between such parts and whole is too great, presumably because the
universe is infinite or indefinitely large; second, the transference from parts to the whole
universe would be like reasoning from what happens to a human hair to what happens to
a whole human body, or from what happens to a leaf to what happens to a whole tree.
And this second reason amounts to a meta-argument from analogy, in which Hume
argues that this subargument of the design argument is illegitimate because the
subargument is an argument from analogy and is as illegitimate as the analogies from hair
to human body or from leaf to tree.2
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
My empirical and theory-laden search has found other important historical cases, which
cannot be elaborated here, but which deserve a brief mention. One of these other
examples is Aristotles geocentric argument from natural motion: that the natural motion
of terrestrial bodies is straight toward the center; and therefore the natural motion of the
whole earth is straight toward the center. Galileo objected by arguing that if center
means center of the universe, Aristotles argument begs the question; but if center
means center of the earth, the premise is empirically true, but the conclusion is inherently
false. And the latter is a memorable counterexample that deserves further logical analysis,
because it seems to undermine the formal validity of not only Aristotles particular
argument, but also of any argument from parts to whole (Aristotle, On the Heavens,
296b7-297a1; Galilei, 1997, pp. 83-84; cf. Finocchiaro, [1980, pp. 353-56; 2014b, pp. 5963]).
A third case involves Robert Michelss argument for the so-called iron law of
oligarchy: that political parties inevitably become oligarchic even if they claim to have
democratic aims; and therefore, a democratic society inevitably becomes oligarchic.
Political scientist Robert Dahl objected that such reasoning fails because there is a crucial
disanalogy between such parts and such a whole: a democratic society allows competition
among its parts, but a particular party does not. Similarly, sociologist Seymour Martin
Lipset objected that there is another crucial difference: a democratic society has an antityrannical system of checks and balances in its written or unwritten constitution, but
political parties and labor unions do not (Michels, 1962; Dahl, 1989; Lipset, 1962; cf.
Finocchiaro, 2013b).

There is much more to be said on this aspect of the Dialogues, namely Humes employment of metaarguments from analogy to criticize or strengthen various ground-level arguments from analogy. See
Barker, 1989; and Finocchiaro, 2013c, pp. 201-203.

431

Such examples are certainly real and realistic. They are obviously also historically
important. The ground-level arguments are clearly compositional; i.e., they are arguments
of composition, if I may be allowed to introduce an obvious term for a type of argument
that leaves open the question whether it is incorrect or fallacious; that is, an argument
from premises with distributive terms or about parts or members to a conclusion with
collective terms or about the whole or class. And the ground-level arguments are more or
less inferentially incorrect: incontrovertibly and memorably so in the case of Aristotles
geocentric argument from natural motion; arguably and cogently so in the case of the
compositional step of the theological argument from design; and arguably and plausibly
so in the case of Michelss support for the iron law of oligarchy.
However, some qualifications are in order. First, even if we take these claims as
acceptable, one important conceptual qualification needs to be kept in mind about such
examples of the fallacy of composition. For these claims amount to saying that we have
found important historical examples of arguments of composition that are inferentially
incorrect. However, as John Woods (2013; cf. Finocchiaro, 2014a) has recently stressed,
the traditional concept of fallacy is that a fallacy is a common type of reasoning that
appears to be correct but is actually incorrect. This conception contains five elements:
frequency, generality, reasoning, apparent correctness, and actual incorrectness. Now, in
my three examples, the ground-level arguments obviously meet the condition of being
reasoning; they also meet the generality condition since they are arguments from parts to
whole; and they possess apparent correctness, since the exposure of the flaws of the
ground-level arguments required meta-argumentation by thinkers such as Galileo, Hume,
Dahl, and Lipset. But I am not sure about their common occurrence and their actual
incorrectness. In fact, the same features that make these examples historically important
may suggest that they are relatively uncommon; and their actual incorrectness could
perhaps be questioned by questioning the critical meta-arguments of Galileo, Hume,
Dahl, and Lipset. On the other hand, while such considerations would show that we have
not found three examples of fallacies of compositions, they do not undermine the claim
that we have found three important historical examples of seductive (i.e., apparently
correct) arguments of composition. This problem required further reflection.
Another problem for future investigation concerns an issue which has received
some discussion, with some promising and insightful results. The issue is that of the
evaluation of the correctness of compositional arguments, and the formulation of useful
evaluative principles. A key principle which I gather from this literature (e.g., Ritola,
2009) is that the evaluation of compositional arguments should not be limited to
deductive evaluation, but should include inductive evaluation; for even when
compositional arguments are deductively invalid, they often possess some plausibility,
cogency, or inductive strength. Another principle, advanced by van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1992, p. 177; 1999), urges us to distinguish between absolute and relative
properties (e.g., square vs. heavy) and between structured or heterogeneous and
unstructured or homogenous wholes or aggregates; and it claims that properties are
transferable from parts to whole (or vice versa) only if the properties are absolute and the
wholes are unstructured. However, the only if in this formulation should be taken
literally and strictly, as not including the if, that is, the principle at best states necessary
but not sufficient conditions for transferability; thus, more work is needed to find and
formulate sufficient conditions.
432

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Identifying The Warrant Of An Argument

James B. Freeman
Department of Philosophy
Hunter College of The City University of New York
New York, NY USA 10065
jfreeman@hunter.cuny.edu

ABSTRACT: Hitchcock has presented a way to extract the warrant from an argument. We summarize his
procedure and note that applying it in specific cases may be problematic. We then extend his procedure by
indicating how symbolization in a formal language addresses the problems. We indicate the richness required of
such a language and then present an expanded procedure for identifying the warrant of an argument.
KEY WORDS: conclusive, defeasible. formal language, Hitchcock, identification procedure, symbolization key,
warrant

By a warrant we understand an inference licence, an instance of a general pattern:

From
To infer (universally/ceteris paribus)

P1, ..., Pn
Q

where for some m 1, P1, ..., Pn, Q contain free occurrences of m variables or schematic
letters of some sorts (individual, k-ary operation symbol, k-ary predicate, for some k 1,
propositional). Since we understand that any expression contains itself as an instance, our
characterization allows propositional variables or schematic letters themselves as instances.
Hence our formulation accommodates straightforwardly.
From
To infer

P, Q
P&Q

Characterizing warrants explicitly is important, since we find confusion in the literature over
this concept. Warrants have been characterized as universally generalized conditionals, either
unqualified or ceteris paribus, as opposed to inference licences. These two however are
distinct. Every argument assumes that we can step from the premises to the conclusion, and as
Hitchcock (1985) has argued, this step involves generality. That we may infer Socrates is
mortal from Socrates is human is not something specific to Socrates. The warrant permits
us to step from any instance of the premises to the corresponding instance of the conclusion.
The warrant, then, is not part of the argument, the way premises and conclusions are.
Formulating the warrant as a generalized conditional statement tempts us to regard it as an
unstated premise, and thus a part of the argument. Different types of warrants raise different
connection adequacy considerations. Hence identifying the warrant of an argument is an
essential first step in evaluating its connection adequacy. In (1985), Hitchcock has proposed a

435

generic way of extracting the warrant from an argument. We turn to summarizing that method
first.
1. HITCHCOCKS GENERIC PROPOSAL F0R IDENTIFYING WARRANTS
This procedure has two central steps. Let us agree that we are setting aside, in this paper,
arguments properly analyzed as involving unstated premises, which would need to be stated
explicitly and added to the explicit premises for a proper analysis. We may state Hitchcocks
procedure this way:
1.
2.

Identify the repeated content expressions in the argument.

Uniformly replace repeated content expressions with variables of the appropriate
category, i.e. replace proper names with individual variables, predicate expressions
with predicate variables, repeated whole propositions with propositional variables,
repeated content expressions of other types with variables of those types.1

Two problems may arise when faced with a particular argument. First, repeated content
expressions may occur as constituents of wider repeated content expressions. Consider
If President Obama says that Hunter College is one of the best colleges in the United
States, then Ima should go to Hunter College.
President Obama says that Hunter College is one of the best colleges in the United
States. So
Ima should go to Hunter College.
Here the repeated content expressions include President Obama, says that, Hunter
College, one, best, colleges, United States, Ima, should, go. But also the entire
sentence President Obama says that Hunter College is one of the best colleges in the United
States together with Ima should go to Hunter College are repeated. But obviously this is a
modus ponens argument and no more fine-grained analysis is needed to recognize its validity.
We abstract the warrrant
From:
To infer:

If P then Q
P
Q

rather than, for example

From:
To infer:

If x says that y is one of the best colleges in z, then w should go to y

x says that y is one of the best colleges in z
w should go to y

Hitchcock formulates this procedure not explicitly for warrants as we have characterized them, but for the
associated generalization of the argument. See (1985, p. 89).

436

This example motivates Hitchcocks directive to replace the widest repeated content
expression unless the resulting associated generalization is implausible (1985, p. 92).
An argument may contain a number of repeated content expressions which do not nest
within one another. For example,
President Obama is the husband of Michele Obama. So
Michele Obama is the wife of President Obama.
Intuitively, we should replace both repeated content expressions, the warrant being
From:
T o infer:

x is the husband of y
y is the wife of x

This example motivates Hitchcocks second directive to generalize over each of the repeated
content expressionsunless it would be implausible to do so (1985, p. 92)
2. APPLYING THE PROCEDURE: SOME CHALLENGING EXAMPLES
Applying Hitchcocks proposal to identify the warrant of a given argument may involve two
judgment calls:
1)
2)

What are the widest repeated content expressions which should be replaced by
variables of the appropriate type?
If a sentence contains multiple repeated content expressions, which should be replaced
by variables?

When confronted with actual examples of arguments, including textbook examples for
analysis, applying Hitchcocks procedure may very well not be a trivial exercise. Lets
examine several examples taken from Goviers text (2010):
(1)

Most people take seriously what they have to pay for and take less seriously and are
less dedicated to something that other people pay for. Adult students of music pay for
their own lessons, whereas children who study music typically have their lessons paid
for by their parents. For this reason, in the context of music lessons, we can expect
adult students to be more serious and dedicated than children. (Govier, 2010, p. 153)

What should strike us immediately with this example is that what you see is not what you get.
That is, there is a distinct difference between the surface vocabulary of this passage and its
depth vocabulary. On the surface, the repeated content expressions are people, take,
seriously, pay for, music, lessons. But students of music and [those] who study
music express the same content, at least in this context, and so should be paraphrased by the
same expression.
The first sentence is asserting something about comparative degrees of seriousness. So
take and seriously are constituents of a complex expression takes seriously to degree.
Again, the sentence asserts that this degree of seriousness depends on who pays for what thing
437

is to be taken seriously or less seriously. So the shared content expression is not pays for but
pays for by. We also see that our paraphrase must include an expression to the effect that
something is greater than something else. So upon paraphrase, the first sentence may become
(1.1)

Most people who pay for one item where someone else pays for another, take the first
item to a certain degree of seriousness and the second to a degree of seriousness less
that the first.

The second sentence actually expresses two statements. Seeking to paraphrase brings out that
lessons is implicitly relational in the context of this argument: x is a lesson for y in
(subject) z. Stating the paraphrase of the second premise requires a further judgment call. The
statement appears to be a conjunction of two straightforward A-categoricals. The universal
quantifier is unrestricted. But is that interpretation fair? Would the statement really be refuted
if one could cite a small number (i.e. greater than 0) of adult music students who did not pay
for their lessons? Clearly this first conjunct makes a claim about most adult music students, or
adult music students ceteris paribus. So the first conjunct of the sentence becomes
(1.2a) Ceteris paribus adult students of music pay for their own lessons in music.
The paraphrase of the second conjunct becomes
(1.2b) Ceteris paribus students of music who are children have a parent pay for their lessons
in music.
In light of these paraphrases, the third sentence requires paraphrasing also. A qualified
generalization is intended, witness we can expect. For simplicity, let us omit the phrase with
a certain degree of dedication:
(1.3)

Ceteris paribus, adult students of music will take seriously their music lessons to a
certain degree and students of music who are children will take seriously their music
lessons to a certain degree, and the first degree of seriousness is greater than the
second.

By now, it should be obvious that in this exercise, we have been doing half of what is required
in symbolic logic in setting up a symbolization key. Recall that such a key will match simple
expressions in a formal language with English expressions. As Bergmann, Moor, Nelson point
out in their text (2014), to represent an English sentence in a symbolic formal language, one
must first paraphrase it to recognize how the symbols fit the sentence (or the sentence the
symbols given the key). As with formal deductive logic, in seeking the warrant, we are
seeking a formal (or at least quasi-formal) feature of the argument. Formal deductive logic
concerns the special case where the warrant is completely formal, retaining no content
expressions. Our reflection on this example shows we are seeking to generalize the procedure.
We must then go the whole wayset up a symbolization key, symbolize the argument through
that key, and then inspect the symbolization for repeated content expressions which should be
replaced by variables of a certain sort. Our symbolization key will include not only formal
438

expressions corresponding to the recognized shared content expressions in our paraphrase, but
to all the non-logical expressions in the argument as paraphrased. This may lead us to
recognize that some content expressions occurring only once in the argument as originally
stated are actually repeated content expressions. For example, people appears only once, but
is implicitly repeated in the argument. Adult students of music are people; so are children. So
not all repeated content expressions will be evident on the surface or upon first inspection of
an argument text.
So what is our argument going to look like when symbolized? Let us set up the
following symbolization key:
UD =
Hx:
Sxy:
Txyz:
Pxyz:
x < y:
x > y:
Lxyz:
Ax:
Cx:
m:
Rxy:

{x: x is a thing}
x is a human being
x is a student of y
x takes y seriously to degree z
x pays for ys z
x is less than y
x is greater than y
x is a lesson for y in (subject) z
x is an adult
x is a child
music
x is a parent of y

This symbolization key reflects a prodigal attitude toward what is to count as a thing. The
class includes far more than physical objects. Hence units of service such as lessons are
things. Degrees are units of measure and so things. Areas of activity may be rather abstract
objects, but music refers to one of them. In general, then, anything which may be the
designation of some referring expression may count for us as a thing for the purpose of
analyzing an argument containing such a referring expression and may be included in the
universe of discourse of the symbolization key for that argument.
Our symbolization key has not taken us beyond the resources of first-order predicate
logic. (For the purists, we could have used Gxy instead of x > y.) But clearly we can not yet
proceed to a symbolic representation of the first sentence as paraphrased and preserve the
force of most. Fortunately our work has already been done for us by the scholastics with the
@-qualifier read as other things being equal, which for our purposes can be taken as having
the same function as most. (See Rescher 1977, pp. 13-14. As pointed out there, the @qualifier is treated in Oesterle 1961, pp. 27-38.)
(1.1) @( x1)( x2)( y1)( y2)(([(Hx1 & Hx2) & x1 x2] & [Px1x1y1 &Px2x1y2])
( z1)( z2)[(Tx1y z1 & Tx1 y2 z2) & z2 < z1])
(1.2a) @( x)( y)[([Sxm & Ax] & Lyxm) Pxxy]
(1.2b) @( x)( y)[([Sxm & Cx] & Lyxm) ( z)(Rzx & Pzxy)]

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(1.3) @( x)( y)( z1)( z2)[(([Sxm & Ax] & [Sym & Cy] & ([Lz1xm & Lz2ym]))
( w1)( w2)([Txz1w1 & Tyz2w2] & w1 > w2)]
Are we now in a position to extract a warrant from this argument as symbolized?
Simplification before proceeding is desirable. If this simplification accords with the intent
expressed by the argument, we should regard it as legitimate. Already our symbolization
should suggest how that simplification should proceed. To be justified in asserting (1.3), one
must be justified in accepting the claimed connection between the subject (antecedent clause)
and the predicate (consequent clause). The subject concerns adults and children who are
students of music together with their music lessons. The predicate concerns the one valuing
their music lessons more than the other. Premises (1.2a) and (1.2b) connect the subject with
the concept of paying for something oneself (1.2a) versus a parent, i.e. someone else, paying
for something (1.2b). Does (1.1) serve to connect ones paying for something oneself versus
someone else paying for it with the difference in valuing that thing, i.e. do we in effect have a
defeasible syllogism in Barbara here? At the propositional core of both a syllogism in Barbara
and this argument, we may see a hypothetical syllogism, if we interpret (1.1) properly. What
is needed then is connecting one persons paying for something himself or herself and valuing
that thing to a certain degree versus someone else not paying for a thing and valuing it to less
of a degree. Now (1.1) concerns a single person, not a comparison between two persons. But
does not (1.1) suggest that people in general give a higher value to what they pay for and in
general a lower value to what someone else has paid for? If this is fair, we have justification
in revising (1.1) as
(1.1) @( x1)( x2)( y1)( y2)(([(Hx1 & Hx2) & x1 x2] & [Px1x1y1 &( w)(Hw & [w
x2 & Pwx2y2]) ( z1)( z2)[(Tx1y1z1 & Tx2y2z2) & z2 < z1])
Look at premise (1.2b). The point is not that the childs parents pay for the music lessons but
that someone other than the child pays for them. So substituting z x for Rzx in (1.2b) is
consonant with the intent of the argument.
Now we are nearly in a position to see how this argument involves the reasoning
pattern of hypothetical syllogism. Elide (1.2a) and (1.2b). The result, which is logically
equivalent to the conjunction of (1.2a) and (1.2b), is
(1.2) @( x1)( x2)( y1)( y2)[[([Sx1m & Ax1] &Ly1x1m) & ([Sx2m & Cx2] & Ly2x2m)]
[Px1x1y1 & ( z)(z x2 & Pzx2y2)])
Now clearly it is a semantic truth, at least in the context of this argument, that adults are
human beings, children are human beings, and adults and children are distinct human beings.
So adding the conjuncts (Hx1 & Hx2) & x1 x2' to the consequent of (1.2) yields a
symbolization of a semantically equivalent statement in this context. Also we may exchange
the bound variable z for w in (1.2) via alphabetic variance. The result is
(1.2) @( x1)( x2)( y1)( y2)[[([Sx1m & Ax1] &Ly1x1m) & ([Sx2m & Cx2] & Ly2x2m)]
[[(Hx1 & Hx2) & x1 x2] & [Px1x1y1 & ( w)(w x2 & Pzx2y2)])

440

Both the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional subformula of (1.2) express
quaternary relations. Likewise, antecedent and consequent of (1.1) express quaternary
relations and the consequent of (1.2) and antecedent of (1.1) express the same relation.
Likewise both antecedent and consequent of (1.3) express quaternary relations, and the
antecedent of (1.3) is logically equivalent to the antecedent of (1.2) (via commutation and
alphebetic variance), while the consequent of (1.3) is the same as the consequent of (1.1).
We have in effect a hypothetical syllogism. Recall Hitchcocks directive to generalize over the
widest repeated content expressions. We have now identified what they are. The warrant of
this argument is
From:
To infer ceteris paribus:

@( x1)( x2)( y1)( y2)[x1x2y1y2 x1x2y1y2]

@( x1)( x2)( y1)( y2)[x1x2y1y2 x1x2y1y2]
@( x1)( x2)( y1)( y2)[x1x2y1y2 x1x2y1y2]

In going from English to a formalization of this argument, we needed a formal language

whose vocabulary includes predicate letters, individual variables, individual constants,
sentential connectives, and quantifiers together with punctuation symbols. A standard formal
language for full first-order predicate logic will also include sentence letters together with the
identity sign and operator symbols. We have also seen that symbolizing defeasible universal
generalizations requires adding the ceteris paribus qualifier @ to our vocabulary. We shall
need more. To analyze certain arguments properly, we shall need modal concepts. Consider
the following:
(2)

There are idiots among students who have taken my courses and I have given them
passing grades. There are bigger idiots among government officials and the electorate
has put them in office. Am I required to be more rigorous then the electorate?

Clearly this argument has an unstated conclusion:

My giving passing grades to students who are idiots is acceptable.
From the informal logic point of view, this argument appears to be a classic example of the
Two Wrongs Make a Right fallacy. (See Govier 2010, pp. 341-42.) From the fact that
behavior of a certain type has been accepted, one infers that some further behavior similar to
that type is acceptable. Looking at the argument as stated, we may formulate the following
symbolization key:
Ix:
Sxy:
Pxy:
Gx:
Bxy:
Oxy:
i:
e:

x is an idiot
x is a student in a course of y
x gives a passing grade to y
x is a government official
x is a bigger idiot than y
x has put y in office
I myself
the electorate
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Symbolizing the premise is straightforward:

(2.1) ( x)( y)[([Ix & Sxi] & Pix) & ([(Gy & [Iy & Byx]) & Oey]]
How shall we symbolize the conclusion as we have formulated it, including the
concept of acceptable? One way to approach this problem uses deontic logic, We may
construe being acceptable as a deontic modal operator equivalent with permissible. Should
deontic represent it ought to be the case that, then deontic represents it is permissible
that, i.e. ~deontic~. On this analysis, we symbolize the conclusion as
(2.2) deontic( x)(Ix & Pix)
As our previous example illustrates how symbolization may help to identify what are the
widest repeated content expressions in an argument, so this example illustrates how we may
identify which of several non-overlapping content expressions we should generalize over. Our
symbolization identifies idiots, gave a passing grade to, and I myself as the shared
content expressions. But we cannot generalize over either idiots or gave a passing grade to.
The resulting inference rule is clearly unacceptable. Keeping in mind that Pxy and Oxy
share the meaning of accepting or approving, and Bxy presents a comparative form of Ix,
we can straightforwardly construct a refutation by logical analogy:
There are highly competent students of mine whom I have failed unfairly and there are
highly competent government officials, even more competent than the students, whom
the electorate has thrown out of office. Therefore my unfairly failing those highly
competent students is acceptable.
This argument is obviously fallacious. On the other had, the fact that I myself, i.e. the
arguments proponent, as opposed to some other instructor gave the passing grades seems of
no importance. We may then replace I with an individual variable to identify the warrant:
From:
To infer ceteris paribus:

( x)( y)[([Ix & Sxz] & Pzx) & ([(Gy & [Iy & Byx]) &
Oey]]
deontic( x)(Ix & Pzx)

Let us consider one further instructive example:

(3)

Charred rhinoceros bones, thought to be about 300,000 years old, were found in an
archeological site in France. Therefore the rhinoceros species lived in Europe about
300,000 years ago. (Example adapted from Govier 2010, p. 152. She credits the
example to a report in the Globe and Mail, June 21, 1995.)

Although seemingly very simple, this argument has some interesting features. First, the
shared content expressions, at least on the surface, are rhinoceros, 300,000 and years. But
years is embedded in two different contexts, years old and years ago. The first is
442

adjectival while the second is adverbial. These units, rather than years, should count as
content expressions (or elements in content expressions), rather than years as an independent
expression. Next, although rhinoceros is a content expression shared between premise and
conclusion, in each case the word is embedded in a context referring to completely different
thingscharred rhinoceros bones versus members of the rhinoceros species.
Cx:
Bxy:
Rx:
Yxy:
Fxy:
Lxyz:
t:
f:
e:

x is charred
x is a bone of y
x is a rhinoceros
x is y years old
x was found in y
x lived in y z years ago
300,000
France
Europe

Given this key, we may symbolize the argument this way:

(3.1) ( x)( y)([([Cx & Bxy] & Ry) & Yxt] & Fxf)
(3.2) ( y(Ry & Lyet)
It is now straightforward to see how the shared content expressions enter into this argument.
By replacing R with a schematic monadic predicate letter or monadic predicate variable
and t with an individual variable, z, extracting the warrant of the argument is totally
straightforward:
From:
To infer ceteris paribus:

( x)( y)([([Cx & Bxy] & y) & Yxz] & Fxf)

( y(y & Lyez)

Hence analyzing beyond surface vocabulary is necessary to identifying the depth content
expressions of the passage and in some cases their grammatical category. The analysis
involves symbolizing the component statements of the argument in a formal language. This
point, however, immediately raises another question. What categories must a formal language
include to be rich enough to handle the different categories of expressions arguments in
general may involve? Answering that question is the subject of the next section of this paper.
3. A COMPREHENSIVE LANGUAGE FOR ANALYZING ORDINARY LANGUAGE
ARGUMENTS
It is easy to see that we shall need more categories of expressions in our language than the
vocabulary of first-order predicate logic with identity and operator symbols, supplemented by
modal operators for various types of modality, will allow. The argument

443

(4)

Tom vouches that he saw the accused leaving the house at 3:00 am. Therefore ceteris
paribus the accused left the house at 3:00 am

indicates a further needed expansion. The expression vouches that is a propositional attitude,
to be classed with knows that and believes that. Understanding the expression as building a
statement operator from a name or other referring expression, e.g. Tom vouches that, Mary
believes that, Larry knows that, we have a category of expression which functions as the
modal operators we have already seen. We understand them this way and refer to them as
attitudinal modalities. Our example makes the point that our formal language must include
them. We may have more than one-place modalities, both attitudinal and non-attitudinal.
Karen believes more strongly that the cosmological argument is fallacious than she believes
that the teleological argument is fallacious instances a two-place attitudinal modality. The
counterfactual conditional and the implication sign in relevance logic are two-place nonattitudinal modalities. Attitudinal modalities may be represented in our language by
expressions parallel to non-attitudinal modalities, already familiar, for example, from
epistemic or doxastic logica capital letter subscripted with an expression referring to
whomever has this attitude toward some proposition. Thus Vt may symbolize Tom vouches
that.
We must expand the vocabulary of our language even further. Consider the argument
(5)

The Secretary of State spoke forcefully about the Syrian Presidents crimes against
humanity. Therefore the Secretary of State spoke about the Syrian Presidents crimes
against humanity.

It seems intuitively clear that if a verb adverbially modified holds of some instance, the verb
without modification holds also.
(6)

Socrates runs quickly. So Socrates runs

to give a much simpler example. Hence, we need a category of adverbial modifiers in our
symbolic language. A convention uses a lower-case letter followed by a dash attaching it to
the representation of the verbal expression.
(6)

q-Rs
Therefore Rs

Lets summarize this exposition of the categories of expressions in our vocabulary by

specifying the vocabulary systematically, including both content and logical expressions. In
this exposition, we are supplementing the formal language for first-order predicate logic with
identity and operator symbols presented by Bergmann, Moor, Nelson (2014):

444

CONTENT SYMBOLS
i.
ii.

iii.
iv.
v.

vi.

Sentence letters:
Predicate letters:

A - Z, with our without positive integer subscripts

Ak - Zk, with our without positive integer subscripts, k 1. The
integer superscript indicates the degree of the predicate and does
not appear in a symbolization, degree being indicated by the
number of terms following the predicate letter.
Constants:
a - v, with or without positive integer subscripts
Individual variables: w, x, y, z, with our without positive integer subscripts
Operation symbols: ak( ) - zk( ), with our without positive integer subscripts. As with
predicate letters, the superscripts indicate the degree of the
operation symbol. Omitted in practice, the degree is indicated by
the number of terms within the following parentheses.
Adverbial symbols: a- z-, with or without positive integer subscripts

LOGICAL SYMBOLS
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

vi.

Sentential connectives: ~, &, , ,

Quantifier symbols: ,
Qualifier symbol:
@
Identity sign:
=
Modal connectives: - it is logically necessary that
- it is logically possible that
C - it is causally necessary that
C - it is causally possible that
F - it always will be the case that
F - it sometimes will be the case that
P - it always was the case that
P - it sometimes was the case that
O - it ought to be the case that
P - it is permissible that
- would conditional
- might conditional
Attitudinal modalities: At - Zt, where t is some term

PUNCTUATION SYMBOLS

(, )

Given these vocabulary categories, the grammar of our language consists of the wellformedness rules of first-order logic supplemented by rules for incorporating the additional
vocabulary elements. Such rules are totally straightforward, but require noting two points.
First, for forming atomic sentences, the class of predicate letters must be widened to the class
of predicate expressions. Besides predicate letters, this class includes predicate expressions
formed by prefixing an adverbial symbol to a predicate expression. An atomic formula then,
will be either a sentence letter, a k-ary predicate expression followed by k terms, or the
445

identity sign flanked by two terms. Second, a quantifier may be immediately preceded by an
@-qualifier.
The richness of this language should aid in seeking to identify the warrant of an
argument. Does our language deliver on its promise? We shall answer that by proposing an
overall procedure for identifying the warrant of an argument which incorporates symbolizing
the argument in a formal language.2 That is our topic in the next section.
4. A COMPREHENSIVE PROCEDURE FOR IDENTIFYING WARRANTS
STEP I.

Identify any merely background statements. Disregard further.

STEP II.

Construct a symbolization key and proceed to symbolize the statements of the

argument.

STEP III.

Decide whether the argument is conclusive or defeasible.

STEP IV.

Reduction Step
A.
Identify the repeated complex expressions in the symbolization.
B.
If a repeated complex expression is a complete sentence not a sentential
component of another repeated complex expression, replace it with a
propositional schematic letter.
C.
In the resulting set of expressions, if a repeated complex expression is
an n-ary relation expression, not a subformula of some wider repeated
n-ary relation expression, replace with an n-ary predicate schematic
letter applied to the n-individual terms in the symbolization.
D.
In the resulting set of expressions, if an expression is a complex term
(i.e. an n-ary operation symbol applied to n-terms), not a component of
some more complex term, replace with an individual variable.

The resulting symbolic sequence represents a reduction in complexity of the symbolization of

the argument. The sequence may still contain repeated expressions. We do not generalize over
any logical constants. Also, we do not generalize over modal connectives or attitudinal
modalities, regarding them as logical as opposed to content symbols. Neither do we generalize
over adverbial symbols. The principle governing all these cases is that we do not generalize
over syncategoremata, i.e. expressions which do not have an independent meaning of their
own but modify the meaning of expressions to which they are attached.
Simple repeated content expressions, i.e. constants, operators, predicate, and
propositional expressions, may remain.
STEP V.

Replace repeated remaining content expressions by individual variables,

operator symbols, predicates, and propositional expressions by schematic
letters of the appropriate sort.

This procedure is a first approximation. We must address the warrants being unacceptable but the inference
step intuitively acceptable.

446

The resulting sequence may still contain content expressions, but not repeated content
expressions.
STEP VI.
A.

B.

STEP VII.

If the argument is deemed conclusive, determine whether the

conclusiveness rests solely on formal considerations or on some
connection between some of the remaining content expressions. If the
conclusiveness rests solely on formal considerations, replace the
remaining content expressions with individual variables or schematic
letters of the appropriate sort. If the conclusiveness rests on some
connection, leave the expressions involved in that connection and
replace only the other content expressions by individual variables or
schematic letters of the appropriate sort.
If the argument is deemed defeasible, no further replacement is
appropriate.

Take the resulting sequence of statement schemata as the warrant of the

argument.

Does our procedure effectively make Hitchcocks judgment calls for identifying the warrant?
After symbolizing the argument, identifying the repeated content expressions which are not
contained as components or subformulas within other repeated content expressions is a matter
of inspecting the symbolization. This allows us easily to make the first judgment call. Our
method then calls for replacing these widest repeated content expressions with individual
variables or schematic letters of the appropriate type. Where there are multiple repeated
content expressions, again inspecting the symbolization identifies them. This lets us
straightforwardly make the second judgment call.
What is the relation between identifying the warrant of an argument and determining
the arguments connection adequacy? We hold that connection adequacy depends on the
acceptability of the associated generalization of the warrant or, if the warrant contains
schematic letters, of the associated generalization schemata. Hence, identifying the warrant is
a significant early step in the evaluation process. How can we present an argument either that
such an associated generalization is acceptable or unacceptable? Answering such a question
lies beyond the scope of this paper. We intend top address that question in future inquiry.

REFERENCES
Bergmann, Merrie, Moor, James, & Nelson, Jack (2014). The logic book. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Freeman, James B. (2013). What types of arguments are there? Studies in logic 6, 30-55.
Govier, Trudy. (2010). A practical study of argument Seventh edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage
Learning.
Hitchcock, David. (1985). Enthymematic arguments. Informal Logic, 7, 83-97.
Rescher, Nicholas. (1977). Dialectics: A controversy-oriented approach to the theory of knowledge. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press.

447

On The Persuasive Power Of The Best Explanation Argument

Rodolfo Gaeta & Nelida Gentile
Department of Philosophy
University of Buenos Aires
Argentina
rgaeta@filo,uba.ar
nelgen@filo.uba.ar

ABSTRACT: Scientific realists claim that scientific realism must be accepted because it is the best
explanation of the success of science. But arguments to the best explanation are objectionable. We explore
the possibility that the greater or lesser resistance to those inferences depends on differences about the
persuasion criteria that correspond to each context: participants of philosophical discussions usually apply
stricter criteria than the ones considered to be persuasive in other kinds of argumentation.
KEYWORDS: argument to the best explanantion, non-miracle argument, scientific realism.

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the inference to the best explanation (IBE) as a kind of
argumentation in philosophy of science. Several scientific realists argue that scientific
realism is the best explanation for the success of science. But serious objections have
been raised against IBE. Given the controversy generated by the IBE argument, this paper
explores the possibility of the fact that the degree of resistance to accepting the inference
to the best explanation depends on differences which are related to the persuasion criteria
that corresponds to each context. We distinguish four different contexts in which IBE is
used: a) the common sense knowledge context; b) the scientific research context; c) the
philosophy of science context: when talking about scientific theories some philosophers
contend that the truth of a theory and the existence of the unobservable entities it posits
are the best explanation of its success; d) the philosophy of science context again, but in a
higher level: when some philosophers argue that scientific realism is true because it
explains the success of science better than the antirealist claims.
According to our hypothesis, participants of philosophical discussions often apply
criteria that are stricter than the ones considered to be persuasive in other kinds of
argumentation, but many realists seem not to be aware of that. As they do not make any
distinction amongst different contexts, they carry on IBE from every day belief formation
to higher levels of philosophy.
We will start with a presentation of the no miracle argument (NMA) as an
emblematic instance of IBE and we will try to show how realists use IBE simultaneously
at different levels of argumentation. We will examine various formalizations of both
NMA and IBE and we will compare the strength of IBE in different contexts. As a result,
we hope to show that, contrarily to what realists believe, IBE is not a powerful tool for
supporting their doctrine.
2. THE CANONICAL FORMULATION OF THE NON MIRACLE ARGUMENT

448

The so-called no miracle argument (NMA) is one of the most widespread beliefs amongst
scientific realists. It can be synthesized, broadly speaking, in the idea that the explanatory
and predictive success of our best scientific theories implies that they are true or
approximately true because, if they werent, their numerous successes would be a
coincidence so surprising as miracles are. Putnam says it with the following words:
And the typical realist argument against idealism is that it makes the success of science a miracle.
And the modern positivist has to leave it without explanation (the realist charges) that 'electron
calculi' and 'space-time calculi' and 'DNA calculi' correctly predict observable phenomena if, in
reality, there are no electrons, no curved space-time, and no DNA molecules. If there are such
things, then a natural explanation of the success of these theories is that they are partially true
accounts of how they behave [...] But if these objects don't really exist at all, then it is a miracle that
a theory which speaks of gravitational action at a distance successfully predicts phenomena; it is a
miracle that a theory which speaks of curved space-time successfully predicts phenomena; and the
fact that the laws of the former theory are derivable 'in the limit' fron1 the laws of the latter theory
has no methodological significance (Putnam, 1978, pp.18-19).

Probably, many people would be persuaded by this argument because it has certain
similarities with inferences that we make in everyday life. Some authors would try to
justify this reasoning proclaiming that it is a special kind of inference, which Peirce
called abduction or retroduction and after Harman is often identified under the name of
inference to the best explanation.
3. THE IBE IN EVERYDAY KNOWLEDGE AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
The incorporation of IBE in the second half of the twentieth century as an important
concept for understanding the process of knowledge is mainly due to Hanson. He
represented IBE as follows (Hanson, 1958, p. 86)
[1] The surprising fact C is observed
[2] But if H were true, C would be a matter of course
[3] Hence, there are reasons to suspect that H is true
As we have said, this type of inference is often used in common-sense knowledge. Van
Fraassen, proposed an example that illustrates this: if you hear little noises that come
from the interior of the wood walls, if in addition you see that a piece of cheese that had
been left the night before on the table has disappeared and there are mouse droppings on
the floor, you will accept the hypothesis that there is a mouse in the house. It is not fully
clear whether van Fraassen would be willing to admit that in situations like these it is fair
to say that the hypothesis is accepted as true (or probably true) or only that it is accepted
as empirically adequate (Psillos, 1999, pp. 211ff); but in any case he rejects that a
reasoning of this kind is valid in the scientific context. Recall that for van Fraassen the
goal of science is not to find true theories but empirically adequate theories, i.e. find
theories whose observational predictions are effectively met. According to van Fraassen,
then, a scientist would not be entitled to believe that the predictive success of his theory
implies that it is true and that the entities postulated by it, for example, the atoms, do
exist.

449

Psillos suggests that if the reasons for van Fraassen to object the use of IBE in the
scientific context are intended to prevent unwanted ontological commitments with new
classes of entities because they allow inferring the existence of unobservable entities,
then van Fraassen is wrong. Because the IBE is also used to infer the past existence of
extinct species, i.e, a new kind of entities, from the discovery of fossils, and these
animals, although unobserved by us, are not unobservable entities.
On our part, we believe that anyway there is a difference between the mouse and a
possible extinct species. Although van Fraassen considers it appropriate not to draw any
distinction between a theoretical vocabulary and an observational one, it seems
undeniable that asserting the existence of an extinct species is very far from our everyday
experience. There is a much more hypothetical and uncertain character in the former
assertion. In the event of having observed the behavior of mice, a prehistoric man surely
would have reached the same conclusion as that a person of our day would, had he found
the same indirect evidence of their presence. And, in fact, the finding of a fossil is a
pretty different situation, to name one of the reasons because its identification as a fossil
implies a controversial theoretical supposition. The case of the "Piltdown Man" is a good
example.
Psillos extends the use of IBE from everyday life to scientific research very
naturally. But at the scientific level, the postulation of theoretical entities, even though
they might serve to explain and predict phenomena, has often been rejected. This was the
case for atoms, which Mach never accepted. In addition, the entities of everyday life,
such as the mouse that has eaten the cheese or the weasel that has eaten the hens during
the night, belong to kinds of things that have remained unchanged for a long time, while
theoretical entities have frequently resulted to not exist or their concepts have been
modified so much that the realists have to make desperate efforts to sustain that the old
theories were to some extent true and the entities they posited are eventually the same as
those that are postulated today.
4. THE IBE IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTATION
Now let us consider the use of IBE at the philosophical level. According to what we have
already seen, the example proposed by van Fraassen would have this form:
[1] The surprising fact C (the indications of the presence of a mouse) is observed
[2] But if H were true (if there is a mouse in the house), C would be a matter of
course
[3] Hence, there are reasons to believe that there is a mouse in the house
But Putnam's argument about realism is considerably more complex. To begin with, in
the text we quoted above there are overlapping arguments that operate at different levels
of analysis. On the one hand, in a first meta-scientific level (MS 1), it is argued that the
predictive success of scientific theories can be naturally explained if it is thought that
theories explain properly how things really are in the portion of reality they deal with. On
the other hand, Putnam climbs to an upper epistemological, a meta-meta-scientific level
(MS 2) when he applies a similar form to argue not directly about scientific theories but
about certain epistemological conceptions, in this case, realism and antirrealism.

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To facilitate the analysis, we will adopt a more precise formulation of the argument
corresponding to MS 1. Magnus and Callender, for example, offered a schema that seems
to pick up the core of Putnams argument (Magnus and Callender 2004: 320-338):
[1] The theory h is very likely to be successful
[2] If h were true, it would be very likely to be successful
[3] If h were false, it would not be likely to be successful
[4] Therefore, there is a high probability that h is true
At first sight, Magnus and Callenders formulation of IBE differs from the one proposed
by Hanson, because they do not make any explicit reference to the relationship between
the explanatory and predictive power of a hypothesis and the likelihood of that being true.
However, we can establish the connection because the success of a theory would be
measured precisely according to its ability to explain and predict phenomena.
On the other hand, oddly, although Magnus and Callenders schema aims to
clarify the non-deductive form of IBE, it can easily be transformed into a deductive
reasoning without adding any assumption. In fact, from the premises [1] and [3] of
previous argument, that is,
[1] The theory h is very likely to be successful
[3] If h were false, it would not be likely to be successful
by modus tollens we can infer:
* Theory h is not false
And from there we can deduce the conclusion Magnus and Callender had reached:
** Theory h is very probably true
In this case, the crux of the matter is not in the kind of inference that leads to the
conclusion but in the justification of the premises that associates the success of a
hypothesis with a high probability of it being true. This situation was shown also by
Musgrave, who feels that the classic formulations of IBE are deductively fallacious. If
you want to avoid the fallacy, he suggests, you should express the argument in this
manner (Musgrave 1999: 285):
[1] If hypothesis H is the best explanation of the fact to be explained, then it is
reasonable to accept H as true
[2] H is the best explanation of the evidence
[3] Therefore, it is reasonable to accept H as true
On the other hand, some authors -like Magnus and Callender- say that IBE is inductively
fallacious. If all that is true, if IBE can't be justified either in an inductive or a deductive
way, proponents of the idea that there is a relationship between the explanatory value of a
hypothesis and its truth should think that the statement "If hypothesis H is the best

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explanation of the fact to be explained, then it is reasonable to accept H" is a reliable

assertion on its own right, perhaps because it possesses a sort of intuitive evidence. In
fact, it looks like some conclusions reached in everyday knowledge, as in the case of the
mouse, rely on the implicit acceptance of that belief.
As we have shown, IBE is used at the meta-meta-scientific level (MS 2) to justify
the scientific realism. Kukla expresses the argument as follows (Kukla: 12):
[1] The enterprise of science is (enormously) more successful than can be
accounted for by chance
[2] The only (or best) explanation for this success is the truth (or approximate
truth) of the scientific theories
[3] Therefore, we should be scientific realists
This argument may be reformulated so that the assumption that the virtue of being the
best explanation involves the truth becomes explicit. This is achieved by adding the
premise:
* If the scientific realism is the best explanation for the success of science, then
realism is true.
The explication of this premise drives us back to considering the value of IBE in those
different contexts in which it is used. Next, we will develop our conclusions in this
regard.
5. THE SCOPE OF IBE
According to what we have said so far, IBE is an instrument which has been used at least
in the following contexts: a) in the common-sense knowledge context; b) in the scientific
knowledge context, especially as a way of legitimating the belief in the existence of
theoretical entities postulated by a specific scientific theory; c) in the philosophy of
science context, as a sort of generalization about scientific theories and the existence of
theoretical entities ("successful scientific theories are approximatively true and
theoretical entities postulated by them very probably exist"); d) in the philosophy of
science context, but at a higher meta-philosophical order ("scientific realism is true
because it is the best explanation for the success of the science").
We have already advanced that IBE probably has a different persuasive force
depending on the context in which it is being used, that is, depending on the
circumstances in which it is applied and the intended audience to which it is directed. In
general, this remark seems to be true of any kind of inference, except perhaps those that
are strictly deductive. It would seem that, for example, a simple enumerative induction
would be more easily accepted in everyday life than in the context of scientific research,
where it must comply with certain special conditions about the extension of the sample,
its representativeness, etc. Inductivist philosophers often point out that the inductive
inferences are used constantly in both common sense knowledge and factual sciences.
But they have found it difficult to justify these inferences in the face of objections from
Humean criticism so they had to elaborate more refined versions of the induction to

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reconstruct and validate their use when justifying scientific theories. From a
philosophical point of view, Popper has not hesitated in sustaining that even if it were
true that in everyday life and in the scientific research induction is continuously used, all
who do so can be wrong. But even under the assumption that a persuasive defense of
inductive inferences in factual sciences has actually been achieved, there is no room for
them in, for example, formal sciences. The so called mathematical conjectures do not
cease to be only conjectures no matter how many favorable cases they accumulate.
Precisely, their interest lies in the fact that they seem to have no exceptions. But only a
deductive demonstration could convert a mathematical conjecture in a theorem. Despite
Mills attempt to show that the laws of pure mathematics have arisen inductively and
despite Quine's suggestion on the possibility that such principles are revisable in extreme
cases, the prevalent conviction is that mathematical truths belong to the field of a priori
knowledge. In the same vein, the fact that a kind of reasoning can be admitted in the
context of common-sense knowledge or in factual sciences does not imply or makes it
more likely that it is equally acceptable in the domain of philosophy.
Now we must ask ourselves: What relevance and validity the non-deductive
inferences and in particular IBE could have in philosophical contexts? Philosophical
discourse, even if we focus only in the philosophy of science, is so varied that trying to
identify ways of justifying philosophical thesis seems more difficult than to agree about
how to reconstruct the methodology of the factual sciences. But if we put aside the claim
of naturalizing epistemology to the point where it would became simply one more of the
empirical sciences, philosophy of science seems to depend essentially, although perhaps
not exclusively, on a priori analysis. Notorious examples are the statements of Putnam
about his well-known argument of the brains in a vat. After confessing that for several
years he had many doubts about its validity, Putnam relates that his argument came to his
mind while he was studying the Lwenheim-Skolem theorem and he saw a connection
with some arguments developed by Wittgenstein. He points out that, even when some
elements of his own argument have an empirical origin, it has a kinship with Kant's
transcendental reflections because he developed it by thinking a priori about the
conditions of the possibility of knowledge (Putnam 1981)
Another valuable testimony in favor of the independence of the philosophical
inquiry with respect to the factual knowledge comes from Kuhn. Despite having been one
of the creators of the so-called "historical philosophy of science", he confessed in his late
works that his doctrine, also partially related to that of Kant, had been since its very
beginning rooted in philosophical principles rather than in empirical data extracted from
the history of science.
Philosophical discussions have a sui generis status. They cannot be empirically
contrasted, as it is assumed that it can be done with common sense beliefs about the
world or the hypothesis of factual sciences, neither can they be solved as problems of
mathematics or pure logic. This does not mean, of course, that certain principles
associated with inferences, such as the principle of induction or the argument to the best
explanation, become useless in philosophical discourse; but this shows that they deserve
at least a special justification that so far seems to be out of our reach.
As an illustration of the difficulties involved in applying to philosophical theories
concepts forged with the purpose of analyzing scientific theories, it should be noted, for
example, that while the predictive success of a scientific theory could be a strong

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indication of its empirical adequacy, such an approach could not be extended to

philosophical theories. It would be inapplicable because we can't even understand what
empirical adequacy means for theories which, by its own origin, do not purport to
describe the world in the same manner of the factual sciences. Similarly, while IBE
presupposes a notion of explanation which, as in the Hempelian models, allows us to
stablish the truth or the likelihood of the explananda as a consequence of the truth of the
explanans, it is not clear in what sense a philosophical theory constitutes an "explanation"
or a "best explanation". In addition, if we assume that the truth of a scientific theory
means something like a correct description of both, the observable and non-observable
characteristics of nature, it is not very clear in what sense we can say that a philosophical
conception, as the scientific realism or its rivals, are "true" or "false".
6. CONCLUSION
In summary, logicians have identified the use of IBE in common-sense thought and
scientific research and that discovery has inspired its explicit use in philosophy of science
to underpin scientific realism. However, this maneuver, especially when IBE is expressed
in the no miracle argument, far from overcoming the resistance of scientific antirealists,
seems to offer evidence that the persuasive power of IBE becomes increasingly weak as
we move further away from the domain of the beliefs of common sense.

REFERENCES
Hanson, N.R. (1958). Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kuhn, Th. (1992). The Trouble with the History Philosophy of Science. Rothschild Distinguished Lecture.
Cambridge: Department of the History of Science, Harvard University.
Kukla, A. (1998). Studies in Scientific Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Magnus, P.D. y Callender, C. (2004). Realist ennui and the base rate fallacy. Philosophy of Science, 71(3)
Musgrave, A. (1999). Essays on Realism and Rationalism. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London: Routledge.
Putnam; H. (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Fraassen, B.C. (1980). The Scientific Image. New York: Oxford UniversityPress.

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The Strategic Function Of Argumentative Moves In Corporate

Social Responsibility (CSR) Reports
Anca G
Department of French
Dunrea de Jos University of Galai
Romania
Anca.Gata@ugal.ro

ABSTRACT: A CSR report may be viewed as part of a virtual critical discussion in which the company
acts as a protagonist claiming that their behaviour is responsible towards society. Social actors may be
represented as virtual antagonists in the critical discussion who (virtually) doubt or critique this standpoint.
This paper presents several argumentative moves used in CSR reports to build a better image of the
business and persuade various audiences that the company acts responsibly towards society.
KEYWORDS: adjudication, appeal to emotions, argumentation, argumentative move, audience demand,
critical discussion, CSR report, organizational rhetoric, pragma-dialectic approach, strategic maneuvering.

1. INTRODUCTION
CSR is defined as the attitude companies adopt towards society, consisting in responsible
business practice. CSR discourse has become lately a strategic issue for companies and
their marketing operations. The methodological framework of this study is the pragmadialectical approach to argumentation. In this framework, businesses and other social
actors are represented as parties in a difference of opinion. CSR discourse may thus be
viewed as a fragment of a virtual critical discussion in which the company acts as a
protagonist and claims that their corporate business behaviour is responsible. Other social
actors may be represented as virtual antagonist(s) who doubting or critique this
standpoint. They may be held as having not agreed to the main standpoint at issue.
This study identifies several argumentative moves used in CSR reports to help the
company prove to stakeholders and to the public opinion that the company acts
responsibly towards society.
2. THE CSR REPORT
A CSR report is a discourse genre or subgenre which pertains to organizational
communication. It opens with a CEOs letter and lists the most important contributions
made by the company to social welfare, environment protection and sustainability.
CSR reports are meant to show how much, in which ways and with which effects
a company invests in environmental and community protection. Responsibility towards
sustainability and well being is the main focus of CSR discourse. CSR reports are usually
issued in the first five months of the year for the previous year of the companys activity.
A CSR report would tell mainly about the companys activity and operations with respect
to their impact on human, social, technological and natural environment during the
previous year. This account is to show all those interested in the existence and the activity
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of the company that, although interested in making profit, the company may yield various
benefits to communities and contribute to sustainability and well-being.
When the CEO is not Warren Buffet himself, the CEOs letter introducing a CSR
/ sustainability report or an annual report is most often written by a free lance
professional, also known as a writer-for-hire. For instance, Andrew Wilson is reported
to have a special formula for writing CEOs letters:
A companys product is pitted against its competitors. But a companys annual
report is pitted against the business media and the analyst community, which are
susceptible to groupthink in the way they look at companies, Wilson says. The
CEOs letter can and should challenge the storyline with a more compelling, more
in-depth, more accurate narrative. Theres a double requirement to achieve this:
honesty, and a willingness to deal with the challenges the company faces.
Wilson recommends that you dramatically make the case for where the company
wants to go and how it will get there despite the difficulties. (Murray, 2008)
More recently, a CSR report of good quality is written by a specialized agency, on the
basis of a writing protocol obeying reporting regulations set by the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI). This is seen by Walmart, for instance, as a multi stakeholder approach
(Walmart 2012 Global Responsibility Report 2012, back of the front cover).
Writing a CSR report is part of the job of a specialist in what may sometimes be
called strategic writing, a subfield of Marketing and of the Business Administration area.
Courses, seminars, workshops are being held to train professionals in reporting about
sustainability and corporate responsibility. It may be presumed that not all companies
have the capacity of choosing the right means by which to have a report issued. The title
of the report, usually mentioned on the cover, states the type of CSR report (it may a
sustainability report) and the year(s) for which the report was drawn. Walmart, for
instance, mentions 2012 on the cover of its CSR report for 2011, that is, the publication
year of the report instead of the activity year reported about. To this adds another
inconsistency or negligence in the first descriptive paragraph, About the report, where
the year 2012 is mentioned again instead of 2011:
(1) The report reviews our progress and performance during fiscal year 2012,
reflects areas where we have achieved tremendous positive results and specifies
areas of opportunity we must continue to focus on. The reporting timeline covers
the period of Feb. 1, 2011 - Jan. 31, 2012 and builds on our last report, issued
April 2011. (Walmart 2012 Global Responsibility Report, front cover; my italics.)
The company has a clear advantage in using the CSR report as a strategic tool since it
may present its actions and activities with no direct interference from any opposite party
or media bias. If some years ago CSR reports of large companies obeyed to the GRI
standards, but also to their own marketing goals, the latest CSR reports obey quite strict
standards and they mention it at the end of the report, giving precise indications on which
particular GRI issue they are concerned with and also mentioning the place in the CSR
report the issue is addressed (see Wells Fargo & Company CSR Report 2011). Therefore,
it may be assumed that more recent CSR reports are less adapted to discourse analysis

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since they no longer reveal much of the companies marketing and branding strategies
which were more transparent in previous CSR reports.
3. THE CSR REPORT DISCOURSE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF PRAGMADIALECTICS: STRATEGIC MANEUVERING
This study proposes to add to the list of domains relevant for argumentative analysis the
field of organizational discourse, and mainly its subfield strategic discourse. There are
many argumentative practices within the organizational domain which can be analyzed
from the rhetorical and dialectical perspectives. Organizational rhetoric is considered to
be the art of reacting to rhetorical situations arising in the companys activity, and
dealing with these also involves proactively and strategically molding such situations.
(Conrad, 2011, p. 130)
CSR discourse is conceived in the framework of this study as a manifestation of
argumentative practice following specific patterns. Within the pragma-dialectical
framework, the CSR report may be viewed as an argumentative type or subtype
belonging to the public sphere. It is a highly institutionalized and conventionalized piece
of discourse, a discursive and communicative category regulated by the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI).
The text of a CSR report may be analysed with the tools of the pragma-dialectical
methodology. The analyst may identify or reconstruct in such text excerpts standpoints,
or virtual standpoints, expressed or unexpressed starting points for argumentation,
arguments, substandpoints of a protagonist representing the company / corporation. The
antagonist is virtual, being represented by the various categories of stakeholders and/or
the media.
The CSR report is a good opportunity for the company to act as a protagonist by
advancing its credo with respect to business practice in correlation with CSR. Its actions
and activities are presented here in the most advantageous way, the more so as the report
is drawn by specialists and elaborated over a long period of time.
The extended pragma-dialectical theory introduces the notion of strategic
maneuvering in order to allow the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse by
looking at the efforts of the speaker or writer to pursue rhetorical effectiveness and at the
same time dialectical reasonableness. This study assumes that CSR reports of important
companies are written by specialists in the field of strategic writing and global reporting.
It might thus be interesting to look at how strategic maneuvering is achieved in this type
of discourse, or discourse subgenre. In adopting this approach, I consider that the
discourse excerpts from CSR reports I am analyzing come from a writer who, in his
strategic maneuvering, is combining in a systematic way rhetorical techniques with
efforts to fully comply with the dialectical rules for critical discussion (cf. van Eeemeren
et al., 2012, p. 323).
One important assumption of this study is the idea that CSR reports of global
corporations or of companies operating at a multinational level in various regions of the
world may stand as very good or excellent examples of strategic maneuvering.
In a discourse analysis approach, CSR reports may be thought to act as a
descriptive and narrative argumentation in favor of the standpoint We are doing
business / making profit responsibly / with responsibility towards society and the
environment. In this statement, the term society makes reference to all types of individual
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and group stakeholders, and the term environment points to human-made and natural
environment.
Many CSR reports, mainly those published in the previous years, did not take into
account closely all the standards of the GRI. This is why some of them do not advance
this standpoint explicitly and it has to be reconstructed for the analysis. It may be
considered as an unexpressed argumentative move: the corporation may not make
explicitly the argumentative move of advancing this standpoint. Throughout the whole
CSR report however, the company provides evidence to support it. The company is not
only saying (implicitly) that they are acting responsibly, but also that they are doing this
because they have an ethical behaviour / care about the stakeholders.
The main hypothesis of this study is that a CSR report is a well regulated piece of
discourse illustrating at its best the concept of strategic maneuvering. This means that on
most occasions, strategic maneuvering has legitimate manifestations in CSR reports of
good quality, while the fallacious manifestations of strategic maneuvering are a most
infrequent case in such reports.
A fallacious manifestation of strategic maneuvering consists in an argumentative
move for which, at the point in discourse where it occurs, certain soundness conditions
have not been met that apply to the mode of strategic maneuvering concerned in that
activity type and argumentative situation in which the maneuvering takes place. (van
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009, p. 14)
In line with pragma-dialectical studies (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 269, note 5; van
Eemeren et al., 2012, p. 323), I am using the term (rhetorical) effectiveness with regard to
strategic discourse instead of the term persuasiveness. It can be considered that such
discourse is more than simply rhetorical, or persuasive, since persuasiveness is not by
definition subjected to the requirements of reasonableness (van Eemeren 2010: 269).
Moreover, the discourse of the CSR report has or pretends to have communicative value
to a high degree: it is informative, descriptive, evaluative, commissive. It is meant to
communicate knowledge about the corporation from the inside, besides communicating
the good intentions of the corporation towards society and the environment.
3.1 Adaptation to the CSR reports audience demands
Meant to convince an audience by a combination of rhetorical techniques and dialectical
efforts, strategic maneuvering is concerned, among others, with adapting discourse to
audience expectations and using various presentational (linguistic) devices.
As already mentioned, the audience of a CSR report is represented by
stakeholders. In one of the CSR reports analyzed for this study (Arcelor Mittal USA
Corporate Responsibility Report 2012, written by Jeff Fraga), the following categories of
stakeholders are identified: employees, customers, suppliers, investors and lenders,
government and regulators, non-governmental organizations, multilateral and business
organizations, media, local communities. These can be found at local, regional, national,
international level. The larger and/or more multinational a company, the larger and the
more diverse and diversified its audience.
In designing the CSR report, a writer should take into account the various roles
stakeholders play as a unitary group or, more obviously, as distinct groups. Stakeholders,
as a unitary group and as distinct groups are the addressees of the CSR report. It is
however assumed that: 1) most of the stakeholders are not aware of the contents of the
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CSR report; 2) the CSR report is mainly designed for the media, the government and
some agencies which are able to disseminate parts of it to a larger audience on various
occasions.
Various groups of stakeholders are the beneficiaries of the (CSR) actions and
activities of the company. Such actions are of two types: actions directed specifically to
certain groups of stakeholders as part of the routine activity of the company (for job
seekers and employees, the company has created jobs and given stability to the current
positions) and actions directed specifically to certain groups of stakeholders as part of the
companys concern for society and the environment.
As previously mentioned, from the pragma-dialectical perspective, the CSR
report may be reconstructed as a critical discussion. If the CSR discourse is represented
as a critical discussion, the stakeholders may be represented as virtual antagonists. Each
category of stakeholders may play the role of a (virtual) antagonist of some
(sub)standpoints. They may also play the role of a (virtual) protagonist of standpoints, as
they are introduced / reported by the writer of the CSR report.
By strategic maneuvering, a writer or a speaker should adapt the argumentative
moves to audience demand. This means that the speaker / writer should: a) seek to
achieve communion with the audience; b) privilege endoxa, by valuing at their most the
beliefs of the many and of the wise; c) make concessions to the audience, by taking into
account their beliefs and commitments concerning the standpoint and the topic of the
discussion; d) be aware of contextual commitments of the audience, created in the
particular argumentative situation. Endoxa corresponds to views generally accepted in a
specific culture or subculture (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2012, p. 52, note 1). In
Aristotles Topics, endoxa points to commonly held beliefs and beliefs of the many or
of the wise or both. (T. Irwin, Aristotles First Principles, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1988, pages 8 and 57, quoted by van Eemeren and Garssen 2012, p. 52, note 1)
A specific group of stakeholders may be made reference to in the report to act as
an antagonist of a companys standpoint. If so, this move is strategic as long as the
critique or doubt on the virtual antagonists side is brought about in the CSR report to be
dissipated. In the following excerpt, the local community, the local authorities and
possibly the government are categories of stakeholders which could act as antagonists.
Although the company does not explicitly assure these categories of stakeholders that
their dams will not fail, they show commitment to the structural soundness of the dams
by pointing to / naming / evoking the most concerned category of stakeholders:
(2) It is important that our tailing dams are structurally sound to ensure they do
not pose a risk to local peoples health and safety to the environment. (Steel:
stakeholder value at every stage, Corporate responsibility 2013, Arcelor Mittal;
my italics)
Adaptation to audience demand in strategic maneuvering consists in ensuring
communion with the people the argumentative discourse is aimed at by achieving
certain communicative and interactional effects on the audience. (van Eemeren &
Garssen, 2012, p. 49) Therefore, it is important to take into account who the audience are
and which their relevant views and preferences are. Taking the audience into account,
which is the main purpose of a CSR report, means taking into account and valuing their
individual and group values, views, preferences. Their views correspond to their
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descriptive commitments (idem), i.e. what they know, what they believe, what they
believe they know about reality (facts, truths, presumptions, the real, in Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tytecas terminology, as quoted idem). Their preferences are considered by
pragma-dialecticians to be their normative commitments and to include values, value
hierarchies, and loci. Several types of such commitments could be identified based on the
criterion of as it were notoriety: explicit commitments, or concessions, expressed in the
opening stage of a critical discussion; implicit situational commitments (pertaining to the
given situation called contextual commitments by pragma-dialecticians); implicit
general commitments, or endoxa. These three classes of commitments represent the
audiences frame of reference (cf. van Eemeren & Garssen, 2012, p. 52). A special class
of implicit situational commitments are the acquired discursive commitments which turn
up along the discourse as a result of the argumentative moves made.
With reference to a CSR report, these commitments may be pertaining to the
party producing the CSR report, since there is no direct and immediate involvement of
the other party when the report is being produced. The CSR report is thus a static
discourse, it is an official document based on previous interaction and apt to subsequently
yield reactions. At various points of the report, according to its sections, the target group
and the specific groups of addressees may be different.
For instance, the media may be interested in all the elements of the report as a
target group and as an addressee. Employees and customers are more interested in their
workplace conditions and product quality and price, respectively. They are less concerned
by the CSR report. The employees are most often targeted by one or several sections of
the report, but are not always an addressee group, since it is not expected by the company
that all employees read the report. The customers may well play the same roles as the
employees, and not be aware of the CSR report contents. Nevertheless, any individual or
smaller groups of these two categories of stakeholders may easily get in touch with the
information in the CSR report by means of media and publicity. This is why it is
important to distinguish, from a methodological viewpoint, between the target group as
audience and the audience as simply audience of the report (case of the government,
nongovernmental associations, etc.)
3.2 Pointing to the audience
It is assumed that in the case of a CSR report, the audience is represented by the
stakeholders. A common presentational device used in the CSR reports is the direct
address to the audience in the Introductory Section of the report, The CEOs Letter. This
section in the 2013 Arcelor Mittal CSR report is titled Letter from our CEO and
chairman. Lakshmi Mittal addresses the audience in a friendly and polite way: Dear
stakeholders, by wishing them Welcome to the CSR report. This use of the direct address
creates for the stakeholder the status of an interlocutor, an individual who is in some way
given the opportunity to enter communication with the CEO. It also leads to think that the
CEO envisages the CEO report as if it were written for the stakeholders. In fact, media is
often the conveyor of the information included in the CSR report to the stakeholders.
Another common presentational device used in CEO letters and in CSR reports is
addressing the stakeholders indirectly. This can be achieved in several ways.

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a) Describing the stakeholder. The stakeholders may be defined as a whole group

in the CSR report. This ensures that the company has a very positive image of the
stakeholder. This move can act as a captatio benevolentiae, especially when it appears at
the beginning of the report. In the excerpt below, the report author chose to depict
intellectual and professional qualities of the stakeholders to show that the company
respects and highly praises the stakeholders, no matter the category:
(3) Stakeholders in todays digital world are smart. (Steel: stakeholder value at
every stage, Corporate responsibility 2013, ArcelorMittal; my italics)
b) Pointing to the stakeholders benefits. Pointing to various benefits stakeholders
may have from the companys activity is a strategic move playing the role of an
argument. For this study, the CSR Report of ArcelorMittal was examined to identify
discourse fragments using explicitly the term benefit in relationship with the stakeholders.
The excerpts (4) to (11) mention explicitly that there have been various benefits affecting
the local communities. Figures, mention of places and years of activities allow the report
author to appeal to logos and make the argument more convincing for the local
community, the government, other organizations, employees. The stakeholders are
pointed to by mentioning the particular activities addressing them and the specific
benefits they may have had (my italics in the quotes).
Using a dissociation in (4), by means of the phrase real change, contributes to
distinguishing the role of ArcelorMittal compared to that of other companies. The local
stakeholders are explicitly referred to so as to identify their main point of interest in the
report:
(4) ... in Liberia, where we operate an iron ore mine. We are bringing real
change to the country, but in doing so we want to ensure we are sensitive to local
stakeholders and bring them long term benefits. We have set up 52 local
consultation forums and last year ran 103 workshops with the local community.
(p. 3)
The appeal to logos by evidential arguments is often the case. On the one hand the GRI
requests numerical information an details, but at the same time the company puts itself in
a favorable position when reminding the stakeholders of concrete measurable projects:
(5) There have also been some important economic and social benefits: between
270 and 600 jobs were created between 2006 and 2011; the $20.7 million of
programme investments during the same period generated an estimated $45
million of extra local economic activity; and the area has become more attractive
as a leisure and fishing destination. There is also less risk of flooding and harmful
algal blooms. (p. 48)
When the contribution of the company to the living standard of a community is obvious,
the appeal to emotions is most often the case. The CSR report may thus touch upon
sensitive issues, as employment. Even if the project is not yet in place, as in (6), the
company will announce its commitment for the future as an appeal to pathos:

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(6) As part of the Inuit Impact and Benefits Agreement negotiated with the
Qikiqtani Inuit Association, Baffinland will look first to the five closest North
Baffin communities when it hires new employees. (p. 52)
By using the term benefits, the CSR report may make reference to a series of benefits
derived from one another, in a cause to consequence relationship. In (7), employing local
people leads to training them, which leads to an enhancement of their skills, which may
lead to long-term benefits for the larger community:
(7) Along with our contractors, we employ nearly 3,000 employees in Liberia,
96% of whom are local. Because we are investing in the ongoing education and
training of employees and contractors, we also have the opportunity to raise the
skills level of the local population. This has long-term benefits for the country and
its citizens, as well as for ArcelorMittal. (p. 52)
The company points to the total number of beneficiaries of ArcelorMittal Foundation
projects in 2013, which is 3.06m (p. 57. The information on various benefits is
summarized in a more convenient way, then repeated in (8) and supplemented by the
number of projects developed by the company:
(8) In 2013, over three million people benefited from 558 projects supported by
the Foundation in communities surrounding our steel plants and mines. (p. 56)
The stakeholders in poor countries and important categories of population are targeted by
the projects, and explicitly referred to repeatedly as in (9) and (10), again with evidential
mentions of numbers as:
(9) The Foundation promotes the exchange of best practice across the globe. For
example, in several countries of the Americas Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela the Foundation supports a project Seeing is
Believing, which focuses on testing childrens eyesight. Detecting and addressing
problems with childrens sharpness of vision are key to supporting pupil
performance at school. This project benefited 16,812 children in 2013. (p. 56)
(10) In Ukraine, the ArcelorMittal Foundation invested in the repair of three
schools, a kindergarten, a boarding-school for deaf children and a health
improvement camp for children, which will help them to play and study in a safe
and warm environment. The facilities are located in the towns around Kryviy Rih.
In 2013, 12,950 pupils benefited from these facilities. (p. 57)
If not explicitly mentioned, the beneficiaries are included in a larger group, those affected
by the changes involved in establishing the companys operational premises and
facilities:
(11) We do everything we can to avoid involuntary resettlements, and where this
does prove to be unavoidable we always aim to adhere to international standards
and comply with the national or relevant regional authorities guidelines on
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resettlement and compensation. In practice this means consulting those affected

and devising an approach that will best benefit those affected, and offer them a
better quality of life as a result. (p. 71)
c) Pointing to the cooperation of the stakeholders. This kind of address is
emotional and apt to create communion between the company voiced as we and
the very heterogeneous group of stakeholders. Moreover, in (12) the combination
between the first person plural pronoun (we our) and the noun stakeholders in
the context of a directive speech act (we need) is in itself emotional while creating
a positive image of any stakeholder virtually capable, as the text of the report is
saying, of support and understanding.
(12) We need the support and understanding of our stakeholders. Effective
engagement to ensure they have a good understanding of our business and the
decisions we take is vital. (Lakshmi Mittal, letter to employees, February 2014,
quoted in CSR Report Arcelor Mittal, 2013, p. 65.)
d) Naming / Evoking explicitly the stakeholders. A presentational device used in
the latest CSR reports is naming the audience. As previously mentioned and
shown in excerpts (4) to (12), the audience of a CSR report is at times identical
with the groups which CSR discourse and the report itself are targeting. Naming
the audience / Evoking the target groups is the handier presentational device for
the contents of the CSR report which is mostly narrative and descriptive, with no
explicit auctorial presence. It is different in point of narrative perspective and
stance from The CEOs Letter, which addresses the audience directly.
This becomes obvious from the very title of the 2013 ArcelorMittal CSR report: Steel:
stakeholder value at every stage. The function of the colon here is ambiguous. Does it
stand for a copula is or for a verb, such as produces, or for a passive structure, such as
is invested with? This ambiguity may be voluntary and help achieve a rhetorical poetic
effect through ellipsis.
3.3 Calling upon the emotions of the audience
A presentational device used to call upon the emotions of the audience is the use of
emotionally endowed words.
In (12), terms such as support and understanding in connection with the notion of
stakeholder (pointing to almost any recipient of the CSR report message) ensure
emotional overload. To this add the repetition of the word understanding, the use of such
words as to ensure and vital. If the CSR report is to be conceived as able to be fit in the
pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion, then these statements act as a listing of
starting points in the opening stage of a critical discussion.
Moreover, ArcelorMittal presents itself as the worlds leading steel and mining
company (see main website of the corporation. http://corporate.arcelormittal.com/). The
presentation of the corporation on the website homepage is strongly rhetorical, by an
artful appeal to emotionally endowed words: Guided by a philosophy to produce safe,
sustainable steel, it is the leading supplier
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4. THE CSR REPORT DISCOURSE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE ACTIVITY TYPE

The discourse of the CSR reports resembles the activity type adjudication. It addresses at
the same time a particular class of stakeholders or the stakeholders as a whole, and a third
party. It may have as a particular goal, for instance, to show the investors that the
company is acting responsibly towards them and to convince the government that the
company is socially responsible. We are speaking in this case of a double fold effect, with
different pursued consequences with the two categories of audience. And the same piece
of discourse may have a more convincing force on the latter category than on the former
or vice versa. For the examples provided, it may be judged by the government that the
company has done its best to comply with social responsibility commitments, among
others. The consequence may be new regulations favouring the company, and not the
investors.
In this way, a CSR report fragment of discourse functions as an argumentative
activity type of adjudication. The burden of proof belongs to the company: they can show
by means of the CSR report that some possible allegations about the negative
consequences of their activity were fought, and that the company invested a lot of its
profit in activities making benefit large categories of population, economy and the
standard of living in particular settings. The public opinion through dissemination by
the media , the local and governmental authorities may play the role of the judge in an
adjudication to settle the virtual dispute between the profit seekers, the company, and
those affected by the changes brought about by the company, and this in a reasonable
way. The kinds of proof that count as acceptable are, for instance, as mentioned in the
analysis of the excerpts provided in the study, the projects the company is mentioning in
the CSR report, the specific targeted groups named as such and the numbers of members
in target groups addressed by the projects. This is meant to convince the specific
adjudicator in each case. The CSR report may be seen as a weakly institutionalised type
of argumentative discourse which the standards of the GRI tend to institutionalise more
by codification and formalisation of procedural and material starting points. The facts and
the figures are evidential, and they have argumentative potential since they bring about a
change of perspective in the dispute, by providing the other party and the adjudicator with
elements responding to virtual critical questions.
5. CONCLUSION
This study is part of a larger research on the rhetoric of corporate social responsibility
discourse. The goal of the larger research is to show that the recently established very
strict standards of CSR reporting by the Global Reporting Initiative have provided a
framework in which companies may report strategically about their business. The first
CSR reports played a lot upon rhetorical devices to persuade the stakeholders they were
doing their job by complying with responsible behaviour towards society. The latest ones
are guided throughout this endeavour by clearly delineated regulations. These regulations
allow them to adopt strategic maneuvering in order to convince the society at large and
any virtual adjudicator that they are acting responsibly and at the same time persuade
their audience on the merits.
This study took as the main reference text some excerpts of the ArcelorMittal
CSR report for 2013. It highlighted some of the argumentative moves instrumental in
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resolving a virtual difference of opinion. Adaptation to the CSR reports audience

demands is achieved by including in the report specific data, figures, details on the
companys sustainable projects, and mainly the specific actions carried for each category
of stakeholders as requested in the GRI guidelines. Complying with this is explicitly
shown in some reports with precise reference to the particular GRI standards (Walmart).
An argumentative move contributing to strategic maneuvering is pointing to the audience
by describing it (properties / qualities of the audience / stakeholders), pointing to their
benefits, pointing to their cooperative behaviour, and evoking the particular groups of
stakeholders in order to say which advantages the companys activity have brought them.
Calling upon the emotions of the audience is as well achieved separately or by one of the
previous moves, by exploitation of the audiences positive face (qualities), social status
(specific groups targeted by the companys activity), and emotionally endowed words.
It also appears that the discourse of a CSR report could be represented, at least n
part, as a semi-institutionalised type of adjudication, since it addresses not only a virtual
antagonist which may be part of the audience, but also a third party having an upper role
in the settling of the dispute. The CSR report may be considered as the testimonial of the
company made to ensure adjudication of the virtual dispute in favour of the company.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
This study is funded by Dunrea de Jos University of Galai, under its annual research
strategy. I am very grateful to Marianne Doury, Researcher, and Isabelle Veyrat Masson,
Director, at the CNRS Laboratoire Communication et Politique, Paris, as well as to Frans
H. van Eemeren, from International Learned Institute for Argumentation Studies. They
have always assisted me throughout the last years for documentation and research
purposes. I am also acknowledging support from Agence Universitaire de la
Francophonie.

REFERENCES
Conrad, Ch. (2011). Organizational Rhetoric. Strategies of Resistance and Domination. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Eemeren, F. H. van (ed.) (2009). Examining Argumentation in Context: Fifteen Studies on Strategic
Maneuvering. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse. Extending the Pragmadialectical Theory of Argumentation. Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Eemeren, F. H. van & Garssen, B. (eds.) (2012). Exploring Argumentative Contexts. Amsterdam: John
Benjamins Publishing Company.
Eemeren, F. H. van & Garssen, B. (2012). Exploiting the room for strategic maneuvering in argumentative
discourse. Dealing with audience demand in the European Parliament. In F. H. van Eemeren & B.
Garssen (eds.), Exploring Argumentative Contexts (pp. 43-58).
Eemeren, F. H. van & Garssen, B. (eds.) (2012). Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory. Twenty
Exploratory Studies, Argumentation Library, Volume 22. Dordrecht / Heidelberg / London /New
York: Springer.
Eemeren, F. H. van & Garssen, B. (2012). Some Highlights in Recent Theorizing: An Introduction. In F. H.
van Eemeren & B. Garssen (eds.), Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory (pp. 1-14).
Eemeren, F. H. van, Garssen, B., Meuffels, B. (2012). The Extended Pragma-Dialectical Argumentation
Theory Empirically Interpreted. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (eds.), Topical Themes in
Argumentation Theory (pp. 323-343).

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Eemeren, F. H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2009). Strategic Maneuvering. Examining Argumentation in Context.
In F. H. van Eemeren (ed.), Examining Argumentation in Context (pp. 1-22).
Murray, D. (2008). Frankly, dear shareholders, The secret to a readable and effective CEO letter.
http://www.becontentwise.com/Article.php?art_num=5093

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Rules Is Rules: Ethos And Situational Normativity

Michaela A. Gilbert
Department of Philosophy
York University
Toronto, Canada
Gilbert@YorkU.ca

ABSTRACT: One question in the debate between the rhetorical and dialectical approaches concerns the
availability of rules and standards. Are there objective standards, or are they changeable and situational? In
Part One I briefly identify three concepts, context, audience and ethos. In Part Two I focus on ethos and how
it is endemic to argument with familiars. Part Three shows that ethos concerns many local factors is
situational. Finally, in Part Four, it is shown how the pragma-dialectical Rule 1 is situational.
KEYWORDS: context, ethos, pragma-dialectics rhetoric, Grice, familiars, argumentation.

If rational means scientific, there can be little doubt that most people are irrational
(Burke 1984, 17)

1. INTRODUCTION
I am going to distinguish, for the purposes of this talk, between rhetoric and dialectics in a
particular way. I do not mean this to be the only difference or the essential difference, but
the one I am focusing on for this discussion. I want to say that dialectics is concerned with
rules that are to one degree or another independent of a particular audience or context,
while rhetoric takes rules as being relative to audience and context. This is not to say that
audience is completely irrelevant to dialecticians, but rather that the rules and their
applications do not vary much as audiences change.
In my paper, Natural Normativity (Gilbert 2007), I argued that rules emerge
from the interaction of interlocutors in a natural way governed primarily by social mores,
face goals, and relationships. There are three important components of this interaction:
ethos, audience and context. It will be noticed first that each of these is a sub-species of
the subsequent. Ethos refers to an individual, and an audience is composed of individuals.
Audiences occur in contexts that delineate who and what they are. Contexts are
overarching and range from extremely broad to relatively narrow and concrete.
While there is disagreement between the two primary camps in Argumentation Theory,
some things are acceptable to both. Each side agrees that context, from geographic to
socio-political, has a role in defining how an argument will proceed. No one thinks an
argument taking place in a formal Japanese business setting will be the same as one
occurring at a fender bender in Italy. On the other hand, while rhetoricians may believe
that different rules will obtain in different context, the dialecticians are more inclined to
imagine that the rules will only change mutatis mutandis. Similarly, the idea that different
audiences hold different sets of beliefs and loci will receive a nod from most theorists. The

467

difference here will be that dialecticians tend to be more concerned with truth than belief.
This distinction is highlighted by Burke (1984).
Calling traditional wisdom and loyalty fallacies, when they have guided the lives
of most humans throughout history, surely cannot mean that we should not base
our behaviour on them. It cannot mean that they never give us good reasons to
believe (in) something, and to act on the basis of that belief. (18)
In short, we normally separate belief and truth, the former only coming under examination
when questioned.
2. FAMILIARS
The component on which this talk will focus is ethos. Ethos is the finest in the sense that it
typically applies to the particular partner with whom one is immediately engaged. First, let
me reiterate my usual parameters. My primary focus is on dialogical arguments between
two people or, perhaps, three or four. Secondly, most of the time we argue it is with what I
call familiars: people we know, have argued with before, and will argue with (or at least
communicate with) again. This is of vital importance: Each of these people, people in our
lives, has an ethotic standing that is a result of our past interactions. So, the sense of ethos
I am talking about here is not the kind that adheres to well known public figures or famous
orators. Rather, it is the kind that leads you to trust your auto mechanic, rely on your best
friend, and be wary of the colleague who always feels too inquisitive about what youre
working on.
Following Aristotle (1986) Brinton stresses the importance of ethos in assessing
speeches. Fair-mindedness in the presentation of speech influences us as to the credibility
of the speaker: character is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion
(Aristotle in Brinton 1986 247). Brinton uses the term ethotic argument as follows: So
argument will be regarded as ethotic whenever the credibility of some person or persons is
introduced or otherwise appears as a factor in persuasion or reasoning (Brinton 1986 247).
Now I am happy to follow Brinton in taking an ethotic argument as one in which
the ethos of the speaker becomes an issue. But I think it is important to distinguish
between an ethotic argument and an ethotic rating. While the former has the ethos of the
speaker as its subject, the latter is omnipresent in all arguments whether ethos is the
subject or not. An individuals ethotic rating [ER] comes first and most assuredly from
previous interactions. Even when encountering someone for the first time the associations
they carry, the context they bear, and the situation in which that encounter ensues all form
a basis for at least a preliminary ER. Who introduced you, the purpose of the meeting, its
importance to you, the initial power standings of those involved, all serve to create an
initial tentative ER.
The preceding makes it sound as if an ER is a simple single factor such as might be
applied to a public figure with respect to her approval rating. With familiars this is not
the case because our interactions with them range over a large number of occasions and
activities. If we consider the sorts of factors that go into an ethotic rating, we quickly see
that it can vary from factor to factor. Perceived traits such as honesty, trustworthiness,
reliability, and loyalty are obvious, but as well there is enthusiasm, empathy, intelligence,
468

humour, vision, and sensitivity among others. Here context also plays a role. In a business
setting with a colleague reliability might be paramount, while in a casual setting with a
friend, sympathy and humour might be at the top. The friend you go to a music concert
with might be a different person from the one who goes with you to a ball game. It is also
important that Music Guy may well be aware that his preference is in that direction, and
not toward baseball. Its not that hes bad company, or a bad person, its just that he
spends all his time at the game chatting about music. My baseball friend can, in fact, talk
about music, but when Ball Gal is at the game with me, her focus is on balls and strikes
rather than music. This does not make her a better person, but a better baseball companion,
and that is why I choose Ball Gal over Music Guy when I have an extra ticket for the Blue
Jays game.
When talking about familiars we tend to know what are their strengths and
weaknesses. Lets change the context to the office. I know that Office Guy is an excellent
researcher, while Business Gal is a first rate planner. These, like those above, are all
personal aspects we might consider skills, talents, or preferences rather than moral
characteristics or virtues. Yet, they can often play a role in an argument as when, for
example, you are deciding who to invite to what or who to assign to what. Very often
when we are talking about ethos we are referring primarily to trust, and how reliable a
speaker is with respect to their authority and veracity. These characteristics are of the first
importance and are certainly the sorts of things that Brinton has in mind. But notice that
what they have in common with the previous characteristics is that they all concern
behaviour, how people behave or are expected to behave in different situations depending
on our historical awareness of their previous behaviour.
In some world ruled by Informal Logic we ought only pay attention to what is in
the speech being presented, and not the character of the proponent. But that is, first, close
to impossible, and, secondly, it does not seem desirable. I say its not possible because we
use past interactions to both form and facilitate current ones. I cannot and would not want
to blank out my memory each time I encountered someone or listened to a speech or
argument put forward by them. At this time we in Toronto have a mayor, Rob Ford, who
has become internationally notorious for unseemly behaviour including drunkenness,
smoking crack cocaine, lying and boorish statements and actions. If he makes a statement
denying various allegations it would be foolish of me to accept them at face value and
ignore the fact that he has frequently denied charges that he will subsequently accept. His
ethotic rating is so low, that he is beyond belief in both the figurative and literal senses.1
When we read about ethos, whether in the context of the Aristotelian sense or in
regard to appeals to authority (for example, Walton 1989, Willard 1990), there seems to be
a sense that the ER is one complete thing that applies to a person, but I suggest this is not
generally the case, and especially not when interacting with familiars. To see that its not
always the case in the Aristotelian sense consider once again Mayor Ford. While there are
some people who believe everything he has said, most of those who still support him
believe he has lied and mislead regarding aspects of his personal life and behaviour. But
they still have faith in his ability to save Toronto taxpayers money and believe in his

This is not to say that Mayor Ford does not have his supporters. See Tindale (2011) for a discussion of this
phenomenon.

469

mantra, stop the gravy train.2 So his ethotic rating with respect to his ability to control
himself at a party may be very low, he is still trusted when it comes to municipal money
management. Tindale is relevant here.
This is related to the experts ethos. A speaker cannot give herself or himself trust;
the audience extends that to them. But this can be a crucial factor in whether an
audience will accept what an expert says, and, depending on its strength, can give
that acceptance durability in the face of conflicting evidence. (Tindale 2011, 341)
The point I am making is that trust adheres to an expert, i.e., a person, with respect to a
specific domain of information, and not necessarily to everything they utter. Indeed, this is
one of the standard caveats of rules for agreement from authority: make sure the speaker is
an expert in the right field. Thus Johnson & Blair (1983, 144 ff) are clear that there is a
field S, and that expert A asserting Q, must be an expert in field S. Music Guy, might be
unreliable in many areas, might even be personally un-respected by you, but nonetheless is
widely regarded to know everything there is to know about fifties and sixties Rock and
Roll. You might not trust him to repay the $50 he wants to borrow, but youll always let
him settle an argument about who wrote The Book of Love. Certainly, ethos can be a
general idea pertaining to an individual, but that is not the only way it can be applied. In
fact, much of the time were more particular and more discerning. We have expectations
of the people we talk to, and standards we expect them to uphold. So, if we ask Music Guy
who sang the lead in the premiere performance of Bizets Carmen, and he does not know
we expect him to say so.
3. BELIEFS
As cited above, Burke points out that we invariably rely on uncertain information
embedded in shared beliefs and loci. Without these all arguments would end up in an
infinite regress. Mind you, saying that many beliefs are taken for granted does not mean
they must be accepted. To the contrary, any belief can be questioned, and if questioned,
must be defended. Feed a cold, starve a fever, is a common belief dating back to 1574,
and while widely believed by others worldwide, will turn out to be false if challenged
(Fischetti 2014). Chicken soup is good for colds, may or may not be true. But if our
family accepts the maxim, then when little Emma has a cold the question is not, should we
research the issue, but rather, whos going to make the chicken soup. Since, as Perelman
has taught us, arguments begin with shared beliefs, they all depend on situational
components deriving from context, audience and ethos. Thus, dialectical reasoning
begins from theses that are generally accepted (Perelman 1982, 2).
It is important here that I reiterate my stipulation that my concern is with familiars.
When it comes to people with whom we do not interact, the situation is quite different as
then their public reputation is all we have to go on. In consequence, I would be loathe to
accept the word of Mayor Ford on anything, as he has shown he lies about some things.
Most of my friends, tradespeople and professionals, on the other hand, follow Grices
2

It is notable that even though almost every claim he has made regarding the money he has saved has been
challenged, he is still believed by some.

470

Maxims (Grice 1975) or I am aware of their exceptions. I know, for example, that Simon
is very honest, but always misjudges how long it will take him to complete an assignment,
and that my friend Deanne invariably exaggerates somewhat to improve the drama of a
story. One way of thinking of this is just how far, how seriously, and how crucially they
stray away from the maxims. In fact, when considering rules we may need not go much
further than Grices maxims. We expect people to be truthful (or at least honest), relevant,
clear and reasonably concise (Grice 1975, 26-27). 3 Violation of these rules indicates a
potential invoking of the Cooperative Principle [CP], whereby we force the utterance into
accordance with said rules. But the CP cannot be invoked if we have no knowledge of the
situation and/or audience. Returning to ethos, I offer the following definition.
An ethotic rating is a symmetrical relationship between a proponent and
interlocutor based on value judgments regarding qualities relevant to the specific
situation, where those judgments are based on previous interactions and/or
information.
The relationship is symmetrical because both parties will be applying ERs to each other,
and the awareness of that process is itself a component in the interaction. So our reaction
to people is frequently relevant to Grices maxims making alterations, mutatis mutandis,
for cultural variation. These are based on previous interactions, except in the null case of
an initial meeting. Even then, such factors as who made the introduction, the context,
location and known goals can provide at least minimum pre-interaction grounds for a
rating. In other words, context and situation always plays a major role. It colours our
expectations, as well as our evaluative sensitivities insofar as context determines what sort
of behaviours, beliefs and values are deemed appropriate and acceptable at a given time
and place.
4. RULES
The pragma-dialectic approach, as propounded by van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1987)
contains a set of ten rules designed to govern a critical discussion [CD]. A CD is an ideal
form of argumentation, and following the rules maintains its integrity. The underlying idea
of the rules is to create a situation in which the interlocutors are being fair, open and
focused on obtaining the truth. This is expressed in Rule 1: Parties must not prevent each
other from advancing or casting doubt on standpoints (1987, 287). Of course, ideal CDs
are as rare as hens teeth, and this is acknowledged when the concept of strategic
maneuvering was introduced in the late 1990s. Arguers want to and will make their points
in persuasive ways so as to convince their partners to agree with them. This is fine and
perfectly normal in most situations; some would argue it is inevitable. Thus, van Eemeren
and Houtlosser write, in 2002:

Grices maxims require cultural variation and can be quite different in a variety of situations. Written with
British gentlemen of a certain class in mind some alterations may be quite startling, e.g., in some cultures
saying the minimum is rude, and in some being honest is not always expected. That, however, is a different
talk.

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Strategic manoeuvring may take place at several levels of an argumentative move.

The basic aspects of strategic manoeuvring are, in our view, making an expedient
selection from the topical potential available at a certain discussion stage, adapting
ones contribution optimally to the specific expectations and demands of the
audience, and using the most effective presentational devices. (392)
One is, nonetheless, limited by the dialectical rules mentioned above. The question is, how
far can one push persuasive techniques without crossing the line so that an argument
becomes derailed. An argument is said to be derailed when it violates one of the rules.
An argumentative move is considered sound if it is in agreement with the rules
applying to a specific stage of a critical discussion and it is considered fallacious if
it violates any of these rules and hinders the resolution of a dispute (393).
Now as I said in Part One, and very loosely speaking, the dialectical approach takes
argumentation as being first governed by rules, and subsequently controlled by audience.
For me, this raised a question (and I am not sure it applies only to the dialectical
approach,) and that is this. There are very many contexts, especially when that is broadly
taken, where rules are violated. In particular, there are situations in which the ethos of a
proponent is such that one is culturally enjoined from responding in an argumentative
manner. Much as we learn in the west that boys dont hit girls, so the ER of an individual
may preclude responding in a full and open way. So what happens when we have a
conflict between a cultural norm and an argumentative rule? There are many cultures, for
example, where arguing with a person who is older is unseemly and rude. Their ethotic
rating comes not from personal experience, but from their contextually defined status, or,
perhaps more likely, the ER I have of this individual is overridden by the context. This
cultural ER means that I cannot contest their opinions or beliefs, and this is opposed to the
PD rule 1 where preventing argument is outlawed.
When I ask my Asian students about such arguments they are clear that they never
argue with their elders; it is simply not done. In a similar vein, my Italian students explain
that arguments never really end because no matter what, no one ever backs off or accepts
defeat, a violation of Rule 9. Rule 10 states: Formulations must be neither puzzlingly
vague nor confusingly ambiguous and must be interpreted as accurately as possible. But
many cultures, aboriginal, Talmudic, and so on present arguments that by design or
tradition are both ambiguous and confusing. When arguments are narratives, they may
consistently violate this rule.
I could go on but I prefer to get to the question all this seems to raise, viz., are
these situations of fallacy and rule violation, or would they be considered not arguments at
all. What I mean to ask is this, if the ER of a proponent is such that one is not permitted to
disagree, or if permitted to disagree then only to a limited extent, are we in an inherently
fallacious situation, or is there simply no argument taking place. Obviously, one answer
may be that there is an argument going on, but its not a critical discussion, but even then
the question of fallaciousness still arises. One might need to ask, as bizarre as it sounds,
can a culture commit a fallacy? If a culture, religion or tradition marks an individual or
class of people with an ethotic rating that precludes disagreement, then how can we assess
the quality of their arguments?
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On the dialectical model of argumentation rules, and following them, is the very heart of
the project. As a result, unimpeachable ERs are inherently a violation of dialectic rules
insofar as argumentation is severely limited. It strikes me, in consequence, that it is best
for the dialectical view to claim that no arguments are taking place. The alternative is to
charge that a culture is inherently fallacious. This is akin to what Malcolm Gladwell did in
his analysis of the 1997 crash of Korean Airlines flight 801 (Gladwell 2008). He
maintained the crash occurred because of the culture of deference that precluded a co-pilot
from arguing forcefully with a pilot.4 In this sense it is the ethotic relations imbued by the
culture that is at fault.
Ethotic ratings are ubiquitous for the simple reason that we almost always know
those with whom we are interacting, and when we dont, we use the context to fill in as
much as possible. Our partners always have markers of gender, race, class, age, and often
status, wealth and cultural background. All of these influence our view of our protagonists,
limit the actions and reactions we will have, and generally undermine a level playing field.
So the question of violating various rules applies not only to severe cases such as the
Korean deference issues, but in our own egalitarian society as well. It strikes me that on
the dialectical model, because of the pervasive nature of ethotic evaluation, that virtually
all argumentative interactions will become fallacious, which, of course, makes it an empty
concept.
On the rhetorical view, this is not really a problem. Its not a problem because the
audience centred nature of the view means that relations need to be explored in order for
the interaction to be understood. As Willard, an extreme rhetorician, explains, arguments
must be examined in situ, and the Argumentation Theorist must get her hands dirty by
examining the human relationships that exist amongst the audience members (Willard
1989, 93). In this way ethotic relations are recognized as existing and as permeating the
interaction, but now they can be examined for mis-use and abuse, rather than having their
simple existence be evidence of a fallacy.
I dearly hope that I have not created a straw man in the description of the
dialectical position. If I have, I apologise and beg for clarification. But it strikes me that a
rule-based system cannot account for the personal dynamics that are inherent to human
interactions. That said, I believe the rules, be they the pragma-dialectic ten commandments
or the Informal Logic evaluative triumvirate, are important and useful. My issue is not
with them as rules, but rather with them as the first basis for evaluation.
REFERENCES
Brinton, Alan. 1986. "Ethotic Argument." History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (3):245-258.
Burke, Richard J. 1984. "A Rhetorical Conception of Rationality." Informal Logic 6 (3):17-26.
Eemeren, Frans van, and R. Grootendorst. 1987. 'Fallacies In Pragma-Dialectic Perspective.' Argumentation
1 (3):283-302.
Eemeren, Frans van, and P. Houtlosser. 2003. "The Development of the Pragma-dialectical Approach to
Argumentation." Argumentation 17 (4):387-402.
Fischetti, Mark. 2014. "Fact or Fiction?: Feed a Cold, Starve a Fever ". Scientific American Accessed May 2,
2014. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fact-or-fiction-feed-a-cold/.
4

There is not universal agreement with Gladwells claim. Cf.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/opinion/29iht-edbeam.1.18978412.html?_r=0 for example.

473

Gilbert, Michael A. 2007. "Natural Normativity: Argumentation Theory as an engaged discipline." Informal
Logic 27 (2):149-161.
Gladwell, Malcolm. 2008. Outliers: the story of success.1 st ed. New York: Little, Brown & Co.
Grice, Paul H. 1975. "Logic & Conversation." In Studies in the way of words, 394. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
Johnson, Ralph H., and J. Anthony Blair. 1983. Logical self-defense. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.
Perelman, Chaim. 1982. The realm of rhetoric. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Tindale, Christopher W. 2011. "Character and Knowledge: Learning from the Speech of Experts."
Argumentation 25 (3):341-353. doi: 10.1007/s10503-011-9224-9.
Walton, Douglas N. 1989. "Reasoned Use of Expertise in Argumentation." Argumentation 3:59-73.
Willard, Charles A. 1989. A theory of argumentation. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Willard, Charles A. 1990. "Authority." Informal Logic 12 (1):12-22.

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Towards A Foundation For Argumentation Theory

G.C. Goddu
Department of Philosophy
University of Richmond
Richmond, Virginia
United States of America 23173
ggoddu@richmond.edu

ABSTRACT: I shall present and analyze numerous principles that argumentation theorists do agree upon
(and some closely related one which they do not) and argue that the set presented here offers at best limited
grounds for cross-theoretical evaluation.
KEYWORDS: Acts, expressions, informational content, reasons, arguments, repeatable, abstract object

1. INTRODUCTION
Argumentation theorists disagree about many things. For example, is conductive reasoning
distinct from deductive or inductive reasoning? Could a painting or a judo flip be an
argument? How many types of fallacies are there? Are there any enthymemes? Is
relevance an independent condition of a good argument? Can a non-virtuous arguer give a
good argument? Are arguments better construed as acts or as propositions or as sentences?
Are all arguments dialectical? Answering these sorts of questions are among the current
challenges of argumentation theory.
One impediment to answering these questions is that differing answers are often
grounded in different theoretical frameworks. Hence, the issue is not merely one of trying
to marshal the best reasons for a particular answer to one of these questions, but rather to
produce the best overall theory. But now a new problem emergeshow do we assess,
across theories, whether theory X is right for saying an argument can have an infinite
number of premises say, while theory Y is wrong for saying an argument cannot? We
could of course try to adjudicate theories in the standard way in terms of simplicity,
explanatory depth and breadth, etc., but such comparisons rarely generate a neat linear
ordering. One theory may have advantages in one area of explanation, but do worse in
another. Even worse, the theories may not agree on even the basic ontology and not agree
on what sort of thing an argument is (or could be). Hence, one might doubt that it is
possible to construct a fully adequate theory of argumentation.
My concern here is to at least begin to explore the possibility of adjudicating basic
ontology issues in argumentation theory. What, if anything, are the constraints on an
adequate theory of argumentation at the basic ontological level (at least from the
perspective of argumentation theory)? Are there any substantive principles that are
accepted by all theories that might serve as grounds for adjudicating amongst competing
theories? In this paper I shall present and analyze numerous principles that argumentation
theorists do agree upon (and some closely related ones which they do not) and argue that
the set presented here offers at best limited grounds for cross-theoretical evaluation,
though I shall also point to some possible paths forward.
475

2. BACKGROUND AGREEMENT
Argumentation theory does not take place in a vacuum. Indeed, for there to be a
recognizable argumentation theory (as distinct from say particle physics or pre-Imperial
Roman history or basket weaving or World Cup football) there must be much that is at
least tacitly agreed upon, such as at least: there are thinking beings, there are material
objects such as chairs, buildings, stars, etc. The thinking beings perform various kinds of
actions and have various kinds of goals, beliefs, and desires. There are languages which
thinking beings use to communicate information with each other. There are various
academic disciplines that categorize this information, etc.
I am not claiming that these tacitly agreed upon items are definitely known or true
or unchallenged. Paul Churchland (1981) doubts there are beliefs. Trenton Merricks
(2003) argues that there are no macro-sized non-conscious material objects while Jason
Turner (2011) argues there are no composite objects at all. All I am suggesting is that, as
argumentation theorists, we presuppose that argumentation is a human activity that occurs
within the context of human beliefs and desires and goals within a world of tables, chairs,
buildings, etc.
So there is a vast swathe of propositions that I suspect we agree upon and take for
granted when we are doing argumentation theory. But much of this that we presuppose
does not itself impact or help us adjudicate disputes in argumentation theory since it is
against this presupposed backdrop, when trying to understand the human activity of
argumentation, that the disputes themselves arise. Hence, even if it turns out that Merricks
is right that there are no baseballs (or any other non-conscious composite objects), but
merely atoms arranged baseball-wise, then, while a part of our presupposed background is
not quite accurate, the inaccuracy is not something that affects our argumentation theory.
We can argue about whether baseballs were in the strike zone just as easily as whether
atoms arranged baseball-wise were in the strike zone. So despite the existence of largescale agreement, we have not necessarily made much progress in terms of helping
adjudicate theory disputes in argumentation theory, since it is against the large-scale
agreement that the disagreements arise.
3. SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT
Is there anything substantively relevant to argumentation theory that all argumentation
theorists agree upon? (or at least should agree upon?) At the very least it seems hard to be
counted as doing argumentation theory if one does not accept:
(1)

There are acts of arguing.

[Hard, though perhaps not impossible. Could there be a world in which people
give/express arguments (and so there is a need for argumentation theory, and yet there is
no arguing)? Perhaps they give arguments as a form of poetry or entertainment. The
question of course is whether what the people give should in fact be called arguments (or
whether even if called arguments, the study of them should be called argumentation
theory). If we say yes because historically they once used them to argue, but now do
not, then the world is not a world in which there are no acts of arguing. If we say yes

476

because what they give/express correspond with what we give/express when we argue,
then the matter is inconclusive since it may be that it is the usage of the giving/expression
to argue that allows the giving/expression to be called an argument. So without the
arguing, the giving/expressing in our hypothetical world would not be the
giving/expressing of an argument. Regardless, even if it really were a possibility that one
could do argumentation theory without there being acts of arguing, that possibility is quite
remote from the situation in which we actually find ourselvesone in which there are acts
of arguing.]
Given the plausible background assumption that action theory and argumentation
theory are not the same thing, we should also accept:
(2)

Not all acts are acts of arguing.

(2), unlike (1), is not a precondition for doing argumentation theory, but rather a fact about
the background world that is presupposed and yet is relevant to argumentation theory.
Given the world of agents with beliefs and desires, and goals and wants and needs who act
on those beliefs and desires to achieve their goals in a world of tables and chairs and
money, etc., there are in fact acts that agents perform that are not acts of arguing. My
sitting down before turning on the computer was not an act of arguing. Your eating of
breakfast this morning (assuming you ate breakfast this morning) was not an act of
arguing. In general acts of poety reading, prophesying, walking, etc are, most of the time
anyway, not acts of arguing. This of course leaves open where the line is between acts of
arguing and acts that are not acts of arguing. For example, are acts of persuading (or
attempted persuasion) all acts of arguing or not. Are at least some acts of explaining also
acts of arguing? Is proving a type of arguing or not?
While we may disagree on where the line is, we agree that there is a line to be
drawn. For the notion of arguing to be a relevant sub-class of action, then there need to be
examples of action that do not fall into the sub-classotherwise arguing and acting start
to look like two different names for the same thing. Hence, any theory that ultimately
claimed that all acts (or none) are acts of arguing is to be rejected.1 So what to make of
the critical thinking textbookEverythings an Argument? Despite the title, the actual
claim of the book is that every instance of language or symbol use is a form of argument,
which, even if stronger than most argumentation theorists are willing to accept, is still
much weaker than the claim that all acts are acts of arguing.
(2) is not to be confused with the related:
(Z) Not all acts could be acts of arguing.
Put another way (Z) is: there is some act that could not be an act of arguing, or there is
some act for which it is impossible that it be an act of arguing. While I suspect that many
argumentation theorists agree with (Z)there just are some acts that could never be acts
of arguing, I am not sure that such agreement is justified. Indeed, if exemplifying,
providing an example to show a certain kind of object, act, or state of affairs is possible, is
a kind of arguing and any action could, in the right circumstances, be an act of
1

John Woods (1992) appeals to similar principle with regards to relevanceany theory of relevance that
makes everything relevant to everything or nothing relevant to anything is to be rejected.

477

exemplifying, then every act could be an act of arguing.2 (This does not mean that there is
a possible world in which every single act in that world is an act of arguingit merely
means that for every act x, there is some possible world in which x is an act of arguing.)
Some argumentation theorists hold that there must be a linguistic component for an
act to count as an act of arguing. Others disagreeconsider for example, Michael
Gilberts (2003) judo flip example. Regardless, if it is true that an act of arguing must
involve a linguistic component, then any act with no linguistic component is not and
(assuming it could not be the same act if it had a linguistic component) could not be an
argument. But since argumentation theorists do not universally agree on whether an act of
arguing must involve a linguistic, or even symbolic, component, we cannot use such an
appeal to ground accepting (Z).
While argumentation theorists disagree about what is and is not an act of arguing
and disagree about whether there are boundaries to what acts could be arguings, theorists
at least agree that:
(3)

At least some acts of arguing involve the expression of reasons.

Stipulate that to express reasons it to give a symbolic representation of the reason. For
many those expressions are limited to linguistic expressionsfor others, pictorial
expressions with no linguistic component will also count as expressions of reasons. But
given the stipulation, Gilberts judo flip may be the giving of a reason, but not the
expressing of one. Hence, I cannot say that argumentation theorists agree that all acts of
arguing involve the expression of reasons. But what of:
(A)

All acts of arguing involve the giving of reasons.

According to Tony Blair (2003), [e]ven the broadest definitions of argument, such as
those of Willard (1989 ) and Gilbert (1997 ), presupposes some element of reason-using.
Is there then no arguing if one is just giving the conclusion without reasons for it? While
plausible, I am not sure that all argumentation theorists agree. For example, Maurice
Finocchiaro (2003), argues that in at least some instances an argument is merely a defense
of its conclusion from objections even if no reasons are given for that conclusion. Others
allow the possibility of zero-premise arguments and if one thinks that for every argument
there is a corresponding potential arguing, then again it seems one is committed to the
possibility of an act of arguing that does not involve the giving of reasons.(See Goddu
2014) So as plausible as (A), I hold off from adding it to list of agreed upon principles. [It
may turn out that resolving the Finocchiaro case or the zero-premise argument case will
ultimately vindicate (A). In the former, one might hold that the rejection of objections to a
given conclusion themselves constitute reasons for that conclusion, whereas in the latter,
perhaps one might reject that for every argument is a corresponding potential arguing.
Regardless, I leave (A) off the list for now.]
Could you have an expression of reasons that was not part of an act of arguing? I suspect
so. When I give an example of a reason, I express it, even if I do not argue. If I merely
2

The issue is made more complicated by the problem of trying to type acts or identify the identity conditions
of an actcould act x have happened two minutes later and still be the same act? On some theories of the
nature of acts the answer is no, but on others it is yes.

478

repeat someone elses reasons, I express them without arguing with them. A computer that
generates complexes of sentences in the form: A, B so C may express reasons without
any act of arguing happening. So I suspect we have evidence for:
(B)

Not every expression of reasons is part of an act of arguing.

But I put (B) aside on the grounds that there may be some dispute about what counts as the
expressing of a reason.
Finally, it is part of our background presuppositions about language and symbols
and representations in general that they have meaning or content. Hence, all argumentation
theorists should agree that:
(4)

Expressions of reasons have informational content.

Of course we may disagree about how to capture the notion of informational contentsay
in terms of propositions, or some primitive same content as property, or something else.
Regardless, we still agree that there is informational content that is distinct from the
expressionx is a bachelor and x is an unmarried male of marriageable age, or x =
25 and x = 5 squared may have the same informational content, but are definitely not
the same expressions.
Argumentation theorists, as far as I can tell, agree on (1)-(4). At the very least they
act and write as if they do even if they have never explicitly uttered or written them. I
suspect most would assent to (A) and (B) as well, but for the moment I am putting those
aside. (Though what follows does not change if (A) and (B) are put in the mix.) If I am
wrong and argumentation theorists do not even agree on (1)- (4), then the prospects for
moving forward are quite limited. If we cannot even agree on the basic constituents out of
which the data we are trying to explain are constructed, then we will certainly never agree
on any attempt to explain and organize that data. But is agreement on (1) (4) enough for
any progress? I turn to that question in the next section.
4. ANY PAYOFF?
Does (1)-(4) provide us enough agreement to make progress on our disputes? I suspect
not, since the background presuppositions and (1)- (4) are currently consistent with:
(Y)

There are no arguments.

Proof: Suppose the word argument were stricken from our language as a myth, say on
the par of subluminous ether or phlogiston. Could one still do argumentation theory
with the ontology presupposed in (1)-(4)? Yes. There would be acts of arguing which we
would try to distinguish from acts that were not acts of arguing. At least some of those acts
of arguing would involve the use of expressions that had informational content. One could
still debate whether the act or the expression or the informational content was the most
important aspect of what was going on. One could still distinguish combinations of actions
and expressions that in a certain context for a certain audience would be more likely to
achieve assent than other combinations of actions and expressions in that context. One

479

could talk of the logical properties holding between different pieces of informational
content. One could ask whether the actions or the expressions or the informational content
could be partitioned into various categories such as good, bad, rational, irrational,
deductive, inductive, conductive, abductive, enthymeme, fallacy, convergent, divergent,
virtuous, etc. One could, in short, I suspect recapitulate much of argumentation theory
without the word argument referring to anything at all.
One might claim that all this shows is that the word argument is ambiguous
sometimes it is used to refer to the acts of arguing, sometimes to reason/claim expressions,
sometimes to the informational content of those expressions. Granted. But I was not trying
to show that (1) - (4) entail that there are no argumentsI was merely trying to show that
(1) - (4) are consistent with there being no arguments. The fact that (1) - (4) would also be
consistent with argument being a disjunctive ontological category, i.e. x is an argument
iff x is an act of arguing or a reason/claim expression or the informational content of a
reason/claim expression is beside the point. Put another way, (1) - (4) is consistent with
none of the three contenders being arguments and with all of them being types of
arguments. Nothing in (1) - (4) privileges one possibility over another. But note that even
if one accepts that the word argument is ambiguous, the word could still be excised for
claritys sake with no ontological lossin other words, at the very least one could be a
reductionist about argumentsthey are nothing over and above acts of arguing or
reason/claim expressions or the informational content of reason/claim expressions (and if
the ambiguity was causing theoretical problems, then for the sake of accurate theory we
might decide to excise the word anyway.)
But if (1) - (4) are consistent with there being no arguments, or with just acts being
arguments or with all three ontological categories including types of arguments, then
agreement on (1) - (4) alone will not help us adjudicate disputes concerning the nature and
types of arguments. We cannot resolve disputes concerning enthymemes or fallacies or
whether there are deductive, inductive, conductive, and abductive types of arguments if we
cannot agree whether there are arguments at all, or if there, are what ontological category
they fall into. Suppose, however, that, in addition to ~(Y), i.e. there are arguments, we
add:
(C)

Arguments are repeatable

to our list of agreed upon principles. Roughly speaking, repeatable entities can happen,
exist, or be instantiated more than once. On most views, material objects are repeatable,
but the temporal slices of material objects are not. Your desk chair is probably the same
chair as yesterday. Even if the person in the next office is sitting in the same type of chair
as youthey are not sitting in the very same chair. Similarly, on most views properties are
taken to be repeatable even if the particular instantiations of them are not.
Argumentation theorists write and act as if arguments are repeatable. We worry
about how to correctly extract the arguments from given texts, we expect our students to
give us Anselms argument and not their own muddled version of it, we speculate about
how an argument would fare when given in different situations or to different audiences,
and so on. This is not to say that we agree on the identity conditions of argumentsby no
means. But argumentation theorists do not take the identity conditions to be so stringent
that arguments are not repeatable.

480

But holding to (1) (4), ~(Y), and (C) has significant consequences for argumentation
theory. Assume that the only three plausible candidates for arguments are some sort of act,
expression, or abstract object. I know of no attempt to define argument that does not fall
into one of these three categories (though I can find you various works where a given
definition in one place puts arguments in one ontological category, but in another place
puts arguments in a different ontological categoryoops!). But given (C) we should also
accept, what I take is a controversial claim in argumentation theory, viz.:
(*)

Arguments are abstract objects.

The reason is simple. Neither acts nor expressions are repeatable. I raise my hand. I raise
my hand again. While I performed two acts of the same type, I did not perform just one
actone act happened before the other and temporal location is one of the identity
conditions of acts. Similarly for expressions: the first the on this page may be the same
type of symbol as the second the, but the two thes are not one and the same
expressionthey are located in different places and composed of different molecules of
ink. Abstract objects of various stripes, on the other hand, are repeatableinformational
content construed as propositions say, or act types or expression types which are
properties. Hence, adding (C) to our list of agreed upon principles brings with it a
commitment to arguments being a kind of abstract object.
Note that it does not commit us to a particular type of abstract object. Hence, those
who favour act talk might opt for act types over propositions. I suspect that such solace
will be short lived, for though I will not argue it here, I strongly suspect that any appeal to
act types, to get the typing correct, will ultimately appeal to the informational content. For
example, my giving Anselms argument in a high falsetto in English while someone else
presented Anselms argument in booming Danish will count as instances of the same act
type, for the purposes of identifying arguments, in virtue of the informational content
presented since most of the other act types these two particular acts fall under do not
overlap.
Regardless, I am not here trying to argue for the truth of (*), but merely to show
that given (1) (4), commitment to ~(Y) and (C), short of finding another ontological
option for arguments beyond the three standard ones used in argumentation theory,
commits one to (*). If arguments as abstract objects cannot be tolerated, one is free to
reject that arguments are repeatable (and live with the consequences) or even to reject
~(Y) and just give up on arguments altogether and focus, in one prefers, on, say, arguings
and types of arguings instead.
5. CONCLUSION
On the one hand I have made no progress on the list of issues I used as examples at the
beginning of this paper. The principles we, as argumentation theorists, agree upon so far,
are too minimal to help us resolve these issues. But I do hope that I have at least provided
four possible avenues for moving forward. Firstly, we could try to find more principles
that argumentation theorists agree upon. (Perhaps one might try to appeal to the principles
offered in George Bogers Some Axioms Underlying Argumentation Theory? I suspect
however that the tenets he gives are not generally agreed upon or non-contentious, even if

481

widely accepted within one strain of argumentation theory.) For example, I strongly
suspect that argumentation theorists also agree on some principles roughly like the
following:
(D)
(E)
(F)

All arguings involve the expressing/giving of a claim.

All arguers have some goal to be achieved by arguing.
Some arguings happen for the purpose of changing belief, promoting action,
convincing, persuading, demonstrating,

One can hope that finding more agreed upon principles will generate a better basis for
adjudicating disputes. Note however, that even adding (D) (F) to our list of agreed upon
principles does not change the results of section 4.
Secondly, we could deny that there are arguments and focus instead on arguings,
reason/claim expressions, and the informational content of such expressions (and the
relationships and uses and types) of each and see if dissolving talk of arguments also
dissolves the original problems. Thirdly, we could deny that arguments are repeatable and
trace out the consequences for argumentation theory. Fourthly we could accept that
arguments are repeatable and focus on arguments as abstract objects and trace out the
consequences of that. For example, it is not at all clear that arguments as abstract objects
can have missing premisesperhaps the expressions of the arguments in texts can have
missing components (given the arguments we take those expressions to express), but the
arguments themselves cannot. Hence, commitment to (*) might also commit one to
enthymeme not being a property of arguments at all. I leave it up to you which path you
shall follow.

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Merricks, T. (2003). Objects and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Turner, J. (2011). Ontological Nihilism. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 6. Oxford: Oxford University
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Willard, C. A. (1989). A Theory of Argumentation. Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama Press.
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482

Western And Russian Media Coverage Of The Ukrainian Crisis: An

Emotional Commitment Or Bias?
Vadim Golubev
Department of English for the Faculty of Journalism
St. Petersburg State University
Russia
vadimgol@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: During an international conflict, even otherwise objective journalists frequently display a
strong emotional commitment to their governments stance in the crisis. This commitment may cloud
rational judgment, turning journalism into propaganda. A journalists choice to abandon truth-seeking in
favor of persuasion makes the journalist a party to the conflict and transforms a critical discussion, based on
a cooperative approach, into a persuasion dialogue, based on an adversarial approach.
KEYWORDS: emotion, fallacy, journalism, persuasion, propaganda, reason.

1. INTRODUCTION
During an international conflict, even otherwise objective journalists frequently display a
strong emotional commitment to the stance of their own country in the crisis. This
commitment may cloud rational judgment, turning journalism into propaganda. The paper
is an attempt to show that if a journalist chooses to abandon truth-seeking in favor of
persuasion as his primary communication objective he immediately becomes a party to the
conflict he is supposed to be observing impartially. In the end, such a journalist can turn
into a propagandist. Abandoning truth-seeking transforms a critical discussion, based on a
cooperative approach, into a persuasion dialogue, based on an adversarial approach. The
persuasion dialogue, in turn, can further escalate a quarrel.
To provide answers as to how this transformation occurs in global journalism, this
paper examines interplay between propaganda and journalism by delineating persuasion
and truth-seeking in American and Russian media coverage of the Ukrainian crisis. The
paper seeks to examine American and Russian media coverage of the Ukrainian crisis and
show the nature of propaganda as fallacious emotional appeals, defined as those that
supplant rational appeals.
2. DISCUSSION
Propaganda is an elusive topic to describe using verifiable criteria. The challenge is all the
more fascinating given that we are currently experiencing an all-out propaganda war
between Russia and the West in a completely new context. Unlike the Second World War,
this is a local conflict, and unlike during the Cold War, people on both sides have full
access to the other sides media discourse if they so wish (the question is how many
people wish to make that effort rather than stay within the comfort zone of their own
countrys media narrative a condition for propaganda to thrive).

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Richard Alan Nelson defines propaganda as follows:

Propaganda is neutrally defined as a systematic form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to
influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target audiences for ideological,
political or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages (which
may or may not be factual) via mass and direct media channels.
(Nelson, 1996, pp. 232233)

Another interpretation is that propagandists present their facts selectively (thus possibly
lying by omission) and use loaded messages to produce an emotional rather than rational
response to the information presented (Denish, 2012, p.1).
There are studies concerning principles and responsibilities of journalism as an
antidote to propaganda, written by journalism practitioners and critics. In their prominent
book, Director of the Project for Excellence in Journalism, Tom Rosenstiel and his coauthor Bill Kovach (Rosenstiel & Kovach, 2001), present ethical guidelines to journalists
based on the common conceptions about the press, such as neutrality, fairness, and
balance. They argue that journalism first obligation is to the truth, its essence is a
discipline of verification and that its practitioners must maintain an independence from
those they cover.
The paper presents argumentation discourse analysis of the Ukraine-related media
content of two American mainstream TV channels: CNN (as an example of a broadcaster
with an international focus) and Fox News (a broadcaster targeting primarily a domestic
audience) and their Russian counterparts: RT (formerly Russia Today), which broadcasts
for an international audience, and the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting
Company (referred to as the Russia Channel), which is mainly a domestic broadcaster.
This is done because propaganda for the domestic consumption is quite different from
international propaganda. The choice of channels is also determined by the similarity of
the pairs in terms of political affiliation: the more liberal (CNN and RT) vs. the more
conservative TV channels (Fox News and Russia Channel). This juxtaposition will
increase the validity of the comparative study and raise the likelihood of interesting
findings.
Appeals to emotions, such as fear, pity and compassion, are not necessarily wrong;
they used legitimately and effectively in public awareness and charity campaigns. The
problem is that while appeals to emotion have a legitimate, even important, place as
arguments in persuasion dialogue, they need to be treated with caution because they can
also be used fallaciously when they supplant rational arguments.
But how do we decide which emotional appeal is fallacious and which is not?
The paper is based on the presumption that certain types of emotional appeals are
very powerful as arguments in themselves, but they may have a much greater impact on an
audience than is warranted in the case argued (Walton, 1992, p. 1).
There are three main emotional appeals that supplant reason:
Argumentum ad populum or mob appeal invite peoples unthinking acceptance of
ideas which are presented in a strong, theatrical manner and appeal to our lowest instincts
(Engel, 1976, pp. 113-114). The Russian takeover of the Crimea has been presented by the
Russian mainstream media as liberation, reunification of the Russians living there with
their homeland, akin to their return from captivity. According to this line, it was a
legitimate restoration of historical truth: an act of saving Sebastopol, a city of Russian

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naval glory, for which so much Russian blood has been spilt, from becoming a NATO
naval base. The images showed Crimeans dancing in the street with tears of joy in their
eyes.
The story Ukraine and EU sign free trade zone deal published on the RT website
(http://rt.com) on June 27, 2014, says:
Georgia and Moldova also signed both political and economic parts of the Association Agreement.
Ukraine signed a political part of the agreement in March, shortly after Crimea rejoined Russia.

Note the clause Crimea rejoined Russia: the actor is Crimea not Russia who is the
recipient of the action which is described by a verb with a clearly positive connotation
conveying a sense of restoration of something that has been broken. The style of the story
is markedly neutral; it is presented as a mere narrative of events that happened in and
around Ukraine. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine signed the Association Agreement while
Crimea rejoined Russia. Everyone is happy; they have got what they wanted.
The Culture Channel which is part of the Russian State Television Holding
Company hosted two cultural historians on the Power of the Fact show as far back as
2012. The summary of the episode, published on the Culture Channel website
(http://tvkultura.ru/), describes the program as follows:
One of the most ancient inscriptions in Russian dating back to the 11 th century talks about the
Crimea: "Prince Gleb measured the sea on ice from Tmutarakan to Korchev to be 14,000 sazhen."
(Sazhen is a measure equaling approximately 2 meters. Korchev is the modern Crimean city of
Kerch). Later the histories of Russia and Crimea have been so intertwined that the Crimean context
has become part of Russian consciousness, and a significant part of Crimean cultural heritage has
become part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union Crimea as a unique mixture of
civilizations from the Hellenic to the Soviet. What is the Crimean myth, does Crimea hold the same
cultural appeal today as it did one hundred years ago, at the time of the Silver Age? Are there any
people in Crimea continuing the Russian cultural tradition?

In this discussion, again, the sense of a lost and regained part of Russia was the core of the
persuasive thrust.
Another RT story Who undermines the Budapest Memorandum on Ukraine?,
contributed by Dr Alexander Yakovenko, Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Deputy foreign minister (2005-2011), published on
May 29, 2014, contains a picture of a poster in Russian with the following caption:
Children walk past a billboard sign in Sevastopol on March 13, 2014, reading On March
18 we will choose either or and depicting Crimea in red with swastika and covered
in barbed wire (L) and Crimea with the colours of the Russian flag (R) (AFP Photo/Victor
Drachev). Note the hidden juxtaposition of innocent children (a girl and a boy for
balance) signifying peace and security for the children and a need to protect them from a
clear threat represented by a neo-Nazi Ukraine. This powerful visual is an example of
appeal to fear in a theatrical manner. It is also an argumentum ad hominem described
below in that it demonizes the opposing side (see Fig.1)

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Fig.1
Argumentum as mesirecordiam is fallacious when one tries to persuade someone to accept
a popular view by arousing his sympathy or compassion (Michalos, 1970, p. 51).
American mainstream media used very strong vocabulary, such as aggression,
annexation and occupation. They compared the Russian involvement in the Crimea
and Ukrainian eastern provinces with Hitlers annexation of the Sudetenland in March
1938 (under the pretext of the alleged privations suffered by the ethnic German population
living in those regions). This was meant to mobilize American government and society for
a rescue mission to protect Ukraine from a Russian bully. On the other hand, the Russian
media discourse also centered on protecting the Ukraines Russian-speaking population
from neo-Nazi groups from Western Ukraine. The culmination of this appeal was the
coverage of the Odessa tragedy in which over 40 pro-Russian protesters were killed.
As the genre of news is supposed to be objective, we often find opinion in the
concluding part of a news story meant to put the news in perspective. The nature of a
background setting is that it calls for a concise summary of the events leading up to the
situation described in the story. This compactness leaves very little room for a two-sided
approach to the news. It is in that part that we see opinion clearly stated. The story titled
Ukraine signed a trade and political deal with the EU last week, the one that Yanukovych
had rejected. Ukrainian, Russian leaders agree to work on ceasefire, published on June
30, 2014, on the Fox News website (http://foxnews.com), states:
The conflict in eastern Ukraine began after a protest movement among those seeking closer ties
with the EU prompted President Viktor Yanukovych to flee in February. Calling it an illegal coup,
Russia seized and annexed Ukraine's Crimea region in March, saying it was protecting Russian
speakers. The insurrection in the east began shortly afterward. The authors openly blame Russia

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for seizing and annexing one Ukrainian region and indirectly for igniting an insurrection in another,
whereas President Yanukovich had to flee from protesters merely seeking closer ties with the EU.

The story Ukraine cries 'robbery' as Russia annexes Crimea, published on March 18,
2014 on the CNN website (http://cnn.com), is supplied with this opening summary
Cheers in Moscow. Outrage in Kiev. Bloodshed in Simferopol. Description of the
bloodshed is found in the middle part of the story:
Masked gunmen killed a member of Ukraine's military, wounded another and arrested the
remaining staff of Ukraine's military topographic and navigation directorate at Simferopol, Defense
Ministry spokesman Vladislav Seleznyov told CNN.

While the loss of even a single life is a tragedy, the use of the word bloodshed is a clear
overuse of emotional appeal and is an example of argumentum ad misericordiam.
Argumentum ad hominem is an argument that uses a personal attack against an
opposing arguer to support the conclusion that the opposing argument is wrong. Character
assassination is evident in American media demonizing Putin, who is often described as a
former KGB spy and a dictator with Soviet imperialistic ambitions. Character
assassination, however, is such a powerful tactic in argumentation that it is difficult to
resist using it, and it is then difficult to prevent the argument from denigrating into a
personal quarrel.
The story Putin calls for compromise in Ukraine, published on the Fox News
website on June 22, 2014, says:
Separatists in the eastern Donetsk and Lubansk regions have declared independence and asked to
join Russia. Moscow has rebuffed their appeals, but is seen by Ukraine and the West as actively
supporting the insurgency. Putins conciliatory words came as Russia began large-scale military
exercises and after NATO accused Russia of moving troops back toward the Ukrainian border.

A circumstantial variant of an ad hominem attack on Putin is evident in the juxtaposition

of Putins words and actions: his conciliatory words and his rebuffing of the separatists
appeals come at the background of Russias large-scale military exercises.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, these emotional arguments all play upon the prejudices in an audience. To
bring these prejudices to the fore, the speaker directs an argument at what he or she takes
to be the deeply held emotional commitments of the audience. Such tactics exploit the bias
of an audience toward its own interests whether it is a financial interest, a social interest
in belonging to a certain group (including a nation or a group of nations, such as
membership of the European Union for the Ukraine), or an interest in avoiding harm or
danger (e.g. a Ukrainian nationalist threat for eastern Ukrainians).
A well-known 17th-century political maxim said that interests never lie. People lie, nations
lie, but interests never lie. The primary interest of a journalist turned propagandist is to
resolve a difference of opinion by defeating his opponent, while an objective journalists
goal is to find the common truth of the matter.
Platos Socrates advocated dialectic aimed at establishing the truth through
reasoned arguments, based on a cooperative view of argument. Sophists taught rhetoric
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aimed at persuasion, based on an adversarial approach to dispute. Platos dialectician

considered his opponent a partner in discussion while a Sophist saw an adversary in his
interlocutor. While both bore their audience in mind when arguing their points, the latter
viewed the audience as his main target of persuasion, since it was the audience that
ultimately chose the winner.

REFERENCES
Denish, N.A. (2012). The desired result of attitude toward the subject in the target audience of propaganda.
In The Journal of Historical Research, (p.1) www.ssresearcher.com
Engel, M.S. (1976). With Good Reason: An Introduction to Informal Fallacies. New York: Bedford/St.
Martin's.
Kovach B., Rosenstiel T. (2001). Elements of Journalism: What News People Should Know and the Public
Should Expect. New York: Random House LLC.
Michalos, A.C. (1970). Improving Your Reasoning. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Nelson, R.A. (1996). A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the United States. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press.
Walton D.N. (1992). The Place of Emotion in Argument. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University
Press.

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Climate Scientist Stephen Schneider Versus The Sceptics: A Case

Study Of Argumentation In Deep Disagreement
Jean Goodwin
Department of English/Program in Speech Communication
Iowa State University
USA
goodwin@iastate.edu

ABSTRACT: Can deep disagreement be managed by argument? This case study examines the 2010
exchange between prominent climate scientist/climate communicator Stephen Schneider and an Australian
television audience of self-described climate "sceptics." An analysis of the moves made by audience
members, the moderator, and Schneider himself shows that Schneider consistently reframed the interaction
emphasize trust, refusing to respond in kind to attacks on his credibility. He exerted firm control on the
issues. And at several points, he exercised his authority as a scientist in refusing to engage points that were
outside the scientific consensus. Although some of Schneiders moves might traditionally have been
classified as fallacies, in this context they served as strategies for managing interactional challenges, and
making an exchange of arguments possible.
KEYWORDS: argument, argumentation, disagreement, normative pragmatics, authority, climate
communication

1. INTRODUCTION
Arguments get made when people disagree (Goodwin, 2001; Govier, 1987; Jackson &
Jacobs, 1980). But disagreeable interactions aren't necessarily ideal environments for
good reasons to flourish. Some argumentation theories try to side-step this difficulty by
supposing that arguers' surface disagreements rest on a deeper basis of cooperation. But
even if we adopt this idealizing starting point for theoryand certainly if we do not
(Goodwin, 2007)we still have to inquire "how arguers make do under imperfect
circumstances" (Jacobs & Jackson, 2006, pp. 123-124), that is, under the circumstances
they are actually in. Thus lack of cooperation, fallacious moves and other symptoms of
deep disagreement are not just problems for theorists to deal with; arguers in practice
have to confront and manage them. "Argumentation is a self-regulating activity" (Jacobs,
2000, p. 274); it is primarily up to the arguers themselves to construct an interaction
where they can use good reasons to get something done.
This case study carries forward the normative pragmatic approach to
argumentation by untangling the management strategies adopted by a most skilled arguer
in a most disagreeable situation. In 2010 eminent climate scientist Stephen Schneider
appeared on Australian television to talk with an audience of climate "sceptics."
Schneider's long career as a science communicator had started in 1971, when as the
juniormost member of a modelling team whose results had attracted the attention of the
press, he was volunteered to be their spokesperson. Schneider found he enjoyed the work,
and was good at it, so for the next forty years he placed himself on the leading edge of
both climate sciencefounder and editor of the journal Climatic Change, lead author in

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the IPCC processand climate science communication. A highly reflective

communication practitioner, his working paper on "Mediarology" documents his
commitment to thinking through the "oxymorons" or "double ethical binds" confronting
scientists who lived up to their obligation of public outreach (Schneider, n.d.). And the
very title of his memoir, Science as a Contact Sport (2009) documents his willingness to
engage broadly with diverse public audiences on the issues he devoted his life to.
It was likely Schneider's general willingness to talk with his fiercest opponents
that lead him in to respond positively to an invitation to go on the Australian news/talk
show Insight to engage with 52 self-described doubters. Australia, one of the early
leaders in policy action against climate change was at that time entering a period of
backlash, which eventually resulted in the repeal of many important measures. Although
outright doubts about the reality of anthropogenic global warming were low (Leviston,
Price, Malkin, & McCrea, 2014), the tone of the debate had grown increasingly harsh.
The Sceptics, as the episode was called, is thus a promising context in which to
study good practices for managing deep disagreement. In the following pages, I first
outline specific challenges Schneider faced, before turning to what we can observe of his
toolkit for managing these challenges. Quotations are from the show's own transcript
(Insight, 2010), corrected from the video.
2. THE CHALLENGES
In undertaking to engage with "the sceptics," Schneider was facing several challenges.
The first, overarching challenge was whether interaction was possible at allor at least,
whether a reason-giving, argumentative interaction was possible. Schneider himself
characterized the wider public discussion of climate issues with a fight metaphor, as a
"constant set of combat." The press moderator similarly framed the present interaction in
warlike terms, introducing segments by inviting the television audience to watch
Schneider "take on a room full of climate change sceptics" and "to win them over." This
framing hardly provided optimism on the ability of good reasons to find traction in the
situation.
In addition to the general problem of deep disagreement, Schneider faced two
related, specific challenges when interacting with "sceptics." First was the challenge of
distrust. Australians have been characterized as having a "not exceptionally high" level of
trust in scientists generally (Leviston et al., 2014). Not surprisingly, there is evidence
(from surveys in the US, at least) that people who are doubtful or dismissive of the
existence of climate change are particularly distrustful, especially of climate scientists
(Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Hmielowski, 2012). In meeting with The
Sceptics, Schneider repeatedly encountered indications that his interlocutors not only
doubted his climate science, but also doubted him, personally. One criticized him for
allegedly spinning his science, characterizing him as "exaggerating;" another said he was
giving "prevaricative" answers; and Janetone of his leading opponents on the
programaccused him of "alarmism" and "scaremongering." During the interaction,
Schneider's perceived bias was twice traced back to its roots in self-interest, either
financial:

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The only reason you're getting grant money is because climate change, the planet is warming, it's
the only reason you're getting grant money. If we didn't have this hysteria there would be no
grants, there would be no moneyno people making money at all.

or political:
What I find suspicious is that I have not heard, and I watch a lot of media, one of these moderately
minded scientists come out and hose down the Doomsday scenarios being pedalled by
environmentalists and our politicians. I'm not speaking of you yourself, sir, but your industry, your
lobbying, the lobby of which you are a part I think a scientist in your position could speak up
against bias language even in areas where it actually contributes to your industry. I would like to
hear people in your business admit some doubt.

This second passage occurred relatively late in the event, after Schneider (as we will see
below) had built up some trust with his audience, and the interlocutor here tries to exempt
Schneider from the criticism he is levelling. But his utterance reveals that he takes
climate scientists to be a "business," "industry" or "lobby" group, roughly on par with the
fossil fuel industry or environmental advocacy organizations: a typical political actor,
using "bias language" to advance self-interest. Obviously, it will be difficult for
Schneider to get his interlocutors to take his arguments seriously if they believe he is just
a political shill; Schneider must therefore do something to mitigate the distrust in order
for the interaction to proceed.
A second specific challenge Schneider faces arises from the fact that climate
science is complex, but the time for making arguments is always limited. Those who
would cast doubt on mainstream science can take advantage of this fact by adopting a
strategy known as the "Gish Gallop," or what American debaters term "spread." Using
this strategy, interlocutors raise such a large number of argumentsgenerally weak or
baseless argumentsthat their opponents are unable to respond to them all within the
time constraints, thus creating an appearance that they cannot respond. Intentionally or
not, several of Schneider's interlocutors bombarded him with diverse considerations in a
small space of time. For example, early in the interchange one interlocutorJanet
raised three distinct points over a short set of three turns:
[Janet] The hypothesis that we are currently faced with is that carbon dioxide is the driver of
climate change and throughout history we have proven evidence that temperature has been much
colder with higher degrees of CO2 in the atmosphere than what we have today and vice versa...
The evidence says that we did have warming, yes, we have [not] been in a long-term warming
trend the last 15 years, we haven't had no statistical warming and so I think that's a problem with
this hypothesis. I believe that the hypothesis has been shown to be false.
I think we've got a fundamental problem in that we are wanting to change our entire economic
structure based on the hypothesis that CO2 is the driver of climate.

The first concerns how scientists have attributed the current warming to the rise in CO2
("attribution"); the second concerns the existence of current warming at all ("detection");
the third concerns the correct policy response to climate change. Although the program is
long given the television medium (with 45 minutes devoted to talk), and the moderator
allows Schneider extended turns, Schneider could legitimately find it difficult to respond
fully to even one of these points, much less all three. After all, it took the IPCC 5th
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Assessment Report 1552 pages to summarize the physical science relevant to points 1 and
2.
3. SCHNEIDER'S STRATEGIC TOOLKIT
Having reviewed the challenges Schneider faces, I now turn to examine his responses.
What strategies does he have for opening a space for argumentative interaction, managing
deep disagreement, distrust, and issue spread? I start with Schneider's responses the two
more specific challenges, before taking up the general problem of transacting
disagreement between scientists and citizens.
3.1 Aggressive presumption of good faith
Throughout the event, Schneider refuses to accept his interlocutors' negative
characterizations of his motives. But he equally refuses to reply to them in kind. In this
way, Schneider verbally enacts an attitude of trust in his interlocutors, treating them as
worthy conversation partners.
Consider first Schneider's management of the open expressions of distrust towards
him. When accused of exaggeration, Schneider responds by simply denying the charge
and re-explaining the evidence for his figures. When accused of contradicting what he
had said in another context, he blames the problem on his "American English" and admits
that "if" he said what the interlocutor said he said, "he misspoke"although it was
almost certainly the case that it was the interlocutor who misunderstood. When accused
of bias due to membership in the climate science "industry," he either ignores the
accusation (helped by the moderator, who shifted immediately to another member of the
audience), or explains that the group of climate scientists are quite diverse, including
some members who admittedly do "overstate," but many (including himself) who do not.
Schneider is furthermore careful to avoid saying that his interlocutors are
speaking with the kind of "bias" or "exaggeration" they charge him with. Schneider of
course is aware of the generally accepted fact that special interests have put substantial
amounts of money behind messaging that manufactures doubt of climate science (e.g.,
Ceccarelli, 2011; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). And it is also clear that Schneider thinks
some of his interlocutors have been misled by these messages. But in discussing the
misinformation, he distances his present conversation partners from the advocacy. For
example,
There are groups which have spent a lot of timepeople have made assertions

Here Schneider starts by a reference to the "groups" doing the distorting, but immediately
corrects this already impersonal designation to remove the suggestion of active
misleading (it's just making "assertions") and of organization (it's just "people"). Even
when pressed, he maintains a distinction between the intentional misleading performed
by advocacy groups in the public sphere and the specific utterances of his present
interlocutors. Schneider starts his second interchange with Janet, one of his most hostile
opponents, by saying:

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I'm concerned that youre kind of repeating a mantra from what you've heard from discredited
information. When people try to say that [the "discredited information"] they either do not
understand climate science or they polemicizing, because it is an absolutely every single model.

Here we see Schneider reporting not his interlocutor's assertion of faulty reasoning
(hedged as "kind of"), but his own "concerns" about it; and he gives his interlocutor an
out, allowing that she may just "not understand," not that she is necessarily
"polemicizing."
Finally, Schneider responds to distrust by actively expressing trust, specifically
denying that people like his interlocutors are moved by anything less than the public
good. "I don't know [any] coal miner or any auto worker making a big car who does it to
screw up the climate," he explains at one point, "but they may be screwing up the
climate."
In sum, Schneider appears to be systematically avoiding any hint that his
interlocutors may be guilty of bad argumentative conductand specifically, of precisely
the bad argumentative conduct some of them accuse him of. There is no "crying foul"
against his interlocutor's questionable moves (Innocenti, 2011). Instead, Schneider is
implicitly following Sally Jackson's (2008) advice to scientists in particular: to refrain
from questioning others' motives, to avoid opening a meta-debate over possible
"politicization" of scientific findings, and instead to stick to critiquing the reasoning
itself. Although (as we will see below) Schneider does set limits around what is worth
debating, in his utterances he consistently frames his interlocutors as worthy conversation
partners.
3.2 Issue management
As pointed out above, Schneider's interlocutors (intentionally or not) several times
present him with multiple potential issues, threatening to make his replies appear
inadequate. Issues are not simply given by the occasion, however; they are the outcome
of the discursive work done by all participants in an exchange (Goodwin, 2002). What
does Schneider do to manage the complexity he faces?
Throughout the event, Schneider displays some skill at being explicit about the set
of issues he is addressing. At a minimum, he often begins his turns with "first of all,"
priming his auditors to expect additional arguments after the first is finished. He even
occasionally manages to mark his later points, with "with regard to" or "the question
is"something that is difficult to do on the fly. Schneider also frequently begins by
identifying the specific issue he will address. In an elaboration of his first strategy of
aggressive trust, he tends to accomplish this by praising his interlocutor's framing of the
"question" as "good," "very good," or even "excellent." At one point he even goes out of
his way to explain why the question is a good onebecause it aligns with the questions
climate scientists themselves have raised:
Yeah, a good question [raising doubts about the integrity of some measurements] and so does the
scientific community. So that very good question that you asked is exactly the same question
that climate scientists have been asking themselves for 30 to 40 years .

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When faced with a definite "Gish Gallop," Schneider is especially careful to be explicit
about the issues in play. Here is Schneider in his first interchange with Janet, the
interlocutor whose three issues were quoted above, at the end of taking up her second
point:
That's [her first point, attribution] a tougher question which I will be happy, in fact must address
which many of you brought that up in your opening comments.
[Moderator] We'll get on to that in a moment. Does that answer your question, Janet?
[Janet raises her first point again.]
[Schneider] Yeah, that's a different question.
[Janet, overlapping] That isn't
[Schneider] That's what we call detection[correcting that to] attribution. I promise you I'll talk
about that. Right now we're only talking about, is the climate changing? [i.e., detection]

Here we see Schneider doing extensive metadiscursive work to differentiate the potential
issues, to identify which he has already replied to, and to promise to reply to the
remaining. The moderator never gave him a chance to return to the missing point, but his
explicitness here makes clear to the listening audience that it is the constraints of the
medium, not his own inability, that prevents a full response to the issues.
Finally, in one extreme case Schneider twice breaks in to secure his opportunity to
register a reply. At the end of the second interchange with Janet, Schneider first interrupts
the moderator, asking, "can I just quickly answer that?" and then interrupts Janet with
"can I please finish?" Despite the politeness devices (asking for permission, minimizing
the interruption as "quick," using "please"), Schneider here shows he is willing to disrupt
the interchange in order to get his points heard.
Schneider's marking of points is helpful for ensuring that his audience follows his
reasoning. But clarity is not the only strategic purpose of his heavy use of metadiscourse.
While responding as fully as the medium permits to the points he thinks most important,
Schneider's argumentative roadmaps prevent his audience from inferring that he has no
answers to the others.
3.3 Exercise of authority
As we have seen above, Schneider does a lot to establish his interlocutors as worthy
conversation partnerseven when they are giving them griefand also gives strong
endorsements to the "questions" they are raising. At the same time, however, he is clear
about one thing: there are points that are simply not debatable.
In his first interchange with Janet, Schneider leads off with:
Yeah, okay, that's wrong, sorry - that's not what the evidence says. First of all

Notice that Schneider mitigates the rejection of Janet's reasoning by shifting from the
possible "you're wrong" to the impersonal "that's wrong," and by adding hedges in
advance and an apology afterwards. Also, although he does not argue against Janet's
point, he does go on to provide an explanation of the science on the topic. Stronger is his
response to another interlocutor:

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I'm sorry to say that's not true. Please read the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
report

Here we see the same impersonality and apologizing, but coupled with a possibly
condescending instruction to the interlocutor to go and read up on the topica method
for resolving the difference of opinion that doesn't take up precious time in the
interaction. Finally, in an exchange with a recalcitrant interlocutor Schneider first offers
an out"perhaps you haven't understood the answer"before finally concluding:
[Schneider] Oh, then you're totally wrong.
[Interlocutor] I'm saying [repeats point]
[Schneider] I think you need to study this problem.
[Interlocutor] I've studied it
[Schneider] Obviously not well. Let me give you an example.
[Moderator] Okay, one at a time. Let Stephen respond.
[Schneider] [Gives example.] That is completely well established, it's been established for a
long time and if you don't accept that you really need to study science. You're just wrong.

Here Schneider's reply is personal"you're totally wrong"and the dismissal he gives

his interlocutorto go and "study science"direct.
It is interesting to note that in all three instances, Schneider is refusing to engage
when his interlocutor attempts to play a "scientist" role (e.g., when he is identified as a
"Dr.") or to use the language of science (e.g., "hypothesis"). While Schneider finds it
praiseworthy for lay interlocutors to raise "questions"especially when their questions
coincide with scientists' ownlay interlocutors aren't worth talking with when they cross
over into the terrain of science and maintain positions that he, the scientist, finds
unsupportable. In these cases Schneider exercises his authority as a scientist, declares that
his interlocutors are "wrong," and directs them to engage in further study (i.e., to become
scientists) before he will engage with them. Shutting down debate is of course commonly
accounted as a fallacious move in argumentative interactions. In Schneider's interaction
with "the sceptics," it appears to play a vital role in keeping the controversy contained.
4. CONCLUSION
Few raised their hands towards the end of the program, when the moderator inquired
whether Schneider had changed any minds. But perhaps changing mindsresolution of
the disagreementwas not the point of the interaction (Goodwin, 1999)
Instead, towards the end of the event Schneider and many of his interlocutors find
themselves converging with regard to what one in the audience calls "the rhetoric of
this"that is, the way the controversy is discursively transacted outside the present
interaction. Schneider echoes an interlocutor's criticism of some of his fellow scientists,
who "overstate" the facts about climate change. Another interlocutor picks up with
approval Schneider's critique of the media's "sound byte journalism," which she agrees
adds to "the problem." When one interlocutor criticizes the "argy-bargy sort of thing"
which makes it impossible for laypersons to find credible answers, Schneider approves
and goes on to warn against any speaker who claims to be a "truth teller"on either side
of the debate. And most notably, Schneider and two of "the sceptics" exchange stories of

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receiving threats and ostracism because of their statements on climate issues. Schneider
sums up that discussion:
I decry the destruction in civility that's been happening around this issuebecause if people can't
maintain a civil dialogue how are you going to run a civil democracy?... There's no place for that
in civil society because scientists also need to be engaged by helping people understand risk. And
when you're in this constant set of combat then how do we have any chance of talking to each
other in a civil way? Which is why I agreed to do this program.

To which his interlocutor replies:

I was just about to say the thank you for actually engaging in dialogue sensibly and not
basically not demonising anyone who dares to raise a doubt.

It's become typical advice to offer climate scientists: do not debate with "the sceptics"
who doubt your science; stop arguing, and use more effective communication techniques
instead (e.g., Lamberts, 2014). The fact that Stephen Schneider was able to argue with an
audience of "the sceptics" for an hour flies in the face of this advice. It took effort to
make the interaction happen; as I have shown, Schneider had to use great care in
projecting an active trust in his interlocutors, in managing the issues, and, at some points,
in closing down debate. But the investment was worth it. As a small enactment of "civil
dialogue," this event provided a demonstration to the participants and the wider audience
that something like a worthwhile argumentative interaction is possible, even among those
who deeply disagree.
REFERENCES
Ceccarelli, L. (2011). Manufactured scientific controversy: Science, rhetoric, and public debate. Rhetoric &
Public Affairs, 14(2), 195-228.
Goodwin, J. (1999). Good argumentation without resolution. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A.
Blair & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference of the
International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 255-257). Amsterdam: SicSat.
Goodwin, J. (2001). Henry W. Johnstone's still unacknowledged contributions to contemporary
argumentation theory. Informal Logic, 21, 41-50.
Goodwin, J. (2002). Designing issues. In F. H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and
Rhetoric: The Warp and Woof of Argumentation Analysis (pp. 81-96). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Goodwin, J. (2007). Argument has no function. Informal Logic, 27, 69-90.
Govier, T. (1987). Reasons why arguments and explanations are different. In Problems in Argument
Analysis and Evaluation (pp. 159-176). Dordrecht: Foris Publications.
Innocenti, B. (2011). Countering questionable tactics by crying foul. Argumentation & Advocacy, 47, 178188.
Insight, SBS ONE (Producer). (2010). The Sceptics. Retrieved from http://www.sbs.com.au/news/insight/
tvepisode/sceptics
Jackson, S. (2008). Predicaments of politicization in the debate over abstinence-only sex education. In F. H.
v. Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Controversy and Confrontation: Relating Controversy Analysis
with Argumentation Theory (pp. 215-230). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1980). Structure of conversational argument: Pragmatic bases for the
enthymeme. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66, 251-264.
Jacobs, S. (2000). Rhetoric and dialectic from the standpoint of normative pragmatics. Argumentation, 14,
261-286.

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Jacobs, S., & Jackson, S. (2006). Derailments of argumentation: It takes two to tango. In P. Houtlosser &
A. v. Rees (Eds.), Considering pragma-dialectics (pp. 121-133). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Lamberts, R. (2014). Facts wont beat the climate deniers using their tactics will. The Conversation.
Retrieved from http://theconversation.com/facts-wont-beat-the-climate-deniers-using-their-tacticswill-24074
Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., & Hmielowski, J. (2012). Engaging Diverse Audiences
with Climate Change: Message Strategies for Global Warming's Six Americas. New Haven, CT:
Yale Project on Climate Change Communication.
Leviston, Z., Price, J., Malkin, S. C. F., & McCrea, R. (2014). Fourth survey of Australian attitudes to
climate change: Interim Report. Perth, Australia: CSIRO.
Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010). Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the
Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press.
Schneider, S. H. (2009). Science as a Contact Sport: Inside the Battle to Save Earth's Climate. Washington,
DC: National Geographic.
Schneider, S. H. (n.d.). Mediarology. from http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Mediarology/
Mediarology.html

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The Matrix For The 21st Century Russian Education

Kira Goudkova & Tatyana Tretyakova
Philological Faculty
Saint Petersburg State University
Russia
gudkovakira@bk.ru
Philological Faculty
Saint Petersburg State University
Russia
tretyakova.tp.50@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: The paper deals with the problem of argumentation literacy in the field of modern Russian
education. We carry out the analysis of argumentation that university students put forward while writing
argumentative essays as a part of their final English test. The analysis concerns papers written by students
at different exam levels: B2, C1. The command of English at these levels differs a lot and the analysis is
aimed at revealing connection between students language ability and their argumentative ability.
KEYWORDS: Argumentative ability, CEFR, language competences, B2/C1 students.

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the study of relations between students argumentative ability and
their foreign language ability and in particular, that part of relations that has to do with
the skill to produce arguments in a foreign language (English in our research) and the
level of the English language competence. The study makes use of the pragma-dialectical
approach to argumentative discourse that unites normative and descriptive approaches to
the argumentation. We start with some background information concerning the changes
in educational approach to foreign language teaching that are being carried out in the
field of Russian language education. Then we present the results of students essays
analysis and finally make some conclusions.
2. EDUCATIONAL SHIFT TOWARDS COMPETENCES
The Common European Framework provides a common basis for the elaboration of
language syllabuses, curriculum guidelines, examinations, textbooks, etc. across Europe.
It describes in a comprehensive way what skills language learners have to acquire in
order to use a language for communication and what knowledge and skills they have to
develop to be able to act effectively. The Framework also defines levels of proficiency
that allow learners progress to be measured at each stage of learning and on a life-long
basis.
The Council of Europe is concerned to improve the quality of communication among
Europeans of different language and cultural backgrounds. This is because better

498

communication leads to freer mobility and more direct contact, which in turn leads to
better understanding and closer co-operation.
The main document produced by the Council of Europe is the CEFR, the chief
goal of which can be formulated as the following: The Common European Framework is
intended to overcome the barriers to communication among professionals working in the
field of modern languages arising from the different educational systems in Europe
(CEFR, 2001, p. 1). Recently created Language Testing Centre of Saint Petersburg State
University has developed its own tests that are currently going through the process of
being linked to the CEFR. That means that a group of international experts are analyzing
the above-mentioned tests developed by the university experts in terms of their
compliance with the CEFR requirements.
According to the CEFR language use embracing language learning comprises the
actions performed by persons who as individuals and as social agents develop a range of
competences, both general and particular language competences with the special
emphasis on communicative competence. They draw on the competences at their disposal
in various contexts under various conditions and under various constraints to engage in
language activities. The production and receiving verbal messages in various situations
imply both the diversity of themes covering specific topical domains and communicative
relations between interlocutors. Activating strategies relevant to functional approach
seems most appropriate for carrying out the tasks to be accomplished in general education
(CEFR, 2001, p. 9)
Thus, we can say that modern educationalists regard forming competences as one
of the main goals of foreign language teaching. Competences are regarded as a sum of
knowledge, skills, abilities behavioral rituals that allow a person to perform actions. In
our study we are interested mainly in communicative language competence that
comprises several components: linguistic, sociolinguistic and pragmatic. If we look at the
definitions of the above competences given in the CEFR, we will get the following:
Linguistic competences include lexical, phonological, syntactical knowledge and
skills and other dimensions of language as system.
Sociolinguistic competences refer to the sociocultural conditions of language use.
Pragmatic competences are concerned with the functional use of linguistic
resources (production of language functions, speech acts), drawing on scenarios or scripts
of interactional exchanges.
All these competences are necessary for encouraging learners to organize
argumentative speech in a foreign language in both learning situations and natural
communicative situations. Argumentative foreign language competences are concerned
with argumentative ability of the person and comprise the ability to present a viewpoint
in a foreign language drawing on linguistic devices, to put forward arguments for or
against a particular standpoint, to sequence arguments in a logical way and to present
arguments organizing them in argumentative structures.
We think that these competences should be included in pragmatic competences as
an important component in the course of foreign language teaching.

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3. ARGUMENTATION LITERACY
The problem of argumentation literacy in the field of Russian education has become
urgent with the introduction of the United State Exam in Russian comprehensive
secondary school. School students are encouraged to use some of argumentation schemes
in foreign language writing and speaking. However, the level of present Russian school
foreign language interaction concerns more explanation of the speakers standpoint rather
than argumentation. The level of higher education requires a more sophisticated approach
to argumentation education incorporating different levels of language proficiency and
knowledge in special professional fields. With State Saint Petersburg Universitys joining
the Bologna process aimed at the creation of European Higher Education Area (EHEA)
the urgency of argumentation literacy has become even higher.
As far as Russia is concerned we can say that practical argumentation education
was mostly developed in business schools and foreign languages in most cases came as a
subsidiary instrument used for verbal socializing. Moreover, the model of the adult world
reflected in the language is connected with certain stereotypes, which should be taken
into account and are presently covered by the culture-studies as speech habits and rituals
in quickly changing present-day communication. The concept of the stereotype can be
seen as a phenomenon that covers social aspect of communication practice and a
rhetorical one. In the first case the recurrence of social situations is important which can
be used in educational case settings, whereas the rhetorical aspect provides the genre of
argumentative dialogue. Both aspects are relevant for argumentation literacy.
Second and foreign language teaching is often based on the assumption that
learners have already acquired a knowledge of the world sufficient for the purpose
participating in argumentative dialogue. This is, however, not always the case and we
think that is definitely not the case when we are talking about argumentative ability of the
learner of a foreign language. It is really difficult to put your message across to other
people in a foreign language and far more difficult to convince them.
The learner may well argue in his/her mother tongue and we tend to extrapolate
his/her ability into a foreign language. Understanding the stereotypes and the fact that
people communicate and listen differently is a part of argumentation and language
teaching.
As J. Harmer noted language teachingreflects the times it takes in. Language is
about communicationTeaching and learning are very human activities; they are social
just as much as they are linguistic (Harmer, 2011, p. 9)
3.1 CEFR criteria
The aim of the present study is to carry out the analysis of argumentation that university
students put forward while writing argumentative essays that are an obligatory part of
their final test in English. First we discuss basic criteria for two levels (B2 and C1) and
then cover the comparative argumentation analysis connected with their language skills.
New requirements for English as a foreign language have recently been adopted
for university students. According to these requirements all university graduates should
possess B2 in English. Those students who entered university with B2 should sit English
exam at C1 level. Thus, university graduates may be either B2 or C1 students. We

500

conducted a comparative analysis of essays written by students at different exam levels:

B2 and C1 according to CEFR (Common European Framework of Reference). The
required performance of English at these levels differs a lot and we believe that the
argumentation competence may also differ. CEFR criteria at the target levels B2 and C1
are the following:
B2 students can write an essay or report, which develops an argument
systematically with appropriate highlighting of significant points and relevant supporting
detail. Examples: Can write an essay or report which develops an argument, giving
reasons in support of or against a particular point of view and explaining the advantages
and disadvantages of various options. Can synthesize information and arguments from a
number of sources. Has a sufficient range of language to be able to give clear
descriptions, express viewpoints and develop arguments without much conspicuous
searching for words, using some complex sentence forms to do so.
C1 students can select an appropriate formulation from a broad range of language
to express him/herself clearly, without having to restrict what he/she wants to say.
Examples: Can write clear, well-structured expositions of complex subjects, underlining
the relevant salient issues. Can expand and support points of view at some length with
subsidiary points, reasons and relevant examples.
3.2 B2 students argumentative ability
Argumentation scheme for the analysis is taken from the pragma-dialectical approach. In
pragma-dialectical approach (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993)
natural argumentative discourse models were described through normative models, which
allow incorporating normative models of dialogue and different types of communicative
activity in some particular situational settings.
The analysis shows that students presenting their essays at B2 level demonstrate
the following argumentative abilities and competences. They can indicate standpoints and
produce mainly utilitarian arguments. They employ the limited range of language to
express standpoints. The examples of the expressions are the following:
(1)

In my opinion, I personally think, I agree, I consider, Im inclined to believe, I

believe, I think, I feel, as far as I am concerned, my personal opinion is, from my
point of view.

The most common way to indicate standpoint at this level is to indicate it explicitly by
using personal pronouns and explicit linguistic markers as can be seen from given
examples.
The analysis also reveals that at this level of language competence students use
two main types of arguments: 1. personal, utilitarian, beneficial; students appeal to
positive concepts of goodness; 2. arguments to popular opinion.
Let us look at the example of utilitarian argumentation. The standpoint that is defended is
expressed explicitly with the clear linguistic marker. The argumentation can be
reconstructed as subordinately compound:

501

(2)

Standpoint: In my opinion, it is very useful for young people to move to another

city to study
Argument 1: Studying far away from home gives students not only an academic
knowledge but also a great life experience.
Sub-argument 1: These skills make young people more successful, self-confident
and clever. Sub-argument 2: It makes students to become independent from their
parents.

There is one argument that is backed up by two sub-arguments. All the arguments that are
put forward to defend the standpoint are mainly utilitarian and beneficial and closely
connected with the personal life experience of the arguer. A special type concerns causal
relations.
Given examples show that the arguer cannot alienate himself/herself from his/her
owns self. It is revealed in the concepts to which he/she appeals: life experience,
independence, success, self-confidence.
We can consider some more examples of personal utilitarian arguments:
(3)

(4)

(5)

Standpoint: Some people think that participating in a reality show can be a

valiable life experience (we retain original grammar and spelling)
Argument: I agree with this statement, as this kind of experience may be very
useful.
Standpoint: The Internet is very useful thing.
Arguments: 1. it can help us to find information, 2. it connects people around the
world, we can chat how much we want.
Standpoint: In my opinion, people should communicate face to face.
Arguments: 1. a human will feel himself better if he communicates really not with
Internet. 2. Live communication will help us to understand other people, their
problems, interests. 2.1. By this way you can find friends easier and faster. 3.
Walking with friends is also good for mind.

All these examples of utilitarian argumentation reveal that at B2 level students (in the
majority of cases) cannot alienate themselves from their personal experience and put
forward arguments that are closely linked with their knowledge of the world. Thus, they
act as nave arguers and draw heavily from their knowledge of the world that was formed
mainly by their environment (school, family, friends etc.).
3.3 C1 students argumentative ability
The argumentation scheme used by C1 level students is a little bit different. The analysis
shows a definite ability of students to alienate themselves from their personal experience
and produce more abstract and impersonal arguments. These types of arguments are
presented in a more orderly way and they are more explicit. The created argumentative
scheme reflects standpoints are becoming more varied and the point of view is expressed
more eloquently. Although the functional register of verbal stereotypes is still egocentric
as in utilitarian argumentation, the indicators reflecting introductory level of

502

argumentation show the confidence of the speaker : I cannot deny, I would like to say,
thats why I am sure etc.
C1 level students more often introduce their standpoints without explicit verbal
indicators, which is not the case with B2 students. The latter prefer to express their
standpoints explicitly or present a certain proposition as a generally accepted idea such as
some people think. According to F. Eemeren, P.Houtlosser and F.Henkemans When a
proposition is presented as generally accepted or irrefutablethis implicates that the
other party cannot escape from accepting that proposition as a shared starting point
(Eemeren, Houtlosser & Henkemans, 2007, p. 105). B2 students act as nave arguers
and make use of the tools they would have used arguing in their mother tongue, for it
seems safer to stick to generally accepted ideas.
Students presenting their essays at C1 level also often use compound sentences to
introduce standpoints. Here are some examples of different ways to present a standpoint:
(6)
(7)

Nowadays globalization not only affects world economy and culture but also
changes peoples everyday experiences.
To my mind globalization would not change the world for the better.

C1 level students when using utilitarian argumentation connect arguments with

usefulness for the community and society in general rather than with their personal
experience... Thus at this level utilitarian argumentation becomes more impersonal. This
can be illustrated with the following examples:
(8)

(9)

One more argument for globalization is that it benefits everyone, not only big
corporations but also people in developing countries, as it provides them with job
places.
It (globalization) offers new opportunities for travel, work and education and of
course for communication.

In terms of argumentation schemes students at C1 level demonstrate the ability to use

regressive presentation (which is not the case at B2 level students who prefer the
progressive presentation). The arguer puts forward arguments and then expresses his/her
opinion.
(10)

Companies tend to become more productive and competitive thereby raising the
quality of goods, services and the standards of living, thats why I am sure that
term globalization is definitely about progress.

One more argument type of C1 level students argumentation is connected with the
binary oppositions. Unlike the schemes reflecting specific relations between a premise
and standpoint opposites are patterns that can be abstracted from any particular content.
A binary opposition deals with the aspect of categorization
Modern global world is full of opposites that could be defined through diverse
categories --good opposes bad, big opposes small, right opposes left, night opposes day,
old opposes young, and globalists oppose anti-globalists. These oppositions create
societys beliefs and misconceptions of what is good and what is bad, or what is ethical

503

and non-ethical, and from a young age we subconsciously conform to these without even
knowing it , and even as adults we continue creating these oppositions in our minds when
processing fact evaluation of facts. A binary opposition is a pair of opposites that
powerfully form and organize human thought and culture. Binary opposition is so deeply
rooted in thinking patterns that we cannot even escape it. The concept of binary
opposition is in use almost always whether we realize it or not (Goudkova & Tretyakova,
2010, p. 657).
C1 level students use binary oppositions to present their arguments thus directing
the vector of argumentation to the positive concepts when defending a standpoint and to
the negative concepts when putting arguments against a standpoint. Here are arguments
that students put forward arguing for and against globalization.
Arguments for:
(11)
(12)
(13)

When the nations have one world, one vision, the same political and economic
interests, it helps them to live in peace appellation to the concept of peace.
Globalisation encourages better standards for the environment appellation to the
concept of environment protection.
Globalisation gives us many communication advances such as e-mail, mobile
phones, social networks, skype appellation to the concept of easy and better
communication.

Arguments against:
(14)

Globalisation results in destruction of cultural diversity appellation to the

concept of destruction.

Counter-argumentation refers to negative concepts, e.g.:

(15)

The great number of employees from developing countries creates such a

competition that multinational companies could easily exploit the workers setting
unfairly low wages.
The negative concepts to which the arguer appeals are the concept of exploitation and the
concept of injustice.
Thus, we can specify the following features of C1 level in argumentation: a
regressive presentation of argumentation, alienation from personal experience in
utilitarian argumentation scheme, a greater number of verbal expressions reflecting
introductory level of argumentation and the use of opposites as a specific pattern.
4. CONCLUSION
In conclusion it may be stated the matrix for the argumentative analysis of foreignlanguage essay writing can be effectively carried out with the help of pragma-dialectics.
Critical argumentation is a practical skill that needs to be taught, from the very beginning,
through the use of real or realistic examples of arguments of the kind that the user
encounters in everyday life (Walton, 2006, p. xi)

504

The analysis of B2 and C1 students essays shows that Russian students writing in
English may know the basics of argumentation but they cannot use it properly, as they are
not proficient enough in the L2 language. They start using arguments when they become
more skilled in the language and the results show that that is achieved at C1 level. At all
these levels of language competence the type of argumentation in a foreign language is
connected with the concept of stereotyping as a multi-dimensional activity that creates a
communication frame of critical discussion and a range of indicators for presenting
arguments.
Results obtained show that students act as nave arguers in Russian environment
because of the lack of basics of argumentation theoretical technique. They produce their
arguments on intuition, which tells more about the speaker/ writer than about effective
arguments.
Argumentation competences should be incorporated into the university curriculum
to provide students with basic concepts and practices. Argumentation appears to correlate
with innate properties of the students mind. The more advanced in the language
(English) students become the more independently from their personal experience and
more impersonal their arguments are. Thus, the higher language competence the more
abstract arguments become. We can conclude that there is strong correlation between
language competence and argumentative competence.

REFERENCES
Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment. (2001).
Council of Europe. Strasbourg: Cambridge University Press.
Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1993). Reconstructing argumentative
discourse. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Houtlosser, P. & Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. (2007). Argumentative indicators in
discourse. A pragma-dialectical study. Dordrecht: Springer.
Goudkova, K. & Tretyakova, T. (2011). Binary oppositions <good-bad> in media argumentation. In F. H.
Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh International
Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 656-662). Amsterdam:
Sic Sat.
Harmer, J. (2011). How to teach English. Harlow: Person Longman.
Walton, D. (2006). Fundamentals of critical argumentation. New York: Cambridge University Press.

505

Argumentation From Analogy In Migrants Decisions

Sara Greco
Institute of Argumentation, Linguistics and Semiotics
Universit della Svizzera italiana
Switzerland
sara.greco@usi.ch

ABSTRACT: Basing on the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT) within the general framework of a
pragma-dialectical viewpoint on argumentation, this paper analyses the role of argumentation from analogy
in international migrants decision-making processes on the basis of a corpus of interviews to migrant
mothers resident in the greater London area. Reasoning from analogy allows evaluating pragmatic decisions
such as leaving ones home country, staying over in a foreign country, etc. in terms of feasibility and
reasonableness.
KEYWORDS: Argumentation from analogy, loci, international migration, migration strategy, inner
argumentation, functional genus.

1. INTRODUCTION
In the framework of analysis of contextualised argumentative discourse, this paper
approaches argumentation from analogy in international migrants decision making
processes. International migration is a phenomenon which can be approached in a variety
of dimensions and contexts, from families to institutions, to media portraits of migration.
Amongst these contexts, a significant case in which an argumentative analysis may help
shed light on the phenomenon of migration is family and individual decision processes
concerning the decision to migrate or (not) to go back to ones home country.
In the literature on international migration, general terms to describe the reason
why individuals migrate are defined push/pull factors or migration determinants (cf.
Castles and Miller 2009: 21ff). These terms, however, only cover general concepts that
tend to identify social tendencies without explaining individual trajectories and objectives.
Other authors introduce the notion of migration strategy in order to more specifically
account for the long-term goals and projects of the individuals who opt for international
migration. For example, in studying strategies of Polish migrants to the UK, Eade (2007)
distinguishes (amongst other categories) between hamsters, who consider their stay in the
UK as a one-off act, intending to return to their home country as soon as they have
accumulated enough capital; and searchers, namely those who keep their options
deliberately open, thus being characterized by intentional unpredictability (Eade 2007:
34). Approaching individual migration strategies from an argumentative viewpoint means
casting a new light on the individual goals and reasons why each migrant chooses to start a
migration trajectory, thus allowing a nuanced view of this phenomenon. With the intention
of moving forward on this path, I consider international migration from an argumentative
viewpoint in the framework of personal decision-making strategies, thus also approaching
the field of inner argumentation (Greco Morasso 2013).

506

Amongst the possible argument schemes used by migrants in their inner argumentative
dialogue, I claim that a significant role is played by argumentation from analogy, allowing
migrants to compare their present situation, in which a decision whose effects are
uncertain has to be faced, with other more familiar situations. In migrants decision
making, the locus from analogy appears as a prominent feature, both in terms of frequency
of occurrence and in strategic terms, because it is often subservient to the crucial decision
of leaving ones country as well as to equally important decisions, such as to return or not
to return (Finch et al. 2009). Some examples of migrants argumentation from analogy
have been shown in Greco Morasso (2013). In this paper, I will claim that analogical
reasoning is never the ultimate basis on which a migrant decides to leave (or not to leave),
but it is part of a more complex reasoning process. Arguments from analogy, in fact, seem
to mainly serve the purpose of evaluating the feasibility of a certain migration strategy.
In order to discuss this topic, I will proceed as follows. Section 2 will situate this
work in a theoretical framework on argumentation and, in particular, on the approach to
argument schemes that will be adopted. The data on which the analysis is based will be
presented in section 3 and analysed in section 4, while section 5 will present some general
discussion about the main results of the analysis. Finally, possible openings of this
research will be discussed in section 6.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Considering migrants individual decisions brings us to consider a particular type of
argumentation, namely what has been called inner argumentation (Billig 1996),
argumentative monologue (Rigotti 2005, Rocci 2005) or debating with oneself (Dascal
2005). In fact, even though in the data analysed in this paper certainly portrait a social
discussion between the researcher and the participants to this research, the same data also
provide clues to participants inner dialogue, most especially concerning their crucial
migration decisions (Greco Morasso 2013). In a pragma-dialectical framework, as in other
approaches, argumentation per se is a social phenomenon (van Eemeren and Grootendorst
2004). However, despite clear differences between inner and social forms of
argumentation, several authors have acknowledged the importance of inner argumentation
in peoples decision making processes. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: 54) claim
that inner deliberation should be legitimately considered as a form of argumentation;
drawing on Isocrates, they observe that the arguments that we use in order to persuade
others are the same as those we use when reflecting with ourselves. Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (2004: 120) claim that It is even possible for one person to assume the role
of both protagonist and antagonist of one and the same standpoint and to conduct a
dialogue intrieur by way of self-deliberation. Billig (1996: 142) argues that, in inner
argumentation, Part of the self turns itself into a harsh critic against the rest of the self
and that inner argumentative discussions count as a highly dramatic arena of
argumentation.
According to Dascal (2005), there is evidence for contiguities and analogies
between inner and social argumentation. Contiguity refers to the fact that dialogue with
others and dialogue with oneself often follow each other in a temporal sequence. Thus,
most especially in front of a difficult decision, one will reflect with herself and come to a
provisional conclusion; then talk to family and/or friends; then, again, reconsider their

507

advice and possible objections in personal thoughts before making a final decision and
so on. From this perspective, social and inner argumentation are contiguous segments of
one and the same line. Analogies can be found in how social and inner argumentation are
structured: both are informed by the presence of others standpoints and arguments, as
well as their refutation. Greco Morasso (2013) has shown how it is possible to reconstruct
even complex argumentative discussions within inner dialogue1. The present paper
contributes to this research stream by focusing on the role of argumentation from analogy
inner argumentation in migrants decisions.
In order to analyse argumentation from analogy, I will adopt the Argumentum
Model of Topics (Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2006, 2010; Rigotti 2008, 2009), while at the
same time situating my approach in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. The
Argumentum Model of Topics will be used for the analysis of argumentation from
analogy, because it allows a specific consideration of the inferential configuration of
argument schemes. The combination of pragma-dialectics and AMT has already proven
fruitful in a number of previous works, amongst which Greco Morasso (2011) and
Palmieri (2014).
In the AMT, analogy is considered as one of the extrinsic loci. Intrinsic and
extrinsic loci, namely the two fundamental categories of the typology proposed by the
AMT, are distinguished on the basis of a criterion based on the proximity of the (world
of the) argument to the (world of the) considered standpoint. Such criterion has been first
introduced by Cicero in his Topica, although its systematic application is initiated only
later by Boethius (see the discussion in Rigotti & Greco, forthcoming). In the case of
intrinsic loci, standpoint and argument belong to one and the same possible world. For
example, if one says that a tree has fallen because of a violent thunderstorm2, the three and
the thunderstorm (efficient cause) belong to the same world. Contrastingly, with extrinsic
loci, argument and the standpoint belong to different worlds. For example, with the locus
from the opposites, we reason that one and the same thing cannot be A and non-A at the
same time and under the same respect. Hence, Lisa cannot be in London and in
Amsterdam on the same day and at the same time. Lisa being in London and Lisa being
in Amsterdam are events that certainly do not belong to one and the same world; they
belong to two different (and in this case alternative) possible worlds.
The same holds with analogy. For example, in the summer 2011, it was not rare to
read in European newspapers the forecast that Italy was going to need a bailout loan soon.
This forecast was sometimes motivated on the basis of the experience of Greece, a country
which had needed a bailout in 2010. Such argument was obviously based on an analogy
between these two countries; the latter, however, are obviously different under many
respects, and crisis in Italy and crisis in Greece constitute two logically distinct
worlds. In this case, these two worlds are not mutually exclusive; rather, they actually coexist.
Several authors have considered how the main problem with argumentation from analogy
is comparability of the concerned entities or states of affairs. Some argue that
argumentation from analogy is built on the basis of a functional genus, which is not a
1

Greco (submitted) analyses migrants pragmatic argumentation in inner dialogue, while Perrin & Zampa
(submitted) approach this topic in a fairly different context, as they describe journalists inner argumentative
reflections while making decisions about their newspapers articles.
2
In this case, we are on the boundary between argumentation and explanation of a physical fact.

508

genus in the traditional Aristotelian sense of this word, but rather a pragmatic category
under which both entities are said to fall (see in particular Macagno 2014). In an AMT
perspective, the functional genus is functional precisely because it connects two possible
worlds, working on an extrinsic locus such as analogy is. Following up on this view of
analogy, as Juthe (2005: 9) remarks, Two things seemingly very dissimilar with few
properties in common can still be analogous in important respects while two other objects
with many properties in common are not analogous in the way one superficially thinks.
More specifically, in his account of argument schemes, Whately (1828[1963]: 8586) considers that in argumentation from analogy there is an explicit reference to a
common class under which both analogues fall. This author adds that this common class
(wich arguably corresponds to the notion of functional genus) is actually a relation: "The
two things (viz. the one from which, and the one to which, we argue) are not, necessarily,
themselves alike, but stand in similar relations to some other things; or, in other words,
that the common genus which they both fall under, consists in a relation. Thus an egg and
a seed are not in themselves alike, but bear a like relation, to the parent bird and to the
future nestling, on the one hand, and to the old and young plant on the other, respectively;
this relation being the genus which both fall under: and many Arguments might be drawn
from this Analogy (Whately 1828[1963]: 90-91). Whatelys intuition, which we might
represent as a proposition (parent bird : future nestling = old plant : young plant), has been
then called analogy based on proportion or proportional analogy (see the discussion in
Rigotti 2014).
3. MIGRANTS DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES: EMPIRICAL DATA
The corpus which this paper will be drawing on has been collected in the framework of the
project Migrants in transition: an argumentative perspective3 and consists in the
transcriptions of 29 reconstructive interviews to international mothers in the process of
migrating and settling down in London. In these interviews, participants reconstruct how
they lived a moment of rupture and the following transition a posteriori (Zittoun 2009:
415ff). One of the main goals of these interviews (conducted between September 2010 and
March 2011) was to provide an empirical basis for the study of the boundary between
social argumentation and inner forms of debate and self-controversy (see Greco Morasso,
2013).
Twenty-nine migrant women with children, coming from different ethnic and
linguistic backgrounds (aged 25 to 50) have been interviewed about their experience of
international migration. At the time of the study, all participants had been living in the
greater London area for a period of one to twenty-two years. The interviews lasted from
32 to 90 minutes; they were all recorded and transcribed according to the standards of
conversation analysis adapted to the needs of an argumentative analysis (for a discussion
on this aspect, see Greco Morasso 2011).
In a perspective of socio-cultural psychology, migration can bear one or more
ruptures (Kadianaki 2010; Lutz 2013) which require adaptation. Because motherhood may
potentially amplify the ruptures of migration (Sigad & Eisikovits 2009; Tummala-Narra
3

The project was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (PBTIP1-133595). Research was based
at University College London (2010-2011) and at the University of Surrey, UK (2011-2012). See
https://sites.google.com/site/migrantsandmothers.

509

2004) and, therefore, make involved decisions more complex, I have chosen to focus on
pragmatic argumentation by migrant mothers, who need to take the wellbeing of their
children and family into account when they design migration strategies.
4. ARGUMENTATION FROM ANALOGY IN MIGRANTS DECISIONS
Due to the ruptures that a migration decision introduces in a persons experience, migrants
face a new experience, which puts them to decide under conditions of uncertainty when
they make their decisions. In such situations, the prominence of argumentation from
analogy is not surprising. In fact, because analogy permits to compare different worlds and
highlight their comparability and differences, it may orientate migrants, helping them to
figure out how their migration projects will end up, by comparing them to other similar
cases.
Whatelys 1828[1963] observation about the relational nature of the functional
genus in analogy appears particularly useful in this respect. Analogy would be represented
as a sort of proportional reasoning, which, in the case of migrants, could be represented as
follows:
Person x : Migration situation 1 = Person y : Migration situation 2
In this formula, Migration situation 2 (phoros, in terms of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca
1958) is already known (i.e. it is a world in the past) while Migration situation 1 (theme, in
terms of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958) is the unknown experience that awaits the
migrants who needs to decide. This proportion qualifies the functional genus of
international migration experience, which is implicitly advocated by participants when
introducing this type of arguments.
In the extracts collected from my corpus, I have identified two main types of
analogical reasoning relative to migrants decisions and to their evaluation in terms of
feasibility. In the former case, Migration situation 2 has been lived by someone else, who
might be family or friends, or somebody whom the participant in question knows. In the
latter case, Migration situation 2 has been lived by the participant herself in the past. I will
now briefly present these two types of analogical reasoning and then focus my analysis on
some of the most representative examples.
4.1 Migration situation 2 lived by someone else
The first extract is taken from an interview to Katarina, a young migrant from Poland who
is working in London and is mother to a young girl, who was born in the UK. Katarina
elaborates on the reason why she left Poland for London. If the main reason of her move
was economic i.e. searching for a job still she confesses that the experience of a friend
who had done the same thing was inspirational to her: I thought oh she she did it why (.)
why cannot I [] do the same? (lines 6-8 and 10).

Extract 1
Sara

So when you sorry I didnt ask you before when you decided to

510

Katarina
Sara
Katarina

Sara
Katarina

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

come here because you werent (.) finding a job in Poland (.) why
did you decide to come to London rather than [I dont know
[Other countries Because my friend was here
Ah
She didnt really HELP me to come (.) to UK- so to London (.) but
she was kind of inspiration (.)I thought oh she she did it why (.)
why cannot I
Yeah
Do the same

This type of reasoning, in which a migrant compares her experience to that of someone
else who has lived a similar situation, has been very often found in this corpus. A very
similar case is made by Kate from New Zealand: [] most of my friends as I said had
done it already had this experience before (.) and they were already back to New Zealand
(.) a lot of them were married ( ) and I decided to yeah so. Also similar to Katarinas
case is Linda from Swizerland, who moved to the UK because her husband found a job in
a prestigious UK university. She reasoned out that she could adapt to a new life in
England, because her husband had done the same thing some years before, when he
followed her from The Netherlands to Switzerland. When asked if her mixed marriage
helped her, she replies as follows: []I think (.) the problem is I dont know thinking
that in any case he did it already this step coming to Switzerland fro- from Holland he had
already: to adapt a bit to a new life4.
The AMT analysis of Katarinas argumentation from analogy is represented in Figure 1.
The locus from analogy, as any locus, does not directly intervene in the inferential
configuration of arguments. In other words, loci are not immediate constituents of
argument schemes. Rather, they guarantee a principle of support (in terms of Garssen
2001) linking arguments to their standpoint. Loci are the basis on which the procedural
component of argument schemes is founded (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010). In
particular, different maxims can be drawn from each locus, each representing an
ifthen inferential connection working as a major premise. In Katarinas argumentation
(Figure 1), the relevant maxim is constructed on the basis of the above mentioned
proportion between her situation (Migration situation 1) and her friends past situation
(Migration situation 2): If something has been possible to person x in situation 1, the
same thing will be possible to person y in situation 2, which is of the same functional
genus of situation 1. Other maxims are also possible for the locus from analogy, as for
example If two entities are analogous, they need to be judged analogously, which counts
as analogy based on a rule of justice, i.e. analogy combined with the principle of
consistency (Garssen 2009: 136).

In the case of Linda, the interview was in Italian and has been translated into English. For an AMT analysis
of this argument, see Greco Morasso (2013).

511

Figure 1: AMT representation of Katarinas argument

A maxim, together with a minor premise, activates a syllogistic procedure which allows
drawing a Final conclusion. Such conclusion coincides with the standpoint to be defended,
namely I can move to the UK for good (hence the name final conclusion), as
argument schemes by definition count as inferential moves backing up standpoints in
argumentation.
Yet, as it clearly appears if looking as Figure 1, while maxims are abstract
inferential rules, which might be valid in different contexts, minor premises need to derive
their validity from some further backing because they are never justified in themselves. In
this case, the minor premise My friend in a situation of the same functional genus as my
situation could move to the UK for good needs to be confirmed in reality. Drawing on
this consideration, the AMT model highlights that there is also a material component in
each and every argument scheme (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010), which is represented
on the left side of the quasi-y inferential configuration in Figure 1. The material
component is constituted by another syllogistic reasoning. The major premise in the
material component is constituted by an endoxon, an Aristotelian term indicating an
opinion that is accepted by the relevant audience, namely the interlocutors who are jointly
participating in the argumentative discussion in question. Endoxa are general propositions
concerning knowledge or values, and their validity is situated in a particular
conversational context. In Katarinas argument, for example, the endoxon is The
experience of my Polish friend who migrated to the UK and my experience as a Polish
who migrates to the UK are of the same functional genus Polish women who move to the
UK. The functional genus is constructed within the endoxon, thereby postulaitng

512

comparability between Katarinas situation and her friends. A minor premise of factual
nature (datum) is then associated to the endoxon; this minor premise (My friend could
move to the UK for good) acknowledges that her friend had a positive experience when
migrating to the UK, which is implicitly conveyed by the term inspiration used to
describe her. Endoxon and datum, if combined, bring to the conclusion that My friend in
a situation of the same functional genus as my situation could move to the UK for good,
which explains the intertwining between material and procedural components in
argumentation. The connection between the procedural and material components also
provides the required contextual backing to the procedural component.
Note that in this case, as in the cases of Kate and Linda mentioned above, the
standpoint is not immediately pragmatic; it is rather an evaluation of feasibility of
migration to the UK. In other words, Katarina did not leave Poland because her friend had;
she left Poland in search of a job and of a new opportunity for her life. Her friend having
already made a similar experience was inspirational in the sense that Katarina knew that
this migration project was realistic and (possibly) satisfying. Evaluating if something is
possible is a form of knowledge-oriented argumentation, yet subservient to a pragmatic
decision (whether to leave or not).
4.2 Migration situation 2 lived by the migrant herself
In the second type of analogical reasoning found in my corpus, Migration situation 2 is
lived by the migrant herself in the past. This happens because some of the participants had
experience of living abroad before their move to the UK. In these cases, it can still be said
that analogy is built on the comparison between possible worlds, because present and past
are compared, as well as different destinations. Extract 2 reports a passage of the interview
to Linda from Switzerland, already mentioned in section 4.1. After discussing her
husbands experience as a Dutch migrant to Switzerland (see above), she moves to build
another analogy relative to her personal experience.
Excerpt 2
Linda
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

[...] (.) and in any case the experience being from Ticino is a bit
different because even if you stay in your country (.) eh going to the
French or the German parts of Switzerland was a cultural change in any
case: another language other traditions respectively influenced by
France or Germany ehm (.) I dont know I found it in any case almost
like going abroad even if you stay in your country (.) stamps are the
same your bank is the same but (.) language and cultures are different
(.) and (.) ( ) its fairly peculiar you know =

Linda considers her present move from Switzerland to the UK as substantially similar to
the move she made when leaving the Ticino Canton, where she comes from, to settle in a
city in the German part of Switzerland. Interestingly, she draws such analogy even though
reflecting on all possible differences that can be found between international migration
and migration from one to the other linguistic areas in Switzerland. She argues that, while
stamps are the same your bank is the same (lines 16-17), i.e. the institutional framework
does not change, languages and cultures are different (lines 14 and 17) because of the

513

traditions respectively influenced by France (in the French speaking cantons) or Germany
(in the German speaking cantons, see lines 14-15). This represents a meta-reflection on
comparability, which has been often found in the interviews where analogy is built on the
basis of a participants previous experience. A similar case has been found, for example, in
the interview to Lucy from St. Lucia, who compares the time when she left for the UK to a
previous moment in which she left St. Lucia in order to attend university in Jamaica. She
says that her experience in Jamaica had toughened her up and this made it easier to leave
for the UK later. Lucy also argues that Jamaica and the UK are comparable, despite all
obvious differences, because of the similar financial conditions needed to live in these two
countries: I mean in some ways its [Jamaica is] like England because (.) you need quite a
lot of money for you to be comfortable there.
Both in the case of Linda and in that of Lucy, meta-argumentation is advanced
because the attribution of a functional genus is not taken for granted. As a matter of fact, a
functional genus is pragmatic and it is not necessarily accepted as it is; an example of this
is discussed in Xenitidou and Greco Morasso (2014), who analyse a focus group of Greek
residents discussing the effects of immigration to their home country. Within this multiparty discussion, an analogy between Greek immigrants to Germany, on the one hand, and
Eastern European immigrants to Greece, on the other hand, is drawn, then refuted, then
drawn again. If these examples are considered from the viewpoint of the Argumentum
Model of Topics, it clearly appears that it is the endoxon to be discussed, because the
endoxon is where the functional genus is constructed as something that can be taken for
granted. This appears in Figure 1 as well as in Figure 2, where the AMT representation of
Lindas argument is proposed.

Figure 2: AMT representation of Lindas argument (adapted from Greco Morasso 2013)

514

5. DISCUSSION
In all cases considered, argumentation from analogy is used to support knowledgeoriented argumentation aimed at the evaluation of the feasibility and/or reasonableness of
a migration project. This amounts to typically knowledge-oriented standpoints. Such
knowledge-oriented standpoints, however, are always subservient to justify a pragmatic
standpoint concerning a migration decision, normally justified a posteriori (after or during
a transition process). In all cases, the decision to migrate has been necessarily made under
conditions of uncertainty, because migrants cannot but imagine what they are going to live
in the new world, but they cannot anticipate their experience.
Now, argumentation from analogy never represents the main reason why they
leave their home country. Intuitively, one would not leave his or her home country just
because someone else has left. There must be some other profound reason why a person is
thinking to leave in the first place. From an argumentative viewpoint, ultimate reasons to
migrate are likely to be supported by means-end argumentation (locus from final cause),
based on a series of goals ranging from economic reasons, to a desire to improve ones
conditions of life, to a marriage, and so on (see Greco, submitted). Argumentation from
analogy comes into play when participants ask themselves whether a given decision will
actually be feasible for them. Analogy, thus, works as a side-argument, seemingly
answering the question: is it reasonable for me to think that I will make it? Will I cope
with this?
What said is important for a global evaluation of this type of argumentation. If it is
true that the maxim If something was possible for a person in a migration situation of the
same functional genus as mine, then it is possible for me is weak under some respect,
because things can always change, and the comparability between the two migration
situations could be questioned, it is true that migrants may lack other ways to study the
feasibility of their project. As it happens with examples, analogies of this kind are valid as
far as they show how things could be, of course without cogently proving what will
happen in the future, which would be impossible.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have analysed argumentation from analogy in migrants decision processes.
I have shown that the locus from analogy is often used in order to support a knowledgeoriented standpoint, concerning the feasibility and reasonableness of a migration project.
In the cases observed, this type of knowledge-oriented argumentation is generally
subservient to pragmatic argumentation, more specifically concerning whether to migrate
or not. This recurrent combination of means-end argumentation (locus from final cause)
and locus from analogy in the specific context of migrants individual decisions brings us
close to the notion of argumentative pattern, introduced by van Eemeren and Garssen
(2014) as a characterization of institutionalised argumentative discourse. In the cases
discussed in this paper, however, institutional constraints are limited, while it could be
hypothesized that the pattern observed is linked to the type of decision which migrants
need to make. The possibility to interpret the observed regularity as an argumentative
pattern characterizing migration projects, however, is in need for further exploration at the
theoretical level.

515

Another theoretical aspect which could be developed as a follow-up of this paper concerns
the relation between argumentation from analogy and framing. The connection between
framing and argumentation has been explored in previous works (Greco Morasso 2009,
van Eemeren 2010, Greco Morasso 2012, Bigi & Greco Morasso 2012). In the specific
case of analogy, the construction of a functional genus, which is by definition a pragmatic
move, could be interpreted as a process of framing in the context of an arguers strategic
manoeuvring.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
I am grateful to the Swiss National Science Foundation for the fellowship PBTI1-133595
which funded the project Migrants in transition: an argumentative perspective. The data
used in this paper are taken from this project.

Sign

Explanation

Eh:

Lengthening of preceding vowel is indicated by colons

A::nd

Longer lengthening of preceding vowel

(.)

Pause of one second or less

(3)

Pause of more than one second (the duration in seconds is indicated)

Rising intonation (questions)

Slightly rising intonation (suspension)

Falling intonation (exclamations)

YOU SHOULD

Majuscules indicate emphasis

(looking at T)

Relevant non-verbal elements and actions are indicated in italic inter brackets

[]

Omitted from transcription

( )
Inaudible/incomprehensible
Table 1: Transcription symbols

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517

Missiles As Messages: Appeals To Force In President Obamas

Strategic Maneuverability On The Use Of Chemical Weapons In
Syria
Ronald Walter Greene & Jay Alexander Frank
Department of Communication Studies
University of Minnesota
United States of America
green179@umn.edu
Department of Communication Studies
University of Minnesota
United States of America
frank581@umn.edu

ABSTRACT: In the aftermath of the Bashar al-Assads use of chemical weapons, President Obama
proposed a military response that would send a message via missiles. This paper explores the way that
such a message blurs the line between force and persuasion in diplomatic argument, complicating the
normative assumptions of argumentation theory and underwriting the conditions of possibility for Obamas
strategic maneuverability in the context of diplomatic argument.
KEYWORDS: [Diplomatic Context, Ad Baculum, Violence, Power, Presidential rhetoric].

Between August 21 and September 10, 2013 President Obama provided a rationale for
military strikes in response to Bashar al-Assads use of chemical weapons in the suburbs
of Damascus. This period was punctuated by a White House assessment that the Syrian
Government was responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Ghota, and two speeches
by President Obama on the use of military force. The first speech came on August 31, and
requested Congressional authorization to use military force against the Assad regime. The
second came on September 10 amidst indications that Congress might not authorize the
use of force against Syria. The second speech, however, called for Congress to postpone
the vote in order for a joint U.S.-Russian diplomatic effort to push Assad to give up his
chemical weapons. Our concern is primarily with the communicative dimensions of this
shift between military action and diplomatic negotiations. To that end, it is useful to
recall a series of events which led up to these moments.
The Syrian uprising against Bashar al-Assad began in March of 2011 was among a
series of protests against authoritarian regimes in North Africa and Southwest Asia. By
April of that year Assad had committed himself to a military response to the uprising. In
August, President Obama claimed that Assad had lost his legitimacy to rule and called for
him to step down. The U.S. imposed deep sanctions on the Assad regime going so far as to
close its embassy in Syria (Harding, Mahmood, & Weaver, 2012). By early 2012, Assads
forces had shelled opposition forces in the city of Homs, and the protests of March
2011had transfigured into an armed rebellion. As the situation escalated, President Obama
rejected directly arming the rebellion but also warned the Assad regime that the use of
chemical weapons would be a tragic mistake. By August of 2012 President Obama had

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drawn a red line on the Assad regimes use of chemical weapons, noting that any
violation of the so called red line would change U.S. policy regarding military
intervention in Syria.
When Obama was asked by Chuck Todd whether or not he envisioned using [the]
US military, if simply for nothing else, the safe keeping of the chemical weapons, and if
you're confident that the chemical weapons are safe? Obama responded by saying that the
use of chemical weapons would change his calculations about military engagement.
I have, at this point, not ordered military engagement in the situation. But the point that you made
about chemical and biological weapons is critical. Thats an issue that doesnt just concern Syria; it
concerns our close allies in the region, including Israel. It concerns us. We cannot have a situation
where chemical or biological weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people. We have been
very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is when
we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would
change my calculus. That would change my equation (The White House, 2012).

A year later the United Nations (2013) special report on the use of chemical weapons in
Syria found clear and convincing evidence that chemical weapons had been used in the
Ghota suburb of Damascus. The final UN report did not claim who was responsible for the
use of these weapons, instead concluding that chemical weapons have been used in the
ongoing conflict between the parties. The Obama administration, however, was clear in
its assessment that Bashar al-Assads government had authorized the use of chemical
weapons. On August 30, 2013 the White house (2013, 1) claimed with high confidence
that the Syrian government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus
suburbs on August 21, 2013. One might have expected, then, at least given the red line,
that a U.S. military response was imminent.
Obama delivered a statement setting out the case for military actionduring which
he asked Congress for the authorization to use force against the Assad Regimejust one
day after the White House released its accusation that Assad had used chemical weapons.
He quickly reiterated the findings of the government assessment from the day before (The
White House, 2013, 2): the Syrian government was responsible for the attack on its own
people. He described Assads use of chemical weapons as an assault on human dignity
a danger to our national security. It risks making a mockery of the global prohibition on
the use of chemical weapons. It endangers our friends and our partners along Syrias
borders It could lead to escalating use of chemical weapons, or their proliferation to
terrorist groups who would do our people harm. Thus, he continued, this menace must
be confronted. The President then informed his audience that he had decided that the
Unites States should take military action against Syrian regime targets. Importantly, he
noted that the capacity to execute the mission is not time-sensitive, but that he was
prepared to give the order.
Indeed, this was not too far from the case. Obama had initiated plans for a military
strike over a 48 hour period during Labor Day weekend (August 31-September 1, 2013).
Reports indicated that this strike may have had as many as 43 targets (Klein & Sotas,
2013; Luce, 2013). It would seem, at least on these grounds, that a strike was immanent
(potentially displaying the credibility of U.S. deterrent power to the international
community). We also know, thanks to the work of Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen
Hall Jamieson (2008), that this course of action is relatively commonplace in the history of
American presidential rhetoric. Indeed, presidential rhetoric has always sought to justify
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military action and to evoke congressional and public approval, such justification now
appears less frequently in speeches seeking congressional authorization for future actions
and more frequently in speeches seeking congressional ratification of actions already
undertaken (p. 219).
Obama, however, followed the call for military action with the claim that since
U.S. power is rooted in our example as a government of the people, by the people, and
for the people, and that he intended to seek authorization for the use of force from the
American peoples representatives in Congress. Obama then turned to providing a
rationale for why Congress should authorize the use of military action. The impetus to
send the right message took the form of a rhetorical question. Heres my question for
every member of Congress and every member of the global community: what message
will we send if a dictator can gas hundreds of children to death in plain sight and pay no
price? Whats the purpose of the international system that weve built if a prohibition on
the use of chemical weapons is not enforced? He concluded the speech by asking
Congress to send a message to the world that we are ready to move forward together as
one nation. The message must therefore be that the United States will enforce the
international prohibition against the use of chemical weapons, and that it will do so using
its military prowess. We must, as Obama put it follow through on the things we say, the
accords we sign, the values that define us.
This strike was, of course, never executed, and thus Obamas appeal to Congress
was not retroactive per se. On the one hand, the lack of actual military action makes it
difficult to claim that Congress could retroactively authorize it. On the other hand, the
Obama administration had planned and prepared the strike, while Obama claimed that he
had the authority as Commander-in-Chief to execute a strike without Congressional
approval. The reason to appeal to Congress was simply to imbue the strike with our
example as a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. The argument
in favor of a jurisdictional shift was thus a tropological deployment of the locus of the
irreparable: the implicit claim was that the strikes were all but inevitable, while the strikes
only carried the weight of American democracy if they were approved by Congress.
Military action effectively became a figure of speech in which Obama maneuvered
strategically. In one fell swoop this message, ostensibly delivered not just to Assad, but to
the entirety of the international community, changed the subject of the argument from the
desirability of military action to the desirability of an extant set of international norms,
while simultaneously reframing the former in terms of the latter by way of a simple
metaphor: let the strikes deliver a message; if they deliver only death, then Americans are
no different than Assad; if they deliver only death, the international community is no
different than Assad.
At the same time, the move was tactically relevant. The jurisdictional shift from
Obama to Congress had real implications for the timeframe in which the strike could be
executed. This tactical effect was made much more important during Obamas speech on
September 10, 2013, during which he called for Congress to postpone action in order for
the U.S. and Russia to pursue diplomatic arrangements with the Syrian government (The
White House, 2013, 3). First, however, Obama reiterated his claim that Assads use of
chemical weapons violated U.S. national security interests and that the United States
should respond to the Assad regimes use of chemical weapons through a targeted military
strike. Again, he noted that such a course of action was within his authority as

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Commander-in-Chief, but defended his decision to take this debate to Congress. He

even noted the way such a course of action departs from the previous decade that had put
more and more war-making power in the hands of the President, and more and more
burdens on the shoulders of our troops, while sidelining the peoples representatives from
the critical decisions about when we use force. Obamas next move, however, was yet
another jurisdictional shift, this time back in favor of action undertaken by the executive.
Specifically, he referred to the opening of a new diplomatic path that resulted from the
efforts of Russia to join the international community in pushing Assad to give up his
chemical weapons. In so doing, the Assad regime had verified that it had chemical
weapons and would be willing to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. Obama then
asked the leaders of Congress to postpone a vote to authorize the use of force while we
pursue this diplomatic path. This second jurisdictional shift (this time from Congress
back to Obama) removed the impetus for Congress to act in order to create more room for
executive branch diplomacy to work.
Of particular importance is that Obama declared that this new diplomatic path was
possible, in part, thanks to what might be termed a credible threat of US military action.
Moreover, he ordered our military to maintain their current posture to keep pressure on
Assad, and to be in a position to respond if diplomacy fails. It is worth noticing the
communicative dimensions of the US military action: it returns in this institutional
configuration as a threat to enforce the success of the diplomatic path. This response is
once again presented as a message: in responding to Hawkish claims that the US should
militarily remove Assad from power Obama argued that even a limited strike will send a
message to Assad that no other nation can deliver. I dont think we should remove another
dictator with forcewe learned from Iraq that doing so make us responsible for all that
comes next. But a targeted strike can make Assad, or any other dictator, think twice before
using chemical weapons. A targeted strike is an appropriate message to deter future uses
of chemical weapons whether by Assad or another actor. Absent this message the U.S.
would abdicate its role in enforcing international agreements, which in turn would obstruct
the efficacy of a diplomatic resolution.
It is the repetition of this prospect of sending a message which strikes us as
peculiar. Obamas isolation of chemical weapons as a red line in his calculation to use
military force, all wiggle room aside, was an argument ad baculum: it was an appeal to
force or violence; it was a threat. If its true that Obamas reference to the red line can
be included in this category of argument, then the assumption that he ostensibly intends
for Assad to have is that crossing the red line will result in military strikes. By
extension, both Assad and any number of other national or military leaders should have
been deterred from using chemical weapons. At first glance, it appears that the problem (at
least the problem for Obama, given his claim that Assad has, in fact, crossed the red
line) is one of efficacy. Surely Assad would have been deterred had the threat been more
credible, or so the argument goes. Moreover, since we have claimed that this threat
appeal was as much for the international community as it was for Assad, one would
have expected a prompt military strike against Syria. The success of diplomatic
negotiations, however, muddles any discussion about efficacy insofar as threats appear to
have been central to the diplomatic discourse. Certainly it might be the case that Obamas
red line was ineffective at stopping the violation of international norms regarding the

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use of chemical weapons, but it also seems to be the case that threats were integral to the
diplomatic efforts undertaken in the name of those very norms.
It is not as if ad baculum arguments are a novel concept in the study of diplomatic
argumentation, nor is it the case that they have gone untreated by scholars of
argumentation. Douglas Walton provides a useful summary of this literature (2000). In the
logic textbooks (as Walton calls them), argument ad baculum is frequently classified as
a type of fallacy on one of two grounds: argument ad baculum is irrelevant to the
discussion; or argument ad baculum is not technically an argument, since it cannot
establish the truth or falsity of a given proposition. One makes a threat in order to forego
argument, rather than to advance it. In the diplomatic context, however, ad baculum
arguments are more or less routine. Diplomatic argument is often described as a pragmatic
exercise rather than a purely logical one. Diplomatic arguments have little to do with truth
or falsity, and as a result little to do with argumentation logic. Carney and Scheer (1964),
for example, make exactly this point: appeals to force are not fallacious because they do
not intend for two parties to agree on the truth of a proposition. Assad may not have had to
believe that the use of chemical weapons was unjust in order to believe that a shooting war
with the United States was unacceptable.
Scholarship about ad baculum argument, however, has not been limited to thinking
it as either fallacious or fundamentally non-argumentative. Woods and Walton (1976), for
example, find a certain kind of prudential argumentation in threat appeals. This thinking
relies on understanding the physical violence that is implied by a threat appeal as itself
external to the argumentation at hand. For Woods and Walton, the violence to which a
threat refers has nothing to do with the discussion in which that reference is meaningful.
The violence to which a threat refers is thus a potential consequence of the discussion
much like any other consequence will require a listener to make a prudential inference.
The fallacious element of ad baculum, at least in this account, is not in the inference, but
rather in the broader dialogic context in which it is invoked. This is why Walton
eventually concludes that argumentation scholars require a dual analysis that is capable
of understanding prudential inferences alongside contextual-dialectical analysis. The
analysis of ad baculum argument as fallacious or non-fallacious is thus premised on a shift
in dialogue; from a discussion where threat appeals are out of place to one where they
are acceptable.
The difference between a fallacious threat appeal and a non-fallacious threat
appeal, then, is a matter of context: threats are a part of the normal evolution of
international negotiations, therefore arguments ad baculum are (contextually) not
fallacious. In any case, the evaluation of the threat appeal seems dependent on a reading of
Obamas intent. This process, however, is not without pitfalls. Since political discourse is
neither pure negotiation nor pure persuasion, the best we can do, as Walton puts it, is to
ask what type of dialogue the participants were originally supposed to be engaged in.
This problem, as David Zarefsky (2014, pp. 88-90) has rightly pointed out, stems
primarily from fact that there are no clear time limits and no clear terminus to political
argument. How then are we to understand the distinction upon which the application of
these analytic tools (logic and dialectic) are based? How are we to understand the nature of
the contextual shift from one type of argumentative discourse to another?
It seems to us that a useful point of departure might be that these disparate bodies
of literature, at least as Walton treats them, essentially reach a similar conclusion: an

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appeal to force effectively suspends argument (or at the very least argument of a specific
kind) insofar as it does not allow argument to test the validity of a given proposition so
that a consensus may be reached. At first glance, Obamas discourse is well explained by
Waltons analytical tools. He seeks to introduce violence as integral to argumentative
reasoning. In particular, Obamas argument seems to be that the international
community (which is here led or even constituted by the United States) will react with
violence against Assad if a particular set of actions are taken. The prudential inference is
that its unwise for the Assad government (or any other government) to use chemical
weapons. There is also a contextual shift at work here. Certainly the original reference to a
red line was not an offhand remark. It responded to a hypothetical action undertaken by
the Assad government. This, in turn, means that Obamas initial threat was situated in the
context of a pre-existing set of propositions which required a prudential inference on the
part of the Assad government. There was a decision to be made about the use of chemical
weapons, and Obamas initial threat added to the circumstances under which a prudential
inference could inform that decision.
We were not, of course, privy to the contents of that decision-making process. One
would be hard pressed, however, to claim that such a process was a part of a diplomatic
dialogue. Obama was not bargaining with Assad when he claimed that the use of chemical
weapons would cross this red line. Rather, he seems to be doing many of the things that
we call strategic maneuvering, while at the same time he makes a claim which may very
well be accurate: he is able to make many useful arguments as a result of the continued
threat of U.S. military power. The threat appeal did, if we are to take Obama at his word,
have the effect of creating a diplomatic dialogue. In other words, the threat appeal would
constitute a fallacy (at least using Waltons model) since it constituted a contextual shift in
the nature of the discussion. It is at this point that several epistemological barriers, namely
the lack of clear time limits and a terminus of discussion, rear their ugly heads.
Specifically, the difficulty becomes separating these transitions in dialogue from each
other sufficiently to recognize clear contexts. The tendency of the discussion indicates
that the diplomatic dimensions of Obamas negotiation are instantiated by their fallacious
origins, since they continue a line of thought which is only possible qua fallacy. Obamas
diplomacy becomes a trans-fallacious moment constituting a diplomatic context.
We can gather from this trans-fallaciousness why the suspension of
argumentation must be our point of departure: argument is not (or arguments of a specific
kind are not) suspended by threats in the sense that they are ended as such. This is because
the discourses in which threats are fallacious are themselves normative performances.
Argumentative discourses where threat appeals seem out of place still produce norms by
way of persuasion. Further, and regardless of the effect of a threat on actual persuasion,
the expectation of an argumentative discourse is that one performs as if the conclusion that
is reached is true. But this is true of argumentation sans threat appeal as well. The
exposition of the truth or falsity of a given proposition qua argument is a practical exercise
that has real implications for ones being-in-the-world. The performance of persuasion,
particularly over time, can thus be understood as the material organization of the cultural
practice of argument. What we mean, then, when we say that argument ad baculum
functions by suspending argument (or certain types of arguments) is that threats can be
considered as a part of the material history of power relations in a given society. They
submerge or subordinate potential or evolving lines of argumentation such that those lines

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of argumentation become external to the norms of discussion. In a diplomatic context what

the threat appeal materializes is the third order conditions of strategic maneuverability
which pertain to the power or authority relations between the participants (van
Eemeren, Houstlosser &Snoeck Henkemans 2008, p.478). The trans-fallacious character
of a missile message is built into the very diplomatic context that defines the power
relationship between state actors.
It may well be insufficient, then, to analyze the role of threat appeal in
argumentation at the level of fallacy. If it is an international norm (or rather a set of
norms) which allow diplomatic argument to even take place as we know it, then the move
is not to use violence to silence a debate about whether or not Syria should adhere to the
international norm against the use of chemical weapons, but instead to claim that military
power is both the condition of and is justified by that norm. It is critical, at this juncture, to
recall Obamas rhetorical question to Congress: what is the point of the international
prohibition on the use of chemical weapons if it cannot (or will not) be enforced? This
claim ties together violence and the norm itself. The symbolic value of a congressionally
approved military action, however, is that it binds a set of disparate actors together as the
international community in a way that allows for a democratic discourse. There is no
debate about the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons unless violence and the threat
of violence are the metaphors through which the international norm against the use of
chemical weapons grants a certain coherency to the international community. Such a
phenomenon should not be taken lightly, since it bears upon an established notion of the
relationship between violence and reasoned argumentation: it is not as if the
violence/persuasion relationship only works in one direction, nor is it the case that the line
between persuasion and coercion is clear. As a result, we must be able to think the ways
that communication is able to mobilize violence (or at the very least the potential for
violence) as a precondition for argumentative discourse. Put differently, there is nothing
reasonable about diplomatic argument unless we presuppose violence as a precondition of
reasonability.

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Carney, J. & Scheer, R (1964). Fundamentals of logic. New York: The Macmillan Company.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Houtlosser, P., & Henkemans, A.F. Snoeck (2008). Dialectical profiles and indicators of
argumentative moves. Journal of Pragmatics, 40, 475-493.
Harding, L., Mahmood, M., & Weaver, M. (2012, February 7). Syrian siege of Homs is genocidal, say
trapped residents. The Guardian. Retrieved from
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Luce, E. (2013, September 8). A trap of the Presidents making. Financial Times. Retrieved from
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United Nations. (2013). United Nations mission to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in
the Syrian Arab Republic: Report on the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of
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Woods, J. & Walton, D. (1976). Ad baculum. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2, 133-140.
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Disruptive Definition As A Method Of Deterritorialization In

Modern Argumentative Contexts
Allison Hailey Hahn
Communication Studies
Baruch College, City University of New York
USA
Allison.hahn@baruch.cuny.edu

ABSTRACT: This paper proposes the concept of disruptive definitions as a tool to territorialize,
deterritorialize, and reterritorialize argumentative space. Upon exploring definitional scholarship, I
investigate the argumentative strategies of herders along the Mongolian/Chinese border. Then, I ask how
cross-border protest movements have used disruptive definitions to deterritorialize and reterritorialize
government definitions of citizenship. Finally, I juxtapose these protests to Deleuze and Guattaris
nomadology to investigate the complex terrain of political struggle in our hyper-globalized, internetworked
society.
KEYWORDS: Argumentation, China, definition, identity, Mongolia nomadology, protest, territorialization

1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I propose the concept of disrupting definitions as a tool to territorialize,
deterritorialize, and reterritorialize argumentative space. Specifically, I examine
arguments made by herders along the Mongolian/Chinese border where argumentative
space is territorialized by governments that define identity by residency. Communities
have resisted this territorialization through cross-border protest movements using what I
call disruptive definitions, those that define identity by culture, religion, history, or access
to open space to deterritorialize and reterritorialize argumentative space. To better
understand the effect of these new argumentative spaces, I juxtapose this analysis to
Deleuze and Guattaris metaphor of nomadology to explore the process of culture and
identity meaning making among modern herding communities. From this study, I argue
that deterritorialization-by-definition may produce radically expanded argumentative
definitions that can be used as tools to investigate the complex terrain of political struggle
in our hyper-globalized, internetworked society.
2. DISRUPTIVE DEFINITIONS
Questions of definitional certainty in argumentative contexts have been widely discussed
within a variety of contexts. Scholars such as Edward Schiappa (1993) and David
Zarefsky (2009) have examined the use of persuasive definitions and the dramatic
implications of those definitions in regard to strategic maneuvering. These works have
illuminated the use of definitions to plead a cause and to differentiate between the is and
ought of deliberation. Such studies have been applied theoretically by contest round
debaters, using topicality challenges to investigate the argumentative relevance of claims
(Spring, 2010). Pragmatically, these studies have been used by Kenneth Broda-Bahm
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(1999) to understand environmental security and land development. In each instance,

definitional scholarship has been used to mark argumentative and tangible spaces
territories that create authoritative terminologies that bind deliberations by inclusion and
exclusion.
The resulting territorialization-by-definition allows argumentation scholars to
produce coherent analysis, yet makes it difficult to understand those communities, spaces,
and arguments that transcend demarcated territory. In this paper, I utilize the figure of the
nomad as one such metaphor that moves between demarcated spaces, between both the
is and is not of territorialized definitions. Yet, to approach the figure of the nomad
requires a disturbance in the process of definition, resulting in the creation of disruptive
definitions, those definitions that open space for multiple possible understandings,
embodiments and entailments. This approach is required as nation-states have sought to
define mobile citizens using terms such as nomad in an attempt to settle and control
communities.
This trend towards nationalist definition is seen in western literature that typically
refers to Mongolian herding communities as nomads, pastoral nomads, or pastoralists.
Relying on the metaphor of nomad tends to suggest that community members wander
through the fixed gridlines of nation-state geography as random atoms, acting in a
backward, uncivilized manner (Lafitte, 2011). This misunderstanding of Mongolian
herders misses the complex, often hierarchical structures of their communities and
networks of exchange. The label nomad also tends to reinforce a dualism that ossifies
divisions between the nomadic and settled communities, between the civilized and the
barbarian, between the knowable and unknown, and between right and wrong. Disturbing
this state expectation and definition of nomad expands the possibilities of identity
meaning making by communities such as Mongolians on the Chinese/Mongolian border.
Disruptive definitions, particularly those seen in Mongolian communities, have
much in common with the process of deterritorialization proposed by Gilles Deleuze and
Felix Guarttari (1983) in Anti-Oedipus. Here, deterritorialization is used to describe
processes of de-contextualizing sets of relationships, creating origami-like folds in the
paper of meaning, finding new points of meeting and departure distant actualizations
that previously eluded perception.
Many deliberations are premised on territorialization, the process of definition that
uses a key word to mark territory and understand contexts that inform argumentative
possibilities and deliberative analysis. These demarcations function to limit deliberation,
but also limit the connections that deliberators can draw between multiple views and
theories. The process of argumentative territorialization-by-definition excludes many
perspectives, including the nomadic that rejects such boundaries. A process of
deterritorialization recontextualizes and resists these argumentative territories and
boundaries. In this moment, connections and positions that had previously been considered
beyond the scope of a deliberation, labeled as is not and ought not, again become
possible. The new connections uncovered by deterritorialization may lead to
reterritorialization, the marking of territory in new ways where the argumentative
definition is radically expanded or rearticulated. Or, the definition may remain
permanently deterritorialized, resulting in an expectation of multiple competing
understandings in deliberation.

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3. NOMADOLOGY
My own work, through an understanding of disrupting definitions of the figure of the
nomad, aims to integrate our understanding of modern struggles within the broader
dialogue about nomadology as a mode of critical inquiry. The figure of nomad requires
special attention to the competing definitions used by self-identified communities,
ethnographic studies, development projects, nationalistic movements, and philosophical
theories. In this essay, I examine Mongolian communities along the Mongolian/Chinese
border where revolutions, cartography, and climatic change have drawn divisions between
traditional Mongolian herding communities. The Chinese and Mongolian governments
anticipate that citizens, even those choosing to live as herders will choose to identify as
citizens of modern nation-states. As a result, conflict frequently occurs when herder
communities choose to identify via extra-state networks such as traditional grazing
patterns or family structures. A plethora of publications, protests, and productions point to
a more nuanced understanding of cross-border connections. Applying the term of
disruptive definitions to this milieu reveals previously misunderstood connections between
definition and disruptive definition, between territorialization and deterritorialization.
Juxtaposition of disruptive definitions to Deleuze and Guattaris theory of
nomadology further enhances our understanding of cultural and identity meaning making
among modern herding communities. In this essay, through an examination of crossborder protests, I ask if the pressures created by the need to contest definitions and present
counter-definitions have created quilting points that have deterritorialized or
reterritorialized the figure of nomad, in ways that awaken new understandings of both
specific definitions of nomad and the argumentative study of definitional deliberation.
For example, the Mongolian government is currently territorializing herding lands.
Articulated as a linear progression, this process is prefaced by the concept of empty land,
terra nullis, which government officials use to justify new development projects. This is a
strategy that could be articulated as territorialization (government parcels land and defines
it as terra nullis), deterritorialization (herders articulate land use in response to terra
nullis by using a frame of movement-as-otor), and reterritorialization (herders produce
new assemblages to participate in public forums while maintaining herding traditions).
Argumentative clash emerges in this process as mining companies are attracted to the
open spaces of the Eurasian Steppe where strip-mining is used to quickly extract vast
reserves of coal, copper, uranium, and rare-earth minerals. Many interventions into mining
protests within China and Mongolia seeking to reach peaceful resolution have failed
because they have assumed that herders are only vying for monetary reparations for lost
land. I argue that these studies are incomplete because they have not accounted for the
process of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization from which
modern clashes emerge. Were these efforts to engage in the study of disruptive definitions
proposed by this paper, they would be able to access the richer history and entanglements
between herder communities and herding lands. While such an understanding might assist
mining corporations in better averting protests, it is more likely to encourage analysts and
negotiators to produce protections and policies inline with herder communities needs.

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4. LAND DISPUTES
Exploring Mongolian land disputes through Deleuze and Guattaris conceptual triptych of
territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization, can encourage better
understand both how this land came to be known as empty and why protests are occurring.
The concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization help us to understand the ways
in which this land can be understood as neither empty nor full, but instead a rhizomatic
mechanic assemblage. In doing so, we begin thinking about the Mongolian steppe as a
mechanic assemblage incorporates the complex body of interpretations, connections, and
dimensions that can be joined together in multiplicitious ways to create new
understandings of the Mongolian steppe. These new connections create a realm of
multiplicities that herders can use to resist the attempts of states and governments to over
code herder identity or privilege a singular, government authored, definition of what it is
to be a herder.
Mongolian communities have long dealt with competing definitions of what is
means to be a herder or a nomad. These definitions have been used by invaders,
colonizers, nationalists, and development programs to justify boundaries, education, and
readings of history. As such, these definitions are ideal locations for an analysis of
disrupting definitions. Scholars have produced a number of nuanced terms and hierarchies
with which to describe herders. For example, anthropologists classify, Mongolians as
pastoral-nomads because they move in biannual migrations with herds of domesticated
animals. In Marxist terms, Mongolians are landless peasants, and for Social Darwinists
they exist at the lowest level of human development. A territorialized definition of the
Mongolian nomad would require that one of these definitions were chosen as the primary
mode of analysis, and all other definitions understood as competing definitions. However,
a deterritorialized definition might take a broader scope of possibility; Mongolian
communities could simultaneously and selectively embody the definitions of
anthropologists, Marxists, Social Darwinists, and governments, while also maintaining
their own definitions of community and movement.
The need for such deterritorialization of definition was seen in 2005 when
President N. Enkhbayar stated; It is not my desire to destroy the original Mongolian
identity but in order to survive, we have to stop being nomads (as cited in Diener, 2011).
Similarly, across the border in Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Government released a
whitepaper indicating that by 2015 there will be no more nomads in China (Southern
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 2012). At the same time, Mongolians were
producing disrupting definitions, deterritorializations, of the terms herder and nomad
to explain their complex interactions with modernity. Here, state territorialization, and
community deterritorialization produce definitional clash that I argue illuminates the need
for disruptive definitions.
Pastoral-nomadic communities, along with other types of nomads, hunter-gathers,
and travelers from whom Deleuze and Guattari pull to create their metaphor of
nomadology, present a special problem to definitional scholarship. These communities
resist and therefore do not have figureheads such as presidents and community leaders.
They may on occasion appoint a speaker, or a speaker may appoint herself to speak for her
community, but the power of that appointment is short term and intangible. As such, the
artifacts, speeches, protests, and discussions that I analyze are but single entry points to

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understand the assemblage of multiplicities in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia. What these
deliberations do for my analysis is provide quilting points that bind together herders, the
nation-state, and international organizations. Analysis of these quilting points indicates the
emergence of new forms of protest and identity. For example, Mongolian mining protests
articulate neither traditional herding culture nor the government definitions of land and
citizenship. Instead, these mining protests articulate the emerging shifts and developments
amongst herding communities in late modern capitalism.
5. PROTEST RHETORIC
In China, the Cultural Revolution resulted in the arrest and persecution of at least 100,000
Mongolians who resisted collectivization and the cultural politics of the Chinese
Communist Party. This history has been used as a reference point for divisions between
Mongolian herders, farmers, and urbanites, and between Han and Mongolian citizens of
the Peoples Republic of China. The Chinese government attempted to smooth over these
poor relations by establishing university and government position quotas for Mongolians,
allowing exemption from the national birth control policies, and sponsoring specific ethnic
events. These exemptions did not work as intended, and conflicts such as the 1981-1982
protests by Mongolian students over filling up Inner Mongolia with Han Chinese
continued (Jankowiak, 1988). More recently, conflict erupted as 650,000 herders were
evicted from traditional pasturelands (Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information
Center, 2011a). These evictions, which the government calls environmentally-driven
resettlement, are coupled with plans for state-sponsored education, public health, and
housing services. However, such policies still restrict movement of herding communities
under the auspices of saving land and limiting the effects of climate change (Tan, 2011).
For example, in Inner Mongolia, China, in May 2011 a herder named Mergen set
up a roadblock protest to prohibit the transportation of coal across his grazing lands. In
assessing this protest, it is important to remember that transportation infrastructure in this
part of Inner Mongolia is minimal. Mergen was blocking the pathway frequently taken by
mining companies, taken so frequently that tire tracks had cut through the low grasses that
feed herds of cattle. This is not a paved road, and the space alongside the road is identical
to the road except it is not cut by tire tracks. Mergen was run over by a Han Chinese truck
driver who drove through the roadblock of herders and horses. Mergens head was crushed
beneath the trucks tires and his body dragged across the steppe. Mergens death was only
one of many deaths-by-traffic accidents that occurred during the spring and summer of
2011. What made his death different, however, was the immediate recording and
distribution of images of Mergens death and crushed skull accompanied by the HanChinese truck drivers statement my truck is fully insured, and the life of a smelly
Mongolian herder costs me no more than 40,000 Yuan (approx. 8,000 USD) (Southern
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 2011c). Although the driver was eventually
tried and executed for his part in Mergens death, it was only after weeks of protest that he
was tried for his crime. In press statements prior to his execution, the truck driver
continually emphasized that his victim was both a Mongolian and a herder. To the driver,
this ethnic and lifestyle classification legitimized his dehumanizing rhetoric.
A wide variety of protests emerged from Mergens death, including the Song
Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands, which was both published and banned on

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May 29, 2011. This song calls forth a broad audience of Mongolians, from those living in
the steppe with herds to those in apartment buildings who only speak Mandarin. In this
song, the author identifies as Mongolian, focusing on bloodlines rather than the
governments use of bounded land and special ethnic characteristics such as language. The
implications of this identify is to explode the definition of Mongolian and link with
communities living as, and identifying as, herders.
I am a Mongol even if I sing my rap in Chinese
No matter what you say I am a Mongol
Mongol blood flows in my veins
The vast Mongolian steppe is my homeland.
(Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 2011b)

The Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands exemplifies reterritorialization in

a realm of multiplicities where the songs author has provided a connection between two
completely different multiplicities. This connection forms a parallel evolution or
deterritorialization and reterritorialization so that the protesters deterritorialize the
Chinese definition of Mongolian identity by making keeping applicable portions of the
government definition and mixing in their own interpretations. This process demonstrates
the way that Deleuze and Guattari think of connections that produce multiplicities, which
then connect together to create rhizomatic assemblages.
In the time since Mergens death, herders along the Chinese/Mongolian border
have continued to protest state infrastructure projects that they see as threats to their
identity. The Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center outlines five deaths
that have occurred since 2010, along with large-scale protest, and imprisonment of protest
leaders and Internet activists. (Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
2013a, 2013b, 2014). Yet, these clashes are not endemic to only Inner Mongolia, similar
clashes are occurring in Tibet (Hundreds of Tibetans, 2014) and Xingjian (Mongolian
Herders, 2014). Additionally, outside of China, Maasai (Kanduli, 2013), Bedouin
(Arrests At, 2013), Native American (Strasser, 2013), and Aboriginal communities
(Traditional Landowners, 2014) are engaging and disrupting state definitions of identity
in land-rights conflicts.
6. CONCLUSION
Deleuze and Guattari identify rhizomatic assemblages as lines of flight, pathways that
we can follow to escape the hierarchical modes of control and the emphasis on a center
and periphery that characterize modern governments. While Deleuze and Guattari suggest
that nomadology is a useful line of flight for settled communities, my work asks if
nomadology is also useful to understand the lines of flight utilized by herders to escape
repressive government regimes.
The possibility found in modern Mongolian protests, articulated by disruptive
definitions, is the emergence of arguments that embody new possibilities, frames, and
connections. The results of such disturbed definitions, and the deterritorialization that they
produce, are difficult to predict before they have come to fruition. However, those
definitions that have emerged, such as the definition articulated earlier in the Song for
Mergen, point to the ability to better analyze complex arguments, for deliberations to

531

incorporate multiple competing and at time contradictory positions in a manner that

engenders new connections and understandings.
Skeptics might argue that this study has merely proposed a correction, evolution,
or better understanding of what it means to be a Mongolian, herder, or nomad. My
argument is that the use of static definitions misses the very being of herder communities,
and as such will always fail to inform discussions and policies pertaining to these
communities. Yet my argument, that a definition should be in flux, risks producing both
messy deliberation and analysis how can we study a song writer who identifies as both
Mongolian and Chinese, speaks in a language that he opposes, heralds a herding lifestyle
while writing from an apartment block? We might call him hypocritical or accuse him of
speaking for others but in doing so we miss, or worse silence, critical aspects of his
identity. What is required is a definition that can embody both of these opposing polarities
that resists the desire for definitional certainty that is dependent on polarities. By using
disrupting definitions as a tool to territorialize, deterritorialize, and reterritorialize
argumentative space we might be able to move towards better policy making, better
argument analysis, and better deliberative practices.

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Testing The Relationship Between Argument And Culture

Michael David Hazen
Department of Communication
Wake Forest University
USA
hazen@wfu.edu

ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a framework for testing the relationship between argument and culture.
The framework is based on the ideas that: 1) the minimal requirement for what constitutes argument across
different cultures is the idea of argument as linkage, and 2) that arguments can be conceptualized in terms
of the context of messages. A short exploratory analysis of a data set is used to illustrate the framework.
KEYWORDS: argument, contexts, culture, Edward Hall, linkages

1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between argument and culture has not been a common topic of
consideration in the field of argumentation. The traditional view was that argument was a
universal process that fundamentally operated the same everywhere. In recent years, there
has been an increased interest in the relationship between argument processes and culture,
which has been manifest in an increasing use of culture in theoretical treatments of
argumentation (e.g. Johnson, 2000), consideration of argument in non-Western traditions
(Jensen, 1992; Combs, 2004), and studies of argumentation practices in various societies
(Hornikx & Hoeken, 2007; Hazen & Inoue, 1991). However, even with this increased
attention, what is missing in the literature is a systematic attempt to relate argument to
culture.
We will contend that the study of argument across cultures reveals the limitations
of existing definitions, the need for a more fundamental definition of argument that is part
of the process of communication and that is linked to the phenomenological way argument
is used among people. Therefore, we will explore the outline of such a framework by 1)
defining argument as it can be applied across cultures, 2) relate argument to Halls theory
of contexting (1977), and 3) examine the framework in terms of examples of crosscultural argument.
2. DEFINITIONS OF ARGUMENT AND CROSS-CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
To be able to outline the relationship between argument and culture, it is necessary to have
a definition of argument that will work across cultures. Such a definition is necessary to
insure that we are talking about the same phenomenon in different cultures.
Most definitions of argument have their origin in the Western tradition, and are
closely associated with the following terms: logic, rationality, and reasoning. While a
number of figures were involved with the development of argument in the West (Plato,
Hermogoras, the author of the Ad Herennium, Cicero, and Quintilian), Aristotle is the
pivotal figure in our thinking about the nature of argument. Aristotles ideas about
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argument are based on his observations of Athenian society. As such, they are complex
and not totally systematic. On one hand, a number of his works deal with what has become
known as formal or analytic argument with an emphasis on deduction and the syllogism
designed to lead to certain knowledge. On the other hand, some of his works deal with the
more informal or substantive processes of argument with an emphasis on the general
acceptance of opinions (dialectic) or the convincing of an audience about a view
(rhetorical) (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996; Wolf, 2010).
These viewpoints have proved problematic for the cross-cultural study of
argument. First, forms of argument in the West and in other cultures may not appear to be
comparable. Some of the forms of argument considered to be valid in western cultures
may not be found or accepted in other cultures. Thus, Morrison (1972), in discussing
Japan, asserted that there is a virtual lack of any logical system resembling Aristotelian
logic, experimental logic, or any other kind (p. 90). His conclusion is based on a
comparison of scholarly topics in Japan with those in the West, making it appear that
comparable uses of argument do not appear across cultures. In addition, other forms of
argument may be found in non-western cultures that do not seem to be the same as in
Western cultures. Finally, cultures may have different norms about what are acceptable
forms of argument. They may look with great displeasure on disagreement expressed in
public situations. Thus, we are faced with a situation where our traditional ways of
viewing argument do not seem to fit what we are finding in other cultures.
Second, the conditions under which our understanding of argument and logic
developed in the West, and particularly in Athenian Greece and Republican Rome, were
not typical at that point in time around the world and not been typical throughout most of
human history. Athens was a city state (as opposed to larger entity like a kingdom or
empire), and was quasi-democratic (as opposed to authoritarian as were most other states).
These characteristics led Aristotle to focus his observations on the public use of argument
to persuade others in democratic deliberations. Different political systems and assumptions
about the role of the public and public discourse existed in other societies, which did not
privilege certain elements of the argumentative process that were valued in some of the
Western traditions. In an authoritarian society, public discourse and the attempt to
persuade through argument is limited by the power structure and the assumptions of those
in authority. When called upon to make arguments, people in these societies operated
under tight constraints and faced dire consequences for the arguments that they made.
Third, as Aristotle and other thinkers have been interpreted and used over the
course Western thought, there has been an over-emphasis on the proper forms or validity
of arguments. While Aristotle discusses how argument works in everyday life, this
emphasis has often been overlooked in Western thinking. He specifies that there is a
rhetorical form of both induction (the example) and deduction (the enthymeme), where the
key is that something is not explicitly stated in the message and the audience participates
in the process a set of statements with the conclusion unstated or one example that serves
to lead to a generalization. Such forms of argument could approximate the way people
argue in everyday communication.
One solution to this problem would be to simply default to the conclusion that argument
varies across cultures and its forms are relative to the nature of a particular culture,
however, such an approach would be premature. First, the comparison of western
conceptual forms of argument with the description of eastern forms of actual argument is

535

not a parallel type of analysis. The appropriate comparison would be the description of
actual argument behavior in both the west and the east. Second, the frequency of use of a
particular form of argument is not an indicator of whether a particular form exists in a
culture or is capable of existing in the discourse of a culture. And third, if we see argument
as completely under the direction of culture, then it overlooks a major force for cultural
change and does not correspond to the actual analysis of historical events. Instead, a more
fruitful approach may be to explore whether our definitions of argument are limiting what
we see in other cultures. What are the bare essentials of argument? This question can be
answered from the perspective of both function and form.
The result of these emphases in Western thought is a need for a view of argument
that a) would fit any culture, b) would fit societies ranging from to democratic to
authoritarian, c) would fit historical examples as well as the present, and d) would deal
with informal as well as formal views of argument.
3. THE NEED FOR A CROSS-CULTURAL DEFINITION OF ARGUMENT
We are interested in describing what arguments look like in other cultures. This
necessitates going behind the labels and ways of talking about argument in one culture,
and looking for what is in common in the process across cultures. Thus, we need a
definition of argument that is minimalistic, i.e. would use the most basic or foundational
aspect of argument to define the process.
My desire to think about arguments in a more fundamental sense grew out of my
experiences attempting to explain argument within different cultures such as Japan, the
Soviet Union (Russia) and later China. These experiences led me to believe that our
conceptions of argument and logic while useful and worthwhile did not automatically
encompass the concept at its most fundamental level; particularly as it applies to different
cultures and different time periods.
This position can be explained in terms of an incident in my first intercultural
experience. As part of the NCAs Committee on International Discussion and Debate
program, I found myself in Japan with two American students for a six week tour
involving debate. At one stop, I was asked to give a lecture on what is logic to an audience
of about 600 students and faculty. My immediate inclination was to fall back on my
training in Western argumentation theory and discuss things as deduction and induction.
However, since I knew that the members of this audience were less likely to be familiar
with that tradition, I started to wonder whether there was some more fundamental way to
explain argument to these people.
My concern was not meant to deny the importance of any of the highly elaborate
and established systems of logic that have been developed in the West or even in such
societies as India and China. Instead, I was asking a simple question about what is the
most fundamental idea underlying the concept of argument, i.e. what constitutes the most
minimal definition of argument? We know that in a culture such as Japan or China, there
are long histories of intellectual inquiry, but that the concept of argument as set forth in
Western societies is not present in the same forms. This does not mean that argument is
not present or even thought about in those cultures, but it does mean that our way of
thinking about argument may not be the most fundamental way of understanding the
process. These concerns have led me to wonder whether our present conceptions of

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argument are the most basic ways of representing the fundamental nature of the
argumentation process.
A consideration of this question can start with an article written by Corbett (1986),
where he explored the question of how argumentation strategies have changed from
ancient to modern times in the West. His thesis is that changes have occurred in the
strategies of argumentation particularly as they relate to kinds and combinations of
attendant factors, however, there is a single archetypal pattern that spans this period of
time. The archetypal pattern, as he sees it is one in which a person makes an assertion and
if it is not self-evident or cogent enough to compel conviction, then they present evidence
or arguments to support the assertion. If we look at this pattern, he starts with an assertion
that becomes linked indirectly to things that are self-evident such as cultural assumptions,
or that compel acceptance by their implied elements or that directly present evidence to
support the assertion.
Further analysis of the various treatments of argument and attendant concepts
reveal a similar theme of linkage emerging from the thickets of difference and
convolutedness. For example, in many discussions of formal logic and forms of valid
reasoning, the word inference keeps reappearing. Kneale & Kneale (1962) in their
monumental discussion of The Development of Logic, in their first sentence say that logic
is concerned with the principles of valid inference and that such forms imply the seeking
of proof (p. 1), which involves premises and arguments from them to some conclusion.
The idea of drawing inferences from premises involves drawing links between ideas in a
fashion that are judged as valid.
Standard treatments of argument in the mid-twentieth century, have similar
suggestions. For example, Ehninger (1974) defines an argument as a single capsule or
unit of proof that can be grouped together into organized patterns (p. 1). A similar
traditional definition of an argument is that of a claim and reasons for it (Toulmin, Rieke
& Janik, 1979), which also reveals the idea of linkage.
In the last half of the twentieth century, another view of argument became
prominent, which viewed it as a disagreement between people. OKeefes (1977)
combined the two views by distinguishing between argument1 where argument is viewed
as a kind of utterance that one makes and argument2 where argument is viewed as a kind
of interaction or process. Argument1 exemplifies most of the traditional ways of thinking
about argument, while argument2 takes the colloquial idea of disagreement and situates it
within the accepted canon of what constitutes argument. Should we be concerned with
whether arguments are seen as the products of interaction or seen as a process of
interaction? Should we see argument as tied implicitly to the concepts of validity and
good arguments versus bad arguments?
4. A CROSS-CULTURE VIEW OF ARGUMENT
In general, there is no conceptual problem with the accepted definitions, however, when
approaching argument from a comparative and intercultural perspective, it is useful to
think of it in a minimalistic sense. It is important to view argument in terms of the
activities that perform the argument function in different cultures so as to not get caught
up in disagreement about whether argument exists in particular cultures based on whether
a particular label is used. This pragmatic approach is based on viewing phenomena as

537

argument when they function as argument whether they are defined as argument in a
particular society or not.
4.1 The form of argument
As discussed above, the question of what is argument in cross-cultural setting seems to
be related to the idea of linking, i.e. it connects ideas and pieces of information so as to
provide coherency and support between them. This perspective is broad enough to include
the various definitions of argument and therefore is more parsimonious but more
importantly, it starts to get at what argument is doing phenomenologically in different
cultures. It describes the process that people actually use to justify their views and
positions in communicative exchanges. The resulting linking process may be a generally
accepted one such as going from a series of examples to a generalization or it may be a
less familiar form where one goes from a period of silence to an implication about a
persons character. As a result, it is easier to see the argument function in any culture
when it is viewed as linkages between things. When argument is defined in narrower ways
such as in traditional Aristotelian forms of argument1, it may be seen as absent in cultures
such as Japan (Morrison 1972) and when defined as argument2 it may be seen as
inconsistent with the emphasis on harmony in Confucian cultures (Becker 1986).
Therefore:
1.

The form of argument should be thought of as involving the linking of any two
ideas, concepts or feelings.

A major part of the proposed perspective on argument is the distinction between the form
of argument and the function of argument. The aspects of form and function are often
conflated in discussions of argument. For example when we talk about argument as a
kind of utterance or a kind of interaction we seem to be suggesting something about
the form of an argument and when we talk about induction and deduction, we are
definitely referring to form. However, when we talk about reasoned decision-making, we
could be talking about either form (the steps of the process) or function (the outcome of
the process). Most of the discussions about argument in different cultures seem to focus
on the form aspects of argument and conclude that argument is absent in a culture, if the
form is absent (e.g. deduction or debate). However, when we shift to looking at function,
we find a fundamental human outcome that takes a number of forms. We could leave the
analysis at this point, and accept the idea that any form that fulfills the function is
argument and while accepting the common function, explore the different forms.
However, there is a further step to consider, whether the forms have anything in common?
4.2 The function of argument
Arguments should be defined in terms of the activities that fulfill a function not their
labels. So, it does not matter if we call argument logos, wen, logic, or even
argument. As a result, the task for argument theory is to explain the functioning of
argument in different cultures, i.e. the process of convincing others of the best course of
action whether it be in the democratic forms of decision-making or before an absolute

538

monarch with the power of life and death, and the resulting forms it can take in different
situations. The task for the study of culture is to outline the dynamic process that explains
how meaning and conviction are generated in a culture. This means moving beyond the
idea that culture dictates the nature of meaning and argument to a more nuanced idea that
sees argument as sometimes influenced by cultures, sometimes reinforcing culture and
sometimes changing or generating culture. The result is that in linking ideas, argument
functions to make one idea related to another idea and in so doing increases the
plausibility and believability of the original idea. Therefore:
2.

The Argumentative Function is the linking of ideas so that they support each other
and in doing so, making sense to people and influence others

It should be noted that this perspective is broader than it may initially appear. First, the use
of phrases such as justify or reasons should not be taken to imply a degree of
conscious intention as sometimes happens in Western theory. Instead, it implies a function
that a person may or may not be aware of but that they still find makes sense. In addition,
it should not be assumed that everything is explicitly stated in a verbal fashion.
Indirectness, implication, and silence can all function as part of the argument process as
can the verbal, nonverbal and situational. The result is a view of argument where ideas are
linked in both conscious and unconscious fashions using a plethora of means going
beyond the explicitly verbal with results that may be consciously intended or not.
If we look at the function of argument, its primary function has always been to
convince someone of the truth, rightness or correctness of a claim. Argument does this by
linking the claim to other things, which may, in the Toulmin sense, be called grounds,
warrants, backing etc. or in non-western cultures, something else. Thus, functionally,
arguments exist in cultures whenever someone presents two things (a claim and a reason?)
as linked in an effort to convince someone else. What is accepted as the claim and what is
accepted as support may vary from culture to culture, and what links are accepted as valid
may also vary, however, at a bare minimum, ideas are linked together to function as a
means of convincing someone else.
So, why have we not been able to see the argumentative function as operating in all
cultures? There are at least five reasons. First, cultures vary in the degree to which they
expect messages to be explicit or implicit. The problem here is that people from cultures
that expect to see explicit arguments may not see the implicitness of arguments in other
cultures. They may not be able to understand the claim or any of the kinds of support that
are present because they expressed in an indirect fashion or even not verbally expressed at
all.
Second, understood knowledge is often an important part of arguments, but much
of that knowledge is cultural. Aristotle recognized this in his discussions of the
enthymeme and the example as the rhetorical forms of deduction and induction. The
problem is being able to see the presence, and understand the meaning of, such knowledge
in cultures in which we are not immersed.
Third, cultures vary in the degree to which they depend on the verbal and the
nonverbal to communicate. If the nonverbal is used to provide information in a message
situation, someone from outside the culture may not be aware of its presence or meaning.
Fourth, the norms for what is acceptable argument and for the presence of disagreement

539

vary from culture to culture. Where public disagreement is frowned on, there is a tendency
to use non-explicit forms of argument, which will probably not be apparent to an outsider.
Finally, the rhetorical exigencies of a culture and period of time often vary and
constrain the types of argument used. In strongly authoritarian societies, the use of implicit
and safe forms of argument are essential for survival. This does not mean that people are
not capable of using explicit argument, just that it is not expedient. Thus, we can see that a
major part of the problem of difference in argument forms across cultures is the inability
to see how argument functions because of outsider status and the concomitant tendency to
assume that argument ought to look like that with which we are familiar.
4.3 The importance of argument description cross-culturally
Describing arguments across cultures tells us what kind of arguments (linkages of ideas)
people use and think make sense. The comparative perspective is primarily interested in
argument from a descriptive point of view where we look at what is functioning as
argument in any culture. It is not to be denied that a normative element can be overlaid on
this definition by those who choose to do so, i.e. they can look for the pattern of idea
linkages that they think are valid or lead to good decisions or that a society thinks are valid
and may lead to good decisions. However, a descriptive approach to argument as a
function can be seen as prior to the normative in that only when we can describe what
people are doing argumentatively, can we make judgments about it. When a normative
definition is privileged, it can result in situations where argument is equated with forms of
democracy, free expression or types of decision-making. The result is that such forms of
argument may not be present in a culture due to its political traditions even though the
process of argument is still functioning in other ways. It is useful then to look at the
phenomenon of argument as it functions in different cultures and then talk about what
characteristic patterns of links are doing and what values they incorporate.
3.

The cross-cultural study of argument or the argumentative function needs to

describe how arguments are used in a culture before evaluating their validity

5. ARGUMENT & CONTEXTUALITY

The theory developed by Edward Hall, over a long career, provides a way of looking at the
relationship between communication and culture that is compatible with the proposal
developed in the previous section. He is famous for his aphorism: Communication is
culture and culture is communication, however, the exact nature of the relationship is
embodied in his idea of contexting. Contexting is based on the following question:
What information do people pay attention to when communicating with each other? Hall
assumes that people are presented with more information than they can pay attention to
and as a result they have to choose what kinds of information to encode and to pay
attention to. The patterns used for encoding and decoding are what he defines as
contexting.
For Hall, contexting is a process that occurs at both the level of the culture and the
level of messages, even though his basic definition of contexting is in terms of messages.
Cultural contextuality can probably be best thought of as a set of norms that condition the

540

perceptual tendency about where to look for information and how to encode it in
messages. On the other hand, message contextuality ought to be thought of as a set of
message features that provide or direct people to certain places for information.
For Hall, messages can fall along a continuum between low context messages on
one end and high context messages on the other end. Low context messages are those
where the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code (i.e. spoken or written
communication). High context messages are where most of the information is either in
the physical context or internalized in the person. The external or physical context of the
message involves things such as the situation, the setting, the status of people involved,
and the activity, while the internal context includes things such as past experiences,
common cultural information, common cultural assumptions, the structure of the brain and
nervous system, e.g. Gestalt rules of perception).
In most cases, messages are a mixture of explicit information and contextual
information, which affects the appearance of arguments across cultures. Of course, this
idea is closely related to Aristotles ideas of the enthymeme and the example. It can also
be seen in the following discussion of the difference between formal systems of reasoning
and everyday systems of reasoning by Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977) within the context
of cognitive science. They argue that The distinction between conscious deductions and
everyday inference is probably a reflection of a more general contrast that can be drawn
between explicit and implicit inferences (p. 5). And of course, inferences involve the
moving from one idea to another in a fashion so that they are linked.
People do not operate exclusively out of a low context or high context perspective.
Individuals may move back and forth on the message continuum depending on the
situation. For example, Americans, when talking with close friends where there is a high
degree of homogeneity or familiarity among the communicators, are more likely to use
messages toward the high context end of the continuum. But when talking with people
they do not know or when communicating in formal settings like the legal system, they are
more likely to explicitly spell out their arguments in low context messages.
The kind of process that Hall discusses in his ideas about the contextuality of
messages is very similar to that proposed for thinking about arguments across cultures.
The information in a message, whether explicitly expressed or not, provides the elements
that can serve as an argument. Furthermore, in Halls conception, presumably the
information that is expressed in the various parts of a message is seen as linked by the
participants in the interaction. Thus, if all or part of the message functions as an argument
that may or may not be explicitly expressed, then arguments may be contextualized in the
culture and may function in any possible combination of explicit and implicit elements.
6. A CROSS-CULTURAL EXPLORATION OF THE THEORY
To demonstrate how this theory might work, we will examine some data from a 2008
study by Hazen, Inoue, Fourcade and Maruta. The study compared the responses of 42
American students from a private southeastern university with 46 Japanese students from a
public university in the southern part of Japan. We will look at a subset of the data to
explore the relationship between arguments as linkages and contextual characteristics of
print advertisements. Eight print ads from the United States and Japan were selected on the

541

basis of a pilot study to represent both high and low context messages that would be
interchangeable between the two cultures (Fourcade & Hazen, 2006).
The question will be what relationships exist between measures of linkage such as
making sense and cohesiveness with a measure of logicality and with measures of
contextuality such as clearness, implicitness, informativeness, completeness, and
obviousness. Japan has usually been assumed to be a culture that makes greater use of
high context arguments than the United States, which is seen as more likely to use low
context arguments.
A ranking was made of the overall degree to which the participants saw each of the
messages as making sense on a seven-point scale (1=makes sense). Two of the
advertisements seemed to make sense to both the American and the Japanese samples,
Fritolay chips (2.18) and Dell Printer (2.80), and one advertisement did not seem to make
sense, Vodaphone cellphone (4.69) especially for the Japanese. There were also two
advertisements that fell in the middle of sense continuum: Kanebo cold medicine (3.71)
and HP speakers (3.71). Using these three references points, we will make some
observations about the relationship between argument linkages and contextuality. In the
original framing of these advertisements, FritoLay, Dell, and Kanebo were seen as on the
low contextuality side, while Vodaphone and HP were seen as on the high contextuality
side.
For Japanese sample, a couple of interesting relationships are present. In terms of
logic, there is a significant negative correlation between making sense and logicality for
both ends of the continuum (the high sense ads and the low sense ads), i.e. the more sense
the ad made, the less logical it was seen as. Since logic is not a traditional concept in
Japanese thought, it may be that this term does not fit into their thinking about arguments.
In addition, the more sense that ads were seen as making, the more obvious they were seen
as. Which is interesting because the relationship between sense making and certainty was
seen as negative, i.e. the more sense an ad made, the less certain it was.
On the other hand, the American sample, generally did not see a relationship
between making sense and logicality. In the one case where they did, for the Vodaphone
ad, it was a significant positive relationship, i.e. the advertisement was not seen as making
a lot of sense and it was not seen as logical. For all of the advertisements, the relationship
between making sense and two contextuality characteristics, obviousness & clearness,
were seen as consistently positive and significant, i.e. as the ads made more sense, they
were seen as being more obvious and clear.
The preceding analysis of this data suggests that the framework of argument links
(making sense) and contextuality characteristics can provide interesting insights into the
way argument works and the differences between cultures.

REFERENCES
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Combs, S. C. (2004). Challenging Greco-Roman argumentation trajectories: Argument norms and cultural
traditions. Argumentation and Advocacy, 41, 55-57.
Corbett, E. P. J. (1986). The changing strategies of argumentation from ancient to modern times. In J. L.
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Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R. & Snoeck Henkemans, F. (1996). Fundamentals of Argumentation

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Fourcade, S. S. & Hazen, M. D. (2006). Effects of Message Contextuality & Nationality on Responses to
Print Advertisements: Japanese & American Responses to High & Low Context. Paper presented at
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Hall, E. T. (1977). Beyond Culture. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
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the Second International Conference on Argumentation (pp. 971-979). Amsterdam: SICSAT.
Hazen, M. D., Inoue, N., Fourcade, S. & Maruta, N. (2008). Cross-cultural responses to arguments in high
and low context messages. Paper presented at the Tokyo Argumentation Conference.
Hornikx, J. & Hoeken, H. (2007). Cultural differences in the persuasiveness of evidence types and evidence
quality. Communication Monographs, 74, 443-463.
Jensen, J. V. (1992). Values and practices in Asian argumentation. Argumentation and Advocacy, 28, 153166.
Johnson, R. H. (2000). Manifest Rationality. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Wason, P. C. (1977). Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Oxford, England:
Cambridge U Press.
Kneale, W. & Kneale, M. (1962). The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Morrison, J. L. (1972). The absence of a rhetorical tradition in Japanese culture. Western Speech XXXVI, 89102.
O'Keefe, D. J. (1977). Two Concepts of Argument. Journal of the American Forensic Association 13, 121128.
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Wolf, S. (2010). A system of argumentation forms in Aristotle. Argumentation, 24, 19-40.

543

A Plea For A Linguistic Distinction Between Explanation And

Argument
Thierry Herman
EFLE and Institute of Language Sciences and Communication
Universities of Lausanne and Neuchtel
Switzerland
Thierry.Herman@unil.ch

ABSTRACT: There is no clear consensus about a difference between explanation and argument. After
having explained why traditional points of view of informal logic raise a problem, Ill argue for a linguistic
point of view on this question and show how rhetorical strategic moves can exploit the blurry frontier
between explanation and argumentation. A third category seems necessary to introduce apparent
explanation and two French connectives car and parce que will be used to describe differences.
KEYWORDS: Explanation, argument, informal logic, linguistics, connectives, car, parce que.

1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to highlight some linguistic insights on the difference between
explanation and argument in order to make apparent some rhetorical strategic moves that
exploit the blurry frontier between both them. In order to achieve that objective, French
connectives car and parce que will be used at the end of the paper but the main ideas
should remain clear for non-French speakers.
I would like here to offer a slightly new point of view on a very old and common
problem: how to distinguish between explanation and argumentation? I will offer here a
linguists point of view on this problem, which is often tackled by philosophers and
critical thinkers. After having explained the linguistic clues I use to distinguish
explanation and argument, I will discuss rhetorical strategies that exploit the appearance of
an explanation to fulfil argumentative purposes. During this examination, I will need to
speak about the French connectives car and parce que, but non-French speakers will
be able to understand what I would like to underline.
Broadly speaking, two points of view on a difference between explanation and
argumentation can be found in the literature. The first one comes from a philosophical side
mainly informal logic and critical thinking and a second one comes from a linguistic
side, which is perhaps less known outside French tradition on argumentation. There are
problems within each of these sides: the old issue of differences between explanation and
argumentation is still not resolved. Recently, McKeon (2013) argued for example that
explanations should be considered as arguments. On the other side, Trudy Govier (Govier,
2005) has written that explanation and arguments are different, but some explanations can
nevertheless be seen as arguments within different contexts.
Now the French linguist Jean-Michel Adam considers that explanations and
arguments have different patterns, called sequences. He argued in a seminal book that
argumentative sequence (inspired from Toulmins model) differs from an explicative

544

sequence by the explicit presence of a problem and a solution. Thus, example 1 must be
seen as an explanation:
(1)

Why should I stop smoking ? Because, as soon as I run, I have difficulties to

breathe.

An explanation, according to Adam (Adam, 2011), ties together four propositions (not
in a logical sense): P. exp. 0: Introduction; P. exp 1: Problem or Question (Why P ? How
P?); P. exp 2: Solution or Answer (Because Q) and P. exp. 3: Conclusion Evaluation.
The presence of an explicit question and its immediate answer introduced by because
seems to be the criteria to distinguish explanation and argumentation. But the example (2)
would probably be seen as an argumentative move in Adams viewpoint.
(2)

I should stop smoking, because as soon as I run, I have difficulties to breathe.

The problem of these two similar examples is that a conclusion can be an explanandum
and that premises can function as an explanans, just because of the presence of a whyquestion. This sudden change of nature of the sequence seems unsatisfactory, since the
semantic point of view within these clauses seems untouched.
On the philosophical side, problems arise because of several difficulties rightfully
underlined by Govier (1987):
1. In this example, thus is used is the pardigmatic logical role, preceding the conclusion in an
argument. But in other cases, thus functions just as naturally in an explanation.
2. According to the classic deductive-nomological account, explanation is one type of argument.
Although this account is now widely criticized, it was dominant in the philosophy of science for
several decades and still enjoys influence.
3. As many informal logic teachers have observed for their displeasure, it is very difficult to teach
students the distinction between explnantion and argument. They find it hard to grasp in theory and
still more difficult to apply in practice.
4. Even when the distinction is grasped in theory, many passages, real or invented, can be
interpreted as either explanation or argument. (Govier 1987, p. 159 - 160)

The first quotation illustrates that the same connectives can be used in argumentation and
explanation; this is also the case in French. The second one points out that, historically,
explanation was just an argument scheme; thus explanation was seen as a category inside
argument. The third one illustrates a very common pedagogical problem: a lot of people,
including students but not excluding teachers, do not understand the difference between
explanation and argumentation. The last one, finally, emphasizes either an empirical
problem of some unclassified examples or an insufficiency of theory that prevails to
distinguishing explanation and argument. Why is this so difficult to grasp a difference
between these two types of reasoning? Answering this question needs to understand first
how they are both defined.
To sum up the general frame in which explanations and arguments are
distinguished, a good starting point is the following one: Arguments offer justifications;
explanations offer understanding (Govier, 2005, p. 21). In another way:

545

In order for a collection C of propositions to represent ones evidential reasons for a proposition P,
one must be more certain of the propositions in C than one is of P. (2) In order for a collection C of
propositions to represent ones explanatory reasons for a proposition P, one neednt be more certain
of the propositions in C than one if of P (McKeon, 2013, pp. 286287)

This leads to consider that (P) Carole is the best math student in the class, (Q) because
she is the only student in the class who is going to a special program for gifted students
(Govier, 2005, p. 22) may be interpreted as an explanation if everyone knows (P) but as an
argument if the addressee must be convinced that (Q) is true. Hence, the difference
between argumentation and explanation depends on addressees knowledge.
But this view, which is presented as unstable as Goviers example of Carole
reveals (Even when the distinction is grasped in theory, many passages, real or invented,
can be interpreted as either explanation or argument (1987: 159)) may also be
unsatisfactory. I would like to highlight three obstacles of the philosophical approach in
the next sections.
2. PHILOSOPHICAL OBSTACLES
The first obstacle is that certainty is viewed as an evaluation by the addressee. McKeon
argues against Goviers premise that one must be more certain of the propositions in C
than one is of P (McKeon 2013: 286), writing: [Goviers premise] is false. [] I am
certain of A and B, but not of C. I come to see that A and B are evidential reasons for C
and as a consequence I become equally certain of C [] (McKeon 2013, p. 287).
This counter-argument exhibits the pronoun I, which is clearly the addressees
epistemic evaluation of C, between uncertainty or certainty. Thus, certainty appears to be a
cognitive reality and not a linguistic feature. It raises a problem of access to an evaluation
of certainty for any analyst. This absence of a clear-cut criterion about addressees
evaluation prevents any analyst to settle between explanation and argument in ambiguous
cases.
As a linguist, my solution is not to evaluate cognitive certainty but to describe how
it is linguistically encoded. Works on epistemic modality1 epitomizes this view on
certainty to the extent that manually annotate and consequently automate identification of
statements with an explicitly expressed certainty or doubt, or shades of epistemic
qualifications in between (Rubin, 2010, p. 535) can now be done. It means that a
discourse analyst interested in evaluating whether a statement is an explanation or an
argument should focus on certainty encoded by the speakers rather than addressees
evaluation. In this frame, only absolute certainty (the highest of the five levels described
by (Rubin, Liddy, & Kando, 2006; Rubin, 2010)) is a relevant category for explanation.
The second obstacle is also tied with cognitive contingencies. Context-dependency
is quite an hurdle in this case. These two quotations illustrate the problem [italics are
mine]:

Epistemic modality, or certainty, concerns a linguistic expression of an estimation of the likelihood that a
certain hypothetical state of affairs is, has been, or will be true (Nuyts, 2001). Subtle linguistic clues, or
markers, contribute toward the users understanding of how much credibility can be attached to individual
propositions and whether the information comes from the first-hand or second-hand sources (Rubin, 2010,
p. 535)

546

Passages that appear to be arguments are sometimes not arguments but explanations. The
appearance of words that are common indicators [] cannot settle the matter, because those words
are used in both explanations and arguments. We need to know the intention of the author (Copi &
Cohen, 2008, p. 19).
In such a context, there would be no point in arguing for that claim, because there is no need to try
to rationally persuade anyone that it is true; the people spoken to already believe it (Govier, 1987, p.
23).

My view, as a linguist and discourse analyst, is that we can only infer relevant intentions
from what is said and make assumptions about the addressees mental states (beliefs,
desires, intentions, etc.) from a contextual point of view. Works by Grice (1975) or
Sperber & Wilson (1996) are typically used to calculate meaning from what has been said.
On the other side, rhetoric is first defined by making adjustments with addressees beliefs
and desires (Herman & Oswald, 2014). Knowing intentions and beliefs is quite an
impossible task, but a discourse analyst should make assumptions or hypotheses about
these mental states and estimate their probability within a given context of
communication.
The third philosophical obstacle is linked with a strong vision of truth. Explaining
why C [I should stop smoking] is true is the very same thing as giving a reason to think C
is true (Wright, 2002, p. 37) is a typical quotation that illustrates how evaluating truth is
unavoidable in these matter or in order to settle the question. Linguists, on the other side,
arent generally interested in knowing the truth, but they are interested in showing how
reality is represented.
(3)

(P) Joe took the time machine, (A) because he needed digital pictures of Napoleon
during the battle of Waterloo.

(3) will be seen as an explanation even if (P) is very likely to be false in 2014, because (P)
is represented as real. Linguistic markers underline it: use of the simple past; act of an
assertion; no doubt mentioned on an epistemic level. This utterance appears to be true and
is intended to appear so for the addressee independently of our knowledge of the state of
the world.
So, if we accept to get around those obstacles as I do with the linguists points of
view Ive just underlined, we can define explanation like this:
Explanation of a proposition (p) by a proposition or a set of propositions (q) implies that (p) is
linguistically presented as indisputable, i.e. represented as true or as certain

This leads of course to another difficulty: what is linguistically indisputable? The key
criterion I shall use here is linguistic modalities.
3. USING LINGUISTIC MODALITIES
Ill use the most thorough book on the subject in French, Laurent Gosselins book
published in 2010 (Gosselin, 2010) in which he detailed six types of modalities . alethic,
epistemic, appreciative, axiological, boulomac and deontic modalities. It is important to
underline that we will not use logical modalities like necessity or contingency. Of course,
547

the modalities that are tied with the question of explanation are essentially alethic
modalities (truth represented) and epistemic modalities on certitude. Lets see those two
cases.
Alethic modality characterizes fundamentally descriptive judgments [they are
supposing preexisting facts and report them] that refer to an existing reality, independently
of judgments passed on it(Gosselin 2010 : 314), my translation). Statements expressing
alethic modality are not considered as standpoints, but as facts which cannot be presented
with I guess that or I find that see example 4. This is quite a good test to identify
modalities.
(4)

Joan is a widower ?? I guess that Joan is a widower / It is a fact that Joan is a

widower

Conversely, epistemic modalities are linked with subjectivity. Gosselin talked about
subjective truth. It is difficult to insert a circumlocution like Its a fact that before an
epistemic utterance see example 5 without a sort of power grab on this utterance.
Theres no problem however to insert I guess that
(5)

My computer is too old ? It is a fact that my computer is too old / I guess that
my computer is too old

Alethic modality is quite clear: it is the only modality that necessarily leads to an
explanation. Those statements are linguistically represented as true. Hence, any causal
conjunction following an alethic statement A is designed to offer an explanation of it (why
A? or How A?).
Dealing with epistemic modality is a bitt more complex and confusing. Epistemic
modality concerns subjective truths, beliefs on objects of this world, descriptive
judgments which do not constitute value judgments, but which do not also put back to an
autonomous reality (Gosselin, 2010, p. 325). With epistemic modality, what is
represented is not a matter of truth but a matter of certainty and a matter of degrees of
certainty.
In principle, epistemic modality expressed in (6) leads to argumentation, since the
conclusion is a standpoint and following arguments give reasons to justify beliefs.
(6)

My computer may be too old now.

But there is a major problem with epistemic modality when the epistemic value is absolute
certainty (e.g.: My computer is too old). Here, the subjective part of the clause, which
was inherent in the modal verb may, seems erased by the certitude of the modal verb to
be. This is a strong rhetorical move when epistemic modalities appear to be transformed
into alethic ones see the move between (7) and (8).
(7)

It is estimated that there are 2 million weapons in Switzerland (8) There are
2 million weapons in Switzerland (and its a fact)

548

With this kind of move, an evaluation of reality appears to be encoded as something which
is imposed as true. In this case, when reasons are provided, they appear as explanations.
(8) is not expected to be contradicted or called into question. This strategy offers a crucial
advantage for the speaker, which is pointed out by Aristotle in Topics:
Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle one of
those who need argument []. For people who are puzzled [] to know whether snow is white or
not need perception. (Aristotle, 2014)

This move transforming epistemic clauses into alethic utterances uses what Danblon
(2001) calls obviousness effect. A consequence of this effect is to let appear some
premises or conclusions as not open to discussion or to justification or not expecting to be
discussed as some linguistic presuppositions do.
4. PSEUDO-EXPLANATIONS
There are also moves in which the speaker can exploit the blurring lines between
explanation and argument without transforming modalities. In order to analyze such
moves, one must decide if the conclusion of an argument or an explanation is represented
as admitted. In other words, the analyst must evaluate if the speaker commits the audience
to believe the reality described in the conclusive clause. This evaluation, founded on
linguistic clues, leads me to conclude that we need a third category between argument and
explanation: a kind of pseudo-explanation where (p) is considered as admitted and takes
advantage of the certainty expressed to appear as explicative but, as these statements
remain non-alethic, they may be disputed like an argument. Here are some cases of
apparent explanations or pseudo-explanations:
The first case exploits the invisible epistemicity of non-axiologic evaluative
terms: Philip is tall, Taxis are expensive. This move counts clearly on a supposed
common ground, or a doxa, between speaker and audience. If Philip is a classic European
basketball player, probably no one will contest (P) Philip is tall; if he is a grown-up
French man whose height is about 1m80 (5.91 feet), (P) will probably be more disputable.
If, finally, his height is about 1m55 with the same contextual data, (P) will probably be
considered as ironic. Because the speaker counts on a collective acceptance on his/her
claim, Philip is tall, because he ate a lot of soup can be counted as an explanation. Still,
the conclusion part of it remains intrinsically epistemic and cannot be considered as
pure explanation.
The second case is an echo of the first one. Doxa and stereotypes taken for granted
e.g. French people are eating cheese after the main course, because offer also
apparent explanations. In this example, the speaker gives no linguistic clue that French
eating cheese after the main course is a disputable generalization. It is assessed as a
monolithic truth. Hence, the audience is invited to consider it as true and non-disputable.
The third and last case I see without aiming at completeness of these
observations can be called a gamble on certainty. The future tense, even if it is
inherently unknown and disputable, may encode a virtual certainty. John will arrive at
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noon: he told me that he caught the 11:00 am train offers an example where future can be
taken for granted and represented as certain.
These cases have one common trait: they count on audiences acceptance. Now, in
contrast, we may find alethic clauses that are in fact linked with argument and not
explanation or pseudo-explanation. Inference to best explanation is, despite its name, an
argumentative move. If (9) is alethic, (p), in example 10, becomes epistemic, because (q)
is used to establish the truth represented in (p).
(9)

John has left the party

(10)

(p) John has left the party, (q) because no one has seen him for an hour

Yet, alethic form of (p) conceals the intrinsically uncertain conclusion. Note that I am
certain that John has left the party is completely epistemic and appears paradoxically less
certain than (2). In these cases, the process of establishing a conclusion implies in
retrospect that (p) cannot be considered as true or certain. Hence, it cannot be an
explanation. It is important to see that alethic nature of (p) disappears when it becomes
clear that (p) is inferred and not stated.
Finally, axiological or evaluative modalities (I love it) are not represented as true
nor admitted because of the speakers commitment in evaluative terms and deontic
modalities (we should do that) are intrinsically tied with a possible disagreement. These
cases are open to disputation, which is a key criterion to identify an argumentative
process. Even when appreciative modalities are generalized, for instance This is a great
movie, the subjective adjective great is intrinsically representing a subjective
evaluative standpoint that isnt cancelled in generalization.
Lets sum up our position, before seeing how connectives can interact with this
table.
Linguistic representation

Nature of
(p) because (q)

Expectations

A. (p) is represented as a true

Explanation
fact
(p) will probably not be called into
question
B. (p) is represented as
Pseudoadmitted
explanation
C. (p) is represented as
(p) can be called into question
Argument
disputable
Table 1: Explanation, apparent explanation and argumentation
5. FRENCH CONNECTIVES IN INTERACTION WITH EXPLANATION AND
ARGUMENT
Because can be translated in French either by parce que or car (see Zufferey, 2012).
The main difference is the following one: Parce que is generally and quite often
connected to an explicative move:

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Affirmation that p has a cause q, in the phrase p parce que q always takes for granted truth of p.
We start with p, considered as undisputed and then we present its origin q. (Groupe Lambda-l,
1975, p. 59, my translation)

This quotation of the seminal article on differences between those French connectives
highlights that q can be taken for granted, even if q is open to discussion. Hence, using
parce que is a possible rhetorical strategy in order to make an argument appear as an
explanation:
(11)

According to Samy Chaar, who has met her some time ago, this nomination is
good news, because [parce que] we have avoided a war of succession (Le Temps,
October 10 2013, my translation).

Example (11) illustrates that the speaker seems to forget the evaluative modality
contained in good news and offers this argumentative move as an explanation. The
obviousness effect of good news included in an explicative move is an interesting power
grab: the audience is supposed to accept the idea of good news. This strategic move can
be illustrated in table 1 from case C to case A and B. Unlike parce que, car is
exclusively argumentative:
Enunciation of q is represented as being intended for justification of the enunciation of p (groupe
lambda-l 1975 : 259, my translation)

Car illustrates a double meta-discursive move: Ive said p and I justify p by saying q.
Car doesnt directly give a cause of (p) but a reason that justifies saying (p). This
presupposes that (p) can be disputed. Therefore, car is strictly an argumentative
indicator. Hence, when car is used with apparent explanations, it reveals inherently
greater expectations to be called into question than with parce que and gives up
explicative appearance to exhibit an argumentative nature. This move from case B in
table 1 to case C can be illustrated by (example 12)
(12)

(p) The conference fee is expensive, (q) because (CAR) organizing committee
must pay many students to do the job

The use of car instead of parce que reveals that (p) may already be a disputed issue in
a community that leads the speaker to a justification. The speaker acknowledges that (p) is
a matter of concern or may lead to an open debate. Thus, the pseudo-explanation is in fact
embedded in a real or potential argumentative situation.
Some examples are even stranger. In principle, if car is strictly argumentative, one
shouldnt find car with alethic modality. Its not the case. Examples (13) and (14) show
it:
(13)

(p) Nol Mamre : Im leaving the Green Party, (q) because [car] the party is
captive of its factions (Le Monde, September 26, 2013, p. 10, my translation).

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(14)

(p) Nelson Mandelas agony goes on (q) because [car] his soul isnt in peace,
according to traditional chiefs who estimate that Mandelas ancestors are irritated
by family quarrels (Tribune de Genve, June 30, 2013, my translation)

In those examples, (p) are undisputed statements of fact. So, what are the effects of this
move from case A in table 1 to case C ?
From a contextual point of view, Nol Mamres and Nelson Mandelas cases are
clearly moving from a non-polemic linguistic explanation taking place in a polemic
context. Even if truth of (p) isnt called into question, the causes in (q) are expected to be
disputed. Car, in these situations, reveals the speakers self-consciousness that his/her
explanation will almost certainly create a dispute or arouse an opposition: disagreements
about offered causes or about the link between (p) and (q) are now expected.
This explanation may let us understand an empirical test lead by Sandrine
Zufferey (2012). In this test, participants were asked to fill a blank within two clauses with
either parce que, car or puisque (since). Example (15) has delivered rather
unexpected results.
(15)

John laughed ____ Peter stumbled

Indeed, 72,5% of participants put parce que (72,5%) as a connective between these
clauses whereas 27,5% participants prefer car (27,5%). It is perfectly standard and
expected to see a massive preference for parce que because of the alethic nature of
John laughed. But how to explain that more than a quarter of tested people prefer car?
It is difficult to answer, because there wasnt any situational context in this test. But in
order to understand that car is still perceived as possible, one must probably admit that
car shows a readiness for a discussion. To be more precise, car indicates that Peter
stumbled may be disputed as the true or the only cause of Johns laughter.
6. CONCLUSION
We wanted to highlight in this paper that, in a linguistic perspective, two criteria must be
used to make fruitful distinction between explanation and argument: one is a semanticoenunciative analysis of proposition (p) which may be done with linguistic modalities; the
second one is pragmatic expectations to be eventually called into question a in a real or
potential context. These two criteria lead to distinguish in fact three categories:
explanations, apparent explanations and arguments. We defined apparent or pseudoexplanations as non-alethic clauses explained or justified by some reason if and only if
these non-alethic clauses are expressed with an absolute certainty, i.e. taken for granted by
the speaker.
Strategic moves to open or to close a possible disputation must be analysed within this
frame. We may find at least two cases: non-certainty bound modalities (deontic or
evaluative modalities for example) may be linguistically encoded as generalized (This is
a wonderful movie). In this case, it seems that the evaluative nature of this clause will
remain as argumentative. But in the second case (John is rich), erasing the epistemic
nature of this clause (I think that John is rich) leads in fact to turn an argumentative
move into an explanation.

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Finally, the dynamics of some connectives (at least in French) is a way to analyse
rhetorical and strategic moves: adding a layer of explanation on intrinsic argument (some
uses of parce que) or expressing in an explanation an expectation of plausible future
argument (some rare cases of car).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to Steve Oswald for the precious help in Amsterdam, to Jrme Jacquin for the
motivating moral support and to Thierry Raeber for his enthusiasm and nice ideas of
linguistic tests.

REFERENCES
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Aristotle. (2014). Complete works of Aristotle, Volume 1: The revised Oxford translation. Princeton
University Press.
Copi, I. M., & Cohen, C. (2008). Introduction to logic (13 edition.). Upper Saddle River, N.J: Prentice Hall.
Danblon, E. (2001). La rationalit du discours pidictique. In M. Dominicy & J.-M. Adam (Eds.), La mise en
scne des valeurs: la rhtorique de lloge et du blme (pp. 1947). Lausanne- Paris: Delachaux et
Niestl.
Gosselin, L. (2010). Les modalits en franais: la validation des reprsentations. Amsterdam- New York:
Ed. Rodopi.
Govier, T. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Dordrecht- Providence-U.S.A: Foris.
Govier, T. (2005). A practical study of argument (6th ed.). Belmont [etc.]: Thomson Wadsworth.
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In D. Davidson & G. Harman (Eds.), The logic of grammar (pp.
6475). Encino, Calif: Dickenson Pub. Co.
Groupe Lambda-l. (1975). Car, parce que, puisque. Revue Romane, 10, 248280.
Herman, T., & Oswald, S. (Eds.). (2014). Rhtorique et cognition: perspectives thoriques et stratgies
persuasives / Rhetoric and cognition: theorical perspectives and persuasive strategies. Bern: P.
Lang.
McKeon, M. W. (2013). On the Rationale for Distinguishing Arguments from Explanations. Argumentation,
27(3), 283303.
Rubin, V. L. (2010). Epistemic modality: From uncertainty to certainty in the context of information seeking
as interactions with texts. Information Processing & Management, 46(5), 533540.
Rubin, V. L., Liddy, E. D., & Kando, N. (2006). Certainty identification in texts: Categorization model and
manual tagging results. In J. G. Shanahan, Y. Qu, & J. Wiebe (Eds.), Computing Attitude and Affect
in Text: Theory and Applications (pp. 6176). Springer Netherlands.
Sperber, D. (1996). Relevance: Communication and Cognition (2 edition.). Oxford- Cambridge, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell.
Wright, L. (2002). Reasoning and Explaining. Argumentation, 16(1), 3346.
Zufferey, S. (2012). Car, parce que, puisque revisited: Three empirical studies on French causal
connectives. Journal of Pragmatics, 44(2), 138153.

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Cultural Differences In Political Debate: Comparing Face Threats In

U.S., Great Britain, And Egyptian Campaign Debates
Edward A. Hinck, Shelly S. Hinck, William O. Dailey, Robert S. Hinck &
Salma I.
Department of Communication Studies
Central Michigan University
Mount Pleasant, MI
United States, 48859
hinck1e@cmich.edu
Interim Dean, College of Communication & Fine Arts
Central Michigan University
Mount Pleasant, MI
United States, 48859
Chair, Department of Communication Studies
Central Michigan University
Mount Pleasant, MI
United States, 48859
Department of Communication
Texas A & M University
College Station, TX
United States, 77843
Dean, College of Communication
DePaul University
Chicago, IL
United States, 60614

ABSTRACT: We compared recent historical debates from the U.S., Great Britain, and Egypt using politeness
theory to determine if there were significant cultural differences and/or similarities in the way candidates
argued for high office. The transcripts from these debates were coded using a schema based on face threats
used in debates. Results indicate some differences between the way U.S. presidential candidates, British
leaders, and Egyptian leaders initiate and manage face threats on leadership and competence.
KEYWORDS: Campaign debates, culture, politeness.

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper explores cultural differences and similarities in argumentation strategies used by
candidates in debates for high office. Recent historical campaign debates in Britain and
Egypt offer an opportunity to examine cultural differences in reasoning about public affairs.
Debates for the office of British Prime Minister were held for the first time in 2010
between Gordon Brown, David Cameron, and Nick Clegg. Similarly, Egypt held the first
debate between Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Amr Moussa. To date, limited amount of

554

work has been done on these historic events (see Benoit & Benoit-Bryan, 2013) and less is
known about cultural differences in arguing for office.
Our interest is in the ways candidates manage face concerns in the potentially
threatening encounters of campaign debates. These events are held in front of audiences
who watch and deliberate over candidates political skills. Previous work has examined
politeness strategies used by U.S. candidates for the presidency from 1960-2008 (Dailey,
Hinck, & Hinck, 2008) and found a trend of declining reasoned exchanges over policy
difference while direct attacks on character increased. Comparing the language strategies of
the candidates representing different political cultures of the United States, Great Britain,
and Egypt will allow us to explore trends in international campaign debate discourse.
2. THE DEBATES IN CONTEXT
On April 6, 2010 British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that dissolution of
parliament and general election would take place in one month, May 6, 2010. At that time,
power was relatively evenly divided between Gordon Browns Labour party and David
Camerons Conservatives (Shirbon, 6 April 2010). The Liberal Democrats had a new
leader in Nick Clegg. The campaign was significant in the sense that it was one of the few
times that the politics of the time might result in a hung parliament, where three leading
candidates running for office had not been the situation since 1979 (when Margaret
Thatcher led the Conservatives, James Callaghan represented Labour, and David Steel was
the candidate advanced by the Liberal party), where all three parties featured new leaders,
and where debates were featured for the first time.
Three debates were held about one week apart in the one-month campaign. The first
debate concerned domestic policy, the second international policy, and the third economic
policy. Although a variety of issues were addressed under each of those subject areas, two
main issues were of concern at the time (Shirbon, 6 April 2010). First, Britain was facing
an economic crisis much like the U.S. was in the wake of the 2008 recession. Looming
before the British government was a huge budget deficit and markets wanted a clear sense
of direction regarding how the government would go about responding to the problem.
Second, the outgoing parliament had been tarnished with an expenses scandal where one
hundred and forty-five members of parliament were accused of inappropriate expenses
while serving in office.
The format of the debate featured opening statements lasting one minute for each
leader. After the three opening statements, the moderator would then take the first question
on the agreed theme. Each leader was given one minute to respond to the question and then
each leader had one minute to respond to the answers. The moderator was then allowed to
open up the discussion for free debate for up to four minutes. Each leader was then given
ninety seconds for a closing statement (BBC, 2010). According to the Select Committee on
Communications Report (13 May 2014), the debates were a success: the average viewing
figures for each of the debates was 9.4 million (ITV), 4 million (Sky), and 8.1 million
(BBC) p. 12.

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2.1 The 2012 Egyptian debate

The Moussa-Fotouh debate was the first and only political debate to have occurred in
Egypt, at least at this point in time; thus, it was an important experiment in democratic
practices for the Egyptian people in the immediate post-Mubarak political climate. The
presidential debate between Amr Moussa and Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh took place in
Egypt May 10, 2012 and was sponsored by several media organizations. Moussa was the
former foreign minister and former head of the Arab League, has also served as
Ambassador of Egypt to the United Nations in New York, as Ambassador to India and to
Switzerland. Abul Fotouh, is a medical doctor who was politically active since his college
days. He was also a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic opposition
party founded in 1928. The candidates had a very different relationship with the former
regime under Hosni Mubarak. Moussas political career took place under Mubarak and
Abul Fotouh was imprisoned for five years from 1996 to 2001. Despite the fact that these
two candidates did not make the final election ballot, the selection of the candidates for that
debate reflected the two leading candidates according to polls at that point in the campaign.
The Moussa-Fotouh debate structure was based on American presidential debates.
Amr Khafaga, editor in chief of Al Shurouk newspaper, one of the sponsors of the debate
said that, there is no precedent for such an event in Egypt so theyve borrowed the debate
rules from the U.S. Egyptianizing it a bit (The Guardian, 2012). The Christian Science
Monitor reported that, in the hour-long run-up, hosts explained that the format was based
on US presidential debates, and broadcast part of the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy debate. Mona
el-Shazly, a talk show host and Yusri Fouda, a former Al-Jazeera journalist moderated the
debate. The debate was divided into two parts consisting of 12 questions. The first half of
the debate focused on the constitution and presidential powers and the second half focused
on the candidates platforms, the judiciary and security. Each candidate was given two
minutes to answer each question and was allowed to comment on the others responses. In
addition, the candidates were permitted to ask each other one question at the end of each
half of the debate. Each candidate had two minutes for closing remarks. We were unable to
locate exact numbers for viewership but one estimate described viewership as reflecting a
high rate of interest (Hope, 2012).
2.2 The 2012 U.S. presidential debates
President Barack Obama debated former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney three times
during the 2012 presidential campaign. The record of the Obama administrations first term
included steering the country out of the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression,
sweeping new regulations of Wall Street, health care reform, ending American
involvement in Iraq, beginning to draw down American forces in Afghanistan, and more
(Glastris, 2012). Still, 52% of Americans polled during the 2012 campaign believed that
the president had accomplished not very much or little or nothing. The economy was
weak during the campaign and despite some promising news of job growth many
Americans were open to the possibility of new leadership.
Mitt Romney had a successful record as a businessman and Governor. At Bain
Capital he led the investment company to highly profitable ventures and then served as the
CEO of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee for the 2002 Winter Olympics. In 2002 he

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was elected Governor of Massachusetts and passed health care reform at the state level. He
campaigned vigorously for the Republican presidential nomination in 2008 but lost to John
McCain. That campaign experience prepared him well for the 2012 campaign and in a long
series of primary debates won the presidential nomination. During the primary campaign
his communication strategy was to appeal to the base of the Republican party. In a leaked
video of a private campaign speech Romney claimed that 47% of Americans pay no
income taxes.
The fact that Bain Capital had made money by taking companies over to sell their
assets with the result in some instances of eliminating jobs, that Romney had been opposed
to bailing out the U.S. automobile industry while Obama had offered loans to save it, that
Romney was opposed to health care reform on a national level when he had been in favor
of it at the state level, and the 47% comment hurt Romney going into the last seven weeks
of the campaign. According to Richard Wolffe (2013) what had been a 4-to-5 point race in
the battlegrounds became a 6-to-7 point race (p. 204).
The debates provided Romney with an opportunity to change the dynamic of the
campaign. Beth Myers (Myers & Dunn, 2013) who served as Romneys Campaign
Manager indicated there were three goals for the first debate: create a credible vision for
job creation and economic growth, present the case against Obama as a choice, and
speak to women (p. 101). Given the lead that Obama had developed in the battleground
states, Obamas advisers believed that he did not need to be aggressive anymore because
its kind of baked in there (Wolffe, 2013, p. 210). However, Obama became caught
between what he wanted to say on stage and what his agreed strategy was. He couldnt
attack in case it destroyed his own popularity. But he needed to attack to show he had some
backbone (Wolffe, 2013, p. 213). The conflict resulted in a poor performance that
energized the Romney camp. Viewership for the first debate was over 67 million (Voth,
2014), 65.6 million for the second debate (Stelter, 17 October 2012) and 59.2 million for
the third debate (Stelter, 23 October 2012).
We compared the debates using Brown and Levinsons politeness theory. This
approach to the study of political debates has been described elsewhere (Dailey, Hinck, &
Hinck, 2008; Hinck & Hinck, 2002). For the purposes of this study we examined the
degree of direct threats on candidates positive face across the debates in order to answer
the following research question.
RQ: Are there differences between face threat strategies in U.S., Great Britain, and
Egyptian debates?
3. METHOD
3.1 Selection of debates and the acquisition of primary texts
Seven debates were coded and analyzed for this study. The texts of the three 2012 United
States Presidential Debates featuring Governor Mitt Romney and President Barack Obama
were found on the website of the Commission on Presidential Debates. The text of the
three 2010 British Prime Minister Debates involving, Nick Clegg, David Cameron, and
Gordon Brown were found on the BBC website (news.bbc.co.uk.). Finally, the text of the
May 10, 2010 Egyptian Debate between Moussa and Abul Fotouh was created from a You

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Tube video of the event

(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vrbkI1fkZFM&feature=player_embedded). An
Egyptian native translated the debate transcript used for analysis from Arabic into English.
Unitizing the debates
3.2 Unitizing and coding the debates
Two individuals served as coders of the transcripts. The coding process involved three
decisions. First, the coders divided the transcripts into thought units. Hatfield and WeiderHatfield (1978, p. 46) define a thought unit as the minimum meaningful utterance having
a beginning and end, typically operationalized as a simple sentence. Since viewers of
televised debates are interested in how candidates construct their messages unitizing the
transcripts into statements of complete thoughts seemed most appropriate for this study.
Second, the thought units were coded according to Dailey, Hinck, and Hincks
(2008) coding schema. The coding schema is an extension of Klines (1984) social face
coding system. Klines coding schema notes that positive politeness and autonomy
granting/negative politeness are two separate dimensions of face support. Positive
politeness is defined as the desire to be included and the want that ones abilities will be
respected. Negative politeness is defined as the want to be unimpeded by others. Positive
face is supported by expressions of understanding solidarity, and/or positive evaluation; it
is threatened by expressions of contradiction, noncooperation, disagreement, or disapproval.
Since political debates are primarily concerned with a candidates ability to demonstrate
his/her ability to lead, and to offer and explain policies and plans important to the wellbeing of the country, our analysis and coding schema focused on the positive face of the
candidates.
The coding schema is composed of three major levels. Statements at the first major
level of the system are those that threaten the positive face of the candidates. Statements at
this level of the system are further differentiated concerning the directness of the positive
face attack (levels 1 and 2). Statements at the next major level of the system balance both
threatening and supportive evaluative implications for the others face (level 3). Finally,
statements at the final major level explicitly support the positive face of the candidates.
Statements at this level of the coding system are further differentiated in terms of the
directness of the positive support exhibited by the candidates (levels 4 and 5).
The third decision made by the coders focused on the topic of the action identified
in the coded thought unit. Topics such as leadership/character, policy/plan, consequences
of the plan, use of data, differences and/or disagreement between the candidates, campaign
tactics, ridicule were identified.
3.3 Reliability
To determine intercoder reliability the two coders both coded the first quarter of the first
2012 Presidential debate, the first quarter of the first Prime Minister Debate, and the first
quarter of the Egyptian debate. There was 92% agreement on the thought unit designation,
and Cohens Kappa of inter rater agreement of .86 on the coding schema for the different
content elements of the debate.

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4. RESULTS
The sample for this particular study included seven debates (three U.S. Presidential debates
in 2012, three Prime Minister debates in 2010, one Egyptian Presidential debate in 2012).
Tables 1 through 4 contain the results of the coding of face threat in these debates
according to the system we have developed and adapted over the last 12 years as was laid
out in the Methods section.
Table 1 has the raw percentage of thought units that were coded into one of the
many categories of the coding scheme. For the U.S. and U.K. debates, these would be
totals summed across the three debates. Also, included in all the tables are the averages for
the coding categories for the debates from the 10 U.S. Presidential Campaigns we have
coded before the 2012 debates.
Table 2 looks at combined categories of face threat according to directness of that
threat. Over the program of research, we have found interesting information when we sum
across the direct face threat and indirect face threat categories. This table also reveals a new
way to look at the summed types by providing a ratio of the direct to indirect face threat.
As a rough basis of comparison, in the 1960 U.S. Debates, this ratio was about 1.5, and in
2004 it was about 8.6. Generally, the preference for direct face attack has increased
markedly across time, though the trend has been far from consistent. On the other hand, the
decline in the use of indirect face threat has been fairly consistent starting at about 15% in
1960 and now hovering around 5% for the last three American campaigns.
Table 3 presents what we consider a disturbing trend in modern debates. Among the
categories of face threat, we regard the roughest as the personal attack on the opponents
character and leadership competence. In essence, nasty debates would tend to have more
of this personal attack on character and competence and less of a focus on plans, policies,
and ideas. In 1960, around 3% of the face threat thought units were made up of this
personal and direct attack on character and leadership competence. Even the proportion of
direct face threat thought units spent on attacking the opponents character and leadership
competence was only 4%. The highest proportions occurred in the 2012 debates, and those
numbers are listed in Table 3. This is to say that more than a third of direct face threats in
the debate were attacks on the opponents character and leadership competence.
Table 4 takes a look at the categories of face threat if we combine the direct and
indirect face threat forms of those categories. Again, to place the values in some context
across the U.S. Presidential debates, 2012 had the second highest percentage use of attacks
of character and leadership competence and second lowest percentage of attacks on ideas,
plans and policies.
The purpose of this particular study was mainly to uncover differences and
similarities across the three cultures debates. We think it is useful to draw attention to five
different outcomes we see from these recent debates. These are the use of direct face threat,
the use of indirect threat, the use of attacks on character and leadership competence, use of
attacks on plans, policies and proposals, and the use of attacks on the manipulation of data.
4.1 Direct face threat
A direct face threat is an attack on something about the opponent personally. For example,
were Romney criticizing the Affordable Care Act, that would be an indirect face threat, but

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if he were criticizing Obamacare, then it would be a direct face threat as the plan is now
personally linked to Barak Obama. What we see across the three sets of debates in this
study is a remarkable consistency in the use of direct face threat, and percentages that
mirror the U.S. average (see Table 2). This leads us to say that there appears to be a
natural sort of direct face threat for these sorts of debates. The way that the different sets
of debates arrived at this median value were very different and will be discussed below, but
from a macro view, debates that vary, approximately 10% over this 25% value may be
excessively rough, while debates that fall 10% below seem quiet and lack vigor.
4.2 Indirect face threat
In contrast to the overall level of direct face threat, the overall level of indirect face threat
does vary across the three debate samples we use here. The U.S. debates show the very low
level of indirect face threat that reflects a generally consistent decline across the American
debates; both the British and the Egyptian debates show a high use of indirect face threat.
Indeed, the British and Egyptian debate values for indirect face threat are just what would
have been common in the early American debates, those that are held up as models for
useful and healthy political discourse. Even in the ratio of direct to indirect face threat, the
low values for the British and the Egyptians are on par with the low values from the early
American debates. We view the American experience here as an indicator of the decline in
the quality of debates, while the British and the Egyptians seem to have taken a better tact,.
4.3 Attacks on character and leadership competence
A disturbing trend in American political discourse is the vilification and demonization of
opponents and enemies. This would include direct attacks centered on tearing down the
nature, personality, abilities, and leadership of opponents. In American debates, up to 2000,
the average percentage of direct attack on character and leadership competence was about
3.5%. After, 2000, the average percentage was 9.5%. Looking across the debates for this
study, we see that higher level of direct attack on character and leadership competence in
the British and Egyptian debates. When we look at the proportion of face threat expended
in this type of personal attack, it is also quite high among each of our samples (see Table 3).
Indeed, as noted above, the proportion of direct face threat focusing on direct attack on
character and leadership competence in the 2012 American debates was the highest for any
American debate, and the British exceeded even that number. Just as we are not
encouraged by this trend in the American debates, we find it equally disturbing that the
British and Egyptian debates also relied heavily on this rough form of campaign dialogue.
4.4 Attacks on ideas, positions, and plans
The proportion of thought units used to criticize the others plans and policies has remained
fairly consistent over time for the American debates, more so in the case of direct attacks
on the opponents plans and policies. In the results for this study (see Table 4), the
Americans and the British debaters used about the same amount of direct attacks in this
category as is the American average. The Egyptians, however, showed virtually no
criticism or attack on the others plans and policies. Looking at the indirect attacks, such as

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criticism of a plan without also threatening the face of the opponent personally, the
Americans show a small proportion of thought units, Egyptians show no thought units in
the category, and the British show a very high level. Indeed, the American proportion is the
lowest among the 11 American campaigns we have studied, while the British proportion is
equal to the highest level among the American debates. In essence, the British candidates
were behaving as the Americans did in the early days of televised debates. We think this
form of attack in the debates, especially attacks and criticisms that dont focus on a person
as much as a plan, is one of the best practices for debates. Unfortunately, the Americans do
not tend to use this form of debate behavior any more, and it appears in the case of this one
Egyptian debate, there is also a lack of focus on plans and policies.
4.5 Attacks on use of data
Finally, one thing we found very striking about the comparisons here was the high
percentage of thought units used to attack the opponents use of data in the Egyptian debate
(see Tables 1 and 3). Basically this category includes those claims that the opponent (of the
opponents administration or party) is using data in a biased and possible incorrect way.
One may claim the other side isnt revealing the whole picture of information that is
available, that the other side was wrong in what it proposed was the others record on
activities and statements, that the other side is not interpreting data as it should be, etc. We
are used to seeing a prevalence of this type of argument or attack when the parties are
claiming the others proposals and plans wont work and are misguided. The attacked party
might rebut saying the opponents criticism lacks merit due to a biased or incorrect
interpretation of the data.
This was clearly not the case in the Egyptian debates. Even though the amount of
attacks on data use far exceeded any American debate, the amount of attack on the
opponents plans and policies was virtually nil. Upon examining the transcripts, we found
the claims about inappropriate use of data were to rebut the opponents claims about ones
character and leadership. For example, if one party claimed (or implied as it turns out) that
his opponent failed to resign from the Mubarak government after a certain incident, the
other would claim that the accuser did not have the record of events correct or failed in his
interpretation of the what actions the other did take. Indeed, the major portion of face threat
in the Egyptian debate was about 1) the opponents character and leadership competence
and then 2) the inappropriate way the would-be slanderer was using incorrect data in order
to make the claim about deficient character or leadership.
5. DISCUSSION
In looking at the aggregate results of direct and indirect face threats, the results indicating
some similarities across the three campaigns. It was interesting
to find that the amount of direct face threat across the sample mirrored the U.S. average of
direct threat. This might be some indication of a cultural similarity. The fact that debates
call for criticism of opposing candidates programs and records, and that the amount of
direct face threat was similar in this sample suggests that more work might be done to
assess standards of direct threat in other nations leader debates. However, these findings
are limited to just the most recent campaigns and only one Egyptian debate. A larger, more

561

comprehensive sample of debates from other countries might yield a different finding on
the question of overall use of direct threats.
When we turn to a consideration of indirect face threat some interesting differences
appear. The fact that U.S. indirect threats were low suggests a concern with U.S.
presidential candidates reliance on direct attacks. We wonder whether the decreasing use of
indirect attacks reflects a misguided assumption on the part of candidates and advisers that
respect for the opponents face should be abandoned in the hope of generating an
impression of a strong candidate. However, the fact the U.K. debates and the Egyptian
debate showed higher levels of indirect face threat reveals a potential cultural difference
between the state of U.S. debates and those of these other two countries.
Looking at specific content dimensions of the coding schema, the results
concerning attacks on character and competence revealed a similarity between the three
campaigns in terms of higher levels of direct face threats in the U.K. and Egyptians debates.
However, it is interesting to note that with the U.K. this was a well established democracy
while Egypt was attempting to model western democratic practices in their historic first
experiment with a political debate. The uniqueness of the events might have accounted for
the intense nature of attacks on character and competence. The debates in the U.K. took
place in the context of three person race, a situation that had rarely occurred in the past.
Egypt had never held debates before and the candidates had limited experience to draw on
in preparing for the debates. Thus the high degree of direct attack on character and
competence might have meant that the candidates and their advisers saw little value in
balancing concerns for the face of the opponent with the need to advocate for office. This,
however, does not explain the intensity of the U.S. debates. In the 2012 campaign, the
direct attacks on character and competence were the highest for American debates since
1960. Also, however, the British debates exceeded even that number. We can only
speculate that as the British campaign tightened up in the last few days, the candidates
increased the intensity of their attacks in the hope of drawing distinctions between
themselves in ways that might win over voters.
The last two findings raise some interesting topics regarding Egypts attempt to
break free of authoritarian rule and move to a more democratic system of government. In
terms of attacks on ideas, positions, and plans, American and British debates featured about
the same amount of direct attacks, However, the Egyptian debate showed almost no
instances where the candidates argued about ideas, positions, and plans. This finding by
itself, suggests that the Egyptian candidates were less prepared to advance and test ideas,
positions, and plans, and more predisposed to attack character and competence and to
attack each other on the use of data. In fact, there was a high percentage of thought units
devoted to attacking each persons use of data in the Egyptian debate. When we looked
more closely at the messages dealing with the use of data in the Egyptian debate, we
realized that what we coded as arguments over the use of data could also be interpreted by
an Egyptian as an attack on character or competence. For example, to say to your opponent
that, you must be using wrong information to come to such a conclusion as you have, is
considered to be an attack on a persons capacity to see an issue in the same way that others
do, that the opponent lacks the ability to make sense out of the social reality in the same
way as most others do. Within this kind of a statement is an implied presumption for the
candidate who utters such a comment and calls into question the opposing candidates
ability to use information in the same way that others do. Thus, it might be the case that to

562

be sensitive to the different ways in which individuals from other cultures engage in
argument over political issues in debates, some revision might be necessary to account for
the differences in the way that communities engage in political argument.
Last, we think that it is interesting that the Egyptian debate featured so few
exchanges over ideas, positions, and plans. We think it might be the case that when a
nation attempts to move away from authoritarian forms of rule, democratic traditions and
practices need to be cultivated over longer periods and institutionalized as political
traditions before they can achieve the promise of informing the electorate. Even after
attempting to model the debate on the classic 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates, the candidates
did not engage in substantive exchanges over differences in ideas, positions, and plans. In
conclusion, the results of the study indicate interesting differences between these debates
and warrant further exploration of cultural differences in political debates.
6. CONCLUSION
To summarize our findings as we look across the intercultural sample of campaign debates,
we found both similarities and differences. The similarities include the amount of direct
face threat used, a level that has actually been fairly consistent across the American debates
as well as the use of direct face threat used to attack the character and leadership
competence of the opponent. The differences include the relatively low level of indirect
face threat used by the Americans, the extremely low use of any criticism of plans and
policies in the Egyptian debate as well as extremely high use of criticism of the manner in
which an opponent has used or manipulated data.

563

Table 1: Raw Percentage of Thoughts Units Coded for Face Threat.

Face Threat Category

U.S.
2012

U.K.
2010

Egypt
2012

U.S.
Avg.

9.2%
7.3%
1.7%
4.2%
0.9%
0.1%
1.7%

8.9%
7.5%
1.7%
2.0%
0.2%
1.1%
1.8%

7.3%
1.1%
0.6%
13.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

5.1%
7.3%
2.0%
6.2%
4.0%
1.4%
0.5%

2.2%
1.3%
1.2%
0.6%
0.6%
0.0%
0.1%

5.6%
5.4%
1.2%
0.2%
0.4%
0.4%
0.0%

10.1%
0.0%
1.1%
1.7%
0.6%
0.0%
0.6%

1.9%
2.8%
2.2%
1.3%
1.7%
0.4%
0.0%

3.9%

4.0%

0.6%

3.6%

Direct Face Threat:

Character and Leadership
Policies and Proposals
Blame for Problems
Incorrect Use of Data
Inappropriate Campaigning
Disagreement
Zinger Insult
Indirect Face Threat:
Character and Leadership
Policies and Proposals
Blame for Problems
Incorrect Use of Data
Inappropriate Campaigning
Disagreement
Zinger Insult
Neutral Comment of Support

Table 2: Comparison of the Use of Direct versus Indirect Face Threat

Across the Debates
Face Threat Type

U.S.
2012

U.K.
2010

Egypt
2012

U.S.
Avg.

Direct Face Threat

Indirect Face Threat
Neutral Comment or Face Support
Ratio of Direct to Indirect Face Threat

25.1%
6.0%
3.9%
4.20

23.2%
13.1%
4.0%
1.77

22.3%
14.0%
0.6%
1.60

26.5%
10.3%
3.6%
2.57

564

Table 3: Proportion of Face Threat Focused on the Opponent's Character

and Leadership Competence
Basis for Proportion
Proportion of Direct Face Threat
Proportion of All Face threat

U.S.
2012
36.6%
29.5%

U.K.
2010
38.5%
24.6%

Egypt
2012
32.5%
20.0%

U.S. Avg.
19.3%
13.9%

Table 4: Percentage of Face Threat Types Combined Across Direct and Indirect Face
Threats
Face Threat Type

U.S.
2012

U.K.
2010

Egypt
2012

U.S.
Avg.

Character and Leader Competence

11.4%

14.5%

17.3%

7.0%

Policies and Proposals

8.6%

12.9%

1.1%

10.1%

Blame for Problems

2.9%

2.9%

1.7%

4.1%

Incorrect Use of Data

4.8%

2.3%

15.1%

7.5%

Inappropriate Campaigning

1.4%

0.6%

0.6%

5.8%

Disagreement

0.1%

1.4%

0.0%

1.8%

Zinger Insult

1.8%

1.8%

0.6%

0.5%

565

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568

The Linked-Convergent Distinction

David Hitchcock
Department of Philosophy
McMaster University
Hamilton, Canada L8S 4K1
hitchckd@mcmaster.ca.

ABSTRACT: The linked-convergent distinction introduced by Stephen Thomas in 1977 is primarily a

distinction between ways in which two or more reasons can directly support a claim, and only derivatively a
distinction between types of structures, arguments, reasoning, reasons, or premisses. As with the deductiveinductive distinction, there may be no fact of the matter as to whether a given multi-premiss argument is
linked or convergent.
KEYWORDS: argument structure, coordinatively compound argumentation, convergent, linked, Monroe C.
Beardsley, multiple argumentation, Stephen N. Thomas, support

1. INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time introductory logic textbooks did not mention the linked-convergent
distinction. See for example Cohen and Nagel (1934), Black (1946), and Copi (1978).
Stephen Thomas was the first one to draw it, in 1977.1 Thomas took the term convergent
from Monroe Beardsleys earlier textbook, from which come also the terms divergent
argument and serial argument (Beardsley, 1950, p. 19). A contrast concept was already
implicit in Beardsleys recognition that a reason that converges along with one or more
other reasons on a conclusion might itself consist internally of more than one coordinate
premiss. Thomas refined Beardsleys concept of convergence, made the contrast concept
explicit, coined the term linked for it, and supplemented Beardsleys convention for
diagramming convergent reasons with a convention for diagramming the linkage among
the coordinate premisses of a multi-premiss reason. Independently of Thomass
innovation, Michael Scriven (1976, p. 42) introduced a similar distinction, with a different
diagramming convention, but used the term balance of considerations to describe an
argument with a convergent support structure. Johnson and Blair (1977, p. 177) and
Hitchcock (1983, pp. 49-52) appropriate Scrivens way of making the distinction.
The distinction appears with Thomass labels and diagramming conventions as a
topic in many introductory textbooks. See for example Freeman (1993, pp. 86-106), Ennis
(1996, p. 39), LeBlanc (1998, pp. 32-36), Fisher (2001, pp. 32-38), Bailin and Battersby
(2010, pp. 42-44), Govier (2010, pp. 37-39), Vaughn and MacDonald (2010, pp. 95-96),
and Groarke and Tindale (2013, 115-119). Many of these textbooks explain the distinction
in one short section, with exercises on applying it, but neither mention nor use the
distinction elsewherea sign that its inclusion has become a piece of scholasticism.
1

He claims (1986, p. 457) to have introduced it in the 1973 edition of his Practical Reasoning in Natural
Language, but I have been unable to find a copy of this textbook published before 1977, despite the claim
(Thomas, 1977, p. ii) of copyright in 1973, 1974 and 1975.

569

The distinction is intuitively clear. Where more than one premiss is offered in direct
support of a conclusion, the premisses sometimes work together to support it and are in
this sense linked, whereas at other times distinct subsets of them offer independently
relevant reasons that converge on the conclusion. A paradigm case of linked support
would be a deductively valid two-premiss argument where neither premiss by itself entails
the conclusion, such as the argument:
(1)

There is no life on Mars, because its atmosphere is in a stable equilibrium, which

would not be the case if there were life on that planet.

A paradigm case of convergent support would be an appeal to disparate considerations or

criteria in support of the attribution of some supervenient status to their common subject,
such as the following argument:
(2)

There should be no capital punishment. The death penalty violates human rights
codes that forbid cruel and unusual punishment, cannot be reversed or
compensated for if it is discovered that a person was innocent of the crime for
which they were executed, is no less effective as a deterrent than the likely
alternative of a long prison term, and is not needed to prevent a person convicted
of a capital crime from repeating that crime.

Despite this intuitive clarity, it has turned out to be difficult to spell out theoretically when
premisses are linked and when they converge. This difficulty has given rise to several
scholarly treatments of the distinction, among which Walton (1996) and Freeman (2011)
stand out for making it a major focus of their books on argument structure.
In this paper I wish to make one main point: that the distinction is primarily a
distinction among types of support, not among arguments, premisses, reasons or
structures. Only derivatively can we apply the distinction to arguments, premisses, reasons
and structures. This point seems to me to be obvious once one is made aware of it, but it
seems not to have been made in the literature. It implies that the search is futile for a
criterion of linkage in terms of the consequences for the strength of support of finding a
premiss questionable or false (e.g. no support upon falsification, diminished type of
support upon elimination, etc.). Nevertheless, I shall argue, the distinction is useful.
2. CONVERGENCE: NOT MULTIPLICITY OF ARGUMENTS
Initially we should be clear that the linked-convergent distinction is not a distinction
between a single multi-premiss argument and multiple independent arguments. There is
nothing particularly problematic about the concept of distinct arguments for a single
conclusion. We have clear examples of such piling on of arguments, as in Aristotles 21
arguments in his Metaphysics against Platos theory of forms (Aristotle, 1984 [4th century
BCE], 988a1-8 and 990a34-993a10), Thomas Aquinass five ways of proving the
existence of God (Aquinas, 1913 [1269], I, Q. 2, Art. 3), and the 367 different ways of
proving the Pythagorean theorem (http://www.wikihow.com/Prove-the-PythagoreanTheorem; accessed 2014 05 24). The appropriate response to such texts is to treat each

570

argument by itself: identifying, analyzing, interpreting and evaluating it as if no other

argument for the conclusion were in the offing.
There is however some controversy over how to combine the results of such
evaluations. Pollock (1995, pp. 101-102) doubts that there is accrual of independent
reasons, and assumes that the degree of justification for a conclusion supported by
separate undefeated arguments is simply the maximum of the strengths of those
arguments. He argues that cases adduced as evidence of accrual of independent reasons,
such as the greater reliability of testimony when given independently by two witnesses
than when given by just one of them, are in fact cases where the separate pieces of
information function as premisses of a single argument. Selinger (2014) on the other hand
takes a new argument to reduce the uncertainty left by any preceding arguments for the
same conclusion, provided that the premisses of the new argument are independent of the
premisses of its predecessors. On the basis of this intuition, he provides a formula for
calculating the degree of acceptability conferred on a conclusion by a set of such
independent arguments. The inputs to this formula are provided by a valuation function
which assigns to each premiss and each inference (but not to the conclusion) degrees of
acceptability ranging from 0 for complete unacceptability via for being neither
acceptable nor unacceptable to 1 for complete acceptability. Let v(ij) be the degree of
acceptability of a premiss ij of an argument j with conclusion , and w(|1j, ..., nj) be the
degree of conditional acceptability in this argument of its conclusion given total
acceptability of its premisses 1j, ..., nj. If the premisses of this argument are independent
and the product of their degrees of acceptability is greater than (meaning that the
conjunction of the premisses is more acceptable than not), then the degree of acceptability
vj() conferred on the conclusion by the argument is the product v(1j) ... v(nj)
w(j|1j, ..., nj). (This formula can be adjusted to accommodate cases where the premisses
of an argument are not independent of one another.) The degree of acceptability conferred
on by m such arguments (m > 1) with independent premisses is given by the formula
v1() ... vm(), where x y = 2x + 2y - 2xy - 1. Selingers formula appears to give
intuitively acceptable results. For example, according to the formula two independent
proofs that each confer separately a total acceptability of 1 on a theorem confer together
the same acceptability of 1, whereas two independent arguments that each confer an
acceptability of 3/4 on a claim together confer an acceptability of 7/8 and a new
independent argument that confers an acceptability on a claim only slightly greater than
raises the acceptability of this claim by a very small amount. Thus the conflict between
Pollocks rejection of accrual of independent reasons and Selingers acceptance of this sort
of accrual comes down to a conflict of intuitions. It is an open question whether there is
any compelling argument that would resolve the conflict.
There is also an interpretive difficulty in determining whether an additional
supporting reason introduced by a bridging term like besides or moreover or further is
a new argument or merely an independently relevant part of a single argument. This
difficulty is best resolved by applying a moderate principle of charity, according to which
an ambiguous text or discourse is to be disambiguated in the way that makes it more
plausible.
The difference between independently relevant reasons in a single argument and multiple
arguments for the same conclusion implies, as Freeman (2011, pp. 108-113) has pointed
out, that the pragma-dialectical distinction between coordinatively compound
571

argumentation and multiple argumentation is not the same as the linked-convergent

distinction. Multiple argumentation involves distinct speech act complexes, in each of
which one or more arguments are advanced in an attempt to justify a point of viewas it
happens, the same one in each case. Coordinatively compound argumentation involves a
single complex of speech acts in which more than one premiss is used in direct support of
a point of view. From the pragma-dialectical perspective, the linked-convergent distinction
is a distinction within the class of coordinatively compound argumentation. Snoeck
Henkemans (1992, pp. 96-99), for example, recognizes two types of coordinatively
compound argumentation, cumulative and complementary, which stand to each other
roughly (but not exactly) as convergent arguments stand to linked arguments.
Beardsley and Thomas may have contributed to confusion between multiple
arguments for a single conclusion and multiple independently relevant reasons in a single
argument. Indeed, they may themselves have conflated these two concepts. They diagram
convergent reasoning with a separate arrow from each independently relevant reason to
the conclusion, thus giving the visual impression that there are distinct inferences to be
evaluated but no need for a comprehensive assessment of how well the reasons taken
together support the conclusion. Further, Beardsley refers to convergent reasoning as
involving independent reasonsa phrase that could easily be read to cover independent
arguments as well as independently relevant reasons in a single argument. Further, since
Beardsley gives only two examples of convergent structures (one an argument from sign
[1950, p. 18] and the other an [intuitively linked] argument for an evaluation [p. 21]) and
makes nothing of the concept in his approach to evaluating arguments, it is hard to flesh
out his ambiguous definition of a convergent argument as one in which several
independent reasons support the same conclusion (p. 19). Beardsley in fact made less and
less use of the concept of convergence in subsequent editions of his textbook; in the
second (1956) edition it is merely mentioned at the beginning of a check-up quiz, and it is
missing from the third (1966) and fourth (1975) editions. It seems then that users of the
first edition did not find its concept of convergence particularly useful. For his part,
Thomas (1977, p. 39) conflates independently relevant reasons in a single argument with
distinct arguments sharing a conclusion by counting as convergent reasoning not only
independent reasons for some action but also separate alleged proofs of a single claim,
such as different arguments for the existence of God.2
3. THE PRIMARY SPHERE OF THE DISTINCTION
To get a sense of the primary field of application of the linked-convergent distinction, we
need to go beyond the intuitive distinction between premisses that work together and
premiss-sets that constitute independently relevant reasons. We need to look at how the
distinction is used, and in particular how the concept of convergent reasoning is applied.
For this purpose, our most extensive and therefore best sources are the treatment of
practical decision-making in the various editions of Thomass textbook (1977, 1981, 1986,

This example disappears from the fourth (1997) edition of his textbook. A third type of example, in which
a claim is supported both by evidence and by testimony, occurs only in the first two editions (1977, 1981) of
his textbook

572

1997) and the treatment of conductive reasoning in the various editions of Trudy Goviers
textbook (Govier, 1985, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010).
In the last edition of his textbook (Thomas, 1997), which presumably incorporates
his most developed thinking on the topic, Thomas devotes 57 pages (385-441) to practical
decision-making. He recommends a five-component approach to important personal
decision-making situations:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identify mutually exclusive options.

For each option, articulate whatever possible reasons pro and con one can think of.
Evaluate separately the acceptability and relevance of each such reason.
Consider reasons bearing on the acceptability or relevance of each reason (and
reasons bearing on the acceptability or relevance of those reasons, and so on).
Pick the option that is best supported by its undefeated pro reasons and least
opposed by its undefeated con reasons.

Diagramming these components is helpful, and perhaps even essential, for keeping track
of ones reasoning. In diagramming the reasoning concerning each option, Thomas uses
separate arrows for each reasonsolid if it is a pro reason, dashed if it is a con reason
(including a reason against the acceptability or relevance of another reason). He illustrates
his recommended procedure with reference to two decision-making situations, described
initially in the words of the decision-maker: a choice of living accommodation (pp. 395404) and a choice of whether to move cities in order to get a better job in ones company
(pp. 414-430).
We find a similar approach in Trudy Goviers treatment of what she calls
conductive arguments (Govier, 2010, p. 353), which she characterizes as arguments in
which premises are put forward as separately and non-conclusively relevant to support a
conclusion, against which negatively relevant considerations may also be acknowledged
(2011, p. 262) and whose structure she describes as always convergent (2010, p. 352).
Like Thomas, she proposes that one evaluate such arguments by considering for each
premiss separately not only whether it is rationally acceptable but also whether it is
relevant, positively or negatively, to the conclusion. After having done so, one should
judge the strength of support given by each positively relevant rationally acceptable reason
separately and by these reasons cumulatively, the strength of opposition given by each
negatively relevant rationally acceptable counter-consideration separately and by these
counter-considerations cumulatively, and the size of the difference between the cumulative
support and the cumulative opposition (Govier, 1999, p. 170; 2010, pp. 365-366). Govier
illustrates this complex procedure with reference to an invented argument for legalizing
voluntary euthanasia (Govier, 2010, pp. 360-363).
Thomas and Govier have developed more extensively than any other authors a
procedure for evaluating convergent reasoning and argument. Although their procedures
differ and are illustrated by application to different types of arguments, they have an
important commonality: separate judgment of the relevance to some conclusion of each of
a number of diverse considerations, criteria, or signs. The point of distinguishing
independently relevant, or putatively relevant, reasons pro and con in a convergent
structure is thus to isolate them for separate consideration. If a given reason turns out to be
unacceptable, questionable or irrelevant, it is still possible to estimate the strength of
573

support that the remaining acceptable and relevant reasons give to the conclusion. The
partitioning into distinct reasons is a necessary preliminary to this evaluative approach, but
would generally not be helpful for evaluating other types of arguments.
The appropriate criterion for convergence, then, is the independent relevance to a
conclusion of distinct sub-sets of an arguments premisses. Relevance in this sense is an
ontic property, that of counting in context for or against the conclusion drawn. It is not a
mental property of the person putting forward the argument, such as the arguers intention
or belief. Nor is it a property of the argumentative text, such as a claim or textual
indication that the supporting reasons are being put forward as independently relevant.
Convergence is thus primarily a feature of the way in which multiple coordinate premisses
of a piece of reasoning or argument in fact work to support the conclusion. They do so
convergently when and only when distinct sub-sets of the premisses adduce distinct
considerations or criteria or signs that are in fact relevant, positively or negatively, to the
conclusion drawn.
Although convergence is primarily a property of the support that multiple
coordinate premisses provide to a conclusion, one can apply the concept derivatively to
reasoning, arguments, premisses, reasons and argument structures. Reasoning and
argument are convergent when they have multiple coordinate premisses that can be
partitioned into distinct sub-sets that it is plausible to interpret as put forward as
independently relevant to the conclusion. In that case, the reasoning or argument can be
said to have a convergent structure. The reasons constituted by such distinct sub-sets
should then be treated as being put forward as convergent, i.e. as independently relevant to
the conclusion, even if on evaluation not all of them turn out to be both rationally
acceptable and relevant. If any such reason consists of a single premiss, then one can take
that premiss to be put forward as convergent; otherwise, the concept of convergence
should not be applied to the individual premisses.
Since convergence is primarily a way that a claim can be supported, there is
judgment involved in deciding to treat a piece of reasoning or argument by the procedure
appropriate to a convergent support structure. In cases where the reasons into which one
partitions multiple coordinate premisses are not all rationally acceptable and relevant, the
decision to partition may rest on syntactical considerations (e.g. a number of premisses
attributing various characteristics to a common subject to which the conclusion attributes
some further characteristic), semantic considerations (e.g. the status of the conclusion as a
policy decision and the corresponding status of the distinct premiss-sets as diverse
consequences or rules or deontic principles, or the status of the conclusion as a diagnosis
and the corresponding status of the distinct premiss-sets as diverse signs or symptoms),
textual considerations (e.g. the introduction of a subsequent premiss-set by the word
besides), and perhaps other sorts of considerations. Decisions to partition premisses
based on such considerations are not correct or incorrect, but only more or less reasonable.
Thus there may be no fact of the matter about whether a particular piece of reasoning or
argument with multiple coordinate premisses is convergent, since the case for partitioning
the premisses may be about as strong as the case against partitioning them. In this respect,
the situation is exactly like that of deciding whether a piece of reasoning or argument is
deductive, i.e. appropriately evaluated by the standard of deductive validity. The claim of
the present paper that convergence is primarily a way in which a claim can be supported

574

rather than primarily a type of argument is exactly parallel to my claim long ago that
deduction is primarily a type of validity rather than a type of argument (Hitchcock, 1979).
What about the concept of linkage? If we take linkage to be the complement of
convergence, we can define it as support by multiple coordinate premisses in some way
other than by distinct considerations or criteria or signs that are separately relevant,
positively or negatively, to the conclusion drawn. As with convergence, we can
derivatively define linked reasoning, arguments, premisses, and argument structures as
those that it is appropriate to treat for evaluative purposes as linked. Judgment will be
involved in making the decision about appropriateness.
This conception of linkage is purely negative. It implies nothing about the effect on
the strength of support of finding that a premiss of an argument with linked support is
questionable or unacceptable. And a fortiori it implies nothing about this effect in the case
of an argument or reasoning that one decides, appropriately or not, to treat as linked for
evaluative purposes. Thus, if we accept this conception of linkage, we should regard as
exercises in futility the many attempts in the literature to find a criterion for linkage in the
consequences of suspending a premiss or finding it false: diminished support upon
falsification (Thomas, 1977, p. 38), no support upon falsification (Copi, 1982, p. 21),
insufficient support upon elimination (Snoeck Henkemans, 1992), type reduction upon
elimination (Vorobej, 1994), and so forth. In any case, there is a useless spinning of
wheels in applying any such test if the point of classifying an argument as linked is to
facilitate evaluation, since one has to do the evaluation first in order to classify the
argument in a way that indicates how one is to do the evaluation. Better just to do the
evaluation and forget about the classification.
It might be doubted that suspension or falsification of a premiss in an argument
with linked support for the conclusion can have no effect at all on the strength of support
that it gives to that conclusion. A simple example of such an argument is one that has a
redundant premiss whose suspension or falsification does not affect the status of the other
premissesfor example, the argument:
(3)

If there were life on Mars, its atmosphere would be in an unstable equilibrium; the
atmosphere on Mars is not in an unstable equilibrium; Mars is an asteroid;
therefore, there is no life on Mars.

The third premiss is known to be false, but this fact does not affect the strength of support
given by the argument, which is in fact conclusive, given that the first and second
premisses are both known to be true.
How then should we evaluate an argument that we decide to treat as if its support
were linked? A straightforward way is to judge first the status of each premiss separately,
in terms for example of whether it is acceptable, questionable or unacceptable. Then
determine how strongly the premisses with their attributed statuses collectively support the
conclusion and whether in context that degree of support is enough. It is important in such
an exercise not to treat a premiss found to be questionable as if it had never been part of
the argument, since its questionable status might affect the strength of support differently
than its omission would have. Consider for example the following argument:

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(4)

Since everyone would agree on reflection that public knowledge that physicians
may deceive their patients about their medical status would have worse
consequences than public knowledge that physicians may not so deceive their
patients, then physicians should not engage in such deception, for violations of the
moral rule against deception are not justified under such conditions (cf. Gert,
2005).

If one finds the major premiss questionable, then one should take the argument to provide
at best weak support for the conclusion, whereas one might reasonably take a variant of
the argument without the major premiss to provide moderate support for the conclusion.
4. CONCLUSION
The linked-convergent distinction introduced by Stephen Thomas (1977) is not the same
as the distinction between a single argument for a claim and multiple arguments for a
claim. It is a distinction to be applied within the class of single arguments for a claim,
specifically to such arguments with more than one premiss. It is primarily a distinction
between ways in which two or more premisses in such an argument can directly support a
claim. Support is convergent if the premisses can be partitioned into independently
relevant reasons that each consist of rationally acceptable premisses. Support is linked if
the premisses cannot be partitioned into independently relevant reasons that each consist
of rationally acceptable premisses. One can classify arguments, reasoning, premisses, or
structures as linked or convergent only in a secondary or derivative sense, where what is
involved is a judgment call on what type of support the argument, reasoning or component
is attempting to provide. Hence, as with the deductive-inductive distinction, there may be
no fact of the matter as to whether a given multi-premiss argument is linked or convergent.
The value of the distinction lies in the consequences of treating an argument
component as having convergent structure. Such a decision introduces into the evaluation
of the premisses a consideration of the independent relevance of each premiss-set that is
partitioned as a reasona step that makes no sense if one is treating it as having linked
structure. We should not automatically assume, however, that we can refute an argument
component that we are treating as having linked structure by refuting just one of its
premisses. We need to check and see.

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Philosophy of Argument (pp. 155-180). Newport News, VA: Vale Press.
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Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. (1992). Analyzing complex argumentation: The reconstruction of multiple and
coordinatively compound argumentation in a critical discussion. Dissertation, University of
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Walton, D. (1996). Argument structure: A pragmatic theory. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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Changing The Practice Of Knowledge Creation Through

Collaborative Argument Mapping On The Internet
Michael H.G. Hoffmann
School of Public Policy, Philosophy Program
Georgia Institute of Technology
USA
m.hoffmann@gatech.edu

ABSTRACT: Based on a definition of knowledge as justified true belief, this paper develops a vision of
global, collaborative knowledge creation in a World of Arguments that is centrally stored on the Internet.
Knowledge claims and hypotheses would be formulated, justified, and debated on continuously growing and
improved argument maps. Additionally, the paper discusses a few problems of this vision.
KEYWORDS: AGORA-net, argument mapping, collaboration, computer-supported argument visualization
(CSAV), individuality, Internet, knowledge, logosymphesis, scientific practice, visualization.

1. INTRODUCTION
The definition of knowledge as justified true beliefwhich seems to be widely shared
in philosophy since Plato introduced it in his dialog Theaetetus (201d) requires that one
can know only what one is able to justify. What we cannot justify, we might believe, but
we do not know it. Only those statements can be claimed to be knowledge that can be
justified by reasons. For this reason we can say that the process of justifying claims and
hypotheses is at the core of knowledge creation. Providing reasons is the essence of
scientific activity.
Based on this consideration, I will develop in this contribution a vision of how the
practice of knowledge creation can be substantially changed by using collaborative
argument visualization software that allows synchronous and asynchronous collaboration
on graphically represented argument maps on the Internet. Starting from a description of
traditional knowledge production as a four-step process of research, publication, debate,
and new research, I will show in the first part that computer-supported collaborative
argument visualizationCSCAV, as I call itcan change the practice of knowledge
creation in a variety of ways, most importantly by putting collaboration in the centre of
scientific activity, so much even, that the contribution of individual scientists and scholars
might disappear behind the communal effort.
In the second part, I will discuss some problems of such a shift to CSCAV-based
knowledge production: How can large-scale argument mapping be integrated with the
rhetorical demands of communicating knowledge? What happens if the very idea of
publication becomes obsolete because in collaborative argument mapping there is no
point in time when the process of reasoning, deliberating, communicating, and fighting
about a position comes to a stop? Will the concept of authorship lose its significance
when the focus of knowledge production is on representations of knowledge that grow
without limits in space and time in form of growing argument maps? And then there are

578

more technical questions such as: How can it be possible to revise the overall structure of
huge argument maps and their main conclusion, especially if there are conflicts on how to
frame a knowledge area? How to keep the right balance in collaborative systems between
openness and security when it comes, for example, to dealing with trolls and other
destructive behaviour?
2. FROM PUBLISHING TO LOGOSYMPHESIS
We are all familiar with what can be described roughly as a four-step process of research,
publication, debate, and new research. First, we do research and develop arguments in
texts. Then we publish these texts in the form of journal articles, chapters, books, or
conference presentations. In a third step, we debate publicationsours and those of
othersand, finally completing the circle, we engage in new research. This recursive
process is characterized by a clear separation between individual and social activities.
Papers and books are written by individuals or, usually, small groups of authors, while
social exchange happens in peer review, at conferences, in seminars, and in person-toperson communication.
Given the tremendous changes that newly developed software tools and the
Internet brought to almost all areas of life over the past decades, an important question for
the future of science is what the possibilities of the Internet will, could, and should mean
for the creation of knowledge. There is alreadyparticularly in computer science and
fields close to ita large amount of literature that discusses this question. For example, in
Knowledge Cartography, Alexandra Okada, Simon Buckingham Shum, and Tony
Sherborne asked contributors to describe visualization tools they developed, ranging from
mind mapping and concept mapping to argument, evidence, issue, web, and thinking
mapping (Okada et al., 2008). Katy Brner provided an even broader picture in her Atlas
of Science: Visualizing What We Know (Brner, 2010). In addition to an impressive
collection of visualizations that focus, in particular, on information and data, Brner
locates her work on science maps in a history of visionary approaches to knowledge
collection, encyclopaedias, knowledge dissemination, knowledge classification,
knowledge interlinkage, knowledge visualization, man-machine symbiosis, and the
global brain (pp. 14-25).
Compared to this broad range of activities, the following considerations focus on a
very small and specific area. Based on the philosophical definition of knowledge as
justified true belief, I limit the term knowledge creation here exclusively to the
following four, connected activities:
1.
2.
3.
4.

formulating knowledge claims and hypotheses;

providing reasons and evidence for them;
debating claims and their justifications; and
continuously improving these claims and justifications.

With this very narrow focus in mind, we can point at three types of examples in which the
Internet played already a major role for the creation of knowledge. First, there is webbased debate about published work. For example, there was in the beginning of this year a
lively online debate about a pair of articles published by Harukos Obokata and her team in

579

Nature that describe a new method to create pluri-potent cells out of ordinary non-stem
cells (Economist, 2014a). Since research with stem cells requires the use of aborted
foetuses, there is a great deal of interest in methods that allow the same kind of research
with cells taken from adults. So, the astonishing results led quickly to attempts to replicate
them, but without success. This failure was reported immediately online, which again led
to extensive discussions on blogs and websites about irregularities in diagrams and
pictures of the two articles. On July 2nd, only five months after publication, Nature
formally retracted the two papers (Economist, 2014b).
A second type of example for the role of the Internet for knowledge creation is a
process called open peer review. Fritz and Gloning (2012) define it as a process in
which anyone can appoint herself a peer and criticize work that has entered the public
domain. In open peer review, the secrecy of traditional peer review and the
unaccountability of reviewers is overcome, but the process is obviously less controllable.
A third type are blog discussions on articles submitted to open peer review. This
refers to a mixture of the two first types of examples (Fritz and Gloning, 2012). As Fritz
and Gloning discuss, these three types of activities that contribute to knowledge creation
of the web have the potential to change important aspects of scientific communication:

They substantially enlarge the reach of scientific information, but they may also
attract unqualified and disruptive participants (pp. 229-230).
They increase the speed of publication, but it is also noteworthy that rash
replies increase the risk of injury (p. 229).
They increase the amount of interactivity between scholars.
They provide transparency for the general public about important scientific
controversies.

It should be noted, however, that these three types of contributions to web-based

knowledge creation still remain within the boundaries of the traditional four-step-process
of research, publication, debate, and new research. Web-based debate about published
work is still a form of debate, only faster and with a wider reach. Open peer review of
journal submissions still remains within the idea of traditional publishing, and blog
discussions that might branch off of reviews on articles submitted to open peer review
simply combine debate and publication.
The question, thus, is: Does the Internet provide possibilities that substantially
change the usual four-step-process? Based on the crucial role that justifications play for
the creation of knowledge, I can imagine a world in which central areas of knowledge
productionformulating claims and hypothesis, providing reasons and evidence for them,
debating claims and their justifications, and continuously improving claims and
justificationsare done online in the form of collaboration on centrally stored argument
maps.
An argument map is, as Tim van Gelderone of the pioneers of argument
mappingwrites in an encyclopaedia entry on the topic, a box and arrow diagram
with boxes corresponding to propositions and arrows corresponding to relationships such
as evidential support (van Gelder, 2013). Such a graphical representation of arguments
has the advantage, compared to representing arguments either in texts or in numbered lists
of propositions, that the structure of more complex argumentationsin which, for
580

example, reasons might be justified by further arguments, and so onis more easily to
comprehend. Working step by step from one area of a two-dimensional map to the next
should reduce the cognitive load that is required, in each moment, to analyse and
understand arguments (Hoffmann, 2013).
The vision that I have in mind includes the following. There might be one place on
the web where a World of Arguments can be found. This world might be accessible
through a variety of portals (for example for different languages or different groups of
people such as professionals on one hand and different educational levels on the other, or
lawyers v. journalists or companies, etc.). Arguments might either be organized in fixed
knowledge fields, be it disciplines, sub-disciplines, and subject areas, or problem areas in
which multiple disciplines collaborate, or they might be organized dynamically, dependent
on user interests and abilities to manage the system. The lowest level of any organization
consists of claims and theses. Everybody, from all over the globe, can click on such a
claim and an argument map opens that provides a justification for this claim in form of an
argument map. The argument map is the place where collaboration happens. Users can add
arguments to existing assumptions that might be questionable, they can add objections to
specific assumptions and justify them by arguments, and they might be able to add
comments, definitions, questions, references, friendly amendments to improve existing
formulations, and links to both other arguments and to other resources on the web, if
reasons are justified by experimental data and so on. Of course, everybody can also create
new arguments either for other claims, opposing claims, or only slightly different claims.
Additionally, it should be possible to copy existing maps to modify them and to copy
strings of justifications from one map into another. Collaboration on arguments should be
both synchronousmeaning that users can change things at the same timeand
asynchronous so that things can be changed and added at any time.
There are already CSCAV tools available online that provide most or some of the
functionality that is required to realize this vision, even though in very different ways (see
Table 1). Since I developed myself AGORA-net, and since the AGORA software realizes
already most of the functionality listed above, I will use it in the following as an example
for my vision of collaborative knowledge creation.
Table 1: Some currently available CSCAV tools, alphabetically ordered. Only tools are listed that are
both collaborative and allow two-dimensional representations. These tools are designed for very
different purposes, from education to public deliberation, corporate decision making, and legal
argumentation. * indicates commercial products.

AGORA-net
bCisive online*
Belvedere
Carneades
Cohere
Debategraph
DREW
Evidence-Hub.net
LASAD
LivingVote

http://agora.gatech.edu/
https://www.bcisiveonline.com/
http://belvedere.sourceforge.net/
http://carneades.github.io/
http://cohere.open.ac.uk/
http://debategraph.org/
http://scale.emse.fr/pws/student/
http://evidence-hub.net/
http://cses.informatik.hu-berlin.de/research/details/lasad/
http://www.LivingVote.org/

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Metafora
Rationale Online*
SEAS*
STELLA*
TruthMapping

http://www.metafora-project.org/
https://www.rationaleonline.com/
http://www.ai.sri.com/~seas/
http://iseesystems.com/softwares/Education/StellaSoftware.aspx
http://www.truthmapping.com/about.php

Computer-supported collaborative argument visualization (CSCAV) that allows the

graphical presentation of arguments and collaboration on argument maps on the Internet
has the potential to fundamentally change the practice of creating knowledge in a variety
of ways.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

By focusing exclusively on the structure of arguments and argumentations (that is:

on inferential relations), CSCAV minimizes distractions and the marginalization of
certain perspectives that might occur when discussions can be dominated by nonargumentative means such as rhetorical tricks or simply repeating the same ideas
time and again, as it often happens in blogs.
By allowing and fostering collaboration through the entire process of knowledge
production on a large scale, individual and social aspects of knowledge production
are more closely intertwined in CSCAV as it is traditionally the case.
A centrally located World of Arguments would provide one place where all
knowledge of the world could be found and everything is accessible for everyone
in one large structure of world knowledge; one place where all disagreements are
debated, and all possible perspectives on things have a place to be developed,
justified, and criticized. The latter means that every claim can be framed by
whatever conceptual, theoretical, or ideological means a user brings to a knowledge area. One central location does not mean that there would be centralized
control. As any representational system, such a World of Arguments would have
representational constraints (one can only represent those entities that are provided
by the software), but the content that users create should not be controlled by
anyone; diversity needs to be guaranteed to secure innovation and development.
By creating all knowledge within an already existing structure, there is no need
as we do it currently in publicationsto contextualize our contribution by
describing a problem and providing a review of the literature. The accepted
knowledge from which we startthe shoulders on which we standis already
given in arguments that are already in the system. As knowledge creators, we work
at different construction zones of argument maps, or we create new ones.
And we are always working with others. We add to, or criticize, the arguments of
others and others add to, and criticize, our arguments. At the core of such a World
of Arguments is collaboration, be it realized in the form of mutual support or
adversarial criticism.

The fact that collaboration is so deeply ingrained in what I envision as computer-supported

collaborative argument visualization in a World of Arguments will lead, I assume, to a
fundamental shift in how we perceive our individuality as scientists and scholars in
contrast to the knowledge we produce. Currently, our individuality is documented in the
things we publish: journal articles, books, book chapters, blogs, and so on. However,
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shifting all this to what could be perceived as mere contributions to an already existing
World of Arguments could imply for many the experience that their individuality will take
a back seat in favour of the growing World of Arguments itself. In an article in which I
discussed some of these ideas for the first time, I coined the term logosymphesis to
describe what is going on (Hoffmann, 2013; more precisely, I called it synergetic
logosymphesis). Symphyestai is Greek and means growing together into a unity.
Logo-symphysis is intended to refer to the growth of argumentative structures. More
precisely, I define logosymphysis as a process in which an argumentative structure
(composed of arguments, counterarguments, counter-counterarguments, and so on) grows
continuously in a collaborative effort. In CSCAV this argumentative structure is an
argument map that is stored online.
Logosymphesis in an Internet-based World of Arguments realizes an idea that
Charles S. Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism and semiotics, envisioned about a
hundred years ago when he wrote about the growth of reasonableness and the
development of Reason. For Peirce, individual acts of reasoning are, at the same time,
governed by the development of Reason (because all reasoning uses signs and
representations that are socially shared and develop over time) and they constitute this
process. Peirce conceives this very development of Reason as the creation of the
universe, a process that is still going on today and never will be done. Individuals like
us are just giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the
slang is, it is up to us to do so (Peirce, EP II 255; and Peirce, CP 1.615, 1903).
3. PROBLEMS
In order to get a clearer picture of what I suggest here as collaborative argument mapping
on the Internet, CSCAV, or logosymphesis in a World of Arguments, it should be beneficial to discuss some of the problems that come immediately to mind. I would like to start
this discussion with a few argument maps or, more precisely, with some excerpts from
those maps since the size of infinitively growing argument maps excludes them,
obviously, from traditional modes of publication. These maps are produced in AGORAnet. They are accessible online at http://agora.gatech.edu/release/English.html. To just to
see them in their entirety, Enter as Guest, but if you like to engage in collaborative
argument mapping, you have to register. The easiest way to find these maps in a database
of currently almost 10,000 argument maps (most of them are not publicly accessible,
though) is to search for their map ID.
The first argument map (#9771) justifies the thesis collaborative argument
mapping (logosymphysis) is better than individual argument mapping. Figure 1 shows
the entire map. You will not be able to read anything, but this picture shows the overall
structure. The blue parts represent the original argument whereas the orange parts
represent an objection to a specific assumption of the original argument, together with its
justification (also in orange). As you will see also in Figure 2, the main conclusion of this
argument is located in the top-left corner of a two-dimensional space that can expand
infinitively (as far as I can tell) to the right and downwards. This conclusion is defended
by three independent arguments that are located from top downwards on the left side.
(Since AGORA-net creates only logically valid arguments, every argument has always
three types of components: one conclusion, one enabler, that is the premise located

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underneath the therefore in Figure 2, and an arbitrary number of reasons.) The reason of
the first argument in the top-left corner is defended by two further independent arguments,
and so on.
Figure 2 shows the first main argument, the one that is located in the top-left
corner of Figure 1. This argument is provided here only to illustrate the structure of one
complete argument. More import for the purpose of this discussion is Figure 3. Based on
the limits of reproduction, the conclusion of this argument is cut off. But as you can see in
Figure 1, the line of the left side of Figure 3 is going up to the main conclusion as it is
represented in Figure 2.
I want to show two different things with this example. On the one hand, I would
like to focus on the content of this argumentation and the controversial question what role
assigning individual merit plays for the growth of knowledge. The objection of
GeorgePBurdell (in this case a fictional character) should be perfectly reasonable. This
means that the relation between individuality and logosymphysis that I discussed at the
end of the previous section is a real problem for creating knowledge through collaborative
argument mapping.

Figure 1: An argumentation for the thesis collaborative argument mapping (logosymphysis) is better than
individual argument mapping. Zoomed-out to visualize the structure. The entire map can be found in
AGORA-net, map ID 9771. Some details are shown in the following figures.

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Figure 2: The first main argument of map 9771. The arrow on the far right of the picture shows that this
reason is justified by further arguments. The line leading downwards ends finally in the line that is depicted
in the following figure.

Figure 3: In blue the third main argument. The text in the orange box at the bottom is an objection against
the enabler of this argument. This objection is justified (not visible here) by two arguments that show that a
large number of scientists and scholars will probably not contribute to the growth of knowledge if individual
contributions are not recognized by the scientific community. One of these arguments refers to an empirical
study: Bader et al., 2012.

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On the other hand, I would like to use this example to illustrate how the process of
collaborative knowledge creation through argument visualization could go from here.
Since I, as the author of the original argument, accept the objection provided by Burdell, I
would like to reformulate my argument. Since it is impossible, in AGORA-net, simply to
delete or change what other users wrote (it shouldnt be too easy to get rid of strong
criticism),1 I have to copy the entire argumentation. This way I gain ownership of all
components of the map, including the ones provided by Burdell, and I can change
whatever I want. To make clear, though, that I am using material provided by other people
in a copy, every text box that is taken from the original map includes behind the author
name a small, red button PA, meaning previous author. If I move the mouse over it,
the name of the original author pops up. At the same time, every viewer of the new map
can click on history on the right panel that is visible on each argument map to get access
to the original map.
Now, going back to the content of this argumentation, I would think that the
original argument should be improved by changing the overall conclusion, and by
justifying this change by adding a reason that is directly taken from Burdells objection.
What I have in mind as a better argument is depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4: AGORA map 9773, created from a copy of map 9771 which is depicted in the previous figures.

At least on published maps. In projects (accessible only for those users that the creator of the project
added as members) it is possible to switch between an adversarial und collaborative mode. In the
latter, every member can change everything.
1

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The main change of the conclusion is that it is now formulated as a conditional statement.
The addition of the condition is justified by the third reason on the right, which goes back
directly to Burdells objection.
It should be noted that the decision, in designing AGORA-net, to show the user name of
the person who creates a text box within this text box, was motivated by the kind of
considerations that are discussed in these maps. In collaborative argument mapping it
should be clear who contributed what. However, it still remains a serious question whether
this is enough to cope with the concern that scholars and scientists would engage in
collaborative argument mapping as a new form of knowledge production only if their
engagement is honoured by their respective scientific community, for example when it
comes to promotion and tenure.
Another problem of collaborative argument mapping that becomes visible in this
example relates to the more technicalor proceduralquestion of how to deal with
revisions of argumentations that affect their overall structure. Every author of a text box
can change the formulation of its text at any time, so I could have inserted the main
conclusion of Figure 4 also in the main conclusion of Figure 2. But often such a change
requires changes also in the formulations of the reasons and/or their overall structure. As
in Figure 4, I can always add reasons to an existing argument, but I could not delete my
own reason that is depicted in Figure 3 since an objection by somebody else is attached to
it (again, that would make it too easy to get rid of critique). As I said, the only thing I can
do is to copy the map and change everything as I need it.
The problem is that this could leadin collaborations with large numbers of
usersto an enormous variety of maps on the same topic. That would not only be very
confusing, but it would also cost a lot of effort and time for everybody to study the
differences, and then to decide where to contribute. It would be better if collaborators
could deliberate what to do, on which maps they should focus, and which ones should be
deleted. AGORA-net provides a rudimentary infrastructure for such deliberation. (A chat
function and the possibility to add to each text box friendly amendments and comments,
and the possibility to add further comments and other things to existing comments and
other things. If the small triangle at the bottom of a text box is yellow instead of white,
as visible in Figures 2-4, that indicates that there are those additions that can be seen when
one clicks on this triangle.) But this deliberation infrastructure in itself will not be
sufficient to cope with the complexity of such deliberations.
Further problems that should be discussed refer to rhetorical necessities to
communicate knowledge; the idea of publishing that goes through the window if there is
simply no point in time when a growing argument map can be declared completed; and
the question of how to balance the openness of online collaboration with security issues.
With regard to the first point, the question of how to deal with rhetorical demands
of communicating knowledge, it is hard to say how serious that is. It is clear that in the
process of creating knowledge in the form of large-scale argument maps, scientists would
focus exclusively on the inferential structure of knowledge and evidential relations. But if
this is indeed the core of scientific knowledge, then there should be no harm in delegating
everything else to modes of communication that exist outside a World of Arguments. In
educational settings, a teacher or instructor will still use all sorts of rhetorical means, such
as storytelling, problem descriptions, and contextualization, that are helpful to introduce

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the novice to knowledge and the process of knowledge production. And anybody else is
free to do the same.
Questionable, I think is also whether there is much harm in giving up traditional
publications. Journal articles, books, blogs, and material provided on web-pages do not
have a value in themselves. Historically, they were developed to facilitate scientific
exchange and debate. Today, they are additionally important to assess the value and
impact of individual scientists. But if all these functions can be achieved by other
meansand at least for the representation, creation, debate, and ongoing improvement of
knowledge that seems to be the casethen the question should be: what is the best way to
do things? At this point, we should note that traditional publications have many
disadvantages: they are always isolated entities that are connected to their respective
contexts only by means of references; they do not allow any collaboration with people
outside of the group of authors; and they might insinuate an idea of completeness that is
not appropriatewhatever appears to be perfectly justified in a publication can be
criticized from alternative or opposing points of view. In a growing argument map, by
contrast, everything can be accepted as justified as long as there is at least one independent
argument whose premises are not defeated or questioned.
More serious, I think, is only the question of how to find the right balance in
collaborative systems between openness and security when it comes, for example, to
dealing with trolls and other destructive behaviour. Bad arguments can be criticized or
ignoredfor example by allowing voting on the quality of argumentationsbut
destructive or disruptive behaviour as it has been observed in many areas of online
activities, from gaming to blog discussions, can be so annoying that the entire project of
collaborative knowledge production on the Internet could be endangered. From a technical
point of view, it would not be a problem to erase all contributions of a certain user from a
database, but the question is who decides on such a drastic step based on which criteria.
Any serious knowledge infrastructure will need a governance structure that would develop
policies and mechanisms for decision making and for enforcement. However, since
everybody whose user account has been eliminated this way can create a new account at
any time, it might be necessary to develop knowledge systems so that personal identities
can be checked. This, however, raises again serious privacy and data security issues.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper I showed that collaborative argument mapping on the Internet can substantially change the practice of knowledge creation, and I discussed some of the problems
that would arise from such a change. Like everything else that happens on the web,
logosymphesisa process in which argumentative structures grow continuously in a
collaborative effortcan overcome limits of space, time, and access, and would, thus,
contribute to the empowerment of users from all over the world. More importantly for
scientific purposes, it can enormously increase the level of collaboration so that individual
and social aspects of knowledge production are more closely intertwined than in
traditional scientific activity. Moreover, everything we know in a specific area could be
found at one place. If all knowledge would be formulated, justified, debated, and improved
in one World of Arguments, there would be no need for a literature search, everything
would already be there.

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While the potential of computer-supported collaborative argument visualization (CSCAV)

for knowledge creation should be clear, the problems of such a changea decrease of the
importance of individual contributors in favour of the growing knowledge structure in
itself; a decreasing role of traditional publications; and problems of governing online
interaction among othersseem to require, on the one hand, the further development of
available CSCAV tools and, on the other, certain changes in well-established institutional
structures, for example with regard to the assessment of scientists and their impact. But
even if it turns out that my vision of changing the practice of knowledge creation through
collaborative argument mapping on the Internet goes too far, available tools can still be
useful for things like the organization of large-scale meta-reviews that summarize research
in the form of growing argument maps.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research and the development of the AGORA software has been supported by a grant
from the U.S. Department of Education (FIPSE Grant P116S100006). I thank the audience
at ISSA 2014 for helpful feedback and suggestions.

REFERENCES
Bader, A., Fritz, G., & Gloning, T. (2012). Digitale Wissenschaftskommunikation 2010-2011. Eine OnlineBefragung. Unter Mitarbeit von Jurgita Baranauskaite, Kerstin Engel und Sarah Rgl. Gieen:
Gieener Elektronische Bibliothek.
Brner, K. (2010). Atlas of science: visualizing what we know. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Economist (2014a). Peer review: Acid test. Doubts over ground-breaking stem-cell research are just what the
field needs. Economist, March 22nd.
Economist (2014b). Regenerative medicine: Bad science. Economist, July 10th.
Fritz, G., & Gloning, T. (2012). Critique and controversy in digital scientific communication. New formats
and their affordances. In F. H. v. Eemeren, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Exploring Argumentative Contexts
(pp. 213232). Amsterdam ; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pub. Co.
Hoffmann, M. H. G. (2013). Changing philosophy through technology: complexity and computer-supported
collaborative argument mapping. Philosophy & Technology (pre-print version available at
http://works.bepress.com/michael_hoffmann/41/), online first. doi:10.1007/s13347-013-0143-6
Okada, A., Buckingham Shum, S., & Sherborne, T. (Eds.). (2008). Knowledge cartography. London:
Springer.
Peirce (CP). Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Volumes I-VI, ed. by Charles Hartshorne and Paul
Weiss, 19311935, Volumes VII-VIII, ed. by Arthur W. Burks, 1958; quotations according to
volume and paragraph). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP.
Peirce (EP). The essential Peirce. Selected philosophical writings. Vol. 1 (18671893), Vol. 2 (18931913)
(ed. by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, Peirce Edition Project). Bloomington and
Indianapolis 1992 +1998: Indiana University Press.
van Gelder, T. (2013). Argument Mapping. In H. Pashler (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind (Vol. I, pp. 5153). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

589

A General Rule For Analogy

Robert Hmmer
Department of German Linguistics
Otto-Friedrich-University Bamberg
Germany
robert.huemmer@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: The following contribution attempts to introduce a number of candidate descriptions that can
render an argument from analogy deductive. The starting point is the muchdiscussed notion that one of the
arguments premises could comprise a general rule which helps guarantee the conclusions necessity.
Taking Wohlrapps (2008) pragmatic approach to the issue, the general rule in analogy can be described in
terms of its contribution to satisfy individuals need of orientation.
KEYWORDS: argument from analogy; argument structure; deductive analogy; general rule; orientation;
pragmatism; Wohlrapp

1. THE RULE ISSUE WITH ARGUMENTS FROM ANALOGY

Imagine, Anna is a student who comes to see her professor during office hours saying
(1)

I need an extension on my paper

and

(2)

My classmate got an extension, too .

Evidently, what Anna is using here is an argument from analogy: it crucially relies on
relevant similarity of two cases and it obviously comprises the characteristic general
structure known at least since Aristotle (2003, 1131f):
A:B=C:D
A and B are properties of case I (Annas classmates case) and C and D are properties of
case II (Annas case). Anna lets us know that her classmate (A) got an extension (B) and
that Anna herself (C) should get an extension (D). But how does this work?
Often it is hard to prove what can be taken to belong to analogical argumentation
in terms of form. Arguments from analogy are known for their pervasive logical
structure. Parameters for assigning a certain category generally involve what element (A,
B, C, D) or which relation of elements (similarity, causality, probability, necessity, etc.)
is being backed up, which of these are used for the backing up and in which way. For
figurative analogy, for example, elements and relations might even be invented and
represented so as to fit logical and semantic conditions in order to make a point. In
finding out how analogy works in a specific case, textbooks and research on informal

590

logic also recommend the application of critical questions (cf. amongst others Walton,
2006; Tindale, 2007; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992).
Here is an example: According to Walton, Reed & Macagno (in the following
Walton et al., 2008), Annas professor might ask, whether case I and II are relevantly
similar and in which respect. Such questions about relevant similarity are commonly held
to be the most important critical questions of the arguments scheme. Anna might answer
yes, and when asked for a backup, she might say something like: Well, my classmate
really needed the extension. And I really really need it, too. Now if the professor wanted
to know explicitly, whether there is a rule at work here, the professor could ask Anna
something like this: So, if somebody really needs an extension, then this person should
get it? Is that what you are saying? Anna might then go on and specify the case of her
classmate, saying that her classmate was not personally liable for the delay in case I and
that Anna herself also got held up on the way of meeting her deadline due to some
incident she was not responsible for. The professor then, taking the next turn, might ask:
So if somebody really needs the extension and was not personally responsible for the
delay, then the person should get the extension? Is that then what you are saying? And
again, Anna might go on specifying further characteristics and the professor might go on
committing her to a rule and so on.
The problem here is not so much a problem of logic: If such a rule is applied
correctly conforming to the formal standards of deduction, the argument is valid. The
problem lies in the question whether the rule is justified as something we are allowed to
even expect from analogical reasoning: May analogies be pinned down to have that rule?
Analogical arguments are generally either called inductive or figurative (Govier,
1987; 1989; see also Garssen & Kienpointner, 2011 for a current view). But analogy can
also be deductive if the truth of its conclusion follows necessarily from true premises.
The central question of my contribution asks from a pragmatic perspective whether and
under which conditions analogies can be held to comprise a rule-like major premise that
might help guarantee such necessity.
Within a kind of negotiation on whether there is a rule and what it might contain
(e.g. one similar to the adjustment Weinreb, 2005, p. 31 suggests), the professor seems to
commit Anna to a formal standard also implicating that there should be a rule of a certain
content and that it should be followed.
Annas point, on the other hand, seems to rely entirely on the classmates case and
on its similarity to her own. In this respect, her reasoning appears to be so different from
the professors that it becomes hard to believe, they are both using and negotiating the
same argument scheme: Like any analogy, Annas argument appears to her as the
plausible way to go presumably because she lacks a better one. She simply needs the
extension. The only thing she has got is some analog case of a classmate of which she
might not even be sure whether it is an appropriate role model for her own.
Because analogies lack explicit formal requirements inherent to inductive and
deductive schemes and precisely for the reason analogies lack the explicit rule, they are
called fallacies on formal and deductive accounts, like e.g. Lumers (2000; 2011). For the
same reasons they are weak and defeasible arguments in informal accounts, like Waltons
et al. (2008). And taken in one account with striking common traits analogies share with
argumentative forms of classification, precedence, comparison, appeal to authority and
others, the absence of the rule also allows analogies to appear in a hard to define category

591

of arguments reasoning by similarity (cf. amongst others van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
1992; Hoppmann, 2009).
Because having the rule is clearly a sign of formal quality, it might righteously be
expected during a conversation and even analogy can turn out to have it during a testing
procedure in a dialog. On the other hand, not having the rule can also be part of the
conventional meaning of putting forward an argument from analogy: Who ever argues
from analogy then seems to state implicitly I dont know any better or even: I dont
need to know any better.
Therefore, we come to a first intermediate conclusion: When analyzing analogy,
logical structure does not alone suffice in finding out what Anna is doing here. We need
to get to know more about what standards and conventions of language use are involved
and applied and to what end this is the case as Anna brings forth her argument from
analogy.
2. THE GOAL OF ARGUMENTATION AND ITS ROLE IN RECONSTRUCTION
At least since the 1950s purely formal argument analysis has been flanked by argument
analysis including context (at least the works of Toulmin, 2003 (1958) and Perelman &
Olbrecht-Tyteca 1971, (1958) are to be mentioned). And at least since the 1980s the
notion of argumentation as speech acting has both become prominent and proven useful
for analyzing and describing language used for argumentation. Context and function of
argumentative talk have been taken to play a key role in reconstructing the form and
content of (parts of) arguments. Looking at what is presumably the most influential
theory of argumentation today, it appears, that bringing forth an argument entails
speaking with a purpose: In Pragma-Dialectics (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984;
2003) resolving a difference of opinion is the one master-goal of a critical discussion.
Like Searle (1969; 1985) and Grice (1957; 1967), both of whose insights van Eemeren &
Grootendorst use in their framework, Pragma-Dialectics also aims to make explicit what
remains implicit when an utterance is made. Grice and Searle start with the propositional
content of an utterance, and ultimately relate it to the speakers intention: Intentional
States of the mind set up conditions for a Speech Act to carry meaning. But although
Pragma-Dialectics draw from Grice and Searle, their suggested reconstruction apparatus
identifies implicit premises slightly differently: Reconstruction does begin with the
propositional content of an utterance, too. Then the reconstruction process works along
the normative criteria of Pragma-Dialectics. But every step in the process and the result
of the reconstruction as a whole is ultimately warranted by the normative goal of any
argument within Pragma-Dialectics: The resolution of a difference of opinion.
So talking about argumentation as speech action, at least two conditions apply
both for the evaluation of arguments and for the reconstruction of arguments uttered in
context. These conditions are also rooted in Searles and Grices accounts of meaning. In
matters of argumentative speech they can be found within the Amsterdam approach and
others: First, there must be a starting point for the reconstruction based on the actual
utterance made. Second, we have to relate this raw material of explicit language used to
the goal of the utterance made. As the goal is set, the utterances conditions of success are
set.

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Despite the striking similarities between Argumentation Theory and Speech Act Theory,1
the reconstruction of implicit premises has proven tricky when specific goals are set and
assumed by the analyst and so applied within the reconstruction process. Criticism
includes this might not do justice to the actual goals people follow when communicating
and even influence the outcome of the reconstruction process: People tend to spell out
reasoning for various purposes which does not necessarily include asserting something or
even convincing somebody, explaining, arguing, etc. (Jacobs, 1989, p. 352).
Now I would like to briefly demonstrate that Wohlrapps account of argument can
fulfill both necessary conditions for reconstruction and that his approach might be a
suitable candidate framework for reconstructing implicit parts of argumentation, too. In
addition to that, this might allow us a fresh perspective on the rule issue from analogy.
3. ARGUMENTEVALUATION IN TERMS OF ORIENTATION
According to Wohlrapp (2008, p. 86), it is orientation that we seek when doing science,
when spelling out reasoning or arguing in any professional or everyday context
(Wohlrapp draws from and reformulates what had been started as the pragmatist
endeavor around the beginning of the 20th century). And orientation is needed wherever
our practice fails or where it can reasonably be expected to fail. We then identify the
problem as well as we can; such a problem might involve finding the way to the station in
an unfamiliar city or an inconsistency within our set of beliefs; it might involve
assembling a Swedish shoe rack, getting an extension on a seminar paper from a
professor, or, if we are the professor, finding out whether an extension is justified. Such a
lack of orientation, according to Wohlrapp (2008, p. 123), yields the forming of a theory:
a theory of how a problem might be solved satisfactorily, of what might satisfy the need
of orientation. A theory will be relevant and therefore count as provisionally true in as
much as it succeeds in practice.
How to form such a theory? Sticking with the examples just mentioned, such a
theory might just contain how to exactly hold the screwdriver when assembling the rack.
The content of the theory need not only be suitable for the goal of action. We also make
use of what we know, to a great deal, from experience. We use knowledge of what has
already worked in the past: How did I get the extension last time? What worked out
fine for me and for others in similar cases? Was the extension given to me right away or
did I have to go into details argumentatively?; Why?; Why not?: In this way, we do
not only form a theory of what might work now but also why it might work now.
How to evaluate the theories? The theory is put into practice and is then judged by
its degree of success. This includes that the actual outcomes of practice are weighed
against the expected outcomes of it. Whether an irregular verb in Italian is used correctly,
we can tell by being understood, or almost correctly understood, or not understood at all,
etc. Good arguments are theories, which succeed when put into practice. At best, they
suffice in guiding our present and future practice. When our need of orientation contains
a rule for deduction and all we get is a vague reference to a remotely similar case, we are

Cf. Budzynska & Reed (2011). More recently, bridges between the theories of argumentation and speech
action have been the focus of intensive work again, see Budzynska, van Eemeren & Koszowy; Snoek
Henkemans; Goodwin (all in wiczkowska & Trzsicki (ed.), 2014).

593

unsatisfied. If, on the other hand, we are in a hurry and all we need is a rough clue, a
vaguely put analogy might be just fine.
Speaking of our two necessary conditions for reconstruction mentioned earlier,
Wohlrapp might not need the notions of propositional content and conventional
meaning. In finding out, whether an utterance meets the need of orientation, people
would make use of successful experience with similar stretches of speech in similar
contexts. Therefore, both necessary conditions are fulfilled within Wohlrapps
framework.
4. A LACK OF ORIENTATION: WHO NEEDS THE RULE AND WHAT IS IT
NEEDED FOR?
In line with Wohlrapps view, two individuals engaging in argumentative discourse have
individual needs of orientation and individual knowledge which they can involve in
figuring out whether an utterance satisfies the need of orientation or not. Translated into
our example, we can then assume, that also Anna and her professor each have their own
need of orientation. Say, for example,
Anna
would like to get the extension; she also
would not like to make too bad an impression on her professor given that she is
about to miss her deadline; she also
still needs to go shopping for groceries that afternoon and the shops are about to
close and
for politeness reasons she wants to avoid talking about any private issues of her
classmate who got the extension in case I.
The professor on the other hand
wants to help Anna out in some way but still
fears that even more students could claim an extension without any specific
reasons,
cannot recall what warranted the extension in case I and
wants to find that out;
has other classes to prepare that day and
would like to find a reliable solution in Annas case which will likely save her
time in the future.
None of these possible goals of Anna and her professor are necessary or sufficient for
absolute certainty about the rules form or content or even about whether it is there or
not. More than that, the rules form and content seem to depend on whether and to which
degree the interlocutors make use of it. Within Annas and the professors individual
search for orientation, the rule can play at least three roles.
Firstly, it can be part of the need of orientation. For example: Both Anna and the
professor might like a solution for Annas case which applies now and in the future when
other students have a similar concern. Both might also want to set an appropriate
precedent: The rule should now exclude cases which shall be excluded in the future and

594

the rule should now capture and include cases, which shall allow for the extension in the
future. This might motivate both or either of them to ask the other a couple of
straightforward questions about the relevant similarities of case I and case II in order to
abstract a rule from them.
Secondly, the rule might be part of the theory, provisionally set up to satisfy the
need of orientation. This holds both for Anna and for the professor as well. Both might
identify relevantly similar characteristics in both cases and form a rule like the following:
Based on the relevance of properties 1 n in case 1, if another case has properties
1 n, then an extension can provisionally count as justified.
The professor would probably have a special interest in fine-tuning the properties in
terms of quantity and quality: If the rule becomes too general, it will warrant an entire lot
of unwanted future extensions. If it is tied by very specific properties almost exclusively
inherent in case I and II, the rule might unfavorably exclude relevant future cases. Also
the sheer number of properties needs to come in handy for taking decisions quick and
easy while still maintaining a favorable level of decision quality. Doing all this, the
professor might follow a complex agenda, which might involve the appraisal of Annas
argument at hand in order to weigh the pros and cons of the rule in the light of predictable
future cases and in the light of Annas case, including assumptions about Annas need of
orientation.
Of course, Anna can recognize as well that a rule might be needed because each
interlocutor has her own need of orientation and also makes assumptions of what the need
of the other person could be: Anna might therefore include the rule in her argument, too.
And she could even purposefully not include it for strategic reasons, for example.
Thirdly, the rule might be part of a persons knowledge and serve forming a
suitable theory. Anna and her professor might have made the experience that in certain
contexts transparence of argument structure is required: in decisions involving great sums
of money, for example, in legal decisions, etc. When asking for an extension, Anna might
have just not thought, this is one such context and the extension to be not such a big deal.
The rather blunt remarks: My classmate got it, too and I really need it might have
satisfied her need of orientation in the beginning. Later, she finds out, her need of
orientation must conform at least to some degree with that of the professor in order to
find a solution they are both satisfied with.
5. CONCLUSION
In the first bit, I described roughly, what the rule-issue in arguments from analogy is
about. Then I was able to show that two aspects necessary for reconstructing parts of
arguments, which are speech acts, are fulfilled by Wohlrapps notion of orientation.
Therefore it might generally be a suitable candidate framework for reconstructing implicit
parts of arguments. More precisely, the general rule in analogy can be described in terms
of its contribution to satisfy the individuals need of orientation. The rule can be part of
the orientation needed, it can be part of the provisional theory put into practice and it can
be part of the knowledge that serves individuals in forming such a theory. Therefore the
question: Does every analogy have such a rule? can be plausibly rephrased as: Does

595

the individuals need of orientation require the analogy to have the rule?.2 If so, the
argument can draw additional strength from its content. Additionally, this contribution
has hinted at some future opportunities for research including advantages and
disadvantages of Wohlrapps account compared to Pragma-Dialectics and problems of
negotiating the shared need of orientation by interlocutors.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe thanks to Thomas Becker and Jan Henning Schulze from Otto-FriedrichUniversity, Bamberg (Germany) and to Nikil Mukerji from Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversity, Munich (Germany) for most helpful remarks and comments on this paper. I
am also grateful for funding I have received from the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation,
Germany.

REFERENCES
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Budzynska, K. & Reed, Ch. (2011). Speech acts of argumentation. Inference anchors and peripheral cues
in dialogue, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org).
Eemeren, F. H. van & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions. A theoretical
model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion. Dordrecht,
Cinnaminson: Foris.
Eemeren, F. H. van & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication, and fallacies. A pragmadialectical perspective. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum.
Garssen, B. & Kienpointner, M. (2011). Figurative analogy in political argumentation. In E.
Feteris,
B. Garssen, F. Snoek-Henkemans (Eds.), Keeping in touch with Pragma-Dialectics (pp. 39-58).
Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Govier, T. (1987). Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris.
Govier, T. (1989). Analogies and Missing Premises. In Informal Logic, 11, 3, 141-152.
Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. In The Philosophical Review, 66, 377-88.
Grice, H. P. (1967). Logic and conversation. The William James lectures. Harvard: Harvard University.
Hoppman, M. (2009). The rule of similarity as intercultural basis of defeasible Argumentation. In Ritola, J.
(Ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-14). Windsor, ON: OSSA.
Jacobs, Scott. (1989). Speech Acts and Arguments. In: Argumentation 3, 345-365.
Lumer, Christoph. (2011). Argument schemes an epistemological approach. In Zenker, F. (Ed.)
Argumentation. Cognition and community. Proceedings of OSSA 10, CD-ROM (pp. 1-32).
Windsor, ON: OSSA.
Lumer, Christoph. (2000). Reductionism in Fallacy Theory. In: Argumentation 14, 4, 405-423.
Perelman, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1971). The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation. Translated
by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver. Nachdruck der ersten Aufl. 1958. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press.
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge: CUP.
Searle, J.R. (1985). Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: CUP.
wiczkowska, H. & Trzsicki, K. (Eds.) (2014). Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 36.
Tindale, C. W. (2007): Fallacies and argument appraisal. Cambridge: CUP.
Toulmin, S. (2003). The uses of argument. Reprint of the first edition 1958. New York: CUP.
Walton, D. N. (2006). Fundamentals of critical argumentation. In D. N. Walton & H. V. Hansen. (Eds.),
Critical reasoning and argumentation. Cambridge: CUP.
Walton, D. N., Reed, C. & Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation Schemes. New York: CUP.
Weinreb, L. L. (2005). Legal reason. The use of analogy in legal argument. New York: CUP.
2

In staying consistent with Wohlrapps overall approach, this change might be even necessary, namely to
avoid a logicistic (logizistische) reconstruction (cf. Wohlrapp a.o. 2008; 1999).

596

Wohlrapp, H. (2008). Der Begriff des Arguments. Wrzburg: Knigshausen.

Wohlrapp, H. (1999). Jenseits von Logizismus und Zweckrelativismus. Zur Rolle der Logik im
Argumentieren. In Dialektik 1 (pp. 25-36). Hamburg: Meiner.

597

Negotiation Versus Deliberation

Constanza Ihnen
Institute of Argumentation
Law Faculty
University of Chile
Santiago, Chile
cihnen@derecho.uchile.cl

ABSTRACT: Negotiation and deliberation are two context types widely studied in the argumentation
literature. However, one issue that still must be addressed is how to distinguish negotiation and deliberation in
practice. In this paper, I seek to develop linguistic criteria to identify instances of these genres in discourse.
To this end, I characterise the felicity conditions of the superordinate speech acts defining and structuring
deliberation and negotiation encounters.
KEYWORDS: Deliberation, negotiation, offer, proposal, superordinate speech act

1. INTRODUCTION
Most contemporary argumentation theorists agree that fallacy judgments are, ultimately,
context-dependent. Accordingly, over the last two decades we have witnessed a wave of
attempts to characterise different types of contexts and formulate specific reasonableness
conditions for the use of argumentation within each of them. Among these attempts, those
carried out by Walton and the pragma-dialectical school are probably among the most
systematic and advanced.
In Waltons (1998) approach, context types are conceptualised as dialogue types:
i.e., as exchanges of speech acts between two speech partners governed by a primary goal
and a set of rules. Within the pragma-dialectical framework (van Eemeren, 2010), context
types are partly studied through the concept of discourse genres, conceived as socially
ratified ways of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity
(Fairclough, 1995, p.14).
Negotiation and deliberation are two among a number of other context types that
have been studied by these authors. Walton and Krabbe (1995) have proposed a
characterisation based, mainly, on their primary goals and rules; pragma-dialecticians have
characterised the two contexts in terms of their communicative conventions and the
constraining force of those conventions on argumentative discourse. Thanks to these
descriptions, it has become possible to carry out context-sensitive and, thereby, more
nuanced evaluations of argumentative discussions.
However, one issue that still must be addressed by the aforementioned contextual
approaches to argumentation is how to distinguish negotiation and deliberation in practice.
Since negotiation and deliberation share important features both are collective decisionmaking procedures centred on the practical question what to do they can be easily
confused during the process of analysing actual fragments of discourse. This difficulty is
compounded by the fact that it has not yet been made clear which of the rules or
conventions specified for each genre are to use a well-known distinction constitutive
598

and which are only regulative of these practices (Rawls, 1955; Searle, 1969). Constitutive
rules or conventions not only regulate, but also define the activity they regulate. Thus,
constitutive rules or conventions are reliable criteria to distinguish one genre from another.
Regulative rules or conventions, by contrast, only regulate a pre-existing activity and are,
for this reason, unreliable criteria. If, for example, one of the parties violates a regulative
convention of the genre of deliberation, it does not necessarily mean that the parties are not
deliberating. It may just means that one party is behaving fallaciously.
With a view to contributing to the study of argumentation in context, this paper
seeks to develop criteria that can help the analyst distinguish negotiation and deliberative
practices. In this endeavour, I will use pragma-dialectics as my main theoretical starting
point.
2. DISCOURSE GENRES AND SUPERORDINATE SPEECH ACTS
In line with the rational approach to discourse underlying the pragma-dialectical theory
(Eemeren et al., 1993), this essay studies the genres of negotiation and deliberation as
rational (i.e. goal-oriented) and socially ratified sequences of speech acts, motivated by the
need to repair a specific kind of interactional problem in a given social activity.
To develop criteria for establishing whether or not a particular sequence is an
instance of negotiation or deliberation, I shall make use of the concepts of superordinate
speech act, pre-sequence and post-sequence developed in the field of conversational
analysis. A superordinate speech act is a speech act that pragmatically organises a sequence
by structuring the interaction and aiding in the interpretation of the speech acts performed
before and after the superordinate speech act. Pre-sequences and post-sequences are
sequential expansions occurring before and after a superordinate act (Jacobs & Jackson,
1980, 1983).
The hypothesis I wish to explore in this paper is whether there is a specific
superordinate speech act within each genre sequence, the performance of which can be seen
as a prima facie indication that the sequence is a token of one genre rather than the other.
Since, according to this hypothesis, the performance of a certain type of speech act defines
the genre in which the discourse unfolds, the requirement to perform such speech act can be
considered a constitutive convention of the genre if the hypothesis is proved to be correct.
In exploring this hypothesis I will assume that any pre and post-sequences which are
relevant to deciding on the meaning or acceptance of the superordinate speech act in other
words, whose performance is instrumental to determining whether the felicity conditions of
the superordinate speech act hold will fall within the scope of the same instance of
negotiation or deliberation.
3. THE SUPERORDINATE SPEECH ACT OF NEGOTIATION
Since the late 1960s, there has been a number of efforts particularly in the field of
business communication and artificial intelligence to describe negotiations and
deliberations from a speech act perspective. Some of these efforts have been directed at
identifying the types of speech acts that are vital to the negotiation and deliberation process.
In terms of negotiation, scholars generally agree that commissives and, particularly, offers
are essential to any negotiation activity (e.g., Tutzauer, 1992, p. 67; Fisher, 1983, p. 159).

599

This suggests that offers are likely to be the superordinate speech act underlying
negotiation.1
An offer counts as an attempt by the speaker to commit himself to perform a future
action if this is accepted by the hearer. Offers are similar to promises, but they differ from
promises in that the commitment to perform the future course of action is always
conditional on the hearers acceptance. Put differently, while offers become binding only
on acceptance, promises become binding as soon as they are performed (Searle &
Vanderveken, 1985, p. 196). Offers and promises also differ, to some extent, in the
psychological state expressed by the speaker concerning the preferences of the audience.
When a speaker issues a promise, he can be committed to the view that he believes rightly
or wrongly that the hearer would like him to perform the action. But when an offer is
made, speakers can only be committed to the view that they suppose, conjecture or guess
that such is the case. Offers seem to be more tentative than promises.
Not all types of offers, however, seem to be well-suited to performing the role of
negotiations superordinate speech act. To demonstrate this, compare the dialogues in
examples 1 and 2:
(1)
Two flatmates have just finished dinner and talk about what they would want for
dessert. This is an excerpt of their dialogue:
1
2

A:
B:

3
4
5

A:
B:
A:

I quite fancy an orange. How about you?

Me too.
(Party A walks to the kitchen to fetch a pair of oranges but comes
back only with one)
Sorry, bad news: there is only one left.
Too bad. Should we split it in half?
Hmm Are you sure you want an orange?

(2)
Two flatmates talk over dinner about the imminent departure of one of them to
another country. The one departing is a little stressed about the trip. His friend
notices this. This is an excerpt of their dialogue:
1
2
3
4

A:
B:
A:
B:

Would you like me to help you with the check in?

No, thanks a lot.
Ok, can I help you calling the airport transfer?
Oh, yeah. I have totally forgotten about that. That would be great!

Various authors (e.g., Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965; Prakken & Veen, 2006; Amgoud & Vesic, 2012) have
pointed out that argumentation not only can play a role, but also that its use is highly recommendable in
negotiations. This does not mean, however, that the performance of argumentation is necessary for a
negotiation to take place. Paradigmatic cases of distributive bargaining, for example, may not involve
argumentation.

600

Are both examples instances of negotiation? The answer appears to be in the negative. Only
Example 1 seems to match our pragmatic intuitions about what a negotiation is. However,
in both examples, at least one offer is performed. In Example 1, turn 4, party B offers to
split the orange in half; in Example 2, turns 1 and 3, party A offers his help to party B in
order to alleviate the stress of his trip.
If in both dialogues an offer is being performed, why, then, is Example 1 perceived
as a negotiation encounter, while Example 2 is perceived as a token of something else? The
explanation lies, I think, on the type of offer performed in each case. In Example 1, the offer
is performed in an attempt to reconcile a trivial conflict of interest. Judging by the
expressions of disappointment in turns 3 and 4, both parties want the whole orange for
themselves, and this creates a tension between them as there is only one orange left. In
Example 2, there are no signs of a conflict of interest, at least not on the basis of the
information available. On the contrary, their interests appear to be identical, as they both
want party B to feel less stressed about the upcoming trip. In order to distinguish the two
types of offer, I shall refer to the type of speech act performed in Example 1 as the speech
act of making an offer and to the type of speech act performed in Example 2 as a generic
offer.
Accordingly, not all types of offers can be analysed as the superordinate speech act
of negotiation; only the speech act of making an offer fulfils this role. Like every type of
offer, making an offer counts as an attempt by the speaker to commit himself to perform an
action, so long as the action is accepted by the hearer. However, unlike generic offers, such
a commitment is taken by the speaker with the specific objective of reconciling a presumed
conflict of interest with the listener. The conflict of interest presumed by the speaker may
become clear while the dialogue unfolds as illustrated in Example 1 or be presupposed
by the context and never verbalised by either party, as often happens in market exchanges.
Speakers can of course make an offer in non-conditional or conditional terms. To
make a conditional offer counts as a commitment by the speaker to perform some future
action, on condition that the hearer performs another action in turn (besides the action of
accepting the speakers offer). Example 3 below contains only conditional offers and is also
a clear cut example of a negotiation encounter:
(3)
A customer enters an antique shop. He browses over the items and begins to pay attention
to one particular shelf in a display case. He picks up one of the items and inspects it. The
proprietor notices this, approaches the customer, and the following dialogue ensues:
1

A:

2
3
4

B:
A:
B:

If you buy that item and one of those pots, then you can have the item for
45 and the pot for 30. Thats a substantial reduction on their original
prices.
No, sorry. I dont have that amount of money with me at the moment.
Okay, how about 60 for both?
Okay, deal.2

In Example 3, the conditional nature of the offer is clearly signaled by the use of an Ifthen clause.
Conditional offers, however, can be performed implicitly. For example, if, in the same context, the proprietor
had said to the potential client You can take those pots for 75, he would have made a conditional offer,

601

In order to distinguish the three types of offers discussed, I compare them in table 1 in
terms of their felicity conditions: 3
Table 1: Types of offers and felicity conditions
Felicity
Conditions

Generic offer

Making an offer

Making a conditional
offer4

Essential

Counts as an attempt by S
to commit himself to do A,
on condition that H accepts
Ss doing A.

Counts as an attempt by S
to reconcile some
competing interests with H,
by committing himself to
do A, on condition that H
accepts Ss doing A.

Counts as an attempt
by S to commit
himself to do A, on
condition that H does
A (besides accepting
Ss doing A).

Propositional

Some future action A is

predicated of S.

Some future action A is

predicated of S.

Some future action A

is predicated of S and
another future action
A is predicated of H.

Preparatory

S is willing to do A.

S is willing to do A.

S is willing to do A, on
condition that H does
A.

S is able to do A.

S is able to do A.

S is able to do A.
S believes H is able to
do A.

S presumes that H would

prefer Ss doing A to Ss
not doing A.

S presumes that H would

prefer Ss doing A to Ss
not doing A.

S presumes that H
would prefer Ss doing
A to Ss not doing A.
S presumes that H
would prefer doing A
if S does A, than not
doing A and, as a
consequence, not
having S to do A.
S would rather not do

because he would have committed himself to a course of action (selling the client the pots) in exchange for
another course of action from the client (paying him the 75).
3
The analysis of conditional offers is based on Tiersma (1986), although he presents this set of conditions as
the felicity conditions of offers in general, not of conditional offers in particular.
4
The analysis shows that making a conditional offer is a sub-type of the speech of act of making an offer.
Even though the essential condition of a conditional offer does not refer explicitly to the speakers objective
of reconciling a presumed conflict of interest between speaker and hearer, the preparatory conditions clearly
presuppose the existence of such a conflict: S and H have contrary preferences.

602

A, unless H does A.
S presumes that H
would rather not do
A, unless S does A.
S prefers H doing A
than not doing it.

Sincerity

S believes that it is not

obvious to H that S will do
A in the normal course of
events.

S believes that it is not

obvious to H that S will do
A in the normal course of
events.

S believes that it is not

obvious to H that S
will do A in the
normal course of
events and that H will
do A in the normal
course of events.

S intends to do A if H
accepts Ss doing A.

S intends to do A if H
accepts Ss doing A.

S intends to do A if H
does A.

An illustration
Thus far I have argued that making an offer (non-conditional or conditional) is the
superordinate speech act of negotiation and that the performance of this speech act can be
used as a criterion to determine whether or not a negotiation has taken place. I will now
illustrate how the criterion can be applied in practice. The example of negotiation under
analysis has been taken from Fisher, Ury and Paton (1991 [1981], p. 23). In contrast to the
examples already analysed, Example 4 not only involves a process of distributive, but
also integrative negotiation.
According to Walton and McKersie (1992), distributive negotiation occurs when the
parties assume that what is at stake is the distribution of a fixed pie. In this case, the gains
of one party necessarily result in the losses of the other. Distributive negotiations result in
zero-sum solutions. Dividing the orange between two parties is a paradigmatic case of
distributive bargaining: the more sections of orange one party gets, the less the other. By
contrast, integrative negotiations take place when the parties no longer assume that what is
at stake is the distribution of a fixed pie, but instead search for a solution where both can
maximize their gains simultaneously. Integrative negotiations aim at a win-win solution.
Since Example 4 involves both types of negotiations, it will also help me
demonstrate that the proposed criterion is also useful in identifying integrative negotiations:
(4)
Two friends are sitting next to each other in a library. One of them walks towards the window and
closes it. The following dialogue ensues:
1
2
3

A:
B:
A:

What are you doing? There is hardly any air in the room.
Fine, I can leave the window open a crack.
No, leave it halfway.
603

4
5

B:
A:

B:

But theres a cold draft coming in. Im freezing.

Okay, how about opening the window in the next room? Then we will
have fresh air without a draft.
Good thinking!

The sequence of speech acts used by the parties in each turn is represented below. The
superordinate speech acts underlying the verbal exchange are in italics; implicit and
projected speech acts appear between parentheses:
1

A:

B:
A:
B:
A:
B:

A:

B:
A:
B:

A:
B:
A:

B:
A:
B:
A:
B:

(Advances standpoint1: B shouldnt have closed the

window)
(Doubts acceptability of standpoint1)
(Maintains standpoint1)
(Requests argumentation for standpoint1)
Advances argumentation for standpoint1
(Accepts argumentation for standpoint1)
Accepts standpoint1
Makes offer1
Rejects offer1
Makes offer2
Rejects offer2
(Doubts acceptability of rejecting offer2)
(Advances standpoint2: Rejecting offer2 is
acceptable)
(Requests argumentation for standpoint2)
Advances argumentation for standpoint2
(Accepts argumentation for standpoint2)
Accepts standpoint2
Makes offer3
(Doubts acceptability of offer3)
(Advances standpoint3: Offer3 is acceptable)
(Requests argumentation for standpoint3)
Advances argumentation for standpoint3
(Accepts argumentation for standpoint3)
Accepts standpoint3
(Accepts offer3)

Sub-negotiation1

Sub-negotiation2

Sub-negotiation3

The analysis proposed shows that the superordinate speech act of making an offer is
performed three times in the dialogue: in turns 2, 3 and 5. Thus, according to the
identification criterion proposed, there are three negotiation processes in this fragment.
The sequence of speech acts involved in such processes is indicated in the analysis
between braces. We can clearly identify these three negotiation sequences because each of
them is relevant in determining the meaning or the acceptability of their respective
superordinate speech act. For example, in the first negotiation process, the pre-sequence of
604

speech acts performed (and projected) in turn 1 is relevant to the offer made in turn 2: party
As performance of those speech acts is necessary to establish the existence of a conflict of
interest with party B. If such conflict had not been established, then the speech act
performed by party B in turn 2 would not be that of making an offer but only a generic
offer.
Likewise, the post-sequence of argumentatively relevant speech acts performed (and
projected) in turn 4 (and partly in 5) is necessary to decide on the acceptability of the offer
that was made in turn 3. It is clear however that despite there being three processes of
negotiation, all of them can be seen as part of a broader negotiation framework because
they are all an attempt at reconciling the same interactional problem: what should the
parties do with the window in the library, considering that one prefers it open and the other
one would rather have it closed. In this sense, the three processes can be reconstructed as
sub-negotiation processes.
On the basis of the analysis presented, we can also show that our criterion applies to
both types of negotiations. Sub-negotiations 1 and 2 are clearly distributive negotiations;
sub-negotiation 3 is a classic example of integrative negotiation. However, in both cases,
there is a conflict of interest between the parties and, in both cases too, the offer performed
is a clear attempt at dealing with the conflict. In sub-negotiation 1, the offer made is an
attempt at reconciling the fact that party A wants the window open while party B wants it
closed; in sub-negotiation 2, the offer is a reaction to the fact that party A doesnt want to
leave the window open a crack and party B wants to leave it open a crack; in subnegotiation 3, the offer is an attempt at reconciling the fact that party A wants the window
halfway and party B does not. The difference between the two types of negotiations is not,
therefore, that in one case an offer is made while in the other a different type of speech act
is performed. In both types of negotiations, the speaker makes an offer. The difference lies
in the way in which the speaker attempts to solve the conflict of interest in each case by
making an offer. In a distributive negotiation, the offer is made in order to solve a conflict
between interests X and Y by trying to reach a compromise somewhere between interests X
and Y. In an integrative negotiation, the offer is performed to solve a conflict between
interests X and Y by trying to fulfil the parties convergent interests, which are neither
shared nor in conflict, X and Y (in this case, party As interest to have more air in the
room and party Bs interest in avoiding a draft cold coming in).
4. THE SUPERORDINATE SPEECH ACT OF DELIBERATION
Several authors have studied the role of proposals within the deliberative genre (e.g.,
Kauffeld, 1998; Aakhus, 2005; Walton, 2006; Hitchcock et al, 2007). Waltons view on
this issue is particularly relevant here. According to Walton (2006, p. 181), the activities of
proposing and deliberating are intrinsically related to one another. This idea is expressed in
the way he defines the goal of deliberation, namely, as that of deciding which is the best
available course of action among the set of proposals that has been offered (my italics).
By means of this definition, Walton suggests that the very existence of a deliberative
encounter is logically dependent on the (explicit or implicit) performance of the speech act
of proposing and thereby implies that proposals are deliberations superordinate speech act.
This is not to say, of course, that the performance of the speech act of proposing is
sufficient to establish the deliberative nature of some discursive interaction; the

605

performance of a proposal is only a necessary condition. Deliberation is also defined by the

presence of the speech act of argumentation.
If proposals are the superordinate speech act of deliberation, then the distinction
between negotiation and deliberation boils down to the distinction between the speech act
of making an offer and the speech act of proposing. In order to characterise proposals and
distinguish them from offers, it is first necessary to make a distinction between the English
illocutionary verb to propose and the illocutionary act or speech act of proposing.
The illocutionary verb to propose (and the related noun proposal, referring to the
act of proposing) can be used at least in two ways. In one sense, it is used to refer to the
speech act of making an offer, as Example 5 illustrates:

(5)
A couple talk about their plans for the weekend:
1
2
3

A:
B:
A:

B:

A:

What are your plans for this weekend?

I want to work on my book.
Oh, really? I was hoping we could go to the beach; you havent had a free
weekend for months.
Thats true. Ok, how about this proposal: we stay at home this weekend,
but I promise that we go to the beach next weekend.
OK, thats fine with me.

However, the same term can also be used with a different meaning, as shown by Example 6
(6)
A couple talk about their plans for the night:
1
2
3

A:
B:
A:

B:

What are your plans for tonight?

I dont know yet, but I would like to do something relaxing.
Hmm, me too. OK, Ive got a proposal: why dont we go to the cinema.
Thats a relaxing thing to do, isnt it?
Yeah, sure. Lets go.

Both examples use the term proposal. However, I would argue that the same term is used
to refer to different types of types of speech acts. It is only the second use of the term
proposal that interests me here and that I wish to capture when I henceforth speak of the
speech act of proposing.
Having made the distinction between illocutionary verbs and the speech act of proposing,
we are now in a position to contrast the speech acts of making an offer and that of
proposing. The best way to establish their difference is by comparing their felicity
conditions. The felicity conditions of proposing set out in table 2 are largely based on
Aakhus (2005):5

Differences relate to the propositional content and sincerity conditions.

606

Table 2: Felicity conditions of a proposal

Felicity
Conditions

Proposals

Essential

Counts as an attempt by S to get H to consider mutually bringing about A.

Propositional

Collective future action A is predicated of S and H.

Preparatory

S is willing to do A together with H.

S is able to contribute together with H to the accomplishment of A.
S believes that doing A serves some interest(s) shared by S and H.

S believes that it is not obvious to H that either S or H can do A of their

own accord in the normal course of events.
Sincerity

S believes A will mutually benefit H and S.

5. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MAKING AN OFFER AND PROPOSING

An analysis of the felicity conditions of the speech act of proposing, as defined in this
article, shows that there are two main differences between a proposal, on the one hand, and
making a non-conditional or conditional offer, on the other.
First, when a speaker makes a proposal, the speaker predicates the same collective
action of both speaker and hearer.6 This is specified not only in the propositional content
condition of the speech act, but it is also suggested in the essential condition, as the action
proposed is an action mutually brought about by speaker and hearer. This is not true when a
speaker makes an offer. In order to make a non-conditional offer, it is sufficient for the
speaker to predicate an action of himself, and in order to make a conditional offer it is
sufficient for him to predicate an action of himself and a different action of the hearer.
When making an offer, however, speakers may also predicate a collective action for both
speakers and hearers.
Consider, for instance, Example 5. Party A is committing himself to two collective actions,
both of which involve the hearer: both parties will stay at home this weekend and both
parties will go to the beach the next. Thus, if a speaker commits himself to an action that
does not involve the hearer, we can be certain that he has not performed a proposal. Yet, if
the hearer commits himself to an action that also involves the hearer, it may be a proposal,
but it can also be an offer. In short: to propose is necessarily to predicate a collective action
6

An action can be collective in the sense of shaking hands and getting married that is, the action cannot take
place unless both parties engage in it , but it can also be collective in the sense of lighting a fire with one
bringing the logs and the other fetching the matches.

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of speaker and hearer; to make an offer is to predicate an action from the speaker which
may or may not involve mutually bringing it about with the hearer.
The second difference between making an offer and proposing relates to whose
interests are meant to be served by the action(s) that speaker (and hearer) would be carrying
out. This difference becomes clear when examining the preparatory conditions of the
speech acts. When a speaker makes a proposal, he is committed to the view that the action
proposed will further an interest goal, objective, etc. that is shared by both speaker and
hearer. When a speaker makes an offer non-conditional or conditional he is committed
to the view that his action will further, in varying degrees, interests that are not shared by
speaker and hearer. In the context of a distributive negotiation, the offer will attempt to
partially further the differing interests of the two parties by means of a compromise. In the
context of an integrative negotiation, the offer will be directed at fully furthering the
parties convergent interests.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that negotiation and deliberation can be distinguished in
practice by examining whether or not the superordinate speech acts underlying each of
these genres making an offer and making a proposal have been performed. I have also
specified the felicity conditions of these speech acts in order to make clear their differences.
Moreover, I have emphasised that for a deliberation to take place not only a proposal has to
be performed, but also argumentation in favour or against that proposal.
I believe this approach suggests at least two further lines for research. First, I
presume that a similar analysis can be carried out with other discourse genres, such as
adjudication information-seeking and consultation, in relation the speech acts of accusing
informative requests, and advising.
Second, it is possible that the occurrence of deliberation or negotiation (and other
genres) depends not only on the performance of the superordinate speech acts that I have
identified, but also on the specific demands imposed by the macro-context or
communicative activity type in which they occur. Thus, for example, in the context of an
antique market, a negotiation may consist solely of an offer and the rejection of that offer.
In the context of a collective bargaining process between a trade union and a company,
however, the same sequence of speech acts an offer and a rejection of the offer is
probably an insufficient indication that a negotiation dialogue has taken place. In such a
context, if one of the parties systematically rejects the offers made by the other party, and
makes no counter-offers in turn, then the party who is making the offers would probably be
right in accusing the other party of not being open to negotiation. Clearly, the criteria I
have proposed to determine whether or not a negotiation or deliberation has taken place are
minimal and may need to be complemented with the particular requirements of a given
social activity.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank the members of the Institute of Argumentation at the Law Faculty of
University of Chile for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.

608

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conference, August.
Amgoud, L. & Vesic, S. (2012). A formal analysis of the role of argumentation in negotiation
dialogues. Journal of Logic and Computation, 5 (22), 957-978.
Eemeren, F. H., van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1993). Reconstructing argumentative
discourse. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical discourse analysis. London: Longman.
Fisher, R. (1983). Negotiating power, getting and using influence. The American Behavioural, 27 (2), 149166.
Fisher, R., Ury, W. & Patton, B. (1991). Getting to yes. Negotiating agreement without giving in. (2nd ed.).
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Hitchcock, D., McBurney, P. & Parsons, S. (2007). The eightfold way of deliberation dialogue. International
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Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1980). Structure of conversational argument: Pragmatic bases for the enthymeme.
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Jacobs, S., & Jackson, S. (1983). Speech act structure in conversation: Rational aspects of pragmatic
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Strategy (pp. 47-66). Beverly Hills: Sage.
Kauffeld, F. (1998). Presumption and the distribution of argumentative burdens in acts of proposing and
accusing. Argumentation, 12 (2), 245-266.
Prakken, H. & Veenen, J. van (2006). A protocol for arguing about rejections in negotiation. In S. Parsons, N.
Maudet, P. Moraitis & I. Rahwan (Eds.), Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems (pp. 138-153).
Berlin: Springer.
Rawls, J. (1955). Two concepts of rules. The Philosophical Review, 64 (1), pp. 3-32
Sawyer, J. and H. Guetzkow, 1965. Bargaining and negotiation in international relations. In H. Kelman (Ed.),
International Behaviour: A Social-Psychological Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Searle, J. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Searle, J. & Vanderveken, D. (1985). Foundations of illocutionary logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Tiersma, P. (1986). The language of offer and acceptance: speech act and the question of intent. California
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Tutzauer, F. (1992). The communication of offers in dyadic bargaining. In L.L. Putnam & M.E. Roloff (Eds.),
Communication and Negotiation (pp. 67-82). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Walton, D. (1998). The new dialectic: Conversational contexts of argument. Toronto: University of Toronto
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Walton, D. (2006). How to make and defend a proposal in a deliberation dialogue. Artificial Intelligence and
Law, 14 (3),177-239.
Walton, D. & Krabbe, E. (1995). Commitment in dialogue: Basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning.
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Walton, R. & McKersie, R. (1992). A behavioral theory of labor negotiations: An analysis of a social
interaction system. New York: McGraw Hill.

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Internal Logic: Persuasive Form And Hierarchy In Kenneth Burke

David Isaksen
Department of English
Texas Christian University
USA
d.e.isaksen@tcu.edu

ABSTRACT: According to Kenneth Burke, language contains highly persuasive structures that are not
necessarily detectable at the level of arguments. Every author or speaker constructs a unique vocabulary
where words are given different nuances of meaning and operate within networks of form and hierarchies of
values. These structures form an internal logic or a pattern of experience which creates both vertical and
horizontal convergence. Burke's unique method of analysis, "indexing," reveals these implicit argumentation
structures.
KEYWORDS: Aesthetic truth, equations, god-terms, hierarchies, indexing, internal logic, Kenneth Burke,
literary form, persuasive form.

1. INTRODUCTION
In Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Disourse, Eemeren conducts a brief review of
the field of rhetoric and the most cited rhetorical scholars. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca,
Toulmin, Zarefsky, Fahnestock, and Kennedy are most cited and discussed, whereas
Kenneth Burke is only given a few passing remarks. The few times Kenneth Burke is
mentioned he is credited with expanding the definition of rhetoric from "persuasion" to
"identification" (Eemeren, p. 74) and being part of the theoretical foundation for
Fahnestock's research on rhetorical devices. I think this is much less attention than
Kenneth Burke deserves from students of argumentation. What I hope to do with this
presentation is to show how Burke gives us the vocabulary to discuss some central
persuasive features of texts, which I will call persuasive form and hierarchy, and also
gives us the critical tools we need to analyze these features
What does a text do and how does it do it? I think we all agree that texts are not
simply delivery devices for information, for a text does not simply tell us what to think,
it also tells us how to think. As Burke writes in Counter-Statement (1957): A text can,
by its function as name and definition, give simplicity and order to an otherwise
unclarified complexity. It provides a terminology of thoughts, actions, emotions, attitudes
for codifying a pattern of experience (p. 154). Burke saw two connected mechanisms
operating within a text: the psychology of form and the psychology of information. The
psychology of information operates by revelation, as in a Whodunit crime novel where
information is slowly released to clarify the picture of how the murder was committed and
who did it. Suspense is its natural artistic expression. The psychology of form, on the other
hand, operates by ritual and initiation, as in a tragedy where the sacrificial victim goes
through the inevitable downfall due to his hubris. It is not the ending, but the process, the
unfolding of events and thoughts which grips us and keeps us interested. Unlike a crime
novel, we may return to this form of literature again and again to enjoy the experience of
literary form. A key lesson for argumentation theorists is that all texts use both of these
mechanisms, but the internal logic of form can be more subtle and therefore avoid
detection if it is not critically examined.

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What do I mean by literary form? Kenneth Burke (1957) defines form as the arousal and
fulfilling of expectations or desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a
reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence (p. 124). This principle is
in operation even now as I started the text by creating an expectation of what I would
provide with this text, and hopefully I am in the process of fulfilling that expectation. It
seems pretty obvious and straight-forward. However, this same principle also operates on
the level of words and their associated terms. Burke (1973) writes that, The symbolism
of a word consists in the fact that no one quite uses the word in its mere dictionary sense.
And the overtones of usage are revealed by the company it keeps in the utterances of a
given speaker or writer (p. 35). When we read a text, we are being initiated into a
different vocabulary that has different meanings for words than those we normally use. For
example, we are gradually taught by Harriett Beecher Stowe in Uncle Toms Cabin that
lawful and constitutional are dirty words which are opposed to conscience, truth, and
the will of God. In the same way, the concepts of security and risk are given new
meanings in the 2003 State of the Union Address by George W. Bush, where risk is
connected to inaction and security is connected to war.
The vocabulary itself and the relationships between key terms set patterns of
expectation which the speaker then fulfills, thereby achieving consistency or aesthetic
truth. When something is aesthetically true it means that it conforms to the rules which
have been set up by the ritual or text. As Burke (1957) comments, In so far as the
audience, from its acquaintance with the premises, feels the rightness of the conclusion,
the work is formal. The arrows of our desires are turned in a certain direction, and the plot
follows the direction of the arrows (p. 124). When a work satisfies the expectations it has
aroused in us it is aesthetically true, even though it may be far from scientific truth. In a
text it is the author, rather than the laws of science or logical validity, which establishes the
boundaries for what can and cannot happen.
We therefore have a structure of internal logic which operates by different rules
than Aristotelian logic or even the normal structure of argumentation. If we look at a
logical argument from Aristotelian logic we have a major premise, minor premise, and
conclusion: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal. The test
of validity here lies in definition. The major premise is like an axiom which does not need
to be proven since it can rely on the structures of reality already established by the
community. It is not proven that all men are mortal, just commonly accepted. This
structure of reality operates almost as an invisible Higgs field which lends its weight to the
argument. In contrast, internal logic makes the elements of its argument interact with a
structure of reality set up by the unique vocabulary of the text. The text functions as an
interpretation of life, and the argument simply needs to be consistent with that
interpretation. In a sense, this form of argument operates more like a cloth of interwoven
connections rather than as a chain.
There are many features of internal logic, but I want to briefly discuss two of them:
persuasive form and hierarchy.
2. PERSUASIVE FORM
In A Rhetoric of Motives (1969b), Burke describes the rhetorical effect form can have:
"Once you grasp the trend of the form, it invites participation regardless of the subject
matter. Formally, you will find yourself swinging along . . . Thus, you are drawn to the
form . . . and this attitude of assent may be transferred to the matter which happens to be
associated with the form" (p. 58). The form involves identification through participation in
a "universal appeal" and then connects that appeal with "a partisan statement" (p. 59).
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The strongest result or rhetorical effect of form is amplification: "as extension, expatiation,
the saying of something in various ways until it increases in persuasiveness by sheer
accumulation, amplification can come to name a purely poetic process of development,
such systematic exploitation of a theme as we find in lyrics built about a refrain" (Burke,
1969b, p. 69).
In language, an idea or image is infused and connected with associations and
relationships which are not necessarily synonyms or words logically related to it, yet these
connections can amplify and enlarge the original idea by accumulation. As Burke (1969b)
writes, "You can't point to the house that appears in a poem . . . For 'house' will also stand
for relations alien to the concept of house as such. The conceptual house is a dwelling of
such-and-such structure . . . The poetic house built of identifications. (Thus it may equal
sufferings in childhood, or sense of great security in childhood; a retreat from combat . . .
etc.)" (p. 84-5). For example, one politician may mention words such as "house, homes,
families, national security, peace, father, children, safety, watchful care, government,
homeland, defense, sleep" in grammatical structures that do not specifically connect them
all, yet poetically and rhetorically they may work to amplify an idea of "house" which
includes these separate concepts and metaphorically extends the borders of "home" to
include national borders, and extends the concept of father to government. These
"equations" make up what Kenneth Burke calls "the underlying pattern of experience." It is
a substructure of images, terms, concepts, and emotions that are connected together by
association.
The restatement of a theme like this through "equations" constructs a kind of
rhythm for us as an audience. It invites participation, and soon we feel ourselves swinging
along. This is the "magic" of form arousing and fulfilling expectations in us. In CounterStatement (1957), Kenneth Burke writes, The artist possessed by a certain pattern of
experience is an expert in this pattern. He should thus be equipped to make it convincing
. . . By thoroughness he should be able to overwhelm his reader, and thus compel the
reader to accept his interpretations. For a pattern of experience is an interpretation of life
(p. 176).
So how does this work in a dialectic argumentation? Persuasive form works as a
"presentational device" which helps to create identification between the speaker and the
audience. Vertical convergence means that "all aspects of a strategic maneuver made by
the speaker or writer reinforce each other." One way all the aspects can reinforce each
other is by the speaker using language that is unified with a form of interrelated terms
Kenneth Burke recommended a method of close reading which he called
"indexing" in order to uncover the implicit equations in a given text. The basic concept is
that one follows a set of what appears as central terms throughout a text and see which
other terms they frequently occur with. After a while one then gets clusters of words which
center around common themes or motivations, where some will be more central and others
will be more peripheral, based on their frequency and intensity (importance for creating
meaning) in the text. This will make visible the restatement and amplification that occurs
in the text and may show how this persuasive form is connected to different partisan
statements. For example, we can study the term atomic bomb in the speech given by
President Harry Truman (1945) after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.
What we find is a cluster of terms that includes scientists of distinction, greatest
scientific gamble in history, the race of discovery, battle of the laboratories,
industrial and financial resources, manpower, greatest achievement in the history of
science, and harnessing the basic power of the universe. Already at this level we see
some interesting connections, with the atomic bomb connected to metaphors from sports
and gambling, and hailed as a great achievement and example of the American will to
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gamble and risk much in order to get the a handsome pay-out or reward for the trouble.
However, it is first by studying the effect of hierarchy that the deeper ideological
implications involved become more transparent.
3. HIERARCHY
Kenneth Burke (1969b) writes that no expression can be more profoundly appealing than
a rhetoric which follows in the direction of a perfect dialectical symmetry" (p. 291). What
he means by dialectical symmetry is something like the rhetoric Plato uses in Phaedrus
where writing is connected to love and love again is connected to the eternal progression
of the soul and the gods. Seen in this perspective, the criteria for good writing follow as a
natural consequence of the big picture or hierarchy which Plato has constructed, and the
dialogue therefore has dialectical symmetry. So a hierarchy which is internally consistent
is the manifestation of dialectical symmetry.
To give a simple example of hierarchy, humans of all ages, ethnicities, and
persuasions can be gathered up, dialectically, in the term "human." Humans again can be
classed with dogs, bears, and cows as "mammals." and mammals again can, by a few more
steps, be categorized as a form of "life." The movement here is from concrete to more
abstract form. I can be touched as a concrete object. However, the principle "human"
cannot be felt or experienced in the same way. It has already become too abstract to really
touch. Further, a "mammal" can be touched, but the concept of mammal cannot. Finally,
we come to "life," which may be the closest we get to an ultimate term in that vocabulary.
This is a hierarchy constructed according to the biological definition of what it means to be
"human." This hierarchy tells an implicit story about what and who we are, and it has very
different implications than a hierarchy that is based on for example a definition from
Christian theology, which would find humans "a little lower than the angels," but still
created by and belonging to God. For example, if we look at death penalty from these
different perspectives it makes little sense to end biological life to punish the end of other
biological life, yet it may make sense to hasten an already expected day of judgment for a
killer. One important principle in Burke's (1969b) concept of hierarchy is the concept of
movement:
On the way up the steps of the hierarchy there is a distancing from the everyday,
for the mystic, a crossing into a realm that transcends everyday judgmentsafter
which there may be a return: the Upward Way is matched by a Downward Way . .
. whereupon the visionary can once again resume his commerce with the world,
which he now sees in a new light, in terms of the vision earned during his stage of
exile. (p. 95)
The highest term in such a hierarchy, or God-term, is a self-causing motivational term
which works as the explanatory principle for all the other terms in the hierarchy. In
Burkes words, the encounter with the "God-term" changes the perspective on the world,
just as Platos discussion of love as divine madness and the myth of the ascending chariots
changes our outlook on writing. The world now looks different, and infused more
powerfully with a new vocabulary of motivations.
Hierarchy creates the effect of order and symmetry, which creates the illusion of
naturalness or unavoidability. The different steps of the hierarchy lead into each other so
naturally that they seem to be an integral part of the fabric of the world, much like the real
hierarchy of feudalism was at one time seen as unavoidable and established by divine
decree.
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Burke (1969b) claimed that there is no more persuasive rhetoric than the one that follows
the steps of dialectical transcendence. One example of the explicit use of hierarchy is
President Ronald Reagan's (1986) remarks at the memorial service for the astronauts who
died in the Challenger disaster. The disaster, and the death of the people in the space
shuttle, is transcended by viewing it in terms of "progress," where mankind moves
forwards through toil, danger and sacrifice. The people who died as the result of bad
engineering, constrained budgets, and what has become a classic example of "group
think," are now instead exalted as martyrs of American progress, alongside the pioneers
who died on the Oregon Trail and in the end help to pave the ascent of mankind towards
the stars. What may have otherwise inspired anger and frustration now inspires admiration
and the willingness to sacrifice for the greater good. Reagan's implicit argument in this text
goes from the personal to the astronomical and historical, yet the hierarchy of terms he
uses to get from the one to the other is "symmetrical" in the sense that one part naturally
leads into the next.
To go back to the concrete example of Trumans speech on the atomic bomb, the
cluster of terms or equations we have found are hierarchical in relation to one another. In
order to find which terms belong on the different rungs of the hierarchy, we can start by
asking which terms are most concrete. On that level we can find the scientists of
distinction, the industrial and financial resources, and the enormous manpower that
went into this project. To go upwards we can then find titles to describe the different facets
of the project; the larger categories that the more concrete terms belong to. The project is
described respectively as the greatest scientific gamble in history, the race of
discovery, and the battle of the laboratories. This all culminated in the greatest
achievement in the history of science, which was to make the atomic bomb. However, it
becomes clear that the atomic bomb is not an end in itself, but that it is itself merely a
means to a higher end. Truman states that it contributes to the increasing power of the
armed forces of the United States, and is merely an expression of mans harnessing the
basic power of the universe. Therefore, in the hierarchy of this text, scientific
achievement is in service of power and is subordinated to it as a value. Power stands as the
God-term. Once we have arrived at this point in our analysis, we, like Burkes mystic, can
return for a new look at the text and see it in light of its inherent ideological structure.
4. CONCLUSION
So what are some lessons we can learn from Burkes internal logic? I have a few
suggestions to conclude:
1.
2.
3.
4.

A text is not a neutral delivery device for information. In fact every text contains an
implicit ideology which it teaches us by symbolic initiation.
This ideological structure can be persuasive and can be used to give an argument
the experience or semblance of validity through aesthetic consistency.
The features of persuasive form and hierarchy at the level of terms can be traced
and analyzed by Kenneth Burkes method of indexing.
If they are not analyzed, these structures remain tacit and implicit and therefore
they also remain unquestioned, leading to lack of understanding and criticism.

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REFERENCES
Burke, K. (1957). Counter-Statement. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Burke, K. (1969b). A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Burke, K. (1973). The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action. 3rd ed. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1973.
Bush, G. W. (2003, January). 2003 State of the Union Address. American Rhetoric. House of
Representatives. Washington, D.C.
Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse. Philadelphia, PA: John
Benjamins.
Plato. (2005). Phaedrus. Trans. Christopher Rowe. New York, NY: Penguin Classics.
Reagan, R. (1986, January). Speech on Challenger Disaster. Houston, TX. Retrieved September 1, 2014
from http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/speech-on-the-challenger-disaster/
Stowe, H. B. (1969). Uncle Tom's Cabin. Columbus, OH: C. E. Merrill.
Truman, H. S. (1945, August). Statement by the President of the United States. Washington, D.C. Retrieved
September 1, 2014 from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primaryresources/truman-hiroshima/

615

Deference, Distrust, And Delegation: Three Design Hypotheses

Sally Jackson
Department of Communication
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
USA
sallyj@illinois.edu

ABSTRACT: A design hypothesis in argumentation is a broad notion about how argumentative practice
can be shaped toward greater reasonableness. Different design hypotheses do not compete with one another
in the way empirical hypotheses do; each may add to our overall rationality in some circumstance, and each
may have unwanted by-products. The complicated controversy over childhood vaccination displays
tensions among three quite different design hypotheses related to the role of expert opinion in decisionmaking.
KEYWORDS: argument from authority, design theory, expertise, vaccination controversy.

1. INTRODUCTION
A central premise of a design theory of argumentation (Jackson, 2012) is that
argumentation is a set of invented cultural practices that change over time to adjust to
material circumstances, including the emergence of new communication technologies. A
design perspective suggests that societies try out ideas about how to reach conclusions
and agreements, embodying them in techniques and technical systems, some of which
accrete to a durable set of reasoning practices, even though they may not be consistent
with ideas that have already been added to the set. The result at any point in time is some
collection of practices carried forward from the past, plus new, emerging ideas that must
somehow co-exist with the old.
I have argued elsewhere (Jackson, 2012; Jackson & Aakhus, 2014) that design is
becoming much more important to our understanding of argumentation. New methods of
inquiry may be needed that are neither empirical nor critical. Nelson and Stolterman
(2012) describe design as a "third way of knowing," complementary to scientific and
humanistic inquiry.
My purpose in this paper is to take a familiar kind of problem for argumentation
theory and use it to explore what this third way of knowing might add to argumentation
theory.
2. WEIGHING EXPERT ADVICE
Many contemporary controversies include disagreement over the reliability of expert
opinion. One such controversy, very active in the US and UK, concerns childhood
vaccination. Public health officials in both countries are overwhelmingly supportive of
vaccinating children for a range of infectious diseases. Within the public, however, a
significant minority of parents refuse to vaccinate their children, justifying this refusal on

616

a variety of grounds, but mostly on the suspicion that vaccination may cause dangerous
and irreversible side effects such as autism.
Anti-vaccination movements have often accompanied a change in public health
policy. Jones (2010) documents one of the earliest, a protest against smallpox
immunization that spread from Muncie, Indiana, to the other localities within the state.
Many of the themes seen in the current controversy over MMR are identical to those
documented by Jones. In the 1893 protests against mandatory smallpox vaccination, as in
today's resistance to the MMR vaccine, citizens questioned the safety and efficacy of the
vaccine, but also objected to health officials denying them a free choice in whether to be
vaccinated; and as is happening today, these citizens were represented as irrational in
their refusal to defer to expert opinion. Then and now, the controversy was as much about
individual responsibility for choice as about the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine.
But the environment for argumentation changed in the hundred years between the
outbreak of protest over smallpox vaccination and the outbreak of protest against MMR
vaccination. In Muncie, print journalism controlled the pace of the controversy and
eventually throttled the ability of dissenters to publish their views. In the communication
platforms that define the current media ecology, people move in and out of the active
discussion as its relevance for their own lives shifts. At every moment there are
participants who are absolutely new to the discussion (wondering whether to vaccinate
their child) and participants who have grown jaded by seeing the same arguments
recycled over and over. The controversy seems to pulse as interested participants enter,
make their decisions, and exit. Various kinds of uninvolved commentators are part of the
discourse, including academics introducing new concepts like "argument enclaves." It is
an unsettled discourse that does not appear to be moving toward a single resolution of the
central question for parents (should they vaccinate their babies) or for communities
(should vaccination be required by law for all babies).
John (2011) characterizes the controversy as "an instance of a general
phenomenon: non-expert failure to defer to expert testimony." He continues: "It seems
intuitive that something has gone wrong in such cases, and that non-experts ought, in
some objective sense, to have deferred to expert testimony" (p. 497). When non-experts
"fail to defer," is it really the non-experts who have failed? An important element of the
public resistance to vaccination, especially the MMR vaccine, is the suspicion that this
vaccine is linked to the onset of autism, a suspicion grounded in parents' own firsthand
observations. Offit and Coffin (2003) fault the press (especially the television news
program 60 Minutes) for presenting emotionally affecting content without scientifically
meaningful interrogation of that content. Parents' direct observations of symptoms of
autism in their own children, appearing soon after vaccination, are a continuing source of
evidence for the link. Offit and Coffin explain how 60 Minutes might have presented
observational evidence of this kind within a context that would have helped parents and
viewers to reason more clearly about causality.
Burgess, Burgess, and Leask (2006) apply a general framework for understanding
"public outrage" to the MMR vaccine controversy. This framework specifies a dozen
situational factors--for example, perceived coercion--that amplify outrage. All of these
factors were present to some degree in the way the public health establishment reacted to
a conjecture, published in the medical journal

617

The Lancet, that MMR vaccination might trigger autism through other immediate
physiological reactions to the vaccine (Wakefield et al., 1998; retracted by the journal's
editors in 2010). One factor of special significance was the unresponsiveness of the
public health establishment to parental fears--a dismissiveness that eroded trust in the
expert community. Tindale (2012) makes a similar point from an entirely different set of
background assumptions: what happened here was not citizens' failure to defer but
experts' failure to win trust. So against John's characterization of this as a case of failure
to defer, we have a number of other analyses of failure to inform and failure to persuade.
Note that all of these accounts assume that citizen and parental resistance to
vaccination really should have been overcome in the end. But two empirical studies,
Hobson-West (2007) and Hample (2012), raise doubts about whether it is useful, or even
accurate, to see this controversy as a failure of anything. Both examined groups critical of
mandatory vaccination. Hobson-West's data came from face-to-face interviews with
leaders of 10 groups organized around a range of issues spanning decades of debate in the
UK over vaccination. Hample's data came from online discussions within a virtual
community formed around resistance to required vaccination in the US. The picture of
citizen reasoning emerging from these analyses is complex and multi-faceted, not
reducible to a matter of deferring to expertise or refusing to do so. Hobson-West's
qualitative analysis of interviews with group leaders exposed a number of themes having
nothing to do with questions of expertise. One important theme (of five) was the notion
that vaccination is a governmental strategy used in place of more fundamental
improvement in living conditions, especially for the poor; against this notion, the safety
and efficacy of vaccines are beside the point. Hample's detailed qualitative content
analysis of an online discussion group identified several additional themes of interest:
suspicion of government/industry conspiracy, feelings of guilt associated with both
vaccinating and not vaccinating, and supporting community members in their off-line
confrontations with "provaxxers." Both studies contradict any simple characterization of
vaccine resistance as an irrational refusal to defer to expert authority.
Very importantly, both of these empirical studies also portray contemporary
resistance to vaccination as a difficult and socially costly choice that involves active
search for information beyond what is typically received from the family physician.
Parents who resist medical advice on vaccination do not simply reject expert opinion but
engage in serious and sustained inquiry. In some cases, resistance to vaccination also
involves active search for physicians who will provide the kind of treatment judged best
by the parent. Empirically, this controversy is not about argument from expert testimony,
nor about general epistemic postures such as deference to expertise. For most
participants, the controversy is simply about whether to vaccinate their children. Much is
at stake in this decision, and the resources available for making the decision are
extraordinarily difficult to evaluate.
3. A PROBLEM FOR ARGUMENTATION
Given that there are experts and non-experts, and that both are often parties to a
controversy, what should happen when most experts line up on one side of the
controversy? This is an open question for argumentation theory. John (2011) suggests
that in such cases, people behaving rationally should defer to experts, and in some cases

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they may have a moral obligation to do so. Mizrahi (2013) argues, to the contrary, that
expert opinion is a poor basis for deciding what to believe or do, because experts,
notwithstanding knowledge superior to that of non-experts, still do not demonstrate a
high enough correlation between truth and expert belief. In other words, relying on
experts does not yield a high enough proportion of good decisions. Responding to
Mizrahi, Seidel (2014) argues that to forego expert advice is "self-undermining,"
recommending instead a policy of "reasonable scrutiny" that would help differentiate
between reliable expert judgments and unreliable ones.
These three very recent papers give contemporary interpretations of ideas that
have waxed and waned throughout Western intellectual history. Different times and
circumstances have favored any of three competing ideas: (a) that rational people should
defer to authority greater than their own; (b) that they should distrust all authority and
attempt direct examination of any question of importance; and (c) that they should trust
authority once it has been adequately tested for reliability. Each of these postures may be
considered to be a mid-range epistemic policy--a preference for reasoning of some
particular kind, or a disdain for that kind of reasoning. Each of these epistemic policies
has been considered a way of being rational, and each has also been subject to sustained
critique. As uniformly applied policy, these postures are mutually incompatible, and all
have vulnerabilities. Hence, what to do with authority in general, and expert opinion in
particular, remains challenging for argumentation theory.
But these theoretical ideas about appeal to authority also reflect change in
argumentation as a practice. Appeal to authority has actually been a different kind of
argument over the centuries--depending on many factors, but especially on what at each
time and place has been considered the source of authority. Nowadays, appeal to
authority mostly means reliance on experts, and this requires entirely different argument
evaluation strategies than those employed before there was such a thing as an expert in a
specific field--a modern notion, not an ancient one. Asking whether a speaker is an
authority "in X" would have made little sense until perhaps the middle of the 19th
century, even though it is certainly also the case that there have been people with
extraordinary knowledge and skill, meriting others' deference in some specific domain
but not in others, throughout human history. Nor has appeal to authority remained static
in the post-WWII era, as it has become increasingly difficult to differentiate scientific
authority from government policy.
Structurally, appeal to authority may have had very similar characteristics across
the ages. But if the environment changes, the strengths and weaknesses of this argument
form may also change. In some contexts, appeal to authority may be the best available
basis for a conclusion; in others, it may be only a shortcut; in still others, it may represent
a refusal to engage in deeper thinking about a topic. In other words, argumentation
practice is sensitive to change in media ecology, and our theoretical assessments of
particular argument forms may need constant updating.
4. FROM ARGUMENT APPRAISAL TO DESIGN HYPOTHESIS
If we understand argumentation as a changeable practice that is constantly being
redesigned to meet the needs of its practitioners, all ideas about argumentation are liable
to affect the practice. A design hypothesis is any notion, theoretical or intuitive, about

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how argumentation might be conducted to better achieve its purpose. Like an empirical
hypothesis, a design hypothesis must conform with facts, but its real test is its ability to
support particular human purposes in particular circumstances. Design hypotheses do not
compete with one another in the way empirical hypotheses do; each new design
hypothesis may add to our overall rationality in some circumstance. New problems, or
new contexts for old problems, may need new design ideas. Design theory builds by
adding options.
In a design theory of argumentation, normative components can take the form of
design hypotheses, and these may concern not only standards for appraisal but also
procedures to follow or resources to provide or anything else that may improve the
outcomes of argumentation. Both deferring to experts and challenging the authority of
experts can be reframed as design hypotheses. And other design hypotheses can be
imagined. One of these is the idea of making a deliberate prior choice to delegate a
difficult question to someone who can be trusted to find the best possible answer.
Deference, distrust, and delegation are three distinct ideas about how to integrate expert
opinion into a discussion; each tends to add distinctive features to how people interact.
4.1 Deference
A posture of deference is based on the idea that people should accept conclusions that are
accepted by those most knowledgeable about a topic. In some places and times, this has
been not just an epistemic policy, but a sort of social obligation involving the giving of
respect to people who have in some sense earned that respect. If deference is built into the
rules of a kind of interaction, the only reasonable question to ask of an authority is what
they believe or what they recommend.
A strong contemporary defense of deference can be found in the work of the
Third Wave science studies group led by Collins and Evans (2007). Based on careful
examination of what is involved in becoming an expert in anything, Collins and Evans
aim for a philosophical defense of deference to experts. Within their framework,
expertise is defined primarily in relation to expert communities. Individuals may have
various kinds of expertise depending on how they stand with respect to an expert
community. Collins and Evans have distinguished several forms of expertise, of which
the most relevant to my topic are contributory expertise, interactional expertise, and
primary source knowledge.
Contributory expertise, interpreted within a wide range of enterprises other than
science, consists in having the capacity to move a discussion forward, toward a resolution
of disagreement among experts themselves. People who publish original research in the
specialized literature of a field are contributory experts. The contributory expert helps to
build the expert field through direct extension of what an expert in that field knows.
According to Collins and Evans, contributory expertise can only be acquired by
immersion in the expert community and direct practice in contributing.
Interactional expertise is an understanding of the field sufficient to be in
conversation with experts even if unable to contribute anything new. This form of
expertise involves understanding the methods of the field, and even being able to critique
the application of these methods to scientific problems, but it is expertise developed
toward an end other than contributing new knowledge. Interactional expertise is not just a

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diminished version of contributory expertise but an acquired ability to do a different job.

Interactional expertise is partly generalizable across fields, but it must also be developed
in interaction with contributory experts.
Primary source knowledge is a form of expertise that is acquired at a distance
from the expert community. A person can acquire primary source knowledge by reading
the expert literature. However, this is a very different kind of knowledge than the
knowledge possessed by even a novice contributor. The relationship to the expert field is
completely unidirectional in this case and lacks the tacit knowledge that contributory
experts possess but do not (and maybe cannot) communicate in writing. As Collins and
Weinel (2011, p 402) point out, to become an expert in a technical domain means
acquiring the tacit knowledge pertaining to the domain. As far as is known, there is only
one way to acquire tacit knowledge and that is through some form of socialisation; tacit
knowledge cannot be transferred via written or other symbolic form so some form of
sustained social contact with the group that has the tacit knowledge is necessary. This is
extremely important; it means that no matter how diligently a person studies what has
been written about a topic, that person will still lack important components of expert
judgment.
In short, the argument for deference is that to really understand an expert's
judgment requires prolonged immersion in the material and social world of the expert--in
other words, altering one's life course to become an expert. Attempting to retrace an
expert's reasoning or to evaluate the same evidence the expert had available will not
replicate expert judgment, because tacit knowledge and experience are indispensable
ingredients in such judgments. Except in special conditions where experts'
trustworthiness is compromised, our most rational posture toward expert fields, according
to Collins and Evans, is to believe what they say.
As a design hypothesis, deference works by acknowledging true gaps between
what an expert knows and what can be fully defended to skeptical non-experts. In
sustained questioning of experts by non-experts, a point must always be reached where
the expert "just knows" something that cannot be known in the same way by anyone who
has not been socialized into the expert community. If experts are part of a discussion,
they must be allowed their expertise, even if what they see when they look at evidence is
uninterpretable to anyone else looking at the same evidence.
Collins and Evans describe their own aim as a normative theory of expertise that
includes an approach to the question of who should and who should not be contributing
to decision-making in virtue of their expertise (p. 52). Designing around deference
generally means differentiating among the participants in a discourse and assigning
special communication privileges to some but not others; it may involve forms of
compulsion (such as rules and laws) that take matters out of the realm of individual
reasoning. It can mean limiting the kinds of questions that can be asked of experts or the
kinds of arguments that can be raised against their conclusions. In the vaccination
controversy, laws that require vaccination for enrolment in school enforce deference to
medical science, at least in the US. An individual has options for avoiding compliance,
but not for escaping the societal deference that is paid to medical research.

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4.2 (Dis)trust
A posture of distrust is based on the idea that accepting anything without question is
dangerous and that authority is most dangerous when it is most difficult or most costly to
question. In some places and times, this posture has been accompanied by the assumption
that all citizens are capable of making independent assessments of facts and reasoning if
they are willing to inform themselves--and that they have a duty to do so. In
contemporary practice, this notion leads motivated citizens to conduct exhaustive
"primary source" research on topics of interest to them. The challenge for this posture is
the collapse of the assumption that ordinary citizens, sufficiently motivated, can reach
independent conclusions of a quality equal to the conclusions of experts. If Collins and
Evans are correct about what expertise really consists of, no amount of exposure to
"primary sources" of expert fields will allow the consumer to develop expert judgment.
However, even those who agree with Collins and Evans on the nature of expert
communities do not always give up on the idea that non-experts should withhold trust
until experts themselves have been tested. The idea of retracing and directly evaluating an
expert's reasoning has not completely disappeared within the general public, but among
theorists it has given way to the idea that what can be interrogated is whether the
authority should be trusted. To competently interrogate authority requires a different,
potentially generalizable set of skills, possibly included in what Collins and Evans call
"interactional expertise."
Theoretically, distrust of authority can co-exist nicely with trust in expert opinion,
so long as expert opinion can be evaluated through non-expert questioning. This is
demonstrated in Walton's (1997, 2002) very detailed analyses of arguments from
expertise, which include explorations of how institutions (e.g., courts of law) design
procedures for rigorous testing of whether to admit expert testimony and for specifying
what can be concluded from any particular piece of expert testimony. Distrust is a starting
position from which non-experts can arrive at confidence in experts, but only after those
experts have been thoroughly scrutinized.
As a design hypothesis, distrust operates through audit-like procedures that check
for anything being hidden, anything that might incentivize experts to prefer one judgment
over another, anything that experts might be missing or ignoring, any change in meaning
as an assertion passes from context to context, and so on. This has design implications
both for citizens and for experts, including implications for how to design participation
formats to fit particular controversies: formats that adjust to differing degrees of citizen
trust in expert communities and public bureaucracies. For example, in "post-trust
societies" (as described by Lfstedt, 2005), there may be greater public calls for openness
of information and transparency in how information is used. It can also mean regulating
the experts themselves. Snoeck-Henkemans and Wagemans (2012) pointed out that one
protection that makes it reasonable for patients to trust their physicians is a Dutch law
that requires physicians to cooperate in patients' efforts to get a second medical opinion
when they do have doubts.

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4.3 Delegation
A third design hypothesis, less visible within argumentation theory, is delegation of a
decision through implicit or explicit bilateral agreement. The core idea behind delegation
is that some issues require such sustained analytic effort that the only feasible way to
make progress toward resolution is to transfer responsibility to some trusted person or
group that willingly accepts this responsibility. Where deference and critical trust may be
seen either as epistemic policies or as design hypotheses, delegation really only makes
sense as something designed into a broader framework for making decisions.
Retrospectively, accepting a result from a delegated inquiry may look like any other
argument from expert opinion. Procedurally, it is quite different.
Delegating responsibility for a question implies that the answer will be accepted
once it has been returned from the delegation process, so it is tempting to see this as a
version of the deference posture. But delegation is not just deference, and indeed,
sometimes it involves nothing that could be mistaken for deference to authority. For
example, delegation is the design principle behind use of trial juries, where a judgment
that any citizen is capable of making is handed over to selected individuals who agree to
invest time, attention, and effort in arriving at their judgment.
But delegation is different from deference in another very important respect.
Deference is an acknowledgement that some individual possesses superior knowledge
that others are not in a position to question. Delegation involves a sort of agreement
between the community as a whole and the individuals who take responsibility for the
community's questions about a domain. When important matters are delegated to experts,
it is assumed and often explicitly stated that the experts owe a duty of care to anyone who
depends on their expertise. Delegation may require someone to become an expert on the
question at hand--for example, as a juror--but that expertise does not merit deference
unless understood as part of an implicit contract in which acting in good faith is as
important as being knowledgeable. In other words, deference does not involve any
accountability, while delegation does.
As a design hypothesis, delegation works through a kind of bargain in which
deference to a judgment is promised in exchange for dutiful performance. Without some
form of accountability to ordinary citizens, experts and expert communities may feel that
they deserve deference, but ordinary citizens do not have to agree to this. In such cases,
experts must make their way in argumentation just as any other arguer would.
Scientific fields sometimes behave as though they hold delegated responsibility
for society's knowledge about a domain, and other times behave as though they are
completely autonomous, so using delegation as a tool to understand the role of expertise
in public affairs remains complex. The best contemporary examples of delegation as a
design principle involve explicit bilateral agreements. One model is the practice
associated with "informed consent" for both acceptance of medical procedures and
participation in experimental research. Informed consent specifically acknowledges the
autonomy of the recipient's decision and the obligation of an expert to fully inform the
recipient of benefits and risks associated with each possible decision.
But nothing like informed consent qualifies many of the efforts scientific fields
make to influence public policy. Occasionally, experts demand deference without
acknowledging any duty of care, without manifesting this duty of care in their behavior,

623

and, frequently, with explicit disavowal of any duty of care. Scientific communities
desire autonomy from public accountability, and research literatures reflect interests (and
viewpoints regarding those interests) that acknowledge no duty beyond various forms of
research ethics. But unilateral assertions of authority by experts are not at all the same as
the voluntary delegation of authority to experts--and it should come as no surprise when
members of the public refuse to defer to such unilateral assertions.
The motivation behind delegation is the belief that a problem is of sufficient
complexity to require a great deal of diligence for a good solution. This diligence takes at
least two forms: preparation for attempting the solution (for example through professional
training), and prolonged consideration of the problem from all possible angles. What
makes delegation safer than generalized deference is the assurance that the expert
community will in fact "do due diligence" on behalf of the public. Deferring to expertise
is dangerous when an individual expert or a community of experts refuse to accept a duty
of care. Delegation as a design principle is about structuring a system in which it is
understood that specific people or institutions are responsible, to everyone else with a
stake in the conclusion, for exercising the due diligence needed to understand an issue
and make good decisions as needed.
5. DESIGN HYPOTHESES IN ACTION
Design hypotheses are ideas about how something might be improved, and these ideas
get embedded in invented practices that can achieve surprising levels of permanence as
other practices are built over them. Deference, distrust, and delegation are all deeply
woven into the contemporary practice of argumentation. All three are actively present in
the anti-vaccination controversy, not only as explicit themes in the discourse but also as
features of designed systems that come into play.
Although the idea of deferring to disciplinary expertise (that is, to medical
research rather than to the judgment of individual doctors) is still relatively new in human
history, it has become deeply embedded in technical practices such as randomized
clinical trials for proposed treatments and peer reviewed publication. Public health
authorities, legally empowered to decide for all of us which treatments are safest and
most effective, willingly defer to upstream medical research; downstream, they expect
deference from citizens, and they get it from the vast majority. Most citizens
acknowledge that they are in no position to seriously review the conclusions of experts,
and they willingly defer both to public heath officials and to their own health care
providers. A variety of durable institutional arrangements reflect a decision that society
has already made to defer to medical expertise on matters of public health. This decision
can be revisited--for example, to consider other kinds of expertise that might guide
thinking about public health, such as sociology or economics--but the scale on which this
re-evaluation takes place is not the individual argument from expertise but the design of
these durable institutional arrangements and the highly elaborated technical practices that
represent our current best ideas about how to reason our way to good decisions.
Caution with respect to expert authority is similarly built into the environment in
which the anti-vaccination controversy thrives. Despite the high levels of deference
afforded to medical research, researchers themselves operate under increasing levels of
oversight and scrutiny, mandated by law in many countries (including the US and

624

throughout the EU). Independent ethics committees that review and approve the conduct
of research differ from scientific peer review in having members who are not from the
researcher's own field, and even in some cases members who are not scientists of any
kind. One danger in deferring without question to an expert field is that the members of
the field will become socialized into a common disregard for the values of the
surrounding society. Our designed systems for managing this danger have the flavor of
Walton-like tests for testing an individual expert, but they are adapted to inspecting the
taken-for-granted practices of the expert field. They are built into the environment, and,
besides their direct effects as regulatory mechanisms, they also keep alive the idea that
experts must continue to earn our trust, even after we have made decisions to defer to
them routinely.
6. CONCLUSION
In academic research on the controversy over MMR vaccination, critical attention has
been divided among the small minority of individual parents who resist mandatory or
recommended vaccination, the journalists who amplify fears about vaccination, and the
public health authorities who fail to be responsive to public fears. No doubt some of these
players are performing incompetently.
Design thinking about argumentation draws attention to a rather different class of
questions: for example, about how an innovation like peer review affects a whole
society's capacity for reasonableness, both positively and negatively. If we zoom out to
examine the impact of designed systems for producing, evaluating, and deploying
expertise, our attention is drawn to the overall behavior of these systems, and especially
to their ability to naturalize deference to expert fields while continuously enforcing due
diligence. Most importantly, a design perspective on argumentation draws attention to the
features of the communication environment that are changeable and to what can be done
to make individuals and societies more or less reasonable.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to Scott Jacobs for many helpful suggestions.

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expertise. Argumentation, 25(3), 401-413. doi:10.1007/s10503-011-9217-8
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Mizrahi, M. (2013). Why arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. Informal Logic, 33, 57-79.
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Logical Validity, Bounded Rationality, And Pragma-Dialectics:

Outline Of A Game-Theoretic Naturalization Of Classically-Valid
Argumentation
Justine Jacot, Emmanuel Genot & Frank Zenker
Department of Philosophy
University of Lund
Sweden
justine.jacot@fil.lu.se; emmanuel.genot@fil.lu.se; frank.zenker@fil.lu.se

ABSTRACT: This paper outlines how classical propositional logic, particularly the notion of obtaining
a classically-valid logical proof, can be understood as the outcome of an argumentation-game. We adopt
two game-rules from dialogical logic under which obtaining such as proof is a matter of due course, as
both rules together guarantee a winning-strategy for one player when logical consequence holds. We then
show how these rules can arise from players preferences, rather than be imposed externally, and can
hence count as player self-imposable. Subsequently, this game is shown to comply with the Pragmadialectical Code of Conduct, while some of the Codes rules become gratuitous as their content arises
directly from players preferences instead. Our discussion is oriented towards future inquiries into how
logics other than its classical variant can be similarly naturalized.
KEYWORDS: game theory, classical logic, proof, proponent, opponent, winning-strategy, pragmadialectical code of conduct rules.

1. INTRODUCTION
Viewing logic as one language game among many, Ludwig Wittgenstein had offered an
analogy between having a proof and winning a game (Wittgenstein, 1953). The formal
details of this analogy have been mostly studied by formal logicians who, in viewing
logical proofs as regimented argumentation-procedures, sought to give an argumentative
characterization of logic. 1 Game-theory in particular became a natural framework to
model episodes of natural language argumentation that characterizes logical inference,
giving rise to game-theoretic semantics (GTS) (Hintikka & Sandu, 1997) and dialogical
logic (DL) (Rahman & Keiff, 2005) as the two main approaches.
GTS and DL partially reduce logic to argumentation-procedures by restricting
players strategies so that games realize the model-checking procedures and proof
procedures typical of logical inference. The motivation for such restrictions, however,
remains internal2 to the model, receiving primarily pragmatic justification through
successfully recovering logical inference formally from particular constraints on
argumentation. This article shows DL-restrictions that are imposed to recover first-order
logical consequence from argumentation to be instead forthcoming from preference1

Logic had thus returned to its origins in argumentation, if one views Aristotelian logic to emerge from
the argumentative practices in the Academy and the Lyceum (Robinson, 1971), being proceeded by the
Socratic elenchus, among others. For a brief historical overview, see Dipert, Hintikka, & Spade (2014),
and Hintikka (1996).
2

Our use of internal and external breaks with standard game-theory where preferences are part of the
definition of a game set-up, and in this sense internal to the game, while restrictions imposed on players
strategies to guarantee a proof are called externalities whenever being independent of such preferences.

627

profiles of boundedly rational players. Such players, we take it, cannot optimize their
strategies because they lack the ability to compute complete representations of a game,
while we understand constraints on such a game to be player-self-imposable through
strategic reasoning (provably) equivalent to the elimination of dominated strategies.
The following outlines how classical propositional logic, particularly the notion
of obtaining a classically-valid logical proof, can be understood as the outcome of an
argumentation-game (2.1), and introduce two game-rules under which obtaining it is a
matter of due course, for both rules together guarantee a winning-strategy (2.2), then
raise the claim that the strategies adopted by players in this game are player selfimposable, because these same strategies may be inferred from players preferences by
(reasoning employing) a maximin-principle (Sect. 2.3 to 2.5). Subsequently, this game
is shown to comply with the Pragma-dialectical Code of Conduct (3.1), but that some
among the Codes rules are gratuitous, so to speak, whenever normative content already
arises from players preferences (3.2). Our discussion, in Sect. 4, is oriented towards
future inquiries into how logics other than its classical variant might similarly be
naturalized. We close with brief conclusions in Sect. 5.
2. THE GAME-THEORETIC APPARATUS
To start, we will sketch the elements of an argumentation-game as they appear from a
game-theoretic perspective, introducing further relevant notions as we go along.
2.1. Logic as an argumentative game
The players choice of a language, L, is a preliminary step to any language game.
Agreement on the language in which the argumentation will be couched determines the
actions arguers can take (e.g., how to attack and defend complex sentences; how to
assess an atoms truth value). We restrict L to a propositional language corresponding to
a fragment of vernacular English where basic sentences (aka atoms) contain a subject
phrase referring to individuals, a verb phrase, and terms referring to individuals, e.g.
The cat is on the mat; Alice is taller than Bob. Complex L-sentences combine
atoms through connectives (and, or, if then), and locutions equivalent to negation
(is not, or it is not the case that), or locutions that combine such complex sentences,
collectively called operators.
Given a language L, a proof demonstrates that a conclusion C follows from a set
P of premises. We will here be mostly concerned with the semantic view, where P
collects situations where the sets members are true, and to prove C is to demonstrate
that C is true in every situation.3 In a DL game, the proponent (PRO) is committed that
C is true if P is assumed, while the opponent (OPP) is committed that C may be false in
at least one case where all members of P are true. In order to prove C, PRO must
demonstrate that, once OPP concedes P explicitly, C is conceded implicitly. Players
legitimate moves are attacks, which ask for explicit commitment to the consequences of
a statement, and defenses, which incur commitments. A moves legitimacy is partly
determined by L; both players are allowed the same moves. Independently of the PRO
or OPP role, for instance, if player X states A and B then player Y can constrain her to
3

Viewed syntactically, P is a set of grammatically well-formed L-sentences, so to prove C is to

demonstrate that, using only the grammatical rules of L, C can be obtained by a transformation and a
combination of P-members.

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commit to A, to commit to B, or to both. If player X states A or B, then player Y can

only constrain her to commit to (at least) one of the disjuncts, while X retains the option
to commit to A, or to B, or to both. In tree form, Table 1 provides the complete set of
attacks and defenses. Atoms are noted and are indexed by 1 or 2 when these occur
in complex sentences; the prefix Y? indicates an attack, followed by the specific
sentence it targets, where some attacks allow to ask for a commitment that, when
relevant, is specified after a forward-slash (/). These rules can be applied
systematically to any sentence player X has stated, eventually forcing X to commit to a
basic sentence or its negation.

Table 1. Attacks and defenses for a propositional language L in tree form.

2.2 Structural rules that guarantee a winning-strategy
Provided the conclusion, C, is a finite statement, OPP is restricted to a finite number of
genuine attacks, i.e., excluding repetitions. As we saw above, asking PRO to commit to
complex expressions eventually brings it about that OPP asks PRO to commit to a
literal, i.e., an atom, or its negation. (By convention, negated atoms cannot be attacked.)
The first of the two structural rules, the Structural Rule for Literals (abbreviated SR-L),
amounts to PRO having the last say in a play, only if she can, using merely the
premises, P, defend C in that play. SR-L restricts only PROs strategies.
Structural Rule for Literals (SR-L): Unless OPP has previously stated
the literal A, PRO cannot defend herself against an attack that requires
of her to state A.
The second, the Structural Rule for Repetitions (SR-R), prevents delay-tactics. After all,
by repeating a genuine attack, one player could keep denying the other players win, and
so (forever) delay reaching the plays end-state.

629

Structural Rule for Repetitions (SR-R): Should player X have

previously attacked statement A of player Y to which player Y has
responded, then X cannot repeat this attack.
Together with agreement on the meaning of Ls logical terms laid out in the attack and
defense-rules in Sect. 2.1, these two rules suffice for representing argumentative games
in tree form. The analogy between proving and winning a game thus gains precision.
We now turn to the strategic reasoning of the players.
2.3 Strategy selection
Game theory generally explains strategy-selection by an inference called elimination of
dominated strategies. This inference considers all strategies available to players, ranks
these on an outcome-ordered ordinal scale, and eliminates all strategies but that, or
those, at the highest rank. (Once eliminated, the succession of moves such strategies
consists of is not played.) Leaving implicit those preferences that are instrumental in
generating the outcome-ordered strategy ranking has, in our opinion, prevented
argumentative approaches to logic from becoming genuinely game-theoretic treatments.
As we now argue, these shortcomings prevent DL from describing genuine language
games, which thus fails to resonate with its self-professed Wittgensteinian origins. As
we also argue, however, DL semantics can be suitably fixed.4 The required
modifications apply at each of the following steps:
At step (1), each player must be provided with a preference-profile over the
games outcomes. From it, one may infer players preferences over all possible moves
of a play, thus postulating an inference from outcome-preferences to move-preferences.
A genuine import from game-theory would otherwise be hard to discern.
At step (2), the rules SR-L and SR-R are promoted from being reasonable gamerules to the status of player-self-imposed restrictions. Here, one might postulate another
inference that derives both rules from players preference-profiles. But players might as
well agree upon these restrictions explicitly, making them non-inferred game-rules that
promote players interests (see the next section).
At step (3), one requires some explanation on how players can each prefer
selecting a strategy that, in combination with the other players strategy, gives rise to a
paircalled a strategy-profilewhich would be mapped to a semantic proof obtained
when implementing mechanical constructions that guarantee this proof to terminate if
and only if C follows from P.
As we show in the next section, comparatively weak assumptions suffice to
equip players with suitable preferences.

A tentative explanation why this option had not been considered much earlier, crucially in the Erlangen
school (see Krabbe (2006)), is that the requisite reasoning had (falsely) been viewed to demand of players
abilities that are equivalent to mathematical induction. After all, in logic and proof theory, it is
mathematical induction that is normally used to reason about logical proofs (aka meta-logic or metamathematics). However, mathematical induction is here required only to prove that a given proof strategy
will be successful, but is not required to implement a proof strategy. So a game-theoretic approach to
logic could well have internalized reasoning-about-proofs within a given proof, and thus strictly
subordinate logical reasoning to meta-logical, or meta-mathematical, reasoning.

630

2.4 Preferences
Being rather natural ones, our assumptions seemingly describe but mildly idealized
arguers. Furthermore, a single inference-principlecalled Harsanyi-Maximin,
introduced belowapparently suffices to let players (i) individually select movepreferences, (ii) jointly self-impose the game-restricting rules SR-L and SR-R, and (iii)
jointly select only strategy-profiles that generate the equivalent of systematic tableaux
proofs. These assumptions have been formalized in Genot & Jacot (2014). The
following provides an informal version:
A1
Meaning Coordination
Players have coordinated on the meaning of logical operators, and have
the means for disambiguating non-logical terms.5
A2
Asymmetric Burden
Players agree that, to win the game, PRO must meet every challenge
raised by OPP, and so must win every play; OPP may challenge PRO
by raising all alternatives compatible with the common ground, and
OPP subsequently wins the game as soon as he has won a play.
A3
Comparative Efficiency
Both players prefer games with fewer to those with more moves.
A4
Termination over Frustration
Both players prefer losing a play, or a game, over playing indefinitely
long.
A5
Imperfect Foresight
Both players ability to anticipate the others moves is limited.
A6
Common Knowledge6
Both players know A1 to A5 to be the case.
As sketched in Sect. 2.1, A1 can be satisfied by players agreeing on rules for attacks and
defenses for connectives, and by their referencing atoms ostensibly (i.e., pointing to a
terms referent).7 A2 is equivalent to having agreed on semantic consequence,8 while an

Non-logical terms comprise noun-phrases, verb-phrases, etc.; disambiguating these is understood to be

part of linguistic competence.
6

Unlike A1 to A5, which are both necessary conditions to obtain proofs from games, A6 is sufficient but
not necessary. Also a weaker assumption may do, such as a belief in the other players rationality (see
Genot & Jacot (2014)).
7

Genot & Jacot (2014) use pointing to abstract representations such as vertices and edges of a graph to
disambiguate atoms, where a vertex represents an individual, and a labeled path of length n represents an
n-ary predicate. The representations are motivated cognitively, as they share properties of perceptual
representation.
8

Agreement to consider some, but not all possibilities compatible with P yields a non-monotonic logic
where, once drawn, a previously agreed-upon conclusion can nevertheless be retracted if this agreement is
subsequently revised, for instance upon taking into consideration additional possibilities, including

631

explicit notion thereof remains gratuitous as long as it is well-defined how a play is won
(which occurs by agreement on L). A3 is immediate whenever playing is costly, for
instance time-wise. A4 is reasonable whenever players can contemplate the prospects of
winning future games, while they might lose the present one. A5 typically holds for
boundedly rational self-knowledgeable players unable to grasp the games full
combinatorial structure, and assuming as much of the other player. A6 holds whenever
players explicitly agree to A1 to A5, in the sense that each then knows that the other
does, too.
As a consequence of assuming bounded rationality, players cannot be
meaningfully said to distribute probabilities over alternative courses of the game, and so
cannot form rational expectations based on these. They can, however, always apply the
rationality principle that Harsanyi (1977) proposed for reasoning in games where
(probabilistic) expectations are not well-defined:
Harsanyi Maximin (HM): If player X cannot form rational expectations
about the probability that Y will not select the strategy leading to Xs least
preferred outcome, then X should play the strategy that best responds to
Ys most detrimental strategy for X.9
The rationale for HM consists in a simple consequentialist consideration: acting as HM
prescribes guarantees minimizing losses that are incurred in worst case scenarios.
Hence, for HM to be applied, it must be clear what the most detrimental strategy is.
Together with A1 to A4, HM suffices in DL-games to vindicate informal arguments that
are typically provided for the collapse of symmetrical options in dialogical games to the
asymmetrical rules of semantic tableaux. More importantly, as is shown in the next subsection, from HM, together with A1 to A4, SR-L and SR-R can be obtained as selfimposed strategic principles. Finally, if players agree to sequentially conduct all plays
necessary to demonstrate whether PRO has a winning-strategy, or not, then this
sequence simulates a tree proof. As noted above, when L is a first-order language, the
possibility of infinite plays arises, and consensus can therefore only be found in the
limit, by assuming that infinite plays are won by OPP.
2.5 Structural rules as self-imposed constraints
Formal proofs are given in Genot & Jacot (2014) that HM suffices to (i) collapse the
best options for PRO and OPP to tree-building rules, (ii) obtain SR-L and SR-R as selfimposed restrictions, and (iii) lead players to realize proofs. We point readers to this
paper for the third claim and will not separately treat the first claim here, either, as
particle rules depend on the language L and thus on the pre-play agreement. But the
second claim concerns structural rules which are in force in any DL-game, and for any
language. How boundedly rational arguers can self-impose the structural rules SR-L and
counterexamples formerly disregarded. Such agreement is independent of the players agreement on L,
and so depends on their preferences.
9

The most detrimental strategy, aka the worst case, for X is not always the best case for Y. In our games,
the worst case for either player is to be denied victory in a play through the other players use of a
delaying tactic. But this tactic is never the best one for any player using it. After all, the outcome of the
game would be unnecessarily delayed, so both players would incur a loss, and so both players
preferences (as expressed in A3 and A4) would be satisfied to a lesser degree.

632

SR-R should therefore be relevant to the reduction of logical reasoning, classical or

other, to argumentation. We now sketch how SR-L and SR-R can be justified
argumentatively.
As for SR-L, the strongest position for the proponent of a thesis C in a pro and
contra argumentation entails the ability to always support C ex concessis, i.e., through
arguments raised by the opponent. In PROs case, then, supporting C comes down to
supporting those literals for which PRO has incurred commitments as a consequence of
upholding a commitment to C vis--vis OPPs doubt about C. PRO can maintain the
strongest position only if these same literals have previously been stated by OPP. And
were PRO about to state a literal A that OPP had not yet stated, then PROs worst case
would consists in OPP systematically avoiding to state A. Since, qua A4, PRO cannot
form a rational expectation as to the probability of OPP avoiding to state A, qua HM,
PRO should never state literals, unless these had first been stated by OPP.
Turning now to SR-R, consider cases where PRO might want to repeat an attack,
because PROs previous attempt to obtain a suitable literal A from OPP had failed,
while PRO could possibly obtain a better response through repetition. PROs worst case
here consists in OPP repeating the response that had already proved non-suitable to
PRO. Qua HM, PRO should therefore not repeat the attack. Doing so would merely
extend the play, but bring no further benefits, an option that is ruled out by the
preference expressed in A3.
OPPs reasons to enforce the content of SR-R are symmetrical to PROs reasons,
as the only situation where an attack-repetition is plausible is exactly that where PRO
has answered all previous attacks. And even here, OPP could at best hope, but not
rationally expect that PRO might, upon OPPs repetition of the attack, give responses
that PRO cannot defend. The worst case for OPP, then, is that course of the game where
PRO selects the same responses that PRO had previously managed to defend. Qua HM,
as above, therefore also OPP should not repeat the attack.
3. COMPARISON WITH THE CODE OF CONDUCT
Players choices with respect to L, and with respect to preferences, may yield
argumentation-games that instantiate different systems of logical inference. In
particular, starting from an impoverished L, characterizing players preferences through
the assumptions A1 to A6, and using the Harsanyi Maximin principle (HM) suffice in
order to obtain classical logic, modulo quantifiers. On these, see Genot & Jacot (2014).
Classical logic is therefore said to result from self-imposed restrictions when
argumentation is treated as a game that to win presupposes the existence of a winningstrategy, but not knowledge of its existence. This provides a formally precise sense in
which logic can in principle emerge from arguers preferences, thus clarifying the
Wittgensteinian analogy mentioned in the introduction.
Were the formal relation between logic and arguer-preferences more fully
understood, then one might perhaps obtain one from, and in terms of, the other. Until
future research has shown as much, a modest but no less important insight is that
classical logic needs no mentioning in normative argumentation-rules for it to
nevertheless dictate the games winner, because the constraints that make classical logic
the ruler can arise from arguers preferences, and so need not be explicit.
In the remainder, we argue that reaching a consensus on the kind of logical
consequence that shall apply for some argumentation-game, amounts to endorsing a
particular specification of the Code of Conduct in the Pragma-dialectical theory (PD),

633

and so may be viewed as a special case thereof. Sect. 3.1 compares the fifteen PD-rules
to our structural rules. SR-L and SL-R are said to be specifications of PD-rules
whenever the Code does not prevent participants from specifying its content in this way.
We moreover discuss the assumptions A1 to A6 vis--vis PDs higher-order conditions
that are placed on arguers seeking to settle a difference of opinion on the merits, and
provide a brief discussion of the HM-principle (Sect. 3.2).
3.1 Comparison of Structural Rules with PD-rules
We assume familiarity with the fifteen Pragma-dialectical discussion-rules, aka the
Code of Conduct. Its latest version is found in Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004),
123-157; Zenker (2007a) compares it to the Codes 1984 version. We refer to the
Codes n-th rule as PD-n.
The structural rule for repetitions (SR-R) is a near-verbatim copy of PD-13,
serving the same function: preventing delays. In contrast, the content of the structural
rule for literals (SR-L) specifies more than one PD-rule. Moreover, some specifications
of the Code arising from SR-L do so in combination with the assumptions A1 to A6, as
will be discussed further below.
SR-L distributes the proponent and opponent rules, which remain the same
throughout the game, thus specifying PD-4. Moreover, SR-L specifies the right to
challenge, thus specifying PD-2, assigning it to OPP, and the obligation to respond to a
challenge, thus specifying PD-3, assigning it to PRO. This allocation, in turn, implies a
corresponding distribution of the burden of proof, regulated likewise through mutual
implication in PD-3. Provided that players agree on the circumstances of winning qua
accepting SR-L, this also specifies PD-5, for players now agree on a successful attack,
and a successful defense, in this discussion. (Recall that, per SR-R, a successful
attackof the claim that C follows from Pmust not have been used already in the
same discussion; and that a successful defense of that claim may not recur to material
other than that conceded by OPP.)
PD-6 demands that players attack and defend only by argumentation. We do not
so much take PD-6 to be specified, but to be implied by SR-L and SR-R. After all,
neither SR-L nor SR-R leave room for moves other than argumentative attacks and
defenses. Thus, one may not strictly need PD-6 in the sense of a necessary condition for
the resolution of a difference on opinion, provided certain preferences. Similarly, for a
critical discussion the rules PD-7, PD-8, and PD-9 demand that participant-agreement is
reached on a successful attack and defense of a propositional content and of its
justificatory potential, and on a conclusive defense. Such definitions are effectively
provided by SR-L, along with Asymmetric Burden (A2), to which we return below.
Moreover, if we view the defense of a sub-standpoint, regulated in PD-9, to amount to
winning a play, as opposed to winning a game, then SR-L and A2 jointly imply the
content of PD-9.
PD-10 and PD-11 assign the right to attack and to defend undefended
standpoints to the proponent and the opponent, respectively. We had only introduced a
single standpoint, expressed as: C follows from P. Therefore, neither PD-10 and PD-11,
nor their negations, apply to our argumentation-game; hence these rules cannot be
violated, either; a fortiori they cannot be meaningfully called necessary. Having
discussed PD-13 above, PD-14, which assigns an obligation to retract upon a conclusive
defense, is implied by SR-L. Finally, PD-15 states an unconditional right to demand
usage-declaratives. This is either not needed (when stipulating players to assign truth

634

values without analyzing the meaning of literals) or assumption A1 states as much, but
also more (see Sect. 3.2). Finally, PD-1, which denies special preparatory conditions on
arguers or their arguments, can be viewed as being fulfilled, but has no direct or indirect
counterpart in the assumptions A1 to A6.
In sum, the Code of Conduct does not bar logical argumentation from occurring
as a result of playing, with suitable preferences, according to PD-rules. This being so is
far from incidental, and should rather be viewed as a desired consequence of the PD
model. At any rate, our rules and assumptions yield a limiting case of the Code, while it
also became clear that the content of PD-rules that regulate agreement on a conclusive
attack and defense are not needed as explicit rules.
In Sect. 2, players preferences as to how the game should be played were shown
to arise on the assumptions A1 to A6. We now turn to these.
3.2 The assumptions A1 to A6, and the HM rationality-principle
Immediately above, Meaning Coordination (A1) was seen to be slightly stronger than
PD-15, for A1 assumes players to coordinate successfully, while the Code merely
reserves the right to demand usage declaratives, without stipulating semantic success.
Asymmetric Burden (A2) amounts to a definition of winning a play, and thus the game,
for both PRO and OPP. It hence specifies PD-7 to PD-9, along with both of our
structural rules, as discussed above. Comparative Efficiency (A3) spells out an
assumption that seemingly fails to correspond to any PD-rule, but neither is A3 in
violation of the Code. The same holds for the remaining three assumptions: Termination
over Frustration (A4), Imperfect Foresight (A5), and Common Knowledge (A6). As
stated, A4 characterizes a preference of players to rather seek playing the
argumentation-game, while the constraint A5 mirrors players cognitive limitation, of
which A6 says that players know it. All assumptions are compatible with the Code.
Further, in PD, so-called higher-order conditions spell out additional features on
arguers, for instance, their willingness to settle a dispute. See Zenker (2007b)for a nonexhaustive list of such conditions. We find it plausible to view A4 to A6 as higher-order
conditions that describe what one might reasonably expect on behalf of boundedly
rational players and their cognitive states. Also, endorsing HM as a rationality principle
may be understood as a higher order condition. As we saw, HM ensures that, if an
argumentation-game has a winning-strategy, then PRO or OPP will find it. Recognition
of HM, or a principle similar to it, bars player X from assuming that Y plays anything
but that strategy, or those strategies, on which Y eventually wins the game, if Y could
win, and vice versa. Therefore, as HM states, the best response to any such Y-strategy is
for player X to pursue a strategy that does not in principle fail to reach the same goal, so
both players are kept from playing in ways that lead nowhere near the desired result
anytime soon.
While HM amounts to a generalized form of pessimism, nothing in the Code
keeps HM from applying to players or to their game. For idealized arguersidealized
with respect to possessing sophisticated game-theoretic knowledgeHM is clearly a
reasonable choice. But we cannot find that HM would even be questionable for
boundedly rational arguers. After all, when properly understood, the content of HM is
hardly more complex than the final sentence of the previous paragraph. Put differently,
failure to understand, or to endorse, HM would arise from cognitive, emotional, or
perhaps ecological boundaries outside the normal range of boundedly rational agents.

635

All the same, HM remains a genuinely game-theoretic principle of rational interaction.

Its acceptance by players, as a rationality principle, cannot be motivated other than by
explicitly viewing argumentation as a game whose outcome depends on the way in
which a strategy-profile, i.e., the particular pair of strategies chosen by X and Y,
generates the games outcome.
4. DISCUSSION
The Code of Conduct provided by the Pragma-dialectical theory (PD) normatively
governs attacks and defenses of a standpoint in a merit-based critical discussion aimed
at a resolution of a difference of opinion, or consensus, where arguers assume the
dialectical roles of proponent and opponent. This framework was seen to be consonant
with attempts at capturing logic as formal argumentation, understood as a
Wittgensteinian language game, as currently implemented in dialogical logic (DL) and
game-theoretic semantics (GTS). All three approaches view natural language
argumentation as an interactive process between a proponent, who states and
argumentatively supports a thesis, and an opponent attacking it.
Logic is regularly equated with the rules one should apply to implement logical
reasoning, thereby deriving a valid consequence from the premises; DL and GTS make
no exception to this, as both represent logic in a game by imposing logical rules onto its
players. Equating logic with its rules, however, is in conflict with the view ascribed to
Wittgenstein, above: what matters in a language game are not the rules, but the players
goals and preferences. For players who self-regulate their argumentative conduct, the
status of logical rules was consequently seen to be demoted to that of a description,
useful for instance when instructing newcomers pursuing the same goals. Wittgensteins
view being in principle vindicated by the theory of games that DL and GTS build on,
players can therefore dispense with such rules altogether, at least as primitive notions.
Embracing this demotion of logical rules brings DL and GTS closer to their professed
philosophical and methodological sources. So far, however, both DL and GTS do not
yet characterize players who meaningfully prefer arguing logically, as opposed to being
forced to do so.
We have indicated how to tell a different story: take a fragment of natural
language (restricted to noun phrases, verb phrases, and any complements needed) no
more expressive than a formal propositional language; then understand logical
argumentation taking place between a proponent and an opponent as the outcome of a
particular type of argumentation-game; finally, provide sufficient conditions under
which players preferences and abilities restrict their argumentative moves to logically
valid inferences. In this way, enforcing the consensus through the imposition of logical
rules becomes superfluous, for logical rules now emerge from a game where welldefined preferences are ascribed to players who achieve meaning-coordination.
Importantly, our assumptions about players preferences and abilities were said to
characterize boundedly rational agents, thus remaining much closer to human reasoners
than to the ideal reasoners typically assumed in DL and GTS approaches.
Comparing what such assumptions induce with the Pragma-dialectical Code of
Conduct, we observed a similarity between natural-language argumentation and logical
argumentation that is far from incidental. Some of our assumptions on players abilities
and preferences were seen to be specifications of the Codes rules, or its higher order
conditions, while assumptions that remained unrelated to the Code did not violate its
normative content. Hence, logical argumentation can arise within the Pragma-dialectical

636

framework for a critical discussion among boundedly rational players without assuming
prior knowledge of, or explicit agreement on, the norms of logic. This being as it should
be, we hope to have made understandable how logic can systematically emerge from
natural language argumentative practice.
5. CONCLUSION
While our story here had ended with classical propositional logic, the main result
presented in the present paper has been successfully extended to full classical first-order
logic (Genot & Jacot, 2014). Consistent with the conjecture that a similar story can be
told for logics ontogenesis, only a natural language and boundedly rational players
were taken to be necessary to make a first step towards a naturalization of logic. To
carry this naturalization-attempt further, future research should be conducted in a
theoretical and in an empirical manner. Similar argumentative accounts of logic should
be extended to non-classical logics, by considering richer natural language fragments,
for instance, as well as different goals and preferences. Moreover, assumptions that
constrain players preferences and abilities should be validated, e.g., in focus interviews,
but also through systematic experimental work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
For comments and useful criticism, we thank the audience at the 2014 ISSA conference,
1-4 July, 2014, Amsterdam, as well as Jeroen Smid, John Woods, Maurice Finocchiaro,
and Erik Krabbe. The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from the Swedish
Research Council (VR) and the Lund University Information Quality Research Group
(LUIQ) led by Erik J. Olsson. For an extended manuscript that significantly extends
Sect. 2 and 4 of the present paper, please contact the first author.

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Creating Disagreement By Self-Abasement. Apologizing As A

Means Of Confrontational Strategic Maneuvering
Jeroen Jansen
Dutch Studies
University of Amsterdam
Netherlands
j.jansen@uva.nl

ABSTRACT: The analysis of the different stages in a preface to a stage play (1617) by Gerbrand Bredero makes
clear that antitheses, exaggerated modesty and self-humiliation may be used as strategic tools in the
confrontation stage. The disagreement between protagonist and the primary audience has been created in the
confrontation stage by polarizing the parties' attitude towards each other.
KEYWORDS: Antitheses, Apologizing, Confrontational Strategic Maneuvering, Disagreement, Double
audience, Modesty, Polarization, Self-Humiliation

1. INTRODUCTION
It is an open secret that European debate, which is characterized as a rather formal discussion,
becomes livelier and even biting in election time. The discussants have in fact a double role.
On the one hand they discuss with each other in a reasonable way, in accordance with the
parliamentary conventions. On the other hand, conscious of the role of media in forming
impressions of public opinion, they push the boundaries to play to their electoral audiences,
aiming at successes with a much wider circle of voters and public opinion. The parliament is
a public discussion arena with plenty of possibilities to engage the public and voters (Van
Haaften, 2010; Te Velde, 2003). Therefore, parliamentary debate has two main audiences,
the parliament as well as the society. As a consequence, it has a double institutional goal,
reaching decisions by prevailing rules and procedures, but also giving an account to the
public, a goal that is linked to the protagonist's relation to public and voters. To win the
support of potential voters, members of parliament try to get - to quote Yvon Tonnard (2011)
- their party's priority issues `on the table'. Moreover, this addressing of a dual audience has a
direct influence on the way one has to maneuver strategically: in the choice from the topical
potential, in audience-directed framing of argumentative moves, as well as in the purposive
use of presentational choices one not only has to deal with parliamentary rules for the debate
but also with one's personal relation to the voters and with public opinion (Van Haaften,
2010).
However, my paper is not on European parliamentary debate, but on the preface of a
Dutch stage play of which the first edition appeared in 1617 (Bredero, 1999, pp. 14-17). The
author of both the preface and the stage play is the famous seventeenth century Amsterdam
playwright Gerbrand Bredero (1585-1618). The text in question is a preface to Bredero's
comedy Moortje (`The little Moor'). This comedy is an adaptation in Dutch of the comedy
Eunuch by the ancient Roman playwright Terence (2th century BC).
The comparison between this preface and the parliamentary situation has been drawn
as a preface in a printed book is also a public arena in which the author may strategically
exploit a comparable double focus towards a primary addressed antagonist and a wider
audience (Cf. Van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 108-110). In this specific preface, the starting point is
the protagonist's explicitly addressing of Neo-Latin professors (of the Leiden University), a
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relatively small elite group in society, whereas his secondary audience will have consisted in
a general reading public of non Neo-Latinists, common, vernacular readers comparable with
the protagonist's background. As we will see this dual audience enabled him to strategically
exploit antitheses, exaggerated modesty and self-humiliation. In fact they are strategic tools
in the confrontation stage of this preface and the double audience-group has influenced the
way in which strategic maneuvering is accomplished, especially by way of the polarizing
moves.
The use of antitheses in this preface has made it possible for the protagonist to start
the defence in the argumentation stage from a seemingly underdog position, reacting on the
issues raised in the confrontation and opening stages. This underdog position constitutes an
optimal possibility to defend the standpoint at issue and to constitute an attack on the
standpoint of the antagonist that the adaptation and publication of the play is not justified, as
it enables the author to deal with the (supposed) criticism of the scholarly Neo-Latinists.
2. POLARIZING MOVES
How has this strategy been prepared in the confrontation stage?1 As we will see, the
supposed criticism of the antagonist is designed and shaped by a kind of self-reflection,
including self-abasement and apologizing phrasings. Obviously, as an apology may be
regarded as a reaction to a "willful violation of a mutually binding norm", the `offence' (in
this case the publication of Bredero's adaptation) could have been considered as "an
apologizable offense", the responsible actor as a `wrongdoer' reacting in terms of sorrow and
asking a contrition for the harm done, seeking "forgiveness from the offended party"
(Tavuchis, 1991, pp. 120-121). In my view though, Bredero's apologizing has not really been
used in its role of litigation (cf. Taft, 2000), but rather to bring about an antithesis that is
crucial for the way in which the issue is discussed. The difference of opinion is created by
firstly yielding with the supposed criticism (`... I fear that you will condemn me alive as a
murderer'), depicting the own act and the product of it as something inferior.
In the confrontation stage Bredero is maneuvering strategically with the choice of
presentational devices. It starts with the proposition that the author of the play has been very
audacious in adapting Terence, as he is an `unlearned' writer and belongs to the non-scholars.
Without having been in a Latin school he still has chosen this model of pure Latin to write an
adapted version in the Amsterdam dialect. It marks the start of a difference of opinion
between protagonist and antagonist initially on the basis that Bredero has published this
adaptation; the preface is an introduction to (and justification of) this publication.
The difference of opinion is created by way of a polarizing maneuver, suggesting that
the opponent actually holds the opposite standpoint to the protagonist and will condemn the
act of translating and adapting a Latin play to vernacular by an unlearned writer, as well as
the publication of it. The address to the small elite group of learned Latin scholars is as
strategic as understandable. These Leiden professors are authorities in the classical field and
supposed experts in the Latin play by Terence. Moreover, this address enables the protagonist
to make a polarizing move, effectively aiming at starting the discussion with a situation of
created difference of opinion, attributing a counter-standpoint to his opponents (cf. Tonnard,
2011, pp. 73ff., 112ff.). In terms of presentational devices, Bredero's use of antitheses in the
confrontation and opening stages shows a lot of indulgence concerning the difference of
opinion about the publication, like: the antagonists are right; the author has been most daring;
the product is miserable and the condemnation of it will be appropriate. Bredero uses a kind
1. See the Appendix. The Dutch version of this preface in: Bredero, 2011, pp. 200-213.

640

of conciliatio, in which the propositional content of his argument must have been acceptable
for the antagonist (cf Van Eemeren, 2010, p. 208). In the end it will support Brederos own
standpoint.
But there the `tolerance' seems to end. As Bredero has published this play, the
intended purpose of the preface is explaining why he did so. From a strategic perspective the
indulgence showed by the protagonist shapes a kind of common ground from which he can
argue with the most beneficial effect in a later stage.
In fact the confrontation and the opening stage overlap: the topic at issue is identified
and the positions assumed by the participants in the difference of opinion are taken. Hereby
the standpoint of the antagonist is elaborated by the protagonist. At the same time the
protagonist clearly appoints where the parties engaged in the difference of opinion has to
commit themselves to act as a protagonist and antagonist. Common ground is easily found
where the protagonist takes the lower rank and praises the Latin and the author Terence.
Moreover, his excuses continue in expressions of self-abasement:
Not only have I let him [Terence] change his unsurpassed excellence of talking but I have impertinently
taken the invented history from the treasury of the world, from that imperial Rome. But the awful thing
is, that I dragged it towards my hometown and broke it on the wheel. For this reason I fear that you will
condemn me alive as a murderer. [...] If I tortured him a bit, I am dearly sorry. I did not mean to treat
him in such a harsh way.

These apologies are obvious responses to an implicit accusation (Kauffeld, 1998). But is it
with that an `authentic apology' (cf. Taft, 2000, p. 1147)? Rather does the apologizing
function as to confront and argue about commonly accepted opinions, informing the reader
about generally accepted norms and values (cf. Villadsen, 2014): Bredero is looking after the
interest of his non-Latinist fellow citizens (see below). The antitheses by way of oppositional
textual elements have been strategically used as they underline the protagonist's attempts to
prevent any criticism of having published his drama.
Reasonableness is shown, "in a well-considered way in view of the situation
concerned" (Van Eemeren, 2010, p. 29), as the protagonist has thought for intersubjective
arguments from both protagonist and antagonist, and tries to resolve a (shaped) difference of
opinion (Van Eemeren, 2010, p. 32). In other words, the moves that are made are in
agreement with the prevailing standards of reasonableness and in the opening stage the point
of departure is reasonably established.
However, the contrasted wording is not only capable of attracting the attention of the
reader but it enables him to create new contraries out of terms that have not been previously
opposed for the reader (Andone, 2006, p. 88). In her study on rhetorical figures in science
Fahnestock analyses how the argumentative effects of antithesis, a pattern consisting of
opposing terms, may be experienced encouraging the readers to follow it (Fahnestock, 1999,
p. 69): "The ability to perceive the pattern in an antithesis, to fulfill its predictions and even to
feel its force, is part of the competence of an experienced user of the language". The
anagonist is invited to interpret the protagonist's intention as a true, heartfelt and fair-minded
opinion about himself and the addressee. In other words the antithesis clearly has functional
patterns, giving presence to a selection of elements and placing others into the background. In
the meantime the readers are framed as to accept the proposed oppositions (Fahnestock,
1999: pp. 68-70; Andone, 2006, p. 88). From an argumentative view, however, this antithesis
enables Bredero to explain his own standpoint and to formulate arguments to easily reject
those of the antagonist who is appointed an opposite position. Whether the antagonist
actually takes this standpoint, is irrelevant in this monologue text: the antagonist is expected
to do so as the protagonist is defending himself against an implicit accusation that belongs to

641

such an opposite position.

Thus the difference of opinion exists by the antagonist's interpretation of a
(proleptically formulated) accusation from the antagonist that needs at least clarification (cf.
Andone, 2010, p. 88). But instead of clarifying it from the start, the protagonist first and
foremost puts on the hair shirt, characterizing the own position as low and week, describing
the own act as audacious and as a "foolish boldness". By self-abasement the distance between
protagonist and antagonist is further accentuated. In this way, the dialectical goal of defining
the difference of opinion has been deliberately brought out of balance in order to enlarge the
starting situation from which the protagonist, in the argumentation stage, achieves the
rhetorical goal in his favor. In other words, in the confrontation and opening stages the
balance between satisfying the dialectical and pursuing the rhetorical goals is in fact
undermined by the desire to be rhetorically effective in a later stage and may have overridden
the concern to remain dialectically reasonable, without becoming fallacious however. The
exaggeration of the own position may be slightly overdone according to modern standards, as
is the politeness throughout this preface, but the social gap between Bredero and the Latin
professors must have been immense. More interesting however is how Bredero makes use of
this gap. How does he exploit the polarizing moves?
3. DOUBLE AUDIENCE
`If I [Bredero] tortured him [Terence] a bit, I am dearly sorry. I did not mean to treat him in
such a harsh way'. If we consider this preface as an apologia, it would be one of self-defence,
where the author is concerned with restoring his image and does so by `denial of intent to
achieve persuasiveness' (Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p. 276). Moreover, the apologizing has
been used as a strategic tool to divide the antagonist in a primary audience and secondary
audience.2 In my definition and interpretation of these groups the primary audience is made
up by the explicitly addressed Latin professors, while the secondary audience is constituted
by the implicit wider audience of common readers, being non Latin professors.
Let's have a closer look at the way he organizes his argument in this respect. By
sketching his own capacities in line with those of common people (like "a simple Amsterdam
citizen to whom only a small school knowledge of French shakes in the head"), the
protagonist takes up a position at the level of the wider, secondary, audience that also judges
the acceptability of the argumentative moves and whose verdict will even be the more
important one (Van Eemeren, 2010, p. 109). The self-abasement has been strategically
deployed as to create a polarization and a different standpoint with the primary audience of
professors. The polarization becomes manifest by way of presentational devices, the
difference in wording used to describe the Latin professors and the Latin example Terence
versus himself and his adaptation: "Honoured, high-esteemed masters of the generally
celebrated Latin language" versus "the great audacity of a simple Amsterdam citizen (to
whom only a small school knowledge of French shakes in the head)" (the latter remark as to
explain how he has managed to cope with the Latin material, i.e. via a French intermediate).
Especially the contrast between Terence as a "Latinist, who expresses himself properly" and
2. I don't go along with the definition of primary and secondary audience by Van Eemeren, 2010, p. 109. In my
definition the primary audience is the explicitly addressed audience, while the secondary audience is constituted
by the more important to reach but implicit wider audience of common readers.
One could say this wider audience is the `universal audience' (cf. Tindale, 2004, p. 128). Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958-1969, pp. 28-29) distinguish between a particular audience, consisting of a specific
collection of people, and the universal audience, which is supposed to represent reasonableness (cf. Van
Eemeren, 2010, pp. 116-117).

642

Bredero as an author who "mumbles and cackles" in a "strange Dutch", portrays, in a

proleptic way, the supposed standpoint of the antagonist. In the opening stage Bredero's act of
adapting Terence is still characterized as a "foolish boldness", as "impertinent", and as an
"awful thing". With these opposing qualifications the starting point of the discussion is
established. The opponent will condemn the dramatist "as a murderer", who has "broken" the
Latin play "on the wheel". Therefore, the publication of this play does not seem to be
justified. That is, in the eyes of the primary audience.
Are the soundness conditions for confrontational strategic maneuvering fulfilled? The
topical choice in the confrontation and opening stage is sound, as the protagonist selects the
issues that are to be discussed from the available disagreement space. Not only the
addressees, but also the apologizing move and the self-abasement have been chosen
strategically as they enable the protagonist to answer the expected criticism on his adaptation
of Terence in advance. It offers the protagonist not only an opportunity to `name' the offense,
to identify himself with the action and to become clear about the `norm' that has been
violated (Taft, 2000, p. 140), but it enables him also to defend himself later on from selected
issues: it furthers the achievement of a desired outcome of this stage as it creates a non-mixed
difference of opinion by introducing a discussion and two standpoints: "here you will see (if
you like) the great audacity..." means: the product is ready and has been published. And you
won't agree. But Bredero is not arguing at forgiveness. He rather defences himself and
explains his considerations to this `offense'.
The second soundness condition, presentational choice, concerns the formulation "in
such a way that it can be interpreted as enabling a relevant continuation and being responsive
to the preceding move" (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009, p. 14). The protagonist aims at
enforcing the different views by way of a clear and accentuated distinction between the highesteemed Latin circuit and the simple vernacular one of the common readers.
4. AUDIENCE DEMANDS
The third soundness condition of strategic maneuvering, audience adaptation, is fulfilled as
well, as his move of clarification is relevant to the (supposed) move of the other party in the
discussion that expects clarification and giving account for the publication. The protagonist
starts the discussion in a perspective that is expected to appeal his addressees, the Latin
scholars. The (general) readers of this preface will have known the tradition of the genre to be
a place of topical issues like feigned modesty and benevolence as to please the addressed
readers. The act of a prefational addressing of a stage play to a specific group is quite
common in seventeenth-century Dutch drama.3 Drama introductions mostly address the
common reader. They imply, within the cultural tradition of the genre, an attitude of respect,
of humbleness, as the writer usually explains why and how he has chosen the subject of the
play, which sources he has used, and in what way the reader may expect poetical peculiarities
in the literary text. In this respect the address to the Latin professors is striking.
Bredero's choice from the `topical potential' in the confrontation stage especially finds
expression in his addressing the Latin scholars and not the group he represents, the group of
vernacular readers, non-learned people without knowledge of Latin. These readers are
supposed to be in the protagonist's camp, as the protagonist looks after their interests,
implicitly by having published the adaptation, and explicitly by a remark later on in the
3. Notice that Bredero only addresses and that he does not dedicate this stage play to the group of Latin scholars.
The dedication of Moortje is addressed to Jacob van Dyck (1564-1631), a Dutch advicer of the Swedish king
and Maecenas of artists, asking him for protection and/or money (cf. Bredero, 2011, pp. 154-163).

643

preface. He hopes the professors will accept his adaptation, and argues why he did it in this
way:
As I have mostly changed it [his adaptation of Terence] to accommodate the common people, who
knows little of the Greek customs and traditions, and who understood these characters the best.

This remark is a move adapted to the preferences of the secondary audience and responds to
specific audience demands. It functions not only as an defensive explanation of the own
position (the adaptation and its publication), but creates at the same time a sense of
collectivity with especially this secondary audience.
As stated earlier, the whole preface is overflowing with politeness towards the
Latinists, but in the argumentation stage the protagonist launches an attack, disguised in
flattering words ("this, you professors, will know the best, because you are at home in
anything"), and cloaked in his own feelings of regret and sadness. This attack has been
formulated as blaming the antagonists that they do not share their knowledge with the
common people. At the same time the attack is a defence of Brederos own standpoint. The
author suggests that he had to act like he did because of this negligence of the Latin
professors. As a matter of fact, he brings charges against the professors that they "teach their
learning rather to the scholarly savants than to us, non-scholars, who have no knowledge of
foreign languages whatsoever".4 Such utterances underline the discrepancy between the dual
audiences. They also strengthen the fact that the protagonist takes up the defence not only of
himself but also of the universal audience, strengthening the common ground with this
secondary audience.
5. CONCLUSION
In this specific case self-abasement has been demonstrated a suitable means to create
disagreement by bringing about an antithesis between two audiences: the classical university
circuit of Latin professors who should have condemn this publication, and ordinary
vernacular people, the common reader who would have welcomed and supported it. By
starting with some well-chosen antitheses the protagonist engages both audiences, through
the "experiential nature and collaborative invitation" of such antitheses (Tindale, 2004, p. 85;
Van Eemeren, 2010, p. 125). Thus, the polarization may be regarded as a strategic move
(Tonnard, 2011, pp. 47-48), suggesting that the opponent actually holds the opposite
standpoint to the protagonist. The process of polarization in the preface may be regarded as a
rhetorical strategy directed to both audiences, because the protagonist will have gained
satisfaction from primary addressees (his critics), by showing respect for the Latin circuit.
And at the same time he has taken up the position of the common reader, adopting an attitude
of humbleness, convincing his common readers of the acceptability and sincerity of his
acting.
After the explanation of the opponent's opinion towards the protagonist and his
adaptation, the polarization between the Latin and vernacular circuit will become a fertile soil
in which the standpoint that this publication is justified can be defended fruitfully and the
4. However, the attack remains mostly implicit and may be reconstructed as follows. It is your own fault, Latin
professors, that I, Bredero, being an outsider, had to accomplish such an adaptation: this was in fact your task:
you have neglected your duty towards your fellow-Dutchmen by not using our beautiful Dutch language and by
keeping from the vernacular public all the wisdom and richness you have gained in classical writers and culture.
By burying this wisdom in Latin writings, you obstruct a breakthrough of the Dutch language (being a valuable
medium of knowledge).

644

protagonist hits back in the argumentation stage. The confrontation and opening stage are
therefore most advantageous for the protagonist, to argue in defence of supposed criticism by
his opponent. In the concluding stage, which overlaps with the argumentation stage, we find
most of all repetition, not only the request to the scholars again, but also the praise of
Terence, his esteem for the Neo-Latin scholars, excuses and politeness. Final excuses imply
that if the author in their view had failed in adapting the play, then this was to blame to a lack
of understanding by or to shortcomings of the French intermediate translation ("because of
the shortcomings of the bad example"). He passes the buck to a French intermediate. But
here we also find a strong argument as to make clear that the standpoint defended can be
maintained, whereas the antagonists will have to conclude that their supposed standpoint
cannot (cf. Van Eemeren, 2010, p. 44). This final argument include that he has made his
vernacular adaptation for the common people, who know little of Greek customs and
traditions, and who understand the characters of the adaptation the best.
The addressing of a double audience in this preface has a direct influence on the way
the protagonist maneuvers. The apologies that belong to the self-abasement are obvious
responses to an implicit accusation. Therefore, in this case self-abasement functions not only
to `get the issues on the table', i.e. the (in)acceptability of the protagonist's act of adaptation
including his arguments for doing it, but also to achieve clarity about the issues that are at
stake in the difference of opinion, selecting those issues that are most beneficial from the
protagonist's own perspective to argue or to shirk his responsibility. In sum, making excuses
in the confrontation stage is an excellent means to maneuver strategically with the choice of
presentational devices.

APPENDIX
G.A. Bredero, `Preface' (december 1616) to: G.A. Bredero, Moortje, Waar in hy Terentii
Eunuchum heeft Nae-ghevolght. Amsterdam: Paulus van Ravesteyn, 1617 (Bredero, 2011,
pp. 200-202).
(my translation, JJ)
Confrontation stage
Oration to the scholarly Latinists,
Honoured, high-esteemed masters of the generally celebrated Latin language, here you will
see (if you like) the great audacity of a simple Amsterdam citizen (to whom only a small
school knowledge of French shakes in the head), who unabashedly dares to take in hand
Terence praised by you all, and dares to make this Latinist, who expresses himself properly,
to mumble and to cackle not only strange Dutch, but (that by everyone of the neighbouring
cities mocked) the Amsterdam dialect.
Opening stage
But nonetheless, this foolish boldness of mine will possibly not only surprise you, but maybe
also happily make you laugh, because of the amusing strangeness of our accent, in
particularly by the shortening of words, or by the (in your eyes) unusualness or special nature
of them. Not only have I let him [Terence] change his unsurpassed excellence of talking but I
have impertinently taken the invented history from the treasury of the world, from that
imperial Rome. But the awful thing is that I dragged it towards my hometown and broke it on
the wheel. For this reason I fear that you will condemn me alive as a murderer.

645

Argumentation stage
But, most prudent doctors, at least if you were prepared to take trouble over it, you will find
that I have been merciful, because before his [Terence's] death I have decently and
consequentially dressed him similarly, in our way and to the best of my ability, not with
beggar's clothes of a hundred thousand bits and pieces, of foreign rags and other outlandish
borrowed pieces of tatters, like he was rigged out in Brabant sixty years ago [by Cornelis van
Ghistele]. He didn't look then, if you will permit, dissimilar to the raven of Aesop, so that if
everybody had appropriated his own part, he definitely would have escaped very featherless.
If I tortured him a bit, I am dearly sorry. I did not mean to treat him in such a harsh way. But
it would seem that he, having been raised delicately, couldn't endure rough Amsterdam
embraces, so that, despite my best intentions, he expired.
If I would have heard him in his mother tongue, undoubtedly (if I could have done
that) I would have been fair to him. But look, I just spoke to him via a French interpreter
[Jean Bourlier], whom I myself barely understood, and who I think did not understand him
thoroughly either. Look, I have read so much about his immense eloquence that I loved him
before I saw him. But when he appeared to me in that strange, many-colored Antwerp dialect,
I was doubtful whether I would cry or laugh. If you like, you will come across an example
here and there that you may like well or that will bring you joy, if you like language full of
bombastic or embellished words, like it is employed by many parrots of courtiers and town
clerks.
Hello, busy merchants and others who impoverish and violate their own language,
and rather show off a patched-up cap and bells than that they would like to shine in an
impeccable plain coat. Ah! What voluntarily chosen poverty I hear through all the
Netherlands. Should there be even one nation under the sun that is so much overcome by this
self-preferred foolishness as ours? It could be, but I don't think so. But this, you professors,
will know the best, because you are at home in anything. Don't you agree, Gentlemen, that
this mishmash of language comes from a kind of people that uses this corruption or
confusion of words as were it a lofty beauty? Or is it perhaps borrowed from such folk that
knows other languages before they learn their own language, and who for convenience often
have to manage with a foreign word when they speak Dutch in later years?
One thing I have often regretted and it still saddens me, namely that the scholars teach
their learning rather to the scholarly savants than to us, non-scholars, who have no knowledge
of foreign languages whatsoever. How will we know what you know and understand if you
don't share your knowledge in how wise you are yourselves? All your knowledge counts for
nothing insofar as you only know it yourselves. Nobody is born for himself alone [Cic., Off.
1.22].
Concluding stage
Therefore, let your fatherland enjoy your wisdom as much as the Romans or other far-away
nations did, then you will make your fellow-countrymen, who are not the most stupid ones,
more sensible and wiser. This I have wished many times, and I request you hereby,
honourable, highly esteemed teachers of this generally praised Latin language, that you with
your scholarly reason will kindly accept my venturesome undertaking in changing and adding
time, place, names and other things like that. As I have mostly changed it to accommodate
the common people, who knows little of Greek customs and traditions, and who understand
these characters the best. If I haven't portrayed his [Terence's] features, his little pleasantries
well, then perhaps that's because of a lack of understanding or because of the shortcomings of
the bad example, not those of the Carthaginian [Terence], but of the Frenchman.
I don't need to tell you, my lords, about the excellence of his exceptional knowledge
of worldly affairs and of the different sides of human life, how strikingly he depicts
646

everybody's character and nature, their manners, language and life. For if I intended to do so,
I would light a candle to the sun, or carry sand to the dunes. For me it is enough to ask you
once again that you want to pardon me, who don't know any Latin, for the fact that I have put
my ignorant hands in the significant dough of that acute man, and kneaded it in a Dutch way,
and baked it for the mouth of my choosy fellow citizens. That you will do so, honoured, highesteemed masters of the generally celebrated Latin language, is not doubted by your in every
way obedient servant and friend
G.A. Bredero
It's all in the game

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international conference: proceedings, Vol. 1 (pp. 87-93). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Andone, C. (2010). Maneuvering strategically in a political interview. Analyzing and evaluating responses to
an accusation of inconsistency. Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Bredero, G. A. (1999). Bredero's Moortje en Spaanschen Brabander, E.K. Grootes (Eds.). Amsterdam:
Athenaeum-Polak & Van Gennep.
Bredero, G. A. (2011). Proza. J. Jansen (Eds.). Hilversum: Verloren.
Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse. Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2009). Seizing the occasion. Parameters for analyzing ways of strategic
manoeuvring. In F.H. van Eemeren and B.J. Garssen (Eds.). Pondering on problems of argumentation.
Twenty essays on theoretical issues (pp. 3-14). Dordrecht: Springer.
Fahnestock, J. (1999). Rhetorical Figures in Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
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conference: proceedings (pp. 687-695). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Kauffeld, F.J. (1998). Presumptions and the attribution of argumentative burdens in acts of proposing and
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Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958-1969). The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press.
Taft, L. (2000). Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology. The Yale Law Journal 109.5, 11351160.
Tavuchis, N. (1991). Mea Culpa. A sociology of apology and reconciliation. Stanford: Stanford University
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Te Velde, H. (2003). Het Theater van de Politiek. Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek.
Tindale, C. W. (2004). Rhetorical argumentation. Principles of theory and practice. London: Sage.
Tonnard, Y. (2011). Getting an Issue on the Table. A pragma-dialectical study of presentational choices in
confrontational strategic maneuvering in Dutch parliamentary debate. Thesis Amsterdam (UvA).
Villadsen, L. S. ( 2014). More than a nice ritual. Official apologies as a rhetorical act in need of theoretical reconceptualization. In H. van Belle e.a. (Eds.), Let's talk politics. New essays on deliberative rhetoric
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Ware, B. L. & Linkugel, W. A. (1973). They spoke in defense of themselves: On the generic criticism of
apologia. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59.3, 273-283.

647

I Did Not Do It, Because I Would Not Do It: Defending Oneself

Against An Accusation
Henrike Jansen
Leiden University Centre for Linguistics
P.O. Box 9515
2300 RA Leiden
The Netherlands
h.jansen@hum.leidenuniv.nl

ABSTRACT: When hard proof is absent, someone who faces an accusation can seek assistance in arguments
making it plausible that (s)he did not do it. This paper deals with an argument saying that the accused
would never do the alleged act because of the harmful consequences it would yield. An analysis and
evaluation of this kind of argumentative strategy is demonstrated with examples of two professional cyclists
defending themselves against doping accusations.
KEYWORDS: accusation, character, convincingness, denial, counterfactual, critical questions, hypothetical,
plausibility, risk weighing, soundness

1. INTRODUCTION
In August 2012, the head of the USADA (United States Anti-Doping Agency), Travis
Tygart, reported that its investigation had revealed manifold doping practices by Lance
Armstrong. The accusation was based on detailed allegations of ex-teammates. Armstrong
responded in a statement published on his website. He called the investigation a witch
hunt and a one-sided trial that was only set up to punish him at all costs. As he had done
before in defending himself against doping accusations, he based his denial of guilt on the
hundreds of controls he had undergone during his career without a single positive result:
There is zero physical evidence to support his [Tygarts] outlandish and heinous
claims. The only physical evidence here is the hundreds of controls I have passed
with flying colors. I made myself available around the clock and around the world.
In competition. Out of competition. Blood. Urine. Whatever they asked for I
provided. What is the point of all this testing if, in the end, USADA will not stand
by it? (King, 2005)
The problem with so many negative test results is, however, that the tests used for controls
always lag behind developments in the doping circuit. Professional cyclists, their doctors
and other attendants are very inventive in finding new ways to mislead inspectors and tests,
for example by using new substances that cannot yet be detected. Negative test results may
therefore free an accused person at a formal level, but with regard to the facts, one may
still have doubts. And doubts there certainly were in Armstrongs case, ever since 2005
when the French newspaper LEquipe reported that a lab had retested urine samples taken
from Armstrong in 1999. This lab used new tests that were able to detect EPO tests that

648

were not yet available in 1999. Six out of seventeen samples tested positive.1
LEquipe, not very fond of the American seven-times Tour winner, published the
news of the retesting with bold headlines on its front page (LEquipe, 2005). But in spite
of the big fuss the newspaper made about it, no sanctions followed; neither from UCI
(Union Cycliste Internationale: the international cycling union) nor from any other cycling
institution. The reason was that no formal evidence could be gained from the retesting,
because the samples had been used up. This meant that no confirmation tests could be
carried out a formal requirement in the testing procedure. In addition, Armstrong
questioned the new tests credibility, arguing that there was no guarantee that the samples
had been properly stored, and even if they had been properly stored, there was still no
guarantee that the substances would remain the same after so many years.2 As a result, the
case was dismissed. Nevertheless, the speculations continued, and were discussed by
Armstrong fans and Armstrong haters alike, as well as by Armstrong himself.3 It was only
when Armstrong made his confession to Oprah Winfrey in January 2013 that the truth
finally came out.
This case shows that there are situations in which formal evidence does not
correspond to what seems convincing to a general audience. According to the standards of
a formal legal setting, Lance Armstrong had to be considered innocent, but there was
nevertheless reason for the general public to question his innocence. In order to remove
this kind of doubt, a defendant who wants to defend himself publicly has to use other
argumentative strategies: arguments that do not provide conclusive proof, but nevertheless
make guilt seem unlikely. This paper analyses one such argumentative strategy, which was
used by Armstrong to argue his innocence in the public speculations about his alleged
doping. Furthermore, the same kind of strategy was also used by the Tour winner Bradley
Wiggins when confronted with suspicions about his outstanding Tour performance in 2012.
I will refer to this strategy as the I would not do it argument. Although the examples I
use are taken from cycling, similar arguments can be and are used in other contexts, and
are especially applicable in situations where (f)actual evidence is not available or not
conclusive.
2. THE I WOULD NOT DO IT ARGUMENT
The I would not do it strategy was used by Lance Armstrong in a 2005 interview with
Larry King. Armstrong was Kings guest after LEquipe divulged the retesting of
Armstrongs 1999 urine samples. The argument was put forward in response to the
1

According to the New York Times (Abt, 2005): The lab confirmed that it had conducted the tests, but said
it could not confirm that the samples were Armstrong's because the labels were identified only by six-digit
numbers. L'quipe said it had decoded the labels by matching each sample with forms filed with the French
Cycling Federation during the Tour. Those forms, filled out each time a sample was taken in a drug test,
identified the donor by name as well as the six digits on his urine sample.
2
He also made a big deal of questioning the credibility of the test itself and discrediting everyone who had
made or believed an accusation aimed at him.
3
Armstrong was generally given a high degree of credibility by his fans and most journalists, no doubt
partly because of his foundations work in helping cancer patients (see also note 7). Only one Irish journalist,
David Walsh, dared to ask critical questions after Armstrongs comeback. When the USADA report was
published, Walsh wrote about his queries that began as early as 1999: Everybody would say, what
evidence have you got?. I would say, well I dont have enough evidence to ever prove to anyone that hes
guiltyI just feel that I have huge responsibility, a huge need, to go and ask a lot of questions.

649

question of whether he could unequivocally say that he had never used any illegal
substance ever. Armstrong replied as follows:
Listen, Ive said it for seven years. Ive said it for longer than seven years. I have
never doped. I can say it again. But Ive said it for seven years. It doesnt help. But
the fact of the matter is I havent. And if you consider my situation: A guy who
comes back from arguably, you know, a death sentence, why would I then enter
into a sport and dope myself up and risk my life again? Thats crazy. I would never
do that. No. No way. (King, 2005) [Italics are mine, HJ]
With this answer, Armstrong appeals to the idea that someone who has survived cancer
would not dope. In the British newspaper The Telegraph a journalist referred to this idea
as: an implicit understanding that someone who had almost lost his life would not take
drugs (Moore, 2012).4 The argument seems to have been rather persuasive to all
journalists and fans during the years that Armstrong was a Tour winner. At least, he was
never questioned about it in a critical way, whereas he certainly could have been, as will
be shown below.
Bradley Wiggins used the same kind of strategy in an open letter to The Guardian.
Wiggins begins by saying that the relevant question is not why he would not dope but
rather why he would? His answer to this question lists all the potential negative
consequences of doping:
If I doped I would potentially stand to lose everything. Its a long list. My
reputation, my livelihood, my marriage, my family, my house. Everything I have
achieved, my Olympic medals, my world titles, the CBE [Commander of the Order
of the British Empire, HJ] I was given. I would have to take my children to the
school gates in a small Lancashire village with everyone looking at me, knowing I
had cheated (). (Wiggins, 2012)
Wiggins proceeds with this line of argument by saying that his entire life and source of
income is built around cycling. This includes not only his job in Team Sky, but also the
fact that he and his wife organise cycling events, and many of his friends and family work
in the cycling business. Wiggins states that he would not jeopardise his living, nor would
he betray all the people who are involved in these activities:
If all that was built on sand, if I was deceiving all those people, I would have to
live with the knowledge it could all disappear just like that. () I would not want
to end up sitting in a room with all that hanging on me, thinking: Shit, I dont want
anyone to find out. () If I felt I had to take drugs, I would rather stop tomorrow,
go and ride club 10-mile time trials, ride to the cafe on Sundays, and work in Tesco
stacking shelves. (Ibidem)
4

See also Wassink (2012): His past as a cancer patient made every question about doping superfluous, even
immoral. Why would anybody having faced death take such risks with his health and reputation? [My
translation of: Zijn verleden als kankerpatint maakte iedere vraag naar dopinggebruik overbodig, ja zelfs
immoreel. Want waarom zou iemand die de dood in de ogen had gekeken nog zulke risicos nemen met zijn
gezondheid en reputatie?]

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Just like Armstrongs argument, Wigginss argument for not doping is also based on what
he might lose if he did. Armstrong speaks of literally losing his life, while Wiggins refers
to figuratively losing his, i.e. losing everything that is important to him. And just like
Armstrongs argument, Wigginss argument also mentions weighing the risks:
Doping would simply not be worth it. This is only sport we are talking about. Sport
does not mean more to me than all those other things I have. Winning the Tour de
France at any cost is not worth the possibility of losing all that. I am not willing to
risk all those things Ive got in my life. (Ibidem)
3. ANALYSIS
What kind of argument is expressed in these statements by Armstrong and Wiggins? Lets
have a closer look and see how it can be reconstructed. Firstly, note that both Armstrongs
and Wigginss arguments are formulated hypothetically:
() why would I then enter into a sport and dope myself up and risk my life
again? (Armstrong)
and
If I doped I would potentially stand to lose everything (Wiggins)
Wigginss argument is clearly a conditional, in which If I doped is the antecedent and I
would potentially stand to lose everything the consequent. Armstrongs argument can be
reconstructed as a conditional by adding the antecedent If I doped. The rhetorical
question stands for the consequent connected to this antecedent. The whole conditional
then reads: If I doped, I a guy who comes back from arguably, you know, a death
sentence would risk my life again.
Both conditional statements make up an argument in which the standpoint is a
denial of the act one is accused of: I did not dope. In the antecedent of the conditional
premise If I doped. this negation is left out because the argument is built on
temporarily assuming the truth of the accusation. This hypothetical antecedent is
suggested to imply a hypothetical consequent in which a detrimental consequence is
formulated in both examples risking ones life (either literally or figuratively). And
finally, there is an implicit premise that denies the consequence of the conditional premise,
namely I would not do that (I would not risk my life). This adds up to the following
reconstructed argument (according to the pragma-dialectical model):
1.
1.1
1.1

I did not dope, because

If I doped, I would risk my life again, and
I would not risk my life

In my view, however, this does not account for the whole argument. There is more to this
kind of argument than is shown in this reconstruction. The power of the unexpressed
premise (1.1) lies in the implicit understanding referred to in the Telegraphs comment on
Armstrongs credibility: () someone who had almost lost his life would not take drugs
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(Moore, 2012). So, not only would the protagonist not risk his life, but no rational person
would do such a thing. The argument appeals to generally shared ideas about how people
behave in certain circumstances. What makes this an appealing strategy is that hearers can
connect it to their own desires and fears, knowing that they would go through a similar
weighing and balancing of risks.5 This allows for an extended version of the above
argument, in which the reference to what normal people would (or would not) do supports
the unexpressed premise:
1.
1.1
1.1
1.1.1

I did not dope, because

If I doped, I would risk my life again, and
I would not risk my life, because
Nobody would risk his life

But the argument is even more elaborate than this. That the arguer would not do such a
thing may not only be reasonable to accept because according to generally shared
expectations nobody would do such a thing; we may also accept it because of a
normative aspect that backs up these expectations. Both Armstrongs and Wigginss
arguments appeal to the undesirable consequences that would normally make up an
argument from consequences the type of argument that also goes under the name
pragmatic argument. An argument from consequences also contains an explicit Ifthen
statement, but it takes a different kind of standpoint. In an I would not do it argument the
standpoint is descriptive i.e. it describes a situation in the past. The standpoint of an
argument from consequences is incentive: it announces that the speaker will (or will not)
do something or advises the hearer to do (or refrain from doing) something. An example
of such an argument would be: I will not dope, because if I do, I will lose my life. Now the
unexpressed premise 1.1 reads losing my life is undesirable:
1.
1.1
1.1

I will not dope, because

If I dope, I will risk my life again, and
That is an undesirable consequence

In Armstrongs argumentation this normative aspect is explicitly present, namely in the

phrase Thats crazy. This phrase can be reconstructed as the support for the nobody
would do it premise:
1.
I did not dope, because
1.1
If I doped, I would risk my life, and
1.1 I would not risk my life, because
1.1.1 Nobody would risk his life, because
1.1.1.1 It is crazy [undesirable] to risk your life

Therefore, such an argument pre-eminently satisfies the description of the classical eikos argument as given
in the classical handbook Rhetoric to Alexander (1428a25ff.). An eikos argument is an argument from
plausibility plausibility in the sense that the arguer should adhere to ideas or to representations of events
that correspond with an audiences expectations. In Rhetoric to Alexander it is stated that such an argument
should depict a course of events in such a way that the audience agrees that this is the most likely way for
things to have occurred. See Kraus (2007, p. 7; 2010, p. 365), Hoffman (2008, p. 22), Kennedy (1994, p. 24).

652

Below I will argue that the last more elaborate reconstruction can explain why an I
would not do it argument would be convincing. But when it comes to the soundness of
such an argument, it does not matter in the least whether anybody would do it, or whether
it would be crazy to do so.
4. EVALUATION
In my view, I would not do it arguments can be evaluated by asking some critical
questions derived from the basic reconstruction of the argument the main argument. The
first question that can be asked concerns the weighing of risks and whether the outcome
would really be the one suggested by the argument. Risk weighing is affected by the
chance that the alleged undesirable consequence will in fact occur. But a proper evaluation
of an I would not do it argument can only take place once the weighing of risks is
viewed in relation to the character of the arguer. It should not be viewed from the
perspective of what people in general would or would not do. An appeal to what everyone
else would do can indeed make the argument convincing, but that is not the same as
making it sound. After all, a particular arguer may turn out to be the kind of person who
would not act according to general standards or expectations in a specific situation. This
means that with regard to I would not do it arguments, the second critical question
concerns the arguers personality and how it relates to the alleged risks.
Let us first apply these considerations to Armstrongs argument. The first question
then reads: is it true that taking dope will cause death? The answer depends on how one
takes it, how much of it one takes and whether it is taken in combination with other drugs.
As a result of his cancer treatment, Armstrong was familiar with taking EPO, and this
would seem to provide an argument for - rather than against - him taking this kind of drug.
But even if the risk were as high as implied, is this really reason enough for not taking it?
Many people smoke, drink and eat bad food and continue to do so because the harmful
consequences only become apparent in the long run; most people are not deterred by
potential long-term effects. Therefore, asking the first critical question already leads us to
cast some doubt on Armstrongs argument. Risk weighing may indeed point in favour of
doping because the advantages of winning are so high that one may even accept that one
might die a few years earlier, especially since the chance of this happening may not be
very high. And this is particularly true because Armstrong was an extremely fanatical
racer who had only one aim: to be the best.6 Of course, it is easy to say this in retrospect,
knowing that Armstrong did indeed make a risk calculation that was different from what
his argument suggested.
A critical examination of Wigginss weighing of risks amounts to balancing the
chance of losing the life he has led so far against what would happen were it all to come
out. Granted that losing ones means of income, family and public status is a rather
disagreeable situation, the convincingness of Wigginss argument depends on the chance
of him being caught and therefore on the adequacy of drug tests. How big is that chance?
As revealed in Tyler Hamiltons book The Secret Race (2012), in the first decade of this
century, not getting caught was all about ingenuity and access to the best doctors. For
example, Hamilton, a former teammate of Armstrongs, writes that Armstrongs French
gardener would follow the team on a motorbike during the Tour de France (and was
6

According to Muench (2013), Armstrong was obsessed with winning, with fame, with power.

653

therefore called Motoman), taking the illegal substances with him, so that inspectors
would not find them on the bus. Furthermore, the right doctors know what doses can
safely be used without risking detection, and they know about ideal time spans between
different blood transfusions.7
On the other hand: some people say that those days were another era and things
may have changed since then (e.g. Stephenson, 2012; Muench, 2013; although the excyclist Bassons expresses his doubts in an interview: Cary, 2014). A biological passport
programme has been introduced, and they say that the ethics of the big teams have
changed. This may plead in favour of Wigginss argument for not wanting to take the risk.
However, whether his argument holds depends very much on his personality, i.e. whether
he is likely to find the risk worth taking. This consideration is addressed in the second
critical question. With respect to this consideration, it is relevant that Wiggins calls
himself a shy bloke, who does not think of sport as the most important thing in his life:
I am not willing to risk all those things Ive got in my life. I do it because I love it.
I dont do it for a power trip: at the end of the day, Im a shy bloke looking forward
to taking my son to summer rugby camp after the Tour, where he could maybe
bump into his hero, Sam Tomkins. Thats whats keeping me going here. What I
love is doing my best and working hard. (Wiggins, 2012)
The way Wiggins presents himself in the media does indeed seem to suggest that he is a
different type of person than Armstrong, with a lot less self-confidence. Nonetheless, we
can never be sure of his real mindset.8 The evaluation of an I would not do it argument is
therefore always speculative.
5. CONCLUSION
My conclusion is that an I would not do it argument is weak because the answers to the
critical questions are always speculative. This holds especially for the answer to the
second question, i.e. whether the arguer has the kind of personality that is likely to be
deterred by the undesirable consequences sketched in his argument and is therefore
unlikely to take the risk. On the other hand, an I would not do it argument may give
some plausibility to a denial of guilt. In this respect, we have to take into account that
when an accused person is really innocent, there is not much he can say apart from
referring to his character and what this character would or would not do.
The Nobody would do it element brought to light in the extended version of the
reconstructed argument does not play a role in the arguments evaluation. This element
seems to be important because it makes the argument more convincing. This may at least
partly be due to the fact that this element can block a critical examination. Suppose that
a critic were to respond: Would you really not take that risk? The accused can reply: Of
course not. Nobody would. Would you? What should the critic answer now? In theory he
might respond: No, I would not do it, but I think you are the kind of person who would.
7

See also Seaton (2012), who mentions that Lance Armstrong spent more than one million dollars on doctor
Ferrari and concludes the article with the rhetorical question: Who would you prefer to see winning the
Tour the France: the greatest cyclist in the world or the dope-cheat with the biggest budget?
8
According to Kimmage (2012), Wigginss defence statements are harmed by the fact that Team Sky has
been working with the Dutchman Geert Leinders, a doctor who was associated with doping.

654

However, in real life critics are unlikely to react in this way. Such a response is just too
face-threatening because it implies that the accused is not normal and a liar.9 This may
have been one of the reasons why no journalist ever dared to raise doubts concerning
Armstrongs use of his I would not do it argument.10

REFERENCES
Abt, Samuel (24 August 2005). Armstrong is accused of doping. Retrieved from:
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/24/sports/othersports/24cycling.html
Armstrong, Lance (23 August 2012). Lance Armstrongs statement of August 23, 2012. Retrieved from:
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/23/news/la-lance-armstrongs-statement-of-august-23-201220120823.
Cary, Tom (4 July 2014). Tour de France 2014: Cyclings Mr Clean on why he fears for Lance Armstrong.
Retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/cycling/tour-defrance/10947456/Tour-de-France-2014-Cyclings-Mr-Clean-on-why-he-fears-for-LanceArmstrong.html.
LEquipe (23 August 2005). Retrieved from: http://www.20minutes.fr/sport/diaporama-2599-photo-714593images-retour-histoire-armstrong-tour-france.
Hamilton, Tyler, & Cole, Daniel (2012). The secret race. Inside the hidden world of the Tour de France:
Doping, cover-ups, and winning at all costs. London etc: Bantam Press.
Hoffman, David C. (2008). Concerning eikos: Social expectation and verisimilitude in early Attic rhetoric.
Rhetorica, 26, 1-29.
Kennedy, George A. (1994). A new history of classical rhetoric. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
King, Larry (25 August 2005). Interview with Lance Armstrong. Retrieved from:
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/25/lkl.01.html. See for the video:
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xitaua_2005-lance-armstrong-denies-doping_sport.
Kimmage, Paul (2012). How Bradley Wiggins had to fight against the sports drug demons in a race I still
cant be certain is completely clean. Retrieved from:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/othersports/article-2177405/Bradley-Wiggins-battle-cyclingsdrug-demons--Paul-Kimmage.html.
Kraus, Manfred (2007). Early Greek probability arguments and common ground in dissensus. In H.V.
Hansen et al. (Eds.), Dissensus and the search for common ground, CD-ROM (pp. 1-11). Windsor,
ON: OSSA.
Kraus, Manfred (2010). Perelmans interpretation of reverse probability arguments as a dialectical mise en
abyme. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 43 (4), 362-382.
Moore, Richard (24 October 2012). Riding revelations from best bro George Hincapie likely to hold key to
Lance Armstrong's about-turn. Retrieved from:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/cycling/lancearmstrong/9498439/Riding-revelationsfrom-best-bro-George-Hincapie-likely-to-hold-key-to-Lance-Armstrongs-about-turn.html.
Muench, Sarah (14 October 2013). Journalist who uncovered Armstrong doping: Cycling looks more
believable now. Retrieved from: http://clippedinaz.com/journalist-who-uncovered-armstrong9

The accuser can also put forward a less face-threatening argument, namely: If I were you, yes, I would
take the risk, considering all the advantages. But even if this line of discussion is followed, at some point
the accuser will have to use a face-threatening move. I.e. in that line of discussion the accused will reply that
the accuser does not know what he is talking about, that the risk really is too high. If the accuser wants to
pursue the critical examination at this point, he can only do so by attacking the arguments content The
risk is not as high as you suggest thus still implying that the accused is lying.
10
Such doubts would be particularly face-threatening in view of Armstrongs cancer history. As Walsh said,
cited in an article by Andrew Pugh (2012): It felt like the cancer was a big factor from day one. A lot of
people didnt think it was appropriate to ask what were very necessary questions. I think part of the reason
they didnt want to ask those questions was because the guy had come back from cancer. The good works
done by Armstrongs cancer foundation were another reason: () the Armstrong story was deemed to be so
good, so remarkable, an inspiration to countless millions, who wants to rain on that parade?

655

doping-cycling-looks-more-believable-now/.
Pugh, Andrew (11 October 2012). David Walsh: It was obvious to me Lance Armstrong was doping.
Retrieved from: http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/david-walsh-it-was-obvious-me-lance-armstrongwas-doping.
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (1965; 1st ed. 1937). English translation by H. Rackham. The Loeb Classical
Library 317. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.
Ryan, Barry (4 December 2013). Interview: David Walsh on Inside Team Sky. Retrieved from:
http://www.cyclingnews.com/features/interview-david-walsh-on-inside-team-sky.
Seaton, Matt (13 October 2012). Doping, cycling and the level playing field fallacy. Retrieved from:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/13/doping-cycling-level-playing-field-fallacy.
Stephenson, Wesley (23 July 2012). Tour de France: Are drug-free cyclists slower? Retrieved from:
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18921784.
Wassink, Rutger (23 October 2012). Afkicken Eerste hulp bij ont-Lance-ing. [Kicking the habit First aid
for de-Lance-ing.] Retrieved from: http://www.wielertaal.nl/2012/10/23/afkicken-eerste-hulp-bijont-lance-ing/.
Wiggins, Bradley (13 July 2012). I can never dope because it would cost me everything. Retrieved from:
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2012/jul/13/bradley-wiggins-dope-drugs.

656

The Failure Of Fact-Checking

Jeffrey W. Jarman
Elliott School of Communication
Wichita State University
United States of America
jeffrey.jarman@wichita.edu

ABSTRACT: Fact-checking rests on a foundation that is desirable: an educated citizenry, informed of the
facts, will make a rational decision. Unfortunately, the theory of motivated reasoning suggests prior attitudes
strongly influence the process. This paper reports the results from two studies (n=456) that investigated the
effectiveness of fact-checking in the context of ObamaCare. The results of the studies confirm the real
problem for fact-checking: prior attitudes intervened to reduce the utility of the fact check.
KEYWORDS: fact-checking, motivated reasoning, Obama, political affiliation, Romney

1. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to combat a new wave of false and misleading political advertisements,
American journalists in the early 1990s shed their tendency merely to report politicians
claims and instead took up the challenge to report their truthfulness. These new adwatches
were meant provide the public with the information necessary to make an informed
decision. Journalists embraced their role as the arbiters of truth with the hope that
prospective voters will use information about misleading ads to discount their claims and
turn away from candidates who ads lack veracity (Frantzich, 2002, p. 35). The idea that
voters would rely on evidence and rationally choose a candidate is an ideal that is firmly
rooted in democracy. But, what is less clear is whether voters use the information provided
in adwatches to make a good decision.
Early research investigated the effectiveness of television news adwatches and
found mixed results. Some studies found that adwatches were not effective. Ansolabehere
and Iyengar (1996) found adwatches backfired since the candidate who was scrutinized
by the media enjoyed increased support among those who watched an ad-watch report (p.
82). Pfau and Louden (1994) report mixed results: one candidate gained support while the
opponent in the race faced lower support. Jamieson and Cappella (1997) criticized both
studies over methodological problems. The result found by Ansolabehere and Iyengar,
they argued, was the result of a generally favorable fact-check conclusion that supported
the gist of the claims made in the ad (p. 16). Similarly, the conclusion found by Pfau and
Louden was the result of inviting comparison between candidates (p. 14) since they
were in the same race. In contrast to these studies, Cappella and Jamieson (1994) found
adwatches were effective. The adwaches appear to do precisely what they are designed to
accomplish, namely put the claims of the ad in context so that the ad is judged less fair and
less important (Cappella & Jamieson, 1994, p. 355). Other studies also have found
exposure to fact-checking to be effective (Garrett, Nisbet, & Lynch, 2013; Gottfried,
Hardy, Winneg, & Jamieson, 2012; OSullivan & Geiger, 1995).

657

Contemporary research in political science and social psychology has investigated the
topic under the banner of corrections to political misinformation also with mixed results.
Several studies have documented the failure of new information to correct the
misinformation (Bullock, 2006; Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, & Rich, 2000; Nyhan
& Reifler, 2010). In contrast, some research has found that corrections were effective at
changing opinion (Gilens, 2001; Howell & West, 2009; Kuklinski et al, 2000). In those
cases, however, the public changed their mind because the information was so
overwhelming that it hit them between the eyes (Kuklinski et al., 2000, p. 805).
How can we make sense of these inconclusive results? There is hope to find an
answer. Referred to variously as motivated reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, 2011), the prior
attitude effect (Taber & Lodge, 2006), belief perseverance (Bullock, 2006), biased
assimilation (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), or an attitude congruency bias (Taber, Cann, &
Kucsova, 2009), the theory is simple: individuals will judge confirming evidence as
relevant and reliable but disconfirming evidence as irrelevant and unreliable and will
accept confirming evidence at face value while scrutinizing disconfirming evidence
hypercritically (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979, p. 2099). In other words, people are more
likely to believe what they already believe and are less likely to believe what they already
reject. Political affiliation serves as an important source of bias in the interpretation of
political information (Allen, Stevens, & Sullivan, 2009; Bullock, 2006; Gaines, Kuklinski,
Quirk, Peyton, & Verkuilen, 2007; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Prior research on adwatches
and fact-checking rarely accounted for the role of motivated reasoning. Some articles
mention descriptive statistics for political affiliation, but most studies did not analyze the
role of motivated reasoning, expressed most clearly as political affiliation and a partisan
bias for the source, in the evaluation of the advertisement (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1996;
Cappella & Jamieson, 1995; Jamieson, 1992; McKinnon & Kaid, 1999; Milburn &
Brown, 1995; Pfau & Louden, 1994; OSullivan & Geiger, 1995). This is a major
shortcoming in prior research. The influence of prior attitude is significant, and political
affiliation is an important part of that attitude. This project attempts to remedy this
shortcoming by explicitly addressing the role of prior attitude, especially political
commitments, when evaluating statements subject to fact-check criticism. As such, it is
guided by the following hypotheses and research question:
H1: Evaluation of the strength of the initial argument will be influenced by initial
evaluation of the source and political affiliation, such that attitude congruent arguments
will be rated higher and attitude incongruent arguments will be rated lower.
H2: Evaluation of the strength of the fact-check analysis will be influenced by initial
evaluation of the source and political affiliation, such that attitude congruent arguments
will be rated higher and attitude incongruent arguments will be rated lower.
H3: Final evaluation of the strength of the argument will be influenced by initial
evaluation of the source and political affiliation, such that attitude congruent arguments
will be rated higher and attitude incongruent arguments will be rated lower.
RQ1: Do other factors such as age, sex, level of education, or level of political interest
create prior attitude effects when evaluating political messages or fact-check responses?

658

2. METHODOLOGY
Two studies were conducted in the fall of 2012 to investigate the topic. Both studies
followed the same basic procedure and will be explained together. Experiment 1 focused
on reactions to a statement by President Obama on the cost effectiveness of preventative
health care. Experiment 2 focused on reactions to a statement by Mitt Romney on the cost
savings associated with repealing Obamacare.
Participants initially completed a series of basic demographic questions, including
age, sex, level of education, political affiliation and level of political interest. Participants
also completed a feeling thermometer to express their attitude toward Obama (Experiment
1) or Romney (Experiment 2). The main experiment involved three stages. First,
respondents were shown a brief statement by either Obama (71 words) or Romney (62
words) and recorded their evaluation of the strength of the argument using a semantic
differential scale (explained below). Then, respondents were shown a lengthy refutation of
the argument (439 words in Experiment 1, 332 words in Experiment 2) by a fact-checking
organization and recorded their evaluation of the strength of the fact-check statement
using the same scale. Finally, participants were asked to re-evaluate the strength of the
original claim using the same scale.
In both experiments, the fact-check analysis provided strong refutation of the
original statement and definitively suggested the claim was false. The evidence in support
of the fact-check conclusion came from politically neutral sources. In Experiment 1, the
sources included the Congressional Budget Office, a report in the New England Journal of
Medicine, and a study sponsored by the American Diabetes Association, American Heart
Association, and the American Cancer Society. In Experiment 2, the sources included the
Congressional Budget Office and detailed the revenue enhancements contained in
Affordable Care Act.
Argument strength was measured using a semantic differential scale adapted from
La France and Boster (2001). The pairs included correct-incorrect, valuable-not valuable,
unsound-sound, poorly reasoned-well reasoned, and reasonable-unreasonable. Items were
recoded so the negative element received the lowest score. Items were summed to create
an overall evaluation for the argument. Scores ranged from 6 to 42. A low total score
suggested the argument was weak while a high total score suggested the argument was
strong. The scales were reliable (alpha reported for each experiment).
Attitude toward Obama and Romney was measured before and after the
experiment using a feeling thermometer (0-100) typical in political research (ANES,
2008). Level of political involvement was measured with a single item that asked, How
interested are you in information about whats going on in government and politics?
(ANES, 2008). Respondents could select extremely interested, very interested, moderately
interested, slightly interested, or not interested at all. Level of education was measured on
a five-point ordinal scale (ANES, 2008). Respondents could select no high school
diploma, high school diploma, some college (but no Bachelors degree), Bachelors
degree, or education beyond a Bachelors degree.

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3. EXPERIMENT 1
Participants (N=187) were recruited from several communication classes (in exchange for
course credit/extra-credit) and from Amazons Mechanical Turk service (receiving
payment ranging from $.8 to $1.5 for completing the survey). Participants ranged in age
from 18 to 66 years of age (M=29.12, SD=11.77). A slight majority was female (n=95).
Most participants had some education beyond a high school diploma (n=149). A third of
the participants (33.7%) reported either an extremely high or very high interest in
information about government and politics. About a quarter of the participants (26.7%)
reported only some interest or no interest in similar information. Over a third of
participants reported a political affiliation consistent with the Democratic Party (37.4%)
compared with nearly a quarter that identified as Republicans (23.5%). Just more than a
quarter identified as Independents (28.3%) with the remaining selecting some other
political affiliation (10.7%).
The semantic differential scales used in the survey were highly reliable.
Cronbachs alpha for the three scales were: initial evaluation of Obamas argument
(=.94), evaluation of fact-check analysis (=.92), and re-evaluation of Obamas
argument (=.95).
The first hypothesis suggested that people would be influenced by their prior
attitudes when judging the initial strength of the argument made by President Obama.
There was overwhelming support for the hypothesis. A one-way ANOVA of political
affiliation was conducted on initial evaluation of the strength of the statement by President
Obama. This analysis produced a statistically significant result, F(3,183)=28.54, p<.001,
2=.32). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed a significant difference
between Democrats (M=35.8, SD=6.98), who rated the argument strongest, and
Republicans (M=21.98, SD=8.30), who rated the argument weakest, as well as
Independents (M=30.94, SD=8.01) and others (M=29.95, SD=8.63). In fact, the only
comparison that was not statistically significant was between Independents and others. In
addition, correlation was used to test the relationship between attitude toward Obama and
the initial evaluation of the argument. There was a strong association between the pretest
thermometer rating for Obama and the initial evaluation of the argument, r(185)=.64,
p<.001, r2=.41. As ratings for Obama increased, so too did the evaluation of his argument.
The second hypothesis suggested that people would be influenced by their prior
attitudes when judging the strength of the fact-check analysis. There was support for this
hypothesis. A one-way ANOVA of political affiliation was conducted on the evaluation of
the strength of the fact-check analysis. This analysis produced a statistically significant
result, F(3,183)=4.76, p=.003, 2=.07. Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction
revealed a significant difference between Democrats (M=26.29, SD=8.01), who rated the
argument weakest, and Republicans (M=31.66, SD=7.44), who rated the argument
strongest. There were no other statistically significant differences. In addition, correlation
was used to test the relationship between attitude toward Obama and the evaluation of the
fact-check analysis. There was a moderate negative correlation between the pretest
thermometer rating for Obama and the evaluation of the fact-check analysis, r(185)=-.33,
p<.001, r2=.11. As ratings for Obama increased, evaluation of the fact-check criticism
went down.

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The third hypothesis suggested that people would continue to be influenced by their prior
attitudes when making the final evaluation of the argument. A one-way ANOVA of
political affiliation was conducted on the final evaluation of the strength of the statement
by Obama. The analysis produced a statistically significant result, F(3,183)=32.39,
p<.001, 2=.35. Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed a significant
difference between Democrats (M=32.41, SD=7.65), who continued to rate the statement
strongest, and Republicans (M=17.41, SD=7.20), who continued to rate the statement
weakest, as well as Independents (M=26.00, SD=8.86). The only comparisons that were
not significant were between and others (M=27.10, SD=7.81) and both Democrats and
Independents. In addition, correlation was used to test the relationship between attitude
toward Obama and the final evaluation of the statement. Even after exposure to a factcheck criticism, a stronger positive correlation was found between the pretest thermometer
rating for Obama and the final evaluation of the statement, r(185)=.67, p<.001, r2=.45.
Finally, to investigate the research question, a series of one-way ANOVAs were
conducted to compare sex, level of education, and level of political interest with the initial
evaluation of Obamas argument, the evaluation of the fact-check analysis, and the final
evaluation of Obamas argument. In addition, given the importance of political affiliation,
a series of two-way ANOVAs were conducted using sex, level of education, and level of
political interest along with political affiliation on each evaluation. Correlation was used to
compare age and the three evaluations. Factors beyond political affiliation played almost
no role in the evaluation of Obamas statement or the fact-check criticism.
A one-way ANOVA was conducted between sex and the three argument
evaluations. No group differences based on sex were found for initial evaluation,
F(1,185)=.74, p=.39, final evaluation, F(1,185)=.09, p=.77, or evaluation of the fact-check
analysis, F(1,185)=.312, p=.577. A two-way ANOVA was conducted between sex and
political affiliation on the three argument evaluations. There was no main effect for sex
and no interaction effect between political affiliation and sex for any of the three
evaluations.
A one-way ANOVA found no group differences based on level of education for
initial evaluation, F(4,182)=.805, p=.524, final evaluation, F(4,182)=.381, p=.882, or
evaluation of the fact-check analysis, F(4,182)=.875, p=.480. In addition, a two-way
ANOVA was conducted between level of education and political affiliation on the three
argument evaluations. There was no main effect for level of education and no interaction
effect political affiliation and level of education for any of the three evaluations.
Differences in political interest were found for initial evaluation, F(4,182)=2.582,
p=.039. No group differences based on political interest were found for the evaluation of
the fact-check analysis, F(4,182)=1.701, p=.152, or for the final evaluation,
F(4,182)=1.467, p=.214. A two-way ANOVA was conducted between level of interest and
political affiliation on the three argument evaluations. There was no main effect for level
of political interest and no interaction effect between political affiliation and level of
political interest for any of the three evaluations. In general, sex and level of education
played no role in the evaluation of the competing political statements. Level of political
interest played a very small role in the assessment of the statements. Any role played by
political interest was dwarfed by political affiliation.
Correlation was used to test the relationship between age and the three argument
evaluations. Age was not associated with the initial evaluation of the argument,

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r(185)=.11, p=.14, the final evaluation of the argument, r(185)=.02, p=.77, or the
evaluation of the fact-check criticism, r(185)=.02, p=.84
4. EXPERIMENT 2
The results from the first experiment were conclusive in favor of a motivational bias in the
processing of fact-check information. But, for balance, a second experiment was
conducted using Mitt Romney as the source and an anti-Obmacare argument as the
material for evaluation. Participants (N=269) were recruited from introductory
communication classes (in exchange for course credit/extra-credit) and from Amazons
Mechanical Turk service (receiving payment of $.8 for completing of the survey).
Participants ranged from 18 to 69 years of age (M=28.92, SD=11.19). A slight majority
was male (n=138). Most participants had an education beyond a high school diploma
(82.9%). Nearly half of the participants (45.4%) reported either an extremely high or very
high interest in information about government and politics. Only 18.6% reported only
some interest or no interest in similar information. A plurality of participants reported a
political affiliation consistent with the Democratic Party (38.1%). Republicans (26.7%)
and Independents (26.3%) were the next most common affiliation. A few participants
(8.5%) reported some other political affiliation.
The semantic differential scales used in the survey were reliable. Cronbachs alpha
for the three scales were: initial evaluation of Romneys argument (=.96), evaluation of
fact-check analysis (=.96), and re-evaluation of Mitt Romneys argument (=.97).
The first hypothesis suggested that people would be influenced by their prior
attitudes when judging the initial strength of the argument made by Mitt Romney. There
was overwhelming support for the hypothesis. A one-way ANOVA of political affiliation
was conducted on initial evaluation of the strength of the statement by Romney. This
analysis produced a statistically significant result, F(3,265)=60.78, p<.001, 2=.41. Post
hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed significant differences between
Republicans (M=33.18, SD=7.82), who rated the argument strongest, and Democrats
(M=15.18, SD=8.17), who rated the argument weakest, as well as both Independents
(M=20.93, SD=9.76) and others (M=24.74, SD=10.73). In fact, all other comparisons were
statistically significant except between Independents and others. In addition, correlation
was used to compare prior attitude toward Romney and the initial evaluation of his
argument. There was a strong, positive correlation between pretest thermometer rating for
Romney and the initial evaluation of his statement, r(267)=.78, p<.001, r2=.61. Increasing
evaluations for Romney were associated with increasing evaluations for his statement.
The second hypothesis suggested that people would be influenced by their prior
attitudes when judging the strength of the argument presented in the fact-check analysis. A
one-way ANOVA of political affiliation was conducted on evaluation of the fact-check.
The analysis produced a statistically significant result, F(3,265)=14.83, p<.001, 2=.14.
Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed significant differences between
Republicans (M=23.42, SD=9.21), who rated the argument weakest, and Democrats
(M=32.14, SD=10.80), Independents (M=32.28, SD=7.67) and others (M=30.13,
SD=7.91). There were no other statistically significant differences. In addition, correlation
was used to compare prior attitude toward Romney and the evaluation of the fact-check
criticism. There was a moderate, negative correlation between pretest thermometer rating

662

for Romney and the evaluation of the fact-check criticism, r(267)=-.46, p<.001, r2=.21.
Increasing evaluation of Romney was associated with a decreasing evaluation of the factcheck criticism.
The final hypothesis suggested that people would continue to be influenced by
their prior attitudes, even after exposure to a fact-check criticism, when evaluating the
strength of Romneys argument. A one-way ANOVA of political affiliation was
conducted on the final evaluation of the statement made by Romney. The analysis
produced a statistically significant result, F(3,265)=81.70, p<.001, 2=.48. Post hoc tests
using the Bonferroni correction revealed significant differences between Republicans
(M=30.04, SD=8.03), who continue to rate the argument strongest, and Democrats
(M=11.26, SD=5.97), Independents (M=16.14, SD=9.62) and others (M=20.35, SD=9.59).
In fact, all of the comparisons were statistically significant except between Independents
and others. In addition, correlation was used to compare prior attitude toward Romney and
the final evaluation of his statement. There was an even stronger, positive correlation
between pretest thermometer rating for Romney and the final evaluation of his statement,
r=.79, p<.001, r2=.63.
Finally, the research question was investigated using a series of one-way ANOVAs
between sex, level of education, and level of political interest with all three argument
evaluations. In addition, a series of two-way ANOVAs compared political affiliation along
with sex, level of education, and level of political interest with all three argument
evaluations. Correlation also was used to identify a relationship between age and the three
argument evaluations. Very few factors had a meaningful impact on argument evaluation.
There were no group differences between sex and the initial evaluation of the
argument, F(1,267)=.004, p=.95, evaluation of the fact-check, F(1,267)=2.24, p=.14, or
the final evaluation of the argument, F(1,267)=1.25, p=.27. In addition, a two-way
ANOVA with sex and political affiliation found no main effect for sex and no interaction
effect with political affiliation for the initial evaluation of the argument, the final
evaluation of the argument, or for the evaluation of the fact-check criticism.
There were no group differences between level of education and the initial
evaluation of the argument, F(3,265)=2.27, p=.08, final evaluation of the argument,
F(3,265)=1.09, p=.36, or for the evaluation of the fact-check criticism, F(3,265)=.23,
p=.88. In addition, a two-way ANOVA with level of education and political affiliation
found no main effect for level of education and no interaction effect with political
affiliation for the initial evaluation of the argument, the final evaluation of the argument,
or for the evaluation of the fact-check criticism.
There were no group differences between level of political interest and the initial
evaluation of the argument, F(4,264)=1.61, p=.17, final evaluation of the argument,
F(4,264)=0.83, p=.51, or for the evaluation of the fact-check criticism, F(4,264)=1.16,
p=.33. A two-way ANOVA with level of political interest and political affiliation found a
main effect for both political affiliation, F(3,250)=42.12, p<.001, 2=.34, and level of
political interest, F(4,250)=4.49, p=.002, 2=.07, but not for the interaction. Post hoc tests
using the Bonferroni correction found significant differences between those with no
interest at all, who rated the argument lowest, and those with a slight interest and those
with a moderate interest. No other levels of political interest were significantly different.
Similarly, a two-way ANOVA found a main effect for both political affiliation,
F(3,250)=49.60, p<.001, 2=.37, and level of political interest, F(4,250)=2.67, p=.03,

663

2=.04. Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction found no significant differences
between any of the groups. A two-way ANOVA with level of political interest and
political affiliation found no main effect and no interaction effect with political affiliation
for the evaluation of the fact-check criticism.
Correlation was used to test the relationship between age and the three argument
evaluations. Age was not associated with the initial evaluation of the argument, r(267)=.094, p=.12, the final evaluation of the argument, r(267)=-.07, p=.24, or the evaluation of
the fact-check criticism, r(267)=.02, p=.74
5. CONCLUSION
Fact-checking represents a laudable goal in a democracy. In an effort to help shape public
opinion, fact-checking provides citizens with the facts necessary to evaluate competing
political claims. The public comes to any political dispute with some prior opinion. But,
once exposed to a fact-check, they should update their opinion on the basis of the new
information. Fact-checking, then, should promote a broad consensus on the topic. When
the scrutinized claims generally are true, the public can have confidence in their prior
opinion. But, when the scrutinized claims generally are false, exposure to a fact-check
analysis ought to undermine the prior opinion and serve as the justification for a new
opinion.
Unfortunately, the results from both experiments reported in this paper suggest that
reality is far from the ideal. In both cases, prior partisan attitudes strongly influenced the
evaluation of the arguments. The initial evaluation of the argument was shaped by prior
commitments. Prior attitude toward the source and political affiliation were strong
predictors of the initial evaluation of the statement: Proattitudinal messages were
supported and counterattitudinal messages were rejected. The same commitments shaped
reaction to the fact-check analysis. The criticism levelled by the fact-check was strong,
well-supported from neutral sources, and unambiguously concluded the initial claim was
false. Yet, in both studies, prior commitments were strong predictors of the evaluation of
the fact-check claims: attitude congruent messages were rated much higher than attitude
incongruent messages. Finally, even after exposure to a strong fact-check analysis, prior
attitudes continued to influence the evaluation of the political statement: attitude consistent
messages continued to be supported and attitude inconsistent messages continued to be
rejected.
It could be argued that the results of these experiments confirm that fact-checking
is effective. After all, the evaluations of the statements were lower after exposure to the
fact-check criticism. But, such a conclusion is not warranted for two reasons. First, the
evaluations did not decline substantially. In both experiments, those in the proattitudinal
conditional (Democrats in Experiment 1 and Republicans in Experiment 2) maintained
evaluations that were very positive. While partisans reduced their evaluations, the average
scores were still very positive. Exposure to a strongly worded criticism that seriously
challenged the validity of the claim resulted in only a minor adjustment in evaluation by
committed partisans. With average scores still above 30 (on a scale to 42), it is clear that
partisans continue to believe the claim even in the face of a relentless challenge. Second,
fact-checking ought to cause a convergence of opinion. The ideal of fact-checking is
premised on the idea that there is a truth and that exposing the public to the correct

664

information will cause them to reject the misleading statements. Bayesian updating
suggests that fact-checking should result in a convergence of opinion (Bartels, 2002, p.
122). Two groups of Bayesian learners exposed to the same set of information should
inexorably come to see the world in the same way (Grynaviski, 2006, p. 331).
Unfortunately, fact-checking does not encourage this effect. Instead of a convergence of
opinion, the minor updating by committed partisans prevents agreement. The lack of
agreement on the facts, confirmed by the continuing gap in the final evaluation of the
statement, suggests that partisanship continues to influence the evaluation of the statement
even after exposure to a strong fact-check criticism.
Motivated reasoning provides a useful explanation for these results. Competing
political claims, and the statements of fact-checkers, invoke partisan interests that prevent
a rational assessment of the information. As a result, messages that are consistent with
prior commitments are viewed as strong and not subject to scrutiny while messages that
are inconsistent are viewed as weak and actively scrutinized.
It would be easy to interpret these results as a call to abandon fact-checking. That
is not the intent of this project. Rather, this is a call to encourage those engaged in factchecking to move beyond basic descriptions of true and false. Merely identifying one side
as making a false claim is not likely sufficient to change public opinion. Where Jamieson
(1992) advanced the utility of adwatches by providing a visual grammar to make them
more effective, this research highlights the importance of creating a motivational
grammar to make them more compelling. Fact-checking should not be abandoned. But,
fact-checkers need to be cognizant that counterattitudinal messages will be actively
scrutinized and they must develop strategies to make their messages more compelling in
the face of strong pressures to reject their claims. Merely hoping that the audience will be
motivated by accuracy goals (Taber & Lodge, 2006) will not be sufficient.
Several limitations of this project deserve mention. First, study participants mainly
were drawn from Amazons Mechanical Turk online labor market. While the service has
been shown to be a reliable source for participants for academic research (Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012),
future research should attempt to gather responses from a random sample. Moving from a
convenience sample to a random sample would provide more confidence in the
generalizability of the conclusions.
Second, this study addressed a single issue with a single, brief exposure to a factcheck criticism. While it appears that exposure to a single fact-check was not effective at
changing opinion, it is possible that fact-checking could serve to change opinion in the
long-term. Future studies should attempt to study the effect over many months, especially
with repeated exposure to the criticism. In addition, fact-checking could serve to induce
media coverage of misleading information, prompting repetition of the weakness of the
claim. Repeated exposure, over a significant period of time, could provide the basis for
opinion change, even if gradual and small. Additional research is needed to test the longterm effects of fact-checking on public opinion.

665

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The Persuasive Powers Of Text, Voice, And Film - A Lecture Hall

Experiment With A Famous Speech
Henrik Juel
Communication Studies
Roskilde University
Denmark
hjuel@ruc.dk

ABSTRACT:
This paper presents and discusses a lecture hall experiment concerning the rhetorical impact of different
media. The experiment brings out notable differences in the effects of persuasion and argument embedded in
the same set of words - in this case an extract from a historic speech - when presented respectively in
writing, as speech, and on film.
KEYWORDS:
argument, experiment, film, mountaintop, persuasiveness, rhetoric, soundtrack, text, visual, voice.

1. INTRODUCTION
For a number of semesters I have conducted a lecture hall experiment with international
university students about persuasion and argument and how they appear to differ in their
impact, dependent on whether they are presented in writing, as speech or on film.
It is hardly surprising that the medium used to present a text can influence how its
message is perceived by an audience, but the eye-opening trick of this experiment is that I
present my students with exactly the same "text" or "content" in each case, first in writing,
then as a voice recording, and finally on film. The students' conceptions and evaluations of
each type of presentation of the "text" alter dramatically as it changes from reading mode
to listening mode and then to film-viewing mode. Naturally film-viewing here includes the
sound track with its associated background sounds and voices heard among the audience.
2. PERSUASIVE FEATURES OF THE TEXT
The piece of text that I use is taken from a fairly well known speech, but I have
deliberately chosen a part of it that does not give the orator, the context or the situation
away too obviously. I want the students to focus first on the text as written material, tell
me what it says, how it is structured and styled, and how it affects them. I also ask them
not to let it be known, at this point, if they have recognized the text or are able to make an
intelligent guess either as to its origin or who wrote it. I then ask them whether they have
found any sound arguments in the text and whether, and in what manner, they find it
persuasive. The text runs as shown in figure 1:
Like anybody, I would like to live a long life. Longevity has its place. But I'm not
concerned about that now. I just want to do God's will. And He's allowed me to go
up to the mountain. And I've looked over. And I've seen the Promised Land. I may
668

not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will
get to the promised land!
And so I'm happy, tonight.
I'm not worried about anything.
I'm not fearing any man!
Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord!!
(Figure 1: This is the text image that I project on the screen in the lecture hall1.)
At first the students often hesitate, probably because they suspect that I am setting some
sort of trap or test, and also because they do not find the text particularly clear or easy to
categorize. I often have to help a little with getting them started on what could be called a
common pragmatic analysis, or an analysis of the content and form of the text. For
example, I may ask them what sort of text it seems to be: is it like a love letter? Is it
perhaps more like a note from one's bank about some problem with an account? Or is it
perhaps an announcement from their university about upcoming exams?
At this point the students often say that the text looks more like part of a speech or
perhaps a sermon. I ask them what the indications of that are, and they will then say that
there are a number of short sentences, such as are to be found in an oral presentation, and
also that there are some religious references such as "God" and "the Promised Land", the
latter referring to the story from the bible about Moses leading the Jews to the 'Promised
land' or to "what they considered" the 'Promised Land' (International students in my
classes are often very cautious when it comes to matters touching on political
correctness!).
When asked for more comment about the style of the text they note points such as
the clause "I'm not" as opposed to "I am not" as further indications that it is a transcript of
a speech. The speaker's use of the phrase "Mine eyes" instead of "My eyes" seems to make
the mood of the text rather solemn, as do the words about doing "God's will".
Further encouraged, the students may also mention the alliteration in "Like to Live
a Long Life", and also how many phrases start with the same first word "And" (anaphora).
When asked about possible arguments in the text the students are as a general rule
unable to identify any, but with a little help they can reconstruct at least an example of an
incomplete one: "I have seen the Promised Land, because I have gone up to the mountain"
(the unstated but implied second premise - the "warrant" in Toulmin's terminology - would
be something like: "From the mountain you can see very far/ see the Promised Land").
However they find this unclear, and consequently unconvincing as an argument. All in all
the students do not seem to feel that the text has convinced them, or to put it another way
they do not see that it has any significance for them: they do not feel moved or touched by
it. Once a student went so far as to say that it was just a lot of egotistical religious
nonsense that 'left him cold'.

This text is a transcript of the last part of the speech that is presented more fully on the following pages and
in the notes. In order to give a fairly realistic presentation of the lecture hall experiment the origin of the text
is not revealed at this point even though it would be the usual correct academic practice.

669

3. PERSUASIVE FEATURES OF THE VOICE

I then tell the class that I am, so to speak, going to add a voice to the text - in the form of a
soundtrack while the same text is still projected onto the screen. I further ask them to
reflect while they listen, and consider whether the voice in any way changes their
perception of the text, especially with regard to its argumentative or persuasive qualities.

Figure 2: This pictogram is added next to the text in figure 1, and in the experiment this
enables the soundtrack to be played.2

As I play the soundtrack it is usual for quite a few students to 'light up' as they recognize
the voice, but again I ask them not to mention the fact or name the speaker and remind
them to try to characterize the voice.
That sometimes appears to be rather difficult for them, until I point out that
obvious features, such as whether it sounds like a male or female voice, would be relevant.
'Of course, it is a male voice', they say, and add that it has an American accent. Some even
identify it as being spoken in a Southern dialect and add that it sounds like a black
preacher from the 1960's.
And indeed it is, namely Martin Luther King. By now most of them have guessed
that, and that in turn seems to make it easier for them to characterize the voice. But I then
ask them to consider in principle just the voice that lies before them, by trying to abstract
from background knowledge and simply focusing on such qualities as they can detect in
the voice itself.
They mention that the speaker sounds very dedicated and sincere, and that he has a
peculiar way of enhancing, or prolonging, certain words and vowels, almost as though he
is singing or chanting.
We can then agree that hearing the speaker's voice adds quite a lot of "information"
(or one could say in terms of rhetoric that it adds heavily to the ethos of the text), i.e. in
this case we are convinced that it is a man speaking, but also that he is very engaged and
eager to convince his audience. When I ask them how exactly it is that they have received
this impression which qualities or features of the soundtrack reveal this "dedication",
they may answer that they just feel it very clearly: there is something compelling about the
speaker's intonation, the modulation of his voice, and its loud, stentorian quality.
2

The soundtrack is not embedded in the text here, but it can be played by using the video-link in the
following notes - and to be realistic in terms of the lecture hall experiment one should not look at the video
while playing, but only listen to the sound while looking at the quoted text above.

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We can also agree that while it is quite difficult to describe a voice in detail and we are
not used to doing so - we are nevertheless very good at recognizing different voices. We
do not need to listen for many seconds in order to identify the voice of a friend or family
member, or of someone who often appears in the media: we can do it in a split second, and
can often, just as instantly, recognize the mood or emotion of the person speaking, even
though we may not have much by way of analytical tools, precise concepts or academic
terminology at our disposal.
And the qualities of the voice directly affect our own moods, perceptions and
attitudes. We do not have to wait for a careful analysis or a "reading of the whole text" in
order to take away an impression and be influenced by the voice: it makes its impact
immediately.
Pushed for more information from the soundtrack in question, the students add that
they can clearly hear the response of the audience in the room where the speech is being
given, - and from it get the impression of a very enthusiastic interaction between the
speaker and the audience, something quite absent in the written text.
Of course a careful transcript could have added notes about applause from the
audience and the several cries of "yes!" from within the room, but again such a transcript
could never describe the actual audio experience and might well be felt to be inauthentic.
The written text cannot deliver the "live" experience, whereas the soundtrack feels
immediate and has presence. The text, as text, can be read either slowly or fast, and can
be repeated, broken up and analyzed; the soundtrack, however, flows in a sequence that
normally takes the natural pace of the events it records. We can of course break it up,
change the speed and manipulate it, just as we can manipulate and edit a written text or a
film. But in listening we experience the feeling of something happening "right now", even
though what the listener is hearing may be a historical recording.
A written text can to some extent come to life as we read it, but that requires a
special type of imaginary activity on the part of the reader. Half an empty page and a word
in capital letters will seldom cause a reader to jump from his seat, whereas a long pause or
a sudden loud sound on a soundtrack would normally cause an immediate physical
reaction of surprise or shock among an audience.
Anyway, at this point I can agree with the students that the soundtrack, to a much
greater extent than the written text, gives us a feeling of being present and of participating
in an event with other people. The speaker seems in a sense to include us in his audience,
even though we realize full well that we were not present when he was speaking. The
voice reaches out to us, trying to convince us of something.
This may not be the case with another voice. As an illustration I sometimes read
the text out loud, and my voice sounds very flat, monotonous and unenthusiastic compared
with Martin Luther King's. And the students agree that my reading of the text has quite a
different, even ridiculous, effect. It is in no way convincing; it presents the listener with
quite a different type of speaker, one whose voice does little by way of communicating
either the message or its appeal.

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4. PERSUASIVE FEATURES OF THE FILM

I then ask the students to observe how their experience and evaluation changes when I
project a film clip that covers the same text (including naturally the soundtrack they have
already heard).

Figure 3: Still picture from the film displayed in the experiment. 3

While projecting the film I can see quite clearly that the students become much more
attentive and emotionally involved than when they were simply reading the text or
listening to the sound track. When interviewed about their experience they readily admit
this, and lay stress on his eyes and his very intense eye contact with the audience. His eyes
seem to shine brilliantly, almost superhumanly, almost as if he were about to burst into
tears. They also mention his energetic gestures and commanding posture.
When pushed a little further they tell me that his formal black and white clothing
add to the mood of the film clip, as do the dark back ground and the spot light on the
speaker. Sometimes I can even nudge them into noticing the angle from which he is being
filmed, with the camera 'looking up' at him, emphasizing his appearance as a preacher, or
father figure.
When I ask what more information or "material" they can get from viewing the
film (besides what they have already mentioned about the speaker being a black male,
dressed in such and such a fashion and looking thus and so), the students may recall that
3

The film clip can be seen at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oehry1JC9Rk

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there are also a few short shots that include the audience. If I then search out one of these
shots and pause the film there they tell me that they get the impression, even more so than
from the sound track, of an enthusiastic audience; and note that it was a mixed audience of
men and women, black and white, old and young. And from the clothes and the setting we
get an idea of when and where the speech was given (some decades ago in America).

Figure 4: The film clip gives us more information about the audience and the setting.

At the very end of the film clip we get a shot that is almost 'backstage': the camera has
zoomed out, and in this shot we see the speaker leaving the podium and being greeted or
thanked, by his friends or staff.

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Figure 5: Here the camera shows us what happens 'backstage'.

So when asked to comment on this, my students - being well versed in the academic slang
of our Communication department - can tell me that the film clip offers us more
information about the context and setting of the speech, elements that were missing in the
written text - and some explanatory notes would be needed if one were to evaluate the
written text properly. But even so the film clip still appears to offer us, in a much more
realistic sense than the other types of presentation, the historical and cultural
circumstances; and most notably, a sense of almost being present.
I then ask my students whether the camera is merely registering everything that is
there, or if it is playing an active role in portraying the speech. This may of course lead to
a long discussion about the nature of film and the genres of reportage and documentary,
but I try to keep such digressions short. I often get the answer that certain camera angles
have been chosen for effect and that not everything relevant to the occasion is shown, and
that one can conclude therefore that the camera and film editing have a certain rhetorical
power in shaping our perception and understanding of the event. And that certain things
are missing on the film: if you had actually been in the room you would have had a direct
sensation of the atmosphere; e.g. the smoke, the smell of the room, the temperature, the
roughness and texture of the floor and of the seat you were sitting on.
As I show the film clip again I ask the students to pay special attention to what is
happening towards the end of it. This time they notice a limited, rather shaky, amount of
zoom-in onto the face of the speaker. This reveals of course the hand of the filmmaker
making an adjustment to the camera and could be seen either as a sign of poor practice,
or else as an attempt by an experienced filmmaker to highlight what he feels to be the
approaching climax of the speech. Very often when filming one moves in closer with the

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camera when the most intense moment arrives - or alternatively, by "moving in closer"
one actually helps to create an important moment in the film.

Figure 6: This illustrates the framing of the subject and the camera's distance from it
during most of the speech.

Figure 7: Towards the (anticipated) climax of the speech the camera tries to move in a
little closer; the result is neither particularly smooth nor steady but that in itself seems to
add to the effect of a climax. It is a feature seldom noticed by the students during the first
run of the film clip.

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5. THE HISTORICAL SPEECH EVENT

At this point I tell the students - if it has not been revealed before - a little more about the
speaker and the context: that it is indeed Dr. Martin Luther King, and that the quoted text
is from his last speech, (now known as the "I've Been to the Mountaintop speech), given
on April 3rd, 1968 in Memphis, Tennessee; and I remind them that in 1964 King had
become the youngest person to receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his work towards ending
racial segregation and discrimination through civil disobedience and other nonviolent
means. To younger generations, and because it has often been quoted from and reported
on film and TV, King is nowadays perhaps best known for his "I have a dream" speech of
August 28, 1963, given at the Lincoln Memorial, Washington. He was assassinated the
day after the 'Mountaintop' speech, on April 4, 1968, in Memphis.
This background information adds of course to the experience, to our emotional
response to the words as well as to the film as a whole. Some students argue that it seems
obvious now that he actually knew that some 'bad guys' were out to kill him and that this is
revealed both by his words "I may not get there with you", and by his eyes and whole
appearance. Others will say that it is easy to over-interpret and read things into a text or a
film when you already know the chain of events and the historical circumstances.
At this point it usually becomes clear that we are talking about four different things
here: the written text we saw first, the soundtrack of Dr. King's voice, the film clip
recording his speech, and the 1968 event itself.
The students and I are now agreed that in this case going from the written text to
the soundtrack and then on to the film clip greatly increases the persuasiveness and impact
of the speech, and at this point it would be tempting to ask the students if they feel that
being present at the actual speech event would have left an even stronger impression on
them. But that, of course, would be inviting speculation about what could well become a
very muddy case, so I usually refrain from it.
But I might add a comment that one's actual presence at the historical event in that
room should not be considered critical or decisive when it comes to making an assessment
of the persuasiveness of the speech, as in that case one's assessment would depend,
naturally enough, on whether one was there as a black boy in the front row, a sleepy old
woman at the back, a white policeman on duty, or a member of the organizing committee
worrying about possible riots. And one's individual perception and appreciation of the
performance of the speaker, his gestures and his words, would depend on a number of
other factors. But as a point of departure for an academic content analysis we have to look
at those features that are actually there and that we can agree upon are there (as belonging
to the written text, the voice recording, and to the presented film). The next step will then
be to try to come up with a reasonable interpretation that others will accept too.
6. CONCLUSION
The whole lecture hall experiment described above is actually meant as a warm up
exercise for students about to engage in further studies of Print Media production, Speech,
and Video Production, as well as further studies in the analysis of Communication and
Rhetoric. As such it leaves many aspects unexplored, but it may also give a certain
overview of some constituent persuasive features in different media:

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First of all an actual (unmediated) speech event is dependent - as we already know from
Cicero's pentagon - on certain complex interwoven features if it is to be apt and
persuasive: the speaker, the audience, the situation, the subject and the language. In this
case what stands out is of course Martin Luther King as an eminent speaker, but then again
it can be argued that he is also speaking at a crucial moment to a highly motivated
audience. It can be described as an almost paradigmatic rhetorical situation.
The film reporting from that speech event is in a sense missing something: it is restricted
to only two senses, the eyes and ears, and it has to employ specific camera angles and
camera framing, specific microphone distance and quality, and typically the film last for a
shorter time span than the actual event. So the film media seem to give us a "thinner"
experience than that of being actually present. But then again, the features of camera and
editing techniques can provide a degree of enhancement and dramatic dynamics to the
event. It is not just 'representing' in the sense of duplicating, but actually arranging,
stressing, explaining, condensing, pointing and offering the event to a new audience. The
film maker's work can to a large extent be understood as an extra layer of rhetoric on top
of what is already supplied by the speaker - as when the camera zooms in to "highlight"
the climax of the speech, or what is happening backstage.
The soundtrack played alone without projecting the film reveals the quality of the
speakers voice as well as the background noise in the room. This gives "more" information
and appeal than we get from just reading the transcript, but it can also in some cases even
emphasize and enhance the purely 'audio' qualities of the speech to a greater extent than
what we usually experience when perceiving the complete film clip. Sound is very
important to film, as we all know, and sometimes a soundtrack can become even more
impressive when the images are not seen.
A written text may seem to come out of this experiment as a very weak medium in
terms of persuasion and appeal. But that would be a misleading generalization. Written
texts can be persuasive and moving in their own way. Certainly there are beautiful poems
and novels that are hard to transform into films of equal beauty or impact, and some
argumentative texts are better understood and appreciated when they can be read and reread than when they have simply been heard. Written texts have features such as layout,
fonts, and punctuation that may also enhance their meaning, and possibly also their
persuasiveness.
So the conclusion I pass to my students is that the casual ranking of the various
media in terms of how effective they appear to be in their ability to persuade, to convince,
to argue and to communicate, is a mistake that should be avoided. Rather I encourage
them to investigate very closely all of the different persuasive aspects of the particular
medium they chose to explore in their upcoming workshops in media production and
analysis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank the bachelor and master students, semesters 2010 - 2014, on
the International Track of Communications Studies at Roskilde University, Denmark, for
having endured this lecture hall exercise and for contributing valuable comments. The
author further wishes to thank Rae Duxbury for advice concerning the formulations in
English.

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REFERENCES:
Juel, H. (2004). The Ethos and the Framing a Study in the Rhetoric of the TV camera. An essay on the
author's web-page: http://akira.ruc.dk/~hjuel/.
Juel, H. (2006). Defining Documentary Film, "p.o.v.". Number 22. A Danish Journal of Film
Studies, University of Aarhus.

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Mitt Romney And Ideological Enthymeme In Denver:

Obamacare And Its Functions
Justin Kirk
Department of Communication Studies
University of Kansas
United States of America
justinwkirk@ku.edu

ABSTRACT: This paper argues that surface-level analysis of political argument fails to explain the
effectiveness of ideological enthymemes, particularly within the context of presidential debates. The choice
of a terminological system limits and shapes the argumentative choices afforded the candidate. Presidential
debates provide a unique context within which to examine the interaction of ideological constraints and
argument due to their relatively committed and ideologically homogenous audiences.
KEYWORDS: argument, Barack Obama, enthymeme, ideology, Mitt Romney, Obamacare, presidential
debates, terminology

1. INTRODUCTION
On October 3, 2012 Mitt Romney and Barack Obama took the stage at Magness Arena at
the University of Denver and participated in the first of three debates prior to the general
election. Heading into the Denver debate, Romney was suffering a slow bleed of
independents and moderate conservative voters (John F. Kennedy School of Government,
2013, p. 210). Whether due to the now-infamous 47% comment at a fundraiser in Florida,
the near-calamity of the GOP convention, or Romneys persistent vagueness in regards to
his tax policies, one aspect of the race was abundantly clear; the challengers campaign
needed a significant boost to remain competitive in the last month of the election. As a
result, the Romney campaign entered the debate in Denver with a lower threshold of
expectations than President Obama.
Reactions after the debate did not match the expectations established prior to the
encounter. Rather than being the knock down, drag-out fight described in US News and
World Report, the first matchup between Mitt Romney and Barack Obama was, as
described by one writer at Politico, relatively sleepy with no fireworks or big
moments to speak of and unusually civilized (Metzler, 2012; Haberman, 2012;
Mariucci and Farofoli, 2012). Expectations were on the Obamas side by a 2 to 1 margin
among voters, with the belief firmly in the minds of the electorate that Obama would win
because of his experience (Milbank, 2012, p. A02). However, pundits agreed that the
biggest difference between expectations and results was the lacklustre performance of the
president (Medved, 2012; McAskill, 2012; Ingold, 2012).
Romneys performance was surprising but should not have been unexpected, as eighteen
months of practice against twelve other potential GOP nominees provided him with ample
opportunity to hone his performance and strategy. Following the debate, polls and pundits
agreed that Romney had closed the gap between himself and the President and was in a
much better position after Denver than before (Stelter, 2012, p. A22; Milbank, p. A02).
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David Axelrod, senior advisor to the Obama campaign, speaks about the result of the
debate: I think what he did was, in one night, he got back those Republican-leaning
Independents. I think he improved enthusiasm among his base. I think the race snapped
back to where it was essentially before the convention (John F. Kennedy School of
Government, p. 218).
The debate at Magness Arena provides scholars with a particularly vexing problem.
Despite the media consensus that Romney won the debate in Denver, Robert Rowlands
analysis reveals the superiority of Obama performance at the argumentative and
evidentiary level, leading him to conclude that something other than the arguments must
have been the operative force moving public opinion (Rowland, 2013, p. 537). In what
follows, I argue that the strategic argumentative choices of Romney and his campaign
played a crucial role in influencing public opinion. Mitt Romney uses a particular
configuration of terms to overcome the substantive and evidentiary barriers facing him.
Rather than articulating a set of policies clearly and defending them with supporting
materials and evidence, Romney utilizes three specific strategies to avoid direct
confrontation and outflank the Obama team.
First, Romney rejects the definition of the debate as a contest of ideas. Instead, by
challenging the unspoken decorum and unenforceable rules of the presidential debate,
Romney eschews the norms for a form of ideological combat. He exchanged a contest of
ideas for what the New York Times called a clash of philosophies (Baker, 2012, p. A0).
Descriptions of the debate such as Metzlers, calling for a knock down, drag-out fight is
indicative of the medias preference for such a sport. Focusing primarily on attacking the
president and abandoning the rules enables Romney to fulfill the gladiatorial role perfectly
(Dionne, 2012, p.A23). Second, Romney redefines evidence as something not based on
widely accepted standards of reason, only ideology. By challenging the evidence and
reasoning of the president, Romney makes it impossible to engage in a reasoned discussion
about policy issues. Freed from the burden of proof, Romney becomes nearly
indefatigable. Obamas ability to refute the claims of his challenger was undermined by
this strategy, preventing any real gains on the part of the president. A final strategy
employed by Romney is a particularly effective enthymemea title of titlesthat relies
on the ideological commitments of the audience. In Grammar of Motives, Kenneth Burke
talks about how symbolic equations can be reduced to representative anecdotes that contain
the entire order of symbolic equations (selection, reflection, deflection) within their
structure (1969, p. 59). Romney goes a step further and develops an anecdote that refers to
all other issues in play. By deploying Obamacare as an enthymeme in a variety of
contexts and arguments, including some wildly outside the scope of the Affordable Care
Act, Obamas policy successes are re-characterized as failures. Each iteration of the
anecdote contains the entire symbolic equation of the previous versions and allows
Romney to chain out the Obamacare enthymeme in a way that sums up his evaluation of
the entire administration. In what follows, I develop these positions and show how Romney
used them to create an ideological worldview without speaking to the specific policies
required by his own ideological commitments (Burke, 1974, p. 84).

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2. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Before examining the debate itself, it is necessary to examine some of the key strategic
choices made by the campaigns prior to the debate. First, both election teams understood
both the opportunity and necessity of the first debate. Beth Meyers, senior advisor to
Romney, indicates that people would want to see it on the line and that whatever was
happening in the campaign they would need a winning jolt (John F. Kennedy School of
Government, p. 208). David Axelrod indicated that the Obama campaign understood the
historical significance of the first debate and admitted the team was too focused on the
debate as a problem area and over-prepared the president with too much material (p.
210). Clearly, the Magness Arena debate offered significant dangers and opportunities for
each candidate.
Next, the preparation strategies indicate that the campaigns were focused on two
separate engagements. On the one hand, the Romney campaign arrived in Denver ready for
a direct confrontation, Beth Meyers describes this strategy: On every issue, we were
very focused on finding an attacka place to attack President Obama on every
issuethats what we did so that when Mitt came on that stage at the first debate, he was
loaded for bear on every issue (p. 210). Mitt Romneys campaign devised an offensively
focused strategy, and targeted specific policies of the president in an attempt to place
Barack Obama on the defensive.
On the other hand, Axelrod describes how the Obama campaign approached the
debate as a discussion, focusing mainly on the policies and content preparation, which
limited the Presidents ability to adapt to the situation of televised debating (p. 211). In
Axelrods words, the Obama team had a strategy of limited engagement that the
president then took to an illogical extreme in the moment of the debate (p. 214). The
result of the interaction of these two strategic approaches was that the debate didnt do
much to the presidents imageIts more of what it did for Mitt Romney (p. 220). David
Simas, director of opinion research for the Romney campaign, reflects on the impact of the
strategic choices made by the campaign and their effect on the election:
What we saw after twenty-four hours was a consolidation back to Governor
Romney. It accelerated in the second twenty-four hour periodWhat we saw is, by
the third day, as David said, the race had settled back to preconvention levels.
When we analyzed who it was that moved, it was precisely those voters from our
perspective who had peeled off during the 47, so thats on the quantitative sidein
the qualitative, it opened up the door for Governor Romney. It corrected with a
whole bunch of voters the problem that he hadfor the first time we saw his very
favorable numbers among the Republicans rivaling numbers that we had seen in
2008. (p. 218-9)
Axelrod agrees with this sentiment and argues that Obamas numbers didnt suffer but
Romney definitely improved his standing in the race (p. 218). The debate in Denver
offered the Romney campaign with a significant opportunity to reset the election and the
former governor certainly surpassed expectations.

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THE DEBATE
In the debate at Magness Arena, Romney used three argumentative strategies to capitalize
on his strategic opportunities. The results of the debate prove that the particular strategies
adopted by Romney were successful, at least in the short term. First, Romney approached
the debate as an engagement in ideological combat, rather than a debate about ideas and
policies. Some audiences who watched the debate were expecting and desired a knock
down fight, and a fight is exactly what Romney produced for bring the audience. Burke
describes this strategy as appetite fulfilment and argues for its supreme psychological
effectiveness (Burke, 1957, p. 31). The appetite, however, did not need to be created by
Romney in this case, for the expectations of the audience had already been established
beforehand by the framing of the media. Outlets like US News and World Report and the
Denver Post characterized the debate as a fight and duel respectively (Metzler, 2012;
Crummy, 2012, p. A2S). Polling data prior to the debate also indicated that one of the two
main foci of the electorate during the debate was going to be Romneys adherence to
conservative principles (NBC News, 2012, p. 11). The conditions were prime for the
Romney campaign to approach the debate as an ideological fight.
In contrast to voters expecting a duel, a full one in five likely voters felt that
Romney flip flops and changes his mind too much on issues and is too wealthy to
understand the day-to-day concerns of most Americans (NBC News, p. 11). The
electorates demand for consistency from Romney represented a significant barrier to his
success in the debate. Burke, however, indicates that the fulfilment of audience
expectations only requires the maintenance of a principle under new guises. It is the
restatement of the same thing in different ways (Burke, 1957, p. 125). For Burke,
fulfilling psychological expectations can supplement and sometimes exceed the
effectiveness of the content. Independent and moderate Republicans had an appetite for a
particular type of confrontation heading into the Denver debate, and Romney provided
them with exactly what they wanted.
For example, at the end of the first segment on the economy, Mitt Romney
undermined the norms on speaking order, decorum about who speaks first and who gets the
last word. First, Romney appealed to Jim Lehrer, demanding that he get the final word in
the segment. Jim, the president began this segment, so I think I get the last word, so Im
going to take it. All right? (Chuckles) (NPR.org, 2012).1 Romney aggressively claimed
the response time, then asked for permission as an afterthought. Lehrer objected briefly,
but the President provided Romney the opening he needed to really shape the debate, He
can you can have it. Thats not how it works, replied Lehrer, and despite stringent
objections, the terms of rebuttal order and the time limits on those refutations were
discarded by both candidates, leaving Lehrer with little room to re-establish the original
parameters.
A second example of Romneys ability to control the debates overall structure is
an exchange over the issue of Medicare and the impact of the Affordable Care Act on
current and upcoming retirees. After a section where Obama attempted to pivot back to the
macro-level health care issue, Romney objected:

All quotations from the debate were taken from the NPR transcript and audio recording of the debate.

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MR. ROMNEY: That's that's a big topic. Could we could we stay on Medicare?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Is that a is that a separate topic? I'm sorry.
MR. LEHRER: Yeah, we're going to yeah. I want to get to it, but all I want to do is very
quickly
MR. ROMNEY: Let's get back to Medicare.
MR. LEHRER: before we leave the economy
MR. ROMNEY: Let's get back to Medicare.
MR. LEHRER: No, no, no, no
MR. ROMNEY: The president said that the government can provide the service at lower

MR. LEHRER: No.

MR. ROMNEY: cost and without a profit.
MR. LEHRER: All right.
MR. ROMNEY: If that's the case, then it will always be the best product that people can
purchase. But my experience
MR. LEHRER: Wait a minute, Governor.
MR. ROMNEY: My experience is the private sector typically is able to provide a better
product at a lower cost.
MR. LEHRER: Can we can the two of you agree that the voters have a choice, a clear
choice between the two of you
MR. ROMNEY: Absolutely.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Yes.
MR. LEHRER: on Medicare?
MR. ROMNEY: Absolutely.
In this extended exchange, Romney argued with Lehrer in an attempt to keep the
discussion away from the larger health care issues and focus instead on the relationship
between Medicare and the Affordable Care Act. Romney, even after repeated objections
from Lehrer, continued to change the topic until he succeeds. Rather than complete the
discussion, Lehrer attempted to end the segment as quickly as possible. Instead of asking
for an articulation of the differences between the two candidates, Lehrer satisfied himself
with merely establishing that one exists.
The shift away from predetermined norms about the debate provided Romney with
two direct strategic benefits: (1) he can stay on the attack throughout the debate by always
demanding the last word in any given segment and (2) he can extend the discussion in
areas where he is strongest and avoid defending his own positions. When Jim Lehrer
interrupts the candidates to let them know that were way over our first 15 minutes
Romney says Its fun, isnt it? Fun? Perhaps. Strategic? Certainly. By the end of the
debate, Romney has so thoroughly succeeded in shattering the time limits, Jim Lehrer is
forced to scrap an entire segment of the debate. Romney undermined the parameters of the
debate from the outset and one consequence of that is by forcing Obama on to the
defensive and avoiding the expectation to rebut Obamas arguments.
The second strategy adopted by Romney undermined a key pillar in Obamas
argumentative approach the use and usefulness of evidence. Romney consistently
challenged the presidents statistics and use of studies throughout the debate, establishing

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an unequal balance in the burden of proof. In one of the more memorable exchanges,
Romney indicted the use of studies to challenge the presidents attack on his tax plan.
Now, you cite a study, Romney said, There are six other studies that looked at
the study you describe and say its completely wrong. I saw a study that came out today
that said youre going to raise taxes by $3,000 to $4,000 on middle-income families. There
are all these studies out there. Romney employed four particular strategies to undermine
the use of evidence within this single statement. First, Romney challenged the authority of
Obamas evidence with a quantitative advantage. Romney used a ratio of six to one to offer
the audience with a clear distinction between the two candidates. Second, Romney attacked
the qualitative advantage of Obamas study, arguing that the studies he cited are macrolevel evaluations of Obamas evidence. Romney can now make the claim that he provided
a more comprehensive view of the situation, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Third,
Romney cited a study that he read earlier in the day to challenge the recency of the
presidents evidence. In citing the most recent study, Romney offered new evidence that
undermined the relevance of Obamas study to the status quo. Finally, Romney discarded
the idea of comparing studies to determine truth altogether. There are all these studies out
there, he said, implying that any attempt to discern truth from scientific study is futile.
The entire purpose of this exchange revolves around one of Romneys key goals in
the debate creating as much distance as possible between himself and the tax cuts called
for in the Ryan Budget. In the short term, the tactic worked, and Romneys success in the
first debate is clear. Nine days after the debate in Denver, The Atlantic published an article
calling into question the validity of the studies and their usefulness as support for
Romneys tax plan (OBrien, 2012). Articles challenging Romneys six studies appeared
in most major newspapers shortly thereafter, and the gains Romney achieved in Denver
swiftly evaporated (Khimm, 2012; Schlesinger, 2012). In the long run, the media and
eventually the public found Romneys evidence wanting. During and after the debate,
though, the strategy worked to Romneys immediate advantage. Despite the fact that the
studies he cited were largely produced by ideologically suspect organizations, the limits
of the debate, and the dismal state of public reason made it almost impossible for Obama to
effectively make this point clear during the debate.
Third, Mitt Romney developed the term Obamacare as an encapsulation of all
Obamas policy positions and cast universal aspersions upon them. It functioned primarily
as an enthymeme designed to resonate with far-right, moderate conservative, and
independent voters. The term Obamacare has long been a subject of immense definitional
confrontation by both political parties (Cox et. Al., 2012, p. A12). Mitt Romney,
coincidentally, was the first politician on record to use the term. In 2007, he spoke at a
campaign speech in Iowa, The path of Europe is not the way to go. Socialized medicine.
Hillarycare. Obamacare. This simple equation developed in 2007 in Iowa would be
repeated again and again by Romney throughout his two presidential campaigns (Sarlin,
2012; Goldman & Talev, 2012). Fundamentally, the argument can be summed up asthe
Affordable Care Act is a form of socialized medicine which puts the nation on a slippery
slope towards socialism, this, being the fundamental problem with the European Union,
meaning that the Affordable Care Act dooms America to financial ruin. The rhetorical and
argumentative effectiveness of this anecdote relies on three interrelated arguments that
operate together to engage multiple audiences with contradictory expectations of the
candidate.

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First, Romney used the name itselfObamacareto shape the terms of the debate.
Viewers of the debate literally see this happen. Romney used Obamacare first in Denver,
and tells the president that he uses that term with all respect. Obama quickly responded
by saying I like it and later in the same segment he said I have become fond of this
term. Jim Lehrer also bought into using Obamacare to describe the presidents health care
policies when transitioning into the segment of the debate on health care. Now lets move
to health care, he said, where I know there is a clear difference (laughter) and that
has to do with the Affordable Care Act Obamacare. Rather than using the name of the
legislation and correcting the candidates, Lehrer used Romneys terminology consistently
for the rest of the debate. When Lehrer says to Romney, tell the president directly why
you think what he just said is wrong about Obamacare the name rolls off Lehrers
tongue as easily as it does Romneys.
For Romney, Obamacare is a title of titles, it sums up (that is, literally contains) all
the particulars of things and ideas that the audience should dislike about the president
(Rueckert, 1983, p. 256). A title of titles contains the perfect essence of an idea and
encourages audiences to associate the kernel of the idea with all of its derivations. One
goes up, arrives at the title of titlesand comes back down through all the
levelsbringing (borrowing) back what one discovered at the top, following the reversible
logic that is everywhere at work in these analogies (Reuckert, 1983, p.256). Romney
made meta-level arguments about the problems with Obamacare, and after having
established their credibility with the audience, carried them back down to other policies,
and condemn the whole lot with a single idea. If Obamacare is a bad policy, all of the
administrations policies are bad policy. If Obamacare is socialized medicine, all of
Obamas policies are socialized policy.
Next, the use of the path metaphor allows Mitt Romney to talk about the
Affordable Care Act in what Kenneth Burke calls the end of the line mode, or the
principle of entelechy (Burke, 1974, p. 84). The end of the line mode utilizes principles
of entitlement and entelechy, in which everything human is being driven toward the
perfection of itself, to the end of its line (Reuckert, 1994, p. 9). The principle of
entitlement, or the titling of situation, names the situation, creates a set of conditions for
behaving in that situation. Romney asks the audience to take the implications of Obamas
health care policies to the end of the line. Rather than just being a typical slippery slope
fallacy, Romneys reliance on entelechy develops the Obamacare anecdote as the first
stage of socialism leading to economic and social ruin. The argument does not hinge on the
actual effectiveness of the presidents health care policy, but rather relies on the audiences
conception of the path down which the policy takes the nation.
During the debate, Romney used this strategy to attract fiscally undecided
moderates, some of whom may have been unsure about the arithmetic behind his tax
policies. Romney connected wasteful spending of the Affordable Care Act with the budget
deficits to our economic competitor, China. Is the program so critical its worth borrowing
money from China to pay for it? ... Obamacare is on my list. Romney connects the
spectre of big government with budget deficits, and argues that those deficits put us in the
same position as Europes faltering economies. I dont want to go down the path to
Spain, he says only a few moments later, I want to go down the path of growth that puts
Americans to work. Differentiating between the path to Europe or path to Spain and
the path to growth sets up a dichotomy between (successful) capitalist economies and

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(failing) socialist economies. Romney previewed this in his opening statements of the
debate when he said its going to take a different path, not the one weve been on, not the
one the president describes as a top-down, cut taxes for the rich. The path metaphor
helped Romney to make the debate about ideology, not policy. The strategy allowed
Romney to take one set of arguments about the policy and carry them over to other policies
and issues that have little to nothing to do with health care.
Finally, Romney casted the choice between himself and the president as a moral
issue and used the clash of philosophies expectation to elevate the election to that of an
existential crisis for the American way of life. Romney applied this logic to a variety of
issues throughout the debate. When speaking about Medicaid during the debate, Romney
argued that the entire situation is a states-rights issue, and suggested that the entire nation
craft a plan at the state level rather than implement a single federal mandate. Rather than
addressing the technicalities or providing a nuanced response, Romney cased the issue into
the state-rights/federal-authority divide and asserts that a state-level policy would be
superior. Shifting to the economy, Romney argued that Obama care has killed jobs and
even implied that the president is personally responsible for the failed recovery:
I just don't know how the president could have come into office, facing 23 million
people out of work, rising unemployment, an economic crisis at the at the
kitchen table and spent his energy and passion for two years fighting for
Obamacare instead of fighting for jobs for the American people.
Romney directly blames the president for making a choice to enact health care at the cost
of the recovery, and rather than addressing the difficulty of dealing with two crises
simultaneously, Romney argued that Obama bungled both. In addition to killing jobs, the
administration raised taxes by a trillion dollars under Obamacare. In fact, the
characterization of Obamacare as a tax by the Supreme Court earlier in June probably
helped Romney argumentatively more than Obama. Few things are more essential to core
American political mythology than the issue of taxation. The grievance of taxation
without representation written in American founding documents exhibits the centrality of
the topic in American political mythology. Calling health care reform a tax casts a positive
term reform within the ideologically charged realm of taxes.
Obamacare also destroyed the bipartisan spirit in Washington according to
Romney, driving both sides into their respective corners, from which they have yet to
emerge. Republicans didnt want Obamas version of health care reform, but you pushed
it through anyway Romney tells the president without a single Republican vote. In
Romneys version of events, Obama, pushed through something that he, Nancy Pelosi
and Harry Reid thought was the best answer and drove it through. Romney himself is the
counter-example to Obamas partisanship: I like the fact that in my state, we had
Republicans and Democrats come together and work together. The genius of this move is
that it undercuts Obamas ability to attack Congress while simultaneously placing the
blame on Obama for the failure of the recovery and bipartisanship. Romney also charges
the president with taking away a public good. The health care reforms, he says, put people
in a position where they're going to lose the insurance they had and they wanted. Romney
is targeting voters who already have health insurance, people for whom the fear of losing
ones health insurance operates far more effectively as a bogeyman than does the promise

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of a more efficiently run system. Finally, if voters have any doubt about the consequential
nature of this election, Romney casts the choice in near biblical proportionsIf the
president's re-elected, Obamacare will be fully installed. In my view, that's going to mean
a whole different way of life for people. At its fully realized extension, Romney wants the
Obamacare enthymeme to present an ideological choice to the audience. Choose the
incumbent, head down the path to Spain and socialism, and inevitably national social and
financial ruin; or, pick the challenger and head down the Path to Prosperity.
4. CONCLUSION
Mitt Romneys three strategies in Denver were relatively successful in the short term. Neil
Newhouse, polling director for the Romney campaign explains the effect of the debate on
the race:
these voters saw Mitt Romney, and they watched the debate. Theyre
impressed And the image that had been portrayed of him, painted of him, had
begun to kind of wash away a little bit 47 percent kind of went away it was all
good for us. It gave us perceived momentum. Not just that our numbers were
moving but we began to see some erosion and some softening of Obama support.
The information flow numbers, everything, began to kind of trend our way a little
bit so that you got a sense there was a wind at our back. (John F. Kennedy School
of Government, 2013, p. 219)
Romney eschewed the norms of presidential debates and was successful in keeping both
Barack Obama and Jim Lehrer off balance throughout the debate. He also diminished the
utility of supporting evidence for both candidates, and due to his lack of reliance on it,
ended up benefiting more from this condition than the president. These two strategies
enabled Romney to control both the arguments within the debate, but the conditions under
which those arguments were perceived by the viewing public.
As an enthymeme, Obamacare was useful for arguing for multiple audiences.
Romney fluidly shifted between one attack and another in Denver, using the flexibility
provided him by the anecdote and preventing the president from going on the offensive.
Romney manipulates the ideological coordinates of the audience to create clusters of
arguments that obviate the need for independent supporting evidence for each argument.
Using particular terms in particular configurations, Romney can guide the audience toward
the conclusion that the president has failed in his first term, and use the ideological content
of Obamacare to malign other policy. While speaking of health care reform, Romney can
smoothly introduce topics of taxation, states-rights, the economy, bipartisanship, public
opinion, and so on. Obamacare operates as the central cluster or hub anecdote around
which all other political arguments are arranged. The demands of televised debates, the
format, the state of public reason, and the partisanship on both sides of the political
spectrum are all conditions under which these types of ideological enthymemes operate
with maximum effectiveness on television. However, they take little to no time to use in a
debate, have relatively few downsides, and feed all the worst habits of the American
electorate (sensationalism over substance, attack over defence, and effervescence over
evidence).

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.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor Robert Rowland for revising, my wife Tara Gregg for her
immense patience, and my colleagues John Price and Jeff Kurr.

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Baker, P. (2012). A clash of philosophies. New York Times, October 4, 2012, A0.
Burke, K. (1957). Counter-Statement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Burke, K. (1966). Terministic screens. In Language as Symbolic Action (pp. 44-62). Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Burke, K. (1969). A grammar of motives. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Burke, K. (1974). The philosophy of literary form: Studies in symbolic action. Berkeley: University of
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Burke, K. (1984). Attitudes toward history. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Crummy, K. E. (2012). Duel in Denver. Denver Post, October 3, 2012, A2S.
Cox, A., Desantis, A., Parlapiano, A., & White, J. (2012). Fighting to control the meaning of Obamacare.
The New York Times. March 26, 2012, A12.
Dionne, E. J. (2012). Romney's shifting persona. Washington Post, October 4, 2012, A23.
Goldman, J. & Talev, M. (2012). Obama dueling Romney with Europe Debt Crisis as the Foil. Bloomberg,
June 6, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-06/obama-dueling-romney-with-europedebt-crisis-as-the-foil.html.
Haberman, M. (2012). 5 takeaways from the Denver Debate. Politico, October 4, 2012,
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Ingold, J. (2012). Romney repeatedly batters Obama in presidential debate at DU. The Denver Post, October
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Marinucci, C. & Garofoli, J. (2012). Romney, Obama square off in polite debate. San Francisco Chronicle,
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Metzler, R. (2012). Obama, Romney get ready to rumble in Denver. US News and World Report, October 3,
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Milbank, D. (2012). Romney holds his own and then some. Washington Post, October 4, 2012, A02.
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Fine Arts As Visual Argument: Optical Argument In Discourse,

Technology And Paintings*
Hideki Kakita
Department of English
Dokkyo University
1-1 Gakuen-cho
Soka-city, Saitama 340-0042
Japan
kakita213@dokkyo.ac.jp

ABSTRACT: This essay performatively critiques seventeenth-century Dutch visual culture to offer an
alternative way of understanding visual argument. The formation of optical discourse is rhetorically
analyzed, and a focus is given to how the relationships among paintings, knowledge and technology are
rhetorically subverted, transformed and maintained along with a pre-text of optical controversy. As visuality
is historically and culturally constituted, its constitution is practiced in and by argumentative discourse of
optics and technology.
KEYWORDS: camera obscura, controversy, excess, extramission theory, iconophobia, intromission theory,
Johannes Kepler, optics, retinal image, seventeenth-century Dutch visual culture

1. INTRODUCTION
Recent scholarship on visual argument in the field of argumentation theory has produced
some fruitful areas to explore in order to re-conceptualize the relationship between verbal
texts and visual images. George Roques argument offers a promising starting point.
Roque (2010) argues that it is time for visual argumentation to self-reflect this emerging
field and to start conferring a thorough definition, after having grounded a legitimacy of its
scholarship by collective demonstrations of numerous cases for visual arguments ever
since its incipient recognition of the field. Specifically, he points out the disciplinary
problem in which the visual is singled out as a means of communication to display the
contents of argument, and accordingly, in which visual aspects become considered neutral
and transparent, and hence subservient to the verbal (Roque, 2010, p.1723).
The points he raisedrevealing a political bias of the epistemological ground for
communication technology and its praxisshow the ideological problem of current
scholarship.1 Indeed, the unconscious hierarchy putting the verbal over the visual
* In memory of Professor Bruce Gronbeck, who passed away on September 10th, 2014.
This work was in part supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI Grant Number 26370168.
1

This problem holds two disadvantages, at least, for our present theorization of visual argumentation. First,
it is an ideological problem that makes visual argumentation scholars difficult to understand the nature and
functions of the visual itself. The visual is so taken for granted that it is always regarded from the view of
verbal structure. Visual arguments are acknowledged only as an imitation of verbal arguments, and may or
may not be identified as different phenomena with the same verbal (and propositional) structure. Second,
observing the visual as noticeably modern phenomena, one fails to recognize the historicity of visuality that

690

underpins the iconophobic attitudes embedded in the tradition of argumentationthat

which Roque (2009) identifies as linguistic imperialism, having borrowed the term from
W. J. T. Mitchells Iconology.
Following Roques critical spirit with the proposition against this disciplinary
problemand deconstructing the field of visual argumentthis essay addresses the
visuality of visual argumentation, and the possibility of how to locate this visuality in the
history of argument. This essay argues for an argumentative history of visual images that
accounts for images in history as well as images as history. Drawing from the case of
seventeenth century visual culture, this approach is different in that it seeks to demonstrate
how the historian of argumentation might possibly engage the visual by examining its
background in scientific controversies over optics and its technology.2
2. CULTURAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF VISUAL ARGUMENT
This essay approaches visual argument by extending one of the three theoretical
orientations of the field classified by Bruce Gronbeck (2007). Gronbeck observes that the
three theoretical orientations in current scholarship on visual argumentation approaches
the visual as: 1) evidence in arguments to give us lively experience through its information
gathered in our sights; 2) cultural assumptions that enthymematically justify
epistemological claim of propositional contents in an inferential process; and 3) selfcontained semiotic systems that operationally code signifying activity of representations
within a broader realm of culture. This essay extends the third orientation of the visual, as
an independent code in a semiotic system of cultural formations.3 Along with the critical
predates modern technology. Even before the modern invention of visual technology, visual materials like
pictorial paintings along with the knowledge of optics must have been subjects of inquiry for human vision
in the epistemological culture of ocularcentrism or scopic regime (Jay, 1991). Over emphasizing the
modern innovation of visual technology ignores the historicity of pre-modern vision that were supposed to
be constituted by the epistemological arguments and controversy manifesting the epistemological bias
toward the visuality at that time.
2

The problem of current scholarship is ideologically found as the essentialism of argumentation over and
against visual argument. This essentialism easily manifests when visual argument is defined as a producta
proper noun, if you willthat names a category of argumentative discourse that relies on something other
than words or text for the construction of its meaning. Many works that call visual argument collapse the
idea of visual into image, framing visual argument as a genre category. Subsequently, visual argument is
always destined to be visual argument, while verbal argument, often with a propositional message by verbal
texts, gets to be just argument. This shows the unconscious hierarchy between the verbal and the visual that
discourages an analysis of the visual all along, privileging texts over the visual. In this iconophobic
dominance of the text over the visual, visual argument becomes forever subordinate to the traditional
artifacts of verbal argument. This is precisely the essentialism of verbal argumentation, and hence its
subjection to ideological critiqueyet, for my part, in the different way to critique it apart from the practice
of traditional argumentation.
3

Unlike the current efforts in visual argumentation that analyze different forms of argument in visual objects
and material, here, instead of conceptualizing visual argument as product, I would like to consider it a
project of inquiry, (Finnegan, 2004b, p.235) defined as a critical and theoretical orientation that makes
issues of visuality relevant to argumentation theory. I borrow the idea of visual argument as a project of
inquiry from the current effort of visual rhetoric by Finnegan (2004a, 2004b) who advances the field along
with Mitchells iconology and Barbara Staffords (1996, 1998, 2001) imagism, which attempts to
articulate different categories by means of rhetorical analogy. The critique of iconophobia is not a simple
task that easily counters essentialism as a false idea. Rather, it should be performatively conducted in and as

691

approach by W. J. T. Mitchells iconology, it offers another way of understanding visual

argument when focusing on the visuality of a particular historical period.4
As foci of this approach, the formation of discourse becomes one location of the
visual. Gronbeck maintains that visual culture inevitably reflects the dynamics of power,
and is contextualized in on-going controversies as a way of seeing public life
(Gronbeck, 2007, p.294). The relationship between verbal (argumentative) discourse and
visual material is historically established as a cultural, and thus unconscious, semiotic
association comprehended in a particular space and time. The discourse becomes a
context, or vice versa, of the visual through which its cultural meaning becomes
recognized.
Yet, analysis of this controversy offers more than a simple verbal exchange of
propositional arguments as a context of visual material. An analysis of controversy does
not offer a state of mixture between verbal text and visual images, simply blurring the line
between the different categories. Rather, following Mitchells critique of iconophobia and
linguistic imperialism, I intend to trace what is at stake in the incorporation of one
medium by another, [and] what values are being served by transgressions or observances
of text-image boundaries (Mitchell, 1986, p.156). A controversy does not linearly
proceed by interchangeably replacing text to images or vice versa, and it shows a subtle
process of transgression. The relationship of representations among paintings, knowledge
and technology change along with controversies between different theories of vision. In
the process of argument, the relationships are rhetorically subverted, transformed,
maintained and re-delineated for the sake of visuality. The line between text and images is
transgressed so that visualization evoke whole arguments (Gronbeck, 2007, p.294) as a
site of struggle to determine what is true to be seen. For an extension of the semiotic
understanding of the visual argument, this essay focuses on the cultural constitution of the
visual as a historical and cultural epistemology of vision.
This essay applies such a notion of iconology to transform the relationship to be
established as association in a specific cultural space that includes fine arts. Analyses on
visual argument in the fine arts are limited.5 I argue that the visuality of fine arts is not
(and certainly should not be) taken for granted as ocular visibility innate to human
physiology. Visuality is historically and culturally constituted, and I believe such
constitution is conducted through argumentative discourse of optics and its technology.
Visuality of a particular picture, then, could be changed in accordance with different sorts
of discourse constituting how to see the world.
scholars project to self-reflexively critically inquire ones historicity of the present ideology and doxa. As a
project of critical inquiry, a visual argument can be considered an effort to urge us to explore our
understandings of visual culture in light of the question of argumentation theory, and encourage us to
reflexively (re-)examine own aspects of argumentation theory.
4

Against the iconophobia and the subsequent ideology of linguistic imperialism within the field of
argumentation, Roque (2009) refutes its propositions one by one. Whereas the critique of linguistic
imperialism is significant, critiquing it by means of verbal refutation, which is highly regarded as the
traditional means of argumentation, in turn performatively endorses the linguistic imperialism.
5

Two exceptions are Groarks (1996) analysis of fine arts and Blairs (1996) sharp contrast of fine arts to
contemporary mixed media like magazines. While Groarks analysis of fine arts as a visual form of
argument, along with the messages transmitted by painters as propositional contents may be valuable within
a traditional understanding of fine arts as a manifestation of narratives and anecdotes, this essay instead
avoids analysis of visual contents and sidesteps the analyses of narrative as argument embedded in art works.

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3. THE VISUALITY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Visuality in the seventeenth century is historically overdetermined by multiple layers of
cultural representations. Here, the following three aspects of cultural representations are
analyzed.
3.1 Controversy about the state of lights in the optics
Ideas about vision have been historically a controversial subject of critique among
Western theorists and philosophers as well as scientists ever since the classical Greek
period. The controversy, the argumentative exchange of ideas among theorists, about the
model of vision, happens around a long traditional conflict over two different modes of
theory before the seventeenth century. The space of this paper, however, is limited and
cannot exhaustively trace the changes in visual theory since the Greek period; rather, I
would like to briefly summarize the history of the controversy, arguments and issues in
two different theoretical positions.6
The history of visual theory has witnessed frequent clashes between so called
extramission theory and intromission theory. In extramission theory (or emission
theory), vision depends on light that streams out of the eye and by means of the beam from
the eyes, detects surrounding objects. This idea originally came from pre-Socratic
Alcmaeon of Croton (ca. 450 BCE), who is said to be the first to advocate the brain as the
seat of sensation and cognition and to dissect parts of the visual system. He observed fire
flashing in his eye as visual gleaming, presumably when he bumped his head. This idea of
vision, fire in the eye was extended by Plato. In Timaeus, Plato argues that visual fire
streams out of the eye and combines with daylight to form a body as an instrument for
detecting visual objects:
Such fire as has the property, not of burning, but of yielding a gentle light, they [the Gods]
contrived should become the proper body of each day. For the pure fire within us is akin to this, and
they caused it to flow through the eyes. . . . Accordingly, whenever there is daylight round about,
the visual current issues forth, like to like, and coalesces with the daylight and is formed into a
single homogenous body in a direct line with the eyes, in whatever quarter the stream issuing from
within strikes upon any object it encounters outside. So the whole . . . is similarly affected and
passes on the motions of anything it comes in contact with . . . throughout the whole body, to the
soul, and thus causes the sensation we call seeing. (Plato, Timaeus, 45b-d)

Following Plato, great mathematician, Euclid (ca. 300 BCE), in his Optika, developed
geometric extramission theory.
Rectilinear rays proceeding from the eye diverge infinitely [and] those things are seen upon which
the visual rays fall and those things are not seen upon which the visual rays do not fall . . . (Euclid,
1948, p.257)

Euclids idea of extramission theory was further extended by Ptolemy (127-148) in

combination with Galens (129-199) work on the anatomy of the eye. Ptolemy argues that
6

This summary of the history of optics and visual theories is based upon David Lindbergs Theories of
Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler (1976).

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the visual rays formed a cone or bundle of lights. The Emission of light created by fire in
the eye becomes a tool to search for the object, seen in the form of cone, which suggests
the perspectival cone of vision.
On the other hand, intromission theory explains vision as something entering the
eye from the object seen. This class of theory forms the basis of the argument among
many Greek natural philosophers for vision perceived into the eye. Democritus (ca. 420)
and Epicurus (ca. 341-270) are the first intromission theorists, who believed an isomorphic
image (or eidora) streamed off of objects and entered the eye, where they were sensed.
Epicurus puts it in his Letter to Herodtus,
For particles are continually streaming off from the surface of bodies through no diminution of
bodies is observed. . . . And those given off maintain their position and arrangement . . . it is by the
entrance of something coming from external objects that we see shapes and think of them.
(Epicurus, 1925, 10. 48-49)

A similar view was later also held by atomist poet Lucretius (ca. 60 BCE), who called the
images coming from objects simulacra.
Aristotle develops a detailed discussion of vision in intromission theory. He
rejected the atomist view for the following ground. If objects put out copies of themselves,
these would be objects themselves; but this is impossible because the copies would
overlap on their way to the eye and two objects cannot be in the same place at the same
time. Aristotle also argues against Alcmaeon-Platos extramission view for its inadequacy:
In general it is unreasonable to suppose that seeing occurs by something issuing from the eye; that
the ray of vision reaches as far as the stars, or it goes to a certain point and there coalesces with the
object as some [Plato] think. (Aristotle, De Sensu 2, 438a26-438b2)

In so arguing, Aristotle developed a complicated intromission theory. He assumed a

transparent medium necessary for vision, something like the modern ether, which could be
found in air and water. Light is the state of this transparent medium. According to
Aristotle, the eye can sense movement in this medium, which is continuous between the
object and the eye, and this movement yields visual sensation.
The dialectic between these theories of vision originating in the Greek period
frames later discussion of vision that emerge in various forms of arguments. After the
death of Ptolemy and Galen, scientific inquiry shifted to Islamic centers of learning, first
in Baghdad and then Cairo and Cordoba. Many Greek scientific works were translated into
Arabic in the eighth century, and their achievements were actively discussed and extended
in Islamic science. The nature of vision and light was of great interest for them. Among
them, Al-Kindi (d. 866) defended and expanded Euclids extramission theory. Avicenna
(980-1037) assaulted extramission and reconstructed Aristotles theories of vision.
Alhazen was the most prominent figure of synthesizing the two strains in his Book of
Optics (De Aspectibus), which indeed dominated physiological optics in Europe for two
hundred years until Kepler.
Alhazens contribution was to introduce a new type of intromission theory
incorporating both Euclids rays and the visual cone of Ptolemys extramission theory. He
argues that while visible objects give off light in every direction, only one ray from a
visible object falls on the eye perpendicularly. Only the rays from objects that fall
perpendicular to the surface of crystalline humor (our lens) are sensed. The other rays fall
694

obliquely, and are refracted and weakened virtually to ineffectiveness. The sensitive part
of the eye like the crystalline humor or lens, following Galen, responds only to the
perpendicular rays, and these form a cone with the visual field as the base and the center
of the eye as the vertex.
The theoretical scheme of the new intromission theory Alhazen built incorporates
the geometric ideas of Euclid and Ptolemy and the anatomico-physiological ideas of
Galen. Alhazens intromission theory of vision combines elements of earlier intromission
and extramission theories. His theory became enormously influential, and the basis of
most of the subsequent work in optics in Europe between thirteenth and seventeenth
centuries (Lindberg, 1976, p.86). Indeed, Keplers (1571-1630) theory of the retinal image
in the reverse form (1604), which had found modern visual science, was influenced by this
Alhazens idea.
At first glance, Alhazen seems to elucidate the valid visual mechanism. On closer
examination, it still holds a crucial problem in his weak explanation of the selective
process of refracted light rays. Kepler offers the answer to this problem Alhazen could not
resolve.
Even if Alhazen succeeded in synthesizing intromission and extramission theories,
there was still a crucial deficiency of discerning lights in his theoretical scheme. Countless
rays of lights emitted from the vertex of the visual cone to be presented in front of the eye,
it in turn comes in while being refracted into the eye by lens of the eye. In this theory, one
must hold a means to discern the appropriate ray of vision from other light rays coming to
pass through the center of the lens in a set of visual cone at the vertex. For this purpose,
for instance, a hypothesis that power of refracted rays of light is weaker and the eye
catches the strongest ray was introduced. However, there is no way, even in this case, that
the light from the vertex comes to penetrate into the eye. If vision is established by
discerning one light among a myriad of lights emanating from the vertex of the cone in the
liquid of vitreous humor right behind the glacial humor or the lens, it is extremely difficult
to prove as a true process of human vision. As long as Alhazen is concerned, facing this
significant trouble, it is almost impossible to resolve this problem.
It was Kepler who offered a solution to this problem with his knowledge of optics
and anatomy of eyes. Keplers solution was to posit a reverse retinal image to be
converged through a lens. By being refracted through the lens, light rays emitted from an
object converge at one point in the portion of the retina within the eye. Rays of light,
considered by Alhazen as the subject of exclusion in the selection of weaker rays
irrelevant to vision, have been allocated to their appropriate role and rescued in the
discussion of Kepler. In this way, the retinal image was discovered. Yet, it is rather the
image portrayed in the pyramid of vision; it was the inverted image of the left-right
reversal. Kepler states when he discusses the establishment of the retinal image that if the
picture on the retina were fixed for a moment, then the one who sees it would see a precise
miniature of the hemispherical world deployed in front of the eye. He elucidates the
mechanism to establish the vision with his optical idea of convergence in a reversed
image. At this point, he stops analyzing the manner in which this reversed retinal image
forms our natural vision. He then lefts the question to the hands of natural philosophers
about how the (natural, not upside down) retinal image of the both eyes is established.
This unanswered question about the reversal of retinal image opens a discursive space of
modern optics after Descartes and until nineteenth century.

695

3.2 Camera obscura as visual apparatus for the intromission theory

In seventeenth Dutch paintings, lays of light held a special status as a part of its visual
culture. Dutch paintings during the seventeenth century are uniquely characterized by their
realistic depiction. Dutch paintings may hold a passive attitude to remain just to be seen,
unlike the Italian paintings that come to speak to the audience and ask to be actively read.
Unlike major paintings of the Southern Renaissance, Dutch paintings often describe what
is seen as real without a narrative. For instance, one of the genres of Dutch paintings
established is still life, in which images are so real that things depicted hold its
verisimilitude to our eyes by the use of light and color. The real image of things on tableau
is so natural to our eyes, with a bright and dark contrast of lights and beautiful colors
appealing to our vision.7
Lights (and shadows) flowing into the visible space are one of the distinctive traits
of the seventeenth century Dutch paintings.8 Johannes Vermeer is also reputed for his
magic with light. Jonathan Crary analyzes two pictures by Vermeer, The Astronomer
(1668) and The Geographer (1668-69) as descriptions of the subjective interior:
Each of the thinkers, in a rapt stillness, ponders that crucial feature of the world, its extension, so
mysteriously unlike the unextended immediacy of their own thoughts yet rendered intelligible to
mind by the clarity of these representations, by their magnitudinal relations. Rather than opposed by
the objects of their study, the earth and the heavens, the geographer and the astronomer engage in a
common enterprise of observing aspects of a single indivisible world. Both of them (and it may well
be the same man in each painting) are figures for a primal and sovereign inwardness, for the
autonomous individual ego that has appropriated to itself the capacity for intellectually mastering
the infinite existence of bodies in space. (Crary, 1992, pp.46-47)

Both figures show the inwardness of the individual subject who masters and observes the
world. They observe the world in the room, and in the beam of light from the window,
scrutinize maps, the miniatures of the world itself to represent. These rooms filled with
lights are paradoxically extensions of the world into the inner space, and at the same time
outer space that immediacy are evinced in the subjective mind.
Light from the outside indicate one strong aspect of visuality in seventeenth century Dutch
painting, and its subjective feature suggests the important knowledge to be produced in the
context of visuality and the intromission theory.
One important source of this epistemological assumption to establish optical
knowledge and vision can be derived from the camera obscura, the most famous visual
technology in this period. The possibility that Johannes Vermeer used the camera obscura
as a device to draw his paintings has been often pointed out among art historians since the
nineteenth century.9 Aside from whether Vermeer actually used the camera obscura, there
7

For example, Pieter Claes painting of Still Life (1634) illustrates a silver drinking cup, a goblet of wine
and a cup with a lid along with plates with a peeled lemon. Light from the top illuminates those objects, and
are shining in the water. The light comes into the frame of the canvas, emphasizing the wall behind the
objects, which separates the illuminated interior from exterior world. This separation is more noticeable in
vanitas paintings such as Willem Claes Heda and Jan Davidszoon de Heem.
8

Rembrandts fame is highly regarded for his mastery of light from the top to dramatize the pictorial scene
with a moment of light, typically seen in his A Man Seated Reading at a Table in a Lofty Room (1628-1630).
9

One of the most comprehensive analyses of Vermeers possible use of this visual device is Philip
Steadmans Vermeer's Camera (2002).

696

is no doubt that it was re-invented in the discourse of intromission theory as an optical

apparatus of the seventeenth century. In the camera obscura, like the retinal image of the
eyes, an image appears reversedupside down and right-lefton the interior wall of a
darkroom. As an epistemology of vision, this visual technology was a dominant metaphor
through which people could comprehend vision in the seventeenth century (Crary, 1992).
The important question one must ask, then, is not how painters used these optical devices,
but how the images in the camera obscura were understood and received as the
paradigmatic knowledge of vision in the cultural space of fine arts. This question probes
the constitution of visuality in the seventeenth-century Dutch culture. What constitutes an
image in camera obscura leads to the question of how images in paintings are understood
against the backdrop of this optical apparatus.10
It was the fifteenth century when a camera obscura came to be utilized among
artists as a device to draw a picture.11 It is said that Johannes Kepler is the first person to
coin the phrase camera obscura in 1604. In 1609, he further suggested the use of a lens to
improve the image projected by a camera obscura. The pictorial image in the camera
obscura indeed shows a similarity with the retinal image.
Here, Svetlana Alpers analysis on the seventeenth-century Dutch paintings in
terms of visual culture merits our attention for the sake of visual argument. Alpers (1983)
demonstrates that the relationship between Kepler and seventeenth-century Dutch
paintings should be understood in the background of the emergence of visual culture
derived from the new technology of optics. The reception of Kepler confers enormous
impact on Dutch visual culture, and it merges with a latest technological development of
lens. Kepler, although he lived in Vienna, was actively welcomed by the Dutch homo
fabers and intellectuals, and became the ideological ground of visuality. His discovery that
the retinal image is not a mere optical subject of anatomy and vision; it confers a new way
to see the world with a new status of human eyes.
Kepler became an important figure, not merely because he was an optical theorist
who resolved the issue of the direction of light, but also because he described the eyes as
the most fundamental instrument of observation by an optical mechanism of a lens with
focusing properties. He argues for the importance of understanding an instrument to view,
which inherently holds distortions or errors. His accounts of distortions in sight come from
the retinal image, which is (regarded as) by nature distorted and reversed.
However, according to Alpers, this new vision emerged out of Keplers
performative act of scrutinizing optics. He does not try to prove the epistemological
10

Technologically speaking, the history of camera obscura starts from Aristotle, who referred to the notion
of pinhole projection around 330 BC, and to Alhazen, who presumably invented the optical device, or
pinhole camera, around 1000 AD. In the thirteenth century, Roger Bacon observed the phenomena of an
eclipse with a camera obscura. His figure is said to be the first illustration of its mechanism in the human
history.
11

Leonardo da Vinci, for instance, depicted a camera obscura in Atlantico Manuscript (Codex Atlanticus).
Giovanni Battista della Porta, Neapolitan savant, often identified as one of its inventors, in Magia Naturalis
or Natural Magic of 1558 explains the use of a concave speculum to insure that the projected image is not
inverted on the wall. In the second edition of 1589, he details how a concave lens can be placed in the
aperture of the camera to produce a finer image. Lens and mirrors were often used in camera obscura in the
sixteenth century, and the development of a portable camera obscura was also started. By the seventeenth
century, the precision of lenses had remarkably progressed such that optical devices like the telescope and
microscope could be invented.

697

correctness of vision; rather he is interested in deception or artifice of vision, which

escapes from the right recognition of the world. This parallels Dutch enthusiasm on
technology including lens. There are distortions in the retinal image; this fact was
knownand rather than ignoring or eliminating itDutch painters recreated the retinal
image itself in their pictures.
Vermeers paintings, according to Alpers, are indeed extractions of an optical lens.
She construes that View of Delft (1660/61), Vermeers premier painting, displays a notion
of artifice, and this picture is at the meeting-place of the world seen and the world
pictured (Alpers, 1983, p.35). For instance, white dots seen in tonnage at a barge right
side of the screen are similar to the residual distortion of the circular single lens produces.
This pictorial painting is a site of struggle between nature and artifice.
Alpers testifies that seventeenth-century Dutch culture was in a unique ambience
of empirical interests of what is commonly referred to as the age of observation (Alpers,
1983, p.32). In the empirical observation, confidence on technology is highly placed, and
strangely enough, when lens are trusted as visual technology, this retinal distortion is also
granted as a matter of fact, simply because it is the representation of the observed. We can
only see the representational picture in the lens, and the lens prevents our seeing of the
object. Its images and those engendered by it [lens] take their place beside the images of
art, which are also, of course, representations. The artifice of the image is embraced along
with its immediacy (Alpers, 1983, pp.32-33). Because the presence of pictorial image in
and by lens is observable, it is paradoxically true with such a distortion.
This conclusion is drawn only from the epistemological assumption that there is
no escape from representation (Alpers, 1983, p.35). This recognitionwhich Michel
Foucault calls the episteme of the Classical ageis taken for granted as the
epistemological condition in a given culture, and hence not a problem of moral view. A
picture is a representation; because of its representativeness, its image is not the real object
itself, and the presence of image is possible only within the epistemological ground of the
vision, which is always distorted on the concave surface of retina.12
This epistemological ground of the distorted picture, the nature of representation
independent from the human subject, crystallizes a certain series of Dutch paintings in the
seventeenth-century. Distinguishing the curvilinear perspective of the Northern
Renaissance from linear perspective of the Southern Italian Renaissance, Alpers
understands the perspective itself creates the distortions of a pictorial image. In curvilinear
perspective, the image appeared on the retina of the eye is itself spherical, while the
traditional linear perspective uses straight lines. Therefore, the image gets very strangely
distorted at the edges, like a picture taken by a fish eye lens, as is found in Carel Fabritius
A View of Delft, with a Musical Instrument Vendor's Stall (1652) and Gerard Houckgeests
Ambulatory of the New Church in Delft with the Tomb of William the Silent (1651). Based
on the appearance of wide angle or fisheye lenses, the image showed in curved lines is
projected into a flat surface of paintings and therefore seems to validate the curviness of
12

Wilson (1999) points out the contradictory attitude of rationalists in metaphysics toward the camera
obscura metaphor. She argues that rationalist philosophers like Descartes, Lock, Malebranche, and Libniz
believe that the sensory world we experience is wholly different from the mental world that gives rise to it,
our perceptions do not mirror nature at all. The visual mechanisms, processes, and results are explicitly held
by seventeenth-century theorists of the visual who reject visual species theory to be disanalogous to this kind
of copying from exterior to interior (Wilson, 1999, p.122).

698

visual space. The seventeenth-century argument was that the eye is an internally convex
surface, and this must cause the curvature in lines projected onto it.
3.3 Textual politics of intellectual discourse on the optical controversy
Keplers influence to the philosophical discourse was immense. As the powerful metaphor
of vision, the camera obscura also offers a concrete explanation of the visuality in
philosophical discourse. It is clear that the intromission theory was certainly deployed in
extending Kepler, when we see a figure in Descartes Dioptric. In the illustration of his
theory of the retinal image, Descartes succeeds Kepler and incorporates the idea of the
retinal image where lights coming from the outside converge on the eyeground in crossing
through the lens. The retinal image in a reverse form of picture is seen by the person in a
dark space behind the retina, whose location is analogically the dark room of the camera
obscura, a dark room of its inward separated from the outside filled with lights.
Keplers discovery of the retinal image was indeed a statement of the intromission
theory, and this statement then became a site of struggle to form a discourse of optics.
Yet, Keplers influence to a discursive formation of optics is not a simple effect of
his reception and succession of his ideas in the scheme of the intromission theory. It rather
produced unintended consequences from his discussion of the retinal image or pictura. It
is easy to understand that the metaphor of camera obscura had become dominated against
the backdrop of the victory of the intromission theory over the emission theory, and
explained the reverse picture of the back wall by the inflow of light into a darkroom as its
mechanism. However, this metaphor with a tacit cultural knowledge of lights on the
intromission produces an excess of its own precisely because it backgrounds the
controversy as a discursive formation.
Since Keplers intromission theory was granted legitimacy as a scientific account
by anatomy and physiology, the argumentative battle between the theories of intromission
and extramission was theoretically and physiologically resolved. But, at the same time,
because of this resolution, the emission theory become foreclosed, and produced as an
excess of the truth, i.e., intromission theory. The counter position in the controversy taken
by the extramission theory then becomes an excess of intromission, and creates a space of
agency wherein a new way of thinking about vision can be produced.
The foreclosure indicated by this resolution produces a new discursive formation
of vision, and makes a shift of discourse to a space of philosophical (or metaphysical)
discussion of vision, while the extramission theory retreats from the academic issues in
optics. Catherine Wilson (1999) points out a strange revival of emission theory as a matter
of mind that is capable of observation. As she states:
One accomplishment of this [Keplers] portrayal of perception as a passive rather than an active
process is that, in epistemological discourse, an active mind or intellectual faculty takes up many of
the metaphors with which vision was formerly dressed. The mind rather than eye is portrayed as a
searchlight, a source of illumination, which can be turned and held steadily on material, which is
thereby made perspicuous. (Wilson, 1999, p.129)

Scientifically understanding the mechanism of the eyes, philosophers cannot help but posit
the subject/mind that emits lights, with a metaphor of searchlight. Although the structure

699

of eyes, isolated from the body, forecloses the emission theory, that theory constitutes a
new discursive formation under the topic of subject and mind.
In reading Descartes Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Wilson specifically
points out the paradox that the mind becomes active in contradistinction to the passive eye.
As Wilson points out, if the vision of the eye is passive, that of the mind is active
(Wilson, 1999, p.129). In so saying, Descartes posits the mind as active subject and a
source of vision. Wilson subsequently quotes the following Descartes: The whole method
consists entirely in ordering and arranging the objects on which we must concentrate our
minds eye if we are to discover some truth (Wilson, 1999, p.129). This minds eye,
achieved by philosophical training, holds a faculty to connect one segment of perception
to another in a long chain of being, when one sees the link by an intellectual mastery of
inference.13
Human eyes eventually become an instrument of the mind as an active subject with
a rational frame of geometry. The active subject becomes a source of light emitted through
eyes to search for the object within a geometrical matrix of the perspective seen from the
top of visual cone.14 A gaze of mind, a source of light coming out of eyes, paradoxically
holds power to observe with the means of geometric frame set in the eyes. At this stage,
the camera obscura took the same structure of preceding the visual model of emission
theory in the form of perspective, and at the same time all visual information (or rays of
lights) are converged on the retinal image that establishes a visual field projecting a
reversed picture.15 After all, the metaphor of the emission of light as a beam survived in
philosophical discourse.16
13

This minds eye also leads to the ideas of human wisdom seen in such a metaphor of sunrise (Wilson,
1999, p.129).
14

By viewing the eye as the most basic instrument of observation, Kepler isolates human eyes from a site of
vision and its mind or psychological aspects. Alpers (1983) argument for this isolation comes from his trust
of visual technology and the optical lens that distorts site of vision can be eventually understood within this
new discursive formation of the subject as the source of searchlight. Kepler stops arguing no further than the
mechanism of eyes: I leave it to natural philosophers to discuss the way in which this image on picture
[pictura] is put together by the spiritual principles of vision residing in the retina and in the nerves, and
whether it is made to appear before the soul or tribunal of the faculty of vision by a spirit within the cerebral
cavities, or the faculty of vision. . . (qtd. Alpers, 1983, p.36). The space of question to inquire how the retinal
image is viewed remains unanswered by Kepler and then this open space is filled with arguments by
philosophers. By stopping the inquiry, Kepler himself opens to discuss the way in which image is put
together in retina and leaves it to the question for human spirit of vision. The discursive space Kepler opened
for discussion behind his conclusion of the intromission theory engenders another argument to solve the
problem of distrusted perception and sensation. Alpers thus concludes: It was the power of Keplers
invention, then, to split apart the hitherto unified human field. His strategy was to separate the physical
problem of the formation of retinal images (the world seen) from the psychological problems of perception
and sensation. The study of optics so defined starts with the eye receiving the light and ceases with the
formation of the picture on the retina. What happens before and afterhow the picture so formed, upside
down and reversed, was perceived by the observertroubled Kepler but was of no concern to him (Alpers,
1983, pp.35-36).
15

The metaphor of emission theory crystallizes in the apparatus of the magic lantern. In extramission theory,
the idea of emission, lights coming out of the eyes, is in tandem with a projection of a beam, leading toward
the object to be seen, and reaching beyond the screen of what can be seen as the virtual space of gazing back
from the behind. This visual excess is more than a simple reversal of lights flowing in the intromission
theory. The light beams are rather supposed to be emissions from a magic lantern, which exceeds supposedly
the original picture in retina, emissions coming out of the projection apparatus of magic lantern. With
emissions of light, an excess of intromission, molded in the optical structure of camera obscura, projects a

700

4. CONCLUSION
I have analyzed visuality of the seventeenth-century by means of the controversy as a pretext of argument. In this analysis, I tried to illuminate how the forms of painting argue
performatively. The form itself argues in a pre-text of controversy of optics, when the
visual merges with text. In the controversy, the relationships among paintings, knowledge
and technology are rhetorically subverted, transformed, maintained and delineated.
Visuality is constituted in such a controversy, and argumentation theory can contribute to
reveal such a process.

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16

The metaphor of emission, light stemming out of the eye, has still persisted in our beliefs about the evil
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caption of New Labor, New Danger. This picture is precisely embedded in the metaphor of the emission
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A Strategic Maneuvering Analysis Of The Japans First Internet

Election In 2013
Takayuki Kato, Takeshi Suzuki & Suzuki Masako
Department of Law
Seiwa University
Japan
t_kato@seiwa-univ.ac.jp
School of Information and Communication
Meiji University
Japan
takeshi.suzuki@fulbrightmail.org
Keio Research Center for Foreign Language Education
Keio University
Japan
s.masako@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: In 2013, Japan experienced its first Internet election campaign in history. This essay attempts
to analyze political moves in the campaign within the framework of strategic maneuvering developed by
Frans H. van Eemeren. Different approaches were found between major and minor parties. An opposition
party increased its seats with the effective use of the Internet. With the analysis, the authors hope to indicate
the future direction of the Internet election of Japan.
KEYWORDS: Internet Election Campaign, Japanese Political Parties, Strategic Maneuvering

1. INTRODUCTION
This essay is aimed at clarifying the strategic maneuvers provided by the ruling coalition
parties and by a minor one in the 2013 Japanese Upper House election from the pragmadialectical perspective. In the years summer Japan experienced its first Internet election
campaign in history, which was designed to provide a new form of argumentation. Until
then, the previous versions of Public Offices Election Act had restricted the use of web
tools in elections. But with blogs and social networking services (SNS), such as Facebook,
LINE and Twitter permeating as convenient communication media among individuals, the
prohibition of online election campaign became apparently obsolete.
Originally, the election Act had limited the amount of printed materials available
for each candidate to call for support in consideration for fairness of public relations
chance. Thus the original purpose of this restriction was designed for fairness against the
freedom of expression. Needless to say, it is significant to reconcile both values. There is
no wonder that the Internet campaigning on one hand would contribute to the freedom of
expression with its accessibility, but on the other hand would raise the necessity to
carefully design rules to deter false information or fallacious argument from erupting to
confuse the electorate. The less restrictive the rule becomes, the more rhetorical argument

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would be. In such a case argumentative moves likely derail from the rules of critical
discussion in the pragma-dialectical sense (Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004).
In the tension between fairness and freedom of expression, how strategically did
political parties and candidates maneuver their argumentative moves? How did the new
Internet platform help to deter fallacious arguments or suppress sound arguments? In
answer to these questions, this essay attempts to analyze political moves in the campaign
within the framework of strategic maneuvering developed by Frans H. van Eemeren
(Eemeren, 2010). Specifically, it intends to do the following: (1) examining argumentative
approaches by the involved parties, and (2) evaluating the reconstructed argumentative
moves with theoretically possible moves.
2. CONTEXT
In 2010, moves toward lifting of restrictions on the Internet use for election faded out on
the verge of realization in the midst of political confusion on the resignation of then Prime
Minister Yukio Hatoyama (Motomiya, 2012). The former bill at that time had not included
currently available online tools such as Facebook, LINE, Twitter, blogs, and the like
(Kiyohara and Maeshima, 2013). In 2012, the movement for Internet election campaigns
rekindled over online and real forums joined by citizens, intellectuals, and politicians with
the next general election upcoming. Yet, this move was in the process of finalization when
the Lower House election was held in December 2012. Under the conventional election
rule, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by Shinzo Abe came back to power. As soon
as being chosen Prime Minister in the Diet, Abe revealed his intention to liberalize the use
of the Internet (Netto-senkyo rainen-no, 2012). Not only the LDP but also other parties
agreed with the idea of opening online campaigning.
Eventually, on April 19, 2013, Public Offices Election Act was revised to liberalize
the Internet election campaigning. But there were still some restrictions as only parties and
candidates were allowed to send emails to enlist voters support for fear of impersonation,
while there was no limitation on campaigns to blackball election candidates (Kiyohara and
Maeshima, 2013). In this new framework, the official campaign season of the Upper
House election began on July 4 and ended one day before the election day, July 21. For the
17 days, different approaches were found between major and minor parties. For example,
the ruling coalition parties the LDP and New Komeito held different views on various
issues, such as revision of the Constitution. But they jointly devised an agreeable
standpoint. On the other hand, one of the opposition parties, the Japan Communist Party
began with target audience and topics. Among these approaches were there some tactics
which made contributions to the election winning, although the use of the Internet
seemingly did not raise the voting rate, which was 52.61%, dropped 5.31% from the
previous election, the 3rd lowest under the postwar political system (Saninsen tohyoritsu
52.61%, 2013). Besides, only 10.2% referred to online information on the election
according to an exit survey conducted by Kyodo News (Netto-senkyo yukensha hiyayaka,
2013).
The National Diet of Japan is bicameral, consisting of the Upper House and the
Lower House. It is the Lower House that is superior in designation of Prime Minister who
is authorized to appoint Cabinet ministers. The total number of the seats in the Upper
House is 242, half of which become at stake in the voting every three years. In summer

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2013 held was an Upper House election in which the 121 seats close to the expiration of
six-year term were contested. Seven months earlier, the LDP and New Komeito had
beaten the then-dominant Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) by a wide margin, forming a
coalition government. With this momentum, the ruling coalition parties aimed to increase
their seats to dislodge the DPJ again from the dominant position in the Upper House. In
fact, the LDP gained 65 seats up from pre-election 34, and New Komeito gained 11 seats
on target. The joint parties won the majority with the total 135 seats including uncontested
59 seats (Saninsen 2013 tokusyu, 2013), thus dominating both Houses.
Behind the rulings victorious campaigns, minor candidates targeted a particular
group of voters who were discontent with the major parties mitigation approach. In the
Tokyo constituency of five seats, two fresh candidates beat incumbents. One was former
actor Taro Yamamoto, ranked the 4rth, who was the only new independent elected in the
nation-wide. The other in the Tokyo district was the 3rd ranked victory of Yoshiko Kira
young female candidate from the Communist Party, which became the partys first seat of
the district in the past 12 years. Including Kiras seat, the Communist Party as a whole
nearly doubled its seats from 6 to 11 (Saninsen 2013 tokusyu, 2013). These two first-time
candidates, independent Yamamoto and Communist Kira newly attracted a support base in
their election campaigns especially with effective Internet strategic maneuvers.
3. THEORY
The institutional point of political communication is to contribute to democracy in general.
Deliberation is a conventionally diversified genre of interactional activity in which the
participants are motivated to critically examine the acceptability of a standpoint.
Communicative activity types as the genre of deliberation in the domain of political
argumentation provide wide varieties of opportunities for collective decision-making for
the public good (Zarefsky, 2009, p. 115). Specifically, election should serve to deepen
our knowledge and discussion about social issues in order to eventually make a public
decision through a legitimate resolution process of different opinions.
Domains of communicative activity: political communication
Genres of communicative activity: deliberation
Communicative activity types [Concrete speech events]:
- Presidential debate [1960 Nixon-Kennedy television debate],
- General debate in parliament,
- Prime Ministers question time,
- Election campaign [2013 Election Campaign for Upper House of Japan]
(Eemeren, 2010, p. 139; Italics added)
In the principle of popular representation, however, the critical testing procedure of
standpoints becomes complex since in many types of speech events interaction between
protagonists and antagonists are exposed to the public through various media. Thus with
the Internet use, the intertextuality of argumentative moves becomes even more complex
because reconstruction of argumentative moves fragmented over the Internet media is
painstaking. On the other hand, the difficulty of reconstructing argumentation
simultaneously proves worthy of pragma-dialectical approach because the election

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otherwise would be considered dependently from the rhetorical perspective in the narrow
sense and thus lack the institutional point to serve democracy. Also, it should be noted that
there is a limitation on this study as critics reconstruction of arguments is not fully
reflected by the reality of what has happened, but instead focuses on the argumentative
aspects.
Therefore, challenging is application of the pragma-dialectical approach to the
Internet election campaign. The Internet tools provide nonverbal message such as
audio/visual information so that online verbal information can be extensive in meaning. It
is difficult to convert all nonverbal arguments into verbal ones for pragma-dialectical
analysis. That is why it is difficult to reconstruct Internet-based argumentative moves in a
verbal diagram, or logic tree which suffices to cover the condition of analysis. To counter
possible criticism of picky reconstruction, there are two justifications. First, it is
significant to extract verbal messages to form a corresponding logic tree for the purpose of
synchronically and diachronically checking consistency of arguments. This verbal analysis
would pressure discussants from excessively pursuing effectiveness so that they are
expected to be fair in the online platform. The other is that pragma-dialectical analysis
functions as critical theory. Its evaluation compares reconstructed argumentation either
with the normative rules for critical discussion or with rhetorical techniques for effective
persuasion (Eemeren, 2010). As far as pragma-dialectical analysis serves to find points of
derailment from any of the critical rules in a way that the findings otherwise would be
unnoticed, such a research project is worthy of academic attention even though the
reconstruction is not sufficiently expositive for the broad discourse.
On this point, it should be noted that any actual speech act cannot be perfectly free
from fallaciousness if normative discussion rules are rigidly applied in a dialectical sense.
Therefore, it is important for the rules to specify in which cases the performance of
certain speech acts contribute to the resolution of the difference of opinion (Eemeren and
Grootendorst, 2004, p. 135) with the assumption that there are some cases the principle of
argumentation cannot be applied to. Ideally, a pragma-dialectical analysis should serve to
improve a derailed case toward the normative rules of critical discussion, although it falls
short by nature. In this sense, to improve does not mean absolute solution, but instead
the concept of reasonableness in pragma-dialectical approach is expected to realize a
better one. Also, it is necessary to understand the quality of fallaciousness not as all or
nothing in terms of its presence, but as linear in terms of its significance. In short, the
tolerability of fallaciousness in pragma-dialectical evaluation depends on context or
activity type. It is thus possible that the same type of move could be admissible in a
commercial domain but could be fallacious in a legal one. This is exactly what strategic
maneuvering approach should take into consideration.
The aspects of the strategic maneuvering in the election campaign as an activity
type of political communication requires discussants to be reasonable and effective
(Eemeren, 2010). In light of the institutional point of political communication, being
reasonable as a protagonist in an election campaign means that argumentation should be
clear for the audience to critically examine for the public opinion forming and decisionmaking from the dialectical perspective. A candidate should clearly present the topical
content and the supporting reasoning in a recognizably hierarchically ordered form so that
a wide range of the audience can understand as well as critically look at the logical
relation of standpoints and supporting materials. From the rhetorical point of view, a

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protagonist aims to be effective by exemplifying the arguments in an optimally plausible

manner so that the candidate or the party can win trust and vote.
On the other hand, an antagonist in the campaign needs to be reasonable by making
criticisms to relevantly test the protagonists logical relation of standpoints and supporting
materials so that argumentation to resolve a difference of opinion in a target topic will lead
to a better course of action. Yet, in an election, the primary concern of candidates is to
gain votes. From the rhetorical perspective, an antagonist aims to be effective to cast
doubts on every aspect of the protagonists standpoints and arguments as much as possible.
Doing so might function to hurt the credibility of rival candidates and increase the
possibility of ones own winning in the voting.
4. ANALYSIS
This section is twofold. First, argumentative moves of the ruling coalition parties are
reconstructed into a diagram and, second, those of the Japanese Communist Party one of
the opposition parties are examined in the same manner but with more focus on its Internet
use.
The coalition parties went by an orthodox approach. The LDP focused on
economic policy, emphasizing positive impacts of an unprecedented economic package
coined Abenomics. In the manifesto of the LDP, the party leader Abe declares the
following:
Last December we faced the challenge of taking back Japan. It is a battle to take
back Japan as growing, strongly recovering, and protecting its territorial land,
sea, air. For the first six months of the current government, the bold and
unprecedented economic package three arrows drastically changed dark and
gloomy atmosphere over Japan. [...] Politics of decision gradually made LDPs
pledges certain to result. Yet there is much work to do in economy, education,
reconstruction, livelihood, diplomacy and security. Rectifying the twisted Diet
will realize political stabilization. Therefore, we cannot lose. Japan has
eventually woken to a new dawn. Let us regain our confidence and Japanese pride
now. Let us join forces to renew Japan. (Sangiin senkyo koyaku 2013, 2013;
translated by author)
New Komeito declares Stability is hope for the election (Saninsen juten seisaku). It is
stated in the partys pledges that Japan needs political stabilization which could be
achieved by rectifying the twisted Diet in which the Upper and Lower houses were
controlled by opposing parties. The resolution will make the following possible:
(1)
(2)
(3)

to speedily resolve the problems facing Japan;

to powerfully promote the recovery of national powers, such as economic and
diplomatic powers;
to improve peoples lives into comfortable and reliable ones, enabling each citizen
to feel hopeful about the future.
(Saninsen juten seisaku, translated by author)

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In general, it is an all-too-common attitude to insist that political stabilization is important

to swiftly tackle urgent issues. Particularly in this argumentative move, however, political
stabilization is depicted as equal to the resolution of the divided Diet, which is presented
as the main cause of social problems. This abstraction functions to evade careful
observation of actual problems of future Japan and major differences of the ruling bloc the
LDP and New Komeito. In topical selection, New Komeito together with the LDP
rhetorically established the standpoint that Japan should resolve the twisted Diet as the
foundation on which they could base further argument without discussing significant
issues in dialectical terms. Strategic avoidance of an important issue is apparent in the
attitudes of major parties on the issue of social welfare.
The LDP, New Komeito and the DPJs pledges do not mention an increase in the
financial burden of health care on senior citizens, a decrease in pension benefits,
the raising of the pensionable age or other proposals that would be
disadvantageous to elderly voters. (Editorial: Parties failed 2013)
Thus, they avoided offering difficult opinions to the elderly, the main electoral segment
and, instead, simplified the cause of the problems as the coalitions limited number of
seats in the Upper House. If the main cause of any social problems were the twisted Diet,
then it would be the only solution that the LDP-New Komeito bloc wins the majority in
the Upper House since the Lower was dominated by the joint parties. This would sound
convincing when people felt highly frustrated with the previous governments inability to
make a timely political decision. The following is a logic tree of the coalition parties main
standpoint.
Standpoint: The twisted Diet should be rectified to stabilize politics.
1.
Argument:
The twisted Diet is undesirable for its inability to make effective political decisions.
2.1
Unexpressed Premise: Japan needs speedy political decision-making to cope with
difficult economic condition.
2.2
Argument: The coalition parties are capable of providing effective economic
policies.
3.
Unexpressed Premise:
Economy which needs speedy political decision-making is the top priority now.
The ruling coalition parties, the LDP and New Komeito, succeeded in rhetorically creating
a common ground to appeal to the public although they had conflicting policies which
should have been dialectically examined. The common ground was to rectify the twisted
Diet, in which the coalition parties had been dominant in the Lower House while not in
the Upper House. To begin with, the word twisted has connotation that it needs to be
fixed. In reality, the coalition parties emphasized the twisted condition as the main cause
of the problems of Japanese society. In the coalitions manifestos, because of the twisted
condition, Japan cannot implement even necessary policies at the right timing. Thus, the
coalition parties aimed to make the public focus on the correction of the twisted Diet.

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Presenting the issue of rectifying the twisted Diet at the higher level of abstraction is
highly rhetorical. If one agreed with the abstracted issue, there was no other way but to
vote for either the LDP or New Komeito as mentioned earlier. In the past seven months of
the current coalition government since regaining power in the last Lower House election,
the power-shared government provided bold and unprecedented economic package, which
was favorably perceived in the general public.
From the dialectical perspective, the argumentation derailed from the Rule 10
(Eemeren, 2010). The argumentation abstracted the detailed issues into one simplified
issue. According to the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion, this is fallacious
because the argumentative formation is unclear for its institutional point of the election
campaign.
Next, the Japanese Communist Party is focused. The Communist Party set off a
total confrontation with the LDP. The Partys standpoint was that in this election the
confrontation between the LDP and the Communist Party was the true confrontational axis
(2013nen saninsenkyo seisaku). This was the continuation of what the JCP had
aggressively campaigned. Thus, the JCP had formed a revolutionary image. But the
difference lied in the JCPs attitude. Yoshiko Kira, often referred to as young female in the
media was a very symbolic candidate of the Japan Communist Party that targeted at the
electorate who felt discontent with the dominant LDPs policies. The JCP developed a soft
attitude by positioning Kira in the partys leading figure in order to grant adherence by the
general public. The following is a logic tree of the JCPs main standpoint.
Standpoint: The true confrontational axis is the battle between the LDP and the Japan
Communist Party
1.1
Reckless Abes regime is dangerously fraying at the edges toward collapse.
1.1.a The LDPs time has expired and its politics is getting rotten at base.
1.1.b The LDPs three distortions are centering around the business community,
mindlessly following the United States and turning back the tide of history.
1.2
The Japan Communist Party is the only party that can remove these distortions
with a scalpel.
As for audience adaption, the J-Communist Party focused on widely sympathetic issues. In
this way, the J-communist Party adopted strategic maneuvers to be effective for votegetting. The JCP could have committed to communist ideology that denied the current
economic and social security system. Instead, the conforming Communist Party
emphasized two issues. One is criticism against black companies. The other is anti-nuclear
energy. These issues gained a great deal of attention in the Internet as well as traditional
media. In her Facebook page, young communist Kira frequently updated her activities so
that visitors can access new and previous information about her campaign (Yoshiko Kira
Official Facebook). In this page where movies are viewable, it is easy to find candidate
Kiras commitment to anti-nuclear and anti-black company activities. These two issues are
opposed to the LDPs economic policy, aimed to appeal to the young electorate who were
not able to receive concrete benefit from the current economic policy. Naming of black
company is intended to criticize a company that exploits the young people with low
salary for long hours.

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Dialectically, the argumentative fallaciousness did not exceed the tolerability in the
context. In the first place, shedding the revolutionary image might function as diverting
the public attention from the partys other policies. But consistently the JCP clarified its
stance on 46 detailed topics covering the general policy areas in its webpage (2013nen
saninsenkyo seisaku) so that more concerned viewers can selectively access them.
5. CONCLUSION
Pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the argumentation is useful to clarify strategic
maneuvers in the election argumentative discourse. The Internet use in the election can
function as delineating detailed issues to serve the dialectical institutional point of critical
policy examination, while it also provides rhetorical opportunities to create ones new
image as in the case of the young communist Kiras fresh one.
Positive aspects of the Internet campaign include the creation of public space in
which participants can get relevant information as well as expressing their opinions. In
fact, citizens with strong awareness on a particular issue such as the Constitution
amendment, energy policy, economic policy, social welfare, or the like can easily compare
political parties and candidates opinion or stance on the issues. Citizens can be active in
the virtual that is related to the reality through the voting.
However, there is much room of the Internet potential to be cultivated. It is the 3rd
lowest voting rate in the postwar Upper House election that shows ineffectiveness in terms
of the general publics consciousness-raising toward politics. With the technical use of the
Internet, political parties and politicians can respond not only to the existing issues but
also find possibly interest-attracting issues to bring more people to the public forum.
Citizens are not just consumers of information, but can be participants of argumentative
interaction. In this regard, the strategic maneuvering perspective is one of the keys to
develop the better framework of the Internet election campaign for the future.

REFERENCES
Eemeren, F. H. van. (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Amsterdam: John
Benjamins.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Editorial: Parties failed in not debating social security system reforms. (2013, July 1) Mainichi Daily News.
Maisaku-database <https://dbs.g-search.or.jp> (Access: April 1, 2014)
Kiyohara, S. & Maeshima, K. (2013). Netto senkyo-ga kaeru seiji-to shakai. (trans. Politics and society that
Internet election changes.) Tokyo: Keio University Press.
Motomiya, M. (2012). Netto-senkyo undo kaikineno kadaiwa kokumin-no mukanshin. ITmedia news.
(May 25) <http://www.itmedia.co.jp/news/articles/1205/25/news024.html> (Access: April 1, 2014)
Netto-senkyo rainen-no saninsen-madeni kaikin. (2012, December 27) Jcast news. <http://www.jcast.com/2012/12/27159786.html?p=all> (Access: April 1, 2014)
Netto-senkyo yukensha hiyayaka. (2013, July 22) MSN Sankei news.
<http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/130722/elc13072210590124-n1.htm> (Access: April 1,
2014)
Sangiin senkyo koyaku 2013 : Nihon wo torimodosu Jiminto. (2013, June 20)
<http://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/sen_san23/2013sanin2013-07-04.pdf>
Saninsen juten seisaku: Manifesto 2013. New Komeito.
<https://www.komei.or.jp/policy/policy/pdf/manifesto2013.pdf> (Access: April 1, 2014)

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Saninsen tohyoritsu 52.61%. (2013, July 22) Asahi Shimbun Digital.

<http://digital.asahi.com/senkyo/senkyo2013/news/TKY201307210015.html> (Access: April 1,
2014)
Saninsen 2013 tokusyu. (2013, July 22) MSN Sankei news.
<http://sankei.jp.msn.com/election2013/board/000.htm> (Access: April 1, 2014)
Yoshiko Kira Official Facebook page. <https://ja-jp.facebook.com/yoshikokira.official> (Access: April 1,
2014)
Zarefsky, D. (2009). Strategic maneuvering in political argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.),
Examining argumentation in context: Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering (pp. 115-130).
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
2013nen saninsenkyo seisaku. Japanese Communist Party.
<http://www.jcp.or.jp/web_policy/html/2013sanin-seisaku.html> (Access: April 1, 2014)

711

Analyzing Political Discourse In Georgia: A Critical DiscourseAnalytical Perspective On Political Imageries And Means-Goal
Arguments
Mariam Keburia
Faculty of Humanities
Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University
Georgia
Mariam.keburia@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: Georgia has undergone remarkable socio-economic changes and political unrest on its
difficult road to statehood. Re-establishing itself from the collapsed Soviet Union as an independent,
sovereign state has been a painful process. This paper looks at number of speeches delivered by the
political leader of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili (presidential term: 2004-2013) in order to analyze
argumentative public communication, focusing on how practical arguments in favour of the advocated
policies are developed in the selected speeches.
KEYWORDS: critical discourse analysis, Georgia, practical argumentation

1. INTRODUCTION
This article analyzes Georgian political discourse, namely annual report speeches of the
Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili (presidential term 2004-2013) delivered at the
Parliament of Georgia. It draws particular attention to practical arguments and rhetorical
devices used in the selected political texts. Although President Saakashvili is
acknowledged as a charismatic and persuasive public speaker, I argue that his speeches
reveal lack of argumentative communication and fail to suggest a clear political vision
while strongly advocating policies.
Over the past two decades, republic of Georgia has undergone remarkable socioeconomic and political changes. Re-establishing itself from the collapsed Soviet Union as
an independent state has been a painful and rather complex process. The recent history of
the country has included the overthrow of communism, revolutionary change of the
government and the first constitutional transfer of power through elections (leading to the
so called cohabitation). Georgias shift from a former soviet republic into an independent
state has been analysed within various disciplines. Historical timeline and accompanying
processes have been observed in terms of social or political studies, identity and ideology
related debate and other fields of research. In recent times, there has been growing interest
in applying discourse analysis to study politics and power. According to the Constitution
of Georgia, The president is authorised to address people and the Parliament, and once a
year submits a report to parliament on the most important issues concerning the state. The
present paper looks into 7 institutional the speeches delivered by the president of Georgia
Mikheil Saakashvili to the supreme legislative body of the country. I am primarily
interested in identifying practical arguments in the selected political texts and analyzing
relevant schemes pursuant to Critical Discourse Analysis. This paper addresses the

712

following questions: What particular argument schemes is the arguer using to justify
particular lines of action (policies)? How can these arguments be evaluated from a
dialectical and rhetorical perspectives?
The article will first discuss analytical framework of the research, that is of Critical
Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 2010) and particularly the more recent version of CDA
that gives primacy to practical argumentation and deliberation in political discourse
(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Critical Discourse Analysis is especially relevant due to
the focus it has on texts and its encouragement to have a dialogue between disciplines
while conducting analysis. Second, I continue with the analysis of 7 institutional speeches
with specific attention to practical arguments in favour of the advocated policies - how
practical argumentation scheme is used to legitimize foreign policy and implemented
and/or planned reforms.
Analysis shows that not only are the premises poorly related to the claim for action,
but are also frequently insufficient and unnecessary too. I suggest that vague
representations of the goal premise, hence vague political visions or imageries, are
characteristic of the practical arguments being made, and the measures that allegedly need
to be taken are often insufficient and sometimes unnecessary. There is a complete absence
of alternative courses of action and critical examination of such alternatives, and hasty
generalisation is one of the most characteristic argumentative fallacies in all seven reports.
This seems to correlate with an absence of clear political vision as to which particular
goals Georgia ought to be pursuing and what means are, realistically, most likely to
deliver a range of desirable goals. Certain common elements found in all seven speeches is
a special contribution to this research. Analysis will proceed on focusing on these common
characteristics found in all speeches. The final part of the article is dedicated to
summarizing main findings and lessons learned.
2. METHODOLOGY
The analytical framework of the paper is that of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough
2010) and particularly the more recent version of CDA that gives primacy to practical
argumentation and deliberation in political discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).
Being of highly interdisciplinary character, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) studies
the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and
resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research,
critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and
ultimately resist social inequality (Van Dijk 2001, 352).
In their recent book Political Discourse Analysis a Method for Advanced
Students (2012) Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough describe practical reasoning
as a discussion regarding future actions and suggest showing (reflecting and analysing)
practical reasoning as part of political discourse:
The structure of practical reasoning that we suggest is the following (Figure 2.1),
where the hypothesis that action A might enable the agent to reach his goals (G),
starting from his circumstances (C), and in accordance with certain values (V),
leads to the presumptive claim that he ought to do A. It is often the case that the
context of action is seen as a problem (and is negatively evaluated in view of the

713

agents existing values or concerns) and the action is seen as the solution that will
solve the problem. As the conclusion that the action might be the right means to
achieve the goal or solve the agents problem follows only presumptively, we have
represented the link from premises to conclusion by means of a dotted line.
(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).
Thinking of this scheme as one of the most relevant frameworks for analyzing set
initiatives in political context, I will apply the above described structure in analysing
argumentative communication in annual report texts.
3. ANNUAL REPORTS
2003 was a turning point in the modern history of the republic of Georgia. On November
23rd, a peaceful revolution took place when thousands of demonstrators were led by a
young and a charismatic leader Mikheil Saakashvili. In January 2004 Saakashvili was
elected president of Georgia with 96% of the vote. The first annual report delivered by
President Saakashvili to the supreme legislative body of the country took place in
February 2005.
Introductory part of the 2005 reports text is quite extensive and includes some
argumentative discussion. The speech contains 3480 words out of which 1171 are of
initiatory character. By the beginning of the report, president develops a rhetorically rich
comparative analysis: what did Georgia look like before the Rose Revolution and what it
turned into due to the democracy-promoted efforts made by the new government. The
narrative highlights Our achievements on the one hand and Georgia a year ago in
contrast. While developing this opposition the speaker applies simple argumentative
structure: Georgia was a country with no defensive capacity there was not a single tank
and not even a bullet for an hour fight. We had an army in several month hunger. The
speakers statement about military weakness of the country is supported by two premises:
the lack of relevant equipment and poor conditions for the solders. Achievements of the
year, on the other hand, are presented by using specific, detailed cases and examples. Each
of the successful fields has its own concrete hero. While illustrating successful
governance through individual names (and stories) may serve as a powerful persuasive
strategy, the risk of developing a fallacy - hasty generalization increases. For instance, the
speaker emphasizes the achievements of the finance police through the case of Kvemo
Kartli (administrative region in Georgia) department, names the head of operational
department, greets him in front of the public and expresses gratitude towards him
personally. The same strategy is applied to show the success in the field of education,
security and law enforcement patrol police activities.
One of the fundamental issues highlighted in Georgias development agenda,
especially after the Rose Revolution, has been related to European and Euro-Atlantic
integration. Strengthening cooperative links with NATO has been perceived as one of the
best options for enhancing the countrys security and developing realistic perspectives on
territorial integrity. Georgia has two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Osetia,
consequently international support in consolidating the state is of utmost importance.
The text of 2005 report, however, is quite limited in terms of elaborating arguments in
favour of the implemented foreign policy. NATO integration program is presented as part

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of the general, so to say ,,Georgia now and before argument, part of the rhetorically rich
sequence of statements:
1.

No one should question our presence there. Georgia must participate in the
processes because our country should restore its territorial integrity through peace.
We are not a country in ordinary condition. We are the state that seeks
international support today, as never before, to implement peaceful processes. In
order to gain peace, it is critically important that a country is strong. Army is a
constituent part of it. In summer, during antidrug operation 16 of our best soldiers
died. The first woman instructor, Ms. Ia, trained according to American program
on Krtsanisi polygon is present here today (Annual report 2005).

In spite of the issues priority, the speaker does not provide even primary explanatory
information on peace building activities and operations. Connection between Georgias
participation in the process and restoring countrys territorial integrity is rather vague. This
seems to underestimate the importance of thorough discussion before claiming a specific
action. Gratitude and appreciation towards solders is the major context in which the
speaker discusses Georgias engagement in NATO operations. The sentence on dramatic
consequences of the operations (death of 16 solders) is followed by an innovation, a
modernisation concept (for example a woman solder trained in accordance to American
program) and messages tapping into patriotism, thus disguising (or preventing) alternative
assessment of the action. The passage, I believe, serves to create an emotional attitude
towards Georgian solders involvement in NATO operations in the Middle East.
Goal: Our country should restore territorial integrity.
To achieve the set goal the speaker offers to continue participation in NATO peace
building operations.
Claim of action: Georgia must be the part of these processes.
Circumstances are presented radically: We are not the state in an ordinary situation
The value premise behind this short argumentative text is a concern for territorial
integrity.
Something that is not explicitly discussed in the provided example above is that, in order
to get support from the international alliance, any state needs access to its membership
(which Georgia does not have so far). The challenging questions to the claim for action
would be: Is participation in peace building operations necessary and sufficient for
restoring territorial integrity of Georgia? Is the practice of participation linked to
becoming a NATO member state at all? Does Georgias quest for NATO integration
guarantee facilitation of processes on the long road to alliance membership? According to
the information provided at the official web-page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Georgia, (www.mfa.gov.ge) Georgia became the participant of NATO Partnership for
Peace program. As part of the program, Alliance member and partner states arrange
trainings and quarter teachings. Georgia is actively included in the seminars and
conferences dedicated to modern security challenges. The country made an official
application in NATO Prague summit in 2002. Another important information is that
Georgia contributes to ISAF International Security Assistance Force operation.

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Currently, as a non-member state, it has the second largest military contingent in

Afghanistan. In fact, considering the role taken and participation scale, shedding more
light on the claimed actions could have lead to more rational judgement. Georgias
integration to NATO still remains a highly contested issue. While praising Georgias
reform efforts, achievements and outstanding role in the international alliance operations,
the world leaders comments challenge the dynamic perspectives of integration: There
are no immediate plans for expanding NATO to include Georgia and Ukraine, U.S.
President Barack Obama said at the press conference after the EU-US summit in
Brussels March 26 (2014) - Reports daily news online service www.Civil.ge. The below
quote (cited on the same online news service) provides incentives on why the question of
integration remains debated: I know that Russia, at least on background, has suggested
that one of the reasons theyve been concerned about Ukraine was potential NATO
membership. On the other hand, part of the reason that the Ukraine has not formally
applied for NATO membership is because of its complex relationship with Russia. I
dont think thats going to change anytime soon, obviously, President Obama said.
President Saakashvili touches upon Georgias territorial integrity, security related
issues and a foreign policy as interconnected topics in every annual report delivered in
the Parliament. Most of the time, in my view, relations between the set goals and means
of their implementation are fairly represented. Practical argument on Georgias foreign
policy in the report of 2006 is as follows:
2.

Circumstance premise: Georgia has many international friends. On the other

hand, they (implying enemies) want to annex territory of our country. We move
to NATO standards. Very soon Georgias border will be the borders of NATO.
Today I am confident to say something that I would be unable to say yesterdayGeorgia is one step away from NATO.
Goal: becoming a NATO member state. Reaching a state where Georgia is a free
and a successful country.
Means - goal: identifying concrete means that will deliver this goal, however, is
difficult. One of the suggestions of reaching the goal is the following: If
everything continues the way it is going on today, and if no one is able to involve
us in a heavy provocation, Georgia and Ukraine (however, I can only speak about
Georgia) has a chance indeed to become NATO member states in 2008. And this
year we can become official candidates for NATO membership. Increasing
awareness among international community about the situation in Georgia is
presented as another means goal/ another opportunity to reach the goal/: They
should know that the teacher from Gali can be arrested when her/his student
expresses Long live to my country.

Gali is a district in the breakaway region of Abkhazia that has ethnic Georgian
population. According to the Human Rights Watch report, About 47,000 displaced
people have returned to their homes in Gali district. But the Abkhaz authorities have
erected barriers to their enjoyment of a range of civil and political rights. The document
highlights restricted access to Georgian - language education in the region. The above

716

mentioned means-goal quotation refers to the violation of rights of the ethnic Georgian
teacher in Gali district, the threat that any teacher may face. This may implicitly indicate
that if Georgia spreads information about the circumstances in breakaway region among
the international communities, and sheds light on the human rights conditions, then
inequalities will be revealed and Georgias need of better international protection will
become more explicit.
Claim for action: Seeking international support should continue. The launched initiatives
and policies should continue. Through this judgement, I think the president attempts to
justify the actions taken by the team he represents and advocate the continuation of the
same rout.
Table 1

Claim for action: everything should continue

the way it is going on today.
Seeking international support should continue.

Circumstances:
We move to NATO standards.
Very soon Georgias border will
be NATO border.

Goal: Reaching a state where

Georgia is a free and a successful
country.

Means-Goal: If everything continues the

way it is going on today, and if no one is able
to involve us in a heavy provocation, Georgia
and Ukraine (however, I can only speak about
Georgia) has a chance indeed to become
NATO member states in 2008.

Comparative statement on Georgia before the Rose Revolution and now continues to
retain leading position in the annual report text of 2006. Like in previous case, this time
as well it is enriched with stylistic devices. The president begins his speech by
questioning: Where did we start from? Where do we stand now? Where are we going?
The rest of the text fits into this scheme and increases pathetic background with various
stylistic and lexical devices, such as: ,,We began from the point where Georgia, as a state
had its existence finished... We started from the point where nations and states end their
being. ,,We need to wound our healings. Necessity of continuing reforms and
liberalisation is a key claim for action in the 2006 report script. Circumstance premise in
this practical argument is exceptionally extended: 11 different directions asserting
economic development can be distinguished in it. Sometimes simple argument schemes
are applied within the circumstance premise. Circumstances are described as follows:

717

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)

Impressive economic development;

Georgian entrepreneurs can make business in favourable conditions;
The country budget accumulated more amount than it has been planned;
FDI volume has been increased;
GDP has been increased;
Inflation decreased;
Privatisation has reached unprecedented level;
Georgia strengthens its economic ranking internationally;
Taxation system has simplified and became orderly;
Tourism started to develop;
The countrys economy is considered as one of the most liberal in the region;

Above all, the circumstance premise is summarised metaphorically: This means that we
used to be bad students (losers, those who receive low grades) and have now become
upper-intermediate level students. Frequent application of stylistic devices asserts once
again that the speaker uses maximum language (lexical) means to have efficient
communication and influence audiences attitudes. In this case, for instance, the new
governing team is presented as a bright, hardworking student in contrast to what previous
government used to be. Through this particular personification device, efforts are made to
relate positive concept to the new government, establish and strengthen affirmative
attitudes towards ,,the Georgia after Rose revolution. The goal premise of the next
identified practical argument is poverty reduction - a state of affairs in which poverty has
been eradicated. The speaker is quite confident while setting the goal here and provides
international organisations outlooks as a support to this hopeful attitude: ,,After the year
of 2009, According to the World bank and International Organisations categories,
Georgia will not be a poor country any longer. We will leave poverty in the past forever.
Giving a specific date increases the statements persuasive affect. Value behind the
communication is a concern for everyones prosperity. According to the text, all major
fields of countrys development (including development of social services, banking
system, education etc.) heavily depend on the realisation of rapid reforms. Everything
that a county has achieved so far was a result of reforms. Mainstreaming reform into
every field of policy planning is an absolutely necessary means of reaching a goal. The
means-goal premise (implicitly) delivered here is the following: if we allow radical
economic reforms and economic liberalisation proceed, the goal will be achieved.

718

Table 2

Claim for action: Reforms should quickly

proceed, liberalisation of economy should
continue.

Circumstances :
We used to be bad students
(receiving low grades) and
have now become upperintermediate level students.

Goal:
Poverty reduction (a
state of affairs in which
poverty has been
eradicated)

Value
Concern for everyones prosperity.

The means-goal premise

(implicitly delivered): If we
allow radical economic
reforms and economic
liberalisation to proceed,
the goal will be achieved.

Even though economic liberalisation and radical reforms in essentially every field are
depicted as (almost the only) means to reduce poverty, some analysts question the
relevance and outcomes of this policy. The research on Reforming of Post-Soviet
Georgias Economy in 1991-2011 asserts that successes in economic reforms were
followed by stagnation, which was particularly exacerbated by the increased scale of
corruption. The economic reforms, which were carried out after the Rose Revolution,
are especially interesting. Along with successful reforms of neo-liberal nature, neoBolshevik actions became apparent as the Government started openly infringing property
rights (Papava 2013). A lot of space is traditionally dedicated to the statement Georgia
before the Rose Revolution and now in the text of 2007 report. The representation is
realised through antithesis/ oppositions.
Georgia before 2003:
A ruined state drawn in the mud of failure
Frozen in stagnation, a country left backward
Totally corrupted
A country with criminal mentality
Demoralised, hopeless state on its knees, without any dignity
Georgia after 2003
The worlds one of the most dynamically developing country
The worlds number one reforming state
The worlds leader in fight against corruption
Criminal mentality destroyed
Proud, new Georgia
Sense of national dignity has returned to people

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Quite often development processes and positive outcomes of new governments reforms
are shown through simple argumentative schemes. For instance, while talking about the
fairness of updated education system: Today we live in Georgia, where knowledge is
appreciated... Applicants from ordinary families are able to enrol at the universities. This
statement is supported by an example, the case of an applicant, who is at the same time
attending the annual report presentation. The president greets the young and motivated
person. Bringing this one example as a success story may threaten the rational
argumentation and may, as in the case illustrated earlier, lead to hasty generalisation
fallacy. The same applies to the following part:
Corruption is not a problem any longer. The day before yesterday, officers at Tax
Office were arrested. The operation was named as a left pocket by the
prosecutors office. A whole corruption scheme has been uncovered. Corruption is
totally defeated.
Fallacy in this particular case seems to be related to hasty generalisation. It may still be
possible that beyond this uncovered scheme, corrupted negotiations take place in the Tax
office. Besides, Tax Office case is generalized and is presented as an example applicable
to all fields. Argumentative passage from the report text of 2007 states the economic
growth of the country.
Last year a Georgian company - The Bank of Georgia appeared on London Stock
exchange. Georgian economy used to be made on Validavkaz and Ergneti flea
markets before. Now it has moved to London stock exchange. This is an indicator
of our countrys growth.
By the time of delivering this particular report, Newspaper 24 Hours reports that
London Stock exchange hosts the representatives of 70 countries, around 3000
companies. Out of these 3000, only about 1000 companies are represented in premium
listing. ,,The Bank of Georgia is included in the premium listing. Indeed, the success of
this joint stock company is remarkable; however a broad statement about countrys
economic growth may be estimated as exaggeration.
In the text of 2007, a word reform is applied synonymously to positive concepts
only, lexical items denoting success, fairness and promising future are used in the same
context: Reforming, charitable work, Reformatory and leading parliament. ,,Our
people are hundred times cleverer than those politicians who set themselves against
reforms. ,, Every reform , no matter which field it takes place in, sets itself the only goal:
Improving our citizens lives. There is no such a thing as unpopular reforms.
CONCLUSION
I would like to summarise some basic findings of the presented research. analysis has
shown that although President Saakashvilis report texts contain some argumentative
judgements, still the most part of the corpus is of rhetorical character, enriched with
720

stylistic devices. Practical arguments can be identified in the selected institutional

speeches, however quite often claims for action as well as supportive premises have
essential clarification shortages. The countrys foreign policy and security related
practical reasoning is developed with an absence of clear means leading to the set goals.
For instance, the aim for Georgia to become a NATO member state is clear; nevertheless
proposed means of reaching this goal profoundly lacks clarifications and seem
unnecessary (or even quite wrong). Some of the significant strategies of the speaker
persuading the audience are related to using the concepts of fairness, sense of
responsibility, accountability. In addition, contrasting the nearest past to the current state
- Georgia before the Rose Revolution and now gains an important role as a strategy and
is widely applied in every annual report. Reforms and quick implementation of economic
liberalisation are presented as core of political agenda. Overall, most of the strategies and
generally the discourse created by the speaker is used, in my view, to legitimise the
power of the ruling team, its political agenda and planned as well as already implemented
policies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to express my most sincere gratitude to Open Society Foundations, Central Asia
and Caucasus Research and Training Initiative (CARTI) for the invaluable support it has
provided to me and to the number of junior researchers from Georgia. I owe my courage to
CARTI program mentors and involved fellows of various disciplines from Caucasus and
Central Asia.
REFERENCES
Chilton, Paul (2004) Analysing political discourse. Theory and practice. London: Routledge.
Chilton, Paul and Christina Schaffner (1997) Discourse and politics in T. van Dijk ed. 1997
Chilton, Paul and Christina Schaffner eds. (2002) Politics as text and talk. Analytic approaches to political
discourse. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Fairclough, I. and Fairclough, N. (2012) Political discourse analysis. London: Routledge.
Fairclough, N. (2010) Critical discourse analysis, critical study of language. 2nd edition, London: Longman.
Chouliaraki, Lilie and Norman Fairclough (1999) Discourse in late modernity: rethinking critical discourse
analysis. Edinburgh University Press.
Walton, D. (2008) Informal logic, a pragmatic approach. Cambridge University Press- 2nd edition.
Walton, D. (1996) Arguments form ignorance. The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Papava, V. (2013) Reforming of post-soviet Georgias economy in 1991-2011. GFSIS Center for Applied
Economic Studies Research Paper.
Joseph M. Williams, Gregory G. Colomb (2007) The Craft of argument. Longman
Thomas O. Sloane (2001) Encyclopaedia of rhetoric.Oxford University Press
Van Dijk, Teun ed. (1997) Discourse as social interaction. Discourse studies 2: A Multidisciplinary
Introduction, London: Sage Publications.

721

Political Argument And The Affective Relations Of Democracy:

Recovering Vaclav Havels Theory Of Associated Living
Zornitsa Keremidchieva & Vera Sidlova
Political Science Department
Macalester College
USA
Email: zkeremid@macalester.edu
Czech Republic
Email: vera.sidlova@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: This essay approaches Vaclav Havels first and second presidential addresses as artifacts of
democratization theory. We propose that Havels speeches contribute to an affective theory of argumentation that
can capture the lived, immersive quality of political phenomena such as the collective emotional experience of the
post-communist transition. Specifically, we suggest that Havels observations illustrate the function of arguments as
attuning devices that connect, orient, and sometimes disconnect subjects within the affective atmospheres of
common life.
KEYWORDS: affect, affective atmosphere, democratization, post-communism

1. INTRODUCTION
Post-communism was more than a period of political and economic transformation. It was also
an emotional period of hope, uncertainty and affective dislocation. It was not unusual early on
for observers to claim that the post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe brought forth an
identity in crisis or even an existential revolution (Matustik, 1993, p. 187). On both sides of
the crumbling Berlin wall there was a tendency to imagine the impact of the political and social
developments in the region in dramatic emotional terms. Suddenly everyone was dizzy with
democracy (Jowitt, 1996). In his first presidential address in former Czechoslovakia, capturing
the sudden and seemingly inexplicable shift in the public mood, Vaclav Havel referred to the last
six weeks of the countrys peaceful revolution as evidence that society is a very mysterious
creature (par. 10). He also wondered about the atmospheric forces that seemingly overnight
reconstituted the fabric of society: Where did the young people who never knew another system
get their desire for truth, their love of free thought, their political ideas, their civic culture and
civic prudence? How did it happen that their parents--the very generation that had been
considered lost--joined them? How is it that so many people immediately knew what to do and
none needed any advice or instruction? (par. 10).
We take Havels questions as a point of departure into a theoretical conundrum that has
haunted argumentation theory for centuries. Namely, we inquire into the role that public
arguments play in creating what we can call collective feeling or affect. Right away we face a
certain terminological obstacle: We certainly have a range of concepts--emotion, feeling,
sentiment, pathos, affect--that could potentially help us unravel this phenomenon of mass scale,
where people who were strangers to each other, often disconnected in a physical as well as sociocultural sense, could nonetheless experience a range of emotions collectively. However, each of
722

these terms brings along theoretical legacies and trajectories that are often at odds with each
other and they frequently fail to grasp or tend to ignore the political character and potential of the
embodied, spatial dimensions of collective emotional experiences. And so, after a brief foray into
the available theoretical perspectives on the affective social dimensions of argument, we turn our
attention to Vaclav Havels first and second presidential addresses, which we approach as
artifacts of democratization theory. We propose that Havels speeches contribute to an affective
theory of argumentation that can capture the lived, immersive quality of political phenomena
such as the collective emotional experience of the post-communist transition. Specifically, we
suggest that Havels observations illustrate the function of arguments as attuning devices that
connect, orient, and sometimes disconnect subjects within the affective atmospheres
(Anderson, 2009; Stewart, 2011; Rickert, 2013) of common life.
2. THE PLACE OF EMOTION IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY
Argumentation theory has long been a bit ambivalent on the subject of feeling, even if a large
and diverse literature has been dedicated to it. Recently Raphael Micheli (2010) noted the
somewhat irreconcilable historical division between normative and descriptive approaches to
emotional appeals, leading him to suggest that emotion appears as the poor relation of
argumentation studies (p. 1). This second class status of emotion is rooted simultaneously in
normative theories preference for rational and reasonable argumentation, an issue that has been
widely discussed and often condemned (McGee, 1998), and in descriptive theories minimization
of emotional appeals role as either add-on strategies that can still be evaluated through formal
standards of reasonableness (Manolescu, 2006) or as what Micheli refers to as adjuvants or
enhancers of argumentation.
In either tradition emotion figures simply as a feature of arguments, rarely as a social or
material dimension of discourse. Yet, when emotional appeals are flattened into text,
argumentation theory ceases to behave as a social theory. Contexts become epiphenomenal to
argumentative practice, discourse becomes disembodied, and the capacity of arguments to bring
along political structuration is left undefined and unexplained. Furthermore, the place of emotion
becomes a subject of debate. Is emotion a feature of speakers? Is it a feature of language itself?
Or is it a latent capacity in people that we expect arguments to awaken? These questions not only
put at odds humanistic with postmodern theories, and these days, we would add, neo-materialist,
neurobiological theories of affect; they also seem to strain the borders of argumentation studies.
As our various subfields develop their own tools and theoretical models, ironically, our capacity
to capture the worlding (to borrow Heideggers 1962 term) function of argumentation is
diminished. Rhetorical models, abandoning Aristotles roots, often rely on instrumental models
of emotional argumentation with forceful appeals and passive audiences. While pragmadialectics, with its focus on the formal features of discourse, often loses sight of the humans
altogether.
Against this complicated background, we still would like to reclaim argumentation theory
as a social theory proper, albeit we do so in an emergent model, heeding Heideggers (1962)
reminder that Aristotles study of the different modes of state-of-mind and the ways in which
they are interconnectedmust be taken as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness
of Being with one another (p. 178). As Greene (1993) has pointed out, the subjectivity of
social actors is constituted by argumentative practices (p. 124). Moreover, argumentation forges
the social relations of coexistence (Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, pp. 293-331). Not the least, as

723

Keremidchieva (2014, p. 60) has argued, along with their media platforms, arguments work as
agents of institutional contextualization, thus materializing the structures, routines, and horizons
of social organization. To appreciate arguments in an emergent manner, in other words, is to
recognize their role in assembling the social, the individual, and the material realm. In this vein,
to the extent that they are an inevitable dimension of argumentative practice, it makes sense to
think of emotions too as interstitial, social phenomena that emerge at the intersection of
arguments, audiences, and material conditions. Or, as Rickert (2013) points out, rhetoric
impacts the senses, circulates in waves of affect, and communes to join and disjoin people. It
gathers and is gathered by things not as a denial of the social but as an essential complement to
it (p. x).
Our desire to re-examine the role that arguments played in constituting the affective
dimensions of the post-communist transition is motivated by our own recollections of the
common emotional intensity of those times as well as by the uncanny degree to which Havels
remarks are in tune with some valuable insights from the emergent interdisciplinary field of
affect studies. We approach Havels first and second New Years presidential speeches as
constitutive acts and artifacts of an indigenous, living democratic theory. Namely, we argue that
Havel captures the affective threads of sociality that allowed individuals to move and be moved
as a social organism at the point of the transition. To follow Havel in that trans-personal
dimension, however, we need to shed the vocabulary of emotion that so often haunts argument
analysis due to its easy psychologism and trade it for the concept of affect. The benefit of that
shift, we believe, is that it would allow us to capture the complex interconnectedness between
human and nonhuman agency, between public discourse and the material spaces of everyday life.
In this sense, affect is a concept that can re-establish the access of argumentation studies to the
structures, objects, and language that make collective lived experience possible. It allows us to
attend to collective affects that are not reducible to the individual bodies that they emerge from
(Ben Anderson, 2009, p. 80).
3. VACLAV HAVEL AND THE AFFECTIVE ATMOSPHERE OF POST-COMMUNISM
We turn specifically to Ben Andersons (2009) concept of affective atmosphere as a way to
capture how public discourse bridges the prepersonal and transpersonal dimensions of affective
life and everyday existence (p. 77). Like Havel, Anderson begins his analysis with a speech in a
time of revolution, with Karl Marxs remarks on one other revolutionary atmosphere
enveloping and pressing [European society] from all sides (in Anderson, 2009, p. 77). Marxs
observations of the 1848 revolutions lead Anderson into the notion that affective atmospheres
are impersonal in that they belong to collective situations and yet can be felt as intensely
personal (p. 80). And so was the affective atmosphere at the time when Havel spoke for the first
time as president.
Despite the excitement and euphoria of the Velvet Revolution, at the time of Havels first
presidential address, the public was in the grips of a profound sense of uncertainty. What had just
happened? What did it mean? What would happen from then on? Along with disrupting the
routines and upkeep of the governmental infrastructure, the fall of communism certainly
disintegrated the ideological frames supporting Czechoslovakias national identity. From within
the ruins of the old narrative regime and from its material landscapes, the blueprint of the new
society would have to be created. In addressing the nation on New Years eve in 1990, Havel
acknowledged the role of the favorable conditions in the sphere of international politics. Indeed,

724

at least from the outside, the Czechoslovak revolution was just one more piece moving in the
domino-like collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. For the people in the midst
of that event, however, the turn toward democracy felt profoundly intimate. As Havel
emphasized, the revolution came from within, as a collective psychic surge in search of its object
of desire.
What would democracy look like? For many in Havels audience the notion of
democracy was derived from images of shiny Western product packages and full store shelves,
from images of conspicuous consumption in Western films and glossy magazine covers, from
novels and other literary texts that figured subjects free to roam the world and explore their
social settings. Was that what democracy was all about? What would it take for Czechoslovak
society to move closer to a democratic future? Those were among the many questions that
abounded in the aftermath of the revolution. These questions, we suggest, figured the immediate
aftermath of the Velvet revolution as a profoundly theoretical moment, an intense opportunity for
competing imaginations and experiences to take form and come together.
In this context Vaclav Havel emerged as a distinctive voice that not only responded to the
ambiguities of the occasion but also put together a coherent vision for what democracy could
mean and do for the Czechoslovak people and what it would take for them to bring democracy
about. Havel was certainly not speaking in a vacuum. Democracy was not a concept that he
invented. Democracy was indeed a foreign word, one whose roots could be traced to core
Western liberal philosophies. Yet, bringing democracy to Czechoslovakia or any other country in
the former Soviet block was not a simple matter of translation (Bruner & Marin, 2007;
Keremidchieva, 2009). As we aim to demonstrate, Havel articulated an original understanding
and blueprint of democratization, one that deviated in significant ways from the dominant
western models of transition which privileged structural political reform (Verdery, 1996;
Anderson, Fish, Hanson & Roeder, 2001). In our analysis of Havels speeches, therefore, we do
not attempt to offer a comprehensive reconstruction of his rhetorical response to the challenges
of the transition. Our task is more narrow. It is to recover and highlight those aspects of Havels
democratization theory that hold the potential of enriching our theoretical understanding of the
affective dynamics propelling societies in transition.
In his first New Years address Havel laid out the public sentiment as the foundation for
the post-communist transition. He quickly located the source of social and political instability in
the breakdown of societys moral and affective terminology. As he argued, concepts such as
love, friendship, compassion, humility or forgiveness lost their depth and dimension, and for
many of us they represented only psychological peculiarities (para. 5). He associated the
environment of moral contamination with a tendency to disassociate the individual from the
collective structures of affect so as they learned not to believe in anything, to ignore one
another, to care only of ourselves (para. 5). In his argument such processes of individuation and
affective alienation were precisely the reason why the communist regimes were able to assemble
their totalitarian machinery (par. 7). Such assemblages were inhumane, according to Havel,
precisely because they were impersonal and affectively distant.
Freedom and democracy, on the other hand, include participation and, therefore,
responsibility from all of us (par. 8), according to Havel. Importantly, his notion of participation
is not limited to showing up; rather it is measured by a sense of distance from the cynicism and
enforced mask of apathy (par. 10) that marked the previous regime. It is defined in affective
terms as a manifestation of human, moral and spiritual potential (par. 72). Herewith lies
Havels most profound statement as a democratic theorist who situates certain affective

725

inflections as the foundational conditions for democratic society. As he argues, First of all,
people are never just a product of the external world; they are also able to relate themselves to
something superior, however systematically the external world tries to kills that ability in them.
Secondly, the humanistic and democratic traditions about which there had been so much idle talk
did after all slumber in the unconsciousness of our nations and ethnic minorities, and were
inconspicuously passed from one generation to another, so that each of us could discover them at
the right time and transform them into deeds (par 11). In this formulation, a democratic
disposition appears at the intersection of spiritual and material forces and, importantly, it does
not remain static. On the contrary, it operates on the principle of affective contagion which, as
Nigel Thrift (2008) suggests, spreads and multiplies affect most especially through imitation (p.
223).
The affective contagion via imitation thesis might make sense in view of Havels
observation of how different generations joined forces in enacting the Velvet revolution;
however, we believe that Havel offers an additional insight regarding what sets off the
phenomenon of affective contagion. Specifically, he points to a principle of affective
identification or empathy as the glue that keeps society together when he claims that all human
suffering concerns every other human being (par 13). Moreover, such identification appears as a
source of confidence that can allow affective contagion to cascade up and down the scales of
sociality from interpersonal to international relations and back. As Havel asserts, Let us try to
introduce this kind of self-confidence into the life of our community and, as nations, into our
behavior on the international stage. Only thus can we restore our self-respect and our respect for
one another as well as the respect of other nations (par. 74).
And so in Havels first New Years address as president, the project of the Velvet
revolution is defined in profoundly affective terms that transcend the state of mind of
individuals, but instead form the terrain of politics. The project of democratization is one of
attuning society to certain affective moral registers that are meant to be circulated and
disseminated. In Havels words, Our country, if that is what we want, cannot permanently
radiate love, understanding, the power of the spirit and of ideas. It is precisely this glow that we
can offer as out specific contribution to international politics (par. 17). Politics, for Havel,
should be an expression of a desire to contribute to the happiness of the community rather than
of a need to cheat or rape that community. Politics, he adds, can also be the art of the
impossible, that is the art of improving ourselves and the world (par. 18).
Despite its strong embrace of the role of positive affect as the foundation of democratic
society, Havels first New Years address does not fully reveal how central that concept is to his
argument. We now turn our attention to his second New Years address because by that time the
public mood had changed dramatically. Gone was the joyful atmosphere of those first weeks of
freedom (par. 80) and in were all the pleasant surprises of the past year (par. 80). Four
decades of communist rule had left deep traces in the collective spiritual landscape; hence any
effort at an alternative political environment had to address the affective condition of the society.
In response, Havel presented democratization as a process of what Kathleen Stewart (2011) calls
atmospheric attunement, a process of re-negotiating peoples interactions and relationships
with each other and their environment.
In the 1991 address, Havel repeatedly referred to a house-themed metaphor in order to
illustrate the affective infrastructure needed for a democratic transition. During the weeks
following the Velvet Revolution, the fall of communism had sparked a country-wide euphoria
that allowed little space for assessing the scope of the communist legacy and its impact on

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establishing an alternative. A year into his presidency, Havel captured the common feeling of
disillusionment that was now setting in: We knew that the house we inherited was not in good
shape. The stucco was falling off in places, the roof looked rather dubious, and we had doubts
about some other things as well. After a year of examination, we have discovered to our distress
that all the piping is rusted, the beams are rotten, the wiring is badly damaged (par. 5). If the
house metaphor was meant to stand in for the structure of society itself, then it highlighted two
dimensions of democratic transition an exterior and an interior one. The exterior one referred to
easily identifiable flaws in the material environment. The interior dimension, on the other hand,
described the affective communicative practices through which society inhabited its environment
and made sense of it.
In tune with the materialist orientations of affect theory, Havel's 1991 speech suggested
that the interior and exterior dimensions of political transformation cannot be separated. The first
post-communist year revealed the degree of infrastructural damage, environmental, and juridical
degradation inherited from the previous regime. As Havel put it, We have discovered that what
a year ago seemed to be a neglected house is essentially a ruin (par. 6). More significant,
however, was the affective degradation that had set in society: In an atmosphere of general
impatience, nervousness, disappointment, and doubt, Havel warned, elements of malice,
suspicion, mistrust, and mutual accusation are insinuating themselves into public life (par. 8).
Amidst this situation, Havel recognized a feature of affective atmospheres that Ben Anderson
finds as well: an atmosphere holds a series of opposites--presence and absence, materiality and
ideality, definite and indefinite, singularity and generality--in a relation of tension (Anderson,
2009, p. 80). Havel identified such tension at the heart of his peoples inability to move forward
on the eve of 1991. For him, the suffocating atmosphere (par. 82) at the end of 1990 was due
to some tension in the affective atmosphere: hope for a better future is ever more obviously
intermingled with the opposite feeling: fear of the future (par. 7).
More significantly, such atmospheric tension would create the conditions for further
affective attunement and displacements. As Kathleen Steward (2011) finds,
an atmosphere is not an inert context but a force field in which people find themselves...It is an attunement
of the senses, of labors, and imaginaries to potential ways of living in or living through things. A living
through that shows up in the generative precarity of ordinary sensibilities of not knowing what compels, not
being able to sit still, being exhausted, being left behind or being ahead of the curve, being in love with
some form or life that comes along, being ready for something--anything--to happen, or orienting yourself
to the sole goal of making sure that nothing (more) will happen (p. 452).

Affective attunements, however, do not come out of nowhere; affect invariably mobilizes its
objects. On the eve of 1991, Havel discovered, we have defeated the monolithic, visible, and
obvious enemy and now--driven by our dissatisfaction and by the need to find a living culprit-we are searching for enemies in each other (par. 8). Society, he declared, was in a state of
shock, immobilized by the absence of material referents and signposts to all that was meant to
come. Such subliminal uncertainty (par. 82) marked by the feeling that the horizon of the new
order is distant, dim, and indefinite meant for Havel that many of us cling to partial and
substitute horizons, forgetting that the welfare of individuals or groups is possible only against
the background of the general welfare (par. 82). To establish an atmosphere of democracy,
would require a sense of shared ownership that finds space for all of humanity under the roof of
Havels proverbial house.

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4. CONCLUSION
Havel's house analogy figured the project of democratization as more than a systems change, but
as a process of building a new affective space that required certain affective investments. A sense
of ownership transforms a house into a home. As Havel reminded his fellow citizens,
[R]egardless of how badly the house was damaged during the long years of [communist] rule,
the house now belongs to us, and it is entirely up to us how we rebuild it. Such investment,
however, would not materialize out of thin air.
Herewith, we believe, lies Havels and affective theorys contribution to argumentation
studies. Public arguments do more than give form and assign culturally specific words to the
affective intensities which, as Anderson (2009) points out, are only imperfectly housed in the
proper names we give to emotions. Rather, public arguments assemble, re-shape, and channel the
fragments of feeling that otherwise would float disparately, failing to form cohesive society.
Furthermore, public arguments harness and house these fragments, serving as the archives and
museums of social character, whose displays both narrate and manage the cultures mood. It is
not surprising, therefore, that Havels own solution to the affective immobilization of his people
was to redirect their attention to some other elements of their environment, so as to reconstitute
the affective atmosphere. As he pointed out, we are all inclined to forget the several great and
positive surprises of the first year following our rebellion against the totalitarian regime. I think it
is my duty today to remind you as well of the good things that have happened, accomplishments
that a year ago we could scarcely could have imagined (par. 82).
However, public argument should not be reduced to an instrument of collective emotional
management because it is always already embedded in a given affective atmosphere. Rather, we
perceive it as an attuning device that shapes the quality and intensity of the connections that
allow disparate bodies, objects, and affects to appear in formation. In this way, we believe,
public argument serves a political function as it gathers the elements that make up the society.
This worlding function of public argument would not have been possible, however, had public
argument not been immersed in the ebbs and flows of affect, which as Seigworth and Gregg
(2010) suggest, arises in the midst of in-between-ness; in the capacities to act and be acted
upon in those intensities that pass body to body (human, non-human, part-body, and
otherwise) (p. 1). With such an emergent model of affective discourse it is easier to see why
democratization in the aftermath of communism couldnt be just a product of institutional redesign; it has rather been a process, fueled by feeling and desire, of finding each other, albeit on
other terms, once again, in common.

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Anderson Jr., R. D., Fish, M.S., Hanson, S. E., & Roeder, P.G. (eds.). 2001. Postcommunism and the theory of
democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bruner, L. M & Marin, N. (2007). Considering democracies in transition. Controversia 5(2): 15-22.
Gregg, M. & Seigworth, G. J. (Eds.). (2010). The affect theory reader. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Goodnight, G. T. (2007) The duties of advocacy: Argumentation under conditions of disparity, asymmetry, and
difference. Proceedings of the 6th International Conference of the International Society for the Study of
Argumentation, (pp. 479-488). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: SicSat.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. Trans. John Macquarries and Edward Robinson. New York, NY: Harper &
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Jowitt, K. (1996). Dizzy with democracy. Problems of Post-Communism 43(1): 3-9.

Keremidchieva, Z. (2009). Cultures of argument and the democratic imaginary. Argumentation & Advocacy, 46,
116-119.
Keremidchieva, Z. (2014). The US Congressional Record as a technology of representation: Toward a materialist
theory of institutional argumentation. Journal of Argumentation in Context, 3, 57-82.
Manolescu, B. I. (2006). A normative pragmatic perspective on appealing to emotions in argumentation.
Argumentation, 20, 327-343.
Matustik, M. J. (1993). Postnational identity: Critical theory and existential philosophy in Habermas, Kirkegaard,
and Havel. New York, NY: Guilford.
Micheli, R. (2010). Emotions as objects of argumentative constructions. Argumentation, 24, 1-17.
Perelman, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press.
Rickert, T. (2013). Ambient rhetoric: The attunements of rhetorical being. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
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Stewart, K. (2011). Atmospheric attunements. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 29, 445-453.
Thrift, N. (2008). Non-representational theory: Space, Politics, Affect. New York: Routledge, 2008).
Williams, D. C. & Young, M. J. (2007) Argumentation and education: Preparing citizens in cultures of democratic
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The Role Of Prosodic Features In The Analysis Of Multimodal

Argumentation
Gabrijela Kisicek
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Phonetics
University of Zagreb
Croatia
gkisicek@ffzg.hr

ABSTRACT: This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of multi-modal argumentation by

examining the role of prosodic features in persuasive messages. Standard analyses of advertisements already
assign a key role to visuals in understanding, reconstructing and assessing the argument. I present
reconstructions of TV commercials that take into account verbal, visual and prosodic components. Because
prosodic features are here especially relevant to reinforcing the argumentation, they should not be neglected
in argumentation analysis.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, multimodal discourse, nonverbal communication, prosodic features

1. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary studies on argumentation broaden the scope of argumentation research
beyond verbal and include analyzing the role of images (Birdsell & Groarke 1996; Birdsell
& Groarke 2007; Groarke, 1996; Groarke & Tindale 2013....), music (Branigan 1992),
gesture (Gelang & Kjeldsen, 2010) and other nonverbal elements in argumentation
discourse. The need to deal with other than merely verbal elements in the argumentation
process is perhaps most obvious especially in view of technological developments that
alter our means of communication (and argumentation), as well as the ever present
influences of the media and advertising industry in shaping public opinion, values,
interests, and incitements to action. Groarke (1996, p.10) points out the perhaps plainest
reason to develop an account of visual arguments that are in some cases crucial to
persuade an audience: Visual appeals are especially pervasive in everyday discourse, in
which visual images propound a point of view in magazines, advertising, film, television,
multi-media, and the World Wide Web.
Multimodality expands research to other modes of argument besides visuals which
could equally be persuasive, and may be used by arguers in everyday discourse as a sole
means of argumentation, or consist in the simultaneous use of several such modes. Film or
television commercials, for instance, combine verbal and visual mode but also music,
framing, prosodic features such as voice quality, intonation, etc. However, the
multimodality of argumentation constitutes a challenge to argumentation analysis because
decoding and analyzing non-verbal argument importantly differs from more traditional,
verbal argumentation analysis. Differences in analysis have resulted in a dispute among
argumentation scholars on whether non-verbal elements, for instance images, could ever
be considered as arguments (Fleming 1996; Blair 1996...). Over the recent two or so
decades it has become more accepted (through far from being accepted widely, or beyond
doubt) that arguing without words is possible (Groarke 2002; Kjeldsen 2012; Lake &
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Pickering 1998). Gilbert (1994), who has given analyses of argumentation in everyday
discourse, suggested another view on multi-modality in argumentation that includes
logical, emotional, visceral and kisceral arguments. He states that these modes may
sometimes merely strengthen or repeat each other, but also that kissing, touching, or
feeling could be considered as argument provided it is being used to convince or persuade.
Gelang & Kjeldsen (2010) state that argumentation can occur in a host of different
forms of expression, including speech, pictures and nonverbal behavior. Authors who
investigate the role of nonverbal communication in argumentation, especially the use of
gestures and facial expression, claim that nonverbal elements can function as arguments
contributing to the speakers ethos, in their case politicians, because recipients of a
message in a rhetorical situation create their perception of the speaker through a holistic
perspective Gelang & Kjeldsen (2010, p. 567)
In summary, the analysis of argumentation in every rhetorical situation thus has to
be multi-modal, because messages by which speakers intend to persuade audiences consist
not only of a verbal part, but also feature nonverbal elements that can contribute to the
strength of argument, or may even stand as arguments themselves. In this paper, we shall
particularly deal with the ways in which non-verbal elements known as prosodic features
may contribute to argumentation discourse.
2. PROSODIC FEATURES AND NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION
Prosodic features refer to both voice and speech cues of the speaker. They include features
such as pitch, temporal structure, loudness and voice quality, emphasis and accentuation,
but also (non)fluencies of the speaker. An extensive literature on nonverbal
communication research has generally strengthened the view that such features have an
important communicative role. For instance, Vroomen, Collier & Mozziconacci (1993, p.
577) write:
A speaker may indicate, through prosodic means, to which information the listener should pay
particular attention (accentuation, emphasis), and he may provide cues about the syntactic
organization of the utterance (phrasing). The communicative function of prosody is most
readily associated with the expression of emotion and attitude.

Besides a correlation between prosodic features and emotions (Davitz, 1964; Scheerer,
1993; Vroomen, Collier & Mozziconacci 1993; Neuman & Strack, 2000), prosodic
features are connected to the perception of a speakers personality, credibility, in short his
ethos (Kramer, 1977, 1978; Berry 1990, 1992; Kimble & Seidel, 1991; Zuckerman &
Miyake, 1993; Hickson, Stacks & Moore, 2004; Zuckerman & Sinicropi, 2011). Past
research has particularly confirmed that prosodic features (among other elements of
nonverbal behavior) are associated with persuasiveness of the speaker and changing of
attitudes (Burgoon, Birk & Pfau, 1990; Knapp 2002). For instance, fluency, variations in
pitch, higher intensity (i.e. louder speech) and faster tempo are connected with greater
persuasiveness.
Although the connection between prosodic features and perceived qualities of a speaker
are based mostly on stereotypes, numerous researches have suggested that such findings
likely hold in real-world situations. For instance, Levin & Hall (1985), Knight and Alpert
731

(1985) support a connection between the pathologies of a person and his prosodic features.
To give another example, clinically depressed people tend to exhibit a lower speech rate,
owed also particularly long pauses in their speech. Acoustic measurements, moreover,
confirm that patients can change their vocal characteristics after undergoing therapy
(Ostwald, 1961). The presence of stereotypical vocal characteristics is consistent with
extant research which shows both female and male speakers to regularly perceive
themselves in fairly stereotypically ways (Kramer, 1977, 1978; Berry 1992; Knapp 2002).
Based on this as well as similar empirical research (e.g., Smith et al.1975;
Surawski & Ossof, 2006; Bartsch, 2009 etc.), one can conclude that a lower vocal pitch, a
faster speech rate, and a relative absence of non-fluencies generally goes along with higher
ratings for speakers competence and dominance. Zuckerman and Drivers (1989) research
on vocal attractiveness proposed that, similar to attractive faces, attractive voices may also
elicit a more positive interpersonal impression. They found that professional judges, for
instance, were able to agree on whether voices are attractive or not and that more attractive
voices were associated with more favorable impressions of personality. As mentioned
earlier, attractive voices include lower pitch, absence of nasality and extreme harshness.
Subsequent work has largely replicated such results, showing that vocal attractiveness can
be compared to effects of physical attractiveness (e.g., Berry 1990, 1992; Zuckerman et al.
1990; Zuckerman & Hodgins 1993). Speakers with more attractive voices are thus more
favorably perceived by others. These insights are, of course, regularly sought to be
exploited in public sphere communication such as advertising, radio and television,
business communication (telephone announcements, customer service), and politics,
among others.
Here, nasality makes for a vocal characteristic considered to be particular
undesirable in public speaking. As Bloom, Zajac & Titus (1999, p. 279) state:
Highly nasal voices were rated as being lower in "status" (occupation, ambitious, intelligent,
educated, influential), lower in social solidarity (friendly, sympathetic, likeable, trustworthy,
helpful), and were negatively correlated with perceptions of persuasiveness.

Prosodic features have thus clearly been shown to be of importance for the assessment of a
speakers personality and her persuasiveness, but also for the recognition of speakers
emotional states. One of the early researches in nonverbal communication, Davitz (1964,
p. 13) found that regardless of technique in experiment, all research confirms that
emotional state of a person can be recognized on the basis of vocal nonverbal expression,
a claim being supported in recent studies (Scherer, 1993; Neuman & Strack, 2000).
Scherer (1986) has even hypothesized about a universality of vocal expression of
emotions, the most important cues for emotion recognition being variations in tempo and
pitch such that, for instance, happiness goes along with high pitch (higher frequency),
variability in frequency changes, higher intensity (loudness) and greater temposadness
being associated with the polar opposite. How might such insights be used in rhetoric and
argumentation research?

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3. PROSODIC FEATURES AND ARGUMENTATION

Prosodic features are readily connected to a speakers ethos (credibility, trustworthiness,
honesty, benevolence) which has since antiquity been central to the process of persuasion.
The Aristotelian Rhetoric (1.2. 1356a, 1991, p. 38), for instance, states:
There is persuasion through the character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to
make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent
and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases
where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt.

The credibility of the speaker is thus important whenever there is intent to persuade, and
most importantly so for testimonial claims. As Govier (1993, p. 93) explains:
Testimonial claims are especially important for a variety of reasons. Human knowledge is
utterly dependent upon our acceptance, much of the time, of what other people tell us. Only
thus can we learn language and pass on knowledge from generation to generation; only thus
have we access to times, places, and cultures we do not and cannot experience ourselves.

Although testimonial claims also feature in judicial or political discourse, advertising

contrasts as almost fully relying on testimonies of those who experience a certain product
or are involved in its development. Discussing importance of the speakers credibility in
testimonial claims, Govier distinguishes normative credibility, which depends on a
person's sincerity, honesty, and reliability, from her rhetorical credibility, which depends
on the impression a speaker gives the extent to which one is regarded as believable, and
is believed, by others. And she (1993, p. 94) characterizes such rhetorical credibility in
exemplary fashion when stating:
People who are white and male, who dress well, look professional, appear middle class or
upper middle class, speak without an accent in a deep or low-toned voice, and seem
unemotional, rational and articulate, tend in many contexts to have more rhetorical
credibility than others. Often those who lack such qualities are, in effect, rhetorically
disadvantaged.

On this view, the manner of speaking as well as performance in general (clothing, body
movements, body space etc.) are epistemically irrelevant, but rhetorically relevant. But
could prosodic features or nonverbal elements be argumentatively relevant in general?
Gelang & Kjeldsen (2010, pp. 567 571) have recently claimed that nonverbal
communication performs an argumentative function, or purpose, by contributing to
speaker`s ethos. They provide examples drawn from the analysis of political discourse,
where politicians are perceived in a certain manner as based on nonverbal signs, they
suggest that, in some cases, such nonverbal behavior can be taken as a premise:
Moderate physical movement can in some circumstances be taken as a premise for the claim
that a person is suitable as president; because it signals that the speaker is in control, where
other people would be steered by their emotions.

We now pursue this idea, and wish to suggest that prosodic features can likewise be taken
as a premise in specific argumentative situations. As will be illustrated with several
733

examples of television commercials, prosodic features can, in certain cases, either

contribute to the strength of argument, or else function as their crucial part.
3.1 Prosodic features as contributors to the strength of an argument
Prosodic features generally make some additional, broadly situated contribution to what,
in abstraction thereof, is some non-situated argument-content. For instance, higher pitch of
the verbal massage and faster tempo may illustrate the speakers happiness; lower pitch,
quiet and slow speech may indicate depression, or sadness; staccato rhythm may see a
speaker be perceived as strict, bossy, dominant and representing an authority, etc. Prosodic
features are frequently used in television commercials to stress certain selling-points, or to
establish one.
3.1.1 Always liners
One example of this is provided by a TV commercial for female hygiene products,1
include a commercial for Always liners which, incidentally being in Polish, perfectly
shows to non-Polish speakers that the verbal part of the message is irrelevant towards
grasping the claim, and the reasons offered in support. As is well common knowledge,
women tend not feel good during the menstruation period, lack energy, be tired, and feel
uncomfortable, sometimes even anxious. But, or so the commercial suggests vividly, using
the Always product, women may do what they please and nevertheless feel clean,
comfortableas shown by using visualsbut also happy, enthusiastic, energetic,
vibrantas presented through prosodic features connected with happiness such as high
pitch, high intonation endings, wide pitch ranges, faster tempo. The chain of reasoning one
might thus associate to this commercial is roughly this: Although menstruating, you feel
good and vibrant when using Always liners. So, if you want as much, buy Always.
Besides pitch, intonation, tempo and pitch range, several other features can
contribute to the strength of an argument. Word emphasis, rhythm and intensity (or
loudness) can also be very important. Word emphasis often serves the purpose of
identifying the most important word in a sentence, reveals new information, and generally
differentiates parts of the speech according to communicative importance. Verbal
message, for instance, can be presented in staccato rhythm (speech with pauses between
words or even between syllables characterized with tense articulation), which is specific
for giving orders in a strict manner that indicates dominance, and establishes authority, or
in legato rhythm with smooth transition between syllables and lax articulation. Loudness
and intensity may also serve a function as louder speech is frequently perceived as more
persuasive.
3.1.2 Depression
A rather good example for the usage of these features is a commercial that advertises
services for people who deal with depression.2 Its main intention is to raise awareness of
depression, stating it to be a disease-like condition that can be cured if approached in a
1
2

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jdyKqbnW7YU
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9EyXUY8ubc8

734

right way. The final claim is: If you suffer from depression, you need to get help. How do
prosodic features contribute to this message? The female voice over, reading the message,
displays a specific voice quality (a whispery voice suggesting empathy, compassion, and
gentleness) and intonation (asking questions and giving answers). Content-wise, the
message points to personal insights on depression. For instance, Did you know that you
can also feel it physically?
Word emphasis is crucial in revealing new information when stating: you KNOW
you can feel it emotionallythus suggesting this is common knowledgeBut did you
know you can ALSO feel it physically? The function of emphasis, here, is to point out
that depression has more than one symptom, besides emotional consequences (being
widely known), pain can also be physical. The ad continues: There ARE treatments that
work on both emotional and unpleasant physical symptoms, emphasizing ways to deal
with this pain. An additional prosodic feature in this commercial is the speech pause, used
in a stylistic function to stress the part of the message preceding the pause. For instance,
Where does depression hurt? (pause) EVERYWHERE. Who does depression hurt?
EVERYONE. By stressing the words everywhere and everyone the problem of
depression receives emphasis; there is no need to explain it further. Everywhere here
indicates that it is indeed a serious and complex condition for which a patient needs expert
help. It is not a simple headache which can be cured with a right pill. And who does
depression hurt?
By stressing everyone there is no need to explain that the whole family is
suffering, that patient`s children, spouses, friends and coworkers feel it too. Everyone is
affected by someones depression. This effectively yields another reason why those
suffering from depression should seek expert help, as they can help not only themselves
but everyone around them.
3.1.3 Evian
Unlike the two previous examples, the third one, a commercial for Evian water3, is based
on the testimony of the product itself. The chain of reasoning is simple: if a product looks
clean and healthy, if it sounds clean and healthy, then it is healthy. The commercial
combines the verbal mode, explaining where the sources of the water are from (the
cleanest water sources in untouched nature), the visual mode (scenes of mountain tops
covered with snow), music (instrumental), but also the prosodic features typical of a
female speaker with very attractive voice quality, a whispery phonation type, and slower
tempo. Her speech is being characterized by enhanced pronunciation of the consonant [s],
her speech resembles the sound of flowing water and wind.
3.1.4 Comparison
The argumentation in the commercial on depression is based on the simultaneous use of
verbal and visual modes, while prosodic features, music and framing so to speak
straighten the argument. This is an example of the use of prosodic features where, were
one to remove or somehow alter these, the argument-content would remain the same, but
its the argument would overall be a weaker one.
3

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EWFuGTACz-8

735

The argumentation in the Always example was based on the testimony of the product user
stating something like: If you want to be like me or feel like me, use this product.
Argumentation in the depression example is based on the argument from authority: a
person who knows more gives advice. In addition, this person is empathic, gentle and truly
wants to help (information conveyed by specific prosodic features). Similarly working in
combination, different modes of argument combine in supporting the claim that Evian
water is clean and healthy, and therefore should be purchased. In all three commercials
prosodic features work in combination with other modes of argument in a multimodal
discourse giving an additional strength to the argument. An easy test to determine
situations where prosodic features are crucial is to ask whether their absence, or
modification, can change the argument-content. If this is the case, such features are in fact
essential for the argument-content.
3.2 Prosodic features as an essential part of an argument
In certain situations prosodic features may function as more than just additional elements
strengthening the argument; rather, they can be key for understanding the overall message,
but also crucial parts of an argument. An example is provided by a Volkswagen television
commercial.4
Here, a specific lifestyle, or an attitude to life, is connected to a specific accent of a
speaker. The main character speaks English with a recognizably Jamaican accent,
stereotypically connected with a particular life-philosophy that values being relaxed,
easygoing, carefree, and happy. Other people in this commercial, being his colleagues, are
depicted as being frustrated, in a bad mood, frowning, while the protagonist spreads joy
wherever he goes (in an elevator, by the coffee machine, at the meeting, etc.), constantly
reminding others to look at the bright side of life. At one of the important moments in this
commercial, his colleagues ask whether he isnt in fact from Minnesota, something he
confirms. So why does a white American from Minnesota speak his native language with a
Jamaican accent? Answer: because he is happy, carefree, and easygoing. Why so? Because
he drives Volkswagen, or so the viewer learns when his moody co-workers, after having
taken a drive in his Volkswagen car, return in a much better mood, smiling, and also
speaking with a Jamaican accent. Jamaican English is here presented not only through
vowel pronunciation, but also through its specific syntax. In this commercial, then, the
manner of speaking is more important than the verbal message.
The argumentation in this commercial can be reconstructed, Toulmin-style, as
follows:
Ground: Happy person in a firm speaks with Jamaican accent (but is not from
Jamaica).
Warrant: People with Jamaican accents are perceived as happy
Claim: Volkswagen auto bring happiness to people
Final claim: Buy Volkswagen auto

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDovzhqwS7g (3:12 4:16)

736

The second example, an Amnesty International commercial on violence against women,

also makes use of accent and pronunciation as a crucial part of an argument.5 It intends to
raise awareness of both the perpetrators and the victims of violence, particularly by
countering the stereotypical view according to which perpetrators are generally of low
social status, lack education, and come from rural areas andsimilarly, that female
victims are weak, poor, uneducated, and unintelligent. Its main message is: Everybody can
be a perpetrator, and everybody can become a victim. Do not judge people based on their
appearance alone.
This message is predominantly communicated through prosodic features, while the
commercial itself instantiates an argument from example, in turn based on the findings of
sociolinguistic research on language attitudes showing people with some accents to be
perceived as more sophisticated, educated, and as belonging to a higher social stratum.
Both the male and the female speaker use Received Pronunciation (RP) British English,
being a strong signal of their socioeconomic position, at least for native British English
audiences (see, e.g., Trudgill 1995; Coupland & Bishop, 2007; Andersson & Trudgill,
1990; Giles, Scholes &Young 1983). Although the most extensive research on language
attitudes has occurred for British English, similar findings for many different languages
regularly demonstrate the important not only of what has been said, but also how, e.g.,
Labov (1966, 1972), Lippie-Green (1997) for American English, Hawkings (1993) for
French, Kontra (2003) for Hungarian, Pomerantz (2002) for Spanish, Bezoojien (2002) for
Dutch, Kiiek (2012) for Croatian. Invariably, accent is connected with the perception of
speakers status, occupation, intelligence, economic situation and prestige.
The commercial makes uses of these insights, in order to launch an argument, as
the commercial presents what in effect is an audition for the best perpetrator. During the
audition, however, the viewer cannot see the candidates, merely their fists. This body part
then is a nonverbal metonymy. The audition is conducted by a female, who the audience
can only hear speak, with all the qualities that representing her as an educated, strong,
intelligent women with authority and dominance. She even chuckles the moment that the
perpetrator displays his aggressiveness by growling. Not intimidated, however, she does
not take the obviously aggressive candidates seriously. This changes, however, when
she faces the third candidate who speaks in perfect RP English with an attractive voice
quality. Initially, his tempo is reduced, showing him to be under control, calm but
dominant; then his manner of speaking changes, and towards the end he is annoyed
because the female speaker interrupted him. These prosodic features typically reveal
aggressiveness: louder speech (yelling), modulation (staccato rhythm), determined,
dominant, giving orders. Also the female speaker changes features of her speech toward
the end, as she begins to stutter, and speaks quietly, being on the verge of tears.
Whether this argument is strong or weak may perhaps be discussed, but prosodic features
remain a crucial part of it. By removing or changing the specific accent from the
argumentation, the message would no longer be clear, nor would the claim be the same.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzOZey7ZGMk

737

4. CONCLUSION
This paper has briefly discussed the importance of prosodic features in multimodal
argumentative discourse. The term prosodic features covers all aspects of the manner of
speech, including voice quality, accent and pronunciation (e.g., of vowel and consonants),
tempo, rhythm, intensity, intonation, word emphasis, and (non)fluencies. Based on several
examples of TV commercials, it was shown that not only what is being said, but also how
it is said can contribute, positively as well as negatively, to the strength of an argument.
Prosodic features, however, can sometimes take on an even more important role. Being
more than mere contributing factors in these cases, they can be essential for successful
making an argument.
Although this paper deals with TV commercials, rather than real-life argumentative
situations, one may tentatively conclude that ones manner of speaking influences ones
persuasive abilities. Thus, features of speech can identify the speaker as being a certain
type of human beingdetermined or weak, cleaver and educated, or not, etc. These
identifications, in turn, can be used as premises in specific situations.
21st century public discourse is multimodal, and there is a need to recognize more
than a mere verbal, or propositional, mode of argument, something that currently
challenges analysts who seek to identity different modes of argumentation. As van den
Hoven & Yang (2013, p. 422) conclude:
The argumentative reconstruction of multimodal public discourse is a necessary element of
advanced media-literacy in a world in which multimodality is the standard and a critical attitude of
experts is desirable.

The argumentative reconstruction of multimodal public discourse should take prosodic

features into account; the appeal to ear, as it were, should not be disregarded and its role in
argumentative discourse properly analyzed.

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740

Where Is Visual Argument?

Jens Kjeldsen
Department of information science and media studies
University of Bergen,
5073 Bergen Norway
jens.kjeldsen@infomedia.uib.no

ABSTRACT: Argumentation studies suffer from a lack of empirical studies of how audiences actually perceive
and construct rhetorical argumentation from communicative stimuli. This is especially pertinent to the study of
visual argumentation, because such argumentation is fundamentally enthymematic, leaving most of the
reconstruction of premises to the viewer. This paper therefore uses the method of audience analysis, frequently
used in communication studies, to establish how viewers interpret instances of visual argumentation such as
pictorially dominated advertisements.
KEYWORDS: advertising, images, pictures, reception studies, reconstruction, rhetoric, visual argumentation

1. AUDIENCES AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PICTORIAL ARGUMENTATION

The reconstruction of pictorial and visual argumentation has been pointed out as especially
problematic since pictures neither contain words or precise reference to premises, nor has any
syntax or explicit conjunctions that coordinate premise and conclusions. Researchers have
been critical of speculative reconstruction of visual premises and arguments that are they
claim not there; or at least that we cannot know for sure are there. So a central question
becomes: Where is argument? Or rather where is visual argument?
I propose that we should more often turn to studies of audience reception; because if
an audience actually perceives an argument when encountering an instance of visual
communication, then surely an argument has been provided.
The first audience analysis must have been Aristotles description of the various types
of human character in the Rhetoric. However, in rhetorical research empirical audience
analyses are rare, and in argumentation studies they seem to be completely absent. More than
anything rhetorical argumentation research is text focused.
When rhetoricians actually discuss the audience, they are mostly concerned with the
audience as theoretical or textual constructions. They examine the universal audience
(Perelman & Olbrecths-Tyteca 1969), the second persona (Black 1998), the audience
constituted by the text (e.g. Charland 1987), the ignored or alienated audience (e.g. Wander
2013), or they theorize about the audiences cognitive processing of messages (W. Benoit &
Smythe 2003).
Instead of limiting ourselves to such textual and theoretical approaches, I propose that
research into rhetorical argumentation should more often examine the understandings and
conceptualization of the rhetorical audience. From mostly approaching audience as a
theoretical construction that are examined textually and speculatively, we should give more
attention to empirical explorations of actual audiences and users.
When argumentation theorists discuss the audience mostly they engage in discussions
about the identity of the audience and the (im)possibility of determining the identity of the
audience (Govier 1999, 183 ff.; Johnson 2013, Tindale 1992, 1999, 2013). Because it is hard
to define or locate the audience aspirations to examine audiences are sometimes countered
with the argument that such studies are futile, because we cannot really know who the
audience is.
741

Trudy Govier, for instance, in her book The Philosophy of Argument, questions how much
audience matter for the understanding and evaluation of an argument. She introduces the
concept of the Noninteractive Audience the audience that cannot interact with the arguer,
and whose views are not known to him (Govier 1999, p. 183).
The mass audience, which is probably the most typical audience in the media society
of our days, is the most common and pervasive example of a Noninteractive Audience. The
views of this noninteractive and heterogenous audience, Govier says, are unknown and
unpredictable (Govier 1999, p. 187). This means trying to understand an audiences beliefs
in order to tailor ones argument accordingly is fruitless (Tindale 2013, p. 511).
Consequently, Govier suggests, it is not useful for informal logicians to appeal to audiences
to resolve issues like whether premises are acceptable and theorists should fall back on other
criteria to decide such things.
Ralph Johnson, continues this line of reasoning, and proposes that a Noninteractive
audience is not only a problem for pragma-dialectics, as Govier suggests, but also for
rhetorical approaches; because it is not possible to know this type of audience. Johnson
criticises the views of Perelman and Christopher Tindale, which holds, the goal of
argumentation is to gain the acceptance of the audience (Johnson, p. 544). Advising a
speaker to adapt to the audience when constructing arguments, says Johnson is either
mundane or unrealistic (Johnson 544). It is unrealistic because, we cannot truly grasp an
audience as an objective reality.
Johnson is right in saying that grasping an audience, understanding and defining its
identity, is a difficult matter. However, while this issue of the audience might be a problem
for the speaker, it need not cause so much anxiety for the researcher. Because, the desire to
determine the identity of the audience is, I think, is not the most fruitful way to an
understanding of how rhetorical argumentation works. Desperately seeking the audience (cf.
Ang 1991) is not the way forward.
I am not arguing that researchers should stop speculating about what an audience is,
nor do I claim that speakers should refrain from defining their audience and adapt their
messages accordingly. But, I am arguing that the primary concern for scholars of rhetoric and
argumentation should not be to determine the exact identity of the audience or settle whether
or not an argument, or another instance of rhetoric, creates adherence.
What we should be more concerned with is how an argument or any rhetorical appeal
is constructed, how it is audience-oriented, and which is the main point of this paper how
it is received, interpreted, and processed that is: how actual audiences actually respond to
instances of rhetorical argumentation.
As pointed out by Edward Schiappa (2008, p. 26): We need to find out what people
are doing with representations rather than being limited to making claims about what we think
representations are doing to people. This requires a combination of close readings of
rhetorical utterances, contextual analyses of the situation, and empirical studies of audience
reception and response. This is why I have done reception studies of ads exploring the
responses of focus groups to pictures and pictorially dominated ads.
2. FOCUS GROUP STUDIES
Through focus groups I have attempted to find out if respondents perceive arguments in the
advertisements, how they perceive them, and tried to explore in this way the characteristics of
visual argumentation. The three focus group interviews carried out for this essay were done in
Norway during June 2014. The groups consisted of, respectively, six pensioners in their 70s,
five young women aged 18-19, and four university students that did not know each other. The

742

groups were selected in order to allow for variation and breadth in knowledge and life
situation.
The respondents were first introduced to each other and the focus group situation, and
then asked to fill out a short survey with relevant personal information. They were then
explained that I as researcher was interested in hearing what they thought about some images
that I wanted to show them. They were not told that I was particularly interested in visual
argumentation. I explained that I would first show them five pictures, each for less than one
minute, and requested that they during this they should write five words or short sentences
about the first thoughts that came to mind when they saw each picture.
When this activity was done, I instigated focus group conversations with open
questions such as What do you think when you see this picture, and open follow-up
questions such as why? or how? Other pictures than the one mentioned in this paper were
shown to the respondents and discussed during the focus groups. One of the advertisement I
examined was this one, from the Israeli bookstore Steimatzky.1

Ill. 1: Steimatzky book chain Read more. Courtesy of: Shalmor Avnon Amichay/Y&R
Interactive Tel Aviv
When I asked a young group of women the age of 18-19 what we could say about this ad
the first respondent immediately said:
You lose intelligence by watching television, because your head becomes smaller by
that (MI/AN 5:33)2.

I have previously written about several of the pictures (including the Steimatzky-ad) shown to the respondents
(cf. Kjeldsen 2012). This afforded the possibility to assess my previous interpretations of the visual
argumentation in relation to the actual interpretation in the focus group situation.
2 This code marks the focus group (MI), the identity of respondent (AN), and the timeslot in the tape and the
transcription for the utterance.

743

Another respondent followed up:

I think that you become more focussed on watching television, than building
knowledge by reading. So, according to the advertisement the head will become
smaller and smaller when watching television. However, it will become larger and
larger by reading books. (MI/AN 05:55)
When asked what the ad proposed, most of the young women answered: Read instead of
watching TV (MI/AN: 07:21). When I asked why one should read; the young women
generally responded something in the lines of either: Because reading makes you smarter
(MI/MA 06:52), or Because watching television makes you stupid (MI/JA: 05.55).
In a group of pensioners in their 70s the first response to my question What can we
say about this picture was: That you should read instead of watching television (BR/UN
09:37).
When a respondent from a group of university students, saw the ad, a male respondent
immediately said, it implicates that if you dont read you will become stupid (MA/BJ
08.32). I asked him why, and he answered: because he has such a little head compared to his
body, it implicates that if you do not read you will become stupid (MA/BJ 10:25).
When asked how one could implicate that, he explained: there is (only) room for a
small brain inside, and a small brain figuratively means stupid (MA/BJ 12:29).
A young woman in the same focus group added to this explanation that she read the
message of the ad: more as instead of watching television, because he is sitting there with the
remote control (MA11:55, my emphasis).
So, it is clear that the respondents actually decode an argument from the ad.
And it is clear that the without the visuals the argument would not be constructed. Almost all
respondents created the argument: Read more, because if you dont, you will become
stupid. Several, as we saw, added the circumstance: Read more, instead of watching
television.
We should note as well that the formulations of the argument do not say that
the person in the picture should read more. In general the respondents do not talk specifically
about him, when reconstructing the argument. Instead they use general pronouns such as
one should read more, or you should read more, They thus move from the specifics of the
picture to a general level expressing a moral claim.
3. PRAGMATIC DECODING
It is obvious that the respondents construct the term stupid from the visual representation of
the little head. In general, it seems possible to visually evoke adjectives such as big, small,
stupid, and the like. At the same time, we would probably be inclined to say, that images
because of their lack of syntax and grammar are unable to evoke conjunctions that connect
premises in an argument and create the necessary causal movements for an argument to be
established. What does conjunctions such as therefor, hence, and then look like?
However, as we have seen, respondents do actually use conjunctions such as then
and therefor both explicitly and implicitly. They also use formulations saying the visual
elements implicate certain conclusions. Furthermore, the respondents explicitly mention the
adversative conjunction instead of. Like the other conjunctions, the term instead of, and
they way it is used to connect premises, is neither in the caption read more, nor represented
anyway directly in the picture.
So, where do the conjunctions come from? In making sense of the three central
elements in the ad the caption read more, the little head, and the persons sitting-position
744

with the remote a connection has to be made. In light of the advertising genre the most
relevant and plausible connection would be argumentative conjunctions.
This kind of search for argumentative meaning is clear in several of the respondents
interpretations. Take the pensioner, who said about the Steimatzky ad: That you should read
instead of watching television (BR/UN 09:37). When I asked her to elaborate the woman
said:
Well, if it is an advertisement for a bookstore, then they obviously want to give a
message saying that he needs to read more, right? And then, where is the message in
that picture? Thats got to mean that his head is so small, that he needs to fill up
(BR/UN, 09:37)
It is clear from this that she is not only searching to make sense of the ad by connecting
verbal, visual, and contextual elements. She is also presupposing that the message has a
persuasive character. Because of the imperative mood in the caption she immediately assumes
that read more is the claim, and she naturally proceeds by looking for the reason. Her short
elaboration illustrates two things.
Firstly, it illustrates that audiences are active in an exploring kind of mental labour
while looking for the meaning and assumed argument in an image. This mental exploring is
not incidental, but is generally performed in accordance with pragmatic rules of speech acts
(Austin 1975, Searle 1969), relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1986), and implicature (Grice
1989); theories which we know have been successfully applied to the study of argumentation
in for instance pragma-dialectics (e.g. Eemeren & Grootendorst 1983, Henkemans 2014).
People obviously make implications, are consciously aware that the ads are trying to convey
messages even arguments. And they clearly try to reconstruct these arguments.
Secondly, the example illustrates that much more is going on in the reception of this
kind of visual argumentation, than can be expressed by stating only the premises and
conclusion of the argument. The picture, so to speak, holds much more than the content of
these short assertions.
4. THICKNESS AND CONDENSATION
It is an important characteristic of predominantly visual argumentation that it allows for a
symbolic condensation that prompts emotions and reasoning in the beholder. In the focus
group of students, for instance, a young woman commented on the ad in this way:
if you do not read you will become a narrow-minded, potato-couch non-thoughtful.
He is not exactly sitting in a position, which is considered very flattering, intellectual,
positive. The whole position is connected with a sick person (MA/SI 11:34).
The basic argument: Read more, because if you do not read you will become stupid is
clearly present in this comment, but the interpretation involves much more. Let me illustrate
the significance of this visual surplus-meaning with a Norwegian ad for the tram-system in
Oslo (see below, ill. 2). The ad shows a scene from the tram. The light blue box in the upper
left has the same appearance as a ticket for the tam, however the text says: Avoid
embarrassing moments. Buy a ticket. At the bottom of the ad the text says: There are no
excuses for dodging the fare (We are intensifying our controls).

745

Most respondents sum-med up

the argument from this ad
something like this: Buy ticket,
and you will avoid an
unpleasant situation (MV/MA
48:43). We could state the
argument like this: You should
buy tickets, because it will make
you avoid an unpleasant
situation However, if we
reduce visual arguments to only
these kind of context-less, thin
premises, we also limit
ourselves to putting forward
only the skeleton of the
rhetorical utterance instead of
the full body. We reconstruct, in
a sense, a lifeless argument.
In contrast to this, it quickly
became obvious, when I
interviewed people about the ads
that much more was going on.
We see that the stating of the
premises and the reconstruction
of the argument is embedded in
a much thicker understanding of
the depicted situation, and of
similar situations and emotions
evoked by the ad.
Ill. 1: Ad for the tram in Oslo: Unng pinlige yeblikk (Avoid
embarrasing momente.

We discover that one of the benefits of visual or multimodal argumentation is that they
provide what I call thick descriptions, a full sense of the situation, making an integrated,
simultaneous appeal to both the emotional and the rational (cf. Kjeldsen 2012, 2013). One
respondent said:
Well, they are obviously playing on the embarrassment of getting caught when not
having a ticket. The way you shrink yourself when the inspector comes (MV/BJ
48:43)
He later continued, saying: You try to hide a little, you want to sink into the ground; because
it is so embarrassing to get caught, you make yourself as little as possible. (MV/BJ 48:43)
Another respondent elaborated even more on what she felt the ad represented (MI/AN 31:15):
I am thinking that the person, the little man, has sneaked in. And when there is a ticket
inspection, you always end up with those embarrassing situations, those looks, and
you become embarrassed. Because it says, the text, Avoid embarrassing moments.
746

Buy tickets. And then you would avoid being tense and get caught. And there are a
lot of other people around that might think Oh well, he got caught now; and then
you begin to think strange thoughts about the person that got caught.
The image clearly evokes imagined or previous experiences of embarrassment connected with
sneaking on public transport. One person told that she herself had witnessed a grown man
seemingly well enough off to pay the fare, but he still got caught without a ticket (MA/SI
48:43). Another vividly told about his fear and shame when he himself almost got caught
without a ticket. All these descriptions and evoked emotions are, in fact, relevant parts of the
argument. The more you feel the embarrassment, the more persuasive the argument will be.
This, however, does not mean that the contribution of the image or the ad as such is just
psychological and irrational persuasion.
It is true in this case, that the argument is more or less fully expressed by words in the
text in the upper left corner, which says Avoid embarrassing moments. Buy a ticket.
However, the premises created by these words alone, lack the full sense of situation and
embarrassment experienced by the respondents, and expressed when they talk about the ad.
So, if we limit ourselves to reconstructions of the argument with short premiseconclusion assertions found only in textual analyses we will only get part of the argument
expressed multimodally in the ad. Because the more I feel the embarrassment the more
forceful the argument is, and the more correct the argument actually is; because the feeling of
embarrassment is an important part of the argument. If you do not really feel the
embarrassment, then you have not really understood the argument, since the good reason
offered to buy a ticket is the possibility to avoid an unpleasant feeling. Of course one could
attempt to express this in writing by saying something like: You should buy a ticket, because
it will make you avoid a very unpleasant situation. However, adding modal modifiers to the
premises does not truly capture the sense of embarrassment offered by the visual parts of the
ad, and it is not likely to evoke the same kind of memories and full descriptions that the image
clearly evoked in the respondents.
5. CONCLUSION
The point of the focus group analysis has neither to claim that the respondents interpretations
are the correct interpretations, nor to claim that other audiences will necessarily interpret
the ads in the exact same way even though this is what the focus group interviews clearly
suggest. The point is simply to show that the ads invite the construction of a specific
argument, and that the respondents generally made the preferred reading (cf. Hall 1993).
Much more could be said about the ads and reception analyses of visual
argumentation. My studies of these and other ads, for instance, also suggest that the active
interpretation of respondents evolves to an active form of arguing back, when images are seen
to claim something in which the respondents disagree about. However, even though this has
only been a very brief account of a small part of the focus group studies carried out, hopefully
a few things has become clear:
Firstly, it is clear that audiences are cognitively involved in interpreting the meaning
of pictures and multimodal utterances. In this rhetorical involvement audiences actively
reconstruct arguments from pictures. They not only reconstruct the premises of an argument,
but also the conjunctions that connect these premises.
Secondly, it is also clear that audiences can and do move argumentatively from the
specific content in a picture to more general moral assertions.

747

Thirdly, the audiences reconstructions of the arguments as (thin) premises are generally
embedded in a condensed, thick understanding of situations, experiences, and emotions that is
invoked by the picture and influence the character and force of the argument.
So, where is visual argument? It is obviously present. It is found in argumentative
situations, and we can locate it not only in images, but also in the minds of audiences. A place
I believe we should into more frequently.

REFERENCES
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Theory: A Reader (pp.331-340). New York: Guilford,.
Benoit, W.L. & Smythe, M.J. 2003. Rhetorical theory as message reception. A cognitive response approach to
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Perelman, C. & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. (1971 [1969/1958]). The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation. Paris:
University of Notre Dame Press.
Schiappa, E. (2008). Beyond representational correctness. Rethinking criticism of popular media. Albany: State
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Searle, J. (1969) Speech acts. An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wander, P. 2013. The third persona: An ideological turn in rhetorical theory, In (Eds) B.L. & G. Dickinson
(red.), The Routledge Reader in Rhetorical Criticism (pp. 604623). New York: Routledge,.
Wilson, D. & Sperber, D. (2012). Meaning and relevance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tindale, C. (2013). Rhetorical argumentation and the nature of audience: Toward an understanding of
audienceIssues in argumentation. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 46 (4), 508-532.
Tindale, C. (1999). Acts of arguing: A rhetorical model of argument. Albany: SUNY Press.
Tindale, C. (1992). Audiences, relevance, and cognitive environments. Argumentation 6, 177-188.

748

The Effect Of Interpersonal Familiarity On Argumentation In Online

Discussions
Susan L. Kline
Darcy Oaks
School of Communication
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210
United States of America
Kline.48@osu.edu

ABSTRACT: This study examined if common ground operationalized as interpersonal familiarity creates a
discussion context in which particular argument acts are more likely to occur. Undergraduate students discussed
a US state ban on gay marriage using an online chat tool. Familiarity was manipulated with a get-to-know-you
session, and conversational argument and interpersonal act coding systems were applied to the transcripts.
Compared to the control condition, familiarity produced more interpersonal, disagreement, and process acts in
the discussions.
KEYWORDS: Conversation Argument Coding Scheme, Deliberation, Decision-Making, Interpersonal
Relationships, Online Discussion

1. INTRODUCTION
Deliberation scholars have advocated the potential of online forums to foster dialogue, debate
and discussion on social issues (e.g., Fishkin, 1995, Shane, 2004). The prevalence of
networked communication also provides opportunities for collaborative learning and decisionmaking. Communication forms have become a focus by scholars to design systems that can
improve communication and deliberation practice.
For argumentation scholars, understanding online deliberation includes understanding
how joint action and mutual understanding are constructed in ways that facilitate interactants
argumentation. Communication-relevant theorists such as Herbert Clark (1996) contend that
joint action and mutual understanding are constituted in communication through processes of
coordination and common ground. While online discussion research has examined the effects
of social pressures such as group norms (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998), attention to how
common ground and coordination influences online discussion is sparse. The purpose of this
study is to address this gap, by examining if common ground, as operationalized through
interpersonal familiarity, creates a deliberation context in which particular argumentation acts
are likely to occur.
1.1 Deliberations purposes and challenges
Deliberation is considered to be a type of discussion that involves ordinary people seeking to
solve challenging social problems together (Blacksher, Diebel, Forest, Goold, & Abelson,
2012). People are motivated to deliberate because they can become better informed, better
able to identify common points of view, and better able to learn new perspectives.
749

Despite the benefits of deliberation, however, over the last few decades a body of research has
accumulated which asserts that deliberation about public issues is difficult because discussants
with moderate opinions become less likely to speak out on public issues (Mutz, 2008). Noelle
Neumanns (1974, 1993) spiral of silence theory asserts that media depictions of a normative
climate of opinion influences the expression of opinion, with those holding a perceived
minority viewpoint less likely to speak out. Research on the effect of this mediated climate for
opinion expression finds a moderate sized effect (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997). An
unwillingness to speak out on public issues is also related to a fear of isolation (e.g., Kim,
Han, Shanahan, & Berdayes, 2004; Willnat, Lee, & Detenber, 2002), negative perceptions of
ones opinion climate (e.g., Moy, Domke, & Stamm, 2001), and high communication
apprehension (e.g., Willnat et al., 2002).
To the challenge of deliberation in face to face discussion can be added the challenge
of deliberating about public issues in online environments. In CMC forums, reduced social
presence, limited interaction and anonymity may lead participants to ignore social norms of
appropriate speech and be more willing to express extreme opinions (Short, Williams, &
Christie, 1976). Yet because of their anonymous identities, discussants may also feel more
willing to express their opinions which can lead to positive outcomes. Perceiving that ones
identity is anonymous within CMC discussions, for instance, may reduce status
differentiation, increase equalitarian participation and increase overall participation (Brashers,
Adkins & Meyers, 1994; Kiesler, Siegel, & McQuire, 1984; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, &
McGuire, 1986).
Although deliberation scholars have focused on discovering the benefits and tradeoffs
online forums, most researchers have not analyzed forum interactions for the quality of
argumentation contained in them, despite recognizing that reasoning is a core interaction
process undergirding discussion and democracy (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Rather, the
emphasis has been on itemizing the effects of particular media affordances or particular
psychological factors that affect opinion expression. No coherent view of argumentation and
communication is provided to understand the core processes involved in decision-making,
despite Meyers (1989) having shown that models of group decision-making are incomplete
without considering the nature of argumentative interactions.
1.2 Conversational argument theory
Both online and offline discussions can be understood with contemporary argumentation
theories, which posit that communication acts constitute meanings and rational orientations
towards social issues (Habermas, 1989). One argument theory relevant to online discussions is
the conversational argument theory developed by Meyers, Canary, Seibold and their
colleagues (see reviews by Meyers & Brashers, 2010, and Canary & Seibold, 2010).
Conversation argument theory draws upon Giddens (1984) structuration theory to conceive
argument as a structurated social practice produced and reproduced in interaction (Meyers,
Seibold, & Brashers, 1991, p. 49). Argument is seen as both a system of observational
interaction patterns and structures of rules and resources used by discussants. The
Conversational Argument Coding Scheme (CACS) enacts the theory by identifying argument
acts that contribute to group consensus. The system is presented in Table 1 (Meyers, Brashers,
& Hanner, 2000, p. 9), and consists of six basic categories. Potential arguables are generative
mechanisms that are assertions of fact or opinion, or propositions (calls for support).

750

Reasoning activities consist of elaborations (providing evidence and reasons); responses

(defending assertions met with disagreement); amplifications (establishing relevance); and
justifications (offering validity). Argumentation also consists of providing convergence acts of
agreement and acknowledgements, disagreement acts of objections and challenges, and
delimitors, or acts that frame reasoning, secure common ground, or refute objections.
Nonarguables consist of process, tangential and incomplete statements.
Conversational argument theory has been applied to face-to-face and CMC group
discussions, and using the theory, researchers have found that discussions with more
developed argumentation (i.e., proportionately more convergence, disagreements, and
delimitors) produce proposals that are agreed upon by the majority of discussants. An
argument quality index constructed from the CACS predicts group productivity (Lemus,
Seibold, Flanagan & Metzer, 2004; Seibold, Lemus, & Kang, 2010). In groups where the
minority proposal was adopted, delimitors were used more than other argument acts (Meyers
et al., 2000). Canary and his colleagues have also utilized conversational argument theory to
study romantic couples discussions (e.g., Canary & Sillars, 1992; Canary, Weger, & Stafford,
1991). They have found that jointly constructed and complex arguments are rated as more
appropriate, effective and reasonable than undeveloped arguments, and that the practice of
developing points through reasoning is used more by couples who value cooperative
argumentation.
TABLE 1
Conversational Argument Coding Scheme
__________________________________________________________________________
I.

II.

III.

Arguables
A. Generative mechanisms
1. Assertions: Statements of fact or opinion.
2. Propositions: Statements that call for support, action, or conference on an
argument-related statement.
B. Reasoning activities
3. Elaborations: Statements that support other statements by providing
evidence, reasons, or other support
4. Responses: Statements that defend arguable met with disagreement.
5. Amplifications: Statements that explain or expound upon other statements
in order to establish the relevance of the argument through inference
6. Justifications: Statements that offer validity of previous or upcoming
statements by citing a rule of logic (provide a standard whereby arguments
are weighed)
Convergence-seeking activities
7. Agreement: Statements that express agreement with another statement
8. Acknowledgement: Statements that indicate recognition and/or
comprehension of another statement, but not necessarily agreement, to
anothers point
Disagreement-relevant intrusions

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IV.

V.

9. Objections: Statements that deny the truth or accuracy of any arguable

10. Challenges: Statements that offer problems or questions that must be solved
if agreement is to be secured on an arguable
Delimitors
11. Frames: Statements that provide a context for and/or qualify arguable
12. Forestall/Secure: Statements that attempt to forestall refutation by securing
common ground
13. Forestall/Remove: Statements that attempt to forestall refutation by
removing possible objections
Nonarguables-statements that are not related to the groups argument
14. Process: Non-argument related statements that orient the group to its task or
specify the process the group should follow
15. Unrelated: Statements unrelated to the groups argument or process
(tangents, side issues, self-talk, etc.)
16. Incompletes: Statements that do not contain a complete, clear idea due to
interruption of a person discontinuing a statement

_______________________________________________________________________
Meyers, Brashers, & Hanner (2000, p. 9)

1.4 Common ground as interpersonal familiarity and argumentation

Given the central role that argumentation plays in public deliberation and group decisionmaking, quality deliberation would likely include a focus on the extent to which discussants
know one another. Several lines of theory and research suggest that, when integrated, greater
interpersonal familiarity between discussants should influence the types of argument acts
produced in deliberative discussions.
First, a substantial line of work on small group productivity has found that group
cohesion is comprised of members social attractiveness to one another, emotional intensity,
task commitment, and group identification (Forsyth, 2014). Meta-analyses find that group
cohesion is positively related to group productivity and performance (Beal et al., 2003;
Chiocchio & Essiembre, 2009; Gully, Devine, & Whitney, 1995). Causality is bi-directional in
that cohesion helps groups succeed, which, in turn, creates more cohesion (Mullen & Copper,
1994). Most groups develop cohesion through an initial stage of orientation, called forming, in
which they become familiar with each other and the group (Tuckman, 1965).
Two other approaches to familiarity come from normative theories of argument and
constructivist communication theory. Normative theories of argument like pragma-dialectic
theory contend that critical discussion proceeds against the assumption that its participants
hold each other with respect and regard and that participants are willing to determine and be
motivated by the better argument (e.g., Burleson & Kline, 1979; van Eemeren, Grootendorst,
Jackson, & Jacobs, S., 1993). Critical discussion works better when respect and regard are
ratified in the early stages of the discussion (van Eeemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 1992).
Multiple goal communication theories also contend that competent communication preserves
positive relationships and identities of discussants (OKeefe & Delia, 1982). Constructivist
multiple goal theory specifically suggests that managing face threats and relational aims in

752

disagreements are resolved more efficiently when multiple goals are managed in an
integrative fashion (e.g., OKeefe & Shepherd, 1987). Taken together, both of these theories
contend and provide support that interpersonal familiarity affects the use of face-attentive,
integrative messages that, in turn, facilitate positive decision-making outcomes. Interpersonal
familiarity is also an important consideration in CMC decision-making environments, with
Walther (1996) finding that CMC interactions are more successful if interactants are familiar
with and develop relationships with one another.
A final theory that makes similar assumptions about communication and familiarity is
Clarks (1996) conception of mutual understanding For Clark, three components contribute to
mutual understanding; joint action, coordination, and common ground. Joint action involves
communicators working toward a shared goal, coordination involves conventions and actions
oriented toward the goal, and common ground involves mutual assumptions, beliefs, and
knowledge. Common ground is essential to coordinating joint actions and achieving mutual
senses of understanding, and includes communal common ground, or the evidence about the
cultural communities people belong to as well as personal common ground, or evidence
from peoples direct personal experiences with each other (p. 100). Presumably attributions
of common ground should enable deliberators to ascertain differences between their
standpoints more easily, and understand what reasoning may better integrate their positions.
1.5 Study purpose
The purpose of our study was to examine how members argumentation acts in online group
discussions are affected by a familiarity intervention. Given that common ground is a
fundamental component of communicators interactions, greater familiarity between group
members should produce more acts that foster positive identities and relationships. Following
Clarks reasoning, we hypothesized the following effect of common ground operationalized as
familiarity:
H1: A familiarity intervention with group members will increase acts that foster
positive identities and relationships (i.e., interpersonal cohesion) in online group
discussions, compared to group members assigned to a control condition.
We also expected that common ground, or familiarity, would influence the type of
argumentation acts produced in group discussions. However, given the lack of prior research
we just posed a research question:
RQ1: What is the effect of a familiarity intervention on argumentation acts in online
group discussions?
2. METHOD
Our study employed a between-subjects design with a familiarity vs no familiarity condition
to examine differences in argumentation acts in online group discussions.

753

2.1 Participants
Participants were undergraduate students recruited from communication classes at a large
Midwestern U.S. university. Thirty nine students (68% female) participated in the study for
extra course credit. Most students were either juniors (33.3%) or seniors (55.6%), with an
average age of 21.
2.2 Design and procedures
We conducted the study within Carmen, a Learning Management System based on
Desire2Learn, which was used at the university and which had at the time a chat discussion
tool. Data collection involved two sessions. Participants were assigned randomly to one of two
conditions, and given a group number. They visited a computer lab one week prior to the
second session; participants in groups assigned to the familiarity treatment condition were
given the relevant training and then completed a Session 1 survey. Participants assigned to the
control condition only completed the Session 1 survey.
The familiarity treatment session began with instructions projected on three screens
arranged in the computer lab. The researcher read aloud the instructions that asked
participants to introduce themselves to one another and exchange information about their
hobbies, employment, major, class rank, and membership in organizations. Participants logged
into Carmen in a special course shell for the study, and were told they had twenty minutes to
complete their discussion. The participants were also told that all communication within their
group was to occur within the communication mode assigned to them. At the end of the
intervention session, the Session 1 questionnaire was administered.
Approximately one week later, the groups met again for Session 2. Participants were
reminded of their group numbers and then were presented with the task, Issue 1 and Ohio by
projecting the task via PowerPoint in the computer lab. The task described Issue 1 (an Ohio
Constitutional Amendment that outlaws same-sex marriage), and asked participants to discuss
the pros and cons of the amendment by discussing three questions: (1) Is Issue 1 good for
Ohio? (2) Does Issue 1 affect individual liberties?, and (3) Should Issue 1 stand or be
overturned?. Groups were not composed on the basis of their overall attitude toward the
amendment. Each group was asked to produce a group letter to the editor of The Columbus
Dispatch about their discussion that reflected their perspectives, and to have one group
member email their letter to the researcher. After presenting the instructions, the researcher
asked if there were any questions and then directed participants to find their groups and chat
room online. Participants were asked to interact online for 45 minutes to complete the task,
after which they completed the Session 2 survey, were thanked for their participation, and
debriefed.
2.3 Instrumentation
2.3.1 Familiarity manipulation check.
The manipulation check for the familiarity condition consisted of three 7-point (strongly
disagree to strongly agree) Likert items related to interpersonal familiarity by the participants
with other group members. The items were: I know my group members well; I am familiar

754

with my group members interests; and I am familiar with my group members personalities.
Responses to these items were averaged to form a measure of Familiarity ( .967, M = 3.07,
SD = 1.82).
2.3.2 Conversational argument coding scheme
(CACS). Transcripts of the discussions were obtained and coded with the CACS (Canary &
Seibold, 2010; Meyers & Brashers, 1998, 2010; Seibold et al., 2010). To prepare for the
analysis, two coders read the coding manual for Canarys (1992) version of the system, as
well as chapter discussions by Meyers and Seibold on CACS coding practices (Meyers et al.,
2000; Meyers, Seibold, & Brashers, 1991; Seibold & Meyers, 2007; Seibold, 2012). The
coders learned the system working with one transcript, and then separately unitized four other
transcripts into thought units. Unitizing reliability was acceptable (.06, using Guetzkows
index). The coders next worked through the four transcripts to identify the discussion issues
and lines of argument to categorize each thought unit into the coding schemes primary and
secondary categories as shown in Table 1. The coders repeatedly met to discuss and resolve
coding differences.
Four transcripts were used to assess reliability on coding of the primary categories:
generative mechanisms, reasoning arguables, convergence, disagreements, delimitors and
nonarguables. The Cohen kappas were acceptable using Rietved and van Houts (1993)
conventions, with ks ranging from .65 to .83 (Kappa M = .73). Once reliability was attained,
the remaining transcripts were analyzed by one coder. CACS measures were formed for each
participant, which were the sums of the secondary act categories related to the primary
argument act categories. Five measures were generative mechanisms, reasoning arguables,
convergence, disagreement, and delimitors. Two other measures that were formed were the
sum of nonarguables that only focused on process statements, and the total number of
argument acts.
2.3.3 Interpersonal cohesion acts.
Participants phrasing and acts that were aimed at creating positive relations and identities
were also coded. Ten interpersonal cohesion categories were utilized in coding: praise (Good
job), expressions of positive affect (lol :)), humor moves (Benny boy wears pink
panties!!!), gratitude and closings (Thanks), apologies (Sorry, but Im five lines behind),
greetings (Hey everybody), informal socializing talk (We got our grades back), slang
(Well, this stinks), personal self-disclosure (I only had it one time on my visit I believe)
and verbal helping (Its under start and programs on this computer). Reliability of these
phrasings and acts on four transcripts was acceptable (k = .82). The total number of
interpersonal cohesion acts was summed for each participant to form a measure of
Interpersonal cohesion.
2.3.4 Pre-intervention familiarity. Given that interpersonal familiarity was a key manipulation
in the study, participants prior familiarity with the group members was used as a covariate in
the analyses. This construct was assessed through three 7 point Likert-type items (e.g., "I
know my group members well.), which were averaged to form a measure for Preintervention familiarity, with = .988 (M = 2.05, SD = 1.53).

755

3. RESULTS
Our analyses utilized multilevel techniques, given that students individual responses were
nested within groups and hence potentially influenced by the responses of other group
members. A manipulation check analysis was initially conducted to verify that the familiarity
intervention was effective in producing greater familiarity among the participants in the
treatment than the control condition (coded as 1 or 0). A series of unconditional random
intercept-only models were conducted to assess the degree of non-independence in each
argument act variable across Level-1 units. Finally, a series of multi-level model analyses
were conducted, with familiarity entered as the independent variable and pre-intervention
familiarity entered as a covariate in the analyses.
3.1 Preliminary analyses
A familiarity manipulation check was conducted with an unconditional multi-level model with
the intercept as the only variable, followed by a conditional model with the familiarity
measure as a main fixed effect and baseline familiarity as a covariate. Familiarity was
statistically significant (1.58, SE = .438, t = 3.62, p < .01), as was baseline familiarity (.432,
SE = .124, t = 3.48, p < .01). The findings indicated that the familiarity manipulation had the
intended effect, with those in the familiarity condition having higher ratings of Familiarity
than those participants in the control condition. The model fit for the conditional model was
better than the unconditional model, with a change in deviance statistic (-2 LL) that was
statistically significant (= 37.64, p < .001).
After determining the success of the familiarity manipulation, we conducted a series of
random intercept-only model analyses to assess the degree of nonindependence for the
argumentation outcome variables. Intraclass correlations (ICC) for each outcome variable
were computed by dividing the between group variance by the sum of the between and within
group variance. Except for convergence and disagreements, the intra-class correlations were
significantly higher than 0 (at p < .05): interpersonal communication acts, ICC = .824;
generative mechanisms, ICC = .280; reasoning arguables, ICC = .352; convergence, ICC =
.242; disagreements, ICC = .089; delimitors, ICC = .417; and process statements, ICC = .474.
Thus, employing multilevel modeling was warranted, to control for nonindependence of
argument acts due to group interaction (Hayes, 2006; Hox, 2002).
3.2 Multi-level model analyses
We next conducted a series of multilevel model analyses to assess the hypothesis and research
question, with each argumentation and interpersonal cohesion measure the dependent
variables, familiarity as the independent variable, and pre-intervention familiarity as a
covariate. We utilized restricted maximum likelihood estimation given the small number of
groups, and mean-centered the covariate, pre-intervention familiarity. A summary of means
and standard deviations of the measures is presented in Table 2. Table 3 presents the
parameter estimates that resulted from the multi-level analyses.

756

TABLE 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Argument Act Variables
Construct

No Familiarity Familiarity
Condition

Condition

M (SD)

M (SD)

Generative Mechanisms 13.19 (7.70)

16.44 (5.97)

Reasoning Arguables

12.57 (8.29)

11.28 (6.65)

Convergence

7.05 (5.03)

10.05 (5.66)

Disagreement

4.81 (4.49)

10.05 (4.63)

Delimitors

2.76 (2.56)

2.56 (2.03)

Process

11.62 (6.92)

17.50 (7.06)

Interpersonal Cohesion

11.52 (7.43)

61.17 (31.17)

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TABLE 3
Parameter Estimates for Multi-level Models on the Effect of Familiarity on Argumentation
and Interpersonal Acts in Group Discussion

Interp.
Acts

Generative
Mechanisms Arguables Converge Disagree

Delimits Process

Fixed
Effects
15.26*
(6.70)
Intercept

12.98***
(1.96)

13.37***
(2.41)

7.44**
(1.75)

4.64**
(1.32)

3.033**
(.722)

13.13*
**
(2.14)

Familiarity

42.18**
(10.11)

3.67
(3.01)

-2.88
(3.65)

2.22
(2.64)

5.58*
(2.03)

-.689
(1.09)

2.86
(3.25)

PreFamiliarity

5.33*
(2.33)

-.296
(.902)

1.13
(.950)

.558
(.598)

-.243
(.597)

.345
(.292)

2.15*
(.851)

Intercept

225.44
(129.03)

11.06
(11.40)

24.80
(17.19)

15.72
(8.84)

5.75
(4.78)

2.14
(1.50)

19.47
(13.82)

37.91***
(10.81)

13.82***
(3.89)

16.06*** 3.65***
(4.49)
(1.03)

Residual

212.01***
(59.75)
39.52***
(11.18)

30.59*
**
(8.77)

Deviance
(-2LL)

320.36

254.65

222.62

219.93

246.74

Variance
Components

251.05

169.66

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Standard errors are in parentheses.

H1 predicted that familiarity with group members would increase the number of interpersonal
communication acts in the discussions. Tables 2 and 3 show that familiarity and the covariate
of pre-intervention familiarity produced significant increases in interpersonal communication
acts in the familiarity condition compared to the control condition (as indicated in Table 3
under fixed effects). Hence, H1 was confirmed.

758

RQ1 asked whether the familiarity intervention would alter the types of argument acts that
students used in their discussions. The familiarity condition did not produce a significant
difference in the number of generative mechanisms (opinions and propositions) or reasonusing arguables (e.g., elaborations) in the discussions. The familiarity condition also did not
influence the number of convergence acts in the discussions, but the familiarity condition did
significantly influence the number of disagreement acts in the discussions, with the familiarity
condition producing an average of 10 disagreement acts compared to 4.8 disagreement acts in
the control condition. Delimitor argument acts and process statements were also not
significantly affected by the familiarity intervention; however the covariate, pre-intervention
familiarity, was significant for process statements.
A final analysis was conducted on the total number of argument acts, employing the
same model characteristics as the previous analyses. There were no significant fixed effects
for familiarity or pre-intervention familiarity (estimates and standard errors, respectively:
familiarity condition = 6.23 (10.167), t = .613, ns; pre-intervention familiarity = 3.62 (2.42), t
= 1.50, ns). Both the within-group variance intercept and residual effects were statistically
significant (intercept = 268.45 (65.24), Wald Z = 4.11, p < .001; residual = 316.011(153.91),
Wald Z = 2.05, p < .05). Thus, familiarity did not affect the overall number of argument acts
in students discussion contributions.
4. DISCUSSION
Overall, we found support for our hypothesis that interpersonal familiarity among college
student group members produced significantly more interpersonal acts in online discussions
about a state ban on same-sex marriage compared to students in a control condition.
Interpersonal familiarity also produced significantly more disagreement acts than the control
condition, and the familiarity covariate produced a significant effect for the number of process
statements produced in the discussions. There were no other significant differences in
argument acts in the discussions that were a function of interpersonal familiarity.
These findings contribute to our understanding of argumentation in CMC deliberative
discussions in several ways. A key feature of our study was its experimental design and
analysis of the actual argumentation in the discussions. Most studies on the spiral of silence
about social issues ask participants to complete self-report frequencies of engaging in
interpersonal discussion (Mutz, 2008), or ask participants to rate the likelihood of expressing
an opinion in hypothetical situations (e.g., Kim et al., 2004; Moy et al., 2001; Scheufele et al.,
2001; Willnat et al., 2002). While understanding the likelihood of speaking out on social
issues is certainly important to our understanding of deliberative discussions, in order to have
a comprehensive understanding, the character of actual discussions is also warranted, and has
been called for by others (e.g., Ho & McLeod, 2008).
Employing our design, we found that one significant contribution of the study was that
the interpersonal familiarity condition produced greater numbers of interpersonal cohesion
acts in the discussions than the control condition. This finding supports pragma-dialectic
theory and constructivist multiple goal theories by showing the role that interpersonal
familiarity can have on legitimizing relational and identity aims in discussion while
participants to express their disagreements. The conversation argument coding scheme, along
with the interpersonal cohesion act scheme that we developed, were useful tools to show these
findings.

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A second significant contribution of the study was the increased number of disagreement acts
that occurred in the familiarity condition compared to the control condition. While prior
studies have detected more status equality and higher overall participation in CMC
discussions compared to FtF discussions (Brashers et al., 1994; Siegel et al., 1986), our
findings suggest that a familiarity condition may further boost the status equality effect found
in the studies. Mutz (2008) has called for developing ways of having informal political
conversations in which disagreements can be explored while maintaining social harmony. Our
findings suggest that having simple opportunities for developing interpersonal familiarity may
provide the online interaction space to develop common ground that provides the basis for not
interpreting disagreement as face attack. Many of the interpersonal cohesion acts we coded
for are types of positive and negative politeness strategies that Brown and Levinson (1987)
have found are used around the world. Constructivist multiple goal theory provides further
evidence that such strategies are useful in simultaneously pursuing task, relationship, and
identity goals in conflict interactions (Kline, 1991; OKeefe & Shepherd, 1987).
A third significant contribution of the findings, and which was surprising, was the
inability of the familiarity condition to produce other differences in argumentation acts.
Given that greater familiarity should enable discussants to elaborate on their positions with
arguables and invite more delimitor argument acts to craft common ground, reframe issues, or
engage in refutations, we expected to see more differences in argumentation in the familiarity
condition, compared to the control condition. However, the reason why the familiarity
condition did not produce more complex argument acts may be due to group norms developed
during these discussions. Studies of group task performance have found that social cohesion,
group pride and task commitment are all important factors in predicting cohesion and group
performance, but that task commitment has a larger effect size than social cohesion in
predicting overall cohesion among group members (comparative effect sizes of .25 vs .17;
Forsyth, 2014). Further, not all cohesive groups are productive; if cohesive group members do
not also subscribe to norms that stress high productivity, then the group may not be
productive. The group norm that stresses high performance goals is a moderator of the
cohesion-productivity relationship, with cohesive groups who have high-performance goals
are the groups most likely to have high productivity (Langfred, 1998). While the familiarity
condition in our study encouraged group members to get to know one another, the task
instructions for the second session did not stress high performance goals.
Still, a key implication of our findings is that a short intervention can have important
effects on deliberative discussion. The get-to-know sessions were easy to conduct and were
welcomed by students. The downside of the sessions was that they might have created a norm
that legitimated more socializing during the gay marriage discussions than conducting a
rigorous examination of issues. No special instructions were given to have a thorough
discussion, so the familiarity training might have stifled the likelihood of complex argument
acts like delimitors from occurring. Future research could examine the effects of varying the
instructions for subsequent sessions, to determine if familiarity could have even stronger
influence on argument acts. To stimulate the highest productivity a familiarity condition could
be combined with a norm-based intervention in which group members develop their
commitment to achieving the task goal presented to them.
Future research could also expand upon the findings obtained from this study in
several other ways. We adopted a narrow focus on the particular online communication form
that students used, so future research could examine the effect of familiarity on other

760

communication modes, such as threaded bulletin board, forums, or blog formats. Discussion
tools that permit easy scaffolding produce increases in student questioning during online
discussions (Choi, Land, & Turgeon, 2005), and so the type of communication mode used
would be important to study in online argumentation. Understanding the affordances of the
chat modality in our study could be studied further by contrasting chat room affordances with
the affordances of face to face discussion. The generalizability of our findings could also be
extended by replicating them with different public issue topics and a larger sample of groups.
Finally, the effects of interpersonal familiarity on group argument could be understood further
by linking the argument act measures to measures of attitude change, member satisfaction
with the group process, and objective assessments of the quality of the letters produced by
each group. Whether or not interpersonal familiarity can create the conditions for
argumentation that lead to higher group productivity remains to be seen.
Online forums for deliberating about social issues hold promise because of their
potential to facilitate discussion and community participation, such as in the Electronic
Dialogue Project of the 2000 US Presidential campaign (Price & Cappella, 2002). The
findings here suggest that get-to-know you sessions may boost the ability of online forums to
produce deliberative discussion. Such results may have consequences for political
engagement and may provide opportunities for enhancing citizens argumentation
competencies.

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Institutional Constraints Of Topical Strategic Maneuvering In Legal

Argumentation. The Case Of Insulting.
Harm Kloosterhuis
Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University College
Erasmus University Rotterdam
The Netherlands
Kloosterhuis@law.eur.nl

ABSTRACT: Strategic maneuvering refers to the efforts parties make to reconcile rhetorical effectiveness
with dialectical standards of reasonableness. It manifests itself in topical selection, audience-directed
framing and presentational devices. In analyzing strategic maneuvering one category of parameters to be
considered are the constraints of the institutional context. In this paper I explore the institutional constraints
for topical selection for the legal argumentative activity type insulting. I will make a distinction between
statutory constraints, constraints developed in case law and constraints regarding language use and the logic
of conversational implicatures
KEYWORDS: conversational implicatures, insulting, legal argumentation, speech act theory,

1. INTRODUCTION
Frans van Eemeren explains in Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse (2010,
p. 40) how the theoretical reconstruction of argumentation should incorporate strategic
maneuvering of parties in a discussion. Strategic maneuvering refers to the efforts parties
make to reconcile rhetorical effectiveness with dialectical standards of reasonableness. It
manifests itself topical selection, the audience-directed framing of the argumentative
moves, and in the purposive use of presentational devices. In analyzing strategic
maneuvering the following parameters must be considered: (a) the results that can be
achieved, (b) the routes that can be taken to achieve these results, (c) the constraints of the
institutional context and (d) the mutual commitments defining the argumentative situation
(Van Eemeren 2010, p. 163). In chapter 10 of his study Setting up an agenda for further
research Van Eemeren proposes further research to the theoretical exploration of these
four parameters for specific argumentative activity types. In this paper I want to do this for
a specific legal argumentative activity type: the discussions about the accusation of
insulting. In these discussions there is often disagreement because language users can opt
for indirect insulting. The problem of indirect insulting is that there is a difference
between sentence- and speaker meaning. This difference results in problems regarding the
interpretation and reconstruction of the argumentation for and against the accusation of
insulting. This aspect of insulting has received little attention in legal research and it is my
aim in this contribution to solve some of these problems by providing a theoretical
framework for the analysis of strategic maneuvering in legal discussions about insulting,
using the parameters distinguished by Van Eemeren. I will focus on topical selection and
the parameter institutional constraints by giving a specification of the argumentative
activity type adjudication in cases about insulting and an analysis of the constraints of this
activity type. I will make a distinction between statutory constraints, constraints developed
764

in case law and constraints regarding language use and the logic of conversational
implicatures.
2. THE STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
In order to shed some light on the constraints of the institutional context let us first take an
example of an accusation of insulting, taken from Dutch case law. 10 March 2009 the
Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled in a case about the accusation of insulting. The
case was about article 137c of the Criminal Code, which makes insulting statements about
a group of people a crime. The Supreme Court acquitted a man who stuck a poster in his
window with the text Stop the cancer called Islam of insulting Muslims. According to
the district court and the court of appeal, this statement was insulting for a group of people
due to their religion, considering the strong connection between Islam and its believers.
But the Supreme Court argued that criticizing a religion, is not automatically also insulting
its followers. According to the Supreme Court the appeal court gave too wide an
interpretation of the expression a group of people according to their religion in Article
137c. People expressing themselves offensively about a religion are not automatically
guilty of insulting its followers, even if the followers feel insulted. The Supreme Court
ruled that the statement must unmistakably refer to a certain group of people who
differentiate themselves from others by their religion. While people may not insult
believers, they can insult their religion. The sole circumstance of offensive statements
about a religion also insulting its followers is not sufficient to speak of insulting a group of
people due to their religion.
Discussions about the accusation of insulting can be analysed as species of the
argumentative activity type adjudication. Van Eemeren argues that argumentative
discourse in practice takes place in different kinds of activity types, which are to a greater
or lesser degree institutionalized, so that certain practices have become conventionalized.
Activity types and the speech events that are associated with them can be identified on the
basis of careful empirical observation of argumentative practice.1 One of the activity types
Van Eemeren (2010, p. 147) distinguishes is adjudication:
Adjudication aims for the termination of a dispute by a third party rather than the resolution of a
difference of opinion by the parties themselves. It is commonly understood as taking a dispute to a
public court, where a judge, after having heard both sides, will make a reasoned decision in favor
of either one of the parties. The judge determines who is wrong and who is right according to a set
of rules. Most of these rules are tantamount to specifications of rules for critical discussion aimed at
promoting that the dispute be terminated in a reasonable way.

Now how is the practice of discussions about insulting conventionalized? Which

institutional rules and constraints are relevant? In the following I will make a distinction
between three types of rules: statutory rules, rules from case law and rules regarding
language use.

Unlike theoretical constructs such as a critical discussion and other ideal models based on analytic
considerations regarding the most pertinent presentation of the constitutive parts of a problem-valid
procedure for carrying out a particular kind of discursive task (Van Eemeren 2010, p. 145).

765

In the first place there are statutory rules about this criminal act in the penal code. The
relevant statutory rule in the example Stop the cancer called Islam is Article 137c of the
Dutch Penal Code:
Article 137c
He who publicly, verbally or in writing or image, deliberately expresses himself in
a way insulting of a group of people because of their race, their religion or belief,
or their hetero- or homosexual nature or their physical, mental, or intellectual
disabilities, will be punished with a prison sentence of at the most one year or a
fine of third category.
This rule contains the following partially complex necessary conditions for the
application: (1) there is an act of insulting of (2) a group of people, (3) there is an intention
to insult, (3) the insult is in public, (4) verbally or in writing or image, (5) because of race,
religion or belief, or hetero- or homosexual nature or physical, mental, or intellectual
disabilities. This structure implies that a successful defence of the standpoint that someone
is guilty of the criminal act insulting contains a coordinative argumentation of five
arguments based on the five necessary conditions in the norm. A successful attack of this
standpoint results in single or multiple argumentation, based on a refutation of one or more
of the five necessary conditions.
3. CONSTRAINTS DEVELOPED IN CASE LAW AND LINGUISTIC CONSTRAINTS
In the second place there are rules developed in case law. These rules refine and specify
the five necessary conditions, but the case law about 137c also resulted in a new condition
for the application. According to the rules from case law about the application of article
137c three questions should be answered. The first question is whether or not an utterance
is an insult and whether or not the other conditions of 137c are fulfilled. If the utterance is
an insult and the other conditions are fulfilled, the next question is whether or not the
utterance is part of a public debate. And if the insult is an utterance in a public debate the
third question is whether or not the utterance is unnecessary offensive.
Let us now focus on the first question: is the utterance insulting? Here the relevant
rules are not legal, but linguistic in nature. This third category of rules are
conventionalized semantic and pragmatic rules. In answering the question about the
insulting nature of the utterance a distinction has to be made between direct and indirect
insulting. In order the qualify an utterance as a direct insult the words themselves and
semantic rules may often suffice, but often one may require the context to understand the
actual meaning of the words. It could be clear, for instance, that the tone of the entire text
is ironic. Those few words which in isolation may be construed as insulting, would then in
their totality, in conjunction, be ironic and hence have an entirely different meaning.
As I have shown in Kloosterhuis (2012) the cases of indirect insulting are often
more complicated to analyse. In these cases semantic rules are not sufficient as basis for
the qualifications that an utterance is an insult. Here we need pragmatic rules. Let us look
at some examples. According to Dutch case law the following utterances count as insult
Kloosterhuis (2012):

766

1
2
3
4
5
6

Calling a police-officer a homo.

Greeting a police-officer with Heil Hitler.
Saying I am gonna fuck you to a police-officer.
Having a tattoo or a bomberjack with the text 1312 or ACAB (All Cops Are
Bastards).
Referring to a passage in the Bible where Pilatus washes his hands.
Saying or implicating that the Holocaust did not happen

These utterances are less clear than direct insults. This vagueness often results in
discussions about meanings, between parties, between parties and judges and between
judges. In example 1 for instance Calling a police-officer a homo the judge of the
district court ruled that the utterance homo is not insulting, but a neutral term. In contrast
with this decision the court of appeal decided that this utterance in context had to be
considered as an insult. Another form of defence to the accusation of insulting in these
case is that there was no intention to insult. And sometimes the meaning or to be more
precise the propositional content of a word is disputed. One of the counterarguments
against the accusation of an insult in the ACAB-cases (example 4) was that ACAB does
not mean All Cops Are Bastards but Acht Cola Acht Bier (Eight Cola Eight Beer).
4. CONSTRAINTS RELATED TO THE LOGIC OF CONVERSATIONAL
IMPLICATURES
The interesting problem with the examples like I am gonna fuck you is that there is a
(possible) difference between the sentence meaning and the speaker meaning. According
to Grices theory about conversational implicatures a speaker or writer can use utterances
as I am gonna fuck you and defend that there was no insult meant. To explain this logic
of the conversational implicatures in cases of indirect insulting, we should first give a
precise definition of the speech act insulting. In the analysis of speech act theory, language
users performing speech acts have illocutionary and perlocutionary purposes. The
successful and performance of an illocutionary act will always result in the effect that the
hearer understands of the utterance produced by the speaker. But in addition to the
illocutionary effect of understanding, utterances normally produce and are often intend to
produce, further perlocutionary effects on the feelings, attitudes and subsequent behaviour
of the hearers. An assertive speech act as asserting or argumentation may result in the
perlocutionary effect of convincing or persuasion and a commisseve speech act as a
promise may create expectations. Searle (1971) claims that there are five and only five
types of illocutionary acts:
1
2
3
4

assertive illocutionary acts that commit a speaker to the truth or acceptability of the
expressed proposition, for example making a statement.
directive illocutionary acts that are to cause the hearer to take a particular action,
for example requests, commands and advice.
commissive illocutionary acts that commit a speaker to some future action, for
example promises and oaths.
expressive illocutionary acts that express the speakers attitudes and emotions
towards the proposition, for example congratulations, excuses and thanks.

767

declarative illocutionary acts that change the reality in accord with the proposition
of the declaration, for example baptisms, pronouncing someone guilty or
pronouncing someone husband and wife.

The successful performance of illocutionary acts is dependent on the fulfillment of

different conditions (Searle 1971, p. 47; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, p. 21). A
successful performance of a speech act results in a perlocutionary effect, for example
being convinced in case of the illocutionary act argumentation. Within the framework of
speech act theory we are now able to give a more precise definition of the effect being
insulted: being insulted is a perlocutionary effect that is intended by the speaker or writer
and that is based on rational considerations on the part of the addressee. 2
The next question now is how the perlocutionary effect of being insulted is related
to the five types of illocutionary acts in cases of indirect insulting. How, in other words, is
a language user capable of inferring an insult from an assertion, a promise, a question, a
compliment or a declaration? According to Van Eemeren and Grootendorst the associated
perlocutions are connected to the essential condition or illocutionary point of the
illocutionary act.3 There are five and only five illocutionary points. (1) The assertive point
is to say how things are. (2) The directive point is to try to get other people to do things.
(3) The commissive point is to commit the speaker to doing something. (4) The declarative
point is to change the world by saying so. (5) The expressive point is to express feelings
and attitudes.
Now it is clear from these illocutionary points that none of the five illocutionary
acts is related in a direct conventional way with the perlocution being insulted. Calling a
police officer a homo or comparing an employer with Pontius Pilatus are assertive
illocutionary acts, in which a proposition is presented as representing a state of affairs,
with an associated perlocution as accepting a description or being convinced, but not being
insulted. Saying I am gonna fuck you to a police-officer is a commissive illocutionary
2

In other to make clear what this perlocutionary effect involves Van Eemeren (2010, p. 37) makes the
following distinctions. First, he distinguishes between effects of the speech act that are intended by the
speaker or writer and consequences that are brought about accidentally. Van Eemeren reserves the term act,
in contradistinction with mere behavior, for conscious, purposive activities based on rational
considerations for which the actor can be held accountable. As a result, bringing about completely
unintended consequences cannot be regarded as acting, so in such cases there can be no question of the
performance of perlocutionary acts. According to Van Eemeren a rough and ready criterion for
distinguishing between the performance of perlocutionary acts and the bringing about of unintended
consequences is whether the speaker can reasonably be asked to provide his/her reasons for causing the
consequences in question. Second, Van Eemeren distinguishes between consequences of speech acts whose
occurrence may be regarded to be based on rational considerations on the part of the addressee and
consequences that are divorced from reasonable decision-making, like being startled when someone shouts
boo.
3
Van Eemeren en Grootendorst (1984, p. 53) are of the opinion that there is a conventional relation between
illocutionary acts and associated perlocutionary effects. They describe the associated perlocution as
something like the rationale for performing the illocution; it is, as it were, in the nature of the illocution to
bring about the perlocution. Central in their analysis is the relation between the essential condition or
illocutionary point of the illocutionary act and its rationale. They explain that the relation between the
illocution argumentation and the perlocution convincing can be characterized as conventional in Lewis
(1977) sense of regularity, normativity and mutual expectations.

768

act a promise or a threat in which the speaker commits himself to carrying out an
action. The associated perlocutionary effects of commissives are accepting the promise or
being intimidated, but not being insulted. Greeting a police-officer with Heil Hitler is an
expressive illocutionary act with an associated perlocution as accepting the greeting but
again not being insulted.
So, the question now is: how is it possible to derive the perlocutionary effect being
insulted from illocutionary acts whose associated perlocutionary effects is primary a
different one. The key to an answer to this question is treating the examples as forms
conversational implicatures as analyzed by Grice. In order to analyze the difference
between sentence meaning and speaker meaning, Grice (1975, pp 2630) postulated a
general Cooperative Principle and four maxims specifying how to be cooperative:
Cooperative Principle. Contribute what is required by the accepted purpose of the
conversation.
Maxim of Quality. Make your contribution true; so do not convey what you believe
false or unjustified.
Maxim of Quantity. Make your contribution as informative as is required for the
current purposes of the exchange. Do not make your contribution more informative
than is required.
Maxim of Relation. Be relevant.
Maxim of Manner. Be perspicuous; so avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and strive
for brevity and order.
According to Grice it is common knowledge that people generally follow these rules for
efficient communication and, so long as there are no indications to the contrary, assume
that others also adhere to the maxims. Cases in which the speaker leaves certain elements
implicit, yet the listener still understands what he means over and above what he literally
says, can then be explained by assuming that, in combination with the cooperative
principle, these maxims enable the language users to convey conversational implicatures.
So, if a speaker is able to adhere to the maxims, yet deliberately and openly violates one of
the maxims, even though there is no reason to suppose that he has completely abandoned
the cooperative principle, then it is possible to derive a conversational implicature.
In order to give a more precise description of inferring conversational implicatures
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) propose to combine the maximes of Grice with
Searles conditions for the performance of illocutionary acts. For the performance of an
assertive the preparatory conditions are that the speaker has reasons for acceptance the
truth of the propositional content and the sincerity condition is belief. For the performance
of a commissive the propositional content condition is that the propositional content
represents a future course of action of the speaker, the preparatory condition is that the
speaker is able to perform this course of action and the sincerity condition is intention. For
the performance of a directive the propositional content condition is that the propositional
content represents a future course of action of the hearer, the preparatory condition is that
the hearer is able to perform this course of action and the sincerity condition is desire. For
the performance of a declarative there are no special propositional content conditions, the
preparatory condition is that the speaker is capable of bringing about the state of affairs
represented in the propositional content solely in virtue of the performance of the speech

769

act and the sincerity conditions are belief and desire. For the performance of an expressive
there are no general propositional content, preparatory and sincerity conditions. But most
expressives have propositional content conditions (you cannot apologize for the law of
modus ponens), the preparatory condition that the propositional content is true and the
sincerity condition about a state of affairs that the speaker presupposes to obtain.
These conditions presuppose Grices Cooperation Principle and can be viewed as
specifications of the four maxims. Let us now try to explain how a hearer is able to derive
an insult in our examples. The line of reasoning of the public prosecution defending the
standpoint that an utterance counts as an insult would be s follows.
Someone who calls a police-officer a homo implicates an insult by openly violating
one of the maxims. When the assertive is not true, the speaker violates the maxime of
quality, or in terms of the conditions for performing an assertive, the speaker infringes the
preparatory and sincerity conditions. When the assertive is true the speaker violates the
maxime of relevance, or in terms of the conditions for performing an assertive, the speaker
violates the essential rule, because there is no sense or point.
The fired employee who compares his employer with Pontius Pilatus does not say
that his dismissal is like the condemnation of Jesus, but he is implicating it by openly
violating the maxime of quality, or more precise the preparatory and sincerity conditions
for an assertive illocutionary act.
Someone who greets a police-officer with Heil Hitler implicates an insult by
openly violating the maxime of relation, or more precise the sincerity conditions for
performing an expressive illocutionary act. Someone who promises or threats a policeofficer to fuck him implicates an insult by openly violating the maxime of quality of
relation, or more precise the preparatory and sincerity conditions for performing a
commissive illocutionary act.
Saying or implicating that the Holocaust did not happen counts as an insult because
it is (or counts as) a violation of the maxime of quality. In terms of the conditions for
performing the assertive illocutionary act this utterance can be analyzed as a violation of
the preparatory and maybe also the sincerity conditions for performing an assertive
illocutionary act.
5. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTRAINTS OF TOPOICAL STRATEGIC
MANEUVERING IN CASES OF INDIRECT INSULTING
The analyses of insulting shows that there are three kinds of institutional constraints of
strategic maneuvering: statutory constraints, constraints developed in case law and
constraints regarding language. In cases of indirect insulting the rules of conversational
implicatures are highly relevant constraints for the analysis of topical strategic
maneuvering. The examples of indirect insulting illustrate two important characteristics of
conversational implicatures. The first is that the presence of the implicature must be
capable of being worked out for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the
intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as
a conversational implicature. The second characteristic is that a conversational implicature
is always contextually cancellable if one can find situations in which the utterance would
simply not carry the implicature (Grice 1989:44). In other words, in using an indirect
insult there is plausible deniability. These two characteristics are the explanation for the

770

topical space in discussions about the accusation of an indirect insult. The party who
claims that a certain illocutionary act carries the implicature insulting and the
perlocutionary effect being insulted claims that there are good arguments for this
standpoint, given the conventional meaning of the utterance and the conventional rules for
conversations. Because of the plausible deniability the accused can argue that there was no
insult at all. In the examples mentioned this was precise one of the types of argumentation
to defend the standpoint that there was no insult.
Let us to illustrate this point take a closer look to the argumentation in the case
Stop the Cancer called Islam Is it possible to analyze this utterance as implicating an
insult because the writer openly violates one of the maxims or conditions for performing a
directive illocutionary act? The analysis of the utterance as an open violation of the
maxime of quality and the sincerity conditions for the performance of an assertive Islam
is not a cancer can easily be countered with the argument that it was meant
metaphorically. The analysis of the utterance as a violation of the maxime of relation and
the essential condition for an assertive, can be countered by arguing that this utterance was
part of a public debate. This was in fact the point the defence made in this case.

REFERENCES
Eemeren, F.H. van (2010). Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse. Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing
Company.
Eemeren, F.H. van & R. Grootendorst (1984). Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions. A Theoretical
Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed toward Solving Conflicts of Opinion. Dordrecht:
Foris.
Eemeren, F.H. van & P. Houtlosser (2006). Strategic manoeuvering: A synthetic recapitulation.
Argumentation, 16, 349-367.
Grice, H.P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In Cole and Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech
Acts. (pp. 43-58). New York: Academic Press.
Grice, H.P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kloosterhuis, H.T.M. (2012). The Logic of Indirect Insulting in Legal Discussions. A Speech Act
Perspective. In Explorations in Language and Law. An international, peer-reviewed publication
series (pp. 69-82). Aprilia: NOVALOGOS/Ortica editrice soc. coop.
Lewis, D.K. ( 1977). Convention; a Philosophical study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Searle, J.R. (1971). What is a Speech Act?. In J.R. Searle (ed.), The Philosophy of Language (pp. 39-53).
London: Oxford University Press,
Searle, J. R and D. Vanderveken (1985). Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

771

Classifying Argumentation/Reasoning Schemes Proper Within The

New Rhetoric Project
Takuzo Konishi
Department of English Language and Communication
Showa Womens University
Japan, 154-8533
Email address: QYZ01167@nifty.com

ABSTRACT: Previous research on the New Rhetoric Projects classification categories for
argumentation/reasoning schemes has dismissed three overarching categories association, dissociation, and
breaking of connecting links, and focused on specific schemes proper. Challenging this communal
understanding of the Project about the classification of schemes proper, this article will reconfigure the
relationship between the overarching categories and schemes proper. In this process, a forth overarching
category, or re-confirming of connecting links will be proposed and defended.
KEYWORDS: adherence, argumentation/reasoning schemes proper, association, audience, breaking of
connecting links, dissociation, New Rhetoric Project (NRP), and re-configuring of connecting links

1. INTRODUCTION
Since Arthur Hastings dissertation on mode of reasoning was re-discovered in mid-1980s,
research on argumentation/reasoning schemes1 has flourished. Pragma-Dialecticians,
rhetoricians, informal logicians, and computer scientists have written on the topic, which
has helped argumentation schemes to gain presence within the community of
argumentation scholars.
Before the research on argumentation schemes became significant, Chaim
Perelman and Lucie-Olbrechts Tyteca examined various schemes/techniques of
argumentation in their New Rhetoric Project (NRP). In classifying argumentation schemes
proper, the NRP offers three overarching categories: association, dissociation, and
breaking of connecting links. With association, arguers assemble entities that are thought
to be different into a single unity, using techniques such as quasi-logical arguments,
arguments based on the structure of the real, and arguments establishing the structure of
the real. Each of these subcategories have their sub-subcategories under which specific
argumentation schemes proper, such as argument from sign, analogical argument, or
causal argument are discussed.
With dissociation, arguers dissemble what is originally thought to be a single
unified entity into two or more different entities by introducing criteria for differentiation.
Using dissociation, they help their audience members see the situation in a new light and
attempt to persuade them to accept it. In short, dissociation attempts to establish a
1

While many scholars use argumentation scheme as a key phrase, the author follows J. Anthony Blairs
position that schemes are predicated of reasoning (mental act of inferring) and argument (social speech act
between parties) (Blair, 2001, pp. 372-373). This position is consistent with the New Rhetoric Project that
considers self-deliberation (internal argumentation with arguers themselves) is an variation of argumentation
with others.

772

conceptual distinction and a hierarchy within what is believed to be a single and united
entity.
In discussing dissociation, the NRP briefly refers to breaking of connecting links as
a third category. This third category is referred to as opposition to the establishment of the
connection, interdependence, or unity constructed by association.
In the first three chapters we examined connecting links in argumentation that have the effect of
making interdependent elements that could originally be considered independent. Opposition to the
establishment of such an interdependence will be displayed by a refusal to recognize the existence
of a connecting link. Objection will, in particular, take the form of showing that a link considered to
have been accepted, or one that was assumed or hoped for, does not exist, because there are no
grounds for stating or maintaining that certain phenomena under consideration exercise an influence
on those which are under discussion and it is consequently irrelevant to take the former into
account. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 411)

In the breaking of connecting links, audience members mistakenly accept or assume that a
key entity in the premise constitutes one and the same unity at the beginning of
argumentation when it is actually made up of distinctively different entities; the inferential
process reveals the audience members confusion and advances the thesis that reveals the
distinction that exists. Forcing the audience members to recognize their confusion and
understand the lack of connection can be substantiated by actual or mental experience, by
changes in the conditions governing a situation, and, more particularly, in the sciences, by
the examination of certain variables (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 411).
While the NRP does not claim to be exhaustive in its treatment of argumentation
schemes, the three categories seem to be general enough to encompass different scheme
types. However, argumentation scholars have criticized its weaknesses (Eemeren, Garssen,
Krabbe, Henkemans, Verheij, and Wagemans, 2014, pp. 291-292; Kienpointner, 1987, p.
39). A strong criticism against the NRP on its treatment of argumentation schemes proper
comes from Kienpointner. He states that:
(T)he same scheme can be seen as means of association and dissociation, or with other words,
means of justification and refutation. As most dissociative pairs correspond to associative schemes
(which correspond on their turn to the types of warrants of the standard catalogue), I content myself
to present the associative schemes. (Kienpointner, 1987, p. 283)

With this line of criticism he denies the necessity of the overarching categories of
association, dissociation, and breaking of connecting links. Instead, he examines only
argumentation schemes proper used for association, disregarding ones used for
dissociation. Since his criticism denies the need for the triad categories and urges us to
focus only on argumentation schemes proper, it constitutes a serious challenge to the
NRPs classification of argumentation. Therefore, it calls for our investigation.
In light of Kienpointners strong criticism, this article will attempt to inquire into
the overarching categories of argumentation proposed by the NRP and redeem its
treatment of argumentation schemes. Four key issues to be discussed in this article are as
follows:

773

(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

How clear are the NRPs overarching categories to classify argumentation schemes,
based on association, dissociation, and breaking of connecting links?
How are three overarching categories and argumentation schemes proper related to
each other?
How good are previous secondary research works on the NRP on its treatment of
argumentation schemes by Kienpointner, Gross and Dearin, and Warnick and her
colleagues?
How comprehensive are the three overarching categories to classify argumentation
schemes? In the following sections, this article will examine these key issues in this
order for better situating the NRPs approach to classify argumentation schemes
proper within the current research on argumentation schemes, while keeping
consistent with the spirit of the Project.

2. HOW CLEAR ARE THE NRPS OVERCARCHING CATEGORIES TO CLASSIFY

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES?
Kienpointner claims that there is no need for the classification categories based on
association and dissociation because one and the same scheme can be used both with
association and dissociation. For this reason he has dismissed dissociative schemes and
focused only on associative schemes. Although he does not support his thesis against the
NRP, actual texts of the NRP support his thesis. When discussing incompatibility as an
instance of association, Perelman explicitly states that:
if we want to resolve an incompatibility and not just put it off, we must sacrifice one of the two
conflicting rules, or at least recast the incompatibility by a dissociation of ideas. (Perelman, 1982,
p. 61).

Besides, when he discusses implicit dissociation, he refers to tautology another instance

of association.
A writer does not have to make explicit reference to a philosophical pair or one of its terms for the
reader to introduce a dissociation spontaneously, when faced with a text that would be incoherent
and tautological, and hence insignificant, without it. (Perelman, 1982, p. 135).

Furthermore, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca state that it is possible to interpret any

analogy can be interpreted as dissociation although they assign sections for analyzing
analogy under association (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 429). Since
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca admit that these argumentation schemes proper can be
used both with association and dissociation, Kienpointner rightly observes that there is
some vagueness in the NRPs classificatory system of argumentation schemes. From the
textual support for the thesis advanced by Kienpointner, we must, at least, accept part of
his thesis that one and the same scheme proper can be used with association and
dissociation. Although it must be examined whether the association-dissociation
categories are necessary, suffice it to say that the NRP is vague in its development of
classifying argumentation schemes proper.

774

3. HOW ARE THREE OVERARCHING CATEGORIES AND SCHEMES PROPER

RELATED TO EACH OTHER?
Kienpointners criticism exposes some weaknesses in the NRPs classification categories
for argumentation schemes proper. However, those categories can be coherently
coordinated with schemes proper with a more careful scrutiny of the NRP. This article
argues that the three classification categories (association, dissociation, and breaking of
connecting links) are different from schemes proper, so it is a category mistake to reduce
the former to the latter and examine only associative argumentation schemes.
For us to better understand the overarching categories, we must first revisit the aim
of argumentation and the internal structure of a unit of argument as defined by the NRP. In
discussing non-formal argumentative discourse, Perelman states as follows:
The purpose of the discourse in general is to bring the audience to the conclusions offered by the
orator, starting from premises that they already accept which is the case unless the orator has been
guilty of a petitio principi. The argumentative process consists in establishing a link by which
acceptance, or adherence, is passed from one element to another..., and this can be reached either by
leaving the various elements of the discourse unchanged and associated as they are or by making a
dissociation of ideas. (Perelman, 1979, pp. 18-19)

This short passage emphasizes that argumentation is conducted for increasing adherence
of audience members to the thesis/conclusion of arguments. An argument starts with
premises that audience members accept, then bring them to the conclusion with the
assistance of the argumentative process. This argumentative process is also called schemes
or techniques of argumentation in the NRP, and association and dissociation are
extensively discussed, with breaking of connecting links being concisely described.
While Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas descriptions of these three categories are
fuzzy, they informs us of key nature of rhetorical arguments. These three categories draw
on audience members adherence as a general principle and classify premises and theses,
as well as argumentation schemes. They classify types of premise and inform us whether
audience members rightly or mistakenly regard key entities in the premise as unified or
different, how the inferential process transforms their adherence or corrects their
confusion, and whether the thesis establishes or clarifies a unity or a division. Since the
three categories go beyond the inferential process and also cover audience members
adherence to both premise and thesis, none of the three categories are identified with or
reduced to argumentation schemes proper. Instead, they inform us of the functions that
each of the constituent parts of an argument serve in transforming audience members
adherence or correcting their confusion. From the roles that the three categories play in
classifying the constituent parts of the argument and informing their functions, we can
presume that the categories are relevant to and shed light on argumentation schemes
proper, although that they feature a wider scope than argumentation schemes proper. The
three categories function as umbrella terms that inform us of the function of the
constituent parts of the argument in terms of the audience. However, it would be a mistake
to reduce them to argumentation schemes proper, for they are just as relevant to
argumentation schemes as they are to premises and theses. Figure 1 summarizes specific
features of association, dissociation, and breaking of connecting links in light of the three
components of arguments:

775

Name
Association

Audiences
adherence to the
premise set
two or more
different entities
a single whole

Function of the
scheme

uniting different
entities
Dissociation
subdividing an entity
in accordance with a
hierarchy
Breaking of
mistaken adherence clarifying the
connecting links
to a single whole
existing but
unrecognized
distinction
Figure 1. Summary of three categories of arguments

Thesis
a single whole
two or more subentities
two or more
different entities

4. HOW GOOD ARE PREVIOUS SECONDARY RESEARCH WORKS ON THE

NRPS TREATMENT OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES?
Based on the theses advanced in the previous sectiona, the previous research on the NRPs
approach to argumentation schemes proper seems to commit categorical mistakes. This
section of the article will examine some of the previous research that has dealt with the
NRPs treatment of argumentation schemes.
As the previous section of this article has revealed, Kienpointner has rightly
understood that one scheme can be used with association and dissociation. However, his
dismissal of dissociation and breaking of connecting links and his exclusive focus on
(sub-)subcategories of association fail to account for the roles that association,
dissociation, and breaking of connecting links play in modifying audience members
adherence to the premise and linking it to the thesis. Additionally, he fails to advance our
understanding of the relationships between the three-partite categories and argumentation
schemes proper. While it is possible to advance our understanding of argumentation
schemes proper without referring to the three-partite classification categories as
Kienpointner has done, the role and the significance of the audience members adherence
become much more evident when we relate argumentation schemes proper to the
overarching categories. Argumentation schemes proper generally lead the audience
members to adhere to the thesis based on the acceptable premise. Still, the three-partite
categories tell us more about how the audience members adherence is transferred from
the premise to the thesis by resorting to a particular argumentation scheme proper. Given
the central role that the audience plays in the NRP, Kienpointners dismissal inadequately
recaptures the role of argumentation schemes in the Project at the theoretical level. At the
practical level, his dismissal may end in insufficient incorporation of the conception of
audience in analysis and appraisal of argumentative texts. As a research program aiming to
advance our understanding on argumentation schemes proper, Kienpointners approach,
which focuses only on argumentation schemes proper, is reasonable. However, as a
research program aiming to grasp argumentation schemes proper within a theoretical
framework emphasizing the role of the audience, his scope is too narrow to be

776

comprehensive on theoretical or practical grounds. Therefore, while he seems to have

rightly observed the relationships between the classification categories based on
association, dissociation, and breaking of connecting links and argumentation schemes
proper, his dismissal of the classification categories is off the mark in light of the NRPs
emphasis on audience. To put it simply, Kienpointner is not rhetorical enough in dealing
with argumentation schemes proper.
While Kienpointner has dismissed dissociative arguments, Gross and Dearin, and
Warnick and Kline have mistakenly treated dissociation per se as an argumentation
scheme proper. However, they do not discuss association per se as an argumentation
scheme proper. Instead, they discuss (sub-)subcategories of association as argumentation
schemes proper. For example, Gross and Dearin assign one chapter to each of quasilogical arguments, arguments from the structure of reality, arguments establishing the
structure of reality, and dissociation (Gross and Dearin, 2003, pp. 43-97). Warnick and
Kline set up a similar classification categories and discussed thirteen argumentation
schemes proper, which includes dissociation per se. In both cases, while dissociation per
se is treated as an argumentation schemes proper, association per se is not examined at all,
so we are at a loss why or in what respect association is necessary in the classification of
argumentation schemes. Furthermore, these scholars do not consider Kienpointners
criticism and fail to account for (sub-)subcategories of association used with dissociation,
such as incompatibility, tautology, or analogy.
Example (1) below shows that a so-called associative argumentation scheme is
used with dissociation, thereby questioning the line of research pursued by Gross and
Dearin, and Warnick and Kline. Toshisada Takada, a Japanese military officer stationing
on the Amami Islands in Japan (to the north of Okinawa Prefecture) at the end of WWII,
was demanded to sign a disarmament document. He used dissociation based on argument
from consequence and denied signing the document unless it was revised.
(1)

Premise: The U.S. Tenth Army adheres to the understanding that the Amami
Islands are Northern Ryukyu.
Scheme: While the Amami Islands can historically be regarded as Northern
Ryukyu, they ought to be viewed as part of Kagoshima Prefecture for the purpose
of carrying out disarmament of the Japanese Army stationed on the Amami Islands.
Thesis: The Amami Islands are classified as part of Kagoshima Prefecture, rather
than Northern Ryukyu. (adapted from Takada, 1965, pp. 96-97)

In his attempt to counter the adherence by the US Tenth Army that was in charge of the
negotiation, Takada introduces two ways to understand the Amami Islands: historical and
administrative. Administratively, the Amami Islands had been part of Kagoshima
Prefecture from the second half of the 19th century through to the end of World War II.
This position is opposed to the American position that links the Amami Islands to Ryukyu,
an old name for Okinawa Prefecture. By emphasizing his own understanding of
geographical and historical conditions of the Islands, Takada discredits the American
interpretation in light of the goal of the argumentative situation. Since the disarmament of
the Japanese Army is the goal of the argumentative exchange between Takada and the U.S.
Tenth Army, the historical perspective associating the Amami Islands with Northern
Ryukyu is unconvincing to Takada and the Japanese Army. In contrast, the administrative

777

perspective would lead to the desired end of disarming the Japanese Army in the area.
This way, the Amami-as-Kagoshima thesis is more cogent than the Amami-as-Ryukyu
thesis in this particular argumentative situation because of the potential consequences the
former would likely bring about. In other words, the scheme used in this instance is
pragmatic argument, or argument from the consequence, which is classified as a type of
arguments based on the structure of reality. This dissociative argument confirms
Kienpointners criticism that one scheme can be used with association and dissociation. It
also confirms the authors position that association, dissociation, and breaking of
connecting links are overarching categories to classify argumentation schemes proper,
rather than schemes proper per se.
In summary, Kienpointners criticism against the NRP makes sense, but his
research does not account for the overall picture of the three-partite categories in light of
the audience. Gross and Dearin, and Warnick and Kline commit a categorical mistake and
do not fully account for association per se and roles that argumentation schemes proper
plays in dissociative arguments. Figure 2 summarizes what the previous scholarship by
Kienpointner, Gross and Dearin, and Warnick and Kline.

Name
Association
Dissociation

Gross and Dearin; Warnick

and Kline
Association per se is not analyzed; argumentation schemes
proper is analyzed through subcategories of association.
Dissociation is not analyzed Dissociation per se is
at all.
analyzed as a type of
argumentation schemes
proper.
not analyzed
not analyzed
Kienpointner

Breaking of connecting
links
Figure 2. Summary of previous research on argumentation schemes proper in the NRP

5. HOW COMPREHENSIVE ARE THE THREE OVERARCHING CATEGORIES TO

CLASSIFY ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES PROPER?
The NRP has not claimed exhaustiveness in its treatment of argumentation schemes proper.
However, for making the overarching categories more comprehensive, this article argues
that there should be a fourth overarching category to classify argumentation schemes
proper. Since this fourth type forces the audience members to recognize already-existing
connecting links, it is called re-confirming of connecting links. The argument for the
existence of the fourth category hinges on the nature of breaking of connecting links and
its relation to dissociation; therefore this article initially deals with the relationship
between breaking of connecting links and dissociation, then that between dissociation and
association.
The NRP has repeatedly emphasized that association and dissociation are two main
categories and concisely described breaking of connecting links. In those concise
descriptions, the NRP has consistently dealt with breaking of connecting links in contrast

778

with dissociation. It is characterized as opposition to establishing associations or as

techniques clarifying the existing divisions in the entities dealt in the premises of
arguments. In other words, arguers make use of breaking of connecting links to force the
audience members to accept that they fail to recognize the existing division.
While the NRP treats association and dissociation extensively, only dissociation
has a complementary category called breaking of connecting links. If association is
actually the other main category, then it must have same or similar qualifications, because
two entities sharing essential characteristics must be treated in the same manner, according
to the rule of justice that the NRP endorses. The NRP does not offer reasoning contrary to
this speculative position. Therefore, we can presume that association must have a
complementary pair including association and something else. Here comes the need for a
fourth category of arguments.
Because the fourth category, or re-confirming of connecting links forces the
audience members to recognize their mistaken adherence to the entities dealt with in the
premise set, it is to association what breaking of connecting links to dissociation. In this
fourth category of argument, audience members mistakenly accept or assume that
premises constitute different entities when they actually constitute a single whole. The
inferential process reveals the audience members mistaken adherence and advances the
thesis, revealing the unity that actually exists but goes unnoticed by the audience.
As the dissociation starts with audience members adherence that the premise
constitutes a single whole, the association starts with their adherence that the premise is
composed of different entities. In contrast, the re-confirming of connecting links starts
with their mistaken adherence that the premise is composed of different entities, although
it actually constitutes a single whole. The inferential process of the association combines
those different entities into a single whole, whereas that of the re-confirming of connecting
links clarifies their mistaken adherence and forces them to understand that the premise set
originally constitutes a single whole. The thesis of the association presents a single whole
as a result of the inferential process, whereas that of the re-confirming of connecting links
presents the originally existing single whole in a clearer manner. In other words, while the
association transforms the audience members adherence to the premise by bringing
separate entities together, the re-confirming of connecting links corrects their mistaken
adherence to the premise by having them understand that they have confused a single
entity with separate entities as the starting point of the argument. In conclusion, while the
NRP focuses on the association and the dissociation as two main categories of argument
and briefly discusses the breaking of connecting links, the existence of the re-confirming
of connecting links is logically implied by these three categories, according to the rule of
justice. With re-confirming of connecting links being added to the existing three categories,
the NRPs categories of arguments are summarized in figure 3:

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Name
Association

Audiences
adherence to the
premise set
two or more
different entities
a single whole

Function of the
scheme

uniting different
entities
Dissociation
subdividing an entity
in accordance with a
hierarchy
Breaking of
mistaken adherence clarifying the
connecting links
to a single whole
existing but
unrecognized
distinction
Re-confirming of
mistaken adherence clarifying the
connecting links
to two ore more
existing but
different entities
unrecognized unity
Figure 3. Summary of four categories of arguments

Thesis
a single whole
two or more subentities
two or more
different entities

a single whole

Having speculatively argued for the existence of the fourth category, the onus is on the
author to substantiate the thesis being advanced. In the following self-deliberation
arguments, Haruki Murakami, a well-known Japanese novelist, argued with himself about
whether a Aum Shinrikyos sarin gas attack victim suffered from different types of
violence from Aum Shinrikyo and the company he worked for. He was forced to quit after
the gas attack because he could not perform well due to the aftereffect of the attack.
(2)

Premise: A victim of the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system suffered
from excessive violence twice.
Scheme: The excessive violence can be subdivided into the violence of an
abnormal society, Aum Shinrikyo and that of normal society, a company, with
normal society being more regular and reasonable than the abnormal.
Thesis: The violence by Aum Shinrikyo is more deserving of condemnation than
that by the company.

(3)

Premise: The two types of excessive violence seem to emerge from the same root.
Suppressed Scheme: The same root must have caused two different types of
violence.
Thesis: The distinction between the two types of excessive violence are not
persuasive to the victim of both. (Adapted from Murakami, 2001, pp. 3-4)2

In example (2), Murakami attempts to dissociate different types of violence based on

where the two violent acts come from. In example (3), however, he corrects his own
thinking that the violent acts are two different entities. By directing his attention to the
same metaphorical roots of the acts, he concludes that the two acts are the same. Since he
makes himself recognize the unrecognized unity among the violent acts, it is an instance of
2

Since English translation of Murakamis work omits some text, the author has referred to both English and
Japanese edition.

780

re-confirming of connecting links. With the quality of these arguments being set aside,
example (3) is a clear instantiation of re-confirming of connecting links.
6. CONCLUSION
In this article, the author has extended Kienpointners criticism against the NRPs
treatment of argumentation schemes proper. First, this article has acknowledged his
criticism that the NRP is not clear about its classification framework of argumentation
schemes proper. Next, this article has clarified the relationship between the overarching
classification categories of argument (association, dissociation, breaking of connecting
links and re-confirming of connecting links) and argumentation schemes proper,
concluding that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. In light of this theoretical
discussion, this article has critiqued previous secondary research on argumentation
schemes proper from a NRPs point of view, because it fails to account for the
significance of the audience or distinguish the overarching categories from argumentation
schemes proper. Finally, this article has added re-confirming of connecting links to the
existing overarching categories based on the rule of justice that the NRP endorses. While
the author admits that further case studies are needed to substantiate all the claims
advanced in this article, this article has made a presumptively cogent case on how to
classify argumentation schemes in accordance with the NRP.
Topics that merit further inquiries concerning the NRPs treatment of
argumentation schemes include (1) compilation of specific argumentation schemes proper
used in dissociation, breaking of connecting links and re-confirming of connecting links,
and (2) development of an approach to argument evaluation and criticism that incorporates
audience. The first research topic is geared more toward empirical, and the second one is
geared toward theoretical as well as empirical. As has been recently discussed by Johnson
(2013) and Tindale (2013), the notion of audience calls for theoretical development as
well as empirical substantiation. While there is no doubt that audience must play the
central role in New Rhetorical theories of argumentation, discussion has been going on
about how to crystallize the notion of audience although there has been no consensus
(Crosswhite, 1996; Gross and Dearin, 2003; Jorgensen, 2009; Tindale, 1999, 2004).
Discussing audience at the theoretical level through substantive evidence, we can
hopefully refine our views on this challenging construct, thereby enriching the field of
rhetorical argumentation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This article is based on the authors dissertation at University of Pittsburgh. I thank
Gordon Mitchell, John Lyne, E. Johanna Hartelius, Nicholas Rescher, and Merrilee H.
Salmon for their guidance and support.
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Argumentation 15, 365-379.
Crosswhite, J. (1996). The rhetoric of reason: Writing and the attractions of argument. Madison, WI:
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Eemeren, F. H. van, Garssen, B., Henkemans, A. F. S., Verheij, B., & Wagemans, J. H. M. (2014).
Handbook of argumentation theory. Dordrecht, Netherlands.
Gross, A. G. & Dearin, R. D. (2003). Chaim Perelman. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Johnson, R. H. (2013). The role of audience in argumentation from the perspective of informal logic.
Philosophy and Rhetoric 46.4, 533-549.
Jorgensen, C. (2009). Interpreting Perelmans universal audience: Gross versus Crosswhite. Argumentation
23, 11-19.
Kienpointner, M. (1987). Towards a typology of argumentative schemes. In Frans H. van Eemeren, Rob
Grootendorst, J. Anthony Blair, and Charles A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation: Across the lines of
discipline (pp. 275-287). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Murakami, H. (1999). Underground, Paperback ed. Tokyo: Kodansha.
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International.
Perelman, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. Translated by
John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver. Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press.
Perelman, C. (1979). The new rhetoric and the humanities: Essays on rhetoric and its application.
Dordrecht: Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979.
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Notre Dame Press, 1982.
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Reprint ed. Kagoshima, Japan: Amamisha.
Tindale, C. W. (1999). Acts of arguing: A rhetorical model of argument. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Tindale, C. W. (2004). Rhetorical argumentation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Tindale C. W. (2013). Rhetorical argumentation and the nature of audience: Toward an understanding of
audience Issues in argumentation. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 46.4, 508-532.
Warnick, B. & Kline, S. L. (1992). The new rhetorics argument schemes: A rhetorical view of practical
reasoning. Argumentation and Advocacy 29, 1-15.

782

The Study Of Reasoning In The Lvov-Warsaw School As A

Predecessor Of And Inspiration For Argumentation Theory
Marcin Koszowy & Michal Araszkiewicz
Department of Logic, Informatics and Philosophy of Science
University of Biaystok
Poland
koszowy@uwb.edu.pl
Department of Legal Theory
Jagiellonian University in Krakw
Poland
michal.araszkiewicz@uj.edu.pl

ABSTRACT: The hypothesis proposed in this paper holds that the Polish logico-methodological tradition of the
Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS) has a chance to become an inspiring pillar of argumentation studies. To justify this
claim we show that some ideas regarding classifications of reasoning may be applied to enrich the study of
argument structures and we argue that Frydmans constructive account of legal interpretation of statutes is an
important predecessor of contemporary constructivism in legal argumentation.
KEYWORDS: classifications of reasoning, argument structures, schemes for fallacious reasoning, legal
constructivism, the Lvov-Warsaw School

1. INTRODUCTION
The motivation for this paper lies in exploring possible applications of the heritage of the
Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS) in argumentation theory. After presenting a wider map of
current research strands and future systematic applications of the LWS tradition in
contemporary argument studies (Koszowy & Araszkiewicz, 2014), in this paper we focus on
the study of reasoning as one particular area of inquiry which constituted the core concern of
the LWS. The main justification of the need of focusing on the inquiry into the nature of
reasoning in the LWS is twofold. Firstly, it manifests clearly that apart from purely formal
accounts, the School elaborated the broader pragmatic approach to reasoning which may be
also of interest for argumentation theorists. Secondly, it may be particularly inspiring for
contemporary argument studies because of the possibility of applying it in (i) argument
reconstruction and representation and (ii) identifying the structure of fallacious reasoning.
The research hypothesis proposed in this paper holds that the Polish logicomethodological tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS) has a chance to become an
important theoretical pillar of contemporary study of argumentation. This hypothesis may be
justified by undertaking systematic inquiry which would show that some key ideas of the
LWS may be applied in developing some crucial branches of the contemporary study of
argumentation. In order to argue that such an inquiry is a legitimate research project, we will
show that apart from the developments of formal logic which are associated with the works of
such outstanding logicians and philosophers as Tarski, Leniewski or ukasiewicz, in the
LWS there was also present a strong pragmatic movement which may be associated e.g. with
the works of Ajdukiewicz. Moreover, our aim is also to show that even purely formal
approaches to reasoning (e.g. the theory of rejected propositions proposed by ukasiewicz)
may turn out to be inspiring for argument analysis and representation.

783

In this paper, we will discuss two areas of applying ideas of LWS: argumentation schemes
and legal argumentation. The aim of the paper will be accomplished in following steps. In
section 2 we will sketch an outline of those research areas in the LWS which might be
particularly interesting for argument studies. This preparatory discussion will constitute an
introduction to Section 3 which is aimed at discussing the issue of applicability of LWS ideas
regarding classifications of reasoning in argument representation. In Section 4, we will
discuss the second area of applying the tradition of LWS in the study of argumentation is the
domain of legal argumentation. We will argue that Frydmans constructive account of legal
interpretation of statutes (1936) is an important predecessor of a contemporary view in theory
of legal argumentation referred to as constructivism and advanced for instance by Hage
(2013). Finally, in the concluding section, we will sketch an answer to the question of how the
two specific contexts discussed in the paper form a good starting point for a broader research
project concerning application of methods and ideas developed in the LWS to contemporary
open problems of argumentation theory.
2. KEY RESEARCH STRANDS IN THE LWS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF
ARGUMENT STUDIES
The Lvov-Warsaw School was ambitious philosophical enterprise (1895-1939) established by
Kazimierz Twardowski in Lww (see Woleski, 1989, Ch. 1; Lapointe, Woleski, Marion &
Miskiewicz, 2009, Eds.). It is depicted as the most important movement in the history of
Polish philosophy (Woleski, 2013) the development of which is associated with the golden
age of science and letters in Poland (Simons, 2002). Despite of the fact that the heritage of
the LWS is most famous for the developments of formal logic, thanks to such thinkers as
ukasiewicz, Leniewski, Tarski, Sobociski, Mostowski, Lejewski, and Jakowski, it also
encompasses a great variety of ideas in almost all fields of philosophy, including
epistemology, ontology, philosophy of language, philosophy of argument, methodology of
science, legal theory, ethics and aesthetics (e.g. Woleski, 1989; Jadacki, 2009; Woleski,
2013).
It might be a matter of some interest that the logical studies within the LWS focused
not only on formal logic, but the school also developed the strong pragmatic approach to logic
(Koszowy, 2010; Koszowy, 2013; Koszowy & Araszkiewicz, 2014). Note that even those
representatives of the LWS who may be considered as purely formal logicians also shared
their interest in practical applications of logical theories. A clear illustration of this pragmatic
thread is Tarskis view on employing logic in everyday communication. In the preface of the
1995 edition of his Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences,
Tarski points to two ideas of this kind: (i) logical foundations of successful communication
as logic makes the meaning of concepts precise in its own field, and stresses the necessity of
such a precision in other areas, and hence leads to the possibility of better understanding
between those who have the will to do so, and (ii) logical foundations of identifying
fallacious reasoning as logic perfects and sharpens the tools of thought and therefore it
makes people more critical and thus makes less likely their being misled by all the pseudoreasonings to which they are in various parts of the world incessantly exposed today (Tarski,
1995, p. xi). The latter point raised by Tarski also gives a practical reason why the
systematic study of reasoning (and of typical fallacies involved in it) constituted the core
concern of the logical studies in the LWS.
An example area of possible applications of the LWS heritage in the study of
argument structures is Bocheskis analyses of One hundred superstitions (dogmas) (1994).
Major affinities between this account and argumentation theory were earlier discussed in
(Koszowy and Araszkiewicz, 2014, pp. 290-292). In order to emphasize the pragmatic
784

dimension of Bocheskis approach let us only note that his main concern was to help people
to recognize those communicative mechanisms which are commonly employed in the social
sphere in order to convince people to accept false beliefs. The broad program of detecting
common errors in thinking and communicating may be seen in the fact that superstitions and
dogmas are not only described by Bocheski from the inferential perspective (which focuses
on detecting errors in reasoning), but also from the dialogical point of view (which consists of
identifying typical moves in the dialogue employed in spreading superstitions in the social
sphere), as well as within the rhetorical approach (that rests on analysing utterances aimed at
convincing someone to accept a superstition).
Since this example may be helpful in exposing some general affinities between the
LWS and argument analysis and evaluation, in what follows we will focus on answering the
question: to what extent the accounts of reasoning in the LWS may be employed in the
contemporary study of argumentation? The answer will be given by providing key reasons for
the claim that amongst a variety of possible ways of influencing science and philosophy, the
LWS has a chance to enrich the state of the art in the study of argumentation in two fields: (i)
argument structures and (ii) legal argumentation.
3. THE STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENTS
Classifications of reasoning constituted the key subject-matter of inquiry in the LWS
(Woleski 1988). The main goal of this section is to expose some methodological ideas
related to classifications of reasoning proposed by ukasiewicz, Czeowski and Ajdukiewicz
which may be instructive in reconstructing arguments.
ukasiewicz, Czeowski and Ajdukiewicz attempted to develop their own
classifications which were, amongst some other goals, aimed at achieving a better
understanding of the complex phenomenon of reasoning and of the typical kinds of reasoning
as applied in science and in philosophy. Two main approaches to classifying reasoning were
proposed by (i) ukasiewicz1 (and continued by Czeowski), and (ii) Ajdukiewicz. Whereas
ukasiewicz and Czeowski focused on the formal-logical aspect of reasoning, the
classification elaborated by Ajdukiewiczs took into account not only formal characteristic of
reasoning, but also its substantial pragmatic features what was in line with his program of
pragmatic methodology (Ajdukiewicz, 1974, pp. 185-190; see also Woleski, 1988, p. 24).
Despite of the fact that these two lines of classifying reasoning differ from each other, both of
them consist of some intuitions which may be turn out to be inspiring for those argumentation
scholars who focus on argument structures.
Some particular applications of the legacy of the LWS in the research on argument
analysis and representation were exposed by Trzsicki (2011). In this work we may find two
ideas constituting the heritage of the LWS that might turn out to be particularly useful in
representing the structure of arguments: (1) the distinction between accepted and rejected
propositions and (2) the distinction between the direction of entailment and the direction of
justification.
The first idea rests on developing argument diagramming method which employs the
distinction between four kinds of propositions: (i) asserted, (ii) rejected, (iii) suspended, and
(iv) those which are neither asserted, nor rejected, nor suspended (Trzsicki, 2011, pp. 59-60).
What might be a matter of particular interest for the project aimed at incorporating this
distinction in argument representation and analysis is the possibility of applying
ukasiewiczs account of rejected propositions (ukasiewicz, 1921; see also Supecki et al.,
1971; 1972) in argument diagramming.
1

Observe that although ukasiewiczs classification of reasoning was rather peripheral to his major research
concerns, it turned out to be widely accepted in logic textbooks (Ajdukiewicz, 1955).

785

ukasiewicz (1921; see Supecki et al., 1971, p. 76) noticed that the modern formal logic did
not use rejection as an operation opposed to assertion. Note that even the very justification
of the study of rejected propositions given by ukasiewicz might be of interest for those who
study ancient roots of argumentation theory. According to ukasiewicz, Aristotles idea of
rejection, which has never been properly understood, could be the beginning of new logical
investigations and new problems which should have been solved (see Supecki et al, 1971, p.
76). This intuition concerning the need of the study of rejected propositions in formal logic is
in accordance with the need of representing those argumentative moves (such as attacks,
undercuts and rebuttals) which result in rejecting claims that have been put forward in
argumentation. Although ukasiewicz employed his distinction between asserted and rejected
propositions in the context of research in formal logic, as we will show, there is also a
possibility of employing it also in the field of argument representation.
The second idea elaborated within the LWS which also plays a key role in
representing argument structures is the distinction between the direction of justification and
the direction of entailment. This distinction has been employed within the diagramming
method proposed by Trzsicki (2011). For example, this method allows to represent the
structures of typical kinds of reasoning such as deduction, induction and the reasoning by
analogy:

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 1: Argument diagrams for three kinds of reasoning: (a) deduction,

(b) induction, (c) reasoning by analogy (Trzsicki, 2011).

We may here observe how the previously discussed intuitions regarding classifications of
reasoning are present in argument diagrams. In these three example diagrams, the numbers 1,
2, etc. represent propositions which have been extracted from the particular text. In the above
diagrams all propositions are asserted, however this method also allows us to distinguish all
four types of sentences: (1) asserted (e.g. 1, 2), rejected (e.g. 1, 2), suspended
(e.g.1, 2) and those which are yet neither asserted nor rejected nor suspended (and
which are represented by numbers of propositions without any additional symbols, e.g.
proposition 3 in diagrams (a) and (b)). The direction of entailment is represented by an arrow,
whereas a perpendicular dash denotes the direction of justification. In the diagram (a)
representing deductive reasoning, both premises are asserted and the direction of entailment is
in line with the direction of justification. The diagram (b) for inductive reasoning shows that
the premises justify the conclusion, but the general conclusion (such as All ravens are black)
786

entails the premises (e.g. The raven 1 is black, The raven 2 is black, etc.). Finally, the diagram
(c) for reasoning by analogy shows that the asserted premises about the well known case(s)
justify the conclusion, but the relation of entailment does not hold. Moreover, we may note
that this method enables the representation of linked (diagrams (a) and (c)), convergent (not
represented in the above diagrams) and divergent (diagram (b)) arguments. This project is in
line with the proposal of treating the LWS tradition as a point of departure for modelling the
linked-convergent distinction (see Selinger, 2014).
For the purpose of our paper it might be also interesting how Trzsickis proposal
could be compared to some basic notions which are used in argumentation theory in order to
describe the diversity of argument structures. For example, the argument diagramming
method proposed by Trzsicki may be discussed in terms of four stages of a critical discussion
within the pragma-dialectical model (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 59-62).
Amongst four stages (confrontation stage, opening stage, argumentation stage, and concluding
stage) at least two of them may be pointed out in the discussion of further areas of applying
the diagramming method proposed by Trzsicki, i.e. the confrontation and the argumentation
stage. At the confrontation stage one may apply tools presented above to identify a difference
of opinion by indicating in the diagram which propositions are asserted and which are
rejected. At the argumentation stage one may indicate in the diagram which kind of inference
has been performed, in order to apply proper criteria of argument evaluation.
Although the above discussion shows only some applications of the approach to
classifying reasoning proposed by ukasiewicz and continued by Czeowski, it is worth
noting that some ideas developed by Ajdukiewicz may also play an inspiring role for
argument studies. As early as at the stage of formulating the general motivation for building
his taxonomy of reasoning, his approach may be strikingly similar to the very rationale of
contemporary argument studies which starts from analysing everyday communication
practices. In his talk given at the 1st Conference of Logicians in 1952 in Warsaw which was
later published in Polish in Studia Logica, vol. 2 (Ajdukiewicz 1955), Ajdukiewicz presented
his critique of the taxonomy of types of reasoning proposed by ukasiewicz and Czeowski
(Woleski, 1998, p. 44). One of Ajdukiewiczs objections was that ukasiewicz and
Czeowski defined some key terms employed in defining reasoning (such as inference) in a
way which is far from their common use in natural language (Ajdukiewicz, 1955).
Ajdukiewicz focuses in particular on a critique of definitions of terms which are involved by
ukasiewicz and Czeowski in classifying reasoning. Amongst these terms there are:
reasoning, inference, proving, deduction and reduction. Since, according to
Ajdukiewicz, definitions of these and other terms depart from concepts such as reasoning and
inference present in everyday communication, some distinctions employed in classifying
various kinds of reasoning (such as the distinction between reason and consequence) are
artificial (Ajdukiewicz, 1955; see also Koszowy & Araszkiewicz, 2014, p. 287). This
pragmatic approach will be further seen in Ajdukiewiczs positive proposal of his own
taxonomy of reasoning.
Since Ajdukiewicz developed and modified his attempts at classifying reasoning,
some different proposals may be found in his works (Woleski, 1988, pp. 42-48). The latest
proposal given in Pragmatic logic (Ajdukiewicz, 1974) seems to be particularly interesting
for the purpose of this paper, because it may be treated as a clear manifesto of focusing not
only on formal, but also on pragmatic aspects of reasoning. Within his taxonomy,
Ajdukiewicz divides reasoning into two general categories: (1) conclusive, and (2) nonconclusive (Woleski, 1988, p. 47). There are two forms of conclusive reasoning: (i)
subjectively certain and (ii) subjectively uncertain. Apart from details of this classification, let
us only mention its key pragmatic features. Firstly, instead of using the notion of validity of
reasoning, Ajdukiewicz introduces the concept of conclusiveness (Woleski, 1988, p. 47).
787

Secondly, the notion of subjective uncertainty is clearly in line with those research strands in
argumentation theory which stress the need of considering human fallibility in evaluating
defeasible reasoning. Basing on these two features, we may point to the possibility of testing
whether these ideas may be also applicable in the study of reasoning in argumentation theory,
what might be the task for future inquiry.
4. LEGAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
The research conducted by the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School constitutes not
only an important source of inspiration for the general studies on argumentation, but also for
investigations concerning particular domains of argumentation, including legal
argumentation. In particular, the legal-philosophical work of Sawa Frydman, one of very few
lawyers among the LWS members, offers interesting insights into the controversy concerning
reconstructive or constructive character of legal argumentation (hereafter: the
Reconstruction/Construction Controversy, abbreviated to RCC).
The RCC may be formulated as follows (see Hage, 2013, pp. 125-126 for a broader
introduction to the problem). Legal argumentation either performs only constructive function
(the Constructivism Thesis, CT), or it is reconstructive in easy cases while constructive in
hard cases (the Reconstructivism Thesis, RT). According to the CT, legal consequences of
cases are always created by means of arguments, actually or possibly used to generate these
consequences from some relevant premises. According to the RT, the CT is only locally true
(it applies to the so-called hard cases), while in majority of cases (referred to as easy cases),
the legal consequences of cases are already there, for they are the result of operation of legal
rules, and they should simply be discovered, or reconstructed, by the law-applying organ.
It is not our purpose here to summarize the existing arguments supporting or attacking
the RT or the CT (cf. Hage, 2013, pp. 142-143). Instead, it is our intention to show how
Frydmans (1936) work may provide an import to the merits of the on-going discussion. For
the sake of self-contained character of this paper, we have to recall the basic features of
Frydmans theory of legal interpretation, briefly outlined in our past work (Koszowy &
Araszkiewicz, 2014, pp. 294-295). However, the present elaboration will go deeper into the
details of Frydmans contribution.
Sawa Frydman is the author of one of the earliest consistent proposals (1936) of
constructive account of statutory interpretation. The key technical term in this proposal is the
pattern of behaviour which is an abstract concept referring to certain possible states of
affairs (Frydman, 1936, pp. 144-145). Patterns of behaviour may be encoded in different
media, for instance in oral utterances (such as orders) and, more importantly, in statutory
texts. Patterns of behaviour may be accounted for either directly (intuitively) or indirectly (by
means of justification). The latter case of accounting for patterns of behaviour on the basis of
statutory texts is referred to as interpretation (Frydman, 1936, p. 145).
Frydmans general idea is to develop different ideal types of legal interpretation in the
Weberian sense, which would be useful in empirical investigations. He rightly observes that it
is difficult to indicate any facts that would serve as truthmakers of the statements concerning
assignment of meaning to statutory provisions. In consequence, the only part of legal statutory
interpretation that may be analyzed from scientific point of view is the relation between its
premises and its conclusion. In consequence, the process of legal interpretation is
constructive, because it depends on the set of premises which is arbitrarily adopted by the
interpreting person. Frydman defines the term objective interpretation in the following
manner: statutory interpretation is objective if an only if it is true that from the premises p, q,
r it follows that statute S contains the pattern of behaviour P (Frydman, 1936, p. 177).

788

The basic argument used by Frydman to support his thesis concerning arbitrariness of
premises used in the process of legal interpretation is the argument from plurality of theories
of interpretation. In this connection, the author reviews several important theories of statutory
interpretation discussed in the literature those days (Frydman, 1936, pp. 181-194). The
presence of these discrepant theories, often leading to contradictory conclusions, is an
indisputable fact and there are no decisive criteria that could lead to establishment of a
preference relation between them.
The second argument is based on the observation of actual legal interpretive practice.
Frydman rightly notes that the choice of interpretative arguments is dictated by practical
needs and value judgments rather than by focus on properness of a given set of adopted
assumptions. In this connection it seems implausible to seek for a right set of premises
adopted in statutory interpretation. The question concerning unique and objective sense of a
statute is an ill-formed question (Frydman, 1936, pp. 196-197).
The arbitrary choice of premises that play justificatory role coexists with the fact that
the very process of legal interpretation has well-defined structure and it encompasses the
following elements (Frydman, 1936, pp. 208-209):

the direction of interpretation that is, taking a certain class of facts into account, that
possibly lead to the establishment of the pattern of behaviour;
the material of interpretation all signs (in semantic sense of this term) that are
investigated in the process of establishment of the abovementioned facts;
the means of interpretation the use of this or that material in the scope of a given
direction of interpretation;
the premise of interpretation a statement, which defines a direction or means of
interpretation, or the order of use and significance of each direction in the process of
interpretation.

Interestingly, Frydman emphasizes the twofold role of logic in the process of statutory
interpretation. If the premises are established in a precise manner, then inference of the
conclusions is actually objective, because it is independent of the interpreting person. Hence,
Frydman insists on establishing deductive relations between premises and conclusions in
statutory interpretation. However, Frydman seems to accept also a broader account of logic,
for he argues for application of logical tools in the process of comparison and reconciliation
of results of different directions of interpretation. His brief informal account of this process
invokes the concept of belief revision, which was introduced to the literature much later
(Alchourrn, Grdenfors & Makinson, 1985).
The theoretical framework presented above is a tool designed for empirical
investigations concerning the phenomenon of statutory interpretation, and therefore it should
not be treated as a descriptive model of this phenomenon. In particular, Frydman
acknowledges that in reality some sets of premises used in the process of interpretation may
be rooted so firmly in a given community of lawyers that the interpretative results generated
by these premises may be seen as true (Frydman, 1936, p. 239). However, the existence of
such consensus is a purely empirical question: there is no necessity in assigning this and only
this pattern of behaviour to a given statutory provision. In our opinion, Frydmans account of
statutory interpretation is an important predecessor of contemporary constructive accounts of
legal reasoning. Due to its very precise formulation and deepened analyzes, the work of
Frydman could still provide valuable inspiration for the present research on the subject and
persuasive arguments supporting the CT; however, its the influence will remain limited in
foreseeable future, because the referred work has been published in Polish only. Therefore,

789

we see it purposeful to indicate the following aspects of Frydmans work that can be
particularly fruitful in the research on legal argumentation nowadays.
First, the conception of statutory interpretation discussed is one of the earliest legalphilosophical proposals which focuses on the notion of argumentation. Even if Frydman does
not use the term argument or argumentation, his analysis of the relation between premises
and conclusions of interpretative reasoning may be almost effortlessly translated into the
language of argumentation theory. Let us also emphasize that the general scheme of
interpretative reasoning outlined above may serve as a general template for development of
new argumentation frameworks for representation of statutory interpretation. In particular, the
concept of premise of interpretation is defined very broadly by Frydman, for it encompasses
not only statements that support of demote different interpretative statements, but also
statements concerning the sequence of use of different directions of interpretation, mutual
relations between them etc. In this connection, Frydmans conception may serve as a point of
departure for development of a formal model of constructive argumentation dealing with
statutory interpretation. One should note that such formal systems have been developed for
the context of Case-Based Reasoning (CBR), characteristic for the systems of law in the US
and in the UK (for instance: Bench-Capon & Sartor, 2003), but not for statutory
interpretation, connected with continental European legal culture. In the context of statutory
reasoning, Frydmans broad notion of directions of interpretation enables a researcher to
discuss and analyze a great variety of argumentation schemes that are actually used in
statutory interpretation (for a general introduction to the topic of argumentation schemes see
Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008; for an initial application of this theory to legal interpretation
see Macagno, Walton & Sartor, 2012; Araszkiewicz, 2013).
We are of the opinion that Frydmans general framework may enrich and systematize
the contemporary attempts to analyze statutory interpretation by means of different argument
schemes. Note also that according to Frydmans assumption of arbitrariness concerning
choice of premises in interpretative reasoning, we obtain a negative result concerning the
possibility of establishing a definitive preference relation between different methods of legal
interpretation. However, this does not preclude defining local, or tentative, preference
relations: the set of premises of interpretation encompasses also statements concerning
relative significance of directions of interpretation. This contention makes it plausible to state
that the preference relations between conclusions stemming from different premises could
play an important role in a model of statutory interpretation based on Frydmans conception.
Their determination would presumably take plays on the second logical layer of the process
of interpretation, when different conclusions, presumably inconsistent, conclusions, are
compared and revised.
Second, it is worth emphasizing that Frydmans scientific project was developed to
enable the sociologists to effectively investigate the actual statutory interpretation by means
of empirical research. Interestingly, Frydman postulated conducting of statistical analysis of
large-scale corpora of documents (Frydman, 1936, pp. 267-268), which should be assessed as
a bold proposal in the 1930s, because there were no electronic repositories of legal documents
those days. Nowadays, when these databases are easily available, the conceptual scheme
developed by Frydman may be useful is designing research tools for analysis of the existing
corpora and argumentation mining. In this connection we would like to point out that
Frydmans distinction between three ideal types of interpretation, that is, objective
interpretation, apparently objective interpretation and anticipatory interpretation (Frydman
1936, p. 151) may be used as an efficient guideline for development of empirical research on
legal argumentation. The criterion of the distinction is the attitude of the interpreting person.
In case of objective interpretation, the interpreting person intends to construct the proper
pattern of behaviour from the statute and relevant premises without earlier determination of
790

the desired behaviour. In the apparently objective behaviour the person determines the desired
pattern of behaviour first, and then seeks the justification of this pattern of behaviour in the
statute. Finally, anticipatory interpretation aims at foreseeing interpretive behaviour of other
parties (the opposing party to the dispute or the appellate judge). We are of the opinion that
ignoring these distinctions in the process of empirical research on statutory interpretation may
lead to certain distortions, for instance, to a false conclusion that certain method of
interpretation is generally abused, where in fact it could be abused only in cases of apparently
objective interpretation (used, for instance, in unjustified lawsuits etc.).
In summing up the above considerations, it should be stressed that the work of
Frydman is exemplary as regards the logical culture of investigations in the field of law.
Clarity of exposition of the scientific problems and careful conceptual distinctions together
with explication of all elements of argument of the author form a good pattern of conducting
of this type of conceptual analysis in the field of legal argumentation.
5. CONCLUSION
As the discussion of two example areas (i.e. argument representation and legal argumentation)
of employing the LWS heritage in argument studies show, the logico-methodological ideas of
the LWS constitute not only the roots of argument studies in Poland associated with the
emerging Polish School of Argumentation (see Budzynska & Koszowy 2014, eds), but may
also contribute to the current state of the art in argument analysis and representation. As we
pointed out in this paper, amongst the ideas which may be paricularly inspiring for argument
studies there are: (i) ukasiewiczs theory of rejected propositions as it might enrich the
state of the art in argument diagramming, and (ii) Frydmans constructive account of statutory
interpretation as it may inspire current applications of argumentation schemes theory to
interpretation of statutes and it could be useful for development of tools applied in empirical
research on large corpora of legal documents (in particular, judicial opinions and doctrinal
works).
These two detailed areas of inquiry may also constitute a motivation for exploring the
broader context in which the main pillars of future systematic inquiry might be suggested.
Amongst such pillars we may point to the following: (i) classifications of reasoning as the
foundation for developing argument diagramming methods; and in particular (ii) the inclusion
of the account of rejected propositions in argument diagrams; (iii) the model of statutory legal
interpretation based on the idea of construction; (iv) the framework for future empirical
research concerning the set of actually employed premises in legal reasoning.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Polish National Science Center for Koszowy
under grant 2011/03/B/HS1/04559.
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Thats No Argument! The Ultimate Criticism?

Erik C.W. Krabbe & Jan Albert van Laar
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Groningen
The Netherlands
e.c.w.krabbe@rug.nl
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Groningen
The Netherlands
j.a.van.laar@rug.nl

ABSTRACT: What if in discussion the critic refuses to recognize an emotionally expressed (alleged)
argument of her interlocutor as an argument? In this paper, we shall deal with this reproach, which taken
literally amounts to a charge of having committed a fallacy of non-argumentation. As such it is a very strong,
if not the ultimate, criticism, which even carries the risk of abandonment of the discussion and can,
therefore, not be made without burdening oneself with correspondingly strong obligations. We want to
specify the fallacies of non-argumentation and their dialectic, i.e., the proper way to criticize them, the
appropriate ways for the arguer to react to such criticism, and the appropriate ways for the critic to follow up
on these reactions. Among the types of fallacy of non-argumentation, the emphasis will be on the appeal to
popular sentiments (argumentum ad populum). Our aim is to reach, for cases of (alleged) nonargumentation, a survey of dialectical possibilities. By making the disputants themselves responsible for the
place of emotion in their dialogues, we hope to contribute to a further development of the theory of
dialectical obligations.
KEYWORDS: Abandonment of discussion, Ad populum, Criticism, Dialogue, Emotion, Fallacy, NonArgumentation, Ultimate criticism

1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we want to study the so-called fallacies of non-argumentation and the
corresponding kind of fallacy criticism: the accusation of having presented no argument at
all. This may count as a sort of ultimate criticism.
Generally, fallacy criticisms point out a problem and ask for repair so that in a
metadialogue (a dialogue about the dialogue) one may deal with the problem. But an
accusation of non-argumentation denies that there even is an argument. Therefore it
seems to leave no room for any amendments or further discussion. Let us look at an
example. Its from the ongoing discussion about gay marriage.
When last year the Republican Senator Rob Portman decided to support same-sex
marriage, the Speaker of the House, John Boehner, was asked what he thought about that.
Boehner then rejected gay marriage by an expression of his gut feelings about it. This
again led to an accusation of non-argumentation:

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CASE 1: Gay marriage

Asked about Portman's change of heart, House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) explained on ABC's
This Week, "I believe that marriage is the union of a man and a woman."
Asked if his position might change, Boehner explained and elaborated (not really):
"Listen, I believe that marriage is the union of one man and one woman. It's what I grew up with.
It's what I believe. It's what my church teaches me. And I can't imagine that position would ever
change. (Leon 2013, italics as in the original)

Commentator Michael Leon criticizes Boehner by a charge of non-argumentation:

Boehner's repeated assertions that he feels this way because he believes this way is not an argument
[] (Leon 2013, italics as in the original).

This case is not so simple as it may appear. For one thing, in order for a fallacy charge of
non-argumentation to be appropriate, the accused should be in a position where he or she
is indeed expected to provide an argument. A mere expression of ones opinion, where this
opinion has not been called into question, cannot amount to a fallacy of nonargumentation. Leon seems to suppose that in the case he considers this condition has been
met; probably, because politicians are supposed to argue. Further, there must really be no
reconstructable argument. In Case 1, however, this is doubtful since Boehner invokes the
teaching of his church, which amounts to a be it rudimentary argument from authority.
In some cases, then, accusing the other of having failed to present argumentation
may at first sight seem to the point, but is actually overdoing things. Means of defense are,
and should be, available to the accused. Sometimes, it can be explained that actually there
is an argument contained in what was labeled as non-argumentation. Or perhaps it can be
justified that no argument was needed at this point. Of course, these responses might
misfire so that the original critic should have an opportunity to try and dismantle them. As
long as this discussion lasts, there has been no abandonment of discussion (Fearnside &
Holther 1959, Section 39, pp. 132-133). What we want to do in this paper is to investigate
the ways discussants deal or should deal with such situations and thus formulate a
dialectic of non-argumentation.
According to the pragma-dialectical theory of fallacies, the fallacies of nonargumentation constitute a particular kind of violation of Commandment 4 of the Code of
Conduct for Critical Discussion, the relevance rule:
Standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or argumentation that is not relevant to the
standpoint (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, p. 192).1

Fallacies of non-argumentation do not present argumentation. Other violations of the same

rule do present argumentation but no argumentation relevant to the standpoint at issue
(cases of ignoratio elenchi). So, even though covered by the so-called relevance rule,
cases of non-argumentation are not merely cases of lack of relevance.
1

In an earlier publication, the fallacies of non-argumentation were labeled as those using nonargumentative
means of persuasion, and Commandment 4 was formulated as Rule 4 of the Rules for Critical Discussion
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992). According to the pragma-dialectical theory, violations of this Code of
Conduct constitute fallacies in the sense of being a hindrance for resolving a conflict of opinion by
argumentation.

794

Characteristically, fallacies of non-argumentation substitute either pathos or ethos for

logos (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 134-137). In the first case we have a play
on the emotions of the audience (argumentum ad populum); in the second case an arousal
of emotions of awe or diffidence (argumentum ad verecundiam).2 In our paper, we
concentrate on the ad populum cases, which may stand proxy for all kinds of nonargumentation.
Since the fallacy of non-argumentation is characterized as substituting emotions
for arguments, we are immediately concerned with the role of emotion in argument. We
shall deal with this issue from a dialectical point of view (Section 2). Next, we need to
circumscribe which moves in an argumentative discussion may so we propose count as
cases of non-argumentation (Section 3). Having in this way pinpointed the fallacy, we do
not want to stop there but continue our study by investigating the (actual or required)
means for the critic to protest against it (Section 4). As we think that in some cases these
protests can be answered, we turn to the possible reactions of the alleged ad populum
arguer to the fallacy charge of his critic (Section 5) and to the critics reply (Section 6).
Generally, non-argumentation seems a bad thing, and its criticism a good thing. Yet, we
shall try to point out some advantages of the former (Section 7) and some drawbacks of
the latter (Section 8). Finally, we present a survey of the dialectic of non-argumentation
(Section 9).
2. EMOTION IN ARGUMENT
2.1 Emotion
One possible view on the place of emotion in argument is to see it primarily as a source of
fallacies. However, nowadays a number of subtle accounts of emotion in argument are
available that allow for argumentative contributions that are emotional but non-fallacious.
For instance, both Michael Gilbert (1997) and Douglas Walton (1992; 1999) have argued
extensively that the use of emotions in argument need not be fallacious.
Our use of the term emotion is based on the explanation of that term given by
Aaron Ben-Zeev in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (2010). Ben-Zeev
distinguishes between four components of an emotion (p. 47): feeling, cognition,
evaluation, and motivation.
Feeling is the only component of emotion that is non-intentional. In other words:
One may undergo some feeling without the feeling being about something. The other three
components are intentional: They are always about something. Cognition refers to the
information about the object of an emotion; evaluation refers to either a negative or a
positive view that is taken of the target of the emotion; motivation refers to how an
emotion may influence ones desires or make one take some action. Compared to
emotions, the sentiments are of a more dispositional nature, such as enduring love or grief.

There are other kinds of ad populum and ad verecundiam, which are not specimens of non-argumentation.
For instance, the present kind of ad populum should not be confused with that which consists of an appeal to
the large number of adherents to an opinion in order to justify the opinion (appeal to popularity). This latter
kind of ad populum amounts to a violation of the Argumentation Scheme Rule (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 161, 165-168, 213).

795

Whenever we use the term emotion, we shall refer to both emotions and sentiments in
Ben-Zeevs senses of those two terms.
We distinguish between two uses of an emotion in argument that are prima facie of
dialectical relevance. The first concerns devices for the presentation of argumentation and
the second devices for obtaining concessions from ones interlocutor. We discuss these
two uses in turn.
2.2 Emotion as a presentational device
In one of Gilberts examples, Jill asks Jack: But why should I marry you, Jack? and Jack
answers: Because I love you as life itself (1997, p. 83).
We underwrite Gilberts view that emotion is inextricable from the logic of the
argument (p. 40). Nevertheless, we conceive of emotional arguments as grounds that can
be evaluated as acceptable or unacceptable and as having, or lacking, sufficient
justificatory force. Suppose, Jack utters the words I love you in an emotional, nondetached, even somewhat theatrical manner. Then, in so far as the emotion of being-inlove plays an argumentative role, we propose to reconstruct Jacks argumentation as
having the following propositional structure: (1) Jill, you should marry me because (2) I
love you as life itself; and (2) I love you as life itself because (3) I act and speak like
someone who is really in love with you. Jack expresses the basic premise, proposition 3,
by making this proposition true by his very behavior, tone of voice, mimicry, and so on.
After all, Jill may challenge the acceptability of proposition 3 (You act like a clown) or
challenge that proposition 3 is a good reason for proposition 2 (You might just be playacting).
2.3 Emotion as a device for obtaining concessions
The second way, for a proponent, to use emotion in argument is to express emotion in
order to obtain concessions from the addressees. Suppose for instance that a proponent
arouses in his opponent a feeling of fear for nuclear power plants. Suppose further that this
emotion suggests the cognition that nuclear power plants involve considerable risks, the
evaluation that they are bad things, and the motivation for not letting them be built. Then,
in so far as the opponent shows signs of her aroused emotion (she has a fearful look), she
conveys her sympathy for these propositions. This may count as implicitly conceding
these propositions. By being emotionally aroused, preferably noticeably so, it becomes
harder for the opponent to criticize the position of the proponent.
Waltons (1992,1999) theory of emotion in argument deals mainly with examples
of this second usage. Further, he distinguishes between a number of different subtypes of
ad populum argumentation (1999, Chapter 7). In our view, some of these subtypes are
susceptible to the thats no argument critique, especially if the emotion at hand is used
to obtain concessions in a particularly manipulative way, to wit: appeal to popular
sentiments; the rhetoric of belonging; common folks ad populum; and mob appeal.
Interestingly, none of these types of argument are inherently fallacious, in Waltons view,
even though he identifies possible misuses that may make them degenerate into fallacies.
Like Walton (1999), we want to stress that, depending on situational features, ad populum
arguments admit of fallacious instances, but also of legitimate ones, such as when they are
796

used mainly as non-manipulative devices for obtaining concessions from one's opponent,
and thereby as legitimate parts of one's defense.
3. NON-ARGUMENTATION IN ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE
Clearly, the proponents use of emotional appeals would not suffice to speak of nonargumentation. In what kind of situation, then, would this extremely harsh verdict be
warranted? We here formulate a set of six necessary conditions, which together delineate
those situations in which one could, in our view, arguably speak of a fallacy of nonargumentation:
(1)

There must be a context of dialogue (explicit or implicit) about some issue.

(2)

There must be a standpoint presented by one of the discussants.

(3)

This standpoint must have been called into question.

(4)

There must be a background of shared material and procedural commitments

allowing argumentative exchanges on the issue.

(5)

There must be a proponent/protagonist who accepts a burden of proof for the

standpoint. That is, we want to distinguish the fallacy of evading the burden of
proof from the fallacy of non-argumentation. The latter fallacy is committed by an
arguer who in principle recognizes his burden of proof, i.e. that he should present
an argument, but nevertheless, when the time has come to do so, does not live up to
this recognition. According to the pragma-dialectic theory of fallacies, the two
fallacies are clearly distinct because they violate different rules and pertain to
different stages of a critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992,
2004).3 All the same, given that arguers normally do not make an announcement to
the effect that they do, or do not, acknowledge a burden of proof, it may sometimes
be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between cases of these two fallacies in
real-life examples.

(6)

The proponent tries to make the other concede the standpoint by doing, instead of
presenting an argument, something else that he passes off as argumentation. The
additional condition

(7)

characterizes the ad populum variety of non-argumentation: The means the

proponent uses consist of appeals to popular sentiments luring the interlocutor into
accepting the standpoint.

Evading the burden of proof is a fallacy of the opening stage whereas non-argumentation is one of the
argumentation stage (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 209, 210; 2004, pp. 167-168, 171, 191-192).
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, p. 209-210, 216) mention appeal to diffidence (personal guarantee
of the rightness of the standpoint, Argumentum ad verecundiam2), but not appeal to popular sentiments,
as a way to evade the burden of proof. Both are mentioned as variants of non-argumentation (1992, p. 210,
parading ones own qualities and playing on the emotions of the audience; p. 216 Argumentum ad
verecundiam3; p. 213, Argumentum ad populum2).

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4. THE CHARGE OF NON-ARGUMENTATION

We aim to arrive at a conception of non-argumentation, by examining sequences of
dialogue moves that may follow upon an alleged occurrence of non-argumentation. If the
opponent is confronted with what she conceives of as an example of non-argumentation,
she has a number of possible reactions at her disposal, which we shall list in this section.4
One quite extreme reaction would be to just accept the non-argumentation as if it
equaled argumentation. The opponent might even make her acceptance overt by venting
an ad populum of her own.
Thus, if the proponent defends his resistance to same-sex marriage by saying "I
believe that marriage is the union of one man and one woman. It's what I grew up with.
It's what I believe. It's what my church teaches me," the opponent may go along with him
and try to restore the emotional balance by retorting: "Well, in my Unitarian church, we
feel that all you need is love!"
Clearly, such a lenient attitude towards non-argumentation brings the risk that
genuine considerations pro and con remain unexpressed. We will not further explore how
such dialogues may develop.
To abandon the discussion would be another extreme response. The opponent may
explain her abandonment by pointing out that the proponent, by committing the fallacy of
non-argumentation, forfeits his chance at winning the dialogue.
We are not going to explore how such dialogues may develop either. We cannot,
since the dialogue here stops.
Generally, if a proponent has advanced some nugget of argumentation, an
opponent can request for an elaboration of the proponents case by requesting him to offer
more in support of his position. This is, however, not an option for an opponent who
believes to have been confronted with non-argumentation. There is, as far as she can see,
nothing to fortify.5 However, it is possible that the opponent reckons with the possibility
that she failed to fully grasp the proponent's response: Did she miss his argument or did he
really fail to offer any evidence? In such a case she may request a clarification. This kind
of move can be seen as an intermezzo preparing the parties for a critical exchange on the
merits of what would turn out to be the proponents actual argument.
As soon as it becomes clear to the opponent that the proponent is offering no
argument whatsoever, she can inform the proponent that, as far as she reads his response,
he failed to provide her with genuine argumentation and, to make an issue of it, say
something to the effect of "That's no argument!" The filing of this charge of nonargumentation needs to be explored in some detail, for the ensuing possibilities for
dialectical exchange constitute the gist of our characterization of non-argumentation as a
dialectical move.
As a standard, albeit somewhat overly verbose, way of phrasing this kind of charge
of non-argumentation, we propose the following: In your previous move, you ought to
have advanced an argument in favor of proposition S, given that earlier you incurred the
4

Note that from a theoretical viewpoint what she conceives as non-argumentation could be just a case of
very weak or bad argumentation, or even a completely legitimate move, instead of non-argumentation.
5
In his criticism of Case 1, Leon disregards a nugget of argumentation based on the authority of the church,
i. e. he does not consider it as an argument.

798

obligation to defend S and that you even accepted this burden of proof, which has not yet
been discharged; however, in your previous move you did not provide any proposition that
could constitute (part of) a full-fledged argument, either for S or for something closely
resembling S; instead, showing your own emotion and/or arousing my emotions, you
invoked either popular sentiments or feelings of awe, or feelings that make laugh, cry,
fear, pity, et cetera, acting as if such invocations fulfill the function of an argument in
favor of S. We abbreviate this message as: Thats no argument!6
This message can be presented in different ways and we want to point out three
variants. First, it can be presented in a straightforward manner, more or less instantiating
the standard phrase that we introduced above but often doing so rather bluntly as
exemplified by Leon in Case 1, above.
Second, a charge of having committed the fallacy of non-argumentation can be
phrased in a more rhetorically apt manner: "As far as I can see, your last contribution
might amount to no more than non-argumentation. Can you show me wrong?"
Third, the same message can sometimes be conveyed by means of a counter-ad
populum. Above, we used the Unitarian church response as an example of a response that
is extreme because it deals with non-argumentation as if it were simply acceptable.
However, the same sentence can be used ironically. In that case, the proponent must
interpret her ad populum as an attempt at refutation by parity of reasoning: I respond in
this non-argumentative way and this is a clearly unacceptable way of responding. My
response and your response are relevantly similar. Therefore, your response is
unacceptable.
An example of this ad populum charge by means of parallel reasoning occurred in
a recent performance of Theo Maassens, a Dutch comedian known for his coarsely
formulated criticisms (Case 4).
CASE 2: Black Pete
In the Netherlands, the feast of St Nicholas is among the most popular feasts, and it involves
besides the character of St Nicholas, the character of his black servant: Black Pete (also plural:
black Petes). The black Petes act as St Nicholas helpers, acting in funny, not too smart, formerly
quite threatening, but nowadays mostly extremely friendly ways. In the last few years, this character
of Black Pete has been increasingly criticized as a racist element in the festivities.
Now, someone might argue that Black Pete should be with us to stay because he is providing a
larger number of people pleasure than that of the people he is providing pain. In his televised New
Years Eve show of 2013, Theo Maassen classified this line of reasoning as non-argumentation:
But that is no argument, right? Because then we should also accept that collective rape should be
with us to stay. (Maassen, 2013, quoted from memory, our translation)

If, in one way or other, a charge of non-argumentation has been presented, the next
question is how to respond.

We recognize that the utterance "That's no argument" can be and is also used to charge the interlocutor
with having provided argumentation that is probatively irrelevant or argumentation that, though relevant, is
overly weak. In this paper, we restrict our attention to occurrences of this charge in which the opponent can
be taken to mean literally what she says.

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5. REACTION TO THE CHARGE OF NON-ARGUMENTATON

For a proponent confronted with a charge of having committed the fallacy of nonargumentation, there are in principle two options:
The proponent may either concede to have committed the fallacy or criticize the
charge. In the first case, the proponent ought to retract or repair his fallacious move. In the
second case, when he criticizes the charge as being unjustified, the allegedly fallacious
move is retained.
Like other fallacy charges, charges of non-argumentation (Thats no argument!)
have the force of assertions that may be called into question. When this assertion is called
into question (Why is it no argument?), the burden of proof lies on the disputant who
advanced the fallacy charge, i.e. the original opponent now acting as the proponent of
the charge; it is up to her to show, in a metadialogue, that there really was no argument
offered in the original dialogue. In Case 2, Theo Maassen, as an opponent of the
standpoint that Black Pete should be with us to stay, is clearly aware of this burden of
proof and tries to discharge it by a parity of reasoning argument. It may of course be
doubted whether he demonstrated that there was really no argument at all; perhaps he only
made it plausible that the argument given was no good.
There is, in the metadialogue, no burden of proof on the original proponent to
show that his alleged argument (decried as non-argumentation) is after all really an
argument. But the proponent could voluntarily take on such a burden of proof saying, But
it really is an argument and then, instead of retracting it, explain how his original
contribution could be interpreted as presenting an argument or as a part of one. He could
do so, for instance, by making the propositions expressed by the cognitive, evaluative, and
motivational components of his emotion more explicit, or by elaborating other nuggets of
argumentation contained in his emotional presentation.
6. DEFENDING ONES CHARGE OF NON-ARGUMENTATION
Suppose, the original proponent challenges the original opponent's charge of nonargumentation; how can the opponent defend her charge to be correct? We distinguish
between two ways she can do so.
First, she can hold that the proponent's contribution at issue did not express a
proposition, either explicitly or implicitly, and without any proposition, there cannot have
been an argument. This could be a plausible defense when the proponent simply laughed
off the opponent's doubts about his thesis or when he merely yelled in response to her
challenges. In cases such as these, although the proponent clearly shows emotion, the
emotion remains rudimentary and is not connected with any clearly cognitive, evaluative,
or motivational component.
Second, the opponent can hold that the proponent's contribution does not contain
argumentation, because although it is expressive of one or more propositions the
propositions expressed do not exemplify any known argumentation scheme.7 Note that this
second defense of the charge of non-argumentation fits the characterization by van
Eemeren and Grootendorst of non-argumentation as a contribution "that does not allow
7

We use argumentation scheme in an inclusive sense to encompass both deductively valid patterns of
reasoning as well as merely defeasibly valid (or cogent) patterns of argumentation.

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the reconstruction of an argument scheme that would establish an argumentative

connection between the propositional content of the argumentation8 that is advanced and
the proposition that is expressed in the standpoint" (2004, p. 171).
Of course, such a defense of the opponents charge of non-argumentation is
vulnerable to the reply that even though the argument does not fit any known (deductive or
defeasible) argumentation scheme, it is an argument all the same, and the proponent
could add in fact a good one.
In both cases, the proponent can criticize the opponents defense of the fallacy
charge, by challenging the opponent to make it plausible that no proposition has been
expressed, or that no known argumentation scheme has been exemplified. However, he
also has the option to explain to the opponent what proposition he intended to express or
what familiar argumentation scheme he tried to exemplify or what his argumentation,
though not exemplifying any familiar scheme, amounts to.
7. ADVANTAGES OF NON-ARGUMENTATION
Generally, non-argumentation is thought of as the bad guy and criticism of nonargumentation as the good guy. But some qualifications are in order.
Might not a non-argumentative contribution have virtues of its own, possibly even
dialectical virtues? We think so. First, the proponent may feel the need to vent his
emotions or to arouse the opponent's emotions so as to clear the air, aiming to continue the
exchange of reasons and critical responses as soon as both participants are rightly attuned
to resolving their dispute. A good laugh, or a good cry, even if it happens to constitute
non-argumentation, might be needed for the parties to accept one another as dialogue
partners and to facilitate their argumentative exchange. Second, the aroused emotion, even
if constituting by itself a fallacy of non-argumentation, can nevertheless be useful in so far
as it may dispose a participant to raise the level of attention, and thus prepare her to
seriously consider argumentation that will be presented later (cf. Rehg 1997). Third, the
proponent may want to adjourn the current argumentative exchange and replace it by an
emotional exchange because he supposes that an emotional intermezzo will, in the end,
enhance a later argumentative discussion. Fourth, it may be advantageous to abandon the
argumentative dialogue without intending to resume it, for the reason that other purposes
prevail over dialectical ones. Not all disputes need to be resolved on the basis of
arguments and critical tests and the participants could be right in supposing that they had
better settle their current dispute by means of a non-argumentative exchange of emotions.
For example, a valuable friendship or a love affair may sometimes best be served by
leaving a dispute unresolved.
8. DRAWBACKS OF CRITICIZING NON-ARGUMENTATION
Generally, criticism, also fallacy criticism, is a good thing that helps to keep the
argumentative process on track. But there is always the danger that the emotions that go
with ones criticism will lead the interlocutor away from seriously considering the
criticism and even make him abandon the discussion. This is especially the case when
emotion-related fallacies such as non-argumentation are criticized.
8

I.e. the set of alleged reasons.

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We do not want to say that one should never express a fallacy charge but rather that in
many cases it may be worthwhile to consider whether other means are not more efficient
to reach the goal of conflict resolution on the merits.
In the case of the ad populum variety of non-argumentation, one may think of first
having a careful check whether the expressed popular sentiments do not serve one (or
both) of the two legitimate purposes discussed in Section 2: Perhaps they serve as a mode
of presentation of an argument or as a request to obtain concessions.
But even if no such function can be ascribed to the proponents expression of
popular sentiments, one may still opt for the strategy of asking for clarification (see
Section 4) rather than for that of putting forward a fallacy charge. Clarification by the
proponent could yield an argument perhaps one that was not really there before and
thus the discussion would be put back on the argumentative track. After all, if no argument
results, it will still be possible to charge the proponent with the fallacy of non-argument.
In case these attempts seem futile and the opponent decides that she wants to put
forward the Thats no argument! charge, she should consider the best way of presenting
the charge (Section 4). Putting forward a fallacy charge of non-argumentation is extremely
risky but if one has to do it, one should take care to do so in a rhetorically apt and facesaving way.
9. CONCLUSION
It is clear that emotions can be used in argumentative dialogue in a manner that is
congenial to or at least consistent with the arguers' dialectical purposes but also as a
substitute for genuine argumentation that leads the dialogue astray. In real-life cases, this
is often a subtle issue and in order for the dialogue participants to deal with doubtful cases,
they need to be able to raise and discuss a point of order (Hamblin, 1970). For such
cases, the rules of dialogue need to provide the option of a charge of non-argumentation,
as well as a framework allowing a reasonable examination of the issue. In this paper, we
have explored the options of the dialogue participants within such a setting, summarized in
Figure 1, and thus given an outline of the dialectic of non-argumentation.9
We hypothesize that a normative model for argumentative discussion that aims to include
rules for dealing with non-argumentation as well as the examination of charges of nonargumentation, needs to provide the participants with such prima facie rights and
obligations as make it possible to execute the dialogues indicated in the branches of this
profile of dialogue. Thus, the model would implement the dialectical ideal that the
discussants themselves are in charge of the place of emotion in their dialogues.

For brevity, we omit some options relating to clarification and abandonment.

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Figure 1. The dialectic of non-argumentation

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank the members of our audience at the 8th ISSA conference for their useful
suggestions

REFERENCES
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Emotion (pp. 41-62). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com)
Gilbert, M. A. (1997). Coalescent argumentation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication, and fallacies. Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Fearnside, W. W., & Holther, W. B. (1959). Fallacy: The counterfeit of argument. Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall.
Leon, M. (2013). House speaker's commitment to the party of stupid. MAL Contends , March 17, 2013.
Delivered by Newstex.
<http://malcontends.blogspot.nl/2013/03/gops-house-speakers-commitment-to-party.html>.
Maassen, T. (2013). Einde Oefening [Game Over]. Television program, broadcast by VARA, on 31
December 2013.
Rehg, W. (1997). Reason and rhetoric in Habermas theory of argumentation. In W. Jost & M. J. Hyde
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Walton, D. N. (1992). The place of emotion in argument. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press.
Walton, D. N. (1999). Appeal to popular opinion. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Walton, D. N., & Krabbe, E. C. W. (1995) Commitment in dialogue: Basic concepts of interpersonal
reasoning. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

804

Arguments By Analogy (And What We Can Learn About Them

From Aristotle)
Manfred Kraus
Philologisches Seminar
University of Tbingen
Wilhelmstrae 36
72074 Tbingen
Germany
manfred.kraus@uni-tuebingen.de

ABSTRACT: The paper contributes to the debate about arguments by analogy, especially the distinction
between deductive and inductive analogies and the question how such arguments can be deductive, yet
nonetheless defeasible. It claims that deductive and inductive are structural, not normative categories, and
should not be used to designate argument validity. Based on Aristotles analysis of enthymemes, examples,
and metaphors, it argues that arguments from analogy are complex arguments that involve inductive,
abductive, and deductive components.
KEYWORDS: abduction, analogy, comparison, deduction, enthymeme, example, induction, metaphor,
similarity.

1. INTRODUCTION
Arguments by analogy have been a much-disputed subject recently. The most
controversial issues in that discussion have been whether or not there are different types of
analogical arguments, whether they are to be regarded as basically inductive or deductive
or as a completely distinct category of argument of their own, whether or not they involve
any hidden or missing premises, and whether it is possible for analogical arguments to be
deductive and yet defeasible.
Since the mid-1980s Trudy Govier has repeatedly argued in favor of a view that
arguments by analogy should best be regarded as a distinct type of argument, and not as a
species of either induction or deduction (Govier 1985; 1987; 1989; 2002), by denying that
any universalist generalizations need to be included as unstated or missing premises in
such arguments. In response to her view, while basically agreeing with her distinction
between inductive and a priori analogies, Bruce N. Waller (2001) has tried to restate the
case for a deductivist reconstruction of the latter, whereas Marcello Guarini (2004)
attempted to show that Wallers reconstruction was unsubstantiated. Fbio Perin Shecaira,
in turn, has defended Wallers deductivist analysis by introducing some modifications
(2013, p. 429) and by declaring analogy arguments that do not fit Wallers schema to be
defective or sub-optimal instances of their kind (pp. 407-408; 421). In response to the
dispute between Waller, Govier, and Guarini on the possibility of deductive arguments
by analogy, Lilian Bermejo-Luque has recently (2012, and forthcoming) proposed a new
unitary schema for arguments by analogy as complex second-order speech acts to explain
how such arguments can be deductive, but nonetheless defeasible. Independently from
Bermejo-Luque, but in a way in some respects not dissimilar to her approach, James
805

Freeman, in an analysis of Goviers distinctions (2013), has insisted on the necessity of the
insertion of a ceteris paribus clause and of qualifiers in a priori analogies and defended
their status as defeasible a priori arguments.
I will propose an alternative solution. I would myself prefer to view arguments by
analogy within a greater range of argument types that derive from comparisons and
similarities (see also Doury 2009), including examples, or even metaphors, and analyze
them as complex compound arguments that involve various different types of inferences. I
further hold that Aristotles logic and rhetoric already provides the tools needed for such
an analysis of arguments by analogy.
In a first section, I will briefly analyze the main points of disagreement between
scholars on arguments by analogy. I will then argue that categories such as deductive and
inductive are structural, not normative categories, and should therefore not be used to
designate argument validity (conclusiveness). In a next step, I will sketch the main
features of Aristotles theories on arguments involving similarities and comparisons, and
will finally demonstrate how arguments from analogy can be reconstructed as complex
arguments that involve inductive, abductive, and deductive components.
2. TYPES OF ANALOGIES
Govier, Waller and Guarini all agree that there are two types of arguments by analogy: one
that operates from empirical data and yields only probable conclusions, and one that
proceeds from analogies invented ad hoc and allegedly leads to conclusive inferences. The
disagreement is on whether or not the latter can therefore be regarded as deductive. Govier
calls those a priori analogies. Waller also adds as a third kind what he calls figurative
analogies (2001, p. 200), that is analogies that do not actually argue for a certain claim,
but simply illustrate a statement for the sake of better understanding (see also Garssen
2009). These are not to be regarded as arguments at all. Bermejo-Luque calls those
explanatory analogies (2012, p. 6), and appears to further add also a non-discursive,
cognitive-exploratory function of analogies, in which they act as cognitive tools in that
they offer a kind of cognitive proposals for making new objects and phenomena more
familiar to us. But the emphasis is on the two primarily argumentative types.
Goviers analysis of a typical inductive analogy runs as follows (1989, p. 141):
(1)

1. A has features x, y, z.
2. B has features x, y, z.
3. A has feature f.
4*. Most things which have features x, y, z, have feature f.
5. Thus, probably, B has feature f.

In this reconstruction, the fourth premise is starred because, the way most arguments by
analogy are worded, it would not be explicit in the argument. It would be unstated. (p.
141). One should note the qualifier probably in the conclusion! While she agrees that
such arguments may require some inductive generalization, what she sees involved her is
a hasty generalizationtypically a generalization from a single case. (p. 142). Her
example is that war and slavery have a lot in common, yet slavery was abolished by
citizen action; hence it should be possible to abolish war by citizen action. Typically, in an

806

inductive analogy, the reality and empirical detail of the analogue matter, and the
conclusion predicts a result for the primary subject (p. 142). This is why Guarini (2004,
p. 166), just as William R. Brown (1989, p. 162), prefers to call them predictive.
Goviers master example for what she calls a priori analogy is Judith Jarvis
Thomsons famous example of the desperate violinist that is hooked on another human
being for life support (Thomson 1971, p. 48-49; Govier 1989, p. 142), an ad hoc example
that was meant to support the claim that a woman that had gotten pregnant from rape had
no moral obligation to keep the foetus alive. According to Govier, in an a priori analogy,
the analogue is constructed, it can be entirely hypothetical and may, in fact, be
positively fanciful. (1989, p. 142).
Her analysis of such an a priori analogy is slightly different from that of an
inductive one (p. 144):
(2)

1. A has x, y, z.
2. B has x, y, z.
3. A is W.
4. It is in virtue of x, y, z, that A is W.
5. Therefore, B is W.

There is no qualifier such as probably here, as there was in inductive analogy. On the
contrary, Govier even suggests that from premise 4 (which seems to be presupposed in
some way) it is only a short step to the universal premise:
4*. All things which have x, y, z are W.
This is what Govier calls a U-claim, a universal claim. In the case of the desperate
violinist, the U-claim would be something like No-one has an obligation to support at
his or her own inconvenience the life of another human being to which he or she has been
unvoluntarily linked. This premise would make the argument deductively valid. But it
would also make premises 1 and 3 logically redundant and thus eliminate the analogy as
superfluous. And, what is more, it is clearly an overstatement unwarranted by premises 1
and 3. Based on these considerations and on Stephen F. Barkers objections that it is often
not possible to state a suitable universal premise and that the universal premise [] is
nearly always more dubious than the conclusion (Govier 1989, p. 144; see Barker 1965,
pp. 280-290), she is inclined to reject such a deductive reconstruction, and to accept at best
that some U-claim may be implied, but not presupposed by the argument as an implicit
premise (1989, p. 148). She argues that the cases are epistemologically prior to the
generalization, and that hence a priori arguments by analogy work better directly from
case to case rather than by way of a detour via what she calls a U-claim. In fact: The trick
about analogiesand their charm as well []is that we are often able to see or sense
important resemblances between cases without being able to spell them out exhaustively
[]. (p. 148). This is why she postulates for those analogies a special a priori, but nondeductive category.
Waller, by contrast, finds no sufficient reason for denying the deductive status of
such arguments by analogy (2001, p. 204), just because the U-claim is hard to formulate
or not immediately recognizable. He holds that analyzing an a priori analogy is not a

807

matter of finding the fixed and final universal principle that rightly governs the analogy
(p. 207). Rather, the analogy forces the audience to think hard and reflect upon their own
principles and their implications, so that the analogy does not establish the principle, but
gets the audience to recognize the principle (p. 208). In this way, while preserving the
deductive status of such analogies, Waller on the other hand denies them any inductive
power. According to him, there is not a shred of induction about them. (p. 201).
In her reply to Waller, Govier criticizes this view and argues that, if the U-claim
were in fact implicit as an unstated premise, as Waller claims, it would be much less
required from the audience to think so hard to arrive at it (Govier 2002, p. 156). This
criticism of Goviers, however, appears to underrate the cognitive capacities of audiences,
which Aristotle acknowledged when emphasizing the role of the audience in supplying
unstated premises in enthymemes (e.g. Rhetoric I 2, 1357a17-21).
To overcome this controversy, Bermejo-Luque (2012) intends to construct a
unitary structural schema for both inductive and a priori analogies by analyzing them as
complex second-order speech acts to explain how such arguments can be deductive, but
nonetheless defeasible. Based on a Toulminian analysis of arguments and a linguisticpragmatic model of interpretation, by laying strong emphasis on ontological and epistemic
qualifiers that qualify the inference-claim as well as the analogue and also the connecting
warrant, she proposes to reduce the difference between inductive and deductive
analogies to a matter of such qualifiers (pp. 16-22).
Likewise reducing arguments from analogy to a Toulminian warrant structure by
switching the order of some premises in Goviers analytic schema, and thus reducing
differences between types of arguments from analogy to an assessment of ground
adequacy and the epistemic status of the warrant, Freeman (2013) also insists on the
necessity of the insertion of a ceteris paribus clause and of qualifiers in a priori analogies,
lest they be subject to counterexamples (pp. 180-183), and defends their status as
defeasible a priori arguments. With Shecaira (2013) he shares the belief that synthetic a
priori warrants are typical of moral arguments (Freeman 2013, pp. 179-180).
3. DEDUCTION, INDUCTION, ABDUCTION
Some confusion in this controversy derives from the fact that in discussions of arguments
from analogy terms such as deductive and inductive are oftentimes applied in a
normative sense, implying that a deductive argument is equivalent to a logically
conclusive argument, the conclusion of which follows with necessity, whereas an
inductive one yields only a plausible or probable conclusion (see Bermejo-Luque 2012,
pp. 2-3; 4; 21; explicitly rejected by herself in forthcoming, note 4 and section 4). This
dichotomy, as Hitchcock (1980, p. 9) points out, can only be exhaustive if one is willing
to label inductive all arguments which are not deductively valid. In contrast to this,
pace Hitchcocks defence of induction and deduction as types of argument validity (p. 9),
I would adhere to the view that deduction and induction are essentially structural
categories and should not be employed as normative terms. Based on Aristotelian logic, a
deduction (Aristotles term for which is syllogisms) would be structurally defined as an
inference from a universal rule and a statement about a particular case being an instance of
that rule to a particular assertion about that case, as in the famous example: All human
beings are mortal; Socrates is a human being; hence Socrates is mortal. When cast in

808

syllogistic form, in deductive arguments the middle term is always the subject in one
premise, but the predicate in the other. It is easy to interpret this category in a normative
sense, since, given that the premises are true, deductive arguments in standard form
typically yield conclusive results, and in fact Aristotle himself reserves the term
syllogisms to conclusive deductive arguments only (see Posterior Analytics I 1, 24b1826). But by far not all formally deductive arguments are logically conclusive, as soon as
negations and quantifiers get involved. Consider the following: All human beings are
mortal; Fido is not a human being; hence Fido is immortal. (It is assumed that Fido is a
dog). From a structural point of view, this argument is formally deductive; but it is clearly
fallacious (and would hence not count as a syllogisms for Aristotle).
Inductive arguments, by contrast, infer from the particular to the universal
(Aristotle, Topics I 12, 105a13-16; Posterior Analytics I 1, 71a8-9; Rhetoric I 2, 1356b1415: a proof from a number of similar cases that such is the rule). Such an inductive
argument, however, can be obtained by simply switching propositions within a standard
deductive argument, such as when from Socrates is a human being and Socrates is
mortal it is inferred inductively (and in this case by chance correctly) that human beings
in general are mortal. Aristotle lists such arguments in his taxonomy of enthymemes from
signs (Rhetoric I 2, 1357b10-13; Prior Analytics II 27, 70a16-20), but explicitly remarks
that this type of argument is defeasible, since it is not properly deductive (Rhetoric I 2,
1357b13-14). In syllogistic interpretation, the middle term takes the subject position in
both premises, such as in the following example: Socrates is a philosopher; and Socrates
is bearded; hence philosophers are bearded. It is easy to see that in such an argument the
conclusion will need a qualifier to make it acceptable if not even valid. For it may be
perfectly reasonable to say that the argument does prove that some philosophers are
bearded, or perhaps even that as a rule philosophers are likely to be bearded. Yet one
single counterexample (such as Kant or Wittgenstein) will suffice to refute any general
conclusion such as All philosophers are bearded.
However, in addition to deduction and induction, there is yet a third conceivable
structural type of argument, which is generally termed abduction. In an abductive
argument what is inferred it is the subsumption of a case under a general rule. The middle
term in this case takes the position of predicate in both premises. Using again the obvious
standard example, from Socrates is mortal and human beings are mortal, it may be
inferred that the most reasonable explanation for the observed fact will be that Socrates is
a human being. Arguments of that type are also acknowledged as enthymemes by
Aristotle (Rhetoric I 2, 1357b17-19; Prior Analytics II 27, 70a20-24). Of course, as
Aristotle himself remarks, even if the premises are true, this type of inference will at no
point be safe (Rhetoric I 2, 1357b19-21). Indeed, the Socrates in question may as well
happen to be a dog or some other animal.
4. ARISTOTLE ON ARGUMENTS BY SIMILARITY
Aristotle, in his Rhetoric and Posterior Analytics, calls these latter two types of inferences
enthymemes, since, even if all premises are true, the conclusion will only follow with a
certain probability. But, as we have seen, they are at the same time quite appropriate
descriptions of the structures of induction and abduction. But Aristotle also says
something else, namely that, just as the enthymeme is the rhetorical variant of deduction,

809

the example (paradeigma) is the rhetorical variant of induction. This, I take it, is as good a
description of analogy as any. Whereas in scientific induction a maximum number of
examples must be accumulated to make the induction persuasive, in rhetoric for reasons
of brevity this is mostly reduced to one single example (or very few), but this one
example has to be a particularly significant one: [T]he example is understood as a kind of
qualitative induction in which the fewer number of particular references is compensated
by the fact that they are plausible in connection with the circumstances and the audience.
(Gabrielsen 2003, p. 350; cf. Bermejo-Luque, forthcoming, section 2, on quantitative vs.
qualitative analogies).
In almost identical words, in the Rhetoric as well as in the Prior Analytics,
Aristotle states that arguing by example works neither from part to whole (as induction
does) nor from whole to part (as deduction does), but from part to part or from like to like,
when both come under the same genus, but one of them is better known than the other
(Rhetoric I 2, 1357b27-30; Prior Analytics II 24, 69a13-16; see Gabrielsen 2003, p. 351).
This is exactly parallel to John Wisdoms description of analogy arguments as case-bycase reasoning (Wisdom 1957, cited in Govier 1989, p. 141). Aristotles example is that
Pisistratus, when he asked for a bodyguard, became a tyrant; hence it is inferred that when
Dionysius asks for a bodyguard, he is aiming at tyranny (Rhetoric I 2, 1357b19). How
does this example work? According to Gabrielsens reading, a part to part example
must be perceived as an unpronounced combination of an inductive and a deductive
inference. (Gabrielsen 2003, p. 351). In Goviers terms, this would clearly qualify as an
inductive analogy, since the case adduced is taken from the experience of real life, and
the generalization drawing on it (people who ask for a bodyguard, usually aim at tyranny)
would typically be used to predict another case.
Aristotle further says that examples may either be taken from reality or may simply
be invented (Rhetoric II 20, 1393a28-31). In my view, this is the same distinction as
Goviers between inductive and a priori analogies. Invented examples, he adds, are
subdivided into comparisons and fables; the examples he offers for the comparison type
are in fact quite similar to the standard examples for a priori analogies: it is, he says, as if
one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, since that would be similar to
choosing an athlete for a sports competition by lot instead of by his strength, or to
choosing any of the sailors for helmsman (II 20, 1393b4-8). The examples/comparisons
are in this case clearly invented ad hoc, and in quite fanciful manner so as to highlight the
paradox. Fables (also clearly a fictional genre) may be interpreted as extended forms of
such a priori analogies.
Even Aristotles theory on the metaphor in the Poetics can be adduced here, since
it is based on similarities, and also in view of its cognitive and explanatory power (as
Bermejo-Luque has observed, 2012, p. 8). Moreover, Aristotle notes that metaphors can be
constructed from genre to species, or from species to genre, but also directly from species
to species. Interestingly, he mentions a fourth kind, which he calls by analogy, the
structure of which is that A relates to X just as B relates to Y; hence in this case the
analogy consists in the relationship between two pairs of terms (Poetics 21, 1457b7-9).
In a later passage of the Rhetoric (II 25, 1402b13-14), Aristotle states that
enthymemes can be derived from four sources: probabilities, examples, infallible signs,
and signs; again we find the example featuring prominently among sources for argument.
And here Aristotle explicitly adds that we argue from examples, when they are the result

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of induction from one or more similar cases, and when one assumes the general and then
concludes the particular by an example (1402b16-18). He thus links examples to the
general realm of similarities; and he analyzes arguments by example as a two-step process,
in which in a first step a general statement is established by way of induction, and then
from there a particular case (the target claim) is again deduced. Hence in his view,
arguments from example do argue from case to case, but they do so via a general
principle.
5. ANOTHER UNITARY SCHEME FOR ARGUMENTS BY ANALOGY
Based on what we can learn about arguments by various kinds of similarities from
Aristotle, I would myself propose the following unitary analysis of arguments by analogy:
I endorse the view that arguments by analogy are complex arguments that encompass at
least two separate argumentative stages. In a first stage, from the analogue case, by way of
an argument from example, a general statement is inductively inferred. This is very clearly
the case in so-called inductive analogies, since in those cases one or more empirically
observed examples serve as the starting point. In a subsequent stage, from this general rule
another particular case (the target claim) is inferred deductively. But these two steps cant
be exhaustive. In fact, before the deduction to the target claim can be executed, it will have
to be made sure beforehand that the target case is at all an instance of that general rule.
This, however, will have to be done by an abductive reasoning based on some other
characteristics of the target case. So we have actually a three-stage argument. But this
abductive stage has mostly been overlooked in recent reconstructions.
Things may perhaps be slightly different for a priori analogy. Look at Wallers
reconstruction of the structure of such arguments (2001, p. 201):
(3)

1. We both agree with case a.

2. The most plausible reason for believing a is the acceptance of principle C.
3. C implies b (b is a case that fits under principle C).
4. Therefore, consistency requires the acceptance of b.

Shecaira observes that Wallers schema does not represent analogical arguments simply
as deductive inferences, but rather as complexes of two inferences only one of which is
deductive (2013, p. 407; cf. also p. 424). On our account, however, his analysis in fact
involves no less than three inferences. For anyone acquainted with abductive reasoning,
premise 2 unmistakably evokes one of the most common standard descriptions of
abduction (an inference to the best explanation, see Harman 1965; Lipton 2001; cf.
Wellmans explanatory reasoning as reasoning from a body of data to a hypothesis that
will render them intelligible, 1971, p. 52; see Freeman 2013, p. 190). But so does premise
3 (a case fitting under a principle) for the target case. Shecaira comes very close to this
insight, when he repeatedly speaks of principle C as the most plausible (i.e., the best)
reason for believing a (2013, p. 429), or notes that this move resembles an inference to
the best explanation (pp. 430; 435), but at no point he gets beyond calling it, rather
vaguely, a non-deductive sub-argument (p. 453; cf. pp. 409; 430). Yet if Wallers
analysis is valid, it seems to suggest that in the case of a priori analogies the inductive
stage is replaced by a second abductive reasoning that subordinates the ad hoc invented

811

analogue to some principle that is already in some way part of the commitment store of the
audience (cf. Waller 2002, p. 213).
This would account for the differences most analysts have observed between these
two basic types of arguments by analogy. But since we learn from Aristotle that both
inductive and abductive reasonings are by their very definition defeasible, because they
are always open to refutation by counterexample, this means that no argument by analogy
can be ultimately conclusive. This seems to be trivial for inductive analogies. The
general statement attained inductively in those arguments necessarily needs to be
constrained by a qualifier such as probably or presumably, which will render the
ultimate conclusion only a probable or presumable one as well. Bermejo-Luque is
certainly right in emphasizing the role of those qualifiers (2012, pp. 16-22). But contrary
to what most analysts assume, this equally holds for a priori analogy.
Both Waller and Guarini invoke a number of arguments that challenge the
conclusiveness of Thomsons violinist analogy (Waller 2001, pp. 208-210; Guarini 2004,
p. 159), to the effect that, even if the analogy as such holds, it may be abductively related
to some different moral intuition such as that one is in fact morally obliged to support any
other human beings life at whatever cost. Freemans insistence on the necessity of the
insertion of a ceteris paribus clause in such arguments, lest they be subject to
counterexamples, points in the same direction (2013, pp. 180-182). And both Guarini and
Bermejo-Luque point out that, since all similarities allow for a more or less, arguments by
analogy must also allow for degrees of strength (Guarini 2004, p. 159-160; BermejoLuque 2012, pp. 16; 23).
Freeman (2013, p. 192) ultimately argues that the epistemic distinction between
arguments based on a priori and a posteriori warrants is more fundamental to a general
theory of arguments than structural categories (such as inductive and deductive, which in
his view mainly concern the criteria and methods of assessing connection adequacy, p.
188), but that another distinction is equally fundamental, namely that between conclusive
and defeasible arguments, so that the category of defeasible a priori arguments is not only
not impossible, but even one out of four fundamental categories in a fourfold system of
basic types of arguments (see Freeman 2014, p. 3).
If they are generally defeasible, what, then, is it that makes a priori analogies
appear so compelling? There may be a number of explanations. First, there is most
certainly the deductive element that comes as the last stage and makes one easily overlook
the defeasible abductive or inductive parts. Second, just because in an a priori analogy the
analogue is deliberately constructed ad hoc, it is of course constructed in such a way as to
ideally support the claim, which makes its compelling force appear much stronger than in
inductive analogies from empirical data (cf. Bermejo-Luque, forthcoming, section 2, on
qualitative a priori vs. quantitative a posteriori analogies). Furthermore, since in a priori
analogies both the analogue and the target claim are subordinated to a common general
principle in a similar way, namely by an abductive move, they somehow appear to concur
in supporting that general principle, so that it seems to get double support (Govier once
perhaps inadvertentlyactually says that it is from A and B that we move to the Uclaim, 1989, p. 148). And finally, the ontological and epistemic qualifiers that, as
Bermejo-Luque and Freeman rightly point out, would be needed in most of the
propositions involved, are as a rule suppressed, which is something that frequently
happens in rhetorical arguments such as enthymemes.

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All this may explain why a priori analogies appear so particularly compelling that they are
even sometimes interpreted as essentially deductive (in the sense of conclusive)
arguments. Although Govier acknowledges the fact that her hypothetical reconstructions
of a priori analogies produce, in effect, a two-stage argument consisting of an
inductive argument from one case to a universal statement and a deductive argument
subsuming the subject case under that universal statement. (Govier 1989, p. 151),
nonetheless, in her accompanying diagrams (p. 150-151) the arrows emblematizing an
inference all invariably point the same way downward, as if the entire argument were
deductive.
6. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, then, we may say that a lot was to be learned about arguments by analogy
and other arguments from similarities from Aristotle. Based on Aristotelian categories, a
reconstruction of arguments by analogy seems possible that explains both the
commonalities and the differences of inductive and a priori analogies and their
respective persuasive force. According to this reconstruction, arguments by analogy can be
interpreted as complex compound arguments that involve inductive, abductive, and
deductive elements. Since inductions are mostly, and abductions generally defeasible, the
final step, although formally deductive, rests on defeasible premises and is hence in itself
defeasible. On this view, both inductive and a priori analogies have basically the same
structure; they are invariably defeasible, but allow for degrees of strength.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my thanks to Lilian Bermejo-Luque for kindly making accessible
to me her unpublished work on arguments from analogy, and for many substantial
discussions on that subject.

REFERENCES
Barker, S. F. (1965). The elements of logic. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Bermejo-Luque, L. (2012). A unitary schema for arguments by analogy. Informal Logic, 32(1), 1-24.
Bermejo-Luque, L. (forthcoming). Deduction without dogmas: The case of moral analogical argumentation.
Forthcoming in Informal Logic.
Brown, W. R. (1989). Two traditions of analogy. Informal Logic, 11(3), 161-172.
Doury, M. (2009). Argument schemes typologies in practice: The case of comparative arguments. In F. H.
van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Pondering on Problems of Argumentation. Twenty Essays on
Theoretical Issues (pp. 141-155, Ch. 11). Dordrecht: Springer.
Freeman, J. B. (2013). Goviers distinguishing a priori from inductive arguments by analogy: Implications
for a general theory of ground adequacy. Informal Logic 33(2), 175-194.
Freeman, J. B. (2014). What types of arguments are there? In D. Mohammed & M. Lewiski (Eds.), Virtues
of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the
Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013 (pp. 1-15). Windsor, ON: OSSA (CD ROM).
Gabrielsen, J. (2003). Is there a topical dimension to the rhetorical example? In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A.
Blair, C. A. Willard & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the
International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 349-353). Amsterdam: SicSat.
Garssen, B. (2009). Comparing the incomparable: Figurative analogies in a dialectical testing procedure. In
F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Pondering on Problems of Argumentation. Twenty Essays
on Theoretical Issues (pp. 133-140, Ch. 10). Dordrecht: Springer.

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Govier, T. (1985). Logical analogies. Informal Logic, 7(1), 27-33.

Govier, T. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris.
Govier, T. (1989). Analogies and missing premises. Informal Logic, 11(3), 141-152.
Govier, T. (2002). Should a priori analogies be regarded as deductive arguments? Informal Logic, 22(2),
155-157.
Guarini, M. (2004). A defence of non-deductive reconstructions of analogical arguments. Informal Logic,
24(2), 153-168.
Harman, G. (1965). The inference to the best explanation. The Philosophical Review, 74(1), 88-95.
Hitchcock, D. (1980). Deductive and inductive: Types of validity, not types of arguments. Informal Logic
Newsletter 2(3), 9-10.
Lipton, P. (2001). Inference to the Best Explanation, London: Routledge.
Shecaira, F. P. (2013). Analogical arguments in ethics and law: A defence of a deductivist analysis. Informal
Logic 33(3), 406-437.
Thomson, J. J. (1971). A defense of abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(1), 47-66.
Waller, B. (2001). Classifying and analyzing analogies. Informal Logic, 21(3), 199-218.
Wellman, C. (1971). Challenge and response: Justification in ethics. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois
University Press.
Wisdom, J. (1957). Explanation and proof. Lectures presented at the University of Virginia (unpublished
ms.).

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Evidence-Based Practice: Evidence Set In An Argument

Tone Kvernbekk
Department of Education
University of Oslo
Norway
tone.kvernbekk@iped.uio.no

ABSTRACT: Evidence-based practice (EBP) is currently a dominating trend in many professional areas.
But what do we want evidence for in EBP? Evidence generally speaks to the trustworthiness of our beliefs,
but EBP is practical in nature and truth is not really what is at stake. Rather we are after effectiveness in
bringing about changes. What we need evidence for is a prediction to the effect that what has worked in one
context will also work here. In this paper I argue that is makes good sense to view this prediction as the
conclusion of an argument. To set the evidence in an argument will structure our thinking and help us focus
on what kinds of evidence we need to support the likelihood that an intervention here will work.
KEYWORDS: Argument, causal role, EBP, effectiveness, enablers, evidence, external validity, local facts,
RCT, stability of context

1. INTRODUCTION
There exists a vast literature on EBP, hardly surprising given the status of evidencebased as a buzzword in contemporary professional debates, such as education, medicine,
psychiatry and social policy. Researchers are responding in many ways to political
demands for better research bases to inform and guide both policy and practice; some by
producing the kind of evidence it is assumed can serve as a base for practice; others by
criticizing or even rejecting the whole enterprise of EBP the latter frequently, but not
exclusively, couched in terms of worries about instrumentalization of practice and
restrictions in the freedom of professionals to exercise their judgment.
EBP is practical in nature. It is commonly called the what works agenda and its
focus is the use of the best available evidence in the bringing about of desirable goals, both
for client and society. This is indeed my preferred minimal definition of EBP; the
production of desirable change, or conversely how we intervene to prevent certain
undesirable outcomes. It is vital to note that EBP is deeply causal: we intervene into a
system which already produces an output in order to change that output in a desirable
direction. These interventions should be based on evidence that shows what works. To say
that something (an intervention of some kind) works, is to say that doing it brings us the
effects we want. For short, do X and it will lead to Y.
The very term evidence-based practice obviously draws attention to evidence.
Generally, epistemologists seem to agree that the term evidence denotes that which
serves to confirm or disconfirm a theory (claim, belief, hypothesis) (e.g. Achinstein, 2001;
Kelly 2008). The basic function of evidence is thus summed up in the word support.
Evidence speaks to the truth value and the trustworthiness of a claim, and is therefore
relevant to all belief formation processes, whether in research or in daily life, including the
ones where we form beliefs about the causal relation between action and result, input and

815

output. This basic function can, I submit, in principle be performed by all sorts of data,
facts and personal experiences. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that all people have firsthand experiences of the causal kind that we are talking about here. To act as an agent
means to intervene in the world and have an influence on it (Menzies and Price, 1993). At
the same time, evidence-based practice has led to many misunderstandings about the role
of evidence as well as to the crux of the matter being overlooked. What is really at stake is
the claim that the evidence is evidence for. Evidence is in a sense a servant; good evidence
provides us with good reason to believe that the claim is true.
I shall in this paper argue that setting evidence is an argument makes good sense
for the practical enterprise of EBP; it serves to clarify and structure our thinking about
what we need to know. But to see that, we first have to look at the basic causal structure of
EBP and the EBP orthodoxy concerning admissible forms of evidence as well as
assumptions concerning uses of evidence. Thus, this paper is mainly a laying-out of the
premises I suggest are needed to bolster the conclusion that EBP will be well served by
setting the evidence in an argument.
2. THE CAUSAL NATURE OF EBP
The short version of the causal nature is that EBP is causal because it is about the bringing
about of desirable results. That is to say, we have a causal connection between an action or
intervention and its effects; between X and Y. The long version of the causal nature of
EBP takes into account the many forms of causation; direct, indirect, necessary, sufficient,
probable, generic, actual, etc. and develops a more complex and sophisticated picture. In
educational contexts, as, I assume, in political contexts, this causal complexity goes highly
unrecognized. However, for my purposes in this paper a simplified X-Y relation will by
and large do.
My own field is education; a complex field with many factors that interact and
influence each other in many different ways. Interventions also vary in nature, from simple
actions to highly complex school-wide projects which may take two or three years to run.
It is essential to be aware that, regardless of field, any intervention is inserted into preexisting conditions. The causal system into which we intervene already produces an
output; we just wish to change it because we are not entirely happy with the output in
education, student achievement is a typical output of this sort. The already existing output
is termed the default value (Hitchcock, 2007, p.506); the value we would expect a variable
such as student achievement to have in the absence of intervening causes. The default
assumption is that the system will persist in its state and keep producing the default results
unless we do something or something happens. The default, Hitchcock stresses, it not that
the state or value in question is this or that, but that it will remain this or that unless
something happens to change it. When a set of variables all take on their default value and
business is run as usual, they cannot by themselves take on a different value. This is a
natural principle of causal reasoning, Hitchcock thinks. We tend to assume that if a
variable should take on a deviant (or unexpected) value, there must be some outside
variable or event that explains it. That is, to change the value of our target variable,
whether student achievement or some other desirable outcome, we have to intervene
somehow. This certainly seems to be a tacit presupposition of EBP.

816

For various reasons, the causal theory that best suits the logic of EBP is the
manipulationist theory of causation (e.g. Pearl, 2009; Sloman, 2005; Woodward, 2003,
2008). Let us suppose that X produces Y as its default result. To change the value of Y, we
must change the value of X. Thus, if we set the value of X to xi rather than xk, then the
value of Y should follow in train and change to yi rather than yk. This is precisely what the
manipulationist theory of causation tells us: there is an intimate connection between
causation and manipulation such that causal relationships are eminently exploitable for the
purpose of change. This is one of the reasons why this theory of causation is so popular in
disciplines which are to bring about change and development as well as give
recommendations for practice and policy.
The point of intervening is that we set the value of X to xi from outside the system
rather than letting X be decided by the other variables in the system. That is to say, we
manipulate X in order to further the changes in Y we deem desirable, naturally on the
assumption that X actually leads to or brings about Y. As Judea Pearl puts it,
The simplest type of external intervention is one in which a single variable, say Xi, is forced to take
on some fixed value xi. Such an intervention, which we call atomic, amounts to lifting X i from
the old functional mechanism xi = fi(pai, ui) and placing it under the influence of a new mechanism
that sets the value xi while keeping all other mechanisms unperturbed (2009, p. 70).

There is, however, more to intervention than this quote tells us. First, it changes the value
of Y, even though this is not explicitly mentioned in Pearls definition. Changing Y is the
main aim of educational interventions and usually the reason why we intervene in the first
place (e.g. to improve student achievement). Second, the intervention changes the entire
causal model because it cuts the effect (yk) off from its normal causes (xk). When we have
intervened on X, the system no longer continues in its default state. Business is no longer
run as usual, but is now running in a different way, one we think (or hope) should bring
about the desired result or at least increase its probability. Third, the intervention disrupts
the relationship between X and its parents. The value of X is no longer determined by the
default running of the system, but by the intervention. All other influences on X have been
blocked and/or cut off. As the equation in the quote indicates, Xi is lifted from the
influence of P, its parents, and U, an error term representing the impact of omitted and/or
unknown variables, and its value is decided by a new mechanism, namely the intervention.
I prefer to interpret this in line with the causal agency advocated by Menzies and Price,
although Pearl himself states that intervention does not necessarily have to involve human
activity. But in education interventions require agency, hence my adoption of Menzies and
Prices view on this point.
This is not the place to discuss manipulationist theory in detail, but a couple of
issues deserve mention. First, there is Pearls view that causal mechanisms (X-Y relations)
are autonomous. He thus argues that our intervention on one causal connection leaves the
other connections in the system undisturbed. This presupposition seems deeply
problematic to me. Educational practice is best understood as an open system where
events, actions and factors are somehow locked together, obviously to varying degrees. If
factors hang together, the change in Y will depend more on the total structure and it is a
mistake however tempting it is to look at only small chunks or individual causal
mechanisms. In complex systems we cannot assume that intervention on one mechanism
leaves all other mechanisms intact. Second, it seems to be a presupposition of
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manpulationist theorists that X is already a part of the system. For example, Christopher
Hitchcock (2007) argues that X-Y relations are internal to the system and that
interventions therefore involve exogenous changes to X. My point here is twofold. Firstly,
in education a teacher, as an agent within the system can decide to make changes in input
X; this qualifies as an intervention in the broad sense of them term, but it comes from
inside the system and is thus not exogenous. Second, there are many EBP cases where X is
exogenous and inserted into the system as a new element. I view these two points as
unproblematic amendments the manipulationist theory of causation. The main point is that
X be manipulable and that the intervention alters the causal system.
It is the ambition of EBP to provide knowledge that works; that is, to provide
knowledge about how causal input X can be changed to produce desired changes in output
Y. For example how implementation of a reading instruction program can improve the
reading skills of slow readers, or how a school-wide behavioural support program can
serve to enhance students social skills and prevent future problem behaviour. But not only
that we wish to know what works generally. That means not only that the effect (output,
result) in question is reproducible in principle, but that we know how to achieve it
regularly and can plan for it. This kind of practical causal knowledge is future-oriented, in
the sense that we, on the basis of experience or other empirical evidence, form the
expectation that the desirable results obtained somewhere can somehow be reproduced.
3. WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE TELL US?
As suggested above, the basic function of evidence is to speak to the truth value of beliefs.
In the EBP case, both advocates and critics simply assume that the evidence speaks to the
truth of the belief that there is a causal connection between X and Y, and that this is all the
evidence there is (or all we need).
In a similar manner, both advocates and critics often understand EBP to include a
hierarchy of evidence as part of its definition. There are various versions of this hierarchy;
what they have in common is that they all rank randomized controlled trials (RCTs) on
top, and that professional judgment is ranked at or near the bottom (see e.g. Pawson,
2012). The standard criticism is that such hierarchies unduly privilege certain forms of
knowledge and research designs, undervalue the contributions of other research
perspectives, and especially that they undervalue professional experience and judgment.
The privileging of RCT evidence is evident in e.g. the US Department of Educations User
Friendly Guide. EBP literature, such as the User Friendly Guide, provides evidenceranking schemes (which tell us that the best evidence comes from RCTs), it provides
advice guides (which tell us to choose an educational intervention that is backed by good
(RCT) evidence, and it often provides warehouses (where we find interventions backed
by good evidence). Together these three different functions make up the foundation of
what has become known as the EBP orthodoxy (see e.g. Cartwright and Hardie, 2012).
There is another element to the orthodoxy that I shall return to below.
There are good reasons to adopt the EBP orthodoxy and even better reasons not to
adopt it. The principle behind evidential ranking schemes is trustworthiness our
evidence needs to be trustworthy or reliable in order to do its job, which is to speak to the
truth value of claims and beliefs. It is no accident that RCTs have established themselves
as the gold standard. Nancy Cartwright (2007) divides all research methods in two;

818

clinchers and vouchers. RCTs are clinchers: methods that are deductive and whose logic is
such that if all the specific assumptions of the trial are met, a positive result will logically
entail the conclusion. The evidence provided is thus sufficient for the conclusion; one
might even say that it guarantees it. The evidence, in turn, is guaranteed by the research
design. In RCTs we compare groups that are the same with respect to all relevant (causal)
factors except one. Random assignment is supposed to ensure that the groups have the
same distribution of causal and other factors. The standard result of an RCT is a
treatment effect (expressed in terms of effect size): average effect in treatment group
minus average effect in control group. We assume that the difference between the two
groups needs a causal explanation, and since other factors (supposedly) are equally
distributed we infer that the treatment, our intervention, is the cause of the outcome. It
works; we might be tempted to conclude.
RCTs are strong on internal validity. If we obtain an average positive result and the
conditions of the trial are met, we may safely conclude that the causal claim in question is
true, X does indeed bring about Y and the evidence supports it. But internal validity is
purchased at the expense of external validity, or generality. As Nancy Cartwright (2007)
argues, what RCT evidence shows is strictly speaking that the X-Y relation holds where
the trial was conducted, for that particular study group (see Cartwright for a detailed
discussion of the limitations of the research design). It by no means shows that the X-Y
relation holds generally across differing contexts. This fact is not discussed in the EBP
literature. Rather, we seem to take it for granted that RCT evidence shows that the causal
X-Y relation holds in general, that something works in general. The fact that it does not, is
a major premise in the argument for why it is important to set evidence in an argument.
There are several sides to the limitation of RCT evidence. First, we here come
across a problem that is also found in the manipulationist theory of causation; namely that
one does not distinguish between finding and using causes. Manipulationist theory and
empirical research designs alike focus on finding causes. To investigate whether X causes
Y, we see if the two are correlated once we have controlled for other possible causes of Y.
We hold various background factors fixed, manipulate the values of X and observe
whether the values of Y change in train. Basically we conclude that X causes Y if the
probability of Y is higher with X than without it, and the evidence we get supports our
view. But using causes to bring about desired changes is another matter altogether. I am
tempted to say that both manipulationist theory, RCTs and EBP only tell us half the story.
They all think in terms of methodology geared at finding causes. When it comes to using
causes, it is not the relation between X and Y that matters the most. When we implement
an intervention we either change an X that is already part of the system, or we insert it into
the system. Either way the pre-existing system, practice, has to be taken into account
when we use causes. Hence, what matters is that the probability of Y given X-inconjunction-with-systemi is larger than the probability of Y given not-X-in-conjunctionwith-systemi. And the RCT tells us nothing about this. As Cartwright (2009) points out,
the formula that shows that X is a cause of Y, for example expressed in terms of a
treatment effect, need not be the right formula for telling whether X will produce Y when
we implement it in some concrete system. When we implement X, we generally also
change other factors in the system, not only the ones causally downstream from X. But the
RCT evidence does not tell us whether X will also affect A, B, and C, and if so how that
will affect Y.

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The second ramification of the limitation of RCT evidence is a corollary of the first, and
concerns the EBP orthodoxy. This orthodoxy also demands faithfulness in
implementation, termed fidelity. If you are to implement in your context an intervention
that an RCT tells you has worked somewhere, you should do it exactly as it was done
there. Take for example a school-wide behavioural program (Arnesen, Ogden and Srlie,
2006). Components, principles and guidelines are decided in advance, and so is their order
and manner of implementation, although the authors concede that some local adjustment is
necessary. But basically implementers must be loyal to the procedures prescribed by the
program developers. If actual implementation deviates from prescribed implementation,
we no longer know exactly what it is that works, the argument goes, and the program
suppliers cannot be held responsible for the results. Variations in the efficacy of X are
generally due to deviant or unsystematic implementation, the EBP orthodoxy holds. The
orthodoxy presupposes similarity of contexts and generality of X-Y relation. The demand
for fidelity in EBP is misguided, as it tacitly assumes that the RCT evidence showing the
effect of X on Y is all you need.
But what do practitioners need evidence for? I propose that what practitioners,
say teachers, want evidence for, is a prediction that X will work here, in my classroom,
were I to implement it. The RCT evidence only speaks indirectly to that question, by
telling you that X worked somewhere. But how do you get from somewhere to here? This
is where the usefulness of an argument comes in.
4. SETTING EVIDENCE IN AN ARGUMENT
Let me back up a little. It is important that we take on board the fact that contributions to
an outcome both can and generally do come from different sources. This sounds
commonplace, but is easily forgotten; we tend to look for the cause and if we implement
an intervention it is only natural that this intervention is salient for us and we ignore other
factors. But the overall effect on Y depends on how all these factors add up; thus, an
intervention is part of a team of causes and enabling factors which work together.
What, then, should a practitioner look for when trying to make a decision about
whether to implement X or not? Which facts must be collected if I am to hedge my bets
that X will work here? When is the fact that X worked there relevant to the prediction that
it will also work here? We cannot take it for granted that it will, no matter how large the
effect size emanating from the RCT evidence. We cannot simply export a causal
connection and insert it into a different context and expect it to work. Causal principles are
local, Cartwright argues, and it is easy to agree with her. Educational practitioners love to
point out that students are different, teachers are different, curricula are different,
headmasters are different, parents are different, and school cultures are different. So how
can the RCT evidence be made relevant?
I assume that what practitioners want to know is whether an intervention is worth
trying in their own concrete context. Will X work here, that is, make a positive causal
contribution here if I implement it? RCT evidence does not tell them that. What is does tell
them, is that X made a positive contribution to Y somewhere, and that given this positive
contribution, we may infer that certain enabling factors were present which allowed X to
do its work and make its way to Y. That is to say, the other factors necessary for
producing the outcome must also be in place it is vital to remember that our intervention

820

is part of a constellation of causes which together bring about Y. An effectiveness

prediction that X will work here must take the whole constellation into account, as well as
possible. It is this task that is made easier and more systematic by thinking of the
effectiveness prediction as the conclusion of an argument and that the job is to gather the
premises which lead up to the conclusion.
What works somewhere, as shown by the RCT evidence, can be made relevant to
what will work here. But a number of other facts must be collected if we are to say
something about X-in-conjunction-with-system, which is what we want:
-

In our context here we already get an outcome, a default result, concerning the
student achievements in question, but we want to improve them. How are these
results produced? What factors are present in our context and how do they combine
to produce the result?
This constellation of causes is called the causal principle for the outcome
(Cartwright and Hardie, 2012 and it is needed to connect the alleged cause with the
desired effect.
Mapping the local causal principle is not enough. Next we have to look at the
proposed intervention X and ask whether it can play a positive causal role for
producing the desired effect in our setting. How can it work? There is no
substitute, Cartwright and Hardie insist, for thinking thoroughly about how X
might work if implemented.
Next we look at the factors that must be in place if the intervention is to be able to
play its causal role. Which are they? Are they present? If not present, can they be
easily procured? Do they outweigh any disabling factors that might be in place? It
is important to remember that some of these enablers may be absences of
hindrances. Arnesen, Ogden and Srlie (2006) provide examples of such local
facts, despite their adherence to the EBP orthodoxy and the principle of fidelity.
For example, they argue that there must not be personal conflicts among the staff if
the behavioural program is to work positively. That is, a conflict is a contextual
disabler which hinders or obstructs the working of the program. Conversely we
might say that its absence is an enabler. Another local enabling factor is the fact
that staff norms and values at least do not contradict the values inherent in the
program to be implemented.
Not only must the necessary enablers be in place, their organization must also be
stable. The stability of the system into which we contemplate inserting X is of vital
importance for our chances of success. If the system is shifting and unstable, X
may never be able to do its work and produce Y. This fact is well-known to
teachers, but perhaps not really recognized by EBP proponents. But teachers seek
to stabilize the environment, by structuring it in different ways: creating and
enforcing rules of conduct, establishing habits and ways of doing things in short,
creating a stable environment which at least to some degree makes for
predictability and thus allows us to expect with some confidence that our plans will
work out. Time-honoured educational domains such as curriculum theory and
didactics can be viewed in this light: they provide knowledge and advice on how to
create the stable conditions necessary for goal achievement in general. But since

821

we are trying to predict whether X will work if we implement it, the stability
conditions we assess must be linked to X.
It should be noticed that this kind of mapping is not about listing similarities
between somewhere and here. Similarities are not important for this kind of
generalization. Rather, what it takes is that we have some idea about what a good
constellation of factors surrounding X might be, factors which enable X to make a
positive contribution to Y. This constellation need not be the same; it can vary
from context to context. The important thing is that we map the enablers, procure
them if necessary, and that we avoid or remove the disablers.

In sum: local facts are as necessary as they are overlooked. I by no means claim that the
issues listed above comprise an exhaustive list of facts a practitioner needs to map in order
to hedge his or her bets that a given intervention will work should it be implemented here.
Yet it should be evident from this set of issues that it takes a lot of deliberation to figure
out the chances that an intervention might work. Setting all these different kinds of
evidences into a (reasonably) clear argument structure helps us sort them out and see what
facts we need to ascertain. Inspired by Cartwright and Hardie, here is what I propose:
Premise 1: The intervention in question, X, worked somewhere; that is, it played a positive
causal role in achieving Y for at least some of the individuals in the study group. The RCT
evidence tells us that, and it also indicates how strong the causal influence of X on Y is,
given that all other factors are held fixed (the effect size). We should remember, however,
that effect size is a statistical entity and only informs us of the aggregate result. A positive
aggregate result is perfectly compatible with negative results for some of the individuals in
the study group.
Premise 2: Which factors govern the default production of Y here? The RCT evidence
does not tell us that.
Premise 3: The intervention can play the same role here as it did there. The RCT evidence
does not tell us that.
Premise 4: The enabling factors necessary for the intervention to play a positive causal
role for Y are in place here, or we can get them. The RCT evidence does not tell us that.
Premise 5: The system (context) here is stable enough so that the intervention will have
time to unfold and work. We know the main factors influencing this stability and we know
how to maintain them. The RCT evidence does not tell us that.
Conclusion: Yes, the intervention will most likely work here. There are always unknown
factors that might disable or hinder its workings; despite these we think it is worth
implementing it. Or we may conclude that since the vital enablers are missing and they are
too expensive to get, chances are that this intervention will not contribute positively to Y
in our context.
This tentative argument structure can guide you to what kind of evidence you need to
ascertain. As should be plain, the RCT evidence alone will not be enough.

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5. CONCLUSION
I have in this paper addressed one aspect of evidence-based practice, namely the fact that a
lot more evidence is required in practice than is normally assumed by proponents and
critics of EBP alike. The EBP literature, whether written by critics, adherents or
researchers, focuses on RCT evidence as the kind of evidence on which practice should be
based. Organizations such as CampbellCollaboration and McREL, which collect and vet
evidence and produce meta-analyses, adhere to the EBP orthodoxy and the evidence
hierarchy and view RCTs if not as the only admissible kind of evidence, then certainly as
the preferable kind of evidence. Critics problematize this view point and argue that other
kinds of evidence should count as well.
What none of them do, I have argued, is to address the question of what
practitioners really need evidence for. If we assume that what practitioners really want to
know is whether a proposed intervention will work for them, in their classroom, then it
immediately transpires that RCT evidence is not enough. There are two reasons for this.
The first is that RCT evidence only pertains to the first of the five premises I have
suggested above. The second is that contrary to popular belief, RCT evidence does not
show that a causal relation (X-Y) holds in general, it just shows that is holds for the study
group from which the evidence emanates. In order to make a decision about whether we
actually should implement the intervention in question here, we need to collect a good
many local facts and put all our evidences together in an argument structure which allows
us to make a sensible all-things-considered judgment. We must never lose sight of the fact
that here denotes an already existing practice, a causal system, and that any output has
many antecedent events. Changing a factor in the system or inserting a new one will bring
changes to the entire system; changes which may affect our desired outcome in good or
bad ways. RCT evidence may be highly trustworthy, but it does not even provide half the
story. Putting all the different kinds of evidences in a structure will help us think
systematically about what we need to know. Thus, EBP as a practical enterprise is indeed
well served by setting all the necessary evidences in an argument.
I would like to end this paper with a remark about EBP itself: EBP is much more
complicated that advocates and critics alike tend to think. It is essential to distinguish
between finding and using causes, and it seems to me that using them to bring about
desired results is much more complicated than finding them in the first place. EBP is thus
no magical bullet for improving student achievements, but nor is it impossible. As a
minimum it requires practitioners who can think for themselves; the EBP orthodoxy is
seriously misguided.
REFERENCES
Achinstein, P. (2001). The book of evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Arnesen, A., Ogden, T. & Srlie, M. (2006). Positiv atferd og stttende lringsmilj i skolen [Positive
behaviour and a supporting school environment]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Cartwright, N. (2007). Are RCTs the gold standard? BioSocieties, 2, 11-20.
Cartwright, N. (2009). How to do things with causes. Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association, 83, 2, 5-22.
Cartwright, N. & Hardie, J. (2012). Evidence-based policy. A practical guide to doing it better. Oxford:
Oxford University Press

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Hitchcock, C. (2007). Prevention, pre-emption, and the principle of sufficient reason. Philosophical Review,
116, 4, 495-532.
Kelly, T. (2008). Evidence. In E. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence/ Retrieved September 16, 2008.
Menzies, P. & Price, H. (1993). Causation as a Secondary Quality. British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 44, 187-203.
Pawson, R. (2012). Evidence-based policy. A realist perspective. Los Angeles: Sage.
Pearl, J. (2009). Causality. Models, reasoning and inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Sloman, S. (2005). Causal models. How people think about the world and its alternatives. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen. A theory of causal explanation. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Woodward, J. (2008). Causation and manipulability. In E. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causationmani/ Retrieved March 20, 2012.
US Department of Education (2003). Identifying and implementing educational practices supported by
rigorous evidence: A User Friendly Guide. Washington, DC: Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy.
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/research/pubs/rigorousevid/rigorousevid.pdf. Retrieved June 12, 2014.

824

Shameful Corinthians A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis Of 1

Corinthians 6:1220
Niilo Lahti
School of Theology
University of Eastern Finland
Finland
nilahti@uef.fi

ABSTRACT: Biblical scholars have fundamental differences in defining Pauls argumentative and rhetorical
goal in 1 Corinthians 6:1220. There is no convincing explanation for why the apostle brings 6:1220 up in
the letter. I conduct a pragma-dialectical analysis to account for the argumentation, rhetoric and their
interplay in 6:1220. It turns out that Paul aims at shaming the audience in order to break their resistance.
KEYWORDS: 1 Corinthians, argumentation, Bible, New Testament, Paul, pragma-dialectics, rhetoric,
shame, strategic maneuvering, theology

1. INTRODUCTION
Biblical scholars have had significant difficulties in interpreting the argumentation in 1
Corinthians 6:1220 (Goulder 1999, p. 341; Rosner 1998, p. 336). Two frequent and
general problems are brought up to motivate the upcoming analysis of the section in the
letter.
The first problem deals with the goal of the section. What does Paul want to argue
in the section? Two alternative standpoint options are common (Rosner 1998, p. 336): a.
The apostle argues that the Corinthians should stop a specific behavior, that of having
relations with harlots (Drake Williams III 2008, p. 20; Fee 1987, p. 250; Rosner 1998, pp.
341-342); b. Paul wishes to smother a broader phenomenon: sexual immorality
(Conzelmann 1975, p. 108; Lambrecht 2009, p. 486; Rosner 1998, pp. 337-338). Topically
speaking, the two themes are related. The question arises, which of the two notions
supports the other. Does Paul employ sexual immorality to support the avoidance of
harlots or vice versa?
Furthermore, why does the apostle bring up the issue in the first place? Is the
control of the Corinthians sexual morality an objective in itself for him or does Paul use it
to achieve another goal?
The second problem deals with the placement of the section as a part of 1
Corinthians (Fee 1987, p. 250). Does Paul have a certain strategy in his ordering of the
different argumentative sections? Or is his approach random (Murphy-OConnor 1996, p.
253)? I will argue that he has placed the section strategically with a specific intention. In
this endeavor, I will occasionally refer to the previous argumentative sections 4:185:13
and 6:111 to support my claims. My general claim is that Paul has certain long-term
dialectical and rhetorical aims that he tries to achieve in the section 6:1220 (van
Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, pp. 134-135).

825

I will conduct a pragma-dialectical analysis of 1 Corinthians 6:1220 in order to solve the

problems discussed above. After the analysis, I will draw some conclusions.
2. ANALYSIS
I will apply only those tools and aspects of pragma-dialectics that I deem necessary for the
purposes of this study. I will analyze the argumentative section in two main parts. The first
one consists of the construction of the analytic overview (van Eemeren et al. 1993, pp. 6061; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, pp. 93-94; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, pp.
118-122; van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, p. 134), which, in turn, entails establishing the
following steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Standpoint(s);
Common starting points;
Arguments;
Argumentation structure.

The analytic overview belongs to the so-called standard pragma-dialectical analysis (van
Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). The first three points
listed above correspond with the order of the discussion stages of the ideal model for
critical discussion: confrontation stage, opening stage and argumentation stage (van
Eemeren et al. 1996, pp. 280-283; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, pp. 57-62; van
Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, pp. 132, 138-139). The fourth and last stage, the concluding
stage, is missing in the section 6:1220 and consequently it is left unconsidered in the
analysis. After the identification of the standpoint(s), common starting points and
arguments, the argumentation structure is reconstructed.
The second part consists of the analysis of the strategic maneuvering which is dealt
with theoretically in the extended pragma-dialectical model (van Eemeren 2010). The
analytic overview functions as a basis for its analysis. The strategic maneuvering will be
assessed by scrutinizing the three inseparable aspects of it which are analytically
distinguished from each other: the topical potential, audience demand and presentational
devices (van Eemeren 2010, pp. 93-101, 108-113, 118-122; van Eemeren & Houtlosser
2002, pp. 139-141).
2.1 Analytic overview
In the introduction, two alternatives were presented as possible standpoints: stopping
relations with harlots and sexual immorality. To map where and how they occur in the
text, in Figure 1 I have divided the section into three subsections based on the occurrences
of these two topics:

826

Figure 1 - Section 6:1220 divided into three parts based on the occurrences of the
concepts sexual immorality and harlot
I.
12. All things are permitted for me, but all things are not beneficial; all things are
permitted for me, but I will not allow myself to be brought under the power of any.
13. Foods for the stomach and the stomach for foods, but God will abolish both it
and them. But the body is not for sexual immorality but for the Lord, and the Lord
for the body.
14. God both raised up the Lord and will also raise us up by His power.
II.
15. Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Would I then take
the members of Christ and make them members of a harlot? Let it not be!
16. Or do you not know that he who joins oneself to a harlot is one body with her?
The two for he says, shall become one flesh.
17. But he who joins oneself to the Lord is one spirit with Him.
III.
18. Flee sexual immorality! Whatever sin that a man does is outside the body, but
he who commits sexual immorality sins against his own body.
19. Or do you not know that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in
you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own?
20. For you were bought with a price. Therefore glorify God in your body!
Sexual immorality () occurs in subsection I in verse 13b. In general, verses 1214
hold non-confrontational speech acts. Paul does not explicitly refer to the Corinthians
besides in verse 14, in which he includes himself in the audience ( ). The
apostle does not bring up any apparent dispute in subsection I. Closest to a confrontation is
the notion that sexual immorality is not for the body in verse 13b.
In subsection II, in verses 1517, Paul confronts the recipients directly (Lambrecht
2009, p. 482). He asks them in verse 15a whether they do not know that their bodies are
members of Christ. Then, he makes clear in verses 15bc that the Corinthians should not
become members of a harlot. The phrases of one body, one flesh and joins oneself
in verse 16 indicate that Paul refers to a sexual relation (Butting 2000, p. 83). Subsection II
deals with why sex with harlots in particular should be avoided.
Subsection III begins with a command to flee sexual immorality in verse 18a
(Byrne 1983, p. 612). Paul returns to the broader topic he brought up in verse 13b. The
argumentation in verses 1820 supports the order to flee sexual immorality.
2.1.1 Standpoint(s)
With regard to the standpoint, fleeing sexual immorality (18a) is a too abstract goal to
render it as a plausible main aim. Instead, preventing sex with harlots (15bc) is a more
concrete and feasible goal for Paul to attempt to achieve, when addressing a single
community. It is not feasible to render avoiding prostitutes as a subordinate argument to

827

fleeing sexual immorality. In that case, the argumentation would appear roughly as
follows: You should flee sexual immorality, since you should not have sex with harlots.
The reasoning becomes understandable when the arguments are reversed: You should not
have sex with harlots, since you should avoid sexual immorality.
Furthermore, in the two previous argumentative sections, Paul employs the
generalization of a problem to support a more concrete instance of that problem. In
4:185:13, he employed the general teaching to exile sinners (5:911) as an argument to
drive out the single fornicator (5:2). In 6:111, he argued that lawsuits in front of
unbelievers are shameful (6:5a, 6), since lawsuits in general are shameful (6:7a). Because
of this pattern, I suppose that the current section functions similarly.
2.1.2 Common starting points
In verse 12, Paul states that everything is free to him (see also 10:23). Several scholars
treat this as a Corinthian slogan (Barrett 1968 p. 144; Conzelmann 1975, pp. 108-109;
Dodd 1995, p. 40; Fee 1987, p. 251; Murphy-OConnor 2009, p. 24; Rosner 1998, p. 346;
Thiselton 2000, pp. 459-460). However, in my mind, the exaggerative formulation reflects
Pauls own view (Dodd 1995, pp. 39, 54), since the apostle had a habit to put forward
hyperbole (Lausberg 1998, pp. 263-264, 410-411; Thurn 2000, pp. 202-203, 212). This is
not to say that the apostle does not account for a Corinthian view, too. The recipients
likely considered themselves free in many respects. However, the apostle wants to appear
the expert of freedom by stating that everything is permitted to him. He wishes to promote
his ethos. Paul also wants to begin to argue from a common ground.
The phrase foods for stomach (and vice versa) reflects common sense that is in
itself obvious. I interpret the following phrase in verse 13a about God abolishing as
referring to the eschatological judgment. In the previous argumentative sections, 4:18
5:13 and 6:111, the apostle refers to eschatological matters (5:5 and 6:23). In 6:13, Paul
contrasts the negative destruction in the last judgment with the positive resurrection in
verse 14, which also occurs at the end of times.
A distinct presentational device (see, chaps. 2.2 and 2.2.3) in the current
argumentative section, and in the two previous sections, is the do you not know that
question. Paul uses it to convey common starting points (Wuellner 1986, p. 53). The idea
is that the Corinthians should have taken into account the apostles particular teaching
from a previous visit or letter (see, Hurd 1965, pp. 43-58). Consequently, verse 15a is
considered a common starting point.
However, verses 16a and 19 are not common starting points, even though they hold
an almost identical formulation of the rhetorical question. Instead, they are arguments,
because they are supported by starting points in verses 16b and 20a (Wuellner 1986, p.
67). The word or in the do you not know questions indicates that the Corinthians
should have deduced the conclusion from the starting points that support the arguments
inherent in the rhetorical questions (Lambrecht 2009, p. 483).
In verse 16b, Paul quotes Genesis 2:24, which belongs to the presumably
authoritative religious writings to him and to the recipients (Drake Williams III 2008, p.
20; Heil 2005, pp. 103-105, 122). Consequently, I render the quote as a common starting
point. In verse 20a, the apostle alludes to the sacrifice of Christ (see also 7:23) (Lambrecht
2009, p. 484). God has bought the Corinthians, and believers in general, to himself with

828

Christs blood (Conzelmann 1975, p. 113; Goulder 1999, p. 347; Fee 1987, p. 265). This is
a fundamental event that establishes the faith of the recipients and belongs to the common
starting points.
2.1.3 Arguments
The rest of the text consists of arguments (verses 13b, 16a, 1719 and 20b). There is no
concluding stage, unless one considers verse 20b as belonging to it. I render 20b as a
positive repetition to flee sexual immorality which occurs in verse 18a (Fee 1987, p. 265;
Lambrecht 2009, pp. 484-485). To be able to glorify God in the body, one needs to flee
sexual immorality. The phrases are immediately connected and should be considered as a
single argument.
As stated above, the or do you not know questions in verses 16a and 19 are
considered as arguments, since they are supported by common starting points.
To sum up, Figure 2 portrays the stages of the ideal model as they appear in section
6:1220. The text between the two symbols [S] indicates the sole standpoint. It does not
occur until the midway of the section. The symbols [O] and [A] similarly indicate the
opening and argumentation stages, respectively. Most of the opening stage appears in the
first half of the section. The argumentation stage is prominent in the last half of the text.
This ordering of the text indicates that Paul approaches the argumentative situation
indirectly, making use of insinuatio (Kennedy 1999, pp. 103-104; Lausberg 1998, pp. 121,
124, 132-133, 684). The reason for this is assessed in the analysis of strategic maneuvering
(chap. 2.2).
Figure 2 - Stages of the ideal model in 1 Corinthians 6:1220
12. [O] All things are permitted for me, but all things are not beneficial; all things
are permitted for me, but I will not allow myself to be brought under the power of
any.
13. Foods for the stomach and the stomach for foods, but God will abolish both it
and them. [O] [A] But the body is not for sexual immorality but for the Lord, and
the Lord for the body. [A]
14. [O] God both raised up the Lord and will also raise us up by His power.
15. Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? [O] [S] Would I then
take the members of Christ and make them members of a harlot? Let it not be! [S]
16. [A] Or do you not know that he who joins oneself to a harlot is one body with
her? [A] [O] The two for he says, shall become one flesh. [O]
17. [A] But he who joins oneself to the Lord is one spirit with Him.
18. Flee sexual immorality! Whatever sin that a man does is outside the body, but
he who commits sexual immorality sins against his own body.

829

19. Or do you not know that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in
you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own? [A]
20. [O] For you were bought with a price. [O] [A] Therefore glorify God in your
body! [A]
2.1.4 Argumentation structure
The argumentation structure, in Figure 3, is constructed based on the assessment of the
standpoint, common starting points and arguments (chaps. 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3) and the
division of the text displayed in Figure 1. The three subsections frame three argumentative
wholes (see, Lambrecht 2009, p. 480).
In subsection II, the first line of defense for the standpoint occurs. The
argumentation deals with why sex with harlots specifically is dangerous. Subsections I and
III argue why the more general phenomenon, sexual immorality, should be avoided. The
reasons for fleeing sexual immorality constitute the second line of defense.
Figure 3 Argumentation structure of 1 Corinthians 6:1220
1 You should not have sex with harlots (15bc)
1.1a You should not become one with a harlot (15b)
1.1a.1a You are one with Christ (15a)
(1.1a.1b) [You cannot be one both with a harlot and with Christ (1517)]
1.1b Having sex with a harlot makes you one with her (16a)
1.1b.1 Gen: The two shall become one flesh (16b)
1.2a Sexual immorality should be fled (18a)
(1.2a.1) [Sexual immorality is not like acceptable urges such as eating (13)]
(1.2a.1.1a) [How food affects the stomach will not matter in the end
(13a)]
1.2a.1.1a.1 God will abolish both (13a)
(1.2a.1.1b) [How sexual immorality affects the body will matter in
the end (13b)]
1.2a.1.1b.1 Your bodies will be resurrected (14)
1.2a.1.1b.1.1 The Lords body was resurrected (14)
(1.2a.2) [Sexual immorality is a sin against the Holy Spirit (19)]
1.2a.2.1a Sexual immorality is a sin against the body (18b)
1.2a.2.1b The body is the temple of the Holy Spirit (19)
1.2a.2.1b.1 God owns you (20a)
(1.2b) [Having sex with harlots is a case of sexual immorality]
The arguments beginning with 1.1 (subsection II) represent the spiritual danger that sex
with harlots specifically causes. Curiously, the argument 1.1a.1b is left implicit. This
argument is crucial because it indicates why unity with a harlot is dangerous in view of the
unity with Christ: they are mutually exclusive (see, Fee 1987, pp. 251, 257 and Lambrecht
2009, p. 483). Members of the congregation should not be mixed with representatives of

830

sexual immorality. On a more general level, the point is that the holy and the unholy
should not be mixed with each other.
The arguments beginning with 1.2 build a bridge between the specific issue of
having sex with harlots and the broader phenomenon of sexual immorality (Goulder 1999,
p. 345). The implicit argument 1.2b indicates this connection. Two lines of defense,
beginning with 1.2a.1 and 1.2a.2, support the notion that sexual immorality should be fled.
These correspond with subsections I and III.
In verses 1314 (subsection I; arguments beginning with 1.2a.1), Paul
manufactures a counter-argument to a view that he implicitly attributes to the Corinthians
(see, Fee 1987, p. 253). He compares sexual immorality to acceptable human urges. Eating
is used as an example of an acceptable urge. Eating is alluded to by foods and stomach.
The point of verse 13a is the following: how food affects the stomach, which is a part of
the body, does not matter in the end. This is because God will abolish them. Sexual
immorality, however, affects the body in a way that matters in the end. The body is
important because it is meant for resurrection and not for destruction (Conzelmann 1975,
p. 111; Lambrecht 2009, pp. 481-482). Paul suggests that the unholy sexual immorality
harms the holy resurrection body while acceptable urges do not. Thus, sexual immorality
differs from other urges.
From the above reasoning, the alleged Corinthian position may be deduced. The
Corinthians may have considered sex with harlots as harmless as, for instance, eating. Paul
argues that their view is incorrect. However, the analyst has to be careful in making these
assumptions regarding the recipients stance. The apostle may attribute a false position to
the audience in order to make his own case more persuasive. In this case, Paul would
commit the fallacy of the straw man (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, p. 126; van
Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p. 181; van Eemeren & Grootendorst & Snoeck
Henkemans 2002, p. 177).
In subsection III, Paul argues that sexual immorality should be fled because it is
spiritually dangerous. In verse 18b, the apostle states that sexual immorality is a sin
against the body and in verse 19 that the body is the temple of the Holy Spirit. From these
two notions, the implicit argument 1.2a.2 can be deduced: sexual immorality is a sin
against the Holy Spirit. Again, Paul tries to prevent the mixing of the holy and the unholy.
In verse 20a, the apostle suggests that God has bought the Corinthians. In other
words, they are his slaves and not free. This runs contrary to Pauls initial position in verse
12: everything is free. During the course of the argumentation the apostle attempts to
change the recipients attitude regarding them being free to its opposite. Already in verses
1213, Paul qualifies his radical statements (Lambrecht 2009, p. 480). The Corinthians
should act according to the will of their master and not according to their alleged freedom.
This tactic of Paul functions as an example of his strategic maneuvering which is
scrutinized further.
2.2 Strategic maneuvering
In the analysis of strategic maneuvering, its three inseparable aspects, which can be
distinguished analytically, are assessed: topical potential, audience demand and
presentational devices (van Eemeren 2010, pp. 93-101, 108-113, 118-122; van Eemeren &
Houtlosser 2002, pp. 139-141). The analysis concentrates on finding answers to the

831

questions brought up in the introduction. Consequently, some otherwise interesting issues

are left unaddressed.
2.2.1 Topical potential
Paul chooses to defend a standpoint which holds that the Corinthians should not have sex
with harlots. The topic of the standpoint is substantially strong, because it can be regarded
as a sexual misconduct. The apostle explicates this connection in the argumentation stage
by implicitly suggesting that having sex with harlots is a case of sexual immorality (1.2b).
Paul uses the topic to shame the audience (Goulder 1999, p. 342; see, Moxnes 1993, pp.
22-24).
Connecting the specific issue, sex with harlots, to a broader topic, sexual
immorality, provides Paul a pool of new arguments. In addition, sexual immorality makes
the specific issue explicitly a sin and thus more easily condemnable. Moreover, from a
linguistic point of view the topics, sex with harlots () and sexual immorality
(), are easy to connect.
The specific phenomenon described in the standpoint has significant topical
potential also because the phenomenon is concrete. The Corinthians, according to Paul, are
guilty of a physical sin which also has spiritual implications. It is difficult for the audience
to deny the accusation or to interpret their behavior as something else. The concreteness
leaves little room for defense: either they are guilty or not.
In the opening and argumentation stages, Paul mentions the three persons of the
godhead: God, Christ and the Holy Spirit. That the Corinthians behavior affects the three
persons emphasizes the spiritual danger of having sex with harlots and, perhaps more
importantly, the Corinthians failure. They have failed to glorify God (20b), to take into
account that their bodies are members of Christ (15a), and that they have sinned against
the Holy Spirit (18b19).
2.2.2 Audience demand
Regarding audience demand, Paul approaches the case indirectly. In verses 1214, he puts
forward mostly starting points. Paul does not put forward the standpoint until midway the
section and it is formulated as a rhetorical question. The apostle also refers literally to
himself. Why does he choose the insinuatio-approach? Characteristically this approach is
chosen, when the case is considered difficult for the arguer (Lausberg 1998, p. 121).
A plausible reason for Paul to opt for insinuatio is that he contributed to the
problems in the congregation with his preaching prior to 1 Corinthians (Rosner 1994, p.
125; Thurn 2009). Consequently, Paul does not accuse the recipients directly of wrong
behavior but criticizes, instead, their lack of drawing the correct conclusions from his
previous teachings (verse 15a). In addition, in 5:911 the apostle corrects the
interpretation of his earlier letter (Hurd 1965, pp. 149-150). Moreover, in 11:2 Paul thanks
the audience for taking his message literally. When these features are combined with the
apostles generally hyperbolical presentation, such as that regarding libertinism in 6:12,
radical misinterpretations appear plausible.
Paul addresses the whole congregation even though it is not feasible to render all
the recipients guilty of sexual misconduct. However, by accusing the whole community

832

the accusation becomes potentially stronger, since the congregation has to share the blame
and the shame that follows. Paul wants to claim an authoritative position over the audience
and a shared responsibility of the transgression by them helps in this aim.
2.2.3 Presentational devices
Regarding the presentational devices, the hyperbolical formulation in verse 12 reflects
Pauls own rhetorical position more than that of the Corinthians (Dodd 1995, pp. 39, 54).
In order to correct his earlier teaching on libertinism without losing his ethos, the apostle
chooses to begin from a position that the audience allegedly accepts. Towards the end of
the section, he has changed his stance on freedom almost completely (verses 1920). The
Corinthians are not free but instead Gods slaves. Consequently, they should follow his
commands which Paul, as their spiritual father, puts forward. Instead of losing authority,
he may have felt it necessary to exaggerate his position to portray himself as the expert of
freedom.
Besides establishing common starting points, the do you not know questions
are designed to shame the audience (see, Wuellner 1986, pp. 61-62, 72). The Corinthians
have failed to take into consideration the apostles teachings. Paul suggests that they have
not realized what consequences the quote from Genesis 2:24 and the notion of them being
bought with a price entail. Instead, they have gotten mixed up with unholiness in having
relations with harlots. Paul use of the rhetorical questions to shame the audience
corresponds with their function and intent in the previous sections 4:185:13 and 6:111
(Wuellner 1986, pp. 61-62).
3. CONCLUSION
In the introduction, it was asked, what function section 6:1220 has as part of 1
Corinthians. Is it placed randomly or strategically as a part of the letter? Is there an
underlying train of thought that connects it to the other argumentative sections, especially
4:185:13 and 6:111?
Regarding the dialectical aim, Paul wants to keep the holy and the unholy separate.
He wishes to prevent the Corinthians from uniting with harlots and consequently being
part of sexual immorality. This goal corresponds with the aim of sections 4:185:13 and
6:111. In the former, Paul argues that the recipients should exile the unholy fornicator
from their holy congregation. In the latter, the apostle forbids the community of saints to
have their lawsuits in front of the unrighteous judges.
Regarding the rhetorical goal, Paul wants to shame the Corinthians by accusing
them of sexual immorality. The apostle chooses the topic of sexual misconduct
purposefully to inflict the negative feeling. Prolific presentational devices in this attempt
are the do you not know questions, which appear also in sections 4:185:13 and
6:111. In addition, in 4:185:13, he brings up the Corinthians failure to exile the
fornicator as means to shame them. In 6:111, the apostle explicitly states that he argues to
shame them in verse 5. The recipients going to law before unbelievers is shameful,
because, for instance, they are allegedly worthy and able to resolve the issues themselves.
Paul approaches the case indirectly, by way of insinuatio. Verses 1214 consists mainly of
common starting points and the standpoint in verses 15bc is formulated as a rhetorical
833

question, which refers to the apostle himself. He cannot blame the Corinthians directly,
since he has contributed to the issue at hand with his earlier preaching.
Pauls overall goal in shaming the audience is to diminish their boasting, for which
he blames them in chapters 4 and 5. According to the apostle, the Corinthians think that
they do not require his leadership anymore (4:8, 15, 1819). Paul wants to revive his
authority and argue that they still need him, since there are several severe, even shameful,
problems in the congregation.

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Butting, K. (2000). Pauline variations on Genesis 2.24: speaking of the body of Christ in the context of the
discussion of lifestyles. Journal for the Study of the New Testament 79, 79-90.
Byrne, B. S. J. (1983). Sinning against ones own body: Pauls understanding of the sexual relationship in 1
Corinthians 6:18. The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 45, 608-616.
Conzelmann, H. (1975). 1 Corinthians. Hermeneia. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
Dodd, B. J. (1995). Pauls paradigmatic I and 1 Corinthians 6.12. Journal for the Study of the New
Testament 59, 39-58.
Drake Williams III, H. H. (2008). Light giving sources: examining the extent of scriptural citation and
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Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Argumentation in Context 2. Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John
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Eemeren, F. H. van et al. (1996). Fundamentals of argumentation theory: a handbook of historical
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Eemeren, F. H. van & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication, and fallacies: a pragmadialectical perspective. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
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Eemeren, F. H. van & Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic maneuvering: maintaining a delicate balance. In F. H.
van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and Rhetoric. The Warp and Woof of
Argumentation Analysis (pp. 131-159). Argumentation Library 6. Dordrecht / Boston / London:
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Fee, G. D. (1987). The First epistle to the Corinthians. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company.
Goulder, M. D. (1999). Libertines? (1 Cor. 5-6). Novum Testamentum 41/4, 334-348.
Heil, J. P. (2005). The rhetorical role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians. Studies in Biblical Literature 15.
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Hurd, J. C. (1965). The origin of 1 Corinthians. London: S.P.C.K.
Kennedy, G. A. (1999). Classical rhetoric and its Christian and secular tradition from ancient to modern
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Lambrecth, J. (2009). Pauls reasoning in 1 Corinthians 6,12-20. Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis
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Lausberg, H. (1998). Handbook of literary rhetoric: a foundation for literary study. Ed. by David E. Orton
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Moxnes, H. (1993). Honor and shame. In R. Rohrbaugh (Ed.), The Social Sciences and the New Testament
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Rosner, B. S. (1998). Temple prostitution in 1 Corinthians 6:12-20. Novum Testamentum 40/4, 336-351.
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Thurn, L. (2009). The Corinthians heresies revisited a rhetorical perspective to the historical situation. In
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Argumentative Moves In An Inquisitive Context About

Psychological Harassment In The Workplace: A Case Study In
Qubec
Alain Ltourneau & Marielle Pauz
Philosophy and Applied Ethics Department
Universit de Sherbrooke
Qubec, Canada
Alain.Letourneau@USherbrooke.ca
Ordre des travailleurs sociaux et des thrapeutes conjugaux et familiaux du Qubec
Director of professional development
Montral, Qubec, Canada
mpauze@otstcfq.org

ABSTRACT: We summarize a recently (2013) completed doctoral research, which analyzed and
commented a series of interviews led by four public servants, the mission of which was to ascertain
admissibility for further inquiry, of claims of psychological harassment on the workplace by complainants,
in Qubec province (Canada). We combine with Argumentation and Rhetoric tools and concepts a
Conversation Analysis (CA) perspective, showing how meaning obtains in speech acts constructed in
interaction.
KEYWORDS: Interviews, psychological harassment, argumentation, conversation analysis, rhetoric,
admissibility, speech acts

1. INTRODUCTION
This proposal looks at argumentative strategies between complainants and investigators
around harassment issues at work. A recently (2013) completed doctoral research analyzed
and commented, from an argumentative point of view, a very specific corpus: a series of
four interviews, totalizing ten hours, led by four public servants, the mission of which was
to ascertain a first recognition of validity for further inquiry, of claims of psychological
harassment on the workplace by complainants, in Qubec province (Canada). The
interviews having taken place in 2006, using a convention taking back accepted notations.
One interesting theoretical achievement done in the research is probably to combine a
Conversation Analysis (CA) perspective, claiming that meaning obtains in speech acts
constructed in interaction, with argumentative figures and cues taken in Aristotle,
Perelman, Walton and Van Eemeren.
In the context of a doctoral research in philosophy (Ph.D.), we wanted to study
specific discourses that certainly have a rhetorical dimension: claims of psychological
harassment presented by plaintiffs and their treatment by investigators. Different
conceptual and methodological tools have been used, which are coming from rhetoric,
argumentation studies and also from Conversation Analysis (CA). The notions of logos,
ethos and pathos were examined and used in the analysis of a corpus of scripts of taped
argumentative exchanges, between complainants and investigators; details and

836

conventions utilized are given below. We will start by providing the social and
professional context of the study, recall briefly Aristotles notions, then look at Perelmans
notion of the audiences adhesion, with some contributions of Van Eemeren and Walton;
we will limit ourselves to specific elements of these theories here. Then the research
method used, by reference to CA, will be explained briefly while we will be finishing with
the presentation of a few examples illustrating our main results about the rhetorical effects
of narrative accounts of psychological harassment in the context of specific investigative
interactions.
2. RESEARCH CONTEXT
Our research context was provided by a public organization, the Commission des normes
du travail (CNT), which is a Labour Standards Commission having its jurisdiction in
Qubec, Canada. People who have suffered for different reasons at work, can file
complaints in front of that organism for psychological harassment, the complaints are then
treated by professionals. Since 2004, it is possible in Qubec for a worker (blue or white
collar) to file such a complaint, with the aims of putting an end to the problematic
situation. The law that clarifies the recourse determines the nature of manifestations that
can be associated with psychological harassment; the text refers to notions such as A
vexatious behaviour in the form of repeated conduct, verbal comments, actions or gestures
that are hostile or unwanted, that affect the employees dignity or psychological or
physical integrity and make the work environment harmful, (L.Q. 2002, c.80). This
sentence includes a number of possible situations which resonates with workers who
experience different forms of suffering in the workplace. These possible victims can then
refer to CNT as a public office, even though the procedure will represent an enormous
challenge for people who feel they were or still are being harassed at work.
We looked in particular at the method that was used by the CNT in the years
immediately following the implementation of the law, between 2004 and 2008. In those
years, a professional of the Commission had to play the role of a psychological harassment
investigator, having first to decide on the admissibility of the complaint, e.g. to see if the
alleged facts described would justify an inquiry, before such a thorough inquiry would be
conducted1. That first phase of the procedure would generally happen in a face-to-face
interview with the plaintiff. It is in the frame of that conversation that complainants would
have to demonstrate that the actually lived experience of suffering really could be
understood as psychological harassment as the law defined it. The investigator had to
decide if the set of facts presented and analyzed did meet or not the criteria for
psychological harassment as currently defined.
In this first interview encounter, clearly the exchanges between plaintiff and
investigator showed a rhetorical dimension: the plaintiff wanted to convince the
investigator that he was in fact the victim of psychological harassment as the law defined
1

We should note that the admissibility phase has been conducted differently since 2009. Currently, the
plaintiff would deposit his/her complaint on the website of the CNT or by phone. After that, the admissibility
of the complaint is treated for a good part by phone. Our goal in the research was not to compare methods or
to evaluate the interview procedure, but just to know it better with the aims of situating its resources from a
rhetorical and analytical point of view.

837

it. As the following testimony shows, that interview is crucial, if the plaintiff is to have
his-her status of being a victim recognized: the CNT is my only resort. Elsewhere
nobody wants to hear what I have been living. It is important for me to show that I am
right and that I am the victim here. I am not inventing all this! (Brun et Kedl401)2. This
is why the plaintiff needs to take an argumentative and rhetorical posture to obtain the
adhesion of the investigator to his/her thesis: the manifestations that the plaintiff brings in
recounting the events are clearly associated for that person with psychological harassment,
and the rhetorical aim pursued seems to be that the investigator should accept that thesis.
On the other side of the fence, the investigator will ask questions with the aim of verifying
if the claims do fall under what has been defined as PH by the law.
3. THE NOTIONS OF LOGOS, ETHOS AND PATHOS IN RHETORIC
To be able to treat comprehensively the argumentative strategies deployed in this initial
encounter between plaintiff and investigator, a theoretical frame had to be put in place that
would be appropriate for the kind of process, here psychological harassment at the
workplace. To be able to treat adequately what the actors actually do in the practical
encounter that starts the process of treating the complaint, we will briefly examine two
theoricians of rhetoric and argumentation, Aristotle among the ancients and Perelman
among more contemporary thinkers.
Aristotles [384-322 av. J.-C.] core notions of ethos, pathos and logos, as they
appear in Rhetoric, as we know are three technical means of persuasion. They are still very
relevant in a reflexive approach to argumentative strategies, even outside the strict
relationship between a rhetor and an audience3. Originally, rhetoric is preoccupied with
day to day problems of the city, the rhetor will use discourse to obtain adhesion of the
crowd, the people gathered in the public place. As we will see, the protagonists in
argumentative interaction in the context of the initial encounter in the inquiry process are
not without similarity with rhetors trying to persuade and obtain adherence of a public.
The three persuasive dynamics in Aristotles rhetoric are convergent and complete
each other; ethos for the character of the speaker that always has to be established, pathos
because persuasion needs the emotional dispositions of the audience, and logos because
discourse has to be rationally convincing. In this research every one of these dimensions
has been found at play, in the interaction taking place in the context of a plaintiffs speech
acts and reactions in the argumentative exchange, trying to ascertain if there was a valid
possibility of psychological harassment. We can understand that the ethos of the speaker
has an impact on the reception of his or her arguments (logos); the emotions or passions
(pathos) that he or she will be able to elicit will also play a part, and these three
dimensions will influence one another and the result obtained in differing ways.
The ethos has a great role to play inside rhetoric. It is not true, as some writers assume in
their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes
nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the
Je ninvente pas toute cette histoire! - As everywhere else in the document, the original material was in
French, and the translations in English are provided by the authors.
3
Most of the times, Aristotle talks about the audience in Rhetoric, but there is reference to a judgeauditor , a notion relevant in our context where an orator speaks to one auditor/listener who has a mandate
to take a decision.
2

838

most effective means of persuasion he possesses (Aristotle, 1356a, 10-15). It is to ethos

that Aristotle attributes the greatest capacity of influence on the audience. Persuasion is
accomplished by character whenever the speech is held in such a way as to render the
speaker worthy of credence, by establishing credibility and authority.
The way the speaker presents him or herself, for instance moral character and
honesty, this has an effect to inspire confidence with interlocutors. In our experimentation
and study of the exchanges, we could clearly see that the plaintiff does whatever he or she
can to present his or herself in a better self-image, obviously to inspire confidence to the
inquirer and to help with the adhesion of that person to the thesis of psychological
harassment.
4. PERELMANS NOTION OF THE AUDIENCES ADHESION
Cham Perelmans (1912-1984) most famous book, La nouvelle rhtorique, Trait de
largumentation, written with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, was originally published in 1958. It
breaks with the Cartesian notion of reason and renews a rapport with Aristotelian rhetoric.
To clearly position themselves, the author begins the book with the following sentence:
The publication of a treatise devoted to argumentation and this subjects connection with
the ancient tradition of Greek rhetoric and dialectic constitutes a break with a concept of
reason and reasoning due to Descartes which has set its mark on Western philosophy for
the last three centuries (Perleman and Oblbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 1).
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are adapting classical aristotelian problems in the
epistemological context of the middle of the 20th century. Their work is focussing on the
so-called dialectic proofs; Aristotle analysed them in the Topics while their usefulness was
explained in Rhetoric. Aristotle understands dialectic as the art of reasoning on the basis of
generally accepted opinions. For Perelman, dialectic is preoccupied with opinions, e.g. the
theses to which we adhere with a varying intensity or degree. This is not to be understood
as demonstrative work as in a logic-mathematical model. With Aristotle and Perelman,
argumentative rhetoric is turned towards the other with the aim of making him adhere to a
claim: this is what can be called the persuasive language activity (Charaudeau 3, our
translation). It is in part on the basis of that notion of adhesion that the authors back the
idea of practical reason. The New Rhetoric is based on the idea that since argumentation
aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety,
relative to the audience to be influenced (1969, p. 19). He uses a number of examples to
show how rhetoric was a practical discipline, that was used to have a persuasive effect
on an audience. The book examines the discursive techniques meant to augment adhesion,
positing that this will produce attitudes and eventually action. The force of arguments is
manifested related to the strength of adhesion by the audience to presented arguments.
When rhetor and audience adhere because of the rhetor's creation of an audience-oriented
presence (which is then augmented with argumentative techniques), the adherence
provokes the audience to act in ways desired by the rhetor.
They still recognize the role of ethos and of emotions in the overall argumentative
process, a point very useful to understand better the peculiar argumentative relation
between plaintiff and professional. Rhetoric becomes a study of discourse in the context of
the study of communication relationships, by contrast to a previous notion according to
which it was limited to the apprenticeship of being a good debater.

839

5. VAN EEMERENS AND WALTONS CONTRIBUTIONS

Van Eemeren pragma-dialectic approach had a tremendous importance to finally make
the link between argumentation as rational contents and argumentation as processes.
Similar remarks can be made for Waltons re-reading of the fallacies, we can now look at
them as argumentative schemes, tools in interaction that can in some cases be abusive, but
not all the time. These contributions were both very useful as part of our theoretical
framework, since they look at argumentation into interaction processes in given situations.
While reworking (among other elements) the whole fallacy analysis tradition,
Walton has since quite a few years added a new treatment of the role of emotion in
argumentation, as a major theme of reflection. In The Place of Emotion in Argument,
published in 1992, he discussed the rational value of such appeals. The thesis of this
book is that appeals to emotion have a legitimate, even important, place as arguments in
persuasion dialogue, but that they need to be treated with caution because they also can be
used fallaciously (Walton, 1992, p. 1). Not only does he demonstrate that the appeal to
emotion can be justifiable and acceptable in argumentation, but he also shows how they
contribute to the fundamental goal of the argumentative discussion. Instead of dismissing
these appeals as fallacious wherever they occur, as many have done and still do, Walton
urges that each use must be judged on its merits. He also warns us against fallacious
recourses that could hinder an efficient discussion process. He will explicitly refer and
back himself up with a reference to the pragma-dialectic approach as developed by Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, referring to the 1984 book. According to this new PragmaDialectic concept, a fallacy is a technique of argumentation that may in principle be
reasonable but that has been misused in a given case in such a way that it goes strongly
against or hinders the goals of dialogue (p.18) For instance, in the context of our
research, we could verify that the appeal to pity, ad misericordiam, which is present in the
encounter between the plaintiff and the inquirer, can hardly be understood as fallacious, if
we are to mean by this that it would be for the plaintiff a way to trump the inquirers
research, e.g. to lead him to error. In cases of misery that would be documented, we could
not justifiably talk of argumentative abuse. Such an appeal to emotion can certainly have a
place in our argumentative context, provided the plaintiff is not using that argument to
hide a lack of strength in the proof considered.
Especially important for us was the connection established by the Amsterdam
school between pragmatics of speech acts and the dialectical point of view on critical
discussion. Since we do not have a formal discussion here, it was not possible to
systematically treat the corpus by using the ten rules for a critical discussion (Van
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; 2004). The pragma-dialectical theory regards
argumentation as ideally being part of a critical discussion (see Van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 1984, p. 17). Here of course, we do not have a purely symmetrical dialogue
but an inquiry process, which has an adversarial character (Walton, 2010). The inquiry
does not aim at a reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion, but an authority has to
judge on a complaint which is interested; even though this is not a judiciary process per se,
it could serve as a basis for further endeavours of the kind. In a case like here, with
plaintiffs and inquirers, it still is very helpful to consider, as in pragma-dialectics,
argumentation as a communicative and interactional discourse phenomenon.

840

We did manage to find four stages that do bear a resemblance to Van Eemerens phases in
a discussion. As we recall, in Van Eemeren the four stages are: 1) Confrontation stage, 2)
Opening stage, 3) Argumentation stage and 4) Concluding stage. In our case, the four
stages were the following. 1) Introduction, by each of the participants, of his or her frame
of reference. This is where the inquirer explains what he or she will try to do, and the
plaintiff will express the meaning as perceived of the complaint. It could be seen as a
prelude to confrontation. 2) Discussion about the facts at hand, with formulations from one
side, questions and answers. The plaintiff tries to build his or her own case, mostly with
remarks of clarification from the inquirer. 3) Validation, by the inquirer, of the hypothesis
previously constructed in the interview. During that phase, the inquirer directs more the
process by working on this basis of a tentative conclusion already formulated 4)
conclusion in terms of admissibility or not of the complaint. This will be a challenge for
both parties; the decision will never be totally announced here, but the general direction
taken is given.
6. METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH: CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
With situations of potential psychological harassment, it is interesting to try and capture
the relationships between people, and not to focus only on isolated utterances. We also
tried to recapture impacts of ones utterances on the other and reciprocally, and for this
some background references to speech act theory and pragmatics was useful and
necessary. A rhetorical dimension of the complaints narrative does take place in any case,
whether it will result in success or in failure to convince. So to avoid letting important
elements slip by, we chose a methodology that would make it possible to refer to pieces
with sufficient precision and completeness.
Language produces an effect that is not only linked or limited to the description of
reality, in terms of truth hood and falsity, but it also goes with force and impacts on colocutors. Pragmatics of speech acts permitted to reorient philosophy of language towards
the interlocutors, it also helps to stress the ethical dimension since we are in the domain of
interpersonal relationships.
Such a contribution of pragmatics oriented us towards tools developed inside the
family of methods regrouped into Conversation Analysis. The object of such an analysis is
to describe procedures and expectations that help interactants to act while interpreting the
others conversational behaviour in the relationship, in an interplay of exchanges that is
conversation. Conversation Analysis (CA), a research tradition that grew out of
ethnomethodology, has some unique methodological features. It studies the social
organization of 'conversation', or 'talk-in-interaction', by a detailed inspection of tape
recordings and transcriptions made from such recordings. This way the researcher does not
try to judge or qualify the ways by which the participants act, but focusses on the
strategies they adopt to construct an understandable exchange. Harvey Sacks (1935-1975),
considered to be the founder of this approach, is a sociologist that is interested, at the
beginning of the 1960s, to the experience of everyday life. Sacks became interested in the
structure of conversation while working at a suicide counseling hotline in Los Angeles in
the 1960s. The calls to the hotline were recorded, and Sacks was able to gain access to the
tapes and study them. By using comprehensive transcriptions of recordings of ordinary
language , Sacks sets himself the task to study without theoretical a priori, the

841

interpretations that members had of what is happening here and now . He thus controls
what he could understand of the actions that constitute the talk turns of the interlocutors,
by their mastery of natural language. In effect, the raw data as transcribed gives access to
all the important details; not only the statements themselves, e.g. the contents of the
speech turns, but also the tone of voice, errors, corrections, silences, onomatopoeias and
noises on which interpretations are based by preceding speakers. This way it becomes
possible to deduce certain social activity models since their properties are clearly ordained
and observable. Conversation Analysis may then be conceived as a specific analytic
trajectory which may be used to reach a specific kind of systematic insight in the ways in
which members of society 'do interaction'. In their introduction to a collection of research
papers, Heritage & Atkinson (1984) write: The central goal of conversation analytic
research is the description and explication of the competences that ordinary speakers use
and rely on in participating in intelligible, socially organized interaction. At its most basic,
this objective is one of describing the procedures by which conversationalists produce
their own behavior and understand and deal with the behavior of others. A basic
assumption throughout is Garfinkel's (1967: 1) proposal that these activities - producing
conduct and understanding and dealing with it -are accomplished as the accountable
products of common sets of procedures.(Heritage & Atkinson (1984):1)
Conversation Analysis (CA) is the method chosen to analyse this research corpus,
which includes four interviews taped on a digital recorder for audio support. This method
is part of the social sciences, it requires the careful recording and the attentive
transcription of the conversation in its details, in following the conventions developed by
Gail Jefferson (Sacks, Schegloff et Jefferson 696-735). Gail Jefferson was, along with
Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff, one of the founders of the area of research known
as Conversation Analysis (CA). She is particularly remembered today for the methods and
notational conventions she developed for transcribing talk. The system of notation widely
used today in CA research bears her name. We are reproducing these transcription rules
below to facilitate the understanding the analysis of the interviews.

842

7. CONVENTION USED IN TRANSCRIPTS

Symbol
(( ))

(0.3 )

(.)
[
=

____

XX

Indication
Double parentheses are used to mark transcriber's
description of events, rather than representations of
them.
Numbers in parentheses indicate elapsed time in tenths
of seconds. The device is used between utterances of
adjacent speakers, between two separable parts of a
single speaker's talk, and between parts of a single
speaker's internally organized utterance.
Indicates a short pause in the speakers talk.
Single bracket indicates the point at which a current
speaker's talk is overlapped by the talk of another.
The equals sign (=) indicates 'latching'-i.e., no interval
between the end of a prior and start of a next piece of
talk. It is used for the relationship of a next speaker's
talk to a prior speaker's talk.
Underscoring indicates various forms of stressing and
may involve volume.
The up arrows mark sharper rises in pitch
XX indicate that transcribers are not sure about the
words contained.

Example
((cough)),
((whispered))
Yes (0.2) yeah

A: quite a
B: [ yeah
A: that I'm aware of
B: =Yes. Would
you confirm that?
What's up?
are you
responsible
Would you XX
anything positive

Each of the interviews lasted approximately 2 hours, and where chosen with different
inquirers, after having obtained all the necessary approvals by the ethics committee. We
chose to transcribe the parts of the interviews where there were important verbal
interactive exchanges between the partners, and left on the side longer detailed
descriptions of situations by the plaintiffs, for which the impact on the development of the
exchange was less obvious. Parts that looked like monologues, turning most of the times
on the narration of precise events, have not been transcribed, a choice also justified by the
importance of the interactive material covered, which encompassed more than a hundred
pages; comparatively, parts not transcribed were much smaller overall.
Our task was descriptive, we wanted to document as much as possible the
diversity and scope of the argumentative exchanges present in these particular situations,
into which the plaintiff wants to make sure he or she puts everything in play with the aim
of convincing the inquirer of the well founded character of the complaint for psychological
harassment. Globally taken, the eight hours of interview assuredly permitted to document
the most part of the argumentative tendencies specific to this research context. We will
recall here some examples of the results that emerge from a deep analysis of the
transcriptions. First, we will look at sections where the preoccupation of the plaintiff to
present a favorable ethos can clearly be seen. After that, we will present some examples of
emotion appeals, and in the following part, we will examine argumentative strategies that
emerge in contexts where the inquirer is adhering to the thesis of the plaintiff, and others
where there is no adhesion on the inquirers part.
843

8. A PLAINTIFF PRESENTING A FAVORABLE ETHOS

Since we remember that for Aristotle, ethos is strongest of proofs (Rhtorique, 1356a), we
can easily verify that the plaintiff takes care of his speech to be able to inspire confidence
in the inquirer. He or she will put everything at work to show that he or she is worthy of
belief, by a number of examples that show his or her good side. Here are two short
examples in that regard. A translation from French to English is also provided.
Entrevue 1-A (97-1024)
P5 :
Je suis un employeur, jen ai des employs maintenant pis jai t directeur pour
Options Multi [ancien employeur] donc lusine pendant plusieurs annes, donc
jsais ce que cest que de rencontrer un employ quand on encadre une procdure
qui se veut euh, rparatrice on va dire.
Interview 1-A (97-102)
P5 :
I am a director, I have employees now and Ive also been a manager for Options
Multi (ex-employer), so the factory, I know what it is to supervise a process that
needs to be hem repairing somehow.
Entrevue 1-C (23-26)
P:
Moi je suis arriv au Qubec en 89 avec 70 dollars sur moi. Jai commenc comme
dsosseur chez Options Multi, pis graduellement force de cours je suis mont.
Chu, euh, dfini comme un gnraliste, avec (.) naf et trs ax RH.
Interview 1-C (23-26)
P:
I arrived in Quebec in 89 with 70 dollars. I started with boning chickens at Options
Multi, then gradually I climbed up, with following courses. I am hem defined
as a generalist, with a nave (.) and centered on HR.
Entrevue 2-C (86-100)
P:
OK, jaimerais bien, si cest, euh, si cest vraiment, bon ce qui ma fait, il se peut
que cest avec, avec dautres, dautres filles. Donc, qui sait, cest son harclement,
cest--dire, euh, mme si, mme si moi cest fini, il ma congdi et tout, mais au
moins quil doit savoir, euh, cest--dire, euh, comment faire avec les autres, les
autres employs
E2 : [Quil en tire un petit peu une leon de a
P:
Cest a, quil tire, cest a
E2 : Mm
P:
Lessentiel, euh, mme sil ma, il ma congdie, moi y a pas de problme.

4
5

Numbers represent the chosen segment in the 1-A interview.

P stands for the plaintiff.

844

Interview 2-C (86-100)

P:
OK, Id like, hem, if it, if its really what he did, what he did to me, it might be that
the same goes with, with other girls. So, who knows, his harassment, even if, even
if for me it is over, he fired me and all, at least he should know, hem, how to do,
with the other employees
I26:
[He should get some lesson of that
P:
Yeah, he should, yeah
I2:
Mm
P:
The important thing is, hem, even if he fired me, for me this is not a problem
The examples taken from interview 1 and 2 show the importance of presenting a favorable
ethos by the plaintiff. The two first examples put ahead a plaintiff centered on human
relations , who explains how he knows to treat correctly his employees, he also worked
very hard to get to where he is now. He presents the ethos of a good employer that is also a
good worker. The third example presents a plaintiff who declares she makes a complaint
not for herself, but for female colleagues that possibly suffer the same fate. She thus shows
a decentered attitude, an element that certainly can give a boost to her own ethos in from
of her interlocutor.
These favorable representations of the plaintiffs ethos certainly can have an
impact on the interviewer, at least they are intended thus, as if the fact of establishing trust
and credibility in front of the interviewer would conduct him or her to judge favorably on
her behalf in future interventions. But we should also note that this establishing of a
favorable ethos is frequently put to the test in the remainder of the interviews. The inquirer
will check by asking for precisions; for instance, about the last example, the following of
the interview led the plaintiff to fairly contradict herself in this presentation of this
altruistic ethos. In the following she describes to which point she was in conflict with
those women, for whom she supposedly is pursuing the complaint, wanting to defend
them. The interviews structure, by its numerous validations and its continual asking for
details, can certainly put in jeopardy an apparent construction of a favorable ethos by and
in the complainant. We should also note that such is not the aim of the interview, even if
to appreciate admissibility of the complaint can destabilize a plaintiff involved in a
complex process of validation that is demanding for anyone.
9. APPEAL TO EMOTION
Generally speaking, the plaintiffs discourse is charged with emotions which are revived in
the process of narrating the events previously lived, by which they are recalled. Three out
of four plaintiffs cried in their narrative, by which they kind of relieved the suffering that
they wanted to denounce.
Entrevue 1-C (14-22)
P:
Jai jamais cru, madame, que jallais (.) tre si vid. [] Jai jamais cru (.) les
premires semaines l madame, je me levais (.) je me recouchais (.) je me levais le
midi, je me recouchais, je mettais mon cadran, pour que mon ami ne me trouve pas
couch en entrant (.). Et je me suis compltement, je navais, dabord jai jamais
t congdi (.)

845

Entrevue 2-G (21-49)

P:
C'est ma grande surprise, l, quand j'ai vu a, c'est pour a que j'ai eu un choc,
euh, motif.
E2 : a, a vous a vraiment,
P:
[Ah vraiment
E2:
[a vous a vraiment renverse
P:
Ah, mon dieu
E2:
[bouleverse
P:
J'ai pleur, j'ai pleur, pis, euh, il me demande de continuer. Je n'arrivais plus, je
suis rentre aux toilettes, j'ai lav mon visage, mais je pouvais plus, je, je pouvais
pas finir, parce que
E2:
[Le choc, le choc tait grand
P:
[Moi, comme a? Moi ceci, moi cela, c'est comme, je n'arrivais pas, non, non,
ah c'tait trop fort.
E2:
a, a vous a fait comme un choc, enh?
P:
Mon dieu, mon dieu. Maintenant a va, je suis plus, plus forte, mais les premiers
temps, j'ai pleur, j'ai pleur, j'ai pleur, mais c'tait vraiment
((la plaignante pleure))
Interview 1-C (14-22)
P:
I never would have believed that I would be so (.) exhausted.. [] I never believed
(.) the first weeks maam, I would get up (.) than lien down again (.) I got up at
noon, would get back to bed again, I would set my alarm clock, for my boyfriend
not to find me in bed while coming in (.). And I was completely, I was, I never was
fired in the first place before. (.)
Interview 2-G (21-49)
P:
This was a big surprise, when I saw that, this is why I had an emotional shock.
I26 : So this was really,
P:
[Ah really
I2:
[You really were bowled over
P:
Oh my goodness
I2:
[devastated
P:
I cried, I cried, and then ah, he asks me to continue. I couldnt, i got inside the
toilet, I washed my face, but I could not, I could finish because
I2:
[The shock, the shock was too great.
P:
[Me, being like that? Me this, me that, its like, I couldnt, nah, that was too
much, too strong.
I2:
This gave you a shock, han?
P:
My, oh my. Now its ok, I am more, more strong, but at beginning, in the first
times, I cried, cried, and cried, it was so
((the plaintiff cries))

Ibid.

846

Even if sometimes recourses to emotion denote a lack of contextualization or of nuances

regarding what provoked the situation, they document and make concrete what has been
lived, while at the same time they contribute to facilitate a better understanding for the
inquirer of what happened to the plaintiff. The emotion appeal of the quote from interview
1 renders available to the interviewer the suffering lived by the plaintiff; her illustrations
reinforce the credibility of that appeal. As for the second quote, the call to emotion by the
plaintiff is provoked in particular by the narrative of an attack on her integrity ([Me, being
like that? Me this, me that, its like, I couldnt, nah, that was too much, too strong. The
emotion was revived by the recalling of the hurting that comes in the narrative of the
hurting and cries of the employee, while confirming the importance of the attack on her
integrity.
10. ARGUMENTATION WHICH IS TYPICAL IN CASES OF THE INQUIRERS
ADHESION
By studying their owl process carefully, we saw clearly that two of our four inquiries led
to a conclusion of admissibility and two led on the contrary to a decision of non
admissibility, and each set had specific characteristics that are worth recalling here. The
fact that the inquirer concluded to the admissibility means he adhered in good part to the
thesis held by the plaintiff in terms of in terms of Psychological Harassment in the work
place. In the case where inquirers concluded to the contrary, this conclusion shows that the
inquirer did not associate the claims of the plaintiff with the definition of psychological
harassment as it is clarified by the law that gives a frame to the treatment of complaints.
Let us look now more closely at the argumentative strategies that are present in each of
these sub-sets, in the cases of adhesion and non-adhesion. After a number of readings the
four interviews, we could ascertain that the tones employed by the partners in the
exchange were certainly not the same and we could underscore some tendencies that will
be identified and commented briefly here. We will start by the interviews that led the
inquirer to adhere to the thesis of the plaintiff.
10.1 Expressions of doubt and shame by the plaintiff
One of the lead authors on the issue of psychological harassment, Marie-France Hirigoyen
(1998, 2004) documented in good part what distinguishes victims of psychological
harassment of those that experience different problematical situations present in the work
place but not associated to PH as such as defined by the different laws. She observed that
the speech acts of true victims of PH are marked with uncertainty regarding the victims
role in the situation; the complaint of the victim is punctuated with self-doubt in a person
that wants to end his or her torment. This is something that is confirmed in our corpus, as
we can see in the first interview that is particularly expressive on that point.

847

Entrevue 1-C (50-53)

P:
[Une fois arrt, jtais comme compltement incapable de ragir et je me suis mis
(.) dabord je me sentais extrmement coupable (.) euh, et puis (.) je navais
vraiment plus, javais plus de moral, a nallait plus.
Entrevue 1-E (46-51)
P:
Parce qu'avec le recul, voyez-vous (.) si y a quelque chose que je me suis beaucoup
reproch (.) qui je crois m'a fait compltement perdre pied, c'est de pas avoir mis,
avoir eu la force d'y mettre un oh l. Vous savez, j'ai pas t capable de (.) j'tais
dj fatigu et j'ai pas t capable de l'arrter.
Interview 1-C (50-53)
P:
[Once it stopped, I was completely unable to react and I started to (.) first I felt
extremely guilty (.) hem and then (.) I really did not have, I had no spirit, I did not
work.
Interview 1-E (46-51)
P:
Because as time passed, you see (.) if there is something I really regretted (.) is that
he made me lose footage, it is that I couldnt, I did not have the strength to put an
end to it. You know, I was unable to (.) I was tired already and unable to stop him.
We see clearly in the narrative expressions of self-doubt, guilt and even shame and regret,
not for having somehow provoked the harassers behaviour, but to stand up and make the
person stop that disturbing behaviour. This self-questioning coincides clearly with a
documented characteristic in the victims experience; the person loses ground, his/her
identity is under attack and the person can hardly keep a good judgement on the situation.
That self-doubt in the situation of harassment is what permits the conflict to perpetuate,
most of the times until the person is fired or has to leave for health reasons. On the
contrary here, the expression of this self-doubt seems very close to an ad misericordiam,
even if it is hardly of that kind. The argument seems to function this way: by trying to find
his or her responsibility in the situation, the plaintiff shows good faith to the inquirer, an
element that rejoins some common sense on shared responsibilities in conflicts. But since
this part of responsibility will prove to be absent in the case as presented by the plaintiff,
the inquirer/judge has to shift the burden of guilt somewhere.
11. CHARACTERISTICS OF ARGUMENTATION IN CASES OF NON ADHESION
When the inquirer does not conclude to psychological harassment, the person is not
adhering to the thesis of the plaintiff. The analysis of the corpus showed that the whole
development of the interview takes a very different shape in those cases. The plaintiff did
not convince the inquirer that the actions of the employer or of the co-worker were
something else than just ordinary conflict, that might have to do with ordinary work
constraints. We will describe here the main characteristic of this expression of non
admissibility of a complaint for psychological harassment.

848

11.1 Expressing a work conflict and professional constraints

In what qualifies as a simple conflict at work, reproaches are identified explicitly and the
protagonists manifest their hostility in an almost equal manner. For instance, if a person
feels too much pressure at work, or conversely if a manager finds some worker not
efficient enough, expressions will occur of these malaises. There is no such symmetry in
situations of psychological harassment.
Entrevue 2-H (55-65)
P:
[] mais de toute faon, y avait pas un bon, une bonne relation, ni de travail, ni,
euh, je la voyais de toute faon comment quelle, euh, comment quelle me
regarde, comment quelle euh, de toute faon, cest comme euh, peine si je, je lui
dis bonjour, din fois elle me rpond mme pas, donc, euh.
Mais ce nest pas cette faon cest, moi je pense que cest pas la seule, cest dans
leur ducation, quelques-unes, jamais elles disent bonjour. Cest pas parce que ils
men veulent ou quelque chose, mais cest dans leur ducation.
Entrevue 3-B (148-149)
P:
Ouais, il a explos. Comme si a faisait un moment quil me supportait pas [].
Interview 2-H (55-65)
P:
[] in any case, it was not good, there was no good relation, of work, or of hem, I
saw anyway how she looks at me, how she, in any way, it is like hem, I barely,
hem, I say hello, sometimes she does not even answer me, so hem.
But it is not that way its, me I think it is not the only, it is in their education, some
of them, they never say hello. It is not because they have something against me, it
is just in their education.
Interview 3-B (148-149)
P:
Yes, he exploded. As if its been coming a long time, he couldnt stand me [].
By these and other elements not reproduced here, we see that the plaintiff of Interview 2
denounces a cultural situation, she blames the education of the colleagues, who did not
have the same upbringing (her interpretation of the wrongful behaviour) and she does not
see anything else in the fact that they did not salute her. There seems to be a symmetry in
the conflict, she herself admits that something else than PH is going on here. The quotes
from interviews 2 and 3 illustrate situations of conflict that are not in a dominant-dominee
frame where the one leading the conflict would try to submit the other to the point of
leading the person to loose or doubt her or his identity.
12. CONCLUSION
Differences of tones are present that do play a part on the inquirers decision for the
admissibility or not of the complaint. Some strategies were quite obviously put in place,
around ethos, pathos and logos; we saw some examples of appeals to ethos on the

849

plaintiffs side, but there were also some that were present on the inquirers side for
instance, explaining the limits of what can be done, the professionalism the person was
going to put in place. Adhesion is certainly a crucial element to be obtained along the
process. Since the procedure has been replaced by a form which is less personal, it would
be impossible to enlarge the data set to verify some recurrences already identified.
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Aristote (1991). Rhtorique, Introduction de Michel Meyer. Paris : Le livre de poche.
Austin, J.L. (1970). Quand dire, cest faire (Trad. par G. Lane) Paris : ditions du Seuil (1re d. 1962).
Brun, J.P. et Kedl, E. (2006). Porter plainte pour harclement psychologique au travail : un rcit difficile.
Relations industrielles, 61 (3), 2006, p. 381-407.
Accessible online : http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/014183ar.
Charaudeau, P. (2008). Largumentation dans une problmatique dinfluence. Argumentation et Analyse du
Discours, 1. Accessible online : http://aad.revues.org/index193.html
Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Los Angeles: Polity Press.
Gaulejac, V. d. (2008). Approche socioclinique de la souffrance au travail. International Review of
Sociology Revue Internationale de Sociologie. 18 (3), p. 433-441.
Hirigoyen, M.-F. (1998). Le harclement moral, la violence perverse au quotidien. Paris : La Dcouverte.
Hirigoyen, M.-F. (2004). Malaise dans le travail, Harclement moral : Dmler le vrai du faux. Paris : La
Dcouverte.
Loi modifiant la Loi sur les normes du travail et dautres dispositions lgislatives, L.Q. 2002, c. 80,
modifiant L.R.Q., c. N-1.1.
Meyer, M. (1993). Questions de rhtorique : langage, raison et sduction. Paris : Le livre de poche.
Meyer, M. (2008). Principia rhetorica, Une thorie gnrale de largumentation. Paris : Fayard.
Perelman, Ch.etOlbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1988). Trait de largumentation. La nouvelle rhtorique (6th ed.).
Bruxelles : ditions de lUniversit de Bruxelles (1st ed. 1958).
Plantin, Ch. (1990). Essais sur largumentation. Introduction linguistique ltude de la parole
argumentative. Paris : ditons Kim.
Plantin, Ch. (2005). Largumentation. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
Sacks, H. (1995). Lectures on conversation. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. and Jefferson, G. (1974). A SimplestSystematicsfor the Organization of TurnTakingforConversation. Language 50 (4), 696-735.
Van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R. (1996), La nouvelle dialectique, Paris : Kim.
Van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R. (2003), A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Walton, D.N. (1992), The Place of Emotion in Argument, University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State
University Press.

850

Practical Reasoning And Multi-party Deliberation: The Best, The

Good Enough And The Necessary
Marcin Lewinski
ArgLab, Institute of Philosophy, FCSH
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Portugal
m.lewinski@fcsh.unl.pt

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I elaborate the complex scheme of practical reasoning by proposing its contextindependent and context-dependent elements. Further, I focus on its means-goal premise (We should do X,
because X leads to Y, and Y is desirable). I argue that the practical inference can be licenced in three basic
ways: when X leads to signifies a necessary means, the best means or the means that is good enough.
KEYWORDS: argumentation schemes, inference licence, optimising, practical reasoning, satisficing

We deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends. [] Having set the end [deliberators]
consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they
consider by which it is most easily and best produced. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b12-15)
Ones choice is rational only if one did not recognize clearly better reasons
for choosing any of ones forgone alternatives. (Schmidtz, 1995, p. 38)

1. INTRODUCTION
Practical reasoning (PR) is reasoning about what (to intent) to do, as opposed to theoretical
reasoning, reasoning about what (to believe) is the case. When expressed in language, PR
takes the form of practical argumentation (PA), which has been analysed as a separate
argument scheme with its own set of premises, inference rules and critical questions (e.g.
Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Feteris, 2002; Ihnen Jory, 2012; Walton, 2006; 2007).1
In this paper, I propose a detailed scheme of complex PA which, while building on
previous proposals (esp. Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012), clearly lays out the contextindependent and context-dependent elements of PA. I elaborate the scheme by focusing in
particular on its causal or means-goal premise (Lets do X, because X leads to Y, and Y is
desirable). This premise is crucial, as it points to an inference licencing our step from the
premises to the conclusion that X is the reasoned action to be taken. I will argue that in
principle, when acting rationally, we are licensed to do three things: the best thing, the
thing good enough or the necessary thing. Which of the three applies (and whether it
obtains) is determined contextually in deliberation with others who might suggest
alternative options. In this way, we end up with a multi-party deliberation where different
alternative options are advocated by different parties to argumentation.

Note that some argumentation scholars such as Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 62) and pragmadialecticians (Feteris, 2002; Ihnen Jory, 2012) use instead the term pragmatic argument or argumentation.

851

2. PRACTICAL REASONING AS PRACTICAL ARGUMENTATION

Aristotle is credited with providing one of the first methodical accounts of PR and
deliberation. It has been argued that he was deliberately vague on the distinction between
private (internal) and public (collective) deliberation as chief activities of practical reason,
in order to expose a deep analogy between his conceptions of the two domains (Dascal,
2005, p. 52). Indeed, the limits of private PR can be overcome or reduced by engaging
others: We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting
ourselves as not being equal to deciding (Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b11).
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca take up these arguments and claim not only simple
similarity between public and private deliberation but rather primacy of the former over
the latter:
[] inward deliberation [] appears to be constructed on the model of deliberation with others.
Hence, we must expect to find carried over to this inner deliberation most of the problems
associated with the conditions necessary for discussion with others. [] Accordingly, from our
point of view, it is by analyzing argumentation addressed to others that we can best understand selfdeliberation, and not vice versa. (1969, pp. 14, 41)

Following this tradition, I take an externalist view, where practical reasoning (PR) is in
fact practical argumentation (PA) in both a descriptive and normative sense. Using
OKeefes (1977) distinction, one can say that PA is a product (argument1) of an
argumentative process or activity (argument2) of deliberation. Chief tasks of deliberators
such as determining the most easily and best produced means (Nicomachean Ethics,
1112b15) and recognizing better reasons (Schmidtz, 1995, p. 38) are intersubjective and
discursive achievements, rather than subjective and mental ones. And such are the
evaluative standards as captured in dialectical procedures for critically testing the
reasonableness of practical arguments (Walton, 2006; 2007). This seems an adequate
account given that many intrinsic elements of PA values, norms, obligations are
collectively constructed and sanctioned, thus making up external reasons for action, often
independent from an agents desires or intentions (Searle, 2001; Fairclough & Fairclough,
2012). Overall, as convincingly argued by Hitchcock (2002), an externalist argumentative
approach takes us away from the perils of solipsistic, egoistic and antisocial accounts of
individual PR.
3. DETAILED SCHEME OF PRACTICAL ARGUMENTATION
The scheme of PA presented in Figure 1 stems from a rich literature on practical argument
in philosophy and argumentation theory (see Lewiski, 2014, for a more detailed
discussion). In particular, it is derived from a recent comprehensive account of PA by
Fairclough and Fairclough (2012). While referring to their work for an in-depth analysis of
all the premises constituting the scheme (Circumstances, Goal, Values), I will briefly
mention four basic advantages of the scheme, focussing further on the last two, and
especially on the Means-Goal premise.

852

First, the scheme shapes the framework of relevance for (multi-party) deliberation.
Typically, different parties argue for the contextual betterness of their proposals for action
{M, N, O Z} (see the M is Best box). Their deliberation develops then as an
argumentative polylogue (Lewiski & Aakhus, 2014) along the lines of possible
disagreements over the various elements of the structure (basic premises, inference rules
and contextual criteria).
853

Second, the scheme distinguishes between context-independent and context-dependent

elements of PA. Its basic general structure (as per Fairclough & Fairclough: all the white
boxes in Figure 1) remains constant, while contextual criteria for choosing the right
means (below the diagram) fluctuate. This corresponds to the pragma-dialectical
distinction between the general and specific soundness conditions for various modes
of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren, 2010, Chs. 7, 10).
Third, the scheme clarifies the notion of the means-goal premise.
Fourth, it provides a new account of how to criticize and evaluate PA.
I will now discuss in detail these last two points.
4. THE MEANS-GOAL PREMISE AND INFERENCE LICENCE
Let me start by showing that the simplest formulation of the scheme of PA does not really
work. Philosophers and argumentation scholars alike are eager to follow elegant simplicity
and claim that [f]ully spelt out and made explicit, correct [practical] reasoning (Broome,
2013, p. 260; see Feteris, 2002; Lewiski, 2014) looks more or less like that:
Lets do X!
because
X leads to Y.
and
Y is our desired goal.

(Conclusion)
(Means-Goal premise)
(Goal premise)

That this scheme does not quite capture the rationality of PA can be shown by producing
arguments that clearly follow the scheme but are not so clearly rational:
Lets stop feeding our children!
because
This will save us lots of money.
and
We really need to start saving.

Here, from acceptable premises (the Goal of saving money is morally acceptable; the
Means-Goal relation between stopping feeding children and saving money is technically
speaking correct in many contexts) we get a highly objectionable conclusion. That means
that there is a problem with the validity of the practical inference drawn here and in the
simple scheme presented above in general. What is missing is the inference licence
regarding the quality of the link between the desired goal (premise) and the proposed
means of action (conclusion).2 The Means-Goal inference needs to be thickened beyond
asserting simple causality. This, of course, has already been done, but not quite
completely. The obvious question to be asked is: What does it mean that X leads to Y?
The most common answer is that X is a means necessary to get to Y. An often
quoted Kantian passage captures the rationale for that: Who wills the end, wills (so far as
2

The notion of inference-licence is used by Toulmin (2003/1958) interchangeably with inference-warrant

(see p. 91). Toulmin traces the origins of the notion to the work of Gilbert Ryle, who also uses the notion of
inference-ticket, which licenses its possessors to move from asserting factual statements to asserting other
factual statements (1949, p. 121).

854

reason has a decisive influence on his actions) also the means which are indispensably
necessary and in his power (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 80-81;
cited in Broome, 2013, p. 159). Indeed, the necessity of means is typically considered the
paradigmatic type of inference licence in practical reason (Broome, 2002; 2013; Walton,
2007). It is appealing, most notably, because it makes the practical inference valid by
standards of classic deductive logic: the only if X then Y conditional expressing
necessity (formally: Y X), allows to construct the inference as modus ponens:
Y
YX

(Goal premise)
(Means-Goal premise)

(Conclusion)

Others, however, object to the idea that reasoning from necessary means provides a
paradigm of PR:
If you think about this pattern in terms of real life examples it seems quite out of the question as a
general account of practical reason. In general there are lots of means, many of them ridiculous, to
achieve any end; and in the rare case where there is only one means, it may be so absurd as to be
out of the question altogether. (Searle, 2001, pp. 244-245)

Nevertheless, there surely are cases where arguers build their practical inferences by
claiming the necessity of means to be taken, not least in politics where we often hear that
the only way to fight financial crisis/terrorism/corruption/climate change is X (see
Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Ihnen Jory, 2012). Before I move to discussing other than
necessary, and thus more realistic, cases of PA, let me distinguish between three levels of
necessity an arguer might appeal to (Lewiski, 2014, p. 5):
a)

b)

c)

conceptual (analytic) necessity (or at least a priori synthetic) determined by the

very meaning of the formulated end:
If I want to present at ISSA, then I need to be in Amsterdam in early July.
de iure (conventional) necessity determined by some legal regulations, which may
vary across people/countries/regions:
If I want to present at ISSA, then I need to pay the conference fees.
Note that it is not indispensably necessary across the board it does not apply to
those who help organizing ISSA, invited speakers, etc.
de facto (practical) necessity determined for different arguers by contextual
factors:
If I want to present at ISSA, then I need to start saving a year in advance.
vs.
If I want to present at ISSA, then I need to fill out a travel subsidy form.

Necessity of means, by definition, excludes consideration of alternative options an issue

which seems to be confused in Waltons (2007) account.3 Whenever we find a certain

Of course, arguers can disagree over whether a means X is necessary or not, with the crucial argument
being either the lack or the availability of alternatives (see Ihnen Jory, 2012, pp. 32-33). Once this is settled,

855

action necessary to reach our goal, then (recall Kant) we should take this action.
Alternatively, if the action is necessary yet objectionable on some other grounds, we
should abandon our goal (if the only way to get to Amsterdam is to kill my colleagues
competing for travel subsidies, I should rather forget about ISSA).
In most cases, however, our goal seems to be produced by several means
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b15). The fact that the goal is produced by one means or
another, suggests that we consider sufficient, rather than necessary, means. This is an
equally recognised form of PA (see Walton, 2007). Sufficient means, while closer to life
than strict necessities, generate two serious problems for PA. First, argumentation from
sufficient means is logically invalid, as it instantiates the fallacious pattern of affirming the
consequent: If we implement the sufficient means X, then we produce our goal Y. And
since we intend to produce Y, we should implement X. Formally:
Y
XY

(Goal premise)
(Means-Goal premise)

(Conclusion)

Second, whenever we face a set of options consisting of several mutually exclusive

sufficient means, we need to find a way of concluding our reasoning by selecting one of
them based on some sort of a criterion. Consider a situation when two colleagues in
Lisbon, Portugal, have just been notified their papers were accepted for the ISSA
conference (Circumstances). Their Goal is to get to Amsterdam the day the conference
starts. A sufficient action would be one that takes them from current Circumstances to the
intended Goal. They consider the following set of such actions:
a)
b)
c)
d)

Lets get in a kayak and start rowing: with good seas well make it by July 1.
Lets book a direct KLM flight for 300, departing from Lisbon on July 1.
Lets book a direct TAP Portugal flight for 200, departing from Lisbon on
July 1.

Here, option a) would surely count among Searles ridiculous means. As for choosing
between b) and c) there is clearly some financial incentive, possibly enforced by the
university, to go for option c) its considerably cheaper with negligible differences in all
other respects (let us assume). If this is so, choosing anything other than c) would be
suspicious in terms of rationality of the conclusion. While this is pretty commonsensical, it
comes at a certain philosophical cost. According to Searle, it requires, in our PR, to
introduce a fishy-sounding premise, about wanting to do things by the best way all things
considered (2001, p. 247). This premise, on Searles account, amends PR from sufficient
means so that it is not logically fallacious anymore (see 2001, pp. 246-247). Yet, it
remains fishy for someone who looks for a deductive logic of practical reason for at
least two reasons: considerations of bestness are not logical considerations, and, by the
way, what are they? (What is meant by the best way, and what is meant by all things
considered?, Searle, 2001, p. 247.)
however, and the necessary condition scheme for PR is used, we cannot without contradiction speak of the
selection of means or of the most acceptable necessary condition (Walton, 2007, p. 216).

856

Searle, however, might be guilty of pushing on PR the hard rationality of deductive

logic which is inadequate for a form of reasoning driven by the soft rationality of merely
plausible and thus inherently defeasible inferences (Dascal, 2005). This soft rationality
requires a dialectical and informal model of argumentation based on the balance of
considerations rather than apodictic inference.4 On such a model the concept of better
reasons or the best way becomes intelligible and remains connected to the requirements
of rationality. Following Schmidtz, ones choice is rational only if one did not recognize
clearly better reasons for choosing any of ones forgone alternatives (1995, p. 38). This,
in fact, seems to be the main inference licence in PR, and not only when a set of
alternative (ergo: other than necessary) means is considered (see the Means-Goal premise
in Figure 1).
As mentioned above in section 2, the task of recognizing better reasons is
understood here as an intersubjective achievement of arguers engaged in deliberation over
what to do, or in PA. On this reading, one is irrational if a clearly better reason was uttered
by one of the parties and subsequently dismissed. But why do we need such an inference
licence and what does it mean?
First, Schmidtzs formulation is cleverly negative: no better reasons. This allows
to include the necessary means under the inference licence (one cannot argue for a better
necessary means, contrary to Waltons (2007) conditions), as well as Buridan cases
(when facing two equally good options, we are rational by choosing either of them).
Second, it has direct application to the cases of alternative options discussed here. Despite
Searles worries, there is a long tradition in practical philosophy of investigating what the
best way might be. Briefly, when reasoning or arguing over the best Means to produce
our Goals, we can licence our inference through one of the two basic strategies (see
Byron, 1998, 2004):
A)

Going for the best: optimising / maximising. What the best is, is typically
contextually determined, sometimes loosely (when deciding on the best place to
take summer holidays), sometimes in a very strict, administratively defined way
(when deciding on the best public procurement offer, or best job or grant
application). While the general criteria or parameters for selecting the best course
of action can be suggested (see the bottom of Figure 1, also: Hitchcock, 2011;
McBurney et al., 2007), their exact set, scope, precision and weight depend on the
context and cannot be pre-defined. Therefore, they constitute the fluctuating
conditions in the scheme of PA. One can, however, distinguish between simple and
subtle optimising:
i.
Simple optimising applies when deliberators deal with a static context,
that is, when the set of alternative options (means of action) is finite and
known (Byron, 1998): we should simply take the best dessert from the list.
This requires that the issue is phrased through an alternative question (Do
we take tiramisu, crme brle, or ice-cream?; see Biezma & Rawlins,

[Soft rationality] deals with the vast area of the reasonable, which lies between the hard rational and the
irrational. The model underlying the idea of soft rationality is that of a balance where reasons in favor and
against (a position, a theory, a course of action, etc.) are put in the scales and weighed. (Dascal, 2005, p.
58).

857

B)

2012) or a safe Wh-question (Which of desserts on the list do we take?;

see Hamblin, 1970, p. 216).
ii.
Subtle optimising takes place when we are facing an ever-changing
dynamic context in which the set of options is open-ended and constantly
updated (Byron, 1998), a common situation when selling a house: shall we
accept 100.000 or wait for a better offer? What better offers can we get?
Such risky questions (Hamblin, 1970, p. 216) call for an on-going
calculation of costs and benefits under uncertainty (e.g., its retrospectively
irrational to spend 10.000 and lots of time to get an offer that is 5.000
better).
Going for the good enough: satisficing by setting a threshold which will fulfil
our basic criteria: e.g., any offer equal to or higher than 100.000 is a good deal
and we should accept it. This, of course, is not the best way all things
considered but it is an important and reasonable way to licence conclusions of our
PA under many typical circumstances (assuming, of course, the we set the right
threshold, which opens another fascinating theoretical issue lying, for instance, at
the very foundation of economics):
i.

ii.

In dynamic contexts, satisficing lets us economise on resource-intensive

subtle optimising, which requires constant updates and cost-benefit
analysis.
In static contexts, it allows for global optimisation by letting us being
somewhat easy on less important local results: Yes, I can jog 3hrs a day
for optimal fitness but 30min is good enough in the bigger scheme of
things.
In these ways, satisficing also falls under the no better reasons principle.
In dynamic contexts, we (so far) have no better option than the one which
first meets the threshold (the 120.000 offer is not quite in yet and might
never be). In static contexts, while locally merely satisficing, we might be
optimising in terms of the bigger plan: one might be better off jogging for
30min only, and then reading a book for 2h30min, than jogging for 3hrs
and completely giving up the book.5

The basic inference licence in PA is then: there are no better reasons for proposing other
courses of action. Only when strengthened with this principle the X leads to Y MeansGoal premise is properly licenced and the entire PA generates reasonable, even if
expectedly defeasible, results. Since this general principle has three distinct sub-species,
there are, then, three principles of reasoned action: 1) doing whats necessary; 2) doing
whats best; and 3) doing whats good enough. It is these inference licences that can
become criticisable in PA to the effect of undercutting the practical inference.
Before discussing the ways to criticise PA, I briefly mention one more option,
which is likely the most common and the least discussed kind of means we consider in our
PA. I have called them conducive means in order to convey their presumed worthiness in
5

For similar reasons, it has been argued (e.g. Byron, 1998) that satisficing is eventually a species of
optimisation, as it aims at finding the optimal balance between overall costs (effort, time, other resources)
and benefits (satisfaction of preferences and values) of our actions.

858

approaching the desired Goal, despite their being neither necessary nor sufficient means
(Lewiski, 2014, p. 6). Conducive means should be considered against a disjunction of
other alternatives (for they are not necessary) and in conjunction with other means (for
they are not sufficient). Examples of such means are plenty. Consider the one analysed by
Ihnen Jory (2012, pp. 33-34): In order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions we should
invest in building more concentrated solar energy plants (CSP). Clearly, to do so is not a
necessary action to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, as we can instead drive electric
cars, build more wind farms, or even nuclear plants, and still achieve the goal. Equally, it
is not a sufficient means: alone, more CSPs will not rid us of all the undesired gas
emissions. Still, when supported with other premises of the scheme of PA, and as part of a
bigger plan, going for more CSPs might be not a bad conclusion at all. It might be more
efficient, or otherwise acceptable, than nuclear plants, or might let us achieve a certain
level of mitigation we are satisfied with. Shortly, whether because it is an optimal or a
satisfactory means, it takes us some way from current Circumstances to the Goal and is
thus presumably reasonable.
Following all this, we arrive at the following types of inferences licencing our PA:
a)
b)
c)

Doing X is necessary to get to Y

Doing X is sufficient (and best / good enough way) to get to Y
Doing X is conducive (and best / good enough way) to get to Y

5. CRITICISING PRACTICAL ARGUMENTATION

Among others, Walton stands out as the one who has thoroughly investigated the ways to
criticise PA. According to him (Walton, 2006, p. 188; 2007, p. 223), [t]here are three
ways of criticizing practical reasoning:
1.
2.
3.

To attack one of the premises of the argumentation scheme.

To undercut the argument by asking one of a number of critical questions that
match the scheme (corresponding to Pollocks (1995) undercutters).
To mount a counter-argument designed to rebut the original argument from
practical reasoning by arguing for an opposite conclusion (corresponding to
Pollocks (1995) rebuttals).

This triad is well-justified given the dominant, triadic view of argument (see Figure 2).

One can, then, criticise the premises, the inference or the conclusion itself. That this
actually works (read: is a jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive classification of types
of criticism), can be easily illustrated on a classical syllogism:
859

Some men should work as slaves.

Socrates is a man.
so
Socrates should work as a slave.

To criticise it we can:
1.

2.

3.

Attack one of the premises. Here, the major premise seems vulnerable: How can
you say that some human beings should work as slaves?! Its absolutely
unacceptable!
Undercut it by pointing out that this is not a valid form of syllogism: Heres my
Venn diagram, it clearly doesnt follow. You cant reason validly through two
particulars.
Rebut it by defeating the conclusion: Socrates is a free-born citizen of Athens
with full rights, so he cant work as a slave!

Walton is quite clear that his critical questions regarding given argument schemes fall
squarely under the 2nd category: Critical questions act as undercutters that challenge the
inferential link between the premises and the conclusion of a practical inference (2006, p.
190). When evaluating PA, Walton offers among other more or less similar formulations
the following list of critical questions (CQs) for the basic scheme for practical
reasoning(see 2006, pp. 189-190; 2007, p. 234; italics added):
(CQ1) What other goals do I have that should be considered that might conflict with G?
(CQ2) What alternative actions to my bringing about A that would also bring about G should be
considered?
(CQ3) Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the most efficient
(the best)?
(CQ4) What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically possible for me to bring about A?
(CQ5) What consequences of my bringing about A should also be taken into account?

In view of the schematic representation of PA proposed in Section 3 (see Figure 1), all
Waltons CQs seem to be premise attacks rather than inference undercutters. CQs, rather
indiscriminately, address both the main context-independent premises of PA (Goals,
Means-Goals) and its context-dependent criteria (side consequences, practical feasibility).
One can thus easily (as Walton sometimes does) add additional CQs, for instance
regarding conformance with other goals, opportunity costs or likelihood of success. In any
case, we would have moved CQs from category 2 (inference undercutters) to category 1
(premise attacks).
Moreover, in the scheme of PA proposed here, the better than any other actually
or potentially proposed action {M,, Z} (see M is Best box in Figure 1) sub-premise
already contains Pollocks rebuttals. When arguing practically for the bestness of our
proposal, we (implicitly or explicitly) claim that we have a better (contrary) proposal /
alternative means / conclusion of PA than you. This does attempt to rebut others
conclusions, but only by challenging one of the premises of their PAs. So category 3
(rebuttals) becomes 1 (premise attacks), just as 2 (undercutters) does.

860

While there is no room to discuss these issues in satisfactory detail and thus better
justifying the account proposed here I will argue that on the basis of the analysis in the
previous section, one can distinguish only three inference licenses and three corresponding
critical questions regarding PA, in their intended function of inference undercutters (see
Figure 1):
1)
2)
3)

Is taking necessary means the right thing? (Maybe we should instead give up the
goal, that is, one of my premises?)
Is taking the best means the right thing? (Shall we really optimise here? Or be
somewhat slack and go for a satisficing strategy?)
Is satisficing the right way to proceed? If so, is the threshold set right? Or are we
taking it too easy?

6. CONCLUSION
What I hope to have achieved in this paper is a focused, analytic investigation of the
scheme of practical argumentation. This complex scheme moves quite some distance away
from a simple argument built of a premise, an inference and a conclusion. But simplicity
does not quite capture the reasonableness of practical argument, as is clear in examples
that follow the basic scheme but are faulty. What is missing is one of the three inference
rules: necessity, bestness or satisfactory goodness of the actions to be taken in view of
reaching our goals. These inferences warrant the step from the exigency to be addressed
(Circumstances) and the state of affairs to be reached (Goal) following the accepted
Values, to the action to be taken (Conclusion).
A number of issues require further theoretical attention. Are we speaking here of
argument schemes as basic units of our argumentation or rather of complex argument
structures, combining a number of schemes? Or does a fully fleshed our scheme always
become a structure? Further, what are exactly the relations between the content of
premises and inference licences? While clearly distinct in formal arguments, are they not
confusingly similar in informal schemes? Can we at all clearly distinguish between
premise attacks and inference undercutters?
In any case, by pursuing such investigations, we are moving towards seeing
practical argumentation not as a standalone logical entity, but as an interactive product of
deliberation. This deliberation takes shape of a polylogue: a multi-party argumentative
activity where relative rightness of multiple proposed actions is discussed.
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Biezma, M., & Rawlins, K. (2012). Responding to alternative and polar questions. Linguistics and
Philosophy, 35(5), 361-406.
Broome, J. (2002). Practical reasoning. In J. L. Bermdez & A. Millar (Eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in
the Theory of Rationality (pp. 85-111). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Broome, J. (2013). Rationality through reasoning. Oxford: Blackwell.
Byron, M. (1998). Satisficing and optimality. Ethics, 109(1), 67-93.
Byron, M. (Ed.) (2004). Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge:
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Dascal, M. (2005). Debating with myself and debating with others. In P. Barrotta & M. Dascal (Eds.),
Controversies and Subjectivity (pp. 33-73). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Fairclough, I., & Fairclough, N. (2012). Political discourse analysis: A method for advanced students.
London: Routledge.
Feteris, E. (2002). A pragma-dialectical approach of the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic
argumentation in a legal context. Argumentation, 16(3), 349-367.
Hamblin, C. L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen.
Hitchcock, D. (2002). Pollock on practical reasoning. Informal Logic, 22(3), 247-256.
Hitchcock, D. (2011). Instrumental rationality. In P. McBurney, I. Rahwan & S. Parsons
(Eds.), Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp. 1-11).
Dordrecht: Springer.
Ihnen Jory, C. (2012). Pragmatic argumentation in law-making debates: Instruments for the analysis and
evaluation of pragmatic argumentation at the second reading of the British Parliament. (Doctoral
dissertation). University of Amsterdam.
Lewiski, M. (2014). Practical reasoning in argumentative polylogues. Revista Iberoamericana de
Argumentacin, 8, 1-20.
Lewiski, M., & Aakhus, M. (2014). Argumentative polylogues in a dialectical framework: A
methodological inquiry. Argumentation, 28(2), 161-185.
McBurney, P., Hitchcock, D., & Parsons, S. (2007). The eightfold way of deliberation dialogue.
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Perelman, Ch., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (transl. by J.
Wilkinson & P. Weaver). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. (Original work published
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Pollock, J.L. (1995). Cognitive carpentry: A blueprint for how to build a person. Cambridge, MA: MIT
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Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York: Hutchinsons University Library.
Schmidtz, D. (1995). Rational choice and moral agency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Searle, J. R. (2001). Rationality in action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Toulmin, S. E. (2003). The uses of argument. Updated ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(Original work published 1958.)
Walton, D. (2006). How to make and defend a proposal in a deliberation dialogue. Artificial Intelligence and
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862

Pragma-Dialectical Rules And The Teaching Of Argumentation In

Philosophy For Children
Celso Lpez & Ana Mara Vicua
Instituto de Filosofa
Facultad de Filosofa
Pontificia Universidad Catlica de Chile
Santiago
7560502
Chile
clopezs@uc.cl
Instituto de Filosofa
Facultad de Filosofa
Pontificia Universidad Catlica de Chile
Santiago
7560502
Chile
amvicuna@uc.cl

ABSTRACT: A Philosophy for Children teacher must model a discussion that complies with a critical ideal
of reasonableness and use effectively all tools necessary to attract the students involvement and
participation in a meaningful philosophical dialogue. We distinguish the stages of a Philosophy for Children
class where the pragma-dialectical rules and the pedagogical devices instrumental to enhance the students
participation in a community of inquiry ought to be applied.
KEYWORDS: Community of Inquiry, Philosophical dialogue, Philosophical novel, Philosophy for
Children, Pragma-dialectical rules

1. INTRODUCTION
The Philosophy for children program, created by Matthew Lipman (Lipman, 1980, 1991),
centers around the building of a Community of Inquiry through the practice of
philosophical dialogue. The Community of Inquiry is considered as a way to foster critical
and cooperative thinking through the balance between competition and cooperation in an
atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding, similar to the scientific community in
that it pursues similar goals through identical methods (Lipman, 1998, p. 57). The
Philosophy for Children teacher is a member of the Community of Inquiry with no special
privilege but she must see to it that the logical rules that conduct critical thinking are
respected and guide the dialogue among the participants.
There is a deep connection between critical thinking and democratic participation.
To participate effectively in democracy it is necessary to be able to argue correctly, to
have an informed opinion, to express it clearly and to participate in debates both in small
groups and in society at large. We restrict the meaning of critical thinking to the
fundamental aspect in which most definitions coincide: the ability to participate
reasonably in a debate and to solve the controversy reasonably. We consider that the

863

pragma-dialectical rules for a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p.
208) provide the fundamental criteria to determine what are a reasonable debate and a
reasonable resolution of the controversy. Therefore, the Philosophy for Children teacher
will find in them an essential tool for the conduction of philosophical dialogue in the
Community of Inquiry.
Through the critical rules for a reasonable discussion, Pragma-dialectics provides
the theoretical and the practical tools required to debate reasonably. Our intention in this
paper is to show how the Philosophy for Children methodology requires and facilitates the
introduction of the critical rules in the classroom. The role of argumentation is crucial both
in the building of the Community of Inquiry and in education for citizenship. Because of
its cooperative thinking strategies, which facilitate the introduction and practice of the
critical rules, the Philosophy for Children methodology seems to us the best tool for the
teaching of argumentation.
Certain pedagogical strategies are peculiar to Philosophy for Children. Through
them, the process of learning argumentation can be initiated and the critical rules can be
mastered. In order to visualize this process, we distiguish the different stages that can
occur in a Philosophy for Children class and identify the steps that call for the introduction
of the critical rules. This distinction was made in a research project in which we studied
the development of democratic attitudes in students and teachers through the
implementation of Philosophy for Children (Vicua & Lpez, 1994). We distinguished
five stages: 1) Shared reading of the text, 2) Eliciting questions, 3) Finding relationships
between questions, 4) Discussion, and 5) Complementary Activities. Not all the stages are
performed in every class, but usually reading, eliciting questions and discussion are
present. We illustrate them by dialogues taken from the programs novels.
2. STAGES IN A PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN CLASS
In Philosophy for Children a philosophical novel is used as a text from which to start in
order to create a common ground for discussion and to connect with the interests of the
children. This is a narrative text in which the characters are children who interact with
each other and with adults, conversing and wondering about everyday incidents both at
home and at school. In them genuine children questions are reflected, which, at the same
time, refer to some philosophical problems. This stage prepares the ground for the
philosophical discussion that will emerge from the childrens different reactions and
questions prompted by the story.
For example, in the philosophical novel Kio & Gus (Lipman, 1992), designed for
children in first and second grade of elementary school, Kio narrates the following
incident occurred when he went with his grandfather to have lunch in town:
Next to the table where we were eating was a coatrack. It had a sign that said, Watch your hat and
coat. The coatrack was empty, of course, because it was summertime.
The sign bothered me, so I said, Grandpa, why does it say: watch your hat and coat?
He said, Because they might disappear.
So, I guess there are things in the world that will disappear if you dont watch them! Isnt that
weird!

By means of this dialogue the story relates to the childrens experience of puzzlement
concerning what is real. The students may connect with their own personal experiences of
864

situations that cause them to wonder about the permanence of things beyond our
perception.
Another example, taken from Harry Stottlemeiers Discovery (Lipman, 1982, p. 2),
designed for children in fifth and sixth grades of elementary school. Harry, the main
character in the novel, after realizing that he has made a mistake in answering to a
question from his science teacher, reflects in the following way:
So, there are things that revolve around the sun that arent planets, Harry said to himself. All
planets revolve about the sun, but not everything that revolves about the sun is a planet. And then
Harry had an idea. A sentence cant be reversed. If you put the last part of a sentence first, itll no
longer be true.

Harry has discovered a logical law. His discovery will lead him to wonder about the
meaning of a sentence that starts with the quantifier all and to inquire into the boundaries
of logical expressions, such as all, no, some. He will eventually engage some of his
classmates interest into inquiring further about thinking about thinking. This gives an
idea of how the students reading the story can identify with the thinking processes of the
characters and be stimulated to connect with their own ways of thinking.
Matthew Lipman, creator of the Philosophy for Children program, thought of the
novels as a means to capture the complexity of childrens experiences and, at the same
time, as a way to help them organize them with a sense of unity and wholeness. Each
novel contains a story which develops and ends having as background a philosophical
theme, such as the knowledge of oneself, thinking rigorously, the discovery of the natural
world, the foundation of moral norms, etc. In this way, the students can better understand
and make sense of the complexity of their experiences. Besides, every novel refers, from a
different perspective, to the philosophical problems discussed in earlier novels.
It could be said that the novels constitute a philosophical knowledge that embraces
as in a spiral movement the whole of the childrens experience, which is examined in the
different levels of learning. This facilitates the students exchange of different perspectives
and helps them overcome the frustration produced by a way of teaching that presents
knowledge as parceled in diverse areas without connection between them. The children
need for an integrating experience was among the first things that Lipman realized and he
saw that philosophy could provide it.
On the other hand, the reading of the text provides the first stage in the building of
a Community of Inquiry. Since the reading is shared by all members, they must take turns,
listen attentively, pay attention to the turns, respect each other, avoid correcting or
mocking a classmate who makes a mistake, etc. This is their first experience of sharing in
the community. The teacher must guide this process in a way that generates an atmosphere
of respect and empathy which will help prepare for the respect demanded by the critical
rules that will be introduced later.
2.2 Stage 2: Eliciting questions
After finishing the reading of the text the students are invited to formulate questions or to
share their impressions about the passage just read. The idea is to connect with the genuine
interests of the students, so that the philosophical discussion that would ensue is about
these interests and not an adult agenda imposed upon the students (Lipman, 1980, pp.
102-128). Their questions and commentaries must relate to the text, not necessarily as an
865

interpretation thereof, but as something that the passage brought to mind. Therefore, it is
important to ask the students to explain what the connection is between the reading and
their questions and commentaries. In this way, the process of eliciting questions is a search
for relevance, but not only in relation to the text, but also in relation to the students own
thinking. This may put the students in a rather vulnerable position, because their
classmates may question their ideas or not understand them and they may be forced to
clarify their meaning. This latent process of confrontation gives rise to an analysis and
scrutiny which leads them to express what they really think instead of repeating opinions
inadvertently introduced in their minds by custom or authority figures. In this search for
clarifying the students true thinking it is also important for the teacher to question
opinions that are presented with the only purpose of impressing the audience or simply to
establish a position of power. The questions and problems presented must be those that
really matter to them, so that they will be willing to clarify them by discussion and
common reflection.
Consequently, the process of eliciting questions calls for a teacher that helps the
students clarify their contributions without indoctrination, that is without taking the
advantage of reinterpreting what the students say so as to suit the teachers preferred
meaning. This role is fundamental in the building of the Community of Inquiry. It requires
the ability to balance flexibility and rigor; flexibility to invite and admit all opinions, and
rigor to demand that they express clearly their real thinking. Therefore, the teacher must
ask the students to reformulate what they want to say until it becomes clear for all. In this
way, she ensures a connection with the genuine interests of the students and with the
shared interests of the group, in order to achieve both thinking for themselves and
cooperative thinking.
From what has been said, it seems clear that the pragma-dialectical rules 1,
(Freedom rule) and 4 (Relevance rule) (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 208), may
be introduced at this stage, by reinforcing that all questions and opinions should be
allowed to be expressed and, at the same time, that the proponents must be able to show
how they relate to the text just read.
2.3 Stage 3: Finding significant relationships between questions
In the next step the students questions and contributions are grouped by related themes.
The students are invited to find significant relationships between their questions in order to
determine the different topics of interest and to decide on the subject of the discussion.
This requires a deeper understanding of each contribution and developing sensitivity to
relevance. It often occurs that some contributions are too personal and originate a long list
of anecdotes which may hinder the coherence and consistency of the discussion. Here
again the teacher must balance the students eagerness to participate against the weight of
their contribution towards the cooperative enterprise. An excess of personal anecdotes
may stop reflection and make it impossible to go deeper into the proposed theme.
Therefore, the teacher must demand that the students go further than their personal
experiences and realize that they are part of a more complex and controversial issue. At
the same time as the students are invited to connect with their personal experiences as a
basis for reflection, they are also made aware that other members of the class have similar
experiences and that all this can be seen from a more general perspective.

866

Once all the questions and comments have been grouped in this manner, the students
decide democratically which of the resulting themes they are going to discuss. The authors
of the questions that originated the chosen topic must answer them tentatively and commit
to a standpoint. Thus, they take a more critical view of their own opinions and become
aware of the help that they can get from other members of the class for clarifying and
resolving their doubts. This illustrates cooperative thinking.
As an example of this process, we may consider the following dialogue from the novel
Harry Stottlemeiers Discovery (Lipman, 1982, pp. 28-29):
What I think Lauras saying, said Jill, is that what we call thinking is something we do, like
swimming or walking or riding.
Thats right, Laura agreed, thats just what I mean. When I said before I had a mind, I meant that
I mind things. I mind the telephone, or my baby sister, or just my own business. Having a mind is
nothing but minding.
But Fran wasnt happy with the solution Jill and Laura had arrived at. I agree, she said, that
maybe the mind isnt quite the same thing as the brain. I know I said before it was, but Ive changed
my mind. Everyone giggled for a while, then Fran went on. What I mean is, you cant see
electricity, but its real. So why couldnt our thoughts be something electrical in the brain?
This time it was Jills mother who told the girls they would have to continue the conversation in the
morning. Mom, said Jill, whats a mind?

Although the conversation narrated does not occur in class but at Jills home, where Fran
and Laura have been invited to stay overnight, it reflects well the kind of interaction that
can take place among the children when they are trying to establish relationships between
their questions and to clarify the meanings of their contributions. The girls had been
talking about the persistency of some memories, like a musical tune and things like that,
and the conversation has turned to whether things outside our minds can make us think
about them and finally they have asked themselves what is a mind. An adult is present at
the end of the dialogue, Jills mother, but she is not presented as an authority figure that
would settle the discussion. The girls opinions are being refined by their own
confrontation and analysis of what they mean by them. They may or may not arrive at a
satisfactory opinion about the matter, but even if satisfactory, it would be provisory as
long as they are willing to explore and reflect more deeply about it.
2.4 Stage 4: Discussion of the selected themes
Once the discussion themes are selected in the manner explained above, we may say that a
genuine interest of the children has been expressed. This stage is previous to the
introduction of the pragma-dialectical rule 1, Freedom rule (van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
1992, p. 208), because, in order to identify their genuine interests, the children were
invited to compare and establish relationships between their questions or comments and
the other childrens questions or comments and not to commit to a standpoint yet.
On the other hand, according to Pragma-dialectics, when a language user expresses
a standpoint he commits himself to the truth of his standpoint (van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 1992, p. 31), and is under the obligation of defending it, if questioned (Rule
2, Burden of proof rule). In contrast, in Philosophy for Children a standpoint that conforms
to the criteria formulated in the pragma-dialectical rules may take some time to be formed
and requires some previous steps.

867

After the group has decided on which of the proposed subjects is going to be discussed,
the person who proposed it must give a preliminary answer. This puts him under the
obligation of giving reasons, that is, under the pragma-dialectical critical discussion Rule
2. Demanding reasons is, in fact, one of the basic strategies for conducting a session in
Philosophy for Children (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, pp.121-122). Otherwise it
would be very difficult to foster cooperative reflection.
The following dialogue, excerpted from the novel Harry Stottlemeiers Discovery
(Lipman, 1982, pp. 22-24), shows an exchange of argumentation among children about the
schools quality. (We skip the narrative and give the speakers names).
Mark: (.) schools are awful everywhere.
Harry: What makes them so bad?
Mark: Grown-ups. They run the schools to suit themselves. (.)
Maria: Well, but someone has to run the schools, and so it has to be the grownups, because they
know more than anyone else. Its the same with other things. You wouldnt want to fly on an
airplane where the pilot was just a little kid, would you? And you wouldnt want to go to a hospital
for an appendicitis operation where the surgeons and nurses were just little kids, would you? So
what else is there to do but let grownup people run the schools because theyre the only ones who
can do it right?
Mark: I didnt think up the idea that kids should run the schoolsyou did. (.)
Harry: It isnt a question of whether the grownups should run the schools, or whether the kids
should. (.) The real question is whether the schools should be run by people who know what
theyre doing, or by people that dont know what theyre doing.
Maria: What do you mean, know what theyre doing?
Harry: Understand, I guess. Whoever runs the schools should understand kids, for instance. I think
Marks right. Lots of times they dont. But the most important thing they need to understand is why
were in school in the first place.
Maria: Were in school to learn.
Harry: Are we? What are we supposed to learn?
Maria: Answers, I suppose. No, no, I take that back. Were supposed to be learning how to solve
problems.
Mark: Should we be learning how to solve problems, or should we be learning how to ask
questions?
Harry: We should be learning how to think.
Mark: We do learn how to think, but we never learn to think for ourselves. These teachers dont
want to admit it, but I have a mind of my own. Theyre always trying to fill my mind full with all
sorts of junk, but its not the town junkyard. It makes me mad.

The children are talking to each other after school. Mark states that the schools are awful
everywhere and, after being questioned by Harry, adds that the adults are guilty, because
they run the schools to suit themselves. This shows that he has spontaneously put
himself under the obligation of giving reasons (Rule 2). Due to the questionable character
of this reason, it is challenged by Maria. She says that the adults must run the schools,
because someone has to run the schools, and so it has to be the grownups, because they
know more than anyone else. Next, she offers a counter argument by analogy. In so
doing, she is complying with the critical discussion rules (Rule 8, Validity rule) by using a
valid argumentative scheme. On the other hand, Mark complains about Marias
argumentation: I didnt think up the idea that kids should run the schoolsyou did. That
is, he is accusing Maria of violating the critical discussion Rule 3 (Standpoint rule).
Marks proposition has led to an aporetic situation. Harry looks for a new
alternative that may help to find a better formulation of what Mark has in mind. He says
868

that the people who run the schools must know what they are doing and this means that
they must understand kids. He goes on to state that he agrees with Mark that many times
adults dont understand children, but most importantly they need to understand why the
children must go to school.
After Harrys intervention Mark can formulate more clearly his standpoints: We
never learn to think for ourselves. The teachers try to fill our minds with junk. They
dont accept that we have minds of our own.
The discussion ends because no one comes back to this point. The controversy is
unresolved, but this is not important from the point of view of Philosophy for Children,
since the children lack the necessary information to resolve it. It is important, however, to
notice Marias intervention, when she corrects herself. After she had answered Harrys
question, she thinks for a while and takes it back. The stress is put on the cooperation the
children get from each other to formulate and reformulate their thinking, and not in the
resolution of the controversy. The critical discussion rules are respected along the process,
but the resolution would not be possible at this stage due to the students lack of the
necessary information.
2.5 Stage 5: Complementary Activities: Discussions of concepts
A frequent type of discussion in philosophy is a discussion about concepts. It is difficult
sometimes to find a resolution, due to the fact that definitions are often dependent on
many factors, especially on the purposes that the arguer has in mind. However, they
constitute an excellent training in searching for assumptions, one of the main
characteristics of philosophical dialogue (Lipman, 1980, p.119). In the philosophical novel
Pixie (Lipman, 1982 p. 50) we find the following discussion:
Miranda said, Pixie, you know what mother said. We mustnt let anybody in. Rules are rules! But
mother didnt mean that we shouldnt let in people that we know, I insisted. Miranda said, There
are many weird people that we know and that mother wouldnt allow us to let in.

It is difficult to decide which interpretation is correct. Both seem right. Although we could
find some flaws in Mirandas attitude in trying to impose her authority to Pixie without
giving reasons, what she says is true. It adjusts literally to what their parents had said.
Pixies interpretation, on the other hand, appeals to a more contextual prohibition: Dont
open the door to anyone! is not an absolute prohibition; it does not apply to the people
they know or are friends with. Without more information about the parents intentions, it
doesnt seem possible to resolve the discussion between Pixie and Miranda, but the
students discussion and analysis of this situation provides an excellent training in
searching for assumptions underlying what people say. It is this kind of training what
enabled Mark, in the previous example, to realize that Maria was unduly assigning to him
a standpoint.
Discussions about concepts open a route to the critical rules that have to do with faulty
assumptions (e. g. Rule 5, Unexpressed premise rule, van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992,
p. 208).
Consider, for instance, the following dialogue, excerpted from El libro de Manuel y
Camila Manuel and Camilas book (Tugendhat, Lpez & Vicua, 2001, pp. 11-21):

869

(The children had been discussing about crimes and damages and Sebastin had suggested that
killing is not such a serious offense because dead people dont suffer anymore. This caused much
wondering to Camila and she talked about it at home. Her uncle suggested a problem that she could
propose to Sebastin. We quote just the dialogue indicating the speakers names).
Camila: Suppose that you have committed a very serious crime and are permitted to choose whether
you want to be executed or spend the rest of your life in prison. What would you choose?
Sebastin: I would choose to be executed, because the suffering would be rather short in
comparison with the interminable suffering of years in jail.
Manuel: I dont think that you mean it seriously. Death is the worst thing that can happen to you.
Sebastin: Why do you say that?
Manuel: Think about the death penalty. Everybody considers it to be the worst punishment, even
though it causes short pain.
Camila: Thats it! In the question of death its not a matter of suffering pain.
(A little later in the story lvaro addresses Sebastin)
lvaro: Would you really prefer to be killed?
Sebastin: I dont know, maybe.
Manuel: Only because you think that one doesnt feel pain?
(Sebastin did not answer, but it was apparent that he felt at a loss).

Camilas doubts are cleared away when she realizes that Sebastin is not making a
distinction between damage and suffering pain. This insight has been possible through the
interaction with her friends. From the perspective of Philosophy for Children, this
interaction is successful, since an important distinction has been made. Although Sebastin
does not want to admit it, the distinction is valid. This means that the critical discussion
rule 9 (Closure rule) should apply and Sebastin should retract his original standpoint. But
to demand this would mean to violate the spirit of the community of inquiry.
Dialogues in Philosophy for Children are different from the controversies that are
the object of Pragma-dialectics. They are a little fragmentary, if compared with the
resolution of a controversy. It should be taken into consideration also that children do not
satisfy all the conditions of a rational arguer. Nevertheless, by participating actively in
these dialogues, children develop certain important reasoning strategies, such as
establishing distinctions, detecting underlying suppositions, and making adequate
definitions of concepts, which will be fundamental for resolving controversies.
3. CONCLUSION
Philosophical novels provide models of how thinking and dialogue should be. They differ
from the controversies examined by Pragma-dialectics in that they emphasize cooperative
discussion. Children learn to listen to their classmates opinions and to value them.
Although the reasons they may give may have deficiencies and may reflect a very peculiar
way of looking at the world, it is essential that they learn to give reasons for their opinions
and be aware that they can learn from others. In contrast, the pragma-dialectical objective
is the reasonable resolution of a controversy by applying the critical discussion rules.
However, there is a strong connection between the critical discussion rules and the
development of a community of inquiry. It wouldnt be possible without the application of
Rule 1. The children learn that all contributions are valid, but they also learn that they
must be relevant; they must refer to the pertinent passage of the text. There is complete
freedom to formulate questions or comments, as long as they are relevant to the subject
under discussion. Cooperation in elaborating a contribution also conducts to tolerance
870

towards the opinions of others and this very tolerance demands that we put ourselves
under the obligation of giving reasons.
Some steps are implicit in the applying of Rule 1. To get a speaker to formulate a
standpoint and to be prepared to back it up with reasons is a process that has been prepared
by the first stages described: reading, formulating questions or comments about the text,
and refining this contribution so that it may become a standpoint backed up by reasons.
Rule 1 leads to Rule 2.
Rules 3 and 4 were mentioned in connection with the ability to detect underlying
assumptions in discussions about concepts. Concepts dont have definitive borders; they
can be applied according to context in a more restricted or a more relaxed way. This kind
of debate is referred to in Pixies discussion about the meaning of the word anybody in
the sentence: we mustnt let anybody in. Does this mean absolutely nobody or just the
people we dont know? Also in the passage where Mark complains that he didnt say
what Maria has attributed to him. If the teacher had been present, she could have pointed
out that this was a violation of Rule 3. Knowing Pragma-dialectics would grant her
fundamental tools for the fostering of critical thinking.
Rule 5 was mentioned in connection with the discussion of concepts, since it
relates to the ability for detecting underlying assumptions, but we did not give examples.
Anyway the teacher must know well all the rules, so that she can point out the
argumentative flaws during the discussion process. The teachers corrective role will soon
be picked up by the students in what is referred to as the self correcting ability of the
community of inquiry.
Rules 7 and 8 are amply respected in the process of cooperative learning. Although
Maria had incurred in an argumentative error by violating rule 3, she is still able to present
an argument by analogy: children are not able to run a hospital; therefore, they are not
able to run a school. Learning argumentatively valid forms, albeit in a diffused way, is a
fundamental part of learning to think cooperatively. In order to organize this learning, the
pragma-dialectical rules and the analytical tools provided are indeed extremely valuable,
especially for making explicit unexpressed parts of the argumentation and for evaluating
arguments.
Rule 9 is not clearly emphasized in the novels, as was seen in the case of
Sebastin. The model of a critical discussion that ends successfully is missing, but this
deficiency can be overcome without altering the cooperative spirit of the community of
inquiry. On the contrary, a discussion that is successfully resolved emphasizes this
cooperative spirit, since it reflects respect for certain rules previously agreed upon.
Rule 10 is amply respected along this learning process. Clarifying the childrens
contributions, pointing out to language ambiguities, asking the children to be precise or to
explain further the meaning of their expressions is something that the teacher of
Philosophy for Children is constantly doing since the very early stages of the program.

871

REFERENCES
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies. A
Pragma- Dialectical Perspective. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Lipman, M. (1982). Harry Stottlemeiers Discovery. New Jersey: First Mountain Foundation for
the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC).
Lipman, M. (1982). Kio and Gus. New Jersey: First Mountain Foundation for the Institute for the
Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC).
Lipman, M. (1982) Pixie.New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children
(IAPC).
Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M. & Oscnyan, F. (1980). Philosophy in the Classroom. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Lipman, M. (1998). Pensamiento Complejo y Educacin. Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre (Spanish
Translation of Lipman, M. (1991). Thinking in Education. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.)
Tugendhat, E., Lpez, C. & Vicua, A. M. (2001). El libro de Manuel y Camila. Dilogos sobre
tica. Barcelona: Gedisa.
Vicua, A. M. & Lpez, C. (1994).Informe Final del Proyecto Fondecyt 0703-91 [Fondecyt 070391 Final Report]. (Unpublished final report)

872

Discourse, Argumentation And Constructivist Approaches:

Analysing Discourses Of social Change
Esperanza Morales-Lpez
Department of Galician-Portuguese, French and Linguistics
University of A Corua
Faculty of Philology
Campus da Zapateira, s/n
15071 A Corua
Spain
e.morales.lopez@udc.es

ABSTRACT: My research in recent years has focused on the analysis of discourse of social change as a
type of ideological construction, using a holistic, interdisciplinary approach that combines: a)
constructivist rhetoric and argumentation; b) the constructivist theories of Bateson, Goffman, Gumperz
and Lakoff; and c) embodied social cognition studies. This article examines the concept of ideological
construction in relation to data from the Spanish 15M movement.
KEYWORDS: Constructivist rhetoric, Critical discourse analysis, Complexity studies, Discourses of
social change, Embodied cognition, Ideological construction, Socio-cognitive frame, 15M.

1. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, research in Critical Discourse Analysis (or CDA), particularly in
Europe, has shown a growing interest in political discourse in globalized, democratic
societies. This, in turn, has led to a broader definition of the term political discourse,
used here in the wider sense of the varied discursive practices of political professionals,
and the socio-political proposals for change generated by diverse social groups,
described as discourses of social change by Montesano Montessori & Morales-Lpez
(2014) and Morales-Lpez (2012, 2014).
Discourses of social change are ideological speech acts that call for radical
social and political reforms. They appeal, in the first instance, to the countrys citizens,
in order to gain support for the speakers ideological position, but also to government,
key state bodies and other international institutions, in an effort to have their proposals
adopted as policy (Morales-Lpez, 2012, 2014).
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
This study looks at discourses of social change from three different perspectives: 1)
pragmatic-functionalist; 2) rhetorical-argumentative; and 3) socio-cognitive.1 This
triple-perspective approach illustrates more effectively why the construction of meaning
in ideological discourse is inseparable from the following key factors: (a) the deliberate
selection of multi-modal communicative resources; b) human action and the local and
global contexts in which the communicative act takes place; and c) the cognitive
constructions of the actors themselves.

This research is part of the Constructivist Rhetoric: Identity Discourses project, financed by the
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competition (FFI2013-40934R; period: 2014-2016).

873

In the pragmatic-functionalist tradition, discourse is understood as a socio-semiotic

process, in reference to the idea that symbolic meaning is constructed in dialectical
relation to the prevailing social reality. Halliday (1977, p 50) explains this clearly when
he describes his view of language as:
[] a sociological event, a semiotic encounter through which the meanings that constitute the
social system are exchanged. The individual member is, by virtue of his membership, a
meaner, one who means. By his acts of meaning and those of other individual meaners, the
social reality is created, maintained in good order, and continuously shaped and modified.

According to Halliday (1977), the construction of social reality in its most basic form
occurs through spontaneous conversation in the course of everyday encounters, so that
changes or continuity within the social system (and culture in general) are reflected in
the discourse and simultaneously created by it. This dialectical relationship has also led
to the diversification of discourse texts themselves, as the source and expression of new
social (and ideological) meanings in particular contexts of situation.
Ethnography brings an important additional dimension to this functionalist
approach. In this regard, the relationships between discursive data and the local and
global context (Duranti, 1997; Scollon & Wong Scollon, 2001; Blommaert & Jie,
2010), and data, context and action (Scollon and Wong Scollon, 2005; Scollon, 2008)
are crucial. Ethnography also helps to unify more scattered data, since the goal of a
successful ethnographic study is, as Duranti (2007, p. 87) points out, to create a
dialogue between the different viewpoints and voices present: that of the researcher as
well as those of the people studied.
The constructivist rhetorical-argumentative perspective is also essential for the
analysis of this type of ideological discourses; classical authors as well as modern
experts such as Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958), Meyer (2008), van Eemeren &
Grootendorst (2004), van Eemeren (2010) and Pujante (2003), among others. The
pragmatic-discursive approach provides useful tools for analysis at the micro level: in
relation to speech acts (Searle, 1975), as the basic units of any communicative activity;
and also in relation to the selection of contextualization cues (linguistic forms that
activate contextual inference), as defined by Gumperz (1982, p. 131). However, this
type of micro-level analysis limits our ability to appreciate the full complexity of the
constructions involved in ideological discourse, including such macro-level factors as
argument and fallacy, pragma-dialectical rules, etc. (Perelman & Olbrechs-Tyteca,
1958; Perelman, 2007; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; van Eemeren, 2010;
Pujante & Morales-Lpez, 2008, 2009). Both the pragmatic-discursive and the
rhetorical-argumentative approaches share what I consider to be two vital features of
discourse analysis: a functionalist orientation (the goal of which is to establish a
dialectical relationship between communicative functions and the forms that convey
them), and a constructivist view of knowledge (that is, the idea that reality does not
exist independently of discursive practices).
What these approaches lack, however, is a socio-cognitive perspective. For my
own research, therefore, I have adapted the approach used in embodied and social
cognition studies, which dissent strongly from the rationalist view of knowledge and the
computational model of cognitive information processing (Harr, 1981; Forgas, 1981, p.
259; Capra, 1996, pp. 275f.; Morales-Lpez, 2011, 2013). Harr (1981, p. 212) is clear
about where the problem lies:

874

Cartesianism is everywhere, suggesting that if anything is cognitive it must be individual and

private (and then how can we find out about it in publicly reliable ways?) The error of
identifying the cognitive with the inner processes of individuals [...]

From a socio-cognitive point of view, reality exists, but individuals reorganise it to fit
their perception of the world. A persons world view is not individually constructed or
separate from their physical and emotional being, as Bateson (1972, pp. 454, 461, 464)
explains:
The mental world the mind the world of information processing is not limited by the skin
[] What I am saying expands mind outwards [] It is the attempt to separate intellect from
emotion that is monstrous, and I suggest that it is equally monstrous to attempt to separate the
external mind form the internal. Or to separate mind from body.

Batesons constructivist approach is also found in American authors such as Bartlett

(1932), Mead (1956), Goffman (1974) and Gumperz (1982), and has been reformulated
more recently from a cognitive perspective by Lakoff (2007). Other precursors of the
approach include Bakhtin (1981), Voloshinov (1929) and Vygotsky (Scollon & Wong
Scollon, 2005), while the constructivist point of view is also found among social
theorists such as Berger & Luckmann (1968), Castoriadis (1975) and Bourdieu (1990),
among others.
My interest in this type of approach has led me in recent years to authors
applying a similar constructivist approach in other disciplines (studies of complexity, in
particular). One example is the socio-cognitive interpretation found in Maturana &
Varela (1990), Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991), Maturana (1996) and Capra (1996),
among others. For these authors, human cognition operates through a network of
interconnected, sensorimotor sub-networks (knowledge, emotions, etc.), which are in
turn interwoven with embodiment, action and environment; Damasio (1994, 2010)
reaches similar conclusions using neurological studies.
The biologist Humberto Maturana (2006, pp. 96-97) explains the relationship
between language, knowledge, emotions and social relations in the following terms:
Language is not a property or faculty of the brain or of what is called the mind. Language
occurs as a recursive flow of consensual coordinations that takes place in living systems
interacting with each other in a flow of recursive consensual coordinations of doings and
emotions. Consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be considered to exist independently of
the circumstances of their arising in the relational space of language in the flow of coordinations
of doings and emotions. We do not construct the worlds that we live, we just live them.

If cognitive representations are the result of the interaction between communication and
emotion (in the sense of the physical disposition of the body in relation to the specific
domain of human action present in the individual at any given time), cognition cannot
be treated separately from body and the social and interactional context. Capra (1996, p.
300) highlights this point by tracing the meaning of the term consciousness back to its
Latin origin, con-scire knowing together; this sense of shared knowledge also appears
in terms such as embodied cognition, embodied action (Varela, Thompson & Rosch,
1991), and networked (or distributed) cognition (Capra, 1996, pp. 59, 89). Such ideas
depart completely from the modular, representational theory of human cognition that
has dominated cognitive science up to now, and which views cognition as the
representation and parcelled sub-representation of an independently existing world.
In my research, the socio-cognitive notion of framing (Lakoff, 2007) is used at an
interpretative level to explain the different ideological constructions, world views

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(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 130), imaginaries (Castoriadis, 1974) or symbolic universes (Berger

& Luckmann, 1968, p. 124) that social actors create and attempt to maintain in
ideological disputes. In one of his latest books, van Eemeren (2010, p. 126) also refers
to the notion of frame and its function of constructing social facts.
Applying this idea of frame rather than representation involves more than a
simple change in terminology. Framing offers a new cognitive approach, referred to as
post-cognitivism by some authors (Gomila & Calvo, 2008), in which cognition is
understood as a unified process resulting from the interplay between the multiple factors
mentioned above. Under a frame analysis, the construction of meaning in discourse
forms part of a holistic cognitive process, in which the actors experience of the world is
created in the discursive process as part of a dialectical relationship between their
subjectivity and emotions, their actions and the environment.2 All cognitive processes,
including the process of signification, are thus inseparable from our biological
characteristics and the socio-cultural relations in which we are immersed.
The multifaceted approach used throughout this research demonstrates the need
to follow the example set by authors of complexity studies (Morin, 1990; Nicolescu,
2007), and begin to treat discourse analysis as a transdisciplinary field of study and an
area of new theoretical and methodological reflection.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
To illustrate the ideas and models discussed above, I have selected the discourse created
by a social movement that emerged in Spain in response to major cuts in funding for
social services in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis: the so-called 15M
movement.
15M takes its name from a spontaneous peaceful protest in the main squares of
Madrid and Barcelona that took place on 15 May 2011, before spreading to other cities
across the country. (The group is also referred to as the Outrage Movement los
indignados after Stphane Hessels 2010 essay, Indignez-vous.) While Spain is no
stranger to the struggle for democracy, the 15M group presents a number of novel
characteristics, including its emphasis on peaceful resistance and the movements
imaginary of a new democracy or world view, transmitted through inventive placards
and slogans designed by the citizens themselves and posted in public squares and spaces
and/or on various websites (Pujante & Morales-Lpez, 2013). The hypothesis of this
study is that these placards (in combination with the numerous demonstrations and the
overall dynamic of the movement) functioned, in the first instance, as a sign of protest,
but also as a way to reframe the populations understanding of the economic and social
crisis, and rearticulate the identity of the countrys citizens, transforming them from
victims into agents (Montesano Montessori & Morales-Lpez, 2014).
Two recent studies examine some of the most noteworthy slogans produced by
the movement (Pujante & Morales-Lpez, 2013; Montesano Montessori & MoralesLpez, 2014), dating not only from the period of encampment in different towns and
cities, but also from the many events and demonstrations that took place during the
months that followed.3 This article analyses two additional 15M slogans.
2

For a description of the origins of the idea of framing among American theorists, see Morales-Lpez
(2011). Montesano Montessori & Morales-Lpez (2014) looks at the relationship between framing and
Somerss theory of narratives and narrativity (Somers, 1994).
3
For an example of the spontaneous protests and slogans launched by the 15M movement, see:
http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20110516/miles-personas-piden-toda-espana-cambio-del-modelo-politicosocial/432656.shtml

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One of the first slogans used by the emerging movement was: Real democracy now.
We are not goods to be bought and sold by the bankers and politicians (Democracia
real ya. No somos mercancas en manos de polticos y banqueros). (The first part of this
slogan is, in addition, another of the names used by the group.)
From a discursive point of view, the creativity of the slogan lies, firstly, in the
use of the adjective real as a modifier of the noun democracy, introducing a new
collocation whose meaning could imply that the democratic system in place since 1975
has been anomalous in some way or even reminiscent of the dictatorship it was
intended to replace. A second discursive construction is the use of temporal deixis,
introduced by the adverb ya. The temporality of the adverb turns this entire statement
into a directive speech act (Searle, 1975) with deontic modality (Ridruejo 1999): the
actors are not stating a fact, but expressing their intention that the world or the
political world, at least should be made to fit their view of reality. The third device is
the implicit causal argument created by the juxtaposition of the two premises. Lastly,
the slogan presents two metaphors: the citizens as merchandise (a material object for
exchange), and the bankers and politicians as the actors who handle them like puppets,
moving for their own ends the life-strings of those worst affected by the economic
situation. The second slogan reads as follows:4

Translation: Your other bench the bench more and more people are choosing.
Dont pay for their recession. Rise up! Occupy the streets!

The use here of a well-known bank advertisement represents the discursive

recontextualization of a capitalist message for a completely opposite socio-political
purpose.5 The persuasive effect of the original advertisement was based on the
homonymy in Spanish between the word banco bank of money and banco park
4
5

All the 15Ms speeches are open access.

See the original advertisement at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpLbXcmVvkw

877

bench; in the 15M slogan and image, however, Tu otro banco has only one possible
referent. In order to appreciate the full meaning of the park bench in the context of the
15M movement, we must first analyse the metonymy created here: this bench and
countless others like it were where citizens, in squares in cities all over Spain, sat to
debate and demand their rights (that is, the physical space in which the communicative
action took place for that action). The group of citizens mobilized by 15M refers not
just to the people who started the camps, but also to those who came to see what was
happening, and it is to them and future observers like them that the authors of the slogan
are addressing their message when they use the pronoun of solidarity you (i.e.
someone close). The slogan concludes with three directive speech acts designed to
persuade the public to add their voices to the cause.
4. INTERPRETATION
These two illustrations are just a small representation of the huge number of examples
collected as part of this study. To account for the emergence of so much discursive
creativity, in terms of both meaning and the devices and resources used, the following
factors must be taken into consideration:
Firstly, the relationship between discursive creativity and the communicative
and contextual circumstances in which the slogans were formed. These were not the
specific speech acts of individuals discoursing in isolation to persuade/convince a
particular audience, but the collective communicative outcome of a series of assemblies,
information boards, blogs, websites, etc. and the shared emotion of those experiences.
This new communicative action, which began with the encampment of a group
of activists in a public square in one city and spread spontaneously via social media to
other parts of Spain, could be interpreted as a major feat of civic cooperation: the
collective action of a group of citizens who begin to realize that the political class,
though democratically elected, has undermined the democratic values enshrined in the
1978 Spanish Constitution, and the ideals of European integration; has turned its back
on the people, and handed over the countrys wealth and that of Europe to the financial
institutions. Extreme communication situations, such as that represented by the 15M
protest, appear to bear out the belief held by certain authors that cooperation is one of
the most powerful drivers of human evolution: Societies, both animal and human,
might almost be regarded as huge cooperative nervous systems (Hayakawa, 1973, p.
11; see also Capra, 1996).
Possibly as a consequence of the movements entirely peaceful nature, the
groups involved in 15M appear to have adopted discursive creativity spontaneously as a
way of raising awareness of their common cause. Their preferred form of expression
was the slogan, a narrative discursive genre that has the advantage of communicating a
great deal of information in a very small amount of space, while at the same time
maximizing the number and variety of rhetorical-discursive strategies available.
A second point to be considered is that these slogans are the result of a
widespread, co-distributed cognition (Capra, 1996, p. 89; Maturana & Varela, 1990)
that places Spanish democracy since 1975 within a new ideological frame or construct.
According to one study, carried out by the newspaper El Pas in 2011 (23 October), 73
per cent of Spaniards expressed themselves in agreement with the messages and
demands of the indignados.
The slogans of the 15M movement cannot be examined from a solely sociosemiotic or rhetorical-argumentative point of view, therefore, because these
perspectives do not account for the full potential meaning and persuasive effect of the
878

discourse (Pujante & Morales-Lpez, 2013). The analysis of these slogans requires a
more holistic approach, integrating additional disciplines, such as ethnography, which
views the signification process as inseparable from the context of situation and social
action (in the case of 15M, the occupation of public spaces and subsequent
dissemination of messages via social media); and socio-cognitive analyses, which
establish a continuum between the speaking subject (complete with subjectivity and
emotions) and reality. The messages created by the 15M movement not only transmit
knowledge, in the form of a new interpretation of the Spanish socio-political situation,
but also connect at an emotional level both with the past and with the need for younger
citizens to become more actively engaged in politics.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary constructivist framework for this analysis
highlights the inseparability of all factors and actors present in the creation of a new
ideological discourse: the speaking subjects; their speech acts, and their
recontextualization in relation to other acts; the interlocutors present in the physical
space in which the statements are first uttered, and the interlocutors who receive those
messages through traditional and social media; the local context in which the statements
are made; the socio-political environment that gives rise to them, and the action or
actions carried out at the same time by the social actors present.
Only by examining all these variables together can we fully understand the
complex meaning of ideological discourses, especially those which arise in spaces of
radical conflict, as is the case in Spain today.

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The Evaluative And Unifying Function Of Emotions Emerging In

Argumentation: Interactional And Inferential Analysis In Highly
Specialized Medical Consultations Concerning The Disclosure Of
A Bad News
Margherita Luciani
Institute of Argumentation, Linguistics and Semiotics
University of Lugano
Switzerland
margherita.luciani@usi.ch

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the functions of emotions in decision-making processes following the
disclosure of a bad news in medical argumentation, by taking into account suggestions from psychology and
argumentation. I embrace the hypothesis that emotions, due to their capability of unifying the objects of our
thought, strongly contribute to reasonable decisions. I claim that a proof that hints to this can be found at the
interactional as well as at the inferential level of analysis.
KEYWORDS: Argumentum Model of Topics, bad news, decision-making processes, doctor-patient
interaction, emotions, inferential structure, interactional analysis

1. INTRODUCTION
Emotions plays a crucial role in doctor-patient interactions, especially in case of bad news
disclosure; in such highly emotive frameworks a competent usage of emotions through
communication strategies can really make the difference in improving patients
acceptability of heavy treatments and of diseases consequences. This competence is often
strongly influenced by doctors ability to handle in an adequate way their own emotions as
well as by the ability to take into account patients possible emotive reactions. However, it
is not often the case that doctors are able to reach a fruitful communication and an
adequate handling of emotions, and this leads to misunderstandings and produces
undesired emotive and cognitive reactions in patients. Two are the main approaches to
doctor-patient interaction which can be found in literature, namely the patient-centred
approach and the disease-centred approach (Bensing, 2000; Mead & Bower, 2000).
This paper aims to contribute to the study of doctor-patient interactions dynamics
by connecting existing studies in health communication and psychology with
argumentation studies, in order to demonstrate the crucial role of argumentatively played
out emotions. For what concerns the theoretical and methodological framework, we follow
the Pragma-Dialectical approach (Eemeren van, 2004) for the interactional analysis and
the Argumentum Model of Topics (henceforth AMT) for the analysis of the inferential
structures of arguments (Rigotti, 2009; Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010).
In medical argumentation studies there is a gap in the analysis of doctors
argumentatively played out emotions, which concerns both the interactional as well as the
inferential level of analysis. The reasons why doctors emotions emerging in

882

argumentation during this type of communicative practice have a strong influence in

patients acceptability of treatments and of disease consequences remain still unclear.
In this study I propose to combine a fine-grained argumentative and inferential
analysis of doctors experienced emotions in doctor-patient interactions concerning the
disclosure of a bad news. Three are the main aims of this paper. Firstly, I set out to explore
the role of doctors argumentatively played out emotions in the management of the painful
communication and of the subsequent patients decision-making processes. Secondly, I
will investigate the importance for doctors to take into consideration the possible patients
emotions and the importance of arguing in favor of them, and lastly I will prove that
emotions have an evaluative and unifying function which can be retrieved in the
inferential structure of arguments.
2. TWO DISTINCT APPROACHES TO DOCTOR-PATIENT INTERACTION
First of all, the disease-centered approach reduces the relationship doctor-patient to a mere
formality lacking of a human and existential value, which is on the basis of every cure
strategy. It conceives the doctor as the only expert and the doctors only focus is on the
disease in itself, so that all his professional efforts and human attentions are devoted only
to the cure of the disease. As a consequence of that, the patient is induced to adopt a
behavior of compliance, that consists in obeying and adhering to doctors decisions,
preventing him from reaching an autonomous opinion (RPSGB, 1997).
On the contrary, the patient-centered approach puts the patient as a whole at the
center of its interest; the doctor gives crucial importance to psychological and social
conditions of the patient, taking into consideration patients emotive dynamics and
considering the consequences of emotive reactions in decision-making processes, in order
to be able to better understand the actual will of the patient and subsequently to be able to
better guide him in painful decisions. This is possible only caring about communicative
and relational aspects between doctor and patient; adopting such an approach instead of a
disease-centered approach implies a shift of focus from the cure of the disease to the care
of the person, and from the compliance to the concordance, which refers to a process of
knowledge power and decision sharing in doctor-patient interaction, producing a radical
change of the cures intrinsic relationship and of what every participant expects from the
other. In short, adopting a patient-centered approach favoring concordance means
considering the patient as an expert of his own illness situation and of his reaction to bad
news communication and treatment (RPSGB, 1997).
For the purposes of this study, which combines studies from communication,
psychology and argumentation theory, it is interesting to notice the semantic foundations
of the distinction of these two approaches; indeed, also a semantic analysis of the two
verbs to cure of and to care for, respectively representing the disease-centered approach
and the patient-centered approach, lays stress on the different perspective given to the
medical communication by the adoption of these two types of approaches. In order to
highlight this distinction, I analyzed these verbs following an approach known as
Congruity Theory (Rigotti & Rocci, 2001; Rocci, 2005). This theory starts from the
assumption that a whole argumentation is based on a conceptual structure, proceeding
from relations to concepts, and therefore the analysis of argumentation presupposes the
analysis of concepts, that is the semantic analysis. In short, this theory provides the

883

necessary and conceptual instruments necessary to tackle both the semantic and the
pragmatic aspect of discourse. More specifically, the meaningfulness of the units that
make up the nodes of discourses is accounted for semantically in terms of predicateargument frames, where predicates impose presuppositions to their arguments places and
licenses semantic entailments.
The semantic analysis of the two verbs to cure of and to care for is shown in Table 1;

Table 1. Semantic analysis of the verbs to cure of and to care for.

The verb to cure of presupposes that X1 is a human being with a degree in medicine, that
X2 is a living being and that X3 is a disease. The subsequent entailments are that X1 heals
X2 from X3 or that X1 attempts to heal X2 from X3. Here the verb is clearly bound to the
concept of disease, where the focus is on the disease per se. On the contrary, the verb to
care for presupposes as first argument a living being, that is able to help X2, and
furthermore it presupposes that is X2 is a living being, who is in need for help, where the
entailment is that X1 gives the necessary help to X2. This verb perspective is related to the
concept of illness, and here the focus is on the fact of being ill of a person in his whole and
uniqueness.
3. EMOTIONS EMERGING IN ARGUMENTATIVE DOCTOR-PATIENT
INTERACTIONS
It is in this scenario that I propose to consider emotions emerging in argumentative doctorpatient interactions as able to strongly influence the modality of communicative approach
adopted, and strongly determine an adequate or inadequate management of the painful

884

disclosure of a bad news, such as the communication of the impossibility to surgically

intervene in pancreatic cancer (for more details see the case study in Section 5).
I will refer to emotions as they are conceived according to the modern theories of
emotions in social psychology and psychology of emotions; the central core of these
theoretical frameworks is based on the assumption that emotions are rational, so that they
are conceived as a useful mean to reach reasonable decisions, as stated also by the
neuroscientist A. Damasio (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 1999).
However, it is only when one is aware of his own emotions that can inhibit an
action prompted by them (Lambie, 2008; Lambie 2009). I embrace this hypothesis that in
order to make a reasonable choice, one should be aware of his own emotions.
Nevertheless, one step further still needs to be done; I claim that emotions awareness is
strongly played out argumentatively. Furthermore, in support of this claim, I take into
consideration the research trend emotions, rationality and decision (Lambie & Marcel,
2002) according to which every-medium and long-term goal must undergo to review
according to deliberative rationality, which often takes place in argumentation, and this
process is strongly influenced by aware emotions.
4. CORPUS AND METHODOLOGY
Concerning the corpus, data were collected at the highly specialized practice of oncologic
pancreatic surgery at the Hospital of Verona (Italy), where patients arrive after a
diagnostic day-hospital. In order to support the main claim of the paper, namely that the
awareness of doctors emotions and the consideration of patients expected emotive
reactions emerging in argumentation strongly influence the final outcome of the medical
consultation, data were collected looking at the threefold perspective of the doctor-patient
interaction, of the doctor-psychologist interaction, and of the patient-psychologist
interaction. Indeed, data consist of audio-recordings of 15 doctor-patient interactions
concerning the moment of the disclosure of the bad news of the impossibility to surgically
intervene, of 15 doctor-psychologist interactions about doctors emotive resonance after
the communication of the news, and finally of 15 patients-psychologist interactions about
the emotive reactions after the news communication and the impressions about the way in
which the doctor managed the painful communication. The first type of data permitted an
in-depth analysis of argumentative dynamics, whereas the second and the third type of
data permitted to have a confirm of the claim through a retrospective clue.
The methodology used for the reconstruction of argumentative structures at the
interactional level follows Pragma-Dialectics, whereas for the analysis of the inferential
structure of arguments I use the approach known as Argumentum Model of Topics
(Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010).
5. A CASE STUDY: HIGHLY SPECIALIZED MEDICAL CONSULTATION AFTER A
DIAGNOSE-ORIENTED DAY-HOSPITAL AS A PECULIAR ACTIVITY TYPE
According to Van Eemeren stating that the various communicative activity types are
empirical conceptualizations of conventionalized communicative practices (Eemeren van,
2010, p. 145), I propose to conceive the highly specialized medical consultation after a
diagnose-oriented day hospital as a peculiar activity type with its own specific

885

characteristics and purposes, resulting in an activity type, which is clearly different from
the other types of medical consultations. With reference to this, in inoperable oncologic
patients, we can identify three stages of this peculiar activity type, namely the stage of the
communication of the impossibility to surgically intervene, the stage of the
communication of the need to do a chemotherapy and the phase of the choice of the most
suitable chemotherapy. A peculiarity of this activity type can be identified in the fact that
when patients arrive to the consultation, it is the second time that patients see the doctor
(patients met the doctor during the day-hospital), so that the stage of the patient
examination and clinic history has already been made during the day-hospital.
Furthermore, it is important to notice that the communication of the impossibility
to surgically intervene represents a very highly emotive interaction due to the painful
communication of the bad news disclosure referring to the impossibility of an effective
cure.
In order to carry out the main aim of the study, the features of the phases of the two
distinct types of interactional approaches in managing the communication in this activity
type were identified. On the one hand, concerning the patient-centered approach, we can
find the following features; patients awareness degree concerning illness construal is
ascertained, the bad news communication of the impossibility to do a curative surgical
intervention follows, and lastly the most suitable treatment is discussed and negotiated, so
that patients opinion is taken into account and is endorsed. In this interactional approach
doctors show a great ability to argue and to use emotions in argumentations as well as to
show an empathic behavior. On the contrary, the features characterizing the diseasecentered approach are the following; patients awareness degree concerning the disease is
not ascertained, bad news communication follows, and the most suitable treatment is given
as a factual data, without discussion and negotiation. We observe in the best cases the
presence of an only poor argumentation, and emotions, both of the doctor and of the
patient, are not taken into consideration.
5.1 Patient-centeredness: an argumentative analysis
In what follows I will show three argumentative reconstructions pertaining to a patientcentered interaction; the first one shows the standpoint of a patient after that the doctor has
communicated him the impossibility of the surgical intervention at the moment, the second
one shows the doctors standpoint after the communication of the bad news, and the third
one shows the doctors standpoint during the phase of the choice of the most suitable
treatment.
In the first argumentative reconstruction the standpoint of the patient I want to do
the surgical intervention now is supported by the argument of analogy when I had breast
cancer the doctors did the surgical intervention before doing chemotherapy and by two
emotive arguments I fear that if we wait with the intervention other cancer cells could
spread in other organs and I fear that if we wait with the intervention the cancer could
become bigger, as shown in table 2:

886

Table 2. Argumentative reconstruction of the patients argumentation.

A) pa ent-centeredness, Complex argumenta on
1)communica on of the bad news (doctor-pa ent
interac on)

1. I want to do the surgical interven on now (PATIENT)

1.1 when I had breast cancer, the

doctors did the surgical interven on
before doing the chemotherapy

1.2a I fear that if

we wait with
the interven on
other cancer
cells could
spread in other
organs

1.2b I fear that if

we wait with the
interven on the
cancer could
become bigger

In what follows I will illustrate the argumentative reconstruction of the doctors

argumentation; the standpoint our advice is to do a chemotherapy before doing a surgical
intervention is justified by four argumentative lines, as we can see in table 3: the first
argues about the danger of doing a surgical intervention at the present moment, the second
argues about the utility to do a chemotherapy before the surgical operation, and the third
acts on emotions. On the one hand the assertion that doctors want the best cure for the
patient is justified by 1.3.1, and in the last analysis by 1.3.1.1. On the other hand the
argument that doctors want the best cure for the patient is justified by the subordinate
argument 1.3.2, where we can observe an empathic behavior. Finally the fourth
argumentative line, brings reasons in favor of the impossibility to do the surgical
intervention at the present moment.

A) pa ent-centeredness, Complex argumenta on

1)communica on of the bad news
1. Our advice is to do a chemotherapy before doing a surgical interven on (DOCTOR.)
1.1 It is very
risky to do a
s u r g i c a l
interven on
now

1.1.1 We are in
f r o n t o f a
pancrea c cancer
which is close to
a very important
blood vessel

1.1.1.1 This blood

vessel brings
blood to the
whole intes ne

1 . 2
t h i s
chemotherapy
h e l p s i n
reducing the
cancer before
the surgical
interven on

1 . 2 . 1 i t
permits us to
go in the
opera ng
theatre with
more safety in
respect to the
p r e s e n t
situa on

1.3 we want the best

cure for you, we
believe this is the
best cure for you
1.3.1
we
con nue to
propose to
p a en t s t h is
t y p e
o f
treatment
sequence

1.3.2 you could be

my sister, and if
you were my sister
I would advice you
t h e
s a m e
t r e a t m e n t
sequence

1.3.1.1 we have
always been happy
and sa sfied by the
results of this type
of treatment
sequence

1.4 a er this
t y p e
o f
pancrea c
interven on,
postopera ve
complica ons
are usual
1.4.1 we could
risk to delay the
beginning of
chemotherapy
1.4.1.1 the
disease could
easily spread
t o o t h e r
organs

Table 3. Argumentative reconstruction of the doctors standpoint.

887

Finally, in the last phase, namely that of the choice of the most suitable treatment, the
doctors standpoint is I advice a type of aggressive chemotherapy called Folfirinox even
though it has many side effects. In order to justify the importance of doing this aggressive
treatment, the doctor proposes three argumentative lines; the last one lays stress on the
doctors consciousness of the emotive state of the patient, which attempts to make the
argument more acceptable for the patient, as we can see in table 4.

A) pa ent-centeredness, Complex argumenta on

2)Choice of the most suitable treatment
1. I advice a type of aggressive chemotherapy called Folfirinox even though it has many side
effects (DOCTOR)

1.1 it is an
aggressive
treatment used
also in metasta c
disease

1.2 we use it in young

pa ents with op mal
performance status like
you

1.2.1 it gives the

possibility to reach our
objec ve
1.2.1.1a it
permits us to
volumetrically
reduce the
disease

1.3 I know that it is painful for

you to accept hair loss, vomit
a n d i m m u n o d e fi c e n c y .
However, pancrea c cancer
has a prognosis which shi s
from 6 to 9 months of life
without doing an effec ve
chemotherapy.

1.2.1. 1b it permits
us to do the surgical
interven on in a
second me

Table 4. Argumentative reconstruction of the doctors standpoint.

The analysis of a patient-centered medical interaction based on the awareness of doctors
emotions and of the patients possible emotive reactions as well as on an empathic
behavior demonstrates that emotions emerging in argumentation play an important role in
supporting patients in bad news disclosure as well as in guiding patients about the decision
making process of treatment choices; in this framework the most important criterion are
patients preferences. Such kind of interactions favor a shared decision making process
aimed at reaching a treatment on which both physician and patient agree, by discussing the
pros and cons of possible treatment options in such a way that the views of both parties are
taken into account

as stated by F. Snoek Henkemans (Snoek Henkemans, 2012, p. 30). Furthermore they

enable
a reasoned compliance of the patient, where the patient takes a certain course of action
advised by a doctor because she has understood and believes in the inner motivations
behind it

888

as stated by Rubinelli and Schulz (Rubinelli & Schulz, 2006, p. 357). What is more, this
approach permits to support the emotive involvement of the patient during the bad news
disclosure as well as during the decision-making process of the treatment choice.
We can find a confirm of these statements from a retrospective clue in the doctorpsychologist interaction about the doctors emotions during the bad news communication,
as we can see from the excerpt below;
(1)

Ps: how did you feel during the communication of this bad news?
D: I felt at ease because I had already introduced the discussion about a possible cancer during the
previous visit..
Ps: what emotions do you feel now?
D: I must admit that sometimes I feel very sad in communicating the bad news, when patients have
the same age of me, as in this case I sometimes empathize

The importance of emotions awareness is confirmed by the evidence of the fact that the
doctor is aware of his own emotions and succeeds in an empathic behavior.
We find another confirm of the importance of argumentation from another
retrospective clue in the psychologist-patient interaction about the outcome and
impressions of the bad news communication after the consultation, as we can see from the
excerpt below;
(2)

Ps: and did you understand why it is important to do chemotherapy before the surgical intervention?
P: yes I understood that doing chemotherapy is important in order to let the cancer decrease and to
do the surgical intervention in a second moment
Ps: was it important for you to hear about this?
P: Yes the doctor was very clear in clarifying many aspects of my disease and of the cure
the exams confirmed the presence of a carcinoma however nobody told us why it was important to
do chemotherapy first and wait with the surgical intervention

5.2 Disease-centredness: doctors disregarding their own emotions and patients emotive
reactions
In order to highlight the potential benefits of the patient-centered approach, I will hereby
illustrate the inadequacy of the disease-centered approach: we will show some excerpts in
which it is evident that the doctor does not argue in favor of his standpoint, and that this
causes misunderstandings in the communication, because the patient does not understand
the actual situation and does not have the possibility to ask for questions and remarks, as
stated also by S. Bigi (Bigi, 2012). Furthermore, the doctor does not take into
consideration the possible emotive reactions of the patient and this clearly contributes to
misunderstandings. It is remarkable the case of a patient that did not want to do the
surgical intervention after chemotherapy because she did not understand that it was the
most effective cure. The day after the consultation the patient came back for another
consultation because she did not want to do the surgical intervention after chemotherapy
and she was confused about the therapeutic approach to follow, as we can see from the
excerpt below;
(3)

P: Yesterday I asked you if it was possible to avoid the surgical intervention and you answered me
that I absolutely need to do this intervention, without explaining me why.

889

Then, the patient goes on arguing why she did not want to do the surgical intervention, and
the doctor answers I only wish you that we meet in the operation theatre, as we can see
from the excerpt below;
(4)

P: I read that when the cancer is in the pancreas tail, after chemotherapy the cancer may disappear
and so I may avoid the surgical intervention
D: I told you yesterday the answer is no. After chemotherapy you must do the surgical intervention.
I only wish you that we meet in the operation theatre.
P: but why?
D: because you may not be candidate to the surgical intervention and then continue with
chemotherapy/ the surgical intervention is unavoidable it is the best solution because continuing
with chemotherapy is not effective/ the disease could spread in other organs
P: if you wish me that I will be able to do the surgical intervention, then I wish it also myself

The patient asks for reasons and the doctor argues that the patient could not be candidate
to the surgical intervention and then continue with chemotherapy, that it is not the best
solution because continuing with chemotherapy is not effective. Here we observe a shift in
the patients reasoning, after an even poor argumentation, which however hints at an
empathic response.
Concluding, we can observe that no argumentation or poor argumentation which
does not consider doctors emotions as well as possible patients emotive reactions and
which disregards empathy produces misunderstandings and difficulties in accepting
diseases consequences and treatments. In such a framework, the most important criterion
seems to be identifiable in medical evidence, and we observe an unilateral aprioristic
decision-making process, where the patient is in passive condition and the doctor decides
alone for the patient.
Even in this case we show a confirm of this dis-functional type of interaction from
a retrospective clue, namely from the doctor-psychologist interaction about the doctors
emotions during the bad news communication. The doctor is not aware of his own
emotions and is not empathic;
(5)

Ps: the idea to communicate this type of news is painful for you?
D: No, I dont have any emotive resonance.
Ps: Are you sure? It is impossible.. Are you released?
D: Yes, I am sure. I have already removed the content of the communication.. I do this every day.. I
think that this is a sort of defense

We can retrieve another retrospective clue of the importance of an even only poor
argumentation hinting at emotions in the patient-psychologist retrospective interaction, as
we can see from the excerpt below;
(6)

Ps: do you think the doctor was clearer today in explaining you the clinical situation?
P: Yes today he was clearer and more human however, yesterday I was very upset about the fact
that he wished me to go in the operation theatre.
Ps: probably you were upset yesterday because the doctor wasnt clear in explaining the reasons of
the fact that he wished you to go in the operation theatre.
Because if you dont do the surgical intervention the cure would be only a half cure
Because the best cure consists of chemotherapy and intervention
Because continuing with chemotherapy wouldnt be effective
P: Yes now I understand that I must do the intervention and this is all I wish myself

890

6. EMOTIONS AT THE INFERENTIAL LEVEL: THE INTERWEAVING OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND ARGUMENTATION
Until now this paper focussed on the interactional analysis; however, in order to prove the
crucial role of doctors emotions in patients reasonable decisions, it is necessary to make
a more in-depth analysis and to investigate the inferential structure of arguments.
First of all, we need to introduce the theoretical foundations of emotions conceived
as evaluative and unifying devices able to connect one argument to its standpoint. Social
psychology has argued in favour of the reasonableness of emotions since W. James, who
argued that feelings individualize knowledge, telling us how a thing is in conjunction with
us, and that feelings unify knowledge, being able to connect past events deriving from our
expectations and desires (James, 1884; James, 1890).
In more recent time, the famous neuroscientist A. Damasio reevaluated the
Jamesian theory, and lays stress on the necessity of taking into consideration the analysis
James made of the internal world, in order to shed light on that unified mental
configuration which unifies the objects of the Self (Damasio, 1999); the central core of
his theory concerns the mental evaluation of the situation which determined the emotion.
In this paper I propose that an analysis of the inferential structure of arguments
following the approach known as Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti & Greco
Morasso, 2010) offers a proof of the evaluative and unifying function of emotions as
conceived by psychological theories.
The AMT aims at proposing a coherent and founded approach to the study of
argument schemes, which can overcome several emerging difficulties, yet being in line
with previous achievements on this aspect. In general, modern authors conceive of
argument schemes as the bearing structure that connects the premises to the standpoint or
conclusion in a piece of real argumentation. In the AMT, the argument scheme combines a
procedural (universal and abstract) component, in which an inferential connection
(maxim) is activated, with a material component, guaranteeing for the applicability of the
maxim to the actual situation considered in the argument (Rigotti & Greco Morasso,
2010). For space reasons, we will focus only on the material component; in the AMT the
material component is made up of two components, namely the endoxon and the datum.
Endoxa are conceived as opinions that are accepted by everyone or by the majority, or by
the wise men (all of them or the majority, or by the most illustrious of them) as conceived
by Aristotle (Topics 100b, 21). With reference to the datum, it concerns statements that are
peculiar pieces of information, concrete facts emerging in the argumentative situation. It is
in this framework that I will propose to consider the relevance of emotive endoxa and
emotive data.
The single argumentation that I will investigate deals with the doctors argumentation at
the stage communication of the bad news of the activity type. The doctors standpoint is
Our advice is to do a chemotherapy before doing a surgical intervention, motivated by
the argument 1.1 We want the best cure for you, we believe this is the best cure for you,
which is in turn supported by two compound arguments: according to the taxonomy of loci
the first one can be classified as a locus from all the more, 1.1.1a You could be my sister
and if you were my sister I would advice you the same treatment, and the second one as a
locus from termination and setting up, namely 1.1.1b since years we continue to propose

891

this treatment sequence to patients because 1.1.1b.1 we have always been satisfied by
this type of treatment sequence.
I believe that AMT gives the chance to retrieve the evaluative and unifying
function of emotions, integrating emotion and cognition in a unified mental configuration;
the emotive and the cognitive component of the reasoning process are respectively
retrievable in the material and in the procedural component of the argument scheme
resulting in the final conclusion when the decision is achieved.
A careful analysis of the locus from all the more through the Y-structure permits to
observe the presence of an emotive endoxon and of an emotive datum in the material
component. The conjunction of the endoxon and of the emotive datum creates an
inferential effect leading to the first conclusion, which is strongly emotionally determined;
the first conclusion that is obtained from the material starting point is equally exploited by
the procedural starting point. This point of intersection is crucial in the AMT, indeed it
represents the junction between the material and the procedural starting points, and within
this work the interweaving between the emotive and the cognitive components. This
conclusion perfectly meets the conditions established by the maxim and, conjoined with it
allows inferring the standpoint This cure is recommended for the patient, as shown in
Table 5.

Locus from all the more

standpoint: we want the best cure for you
argument: indeed you could be my sister and if you were my sister I would advice
you the same treatment sequence

EM OTI ON
Endoxon: a doctors
sister is dear to the
doctor

Datum: this cure is

recommended for the
doctors sister

COGNI TI ON
Locus from all the
more
M axim: if Z is recommended for a subject
X who is close to the advisor, it is all the
more recommended for any subject

First Conclusion/ M inor Premise:

This cure is recommended for a
subject dear to the advisor

Final Conclusion: this cure is

recommended for the patient

27

Table 5. Inferential analysis: locus from all the more.

With reference to the locus from termination and setting up, I will analyse the single
argumentation we continue to propose this type of treatment sequence to patients
because we have always been satisfied by this type of treatment sequence; again, the
emotive and the cognitive component of the reasoning process are respecively retrievable
in the material and in the procedural component of the argument scheme resulting in the
final conclusion when the decision is achieved. Again, from the analysis of this Ystructure we can observe in the material component the presence of an emotive endoxon
and of an emotive datum. The conjunction of the endoxon and of the datum creates an
inferential effect leading to the first conclusion doctors should not terminate to propose
892

this type of treatment sequence. Again, this conclusion perfectly meets the conditions
established by the maxim and, conjoined with it allows inferring the doctors standpoint.

Locus from termination and setting up

-standpoint doctor: we continue to propose this type of treatment sequence to patients
-argument: we have always been satisfied by this type of treatment sequence

EM OTI ON
E ndoxon: d o c t o r s
happiness and
satisfaction regarding
this treatment sequence
are an indicator that this
treatment sequence is
effective
Datum: doctors have
always been happy and
satisfied by the results
of this type of treatment
sequence

COGNI TI ON
Locus from
termination and
setting up
M axim: if something has proven to be
effective, it is reasonable to continue to
propose it

First Conclusion/ M inor Premise:

it is reasonable that doctors
continue to propose this treatment
sequence
Final Conclusion: doctors
should not terminate to propose
this type of treatment to
patients

26

Table 6. Inferential analysis: locus from termination and setting up.

7. CONCLUSION
With this paper, I have contributed to the current debate on the importance of adopting a
patient-centred approach in highly emotive medical communicative situations such as
highly specialized medical consultations; for this purpose, I proved the crucial importance
of argumentation and of argumentatively played out emotions.
Firstly, I have shown the importance of the awareness of doctors argumentatively
played out emotions in the optimization of the management of the painful communication,
in tracing a particular and an effective path in decision-making processes of the patient
and in helping the acceptance of the diseases consequences in terms of both treatments
and prognosis.
Secondly, I have shed light on the necessity of taking into account patients
emotions and possible emotive reactions, in order to manage an optimal painful
communication and to favour the acceptability of doctors arguments in the patient.
Thirdly, I have shown that the AMT approach gives us the chance to retrieve the
evaluative and unifying function of emotions in the inferential structure of arguments, as
conceived by psychological theories, integrating emotions (conceived as processes of
cognitive evaluation) and cognition in the reasoning process, reflecting a unified mental
configuration.
However, much remains to be done, and future work should be devoted to better
analyse the relationship between doctors empathy and arguments acceptability for
patients. At the inferential level, the correlation between empathy and locus from all the
more should be deepened also with a quantitative study.

893

On the other hand, the role played out by patients emotions should be emphasized and
investigated more in depth; the relationship between patients argumentatively played out
emotions and their standpoint may lead us to better understand some defense dynamics
leading to the refutation of doctors standpoints for instance, aiming at finding out if a
correlation exists between patients experienced emotions and the acceptability of doctors
argumentation.

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895

Islamic Theological Arguments An Epistemological

Systematisation
Christoph Lumer & Serkan Ince
Christoph Lumer
DISPOC (Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, Politiche e Cognitive)
University of Siena
Via Roma 56
I-53100 Siena
Italy
lumer@unisi.it
Serkan Ince
Zentrum fr Islamische Theologie
University of Tbingen
Rmelinstrae 27
D-72070 Tbingen
Germany
serkan.ince@zith.uni-tuebingen.de

ABSTRACT: This contribution starts a critical analysis and reconstruction of arguments in classical texts of
Islamic theology (of the period AD 900-1100) from the viewpoint of the epistemological theory of
argumentation. The main question of the analysis is whether these arguments can be reconstructed as being
of one of the universal types of argument identified so far by the epistemological approach. The answer is:
yes though non-deductive arguments are not yet well elaborated.
KEYWORDS: deductive arguments, epistemological theory of argumentation, Islamic theological argument,
Koran, universality of argument types

1. AIM AND STRUCTURE OF THIS ARTICLE

Many classical texts of Islamic theology are heavily argumentative; and much of Islamic
theology tries to base faith on valid and sound arguments. Some Islamic theologians even
think that Islamic doctrines cannot be defended by revelation alone but have always to be
justified by rational arguments. The rational approach in Islamic theology was
significantly influenced by the Mutazila. But also the Mturdiyya and the As hariyya
have dealt with kalm (Arabic for speculative theology) and applied rational methods in
their theology (see e.g. van Ess 1966, pp. 17-33). This argumentative tradition has nearly
not been studied in argumentation theory up to this day. This contribution starts to develop
a critical analysis and reconstruction of the arguments in classical texts of Islamic theology
from the viewpoint of the epistemological theory of argumentation. The theoretical aims of
this study are threefold: First, we want to compile (the beginning of) a list of the most
important types of arguments used in these texts, giving particular attention to nondeductive arguments. Second, we analyse them with the help of epistemological criteria in
order to establish whether they can be captured in this way, in particular whether all of
them are intended (in a broad sense) to be or can be reconstructed as being of one of the

896

universal types of argument identified so far by the epistemological approach (deductive,

probabilistic or practical arguments or combinations thereof) or whether there are e.g.
specifically Islamic types of argument which should extend the present list of
epistemologically valuable argument types or whether, on the other hand, there are
(frequently used) argument types in Islamic theology which should be abandoned from an
epistemological point of view. Third, we assess the examples with the help of the criteria
developed in the epistemological theory of argumentation to gain an impression of the
state of the art in classical Islamic theological argumentation. The arguments we will
analyse in the following are taken from works by Ab Manr Muammad ibn
Muammad ibn Mamd al-Mturd (about AD 870-944), by Ab al-Qsim al-akm alSamarqand (about AD 890-950) and by Ab mid Muammad ibn Muammad, known
as al-Ghazl (AD 10581111), i.e. texts which were written roughly between AD 900 and
1100, i.e. in European terms at the end of the Early and the beginning of the High Middle
Ages, before Thomas Aquinas or William of Ockham in Western Europe.
As just said, the argumentation theory which provides the background and criteria
of our analysis is the epistemological approach to argumentation and, more specifically,
the Practical Theory of Argumentation developed by one of us, because within the
epistemological approach, apart from the profound theoretical justification, it provides the
most elaborated and precise criteria for good argumentation, the broadest and deepest
systematisation of argument types, and an elaborated theory as well as rules for
1
interpreting arguments.
2. DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS IN MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC THEOLOGY
Islamic theologians of the period under consideration, of course, also use deductive
arguments even of a rather sophisticated type. And since the erudite among them were
familiar in particular with Aristotles logic they even had a theory of deductive arguments
at their disposal.
Nice examples of rather good and sophisticated deductive theological arguments
can be found e.g. in Mturds book Kitb al-Tawhd (The Book of Divine Unity,
AD 944). In this book Mturd is arguing, among others, against Christian Christology
and the doctrine of Trinity. In a long passage of this book he presents a wealth of
independent arguments, which try to show that Christian Christology is self-refuting or
contradicting well-known facts. An extract reads as follows:
1. [S1.1] The Christians are divided over Christ, [S1.2] for there are those among them who
attribute two spirits to him, [S1.3] one of them temporal, the spirit of humanity which is like the
spirits of people, [S1.4] and an eternal divine spirit, [S1.5] a part of God, [S1.6] and this came into
the body. []

General overview of the epistemological theory of argumentation: Lumer 2005b. Practical Theory of
Argumentation: The general approach is developed and justified in: Lumer 1990; 2005a. A systematisation
of existing argument types is developed in: Lumer 2011a. Criteria for particular argument types are
developed in: deductive arguments: Lumer 1990, pp. 180-209; probabilistic arguments: Lumer 2011b; 1990,
pp. 221-260; practical arguments: Lumer 1990, pp. 319-433; Lumer 2014. For theory and rules of
interpreting arguments, see: Lumer 2003; for fallacy theory: Lumer 2000.

897

[S4] Ibn Shabb said: I heard one of their associates say that he [Christ] was son by adoption and
not son by begetting, just as the wives of Muhammad [] are called mothers, and as a man says to
another, My little son.
2. [] [S5] The Master [] said, Say to them: [] [S9.1] Further, it is well-known that a son is
younger than a father, [S9.2] so [S9.3] how can they both be eternal? [S10.1] And if the whole is
regarded as being in the body, [S10.2] say to him: [S10.3] Which thing in it is the Son? [S11.1] And
if he says: The whole; [S11.2] he has made the whole Son and Father, [S11.3] in this making the
Father a son to himself. (al-Mturd <944> 2008, pp. 97-99)

This passage does not contain a classical argument indicator; however, sentence S5: The
Master said, Say to them serves this function. It means: the following are proposals how
to argue against assertions of the Christian doctrines summarised in S1[-S4], whose
negations, of course, are Mturds theses. The negation exactly of which thesis entailed
in S1 is the thesis sustained by S9 is not made explicit; only the content of S9 allows us to
infer that S1.4 is the claim under attack, hence the thesis could be: (The divine spirit in)
Christ is not eternal. That parts of the formulation of the thesis show up only in the
reasons is an indicator for a deductive argument. (In the following reconstructions, S
indicates a sentence from the arguments original text; P indicates a premise; A
indicates a hypothetical assumption, which is not used as a premise taken to be true; L
designates a lemma; T is the name for a thesis; e as well as <> (angle brackets)
indicate insertions included in the spirit of the argument and meant to be acceptable for the
arguer; [] (square brackets) indicate insertions, comments etc. made by us, the
authors.) The argument can be reconstructed as follows:
<eA1 (= part of S6) assumption (not premise) of a part of the Christian doctrine: The
divine spirit in Christ is the son of God (the Father).>
P1
(= S9.1): All sons are younger than their fathers. [This can be formalised as
follows: For all x and y holds: if x is son of y, then there is a moment tz, for which
holds: y subsists at tz, and all moments tw, at which x subsists, are later than tz.]
<eP2 For all x holds: If there is a moment ty, at which x does not subsist, then x is not
eternal.>
P3
(= S9.2): So: description of an inferential relation: From S9.1 (= P1) [and eA1
and eP2] follows the implicature of S9.3 (= T1): The divine spirit in Christ and
God (the Father) are not both eternal. [Mturd formulates this assertion as a
rhetorical question, which implicates the negation of the main propositional content
of S9.3.]

T1
(= S9.3): God the Father and the divine spirit in Christ are not both eternal.
[Mturd has formulated this conclusion as a rhetorical question, which however
implicates a negative answer.]
Here the explicit argument terminates. It suffers from two defects, which, however, can be
repaired easily. First, the thesis T1 does not follow. Since one of the premises of the
inferential relation described in P3, namely eA1, i.e. The divine spirit in Christ is the son
of God (the Father), for Mturd and Islamic theology is just a hypothetical assumption,
only a weaker, conditional thesis follows: eT1*:

898

<eT1* If (eA1:) the divine spirit in Christ is Gods son, then God (the Father) and the
divine spirit in Christ are not both eternal.>
(This implication is logically equivalent to the disjunction:
<eT1.1* (eA1): The divine spirit in Christ is not Gods son, or God (the Father) and the
divine spirit in Christ are not both eternal.>)
Second, for Mturds overall aim already T1 is too weak because he does not negate
Gods eternity and only wants to attack the assumption of Christs divinity. With a further
implicit premise the result can easily be strengthened in the spirit of Mturds argument:
<eT1* If (eA1:) the divine spirit in Christ is Gods son, then God (the Father) and the
divine spirit in Christ are not both eternal.>
<eP4 God (the Father) is eternal.>

<eT2 (eA1): The divine spirit in Christ is not Gods son, or (the divine spirit in) Christ
is not eternal.>
The second horn of this Christian dilemma is in contrast to S1.4, i.e. to one of the
Christian doctrines described in the introduction of Mturds argument.
2
The argument is a proof of a contradiction: from some assumptions of Christian
Christology and some trivially true premises follows the opposite of one of these
assumptions; hence at least one of these assumptions must be false. The argument in its
reconstructed form is deductively valid. Furthermore, the premises P1, eP2 and P3 as such
are true; we can leave it open whether eP4 (eternity of God the Father) is true; in particular
premise P1, i.e. All sons are younger than their fathers, is true for natural sons. However,
a critical point of the argument is whether son in the assumption eA1, i.e. Christ is the
son of God (the Father), can be interpreted as meaning natural sonship. If in Christian
Christology not a natural sonship is meant which probably is the case we would have
two different meanings of son in eA1 and P1; this would make the argument invalid.
More precisely this would be a fallacy of missing fit, namely of fallacious ambiguity
(Lumer 2000, pp. 415-416). By the way, Mturd himself in sentence S4 mentions that in
Christian Christology at least sometimes the expression son is not interpreted in the usual
way, but he ignores this critical point in his argument. He could have restricted his result to
Christian doctrines which assume a natural sonship and could have objected to other
versions that their use of son is more than unclear which for Mturds critical
purposes would be sufficiently strong. Finally, apart from being true, the arguments
premises are also accepted by Mturds (Muslim and Christian) addressees which
makes the argument adequate in this respect for convincing rationally. So, altogether the
analysed argument of Mturd is quite a good deductive argument though in the end it is
fallacious.
This was only one example of a deductive argument in medieval Islamic theology. Of
course, there are many more of them. Given this wealth of deductive arguments, the
2

The argument evaluation in this paragraph uses the criteria exposed in: Lumer 1990, pp. 187-189; abridged
criteria: Lumer 2011, p. 14.

899

theoretical question is no longer whether there are deductive arguments but whether there
are non-deductive arguments in medieval Islamic theology.
A particular important kind is practical arguments, i.e. arguments consisting of listings of
advantages and disadvantages of an object which justify a specific evaluation of this
object. Practical arguments, though perhaps not of a very explicit form, must have been
present in daily life of Muslims of the period under consideration, simply because they
reflect the basic way of human decision-making. The search for and analysis of respective
examples so far is only the topic of further research.
3. SPECIFICALLY ISLAMIC ARGUMENT TYPES? AUTHORITY ARGUMENTS
FROM THE KORAN
One of our theoretically central questions is whether there are specifically Islamic
argument types, in particular argument types which could be recognised by the
epistemological approach to argumentation as being effective in the sense of leading to
true or acceptable (e.g. near to truth) beliefs (i.e. whether they are based on effective
epistemological principles (cf. Lumer 2005a, pp. 221-222; 231-234) which have not yet
been recognised in epistemological argumentation theory). The most obvious candidates
are authority arguments from Holy Scriptures, which are present in Islamic theological
texts as well as in theological texts from other revealed religions.
Good and instructive kinds of such authority arguments from Holy Scriptures can
be found e.g. in Ab al-Qsim al-Hakm al-Samarqands screed against the fatalists who
think believers do not need to care for subsistence, since Allah already cares for them. At
one point e.g. Samarqand argues with the help of an authority argument from Holy
Scriptures that sometimes believers are obliged to strive for their subsistence though
Allah generally cares for the subsistence of human beings. The translated argument is this:
[S1] At certain times it is a duty to strive for living, [S2.1] because [S2.2] the Koran says:
[S2.3] And shake the palm trees stem by pulling it towards you! [S2.4] Then it lets plunge juicy
and fresh dates on you [Koran 19:25], [S3.1] and the Koran says: [S3.2] We have created the day
for you in order that you gain your livelihood [Koran 78:11]. (al-Samarqand <950> 1838, p. 40)

The argument indicator in S2.1 tells us that the preceding sentence, S1, is the thesis
whose content is sufficient for refuting the fatalists and that the following sentences, i.e.
S2.2 to S3, are the arguments. Sentence S2.4, i.e. one part of the Koran citation, is not
necessary for Samarqands argumentative purposes. The rest is a complex argument with
two convergent (i.e. each of them sufficient) reasons for the thesis that sometimes it is a
duty to strive for ones living. Both reasons are independent and correct citations of
Koran verses about doing something for gaining ones livelihood.
The explicit argument is rather frugal. The transition from the two explicit reasons
to the thesis presupposes two groups of implicit reasons. The first group of implicit
premises deals with a general problem to be expected in such arguments from authority of
Holy Scriptures, e.g. from the authority of the Koran, and, more specifically, how to get
from an invitation expressed in the Koran to an effective obligation. This problem can be
resolved by inserting some fairly general premises which can be used in most arguments
from the authority of the Koran. These general premises are:

900

E1
E2
E3

Principle of revelation: Everything written in the Koran is the word of Allah, i.e. a
communication by Allah.
Principle of divine truth: The propositions of all judgements stated by Allah are
true.
Principle of divine duty: All invitations by Allah constitute a respective divine duty
(i.e. a duty enforced by Allah).

The other problems which have to be resolved by a second group of implicit premises
regard the transition from what is written explicitly in the Koran to the type of invitation
or duty formulated in Samarqands thesis, i.e. a duty to strive for living. The first citation
expresses a very concrete invitation, namely to shake the palm trees stem, whereas the
thesis speaks of an abstract duty to strive for living. The context of the Koran citation
makes clear that the addressee, i.e. Mary who is in a desperate situation, by shaking the
palm tree will contribute to her livelihood. However, commands and duties are intensional
texts; and they do not allow for abstractions. I.e. we can say that by shaking the palm tree
etc. she contributes to her livelihood, but this does not imply that if Mary has the duty to
shake the palm tree, she necessarily also has a duty to contribute to her livelihood (in this
situation). The problem is that from one and the same concrete duty enormously many
abstractions could be generated, which in other situations will lead to contradicting duties;
and we have no formal principle to choose the normatively correct abstraction. (Of course,
in the other direction, from the abstract to the concrete, there are no comparable problems:
If we have got an abstract duty we can easily classify more concretely described acts as
instances of fulfilling that abstract duty.) Hence such abstractions without further
substantial premises are not epistemically justified. Since Samarqand does not provide
such substantial premises we do not see any epistemically and interpretively justified
reason to proceed from the concrete to the general in Samarqands first argument; its
inference is invalid.
The second argument contains smaller technical problems. In the following
reconstruction they are resolved by introducing acceptable premises, which in the end
make the argument deductively valid. First, the Koran citation in S3.2 speaks only of
Allahs intention to provide a functional commodity, not of a duty. This gap can be bridged
by a general normative teleological principle, i.e. that such natural functions (created by
Allah) constitute duties to embrace them. (Such normative teleological thinking is also
3
present e.g. in ancient Greek philosophy. ) Second, the Koran quotation in S3.2 simply
speaks of gaining ones livelihood, whereas the thesis S1 speaks of striving for living.
Here a premise is needed which says that the duty to do something implies the duty to
strive for doing so.
On the basis of these explanations, Samarqands argument can be reconstructed as
follows:

Aristotle, e.g., uses the (empirical) fact that something is a unique function of human beings as a reason for
a normative (in a broad sense) claim that fulfilling this function is the supreme good for which human beings
should strive (NE 1097b-1098a). Thereby he seems to assume a normative implication of supposed
teleological facts.

901

Reconstruction of Samarqands sub-argument 1:

P1
<eP2
<eP3
<eP4

<eL1
<eP5

T1

(= S2.2-S2.3): The Koran says: <Mary,> shake the palm trees stem by pulling it
towards you [Koran 19:25].
(= E1) Principle of revelation: Everything written in the Koran is a communication
by Allah.>
(= E3) Principle of divine duty: All invitations by Allah constitute a respective
divine duty (i.e. a duty enforced by Allah).>
<Mary,> shake the palm trees stem by pulling it towards you is an invitation.>

Mary (in the respective situation) has the divine duty to shake the palm trees stem
by pulling it towards her.>
Marys shaking the palm trees stem by pulling it towards her is an instance of
striving for her living.>

(= S1) At certain times it is a duty to strive for living.

Premises P1, eP4 and eP5 are true; the two principles will be discussed in a moment. The
first inference is deductively valid, whereas the second is not because of the intensionality
problem.
Reconstruction of Samarqands sub-argument 2:
P6
<eP2
<eP7
<eP8

<L2
<eP9

<L3

T1

(= S3): The Koran says: [reformulated:] Allah has created the day for men in
order that they gain their livelihood [Koran 78:11].
(= E1) Principle of revelation: Everything written in the Koran is a communication
by Allah.>
(= E2) Principle of divine truth: The propositions of all judgements stated by Allah
are true.>
Allah has created the day for men in order that they gain their livelihood is a
judgement with the proposition that Allah has created the day for men in order that
they gain their livelihood.>

Allah has created the day for men in order that they gain their livelihood.>
Normative teleological principle: If Allah creates something in order that a human
being can do a certain action (and if He communicates this), then to strive for this
action is a divine duty.>

Human beings have a divine duty to strive for gaining their livelihood.>

(= S1): At certain times it is a duty to strive for living.

The premises P6 and eP8 are true, and the three inferences are deductively valid; and all
this is easily recognisable to be so. (The three inferences, of course, can be contracted to
one inference only, thereby omitting the two lemmas.)

902

These four principles are accepted by Muslims but not e.g. by Christians. We can leave
open the question whether the principles are true. In any case they rely on strong
metaphysical and empirical presuppositions: that Allah exists; that He communicates with
human beings; etc. If (some of) these principles are false, the argument is not
argumentatively valid and, according to the epistemological theory of argumentation, a
fortiori not adequate for rationally convincing. On the other hand, if these principles are
true the argument is argumentatively valid and situationally adequate for rationally
convincing Muslims; however, the argument is not adequate for convincing other
addressees. This reflects the fact that arguments from the authority of the Koran are, of
course, addressed to a specific audience, namely Muslims, who believe in the Koran.
This result leads to the question whether these audience-specific arguments constitute a
distinctive, sui generis type of Islamic argument. One could for instance reinterpret the
principles in a Toulminian way as inference rules. As the reconstruction has shown
there is no need to do so; authority arguments from the Koran can as well be reconstructed
as deductive arguments with particular premises, namely the principles. Therefore the
question is which theoretical conceptualisation is generally more appropriate. From an
epistemological viewpoint the reconstruction as a deductive argument with particular
premises is better in many respects and worse in none than the alternative systematisation.
First, it reveals the epistemological foundations, i.e. logically valid inferences and
materially true premises with their different respective procedures of validation, which, in
addition, are theoretically well established. Furthermore, core questions of argumentation
theory regarding the epistemological effectiveness of argument types are thus separated
from argumentation theoretically irrelevant questions about the truth of particular material
premises; the potential falsity of a (material) premise then does not affect argumentation
theory. The alternative approach has nothing to offer in all these respects. Moreover, the
deductive reconstruction is parsimonious in providing only one type of argument with
many sub-forms constituted by the deductively valid inferences. The alternative approach
instead considers every material principle as the basis of a new argument type without any
possibility of systematisation.
4. HERMENEUTIC ARGUMENTS IN ISLAMIC THEOLOGY
Some Islamic theologians of the period under consideration already use a variety of rather
sophisticated hermeneutic arguments.
A good source with a wealth of hermeneutic arguments of various types is
Ghazls book Against the divinity of Jesus because Ghazl accepts the authority of the
Bible but attacks its Christian interpretation; in particular he advocates a figurative
interpretation of many passages which Christians take literally. One part of his argument is
this:
[S1] It is well known that this group [the Christians] uses the word God for the Messiah [].
[S2.1] If only I knew whether [S2.2] this is just an honorary title because everything mighty is
called God [S2.3] or whether they really want to say that he [Christ] is God. [S3] If the latter is
intended, then this group is more unreasonable than all the others.
[S4.1] They get into such trouble because they hold to the literal sense, [S4.2] even though certainty
is given to the clear understanding that the literal sense is not meant. [S5] However, in every law
there is text whose literal sense is contrary to reason. [S6] But then the teachers of the respective
law have interpreted the texts.

903

[S7] A group of significant men has been led to similar things. [S8] One of them said: I am
sublime.
[S9] Another said: How mighty I am!
[S10] And Halldj said: I am God. And in this cowl is nothing except God! []
[S13] This is a question of reason, because the literal sense cannot be meant. [] (al-Ghazl 1966,
p. 92)

What is interesting in this text from an argumentation theoretical point of view is that
Ghazl uses a simple version of a hermeneutic Principle of Charity, sketched in S4.2 to S6
and S16.2, by which to seemingly nonsensical texts a reasonable figurative meaning can
be attributed:
Principle of Charity (= S4.2S6; S16.2): If in a [holy text or in the text of an
authority or of a significant man or in a] law the literal meaning is contrary to
reason (S5), <in particular if it is obviously false,> then the text has to be
interpreted (S6): then i. the literal sense is not meant (S4.2); ii. instead, to the <text
or> word <that leads to the nonsense> a reasonable meaning has to be attributed
(S16.2) <i.e. a meaning which makes the utterance reasonable, in particular one
that makes it true>.
This Principle of Charity is formulated in such a way as to make Ghazls argument
deductively valid. The principle goes in the direction of present-day principles of charity
in rationalising interpretations; it is a big progress for hermeneutics because it provides a
methodological way to reveal figurative meaning. Nonetheless, in its present form the
Principle of Charity is too simplistic and strict for being true. Taken as an empirical
hypothesis about the authors intention, Ghazls Principle of Charity is false: even
authorities believe false propositions and sometimes talk nonsense. The relations
expressed in the principle hold only frequently. Weakening the principle in this respect to a
statistical truth with high frequency would alter the argument entirely, namely make it a
defeasible argument which, however, probably is an argument structure beyond
Ghazls theoretical horizon. Furthermore, the Principle of Charity, apart from
presupposing the falsity of the literal meaning, does not use at all further evidences (like
the context) which could reveal what the author really meant; thereby it does not take
seriously the communicative meaning of utterances. This problem leads to some kind of
circularity: the reader of the holy text must already know the truth; he cannot use the text
to find out what the truth is, in particular the revealed truth about the divinity of Christ.
This makes the holy text worthless as evidence.
In the ensuing part of his argument Ghazl interprets a passage from Pauls first letter to
the Corinthians with the aim to show that even Paul does not affirm the divinity of Jesus
and implicitly even denies it. The passage is hermeneutically rich in using a variety of
hermeneutical means: text quotes, references for them, references for assertions about
word meanings, a disambiguating argument and the hint to an argument which works out
an implicature in the Gricean sense. The disambiguating argument and the argument
working out an implicature are very interesting from an argumentation theoretical point of
view. Ghazl has a quite good intuition about the structure of these arguments in bringing
together many necessary minor premises. But he does not formulate the major premise, i.e.

904

a principle of disambiguation and a principle for revealing implicatures. In our

reconstruction we have formulated such principles on the basis of what is said in the minor
premises, adding to this some plausible necessary conditions. However, it would be
illusory to strive for an argumentatively useful strict principle; all the viable principles are
only frequentist or probabilistic, e.g. the principle of disambiguation:
<eP5 Hermeneutic Principle of Contextual Disambiguation: 1. If a speaker s
ascribes a quality called F to an object a (cf. P1), 2. where F has the meanings
F1 and F2 (cf. eP2), 3. if, furthermore, s in the respective context attributes the
qualities F11, , F1n to a, which are implied by F1a (cf. P3, P4), 4. if in the
respective context s does not attribute any quality F21 to a which is implied by
F2a (cf. eP6) and 5. if no other (in particular opposite) evidences regarding the
meaning of Fa are present in s (cf. eP7), then s with Fa mostly means F1a.>
This Principle of Contextual Disambiguation is probably true and makes the inference of
the first argument (inductively) valid. However, with such a frequentist premise the
argument becomes a defeasible statistical argument with a probabilistically qualified
thesis. Such arguments are based on a best-evidence principle, according to which the best
evidence has to be included in the argument. All this bursts the structure of deductive
arguments. Though Ghazl is at the edge of defeasible argumentation, probably he could
neither formulate such a Disambiguation Principle nor did he see the new quality of this
kind of arguing and the technical requirements it brings with it. As a consequence, in his
arguments he violates in particular the best-evidence principle. Though he has rather good
hermeneutic intuitions these technical gaps are impediments for further formally
elaborating his hermeneutical arguments.
5. CONCLUSION
The preceding analyses have shown that Islamic theological texts of the period between
AD 900 and 1100 use a wealth of argument types. Apart from deductive arguments in
general, we have identified deductive arguments from the authority of the Koran and a
remarkable variety of hermeneutic arguments. None of these argument types requires
enlarging the list of good argument types recognised as such by the epistemological
approach to argumentation. We have found and analysed deductive arguments, but
Ghazls arguments in part can be reconstructed as defeasible, statistical arguments. The
latter case is particularly interesting because Ghazl probably did not know or recognise
them on a theoretical level. As a consequence his respective arguments are rather
rudimentary and, what is more, he could not avoid several risks of these arguments, in
particular that they always need to fulfil the best-evidence condition. This argumentation
theoretical limitation probably was one obstacle for further developing theological
hermeneutics.

905

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906

A Means-End Classification Of Argumentation Schemes

Fabrizio Macagno
ArgLab, Instituto de Filosofia da Nova
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Av. de Berna 26C
1069-061 Lisboa
Portugal

ABSTRACT: One of the crucial problems of argumentation schemes as illustrated in (Walton, Reed &
Macagno, 2008) is their practical use for the purpose of analyzing texts and producing arguments. For this
purpose, argumentation schemes will be analyzed as prototypical combinations between two distinct levels
of abstraction, i.e. semantic (or material) relations and types of reasoning. These two levels can justify an
end-means criterion of classification, representing the intended purpose of an argument and the means to
achieve it. This criterion is strictly bound to the pragmatic purpose of an argumentative move and the
ontological (semantic) structure of the conclusion and the premises.
KEYWORDS: abstraction, argument, argumentation schemes, classification, semantic relations, types of
reasoning

1. INTRODUCTION
Argumentation schemes have been developed in argumentation theory as stereotypical
patterns of inference, abstract structures representing the material (semantic) relation and
logical relation between the premises and a conclusion in an argument. They can be
regarded as the modern interpretation and reconsideration of the ancient maxims of
inference (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008; Walton & Macagno, 2006). Many authors in
the last fifty years have proposed different sets and classifications of schemes (see
Hastings, 1963; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Kienpointner, 1992a, 1992b;
Walton, 1996; Grennan, 1997; Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008; van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004). These approaches raise crucial problems concerning the criteria used
for distinguishing and classifying the schemes, and defining the structure of an
argumentation scheme. These apparently purely philosophical questions are becoming
increasingly important for practical purposes, in particular the application of the schemes
to the field of education (Macagno & Konstantinidou, 2013; Nussbaum, 2011; Duschl,
2008; Kim, Robert Anthony & Blades, 2012; Rapanta, Garcia-Mila, & Gilabert, 2013) and
Artificial Intelligence (Mochales & Moens, 2009; 2011).
The purpose of this paper is to address the problem of classifying the schemes
starting from the analysis of their nature and structure. The different components of the
natural patterns of arguments will be distinguished, and in particular the quasi-logical and
the semantic levels. These distinctions will be used to show the shortcomings of the
existing classifications, and to propose a new model based on the pragmatic purpose of an
argument, which is regarded as a move (speech act) in a dialogue.

907

2. TYPES OF REASONING AND SEMANTIC-ONTOLOGICAL CONNECTIONS,

The relationship between the premises and the conclusion of an argument can be
reconstructed based on generic principles. What guarantees the inferential passage is a
specific major premise that includes the predicates occurring in the minor premise and the
conclusion. In order to reconstruct and motivate the inferential structure, we need to
distinguish the specific principle of inference from two other different levels: 1) the
general rules of inference, i.e. the generic, semantic-ontological connections between the
predicates of the argument that establish the acceptability of an argument; and 2) the
logical rules governing the formal disposition of the terms or propositions in an argument,
i.e. the rules of commitment establishing the acceptance of an argument. These levels of
abstraction will be referred to as specific topoi, generic topoi, and rules of
commitment (or logical rules).
2.1 Specific topoi
In the Topics, Aristotle pointed out a crucial difference between the topoi (or rather
generic topics) and the idia (the specific topics) (Rubinelli, 2009, pp. 59-70). According to
Aristotle, the specific topoi represent propositions that relate to specific disciplines, such
as ethics, law, or medicine, which are used to draw specific conclusions. For instance, in
the third book of the Topics some specific principles of inference concerning the
classification of what is better are set out (Topics, 116a 13-18). Specific topics can be
used both as an instrument for invention, namely for generating and finding the premises
of an argument, and as premises warranting the conclusion (De Pater, 1965, p. 134;
Stump, 1989, p. 29). For instance, a specific topos concerning one of the possible ways of
classifying an action as better than another can be directly used to support the
conclusion. We can analyze the following case:
Saving the money for buying a house is more desirable than spending it on expensive cars, because
a house is more lasting than a car.

The reasoning can be represented as follows:

Minor premise
Major premise
Conclusion

A house is more lasting than a car.

That which is more lasting or secure is more
desirable than that which is less so.
A house is more desirable than a car.

The specific topos indicating one of the possible operational definitions of to be better
directly warrants the conclusion. In specific domains of knowledge, specific topoi can be
listed as instruments of invention, pre-packaged arguments that be used for supporting
prototypical viewpoints. For example, ancient and modern treatises on legal topics (or
rather on the specific commonly accepted principles of reasoning) indicate hundreds of
topics that can be used by lawyers in certain circumstances, such as the following ones:
When a man and a woman refer to each other with the name of spouse, marriage is not proven,
but is presumable. (Everardus, Loci Argumentorum legales, 54, 13th paragraph)

908

Where a person does an act, he is presumed in so doing to have intended that the natural and legal
consequences of his act shall result. (Lawson, 1885, p. 262)

These propositions are used in law to support specific conclusions, i.e. prima facie cases
that can be rebutted when additional information comes in. Such arguments, however,
have the purpose of shifting the burden of production, leaving up to the other party to
provide contrary evidence.
Specific topoi provide relations between specific concepts (acts), which are
abstracted from their individual occurrences (this specific act). These specific rules of
inference are the subject matter of a further process of abstraction, leading from concepts
to categories of concepts or meta-concepts, the generic topoi.
2.2 Generic topoi semantic-ontological relations
Generic topics can be considered as abstractions from the specific ones, or more correctly,
an abstraction from a large number of specific topics. They provide classes of both
necessary and defeasible inferences. In the first class fall some maxims setting out
definitional properties of meta-semantic concepts, i.e. concepts representing semantic
relations between concepts, such as definition, genus, and property. For example the locus
from definition, which establishes the convertibility between definition and definiendum,
represents also the essential logical characteristic that a predicate needs to have in order be
considered as a discourse signifying what a thing is. Other loci, such as the ones based
on analogy or the more and the less, are only defeasible, as they represent only usual
commonly accepted relationships.
In the Topics, Aristotle focuses most of his analysis on the topics governing the
meta-semantic relations between concepts, i.e. genus, property, definition, and accident.
Cicero reduced the Aristotelian list of topoi to 20 loci or maxims, grouping them in
generic categories (differences) and dividing them in two broad classes, the intrinsic and
the extrinsic topics. While the first ones proceed directly from the subject matter at issue
(for instance, its semantic properties), the external topics support the conclusion through
contextual elements (for instance, the source of the speech act expressing the claim). In
between there are the topics that concern the relationship between a predicate and the
other predicates of a linguistic system (for instance, its relations with its contraries or
alternatives). We can represent Ciceros topics as follows:

909

Intrinsic
Directly from the
subject matter
1. definitio
By material parts
(whole-part
definition)
By essential parts
(genus-species
definition)
2. notatio
(etymological relation)

Extrinsic

From things somehow related to the

subject matter
Authority
1. Coniugata (inflectional relations)
2. Genus (genus-species relation)
3. Forma (species-genus relation)
4. Similitudo (similarity relation)
5. Differentia (difference relation)
6. Contraria (4 types of opposite
relation)
7. Adiuncta (relation of concomitance)
8. Antecedentia
9. Consequentia
10. Repugnantia (incompatibles)
11. Efficentia (cause-effect relation)
12. Effecta (effect-cause relation)
13. Ex comparatione maiorum, minorum,
parium (comparison)

Figure 1: Ciceros classification of generic topics

This classification was the model that was taken into account by several dialectical
theories, of which the most important, due to its influence on the further medieval
accounts, is the one developed by Boethius in De Topicis Differentiis.
2.3 Rules of commitment - Logical form
The Latin and medieval dialectical tradition accounted for a type of loci that was not based
on any semantic, metaphysical, or ontological relationship between concepts. These loci
are not aimed at increasing the acceptability of a conclusion based on the acceptability of
the content of its premises. Rather, they represent relations of acceptance (or commitment)
between propositions. For instance, the acceptance of (or commitment to) the consequent
of a conditional proposition follows from the acceptance of or commitment to the
conditional and the antecedent thereof (Cicero, Topica, 53, 1-25). These formal topics
were analyzed in particular in the dialectical theories of the 12th and 13th century. Such
theories conceived the categorical syllogisms as proceeding from topics from the whole to
the part, called dici de omni and dici de nullo. These topics were grounded not on the
semantic-ontological content of the propositions, but only on the meaning of the
quantifiers (Green-Pedersen, 1984, p. 256).
This distinction between semantic-ontological and formal (logical) topics suggests
an analysis of the different rules of inference in which the semantic-ontological topics are
combined with the logical rules. Formal topics can be thought of as representing the
highest level of abstraction, which groups together more generic principles different and
somehow similar argument structures (Searle, 2001, p. 19). For example, the ancient
topics from antecedents or dici de omni formalize the deductive pattern of modus ponens
910

normally used in dialectics. However, many acceptable and reasonable arguments, such as
reasoning from example or sign, follow formal patterns different from the deductive ones
(see also Blair, 2007; Godden, 2005). In addition to the deductive rules, also the inductive
ones need to be accounted for, and the type of reasoning called abduction (Pierce, 1992,
pp. 140-141), retroduction (see Greenland, 1998, p. 545; Poole, 1988) or reasoning from
best explanation (Josephson & Josephson, 1996, p. 15).
The prototypical relationship between the types of argument and the logical level
of abstraction can be summarized in the table below, where three most important types of
reasoning (or categories of arguments of the highest level) are distinguished:
Type of reasoning
Deductive axioms
(abstraction - form)

Induction

Argument from
Argument from
definition, genus...
example

Abduction
Argument from
(improper) signs

Argument from
cause to effect

...

Practical
reasoning

Argument from
consequences

...

Argument from
best explanation

Argument from
commitment

...

...

Type of argument

Figure 2: Types of argument and types of reasoning

This classification suggests the possibility of analyzing arguments from a multi-logical

perspective, in which the logical form can be described using distinct types of reasoning,
which in turn can include various logical rules of inference (MP, MT). However, in the
Latin and medieval tradition, the formal rules of inference are treated as maxims and not
as distinct levels of abstraction. For this reason, the two levels of the general, semantic
topics and of the logical rules are not distinguished, and the possible interconnections
between them are not taken into account.
The modern theories of argument schemes or argumentation schemes inherited this
model, proposing classifications essentially mirroring the ancient approach. The rules of
commitment are treated at the same level as the semantic-ontological topics, and not as
distinct levels of abstraction. This approach can be extremely helpful for quickly
identifying common characteristics in the arguments that are frequently used, but it leads
to classificatory problems. A possible solution is to acknowledge the discrepancy between
logical form and semantic content as a divergence in kind, and try to show how these two
levels can be interconnected. The starting point is the model that, by merging the two
levels, best mirrors the multi-logical approach to natural arguments: the model of
argumentation schemes (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008).
911

3. ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES AS IMPERFECT BRIDGES

Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of inference, combining semanticontological relations with types of reasoning and logical axioms and representing the
abstract structure of the most common types of natural arguments. The argumentation
schemes provided in (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008) describe tentatively the patterns of
the most typical arguments. However, by failing to distinguish between the two levels of
abstraction, under the label of argumentation schemes fall indistinctly patterns of
reasoning such as the abductive, analogical, or inductive ones, and types of argument such
as the ones from classification or cause to effect.
In order to design a system for classifying the schemes, it is useful to understand
the limits thereof, and investigate how the two distinct levels of abstraction are merged.
For example the argument from cause to effect will be taken into account (Walton, Reed
& Macagno, 2008, p. 168):
Argument from cause to effect
Major premise

Generally, if A occurs, then B will (might) occur.

Minor premise

In this case, A occurs (might occur).

Conclusion

Therefore in this case, B will (might) occur.

This argumentation scheme is based on a defeasible modus ponens, which is combined

with a semantic causal relation between two events. The semantic-ontological level is
merged with the logical one, and this combination represents only one of the possible
types of inferences that can be drawn from the same semantic-ontological connection. The
actual relationship between the two levels of abstraction is much more complex. For
example, we consider the classic Aristotelian causal link between having fever and
breathing fast, and see how this cause-effect relation can be used to draw a conclusion
on the basis of different logical rules:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

He had fever. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he (must have) breathed fast.
He did not breathe fast. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he had no fever.
He is breathing fast. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he might have fever.
He is has no fever. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he may be not breathing fast.
You may have fever. When I had fever, I was breathing fast, and you are breathing fast.

These cases illustrate how different logical rules can be followed to draw a conclusion
from the same semantic connection, in this case a causal relation. Cases (1) and (2)
represent instantiations of defeasible axioms, i.e. the defeasible modus ponens (in 1), and
the defeasible modus tollens (in 2). Cases 3 and 4 proceed from abductive reasoning. In (3)
the conclusion is drawn by affirming the consequent, while in (4) the denial of the
912

antecedent can be rephrased by contraposition as not breathing fast is caused by having

no fever, leading to a conclusion drawn abductively (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008:
173). Finally, in (5) the conclusion is based on an inductive generalization, based on a
single case. The prototypical nature of the relationship between semantic relations and
logical rules (types of reasoning and axioms) hides, in this sense, the lack of
correspondence between these two levels. For this reason, a classification system of the
argumentation schemes based on these criteria would be inaccurate. Different criteria are
needed, accounting for this twofold nature of the schemes.
4. A MEANS-END CLASSIFICATION
Argumentation schemes can be conceived as the combination of semantic (or topical)
relations with logical rules of inference. A classification based on the semantic link can
provide an instrument for bringing to light the material relation between premises and
conclusion. However, the same semantic relation can be combined with various logical
rules, and lead to various types of conclusion. For example, causal relations are the ground
of the argument from cause to effect, but also or arguments from sign and practical
reasoning. A classification based only on the semantic content would blur these
fundamental differences. For this reason, it is necessary to find an overarching
classificatory principle.
Argumentation schemes can be thought of as instruments for reconstructing and
building arguments (intended as discourse moves), i.e. analytical or invention tools. For
this reason, in order to provide a classificatory system to retrieve and detect the needed
scheme it can be useful to start from the intended purpose of an argumentation scheme.
From an analytical point of view, the analysis of an argument in a discourse, a text, or
dialogue presupposes a previous understanding of the communicative goal (and, therefore,
the pragmatic meaning) of the argument and the components thereof. For example, an
argument can be aimed at classifying a state of affairs, supporting the existence of a state
of affairs, or influencing a decision-making process.
This teleological classification needs to be combined with a practical one, as the
generic purposes of a move need to be achieved by means of an inferential passage. In this
sense, the classificatory system needs to account for the possible means to achieve the
pragmatic purpose of an argument. Not all the semantic (material) relations that are at the
basis of the schemes can support all the possible conclusions or purposes of an argument.
Definitional schemes are aimed at supporting the classification of a state of affairs, and are
unlikely to lead to the prediction or retrodiction of an event. Similarly, a pattern of
reasoning based on the evaluation of the consequences of an action or an event can be
used to establish the desirability of a course of action brining it about, but cannot
reasonably lead to the truth or falsity (or acceptability) of a proposition. For this reason,
the analysis of the pragmatic meaning (i.e. the purpose) of an argument provides a
criterion for restricting the paradigm of the possible means to achieve it. The crucial
problem is to find categories of argument purposes that can establish criteria for
distinguishing among classes of semantic relations, which in turn can be specified further
according to the means to achieve such goals.
The first distinction to be made is based on the nature of the subject matter, which
can be a course of action or a state of affairs. In the first case, the goal is to support the

913

desirability or non-desirability of an action, while in the second one the schemes are aimed
at providing grounds for the acceptability of a judgment on a state of affairs. The ancient
dialectical accounts (see Cicero, Topica and Boethius, De Topicis Differentiis)
distinguished between two types of argumentative means to bear out a conclusion, i.e.
the internal and the external arguments. The first ones are based on the characteristics
of the subject matter (such as arguments from definition or cause), while the others derive
their force from the source of the statement, i.e. from the authority of who advances the
judgment or the proposal (arguments from authority). This first distinction can be
represented as follows:
Purpose of the
scheme

Assess the desirablity of a

course of action

Internally (quality
of the course of
action)

Establish the acceptability of

a judgment

Externally (authority
of the source)

Establish the
acceptability of a
proposition based
on the properties of
the subject matter

Establish the
acceptability of a
proposition based on
the quality of its source

Figure 3: Basic purposes of an argument

The acceptability of a conclusion can be supported externally in two ways. If the argument
is aimed at establishing the desirability of a course of action, the authority can correspond
to the role of the source needed for recommending or imposing a choice (You should do
it because he told you that!). Otherwise, the popular practice can be a reason for pursuing
a course of action (We should buy a bigger car. Everyone drives big cars here!). When
external arguments are used to support also a judgment on a state of affairs, the relevant
quality of the source is not the speakers authority (which is connected with the
consequences of not complying with the orders/conforming to common behavior) but
rather with his superior knowledge. The quality of the source can be also used negatively
to show that a source is not reliable (it is not a good source), and that consequently the
conclusion itself should be considered as doubtful (ad hominem arguments). The external
arguments can be represented as follows:

914

External arguments

Establish the acceptability of

a judgment

Assess the desirablity of a

course of action

Establish the acceptability of

a proposition based on the
quality of its source

Knowledge
Argument from:
Expert opinion;
Position to know;
Popular opinion;
Ad hominem

Reliability

Assess the desirablity of a

course of action based on the
power of the source

Authority

Ad hominem
arguments

Popular practice
Argument from:
Popular practice

Figure 4: External arguments

Internal arguments need to be divided into the two categories of arguments aimed at
assessing the desirability of a course of action, and the ones supporting the acceptability of
a judgment. Courses of action can be classified as desirable or not depending on the
quality of their consequences (the course of action is a condition of a resulting positive or
negative state of affairs) or their function in bringing about a desired goal (an action is
productive of a pursued state of affairs):
Assess the desirablity of a
course of action

Internally (quality of the

course of action)

Means to
achieve a goal

Consequences
of an action

Argument from:
Practical reasoning;
Values;
Distress

Argument from:
Consequences;
Danger; Fear; Threat;
Sunk cost

Figure 5: Internal practical arguments

The arguments used to provide grounds for a judgment on a state of affairs can be divided
according to the nature of the predicate that is to be attributed. The most basic
differentiation can be traced between the predicates that attribute the existence of a state of
affairs (the occurrence of an event or the existence of an entity in the present, the past, or
915

the future), and the ones representing factual or evaluative properties. The arguments
supporting a prediction or a retrodiction are aimed at establishing whether or not an event
has occurred or will occur, or whether an entity was or will be present (existent). The
arguments proceeding from casual relations (in particular from material and efficient
causes) bear out this type of conclusion. The other type of predicates can be divided in two
categories: factual judgments and value judgments. The first type of predicates can be
attributed by means of reasoning from classification, grounded on descriptive
(definitional) features and supporting the attribution of a categorization to an entity or an
event (Bob is a man; Tom is a cat). Value judgments are classifications that are not based
on definitions of categorical concepts (to be a cat) but rather on values, or rather
hierarchies of values. Such judgments proceed from criteria for classifying what is
commonly considered to be good or bad. Also the reasoning underlying the attribution
of evaluative predicates, such as to be a criminal, can be considered as belonging to this
group of arguments. These latter patterns are grounded on signs of an internal disposition
of character, which in its turn is evaluated. The distinctions discussed above are
summarized in figure 6 below.
Establish the acceptability of
a judgment

Establish the acceptability of a

proposition based on the
properties of the subject matter

Predict/
retrodict an
event/entity

Future
state of
affairs

Past fact/
entity

Argument from
cause to effect

Argument from:
sign;
abductive argument

Classify entities
or facts/events

Value
judgment

Attribution of
factual properties

Argument from:
Classification;
Sign

Argument from:
Verbal classification;
Composition;
Division; Sign

Figure 6: Establishing the acceptability of a judgment on a state of affairs

This system of classification of argumentation schemes is based on the interplay between

two criteria, the (pragmatic) purpose of an argument and the means to achieve it. This
dichotomic model can be used both for analytical and production purposes. In the first
case, the speakers intention is reconstructed by examining the generic purpose of his
move, and then the possible choices that he made to support it, based on the linguistic
elements of the text (Macagno & Zavatta, 2014; Macagno & Walton, 2014, Ch. 5;
Macagno & Damele, 2013). Depending on the desired level of preciseness, the analysis
can be narrowed down until detecting the specific scheme, i.e. the precise combination of
916

the semantic principle and the logical rule supporting the conclusion. In this fashion, the
analyst can decide where to stop his reconstruction. This analytical model can be of help
also for educational purposes, as it can be adapted to various teaching needs and levels
(detecting arguments in a text; reconstructing implicit premises, etc.). For production
purposes, the nature of the viewpoint to be argued for opens up specific alternative
strategies to support it, which in turn can be determined by the characteristics of the
conclusion.
This model relies on the analysts or the speakers reconstruction or awareness of
the purpose of a move, which can be partially identified by taking into consideration the
nature of the subject matter (whether it is a decision or a judgment). The purpose then
opens up possible choices according to the generic goal of the communicative act. The
speakers intention can be further specified by detecting the most generic strategy chosen
to provide a basis for the acceptability of the conclusion. In this case, in order to
reconstruct the move or provide an argument, the analyst or the speaker can choose
whether to use some properties of the subject matter or to appeal to an external source. In
the first case, the means used to achieve the goal are determined by the nature of the
subject matter. In particular, the crucial distinction is between the classification and the
prediction or retrodiction of an entity or state of affairs. This choice leads to a further
specification of the nature of the viewpoint that the speaker intends to support with his
argument (is the event a future or a past one? is the classification a value judgment or does
it consist in the attribution of factual properties?), and then to the specific means that can
be used to achieve this precise purpose (argument from values, from definition, etc.). In
case of decision-making, the argumentation schemes are classified according to the same
interrelation between goal and generic strategies. The internal arguments can be divided
between reasoning from consequence and reasoning from means to goal.
An alternative to the internal, more complex arguments, is provided by external
arguments, where the choice of backing the conclusion by means of the opinion of a
knowledgeable and reliable source can be further made more specific by distinguishing
between the kinds of sources (experts or the majority of people) and the nature of the
support (knowledge or reliability).
The semantic relation characterizing a scheme can be shaped according to
different types of reasoning, i.e. logical forms. For instance, the desirability of a course of
action can be assessed internally by taking into consideration the means to achieve a goal.
However, this pattern of reasoning can be stronger or weaker depending on whether there
is only one or several alternatives. The paradigm of the possible means will determine
whether the reasoning is abductive or deductive, resulting in a conclusion more or less
defeasible. The same principle applies to the other semantic relations, such as the ones
proceeding from cause or classification, which can be shaped logically according to
inductive (or analogical), deductive, or abductive types of reasoning.
5. CONCLUSION
The classification of argumentation schemes is a problem from which their development
and application depends. Given their number and complexity, their use becomes
problematic without a system guiding their selection. In order to organize the schemes in a
useful and accessible way, it is crucial to understand their nature and their components.

917

Argumentation schemes are the result of a combination of two levels of abstraction:

semantic (or topical) relations, and logical forms. Semantic relations provide a criterion of
classifying the arguments based on the content of their major premise, and represent what
makes a conclusion more acceptable than the premises. The logical forms (the types of
reasoning and rules of inference) instantiate the rules of acceptance, i.e. how a premise
supports a conclusion based on the relation between the antecedent and consequent, or
between the quantification of the predicates in the premises and the conclusion. The
possible combinations between them are extremely complex. Argumentation schemes are
imperfect bridges between these two levels. They are the most frequent and common
combinations that characterize the fundamental arguments used in everyday
argumentation. They are incomplete abstractions, simplified and prototypical patterns that
cannot be organized according to the aforesaid semantic and logical levels.
In order to classify the schemes, it is necessary to find a criterion of classification
transcending both levels of abstraction, and leading to a dichotomic system, which can be
used proceeding both from the affirmation of a disjunct, and from exclusion of the
alternative. The classificatory system proposed in this paper is not based on what an
argument is, but rather on how it is understood and interpreted, i.e. on its communicative
purpose. In this fashion, a classification system can mirror the actual practices of
reconstructing and using arguments. The purpose of an argument is connected with the
means to achieve it, which are determined by the ontological structure of its conclusion
and its premises. On this view, it is possible to suggest a course of action, to predict an
event, or to classify an entity, depending on the nature of the predicate(s) attributed in the
premises that support or can be used to support the conclusion. The system of
classification becomes a tree of dichotomic choices aimed at reconstructing or achieving a
communicative goal.

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Gender And Generative Argument: Locating The National

Womens History Museum In The Landscape Of Public Memory
Roseann M. Mandziuk
Department of Communication Studies
Texas State University
USA
rm07@txstate.edu

ABSTRACT: Historical memory is mediated through public argument that determines which histories are
celebrated or silenced. This essay examines the effort of the National Womens History Museum [NWHM]
to establish a significant physical site in Washington, D.C. by exploring in close detail how the case for
womens history that NWHM addressed to the U.S. public developed by focusing in particular on the initial
arguments that circulated when the Museum was founded in 1996.
KEYWORDS: commemoration, generative argument, National Womens History Museum, public memory,
women, womens history

1. INTRODUCTION
Among the questions relevant to how historical memory is mediated through public
argument, examining whose story is articulated as important, what aspects of history are
deemed to deserve a monument or museum at a given time, and why certain aspects of a
cultural history are commemorated are significant points of inquiry. In essence, publics
argumentatively negotiate what constitutes our public memory, designating people,
events, and actions that are deemed worthy of remembrance. In particular, the intersection
of gender ideologies with the processes of commemoration is a primary locus of rhetorical
controversy.
In 1996, Karen Staser envisioned that a museum devoted to womens history could
be built on the National Mall in Washington, D. C. With a small group of volunteers, she
founded an organization called The National Museum of Womens History, dedicated to
making her vision a reality. In 1997 they accomplished a lasting achievement by leading
the effort to raise the Portrait Monument to the Capitol Rotunda from the basement,
where the massive marble tribute to womens suffrage had been consigned since it was
given to the U.S. Government by in 1920. In subsequent years, the Museum mounted
several small exhibitions and launched its cyber museum that features several curated
exhibits about various topics such as women in espionage, woman suffrage, women in
sport. What this young non-profit organization, now renamed as the National Womens
History Museum, did not foresee is that nearly 20 years after it's founding, they still
would be seeking the required approval of the U.S Congress to lease, buy, or build a
physical site that would house a womens museum on or near the their targeted area of the
Mall.
This essay is part of a larger project that analyzes the public argument associated with the
prolonged effort of the National Womens History Museum [NWHM] to establish a
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significant physical site in Washington, D.C. The organization has been successful in
raising the necessary private funds to sustain the organizations efforts and in amassing bipartisan supporters in the U.S. Congress, which ultimately must approve the NWHMs
request to locate a building on or near the National Mall, but these overtures repeatedly
were blocked by members of the Washington D.C. community or stalled in Congressional
committees. My forthcoming larger study explores in close detail how the case for
womens history that NWHM addressed to the U.S. public developed through several
stages of argument and debate, as various sites have been considered, efforts blocked, and
multiple legislation initiatives introduced. The portion of the NWHM engagement with
public memory addressed in this essay focuses on the initial arguments when the Museum
was founded and how it argued its case for the significance of womens history.
2. PUBLIC MEMORY AND SACRED PLACES
Monuments and museums function as material evidence of the public debates to designate
people, places, and events as important. The absence of certain individuals and their
experience in such spaces indicates by implication the relative lack of significance placed
upon them by those who have the power and means to control commemorative processes.
As John Bodnar (1992) explains, public memory must be understood as an ideological
system, "a cognitive device to mediate competing interpretations and privilege some
explanations over others" (p.14). As a process that inescapably denotes the dominant
values and perspective, critics who analyze these argument processes must ponder the
tensions between past and presentor more accurately, the tensions between historical
fidelity to the past and contemporary political motives in the present (Reyes, 2011, p.
597). Public memory studies focus attention on the remembering and forgetting that swirls
around public museums and memorials, an analytical process involving evocation of
recursive and reflective processes. The contemporary studies of space and place invite
contemplation of preferred readings, undesignated space, and the ideological nature of
the signifiers that become objects of desire, identification, movement, and authenticity"
(Dickenson, Blair, and Ott, 2010, p. 33).
Consequently, public memory is a rhetorical process. As arguments circulate in the
public realm, disputes arise especially over what should be commemorated, and where.
Specific locations designate for public audiences particular notions about what is most
worthy of memory, and these geographies are marked with conflicts. In particular, spaces
deemed especially "sacred" become sites for public memory negotiations. These debates
within publics can be identified by how their shared interpretations are represented in their
discourses about a disputed site and by how those share interpretations evince traces of
other discourses that they have pulled into their encounter with the these spaces. This is
what Robert Aden (2012) refers to as "centripidal and centrifugal force" in the negotiation
of memory. NWHM's campaigns to shape public memory, engage battles on two such
sacred grounds in Washington, D.C.: the Capitol Rotunda, specifically, the National Mall
in Washington, D.C.
Gender and race also are particular arenas of contention regarding who will be
remembered and in what ways. Relevant to this study, entry into public memory has been
particularly difficult for women on the National terrain of U.S. history and memory. For
example, no comprehensive museum devoted to women's history exists in the U.S. In
921

Washington D.C., the Smithsonian Institution includes specific museums regarding

American Indian history, African American and Asian Art, and a future museum devoted
to African American history, but the only permanent exhibits in the Smithsonian that
relate women's history are devoted to the First Ladies gowns. Additionally, no statue of
woman was installed in U.S. Capitol Rotunda until 1997. Consequently, the arguments
undertaken by NWHM to claim a space for womens history in the National Mall
challenge ideological assumptions related both to sacred political space as well as the
legitimacy of women to enter into these realms.
3. GENERATIVE ARGUMENT
The theoretical frame defining generative argument that is employed in this analysis of
the Museums early arguments is derived from several linguistic and rhetorical theories.
The generative most commonly is defined as capable of production/reproduction, from
the Latin generare, to beget. A specific usage of the "generative" concept comes from
generative linguistics that is related to the application of finite rules to produce all items
generated from a specific starting point, formulated by Noam Chomsky (1965) to
emphasize the association between deep structures and surface structures. This idea of
generative as related to structures that are produced from root concepts provides a useful
frame for thinking about the function of generative arguments.
A second useful conceptualization comes Kenneth Burke from his book CounterStatement where he discusses the function of the symbol as a generating principle. Burke
states:
As the symbol is ramified, Symbols within Symbols will arise, many of these
secondary Symbols with no direct bearing upon the pattern of experience behind
the key Symbol. These secondary or ramifying Symbols can be said to bear upon
the underlying pattern of experience only in so far as they contribute to the
workings of the key Symbol. In essence, the foundational symbol generates others,
but always within a range that is limited by the meanings in this root symbol.
(1968, p. 157)
Considering how, in particular, generative argument functions in relation to questions of
gender and identity politics, the key symbol or principle can be powerful if grounded in
gender experience, but also limited by the cultural definitions associated with it. This
makes appeals to gender as a root inherently evocative but also constrained. Gender,
therefore can be a paradoxical root symbol, as generative symbolic action provides a
means to identification and difference; its invocation as symbolic root also limits and
defines rhetorical action. As Burke notes,
Symbols will be subtilized in ways not contributory to the pattern. The weak King
cannot be too weak, the manly Peasant cannot be too manlythus we find the Poet
defending to an extent the very character whom he would denigrate, and
detracting from the character who is to triumph. Such considerations arise with the
adoption of the Symbol, which is the conversion of an experiential pattern into a
formula for affecting an audience. (1968, p. 157)
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For the generative arguments grounded in gender identities and experiences, this means
that the discursive case generated from the root cannot stray too far from cultural roles and
categories that are familiar to audiences; following Burke, the case for women's history
cannot be too radical and cannot deviate too far from the cultural meanings embedded in
the symbol itself. Hence, the NWHM finds itself bound by the very symbols that they
must employ to argue the case for the importance of women's history and the need for
such a commemoration in the National sacred spaces of Washington, D.C.
4. NWHMS GENERATIVE SYMBOLS
The NWHM encountered multiple debates over sacred terrain that emerged just after its
founding. First, the Museum continues to meet with opposition from the U.S. Congress
over its desire to locate its permanent building in the National Mall area. Second, the first
campaign undertaken by NWHM regarded the relocation of a statue commemorating three
women suffrage advocates from a basement room to the precious civic real estate of the
U.S. Capitol Rotunda. NWHM hoped to use the relocation of the statue, known as the
Portrait Monument, as a way to establish legitimacy within political and philanthropic
realms. Significant symbolic choices made by NWHM in relation to both public
campaigns are found in the organizations early documents that make the case for women's
history, where the root principles of the arguments emerge. The key generative root
symbols are the definition of "woman" and women's history.
Quite significantly, the Museum chose for its initial logo a visual representation of
a sculpture of a woman. The figure is labelled on its base as being from 2500-4500 B.C.,
and is avery abstract representation, conveying a universal and ancient grounding for
women's history. The image often formed the left border on the letterhead initially used by
the NWHM and also was reproduced in other publications as a small logo next to the
Museums name. The Museums early brochures also evoke symbols and descriptions that
use an inclusive and universalizing narrative to define the key ideas of woman and
women's history
First, the definition of woman reflects traditional cultural dictates. For example, an
early brochure from 1996 states that: The Museum's exhibits will showcase the specific
achievements women have made in every area of human endeavour and celebrate their
contributions as wife, mother, sister, daughter, healer, teacher, scientist, artist,
entrepreneur, and leader" (NWHM, 1996a). Notably absent from this list is any specific
reference to political activity. Moreover, the term contributions functions to foreground
women as always defined in relation to what they do for others.
The case that the Museum makes for what constitutes women's history and the
practice of commemoration also is broadly defined, apolitical, and celebratory. An early
brochure states: The Museum enjoys strong, nonpartisan support from congressional
officials, women's groups, political and business clubs, corporations, and individuals who
share the vision for an institution that showcases women's achievements" (NWHM,
1996b). Here, the word showcases indicates that women's history is to be celebrated and
seen, but not that it is an active dynamic force of change.
The Museum likewise depicted its supporters and its mission in similarly broad,
yet circumscribed ways. One of its brochures claims that women's groups "of all racial,
923

ethnic, and political backgrounds support a museum that values women's contributions in
the home, work place, classroom, laboratory, and hospital--indeed, all places where
women serve the nation on the earth, under, the sea, and in outer space." (NWHM, 1996b).
Certainly, the NWHM cast its definition of women and women's history quite wide, but
notably absent from these early statements is any direct mention of arenas related to
political change, social protest, social justice, and cultural transformation.
Rather, the Museum's traditional sense that women are mothers, wives, sisters, and
healers, but not politicians, agitators, or legislators, reveals the way that the subsequent
symbols generated from the initial symbolic invocation of "woman in a universal sense
served to limit the Museums articulation of scope and purpose. Hence, early brochures
promote the Museum with the slogan, "Sharing Women's Rich Cultural Heritage with
Current and Future Generations" as opposed to "confronting, correcting, or repudiating."
An early fundraising letter also articulates what the Museum will do to address the need to
recognize womens history. In this set of statements, the generalized, yet also limiting,
definition of "woman" and "women's history is implied in the actions that it will
undertake: "exploring and celebrating the contributions women have made to community
and civilization in their many roles such as mother, wife, sister, daughter, healer, teacher,
and leader" (NWHM, 1996c).
In all, the Museum's early promotional statements reflect a positive and
nonpartisan rhetoric of "celebration" and "valuing" rather than correction or accusation.
Both the promise and the pitfalls of the symbols generated from the root definition of
woman can be seen in the debate over the suffrage monument. In becoming involved in
the campaign to raise the suffrage statue and install it in the sacred spaces of the Capitol
rotunda, NWHM found itself engaged in two different disputes over the question of who
belonged in those hallowed halls.
5. WOMEN ENTER THE ROTUNDA
The 1920 Portrait Monument sculpture was commissioned by the National Women's Party
to commemorate the passage of the 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that gave
women the right to vote. The 13-ton sculpture, which bears the likenesses of suffrage
advocates Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Lucretia Mott, was completed
by Adelaide Johnson and given to Congress in 1921, which first refused it, then yielded to
pressure from women's groups and brought it into the Rotunda, held a gala for 5000
people, then banished it to a basement closet. Later it was installed in the Capitol Crypt, a
passageway in the basement, and finally available to public view in in 1963. Four previous
attempts to move the statue to the rotunda had failed (Adelaide Johnson, 2014; Portrait
Monument, 2014).
After the NWHM initiated its campaign to move the statue, debate ensued over whether it
"deserved" a place among the other all male statues in the sacred space of the Capitol
rotunda. Washington Post columnist George Will, for example, stated: "Unfortunately the
supply of greatness is, it seems, infinite, and the supply of choice Washington spots for
homage to greatness is not. The supply of greatness long ago exceeded the supply of space
for statues in the rotunda" (Will, 1997, p. C7). As Blair, Jeppeson, and Pucci (1991) in
their study of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial noted, such places are not closed texts:
"these structures are not only symbolic of the conflict over appropriate commemoration;
924

they constitute the actual historic residue of that conflict" (p. 277). In NWHMs drive to
move the Portrait Monument, deep cultural rifts regarding gender and race became visible.
The first dispute regarded making the claim for women's place in the Capitol
Rotunda. As anticipated, there was significant opposition to the legislative efforts to
relocate the statue both within the Congress and in the press. As a marker of things to
come in the persistent resistance it would encounter in its legislative campaigns to garner
the necessary approval to locate the Museum on the National Mall, both houses of the U.S.
Congress had to approve a bill that allowed for the suffrage statue to be moved to the
Rotunda of the Capitol. An additional barrier the statue advocates encountered was the
increased costs for the actual raising resulting from a delay in this Congressional approval
process. Still, by September 1996, the U.S. Congress had approved moving the statue, as
long as the coalition of women's groups paid for the costs of the move.
This fundraising effort is where the National Museum of Women's History played
a central role. By becoming involved in the campaign to raise the suffrage statue, the
Museum hoped that it would generate interest and establish a base of support for its
efforts, as later explained in a letter to members: "We chose the project to see if we could
assemble a group of individuals who could not only move the statue and correct that piece
of history, but also bring together people who would make possible a national Museum
celebrating all of women's history, both nationally and internationally, from the dawn of
time" (Staser, 1997). The universalizing language here indicates an optimistic, sweeping
vision for the Museum's scope and definition of "women's history". Such broad strokes
created a generative paradox for the Museum when a second, more focused controversy
emerged during their drive to raise the suffrage statue. The mission statements and early
case made for the museum is not overtly political, nor does it feature race, class or other
distinctions. Hence, when a dispute emerged that brought the issue of race into sharp
relief, it exposed the inherent problems in the rhetoric that the Museum had adopted.
When the Museum first entered into collaboration with other historical and
Women's organizations to raise the statue, the effort encountered little opposition from
these constituencies; in fact, universalized language of "woman" served to bind these
groups in their efforts to allow the suffrage statue serve as the symbol for women in the
prime political territory of the Capitol Rotunda. Much to the surprise of the Museum's
board members, however, the most significant and sustained challenge to their Raise the
Statue campaign came from another women's group, the National Political Congress of
Black Women [NPCBW]. The groups president, C. DeLores Tucker, began circulating
letters in October, 1996 that opposed moving the statue, arguing that any monument in the
Capitol that commemorates women's suffrage must include a likeness of Sojourner Truth.
Tucker's group proposed that the unfinished portion of the suffrage monument should be
carved with Truth's likeness.
Tuckers insistence on Truth as the symbolic carrier of black women's history,
requires a brief background. Truth, named Isabella, was born a slave in upstate New York,
1797; after she was freed, she lectured in east and Midwest regions, speaking at forums
with other abolition and women's rights advocates. Truth frequently is invoked as a
symbol for contemporary black feminists to depict their exclusion, especially the angry
Sojourner Truth who reportedly interrogated her audience of White women with the
question "ain't I a woman?" Although now widely disputed, this characterization comes
from Frances Gage's 1863 account of a speech given by Truth in 1851. According to this
925

report, Truth faced a hostile audience of women who did not want her to speak because
they feared that the cause of women's rights would be harmed if mixed up with the issue of
black rights (Gage, 1867, p. 4). This image of the angry Sojourner is the most widely
known, having been anthologized in collections of speeches and frequently referenced by
historians. It is the one most likely to be adopted by contemporary rhetors in search of an
image of defiance (Mandziuk & Fitch, 2001). Hence, deeply embedded identity politics
are at play between white and African American feminists.
The Museum board members who served as spokeswomen for the coalition to raise
the statue were caught in the generalities of the universalizing rhetoric they had adopted,
and consequently had little specific grounds from which to respond to the challenge from
Tucker's group. As Museum Vice President Joan Meacham stated, it has been very
surprising that all of these problems have come up. It's just amazing (Merida, 1997, p.
A1). The Museum worked diligently both publicly and behind the scenes to resolve the
conflict, but Tucker remained unmoved from her resolute stand, founded on a rhetoric of
difference and defiance, for which the discourse of inclusion had no answer. Tuckers
initial letter from October 18, 1996 sharply critiqued the politics of exclusion that marked
the history of white and black women. After two pages in which she argues for Truths
historical importance and recounts how African American women were asked to defer
their interests and made invisible by white women, she states: "when you raise the Woman
Suffrage statue, we want to stand tall and proud with our children so that they will not
receive a distorted and divisive image of history. But that will not be if Sojourner Truth is
not sculpted into the space that is so rightfully hers" (Tucker, 1996a). Tucker ends the
letter with a strong critique of the universalizing rhetoric that the Museum espouses:
There is the adage those who do not know their history are doomed to repeat it.
Likewise, women who do not know their history are doomed to repeat it, too (Tucker,
1996a).
In her letter responding to Tucker's missive detailing the NPCBW protest, the
Museums president, Karen Staser, first argued from circumstance: The contracts were
signed, the Congress was in recess, and no evidence, as Tucker had claimed, existed that
the unfinished portion was intended by the sculptor to be filled in with an African
American woman's likeness. Instead, Staser offers the idea that "a similar campaign to
raise public awareness of the injustice suffered by Sojourner Truth should be undertaken"
in the next congressional session (Staser, 1996). Second, Staser summoned the
universalized sense of women's history and echoed the positive tone of the early
documents when she stated: "The one immutable fact that ties all women together is our
history. Regardless of our rich and diverse causes, we all share the common need to bring
that history to light (Staser, 1996).
Despite some behind the scenes meetings with Tucker and the NPCBW, no
resolution was reached; in fact, opposition to the raising of the statue accelerated even as
the Museum and other advocates made plans for a June 1997 dedication. Tucker addressed
a second letter directly to Sen. John Warner, chair of the Senate Rules and
Administration Committee, under whose jurisdiction the statue legislation resided, in
March 1997, in which she emphatically wrote: when schoolchildren come to the Capitol
Rotunda to see the statue....We do not want them to wonder why SOJOURNER TRUTH
was not a part of the statue when she was a leading voice of the movement" (Tucker,
1997a). Interestingly, this account of history is itself a reconstruction of Truths
926

importance that many historians would dispute, yet constitutes a recasting of the Truth
narrative that white women excluded her and were hostile to her. Tucker ends with an
emphatic statement: We fully support the idea of the statue being raised, but only if it
includes SOJOURNER TRUTH. OUR FIRM POSITION IS THAT NO STATUE
SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE ROTUNDA WITHOUT SOJOURNER TRUTH!!!
(Tucker, 1997a).
As the conflict progressed, Washington Post reporter Kevin Merida noted in April
1997 that the dispute "is so vigorous it is beginning to divide women who normally are
allies (1997, p. A1). Meridas article quotes Staser as stating, This is a mess.... We are
trying to heal our country and bring people together, and I am just heartsick over it. In the
same article, Tucker is quoted as responding to this unification language with an insistence
on difference: We just feel that the bottom line is that it does not represent the suffragette
movement....It's wrong and we are going to do everything we can do to stop it. We have
been left out of history too much and we are not going to going to be left out any more
(Merida, 1997, p. A1). By May, the NPCBW was circulating a list of over 100
organizations that endorsed it efforts to block the statue. Even into June, as invitations had
been issued and the statue was prepared for its relocation, The NPCBW protest continued;
a June 6 memo contains a call for a meeting about the Sojourner Truth issue in which
Tucker rejects the idea of a separate statue of Truth as akin to a re-enactment of the Plessy
v. Ferguson separate but equal doctrine (Tucker, 1997b).
Clearly, the Museum and the NPCBW stances were irreconcilable because they
were generated from two different root principles. For the National museum of Women's
History, honoring Truth separately or later fit easily within its universalizing definition of
woman. However, because Tucker and the NPCBW started from difference and
discrimination as root principles, there was no meeting point that would not leave them
feeling demeaned. The opposition to the Museums efforts exposed the contradictions in
the notion of women's history and the difficult politics of race. As Dickinson, Blair, and
Ott note, public memory debates are not necessarily comprised of pre-constituted
opposing constituencies; rather, publics emerge in relationship to discourses, events,
objects, and practices (2010, p. 15).
Ultimately the Portrait Monument was dedicated on June 26, 1997, and still resides
in The Capitol Rotunda. In 2009, a bust of Sojourner Truth was installed in the Capitol
Visitors Center, the culmination of the efforts begun by Tucker. Consequently, Truth does
reside in the Capitol, but in arguably a less prominent neighborhood". Somewhat
ironically, the Museum obtained a bust of Truth in 1998 that it had planned to travel to
different states as part of their commemorative efforts; the husband of one of its board
members was the sculptor. Clearly this effort to showcase Truth was a response to the
Tucker conflict, but the plan ultimately gained little traction, perhaps because the
Museums ownership of the bust was not quite absolute. After the bust travelled to the
state Capitol in Georgia, and resided briefly in a few Congresswomen's offices, it was
revoked by the artist and resides in his home.

927

6. CONCLUSION
Overarching this dispute over the Portrait Monument and the role of the NWHM loomed
the larger issue of commemoration in the sacred space, and questions about who deserved
to be granted entry into that realm. Clearly, when the NWHM encountered a challenge to
its universalizing definition of women and its inclusive view of history, it had difficulty
responding to a specific challenge based in race and difference. Currently, the Museum,
now known as the National Women's History Museum, continues its efforts on the second
battle to bring women into the sacred space of the National Mall by building a permanent
museum. Their legislation has been introduced during every session since 1996, but has
yet to be passed by both legislative branches. As of September 2014 the NWHM
legislation was approved by the U.S. House of Representatives, with the remainder of the
year to mount a successful vote in the U.S. Senate. If approved, this legislation would
establish a commission to study the need for the museum and an appropriate site.
The history of women may yet come to Washington, D.C., but the symbolic
outlines of that history remain to be determined. The early arguments set out by the
NWHM indicate how powerfully constraining the initial root concepts chosen can be for
later rhetorical appeals. Given the generative constraints set out by its initial definitions
and symbols, and their problematic generality, it is evident that the NWHMs rhetorical
challenges will continue.

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Staser, K. (1997, December 10). Letter to supporters. National Womens History Museum Archives,
Alexandria Virginia.
Tucker, C. D. (1996, October 18). Letter to Karen Staser. National Womens History Museum Archives,
Alexandria Virginia.
Tucker, C. D. (1997, March 31). Letter to John W. Warner. National Womens History Museum Archives,
Alexandria Virginia.
Tucker, C. D. (1997, June 6). Memo to Sojourner Truth Committee/Supporters. National Womens History
Museum Archives, Alexandria Virginia.
Will, G. (1996, February 23). Ladies in the rotunda. Washington Post, p. C7.

929

Ethos And Pathos In Legal Argumentation. The Case Of

Proceedings Relating To Children
Maurizio Manzin & Serena Tomasi
Cermeg - Faculty of Law
University of Trento
Italy
maurizio.manzin@unitn.it
Cermeg - Faculty of Law
University of Trento
Italy
serena.tomasi_1@unitn.it

ABSTRACT: When the judge draws her syllogism, her work is not a lonely one. To what extent can we say
that her work is a cooperative one? How much of it could include arguments, which were ethical and/or
emotional in nature? For answering these questions, we will proceed as follows: (1) by analysing the model
of legal syllogism (CALS), in particular when including elements from ethos and pathos; (2) by checking
this model in practice.
KEYWORDS: ethos, legal argumentation, pathos, persuasion, rhetoric, syllogism.

1. THE COOPERATIVE MODEL OF ARGUMENTATIVE LEGAL SYLLOGISM

(CALS)1
As a starting point of our account we would like to shortly stress the peculiar nature of
legal reasoning in trial and, besides that, the logical structure of legal decision. We
basically agree with scholars (e.g. Cattani, 1990) considering reasoning as a rational
operation which may assume different forms (like deduction, induction or abduction),
remaining however in all cases purely abstract, that is to say formal and not contextualised.
In other words, reasoning implies a set of previous implicit or explicit moves aiming at
establishing either the semantic referents of the discourse (and, consequently, what every
word univocally means) or the inference rules of it. On the contrary, what we call here
argumentation is always related to a practical context, where individuals dispute about a
certain issue without having any fixed referent and, most of times, also without an
agreement about the kind of inference. Argumentation is therefore informal and totally
contextualised by nature. Its logical structure may assume forms analogue to the ones of
reasoning (as deduction, induction or abduction), but the stuff it is made of is completely
different argumentation, for instance, is semantically vague.
To govern such vagueness in order to save the rational (or to say better reasonable)
feature of argumentation, is the very purpose of many types of logic oriented to practice.

The paper is co-written by Maurizio Manzin and Serena Tomasi. Maurizio Manzin is the author of
paragraphs from 1 to 2; Serena Tomasi is the author of paragraphs from 3 to 4.

930

In legal practice, lawyers dispute about many things: such as the meaning of statutes, the
relevance of precedents, the authoritativeness of legal scholars and so on. A peculiar and
probably the most remarkable place for such disputes is the trial, where issues like these
and many others are put under discussion in a specifically institutionalized context, in
order to get a judgement from a third person. Notwithstanding its institutional context,
legal dispute in trial is neither formal nor formalizable, for the semantic referents and even
the inference rules are not established by the parties at the beginning, being often
themselves under discussion. That is why legal logic deals with argumentation rather than
reasoning in the strict sense of the word.
Typically, the logical scheme for legal argumentation in trial is thought to be the so
called legal syllogism: a form of reasoning based on deduction, which looks like a
minds walking from some notorious places (the premises) to another (the conclusion)
which is necessarily connected to the first ones. Such necessity is given by the fact that the
starting point of the minds walking is broader, and contains the area of the further step,
which is more limited. The older scholars of legal logic in trial maintained that these
premises were, as we have said before, notorious. But this is not the case, for the
certainty about referents and inference rules in legal judgements could be only presumed.
The point is that such presumption (typical of formal legal positivism) tends to reduce
legal argumentation to an abstract form of reasoning, having the shape of mathematics: an
idea deeply rooted in Enlightenments authors (and some contemporary legal scholars,
especially in the field of artificial intelligence and law), but totally unfit for trial, where
each party has her own opinion about the notoriety of the premises.
Briefly, legal syllogism could be considered the most appropriate logical form of legal
argumentation in trial only on condition that the informal nature of its premises is
admitted. If so, we could correctly say that, yes, syllogisms are used in legal decisions, but
they have to be intended as argumentative (i.e. syllogisms whose premises must be
reconstructed through an argumentative work) and not formal (like in maths
demonstrations).
1.2 Legal syllogism as a multiple work
Once pointed out that legal syllogisms are argumentative in nature, it remains to
distinguish between the subjective and objective character of argumentation. With such
adjectives we mean respectively the agents of argumentation (the individuals which
debate), and the argumentative work in itself (which is objective in relation to the methods
used for debating) in other words, who and how does operate to argument in trial.
From the subjective point of view, we want to underline that the judge is not the
only person drawing a legal syllogism in trial (although her syllogism is the only one
legitimated to be performative).
From the objective point of view, either the parties or the judge use argumentative
methods to provide the stuff for building the premises of their own legal syllogism
(although every party is free to choose her argumentative strategy, while the judge iuxta
alligata et probata iudicare debet must decide on the basis of evidences obtained in
trials debate).
In conclusion, we could say that it is not enough to qualify the legal syllogism as
argumentative (such qualification being in any case a step forward if compared to the
931

assumptions of legal formalism), because it is also cooperative (CALS), in the sense that
other individuals (and not only the judge) cooperate in order to furnish the argumentative
grounds for decision.
We described elsewhere (Manzin, 2013) the single steps for building the CALS by
both the parties and the judge, and the differences between these two kinds of
argumentative work; what we are going to stress here is the role of ethos and pathos in the
composition of the CALSs premises.
As for the major premise of legal syllogism, each party has to propose a normative
hypothesis by choosing, combining (if it is the case) and interpreting statutes and/or
precedents. To be reasonable and persuasive, all the choices implied by the partys
normative proposal should be justified, and such justification should be made on the basis
of topoi (argumentative places) which traditionally draw their strength from logos (logic),
ethos (moral convictions) and pathos (feelings).
As for the minor premise, in a quite similar way, each party has to propose a
description of the facts; and also in this case she can choose among a variety of things: like
documentary evidences, witnesses, expert witnesses (and interpretations of them), in order
to give a picture of what probably happened more favourable to her client. A strategy
which could succeed insofar as it were justified from the logical, ethical and emotional
point of view.
The major and minor premises (as well as the conclusions) proposed by the parties,
which often include arguments from ethos and/or pathos, are submitted to the judge, who
has this way all the stuff she needs to build the so to say final syllogism of the trial the
performative one. At the end, the judge will evaluate and select the argumentative
strategies of the parties, taking from one or another, or even from both, what she considers
relevant for the composition of her own premises.
For a visual presentation of such operation see the following picture (LS1 and LS2 being
the parties syllogisms, and LS3 the judges one):

(Picture nr. 1)
As shown in picture nr.1, the logical component of the premises should be intended as a
sort of frame, which enables the reasonable placement of ethical () and emotional ()
932

argumentative elements; the weight of these elements can vary, depending on the
rhetorical strategy of the parties (in LS1 and LS2) and on the critical evaluation of the
judge (in LS3).
2. MANAGING THE ETHICAL AND EMOTIONAL FEATURES OF THE CALSS
PREMISES
All -elements (ethos) and -elements (pathos) in CALSs premises can be more or less
effective, depending on the strength they have in public discourses and/or private opinions.
To be very schematic: an element will be effective to the extent that it could be derived
from a widely and/or authoritatively shared moral value; a -element will be effective to
the extent that it could be derived from a widely and/or authoritatively shared feeling. By
effectiveness, we mean the capability of being accepted from the judge when composing
the premises of her own legal syllogism (LS3), as well as from other judges in higher
Courts when deciding upon judgements of lower ones. There is, of course, also an
argumentative strength that could be evaluated by legal scholars when studying
precedents, and even one that could be impressive for some social audience (as, for
instance, the readers of a newspaper), but the syllogisms they could build with - and elements taken from the trial are not properly normative and, least of all, performative.
We suggest here rapidly, as a part of a prescriptive theory on legal argumentation, some
steps based on classical rhetoric (namely from Aristotle and Cicero) for managing the and -elements.
(1) Memoria (recall): the makers of LS1 and LS2 should place their standpoints on a
reasonable and persuasive ground. For doing so, they have to choose from a number of
possible topoi. The greatest the number, the highest the probability to find out some good
-and -elements. From this point of view, memoria has to be regarded not only as the
mnemonic ability of the speaker but, in a broader sense, as the availability of a rich data
storage: it doesnt matter if digital, paper-based or simply mental. Memory deals with
lawyers education, which can never be reduced to skills and technicalities, but should
embrace culture and media information.
(2) Inventio (finding): among all the available data, the makers of LS1 and LS2 should
evaluate and select the most suitable ones. For doing do, they can turn to the criteria of
just/unjust (ethos) and pleasure/pain (pathos). In culture as well as in public discourses the
arguers can detect some moral convictions and feelings, and determine their effectiveness
on the basis of how much shared they are and by whom. More precisely, they could be
perceived from the majority of persons (or experts) as more just (or less unjust) than
others, or because they produce more positive (or less negative) emotions.

933

0/100 = degree of perceived justice () / positive feeling ()

10/>1000 = amount of persons / experts - (Picture nr. 2)
(3) Dispositio (setting): once -and -elements have been chosen, they must be arranged
in a certain order (increasing, decreasing, Nestorian etc.). Like the inventio in the prior
step, setting depends upon the judicial strategy of the arguer, which is aimed at convincing
not just her opponent, but the third person of the trial the judge. This kind of legal
argumentation has in fact a trilogical (rather than dialogical) communicative structure,
being addressed by both the arguing parties to an allegedly neutral audience.
When drawing her syllogism (LS3) to decide the case, the judge needs the stuff for
building the major and minor premises, and such stuff can be provided basically by the
parties in the course of the trials debate. As we have shown before, part of the stuff will
be purely logic, part could be ethical, and part could be emotional (the three kinds of
bricks in the picture nr. 1). It will be a primary task of the judge to make up her mind
about the plausibility of -and -elements and the accuracy of the connections between
them and the partys standpoint. In this very sense, we could say that the final
argumentative legal syllogism (LS3) is also a cooperative one: a work made by many
hands (Villa, 2004, p. 196), where no argumentative engagement from the part of the
judge would be possible without the contribution of the parties. Of course, it is not a
cooperation in the sense of an agreement: the parties work together with the judge to
the extent that they provide reliable bricks for LS3 building notwithstanding (or to say
better, thanks to) the fact that they dialectically struggle one against the other.

934

This is, anyway, the authentic nature of the legal truth: to be the outcome of an
argumentative process set up by the parties and checked by the judge, where
reasonableness works also for the assimilation of ethos and pathos.
3. COMPARING THEORY TO PRACTICE
The second part of this paper will be entirely concerned with the comparison of the model
to practice.
One way to put this point is to carry out empirical investigations in the legal domain to
identify the applicability and the reliability of the model in practice. The main issue is
formulated in terms of testing the use of ethos and pathos in legal argumentation and the
weight of these critical elements in the decision-making process.
The rhetorical model of legal reasoning, that we put forward, captures many of the
insights from the institutional features of legal context. In particular, summarizing the
theoretical framework, central to CALS are the following elements.
First, a cooperative view of the relationship among the parties and the judge. The
hypotheses, on which CALS is based, is that the decision-making process needs for
cooperation. This concept is affected by the models of cooperative agents and cooperative
systems in communication theory. Theoretically, we are addressing to the principle of
communicative ethics theorized by Habermas, through which all participants
unreservedly pursue illocutionary aims in order to arrive at an agreement that provides the
basis for a consensual coordination of individually pursued plans of action (Habermas,
1998, pp. 129-130). In recent years there has been a growing interest in argumentation
theory too: this concept has been fully implemented by the pragma-dialectical rules which
focus on the necessary conditions of mutual respect and equal dignity to solve a conflict of
opinions on the matters. The CALS model encourages a communicative process in the
courtrooms through which the parties and the judge will come to a plausible and sharable
decision. That is possible just modelling an interaction among the parties and the judge by
which the parties in trial contribute to improve the adversary legal system through their
argumentative work.
Another focal point is concerned with the strategic use of the social and moral
values in justifying a legal decision. We are used to consider a legal opinion as a formal
output of the decision-making process, in other words a written pronouncement of the
judge consisting in a summary of the facts of the legal controversy, a description of the
applicable law and how it relates to the facts, a rational argumentation and a final
judgment. The CALS model provide a new methodology for analysing and evaluating a
legal opinion, by considering its inputs: a legal opinion can be reconstructed as LS3 which
combines LS1 and LS2, the legal argumentation proposed by the two parties, using
rhetorical tools (memoria, inventio, dispositio).
3.1 A case by Italian juvenile criminal law
Our research topic could be potentially very broad: it may involve the analysis of Courts
opinions in the different branches of law (civil law, criminal law, administrative law, etc.).

935

In fact, under the adversary system, both in common law and in civil law2, each side is
responsible for bringing pertinent information and argumentation in an effort to produce
benefits to its side of the case.
In this paper, we decide to limit our analysis to a specific field of legal
argumentation, presenting a case as a meaningful example of the applicability of CALS.
We will consider a case of the Italian juvenile justice system3 as a good test-bed for testing
the model. The Juvenile Criminal Courts procedures represent an extreme case in which
our sketched focal points come easily to light. Juvenile Court Rulings are cooperative in
character and show that a cooperative attitude of the parties is necessary in the prevailing
interest of the minor child involved. As far as the personality of someone is concerned,
pathos and ethos are constitutive elements of this kind of judgment. In addition, in Italian
legal system, some institutions of Juvenile Crime Law have recently been adopted by
criminal law dealing with adults. We are referring to a particular formulation based on
legislation concerning young offenders, which implies an alternative resolution at trial: it
involves, now even for adults, the suspension of the trial in order to undergo a
rehabilitation programme. If the conditions of the rehabilitative programme are fulfilled,
the young offender could avoid prosecuting in Court (the formulation is to put the young
offender to the test). Therefore, under the current law, the procedures in criminal law
have been modelled upon the legislative principle of cooperation, which comes from the
Juvenile Legal System.
We will first present a brief overview of the case; then we will rhetorically
reconstruct the judgment through the CALS model.
This is an opinion delivered by the Juvenile Criminal Court of Milan in 20064. The
trial was of a fifteen young man fatherless, accused of violence towards children. He
committed sexual abuse while he was playing in a garage with two younger friends,
showing them his privates under compulsion. The young offender was put to the test and
admitted to a rehabilitation program, under the control of Social Services. According to
the programme, he was required to do activities, carried out by a team of psychologists
and social workers, in order to develop social values and change his offending behaviour.
After a cooperative start, he changed his mood and did not respect the rules of the
programme.
The Public Prosecutor asked for prosecuting and convicting him; to support his
request, the Prosecutor focused on the negative results of the test and his partial and
irregular attendance of the programme. The defence attorney argued his absolution,
reasoning that he did his best. The Juvenile Criminal Court in Milan upheld that the young
offender deserve to be absolved, reasoning that the law was intended to rehabilitate
younger offenders.

As far as the Italian system is concerned, Italy adopted procedures model on U.S. law, making the
procedures at trial adversarial.
3 There exist significant problems with applying non-Italian terminology and concepts related to law and
justice to the Italian justice system. For that reason, some of the technical words used in the rest of the article
shall be defined.
4
Tribunale di Milano, 6.6.2006; available at:
http://www.tribunaleminorimilano.it/dettaglio.asp?id_articolo=478&id_categoria=giurisprudenza Tribunale
per i Minorenni Milano Penale&parola=.

936

According to our model, we will literally analyse the arguments of LS3 in order to
evaluate whether the absolution has been ethically justified and how the Court judges the
young man and his attitude after the criminal offence. We expect that the parties (LS1 &
LS2) have offered most of arguments based on ethos and pathos, which occur in LS3. To
appreciate the weight of ethos and pathos in the legal syllogism, we will identify its
rhetorical elements.
The first step of LS concerns the so called memoria: we are referring to shared
feelings and shared moral values. To some extent, in a legal syllogism the institutional
setting affects this step: by law the parties at trial share and apply principles and
guarantees that should govern the system of justice. In proceedings related to children in
conflict with the law, a common premise of each LS regards the specific principles and
guarantees, which govern the Juvenile Legal System.
LS3 is premised upon the rules of protection of the rights of children and
adolescents and the contemporary international human rights law that recognizes children
as subjects of their rights and not as objects of protection. Police authorities, the Public
Prosecutors Office, public defenders and the judge share these principles and guarantees.
In fact, the juvenile Courts are different and separated by the other Courts.
More precisely, LS3 recalls the normative foundation of juvenile proceedings as a general
ethical foundation. By law n. 448/1988, children who commit crimes have a different
status. Since they are children with less understanding of the laws, they deserve special
protections, for example a specialized judge. Italian juvenile Courts' procedures reflect an
effort to rehabilitate juvenile offenders and to make them to feel responsible. Unlike one
of the goals in a typical adult criminal case, the purpose of a juvenile sentence is not to
punish, but primarily to rehabilitate the juvenile so that he /she can go on to live a
productive adult life.
The following steps of analysis of LS concern the classical phases called inventio
and dispositio. We will analyse the text in order to understand how it sets forth its
argumentation.
3.2 Pathos and ethos arguments in the judgements text
Reading the passages of the judgement, we will detect arguments as they are developed in
paragraphs. In this section, we will take note of them in the same order in which they
appear. For each of them, we will specifically question whether it is based on the element
of pain/pleasure (-argument) or just/unjust (e-argument).
The Court, at the beginning of the decision, says5:
The evolutionary process of adolescence implies to run into the sexuality. Teenagers encounter the
possibility to act and realize what they mentally elaborate. When action prevails on thoughts, they
can commit a crime.

Rhetorically, this could be classified a -element: the Court starts describing the teenage
years during which people go through many changes and may present sexual offence
behaviours. Giving a great emphasis on the psychological problems of adolescent, the
Court means to figure a person in a particular stage of his life.
5

Authors translation.

937

The legislation (D.P.R. 448/88) is intended to abandon the logic, which was historically
predominant, consisting of supervising and punishing.

In this paragraph, the Court states what is right to do towards adolescents by law. The
normative source plays an ethical role.
In this direction, there has been innovation of juvenile criminal legislation such as, above all, the
institution of the suspension of trial with admission of the offender to a test programme. It helps the
young offender to review his action.

The Court is putting emphasis on the ethical demand of giving time and a chance to the
young offender to review his action.
Then the Court notes:
The aim of this institution is not to punish but to re-educate.

This is another -element: what is fair? To enable young offenders to act properly.
The partial attendance of the psychological programme could not be considered in itself a reason
for a negative evaluation of his rehabilitative work. To assess his behaviour, we need to consider
his activities from the beginning to the end, his resources, his family, his social engagement.

We classify it as a -argument: the Court underlines that the assessment must be

comprehensive, with an emphasis on the last imagines of the family and the society. It
cares about the person and his own life story.
A goal was to support the comparison with a non-idealized male model, reasoning that he is
fatherless. Another goal was to support his relationship with the quarrelsome neighbourhood.

This is a -element based on touching events of his life, which regards the family and the
society.
He was forced to work in a charitable institution: he began to speak frankly to the social workers
acknowledging his problems socially interacting.

This is a -element: in a certain way, it leads to consider the effort of the accused to react
and his results.
The victims declared to disagree with is prosecution. They support his re-education.

This is an -element: it is unfair to punish him, because not even the victim wants his
prosecution.
In conclusion, the social workers argue that it is important to give credit to his efforts, despite the
fact he didnt manage to complete the programme.

This is an -element based on the authority of social services. The Court uses a list of
938

climax statements: as if to say, on the high point, that not even qualified psychologists are
for his prosecution!
The court argue the positive effect of the test programme with consequent prescription of the
crime.

The last passage links together the premises built by the judge in the just mentioned ways.
The Court enthymematically infers a conclusion, which is performative in character.
The upshot of using this method of analysis is that you can identify the weight of
ethos and pathos in legal argumentation. The focus is on the way by which emotions and
moral values are made relevant to the argumentative purpose of the judge. In this case,
LS3 balances the arguments of the parties (P.P. victim) within a rhetorical strategy. The
arguments are persuasive because the Court strategically appeals on the passion and the
heart and on the concept of legal justice. The arguments based on pathos count for 50%,
the arguments based on ethos count for 50%. According to a Cartesian tradition, we may
be led to say that this kind of judgment is unscientific, or according to some argumentation
theories, is fallacious: but according to CALS model, this judgment is reasonable and
effective. The method of legal sciences is rhetorically oriented and involves a complex
view in which the relations between the arguments and the thesis are detected considering
the special position of emotions and values. To ground the acceptability of the judgment, it
is necessary to reconstruct the so called memoria, the principles shared by the parties (e.g.
normative principles, precedents of higher Courts).
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has offered an account on the argumentative process at trial, aimed at
introducing the analysis of the use of ethical and emotional elements in judicial decisions
through a theoretical and empirical research.
Theoretically, we underline that ethos and pathos are relevant in many legal discourses:
therefore, we defend an analysis of the Courts opinions based on the cooperative nature of
legal argumentation and on the identification of statements containing (besides the logical
ones) ethical and emotional elements.
Empirically, we consider legal argumentation both as an interactive process of
communication and as its performative outcome. This is why we study legal decisions in a
trilogical perspective, collecting LS1, LS2 and LS3. Contextually, we provide a literal
analysis of legal texts exploring the rhetorical strategy through couples of basic concepts:
pathos refers to the question on pain or pleasure, ethos to just or unjust. In this view, we
reconstruct the legal text considering the chosen ethical and emotional patterns.
This approach may help both judges and lawyers to set a legal controversy in a
more reasonable and effective way.

939

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Tomasi, S. (2011). Adversarial principle and argumentation: an outline of Italian criminal trial. In F. H. Van
Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, G. Mitchell, Proceedings of the 7th Conference of the
International Society for the Study of Argumentation. University of Amsterdam, June 29 July 2,
2010 (pp. 1870-1879). Amsterdam: Rozenberg/Sic Sat.
Villa,V. (2004). Il positivismo giuridico: metodi, teorie e giudizi di valore. Lezioni di filosofia del diritto.
Torino: G. Giappichelli.
Walton, D. (1992). The place of emotion in argument. Pennsylvania. Penn State University Press.
Walton, D. (1998). The New Dialectic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Walton, D. (2002). Ethical argumentation. Lanham: Lexington Books.

941

An Epistemic Theory Of Argumentation For Intercultural

Argumentative Dialogues
Danny Marrero Avendao
Department of Humanities
Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano
Carrera 4 # 22-61, Modulo 7, Office 601
Bogot, Colombia
danny.marreroa@utadeo.edu.co

ABSTRACT: In scenarios of legal pluralism, adjudicators cannot always generalize their cognitive standards
because some of the reasons put forward only make sense in a cultural context. How can the adjudicators assess
arguments that make sense in a culturally different worldview? The answer for this should include a method for
the evaluation of the culturally-dependent arguments. I will evaluate the main theories of epistemic justification
looking for the most compelling answer for this question.
KEYWORDS: Epistemological theories of argumentation, legal pluralism, argumentation in intercultural
scenarios, theories of justification, adjudication

1. INTRODUCTION
I believe that scenarios of legal pluralism pose certain question to theories of argumentation.
Broadly speaking, scenarios of legal pluralism are either legal communities where the cultural
diversity of their populations is legally recognized and protected such as Australia (Mabo and
Others v. Queensland 1992) Canada (Canadian Multicultural Act 1985) or Colombia (Const.
1991), or international tribunals where legal agents (e.g., judges, juries, prosecutors,
defendants, witnesses, and so on) belong to culturally differentiated groups (Cryer 2007;
Kelsall 2009). In scenarios of legal pluralism, some of the conflicts involve members of
culturally differentiated groups who justify their allegations with arguments that only make
sense in the culture to which they belong. If the adjudicator does not share the same cultural
worldview as the parts under litigation, how can he/she come to make a decision determining
the parties rights and obligations?
A simple picture of adjudication illustrates my point. It is commonly accepted that the
resolution of legal disputes requires the application of the law in accordance with the facts
alleged by the parties. Consequently, adjudication implies epistemological evaluations. To be
sure, adjudicators assess litigants factual reconstructions determining whether or not their
beliefs are justified. If a legal dispute takes place in a culturally unified scenario, the
adjudicator becomes an archetypal epistemic agent. This means that he/she confers or denies
justification based on the assumption that he/she and the parties are experientially and
doxastically alike. Therefore, if he/she were undergoing the experiences alleged by the parties,
and he/she would be justified in his/her beliefs, then the parties would be justified, too. In
scenarios of legal pluralism, alternatively, adjudicators cannot generalize their cognitive
standards because the alleged facts are reconstructed from culturally different views. That is to

942

say that although the adjudicator and the parties are experientially alike, they are doxastically
different.
If my diagnosis is accurate, how can the adjudicators determine the justificatory status
of a belief inferred from a radically differentiated cultural view? The main theories of
epistemic justification (i.e., foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism) offer competing
answers for this question. I will evaluate these accounts defending that reliabilism provides
the best response. With this in mind, I will complete the following agenda. First, I will
formulate the issue more carefully. In doing this, I will use some legal cases decided by the
Colombian Constitutional Court. Second, I will reconstruct the three alternative answers
provided for the theories of epistemic justification, and I will evaluate these competing
accounts.
2. THE PROBLEM
As I take it, the problem of determining the justificatory status of a belief held from a
culturally differentiated group emerges from intercultural argumentative dialogues where the
positions under debate are a product of radically different worldviews. To clarify, the trigger
of an argumentative dialogue is a difference of opinions between two arguers. The radical
difference of the intercultural argumentative dialogues under scrutiny comes from the fact that
the participants in these dialogues do not do have unified doxastic states because of their
differentiated cultural perspectives. This is illustrated in the following case decided by the
Colombian Constitutional Court.
Case 1 (Argumentative Dialogues Arising from Radically Differentiated Cultural Views):
In 1997, the Colombian indigenous community, called Paes, was reported to the
Colombian Constitutional Court by one of its members. A man was found guilty of the
murder of another member of his community, and he was sentenced to sixty lashes by
the Paes judicial authorities. He said this punishment was torture, and it was illegal
because under the Constitution of Colombia (Art. 12) and Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Art. 2), the cruel
and inhumane punishments were banned. The Paes judicial authorities said this
punishment was not torture; it was an act of purification. The Paes believed when one
of them was lashed, a ray touched them. This magic touch produces two effects.
First, the indigenous persons crime is purified by the rays touch. Second, he/she can
return peacefully to his/her community. As a result, the lashes are a ray that purifies
and allows pacific coexistence in their community. (Colombian Constitutional Court
1997, T-523)
The epistemological evaluation to be made is whether or not the indigenous community is
justified in believing that the aforementioned lashes are a rays touch. If this is the case, the
punishment is not illegal. If it is not the case, the indigenous community is acting beyond its
constitutional rights, and its actions ought to be stopped. To recall, the adjudicator is not
supposed to confer or deny justification based on the assumption that he/she and the parties
are experientially and doxastically alike. In fact, the adjudicator is expected to take the
cultural differences seriously and evaluate the parties doxastic states in accordance with the
cultural contexts to which they belong. However, how can such evaluation be done if, ex
943

hypothesi, the adjudicator does not share the same cultural view with the parties? I will
determine a specific methodology of work before answering this question below.
3. THE METHODOLOGY
The evaluation to be done in this paper requires the specification of the conditions that
foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism have to fulfill in answering the issue under
account. If any of these theories do not accomplish these conditions, the theory should be
either corrected or abandoned. Since the idea is to evaluate an adjudicators assessment of
justificatory status in contexts of legal pluralism, I will adopt the method suggested by Alvin
Goldman (2003) to evaluate inferences in procedures of adjudication. Avoiding unnecessary
complexities, I will quote the steps of such method. After the passage, some comments and
adaptations will be made.
Step 1. Select the inference procedure, R, as a target of analysis.
Step 2. Posit an aim, or set of aims, A, of the legal adjudication system for example, truth, or
rectitude, of decision.
Step 3. Determine how well the procedure R, would promote aim A.
Step 4. If R would be ineffective or deficient in promoting A, identify some remedies that
would make R perform better. (215)
Following Step 1, I am going to analyze three inference procedures (R). Each of them will be
differentiated by the epistemological principle that is used in its evaluation. Specifically, Rf
will adopt the tenet suggested by foundationalism, Rc by coherentism and Rr by reliabilism.
Step 2, above, requires some clarification. For Goldman, theories of legal proceedings
can take two formseither they are pluralistic or unified (2005, 163-164). Pluralistic accounts
hold that legal processes have different aims, no one of which is prior to the other (e.g.,
justice, impartiality, allowing coexistence, seeking the truth, protection of civil rights, etc.).
Unified theories, in contrast, explain proceedings with reference to one main end. They do not
hold that legal proceedings actually achieve the selected goal; better yet, they use it as an
explanatory resource to clarify the main activities performed in legal proceedings. Within this
second alternative, one can find pure unified theories and impure unified theories. Pure unified
theories state that the legal practices taken into account are subsumable in one exclusive
desideratum. Impure unified theories defend that although the aim of legal procedures is such
an exclusive aim, it is possible to recognize alternative goals coexisting with the dominant
rationale. To illustrate, Goldman himself adopts an impure unified theory of legal procedures.
This allows him to defend that even though the main goal of the law is not the determination
of the truth; it is truth-oriented. These are his words:
The aim [of legal procedures] is securing substantively just treatment of individuals.
This depends on (1) the content of the law and (2) the genuine, or true, facts
concerning the actions they (and others) performed and the circumstances of those
actions. Thus, determining the truth about a persons actions is a crucial means to just
treatment. (Goldman 2005, 164)

944

In the same way, I believe processes of adjudication in contexts of legal pluralism have one
main aim (A), namely, to promote the coexistence between people who belong to different
cultures. In achieving this goal, alternative aims have to be attained. First of all, the relevant
laws have to be applied, (A1). Secondly, the alleged facts should be determined (A2). Thirdly,
the different cultures have to be preserved (A3). Finally, the understanding of the cultures that
constitute a political community might increase (A4). Given that A1 and A2 are common goals
for all legal proceedings, my analysis will focus on A3 and A4.
To conclude, Step 3 is the goal-promoting evaluation of the reasoning under
consideration (i.e., Rf, Rc and Rr). To recall, if some of these accounts do not promote the
constellation of aims that they should supposedly promote (i.e., from A1 to A4), it has to be
either reformed or ruled out.
4. THREE ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS
Theories of justification are accounts that specify the conditions under which a person is
justified in believing (Goldman 1976, 3). Following the standard pattern, a theory of
justification adopts the next structure:
Individual Epistemic Justification
S is justified in believing that p if and only if (iff):
C1, C2 , Cn
Where S stands for a cognitive agent, p is for propositional knowledge, and C1 Cn are the
conditions that transfer positive justificatory status. In Case 1 above, S is the Paes judicial
authorities and p is when a man receives lashes, he is being touched by a ray. Therefore, the
ultimate proposition is:
The Paes judicial authorities are justified in believing that when a man receives lashes,
he is being touched by a ray.
I believe that foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism suggest different conditions for the
justificatory status of this proposition. A detailed reconstruction of these theories is beyond
the specific goal of this paper. Better yet, I will make cautious generalizations showing how
Rf, Rc and Rr could be used in processes of adjudication in scenarios of legal pluralism.
4.1 Foundationalism
The main idea of foundationalism can be captured by the standard pattern as follows:
Individual Epistemic Justification 1 (Foundationalism):
S is justified in believing that p iff:
C1: p is derived from a basic belief, or,
C2: p is derived from a proposition which is, directly or indirectly, derived from a
basic belief.
Two expressions need clarification, namely, basic beliefs and directly or indirectly. I will
start with the last one. Foundationalism suggests that the justification of a belief depends upon
945

the propositional relation between it and other propositions that confer justification. Hence, p
is justified if it is inferred from another justified proposition, p1. Similarly, p1 is justified if it is
drawn from the justified proposition, p2. Equally, p2 acquires its justified status from another
justified proposition, p3. Thus, the evaluation of the justificatory status of a proposition
implies following the path of propositions in which the ultimate belief relies on. Since this
tracking of justification cannot be done ad infinitum, foundationalism determines a point in
which the chain of justification is anchored. In other words, these are the foundations of
justification, or the basic beliefs. These are propositions with the salient feature that they
confer justification, but they need not be justified by other propositions because they are
justified themselves. In the history of philosophy, several alternatives have been suggested as
basic beliefs: clear and distinct ideas, mathematical or logical truths, spontaneous formed
beliefs, and so on. Contemporary epistemology suggests that perception is a basic belief. To
justify this, they propose the following principle:
Seeming Principle
If it seems to S that p, then S is prima facie justified in believing that p.
Practically, I believe that there is a computer screen in front of me because it seems
visually to me that that is the case. Given that I do not need a justificatory proposition
when it seems to me that I am looking at a computer screen, the belief that I am
looking at a computer screen is basic. Furthermore, since this belief depends upon the
external world, it yields knowledge.
Putting all this together in Case 1, if the constitutional judge had used the Rf model to evaluate
the justificatory status of the belief held by the Paes judicial authorities, the following
structure would have been obtained:
Inference Procedure 1 (Rf):
The Paes judicial authorities are justified in believing that when a man receives lashes,
he is being touched by a ray iff:
C1: When a man receives lashes, he is being touched by a ray is derived from
something we perceive, or,
C2: When a man receives lashes, he is being touched by a ray is derived from a
proposition which is, directly or indirectly, derived from something we perceive.
Based on this structure, the constitutional judge would deny the justificatory status of the
ultimate proposition. The reason for this verdict is that this adjudicator, in normal conditions,
cannot verify whether or not the Paes judicial authorities derived their belief from some
perception. From the judges view, what is perceived is a man who is receiving lashes from
another man, but not a ray. The Paes judicial authorities interpret the perceiving lashing ritual
as if a ray touches the man, but it is not derived, directly or indirectly, from any sensorial
experience. Therefore, the Paes judicial authorities are not epistemically justified in believing
that when a man receives lashes, he is being touched by a ray.
I believe Rf does not promote the aims of adjudication in contexts of legal pluralism.
Specifically, it does not promote A3 because the requirement of sensorial experience limits the
Paes culture to the sensorial experiences of the judge. Using the Seeming Principle, given that
for the constitutional judge, it does not seem that a ray is touching a person when that person
946

receives lashes, the judge does not have any reason to think that Paes judicial authorities are
justified in such a belief. Consequently, Rf does not promote the coexistence between people
who belong to different cultures because it reduces one culture to the other. Apparently,
coherentism could offer a better alternative because it does not focus on sense experiences, but
on systems of beliefs. This alternative has to be evaluated carefully.
4.2 Coherentism
Coherentists, unlike founderentists, claim that epistemic justification is not linear, but holistic.
That is, epistemic justification does not go back from the ultimate proposition to be justified to
the previous justificatory propositions. Instead, epistemic justification has to do with holistic
relations of systems of information. In other words, coherentism is the view that holds the
following formula for epistemic justification:
Individual Epistemic Justification 2 (Coherentism):
S is justified in believing that p iff:
C1: p belongs to a coherent set of beliefs.
In this model, the justificatory status of the ultimate proposition is conferred by the coherence
relations it has with the system of beliefs it belongs to. That is, Ss system of beliefs. The main
issue for coherentism is to explain the nature of coherence relations. Old fashioned
coherentism used to require that a particular belief should cohere with the whole doxastic
system of the individual whose belief was being evaluated. However, contemporary
coherentists realized that this requirement was too strong because any incompatible belief
would make the whole system incoherent. That is why contemporary coherentists adopt a
moderate position claiming that coherence is predicated of a specific sub-system of beliefs,
and not from the whole system of them. This allows to compartmentalize systems of beliefs
preserving their coherence against particular inconsistent beliefs (Kvanvig 2012b).
How can an adjudicator evaluate the coherence of a belief inferred from a radically
differentiated cultural view? I am not offering substantial answer for these question here. For
the present purposes, it suffices to imagine two situations which outline a possible answer. To
begin, in Case 1, the judge could determine, with the help of an expert anthropologist, the core
of the Paess beliefs system. Secondly, performing some basic logical (or probabilistic)
operations, the adjudicator could verify if the p coheres with this system of beliefs. These
ideas constitute Rc, as follows:
Inference Procedure 2 (Rc):
The Paes judicial authorities are justified in believing that when a man receives lashes,
he is being touched by a ray iff:
C1: When a man receives lashes, he is being touched by a ray is coherent with
the Paes judicial authorities set of beliefs.
Coherentism has been traditionally criticized with the isolation argument. Broadly speaking,
since the mere coherence between propositions confers justificatory status, the external world
does not matter. However, the isolation problem does not necessarily weaken coherentism as
such. Instead, it is a threat for coherentists theories that do not include perception within their
947

concept of system of beliefs (Kvanvig 2012a, 63). I claim, however, that the isolation problem
represents a threat for coherentism in scenarios of legal pluralism. To recall, the failure of Rf
is that it is too strong. That is, since it demands perceptual experience for all justified beliefs,
then A3 is not promoted. With the mere coherence requirement, this problem seems to be
overcome because perception does not play a strong role in epistemic evaluation. The problem
is that now A4 is not promoted. To clarify, if there are not external standards for justification,
the understanding between cultures is impossible. Rc, therefore, does not only lead to the
isolation from the external world, but also creates epistemic bubbles.
4.3 Reliabilism
As a first approximation, reliabilism suggests that:
Individual Epistemic Justification 3 (Reliabilism):
S is justified in believing that p iff:
C1: p results from a reliable cognitive process.
Two concepts need to be clarified, namely, reliable and cognitive process. Goldman
defines cognitive process as a function with inputs that have beliefs as outputs (1976, 13).
Two types of processes are important here. First, the belief-dependent processes have other
beliefs as inputs. Second, the belief-independent processes do not have other beliefs as inputs.
While perception is a good example of the latter, memory or inference are good instantiations
of the former. Following this terminology, Goldman introduces more distinctions. There are
two kinds of beliefs. A belief-independent belief is the output of a belief-independent process.
A belief-dependent belief is the result of a belief dependent process (13-14). Consequently,
perceptual beliefs are instantiations of belief-independent beliefs, and the conclusion of a
deductive argument is an example of a belief-dependent belief. Finally, reliability is the
tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false (16). While in beliefdependent processes reliability depends on the truth of the inputs, in belief-independent
processes, reliability is categorical. From these distinctions, reliabilism suggests two forms for
evaluating justificatory status.
First,
Individual Epistemic Justification 3 (Reliabilism 1):
S is justified in believing that p iff:
C1: p is a belief-independent belief, and
C2: p is the result of a categorically reliable process.
Second,
Individual Epistemic Justification 3 (Reliabilism 2):
S is justified in believing that p iff:
C1: p is a belief-dependent belief, and
C2: p is the result of a conditional reliable process.

948

According to this second form, Rr adopts the following structure:

Inference Procedure 3 (Rr):
The Paes judicial authorities are justified in believing that when a man receives lashes,
he is being touched by a ray iff:
C1: When a man receives lashes, he is being touched by a ray is a beliefdependent belief, and
C2: When a man receives lashes, he is being touched by a ray is the result of a
conditional reliable process.
C1 is correct because, as I pointed out previously, the ultimate belief in this case is no product
of direct perception, but of a cultural interpretation. That is, the Paes judicial authorities
belief that when a man receives lashes, he is being touched by a ray depends on the beliefs
of the Paes community. The constitutional judge, therefore, has to evaluate C2. For instance,
he/she has to appraise the process of reasoning used by the Paes judicial authorities, or the
memory that they have of their traditions. Due to the fact that this sort of evaluation is not
perception-dependent, the constitutional tribunal does not have to rule out the Paes judicial
authorities ultimate beliefs. Even if the Constitutional judge does not share the input beliefs
of the Paes culture, this adjudicator can evaluate the process of reasoning done by the Paes
judicial authorities. Now, there is an epistemic achievement when cognitive agents reason
properly or recall memories in an accurate way (Lyons 2012, 8). By the same token, assuming
that the Paes judicial authorities got their inferences right, or recalled their traditions in the
right way, the constitutional judge can attribute a positive epistemic status to their beliefdependent beliefs.
5. CONCLUSION
If my analysis is correct, reliabilism offers the best answer for the problem of the evaluation of
justificatory status of beliefs in multicultural scenarios. On one hand, Foundationalism does
not preserve cultural differences. On the other hand, Coherentism leads to epistemological
relativism. With Reliabilism, on the contrary, it is possible to achieve A3 and A4. To be sure,
with Rr it is possible to achieve A3. For one thing, the Paes judicial authorities are not reduced
to the seemings of the Constitutional Court. For another, the adjudicator is not reduced to the
Paes culture either. Rather, the point is that the Constitutional Court should reason
contrafactually. In other words, the question the adjudicator should ask is: if I were
undergoing the experiences of the Paes judicial authorities, would the belief that when a man
receives lashes, he is being touched by a ray be justified? Ex hypothesi, the constitutional
judge is not a member of the Paes community, but given the psychological similarities
between him/her and the members of that indigenous community (e.g., the two of them
reason, have intuitions, make inferences, and the like), if the constitutional judge were
conditionally justified, then the Paes judicial authorities would be conditionally justified, too.
With Rr it is also possible to achieve A4. Some epistemologists claim that understanding is not
factive. That is, the value of understanding is not in the truth of the propositions understood,
but in the grasping of the explanatory connections of those propositions (Kvanavig 2003,
200). Given that Rr allows for conditional justification, the truth of the beliefs of culturally
differentiated groups is not an obstacle for the intercultural understanding.
949

REFERENCES
Canadian Multiculturalism Act. (1985).
Colombian Constitutional Court. (1997). Sentecia T-523, M.P. Carlos Gaviria Diaz.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. (1984).
Cryer, R. (2006). A long way from home: Witnesses before international criminal tribunals. International
Commentary on Evidence, 4(1), 1-4.
Goldman, A. (1976). What is a justified belief? In G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and Knowledge, (pp. 1-23).
Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Goldman, A. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Goldman, A. (2003). Simple heuristics and legal evidence. Law, Probability and Risk, 2, 215-226.
Goldman, A. (2005). Legal evidence. In M. Golding & W. Edmunson (Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (pp. 163-175), Maden: Blackwell.
Kelsall, T. (2009). Culture under cross-examination: International justice and the special court Sierra Leone.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Knanvig, J. (2003). The value of knowledge and the pursue of understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Knanvig, J. (2012a). Coherentism. In A. Cullison (Ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology (pp. 57-71),
New York: Continuum Press.
Knanvig, J. (2012b). Coherentism and justified inconsistent beliefs: A solution. Southern Journal of Philosophy
50(1), 21-41.
Lyons, J. (2012). Should reliabilists be worried about demon worlds? Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 86(1), 1-40.
Mabo and Others v. Queensland. (1992). High Court of Australia 23.
Political Constitution of Colombia. (1991).
Pollock, J., & Cruz, J. (1999). Contemporary theories of knowledge. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

950

Argumentation In Bulgarian Political Virtual Forums And Social

Networks
Ivanka Mavrodieva
Department of Rhetoric
Sofia University
Bulgaria
Email mavrodieva@phls.uni-sofia.bg

ABSTRACT: This study examines specific features of the argumentation in virtual political forums and social
networks. The subjects of research are political forums and Facebook groups as a part of the civil protests in
Bulgaria over the period of two years (2012-2013). The main goal is investigation on arguments used by
Bulgarian citizens in virtual dialogues, appropriateness and effectiveness of argumentation. The second goal
includes survey of specific verbal, visual and multi-modal arguments used in the social networks.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, visual and multi-modal arguments, political virtual forums, social networks

1. INTRODUCTION
The new Bulgarian state has reached 135 years of independent history and form of
government since 1879. From 1945 to 1991 (during socialism) the form of government was a
specific kind of republic (the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria). The Constitution from July 1991
states that Bulgaria is a parliamentary representative democratic republic. The multi-party
system was established after 45 years of socialist and totalitarian government. A transition
towards a pluralistic and democratic society is taking place.
Bulgarian political communication plays a role in the civil society; it continues to be a
function of the state institutions and political parties. Political and civil rhetoric practices and
influence have immensely grown during the Bulgarian civil protests and demonstrations (1989,
1990, 19961997). Political communication has transformed since 2010 and Bulgarian citizens
vow their demands in more definite forms combining direct, media and virtual channels.
Bulgarian citizens largely use the Internet as a tool for increased social activities in the civil
society. The participants in the protests in Bulgaria (20122013) use Facebook as an
instrument of civic activity and acceleration of the protests. The protesters use Facebook as
virtual tribune and Internet forums as virtual discussions where they raise topics and conduct
dialogues.
2. HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The hypothesis initiating the present search is that the argumentation in the Bulgarian political
forums and social networks during the protests from 2010 to 2013 goes through different
transformations as a result of technical, technological and social factors. In addition, the
traditional kinds of arguments are transformed; virtual communication includes verbal, visual
and multi-modal arguments and has achieved new forms of display. The manners and modes
of presenting the ideas have changed as a result of the changes in the attitudes of the e951

communicators and protesters. Bulgarian virtual civil communication has diverse forms of
manifestation and characteristics.
The aim of the current study is to try to give answer the following research questions:
What was the significance of virtual forums and social networks during the protests?
Which are the main features of virtual forums?
Which rhetorical figures, arguments and tools did the protesters use purposefully to
convey their main messages, influence the public conscience of the citizens and
mobilise them to support their ideas?
How verbal, visual and multi-modal arguments create opportunities to persuade
Bulgarians to participate more actively in the civil society events?
3. THEORETICAL FRAME
Aristotle has fundamental contribution to rhetoric and argumentation: Rhetoric (Aristotle,
1986) and The Topics (Aristotle, 1998) and the focus is on verbal manifestations of the
arguments. Studies of rhetoric and argumentation have been conducted throughout the
centuries and they have undergone a kind of renaissance in the 20th and 21st century. Stephen
Toulmin published the book The uses of argument in 1958; Chaim Perelman and Lucie
Olbrechts-Tyteca announce their position to give a new meaning to the rhetorical heritage in
the book The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969).
Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst presented their standpoint concerning the
argumentation in the book A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. The Pragma-dialectical
Approach (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2006). We will also draw on the basic definitions of the
arguments and in particular the terms Pro Homine, Ad Populum Arguments, Arguments from
Authority, Arguments against Authority explained by Leo Groarke and Christopher Tindale in
the chapter Ethotic Schemes of the book Good Reasoning Matters! A Constructive
Approach to Critical Thinking (Groarke & Tindale, 2012: pp. 307340).
The studies of the arguments and argumentation have intensified in the latest two
decades and scientists start to investigate visual arguments. Antony Blair published the article
The Possibility and Actuality of Visual Arguments in 1996. The author continued developing
the research on this topic and he published the article The Rhetoric of Visual Arguments in
2004. Other scientists have displayed their individual positions on visual arguments in a series
of quality papers: Outlines of a Theory of Visual Argument (Birdsell & Groarke, 2008: pp.
103113), Iconicity in Visual and Verbal Argumentation (Hoven, 2011, pp. 831834) etc. Leo
Groarke reconceptualises Toulmins position and he expresses his position in the article Five
theses on Toulmin and visual argument (Groarke, 2009: pp. 229239). Leo Groarke and
Christopher Tindale give a definition of visual arguments in the dictionary of the book Good
Reasoning Matters! A Constructive Approach to Critical Thinking: Visual arguments are
arguments that convey premises and conclusions with non-verbal images one finds in drawing,
photographs, films, videos, sculptures natural objects, and so on. In most cases they combine
visual and verbal cues that can be understood as argument. (Groarke & Tindale, 2012: p. 455).
We are in agreement with the above definition, especially with the position that verbal and
visual cues are combined to support the process of understanding the arguments and we will
use it as a part of the theoretical background of this study. Other researchers have announced
the results of researches on visual arguments. George Roque focuses on the political rhetoric
952

in visual images (Roque, 2008: pp. 185193). Jos van den Broek, Willam Koetsenruijter, Jaap
de Jong, Letitia Smit write about the functions of the visual language (Broek et al., 2012: pp.
3239). Jens Kjeldsen applies a cognitive, contextual, and reception-oriented approach
analyzing the visual argumentation in Scandinavian political advertising (Kjeldsen, 2007: pp.
124132) and he investigates the roles of visual tropes and figures as a way of creating visual
argumentation again on the field of the advertising (Kjeldsen, 2012: pp. 239255). All of them
have their singular contributions to the theory of visual argument and the methodology of its
research.
Following the principle of terminological clarity we will outline the concept multimodal argument as it is applied here in the terms of Leo Groarke who says that:
The fundamental reason for accepting multi-modal arguments is the root notion that
an argument is an attempt to support a conclusion by presenting evidence for it
something that can clearly be done in ways that extend beyond premises and
conclusions understood as declarative sentences. To take only a few examples, I may
try to convince you of some claim by presenting photographs, drawing a map, pointing
to something, telling a story (fiction or non-fiction), showing a film, painting a picture,
and so on and so forth. Our lives are replete with situations in which evidence for some
point of view is presented in these and other ways that do not neatly correspond to the
verbal paradigm that was always stressed in traditional accounts of argument
(Groarke, 2013: p. 34).
The author explains that:
At a time when the development of digital communication is making it easier to
transmit images, sounds, and even physical sensations, it is not surprising that
arguments increasingly incorporate non-verbal elements that can be communicated in
this way. Especially in such a context, recognizing multi-modal arguments is one way
to broaden the scope of our general account of argument, taking us one step further in
the development of a thick theory (Groarke, 2013: p. 36).
For the purposes of this study will also give brief information about the other kinds of
argumentation. Marcin Lewiski introduces and explains the terms argumentation design
and computer-mediated design. He presents in the table 3.1 the three different computermediated argumentation designs (de Moor & Aaakhu, 2006: p. 97): issue networking,
funnelling, and reputation (Lewiski, 2010: p. 38). The pattern provide quote or link exists
to use hyper-linking which is a simple technological affordance that has become a vital part
of online culture and adds that this entry level online-specific mode of attacking the
propositional content of argumentation (Lewiski, 2010: pp. 140141).
We are in agreement with these statements and we will use these terms adapted to the
aim if the current research.

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4. RESEARCH DESIGN
My empirical sources for the present study are selected out of 4 sub-corpora including the
topic protests: Facebooks groups Occupy Bulgaria, Protestna Mreja
Protest network; sites Dance with me http://www.danswithme.com/, No Oresharski
http://noresharski.com/; Solidarnost http://solidarnost.tv/public/life/goriva/; forums
http://forum.clubpolitika.com/; http://www.investor.bg/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=11; hash
tags # (#Retirement), # (#protest), # (#Bulgaria), # (#Come
along).
The study is based on a grounded analysis of 200 posts and 200 posters, photos,
parodies, caricatures from these sites selected from the period between January 2012 and
December 2013 from 4 protests: against high prices and the national protest against outrage,
against the monopolists of energy December 2012 January April 2013, against the
nomination of Peyeveski for the position of director of the State Agency of National Security
(SANS) 14 June 2013.
The specific features of virtual discussion, the behaviour of e-participants and the
factors that determine the dialogues are outlined in the beginning of this study. After that the
focus is on the sources of arguments, kinds of arguments and their specific uses in virtual
forums and Facebook groups. The research includes analysis of five kinds of arguments
Argumentum ad Hominem, Pro Homine, Argument of Authority, Argument against Authority
and Argumentum ad Populum on verbal, visual and multi-modal levels in virtual
environments.
5. FACTORS, SOURCES AND KINDS OF ARGUMENTS
In general social networks are the result of a couple of circumstances such as: developing and
improving technological opportunities for communication; access to new ideas, web-based
information, electronic resources and database serving millions of people the world over. This
is valid for social networks used by Bulgarian citizens. The protesters broadcast the appeals
and civil demands to virtual audiences and they try to persuade them for civic action using
different kinds of arguments. Bulgarian virtual political forums contains posts, dialogues
between e-communicators, and mix of rhetorical figures, verbal, visual and multi-modal
arguments. Argumentation design and computer-mediated argumentation have changed, and
words, terms and short sentences have been gradually mixed with visual and multi-modal
arguments. The forms of the political communication of protesters found in the virtual
environment are heterogeneous. The social networks and virtual forums play a significant role
during the protests against the politicians, governing classes, and the government itself;
Bulgarians have moved from passive behaviour to active citizenship; from recipients of
political messages to participants in the different formats of virtual communication. The
virtual forums are transformed to a mixed format and it contains personal positions and critical
discussions. In their turn, discussions between members the virtual political forums include
some sub-dialogues on such topics as: government, political parties, political system,
monopolists, oligarchy, connections between government and monopolists, law system, prices,
ecology etc.
The analysis shows that most of the debaters prefer the reputation model which every
participant in virtual forums is committed to follow while vowing their proposals and
954

arguments, and thus has a personal stake in the process of argumentation. This argumentative
design presupposes the frequent uses of personal civil experience and explicit defence of the
main thesis based on one or two items of proof.
We can generalize that the participants of the forums did not use too many and too
different arguments. They preferred the following sources: dictionaries, history, statistics,
blogs, media and in particular online media, social networks, legal documents, and personal
experience. The netizens explained the origin of the proofs. The pattern provide quote or link
is generally applied and shows clearly the source of arguments. E-debaters use this pattern as
an ethotic argument and they demonstrate the credibility of the proof. Some of the participants
have adopted their argumentative and digital competence in the forums. Bulgarian netizens as
participants in the Facebook groups prefer short sentences, and verbal expressions are typical
features of the appeals; they consist of negative connotations, polar evaluations of the state
institutions, political leaders, big corporations which are monopolists in Bulgarian business
spheres and market. From argumentative standpoint the telegraphic style is appropriate during
the virtual discussions; the e-communicators posted short messages on the walls of Facebook
groups because they understand that the Bulgarian citizens avoid complicated argumentation.
Written and visual arguments on the wall of Facebook groups are displayed in front of
hundreds or thousands of people in Bulgaria and Bulgarians the world over. Some of the
arguments are created spontaneously by protesters; most of them are selected from personal
experience and they are acceptable for most citizens who avoid the sophisticated
argumentation style of the Bulgarian politicians. The topics of virtual forums are initiated by
netizens and the communication is carried out on horizontal level. The positions are presented
by netizens who accept the Facebook groups as virtual tribune and they combine the
arguments according the situation and concrete aims. The freedom of speech, the digital
competence and the active citizens behaviour establish new opportunities for virtual civil
communication in Bulgaria after 2012.
6. VERBAL ARGUMENTS
The protesters in Bulgaria accept the Internet as an instrument of mobilisation and
organisation; they post messages, publish about events and call up activities on the wall of
Facebook groups and in the virtual forums. During the summer protests in 2013 e-citizens
started to use hash tag # and some of these groups were # (#Retirement), #
(#protest), # (#Bulgaria), # (#Come along). Virtual civil oratory includes
clear words, short sentences and the leaders of the protests avoid sophisticated verbal style.
The protesters include new terms in their messages, most protesters are anonymous authors in
the social networks but they identify themselves in the virtual forums. Most protesters have
argumentative skills and digital competence.
Verbal Pro Homine Argument has relatively new application in virtual civil
communication in Bulgaria. The protesters see themselves as moral, competent and active
citizens. From their point of view civil society could develop better and more effectively if the
politicians and state institutions accept their idea for: civil participation in the decision making
process, institutionalization of the civil participation, and civil control over state institutions.
The protesters demonstrate maturity and they focus on some suggestions in connection with
the elections concerning their transparency and outlining a modern way to organise the
national election campaign. The e-communicators present in the virtual forms the arguments
955

supporting their civil demands: equal access to media during election campaigns, new
organization of the elections including new kind of voter lists and new electoral rolls;
transparency with regard to the connection between parties, institutions and corporations, two
mandates as a member of the Parliament, new Constitution, etc. These arguments are not a
part of the sophisticated ideological communication; they are proofs of a process of growing
conscious activities of the civil society in Bulgaria.
Other kinds of verbal arguments are found on the posters and they are posted on the
Facebooks walls by Bulgarians who live and study abroad. E-communicators used a
combination of Argument from Authority and the Ad Populum Argument. They accept
themselves as Bulgarian citizens and they support the protesters: We are away but we support
you. We are with you. From Spain, Students from Manchester are with you. They have
arrived at the conclusion that they are netizens and that the frontiers and barriers are past
because social networks create good opportunities to express their positions as Bulgarian
citizens. The sense of belonging is effect of this persuasion. Virtual civil citizenship is a new
phenomenon in the contemporary Bulgarian political life. Verbal argumentation related to it
reveals in new circumstances.
Verbal Argument against Authority is preferred by the protesters when they want to
express their disappointment with Bulgarian politicians. For example they write on their
Facebook wall: You are not sufficiently intelligent to manage us, Go voluntarily! You have
a choice now! Next we shall use force!. Some of these verbal arguments were created during
the street protests, the messages and arguments were shared very rapidly across social
networks. Other slogans and arguments were written online and e-communicators broadcast
them to protesters. It is possible to conclude that there are two ways to share the arguments:
from street to social networks and from social networks to square demonstrations. We can go
to the assumption that it is a relatively new manifestation of argumentation design and
computer-mediated design.
Most of the protesters have profiles in social networks, so they create virtual groups.
Digital Bulgarian citizens publish posts, photos, video clips; they share and broadcast them
across the social networks. The dialogue takes up three different levels: real, virtual and a
combination between the two. For example, an expert in psychology who is a member of the
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) evaluates the e-citizens as internet vagabonds, internet
lumpens and he abuses them. The Argumentum ad Hominem activates the protesters who
write on the posters and on the wall of the social network Facebook the following slogans: I
am not an Internet lumpen!. The protesters combine Argumentum ad Hominem with analogy
and they compare the politicians from BSP with politicians from Egypt, Turkey and China
who limit the access to the Internet and appreciate the social networks as tools for mobilising
citizens during the protests. The Bulgarian protesters understand that the social networks
create broad opportunities for them to be active digital citizens yet at the same time they
insult the psychologist named him psycho, red rubbish etc. The Argumentum ad
Hominem is used by the politician against virtual groups which are fluid but the protesters
prefer personalization and they direct the Argumentum ad Hominem against one man.
Summarising, we can draw the conclusion that different kinds of verbal arguments
created by the protesters have wide application in virtual space and the argumentative skills
developed offline are shifted and transferred online.

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7. VISUAL ARGUMENTS
Visual Argument Pro Homine is not used by the protesters very often but it has proven very
effective. The portrait of Vassil Levski, one of the celebrated historical figures of Bulgaria, is
preferable to construct argument Pro Homine. The charisma of Levski as a leader from the
Bulgarian Revival (and to be more precise from the late 19th century) is a solid argument and it
persuades Bulgarians to be more active citizens and netizens. On the poster published on the
Facebook wall the title National protest against outrages is combined with the portrait of
Vassil Levski and Levskis appeal , (Everybody
should sacrifice everything, even himself).
The scheme of Argument Pro Homine is presented by Leo Groarke and Christopher
Tindale:
Promise 1: X says y.
Promise 2: X is knowledgeable, trustworthy, and free of bias.
Conclusion: y should be accepted. (Groarke & Tindale 2012: 308).
The scheme of the visual argument presented on the Facebook wall is the same:
Promise 1: Levski says that we should sacrifice everything in the name of our freedom.
Promise 2. Levski is knowledgeable Bulgarian hero, notable and moral man.
Conclusion: The appeal to sacrifice in the favour of Bulgaria should be acceptable.
The second poster includes the same type of argument and the protesters use the portrait of
Ivan Vazov who is a famous Bulgarian writer and poet from the 20th century. The portrait is
used to help reach the conclusion that the protest will change the situation in Bulgaria in the
second decade of the 21st century.
When the aim is to consolidate and reinforce the persuasive effect, the protesters
combine two portraits constructing Visual Argument Pro Homine and combine it with analogy.
The protesters use the portraits of political leader Levski and patriotic writer Vazov and they
add the verbal messages: Bulgaria for Bulgarians. Levski and Vazov are heroes. Go and
support them!
To take another example, the octopus is a preferable visual proof to persuade virtual
audience that the oligarchy and mafia control the economy in Bulgaria. This visual sign has
the role of an Argument against Authority. E-protesters use the faces of politicians and they
combine them with the octopus. The memory about the Italian movie Octopus (La Piovra),
which is very popular in Bulgaria, supports the persuasive effect.
One and the same visual element can have different argumentative uses depending on
the virtual communicators aim. For example a map of Bulgaria is used both as an Argument
from Authority and as an Argument against Authority. In the case when the protesters has
positive attitudes as Bulgarian citizens they use the coloured map or combine the map with the
official flag or with the state emblem. They try to persuade Bulgarians that we can be proud of
our country and that the official sings express that we are citizens of an independent state. On
the contrary when the protesters prefer to express negative connotation and to reveal the lack
of morality and ethics of Bulgarian politicians, they use the map painted only in black and
white. Additionally they transform the picture of the map using Photoshop and they give it the
957

form of a sheep combining it with the written words and figures of politicians, banks,
monopolists who milk the state visually presented as a sheep.
Another preferred symbol used as visual Argumentum ad Hominem is a hat. The hats
used as visual elements fall into three groups: the first one is typical for a soldier of the Soviet
Army and Sergey Stanishev as leader of the Bulgarian Socialistic Party is wearing it, Volen
Siderov as a leader of the nationalistic party is wearing a hat typical for Nazi soldiers and
Lyutvi Mestan as a leader of the ethnic party of the Turkish minority has a red fez.
Summarising, we can say that visual arguments have persuasive effect and Bulgarians
accept them as an interesting manner to lay civil demands in front of hundreds of citizens.
8. MULTI-MODAL ARGUMENTS
The persuasive power of multi-modal arguments posted during the protests on Facebook walls
or in virtual forums is great.
In the beginning of our study of multi-modal arguments we selected 3 posters from the
corpora which contain the element index finger used as a combination of Argument from
Authority and the Ad Populum Argument. The application of two arguments is an appeal for
mobilisation, taking an active position and participation in the political processes.
In the first poster the visual element index finger is combined with the verbal appeal
! ! ! (Stop
complaining about the state! Change it! Because you are the state!). The sentences look like a
paraphrase of Kennedys appeal Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you
can do for your country.
E-protesters use index finger which directs to active position combining well-known
visual element and figures from a different age, state and political system. In the second and
third posters the protesters have paraphrased the celebrated posters from the USA and the
Soviet Union and they are used too but in Bulgarian political and virtual contexts. Uncle Sam
encourages them to take part in the street protests or to paint monuments from the socialism as
a way to express their position against the manipulation by the government of the Bulgarian
Socialist Party which is a part of the government (June 2013-August 2014):
? ? (Are you a true democrat or not?
Have you painted a monument today). A young soldier from the Red Soviet Army pointed
towards the viewer and said in English What do you occupy?
Parallel and analogy support persuasion because the multi-modal arguments are
decoded easily and fast, despite the mixture of historical periods. The multi-modal arguments
combine Argument of Authority and Argument Ad Populum and the digital competence and
display skills of the protesters and netizens make the argumentation more impressive and
persuasive. The
E-protesters have digital and IT competences and they prefer to paraphrase and adapt
the posters from famous USA movies creating new kind of argument. The combinations of
politicians faces are different and the creators of the posters express negative attitudes while
they use multi-modal variants of Argumentum ad Hominem against the political leaders.
One of them is based on the movie Miserable. The faces are of Oresharski prime-minister,
Ahmed Dogan former leader of the Movement for rights and freedom, Volen Siderov
nationalistic party leader, and socialist leader Sergey Stanishev. A second poster displays the
faces of 10 political leaders, two Bulgarian presidents and state men in the place of the heroes
958

of the movie Oceans Eleven. The multi-modal Argument ad Hominem is not against one
politician but against the politicians from all parties, and it is a specific manifestation of
attitude in the context of the protests because Bulgarians are disappointed with the political
elite and accept that socio political manipulation of the broad public is a result of the lobby
activities of certain leaders, and that Bulgarian politicians have stopped working on the
common ideals coming into reality. This multi-modal Argumentum ad Hominem has had
powerful effect on the protesters.
Argumentum ad Hominem has some other manifestation on the multi-modal level of
application. A particular explication of this argument is directed against political leaders and
the posters published online present the waltz dance of the political leaders Sergey Stanishev
(the Bulgarian Socialist Party BSP), Volen Siderov (Nationalistic party Ataka) and Lyutvi
Mestan (the Movement of Rights and Freedom MRF ethnic party), Boyko Borosov
(Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria CEDB). The political context is that
lobbyism, lacking in transparency and coulisse negotiations and stipulations make the dialogue
between politicians and citizens difficult. The visual image is enlarged; it combines with
verbal Argument ad Populum Dance with me to the end of BSP, MRF, Ataka, CEDB.
Multi-modal argument has been used quite recently in virtual civic communication,
digitalisation and new kind of behaviour of the social networks accelerating its manifestations.
9. CONCLUSION
Most Bulgarian protesters are citizens in the traditional sense, and at the same time they are
netizens who accept virtual forums and Facebook groups as a place where they discuss the
topics initiated by them. Most participants in the virtual forums have digital competences and
they combine them with good argumentative skills applicable in virtual environments. They
follow the good practices of the computer-mediated design; they prefer the pattern provide
quote or link because it is a way to confirm that they use correctly the sources of arguments
because credibility is an important factor to persuade virtual audiences.
The netizens avoid verbosity and prefer a combination of two or three arguments. The
virtual debaters in the forums often use Argumentum ad Hominem, Argumentum ad Populum,
Argument against Authority. It is reasonable because the protesters want to persuade hundreds
of people of Bulgaria that the politicians do not follow moral principles and they have stopped
working in favour of the citizens and the country. The protesters use Pro Homine Argument
and Argument for Authority picturing themselves as moral people, active citizens and
members of the civil society in Bulgaria. The virtual audience easy decodes and understands
the sense; the ethotic arguments have strong persuasive effect.
Bulgarian citizens gradually improve their argumentative skills and take part in the
political virtual forums; they mix verbal and visual arguments and create multi-modal
arguments. The protesters appreciate virtual forums as virtual agora or e-agora as some
researchers prefer to call it avoiding etymological ambiguity based on the meaning of virtue
(Apostolova 2014: 71), the dialogue is semi-formal, and the argumentation is simple. The
freedom of speech and new technological circumstances determine a new model of behaviour,
new attitudes to write, prepare, design, share and broadcast very easily and fast the
information and argumentation across the social networks.

959

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960

Epideictic As A Condition Of Disagreement

Ingrid Mayeur & Loc Nicolas
Facult de Philosophie et Lettres GRAL
Universit Libre de Bruxelles
Belgium
imayeur@ulb.ac.be
http://gral.ulb.ac.be
Facult de Philosophie et Lettres GRAL
Universit Libre de Bruxelles
Belgium
lonicola@ulb.ac.be
http://gral.ulb.ac.be

ABSTRACT: Our paper aims to examine several aspects of the epideictic genre according to the tradition of
the Brussels School of Rhetoric. We study, at first, the confused notions as a specific material for the
rhetorical art, and, in particular, for the epideictic genre as they contribute to create the social concord. Then,
we establish a relationship between disagreement and epideictic genre after the Perelmans New Rhetoric.
Here, our idea is to show how disagreement feeds the argumentative nature of this third rhetorical genre. In a
democratic society, the epideictic genre needs to work well to allow disagreement; and likewise,
disagreement requires always a well-functioning epideictic. According to Perelman, if the epideictic genre
constitutes the foundations of the rhetorical system, or even its crowning, it is also the center, the mobile
part of this system, in other words: its limbs.
KEYWORDS: Chaim Perelman, confused notions, concord, disagreement, epideictic genre, Eugne Duprel,
rationality, rhetoric.

1. INTRODUCTION
Our paper aims to examine several aspects of the epideictic genre according to the tradition
of the Brussels School of Rhetoric started with Eugne Duprel and Chaim Perelman.
We study how, in the epideictic genre, the confused notions contribute to create social
concord. The relationship between disagreement and epideictic genre in Perelmans New
Rhetoric will then be considered to show how disagreement feeds the argumentative nature
of this third rhetorical genre.
To start with, taking as a frame the perspective of Emmanuelle Danblon, in which
rhetoric is a techn and the orator is a craftsman, we would like to show how the confused
notions (in the sense given by Eugne Duprel) could be shaped in a specific way,
according to the desired rhetorical purpose, to become efficient tools, which will be
destined to a good use by the orator.
2. USING VALUE OF CONFUSED NOTIONS AND ITS ROLE IN THE EPIDEICTIC
GENRE
2.1. Origins of the confused notions
Already before the First World War, Eugne Duprel had suggested a re-establishment of
the confused thought, wishing to exceed the classical dichotomy clarity vs. darkness.

961

Confusion and instability, like clarity and stability, are essential components of some
notions, especially values as justice, happiness, merit or freedom.
In Duprels conception, notions are not a reflection of the world but a tool with an
acting value:
Avant dtre classes comme connaissances claires ou confuses, les connaissances servent quelque
chose, la vie des individus et des socits; les mensonges mme ont leur utilit, on ne les produirait
pas sans cela. La connaissance est donc une valeur daction. [] Une notion, tout ce que dsigne un
mot ou une phrase, cela nest pas labor par un souci de correspondance avec un objet rel, cest un
instrument dont on se sert et dont la valeur se mesure dabord son rendement. (Duprel, 1949, p.
332).
Before being classified as clear or confused knowledge, knowledge is used to something, in the lives
of persons and societies; lies even have their uses, they will not happen without it. Knowledge is
therefore an acting value. []. A notion, everything that refers to a word or phrase, is not
developed by a desire to match with a real object; it is a tool that is used and its value is measured
primarily to performance1.

Notions contain an extensible semantical core that allows us to progress towards a

practical knowledge. Actually, the function conferred to the confused notions is to allow an
agreement in domains where formal demonstration is impossible (i.e. the Humanities), and
in particular to allow adherence to a philosophical truth. Indeed, due to the great
precariousness of this kind of truth, that adherence is its only support:
Ne travaillant pas, comme le savant, entre une intention prcise et un mode de vrification fix
davance, ne dterminant quen cours de route son intention, le philosophe verra toujours son uvre
moins formellement accomplie et non formellement vrifie: en fait il ne peut compter que sur
ladhsion gagne, sur laccord avec lui-mme et laccord avec les autres esprits, ce qui nest jamais
un critre, mais un tat de chose, difficile et prcaire. [] Au contraire, la valeur dune vrit
philosophique aura bien plus besoin, pour simposer, de lunanimit dans ladhsion car, en dehors
de la conviction de celui qui la dcouvre, cette approbation dautrui est en fait son seul appui; or,
cest justement cette adhsion qui se montre plus prcaire et moins probable. (Duprel, 1939, pp.
289-290).
Not working, as the scientist, between a specified purpose and a verification mode fixed beforehand,
determining only on the way his intention, the philosopher will always see his work less formally
completed and not formally checked: actually he can only rely on membership earned, on agreement
with himself and the agreement with the other spirits, which is never a criterion, but a state of
things, difficult and precarious. [...] On the contrary, the value of a philosophical truth will much
more need to impose unanimity in membership because, apart from the conviction of the person who
discovers it, the approval of others is in fact his only support; however, it is this membership that is
more precarious and less likely.

To be able to adjust the scope of the notion to a context of use, one needs to require to the
reasonable, which Duprel called excellence confuse (Duprel, 1949, p. 294). Human
being is able to make choices without dogmatism, because a way exists to review these
choices (Duprel, 1949, p. 295). For instance, a part of Duprels Trait de morale touches
on the values of justice and honor as confused notions. According to him, confusion is a
fact that allows to act in a living and human world.
Duprel speaks about a tool, and not about a material. Moreover, he devotes very
little attention to which techn has to be optionally used to transform these confused
notions into a tool. His students, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, make this
point in their article Les notions et largumentation. Returning on what are exactly
1

Unless otherwise specified, the translations are done by the authors of the paper.

962

confused notions, they explain that argumentation involves playing on its plasticity,
through two techna: either opposing two notions through flexibility on the one hand and
curing on the other hand, or extending the semantical core of a single notion.
For the first case, the orator presents to the audience an opposition between two
notions: he offers his own view as modern, flexible and rich in potential, while the
conception of his opponent is downgraded as old, frozen and outdated. In the second case,
and for the notions which the value is clearly established and prior the argumentation,
another techn is used: the extension of the notion (with amplification or restriction of its
semantical core):
Cette technique qui consiste figer le concept de ladversaire tout en donnant plus de souplesse
celui quon dfend, est gnralement adopte lorsque lapprciation sur le concept doit rsulter, en
partie au moins, de largumentation.
Par contre, dans le cas o la valeur de la notion est nettement tablie et pralable largumentation,
cest une autre technique portant plutt sur lextension de la notion, qui est gnralement
employe. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1989 [1955], p. 136).
This technique consisting in freezing the concept of the adversary while providing more flexibility to
one we defend, is generally used when appreciating that the concept must result, partially at least,
from the argumentation.
Contrariwise, if the value of the notion is clearly established prior to the argument, this is another
technique involving the extension of the concept, which is generally used.

The common values, celebrated in the epideictic genre, are included in this last kind of
notions. Public discourses celebrate those values to preserve social concord homonoia for
the Greeks. They are destined to introduce a proairesis, a disposition to act in a good way.
In this case, notions are amplified to the maximum in order to appear, as blatant as the
sensitive evidence (Danblon, 2002, 130-134). On the other hand, regarding the deliberative
genre, decisions have to be taken for the good functioning of the city; regarding the
forensic genre, decisions concern the establishment and qualification of past events. Both
decisions are bouleutics and derive from public debates. The purpose of the techn is either
to make a choice between two notions, or to narrow the semantical core of a notion,
questioning respectively what is useful or what is just in a specific case.
Places where confused notions can be found might be compared to a kind of
marketplace, in which the orator can somehow shop around; this metaphor was
previously used by Wilhelmus De Pater, talking of Aristotles Topics (De Pater, 1965)2.
These stores could take the form of the law to be interpreted or great universal declarations
like, e.g., Human Rights. Indeed, those expressions of topoi, as commonly accepted
premises, form the starting point of the argumentative reasoning. The confusion of the
notion allows, as Perelman said, to an agreement on the formula even if disagreements
subsist on the interpretation. In that way, we might say it becomes more a tool for concord
than a tool for agreement.
In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas paper, notions are thus presented as tools for
persuasion, but after they have been shaped by the techn in accordance with the rhetorical
purposes. One may suggest that the confused notions exist beforehand, in the
marketplace, as raw materials to be shaped, and finally become a tool. We would like to
go further on that process that allows to precise the conception of rhetoric as a craft.
2.2. Rhetoric as a craft, using value of the confused notions as a material fort the
rhetorical art
2

We would like to thank Emmanuelle Danblon and Victor Ferry for this reference.

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Emmanuelle Danblon, in Lhomme rhtorique, recalls Vernants work about craft in Myth
and Thought among the Greeks, and then applies it to the rhetorical art:
Dun point de vue naturaliste, la rhtorique se rvle tre lart de tous les artisanats. Elle nest pas
dune discipline, elle est de toutes les disciplines. Elle exerce lhomme utiliser son environnement
naturel: celui des socits humaines. (Danblon, 2013, p. 84).
From a naturalistic point of view, the rhetoric appears to be the art of all crafts. It belongs not to a
single discipline, it belongs to all disciplines. It exerts the man to use his natural environment: the
human societies.

Following Vernant, in an antique conception of the work (in a craftsmens society), the
point is the using value of the artefact, not its market value. This artefact matches with a
special need for a specific user. The question of this need, the purpose of the craft is
dominant in the process, and much more important than the techn implemented:
The artisan and his skill exist for the sake of the product, the product for the sake of the need. It
could not be otherwise, as long as the product of work was considered only from the point of view
of its use value, not its exchange value. As for its use value, the product is defined by its service to
the person who uses it. (Vernant, 2006 [1965], pp. 295-296).

For Danblon, in that framework, the rationality of the craft is directly linked to its
efficiency. And so it goes in the rhetorical art, whose worth emerges only if its efficiency is
sufficient to impact on mans action and on the running of the City. As far as the rhetorical
activity is concerned, the purpose is to take decisions, and, in Aristotles conception,
decisions that lead to Happiness in the City.
In the classical Greek society of the 5th century, where the first theories of that
discipline emerged, the place given to the craftsman has moved. It became associated to
menial tasks, whereas the craftsman, before, had occupied a much more prestigious and
prevalent position. At the same time, Sophists were leading the first technical reflections
about rhetorical techn. That techn was quite different of the craftsmans techn: while
the craftsman implements a posis (he creates an artefact out of himself), the orator
commits a praxis (he acts on the world) (Vernant, 2006 [1965], p. 291). However, as
Danblon has noticed, the category of using value is very relevant to us. Furthermore, it
could directly be linked to Duprels acting value.
Vernant adds that this model of craft, transferred to intellectual matters, leads to a
model of demiurgic creation mentioned by Plato and Aristotle. The spirit of the final
product exists outside of the craftsman, because its defined by its uses: the house (built)
preexists at the future house to be built, such as vases, and other artefacts in general. What
is important is not the market value but the benefit for the user: to be safe, to carry water
So theres something like a matrix, available for the craftsman, allowing varied shapes of
materials. Craftsmans activity is, according to Vernant, guided by an eidos, prior, fixed
and immutable:
The techn aims, in effect, to produce an eidos, such as health or a house, in a certain matter. Such a
production presupposes the exercise of a dunamis for which the techn, in a sense, provides the
method of use. (Vernant, 2006 [1965], p. 289).

To maintain the parallel with rhetoric, confused notions as materials could be shaped
according to the context and the purpose, since techn, as we said, depends on the type of
decision to be generated. The orator draws on his store, the topical heritage which we
964

mentioned previously, where he could find raw materials. If the orator is a craftsman, that
store contains the eid with which he needs to practice his art.
But that conception of eidos might directly lead to a Platonic vision, and seems
hardly compatible with the efficiency sought by the Sophists or with Duprels acting
value. However, if the eidos is linked to a using value, and that shaping confused notions
allows creating new eid, this hurdle is avoided. Indeed, the orators marketplace is only
composed of shaped material that could be shaped again, according to the uses encountered
or to be encountered, whose meaning will never be defined once and for all. Actually, in
the rhetorical art, there is not any raw material: topical heritage is linked to a specific
period and is constituted by uses; always moving, and liable to be modified by critics. The
dynamic aspect of the notions prevents them from being treated as Platonic ideas.
This point of the using value leads to another question: the good use of confused
notions, in particular in the epideictic genre. Values, confused notions by excellence, keep
a privileged relationship with this genre. Perelman has noted that confused notions without
critique leads directly to propaganda; so it is necessary to implement them in a whole
rhetorical system.
3. EPIDEICTIC AS A CONDITION OF DISAGREEMENT IN PERELMANS NEW
RHETORIC
From their early works, and contrary to popular belief even in our scientific field, Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca give a prominent and leading position to the epideictic genre. There
is something very intuitive in their minds. For them, the epideictic is the first of the three
genres: even before the deliberative and the judicial. However, Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca do not ignore the specific gaps of the epideictic genre in comparison to the two
other genres. These gaps give the epideictic a special and marginal nature. In the epideictic
genre, there is no opponent, no controversial issue, no debate, and no decision-making.
As a genre of circumstance, the epideictic seems secondary, even unimportant in
the rhetorical perspective. In a certain sense: a soft and feminine genre (against the two
others, which are considered more virile). We think usually that the epideictic orator
speaks in order to say nothing because the subject of the discourse is not controversial;
everything in the speech has already been deliberated on. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
oppose this opinion. There is a real ambiguity because they appear to make a marginal (and
not serious) genre a primary one. Whats more, they denounce the misunderstanding of
epideictic. They propose to rediscover its rhetorical and argumentative nature: its place in
the field of argumentation.
For them, the consequences of this misunderstanding were dramatic for rhetoric as
a discipline. They make a link between the dismemberment of rhetoric in particular since
the nineteenth century, and the negative perception of the epideictic genre in public
opinion and scientific field.
We can read what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca wrote about it:
Cest cette incomprhension du rle et de la nature du discours pidictique qui, ne loublions pas,
existait bel et bien, et simposait donc lattention qui a encourag le dveloppement des
considrations littraires en rhtorique et a favoris, entre autres causes, lcartlement de celle-ci
entre deux tendances, lune philosophique [], lautre littraire. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1952 [1950], pp. 15-16).
Its this misunderstanding of the role and the nature of epideictic discourse which, let us not
forget, existed and therefore was well known which encouraged the development of literary

965

considerations in rhetoric, and encouraged, with other implications, the breakup of rhetoric into two
tendencies: one philosophical [] and the other, literary.

For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rhetoric has to be understood as something coherent

and efficient. This requires above all, an understanding of the epideictic genre as a place of
communion and as a mood of gathering. We could suppose that Perelman came to
discover rhetoric (and therefore epideictic) through his reflections on legal agreement
between two sides as well as the conditions necessary to find this agreement.
However, this would be an incorrect interpretation. Upon closer examination, we
find that Perelman is not interested, first of all, by agreement, but by disagreement. He is
especially interested in how disagreement can give rise to argumentative invention and
rhetorical opportunities. For him, disagreement is not a drama, the sign of an error, or the
evidence of our irrationality. He is radically opposed to Descartes and all the radical
positivists. Perelman argues that there may be two (or x) contrary positions on the same
subject without any of these having to be necessarily irrational. Argumentative rationality
can also be found in the exploration of disagreement between the parties. For Chaim
Perelman, it would be misleading to identify agreement with good choice and/or
rationality.
A large part of Perelmans work aims to analyze the possibilities of a reasonable
disagreement; and how such a disagreement can be explored through argumentation. This
is how Perelman presents his intellectual itinerary in a letter to the young Marcel Ct (a
Canadian doctoral candidate) dated from January1982:
Linspiration fondamentale pour llaboration de la thorie de largumentation ne me vient pas du
droit mais de la philosophie [la question tant] do vient le dsaccord entre les philosophies. Ce
nest qu partir de 1953 que jai commenc mintresser srieusement au raisonnement
juridique. (Perelman, 1982).
The fundamental inspiration for in the elaboration of a theory of argumentation does not come to me
from law but from philosophy; [the question, for me, to find] where the disagreement between the
two philosophies has its source. It is only from 1953 onwards that I became interested in legal
reasoning.

To recapitulate, Chaim Perelman encountered rhetoric and epideictic through the lens of
disagreement. However, one of his first texts on rhetoric, Logique et rhtorique
(published in 1950, and co-authored with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca), provides a clear focus
on epideictic to rehabilitate it.
Interested in the concept and practice of disagreement, Perelman focuses on the
genre, which seems most radically distinct from disagreement and which is the least clearly
argumentative of the three genres. There is something contradictory here. That is why we
need to assume a political and rhetorical link between disagreement and epideictic. A link
that Perelman did not explain, but which is implied in his work; a crucial link for
understanding what rhetoric really is. That is to say, to see rhetoric as a truly human
work that can lead the way for a sense of responsibility and freedom (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1952 [1950], pp. 42-43). The Perelmanian idea, because it is humanistic
aims to express the connection between disagreement and the epideictic genre; to challenge
the apparent dichotomy between the two. In a democratic society, epideictic needs to work
well to allow disagreement; and likewise, disagreement requires always a well-functioning
epideictic. This idea is represented in the table below (see fig. 1).
To be clear: we need to ask ourselves, what would disagreement without epideictic?
It would be, no doubt, a permanent cacophony; civil conflict, and maybe even chaos. This
is why, it is always necessary to regularly nourish the intensity of adherence to certain
966

values to ensure the communion around these values. In the same way, what would
epideictic genre be, without disagreement? It would certainly be a dictatorship of enforced
agreement and all forms of propaganda and authoritarianism.
It is for this reason that rhetorical argumentation only has sense if one places value
on adherence. At the same time, this adherence, by nature conditional (i.e. it is a fact, not a
right), must exclude the use of violence or coercion. Rhetorical and political balance hangs
on this relationship.

Disagreement

Disagreement

Disagreement

Epideictic

Epideictic

Epideictic

Freedom without
conscience

Freedom

Freedom
with conscience

= Chaos, cacophony,
civil war

= Propaganda and
Totalitarianism

= Rhetorical and
political balance

Discord

Enforced agreement

Concord

Irresponsible decision

Decision without object

Responsible decision

Fig. 1: The epideictic genre and the disagreement

Perelman does not give the epideictic genre a unique place: he even gives it two. He makes
the epideictic genre the basis of his system of rhetoric: since without epideictic, no rhetoric
is possible. Furthermore, he also makes it the center of his system: since without epideictic,
no disagreement, nor justification, is possible. Summing up, according to Perelman, it is
the role of this genre, which is seen as marginal, to ensure the functioning of the whole
system of rhetoric around it. Not only does the epideictic genre make rhetoric possible; but
also it makes rhetoric practical, and even practicable. It constitutes the roots and the living
substance of rhetoric as in the diagram below (fig. 2). This stark and revealing distinction
is laid out in the two paragraphs from the programmatic article quoted previously:
Ne voyant pas nettement de but au discours pidictique, les anciens taient donc enclins le considrer
uniquement comme une sorte de spectacle, visant au plaisir des spectateurs et la gloire de lorateur, par
la mise en valeur des subtilits de sa technique. Celle-ci devient donc un but en soi. Aristote lui-mme [la
critique est peu charitable, mais passons] ne semble saisir que laspect agrment, apparat, du discours
pidictique. Il ne peroit pas que les prmisses sur lesquelles sappuient les discours dlibratifs et
judiciaires, dont lobjet lui parat si important, sont des jugements de valeur. Or ces prmisses, il faut que
le discours pidictique les soutienne, les confirme. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1952 [1950], p 14).
Not seeing a clear objective for epideictic discourse, the ancients were thus inclined to consider it only as
a sort of spectacle, which pleased spectators and gave glory to the orator, through the showcasing of the
orators subtle techniques. In this way it thus became a goal in and of itself. Aristotle himself [in an
unkind critique, but lets leave this aside] appears to understand only its pleasing aspect, its pomp and

967

circumstance. He does not understand that the premises on which deliberative and judiciary discourses
base themselves, and whose function he values so much, are in fact value judgments. However, these
premises must be sustained and confirmed by epideictic discourse.

Without epideictic discourse to support or confirm certain values, which are seen as
important for a certain community, speakers would be unable of making value judgments.
Speakers would be deprived of the capacity to argue. In fact, the formulation of judgments
in the deliberative or judicial arena implies always the availability of values for judgment,
principles to criticize, and commonplaces to denounce. Without epideictic discourse,
without roots, without premises at our disposal, no one could ever formulate anything but
senseless and valueless discourses.

Fig. 2: Basis and center of Rhetoric

However, if the epideictic genre constitutes the foundations of the rhetorical system, or
even its crowning, it is also the center, the mobile part of this system, in other words: its
limbs. This is why the third genre of rhetoric enables the articulation of the whole edifice
of rhetoric. It helps rhetoric to be applied and tested. In other words, the epideictic is not
only an enabling condition of the judicial and deliberative discourses, their roots, but it is
also the very source of their permanent vitality. Indeed, the epideictic seeks to create a
communion between free and responsible citizens:
Cette communion ne dtermine pas un choix immdiat, dtermine toutefois des choix virtuels. Le combat
que livre lorateur pidictique est un combat contre des objections futures; cest un effort pour maintenir
la place de certains jugements de valeur dans la hirarchie ou ventuellement leur confrer un statut
suprieur. [] Aussi le genre pidictique est-il central dans la rhtorique. (Perelman & OlbrechtsTyteca, 1952 [1950], p 14).
This communion while it does not determine an immediate choice, it does however determine virtual
choices. The struggle which the epideictic orator leads, is a struggle against future objections; it is an
effort to maintain the place of certain value judgments in the hierarchy, or maybe to give them a superior
status. [] In this way, the epideictic genre is central in rhetoric.

968

This genre ensures the stability and the circulation of values. It articulates the continuity
and coherence between the past, present and future of the community. In this regard,
Perelman goes further than Aristotle. On the one hand, he makes epideictic discourse a
place of dialogue between this three temporalities; on the other hand, he makes of it a
place, which, in this dialogue, opens the way for a struggle to come, based on these same
values. This struggle cannot always take place here and now, because it is neither the time
nor the place. This is implied in the rules of the genre. Hence, the deliberative and judicial
genres exist to offer an arena for this struggle to take place in the future.
From now on, we can say that the epideictic genre cannot be placed outside the
field of argumentation. Adherence now and elsewhere is not pre-established. It would be
an illusion to believe that the conditions for a communion of conscience could be inscribed
in the nature of things. At the same time, if the struggle is delayed for now, it is to allow
epideictic discourses to protect the community against itself, against all the threats of
discord, fear, and disenchantment. This is why the epideictic genre, is in no case a
collection of empty commonplaces or trivialities beyond discussion.
4. CONCLUSION
In a bold way, and to conclude, we could say that Perelman underlines the precarious
character of values and adherence to these, which is present in the epideictic genre. He
invites us to recognize this fragility as an opportunity and not as a drama.
The act of speaking to reinforce the established order does not seek to deny the
existence of problems. Neither is it a question of denying the fragility of the values that are
being defended. On the contrary, the aim is to manifest the fact that there is a problem and
that the values being defended are indeed fragile ones.
Concretely, if there would be no problem, and if values would not be fragile, or
confused, there would simply be no need to speak up to set the problem in context.

REFERENCES
Aristotle (1967 [1938]). Rhtorique (vol. 1, trans. by M. Dufour). Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Danblon, E. (2002). Rhtorique et rationalit: Essai sur lmergence de la critique et de la persuasion.
Bruxelles: d. de lUniversit de Bruxelles.
Danblon, E. (2013). Lhomme rhtorique: Culture, raison, action. Paris: ditions du Cerf.
De Pater, W.A. (1965). Les topiques dAristote et la dialectique platonicienne: Mthodologie de la dfinition.
Fribourg: Ed. St. Paul.
Dominicy, M. (2006). Perelman und die Brsseler Schule. In J. Kopperschmidt & E. Eggs (Eds.), Die neue
rhetorik: Studien zu Chaim Perelman (pp. 73-134). Munich: W. Fink Verlag.
Duprel, E. (1939). Esquisse dune philosophie des valeurs. Paris: Librairie Flix Alcan.
Duprel, E. (1949). Essais pluralistes. Paris: PUF.
Mayeur, I. (2015). Les notions confuses comme matire de lactivit rhtorique: postrit dun hritage
duprelien. In L. Nicolas (Ed.), Le fragile et le flou: Apprivoiser la prcarit, un art rhtorique,
forthcoming.
Nicolas, L. (2009). La fonction hroque: parole pidictique et enjeux de qualification. Rhetorica: A journal
of the History of Rhetoric, XXVII, 2, 115-141.
Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1952). Rhtorique et philosophie: Pour une thorie de
largumentation en philosophie. Bruxelles: Presses universitaires de Bruxelles.
Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1989 [1955]). Les notions et largumentation. In Rhtoriques (pp.
123-150). Bruxelles: Presses universitaires de Bruxelles.
Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969 [1958]). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (trans.
by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Perelman, Ch. (1978). Lusage et labus des notions confuses. Logique et Analyse, 81, 3-17.

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Perelman, Ch. (1979). Loriginalit de la pense dEugne Duprel ( loccasion du centenaire de sa

naissance). Bulletin de la classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et politiques, LXV, 60-71.
Perelman, Ch. (1982). Letter to Marcel Ct (January 4, 1982). Archives and Libraries of the ULB Fonds
Chaim Perelman: BE.ULB A&B ARCH.089PP (box 21).
Vernant, J.-P. (2006 [1965]). Myth and thought among the Greeks (trans. by J. Lloyd & J. Fort). New York:
Zone Books.
Sennett, R. (2008). The craftsman. New Haven: Yale University Press.

970

Verbs Of Appearance And Argument Schemes: Italian Sembrare

As An Argumentative Indicator
Johanna Miecznikowski & Elena Musi
Istituto di Studi italiani
Universit della Svizzera italiana
Lugano, Switzerland
johanna.miecznikowskifuenfschilling@usi.ch
Istituto di Studi italiani
Universit della Svizzera italiana
Lugano, Switzerland
elena.musi@usi.ch

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the role of verbs of appearance as argumentative indicators analysing
the uses of the Italian verb sembrare (seem) in a sample of 40 texts chosen from a corpus of reviews,
editorials and comment posts. An analysis conducted within the framework of the Argumentum Model of
Topics, shows that the verb, in its evidential-inferential uses, indicates specific argument schemes of the
symptomatic as well as the causal type.
KEYWORDS: argumentative indicators, Argumentum Model of Topics, causal argumentation, inferential
evidentiality, Pragma-Dialectics, symptomatic argumentation, syntagmatic argument schemes, verbs of
appearance

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the relations between verbs of appearance and argument schemes,
taking as an example the Italian verb sembrare (to seem) in its function as an
argumentative indicator1. In the framework of Pragma-Dialectics, the notion of
argumentative indicators has been defined as including all words and expressions that
refer to any of the moves that are significant to the argumentation process (van Eemeren,
Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007, p. 2). Such argumentative clues can belong to
different classes of linguistic items, ranging from verbs to conjunctions and to various
kinds of discourse markers2. Within Pragma-Dialectics, argumentative indicators have
been considered, above all, from the point of view of the analyst facing the task of
argumentative reconstruction. In this perspective, it has been underlined that indicators
1

The study presented is part of a research on the relationship between inferential uses of perception verbs
and argumentation conducted at the Universit della Svizzera italiana (From perception to inference.
Evidential, argumentative and textual aspects of perception predicates in Italian, SNF grant n.141350,
direction: Johanna Miecznikowski and Andrea Rocci, cf. http://www.perc-inferenza.ch).
2 Discourse markers are particles, connectives, sentence adverbs or more complex lexical expressions that do
not contribute to the propositional content of their host utterance, are syntactically poorly integrated and
whose primary function is to relate utterances to their co- and context at the textual, inferential or
interactional level. See Bazzanella (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the category and Miecznikowski
et al., 2009, for a corpus based analysis focussed on argumentative functions of the discourse connective
allora in Italian.

971

may work at different levels, signaling, for example, the engagement of the interactants in
a particular stage of a critical discussion3, argumentative moves or the presence of a
particular argumentation scheme. From a linguistic point of view, it is crucial to
acknowledge that the usefulness of indicators for the analyst depends on their usefulness
for the participants engaged in an argumentative interaction. Like other aspects of textual
or conversational structure, the construction of argumentative relations at the different
levels mentioned above is, in the first place, the participants task; functional categories
are emic, not etic (Pike 1954). What justifies the attribution of an indicator function to a
linguistic expression is, then, the potential of the expression to guide interlocutors and
readers in this task. In any particular context, this potential will depend both on the
expressions functions coded in a relatively stable manner in the linguistic system (e.g. in
the lexicon or in the domain of recurrent syntactic constructions and discourse routines)
and on the specific pragmatic configuration (Bazzanella & Miecznikowski 2009) the
expression is used in. As we will argue in our paper, corpus-based linguistic analysis,
focused on single expressions and their contexts of occurrence, can fruitfully contribute to
a better understanding of argumentative indicators in this sense.
Like other verbs of appearance interlinguistically (e.g. English to seem, Spanish
parecer), the verb sembrare has been attributed an evidential function in the linguistic
literature when occurring in certain syntactic and pragmatic contexts4. Evidentials specify
the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to the person making that
claim [] (Anderson, 1986, p. 274). The typological analysis of evidential systems has
shown that frequently grammaticalized types of justifications for assertions, otherwise
called information sources, means/ways of acquiring knowledge or modes of knowing, are
direct experience (eventually distinguished according to perceptual modality), inference,
and report/hearsay (cf. Willett 1988). Research on lexical evidentials (e.g. Squartini 2007)
suggests that these cognitive categories are relevant also in linguistic systems that do not
grammaticalize evidentiality, and it is in this line of thinking that the notion of
evidentiality is currently used to analyze the semantics of appearance verbs.
Evidentiality and argumentation are related because the justification of claims is,
of course, the defining feature of one of the central moves in argumentative discourse.
However, an important difference between evidentially marked utterances and full-fledged
argumentative moves is that, in the former case, the speaker signals the presence of
evidence in favor of his or her assertion and categorizes that evidence in a generic fashion,
whereas in the latter case, the speaker establishes a discourse relation between the
assertion and one or more specific arguments given in the text. By consequence, speakers
can use evidentials both to support argumentation, contributing to establish argument3

According to the Pragma-Dialectical framework (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992), argumentation
takes place within the context of a critical discussion involving protagonists and antagonists that critically
test standpoints in order to reduce a difference of opinion. According to that model, the subtasks, or stages,
defining a critical discussion are the confrontation stage (a difference of opinion is made explicit), the
opening stage (the interactants commit themselves to resolve the difference of opinion and agree upon some
basic assumptions and rules), the argumentation stage (arguments are put forward to justify or refute
standpoints), and the concluding stage.
4 Appearance verbs and evidential uses of perception verbs have been studied in Romance and Germanic
languages by Usoniene, 2001, Pietrandrea, 2005, Cornillie, 2007, 2009, Aijmer, 2009, Diewald & Smirnova,
2010, Strik Lievers, 2012, Musi, in press a, b. For a diachronic perspective cf. Gisborne & Holmes, 2007 and
Whitt, 2011 on English and Musi, 2014 on Italian sembrare.

972

conclusion relations present in a critical discussion, and as an alternative to argumentation,

merely suggesting the relevance of evidence without actually formulating any arguments.
Recent studies at the semantic-argumentative interface (Miecznikowski, 2011; Rocci,
2008, 2012, 2013) have concentrated on the argumentation supporting function of modal
and evidential expressions, arguing that, in argumentative contexts, these expressions
function as indicators strengthening and categorizing argument-conclusion relations. One
of the basic ideas is that the evidential categorization of modes of knowing in an utterance
restricts the range of argument schemes with which the utterance is compatible. In the
present analysis, we will develop this idea, showing that sembrare constructions
preferentially occur with certain argument schemes and insisting in the role of the verbs
lexical meaning at this regard. Argument schemes will be analyzed and reconstructed
using the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2010).
In section 3, after having presented our data, we will provide an overview of the
syntactic constructions of sembrare associated with evidential meanings and explain why
these constructions are good candidates to function as argumentative indicators. We will
then focus on sembrare as an indicator of argument schemes. We will discuss existing
research on copulative constructions with appearance verbs as indicators of argument
schemes (section 4), before presenting the results of our corpus study (section 5).
2. DATA
The data considered in this paper consist of 40 texts taken from a mixed corpus of reviews,
editorials and posts published in the comment spaces associated with reviews and
editorials.5. The texts in our corpus have been collected from the Italian daily newspapers
La Stampa and La Repubblica and from four thematic websites about art exhibitions
(www.mostreinmostra.it), music (www.fullsong.it), haute cuisine
(www.passionegourmet.it) and consumer electronics (www.digital.it).
The choice of these text genres is motivated by the important role argumentation
plays in them and by the variety of activity fields they cover. In editorials, journalists
express an opinion, mostly on a political matter, backing it up by arguments. In reviews,
experts or consumers evaluate an object on the basis of firsthand experience as well as
field-specific knowledge and values (Miecznikowski, in press). Comment spaces allow for
a lot of variation in terms of text genres. Argumentation is common in most types of posts,
however. On one hand, users react to the standpoints and arguments put forward in the text
they comment on; on the other hand, on the metacommunicative level, users formulate
opinions about the text as such, usually backing up their judgment by at least one
argument6.

The corpus has been compiled within the project From perception to inference. We would like to thank
Martina Cameroni, Giuliana Di Febo and Francesca Saltamacchia for their contribution to data collection.
6
See Miecznikowski & Musi (submitted), who adopt a genre perspective to investigate the relationship
between reviews published online and the posts published in the corresponding comment spaces.

973

3. SEMBRARE CONSTRUCTIONS
The verb sembrare semantically presupposes two participants, namely an experiencer and
an experienced. The experience in question can be entirely mental or involve perception.
The mental/perceptual process undergone by the experiencer is expressed by
various syntactic constructions in which the experiencer role is either expressed by an
indirect object NP or left implicit. The main form-function patterns attested with sembrare
are the following:
I. Copula constructions asserting similarity between two elements (a, b), the first having
a set of properties identical to a set of properties of another individual:
1. [Marco] a sembra [suo padre] b .
Marco looks like his father.
II. Copula constructions and infinitive constructions asserting the existence of clues to
attribute a property B to an individual a and warranting the implicature, under certain
circumstances, that the speaker indeed attributes B to a:
2. [Marco] a (mi) sembra [affamato/aver fame] B .
Marco seems hungry/to be hungry (to me).
In (2), the speaker states that Marco has a set of (unspecified) properties that normally
warrant the attribution of the property to be hungry. Without contextual clues to the
contrary, the hearer may infer that the experiencer (here: the speaker) holds the weak
belief that Marco is hungry.
III. Constructions with a complement clause in subject function. These directly and
explicitly attribute a belief to the experiencer, presupposing that this belief is based on
available evidence:
3. (Mi) sembra [che Marco sia stanco] p.
It seems (to me) that Marco is tired.
In type I contexts, the experiencer usually coincides with the speaker and is left implicit.
The experience encoded by sembrare is that of grasping the results of a process of
comparison and the verb does not have an evidential function in this construction7.
In contexts of the types II and III sembrare can fulfill evidential functions under two
conditions. The first condition is that the experiencer hold the (albeit weak) belief p. This
7

The process of comparison is presupposed by the propositional content of p (similarity), whereas evidential
operators are independent of the content of the proposition in their scope. In fact, in (1), the speaker commits
herself to asserting the results of the comparison process, leaving the mode of knowing proper unspecified:
(1) is both compatible with a situation in which the speaker has seen how Marco and Marcos father look
and infers the similarity relation on that basis, and with a situation in which the speaker has come to know
about the resemblance between father and son by hearsay.

974

depends on context in II, whereas the experiencers holding a belief is encoded

grammatically in III, where the complement clause strongly suggests the presence of a
proposition, i.e. of a third order entity that can be attributed a truth value and thus become
a term of a belief relation.8 When this condition is fulfilled, sembrare denotes a complex
situation in which someone holds a belief on the basis of some available evidence. The
second condition is that the experiencer coincide with the speaker and that the experience
take place in the moment of speech. In that case, exemplified by (2) and (3) above, the
verb has a performative character (Faller 2002), i.e. knowledge acquisition is not reported,
but presented as achieved in the moment of speech, and the relation between p and the
available evidence is mapped onto the ongoing speech event.
When sembrare is used evidentially, it always signals an indirect mode of
knowing, i.e. either inference or hearsay/report. In this paper, we will be concerned
especially with the verbs inferential uses. Example (2) above is a typical case: if the
speaker holds the belief that Marco is hungry, this belief is based on a reasoning process
that takes into account a set of Marcos properties in combination with further, more
general, premises. In what follows, we will take a closer look at the type of reasoning
sembrare is compatible with.
4. SYMPTOMATIC ARGUMENTATION
In the pragma-dialectic approach, three main types of argument schemes are distinguished,
namely those based on a symptomatic relation, those based on a relation of analogy and
those based on a causal relation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 98-99). In
symptomatic argumentation, the argument (minor premise) and the standpoint have a
common referent (X) but different predicates, as visualized in the scheme:
Y is true of X
Because
Z is true of X
AND
Z is typical (characteristic/symptomatic) of Y
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 98)

The property attributed to X in the minor premise is a symptom of the property ascribed
to it in the standpoint. The major premise states the association between entities or
situations which justifies the relation between the argument and the standpoint. The
critical questions underlying symptomatic argumentation are the following:
- Is Z indeed typical of Y?
- Is Z not also typical of somethingelse (Y)?
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 99)

According to Garssen (1997, p. 77-101) the category of symptomatic

argumentation encompasses different subtypes of arguments such as those based on a
classification, on genus-species relations, on definition and on evaluation critieria.
8

According to Lyons classification of ontological entities (1977, pp. 438-452), taken up also in Functional
Discourse Grammar (Dik, 1997), propositions are third order entities which can be judged in terms of truth
value, whereas (differently from second order entities, i.e. states of affairs) they cannot be located in space
and time.

975

Van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans (2007, p. 160) identify copulative
constructions in which the predicative is an adjective or noun containing the copula to be,
or its modal variants to seem/appear, as particularly suitable to form the standpoint or the
minor premise in a symptomatic argumentation. According to these scholars, the
abovementioned copulative constructions are good candidates to signal symptomatic
argumentation because the copula normally refers to states rather than to events or
processes, mirroring the nature of symptomatic argumentation, which is about qualities
and features rather than about events or processes.
In analogy with van Eemerens, Houtlossers & Snoeck Henkemans (2007)
proposal, also Italian sembrare can be hypothesized to be associated with symptomatic
argument schemes. Lexical semantic arguments lend further support to this hypothesis.
One of the core elements of the meaning of sembrare is the idea of similarity. This idea is
present not only in the type I contexts discussed in the previous section, but also in
inferential uses. In the type II contexts, in particular, the identification of clues to the
presence of a property B often relies on a process of categorization by which a specific
individual or situation is matched to a category (proto)type:
(4) Sembra una beffa la conclusione del processo Mills-Berlusconi. Dopo anni di

preparazione, mesi di udienze, non abbiamo neanche un verdetto sulla

colpevolezza o meno dellex premier Berlusconi.
The conclusion of the Berlusconi Mills trial seems a farce. After years of
preparation, months of hearings, we do not even have a verdict on the guiltiness or
innocence of the former Prime Minister Berlusconi.
(La Repubblica, editorial, February 2012)
In example (4), the speaker categorizes a trial as a farce. One plausible reconstruction of
this process of categorization is that the author compares what he has observed to his idea
of typical farces:
The conclusion of the MillsBerlusconi trial seems a farce
Because after months of preparation the trial has not produced a verdict (i.e. no
goal has been reached and, by consequent, the participants acts appears to be
meaningless)
(and it is typical of farces that one cannot recognize any sense in peoples acting).
The schema of similarity activated by sembrare fosters the establishment of a link between
the minor premise, in which a property is attributed to the first term of comparison, and
the major premise, in which the same property is recognized as being typical of the classes
of farces.

976

5. SEMBRARE AND ARGUMENT SCHEMES IN EDITORIALS, REVIEWS AND

COMMENTS
5.1 Analytical approach
Sembrare occurs 52 times in our corpus. 39 occurrences are performative; among these, 2
are of type I construction, 17 of type II and 20 of type III. In order to find out which are
the argument schemes compatible with sembrare, we have analyzed the local co- and
context of all tokens in order to determine plausible implicit premises and have
reconstructed the inferential relations applying the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti,
2006, Rigotti, 2009a, Rigotti & Greco-Morasso, 2010).
Compared to the pragma-dialectical approach to argument schemes illustrated in the
preceding section, AMT allows for a more detailed analysis of implicit premises.
According to AMT, the inferential structure of any argumentation presupposes the
presence of both procedural and material premises. Procedural premises have the form of
maxims that define the inferential connections at issue. They are based on loci, pieces of
an ontology shared by the speech community which bind the truth value of the standpoint
to the acceptance by the considered public of propositions referring to specified aspects of
the ontology of the standpoint (Rigotti, 2006, p. 527). Material premises are of two types:
the endoxon, a major premise that refers to shared general knowledge and is often left
implicit, and the datum, a factual (minor) premise that is often (but not necessarily) made
explicit. In order to generate relevant arguments, as represented in the schema in fig. 1,
procedural and material components must be combined in a double syllogistic structure:

Fig.1: The Argumentum Model of Topics.

977

5.2 Sembrare as an indicator of symptomatic argumentation

Our data confirm the role of sembrare as an indicator of symptomatic relations. The verb
is indeed compatible with symptomatic argumentation in each of its constructions. More
specifically, the attested subtypes of argument schemes exploit ontological relations from
definition, from the parts to the whole, from implications and from concomitances.
To illustrate this group of argument schemes, we will reconstruct an example taken
from an editorial of the Italian daily newspaper La Stampa about a speech in support of
democracy as a prerequisite for peace, which Pope Wojtya delivered in occasion of the
disorders in Iraq during 2003:
(5) Dunque siamo grati dal profondo del cuore a Giovanni Paolo II per la
costanza e la determinazione con cui ha levato la voce (una voce anche
fisicamente piu' alta e chiara, sembra che stia assai meglio ed questo un altro
motivo di consolazione).
Therefore we are deeply grateful to John Paul II for the persistence and the
determinacy with which he has raised his voice (a voice also physically louder and
clearer, it seems that he is in much better health and this comforts us even more).
(La Stampa, editorial, April 2003)
In (5), the verb sembrare indicates that that the speaker is committed to the proposition
John Paul II is in much better health on the basis of the fact that the Popes voice is
louder and clearer than before. This piece of evidence is a datum made explicit in the text.
As to the ontological relationship between a loud voice and a state of good health, it can
be conceptualized in different manners. The example might be analyzed as an instance of
reasoning from the effect to the cause, if we view a loud voice as a result of the proper
functioning of a healthy organism. Alternatively, it could be hypothesized that good health
and a loud and clear voice are properties that are frequently associated in the experience of
the speaker and the hearer, giving rise to argumentation by concomitance.
Yet another solution could be proposed, in virtue of the fact that the journalist, in
this text, has chosen to institute John Pauls voice as a discourse referent and to attribute a
property to it. The journalist seems to underline the object-like status of the Popes voice,
rather than the event of the Pope using his voice. For this reason, a part-whole relationship
might be relevant in this example. If we assume that the voice is a relevant part of a person
and that loudness and clearness are synonyms of healthiness when applied to a voice, the
property of healthiness can be transferred from the voice to the entire person, through a
maxim like the one proposed in the following reconstruction:

978

Fig 2. Argumentative reconstruction exploiting a locus from the parts to the whole

The validity of the transfer is, of course, questionable. As underlined by van Eemeren &
Garssen (2009), only absolute structure-dependent properties, such as those expressing
colours or materials, are always transferrable. The choice of sembrare, which signals weak
commitment, is congruent with such a context.
5.4. Sembrare as an indicator of causal argumentation
As we have seen discussing the preceding example, symptomatic argumentation does not
exclude causal schemes (from the effect to the cause). In a number of contexts, however,
causality be it from the effect to the cause or from the final cause (Rigotti 2009b) is
even the most prominent ontological relation warranting the inferential transition from
argument to conclusion. We have found cases of this type mostly in contexts in which
speakers refer to the field of human action. In this use of sembrare, the preferred syntactic
construction in the corpus is the complement clause construction.
The example we propose is taken from a post published on the website of the
Italian daily newspaper La Repubblica, which comments on an editorial about Silvio
Berlusconis defeat in the 2011 elections:
(6) La saga SB [Silvio Berlusconi] stata una tragedia italiana che ha fatto
rivivere atteggiamenti machisti ed incolti che ci hanno riportato indietro di
decenni quando il nostro Paese nuotava ancora nellanalfabetismo e le nonne si
stupivano della nuova invenzione della televisione. Fortunatamente sembra che il
Paese sia uscito dallo stato ipnotico in cui i vari programmi televisivi lo avevano
affogato.
The saga of SB [Silvio Berlusconi] has been a tragedy characterized by a revival
of machism and uncultivated attitudes that have taken us decades back, when our
979

country was still swimming in illiteracy and grandmothers were amazed in front of
the new invention of television. Luckily, it seems that the country has woken up
from the hypnotic state in which the various television programs had drowned it.
(La Repubblica, post commenting on an editorial, June 2011)
The author claims that the country has got out of the hypnotic state in which the various
television programs had drowned it. The arguments supporting this claim are largely left
implicit, which is related to the highly interactive and inter-textual situation typical of
forum discussions. In order to reconstruct the writers argumentation, we have supplied
the missing premises on the basis of linguistic and contextual clues and we have
interpreted the metaphorical expression getting out of an hypnotic state, hypothesizing
that the author intends to stress the citizens regaining consciousness and agency:

Fig. 3: Argumentative reconstruction exploiting a locus from causes

The fact that citizens have not reelected Berlusconi is highly salient in this comment space
and can therefore function as a datum although it is not mentioned. The presence of the
adverb luckily in the standpoint as well as the claim that the country was in a state of
backwardness due to Berlusconis government show that the author considers Berlusconis
defeat as an advantage for the Italian people, an opinion that emerges also in other parts of
the text. Considering La Repubblicas political orientation, the author can assume that
many readers share this opinion as an endoxon. The maxim at work is causal and is part of
an ontology of human action (agents normally act in such a way as to obtain results that
are advantageous for them), making it possible to reconstruct the pragmatic reasoning of
agents. As a result, a certain state of mind of agents is infered from these agents deeds.

980

Like in (5), the reasoning is defeasible, due to the defeasibility of the maxim (agents may
act without being fully aware of their acts consequences).
5.5. Discussion
The data we have examined shows that sembrare can indicate symptomatic argumentation
in any of its constructions, while it tends to be associated to causal relations only in the
most pragmaticalized one (the one in which it functions most clearly as a propositional
operator, rather than as a predicate attributed to a specific subject). The semantic
relationship between causal reasoning and the lexical meaning feature /similarity/ is also
rather weak. Both observations lead to the hypothesis that the possibility to express causal
reasoning might be mediated by the dominant evidential function of the complement
clause construction, which shifts language users attention from the lexemes core
meaning to the pragmatic operation of indicating an indirect mode of knowing.
Nevertheless, that functional generalization is not complete. Even in complement
clause constructions, sembrare is not compatible with any argument scheme, and
symptomatic and causal arguments share some relevant features. One of these is that the
various argument schemes of this group are based on loci that we can define
syntagmatic, following Rigotti (2006):
we speak of syntagmatic loci to indicate all the classes of arguments that refer to aspects that are
ontologically linked to the standpoint, either directly or indirectly, such as[..] the relationship
between the whole and its constituent parts; included in this group of loci are also the classes of
arguments which assume as their hooking point those pieces of world, traditionally called causes,
effects, circumstances and concomitances, that condition the state of affairs the standpoint refers to.
(Rigotti, 2006, p. 528)

The term syntagmatic loci has been adopted in the AMT framework (e.g. Rigotti, 2007) to
oppose these to the paradigmatic ones, in which the argument and the standpoint refer to
ontologically independent states of affairs and are rather linked by relations in absentia
such as opposition or analogy. The AMT model distinguishes, moreover, the intermediate
class of complex loci encompassing those cases which present features of both
syntagmatic and paradigmatic argument schemes. A typical example of a complex locus is
the locus from authority, which establishes a causal relation between the qualities of an
author and the truth of his or her discourse, while there is no direct ontological relation
between the state of affairs referred to in the standpoint and the communicative situation
in which the authoritative discourse is uttered.9
Sembrare appears to be compatible with syntagmatic loci and, in the hearsay
reading of the complement clause construction, with the complex locus of authority as
well (e.g. A quanto dicono, sembra che la sinistra vincer le elezioni, According to what
they say, the right wing will win the elections).

Cicero proposes, in his Topica (see Riposati, 1947, pp. 34-35), a distinction between intrinsic loci (alii in
eo ipso de quo agitur haerent, some [loci] are linked to the subject of the discussion), and extrinsic loci (alii
assumuntur extrinsecus, other [loci] are derived from outside). This topical taxonomy has been further
elaborated by Boethius in his De Topiciis Differentiis (see Stump, 2004), who also suggests a third category
of loci medii situated between the intrinsic and the extrinsic loci.

981

Another restriction, which regards causality, is that sembrare is not equally compatible
with any causal argument scheme. We have found several instances of argumentation from
the effect to the cause, but none from the cause to the effect, neither in inferences
concerning the past or present nor in predictions. The following set of constructed
examples illustrates this tendency. Whereas the conclusion introduced by sembra in (7a)
can easily be derived from the premise expressed in the preceding statement, this is not the
case in (7b), where sembra (in contrast to other solutions such as deve must) is
acceptable only if additional perceptual or hearsay evidence is assumed to be available in
the context:
(7a) Marco ha una faccia stanchissima. Sembra che abbia fatto tardi ieri sera .
Marco has a very tired face. It seems he went to bed late, yesterday night.
(7b) ?Marco ha fatto tardi ieri sera. Sembra che sia stanchissimo. [perceptual or
hearsay evidence required].
?Marco went to bed late yesterday night. It seems that he is really tired.
In predictions, inferential sembrare seems to be less acceptable with the future tense than
when it is combined with a periphrasis such as stare per, which indicates a phase
immediately prior to an event, or with alethic dovere must with future reference, which
indicates a situation that will cause an event:
(8a) (Mi) sembra che stia per/debba cadere. (To me), it looks as if he/she/it is
about to fall.
(8b)?(Mi) sembra che cadr. (To me), it looks as if he/she/it will fall.
A possible explanation of these patterns is a temporal one: by choosing inferential
sembrare speakers typically signal that the available datum allows to infer a simultaneous
state of affairs. This is compatible with the basic scheme of symptomatic argumentation
(cf. section 4) and is evident in the cases illustrated by the examples (1) to (5) discussed in
previous sections; but this analysis applies also to (a). The extension to causal inferences
about the past illustrated by (6) and (7) could be mediated by the passato prossimo, since
one of the functions of this tense is to denote a resultant state. The resultant state is, by the
way, communicatively highly relevant in our example (6). We are aware of apparent
exceptions to this generalization such as the use of sembrare in weather forecasts or with
the passato remoto:
(9) (observing the sky): Sembra che piover. It seems it will rain.
(10) Mi sembra che il centro commerciale fu costruito negli anni 70.
As far as I know, the shopping mall was built in the Seventies.
However, these examples may be considered instances of mixed loci that share less
properties with inferential uses of sembrare than with the verbs hearsay uses, which,
according to our data, are not subject to any temporal restriction. In (10), a context type
that is not attested in our corpus, the knowledge source is recall from memory, whereas
(9), for cultural reasons, may be framed as a semiotic practice of sign reading rather than

982

being an instance of genuine causal reasoning10. Further research on appearance verbs

expressing inferences about the past and the future is needed to corroborate this
hypothesis.
6. CONCLUSION
The empirical study presented in this paper has shown that evidential uses of Italian
sembrare can be used to introduce a standpoint and that they constrain the set of relevant
argument schemes. The lexical meaning of sembrare makes this verb compatible with
symptomatic as well as certain causal argument schemes which may be subsumed under
the wider category of syntagmatic or mixed argument schemes. According to a hypothesis
that has to be checked against a larger and more varied set of data, inferential uses (a)
show a preference to express a temporal relation of simultaneity between the datum and
the conclusion, which (b) can be extended to reasonings about non simultaneous causes
and effects, especially when the verb is combined with temporal and modal markers that
encode a posteriority or anteriority relation between an event and a state11.
Lexical semantic analysis, syntactic analysis and the argumentative reconstruction
of texts are all necessary to understand which inferential processes are encoded by
evidential constructions and to define their function as argumentative indicators in
discourse. Perception and appearance verbs combine epistemic stance marking and
evidential meanings and often occur in contexts in which the justifications at the basis of
the uttered proposition are left implicit. Their polysemy and dependance on syntactic
constructions calls for a fine-grained, context-sensitive semantic analysis.
The investigation of evidential and modal verbs usefully completes the growing
body of research on discourse markers as argumentative indicators. Discourse markers, for
example conclusion introducing connectives or concessive markers are useful to the
analyst to recognize stance and argumentative moves, while evidentials and modals appear
to be particularly relevant to argumentative analysis with regard to stancetaking and
argument schemes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank the participant to the 8th Conference of the International Society
for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) for their very helpful comments and suggestions.

It may be relevant, at this regard, that Italian modal verbs behave atypically as well in
meteorological contexts, as shows the use of deve in Deve piovere it will rain, discussed by Squartini,
2004 and Rocci, 2013:143.
11 As far as future reference is concerned, the role played by lexical and modal verbs implying
posteriority relations has been examined by Miecznikowski, under review, on the basis of an Italian
corpus of economic predictions.
10

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The Role Of Ethos In Presidential Argument By Definition

Maureen C. Minielli
Department of Communications and Performing Arts
City University of New York
USA
mminielli@kbcc.cuny.edu

ABSTRACT: This paper examines ethos in conjunction with an orators use of argument by definition.
Scant research exists regarding the use of definition in an oratorical situation by a notable figure holding a
position of power. This paper argues that the American presidents position and institution are additional
elements of ethos that may enhance or detract from his ability to successful employ a definition of x.
KEYWORDS: ethos, American president, argumentation, persuasion, definition, argument by definition

1. INTRODUCTION
Ragsdale & Theis III (1997, p. 1281) point out that research on the American presidency
as an institution embraces a long-standing position that the key feature of the office is the
president and that these studies often focus on how presidents differ in personality,
leadership, and decision-making. This paper shifts the focus toward the Office and
Institution of the American Presidency as an extension of how presidents employ
argument by definition and its subsequent implications for the concept of ethos.
Substantial literature exists about the role of ethos in the fields of argumentation
and rhetoric, political science, history, and philosophy, among others, but scant research
exists regarding the use of definition in an oratorical situation by a notable figure holding a
noteworthy, powerful position of leadership. This paper rectifies that oversight be
examining definitional usage based from the perspective of the office, or the daily job, and
institution, or the storied, gloried executive branch, of the American presidency.
This paper confects ideas, theories, and positions from the communication studies,
political science, political theology, philosophy and comparative literature disciplines,
particularly the works of Lee Sigelman, Ruth Amossy, and David Zarefsky, to examine
how presidents extend beyond defining x via their personal ethos, to the American
presidencys office and institution as additional definitional means in order to obtain their
intended objective. It begins with a review of the difference between argument from
definition and argument by definition. It then summarizes what is known about the
President as a definer before examining argument by definition from the office and
institutional standpoints. The paper concludes with positive and negative implications
when definitions of these types are engaged.

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2. ARGUMENT FROM DEFINTION AND ARGUMENT BY DEFINITION

This paper is a follow-up to my 2010 ISSA paper presentation discerning between
argument from definition and argument by definition (see Minielli, 2011), using the
American presidency as the interlocutor example. The previous paper argued that
argument from definition places the intellectual locus on the definition itself whereas
argument by definition shifts the locus to the orator or user of the definition. The previous
paper claims that Individuals who define (create) or redefine (modify) a word or phrase
when engaging in argument by definition often garner significant power and control that
could become problematic if left unchecked (p. 1299)
A section of my previous paper argued that institutional legitimacy, or the power
of institutions to advance definitions, is well noted in argumentation scholarship.
Referencing competing definitions of X, Schwarze (2002, 139) argues that, in addition
to persuasion and coercion, in the realm of public policy, the empowerment of a
definition is dependent on the legitimacy of the institution authorized to define the term
and that institutional arguments justify the acceptance or rejection of a particular
definition (p. 143). Titsworth (1999, p. 183) notes the power resulting from public
institutional definitions privilege[s] the perspectives of those in power, resulting in not
only a legitimization of those perspectives, but also becomes a mechanism of hegemony
where institutional power over the individual [is] expanded. But scant research in
presidential rhetoric exists. Institutional legitimacy has been addressed in presidential
crisis literature, including power (Windt, 1973; Young, 1992), institutional failure
(Zagacki, 1992; Brummert, 1975), and presidential personalization of and blending with
institution (see Gonchar and Hahn, 1971, 1973; Gibson and Felkins, 1974). This paper
adds to what remains an understudied area.
3. THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT AS DEFINER AND HIS OCCUPATIONAL ROLES
The American president enjoys some level of privilege when it comes to advancing
definitions. Jamieson (1988, p. 240) points out that in some settings the ethos of a
speaker is sufficient to sustain a case, meaning his ability to define is accepted based on
the man serving as president and nothing more. Neustadt (1990, p. 11) famously
recognized the importance of presidential ethos when he claimed that Presidential power
is the power to persuade. Zarefsky (1986, p. 1) extends Neustadt by arguing that when it
comes to presidents, the power to persuade is, in large measure, the power to define.
The paper posits that advances of technology coupled with a no-holds-barred
media approach analyzing every aspect of the contemporary American presidency has
transformed the definitional nature of the American presidency and has expanded from the
person occupying the office to include the office and its institutional nature. Hart (1987,
p. 202) states that because rhetorical skills have been highlighted so often during the last
forty years, they have changed how people view the executive branch of government
itself. One reason why it has changed is the heightened visibility and public awareness of
the Presidents different roles.

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3.1 Presidential roles

The presidents traditional roles are largely known. For example, the president is the
Commander-in-Chief, or head of Americas military. From a rhetorical perspective,
Zarefsky (2004, p. 616) suggests that when a president defines a situation as a crisis, the
ensuing supportive response by Congress and the public is immediate, and thus allows the
president to take on the persona of the commander-in-chief.
The president is also known as Chief Executive or the Head of State. Bose and
Greenstein (2002, p. 186) state that As head of state, the American president is a symbol
of unity. Like a constitutional monarch, he is expected to be a noncontroversial
representative of the entire nation. They (2002, pp. 186-187) also refer to the president as
the Nations Chief Political Leader, arguing that
As the nations chief political leader, however, he must engage in the intrinsically divisive prime
ministerial tasks of political problem solving. The tendency of presidents to sully their public
images by conspicuous displays of politicking may be one reason why their public support often
erodes in the course of their presidencies.

Coe & Neumann (2011, p. 142) state that the American president is the reference point
among journalists and citizens alike for much of Americas international conduct.
The president is also known as the Constitutional Leader, as identified by Caeser,
Thurow, Tulis, and Dessette, among others (Dorsey, 2002, pp. 5-6), although that role may
not be as well known. Zarefsky (1997, p. 6), referencing Basso (1994), states that
constitutionality has a strong effect in determining what kinds of problems are and are
not considered within governments legitimate scope. Subsequently there have been
several studies examining the presidents Constitutional role and its gradual expansion,
most notably Schlesingers 1973 book The Imperial Presidency.
A related but lesser known role is what I call Civic Duties, based on Goodnight
(2002, p. 201). Goodnight argues that
all presidential leadership is a civic art constituted by public enactments of the presidency. Civic
performances distinguish each administration as the executive deploys inherent and implied powers
within the federal arenas of shared and separated authority. Individual presidential actions
constitute individual interpretations of Constitutional text, original intent, and historical practice in
light of contemporary governmental and political constraints and opportunities. Collectively,
administration performances achieve the shape and significance by virtue of the public arguments
among all those who prerogatives and responsibilities are affected by the policies and fortunes of a
presidency.

He continues, arguing that

it is fair to say that the signature of a specific rhetorical presidency is constituted in the ongoing
emphasis, interpretation, and enactment of a democratically elected candidate within and against
the expected roles of chief executive, legislative leader, opinion/party leader, commander in chief,
chief diplomat, and member of the first family of the United States as these performances unfold
to meet and cross the elite and public expectations of an era (2002, p. 204).

Beyond these traditional roles, scholars have identified additional ones. Older ones include
Lowis The Personal President (1986) and Stuckeys Interpreter-in-Chief (1991), and

988

newer ones highlight Nelsons Evolving Presidency (2007), Edwards Strategic President
(2009), Beschlosss Presidential Courage (2008) and the latest edition of Greensteins
Presidential Difference (2009).
In addition to heightened awareness of presidential roles is increasing scrutiny of
presidential oratory as it is often viewed as a means of exerting presidential power and
leadership.
3.2 Presidential oratory
A presidents definitional usage is also contingent on the rhetorical events he is
participating. His definition of x depends largely upon the traditional characteristics of
rhetorical criticism: the situation, the speaker, and the audience. A fourth characteristic,
the media, is also examined as it now contributes to definitional usage and degrees of
acceptance.
3.2.1 The situation, the speaker, and the audience
Sigelman (2001, p. 11) suggests that there are three types of presidential addresses:
ceremonial occasions, international issues, and domestic issues. Referencing Campbell &
Jamieson (1990), he notes that presidential addresses vary widely in substance and style.
Inaugural addresses, for example, constitute a rhetorical genre quite distinct from war
messages. He argues that presidential addresses have a common goal of unifying the
nation behind the president, but different circumstances may lead a president to pursue
different means of achieving that goal (p. 10) In other words, the oratorical situation
itself carries with it pre-established presidential ethos, like the Inaugural or State of the
Union addresses. Sigelman (2001, p. 4) does warn that major addresses are subject to a
number of generic expectations (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990), but these are so bound up
in the situated identities of the presidents who deliver the addresses that the two cannot be
really separated.
The speaker is a second traditional analysis element of rhetorical criticism.
Sigelman (2001, p. 4) identifies what he calls the presidential persona, and states that it is
found in occasions where presidents were most highly motivated to exercise special care
in self-presentation. Rice (2010, p. 9) points out that it is the language of the speaker that
is used to establish his character. Citing Leary (1995), Sigelman (2001, p. 2) states that
the incentive to make the right impression varies as a function of the publicness of the
performance and the perceived importance of the role. Referencing Schlenker (1986 p.
27), Sigelman further states that those who are publicly performing a highly salient role
tend to be especially aware that they are presenting evidence for others to contemplate,
evaluate, and respond
Sigelmans observation highlights a third traditional element of rhetorical
criticism, namely the audience. He argues that in the era of the public relations
presidency (Brace & Hinckey, 1993, p. 382), when presidential leadership increasingly
consists of going public in a full-dress campaign mode to maintain public support
(Kernell, 1986), impression management becomes an ever more vital governance tool
(2001, p. 16). He also also states that as Schlenker and Weigold (1992, p. 155) remind us,

989

what is as important, if not more important, than the public or private nature of a
performance is the audience that is salient to the actor at the time of the performance.
3.2.2 The media
Sigelman (2001 p. 18) introduces the element of the media when he points out that there
are degrees of publicness with regards to a presidents oratory: differences between,
say, a televised speech to the nation and a briefing session with reporters, or between an
informal work session with trusted advisors and a scheduled meeting with a delegation of
dignitaries.
Zarefsky (1997, pp. 6-7) states that there are several ways one definition can be
more effective than another. One way would be for the definition to be associated with a
dramatic event that generates a new frame of reference. Predominantly, Zarefsky points
out, what determines the acceptability of a frame is a more prosaic series of questions
that relate to its political acceptability, comprehensiveness, and authoritative grounding.
He continues by arguing that These factors not only determine the definition of an event
as a public problem but answer the question of who owns the problem. Referencing
Rochefort and Cobb (1994) and Portz (1994), Zarefsky points out that Problem
ownership means domination of the way a concept or social concern is thought of and
acted upon.
As such, due to the advent of heightened role knowledge and greater access and
awareness of him through the media, a leader like the American president may no longer
be able to rely solely on his own personal ethos for definitional usage. Increasingly
American presidents are extending or borrowing credibility from other related areas like
the office and institution of the presidency. The rest of the paper addresses the how they
are doing this and its ramifications, based on the work of Ruth Amossy.
4. AMOSSY AND INSTITUTIONAL ETHOS
Ruth Amossy, in her 2001 essay entitled Ethos at the Crossroads of Disciplines: Rhetoric,
Pragmatics, Sociology, examines ethos from the orator and institutional perspectives.
Amossy argues that the orators prior ethos and the ethos created through the oratorical act
are related to the authority derived from an exterior institutional status (p. 9).
Amossy (2001, p. 20) states that the construction of an ethos in the discourse
often aims to displace or modify the prior image of the speaker. In some cases, the speaker
can heavily rely on the prior ethos; the speaker only has to confirm a preexisting image he
or she sees as appropriate to persuasion goals. In other cases, the speaker has to erase
dimensions of his or her person that are not altogether clear to the public. In this sense,
an orator like a president may borrow from institutional ethos if his prior ethos is not
strong enough to support his goals. In some instances the institutional ethos can be used to
replace a less than satisfactory prior ethos as well. Amossy (2001, p. 21) states that the
status enjoyed by orators, together with their public images, delimit their authority at the
moment they take the floor. Yet the construction of the image of self within the discourse
has, in turn, the capacity to modify the prior representations and to confer credibility and
authority upon the speaker, meaning oratory does have the power to alter a speakers
ethos. Amossy (2001, p. 21) argues further that it contributes to the production of new
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images and helps to transform positions in the field while participating in the fields
dynamic and the discursive ethos thus produced seeks to procure for the speaker a longterm benefit which could well make a difference.
While Amossy points out several benefits associated with institutional ethos, it
would foolish to believe that some negative effects do not exist when a president extends
beyond his self when employing and justifying definitions. The next section examines
how a president uses the office and the institution of the presidency to enhance his
definitional attempts of x beyond personal ethos.
5. THE OFFICE AND INSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY AS
ADDITIONAL DEFINING ENTITIES
For purposes of this paper, I am differentiating between the office of the presidency and
the institution of the presidency. When I refer to the office, I am referencing the job.
This includes the daily activities of the president in the White House like staff meetings,
policy work, and decision-making. Well call this the job persona. When I refer to the
institution, I am referencing the symbolic nature of the presidency, including its
Constitutional designation and often rhetorical references to its history, its stature, prestige
and prominence, as well as its domestic and international placement in the political world.
Ragsdale & Theis (1997, p. 1282) support this position when they state that as an
organization achieves stability and value, it becomes an institution.
5.1 The office of the American presidency
Little research exists on the daily job of the president from a definitional standpoint. Tulis
(1987, p. 7) points out that many political scientists see the evolution of the modern
executive to include the regular active initiation and supervision of a legislative
program, the use of the veto to oppose legislation as a matter of partisan policy rather than
of constitutional propriety; the development and institutionalization of a large White
House staff; and the development and use of unilateral powers, such as executive
agreements in place of treaties, or the withholding of documents from Congress under the
doctrines of executive privilege, although Tulis sees these developments as a more of a
maturation than an evolution of the institution (p. 8). Media reporting of the job
persona has served to increase public awareness of the job as well as the presidents
various roles. In addition, the widespread use of the Internet now allows interested parties
access to the Presidents daily events through the Presidents Daily Schedule available
online at whitehouse.gov (see White House Schedule September 15, 2014). In many
ways the job portion of the Presidency has become more transparent and accessible.
Zarefsky (2004, p. 611) claims that because of his prominent political position
and his access to the means of communication, the president, by defining a situation,
might be able to shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public.
He also states that If, as Hargove (1998, p. vii) suggests, the presidents job is to teach
reality through rhetoric, then the president emerges as the chief national definer of
situations (2002, p. 35). In other words, the office becomes an additional source for
presidential definitions beyond the individual. Increasing awareness and access translates
into a better informed audience that may gain definitional understanding due to the amount
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of explanatory information available to provide readers with context and heightened

understanding.
Substantially more literature exists addressing the institutional part of the
presidency, or what Hart (1987, p. 6) calls the institutional persona.
5.2 The institution of the American presidency
It is here where I think presidential definitions that focus on rights and responsibilities of
the executive branch over the legislative and judicial branches resides as presidents often
invoke the symbolic nature and historical legacy of the presidency as support for their
definitions in their public communication. It also here at this level where many scholarly
works examining presidential actions within and beyond the Constitution take place, like
Aberbach, Peterson, & Quirks 2007 essay discussing their theory of the unitary
Executive, based on George W. Bushs presidency, which argues sweeping
constitutional and policy-making prerogatives to the chief executive instead of executive
agencies and without congressional or judicial interference and contrary to prevailing
scholarly conventions about checks and balances in the separation-of-powers system (p.
516).
Tulis (1987, p. 13) argues that presidential rhetorical practices are reflections and
elaborations of underlying doctrines of governance. Ragsdale and Theiss (1997, p. 1314)
study concludes that the American presidency emerged as an institution in the late 1970s
from its organizational roots. Schlesinger (1973) details the institutional emergence in his
1973 book entitled The Imperial Presidency as part of his indictment of the Nixon
administrations overreaching interpretations of presidential power. Hart (1987, p. 100)
points out that one aspect of Nixons essential communication theory was to speak for the
institution, not oneself.
Zarefsky, (2002, p. 22), referencing Skowronek (1993 p. 20), claims that
Successful leaders, while responding to their situation, are those who can control the
political definition of their actions, the terms in which their places in history are
understood. Zarefsky argues that from this view, leadership is the control of meaning or
interpretation given to actions. Tulis (1987, p. 13) argues that presidential rhetorical
practices are reflections and elaborations of underlying doctrines of governance.
As Zarefsky (2002) reiterates his claim that the power to speak is the power to
define in his discussion of the ambiguous Puritans conception of Americans as the
chosen people and the Monroe Doctrine (p. 32), he argues it is the power to have others
listen and respond to a leader of another nation. That power shapes not only our foreign
policy but Americas relationships with other countries. It establishes parameters and
levels of isolation as well as involvement. It illustrates the power of framing, defining that
frame, and responding in the manner that the President deems as most appropriate for that
frame. As Zarefsky indicates, Blessed with moral superiority, established as the beacon
on the western shore, we have the mission of persuading others by precept and example.
And, because of our unique position, other nations will listen to us. By proclaiming what
we wish to achieve, we have the power to make it so (p. 33).
Hart (1987, p. 208) also notes a stronger, independent executive branch due to the rise of
the media. He points out that the presidential institution is less interdependent with the
other two governmental branches. He states that in the past,
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the president needed the other institutions of governance in part because they controlled the
rhetorical forums. He needed a political party for his convention speech, the Congress for his
budget messages, state caucuses for his campaign speeches, the press for his news conferences.
With the rise of television and, more important, with the presidents growing sense that he is in
control of what he says as well as of why, when, and where he says it, the chief executive has
become considerably less interdependent.

6. IMPLICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DEFINITION FROM THE OFFICE AND THE

INSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
The changing landscape of access and information of the American presidency suggests
that scholarly examination of the executive branch needs to evolve and expand as well.
Many of the advantages of a president defining from the ethos of office or the institution
are the same for definitions employed from ethos as a person. All three are used to draw
attention to, highlight its importance, or enhance the credibility of definition of x as well
as elevate xs status, importance, or prestige.
Scholars have noted several additional advantages. Hart (1987, p. 53) points out
that in the case of Lyndon B. Johnson, legislation was action, the best sort of action
accomplished action. And Lyndon Johnson likes action. As a result, Hart (p. 52) claims
Johnson knew that no matter who authored a bill and no matter who pushed it through
congressional committees, it was the speechmaker who would receive credit for the
legislation heralded and that a new piece of legislation had to be performed for the
mass media, in a ceremonial oratorical situation, so as to give that piece of legislation a
fair chance at being successful. In addition, Hart (p. 87) points out that the American
presidency is a respected institution in the United States. When a president suffers from
poor credibility, he can refer to and borrow from the institutional stature for needed ethos.
Other advantages include imparting vision (Holmes, 2007, p. 418; Andrews, 2002,
p. 1236), exerting power (Hart, 1987, p. 110), obtaining goals (Zarefsky in Dorsey, 2002,
pp. 20- 24; Hart. 1987, p. 81; Cummins, 2010, p. 192), manipulate history and legacy
(Zarefsky, 2002, p. 37), unifying the nation (Andrews, 2002, p. 124), and identity shaping
(Coe and Neumann, 2011, p. 140; Andrews, 2002, pp. 131-141).
Rice (2010, p. 10) argues that a subset of presidential ethos is a wielding one,
which is the use of ethos as a persuasive tool for some other goal. He further argues that
there are certain modes of persuasion that rely more heavily (or entirely) on the preexisting symbolic store of leadership ethos to accomplish their persuasive ends (p. 30).
Rice claims that one way wielding ethos is present and used in through the nature of the
presidential office. Such examples of wielding include going public and working the
bully pulpit in different ways to define the terms the audience uses to define a political
or social reality and thereby the nature of their views of that reality (pp. 30-31). As such
it is possible that presidents who are suffering from low public opinion poll numbers or
support will invoke the office or the institution as additional methods of drawing attention
to or gaining acceptance and support for the presidents definition of x.
My 2010 ISSA paper generated three critical observations. First, the mythical power of the
office of the presidency as an institution substantially contributes to presidential pressure.
Zagacki (1992, p. 53) claims that institutions are so molded by underlying myths of
American superiority, presidents cannot handle failure for it would imply they are
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incapable of reconciling the nation to its ultimate historical purpose. Second, personal
presidential perspective of x is important. Brummert (1975, p. 256) argues that former
president Richard Nixons institutional definitional approach of deflecting criticism and
personal attacks depicted the president seeing himself as reacting to evil and not part of the
evil family. Third, Kiewe (1994, p. xxxiii) notes that the presidency, as an institution,
typically ignores the long term impacts of the occupants crisis rhetoric, preferring its
enactment to garner immediate image considerations and to secure quick policy goals. If
Zagacki is correct, it can be argued that presidential failure whether rhetorical or otherwise
is a paramount concern which may contribute to a presidents preference for short-term
gains over long-term goals, as Kiewe suggests. It may also explain why presidents are
expanding beyond the self when defining x.
There are several negative effects to expanding that definitional base. Zarefsky
(1997, p. 5) accurately points out that
definition of terms is a key step in the presentation of argument, and yet this critical step is taken by
making moves that are not themselves argumentative at all. They are not claims supported by
reasons and intended to justify adherence by critical listeners. Instead they are simply proclaimed as
if they were indisputable facts.

In other words, presidents often define without proffering evidence or some type of factual
or statistical support to back up their assertions. The past personal and institutional
personas have afforded the American president with the means of speaking as an
unchecked authoritative figure whose information is regarded as factual, accurate, and
truthful. But as technology has rapidly increased the speed of information dissemination as
well as broader public access, presidents need to be more cautious about what they say, the
language they employ, and the evidence they use to support their definition of x.
A second negative effect is the widening playing field for argumentation and
criticism. Instead of two traditional areas to attack, namely the personal and institutional
personas, a third one now exists. As such, the media, public, and other concerned
individuals have more territory to scrutinize and attack. Subsequently, by providing a
wider definitional base, presidents now need to be defend that widening base and refute
arguments or counter positions. As any debater knows, the more material presented means
more material subject to questioning, refutation, and attack. This could prevent a president
from achieving his goals, attempts at domestic or international unity, or exerting power.
A third negative effect is a change in advantages. For example, a widening base for
a definition of x does not necessarily mean an improved presidential stature or increased
favorability. For example, Dorsey (2002 p. 17) argues that While the executive office
obviously bestows the status of leader and voice of the nation on whoever holds the office,
simply occupying the position does not necessarily mean that successful leadership will
follow. Along the same vein, heightened awareness and more instantaneous access to
information suggests it has become harder for a president to forge, shape, or manipulate
his identity, image, historical standing, and overall legacy. Collectively, these observations
suggest that further analysis of the offices role in definitional argument as well as the
changing institutional role is necessary.

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7. CONCLUSION
Goodnight (2002, p. 205) argues that Debates over what the president did, could, should,
or will do constitute legitimization disputes over the uses of power and thus inevitably
shape and reshape the domestic and foreign policy landscapes of democratic policies.
These rhetorical efforts constitute the public argument of an American presidency. As
presidents continue to define words or events using language that invites wide public
support, they have become increasing confronted with unprecedented information
knowledge and access that could alter their definitional approach.
By expanding on a previous ISSA paper analyzing the difference between
argument from definition and argument by definition, this paper examines how presidents
are widening their definitional bases from personal or institutional personas to include
what I call the job persona as a means of providing additional reasons or forms of support
when they define x. Ruth Amossys argument that rhetoric allows a president to
transform or modify a pre-existing image supports this papers position that a widening
presidential definitional base is being employed to help a president substantiate his vision
of x toward others. This expansion carries with it both positive advantages and negative
effects. As we become more firmly entrenched in the 21st century, it appears that the
contemporary American president is broadening his definitional base to compensate for
eroding traditional definitional base that has been diminished by technological advances
and quicker information dissemination.

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Argument Operators And Hinge Terms In Climate Science

Gordon R. Mitchell & John Lyne
Department of Communication
University of Pittsburgh
USA
gordonm@pitt.edu; lyne.john@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: Climate scientist James Hansens use of we call hinge terms such as dangerous and
tipping point operate to reconfigure argumentation on global warming by pre-scripting headlines of
media coverage on scientific findings. Study of this case stands to elucidate an understudied aspect of the
global warming controversy, as well as contribute to understanding of how argument operators function to
relocate arguments into different contexts, with potential implications for argumentation theory.
KEYWORDS: global warming, argument activity type, rhetorical figures, James Hansen, rhetoric of science

1. INTRODUCTION
The intellectual roots of American argumentation scholarship intertwine with the tradition
of public address criticism, a fact that helps account for the centrality of context in the
work of prominent American scholars of argument (e.g., Newman 1961; Zarefsky 1990).
The recent launch of the Dutch journal Argumentation in Context, along with a new book
series by the same name, provides an occasion to explore how the American approach to
criticism of public argument in situated contexts relates to new features of pragmadialectics that emphasize contextual features of argumentation, such as the concept of
argumentative activity types (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2009).
Considerable attention has been devoted in pragma-dialectics to understanding
how context may discipline norms for judging the soundness of arguments that unfold
within a particular argumentative activity type (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2009, p. 15).
Left understudied, however, is the question of what happens when an argument shifts from
one activity type to another, and further, what moves by interlocutors might spur, or block,
such shifts.
We use the term argument operators to refer to detectable moves that change
argument modalities. Our focus here is on operators that relocate arguments within
different normative contexts. While context is featured in various ways within the
literature of argumentation (e.g. fields, argumentation activity types), it is normally taken
to be a form of pre-figured ground that constrains or regulates what is possible within the
given context. Our focus differs in that it calls attention to argumentative strategies that
relocate an existing argument within a different context, thereby changing the norms and
constraints that pertain to the argument.1

We note that the term operators, as defined by computer programming languages, may show some
elemental similarities to the ones we are describing, in that they allow manipulations of semantic as well
as syntactic properties. At present, however, the language of genre, stance, audience, and so on,

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The specific argument operator that is our concern here is what we call the hinge term,
and the case of climate scientist James Hansens argumentation on global warming
provides an apt point of departure for our inquiry. The effect of the hinge term, as one type
of argument operator, we contend, is to significantly affect the tenor and trajectory of
climate change arguments. In particular, Hansens controversial use of hinge terms such as
dangerous and tipping point in his peer reviewed journal articles operate to pivot his
argumentation on global warming from the context of professional scientific discourse into
the context of general public argument. In what follows, background on the Hansen case
(in part two) paves the way for critical analysis of his strategic deployment of hinge terms
(in part three). Part four draws lessons from the case study to sketch a speculative
taxonomy of argument operators and open discussion about the possible utility of the
concept. A concluding section reflects on how our intervention relates to ongoing work on
argument context in pragma-dialectics.
2. FROM RETICENCE TO WITNESSING
Widely considered to be one of the worlds leading climate scientists, James Hansen
began his research career by exploring how particulate matter in the Earths atmosphere
refracts light from lunar eclipses (Matsushima, Zink & Hansen 1966). Shortly after
completing his Ph.D. thesis at the University of Iowa, which dealt with properties of
Venuss clouds, Hansen realized that many of the same dynamics driving changes in
Venuss atmosphere might also be occurring on Earth. A decade of work from 1978 to
1988 that involved building a complex computer model of the Earths atmosphere led to
Hansens first major public appearances as a scientist. As an official witness before the
U.S. Congress during 1988 and 1989, Hansen declared with 99 percent confidence that
human carbon dioxide emissions were causing long-term warming in the Earths
atmosphere.
Hansens bombshell congressional testimony provoked intense controversy and
earned him the moniker grandfather of climate changea role the scientist was not
quick to embrace (McKie 2009). Following his first big splash as a public figure, Hansen
(2009) was firmly resolved to go back to pure science and leave media appearances to
people who were more articulate and seemed to enjoy the process (p. xvi). This retreat
to the laboratory was consistent with Hansens (2007a) perspective on scientific
reticence, a default rhetorical posture for scientists that involves a tendency to understate
claims and emphasize the uncertain, open-ended nature of scientific knowledge (see also
Ziman 2000).
For nearly a decade following his blockbuster congressional testimony in
1988/1989, Hansen practiced scientific reticence, publishing findings from his work on
Global Circulation Models in peer reviewed journals and eschewing opportunities to
appear in the media spotlight. Yet that posture changed in 1998, when Hansen agreed to
participate in public debates on global warming with climate contrarians Patrick
Michaels in New York City, and Richard Lindzen in Cambridge, Massachusetts (Mitchell
& ODonnell 2000). As Hansen (2009) explained his motivation for stepping out of the
seem reserved for natural languages used in non-computational contexts. This is not to say that these could
not be represented in binary code.

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laboratory and into the public square for the first time since his famous congressional
testimony, I wanted to present and publish a table of the key differences between my
position regarding global warming and the position of the contrarians (p. xvi).
Hansens participation in the New York debate marked a turning point in his
career, as afterward he increasingly embraced the role of a public witness to the dangers
of global warming, especially following the birth of his first grandchild in 1999 (Hansen
2009, p. xii). This path would eventually lead to Hansens appearances at rock concerts
and protest demonstrations with climate change activists (Eilperin & Mufson 2013). Also
during this period, a subtle shift in the rhetorical arc of his scientific papers could be
detected. For example, in an article published in Atmospheric Chemistry & Physics,
Hansen and colleagues (Hansen et al. 2007a) repeatedly use the terms tipping point and
dangerous to describe global warming. Major news outlets parroted those terms in
headlines during the news cycle in which the paper was published:

Research finds that Earths climate is approaching dangerous point (PR

Newswire 2007);
NASA Research Suggests Earth climate approaching dangerous point (Space
Daily 2007);
Earth nears tipping point on climate change. (Spotts 2007)

Messages of danger are part of the stock and trade of newspapers, so Hansen was in effect
pre-scripting headlines for general circulation and pivoting toward a different context and
rhetorical stance. As a scientific argument became a public argument, the assessment of
facts would move into a normative environment where questions of value and policy
response would predictably arise. This netted Hansen a broader audience, but it
complicated his voice as a scientist. Was he now acting as an advocate?
3. DANGEROUS AND TIPPING POINT AS HINGE TERMS
By 2007, Hansen had become engaged fully in the rhetorical project of trying to invent
ways of communicating the gravity of what he called the climate catastrophe (2007b) to
broader publics. In one open communication on his personal website, he mused:
A related alternative metaphor, perhaps less objectionable while still making the
most basic point, comes to mind in connection with an image of crashing of
massive ice sheets fronts into the sea -- an image of relevance to both climate
tipping points and consequences (sea level rise). Can these crashing glaciers serve
as a Krystal Nacht, and wake us up to the inhumane consequences of averting our
eyes? Alas, that metaphor probably would be greeted with the same reaction from
the people who objected to the first. That reaction may have been spurred by the
clever mischaracterization of the CEO, aiming to achieve just such a reaction. So
far that seems to have been the story: the special interests have been cleverer than
us, preventing the public from seeing the crisis that should be in view. It is hard for
me to think of a different equally poignant example of the foreseeable consequence
faced by fellow creatures on the planet. Suggestions are welcome. (Hansen 2007c)

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This candid reflection laid bare for Hansen a fundamental dilemma facing scientists
working on politically charged topics. The tradition of scientific reticence counsels
restraint, yet the ethical calling to bear witness may demand more strident rhetoric.
Ultimately, Hansen and colleagues settled on the terms dangerous and tipping point as
red flags to heighten salience of the issue. While Hansen personally deployed such terms
increasingly during public appearances, he also worked with his co-authors to pepper their
scientific papers with these terms. For example, the previously mentioned Atmospheric
Chemistry & Physics paper (Hansen et al. 2007) features 36 mentions of dangerous in
various contexts (see Table 1).

Table 1. Mentions of dangerous in Hansen et al. (2007). References with quotation

marks are in blue, while references without quotation marks are in red.

Notably, the first four mentions of the term dangerous on the papers first page are
accompanied by quotation marks, indicating perhaps some hesitance regarding use of the
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term. However, in the final five pages of the paper, these quotation marks drop out and
dangerous appears as an unqualified adjective in 9 of 16 instances. In the penultimate
discussion section, all three mentions of dangerous appear without quotations. This
progression may reflect a common tendency of authors to move from a tentative to a more
authoritative voice as their papers develop (Fahnestock 1998; Holmes 1997; Peacock
2002; Ruiying & Allison 2003), yet such maneuvers did not escape the notice of the peer
review referees. In an interactive comment published in Atmospheric Chemistry & Physics
Discussions, Hansen and colleagues (2007, p. S7351) note that referee #1 expressed mild
concern about terms such as dangerous anthropogenic interference, disruptive climate
effects, and tipping points.
Some of this pushback may have stemmed from the sheer number of dangerous
references in the paper. As Jeanne Fahnestock (1999, pp. 160-172) observes, strategic
repetition of key terms (characterized by the classical rhetorical figure of ploche) can
heighten the impact of scientific argumentation on audiences. Fahnestock points to
Charles Darwins deployment of subtler repetitions that declare identity in reference or
the interconnections among phenomena to illustrate how ploche can operate to heighten,
in the terminology of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 144), a scientific
arguments presence. Just as Darwin eschewed mere repetition, instead weaving
different meanings through recurrent references, Hansen and colleagues deploy
dangerous in an array of different usages, in effect producing a pedagogy of
dangerousness from which journalists could learn.
Previous scholarship has explored some of the rhetorical entailments associated
with Hansens use of terms such as tipping point. For example, Russill (2008, 2010)
notes that in the global warming controversy, tipping point tends to invoke the interests
of future generations, as irreversible, runaway climate change would be most harmful to
those not yet born. Yet as Figure 1 illustrates, concepts from the rhetorical tradition
furnish a set of transformations that point to ways that Hansens hinge term strategy may
carry even broader implications.

Figure 1. Rhetorical concepts illustrate ways that the hinge term dangerous enables discourse to swing
from one activity, genre, stasis or stance to another.

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As the far left column suggests, successful deployment of the hinge term dangerous
enables discourse to swing from the argument activity type of scientific peer review to a
different onegeneral public argument. In a related transformation, alterations in types of
questions asked and goals pursued by interlocutors are marked by a shift in rhetorical
genre. Whereas scientific discourse tends to follow patterns of reasoning associated with
the forensic genre (rooted in the rhetorical tradition of adjudication in the law courts),
public argument tends to feature epideictic (ceremonial) and deliberative (political
decision-making) forms of reasoning (Fahnestock 1998). As the discourse migrates in this
fashion, a further element of transformation occurs at the level of rhetorical stases, with
argumentation pulled (Walsh 2010) from stases of fact and definition, into a different
stasis point in which interlocutors debate how contingent value judgments relate to
possible future courses of action. Aligned with all of these transformations is a
concomitant shift evident in rhetorical stance (Booth 1963), as Hansen himself moves
from self-identifying as a reticent scientist to a public witness.
4. ARGUMENT OPERATORS: NUDGE, PIVOT, OR JUMP
The Hansen case calls to the fore three possible approaches to context-switching, and the
response to Hansen sorts out to some degree according to which of these the audience
senses his speech acts are aspiring to do. To identify these shifts we use intuitive
languagecommon verbs, not adjectivesrather than terminology that aims for technical
precision. These operators, we suggest, can do the following:

Nudge an argument into a wider or narrower context, thereby expanding the range
of rational strictures on relevance (see Walton 2003), but without introducing
competing or conflicting accounts;2
Pivot strategically between competing or complementary contexts of rational
assessment;
Jump to an alternative context.

The first two of these may serve as bridges from one context to another, whereas the third
makes a leap. The response to Hansen seems to depend in large part on which of these his
readers are sensing. Being both a scientist and a citizen, Hansen might see his repeated
invocation of the term dangerous as a way of nudging his audience into a wider context
that encompasses science but also the field of citizen action. While we do not reject such a
characterization, our analysis picks up on what can be seen as a strategic pivot from one
generic context, with its usual strictures and enablements to another. His critics seem
inclined to see Hansen's performance as a kind of abandonmentjumping ship, so to
speakby violating constraints of a professional context in order to play out the argument
in a different context. They would no doubt see that characterization underlined by
Hansens subsequent activism. In response, Hansen might point to the fact that the term
dangerous had been utilized previously in major scientific reports on climate change, and
that tipping point language was justified because it conveys aspects of climate change
2

Here we highlight expansion rather than shifts, but these are not always distinct, as Burke (1945) points
out in commentary on scope and reduction (pp. 59-117).

1003

that have been an impediment to public appreciation of the urgency of addressing humancaused global warning (Hansen et al. 2007b, p. S7351). All of these considerations come
to bear as we interrogate the kind of speech acts Hansen was deploying.
With one foot in the lab and one foot in the public media, it is quite possible that
Hansen could be celebrated as exemplary of the third culture figure, who manages to
speak persuasively across the boundaries between fields of expertise and contexts of
public argument, contributing to a culture that consists of both experts and non-experts,
and constituted in such a way that effective participation requires accepting the legitimacy
of both empirical and interpretive methods (Lyne 2010). In that case we would have to see
him in a rather different light than some of his critics have. He would be seen as crafting a
distinctive voice that bridges, or nudges toward a more encompassing audience.
Because we regard arguments as something more than meaningful texts, we take
their meaning to function in relation to human action. On this approach, the wider
investigative terrain for argument operators is suggested by the speech act vocabulary,
following John Searle (1969) and other speech act theorists (Austin 1975; van Eemeren &
Grootendorst 1984), of locution, illocution, and perlocution which we translate as ways of
posing the following general questions:

Locution: What are you saying?

Illocution: What are you doing?
Perlocution: What effect are you having?

As we move down the list, each function presupposes what is listed above. That is,
someone says in order to do in order to have some kind of effect. The last category,
perlocution, can be variously understood as an actual consequence of an illocution, as an
intended consequence of an illocution, or as a rationally foreseeable consequence of an
illocution. We do not wish to exclude any of these from our consideration of
argumentative effects, that is, of the way speech acts influence ongoing or subsequent
arguments or argumentative moves. Thus, the purview of this analysis would be possible
interactions that can be taken as specifically relevant to an argument, but it would not
include any other kind of effect (e.g. hurt feelings, anger, delight).
In reference to the "hinging" we are looking at here, the hinge effect is performed
at all three levels of the speech act. In saying that conditions are dangerous, Hansen is
making a shift in the argumentative context, with the effect that a number of
entanglementsranging from genre relevance to contestation of appropriatenessbegin
to work at once. But the nature of the shift is such that it can be interpreted in several
different and contestable ways (see Figure 2).

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Figure 2. Hinge term dynamics. Hinge terms enable arguments to swing between genres and stases, with
associated shifts in the arguer's rhetorical stance, artifact produced and activity type.

Returning to a generic reconstruction of the diagram presented in the previous section, we

see five categories that that appear to move in unison. This, we believe, is why the
instance of deploying a hinge term particularly invites attention. Understood as a speech
act, Hansens repeated references to danger would reasonably be taken as a warning. And
whether by intention or not, the illocutionary act of warning within one context has the
perlocutionary consequence of pivoting the argument into another discourse frame. As the
warning of danger breaks out of the confines of the presumptive scientific stasis, it
produces a secondary perlocutionary effect of moving from fact to value. Moreover,
the shift of stases has a gravitational pull that brings changes within each of the other
categories (Walsh 2010). The text is now recontextualized as public argument, where it
stirs controversy, and signals differences of genre, stasis, stance, and artifact. To the
consternation of many, the line between science and public controversy begins to dissolve.
5. SCOPING OUT THE LANDSCAPE
We have argued that the hinge term, in its functional sense, inflects toward, or toggles
between, different registers of argument. What it means, in the most robust sense, is
therefore what it does when affirmed or invoked, that is, what it does when introduced by
a speech act. What it does to the argument is something more consequential than a mere
figure of speech. In this case, for instance, the terms danger and tipping point cannot
be sequestered as mere metaphors. Rather than non-literal flourishes, the introduction of
such hinge terms into an argument is a speech act (or a set of speech acts) with the
capacity to move arguments in a different direction, specifically toward different
cognitive, affective, cultural, semiotic, or praxial registers. This can be done either as a
deliberate strategy or an unintended consequence of the introduction of the term, and its
consequences can be both foreseen and unforeseen. One of the consequences in this case
was an inflection toward arguments about the objective limits of science and accusations

1005

that these terms had taken Hansen into a subjective frame, where their purchase as
scientific claims were questioned.
In describing argument operators specific to this case, we have introduced
strategies of context-shifting. Beyond the hinge term and related context shifters, this case
leads us to anticipate other argument operators that have different modal functions in
argument. Hansen was criticized for acting as an advocate. If he was acting as an
advocate, at what point did that voice emerge? Was it when he dropped the quotation
marks when using the word dangerous? Or were there gradations of his shift, perhaps
subtly indicated, and when he engaged in a debate before academics not in his field?
Depending on how that question is answered, his arguments are likely to be judged by one
set of norms or by another. In argumentation literature, we observe that arguments are
generally aligned with the intention of the arguer, and it is assumed that the arguer has a
unitary voice, such that that person could be held responsible for inconsistencies or
implications of the argument they are making. Moreover, we assume that the authors
intentions are framed with a particular normative context in mind. This would be the
standard case of having a voice in an argument.
It is the arguer with the unitary voice that is typically assumed in philosophical
discussions of rationality. The leading advocate of philosophical inferentialism, Robert
Brandom, speaks of personal accountability in terms of scorekeeping, whereby
participants in an argument constantly track and update the commitments and
authorizations made by either party in order to make explicit the rational purport of any
utterance (Brandom 2000). This is a dynamic way of thinking about argument as process,
because it depends on the relationship between present and past assertions rather than on
constructs in isolation. And this is a useful way of thinking about the trail of assertions as
they chain out. But in view of the shifts of context, voice, and other functions of argument
operators that we have been referencing, one might well ask if it is pragmatic to think of
arguments only in terms of verbalized propositions by philosophically focused
interlocutors. To understand the complexity of context and its relationship to argument, it
might be useful to consider whether there are a number of different scoreboards and ways
of scoring that are the very things at stake in many arguments (Lyne 2013). Public address
scholars, who are observant of the relationship between propositional and nonpropositional features of public argument, as well as the various ways that that rational
arguments may play out, have something to bring to the table in laying out argument
operators.
We know arguers modulate the voice they are using to advance an argument,
sometimes by ventriloquizing the positions of others, or laying out the position of what
another would say were they in top form. This kind of voicing is perhaps most clearly
apparent when a surrogate stands in for a political candidate in a debate, where the
aspiration would be to offer up the arguments the candidate would or could make.
Somewhat differently, a defense attorney makes the best arguments possible, not because
he or she necessarily believes them, but because they are thought to support the best case
that might be made in defense of the client. Other arguments, we well know, are made for
the sake of argument, without binding the hands of the arguer. We might well ask what
are the ways of shifting in an out of any given frame of time-binding accountability.
The formal framing of a staged debate or of a courtroom trial generally eliminates
any ambiguity about whether the arguments presented should be seen as isomorphic with
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those that the arguer would be personally and ethically accountable for making. In other
cases ambiguity or confusion can arise, as when arguers shift between or among voices.
So it would be worthwhile to pay attention to indicators of voice shiftings. These might be
found in tonal changes, changes of body language, or stylistic changesfactors that have
been of interest to students of public address but have generally been backgrounded in
pragmatic analysis of argument.
We have seen from pragma-dialetics that arguments play out differently in
different types of argumentative activities. Here we are suggesting that even within a
given argument activity a shifting of voice can change the function of an argument. So in
addition to context-shifters, other argument operators may need to be fleshed out. This is
among the reasons we believe that the juncture between public address studies and
argument studies may enrich both.
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1008

Euro: Past Arguments For The Contemporary Debate On European

Currency
Silvia Modena
School of Language and Literature, Interpretation and Translation
Department of Languages, Literatures, and Modern Cultures (LILEC)
University of Bologna
40128 Italy
silvia.modena3@unibo.it

ABSTRACT: My paper aims to investigate the debate on European currency and the connection between
two different rhetorics: one emerged during the last French presidential election in 2012 and the other
occurred during the transition from franc to euro in 1998-2002. My paper underlines that the contemporary
crisis of the European monetary construction has been represented by some types of arguments emerged
when euro was proposed, on 1998. I explore the relation between definition and argumentation.
KEYWORDS: argumentation in discourse, definition, discourse analysis, euro, French language,
presidential election.

1. INTRODUCTION
My contribution will first expose a short history of the European currency so as to
underscore the principal and more recent steps of the euro. A place will be given to the
confidence value of the European money which is one of the main items of the related
debate. Later on, I will show two main characteristics of the corpora that I analysed: the
discursive nature of the construction of the euro transition and the two different political
and economical periods of time in France (2002 and 2012) covered by data in my hand.
After this comment, I will introduce the theoretical framework of my analysis based on the
idea of the argumentation as a call-back mechanism: some argumentative designations,
used during the latest French presidential election linked to the euro crisis, recall the
previous debate on euro. I will express and explain this circularity through some examples.
I will then conclude looking at the semantic intersection between argumentation and
lexicon.
2. THE EUROPEAN CURRENCY
In December 1991, the European Council decided to shape an economic and monetary
union in the Dutch city of Maastricht and later confirmed it in the Treaty on European
Union (the so-called Maastricht Treaty). Economic and monetary union brought the
European Union (EU) one step further in its process of economic integration, which
started in 1957 when it was founded. In 1998, the European Central Bank (ECB) was
established and, six months later, the stage three of Economic and Monetary Union was
launched. On 1 January 1999 the euro replaced the former European Currency Unit
(ECU). Euro banknotes and coins began to circulate on 1 January 2002.

1009

The monetary shift from national to European currency is part of contemporary history
and of the construction of Europe, not only from a monetary point of view. Since the
creation of the ECB in 1998 until the introduction of the euro in 2002, the European
currency has been a political challenge, which had peoples to be first convinced, reassured
and trained. This event, taken in the history of European integration, required two different
but quite complementary efforts.
On the one hand, the protagonists of monetary integration of Europe pursued and
built confidence, which is essential in making people confortable with the new currency. I
can consider national currencies, in fact, as symbols of national identities. Money thus
embodies a range of cultural and memory references. The first problem with the new
currency has been that euro is not immediately identifiable to a single nation: so, it needed
bigger endeavors in order to enforce trust and identity. For these reasons, its discursive
aspect, associated to its material presence1, is relevant for my analysis.
On the other hand, European citizens from the first eleven member countries have
permanently changed an age-old practice: the use and, therefore, the name of their national
currency. In France, this change sounded even more complicated by the etymological triad
Franc-France-Franais (Franc-France-French) which was at stake. We will see now how
important is the time factor conceived as a sort of link between the present and the past
argumentations.
3. THE CORPUS
3.1 Subject of the discourse
From our perspective, the study of the euro cannot be separated from the speeches that had
been produced and characterized its birth and launch. The transition to the euro in terms of
its discursive construction means to examine the role of language. More specifically, it
means to analyse the emergence of events related to memory, culture and history of a
given society. The construction of the monetary Europe went through the use of language.
Moreover, its existence, until 1 January 2002, was linked to the discourse of economic and
political actors who either supported or opposed to its launch. Nowadays, the debate
related to the European monetary union is deeply linked with the topics that have been
used during its launch: political and monetary sovereignty, supranational bank (ECB),
national and European identities, etc.
During the first period, from 1998 to 2002, the major aim of the euro defenders
analysed was to build confidence on Euro: his creation, launch and arrival occupied, from
a discursive and media point of view, an important period of time giving rise to mass
production and circulation of discourse. In a similar way, the euro opponents tried to
destroy the arrival of the new currency by emphasizing the lacks of the new currency.
Both positions had to develop a discourse which had largely preceded the arrival of the
1

In 2002, notes and coins of the euro showed an iconographic message of subtraction. In other words,
images and templates chosen by the ECB will leave no room for heated debates. On the one hand, the
representation of monumental works of different architectural styles demonstrated the desire to build a
strong and sustainable image of eternity. On the other hand, the notes and coins empty of architectural
images left a space of non-recognition among citizens within the euro area. As explained by Carbonnier
(1998), the images printed on the notes and coins represent sovereignty.

1010

euro. With reference to the studies of Sitri, we can consider the transition to the euro as an
objet de discours (subject of the discourse) which reveals aspects of traceability in history:
lobjet de discours est conu ici comme une entit constitutivement discursive, et non pas
psychologique ou cognitive: constitu de discours et dans le discours discours o il nat et se
dveloppe mais aussi discours dont il garde la mmoire il est par l-mme pris dans la matrialit
de la langue (Sitri, 2003, p. 39).2

In 2012, during the French presidential election, political speakers recovered some
arguments used ten years before. The members of the political parties as well as the
argumentative recycle were in fact the same; sometimes candidates in 2012 election
simply used same arguments of the past confirming the memorial value of these
arguments.
3.2 The French context
Two issues pushed Jacques Chirac to request a new ballot in June 1997: on the one hand,
European targets, including introduction of the euro and, on the other, different positions
within the government. The victory of the left coalition (PS, PC, Left Radicals, Greens)
inaugurated the period of the third political cohabitation with Lionel Jospin as Prime
Minister. The presidential election took place between April 21 and May 5. In the first
round, Jean-Marie Le Pen was positioned behind Jacques Chirac and before Lionel Jospin
who suddenly announced his withdrawal from political life. On May 5, Jacques Chirac
was re-elected President for five years. During the government of Lionel Jospin, there
have been three ministers of Economics: Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Christian Sautter and
Laurent Fabius. On January 1, 2002 the euro officially began circulating.
The tenth birthday of the European currency in 2012 has been characterised by a
strong financial and political crisis which reinforced the opponents of the euro project.
During the French presidential election, the first round ended with the selection of
Franois Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy. Hollande won the second round. The candidates
discourses had to face up the financial topic of the crisis of the euro mostly because of the
lower political legitimacy of the monetary Europe. The tenth anniversary of the euro and
the argumentative strategies used during the presidential election make this period of time
particularly intersting for my research.
In 2012, the presidential election permitted me to investigate the debate on
European currency within the electoral discourse of the French candidates. Therefore, my
choice emphasizes the time factor of the discursive event euro and highlights the
abundance of media production, following the notion of moment discursif (discursive
moment) elaborated by Moirand (2007) which means:
tudier la circulation des mots, des formulations et des dires, en particulier la faon dont a parle,
a circule dun article un autre, dune mission une autre, dun genre un autre, dun mdia
un autre. Mais si lon sinterroge sur la faon dont ils circulent autant que sur ce quils disent,
2

The subject of discourse is considered here as a constitutively discursive entity, not psychological nor
cognitive. Since it is produced by speeches and within the speech where it was born, developed and
memorized it is thereby rooted in the materiality of language. (All the following translations from French
to English are by the author).

1011

cest parce quon sinterroge galement, au-del de la traabilit des mots, des formulations et des
dires, que lon vise, sur la mmoire, le rappel et loubli des dires qui sont produits, ou transmis, par
les mdias. (Moirand, 2007, pp. 4-5).3

Although the two moments analysed have produced different amount of speeches on euro
and the European challenges are varied from 2002 to 2012, I consider the political event of
presidential election and the evolutive progression of euro as relevant subjects in order to
build a comparative study.
4. ARGUMENTATION IN DISCOURSE
In regards of the theoretical framework, my study investigates the arguments in discourse
by casting light on the processes that users implement. Namely, the discourse can be
considered as the concrete result of the statement in context. My methodological approach
addresses the debate on the euro as a game of positioning, a dialogic process and a
resistance to challenge. As quoted by Plantin,
Largumentation est la confrontation, sur un mode polmique ou coopratif, dun discours et dun
contre-discours orients par une mme question. (Plantin, 1996, p. 72).4

The issue (question) mentioned by Plantin corresponds, in my case study, with the
acceptance or refusal of the euro. The two periods of time analysed and the speakers
involved in the debate produce discourses with an argumentative vise or purpose as stated
by Ruth Amossy:
la simple transmission dun point de vue sur les choses, qui nentend pas expressement modifier les
positions de lallocutaire [dimension argumentative], ne se confond pas avec lentreprise de
persuasion soutenue par une intention consciente et offrant des stratgies programmes cet effet
[vise argumentative] (Amossy, 2009, p. 33).5

Both in 2012 and in 2002 the speakers analysed had to persuade their audience of the
political position they occupied in supporting or opposing euro. In 2002, speakers were
involved in the monetary transition; in 2012, the financial crisis of euro and European
monetary construction pushed candidates to express their position on euro. Therefore, we
need the context in which discourses are produced in order to understand their creation
and use and for this reason I consider argumentation dialogical and rich of intertextual and
interdiscursive elements.

Studying the movement of words, formulations, and sayings, particularly how it speaks, it flows from
one article to another, from one issue to another, from one genre to another, from one medium to another.
But if we ask ourselves about how they circulate as much as what they say, it is because we are also asking
about the recall and the oblivion of sayings produced and transmitted by media, beyond the traceability of
the words, formulations and sayings.
4
The argumentation is the confrontation either on a controversial or on a cooperative manner of a
speech and an opposite speech oriented by the same issue.
5
the mere transmission of a point of view on things which expressly does not intend to change the
positions of the addressee [argumentative dimension] needs to be not confused with the will of persuasion
supported by the conscious intention and strategies programmed for this purpose [argumentative purpose].

1012

4.1 Definition and argumentation

We need now to highlight two kinds of arguments which play their role on the notion of
definition. On the one hand, the argument by definition concerns the concepts as such with
specific distinguishing features (such as legal definitions).6 It is sometimes called
argument by essence. On the other hand, the argumentative definition recaps a significant
amount of data that clearly expresses the speakers position.7 Through this kind of
argument one can recognize opponents and their replies as well as express his/her own
position, infering so the dialectic value of the argument. Following Plantin,
la dfinition argumentative consiste dfinir un terme de telle sorte que la dfinition exprime une
prise de position, favorable ou dfavorable, vis--vis de l'objet dfini (Plantin, 1996, pp. 53-54).8

Far from being comparable to the argument by definition or to the argumentative

definition, I think that the adjectival designations assigned to the euro summarize two
opposed political positions and involve different interdiscursive references. Given that,
any argumentative analysis should question the words used by speakers, as Plantin
remembers in 1996:
la prsence structurante du discours de lun dans le discours de lautre est la base de
lhtrognit du discours argumentatif apparemment le plus monologique (Plantin, 1996, p. 75).9

The corpora analyzed are, in fact, made by monological speeches which maintain an
argumentative mechanism which links past and present by linking one corpus to the other.
Moreover, as stated by Robrieux,
certains termes du vocabulaire politique fournissent sans doute les meilleurs exemples
dimprcisions smantiques due leur charge affective et aux connotations qui sy rattachent
(Robrieux, 2007, p. 149).10

I want to underline that speakers use evaluative terms in order to drive the comprehension
of their audience and, on the other hand, in order to clarify the meaning that they assign to
a word. We cannot talk about definition based on etymology or dictionary definition but I
argue that the lexical and semantic choices made by the speakers analysed reveal
consensual or debatable reactions. As pointed by Amossy in 2009:

As an argument by definition we propose the following article of the Madrid European Council (december
1995): the specific name euro will be used instead of the generic term ecu used by the treaty to refer to the
european currency unit.
7
We propose two conflicting examples of argumentative definitions: Leuro est une victoire de lEurope
(Euro is a victory for Europe Chirac, 31/12/2001) and Leuro, cest le vol de la dmocracie (Euro is the
theft of democracy Pasqua, 02/01/2002).
8
The argumentative definition is made in order to define a term so that the definition expresses a position,
favourable or unfavourable, related with the object defined.
9
The structuring presence of someones speech in the speech of others is the basis of the heterogeneity of
the argumentative discourse, even in the apparently most monological discourse.
10
Certain terms in the political vocabulary probably provide the best examples of semantic inaccurrancies
due to their emotional charge and connotations which are attached to it.

1013

le mot est prendre aussi bien dans le cadre de linteraction [] que des rapports consensuels ou
polmiques quil entretient avec les autres mots du discours dans un espace o les nonciations se
croisent et se rpondent (Amossy, 2009, p. 158).11

In order to explain this specific perspective, I will present two different pair of adjectives
which summarize similar argumentative positions.
5. SINGLE OR COMMON CURRENCY
The first set of examples is linked to the difference between two adjectives referred to
currency: single and common. During the launch of the euro, the European currency
went through a sort of definitional step which led to the use of the word euro. From the
1960s until the early 2000s, the value of the currency name has been the subject of debate
among Member States of the European Union. The adjectives associated with the euro
(e.g. community, parallel, common and single currency) reported thus
fundamental passages in European history, economics and politics. They photograph
explicitly different visions of Europe. Until the December 1995, when the name was
chosen,12 each European official document took explicit position by choosing one term
instead of another.
For example, the quotations from the opponents, determined against economical
supranationality of the euro, defended the common currency and not the single
currency. On the other hand, the contemporary debate on European currency regenerates
past arguments associated with the issue of supranationality and financial reliability of the
euro. Indeed, the political programs of the French candidates to the presidential election of
2012 contained the topic la sortie de leuro (the withdrawal from the euro) linked to the
financial crisis of the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain). The
lack of economic solidarity among the members of EU as well as the increasing method of
austerity enforced by the ECB renew the debate on euro in 2012.
The following examples are organised as a double track which confirms the cyclic
nature of the argumentation even within the same political party, as for example the
National Front. Marine Le Pen, current leader of the party, uses the expression monnaie
commune (common currency) and monnaie unique (single currency) as his father, former
leader of the party, did more than ten years before:
Nous envisageons la possibilit de conserver leuro monnaie commune [] a naurait pas les
inconvnients qu la monnaie unique [] la possibilit de conserver une monnaie commune ce
que nous rejetons, contestons formellement cest cette monnaie unique. (M. Le Pen, 27/11/2011).13

11

The word needs to be taken in the context both of the interaction [] and of consensual or controversual
relationships that it has with other words of the discourse in a space where enunciations/utterances cross and
reply to themselves.
12
The debate on the name of the European currency was resolved during the Economic Council of Madrid in
1995 where the European currency was finally called euro. The point 2 of the final resolution stressed the
importance of the name of the new European currency.
13
We envision the possibility of keeping the euro as a common currency [] it would not have the
disadvantages that the single currency has [] the possibility to preserve a common currency, what we
reject formally it is this single currency.

1014

Oui une monnaie commune, symbole de la coopration fraternelle des Europens. Mais alors
franchement, trs franchement, non, mille fois non, la monnaie unique. (J.-M. Le Pen,
1/05/1998).14

Even if the political context of the French presidential election of 2012 has changed, the
use of the adjectives common and single revitalised the former debate of 1998. The
circularity of these argumentative signals is useful to the persuasive aim of the speakers. In
other words, they exploit some of the most common arguments of the past against euro to
concentrate their speeches and to underline the interdiscursive value of their political
position.
The same mechanism is stated within another couple of examples linked to the
Citizens Movement, a party guided by J.-P. Chevnement :
une mutation si possible harmonise de leuro qui de monnaie unique pourrait devenir monnaie
commune (Chevnement, 24/06/2011).15

The speaker postulates the need to switch from a single currency to a common one. He is
using the same couple of adjectives of the past, as reported in the following example:
Sagissant de leuro, aujourdhui monnaie commune, je minterroge sur le fait de savoir sil ne
serait pas raisonnable dy regarder deux fois avant de plonger, le 1er janvier 2002, dans la
monnaie unique (Chevnement, 21/05/2000).16

Here I want to emphasize the role played by a problematic link between the ideas of single
and common currency. As mentioned above, the single euro is, according to the Marine
and Jean-Marie Le Pen, the currency of the capital markets and ECB while the common
currency could become a slogan for cooperation between European countries. In other
words, a common currency means to them an exchange other than financial transactions.
Other contemporary political French speakers enrich the adjectival meaning of
common and single by adding other adjectives, as Jean-Luc Mlenchon did in 2011:
la France devra uvrer au renforcement de la coopration montaire en proposant le passage du
SME la monnaie commune europenne (et non plus monnaie unique) (Mlenchon,
10/04/2011).17

The speakers of 2012 regenerate the previous debate of 1998-2002 by using the
definitional contrast between common and single. The use of dictionary in this case
has not great interest: what is really important is to take into account the political
interdiscourse which can better define the value of the words single or common.

14

Yes to a common currency, a symbol of fraternal cooperation of Europeans. But then frankly, quite
frankly, no, a thousand times no to the single currency.
15
A possible harmonized mutation of the euro which will become, from single currency, common
currency.
16
Speaking about euro as a common currency today, I wonder whether it would be unreasonable to think
twice before diving in the single currency on 1 January 2002.
17
France must work to strengthen monetary cooperation by proposing the passage of the EMS to the
common European currency (rather than single currency).

1015

6. STRONG OR WEAK EURO

A second topic which summarizes another argumentative value refers to the strength or the
weakness of the euro. On the one hand, the strength of the euro against the dollar is
assigned to different degrees: behind the dollar, at the same level of importance, or in a
contrast to it. This comparison is taken by opponents to the euro as a scale of monetary
subordination against the dollar. Both can be measured only in relationship with the
dollar and, occasionally, with the yen. Fabius explained this concept in 2001:
leuro est la fois un symbole politique majeur de lEurope qui se construit, un gage de paix, un
ple de force face au dollar et demain sans doute face une monnaie ou un panier de monnaies
asiatiques (Fabius, 23/01/2001).18

According to its supporters, euro embodies the European alternative to the dollar and the
yen and it is presented as the currency of the first world power. Therefore, if one refers to
the opponents to the euro, it is considered as a subaltern currency compared to the dollar.
From an argumentative point of view, the lexical selection of the adjective strong or
weak implies that two visions of the euro project are subsumed: on the one hand, a
currency which can defend Europe from financial crisis, unemployment, increase in the
price of consumer goods; on the other, the second vision of euro is linked to the idea that a
money cannot survive outside a state, as De Villiers argued in 2001:
Si l'euro est si faible aujourdhui, cest non seulement parce que les banquiers ne sentendent pas
entre eux sur la baisse des taux dintrt, mais que derrire cela, une monnaie qui nest pas adosse
un Etat, un peuple, une nation, na pas de chance de survivre autrement que comme une monnaie
faible (De Villiers, 7/04/2001).19

I think that the topic of the euro strength or weakness can be analysed by using the
previous argumentative protocol. In other words, we can extrapolate the argumentative
inference of each quotation through the interdiscursive relation existing between the single
adjective and the persuasive aim of the speaker. As we may read in the following
quotation, the strenght and the weakness of euro are related to the dollar :
La faiblesse de leuro fait couler beaucoup dencre, mais le MDC layant souhaite ne la dplore
pas. Nous lavions pos comme une des conditions de possibilit de leuro, avec linclusion des
pays dEurope du Sud. Un euro large devait immanquablement contribuer ce quil ft faible. []
Depuis deux ans, ce qui se passe montre clairement que la faiblesse de leuro nest que lenvers de
la force du dollar. En effet, il suffirait dun dollar faible pour des raisons dcides par le trsor
amricain (ce fut le cas au dbut de la dcennie 90) pour que leuro remonte. Ce nest pas nous qui
dcidons, en dernier ressort, de la force ou de la faiblesse de leuro. Cette faiblesse rvle surtout
linconsistance de lide politique qui sous-tend le projet de leuro (Chevnement, 21/05/2000).20
18

Euro is a major political symbol of Europe that we are making: a promise of peace, a pole of strength
against the dollar and, tomorrow, maybe, against asian currency or against a bunch of asian currencies.
19
If the euro is so weak today is not only because bankers do not agree among themselves on the lower
interest rates, but also because, behind that, a currency which is not supported by a state, a people, a nation
has no chance to survive except as a weak currency.
20
The weakness of the euro spilled much ink, but the MDC do not regret it. We had set it as a condition of
possibility of the euro, with the inclusion of southern European countries. A large euro would inevitably
contribute to his weakness [] For two years, what is happening clearly shows that the weakness of the euro

1016

The opposition to euro expressed by Chevnement is linked to the political inadequacy of

the project of the monetary Union. On the contrary, during the past French presidential
election, some candidates used these adjectives in order to renew the opposition between
euro and franc, as Sarkozy did in 2012:
Si nous sortions de leuro pour revenir au franc, nous devrions rembourser notre dette en monnaie
forte avec une monnaie faible (Sarkozy, 29/03/2012).21

The use of the adjectives strong or weak are then linked to the political context in
which they are used. In short, the semantic referent within the speech of Sarkozy is
completely opposite to the trop forte (too strong) within Marine le Pens quotation:
le problme majeur de leuro cest que cest une monnaie beaucoup trop forte pour notre conomie
(M. Le Pen, 27/11/2011).22

The positive semantic charge of the adjective strong (the euro according to Sarkozy)
becomes a negative semantic shift for the argumentative aim of the speaker (the euro
according to M. Le Pen). The leader of the National Front prompts for a sort of monetary
equality between euro and franc. The argumentative purpose of the speakers analysed
needs to be redefined on a regular basis and adapted to the political context and position of
the candidate.
7. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I want to highlight two main points of my paper. First of all, the study of a
discursive object as the euro requires special attention to the periods of time analysed and
to the selected speakers. The periods of time and the speakers in my paper are linked
insofar as they condense chronological differences but very close political and economic
issues. Moreover, even if the speakers produce monologic speeches, at the same time they
mobilize other discourses pronounced before their single utterance.
Secondly, from a theoretical point of view, I assume that I cannot use the
argumentative typology based on the definition and I think that the argumentative analysis
does not investigate the lexicon itself. Though, I think that the lexical selection operated
by a speaker makes possible her/him to guide and model her/him the argumentation. As
stated by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca,
Parfois le choix d'un terme sera destin a servir d'indice, indice de distinction, de familiarit ou de
simplicit. Parfois il servira plus directement l'argumentation, en situant l'objet du discours dans

is only the other side of a strong dollar. Indeed, a dollar weak for reasons decided by the United States
Treasury (as was the case at the beginning of the 90s) would be enough to let the euro rise. We do not
decide, eventually, about the strength or weakness of the euro. This weakness mostly reveals the
inconsistency of the political idea behind the euro project.
21
If we leave the euro back to the franc, we should pay back our debt in a strong currency with a weak
currency.
22
The major problem with the euro is that it is a far too strong currency for our economy.

1017

une catgorie mieux que ne le ferait l'usage du synonyme (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2008, p.
201).23

The adjectives common and single, strong or weak represent a choice I made to
explain my analysis, but the two corpora present many other possible couples which
testify that a public debate can generate circular argumentative strategies.

REFERENCES
Aglietta, M. (2001). Leuro ou comment crer une nouvelle valeur. Esprit, 104-120.
Amossy, R. (2009). Largumentation dans le discours. Paris: Armand Colin.
Arquembourg, J. (2003). Le temps des vnements mdiatiques. Bruxelles: De Boeck/Ina.
Blanc, J. & Servet, M. (1999). Les monnaies de SEL versus leuro Lancrage citoyen des monnaies face au
cosmopolitisme montaire. La revue du MAUSS, 13, 309-322.
Carbonnier, J. (1988). Limagerie des monnaies. Flexible droit pour une sociologie du droit sans rigueur.
Paris: L.G.D.J., 347-364.
Doury, M. (1997). Le Dbat immobile. Largumentation dans le dbat mdiatique sur les parasciences.
Paris: Kim.
Doury, M. & Moirand, S. (2004). Largumentation aujourdhui. Positions thoriques en confrontation.
Paris: Presse Sorbonne Nouvelle.
Greenstein, R. (1999). Regards linguistiques et culturelles sur leuro. Paris: LHarmattan.
Lager, C. (2005). Leuro, symbole didentit europenne. Etudes internationals, 36, 61-82.
Moirand, S. (2007). Les discours de la presse quotidienne. observer, analyser, comprendre. Paris: PUF.
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (2008). Trait de largumentation. Bruxelles: Editions de lUniversit de
Bruxelles.
Plantin, C. (1996). Largumentation. Paris: Seuil.
Plantin, C. (2002). Argumentation studies and discourse analysis: the French situation and global
perspectives. Discourse studies, 4, 342-369.
Robrieux, J. J. (2007). Rhtorique et argumentation. Paris: Armand Colin.
F. Sitri (2003). Lobjet du dbat. La construction des objets de discours dans des situations argumentatives
orales. Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle.

23

Sometimes the choice of a term is intended to serve as an index, index of distinction, familiarity and
simplicity. Sometimes it will serve more directly the argumentation, placing the object of discourse in a
better category than it would have been the use of a synonym.

1018

Historical Inquiry Into Debate Education In Early 20th Century

Japan: The Case Of Intercollegiate Debates In Yben
Junya Morooka & Tomohiro Kanke
Department of Intercultural Communication
Rikkyo University
Tokyo, Japan, 171-8501
jmorooka@rikkyo.ac.jp
Foreign Language Center
Tokai University
Kanagawa, Japan, 259-1292
kanke@keyaki.cc.u-tokai.ac.jp

ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes intercollegiate debates hosted by Yben (1910-1941), a monthly magazine
specializing in oratory. From 1930 to 1935 Yben held a total of 14 intercollegiate debates in which college
students argued over such controversial topics as capital punishment. By examining the transcripts of the
debates, relevant Yben articles, and historical documents on academic debate in the United States, the paper
seeks to trace the American influence on debate education in early 20th century Japan.
KEYWORDS: American influence, history of debate, intercollegiate debate, modern Japan, Yben

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper aims at shedding light on the influence of American-style academic debate in
early 20th century Japan by scrutinizing intercollegiate debates hosted by Yben (19101941), a monthly magazine specializing in oratory. Despite the fact that Yben was the
most influential publication devoted to promoting speech and, to a lesser extent, debate in
Japan at the time, very few studies have been conducted to examine its role and impact. A
close analysis of Yben thus offers us a new window into debate education in pre-World
War II Japan and thereby provides further historical insights into argument practices in
non-Western societies.
From 1930 to 1935, Yben held a total of 14 intercollegiate debates in which
college students were invited to argue over controversial policy topics of the day such as
capital punishment and international marriage. Importantly, the debates were billed as an
experiment with the debate format being widely practiced in the West back then. While
the first debate was allegedly modeled on the British style, the subsequent debates were in
fact more similar to those practiced at American schools. More specifically, as opposed to
the traditional (elocutionary and belles-lettristic) style of debate, the intercollegiate debates
in Yben emphasized research, the use of evidence, and a direct clash of arguments. Given
that a similar shift from elocution to argumentation occurred in the United States around
the same time, it can be surmised that contrary to popular belief, American debate
practices continued to influence debate education in Japan during the 1920s and 30s. By
examining the transcripts of the debates, relevant Yben articles, and historical documents
on academic debate in the United States, the paper seeks to trace the American influence
1019

on debate education in early 20th century Japan and to consider why Yben was so eager to
introduce American-style debate shortly before the breakout of the Pacific War.
2. YBEN IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As Aonuma, Morooka, and Sen (2013) note, the modern Japanese forensic practice has
always been under the American influence since its inception (p. 1). It is telling that
Yukichi Fukuzawas Kaigiben (How to Hold a Conference, 1874) and Sadamasu shima1
and Aikoku Horiguchis Kagi Bemp (Rules on Holding an Effective Conference, 1874),
which were among the first books on Western debate in Japan, were renditions of James
N. McElligotts the American Debater and Luther Cushings Rules of Proceeding and
Debate in Deliberative Assemblies, respectively. At the same time, the British influence
was equally, if not more, noticeable in those days. For example, Kenkichi is Kaigi
Shinan (Instructions for Conducting a Meeting, 1878) and Gend Nishimuras Seiy
Tron Kihan (The Principles of Western Debate, 1881) were both partial translations of
Frederic Rowtons the Debater.
Efforts to introduce the American and British styles of debate to Japan continued to
be made in the first decade of the 20th century when Seiji Noma, founder of the major
publishing house Kodansha (then named Dainihon Ybenkai [the Great Japanese
Oratorical Society]), launched Yben. Published in February 1910, its inaugural issue was
immediately sold out; the subsequent issues were also widely read among students,
intellectuals, and politicians (Tomasi, 2004, p. 147). Richi Okabe (1987) elaborates on
the role the magazine played in stimulating public interest in Western-style oratory:
Every month it carried diverse articles on Western rhetorical theory and practice, many texts of
speeches delivered by prominent Japanese, and translated texts of speeches of British and American
orators. This monthly magazine was instrumental in nurturing the seed of Western rhetoric on
Japanese soil at the turn of the century and in promulgating learning and knowledge of the Western
world to the enlightenment-conscious people of the late Meiji and early Taisho era (1912-1926). (p.
37)

Although Okabes article is highly informative especially for non-Japanese readers, it is

not without problems. One shortcoming is its failure to separate speech from debate.
While it is true that [t]he Yuben magazine, especially during its first six years of
publication, was instrumental in introducing American public address to Japanese crossnationally (Okabe, 1987, p. 49), articles on debate were few and far between in its early
issues. Hence it is not clear if and how much Yben sought to promote debate activities in
those days. Although Yben carried out written debate competitions (daikensh tronkai)
twice for a brief period of time, they were not actual debates but a selection of readers
opinions for and against pre-announced topics such as strengthening Japans naval forces.
Moreover, while Yben had frequently organized or sponsored speech meetings and
oratorical contests since 1914 (Tomasi, 2004, p. 147), it had not been until 1930 that it
began to hold a debate event.
Seen in this light, the novelty of the intercollegiate debates, which are the focus of this
paper, stands out. Two years prior to the first intercollegiate debate, Tadashi Kiyosawa
1

Macrons have been placed over elongated Japanese vowels except in the case of major cities and wellknown company (or university) names (e.g. Tokyo and Kodansha).

1020

(1928) reported on Japans first international oratorical contest between University of

Oregon debaters and Japanese students. Interestingly, the University of Oregon students
visited Japan as part of the world debate tour and initially challenged Japanese students to
debate. However, it turned out that they did not engage in any debates during their fiveday stay in Japan (Harper, 2003, p. 90) because the Japanese students were not ready to
debate in English and proposed an oratorical contest instead. For Kiyoasawa (1928), their
reluctance to debate was hardly surprising, but still disappointing as it attested to the lack
of debate education in Japan:
Although rare in Japan, this thing called debate is very popular among university students in the
United States. Just like they compete for a championship in baseball, [universities] oftentimes send
teams (composed of three members) of students with intelligence and argument skills to debate on a
particular issue for a victory. What the University of Oregon students proposed was a debate
meeting like this.2 (p. 105)

Given that Kiyosawa was a regular contributor to Yben and would judge several debates
a few years later, he might have affected Ybens decision to be firmly committed to
debate.
3. INTERCOLLEGIATE DEBATES IN YBEN
Yben held its first intercollegiate debate on June 11, 1930 at the Tokyo Imperial
University Young Buddhist Associations Hall. The transcript of the debate appeared in
the August issue. Students from Waseda University, Keio University, and Tokyo Imperial
University constituted two mixed teams and debated the proposition Could a war
between Japan and the United States break out? Along with the college debaters, several
distinguished guests including a politician and a naval officer partook in the debate as
commentators.
The debate began with a speech by the affirmative team. Each speech was
followed by an open forum (or cross-examination) in which not only the opposing team
but also the audience were allowed to ask questions. The members of each team alternated
giving speeches; the last two speakers, however, both represented the affirmative side,
which means only two debaters out of the six took the negative position. Presumably the
participants in the first debate were given leeway to choose their own preferred side and
that Yben was not able to find a third student willing to argue against the topic.
It took three more years after this first debate until Yben finally undertook to hold
intercollegiate debates on a regular basis. We are not exactly sure why it took so long, but
it can be speculated that the first debate was deemed far from satisfactory as encapsulated
in Etsujir Ueharas following scathing post-debate comment: Overall, I must say that
none of the six persons speaking on this topic gave it thorough consideration (Nichibei,
1930, p. 46). Along a similar line, a Yben editor provided an explanation for the threeyear hiatus at the beginning of the second debate:
Many teachers have advised us to hold a debate meeting in Yben for some time; and we had also
felt the need to do that. But as we had been thinking about holding a debate in a place like an
auditorium, we had been a little reluctant. Besides, if we were going to launch [an event like this],
2

All translations in this paper are the authors except where otherwise noted.

1021

we wanted to serialize it so that it would last for quite a long period. [So we asked ourselves:] Are
we capable of it when we are so busy editing the magazine every month?, could our debate set a
good example for [members of] oratorical societies many of which currently conduct debates in
uproar?, debaters may need more experience and audiences may need more training in order to
conduct a debate worth publishing in the magazine? These questions and concerns have kept us
from carrying out [a debate] until today. (Jisatsu, 1933, pp. 27-28)

Following the second debate on suicide in September 1933, the magazine held a total of
13 intercollegiate debates almost every month until March 1935. Table 1 shows the
propositions used in the debates, the universities students represented, their sides, and the
issues in which the transcripts appeared. Most debates took place in a conference room.
No visitors were allowed to attend the debates except for the last four in which a small
number of students were admitted.
Table 1: Intercollegiate debates held in Yben from 1930 to 1935
Propositions
1. Could a war between
Japan and the United States
break out?
2. For or against suicide?

The Affirmative
Waseda, Keio, Tokyo
Imperial Universities

The Negative
Waseda, Keio, Tokyo
Imperial Universities

Meiji University

Toyo University

10. Popular literature or pure

literature?
11. Is the current enthusiasm
for sports excessive?
12. International marriage
should be rejected.
13. Birth control should be
practiced.
14. The summer vacation

Waseda University

Keio University

Issues
Vol. 21
No. 8

Vol. 24
No. 9
3. Rustic civilization or
Nihon University
Senshu University
Vol. 24
urban civilization?
No. 10
4. Should temples be allowed Komazawa University Rissho University
Vol. 24
to possess private property?
No. 11
5. For or against the death
Hosei University
Rikkyo University
Vol. 24
penalty?
No. 12
6. Party politics should be
Tokyo Imperial
Waseda University
Vol. 25
rejected.
University
No. 3
7. The block economy
Meiji University
Keio University
Vol. 25
should be strengthened.
No. 4
8. Should women be allowed Aoyama Gakuin
Takushoku University Vol. 25
to work outside?
University
No. 5
9. Would a war advance
Meiji Gakuin
Daito Bunka Gakuin
Vol. 25
culture?
University
University
No. 8

Toyo University
Nihon University
Chuo University
Tokyo University of

1022

Vol. 25
No. 9
Senshu University
Vol. 25
No. 11
Rikkyo University
Vol. 25
No. 12
Hosei University
Vol. 26
No. 1
Takushoku University Vol. 26

should be abolished.

Agriculture

No. 3

Two judges were invited to adjudicate each debate; In most cases one of them was an
expert on the topic and the other was someone well versed in Western-style oratory. For
example, in the eighth debate on women and work, Fusae Ichikawa, an eminent advocate
for womens rights, served as a judge. No judges, however, were asked to cast a vote;
instead, their primary role was to provide commentary on the debates. Some judges even
gave advice in the middle of the debate, which signals that more emphasis was put on
education than competition in Ybens debates.
Another distinctive feature of Ybens intercollegiate debates was that they were
regulated by fairly strict procedures. Except for the first deabte each team consisted of five
members and was assigned to a particular position. As for the format, although there were
some variations, a debate typically proceeded as follows. In the first phase the negative
team opened a debate with their ten-minute speech followed by the affirmative speech of
the same length. There was a recess between the first and second phases. The second
phase was called jiy tgi, or free discussion/debate, in which the affirmative and the
negative engaged in a back-and-forth exchange of arguments. Although each student was
given 5 minutes to present his views, at least in the early debates, few seemed to have
adhered to the time limit. Some debaters spoke overtime; some others did not make any
arguments but asked questions to the opponents.
Not only were Ybens intercollegiate debates regulated by fairly strict rules, but
the debaters were also encouraged to undertake research and engage in evidence-based
argumentation. Until then, two types of debate had been predominant in Japan: gijitai
(parliamentary debate type) and benrontai (oratorical debate type) (Okabe, 2002, p. 284).
As the name suggests, the former was a simulation of the procedure of a national assembly.
The most popular form of gijitai debate among students was gikkokai (mock parliament).
In a mock parliament students were split into the ruling party and the opposition party and
conducted a spirited debate over a particular policy. With the chairpersons permission, a
student orator was able to speak multiple times in one debate. As with British debating
unions, mock parliaments were meant to give training not just in performing public
speeches, but in the very practise of government of the time through the learning of rules
and procedures (Haapala, 2012, p. 31). Therefore students were more interested in
debating the question than learning argument skills through debate. The benrontai debate,
on the other hand, divided students not into two parties (or teams) but into two opposite
positions. Neither was the number of speakers or the length of speeches predetermined.
Instead, all who wished to speak were allowed to take the podium and speak back and
forth between the two sides until the chairperson called it a day. Also, students
participating in the oratorical type of debate cared more about excellence in oral
performance than the quality of arguments.
In contrast to these traditional styles, Ybens intercollegiate debates encouraged the
logical cohesion of arguments among the team members. For example, Toyohiko Kagawa,
chair of the second debate, advised both teams to work as one organic unity and
maintain consistency throughout the debate (Jisatsu, 1933, p. 29). The importance of
research was constantly underscored as well. For example, after the second debate
Kagawa suggested that the students use more statistics to buttress their points (Jisatsu,
1023

1933, p. 41). Kiyosawa echoed the same point after the fifth debate on the death penalty,
suggesting that three important components of debate were logic, material, and delivery
(Shikei, 1933, p. 79). All in all, emphasis on teamwork, reasoning, and research
distinguished Ybens debates from the conventional ones. Importantly, as elaborated in
the next two sections, this was a deliberate attempt on Ybens part to transplant a new
form of debate in Japanese soil.
4. AMERICAN INFLUENCE
At the beginning of the first debate, Kinz Gorai, chair of the debate, stressed its
academic nature in contradistinction with the mock parliament:
This debate is a purely academic debate. There are various ways to conduct mock parliaments, but
they are sort of imitations of the Diet in that [participants] were split into political parties and
played the roles of ministers. Consequently, they could devolve into bad practices such as imitating
violent behaviors in the Diet. It is imperative that future debate meetings use the purely academic
form of debate, the one adopted at Cambridge and Oxford in Great Britain. (Nichibei, 1930, p.
31)

We can only speculate on why Gorai stated that the debate adopted the Oxford and
Cambridge style. We are also unsure why the negative team started the debate. One
possibility is that he may have had in mind an international debate between Harvard and
Oxford in October 1922, for a rather extensive article on the debate appeared in the March
1925 issue of Yben. As Noboru Tanigawa (1925), then a graduate student at Harvard,
reported, the British and American teams debated the proposition the U.S. should join
immediately the League of Nations. Notably, the debate began with a speech by the
negative side (Harvard). Another possible reason is the use of an open forum, which was
arguably peculiar to the British system of debating back then. Yet another reason is the
adoption of a popular vote system, another characteristic of the British style (Moore, 1992,
p. 56). Although the audiences did not actually cast a vote due to time constraints, it was
announced that a decision would rest on audience votes.
While the first debate was allegedly modeled on the Oxford and Cambridge style,
the subsequent debates more closely resembled the American-style debate. Among others,
they were team debates with the length and order of each speech predetermined. In
addition, the second through last debates emphasized research and teamwork, which also
signaled that they were indebted more to the American style of debate. Baird (1923) spells
out the differences between the American and British styles in the early 20th century:
With little or no reference to his colleague he [the British debater] gives his individual argument,
usually some fifteen minutes long. If he persists, no bell shuts him off. He follows no formal brief,
reproduces no carefully wrought manuscript. [T]he British system is a judgeless, open forum,
parliamentary discussion rather than a competitive sport In his purpose, style, and delivery the
Oxford collegian thus differs sharply from the conventional American debater. (p. 216)

This does not mean, however, that Ybens debate format was identical to the American
one. For one thing, five persons constituted a team in Ybens debates, whereas two- or
three-person team debates were common at American schools during this period (ONeil
& McBurney, 1932; Nicholas, 1936). For another, Ybens debates initially consisted of
1024

opening speeches and free discussion without any rebuttals. Unfortunately, we dont have
any conclusive evidence to explain these discrepancies. What we do know is that frequent
references were made to the American policy debate format in Yben. For instance,
speaking from his own debating experience at Western Seattle High School, Tosh End
(1927) wrote that two or three speakers made up a team and each was given 10 minutes for
constructive work and three minutes for rebuttal (p. 268). Similarly, when asked about the
proper team size at a round-table discussion Yben organized in 1934, Kiyosawa replied:
In the United States each university chooses three representatives and each [speaker] is
given 20 minutes to speak in turn (Tronnetsu, 1934, p. 133). When further asked if
there was any four- or five-person debate format, Kiyosawa answered rarely. The format
is fixed In a three-person debate, the first speakers introduce their arguments, the second
engage in refutation, and the last summarize [the debate] (Tronnetsu, 1934, p. 133).
The debates became a little more Americanized from the 12th debate with the
introduction of rebuttal speeches. More specifically, while each team was still composed
of five members, the third phase was added in which both sides were given opportunities
to summarize the debate. This indicates that continuous efforts had been made to improve
the structure of a debate. Unfortunately, the 14th debate on summer vacation, which
appeared in the March 1935 issue, became the last debate. The magazine itself went
defunct in 1941, the year Japan declared a war against the United States.
5. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE CONCEPT OF ELOQUENCE (YBEN)
What can be extrapolated from the above account of the intercollegiate debates is an
attempt on Ybens part to reformulate the concept of eloquence by shifting its emphasis
from elocution and elegant use of language to reasoning and plainness of speech.
Interestingly, the English word debate (more precisely, the English-based loanword
dibto) was used instead of its Japanese translation (tron) to distinguish the form of
debate Yben promoted from the conventional ones, It is well known that Fukuzawa
translated debate and speech as tron and enzetsu to promulgate Western-style oral
discourse in the 1870s; here the process was reversed to reclaim the values of debate in
early 20th century Japan. For example, at the start of the second debate Kagawa
encouraged both teams to prize the virtue of debatemanship and refrain from ad
hominem attacks and ridicule (Jisatsu, 1933, p. 29). Along the same line, Kiyosawa
(1933) defended his use of the word dibto by asserting:
Some may say that it is better to use a Japanese word rather than an overly-westernized katakana
word like debate [dibto]. But debate is a common word around the world and it is not worth the
effort to translate it into Japanese. (p. 142)

Implicit in Kagawa, Kiyosawa, and other dibto proponents argument is their

dissatisfaction with the ways debates were conducted in schools and society at the time.
The following comment by Totsud Kat, chair and judge of the fourth debate, is
illustrative of this point:
Debate in our country has been so chaotic now. This is no more evident than in the Imperial Diet. I
hope you will conduct [this] new form of debate with firm determination that it will [help to] rectify
this problem and form the basis for a future style of debating in Japan. (Jiin, 1933, p.100).

1025

Then why did Yben seek to redefine the concept of eloquence in the 1920s and 30s? To
answer this question, one must recognize that the popularity of oratory was rapidly waning
during this period. For instance, members of the Third Higher Schools oratorical society
dropped by more than two-thirds (from over 60 to less than 20) within 4 years between
1926 and 1930 (Inoue, 2001, p. 95). Similarly, according to a survey conducted by Himeji
High School Alumni Association in 1931, only 1 out of 152 respondents chose Yben as
their favorite magazine (Inoue, 1999, p. 90). In short, eloquence (yben), which used to be
considered a passport to success, was generally perceived as anachronistic by the late
1920s (Inoue, 2002, p. 81).
Faced with this decline in popularity, Yben made several attempts to rejuvenate
the importance of eloquence; one of them was to promote an alternative style of debate.
As table 2 shows, Yben regularly carried articles on debate around the time it hosted the
intercollegiate debates. This testifies to its systematic effort to spread a new form of debate
in Japan.
Table 2: Yben articles on debate from 1926 to 1934
Titles
Authors
Tips for a successful debate and how Takeuchi, J
to put them into practice
Why isnt debate practiced in Japan? Kayahara, Kazan
Debate tips and tricks
Imai, Sabur
Ways of debating
Tsurumi, Ysuke
I highly recommend debate training
Kiyosawa, Tadashi,
to all of you
Quick guide to learning the ways of
Kiyosawa, Tadashi
debating
A study group to generate enthusiasm Panel composed of
for debate
five intellectuals
American students enthusiasm for
Negishi, Yoshitar
debate
Report on a debate meeting by
Nakamura, Hokusui
[students enrolled in] the Meiji
University Preparatory Course

Issues (Year)
Vol. 17 No. 3 (1926)
Vol. 17 No. 9 (1926)
Vol. 20 No. 7 (1929)
Vol. 21 No. 6 (1930)
Vol. 24 No. 2 (1933)
Vo. 24 No. 6 (1933)
Vol. 25 No. 1-2 (1934)
Vol. 25 No. 8 (1934)
Vol. 25 No. 8 (1934)

Importantly, many of these articles not only stressed the benefits of debate but also tried to
reconfigure the concept of eloquence itself. For instance, Kazan Kayahara maintained that
the lack of debate activities in most college oratorical societies was indicative of a serious
weakness of Japans national character. For as he sees it, [i]t is impossible to conceive of
eloquence without debate. Yet Japan does not have debate, but only speech, which
indicates that there has yet to be any true eloquence in Japan (Kayahara, 1926, p. 36).
Similarly, the Yben editor who moderated the aforementioned round-table discussion
stated that speech meetings are fairly popular in youth clubs as well as among students. I
wonder how much eloquence would be refined if we could bring at least half of their
enthusiasm to debate (Tronnetsu, 1934, p. 144).

1026

Interestingly, this shift from elocution to argumentation coincided with increased emphasis
in the American debate community on research rather than eloquence (Keith, 2010, p. 16).
According to Brown (1996), [a]lthough the American elocutionary movement remained
similar to that of England, it gradually became less interested in elocution itself and more
concerned with intercollegiate debate and argumentation (p. 214). Besides, Yben
attempted to reposition debate from political practice (as with mock parliaments) to
academic exercise around the time judging shifted from judging the question to judging
the debate on the U.S. college debate circuit (Keith, 2010, p. 15).
More importantly, several regular contributors to Yben were well aware of this
shifting trend in the United States. For instance, in the article entitled Ways of Debating
Ysuke Tsurumi (1930) cited the changing nature of public speaking styles in the United
States and used it as a rationale for promoting debate education in Japan:
There used to be such great speakers as Daniel Webster who composed polished prose in the world
of public speaking in the United States; the style of speech, however, has dramatically changed over
the past two decades under the influence of the [former] Harvard University president, the late Dr.
[Charles William] Eliots speeches. That is, flowery, declamatory styles have been abandoned and
replaced with plain, conversational speeches (p. 64)

Likewise, Jji Kasai (1928), who once received the Julius Rosenwald Prize for Excellence
in Oratory as a student at the University of Chicago (Jiuji, n.d.), argued that true
eloquence consisted in expressing ones will as briefly, simply, clearly, and succinctly as
possible. He therefore found it ludicrous for many Japanese to acclaim those who would
speak for a few hours as eloquent speakers (p.162). By the same token, St. Pauls
University professor Yoshitar Negishi pointed out that unlike Japanese students,
American students speeches were rarely cut-and-dried because they learned how to
compose and present clear, logical, and substantive speeches through debate (p. 256).
Conversely, in Negishis view Japanese students tended to cling to the old-fashioned
mannerisms and present cookie-cutter arguments as they received little debate training.
Despite Ybens systematic efforts, the alternative style of debate did not take hold
in pre-World War II Japan. As Meiji University professor Takahiro Akagami (1940)
regretfully wrote in retrospect: under the auspices of this magazine Yben, the need for
debate was emphasized at one point and it was frequently tried in Japan. But in the end
such attempts didnt yield expected results for various reasons (p.106).
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated that persistent attempts had been made to introduce an
alternative (mostly American) style of debating to Japan in the early 20th century. This
runs counter to the common conception that the popularity of Western speech and debate
declined all of a sudden at the turn of the century (Okabe, 2002, p. 288). In fact, even a
year before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Akagami (1940) stressed the need for debate
training by attributing Japans weak diplomacy to the peoples poor debating skills (pp.
105-106). Similarly, Kasai (1928) suggested that the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924 was
passed partly because the Japanese people were too reticent to speak out against the
legislation (p. 167). In Akagami and Kasais views, debating skills could be used to
improve the deteriorating diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States.
1027

In fact, some students and intellectuals made last-ditch efforts to avert a war in the face of
the escalating tensions between the two countries. In 1934 a group of concerned Japanese
students organized the first Japan-America student conference out of the belief that peace
in the Pacific depended on friendly relations between Japan and the U.S. and that this
amity was rapidly eroding (The Japan-America, n.d., n.p.). They invited about 70
American university students and professors to Japan in order to talk about major
problems confronting the two countries. Although it was named Nichibei Gakusei
Tronkai (literally, Japan-US Student Debate Meeting), it was basically a round-table
discussion without any rigorous procedures. Having been disappointed to see Japanese
students insist on their opinions, Kiyosawa (1934) wrote that only if debate had been taken
more seriously in the students universities, they would not have so stubbornly clung on to
their own ideas without responding to American students (pp. 92-93). We are not
suggesting that the Pacific War could have been avoided if the Japanese were more skilled
at debating. Our point is that we should pay more attention to the fact that there was a
grassroots movement to ease the diplomatic tensions between Japan and the United States
shortly before the war and that some students and intellectuals regarded debate as a
valuable cultural resource to achieve that goal.
Lastly, while we agree with Okabe (2005)s view that Western rhetorical ideas
were too artificial and technical for most Japanese people to emulate (p. 165), it should
also be noted that the artificial and mechanical concepts of Western elocutionary
rhetoric (Okabe, 2005, p. 165) were deemed outdated in Western societies as well. More
importantly, Ybens attempt to promote academic debate in the 1920s and 30s coincided
with the shift in emphasis from elocution to argumentation in the United States.
Unfortunately, little is still known about the American influence on debating activities in
early 20th century Japan. Although we often take for granted that debate practices in Japan
have always been under the American influence, the question of how has yet to be fully
explored. Much still needs to be done to understand how American practices have actually
influenced the ways of debating in Japan.
REFERENCES
Akagami, T. (1940). Tron niwa ikanishite katsuka [How to win a debate]. Yben, 31 (10): 106-110.
Aonuma, S., Morooka, J., & Sen, K. (2014). Revisiting the U.S. footprints: A critical exploration of
interscholastic/intercollegiate policy debate in post World War II Japan. In C. Palczewski (Ed.),
Disturbing Arguments: Selected Works from the 18th NCA/AFA Alta Conference on Argumentation
(pp. 432-437). New York: Routledge.
Baird, C. (1923). Shall American universities adopt the British system of debating? Quarterly Journal of
Speech, 9 (3): 215-222.
Brown, B. G. (1996). Elocution. In T. Enos (Ed.), Encyclopedia of rhetoric and composition:
Communication from ancient times to the information age (pp. 211-214). New York: Routledge.
End, T. (1929). Beikoku gakusei daitronkai ni shutujin shite [Reflection on participating in a student
debate competition in the United States]. Yben, 18 (12): 266-271.
Haapala, T. (2012). Debating societies, the art of rhetoric and the British House of Commons: Parliamentary
culture of debate before and after the 1832 Reform Act. Res Publica, 27: 25-35.
Harper, K. R. (2003). Arguing their way around the world: An exhibition proposal for the 1927 University of
Oregon world debate tour. Retrieved from
https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/219/harper_k.pdf?sequence=1

1028

Inoue, Y. (1999, October). Nidome no benron bmu to yben seinen tachino seisui: 1900-1939nen wo
chshin toshite [The second oratory boom and the rise and fall of eloquent youth: from 1900 to
1939]. Paper presented at the 51st conference of the Japan Society of Educational Sociology, Tokyo.
Inoue, Y. (2001). Bungaku seinen to yben seinen: Meiji 40nendai karano chishiki seinenron saikent
[Literary youth and eloquent youth: Revisiting the research on young intellectuals since the Meiji
40s]. Sociologi, 45(3): 85-101.
Inoue, Y. (2002). Eiyshugi no keifu: Yben to Bouken no Meiji 40nendai [A genealogy of heroism: Yben
and Bken in the Meiji 40s]. In K. Inagaki & Y. Takeuchi (Eds.), Fury, hr, sakei: Kyiku to
itsudatsu no shakaigaku [Delinquents, heroes, and a leftist inclination: The sociology of education
and deviance] (pp. 60-83). Kyoto: Jimbun Shoin.
Jiin ga zaisan wo shoy suru no ka hi [Should temples be allowed to possess private property?]. (1933).
Yben, 24 (11): 98-117.
Jiuji Kasai Summer Research Grant. (n.d.). The Center for East Asian Studies, the University of Chicago.
Retrieved from https://ceas.uchicago.edu/page/jiuji-kasai-japan-summer-research-grant
Jisatsu wa hatashite ze ka hi ka [For or against suicide?]. Yben, 24 (9): 26-45.
Kayahara, K. (1926). Nihon ni tron no okonawarezaru ha nanzo [Why isnt debate practiced in Japan?].
Yben, 17 (9): 36-39.
Kasai, J. (1928). Beikoku kakudaigaku niokeru yben kyiku [Eloquence training in American universities].
Yben, 17 (2): 162-167.
Keith, W. (2010). Keynote address: A new golden age: Intercollegiate debate in the twenty-first century. In
A. D. Louden (Ed.), Navigating opportunity: Policy debate in the 21st century (pp. 11-26). New
York: IDebate Press.
Kiyosawa, T. (1928). Nichibei daigakusei yben taiksen wo miru [Report on the speech competition
between Japanese and American university students]. Yben, 19 (1): 105-113.
Kiyosawa, T. (1933). Dibto no hh hayawakari [Quick guide to learning the ways of debating]. Yben, 24
(6): 142-145.
Kiyosawa, T. (1934). Nichibei gakusei tronkai wo kiku [Watching the round-table discussion between
Japanese and American students]. Yben, 25 (9): 88-93.
Moore, G. L. (1922, September 13). When men debate beliefs, not statistics. Outlook, pp. 55-56.
Negishi, Y. (1934). Beikoku gakusei no tronnetsu [American students enthusiasm for debate]. Yben, 25
(8): 254-259.
Nichibei tatakauhi ariya ina ya [Could a war between Japan and the United States break out?]. (1930). Yben,
21 (8): 30-51.
Nichols, E. R. (1936). A historical sketch of intercollegiate debating: I. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 22 (2):
213-220.
Okabe, R. (1987). American public address in Japan: A case study in the introduction of American oratory
through the Yuben (monthly magazine on oratory). In R. J. Jensen & J. C. Hammerback (Eds.). In
search of justice: The Indiana tradition in speech communication (pp. 37-51). Amersterdam:
Rodopi.
Okabe, R. (2002). Japans attempted enactments of Western debate practice in the 16 th and the 19th centuries.
In R. T. Donahue (Ed.), Exploring Japaneseness: On Japanese enactments of culture and
consciousness (pp. 277-291). Westport, CT: Ablex Publishing.
Okabe, R. (2005). The impact of Western elocutionary rhetoric on the East: The case of Japan. Rhetoric, 23
(2): 153-164.
ONeil, J. M., & McBurney, J. H. (1932). The working principles of argument. New York: Macmillan.
Shikei ze ka hi ka [For or against the death penalty]. (1933). Yben, 24 (12): 61-79.
Tanigawa, N. (1925). Oxford (ei), Harvard (bei) rydaiku taik tronkai wo kiku. Yben, 14 (2): 208-212.
The Japan-America Student Conference (JASC): Celebrating seventy years. (n.d.). Retrieved from
http://iscdc.org/history-and-alumni/jasc-history/chapter-1/
Tomasi, M. (2004). Rhetoric in modern Japan: Western influences on the development of narrative and
oratorical style. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Tronnetsu wo sakanni suru kenkykai [A study group to generate enthusiasm for debate]. (1934). Yben,
25 (2): 130-144.
Tsurumi, Y. (1930). Tron no shikata [Ways of debating]. Yben, 21 (6): 64-70.

1029

The Method Of Peer Evaluation For Argument: The Learning

Process Of Japanese College Students
Mika Nakano
Faculty of Engineering
Fukuoka Institute of Technology
Japan
nakano@fit.ac.jp
Tel& Fax: 092-606-4641, Website: http://www.commedu.net/

ABSTRACT: This paper aims at (1) introducing a teaching method of peer evaluation for argument
especially for students who learn debating for the first time, and (2) examining their learning process. The
curriculum consisted of fifteen classes (90 minutes) for a half-year period, and was used for college
freshmen in the engineering department. After the classes, most students understood the importance of peer
evaluation, and the average score of self-recognition toward peer evaluation became higher.
KEYWORDS: Peer evaluation, College freshman, Debate, Argument, Learning process

1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, in Japan, argument education has drawn increasing attention from elementary to
higher levels, as a means of cultivating argumentative skills as well as developing human
resources in a globalized world. Argument skill is recognized as the framework which
reflects thinking skills or thinking processes (Tomida & Maruno, 2004). Teaching how to
argue with peers is the one of the important goals in higher education. In those classes,
peer evaluation is sometimes introduced to improve learners individual ability as well as
to develop community of practice. Nakano (2007) found that to cultivate argument skills
learners need to learn the stratified argument skills step by step and apply those skills to
specific appropriate situations. Through peer evaluation, learners can accumulate the
knowledge and skill of argument by exchanging comments with each other. It helps
learners to foster self-understanding about what they have learned and have not learned.
Learners acquire the viewpoint of evaluator and find their own task, which leads deep
understanding on complicated phenomena of argument (Nakano, 2013).
Previous research reported that peer evaluation is effective as a way to educational
evaluation based on the new ability evaluation (Cousins & Whitmore1988). Along with
the popularization of E-Learning, a lot of programs and systems include evaluation in the
learning process of WBT (Web Based Training). In ordinary classes, peer-evaluation and
self-evaluation are used in bulletin board system (Nakahara et al., 2002), video-on-demand
and web-database. These effects were tested in the research by learners satisfaction and
motivation toward classes. However, empirical studies about how to teach peer evaluation
in argument are scarce and its effect has not been sufficiently tested yet. The problem here
is that teachers who have tried debate education experienced difficulties, as stating
opinions to others is sometimes too hard for Japanese students mentally and technically
(Inoue & Nakano, 2006; Nakano & Maruno, 2012).
1030

The authors have done research on the new system of argument education using peer
evaluation in these years. Nakano (2012) described the importance and the way of peer
evaluation. In the authors laboratory, the research on the effects of peer evaluation were
conducted in 2011 (Hirata, 2012) and in 2012 (Shibata, 2013) Based on these studies, this
paper aims at (1) introducing a teaching method of peer evaluation for argument especially
for college students who learn debating for the first time, and (2) examining their learning
process for two years.
2. THE TOOL FOR PEER EVALUATION FOR ARGUMENT
2.1 Goal and criteria
The goal of peer evaluation is to foster students evaluation skills as well as their selfevaluation skills. As criteria, the two main categories manner (the content of argument)
and matter (how to convey ones idea) in argument were selected for a tool for peer
evaluation. Each category has five subordinate skills. The evaluation system with ten
items of two categories was developed. It is simple and easy so that novice students take
only 5 minutes to complete the evaluation. The system can be used as peer-evaluation as
well as self-evaluation.
Table 1 The criteria of peer-evaluation for argument
Manner 1
2
3
4
5
Matter 1
2
3
4
5

Criteria
Score*
voice production
1-2-3-4-5
speed
1-2-3-4-5
tone
1-2-3-4-5
pause
1-2-3-4-5
eye contact
1-2-3-4-5
clearly stated claim
1-2-3-4-5
reasonable reason
1-2-3-4-5
example and data
1-2-3-4-5
organization
1-2-3-4-5
interest
1-2-3-4-5
*1 poor, 2 fair, 5 excellent

Table 1 shows the tool for peer evaluation for argument. The five items of manner are
voice production, speed, tone of voice, pause, and eye contact. The ones of
matter are clearly stated claim, reasonable reason, example and data,
organization, and interest. Those items were extracted by the result of the authors
fifteen-year observation research for novice students. They are the items the novice
students had common problem when they spoke in front of others. For quantitative
evaluation, Five-point scale is used for evaluation; 1 is poor, 2 is fair, 5 is excellent.
Along with this evaluation, students write about good point and needs improvement in
free description as qualitative evaluation.

1031

2.2 Procedure
2.2.1 Four steps of peer evaluation using a worksheet
There are four steps in peer evaluation. A worksheet is prepared according this procedure
(see Appendix 1). The worksheet contains the following seven questions. Using this
format of worksheet, the themes the students discuss were changed every class.
Q1:
Q2:
Q3:
Q4:
Q5:
Q6:
Q7:

Please write your own opinion about High School uniform should be abolished in
Japan
Please make a presentation using Q1 and evaluate members opinion.
Please write the evaluators comment about your opinion.
Please set your goal for the next presentation considering Q3.
Please analyze the best presentation in your group.
Did you change your opinion after sharing others opinion?
Why did you change, or didnt you change in Q6?

In peer evaluation, first, a teacher makes a small group and decides a resolution. Students
write their opinions in a worksheet in five to ten minutes (Appendix 1, Q1; step 1). After
preparation, students decide the order of presentations in the group and they each make a
presentation in about ten minutes. Students who are not presenters take memos and
evaluate the presentation by filling in a worksheet (Q2; step 2). After presentations,
students evaluate themselves, write about good points and improvement needed, and share
the evaluation in the group in ten minutes. (Q3; step 3). Lastly, students discuss the gap
between evaluations, set a goal about manner and matter, and analyze each others opinion
(Q4-7; step 4). After all the groups finish, a teacher and students discuss consistency and
fairness of evaluation in the class. To improve students skills, the teacher tells students to
focus on the result of highest scores as strong points, and lower scores get close to the
average.
2.2.2 Small step learning of manner and matter
As introduction, to learn peer evaluation effectively, two categories of manner and matter
were used separately for the first time. After students used each category of five items, the
complete version of ten items for manner and matter was used. When using a separate
version for introduction, first manner and second matter is most effective, as students can
evaluate manner base on their objective judgment. On the other hand, matter needs
experience to judge the content. In the peer evaluation, the procedure is the same in
manner and matter, so students can concentrate more on what they evaluate and get used
to it.
2.3 Function and value
2.3.1 Understanding the gap between various evaluations
After exchanging ideas in a small group with around four students, students evaluate
others presentations and their own as self-evaluation using the format shown in Table 1.
1032

When the group consists of four, one student will have three evaluations from others. The
students can learn the variety of evaluations from others, and the gap between others
evaluation and own self-evaluation at the same time. These multiphase feedbacks help
students make an adjustment for improvement and understand what argument is.
2.3.2 The community of practice
Peer evaluation is effective to develop the community of practice in the class. Before
introducing systemized peer evaluation, most of the students had trouble in making
presentations and evaluations to unfamiliar students. A teacher explained that the
importance of peer evaluation is not for just criticizing others, but respect others good
points and improve by learning from others. Exchanging evaluations is the important part
of communication, even though it is hard to say. In the class, the teacher always make
consideration toward the students mood and tells them when they say something wrong.
3. METHOD
To clarify the change of students in the long term, the two research studies in two years
were conducted. Research 1 is based on Hirata (2012), and research 2 is Shibata (2013).
Research 1
The questionnaire research was conducted in the subject of Communication I which
aimed at cultivating debating skills and logical thinking for freshman in Fukuoka Institute
of Technology. The number of students were 36 (M=36, F=0). After experiencing peer
evaluation in the prior four classes, they answered the questionnaire in ten minutes after
the class on June 16th, 2011.
This paper reports the result of one question for comparison with research 2.
Question 1 is about the attitude toward peer evaluation. 1-1 Im good at peer evaluation,
1-2 I like peer evaluation, 1-3 everyone can learn peer evaluation, 1-4 Id like to
improve based on PE, 1-5 peer evaluation is important, 1-6 peer evaluation is useful
in the future.
Research 2
The second research study was conducted in the Presentation which aimed at cultivating
presentation skills for sophomore students. The number of students were 40 (M=40, F=0).
Most students are the same as the research 1. In the class, peer evaluations were used. To
test the changes more closely, two questionnaire research studies were conducted after the
first presentation at the middle stage (on May 17th and 24th, 2012) and second
presentation at the final stage (July 12th and 19th, 2012) each taking ten minutes.
Question 1 is the same as research 1. In addition, this paper reports two more questions for
further analysis. Question 2 is about the object of peer evaluation, and Question 3 is about
the image of peer evaluation.

1033

4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Quantitate analysis of Question 1
Fig.1 shows the results of Question 1 conducted in research 1 and 2. The average scores of
research 1 were as follows: 1-12.5(SD=.97) ; 1-2, 2.8(SD=.96) ; 1-3, 3.6(SD=.87); 1-4,
4.2(SD=.72) ; 1-5, 4.3(SD=.73) ; 1-6, 4.3(SD=.77). These results clarify that most of the
students feel they are not good at peer evaluation and they dont like peer evaluation,
although they recognize the importance and it is needed for the future, and have
motivation. At the time of research study 1, students only experienced peer evaluation four
times in the classes, so they might have been unfamiliar with the new communication style
of peer evaluation. This result implicates that the tool and system of peer evaluation
proposed in this paper contributed to their learning in the classes.
The results of Research study 2 in the middle were as follows: 1-1, 2.5(SD=.86) ;
1-2, 2.6(SD=.87); 1-3, 3.9(SD=.87); 1-4, 4.1(SD=.88); 1-5, 4.1(SD=.89); 1-6,
4.2(SD=.90). The results of Research study 2 in the final were: 1-1, 3.0 (SD=.76); 1-2,
3.1(SD=.76); 1-3, 4.2(SD=.75); 1-4, 4.3(SD=.76); 1-5, 4.3(SD=.77); 1-6, 4.2(SD=.78).
These results showed all the scores of Research 2-middle and final increased except for 16. The score of 1-1 and 1-2 which were lowest in average in the result 2-middle, increased
most plus 0.5 point in each. These results show that the attitude changed positively
through the presentation classes.
5,0
4,0
3,0
Research1

2,0

Research2-mid
1-6 PE is useful in
the future

1-5 PE is important

1-4 Id like to
improve based on PE

1-3 everyone can

learn PE

1-2 I like PE

1-1 I'm good at PE

1,0

Research2-final

*PE=peer evaluation

Fig. 1 The attitude toward peer evaluation in debate

Comparing all the data of Research 1, 2-middle and 2-final in Table 1, we can see the
gradual increase overall. There are three patterns in the result. One is the characteristic of
1-1 and 1-2, which are lowest of all and changed drastically through two years. Another is
the items of 1-4, 1-5, and 1-6 which are highest and change little. The other is 1-3, which
increased as the students became more experienced in the classes. Overall the scores of
1034

sophomore in Research 2-middle and final are higher than freshmen in the Research 1,
which implicates that the learning using the tool and system of peer evaluation succeeds in
helping students become motivated in the classes.
4.2 Qualitative analysis of Question 2 to 6
The answers of free description on Question 2 to 6 can be summarized as follows:
Question 2 What is the object of peer evaluation?
To develop ones merit and improve ones demerit by cooperating with others
To get interested and listen actively to others opinions
To notice what I havent noticed by myself
Question 3 What is the image of peer evaluation?
The good chance to reflect on myself
To improve my skill
To know my bad points
I dont have good image toward peer evaluation as Im not good at evaluating
others.
Question 4 Do you think you changed the image of peer evaluation from freshmen?
I dont know.
I dont remember.
I had trouble in evaluating others when I was a freshman, but now Ive gotten
used to it and think deeply in peer evaluation
Question 5 When do you think you do peer evaluation in daily life?
When I study with my friends
In conversation
Discussion watching TV news
In driving
Question 6 What is the merit and demerit of peer evaluation?
The merit
Evaluator

Presenter

I can evaluate others by comparing

with myself
To get skill to judge and listen to
others
I can help others improve
I can notice my bad point
I can tell others what I feel

1035

To improve bad points

To notice what I didnt know
I can do better the next time

The demerit
Evaluator

Presenter

To say something bad to my friend

Bad evaluation breaks a
relationship
To hurt my friend
I cannot understand their opinion
My evaluation affects badly

To become deflated
To lose confidence
To be caught up in the evaluation by
others

About Question 2 and 3, these results show that most of the students understand the reason
why they learn peer evaluation in the class, effectiveness in improving skills, and
understanding others. Peer evaluation helps students concentrate on listening to others as
they need to evaluate. This is one of the important factors in argument education in Japan.
About Question 4, as stated in 4.1, the recognition toward peer evaluation became better
and one of the students answered that he overcame the trouble in evaluating others and
could concentrate much more on evaluation. In regards to Question 5, there are various
answers and some students do peer evaluation in daily life, but others dont. These
differences in daily-life communication might affect the individual differences in the
classes. As for Question 6, there are a lot of merits and demerits dividing evaluator and
presenter. This result shows that the students understand the meaning of peer evaluation,
but they consider it might a break relationship between classmates. Japanese students are
hesitant to say their opinion directly. This problem is because they are not confident in
what they feel or think enough to tell others.

exchanging information about good and bad point on

other's skill and opinion (Sharing Information Level)

deeply understanding others' opinion and value (Mutual

Understanding Level)

developing oneself by sharing and assimilate information

and knowledge (Develop Level)

Fig. 2 The three level of the objectives of peer evaluation (Nakano, 2012)

1036

Nakano (2012) found that there are three levels of the objectives of peer evaluation shown
in Fig.2:Aexchanging information about good and bad points of other's skill and
opinion (Sharing Information Level),Bdeeply understanding others' opinion and value
(Mutual Understanding Level), Cdeveloping oneself by sharing and assimilate
information and knowledge (Develop Level). The result of this paper follows this model.
By developing the tool and system of peer-evaluation for Japanese novice students, most
of the students feel positive toward peer evaluation. In the process, they have changed
from just sharing information to gradually understanding others, and finally they develop
themselves using the experience of peer evaluation. The result shows some students still
feel trouble in evaluating others. This is caused by inexperience in their lives. These
individual differences need to be researched.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper aimed at (1) introducing a teaching method of peer evaluation for argument
especially for college students who learn debating for the first time, and (2) examining
their learning process for two years. As for the attitude of students toward peer evaluation,
they were getting used to evaluating each other. Through peer evaluation, they seemed
more concentrated on arguments by listening to others opinion. At the same time, they
judged their own opinion standing on the viewpoint of evaluator by evaluating others.
These changes in the process are the essential points of peer evaluation. According to the
results, the system for peer evaluation proposed in this paper fit the needs and levels of the
students and worked properly as a tool for learning argument. On the other hand, some
students still have a hard time in peer evaluation and lose confidence. In the future, a more
systematic approach for the students who are not positive toward peer evaluation is
needed.
REFERENCES
Cousis, J.B. & Whitemore, E. (1998) Framing participatory evaluation. New Directions for Evaluation, 80:
5-23.
Hirata, K. (2012). The research on the peer evaluation in the Communication I class for college students.
Fukuoka Institute of Technology. B.A. thesis. (in Japanese)
Inoue, N., & Nakano, M. (2006). The costs and benefits of participating in competitive debate activities:
Differences between Japanese and American college students. In F. H. van Eemeren, M. D. Hazen,
P. Houtlosser & D. C. Williams (Eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Argumentation: Views from
the Venice Argumentation Conference (pp.167-184). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Nakahara, J., Urashima, N., Nishimori, T., Suzuki, M., Imai, Y., Yamagiwa, K., & Nagata, T. (2002) The
Development and Evaluation of Bulletin Board System Which Enables Learner's Mutual Evaluation
to Their Messages. Japan Society for Educational Technology, 26 (Suppl), 33-38. (in Japanese)
Nakano, M. (2007). How college students acquire argumentative skills in a community of practice.
Cognitive Studies, 14(3), 398-408. (in Japanese)
Nakano, M. (2010). Introductory communication for college freshmen. Kyoto: Nakanishiya.
Nakano, M. (2012). Students Perception on Peer Evaluation in the Class for Argument Skills. Japan Society
for Educational Technology. 37 (Suppl), 185-188. (in Japanese)
Nakano, M. (2013). Discussion: fostering students learning from each other in academia. In E. Tomida, & A.
Tajima (Eds.), University Education: Psychological theories and practices for developing crossboundary explanations (pp.111-126). Kyoto: Nakanishiya.
Nakano, M. & Maruno, S. (2012).The effect of debate training on argumentative skills: The developmental

1037

process of Japanese college students. Studies for the Learning Society. Issue 4.
Shibata, K. (2013). The research on the self and peer evaluation in the presentation class for college
students. Fukuoka Institute of Technology. B.A. thesis. (in Japanese)
Tomida, E., & Maruno, S. (2004) Empirical Findings and Theoretical Background of Argument as Thinking.
Japanese Psychological Review, 47 (2):187-209 (in Japanese)
Tomida, E., Mizukami, E., Morimoto, E., & Otsuka, H. (2010-2011). Learning Environment for
Undergraduates to Enhance Spontaneous Growth of Communication Skills: Effects of group size.
Educational technology research, 33(12), 121-130.

APPENDIX 1

1038

The Agentive Approach To Argumentation: A Proposal

Douglas Nio & Danny Marrero
Department of Humanities
Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano
Bogot-Colombia
edison.nino@utadeo.edu.co
Department of Humanities
Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano
Bogot-Colombia
danny.marreroa@utadeo.edu.co

ABSTRACT: This paper outlines an agent-centered theory of argumentation. Our working hypothesis is that
the aim of argumentation depends upon the agenda agents are disposed to close or advance. The novelty of
this idea is that our theory, unlike the main accounts of argumentation, does not establish a fixed function
that agents have to achieve when arguing. Instead, we believe that the aims of argumentation depend upon
the purposes agents are disposed to achieve (agendas).
KEYWORDS: Agent, agent centered theory of argumentation, function of argumentation

1. INTRODUCTION
The main goal of this paper is to outline an agent-centered theory of argumentation. Our
working hypothesis is that the aim of argumentation depends upon the agenda agents are
disposed to close or advance. The novelty of this idea is that our theory, unlike the main
normative accounts of argumentation (i.e., rhetorical, dialogical and epistemological
theories of argumentation), does not establish an a priori function that agents are expected
to achieve when arguing. Instead, we believe that the aims of argumentation depend upon
the purposes agents are disposed to achieve (i.e., their agendas). The problem with fixing
an a priori function for argumentation is that some argumentative practices do not fit into
the proposed end. Our concern is that when an agent does not aim for the fixed function of
argumentation, his/her argumentative practice could be misunderstood or overlooked. That
is why our agentive theory suggests that the agendas agents are disposed to close or
advance by means of argumentation determine the goal of such communicative activity. If
our intuitions are right, our account shows some promise understanding of a broader
diversity of argumentative practices than each of the normative theories of argumentation
individually considered.
Given the formal constraints of this presentation, we are not going to do a thorough
reconstruction of each of the normative theories of argumentation. Instead, we are going to
do cautious generalizations. First, we are going to make explicit the principle that
normative theories of argumentation use to fix the putative goal for argumentation. Then,
we will use a counter-example showing that the methodology of fixing an a priori function
for argumentation is wrong. Finally, we will present the main concepts of our approach
and show how it deals with the proposed counter-example.

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2. THE NORMATIVE THEORIES OF ARGUMENTATION

The normative theory of argumentation is an account providing responses to different
issues concerning the analysis and evaluation of arguments. In dealing with the problem of
the function of argumentation, normative theories fix an a priori goal that agents are
suppose to satisfy. Three main claims are the object of our analysis.
(1)
(2)
(3)

The goal of argumentation is to persuade (e.g., Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,

1969; Tindale, 2004, Zarefsky, 2014).
The goal of argumentation is to achieve a consensus resolving a difference of
opinion (e.g., van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, van Eemeren, 2010).
The goal of argumentation is to establish truth and justified belief (e.g., Lumer,
2005a; 2005b)

The problem with fixing the aim of argumentation beforehand, is that some argumentative
practices do not adjust to the fixed goal, and, consequently, the theory analyzing and
evaluating argumentation tends to misunderstood or overcome such argumentative
practices.
Lets take a look at one fragment of the following counter-example proposed by
Marianne Doury in the paper Preaching to the Converted. Why Argue When Everyone
Agrees? For future reference, we will refer to Dourys case as CAR RESTRICTION. In
Dourys words, this case is meant to show that the goal of persuasion is but one goal
among others that can be assigned to argumentation, and that, as a result, persuasion
cannot be considered as the central element in the definition of argumentation (2012, p.
100). To contextualize, CAR RESTRICTION is a transcription of a conversation between
a vendor (hereafter V) and two clients (hereafter C1 and C2). All of them have seen each
other before, but they know very little about each other.
CAR RESTRICTION
V:

C1:
V:
C2:
C1:

V:
C2:
C1:

Actually, what do you think of the law, er we were actually talking about er
this law, there, that was just voted, that is in effect, you know, the law about traffic
restriction for odd-even numbered license plates for the cars.
Listen, I will tell you what I think, for Paris, we should be doing this all the time.
All the time.
Exactly. We all agree then.
I find this a great idea. First of all because at last, every day, there is already a
maximum number of people who could find a way to organize their
transportation People do not need their cars all the days!
The opposition parties, actually, were against it at the beginning and we do not
hear them speak anymore, now.
They showed women whowho were actually commuting in the car of their
friends, of a friend who came to pick them up; they can do this all the time.
Of course! There are peoplewell, the problem is, that there need to be jobs or
or certain obligations that allow one to leave at a fixed time and to return at a fixed

1040

V:
C1:

time. For example, in my case, this is not possible. But, ninety-nine percent of the
time, I do not take the car!
Yes, you are all the time using public transportation.
Exactly. (Doury, 2012, p. 101).

According to Doury, CAR RESTRICTION is just an example of argumentative situations

in which a controversy is proposed, and even though all the arguers agree on one same
view, they provide arguments for their positions (p. 103). To be sure, the controversy is
posed by the vendor when asking what do you think of the law about traffic restriction
for odd-even numbered license plates for the cars? The agreement between the arguer
becomes explicit when C1 states we should [impose the restriction for odd-even
numbered license plates for cars] all the time, V assents saying All the time, and C2
responds claiming Exactly. We all agree then. Finally, without a detailed reconstruction,
some of the arguments put forward are the following. C1 finds [the idea of imposing
restriction for odd-even numbered license plates for the cars all the time] great because,
in her words, at last, every day, there is already a maximum number of people who could
find a way to organize their transportation. Additionally, from her perspective People do
not need their cars all the days. C2 agrees with [the idea of imposing restriction for oddeven numbered license plates for cars all the time] because [with this restriction [t]hey
showed women who were actually commuting in the car of their friends [that] they can
do this all the time.
For Doury, CAR RESTRICTION is a counter-example against the idea that the
aim of argumentation is persuasion. Shortly, if to persuade is defined with the MerriamWebster dictionary as to move by argument, entreaty, or expostulation to a belief,
position, or course of action, then persuasion is not the goal of argumentation in CAR
RESTRICTION. The reason for this is that one cannot move someone to believe
something that he/she already believes. To clarify, the point is not that persuasion is never
the end of argumentation, but to provide a negative instance for the claim that all
argumentation aims to persuade.
We believe that CAR RESTRICTION also is a counter-example for the claims that
all argumentation aims to resolve a difference of opinion, and that all argumentation aims
to the establishment of justified true belief. To recall, from the pragma-dialectical
approach, argumentation arises from a disagreement and ends with the dissolution of the
different of opinions. Yet, in CAR RESTRICTION the argumentation does not finish with
the agreement. Rather, that is trigger for the arguments put forward by the participants of
the conversation. Similarly, CAR RESTRICTION presents a counter- example for the
epistemological theories of argumentation because in it the arguers are not epistemically
justified in believing that the restriction for odd-even numbered license plates for the cars
should be imposed all the time. One of the features of knowledge is that it is factual, but
the aforementioned proposition is not. Therefore, there is not knowledge to be established
in CAR RESTRICTION.

1041

3. THE AGENTIVE PROPOSAL

Our proposal is that the problems posed by CAR RESTRICTION are explicated if we
understand argumentation as a type of agenda an agent has. Briefly put, for our
presentation purposes here, an arguer is an agent, and the purpose or objective he/she is
trying to attain by arguing is his/her agenda (cf. Gabbay & Woods, 2003; 2005). The
closure of each of these agendas is bound by a group of conditions of execution (CE). That
is, requirements that, if satisfied by the agent, would count as an achievement of the
agenda. These requirements include, in the case of epistemic agendas, things like time,
information, computational capacity, and methodological strategies (Woods, 2013). Notice
that CE are found in varying degrees. Broadly speaking, the most stringent extreme of the
spectrum only authorizes belief formation when all possibilities of error are ruled out
including miscalculationand/or complete information is achieved, while the other
extreme allows for fallibilist belief formation with incomplete information. For instance,
when argumentation takes place in scientific discovery, its aim can be taken to be the
fixation of a justified (and, optimistically, true) belief. Yet such a demanding goal is not a
requirement for argumentations that are directed towards practical purposes, such as
putting a hypothesis under probation or justifying a practical decision against a
background of incomplete information.
In contrast with other approaches mentioned above, we think the purposes of
arguing vary accordingly with the agendas and sub-agendas advanced by the agents. This
implies that arguing is an activity performed by agents embedded in other activities and as
a part of the requirements of the fulfilment of other agendas. By the same token, arguing
presupposes other agendas agents need to achieve if they want their argumentation to be
successful. For instance, agents need to capture the attention of their addressees, as well as
being warranted that these addressees do understand their arguments. For our present
concerns, however, it suffices that we distinguish four kinds of agendas in which the act of
arguing can intervene. These agendas are not presented in the spirit of showing an
exhaustive list, but only as an example of the fruitfulness of our approach. The agendas in
question are:

Agendas of epistemic arrival (AEA), which aim at forming a particular belief. This
is the case where people argue in order to create a belief (cf. Peirce, 1877). To be
sure, a paradigmatic case of this kind of agenda is the verification of a scientific
hypothesis, and in this sense, there must be some expectations about the grade of
strictness of its justification and veracity. Of course, normative epistemological
approaches provide an account of these kinds of examples. But not all AEA are so.
If you have to engage in argument in the absence of complete information in order
to take an immediate course of action, as e.g. in an emergency room, then to
maintain the strictness of a scientific epistemic arrival would demand more time
and, accordingly, the delay would turn out to be fatalliterally. There are times
when, given the risks at hand, to aim at effecting an immediate educated guess is
better than to wait for a warranted but temporally mediated truth. Still it is also true
that sometimes you can try to close an AEA by simply asking somebody for
information, as in the case of looking for an address in a new city (testimony
references). As this last example shows, however, not all AEA are accomplished

1042

via argumentation.
Agendas of epistemic defensibility (AED), which intend to present and defend (to
other agents) a belief previously fixed by the arguer via the closing of an AEA.
This includes the cases of political harangues, prosecutor accusations, and
attorneys allegations among others. Notice that these agendas do not seek to fixate
the arguers own beliefs, but those of others. In this sense, AED are paradigmatic
cases of persuasion. As such, they naturally fall under the jurisdiction of rhetorical
theories of argumentation. Of course, an AED can be sincerely pursued or not.
Thus, one can defend a belief, or defend a pretended belief, as in the case of the
counsellor who does not believe in the innocence of his/her client.
Agendas of epistemic maintenance (AEM), which aim at ratifying a belief
previously fixed by the arguer via the closing of an AEA. This is clearly a case in
CAR RESTRICTION. Yet it is important to stress that in this example, it is simply
not part of the arguers agenda to review whether the belief is proper knowledge
(the epistemological way), whether it ought to persuade others (the rhetorical way),
or whether there is a difference of opinion to resolve (the pragma-dialectical way).
On the contrary, the arguers advance their arguments in order to have a surplus of
reasons for maintaining and preserving a particular epistemic position. And the
peculiarity of this scenario is due to the fact that multiple agents carry out the
agenda in a joint manner. But there are no obstacles for an AEM to be an individual
agenda (as in Peirces tenacity method for fixing belief) or a collective one (as
many Colombians agreeing with the conclusion that James Rodriguez is the best
player of the first round or stage of the 2014 World Cupwe imagine the Dutch
people might feel the same about van Persie or Robben). In any event, the
collective case can become a mechanism of ideology preservation.
Agendas of epistemic obstruction (AEO), which aim at preventing the proper
attainment of epistemic agendas by other agents. For instance, when you distract
someone in order to avoid them from focusing on some problem (e.g. by arguing
about some irrelevant topic), or when one prepares a diversion (e.g. by admitting
herrings as premises in the argumentative scenario) you are preventing the proper
attainment of epistemic agendas by other agents. In the first case, the obstruction
consists in hindering or delaying a proper belief formation on the part of the other
agent. In the second, it consists of facilitating the other agent in the formation of a
false belief. However, in the last case, there is no pro or con persuasion as such, in
the sense that it can be any of them. Notice that what is at stake is an epistemic
agenda, yet not because the agent has an intrinsic epistemic agenda, but because
he/she is interested in the epistemic agendas of his/her addressee. Of course, this
instance of an AEO is a source of possible error in epistemic agendas and as such it
does not need to always be achieved by means of arguing.

Let us observe that all these agendas (AEA, AED, AEM, and AEO) are actually subagendas, that is, agendas that are carried out as a means with respect to an ulterior end. In
this sense, their role is primarily methodological (in the etymological sense of the word).
Indeed, in the examples discussed above, AEA serves as a means for determining truth,
saving a life, or arriving at some place. In the AED examples, persuasion is pursued in
order to obtain votes or to make a decision about the innocence or culpability of someone.

1043

In AEM, arguing serves the self-assertion of the arguers belief system. And in AEO,
arguing functions as a strategy for weakening the potential course of action of other
agents. In this sense, this approach explains why arguing is not an end in itself most of the
time. Although it can be imagined of as an immediate agenda, as when agents argue as a
way of training in argumentation; argumentation is an activity agents engage in order to
obtain things different to more arguments.
Finally, our proposal is encompassing enough as to admit different types of
epistemic agendas, but equally it is rigorous enough as to not admit relativism: insofar
agendas are things that can be achieved totally, partially, presumptively, etc., their
fulfilment can be evaluated as adequate or inadequate, better or worse, properly or
improperly closed, etc.; and by keeping in mind the conditions of execution (CE) and the
degrees of strictness with which an agenda has to be undertaken, our proposal helps to
clarify, in an unified perspective, why there are different epistemic contexts, what they
are and how to identify them (issues that Doury leaves underspecified), and why they
bring varied although, occasionally, mixed results. All these topics, however,
deserve another paper.

REFERENCES
Doury. M. (2012). Preaching to the Converted. Why Argue When Everyone Agrees? Argumentation, 26(1),
pp. 99-114.
Gabbay, D. & Woods, J. (2005). The reach of abduction: Insight and Trial. A practical logic of cognitive
systems, Vol. 2. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Gabbay, D. & Woods, J. (2003). Agenda relevance: A study of formal pragmatics. A practical logic of
cognitive systems, Vol. 1. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Lumer, C. (2005a). Introduction: The Epistemological Approach to Argumentation--A Map. Informal Logic,
25(3), pp. 189-212.
Lumer, C. (2005b). The Epistemological Theory of Argument-How and Why? Informal Logic 25(3): 214232.
Peirce, Charles S. (1877). The Fixation of Belief. In: The Essential Peirce, Vol 1. Christian Kloesel and
Nathan Houser (Eds.). Bloomington, Indiana University Press. pp. 109-123.
Tindale, C. (2004). Rhetorical Argumentation. Principles of Theory and Practice. Thousand Oaks, SAGE
Publications. pp. 1-27.
van Eemeren, F. & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions. Dordrecht: Foris
Publications.
van Eemeren, F. (2010). Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse : Extending the Pragmadialectical Theory of Argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Woods, J. (2013) Errors of reasoning: Naturalizing the logic inference. College Publications, Milton
Keynes.
Zarefsky, D. (2014). Rhetorical Perspective in Argumentation. Dordrecht, Springer.

1044

Reasoning And Argumentative Complexity

Cristian J. Noemi
University of La Serena
Chile
cnoemi@userena.cl

ABSTRACT:
In this paper, I have investigated partially the relation between reasoning and argumentative complexity
from the theoretical framework of text linguistics. For this purpose, I have explored both the ability
underlying the activity of speaking (the ) and the product created by this competence (the ).
This work supports the hypothesis that the ability reasoning in terms of critical thinking () of
college students is related to formal argumentative complexity () of their discourses.
KEY WORDS: argumentation, complexity, density, reasoning, thinking.

1. PURPOSE
This paper is part of research project Fondecyt N 1130584, whose main objective is to
investigate the relation between reasoning and argumentative complexity from the
theoretical framework of text linguistics. To this effect, I have explored partially both
the ability underlying the activity of speaking (the ) and the product that is
created as result of this competence (the ).
From the first perspective, cognitive operations involved in this knowledge
during the real activity of discursive production are suggested that, as proposed, are
projected in the form of more or less complex, discursive texture or density, on the
discourse. From the second, an initial evidence of argumentative complexity -based on
the derivational property of propositions and from the notion of argumentative
coherence that proceed of those- is provided.
2. METHODOLOGY
The work has followed an approach mixed quantitative and qualitative. In order to
establish the capacity or level of of the subjects, 80 college students was tested
applying the test Tasks in Critical Thinking, created in 1986 by an expert committee of
the Educational Testing Service, United States. The tool considers both the
multidimensionality of critical thinking and cognitive skills that it requires a priori in a
test with 15 kinds of analytical reagents. The dimensions of the test considered are
three: inquiry, communication and analysis.
In order to determine the degree of argumentative complexity of informants
(), I followed a qualitative approach, applying the procedures of grounded theory,
through the Atlas / ti software.

1045

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Thought and language
The conception of a faint boundary between the notions of thought and language dates
from Aristotle, when he says that the referents of the signs are the same for anybody
(Aristteles, 1986) to Wittgenstein, when he argues that the propositional sign applied is
the thought (Wittgenstein, 2003).
Research in contemporary cognitive psychology, on the other hand, has shown
that language is not the only cognitive capacity of the human being, but rather
constitutes a module of a complex function which shares at least with the perception,
memory, intelligence and thought; i.e., numerous specialized and relatively autonomous
subsystems that, however, interact with each other to some extent. In this regard, it has
been proposed that language is a cognitive module (Fodor, 1986) so that its mode of
operation would not be found affected by the other components of cognition. In this
context, and based on evidence such as FoxP2 protein of chromosome 7 (Marcus &
Fisher, 2003), it is postulated that the language would, therefore, a specific skill, not
dependent on other cognitive activities.
3.1.1 Natural reasoning and language
The psychology of development has reported that during the first years of life (stage of
absolute realism), humans assume that the mental representation of reality corresponds
exactly to reality itself. With the development of both cognitive functions as personality
traits, appears later, between cognitive functions, metacognition, and with it, some
reflective capacity that allows generate arguments.
The reflective thinking, due to be metacognitive, can only occur when the
mental content is registered symbolically, what happen when the development of the
language allows the representation and the construction of concepts. When we put these
concepts in relation in order to obtain a given conclusion we build a sort of arguments
that may or may not be verbal, and that are expression formalized of mental activity.
In other words, according to Mercier & Sperber (2009) I admit that the
arguments used in reasoning are the output of the mental mechanism of inference. The
function of reasoning is conceived in this way as an argumentative mental activity since
it involves an activity of conceptual inference that leads not only to a new mental
representation (or conclusion), but also collateral representations (or premises) that
provide guarantees to accept the largest representation.
Reasoning, in this sense, can be conceived both as activity mental that generates
a convincing argument as to evaluate and accept the conclusion produced by a different
individual.
3.1.2 Reasoning and critical thinking
The notion of critical thinking has been addressed basically from three different
perspectives. First, from a philosophical approach (Siegel, 2010) that focuses its
attention on the quality of thought from a regulatory point of view, in terms of standards
or rules, i.e., accuracy, clarity, fairness, logic, breadth, relevance, etc., that must to have
a person considered critical thinker. Second, from the principles of cognitive
psychology (Halpern, 2003), focusing more attention on the real subject, through the
research on the processing of information by the critical thinker in order to describe its

1046

phases such as analysis, interpretation, problem definition, formulation of hypothesis,

etc. Third, from a pedagogical perspective (Bloom, 1971), from which cognitive
abilities are classified hierarchically in a gradual taxonomies.
For the purposes of this paper, following Siegel (2010) I propose to link critical thinking
with reasoning. According to his view, in fact, critical thinking is a manifestation of
reasoning.
3.2 Discursive complexity
The notion of speech complexity has been addressed very superficially, from different
theoretical approaches, and preferably focusing on the microstructure of the text,
particularly its syntactic organization.
For example Vliz (1999) relates syntactic maturity with the ability to produce
linguistic units structurally complex at sentence level, which in his opinion would be
expressed in the number of combinations and transformations that the speaker makes in
the process of production of a given sentence.
From other epistemic approach, van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck (2006),
to address the distinction between an argument based on a single and a complex,
multiple, coordinated or subordinated argument, propose a model that considers
argumentative complexity in terms of the number of arguments of a text and the
relationships established between them.
Merlini (2011), in other hand, in a larger semiotic context, following
Beugrande's standards of textuality relates the notion of textual complexity as evidence
of mark, proposing that any sequence of text marked as complex, could derive from a
source of conflict related with the cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, etc.
3.2.1 Argumentative complexity as
With the concept of discursive complexity I have tried to refer that body of knowledge
of speakers to organize argumentatively, in varying degrees of texture or density, a
speech with respect to the macrostructural level.
According to van Dijk (1992) the macrostructure is an abstract representation, in
a bottom up sense, of the semantic content of a speech. In cognitive terms, represents an
operation of information reduction from the textual surface structure, as shown in Table
1 from the novel The ingenious hidalgo Don Quixote de La Mancha.

1047

Conceived the discursive capacity as a , is interesting establishing the kind of

knowledge involved (i.e., reasoning/critical thinking) that is used to discursively deploy
the macrostructure of a text, in generative direction from top down, at different levels of
complexity by means of a set of propositions of sequential lower level.
The discursive production rules that contribute to the density, texture or
discursive complexity and which represent an opposite operation to the macrorules (van
Dijk, 1992), I suggest, are basically, 'attach', 'particularize' and 'specify'.
The rule 'attach' represents the inverse operation to the macrorule 'delete'. As we
can see in the Table 2, through this application we can wrap the speech with a series of
propositions that are of low relevance to the macrostructure and, because of it, should be
at a low level of macrostructural depth.

The rule 'particularize' represents the inverse operation to the rule 'generalize' (see Table
3). Thus, through its application, we can decompose a macroproposition in a series of
minor propositions that involve it. As textualization rule, apparently have higher density
capacity, texture or complexity that rule 'attach'.

The rule 'specify' finally is conceived as the inverse operation of the 'integrate' rule. As
we can see in the Table 4, by putting into execution this rule we can generate speech in
terms of propositions that are subsumed under the cultural framework corresponding at
the macrostructure. Since cognitively represents the same operation as the rule
'particularize' should have a similar effect of textual complexity.

1048

3.2.2 Discursive complexity as

I conceive that linguistic competence is formed by the sum of a series of independent
knowledge (Coseriu, 1992) that interconnect necessarily together in the time it is
updated in the form of a particular discourse. Constrained by the strength of the
discursive tradition, competence is projected unevenly in the form of discourse, thereby
affecting the density, texture or complexity of the macrostructure and consequently, the
degree of coherence.
I use here the term coherence for to make references to the global interrelatedness (macrostructural) in the text (Halliday & Hasan, 1976) that is dependent on
the formal structure and the relationships established by the parties thereof. I recall that
these relations are nonlinear and are set at different levels of depth of discourse (Van
Dijk, T. & Kintsch, W., 1983).
Depending on the grade or quality of reasoning variables possessing or activate a
particular speaker will be updated a type of discourse with more or less global
coherence, determined by textual structure and relationships of parts, potentially
measurable in terms of complexity or intensity of the texture discursive.
3.2.2.1 Findings
In order to show the relationship between capacity of reasoning and argumentative
complexity, are presented below (see Table 5 and Table 6) two examples of the corpus
with the scores in the dimensions critical thinking and argumentative complexity,
respectively, which in turn are prototypical of the general tendency which emanates
from the corpus.
The Subject 1 shown in Table 5, categorized as deficient in terms of the critical
thinking to achieve a total score of 17 points, 8 in the category of analysis, 5 of inquiry
and a normal behavior in the communication, through the cognitive operations that I
have called macrorules of density, texture or argumentative complexity, generates a
speech with 5 propositions disassociated through rule attach, and 6 linked propositions
through rule particularize or specify.
The Subject 1 demonstrates low critical thinking, and consequently his speech low
coherence, due to the poor speech density, represented by the low depth macrostructural
and the absence of substantive relations between propositions.

1049

The Subject 2, as show the Table 6, categorized as high in terms of critical thinking,
achieve a total score of 31 points, 12 in the category of analysis, 14 in inquiry and a
high performance in the communication, by the macrorules of density, texture or
argumentation complexity generates an speech with 3 propositions at the base through
rule attach, but linked with the rules particularize or specify on the second and/or third
level of semantic complexity (11 propositions at different levels of semantic
complexity).
Unlike the Subject 1, the Subject 2 has more speech density because progresses
with greater cognitive macrorules to a second or third level of macrostructural
complexity that ensuring more coherence overall due to the speech complexity.

1050

4. CONCLUSION
The work has allowed propose initially certain cognitive operations associated with
language competence, 'attach', 'particularized' and 'specify, whose role as has been
suggested is to deploy in the speech, as , the semantic macrostructure causing
thereby different degrees of density, texture or argumentative complexity.
In a similar sense, from the data is possible to suggest characteristics of
argumentative complexity, as , in terms of varying degrees of texture or density of
speech in regard to macrostructural level.
The intersection of the information provided by the test Tasks in Critical
Thinking and the obtained using the initial model of discursive complexity has allowed
specify aspects of the relationship between thought and language, particularly as it
relates to the specific domains of cognition modules.
This is an early work that still requires further research, especially on how and
why the propositions in argumentative discourse relate, and their cognitive justification.
From the sample under analysis, it is possible to argue that there is a correlation
between reasoning in terms of critical thinking and argumentative complexity. The
cognitive dimensions measured quantitatively which provide higher correlations with
discursive rules of complexity argumentative are analysis and synthesis.

REFERENCES
Aristteles. (2001). Tratados de lgica. Mxico, Editorial Porra, S.A.

Coseriu, E. (1992). Competencia lingstica. Elementos de la teora del hablar. Madrid, Gredos.
Eemeren, F.; Grootendorst, R. y Snoeck, F. (2006). Argumentacin. Anlisis, evaluacin, presentacin.
Buenos Aires: Biblios.
Fodor, J. (1986). La modularidad de la mente. Madrid, Ediciones Morata.
Halliday, M. & Hasan, R. (1976). Cohesion in English. London, Longman.
Halpern, D. F. (2003). Thought & Knowledge. An introduction to Critical Thinking. Mahwah, N.J.:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Marcus, G. & Fisher, S. (2003). Foxp2 in focus: what can genes tell us about speech and language?
Cognitive Science, 7, 257-262.
Mercier, H. & Sperber, D. (2009). Intuitive and reflective inferences. In J. S. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish
(Eds.), In Two Minds (pp.149-170). New York: Oxford University Press.
Merlini, L. (2011). A 'natural' approach to text complexity. Pozna Studies in Contemporary Linguistics
47(2), 203236.
Siegel, H. (2010). Critical Thinking. In: P. Peterson, E. Baker, B. McGaw, (Eds.), International
Encyclopedia of Education, 6, (pp. 141- 145). Oxford: Elsevier.
Van Dijk, T. (1992). La ciencia del texto. Barcelona, Ediciones Paids, 1989.
Van Dijk, T. & Kintsch, W. (1983). Strategies of discourse comprehension. New York: Academic Press.
Vliz, M. (1999). Complejidad sintctica y modo del discurso. Estudios Filolgicos, 34,181-192.
Wittgenstein, L. (2003). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Madrid, Alianza Editorial.

1051

The Legacy Of The U.S. Atomic Superiority, Supremacy And

Monopoly: Dispelling Its Illusion In Barack Obamas Berlin
Speech
Hiroko Okuda
College of Human and Environmental Studies
Kanto Gakuin University
Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture
Japan 236-8501
okuda@kanto-gakuin.ac.jp

ABSTRACT: The nature of the dilemma facing the world living with nuclear weapons is not technical, but
political. This study reflects upon the extent to which the U.S. nuclear policy has been influenced by the
mistaken assumption that the nations nuclear supremacy should be enduring. The study focuses specifically
on the speech delivered by the U.S. President Barack Obama, who calls for international cooperation on
nuclear matters, in Berlin on 19 June 2013.
KEY WORDS: atomic diplomacy, Barack Obama, Berlin speech, nuclear policy, nuclear weapons

The nature of the dilemma facing the world living with nuclear weapons is not technical,
but political. To a certain extent, the end of the cold war changed reliance on nuclear
weapons into their further proliferation. On the one hand, in negotiations between the
United States and Russia, the desire to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons corresponds
with the determination to cut back on either their number or variety. On the other hand,
atomic diplomacy holds on to the position of strategic superiority. This study reflects upon
the extent to which the U.S. nuclear policy has been influenced by the mistaken
assumption that the nations nuclear supremacy should be enduring. The study focuses
specifically on the speech delivered by the U.S. President Barack Obama, who advocates
international cooperation on nuclear matters, in Berlin on 19 June 2013.
The U.S. nuclear supremacy has been founded upon a popular fallacya cause
of the false sense of security and power. Nuclear weapons after the destruction of
Hiroshima have not yet convincingly proved themselves to be an asset. However, the
atomic superiority has locked the U.S. administration into a policy of trying to outrace
other nations in the development of new and more means of mass destruction. Such
efficaciousness in diplomacy as much as unforeseen events might lead to another fallacious
assumption concerning the utility of nuclear weapons. That is, their alleged capacity to
avert military confrontations. Since the collapse of its atomic monopoly in 1949, the
experience of the U.S. foreign policy has confirmed that nearly the opposite of these
political assumptions is true. Nevertheless, it survives as myth to the present by giving
impetus to the nuclear arms race.
1. THE END OF THE U.S. MORAL LEADERSHIP
A month after the uranium bombing of Hiroshima, on 12 September 1945, the New York
Times article, Atomic Bomb Responsibilities, questioned whether the U.S. sacrificed its
moral leadership of the world for the achievement of the atomic fission (Baldwin, 1945, p.
4). Regardless of the validity of arguments that try to make war moral, the scientific
achievement of manufacturing the atomic bomb changed the world. Even though Defense
1052

Secretary Forrestal described the duration of the U.S. nuclear monopoly as the years of
opportunity, the emphasis of monopoly on secrecy discouraged the U.S. administration
from taking progressive steps for the international control of atomic energy. Instead, the
U.S. monopoly encouraged its strategic thinking and planning to hold on to its political,
diplomatic and military advantage.
Taking for granted the Soviet large conventional forces, the United States relied
heavily on nuclear weapons in its defense and alliance policies. As a matter of fact, the
threat of the atomic bomb was institutionalized in the U.S. military doctrine, and even in its
operational planning. On the one hand, the United States is the only country that actually
used the bomb, giving such reasons as patriotism, the advancement of science and
technology, and the protection of the free world. On the other hand, the United States had
no justification for integrating the atomic bomb into its foreign policy because it had come
into being not as a result of open debate, but as the result of a secret project (Mendelsohn,
1990, p. 343). Wartime security indeed prevented the members of Congress from knowing
the Manhattan Projectnot to mention its funding hidden in the military budget. Overall,
that the threat of the atomic bomb came to be the U.S. master card in diplomacy turned out
to be a fait accompli.
After failing to reshape the real world in the nuclear age, the United States had to
keep reviewing its nuclear strategy significantly in response to changing technologies,
advancing nuclear weapons, and evolving political contexts. In spite of its primary
responsibility for safeguarding public health and safety from the hazards of the peaceful
application of nuclear energy, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), a predecessor
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), thus promoted the viewing of a nuclear test
as an exciting holiday event. Such an official attempt to celebrate the status of the nuclear
power resulted in more than 200 atomic explosions above ground with witnesses present
between 1945 and 1962.
These explosions went beyond sublimity to sheer terror, leaving trauma and a life
of radiation poisoning as much as for the victims at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As the U.S.
federal agency continued to insist the nuclear tests were safe, thousands of civilians who
lived downwind of the AECs Nevada test sitein Arizona as well as in Nevadawere
subjected recurrently to radiation exposures for two decades. In spite of its unique position
of power and responsibility in history, the U.S. government integrated the atomic
monopoly to its strategy for containing Soviet expansion with wishful thinking.
With the end of the cold war, mutual nuclear deterrence embedded in the bipolar
structure came to be dysfunctional as a legitimate practice in making a stable hierarchical
nuclear world order. During the opening decade of the atomic age, the United States and
the Soviet Union issued nuclear threats. The U.S. officials seriously considered using
nuclear weapons until the 1962 Cuban missile crisis (See Betts, 1987), which was to
repulse the Soviet threats by the U.S. atomic deterrence. Moreover, the antinuclear stand of
many developing countries promoted disarmament politics at the United Nations (UN)
general assembly. Such Third World movements failed to delegitimize nuclear weapons
either as weapons of mass destruction or as inhumane weapons, but to embed deterrent
practices in the means and motives of U.S. foreign policy in the cold war. Over time the
non-use of nuclear weapons after the U.S. use of the plutonium bomb on Nagasaki has
been symbolic of a de facto prohibition against the first use of nuclear arms.
For the damage control of moral leadership, the U.S. Presidents began taking a
conciliatory attitude of getting rid of nuclear arsenals towards the world, especially
towards the Soviet Union (later Russia). John F. Kennedy advocated that nuclear weapons
must be abolished before they abolish us. Ronald Reagan called for their total
elimination. In a 2009 Prague speech, which for the first time brought the Novel Peace
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Prize to the incumbent U.S. President, Barack Obama declared the nation was to take
concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, after four years
those steps became shrouded in a series of steps towards disarmament along with a
promise to impose restrictions on the country to trigger its nuclear strikes. In addition, the
quest for a nuclear-free world was shrunk merely into four out of the twenty-six
paragraphs. There President Obama required consent from Russia to reduce both sides
deployed strategic nuclear weapons and from Republicans in the Senate to ratify the 1996
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
2. A DECLINING SYMBOLIC POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In the development of nuclear strategy, the legacy of the Manhattan Project appears in a
plethora of acronyms like MAD (mutually assured destruction) and NUTs (nuclear-use
theorists). These puns contribute to playing down not merely a historical significance of
the new weapon, but also a unique position of the U.S. power and responsibility in history.
In the opening of the cold war world system, the United States alone took up nuclear
supremacy. Instead of founding an international control scheme for atomic energy, its
administration sought to make political use of that monopoly as a bargaining card. Hence
the Truman administration launched a project on making the hydrogen bomb soon after the
Soviet Union succeeded in making its first nuclear test. As a result of such arms race, the
two superpowers began stockpiling nuclear bombs as well as undertaking research on and
development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons.
The Soviet challenge to the U.S. strategic superiority confronted the U.S. presidents
with difficult choices as commander-in-chief. During the Truman administration, the
United States held out to the Soviet Union a set of selective and incomplete norms to
delegitimize nuclear weapons at the UN. By representing them as a credible threat of
punishment, the United States enabled to put deterrence into practice. Its reliance on
nuclear weapons gave rise to a hierarchical, but increasingly contested global order along
with the U.S.-Soviet nuclear stand-off (Kaufman, 1956, p. 19). Then its victory in the 1991
Gulf War marked a drastic change of the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship from
confrontational to cooperative in the theater of operation. On the one hand, the risk of a
superpower confrontation dramatically declined. On the other hand, the breakdown of the
bipolar structure in the cold war came to fall on further nuclear proliferation in making
bilateral and multilateral nuclear deterrence dysfunctional.
Even after the cold war ended, the United States explored a way to enjoy nuclear
superiority to give force to its diplomacy. In the name of national security, President
Obama hence framed the United States and Russia in the lower levels of nuclear weapons
on both sides by calling for a new international framework for peaceful nuclear power.
For the reduction of global nuclear arsenals, he associated his moral and policy agenda
with that of John F. Kennedy. By reciting a phrase peace with justicefrom
Kennedys address in Berlin half a century ago (Entous & Barnes, 2013, p. A8; Nicholas &
Boston, 2013, p. A12), Obama attempted to remind his audience of Kennedys call for
nuclear-arms control and nonproliferation. In an optimistic tone, he sought to raise his
hopes for moving the world as well as the country further away from nuclear arms race.
In spite of being criticized as nave at home and abroad, Obama indeed held on to
mutual nuclear deterrent for post-cold war contingencies. Report on Nuclear Employment
Strategy of the United States, released with his Berlin speech, made it clear: the United
States would never unilaterally disarm without comparable changes by Russia. In other
words, the United States continued to display nuclear folly to see nuclear inferiority as
imminent threat against national security. Yet the latest data exchange spelled out the U.S.
1054

nuclear superiority to Russia. In addition to the factual predominance of nuclear weapons,

the Obama administration, supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Strategic
Command, concluded that 1,000 warheads would be sufficient with the triad of strategic
forces for a nuclear capability (Blechman, 2013, p. A13). In the military and political
perspective, Obama might take the proper steps to balance the equally important goals of
nuclear safety and the U.S. world prestige.
On the other hand, the inferiority of its conventional as well as its nuclear forces
compared to those of the United States pressured Russian President Vladimir Putin to
modernize Russias nuclear forces and to modify its nuclear war plans. While showing no
interest in delegitimizing nuclear weapons, Putin carefully calculated a formula that would
meet this challenge to both national security and fiscal responsibility. Such speculations
might resonate with U.S. President Dwight Eisenhowers emphasis on massive nuclear
retaliation in order to deter Russia from attacking the United States. The Russian
unwillingness to go further explicated its legitimate needs of nuclear weapons not just as
the instruments of national power, but also as active rather than passive nuclear defense
measures. On the whole, the U.S. supremacy in science and technology served only to
heighten international tensions mainly because no country would disarm at the expense of
its national security.
3. A SHIFT IN NUCLEAR POLITICS
In spite of ruling out any actual use of nuclear weapons, the UN permanent security
membersthe Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) conferred a privileged status to those five
members that possessed nuclear weapons on January 1, 1967could employ a variety of
veiled nuclear threats. The United States carried on the policy of neither confirming nor
denying the presence of nuclear weapons even though the end of the cold war shifted a
focus from the East-West to the North-South issue. Such a drastic shift lost the multilateral
context of equivocating Western deployments, and public and diplomatic statements. Thus,
in response to Obamas requesting a struggle for freedom and security, the Third World
nations called into question asymmetrical obligations imposed by the non-proliferation
regime, in which the NPT system helped legitimize the practice of rational nuclear
deterrence (e.g., prohibitions on possession, acquisition, transfer, and testing of nuclear
weapons).
By taking on the leadership of a world, Obama expressed grave concern about the
spread of nuclear weapon-making materials around the globe. Here the president redefined
John F. Kennedys phrase peace with justice as the security of a world without nuclear
weapons. By adding the magic word security to his vision of a post-cold war world
pledged in Prague four years ago, he suggested his limited ability to influence the
countrys dependence on nuclear arms. Instead, he drew the analogy between horizontal
nuclear proliferation and fear of global annihilation so as to center the North-South
conflict on the proliferation and non-proliferation agenda. With the diplomatic overture, he
framed the number of invisible tensions in speaking of rejecting the nuclear
weaponization that North Korea and Iran may be seeking. Nevertheless, Obama fell short
of providing a basis for a deal on a new international framework for peaceful nuclear
power.
The rise of the developing powers not only weakened the rationality of strategic
deterrence, but also prevented the United States from playing an exceptional role on the
world stage. While keeping hold of the non-proliferation regime, Obama advocated for
democratic principles. His conciliatory words sounded a cautiously optimistic tone in the
call for diplomacy. Nevertheless, the NPT world system could no longer cover up the
1055

inequality between a system of deterrence and system of abstinence with regard to the
acquisition and production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (Walker, 2000). On the
one hand, the U.S. efforts to secure nuclear materials around the world reflected the
diminished threat of superpower nuclear use. On the other hand, the United States failed to
confront the non-nuclear states that viewed the special status of the nuclear powers as
double standard and increased political pressure on them for delegitimizing nuclear
weapons.
President Obama called those non-nuclear powers to take a constructive approach
in the struggle for freedom and security and human dignity. In diplomatic terms, his
pursuit of security interests replaced Kennedys stirring defense of freedom. Obama then
rephrased the security of a world without nuclear weapons as dream, and furthermore
dissociated a new international framework for peaceful nuclear power from military
ambitions to build a nuclear weapon. In making a case for global security, he sought to
carry out a prudent and peaceful exploration of the U.S. nuclear programs. Overall, Obama
balanced strategic interests with moral opprobrium by taking into compelling account the
role of moral restraint in international politics and the non-use of nuclear weapons that
evolved through the cold war.
4. FALLACY OF ATOMIC DIPLOMACY
The development of the super bomb in the early 1950s marked an important turning
point in the nuclear age. Along with international pressure for nuclear restraint, the
morality of nuclear weapons and deterrence became an unwritten rule through a pile of
bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements. In his remarks at the Brandenburg Gate,
President Obama called on Russian President Putin to reduce the danger of nuclear
confrontation. However, Russia formally abandoned the 1982 Soviet no-first-use policy in
1993. China, which had maintained a no-first-use policy since its first nuclear explosion in
1964, also changed the defensive nature of its nuclear use in response to the U.S. plans for
a national missile defense. While the capacity to use nuclear weapons remains confined to
a small number of states, a greater variety of actors are getting involved. Therefore, the
global arms control process is becoming not only more multilateral, but also more
transitional and pluralistic.
Despite the U.S. diplomatic approach, Russia and China rely more on nuclear
weapons than on conventional strength for national security. Yet neither of their post-cold
war nuclear policy is more pro-nuclear than the U.S. foreign policy that emphasizes the
role of power rather than the rule of law. In the call for the full delegitimization of nuclear
weapons, President Obama implicitly confirmed that the United States believes firmly in
the benefits of retaining nuclear capabilities. As a whole, the failure of nuclear arms
control might be the problem of forgetting what actually took place in Hiroshima and in
Nagasaki. In the post-cold war world, the fear of nuclear war recedes entirely from public
memory, thereby eroding inhibitions on the use of nuclear weapons for the cause of selfdefense.

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REFERENCES
Baldwin, H. W. (1945, September 12). Atomic bomb responsibilities: Resolving of problem in relation to
peace is linked to moral leadership of America. The New York Times, p. 4.
Betts, R. (1987). Nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Blechman, B. M. (2013, July 6). A slimmer, smarter nuclear force. The Washington Post, p. A13.
Entous, A. & Barnes, J. E. (2013, June 19). World news: U.S. to propose new nuclear-arms cuts. The Wall
Street Journal, p. A8
Kaufman, W. W. (Ed.). (1956). Military policy and national security. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Mendelsohn, E. (1990). Prophet of our discontent: Lewis Mumford confronts the bomb. In T. P. Hughes
& A. C. Hughes (Eds.), Lewis Mumford: Public intellectual (pp. 343-360). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Nicholas, P. & Boston, W. (2013, June 20). World news: Obamas nuclear offer gets Russian rebuff. The
Wall Street Journal, p. A12.
Walker, W. (2000). Nuclear order and disorder. International Affairs, 76(4), 703-24.

1057

Story Credibility In Narrative Arguments

Paula Olmos
Departmento de Lingstica, Lenguas modernas, Lgica y filosofa de la ciencia, Teora de la literatura y
literatura comparada
Universidad Autnoma de Madrid
Spain
paula.olmos@uam.es

ABSTRACT: Recent work on narrative-based arguments has insisted on the importance, for assessment, of
construing a theory of story credibility or believability. The main tenet of most approaches is the idea
that a credible story should resemble reality. However, narrative realism is a rather problematic concept.
The paper proposes a more nuanced, multi-dimensional and explicitly meta-argumentative approach to the
assessment of arguments involving narratives, that would not prejudge their argumentative form or function.
KEYWORDS: argument assessment, narrative argument, narrative rationality, narrative realism.

1. INTRODUCTION
Narrative argumentation, narration in arguments or the inherent narrativity of arguing and
debating, are, no doubt, trendy topics in the field of argumentation theory. We heard
several papers on these issues in last years OSSA 10th Conference and here in ISSA 2014,
we have two complete panels labelled Narrative argument. Of course, this implies a
certain variety of approaches and some clarifications as to the referents and the scope of
my own paper are required.
First of all, even if I take W. Fishers narrative paradigm of rationality (1989
[1987]) as a truly attractive philosophical stance, that could yield interesting insights
regarding the cognitive basis of our reasoning, I claim some of its assumptions may turn
our attention away from the particularities of real discourse. If we assume that:
regardless of genre, discourse will always tell a story and insofar as it invites an audience to believe
it or act on it, the narrative paradigm and its attendant logic, narrative rationality, are available for
interpretation and assessment (Fisher, 1989, p. xi)

there would be nothing specific to arguments involving explicit narratives as obvious parts
or as a manifest linguistic strategy. Again, Fisher insists When narration is taken as the
master metaphor, it subsumes the others (1989, p. 62). So my first clarification is that
here I dont mean to use narrative as a metaphor (however insightful) of whats
happening when we argue and listen to or interpret arguments; nor as the cognitive key
(however revealing) to the widespread features of our species argumentative practices (as
allegeddly Homo narrans). I will focus, instead, on the straightforward recognition of a
variety of argument types and argumentative discourses in which the particular linguistic
features and genre-specific qualities of narration play a significant role.

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2. NARRATIVE ARGUMENTS
There are a number of widely acknowledged argument types in which narratives may be
involved in significant ways. Certain explicitly narrative-based argument schemes have
been presented and discussed in recent literature (Walton, 2012; Govier & Ayers, 2012)
and there is also interest in pure narrative discourse as a possible way of arguing for a
thesis in the adequate pragmatic contexts (Plumer, 2011; Olmos, 2014).
Not trying at all to be exhaustive in any sense and just for the purposes of this
paper, I will mention four broad categories of arguments for which an exploration of
narrative credibility would be of interest.
i)

First of all, as it comes to everybodys mind, arguments presenting parallel,

digressive stories (cf.: Cic. De inv. I 27), i.e. not directly related and causally and
historically independent, be them fictive or not, to the circumstances referred to in
the thesis, as reasons, nevertheless, for its acceptance (although not necessarily
through an argument by analogy, cf. Olmos, 2014b). They would typically conform
(and I refer here to Walton, Reed and Macagnos 2008 catalogue): arguments from
example (WRM 2008, p. 314), arguments from analogy, especially practical
reasoning from analogy (ibid. pp. 315-316) or arguments from precedent (p. 344).

ii)

In second place, arguments in which the data, or part of the data are presented in
narrative form; i.e. arguments which involve narrative premises which have
something to do with the particulars and circumstances referred to in the thesis
(they are not digressive but they are not core narratives either which contain just
the case and the whole reason for a dispute, De inv., I.27). For example, practical
inferences from consequences (p. 323), or from goal (p. 325), arguments from
sacrifice (p. 322) and waste (p. 326), arguments from interaction of act and person
(p. 321), pragmatic inconsistencies (p. 336), arguments from memory (p. 346).

The argument types so far mentioned do not necessarily always represent what I would
call a narrative argument especially not when they just involve a one-step consequence
supported or supportable by a simple warrant. I would restrict the concept of narrative
argument to cases that explicitly involve a more complex, sequential chain or compound
of events that should be assessed as a whole. In any case, the credibility of the narratives
endorsed as reasons or parts of reasons in these two categories of arguments would be
essential to their interpretation and assessment. But then, we may also think of:
iii)

Arguments about narratives, i.e. about versions of events (these would be what I
call core narratives, cf. Olmos, 2014), with usually partly narrative claims or
conclusions (typically global assertions regarding narrative accounts of disputed
facts: what really happened is) supported by a variety of reasons (typically
involving source reliability) when facts themselves are under discussion or are
unknown to the audience. Such cases would typically involve arguments from
position to know (p. 309) or arguments from witness testimony (p. 310).
iv) These are usually not narrative-based arguments (the key reasons involved are
not typically narrative, although they could be), but theories about story credibility

1059

may be part of their analysis, understanding and assessment as the critical

questions presented by Walton Reed and Macagno (2008, p. 310) concerning
arguments from witness testimony reveal:
CQ1: Is what the witness said internally consistent?
CQ2: Is what the witness said consistent with the known facts of the case (based on evidence apart
from what the witness testified to)?
CQ3: Is what the witness said consistent with what other witnesses have (independently) testified
to?
CQ4: Is there some kind of bias that can be attributed to the account given by the witness?
CQ5: How plausible is the statemente A asserted by the witness?

iv)

And finally, we have what we could call credible pure narration, that I have
elsewhere treated as some sort of self-standing and self-referring argument
(Olmos, 2014), and perhaps could be better understood in terms of assuming
certain argumentative qualities rhetorical and others in a discourse that does not
explicitly present an argument. In such cases we could have a manifestly credible
narration as a discurrsive way to implicitly support the veracity of an account. The
storys veracity would be the (usually implicit or just suggested) conclusion and its
manifest narrative plausibility, its only justificatory measure. We can imagine that
a particular theory or a principle of story credibility could act as such conclusions
warrant, if challenged in subsequent interchange.

There exists, on the other hand, a rather extended impression that the way we go about
assessing the credibility of the stories we hear is something extremely basic within our
cognitive capacities. Thus, Fisher talks about our inherent awareness of narrative
probability (1989, p. 5) or even our natural capacity to recognize the coherence and
fidelity of stories (1989, p. 24). In fact, our everyday experience somewhat matches this
confidence, but this doesnt mean that we cannot try to be more specific as to the way we
assess such narrative probabilitas. In fact, there have been numerous attempts at that, and
many of them from the ranks of the rhetoricians, concerned with argumentative issues and
the specific problems posed by argumentative settings (Olmos, 2012).
3. CRITERIAL THEORIES OF STORY CREDIBILITY
As early as in Isocrates (4th c. BCE), we may find the well-known classical triad of the
virtues required by a narrative discourse to be persuasive, i.e. rhetorically effective.
Narration employed in persuasive processes and rhetorical settings should be clear (safs),
brief (suntomon), and convincing (pithanon). In the subsequent Latin tradition this
convincing (pithanon) was alternatively translated for probabilis, credibilis or
verisimilis. Fortunatianus (4th c. CE), in his Artis rhetoricae (II.20), supports the relevance
of these three virtues by identifying the argumentative benefits expected from each one of
them: Brief, so that the audience may enjoy listening to us; clear, so that we be fully
understood; verisimilar, so that our story serve as evidence (Brevis, ut libentius audiatur,
manifesta, ut intellegatur, verisimilis, ut probetur). According to Fortunatianus formula,
then, it is the third virtue what allows us to use narratives as supporting reasons for our
claims. But how do we attain such verisimilitude that would result in the credibility or
believability of our stories and, therefore, in their usefulness as assessable reasons? The
1060

main tenet of most of approaches to story credibility is the rough idea that a credible
story should resemble reality or what we know about reality. But usually this main
rough idea is complemented and developed by identifying more concrete requirements.
We will take a look at several of these criterial theories of story credibility starting with
some apparently simple distinctions and advancing towards a more complicated panorama.
There has been a long-standing tradition in locating criteria for story credibility
in, at least, two distinct realms: one intra-diegetic (inside the story itself), the other extradiegetic. This is very clear and straighforward in Gilbert Plumers characteristically diadic
account of the novels believability (2011, pp. 1554-1555) which would be attained by
means of its:
1)
2)

internal coherence: that events in the narrative be fully connected, and

external coherence: that they also cohere with our widely shared assumptions
about how human psychology and society [] work.

W. Fisher also presented, in principle, this kind of diadic approach to the evaluation of
communicative discourse (which, in his view, is always narrative). However, while
developing his criteria throughout his book, Fisher finally introduces certain ideas that
point to somewhat different evaluative sources. Fisher calls coherence or probability
whats roughly Plumers internal coherence, and fidelity Plumers external
coherence. Here is a summary scheme of what Fisher says about these two testing
qualities of human communication in different parts of his book (1989: pp. 47; 75; 88;
175).
A)

PROBABILITY /COHERENCE:

whether a story hangs together

A.1. Probability is assessed in three ways:
- by the storys argumentative or structural coherence (i.e. its involving a
coherent plot);
- by its material coherence, that is, by comparing and contrasting it to stories told
in other discourses;
- and by characterological coherence.
A.2. These features (which Fisher calls formal) result in the narrative satisfying the
demands of a coherence theory of truth. The idea is that the story be free of
contradictions.
A.3. Knowing something about the character of the speaker and his or her actual
experience, one can judge whether his or her story hangs together and rings
true. (p. 88).

B)

FIDELITY: truthfulness

and reliability.
B.1. Fisher calls features of fidelity substantive (vs. formal) features, which result
in the narrative satisfying the demands of a correspondence theory of truth.
B.2. Narrative fidelity concerns the soundness of its internal reasoning: Does the
message accurately portrait the world we live in?
B.3. Narrative fidelity also concerns the value of its values: Does it provide a
reliable guide to our beliefs, attitudes, values and actions?

1061

This more lengthily developed and in principle more sophiticated account is ultimately
only apparently diadic. Considerations presented in A.1. about material coherence rely
on a comparative approach between available stories (even, reading through the text,
between available competing stories) which is not so much an intra-diegetic criterion
and which may have to do with a wider assessment of the pragmatic circumstances and
discursive background in which a story is uttered and interpreted well see more of that
later, in other authors, but as a relevantly distinct criterion, with its own weigh.
More unexpected is probably the mention, in A.3., of the speakers known or
attested character as supporting the storys coherence when, for example, in Waltons
considerations on arguments by testimony it is exactly the other way around: the storys
apparent coherence would be part of the assessment of the testifiers performance that
would finally support the plausibility of an argument in which the assessable reason would
be that there is a witness testifying for a certain claim. In any case, I suggest that this and
other ethotic questions would require a better fit as they conform a criterion or a set of
criteria that go beyond the storys coherence.
In the fidelity side, we see again the somewhat unexpected (although fully
consistent with Fishers avowed motivations) introduction of an ethical and value-based
characterization of this requirement, which has to do with its reliable vs. its truthful
quality. However, this very important aspect would demand, in my opinion, its own space
as not immediately related to prima facie believability or, in any case, to a correspondence
theory of truth. Of course the compliance of stories with values may be crucial for their
usefulness in practical reasoning and so their assessment according to this criterion may be
part of their acquiring the quality of evidence in certain contexts. But I still think it
would be better to distinguish more neatly, at least in principle, between the two aspects of
fidelity mentioned by Fisher. So Fishers account, apparently clear, schematic and diadic
has finally proven rather pluralistic, which is not a bad thing, but just reminds us that there
are still many things which could be clarified in this domain.
I will mention now the old list of requirements given by the 15th c. humanist
Rudolph Agricola (ca. 1479) for a probable account (probabilis expositio), which is
triadic, not because I intend to classify theories about story credibility according to the
number of criteria they propose, but because the third criterion he adds to roughly the two
equivalents of the main ones we have already seen deserves, in my opinion, some
consideration. According to Agricola, in a well-known passage of his De inventione
dialectica,1 the kind of probabilitas we are after in accounting for facts is obtained by
means of an exposition which would be:
a)
b)
c)

rich in argumentative content (argumentosa): i.e. which accounts for enough

aspects of the action related;
free from contradiction (per se consequens): i.e. which presents an internal
coherent structure;
consistent with how things are (consentanea rebus): i.e. resembles what we
know about the real world, complies with an external standard of comparison.

Probabilis fit expositio, si sit argumentosa, si consentanea rebus, si per se consequens (Agricola, 1992
[1539], p. 350).

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While b) and c) could be more or less equivalent to Plumers intra- and extra-diegetic
criteria, criterion a) is, obviously, something different. It may have something to do with
the material coherence mentioned by Fisher in the sense that the relative degree of
detail (depth and richness) attained by a story cannot be an absolute meassure, but will
always be evaluated by comparison to other accounts (competing or not).
In any case, this kind of criterion, reconverted into a requirement for coverage,
reappears in modern theories regarding the testing of stories in legal settings. We find
something very similar in, for example, Pennington and Hastie (1992). These authors
mention several factors that determine the acceptability of a story in jurors decisionmaking:
a)
b)
c)

Coherence: which sums consistency (internal criterion) and plausibility (external

criterion);
Coverage: of the legal evidence presented;
Uniqueness: that it is the only story available

The two most obvious principles (Plumers internal and external coherence) they group
under the heading coherence and distinguish between an internal consistency
requirement (freedom of contradictions) and an external plausibility one. The second
criterion (close to Agricolas richness in argumentative content) refers not just to the
particular degree of detail of the story but to its degree of detail relative to the data
presented in trial as evidence, the idea being that the credible story should be capable of
covering, that is of explaining and situating such evidence within a global, articulate
account. This I find a nice way of spelling out the pragmatic circumstances regarding the
kind of criterion demanded by Agricola with his expositio argumentosa for a particular
argumentative practice (in this case, jurors decision-making) and I imagine something
similar should be done in different contexts.
Now, Penington and Hasties criterion c), uniqueness, is also very interesting. It
is rather akin to the material coherence mentioned by Fisher (although Fishers
characterization would include both coverage and uniqueness in material coherence), as
this author specifies that other stories told should be compared and contrasted with the one
we are testing, in order to evaluate it. I would suggest, though that this criterion should be
supplemented or qualified with an additional independence criterion that may bring in
issues about multiple-source confirmation.
It is a common rule in law that, at least, two independent witnesses should coincide
in telling roughly the same story for their joint testimony to constitute evidence. If
there are contradictions between witnesses this circumstance goes against the plausibility
of each of their accounts. However, the meassure of the degree of independence of two,
more or less coincident, witnesses relies precisely on their stories being at least slightly
different so that they do not seem to have been dictated by a common source. If two
people, who in principle should have seen things with their own eyes, from their own
respective different positions, tell exactly the same story, mention the same details and
qualify actions with the same vocabulary, anyone will suspect that their testimony has
been unduly prearranged. So Pennington and Hasties uniqueness criterion should be
supplemented or qualified with an independence criterion that may take account of such
possibilities.

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Well finally mention Ciceros multiple criteria approach as exposed in a well known
paragraph of his De inventione:
The narrative will be plausible if it seems to embody characteristics which are accustomed to
appear in real life; if the proper qualities of the characters are maintained, if reasons for their
actions are plain, if there seems to have been ability to do the deed, if it can be shown that the time
was opportune, the space sufficient and the place suitable for the events about to be narrated; if the
story fits in with the nature of the actors in it, the habits of the ordinary people and the beliefs of the
audience. Verisimilitude can be secured by following these principles (De inv. I.29.)

This paragraph was commented by Marius Victorinus in the 4th c. CE (Explanationum in

rhetoricam M. Tullii Ciceronis) emphasizing the oposition between the so-called seven
circumstances (that account for the storys coverage and internal coherence) and the
doxastic standards that have to do, above all, with the pragmatic circumstances of
discourse delivery (audience-related issues). According to Marius Victorinus (Halm, 1863,
p. 207) Ciceros criteria for the assessment of the plausibility of a narratio could be
schematized thus, placing, on one side, the seven circumstances that must be duly
accounted for by the narrative and, on the oher, the three doxastic aspects mentioned by
Cicero.
Seven circumstances
Who (person)
What (fact)
Why (cause)
Where (place)
When (time)
How (mode)
How possibly (faculty)

Opinion
Nature of the agents
Common habits and values
Audience (arbiters) opinion

This is probably an oversystematic interpretation of Ciceros paragraph, but what counts

for our purposes is that De inventione mentions among the extra-diegetic criteria for
narrative assessment things like the common habits and values of the ordinary people
(in line with Fisher) and also (in an explicit rhetorical mood) the need to take into account
the audiences or arbiters previous opinion in analysing the credibility in context of a
story.
4. ARGUMENTATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STORY CREDIBILITY
Now, all these proposals seem to be based on the collection and ordering of a list of
different criteria that a story told in an argumentative discourse should fulfil in order to be
credible and accepted as evidence of some sort. If we sum up and try to arrange what we
have so far seen, starting from the most inner (intra-diegetic) to outer (extra-diegetic)
criteria, we have a much more complicated framework than the diadic theory we started
with and which referred to roughly numbers 1 and 9 on our list, equivalents of which are
mentioned by practically all authors:

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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

Internal plot or structural coherence

Internal characteriological coherence (Ficher, Cicero)
Internal degree of detail: expositio argumentosa, covering the seven or more
circumstances: i.e. a rich enough, dense enough account (Agricola, Cicero)
Arguer-related, ethotic assessment: story/storyteller coherence (Fisher)
Coverage of relevant extra-diegetic evidence (material coherence). Relative to
argumentative practice involved (Pennington and Hastie).
Uniqueness, situation of the story regarding other competing discourses
(Pennington and Hastie).
Independence regarding other competing discourses (relative contribution to a
collective reconstruction of plausibility based on multiple-source confirmation)
(Olmos).
Audience-related, pathotic assessment: previous beliefs of audience. Relative to
argumentative practice involved (Cicero).
External coherence, fidelity to the real, extra-diegetic world. Degree of realism (a
complicated issue in itself).
Fidelity to human values: reliability and applicability of the story. Degree of
humanism: ethical assessment (Fisher, Cicero).

Now, what can we do with this growingly sophisticated list? (It could be easily extended).
First of all, I see many problems in taking these criteria as a growing number of
requirements that would eventually take us somehow closer to a kind of definitive list of
necessary and sufficient conditions for the assessment of any story as credible. But the
alternative to such an approach is in the hands of argumentation theory.
If we assume that the process of evaluating the credibility of a story would be an
argumentative practice in itself that would require arguments supporting it (or metaarguments in case our story is already a substatial part of an argument) and further
arguments if challenged, then criteria as the ones we have been reviewing (and other
conceivable ones) would be possible (more or less combinable in argumentative
structures) motifs or topics providing warrants for arguing for the credibility of a story or
for challeging it in an argumentative interchange. Our proposal would oppose these two
conceptions and usage of such criteria

Criteria as conditions or requirements for the qualitative assessment of narrative

argumentative discourse. An approach that would imply discussions about the
inclusion/exclusion of individual criteria and about their necessity/sufficiency, vs.
Criteria as topical suggestions providing reasonable warrants for
(meta)argumentative assessment, depending on things like: i) possible argumenttypes involved in the assessed discourse (i.e. different argument schemes would
require different criteria for the assessment of the narratives making part of them);
ii) discursive interactive context with possibly competing stories (i.e. assessment
would in most cases be comparative, Marraud, 2013, p. 149ff.) or iii) objectives of
the particular argumentative practice in which the narrative appears.

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This approach is coherent with my general standpoint that argument evaluation and premis
assessment are, finally, argumentative practices themselves, which may involve a variety
of warrants and lines of argument.
The different theorist and authors that we have reviewed as providing us with
criteria for narrative credibility, coming from different traditions and interested in diverse
kinds of discourse, have coherently pointed to different aspects that could be conceivably
used in arguing for the correctness, reliability or truthfulness of our stories and therefore
for their usefulness as evidence in argumentative discourse.
Such an aproach is, in my view, applicable to any process of argument evaluation
as reveal the different CQs involved in assessing argumentation schemes which may be
easily multiplied in several ways, especially if we take into account pragmatical and
rhetorical issues. But in the case of our narratives, moreover, I think we must also
acknowledge some rather intractable additional problems. In the next section I will
concentrate on those regarding what in our summary list was criterion 9): the requirement
of realism.
5. NARRATIVE REALISM
What exactly is a realistic narrative is not a question that we can answer in any easy
way. Literature scholars have been dealing with this topic for at least the last 150 years (cf.
classics as Booth, [1961]1983; Stevick, 1967) and the answers are multiple and
historically changing. Wayne Booth in his classical The Rhetoric of Fiction, acknowledged
that general rules fail in providing good answers: there are too many ways of being
realistic and of conceiving of realism. More recently, Claudia Jnke (forthcoming), has
presented a study about three French writers: Marivaux, Diderot and Stendhal, all of
whom use very different literary devices (although in all three cases we are talking about
explicit meta-linguistic authorial interventions) to account for the verisimilitude of their
tales and novels. Jnkes study proves a certain historical variation and evolution in the
conventional ways of arguing, within literary narrative, for verisimilitude. If we take in
account the possibilities exploited by more contemporary novels, in which avoidance of
authorial interventions becomes the norm, things get even more complicated. It is, of
course an endless issue.
For our purposes though I would just suggest that we take into account these two
rather reasonable and relevant claims:
a)

b)

we are not really sure of what is plausible in human affairs, the infinite complexity
and unexpectedness of human life will always be there; it is the kind of realm
where we should not look for a complete system of rules (Cf: Wittgenstein on
Menschenkenntnis or knowledge of human nature, PI 355-356, Cf. Bouveresse,
2007, pp. 80-81);
storytelling is a way (one of our most basic ways) to explore whats plausible in
human affairs: so the relation narration/reality is inescapably circular.

Now, regarding (a), I would say that it is part of our condition that the inconceivable, the
unexpected in many cases happens in human affairs and we cannot really construe a
theory that would overcome this situation, among other things because we are not allowed

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to make lab-experiments about what would happen if so-and-so happened regarding

human life and affairs.
Krzysztof Kielowskis film La double vie de Vronique (1991) is precisely about
an author (a storyteller and, ironically enough, a puppeteer) who is not sure about the
plausibility of a certain tale he has imagined and tries to put part of the plot into practice,
inducing a girl to take certain actions just to see whether such actions are conceivable for
her. The film shows how inadmissible and inhuman this playing with others as puppets
is, even in the case of apparently inconsecuential actions (as those in the film which are
not really dramatic). Then, (b) is our alternative, one of our alternatives to this and
Kielowskis film is finally a piece of human life storytelling regarding the intrinsic
difficulties of human life storytelling. Kielowski uses a fiction film, a narrative, to show
us that we cannot make non-narrative or real-life experiments to test stories.
This circumstance exposes the intractable circularity of the relationship between
reality and narrative or storytelling. When we (in a spontaneous, natural way, in Fishers
sense) find a narrative plausible, in part we may be comparing it with what we have
already experienced (it rings true because its similar to what we know) or, alternatively,
we may be partly surprised (and nevertheless convinced) by what it reveals about human
nature and, from then on, apply it in our understanding of real situations. This balance is
rather complex and it may be further complicated.
From the point of view of argumentation theory, we could say, with Perelman, that
narratives (be them fictive or not) are partly based on the structure of reality, partly
founding the structure of reality (1958, pp. 351ss, 471ss). Well have to decide in each
case and depending on the characteristics of the discourses (including the particular types
of argument involved) and discursive interchanges in which the narratives are inserted,
which of these aspects is more relevant and should be taken into account in our analysis,
evaluation or challenge.
6. CONCLUSION
If we assume that the evaluation of arguments or parts of arguments can be conducted in
an argumentative way and become an argumentative practice in itself, we will be prepared
to listen to different ways of arguing for the adequacy of the stories involved in our
practices of giving reasons.
For example, Aristotles maxim warranting the use of past stories derived from
facts as evidence to be taken into account in decision-making processes, by means of
arguments from example, or paradeigmata and which reads: for the most part whats
coming will be similar to whats already happened, (Rhet. II.20) might seem fairly
reasonable. But then so it is (especially for our modern sensibility) Richard Fords
justification of the verisimilitude of the story he tells in the novel Canada:

I cant make what follows next seem reasonable or logical, based on what anyone would believe
they knew about the world. However, as Arthur Remlimger said, I was the son of bank robbers and
desperadoes, which was his way of reminding me that no matter the evidence of your life, or who
you believe you are, or what youre willing to take credit for or draw your vital strength and pride
from anything at all can follow anything at all. Richard Ford, Canada (2012)

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I think both are usable (and in fact used) warrants that I personally would accept as prima
facie good reasons supporting stories in different settings and for different purposes. They
are both rather extreme though and I would certainly prefer more balanced principles for
important or consequential decisions. Ironically enough, if decision-making or other
serious purposes are lacking or avoided and the end of our stories is something like
frivolous entertainment, we may always abide with Mark Twains warning at the
beginning of Huckleberry Finn which prevents his novels serious use as evidence by
precisely forbidding its narrative assessment:
Persons attempting to find a motive in this narrative will be prosecuted; persons attempting to find a
moral in it will be banished; persons attempting to find a plot in it will be shot. (quoted by P.
Stevick, 1967, p. 3).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This contribution has been made possible by funds provided by both the UNED Research
Projects Programme (Project 2012V/PUNED/0010, Narrativity and Argumentation:
Discursive Basis of Plausibility) and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and
Competitiveness (Research Project: FFI2011-23125, Arguing in the Public Sphere:
Deliberation as a Paradigm).

REFERENCES
Agricola, R. (1992 [1539]). De inventione dialectica, ed. by L. Mundt. Tubinga: Max Niemeyer.
Booth, W. C. (1961, 19832). The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago/Londres: The University of Chicago Press.
Bouveresse, J. (2013 [2007]) El conocimiento del escritor. Sobre la literatura, la verdad y la vida.
Barcelona: Ediciones del Subsuelo.
Fisher, W.R. (1989 [1987]). Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value,
and Action. Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Ford, R. (2012). Canada. New York: Ecco Press
Govier, T. & L. Ayers (2012). Logic and Parables: Do These Narratives Provide Arguments? Informal Logic
32/2, 161-189.
Halm, K., ed. (1863). Rhetores Latini Minores. Leipzig: Teubner.
Jnke, C. (forthcoming). Verdad y verosimilitud en la novela francesa de la ilustracin al realismo. In A.
Snchez Manzano (Ed.), Retrica y narrativa. Madrid/Len: Tecnos/Universidad de Len.
Marraud, H. (2013). Es logic@? Anlisis y evaluacin de argumentos. Ctedra: Madrid.
Olmos, P. (2012). La preceptiva sobre la narratio en los rtores latinos. Revista de Estudios Sociales 44, 6274. http://res.uniandes.edu.co/view.php/803/index.php?id=803
Olmos, P. (2014). Narration as argument. In D. Mohammed & M. Lewiski (Eds.), Virtues of
Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the
Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013, CD edition. Windsor: University of Windsor.
Olmos, P. (2014b). Classical Fables as Arguments: Narration and Analogy. In H. Jales Ribeiro (Ed.),
Systematic Approaches to Argument by Analogy (pp. 189-208). Amsterdam: Springer.
Pennington, N. & R. Hastie (1992). Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decisionmaking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62(2), 189-206.
Perelman, C. & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). Trait de lArgumentation. La Nouvelle Rhtorique. PUF: Paris.
Plumer, G. (2011). Novels as Arguments. In van F.H. van Eemeren et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th
Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA 2010) (pp. 15471558). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Stevick, P. (1967). The theory of the novel. New York / London: The fRee Pree / Collier Macmillan.
Walton, D. (2012). Story Similarity in Arguments from Analogy, Informal Logic 32, 190-221.

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Wittegenstein, L. (1999 [1953]). Philosophical investigations. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

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On What Matters For Virtue Argumentation Theory

Fabio Paglieri
Goal-Oriented Agents Lab (GOAL)
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche
Italy
fabio.paglieri@istc.cnr.it

ABSTRACT: Virtue argumentation theory (VAT) has been charged of being incomplete, given its alleged
inability to account for argument validity in virtue-theoretical terms. Instead of defending VAT against that
challenge, I suggest it is misplaced, since it is based on a premise VAT does not endorse, and raises an issue
that most versions of VAT need not consider problematic. This in turn allows distinguishing several varieties
of VAT, and clarifying what really matters for them.
KEYWORDS: virtue argumentation theory, argument quality, validity, conflicting virtues.

1. INTRODUCTION
Virtue argumentation theory (henceforth, VAT) is a relatively new contender in the arena
of argumentation theories a martial metaphor that some virtue theorists may not be ready
to endorse without reservation, by the way (see, e.g., Cohen, 1995). To the best of my
knowledge, the name was coined by Andrew Aberdein as late as in 2007, in a paper where
he outed Daniel Cohen as a sort of closeted virtue argumentation theorist, quoting
persuasive textual evidence from Cohens previous work (2004, 2005). However,
Aberdein (2007, 2010a) has made also abundantly clear that VAT is but the latest
offspring of an illustrious scholarly tradition, to wit, virtue theory in general, dating back
to ancient philosophy, and most notably to Aristotles ethical writings. As it is well
known, that particular approach has been gaining a lot of momentum in recent years, in the
context of virtue ethics (Foot, 1978; MacIntyre, 1981; Hursthouse, 1999) and positive
psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), as well as in the area of virtue
epistemology (Sosa, 1991; Zagzebski, 1996), which share many topics of concern with
argumentation theories. So it should not come as a surprise to see that VAT is currently
prospering: for instance, Virtues of Argumentation was the topic of the latest
international conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argument (Windsor, 2225 May 2013), with Daniel Cohen featuring as one of the keynote speakers; nor is the
relevance of VAT confined to argumentation theories, given that a non-specialistic highprofile philosophy journal such as Topoi is currently preparing a special issue on Virtues
and Arguments, guest edited by Andrew Aberdein and Daniel Cohen.
In spite of all these indications of success, the surest sign of the growing
importance of VAT is the fact that it also attracted a fair share of criticism and doubt.
Some of these were relatively mild, and would be better understood as constructive efforts
to improve on this recent approach: so, for instance, Heather Battaly (2010) has argued
that the frequent efforts at distinguishing fallacious and non-fallacious ad hominem
arguments (e.g., Walton, 1998; Tindale, 2007; Woods, 2007) should be framed in the

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context of virtue epistemology. If Battaly is right, then also several scholars who do not
currently regard themselves as virtue theorists ought to take argumentative virtues into
greater consideration. Other critical commentaries, however, have been less kindly
disposed towards VAT: this is the case with a recent article by Tracy Bowell and Justine
Kingsbury (2013), in which VAT was charged with an inability to offer an alternative
account of what a good argument is, and in particular of validity. That challenge was later
answered by Aberdein (2014), and the present paper also intends to address the same
problem, although from a very different angle. In fact, in what follows I will engage in a
modest effort at meta-argumentative reconstruction (in the sense of meta-argumentation
detailed in Finocchiaro, 2013), to make the following points:

the key problem with Bowell and Kingsbury criticism is that it aims at the wrong
polemical target;
in contrast, taking that criticism as central and thus responding to it in details, as
Aberdein did, has the undesirable consequence of further derailing the discussion
on VAT towards issues that are tangential to its aims and unlikely to be productive;
since there are more pressing theoretical concerns with VAT, priority should be
given to those matters, by both proponents and critics of VAT;
ironically, the whole debate analysed here exemplifies one of those key concerns,
to wit, how to establish the virtuous path when multiple argumentative virtues
conflict with each other.

While my analysis is intended to defuse Bowell and Kingsbury attack against VAT, it
does not end up making their criticism useless. On the contrary, along the way I will show
that it works well as a litmus test: how one reacts to their argument reveals the kind of
virtue theorist that person is prepared to be.
2. A CASE AGAINST VAT AND WHY IT DOESNT MATTER
Bowell and Kingsbury set out to prove that virtue argumentation theory does not offer a
plausible alternative to a more standard agent-neutral account of good argument (2013, p.
23). In order to make that point, they employ an argument (denoted as BK from now on)
that can be reconstructed as follows:
1.

2.

3.

They define a good argument in terms of validity, as an argument that provides,

via its premises, sufficient justification for believing its conclusion to be true or
highly probable, or for accepting that the course of action it advises is one that
certainly or highly probably should be taken (p. 23).
They argue that considerations on the arguers character can be pertinent to
establish the truth of her claims, including the premises of her arguments (e.g. in
legitimate ad hominem), but are never relevant to evaluate the structure of the
argument which is what matters for validity.
They consider and reject two apparent counterexamples to 2: inductive arguments
whose validity may be affected by unstated facts, and arguments based on
reasoning too complicated for the untrained to follow (such as the Monty Hall
puzzle).
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4.

They conclude that argument assessment cannot be reduced to considerations on

the arguers character: virtue argumentation theory cannot be the whole story
when it comes to argument evaluation (p. 31, my emphasis).

In his response to BK, Aberdein (2014) mostly focused on points 2 and 3 above: that is, he
tried to show how the arguers character can provide insight on the structure of the
argument and its validity (contra 2), and how this happens also in those counterexamples
that Bowell and Kingsbury thought to have rejected (contra 3). I will not discuss here
whether Aberdein is successful in his efforts, because I want instead to put pressure on
step 1 of BK, as well as inviting further reflection on 4.
The starting point of BK is in how argument quality is defined: this is a truly
pivotal move, because the attack is aimed at argument evaluation, but it hinges on alleged
limits of VAT in dealing with validity. So, unless validity plays a key role in argument
assessment, the whole criticism falls apart. Bowell and Kingsbury are of course aware that
VAT is unlikely to endorse a definition of argument quality that reduces it to validity, and
this is how they frame the issue: This [i.e., their own definition of argument quality] is
not an account of good argument that a virtue argumentation theorist would accept. The
virtue theorist thinks that what makes an argument good is that the person presenting it has
argued well, whereas we think that what makes it the case that an arguer has argued well is
that they have presented an argument that is good in the sense described in the previous
paragraph (2013, p. 23). Unfortunately, this strikes me as a particularly unhelpful way of
describing the situation, akin to the proverbial dilemma which came first, the chicken or
the egg? we all know how that sort of discussion leads nowhere. In particular, here
Bowell and Kingsbury overlooks the substantive reasons that prompted VAT to focus on
the arguers character in the first place.
Looking at the literature, it is absolutely clear that VAT was borne out of a deepseated suspicion towards a definition of good argument limited to validity, given the latter
inability to justify peoples intuitions on argument quality. Consider for instance the
following (real) textbook example of an allegedly good argument: Both Pierre and Marie
Curie were physicists. Therefore, Marie Curie was a physicist (quoted in Cohen, 2013, p.
479). If we look at this piece of text with a rich notion of quality in mind, we find it hard
to hold it in high esteem, since it does not seem very good in any meaningful sense. On
the contrary, it is manifestly bad in a variety of respects: uninformative, trivial, pedantic
you name it. That is why some people may even have what I like to call a Cohens
reaction to it something like Really? Thats your example of a good argument?!
(again, Cohen, 2013, p. 479, emphasis in the original).
Let us name this the problem of balidity: it hinges on the fact that some inferential
structures, in spite of their unquestioned validity, are still terminally bad qua arguments.
Nor is balidity a rare affection: as a case in point, consider the-mother-of-all-enthymemes
(assuming enthymeme to be a female gendered noun, which is something I was unable to
establish): Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal. If reconstructed as a truncated
syllogism with the implicit premise All men are mortal, it is perfectly valid yet it is
still not a good argument, other than for the purpose of illustration (which is, not
surprisingly, the only use it ever had). Could anyone seriously picture Aristotle, or anyone
else, using this line as a piece of real-life arguing, e.g. to persuade an interlocutor of the

1072

mortality of Socrates? Certainly not: it is only meant, and always was, as an example, not
an argument.
Someone might object to the whole idea of balidity, on the ground that instances
like those mentioned above are best understood as non-argumentative at all. Simply put,
the idea would be to claim that a certain linguistic expression, even though it conveys a
clear (and, in this case, valid) inference pattern, may serve a function that has nothing to
do with arguing e.g., exemplifying what an argument is. However, this view has two
main flaws: first, it is inconsistent with presenting similar sentences as tokens of the type
argument, and it fails to explain how they could exemplify what is supposed to be
good in an argument (by comparison, consider an example of a delicious apple, which is
typically an apple with the appropriate qualities, not something else entirely); second,
scholars have been treating similar cases as arguments (in fact, prototypical ones) for
several centuries, so a very convincing error theory would be required to explain how we
were all so deeply mistaken. Absent such a theory, it is much more parsimonious to treat
these cases as arguments that are valid and yet bad (balid, for short), and therefore try to
provide an account of argument quality that does not reduce it to mere validity.
In this perspective, which is the one endorsed by VAT, balid arguments are
instances in which validity does not rescue the argument from its badness. As Cohen
quipped, only someone with logical blinders on (2013, p. 479) could fail to see their
spectacular lack of value, in spite of their validity. What Bowell and Kingsbury omit to
notice is that balid arguments are also the main motivation for VAT. So, a better
reconstruction of the VAT standpoint on argument quality would be the following: the
virtue theorist thinks that what makes an argument good cannot just be validity (given the
existence of balid arguments), and thus conceives argument quality as depending on the
act of arguing well. This is not just a matter of perspective, but rather a substantial
disagreement on what counts as good argument, based on a verifiable appeal to peoples
intuitions.
The upshot is that Bowell and Kingsbury give us a definition in which validity is
necessary and sufficient for quality, whereas virtue theorists reject sufficiency, and may
also reject necessity, depending on how radical they are (more on this later on). So BK
argues against VAT from a premise that VAT explicitly rejects: it is not hard to see that
this is unlikely to produce much progress.
3. VARIETIES OF VAT
Turning to step 4 of BK, one notes that Bowell and Kingsbury (2013) tend to shift aim
across their paper, or at least leave open multiple interpretations of it. Sometimes their
critique of VAT is framed in terms of failure (e.g., VAT does not offer a plausible
alternative to a more standard agent-neutral account of good argument, p. 23), but more
often it is presented as a charge of incompleteness: e.g., any agent-centered account that
cannot accommodate [a validity-based characterization of argument quality] will be
unable to offer a complete account of good argument (p. 24). Bowell and Kingsbury may
not consider these two positions as truly distinct, since in their view validity is the crux of
argument quality, therefore if VAT cannot give us validity, then it is a failure at evaluating
arguments, period. However, for virtue theorists, who do not consider validity as the crux
of argument quality, the two charges are clearly different. In what follows I will stick to
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the more modest reading of Bowell and Kingsbury accusation, as it is spelled out in point
4 of BK (taken from their own conclusions): virtue argumentation theory cannot be the
whole story when it comes to argument evaluation (p. 31).
The question I want to pose is the following: Should virtue theorists be worried by
this charge of incompleteness? The answer depends on what kind of virtue theorist one is
prepared to be. To simplify, let us distinguish between:

Moderate VAT: validity is necessary but insufficient for argument quality; hence it
is perfectly possible for an argument to be balid, whereas all good arguments are
also valid.
Radical VAT: validity is neither sufficient nor necessary for argument quality
hence looking at validity is a non-starter to assess argument quality.

In a moment I will turn to the empirical question of what kind of virtue theorists are to be
found in the wild, taking as prime examples the leading proponents of VAT, Daniel
Cohen and Andrew Aberdein. But first let us note that radical virtue theorists are by
definition immunized against BK: if validity is neither sufficient nor necessary for
argument quality, who cares whether or not it depends from the arguers character?
Looking at textual evidence, it would seem that Daniel Cohen takes precisely that
stance: Valid reasoning is apparently neither necessary nor sufficient for an acceptable
argument (2013, p. 479). Although Cohen is quick to add that acceptable is not
synonymous of fully satisfying, this certainly sounds as an endorsement of radical VAT.
Now, denying the sufficiency of validity for argument quality is not especially hard, since
balid arguments make a pretty strong case in that direction, as discussed. But to reject
necessity too, one must produce at least one instance (and possibly several) of an argument
which is indisputably good, and yet invalid what I suggest we call a goodacy, i.e. a good
fallacy. This strikes me as something much harder to do. Yet Cohen thinks he can deliver
on this, so let us turn again to his work for elucidation.
Unfortunately, I do not think his treatment of this particular point can really win
the day for radical VAT. This is how Cohen argues against the necessity of validity for
argument quality: Under certain circumstances, it is not necessarily unreasonable to
overlook an arguments flaws. One might, for example, resort to a meta-argument like
this: I can see that the argument doesnt work as it stands, but the conclusion is so
attractive that Im sure someone will be able to fix it. Ill accept this flawed one for now.
The French mathematician and physicist Henri Poincar suggested that he sometimes
operated this way: accepting a formula as a provisional lemma in proving theorems before
he had any proof for that lemma (2013, p. 479).
If we look at this as an example of a goodacy, I believe we are bound to be
disappointed. After all, what is being accepted as good here is the conclusion, not the
argument for it: while this is indeed a fairly common instance (we often have clear
intuitions on certain matters, even when we lack the means to prove them to our
satisfaction), this has little to do with the quality of the argument. In fact, by provisionally
accepting something as a lemma, Poincar was certainly not suggesting that he had a good
proof for it and indeed, the whole point of provisionality is because you can get away
with it for the time being in light of practical considerations, but sooner or later you will

1074

have to deliver the whole thing. So I do not see meta-arguments of the kind suggested
by Cohen as convincing cases of goodacies.
In my view, if one really wants to be radical on VAT, then the most promising
direction to take is looking at cases where validity does not matter for the interested
parties, rather than being objectively absent. Goodacies may or may not be the unicorns of
argumentation, but there is no lack of instances in which people (i) experience an
argumentative exchange as being fully satisfying, while (ii) bypassing entirely any
consideration of validity, or even (iii) regarding such considerations as a threat to the
optimal flow of arguing they are currently experiencing. When you are having the time of
your life animately discussing with your friends, scrutinizing the validity of each other
arguments may very well be considered a fatal faux pas. Granted, presenting similar
instances as evidence against the idea that validity is necessary for argument quality is not
without problem: a predictable, but far from trivial objection would be to note that, as long
as mutual rational questioning of each other arguments is out, then it is hard to see why we
should insist in calling that particular activity argumentation at all. Still, it seems to me
that similar cases are more promising for radical VAT than instances were lack of validity
is fully acknowledged, like the one discussed by Cohen, because in the latter situation the
notion of quality does not truly apply to the argument, but rather to its conclusion.
However, my purpose here is not to defend a radical version of VAT, but rather to
note that (i) it is not easy to be a radical virtue theorist, yet (ii) if you manage to hold to
that particular position, then you do not need to worry at all about BK. This, in turn,
provides us with the intellectual resources to offer a streamlined, and possibly more
informative reconstruction of BK. As far as I can see, Bowell and Kingsbury line of
argument can be summarized as follows:
BK, compact version: Unless radical VAT can be defended, either it can be
explained how validity is determined by the arguers character, or it must be
conceded that VAT does not provide a complete theory of argument evaluation.
Radical virtue theorists deny the premise (they are ready to defend radical VAT), so they
can ignore the disjunctive conclusion. Moderate virtue theorists, in contrast, have to decide
whether they want to take the first or the second horn of it. Again, their choice in that
respect will tell us something on the kind of virtue theorist they intend to be,
differentiating two sub-types of moderate VAT:

Modest moderate VAT: validity is necessary, albeit not sufficient, for argument
quality, and moreover it is an aspect of quality that does not require considerations
of character to be established.
Ambitious moderate VAT: validity is also considered necessary and non-sufficient
for argument quality, but it is conceived as determined by virtue theoretical
considerations, like any other facet of quality.

Aberdein, in his reply to BK (2014), clearly endorses the latter position: so here I am
taking the liberty of outing him as an ambitious virtue theorist, in spite of his moderation.
It is also worth noting that virtue theorists of Aberdeins persuasion, i.e. ambitious
moderates, are the only ones that need take issue with BK. For the radicals, the challenge it
1075

poses is non-existent; for the modest moderates, accepting the charge of incompleteness is
not a problem to start with, since they agree that argument evaluation, while requiring an
appeal to the arguers virtues to establish quality in general, does not need to make use of
similar means in dealing with the specific problem of validity. But, to paraphrase Bowell
and Kingsbury, since validity cannot be the whole story when it comes to argument
evaluation, then leaving validity outside of the scope of virtues does not make VAT any
less necessary to understand argument quality. That is what makes modest moderates
immune to BK.
But is modest moderate VAT a genuinely interesting theoretical option? I believe it
is or, at least, I want to argue that, prima facie, there is nothing wrong in being modestly
moderate, when it comes to VAT. Two main reasons stand out for that claim: first, modest
moderation is a very natural theoretical stance to have, with respect to VAT; second, one
can be moderate in a very ambitious sense, that is, without making virtues any less crucial
to argument evaluation. The first point I take to be rather self-evident. As discussed, from
day one VAT presented itself as an attempt to move beyond validity in assessing argument
quality: as such, it was never necessarily committed to providing a complete theory of
argument evaluation, especially for what it pertains validity, because that is precisely what
VAT is not interested in at least not primarily. This brings us to the second point: VAT
may be modest in that it leaves validity to non-virtue-based considerations, but it also
denies any special role to validity in determining argument quality, to get a fresh look at
everything else that matters open-mindedness, fairness, sense of proportion, contextual
appropriateness, mutual respect, etc. So modest moderate VAT may not give us the whole
story of argument evaluation, but it certainly provides the bulk of it, relegating validity to
little more than a footnote, albeit a necessary one.
4. CONCLUSIONS: DO NOT FEED THE VALIDITY BUFFS!
If my reconstruction is correct, BK does not fare particularly well as an attack against
VAT: it is based on a definition of argument quality that virtue theorists universally reject,
and its conclusion needs to worry only one version of VAT, i.e. ambitious moderation, out
of three too bad for Aberdein, but good for the rest of us! On the plus side, diagnosing
BK helped us uncovering different varieties of VAT, which hopefully may prove useful to
foster the debate.
However, I think BK and Aberdeins reaction to it (2014) epitomize a potential
stand-off in the dialogue between proponents and critics of VAT, so I would like to try and
intervene as an interested third party in the debate. At risk of caricaturing a serious
dispute, the whole affair reminds me of the following hypothetical dialogue between Dan,
a virtue theorist, and Bo, a validity buff, that is, a stalwart defender of validity as the key
to argument quality:
Dan:

Bo:

Look, there are plenty of valid arguments that are not good in any reasonable
sense. Thats fascinating! It means we need more than validity to capture argument
quality.
Well, maybe so, but what about validity?

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Dan:

Bo:
Dan:

Are you not listening? I have no beef with validity keep it, for all I care! I want
to talk about everything else that matters for argument quality, and yet has nothing
to do with validity.
AHA then you cannot account for validity!
Jeez, some key argumentative virtue is missing here...

This is just a cartoon, of course, but it emphasizes a real problem: by insisting on validity
as key in argument evaluation, Bowell and Kingsbury (2013) focused attention on
something which is, explicitly, of very little interest for the general rationale and purposes
of VAT; in turn, by taking up their challenge and dealing with it, it could be said that
Aberdein (2014) allowed the debate on VAT to be momentarily derailed towards matters
that are, at best, tangential to it. Nor my present efforts should be regarded as being
beyond reproach, since what I am doing is to argue that we should not care much whether
validity is analysable in terms of virtues, and this is tantamount to deny that we have to
address the worries raised by Bowell and Kingsbury an attitude that many argumentation
theories would not find especially commendable.
It seems that what we have here is a conflict of argumentative virtues, in which
nobody can honestly claim to have upheld all relevant virtues at once: no matter what the
actors of this minor academic drama do, they will violate at least some argumentative
virtue. To put it simply, Bowell and Kingsbury, by exerting the virtue of careful critical
scrutiny (focus on any unclear or defective details in a target argument), violated the virtue
of relevant engagement (i.e., avoid focusing on what is manifestly of minor importance in
your target argument): this, in turn, risked side-tracking the discussion on VAT. Aberdein,
by closely addressing their line of attack, exerted the virtue of dialectical responsiveness
(address all potentially sound criticism), but failed to apply the virtue of maximal
relevance in theory construction (focus primarily on what is most significant), and thus
allowed the discussion to be side-tracked. Finally, my own approach tried exerting
maximal relevance, but thereby failed to demonstrate dialectical responsiveness: in fact,
readers will notice that whether or not VAT can account for validity is not discussed
anywhere in this paper, so Bowell and Kingsbury arguments to that effect are simply not
answered.
Whether or not my reconstruction of this minor scholarly debate is correct, a
general point should be apparent by now: there is no guarantee that, by exerting an
argumentative virtue, the arguer will not also violate another virtue. This raises an obvious
and yet crucial question for VAT: in similar conflicts of argumentative virtues, what is the
virtuous option? On what grounds?
Now, that is a good challenge for VAT, not quibbling on something that VAT was
never inclined to consider central, i.e. validity. If VAT cannot deliver a solution to the
frequent conflicts of argumentative virtues we encounter in everyday life, then it has a
serious problem, one that applies to all varieties of VAT. Besides, the theoretical means to
engage with that particular problem are within the province of VAT, and two possibilities
immediately come to mind: either assuming some ordering of virtues, so that certain
virtues should have precedence over others, whenever a conflict arises, or adopting some
doctrine of the mean, following in Aristotles footsteps. The former solution lends itself
nicely to neat formalisms, but it raises the thorny issue of establishing criteria to generate
(and possibly change over time and/or across contexts/cultures) the relevant ordering. As
1077

for the doctrine of the mean, it certainly fits nicely in any virtue-theoretical framework,
but it is not easy to spell out in sufficient detail to handle real-life conflicts of
argumentative virtues, which in turn may severely limit the scope of application of VAT.
Not surprisingly, Cohen listed conflicts of argumentative virtues in his to-do-list, at
the end of his keynote address on VAT at OSSA 2013: Questions such as just which
virtues are needed for the different roles in arguments, how they might relate to one
another, how conflicts among them might be resolved, and how they differ from skills (p.
484, my emphasis). To explain why none of these problems were taken up in that
particular paper, Cohen noted that all of them have been addressed at length by others
elsewhere (p. 484). Unfortunately, he did not provide any exact reference for that claim,
and I was unable to locate a satisfactory treatment of conflicts of argumentative virtues in
the relatively small literature on VAT. Thus I suspect that Cohen here was slightly
exaggerating: while some of the problems he mention (e.g., distinguishing between virtues
and skills) have been addressed at length by other scholars (e.g., Aberdein, 2007), some
others have not, and I think conflicts of argumentative virtues belong to the latter group.
In fact, it is only in Cohens own work that I could find a brief discussion of
conflicting virtues in argument, both before (2005) and after (2009) that Aberdein
invented VAT in 2007. In a nutshell, Cohen tends to think of conflicting argumentative
virtues as counterbalances: for instance, he sees an interlocutor that concedes too much
and too readily to the counterpart (the Concessionaire) as the opposite in a spectrum that
starts with the Deaf Dogmatist, that is, someone who never concedes the opponents
point, no matter what. This leads him to explicitly invoke Aristotles doctrine of the mean,
albeit only in passing: If Aristotle is right and the golden mean is found by aiming for the
opposite extreme from our natural inclinations, then we could do worse than trying to
emulate the Concessionaire. The Concessionaire does, after all, listen well and has the
honesty and self-confidence to acknowledge good points. If we hope for as much in our
fellow interlocutors, we should cultivate it in ourselves (2005, p. 62). In a similar vein,
Cohen discusses open-mindedness and sense of proportion as two key virtues of
argumentation, regulated by the same sort of balancing act; in his own words, although it
is a necessary precondition for getting the most out of our arguments, open-mindedness
can also be a counterproductive trait of mind in argumentation. The problem is that
arguments are open-ended in a number of different ways with the potential to be extended
ad infinitum. Open-mindedness exacerbates matters. It needs the counterbalance provided
by a sense of proportion (2009, pp. 59-60).
While I have much sympathy for this counterbalancing view of conflicting virtues,
Cohens remarks are still far from providing us with a general, detailed theory of what the
relevant counterbalances are, and how they are supposed to work: as far as I can see, a
well-structured map of argumentative virtues is still missing. Until that map is sketched
out in greater detail, the jury is still out on whether or not VAT can deliver a satisfactory
understanding of conflicts of argumentative virtues. Still, the point remains: this is a
worthy quest for virtue theorists, as well as a suitable target for their critics. With so much
yet to be done, no energy should be wasted on less essential matters, and virtue theorists
should stop feeding the validity buffs.

1078

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
As Daniel Cohen noted in personal communication, the presentation of this paper to the
ISSA 2014 conference was graced by a truly virtuous audience, whose critical suggestions
later helped me in writing down more clearly my ideas on the subject. Any residual
shortcomings, however, is to be blamed on my numerous argumentative vices.

REFERENCES
Aberdein, A. (2007). Virtue argumentation. In Frans H. van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles A. Willard
& Bart Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the
Study of Argumentation (pp. 15-19). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Aberdein, A. (2010a). Virtue in argument. Argumentation, 24(2), 165-179.
Aberdein, A. (2010b). Observations on sick mathematics. In Bart Van Kerkhove, Jonas De Vuyst & Jean
Paul Van Bendegem (Eds.), Philosophical perspectives on mathematical practice (pp. 269-300).
London: College Publications.
Aberdein, A. (2014). In defence of virtue: The legitimacy of agent-based argument appraisal. Informal
Logic, 34(1), 77-93.
Battaly, H. (2010). Attacking character: Ad hominem argument and virtue epistemology. Informal Logic,
30(4), 361-390.
Bowell, T., & Kingsbury, J. (2013). Virtue and argument: Taking character into account. Informal Logic,
33(1), 22-32.
Cohen, D. (1995). Argument is war... and war is hell: Philosophy, education, and metaphors for
argumentation. Informal Logic, 17(2), 177-188.
Cohen, D. (2004). Arguments and metaphors in philosophy. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Cohen, D. (2005). Arguments that backfire. In D. Hitchcock & D. Farr (Eds.), The uses of argument (pp. 5865). Hamilton, ON: OSSA.
Cohen, D. (2009). Keeping an open mind and having a sense of proportion as virtues in argumentation.
Cogency, 1, 49-64.
Cohen, D. (2013). Virtue, in context. Informal Logic, 33(4), 471-485.
Finocchiaro, M. (2013). Meta-argumentation: An approach to logic and argumentation theory. London:
College Publications.
Foot, P. (1978). Virtues and vices. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hursthouse, R. (1999). On virtue ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacIntyre, A. (1981). After virtue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Pritchard, D. H. (2003). Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck. Metaphilosophy, 34(1-2), 106-130.
Pritchard, D. H. (2008). Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck, revisited. Metaphilosophy, 39(1), 66-88.
Pritchard, D. H. (2012). Anti-luck virtue epistemology. Journal of Philosophy, 109(3), 247-279.
Seligman, M.E.P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. American
Psychologist, 55(1), 5-14.
Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Tindale, C. (2007). Fallacies and argument appraisal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Walton, D. (1998). Ad hominem arguments. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press.
Woods, J. (2007). Lightening up on the ad hominem. Informal Logic, 27(1), 109-134.
Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Access Denied: Crafting Argumentative Responses To Educational

Restrictions On Undocumented Students In The United States.
Edward Panetta
Department of Communication Studies
University of Georgia
United States
epanetta@uga.edu

ABSTRACT: The state of Georgia has enacted laws restricting the access that undocumented Latino/a
students have to universities. The restrictions are comparable to those imposed on African-Americans in the
old South. The students have formulated a set of argumentative responses to challenge the legitimacy of the
restrictions. The strategies include enrolling in Freedom University. This underground university helps to
both humanize the students for the public while affording them the opportunity to join an educational
community.
KEYWORDS: DREAMers, Freedom University, Georgia Undocumented Youth Alliance, immigration,
public argument, and student protests.

1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade a number of jurisdictions in the United States have enacted laws to
restrict the access undocumented college students have to in-state tuition and scholarship
opportunities. While some states have pushed back against this nativist impulse and
enacted laws affording undocumented students access to post-secondary education, there
continue to be students who are denied educational access. The most severe educational
restrictions are found in the old segregated South, and they are often part of a larger
package of laws intended to control the behaviors of the entire undocumented population
in that state. The states of Alabama and South Carolina have instituted a total ban on the
admission of undocumented students to state-funded colleges. My home state of Georgia
has banned students from attending the most competitive schools and stripped
undocumented students of the right to pay in-state tuition.
The suppression of an immigrant population is not a problem confined to the
United States. France, for example, has struggled with political conflict resulting from a
rising Islamic population and fear that French traditions could be lost. In the Netherlands,
young immigrants have found themselves at risk of being ejected from the country, as they
become adults. In France and the Netherlands, advocates for the undocumented have
attempted to redefined the controversy by highlighting the ways in which restrictions
would negatively impact families by tearing them apart (Nicholls, 2013, p. 176). This is
consistent with a recurrent pattern employed by opponents of legislative restrictions on
non-citizens the redefinition of the conflict to focus on the values of community and
family.
This essay hopes to make two contributions to the on-going immigration debate by
reviewing actions take by undocumented youth in Georgia to reestablish access to public

1080

universities. The argument choices made in this local controversy could have ramifications
for the larger immigration debate in both the United States and Western Europe. Against
the backdrop of state restrictions, advocates have formulated a set of communicative
responses that suggest that the immigration debate can be shifted to better protect the
interests of the undocumented. First, by moving the dispute from a focus on border
security to educational access, the argumentative ground may be tilted in the favor of those
advocating immigration reform. The narrative of individual hard work leading to success
is a long-standing appeal in American culture. The undocumented students themselves tell
stories of aspiring to achieve professional success by chasing the American Dream. These
moving stories are slowly replacing the tales of the faceless illegal immigrant skirting a
fence on the border of Mexico and the United States. Second, in response to requests from
undocumented students, professors have played a role in this controversy by facilitating
educational opportunities for them. This paper will review local efforts, including the
establishment of Freedom University and the ways in which Freedom Universitys
communicative campaign contributes to the effort to humanize students, afford them
educational opportunities, and reverse state restrictions. Additionally, Freedom University
provides the students access to the rhetorical trappings of the educational system including
academic garb, graduation exercises, and student protests at administrative offices to use
in the conflict with state legislators.
The essay is divided into three sections. The first section traces the recent trend in
the United States to impose restrictions on undocumented residents. The second section
describes and assesses the argument strategies deployed by students to push their position
with both legislative decision-makers and the public. The final section suggests lessons
that other groups might take from the strategies deployed by the students in Georgia.
2. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS
The roots of the recent immigration debate can be traced back to a series of policy
decisions made in both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations and the ensuing
political gridlock that has dominated American politics since 2005. In the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Welfare Opportunity Act, the Federal government singled out
undocumented residents and precluded them from receiving food stamps and welfare
benefits. The legislation legitimized the process of carving out exceptions to basic social
service access and erasing undocumented residents from the social safety net. This marked
the resurgence of the nativist impulse in the United States and came a decade after
Democrats and Republicans joined together to pass comprehensive immigration
legislation.
In the 1990s, there was an on-going struggle in the United States between groups
with divergent views of immigration. On one hand, there were political advocacy groups
lobbying for in-state tuition for undocumented students; on the other hand, there were
think tanks calling for stricter rules for undocumented residents. A rhetorical characteristic
shared by both sides of the debate was that the youth did not rhetorically represent their
own interests in the dialogue (Nicholls, 2013, p. 48). In many cases, both Democrats and
Republicans lobbied on behalf of comprehensive immigration legislation that would both
secure the Mexican/U.S. border and liberalize the patchwork of laws that drove the
undocumented underground. The extension of rights for the disenfranchised was justified
1081

by discussion of what immigrants would do for the citizenry and the economy. The
rhetorical turn to argumentation that justified the extension of personal rights based on the
potential benefits to the voting public and the economy was a legacy of the Reagan
revolution and permeated the discourse of policy advocates (Aguirre & Simmers, 2011, p.
15). These lines of argument have been found in the debates about the Development,
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act dating back to August of 2001. The
DREAM Act would provide resident status to undocumented graduates of high schools
who are in good legal standing.
The DREAM Act and other policies intended to benefit the undocumented have
suffered from political complications arising from the War on Terror. Immigration policy
was rolled into the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security following the
2001 terror attacks. The Mexican/US border was redefined as a site that was susceptible to
border crossings by Islamic terrorists and the militarization of the border was enhanced.
The politics that suborned immigration policy reform to national security interests was
followed by rapid changes in the politic climate. Despite the support of George W. Bush,
immigration legislation that would have further strengthened border security and
liberalized immigration rules for non-citizen residents did not make it through the
Congress. The last effort, the Comprehensive Reform Act of 2007, was stalled by a series
of procedural votes in the Senate. The DREAM Act was attached to this comprehensive
policy, and this was the last time the act was debated in a serious fashion by the
government in Washington D.C.
While the DREAM Act remains a promise unfulfilled for undocumented students
in the United States, it has played a rhetorical role in the struggle for student rights. The
act had the effect of constituting the largely Hispanic undocumented youth in the United
States into a defined rhetorical community. While legislators and public policy advocates
formulated the legislation, the proposed act effectively established the undocumented
youth as a distinct political force. Those youth built upon the framework articulated by
others and took on their own fight to attain the American Dream.
The pattern of national legislative failure also left conservatives in border-states
concerned about border enforcement and security. As early as 2007, states began to pass
legislation making it more difficult for employers to hire undocumented residents. A
burgeoning population of undocumented workers in conjunction with federal inaction led
the Arizona legislature to expand its role in enforcing immigration statues. The
appropriation of immigration enforcement by Arizona became a full-blown international
controversy with the passage of SB 1070 in 2010. After the law was tested in court, the
state was allowed to check the legal status of anyone involved a law enforcement stop,
including routine traffic stops. The pattern of passing aggressive anti-immigrant statutes in
Arizona was modeled by a number of states. In the case of Georgia, legislation and rules
passed by the state have targeted undocumented college students and pushed this group to
aggressively advocate their case in the public sphere.
While Arizona provided a model, additional political conditions led to Georgia to
pass Board of Regents (BOR) Rule 4.1.6, which restricts the ability of undocumented
students to attend select universities, and the Georgia Illegal Immigration Reform and
Enforcement Act of 2011 (HB 87), which imposes significant penalties on prospective
employers. First, the 2008 recession and ensuing economic insecurity led many to assert
that the undocumented were a drain on the economy by reducing the employment
1082

opportunities available to Georgians. The neo-conservative line of argument used to pass

the immigration legislation of 1986 was rendered ineffective by the recession and the fear
of job loss. Additionally, Georgias the demographics were changing quickly. The
Hispanic population increased from 8% of the population in 2000 to 16% of the
population in 2010. Fewer job opportunities in conjunction with a spike in the Hispanic
population led politicians to use statutes to protect voters. The anti-immigrant climate
worked in conjunction with the restrictive policies to drive immigrants from the state.
In October of 2010, BOR Rule 4.1.6 was approved and it prohibited undocumented
students from attending colleges that had rejected qualified citizens of Georgia in the
preceding two years. The adoption of the rule was followed by a broader set of restrictions
outlined in HB 87. This law made it illegal to transport or harbor undocumented residents.
The law also created an obligation for employers with more than ten employees to use an
electronic verification system to certify a workers legal status. It crippled agricultural
sectors of the Georgia economy and drove undocumented residents into the shadows
(Pea, 2012, p. 247).
The students responded in a more assertive fashion than others in their community.
They risked arrest and deportation and spoke in the public sphere. The risk was magnified
by the repeated stories found on social network sites that reported deportation checkpoints
in and around the city of Atlanta. The students organized into a number of groups,
including the Georgia Undocumented Youth Alliance (GUYA), a group that used both
traditional local networking techniques and contemporary social networking sites to push
back against the restrictions. During the 2011-2013 period, GUYA was the immigration
group with the most active Facebook presence in Georgia. While other groups, including
the Georgia Dreamers Alliance, have pushed against the laws in Georgia, it was the
GUYA that led the initial charge for student rights. GUYA organized and participated in
marches, protests, and delivered speeches in public space. The students protested their
political dislocation by occupying areas reserved for citizens. Nicholls has labeled the use
of distinctive public space, born of legislative restrictions, as the strategy of creating
niche-openings to establish rhetorical opportunities for the undocumented (Nicholls, 2013,
p. 11).
Undocumented students in the United States were constituted into a group by the
anti-immigrant policies, and their identity was cemented with the drafting of the DREAM
Act. Nationally, the group is commonly referred to as the Dreamers. The policy
advocates portrayed the students as the best and the brightest who embodied the cultural
values that made the United States great. The phrase the best and the brightest is a longstanding term in American culture with roots in 18th century British literature. The youth
were differentiated from other immigrants in an effort to move political moderates to
support the act. The students were young, intelligent, and hardworking. And, most
importantly, they were in the United States illegally due to no fault of their own.
In the period immediately following the constitution of the Dreamers, some
students followed the rhetorical path of their advocates and worked to distinguish
themselves from other undocumented residents. This had two important effects on their
argument patterns. First, by narrowing the scope of the controversy to providing
educational opportunities for students, the appeals were more likely to be considered by
moderates and conservative citizens. The students were motivated and smart, and as such,
they could make positive contributions to society. Second, the narrowing of the issue to
1083

education had the unintended negative effect of providing a marker to distinguish

deserving from undeserving immigrants. The deserving population aspired to improve
themselves through education. The undeserving worked as domestic labor in hotels and
restaurants. In many cases, these undeserving who knowingly broke the law to enter the
country were the parents of the deserving students.
The public argument strategy of the students has evolved over time and is more
sophisticated than it was when the Dream Act was formulated in 2001. The early
representations have been replaced by a more sophisticated approach that celebrates the
entire immigrant community. By looking at the ways the students redefine the controversy
to include more than a narrow set of legal definitions of citizenship and student, one can
observe the role that youth play in empowering a subjugated community (Anguiao &
Chvez, 2011, p. 82). While there have been a number of research projects in the
communication field attending to the development of discourse in the Latino/a population,
there has been limited attention paid to the rhetorical approaches of the youth in this
oppressed community. Specifically, the undocumented students are a distinctive
population. They have been defined as having no legal rights, which traditionally
eviscerates a groups opportunity to mobilize support for political reform (Anguiano &
Chavez, 2011, p. 81). Yet, today they are an influential political group in Georgia.
3. RHETORICAL RESPONSES IN GEORGIA
The students used a variety of communicative tactics in their fight to re-establish their
right to education in Georgia. The rhetorical devices reflect a merger of 1960s protest
strategies and the use of social media, as well as a commitment by students to advocate
their own case in restricted public space.
The group affirms the values of protest and civil disobedience found in the
struggles of the 1960s. Given that Georgia was a segregated state, the students draw
heavily from the civil rights movement when crafting public argumentation. In a reference
to the segregationist Jim Crow laws of the 20th century, the students describe educational
policies as Juan Crow laws on the GUYA Facebook page. In November of 2001, their
page highlighted a panel the group co-hosted with the Georgia Latino Alliance to describe
the modern resegregation of the South. According to Lovato, Juan Crow is the matrix of
laws, social customs, economic institutions, and symbolic systems used to impose
psychical and psychological isolation on the undocumented (Lovato). The Jim Crow laws
similarly called for racial separation in education, housing, public businesses and
transportation. African-Americans were often met, for example, with signs indicating that
they were not welcome guests in even the poorest of businesses.
The use of the phrase Juan Crow is a powerful rhetorical device in the effort to
decriminalize the status of being undocumented in the United States. Both the AfricanAmericans of the 1960s and todays Latino/as have been made to feel like criminals by
laws and statutes passed in Georgia. A dominant theme is that the undocumented Latino/a
residents have violated the law and should be categorized as criminals. This illegal/legal
dualism has focused the debate on the question of whether the undocumented immigrants
have broken the law. This framework obscures racial undercurrents and limits civic
dialogue about immigration. For example, this debate does little to uncover the motives for
migration from Central America. Proponents of a secure border do not discuss the reasons
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why someone might flee their home country. The dominant rhetoric works to perpetuate a
society in which nonwhites are controlled, marginalized and disciplined (Lawston &
Murillo, 2009, p.50).
The GUYA Facebook page also has several posts and pictures of undocumented
students meeting in 2011with the civil rights icon John Lewis, further drawing the
comparison to the civil rights battle. Since the Lewis-GUYA meeting, Lewis has called for
the reversal of the educational restrictions on undocumented students. Lewis remains a
force in American politics, and those with even a cursory awareness of the civil rights
movement have seen the picture of a bloodied John Lewis on the Pettis Bridge. His
support of GUYA reminds the public that the struggle of the undocumented shares many
of the characteristics of the civil rights battle. And, this relationship benefits the curators
of the civil rights legacy by reminding people that the civil rights battle is part of a larger
human rights struggle that includes the undocumented student movement in Georgia.
GUYA protests have taken the form of the marches of the 1960s. For example,
GUYA, just like the activists of the 1960s, protest at the Arch at the University of Georgia
and regularly find themselves on the steps of the Presidents office protesting their
exclusion from the campus. Prior to rallies, posts on networking sites call for marchers to
dress in academic robes. The students celebrate their academic performance and their
language reflects the values we hope to see in any young person in society. The use of the
Arch is particularly significant. It is a cultural symbol at the University of Georgia. When
constructed in the 1850s, the Arch was part of a fence and gate built to secure the campus
from the town. The gate disappeared shortly after the structure was built and the border
between the town and the campus was open to all. To this day, the Arch is a location
where people from the university and the town express political viewpoints.
A tradition at the university is that a student should not pass through the Arch until
completing the requirements for graduation. Students continue to step around the Arch
more than 100 years after the tradition was initiated. Each year, graduates line up in their
caps and gowns to have a picture taken as they first walk through the Arch. GUYA
members and other students graduating from Freedom University appropriated that
tradition with the graduation of their first class in 2012. More than twenty students dressed
in caps and gowns and marched through the Arch to celebrate their academic progress.
This is an interesting case study in how the Latino/a population crosses a border in the
struggle to craft a political identity (Cisneros, 2014, p. 20).
The Arch also has been a site of some of the more painful moments in the history
of the University. The use of the Arch by the graduates of Freedom University recalls the
protests of the early 1960s in the United States. For example, in 1961 some in the UGA
community protested the admission of two African-American students at the Arch. The
Arch was a place where the struggle between the Jim Crow South and an integrated
University played out in 1961. The symbolism of that moment echoed as the graduates of
the Freedom University and victims of Georgias Juan Crow laws paraded through the
Arch to celebrate their accomplishments.
Drawing a further parallel to the civil rights movement, GUYA has promoted the use of
non-violent protest techniques. In 2011, for example, members of GUYA participated in a
panel on the use of non-violent protest techniques by contemporary protest movements at
the King Center. The students pushed the boundaries of citizenship by embracing the
notion of educational citizenship as defined by classroom performance, and this type of
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tactic is something espoused by advocates at the King Center. The meeting was held in the
Kings Center Freedom Hall. The use of the Kings Center location for the GUYA panel is
interesting; it is both a monument to the bravery of the 1960s civil rights movement and a
national park that is policed by the Federal National Park Service. The students navigated
the conflicted space in their effort to craft better messages.
While the students adapted tactics used by other groups, an important
characteristic of their campaign was the willingness to speak on their own behalf. While
politicians and policy advocates constituted the undocumented students as a political force
with the drafting of the DREAM Act, it is the students themselves who serve as the most
effective advocates today. The students have delivered speeches in hostile situations and
exhibited a willingness to put themselves at risk. The work of Keish Kim, a long time
student advocate, highlights the forceful nature of student rhetoric.
In November of 2011, Keish Kim was granted the opportunity to speak against
Rule 4.1.6. She affirmed that the undocumented were hard working students who came
from tax paying families who made great sacrifices to come to the United States. She and
her supporters attended the meeting wearing a scarlet U to signify their compromised legal
position. Her speech contained many of the arguments found in the rhetoric of other
undocumented students. The students suffer from hardship as children. In some cases, that
hardship takes place in their country of origin. In other cases, the hardship is tied to
struggling in the United States. The work and determination of the students to advance in
society is recognized and celebrated. An important change in the narrative over the years
is the role that parents are prescribed in the story. In early iterations, some claimed that the
students were victims of decisions made by their parents and should not be held
accountable for the illegal actions of their parents (Nicholls, 2013, p. 128). Students, like
Keish Kim, now regularly celebrate the sacrifices that parents made to afford them the
chance to live in the United States.
Having a student speak before the Board of Regents was an important moment for
the movement. The students have availed themselves of the opportunity to speak at public
meetings and in public locations, sometime at genuine personal risk. Ms. Kim spoke
before a packed room at the Atlanta meeting. She told the group that at a time in life that
students should aspire to great things, Rule 4.1.6 made the students feel naive for believing
in the American Dream. In this speech, the position of the opposition is reduced to nothing
more than a set of numbers. The technicality of the rule and the lack of a nine-digit social
security number were all that prevented these worthy students from attending the college
of their choice (Kim). In addition to the reference by Kim to the Regents rule in this
speech, the students in their campaign regularly used Rule 4.1.6. On the GUYA Facebook
page there is a set of pictures in which a diverse group holds signs with 4.1.6 posted with a
red slash through the numbers.
A recurrent element of the rhetorical campaign is the repeated use of the phrase
undocumented and unafraid. There are a number of blog posts, leaflets, posters, and
YouTube videos, in which the students declare they will no longer be found in the
shadows, rather they are undocumented and unafraid. This is an important statement in
light of the risk of deportation, especially in the years 2011 and 2012. The phrase plays a
role in the rhetorical redefinition of citizenship from simply a legal construct that excludes
the undocumented residents to a cultural one in which they fight for their educational

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rights. The students are unafraid because they are citizens of an intellectual community
and are demanding the state recognize their place in that community.
The students are aware the risks involved in the strategy of public protest and the
necessity of inhabiting public space. The social network sites that posted upcoming
marches and protests regularly post stories about police roadblocks and of college age
residents being deported. They regularly demand a place at the table at the annual Board
of Regents meeting while simultaneously engaging in protests outside the meeting. They
also protest on the campuses to which the law denies them access. Students engaged in
self-risk in ways that recall the protests of the 1960s when the youth protested while
risking being drafted into the Vietnam War.
In 2010, the GUYA inspired a small group of faculty at the University of Georgia
to establish an educational program for them (Pea, 2012, p. 246). Freedom University
opened its door in October of 2011 in Athens and initially serviced thirty-three students.
The school took its name from the Freedom Schools of the 1960s that provided
educational opportunities for young African-Americans in the segregated South. The
students met in an undisclosed location and enrolled in one class during the first semester
(Gutierrez & Tamura, 2011). By 2013, the university added a campus for students in
Atlanta at the King Center. The college has an impressive array of activists and scholars
on the board of directors. While the university received limited media coverage when it
first opened, it received a burst of publicity when board member and Pulitzer Prize winner
Junot Diaz discussed the program in a 10-minute segment of the Colbert Report. At the
end of the interview, Stephen Colbert presented Professor Diaz with a Freedom University
sweatshirt shirt he designed with FU prominently displayed on the shirt (Colbert). The
dual meaning of the abbreviation was not lost on Freedom University supporters. Since
that time, many have embraced the FU moniker and its implied message to state policymakers.
Freedom University plays a role in the struggle to provide educational
opportunities for its students. For example, the instruction the program offers students
serves as a way for colleges across the nation to determine if a student is a good fit for
their college. The school provides hope for students who fear that the restrictions have
robbed them of their chance to attend college. The school also provides the students with a
sense of community and an aspirational cohort to work with on assignments. While
college admissions offices do not officially recognize the coursework, it does help the
students make their case for admission.
Once a student is accepted into a college, Freedom University engages in
fundraising to help that student pay for college. The sacrifices made by the students are
described in the fundraising efforts of Freedom University. Hugo Ms story is a
representative one. He talks about the ways in which his time at the University prepared
him for college and the fact that the scholarship program allowed him to overcome
educational obstacles and aspire to a college degree. He is a student holding down two
jobs who is seeking a medical assistant degree. Other students Freedom University has
placed at regional and national institutions have similar compelling personal stories and
need for financial support.
In addition to these service-based commitments, Freedom University plays an
important rhetorical role in framing the on-going immigration debate. First, the campus
and its proximity to the University of Georgia help to alter the nature of the immigration
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border debate. Stories about Freedom University move the immigration debate from the
securitized Mexican/US border to a focus on deserving students who find themselves at
the border of a university. This locates the students as educational citizens based on their
drive and intellect while highlighting their exclusion from the traditional university
community by an unjust policy.
Second, Freedom University provides the students with a site that allows them to
better challenge the exclusionary policies of the state. They share the local Athens
community with the members of the University of Georgia community. While their
classroom is a segregated one, they are members of the local intellectual community. They
are receiving instruction from a gifted faculty and motivated volunteers. By continuing to
pursue their education, these students are able to better deploy the symbolic trappings of
the educational system in protests. The fact that students continue their struggle to achieve
their educational goals adds to the story they share with others in a way that would be
diminished if they were labeled dropouts.
4. CONCLUSION
While some immigrants have fled communities due to restrictive legislation and a hostile
political climate, the youth in Georgia have stayed to fight for their rights. They engage in
effective public protests and stand in public to stake their claim to a college education
while continuing to advance themselves educationally. The students have worked to
network with a number of groups in Georgia and beyond when pressing their case. The
rhetoric of the group has highlighted the ties to the civil rights movement that played out
in Georgia in the 1960s. Additionally, they have reached out to student groups in other
states with educational restrictions to share stories and communicative strategies. In
Alabama and South Carolina students also are excluded from colleges and universities. In
a number of Midwestern and Southern states, undocumented residents pushed for
eligibility to in-state tuition rates. Undocumented students across the United States
struggle to attain full legal and educational citizenship.
The locally based student movement in Georgia was a response to the restrictions
imposed by state policymakers. With national action on a variety of public policy issues
unlikely in the near future, local responses may be the best path forward for advocates of
progressive politics. The narrow approach to the extension of rights and privileges used by
the undocumented students in Georgia have some applicability to undocumented
individuals in both the United States and in Western Europe. Governments have become
better at restricting the effectiveness of large-scale protests. And, there are recurrent
claims by the protesters that the traditional media outlets have been ineffective in sharing
the stories of the undocumented in newspapers and on television. This condition when
coupled with the inability of the national government to act has moved the students to
engage in a targeted local approach. The tactics used by the Georgia students provide a
potential pathway forward for the undocumented struggling for their rights in the United
States and Western Europe. Specifically in countries as diverse as France, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, and the United States, undocumented
immigrants have launched high-profile campaigns for greater rights, less repression, and
the legalization of their status (Nicholls, 2013, p.176). In each case, the undocumented
are stepping into the public sphere to assert their claims.
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REFERENCES
Aguirre, J., & Simmers, J.K. (2011) The dream act and neoliberal practice: retrofitting hispanic
immigrant youth in U.S. society. Social Justice, 38 (1), 3-16.
Anguiano, A.A. & Chvez, K. (2011). Dreamers discourse: young Latino/a immigrants and the
naturalization of the American dream. In M.A. Holling & B. Calafell (Eds.), Latina/o discourse
in vernacular spaces somos de una voz?. (pp. 81-100). Lanham: Lexington Books.
Cisneros, J. D. (2014). The border crossed us: rhetorics of borders, citizenship, and Latina/o identity.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Colbert, S. (2013, March 25). Junot Diaz freedom university interview. Retrieved June 20, 2014, from
http://thecolbertreport.cc.com/videos/bwz16t/junot-diaz
Gutierrez, T., & Tamura, T. (2011, December 1). Freedom University. . Retrieved June 24, 2014, from
http://schoolsofthought.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/01/freedom-university/
Kim, K. (2011, November 8). Keish Kim speaking in front of Georgia Board of Regents. Georgia
Undocumented Youth Alliance - Keish Kim speaking in front of Georgia Board of.... Retrieved
June 18, 2014, from http://guyaconnect.tumblr.com/post/12616424940/keish-kim-speaking-infront-of-georgia-board-of
Lawston, J., & Murillo, R. (2009). The discursive figuration of U.S. supremacy in narratives sympathetic
to undocumented immigrants. Social Justice, 36, 38-53.
Lovato, R. (2008, May 8). Juan Crow in Georgia. Retrieved June 27, 2014, from
http://www.thenation.com/article/juan-crow-georgia
Nicholls, W. (2013). The DREAMers: how the undocumented youth movement transformed the immigrant
rights debate. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Pea, L.G. (2012) New freedom fights: the creation of freedom university georgia. Latino Studies,10 (12), 246-250.

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Argumentative Strategies In Adolescents School Writing. One

Aspect Of The Evaluation Of Students Written Argumentative
Competence.
Sachinidou Paraskevi
Department of Language, Philology and Culture of Black Sea Countries
Democritus university of Thrace
Komotini
P.O. 69100
Greece
p.sachinidou@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: Argumentation strategies constitute a crucial aspect of argumentation. The purpose of this
paper is to explore the relations of the argumentative strategies observed in the writing of adolescents
texts within language evaluation tests, to the elaboration of their theses and the evaluation of their
argumentative competence. Despite the diversity of argumentative strategies employed, their standpoints
are not fully elaborated and so their argumentative competence is diminished. These findings are
important for the designing of argumentative teaching.
KEYWORDS: Adolescents argumentation, argumentative competence, argumentative strategies,
language evaluation.

1. INTRODUCTION
Argumentation strategies are of significant importance to the study and theory of
argumentation. They reveal the deep structure of argumentation, the dynamic and
convergent steps, moves and choices towards its construction, transcending semantic,
pragmatic, lexico-grammar and rhetorical levels and relations. Strategic maneuvering
is a term coined by pragma-dialectics to describe the multilayered functions of
contextualized argumentation strategies (van Eemeren, 2010).
In evaluating students written argumentative competence, employment of a
variety of strategies is considered a fundamental aspect of argumentation development
(Swain & Suzuki, 2009). Argumentation strategies are connected to a high
metacognitive level of awareness (Kuhn & Udell, 2007) revealing the abstract design
patterns with and through which an argument text is constructed.
Within language evaluation tests, integration of reading and writing tasks
draws a nexus of emerging dialectical argumentation strategies which supports
students written argumentation potential. Nonetheless, activation of strategic routes to
argumentation does not imply argument competence. It constitutes rather a first, step
towards argumentative competence if reflective coordination, elaboration and
contextualization of argumentative strategies do not apply.
1.1 Argumentation in educational context
Although arguing is considered an experiential ability acquired quite early in a childs
everyday life (Kuhn & Udell, 2003), its development and moreover its elaboration and
connection to educational, institutional frames and disciplines is considered to be a
highly demanding and challenging issue for both educators and students. Since critical
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thinking, science, communication, negotiation skills, decision making and social

success were connected to argumentative skills (Baker, 2003, 2009; Byrnes, 1998;
Gilardoni, pp. 723-725; Klaczynski, 2004; Kuhn & Udell, 2007, p. 90, Muller Mirza &
Perret Clermont, 2009, pp. 127-144), teaching argumentation became a crucial issue
for education. What is learned intuitively can be further elaborated through education
thus offering equal opportunities for social and individual development to all social
agents.
There have been various researches on the dynamics of argumentative skills
within educational frames, all concluding its connection to a high metacognitive level,
developed by age and institutional elaboration (Kuhn & Udell, 2003). Additionally,
even teaching practice is regarded as a demanding argumentation approach (Macagno
& Konstantinidou, 2012, pp. 2-3; Riggoti, 2007; Sandoval & Millwood 2005; Schwarz,
2009, pp. 91, 93).
1.2 Written argumentation in language education
Argumentation, as every communicational practice, is contextualized. Within pragmadialectics this is a fundamental aspect of all the four principals (externalization,
socialization, functionalization, and dialectification) in examining argumentation (van
Eemeren, Grootendorst & Henkemans et al, 1996). Life domain, institution,
instructional restrictions, subjects and culture construct the argumentative activity and
consequently the argumentative type in practice (Eemeren van & Houtlosser, 2005, p.
70).
Although these variables are obvious in life situations and in dialogue
involving agents interaction face to face, they are hidden and require a cognitively
demanding and conscious reconstruction in written argumentation, especially for a
child, (Dolz, 1996; Rapanto, Garcia-Mila & Gilabert, 2013; Schwarz, 2009, p. 95)
acquired through educational practices.
In language education students are asked to constantly move back and forth
across a continuum consisting of two domain circles, the one of the physically
observable context of education and the other of the life domain where the language
learning activity is reflected. These moves are even more cognitively and
communicatively demanding and require metacognitive awareness and strategic
coordination, especially when the educational subject is written argumentation.
1.3 Language evaluation test, an educational context of emerging argumentation
One crucial and explicitly institutional oriented aspect of language education is
language evaluation tests. Language evaluation tests comprise a special and crucial
educational context, a special genre within the institutional learning domain of
education. They are crucial in determining the degree to which accomplishment of
learning goals is achieved by both educators and students and special in that they
consist broadly a communicative and educational learning activity aiming not only to
the educational context but to real life communicative competence. In defining
argumentative activities as:
conventional entities that can be distinguished by external empirical observations of the
communicative practices in the various domains, or spheres of discourse, institutionally
variants, some of which are culturally established forms of communication with a more or less
fixed format (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005, p. 76)

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Van Eemeren and Houtlosser offer a descriptive tool for language evaluation tests as
argumentative activities trying to convey ways to reasonably convince educators for
students communicational skills within the restrictions posed by educational
institutional frames while at the same time reflecting life communicative skills. This is
especially obvious when the language assignment task in language evaluation tests
concerns written argumentation.
In language evaluation tests, the integration of reading and writing tasks
consists a textual and subjects network within which students written argumentation
is constructed as an externalized, functional, social and dialogical communicative
activity aiming to reasonably convince two interlocutors, the teacher, the physical
subject of the educational context and the recipients of the text as these are constructed
by the language assignment task. At the same time students are in dialogue, explicit or
implicit, with the author of the text assigned for reading. Although reading and writing
assignments are not always explicitly related in language evaluation tests, they consist
interconnected, fundamental parts of literacy in educational contexts (Fitzgerald &
Shanahan, 2000) creating thus an emerging dialogical context for language learning
(Hyland, 2002, pp. 8-9; Nystrand, Camoran, Kachur & Prendergast, 1997) which
comprises with the requirements of authenticity in language education (Hawkey,
2004b; Weigle, 2002; Weir, 2005b) and in argumentation in particular. This is
especially obvious when there is a common thematic and generic textual orientation
(Lemke, 1996, p. 259).
Effectiveness in language evaluation assignments is mainly considered towards
three directions: a) moving dynamically across a communicative continuum
constructed by the language assignment task and the educational context, b)
understanding of discourse goals and c) application of effective strategies to meet these
goals.
The last two directions are recognized by Kuhn and Udell (2007) as being the
two potential forms of development in argumentative discourse skills (Kuhn & Udell,
2007, p. 1246).
In learning and practicing written argumentation students have to strategically
maneuver across, back and forth the communicational continuum constructed on the
one hand by the language assignment task and on the other by the educational context,
reconstructing a silent and physically absent dialogue as well as writtenly projected
agents in the audience addressed (Hyland, 2002, p. 9).
The integration of reading and writing tasks in language evaluation tasks
creates the prerequisite dialogical network for the emerging of critical exchanges and
strategic maneuvering moves towards the construction of students argumentative text.
Texts assigned for reading and writing form an intertextual network which activates
students intertextual dynamics (Eco, 1979, p. 21) enriching their argumentative
knowledge and competence by developing their ability to enhance a variety of
argumentative moves within a dialogically rich textual frame echoing various voices
and agents (Dimasi & Sachinidou, 2015; Panagiotidou, 2012). In that way, they form a
real life communicative setting (Hyland, 2002, p. 9).
1.4 Emerging argumentative strategies within language evaluation tests
According to Reisigl and Wodak strategy is a plan of accurate practices more or less
intentional including discursive practices to achieve a particular goal (Reisigl
&Wodak, 2001, p. 23; Reisigl &Wodak, 2009).

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The recurrence and coordination of argumentative moves are considered as forms of

argumentative strategies, strategic maneuvers (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009, p. 7;
Rocci, 2009, p. 258). In trying to construct their argumentative text, students use a
variety of discourse strategies (Ferretti, Lewis, & Andrews-Weckerly, 2009; Nussbaum
& Edwards, 2011) many of them emerging through the textual network constructed by
the integration of reading and writing tasks in language evaluation tests. Language
evaluation tests consists a hidden agenda of the constraints allowed and the
opportunities offered by the educational context and the language curriculum in
particular. The parameters determining the argumentative strategies used are also
closely linked to the language assignment task and the communicative context
designed by it.
Since argumentative strategies are communicatively contextualized, they are
determined by the communicative objectives (Hyland, 2002, p. 35) designed by both
the language assignment task and the language evaluation test. Rhetorical goal relating
to genre and text type and informational goals such as subject matter as well as logical
construction relating to the potential of argumentation schemes, direct the use of
argumentative strategies. In a complimentary and more detailed approach, pragmadialectics distinguishes the parameters of the strategic functions of argumentative
maneuvers in: a) results, b) routes to achieve results, c) constraints imposed by the
institutional context and d) commitments defining the argumentative situation (van
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009, p. 11). Adaptation to the demands of the audience to
which argumentation is directed, selection from the topical potential of argumentation
and choice of the stylistic devices in the presentation of argumentation are also
considered as aspects of strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, pp.
484-486; van Eemeren, 2010, Ch4) giving a more detailed account of the forms and
choices argumentative strategic practices take.
The effectiveness of students written argumentation text is defined by
subjects perceptions for argumentation formed within this communicational
continuum between the educational context and the real life projection the later
conveys. When looking into students argumentative strategies we can also gain
insights into the educational formulation of their perceptions on what argumentation is
and how it is effective, a reflection of the teaching and learning of argumentation.
2. STUDY
2.1 Research questions
a) What argumentative strategies do students employ within integrating
reading and writing tasks in language evaluation tests while constructing their
argumentative texts?
b) In what way do these strategies elaborate the validity of their standpoints
and their argumentative competence?
2.2 Research material
2.2.1 Participants
Participants are twenty, 16 year old students, 9 females and 11 males, coming from an
urban area and a low socioeconomic background, at the second, out of three, grade of
the Greek Lyceum. The second grade of Lyceum schooling was preferred due to the
1093

proliferation of the language curriculum goals at that educational level and its
connection to the learning and teaching of argumentation in particular. It is a grade just
before the final grade of secondary schooling and students final exams to enter
university, thus more directed to the secondary educational curriculum, without at the
same time being strictly connected to the exams and related language evaluation tests
for entering university.
The participants belong to the same class, randomly chosen out of five classes
at the same Lyceum to promote a representative sample of an authentic class instance
(Thomas, 2011), and were involved in the same language teaching course by the same
teacher. In this way, they consist a relatively unified and at the same time authentic
educational context for research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
2.2.2 Data
The research material related to the final language evaluation paper given at the end of
the school year 2013-2014, in a period of 2 hours, with integrating reading and writing
assignments as designed by the Greek national language curriculum. Between texts
assigned for reading and texts assigned for writing there are thematic and text type
relevancies constructing an intertextual network, dynamically supportive for the
writing of argumentative texts and thus of argumentative strategies involved.
Institutional significance of final language evaluation tests is of importance since they
compose one aspect of the degree to which language learning was accomplished and is
numerically presented and valued by degrees of accomplishment.
The research focus was 20 argumentative texts written by students within the
frame of their final language evaluation test as the main part of the assigned writing.
2.2.3 Methodology
Two school teachers, familiar with the language curriculum at Lyceum and
argumentation theory, were chosen as independents raters of students texts. At first a
generous reading (Bartholomae, 1986; Donahue, 2008, p. 323) of texts and of the
language evaluation test was conducted in order to acquire an overall and
comprehensive perspective of the research material and to determine the levels,
categories and units of research without pre acquired decisions on the research units
that would impose a research perspective before ahead. Recurring patterns with similar
textual functions at semantic, pragmatic, logic and lexico-grammar level were
observed and categorized into research units.
The research units chosen, given the limitations of the current paper, are: a)
diversity of standpoints used, b) gender diversity of standpoints, c) elaboration of
standpoints e) idea negotiations with the reading assignment text f) lexico-grammar
construction of textual voice and communicational context g) argumentation schemes.
Each text was analyzed applying the units chosen. The consensus between the raters,
expressed as the percentage of corresponding scores, is 87%.

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2.3 Results
The language assignment task preceding the writing of students text, referred to a
subject familiar to students by their language curriculum.
One of the most important problems of our time is the increase of unemployment, especially
among young people. Investigate the reasons of the phenomenon as well as the consequences
in the life of young people. Suppose that your text is the speech that you will give at an event
that will be held at your school. (400-450 words).

The reading assignment text is an article in a daily newspaper written by a university

teacher on the importance of higher education to social as well as individual life
despite the growing numbers of unemployment for university degree holders.
2.3.1. Diversity of standpoints
The number of standpoints employed to meet the questions of the language assignment
text concerning the reasons and consequences of young peoples unemployment are 68
for causes and 65 for consequences, a total of 133 standpoints, slightly privileging
numerically standpoints for causes to standpoints for consequences in a percentage of
1,046%. Given the word limitations of the text (400-450 words), an average of 3,4
standpoints for reasons and 3,25 for consequences is considered a quite appropriate
length for their further elaboration (Figure 1).
In 7 out of 20 texts the number of standpoints for reasons was equal to the
number of standpoints for consequences. In 8 texts the difference between the
standpoints for reasons and for consequences was only a minimum one, echoing
teaching and curriculum directions of balance in the elaboration of the directions given
by the language assignment task. In 5 texts, a difference of employment of reasons to
consequences or vice versa is observed, revealing a difference in the knowledge
dynamic for relevant information and ideas. More specifically, in 2 texts the
standpoints employed for causes were 7 out 5 for consequences and 4 out of 1, whereas
in 3 texts 4 standpoints were employed for causes out of 9 for consequences and
relatively 1 out of 4 and 1 out of 3 (Figure 1).
2.3.2 Gender diversity of standpoints
Gender diversity in number of standpoints deployed, although slightly favors males to
females, falls under the statistical constraint that 55% of the participants are males and
45% females concluding to a female advantage of 2,17% standpoints. On the total, 69
standpoints were employed by males and 64 by females. Females employ more
standpoints for reasons, 35 standpoints, while males 29, resulting to a 2,94%
difference. Males employ 36 standpoints for consequences while females 29, a
difference of 10, 77% (Figure 2).

1095

Figure 1. Diversity of standpoints

1096

Figure 2. Gender diversity of standpoints

2.3.3 Elaboration of standpoints

Elaboration of standpoints deployed is closely linked to the definition of argumentation
as a composition of a structured constellation of propositions that mean to achieve its
discursive purposes and reach a reasonable critique (van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
1992; van Eemeren et al, 1996, p. 5) and to its effectiveness and quality (De la Paz,
Ferretti, Wissinger, Yee & Mac Arthur, 2012, p. 418; Ferreti et al, 2009; Nussbaum &
Schraw, 2007; Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008). In that sense, elaboration in
argumentation transcends pragmatic, semantic, lexico-grammar and reasonable
directions simultaneously. Hence, argumentative elaboration is also closely linked to
argumentative structure, and argumentation schemes into their specific
communicational context.
Argumentation structure comprises of explicitly, gradual and discursively
interconnected propositions, structured constellations of students propositions aiming
at the gradual elaboration of their standpoints (Garssen, 2001, p. 81; Shultz &
Meuffels, 2011, p. 120; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 4), relevant to the issue
under discussion, with sufficient support to the main conclusion, and with reference to
the logical acceptance of reasonable participants (Johnson & Blair, 1994, p. 55) and the
communicational context. A successful argument is semantically, syntactically and
pragmatically valid (Minghui Xiong & Yi Zhao, 2007, p. 3).
One aspect of argumentation structure is argumentation schemes which for
Macagno (2015) represent the formalization of abstract patterns of argumentative
inference combing material links with logical relations between the premise and the
conclusion in an argument (Macagno, 2015, pp. 2-3), an abstract frame that
expresses the justificatory principle employed by the arguer, as Hitchcock and
Wagemans noted (Hitchcock & Wagemans, 2011, p. 185) in order to promote a
transfer of acceptability form the explicit premise to the standpoint (van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004, p. 4).

1097

Argumentation schemes transcend the semantic and reasoned structure of argument

and offer us a descriptive, reflective, analytical and evaluative insight to the structure
of argumentation and argumentative text.
As a consequence, in defining whether a standpoint is elaborated the criteria
proposed and applied in the present study are : a) reference to the issue under
discussion, b) adequate advancement of links between premises and the standpoint one
wishes to defend via argument schemes so as to insure acceptability of the premise and
sufficiency of transference to the standpoint (Garssen, 2001, p. 81), c) argumentative
discourse indicators d) appeal to audience reasonableness and e) communicational
contextualization for the specific activity type or genre argumentation is aimed.
Only 35 standpoints out of 132 were elaborated by students, a percentage of 37,
7%. Elaboration of standpoints is mainly related to reasons, 26 out of a total of 68, a
percentage of 38, 24% and 19 out of a total 64 for consequences, a percentage of 29,
23%. The 42 standpoints related to reasons and the 46 standpoints related to
consequences consisted merely of one proposition leaving other premises and
inference unexpressed and implicit. Females constructed 23 elaborated standpoints and
males 24 which given the gender statistical difference of the participants, results to an
almost equality (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Elaboration of standpoints

1098

Figure 4. Examples of standpoints elaboration

Example 1.

Example 2.

1099

2.3.4 Negotiations with the reading assignment text

At the semantic level of argumentation students negotiated and transformed ideas from
the reading assignment text thus applying in writing the knowledge transforming model
which is considered most appropriate for the writing of argumentation texts (Andrews,
1995, p. 167; Baker, 2009, p. 138; Grabe & Kaplan, 1996, pp. 121-2). With
negotiation, reference is made to the deployment and interactional construction of
meanings and to lexico-grammar and reasoned structures that subjects activate within
communicational contexts in their effort to convey meanings and communicate, a
strategy quite familiar to the integration of reading and writing tasks (Donahue, 2004;
Garcia-Mila & Andersen, 2007, p. 42; Sachinidou & Dimasi, 2010). For the purpose of
this paper, negotiation focused only to the semantic grounds of ideas and information
between the reading and the writing assignment text.
Negotiations were numbered according to ideas students used from the reading
assignment text, to deploy standpoints. 21 one out of 68 (31%) standpoints for the
causes of young peoples unemployment and 32 out 65 (49, 23%) standpoints for the
consequences of unemployment are found in the reading assignment text. Students
retrieve and transform ideas and information from the reading assignment text related
to the subject and goal of their text and consequently diminishing the cognitive load
that argumentation involves (Kuhn & Udell, 2007, p. 1247). Idea selection with
reasoned discourse is an additive value to the construction and development of
argumentation (Anderson, Chinn, Waggoner & Nguyen, 1998, p. 172). Semantic
negotiations reveal a dialogical and intertextual dimension of students argumentation
texts that enhances their effectiveness by invoking strategies supportive of
argumentation (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Negotiations with the reading assignment text

1100

2.3.5 Lexico-grammar construction of textual voice and communicational context

Textual voice and textual identity are defined both by the communicational and social
potentials (Scollon, 1996, p. 7). In writing argumentative texts within the assignments
of the language evaluation test, students engage in the construction of a textual voice as
designed by both the language assignment task and the educational context comprised
by the language evaluation test.
Lexico-grammar construction of textual voice reveals one aspect of style and
stylization and the strategies involved in presenting different voices and selves in the
discourse (De Fina, 2011, p. 273; Fahnestock, 2011, p. 279) employing and at the same
time revealing genre constraints, opportunities and dynamics and subjects
communicational potential and knowledge not only as discourse producers but as
discourse recipients as well. The lexico-grammar construction of textual voice situates
the writer and the reader in the communicational context as potentially interactional
agents and constantly inscribes, changes and challenges their cognitive representations
(Van Dijk, 1998, 2010) thus directing to argumentation (Rocci, 2009, p. 258).
Person markers are one aspect of lexico-grammar construction of textual voice
under various forms, mainly in the pronoun system and verb suffixes.
The first singular person was used in all 20 texts. In 19 out of 20 texts first
plural person was used. In 7 texts, second plural person was included and in just 3 texts
appeared second singular person. In all texts third singular and third plural persons
were used. Genre of language assignment, speech to an audience, contextualized
students choices of person markers. Emphasis was given to the first singular and first
plural person and third singular and third plural person which were present in all texts.
Writers voice is explicitly stated and differentiated by other textual voices in
the first singular person, discursively constructing an identity of a knowledgeable
subject whose judgment is clearly fore grounded and appreciated for its expertise and
authoritative power and thus increasing persuasive effects (Schulze, 2011, p. 132).
First plural person, observed in 19 texts in an inclusive sense unities writer and reader
(Fahnestock, 2011, p. 285) as belonging to the same identity group, with mutual
perspectives and interests as designed by the language assignment task. Obvious
audience appeal is observed in 7 texts with second plural person, one of the markers
of a more oral style (Fahnestock, 2011, p. 281), in accordance with the public speech
genre to which the language assignment task is directed. Second singular person was
used only in three texts in the generic sense of a rhetorical appeal to the human
audience. Third singular and third plural person were used in all 20 texts stating the
objective positioning of an observer to actions, subjects, ideas, a premise of
reasonableness (see figure 6).
Figure 6. Lexico-grammar construction of textual voice, person markers

1101

2.3.6 Argumentation schemes

Argumentation schemes represent abstract patterns of semantic, pragmatic and
reasonable relations between the premise and the conclusion in different and dynamic
combinations (Macagno, 2015). The direction in which the activation of these
combinations will be driven, is drawn in a map of complex possibilities and is closely
related to the purpose of the argument and therefore to its pragmatic meaning emerged
in a communicational context as well as to the strategies connected with the purpose of
the move. The strategies available or of which a subject avails himself of, direct the
combination of relations represented by argumentation schemes in the perspective of
the ontological structure of the subject matter of the claim (Macagno, 2015, pp. 20-24).
In referring to the causes and consequences of young peoples unemployment,
the language assignment task oriented students mainly to causal argumentation,
structured on an interdependent chain of reasons and effects and thus facilitating and
supporting two argumentative aspects of argumentation schemes: a) promote transfer
of acceptability from explicit premises to the standpoint and b) fit to the sort of
propositions (Garssen, 2001, p. 91) the assignment task is oriented to. Since the
purpose is to support a judgment in a state of affairs, what causes young peoples
unemployment and the consequences that this has on their lives, the writer had to
choose how to structure his arguments following two directions:
a)
b)

external arguments based on speakers superior knowledge and

internal arguments providing reasons on the features and characteristics of the
subject matter to support an evaluative judgment on an entity or a state of
affairs (Macagno, 2015, p. 21).

In using the first singular verbal person and thus constructing a knowledgeable
identity, students chose an external argument perspective. At the same time, providing
reasons on the actions that lead to young peoples unemployment and the
consequences that this has on them, they characterize and evaluate entities and
activities aligning the addressee into a community of shared values and hierarchies of
values and beliefs (Martin & Rose, 2005, p. 95) and thus using internal arguments.
The view point of the language assignment task directed another aspect in students
argumentative schemes. In arguing about the reasons of young peoples unemployment
they evaluate mainly actions and activities while in arguing for the consequences of the
subject matter they evaluate entities of being, ascribing attitudes to subjects behavior.
3. CONCLUSIONS
Before drawing on to the conclusions of the study it must be noted that it concerns a
small group of students and can only be indicative for further future research.
A variety of argumentative strategies employed by students within integrating
reading and writing tasks in language evaluation tests in constructing their
argumentative texts is observed.
More specifically:
a.

There is a variety and a significant number of standpoints deployed. 133

standpoints were indentified in 20 texts, an average of 6, 65% per text (figure
1). The increased number of standpoints is considered as a presupposition for a
reader that needs to be convinced or is in need for more information (Martin &
1102

b.
c.

d.
e.

f.

g.

h.

j.

k.
l.

White, 2005, p. 119), a goal in accordance with argumentation development

(Knapp & Watkins, 2005, p. 192) and educational contexts.
There is 2, 17% gender diversity on standpoints employed, slightly
privileging females to males (figure 2).
Elaboration of standpoints is quite low, only 37,7%, 35 out of 133 standpoints
employed. Students, both females and males, rest at the standpoint of the
argument not making explicit premises aiming to conclusion justification and
thus dispersing the relevance of the standpoint to its conclusion and the issue
under discussion while minimizing the depth and effectiveness of
argumentation (Knapp & Watkins, 2005, p. 192; De La Paz et al, 2012, p. 418)
and its validity (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Henkemans, 2002, p. 132)
(figure 3).
The elaboration of their standpoints is mainly related to the causes of the issue
under discussion (figure 3).
Students transform, modify and adjust the information of the text assigned for
reading, to the goals of the new communicative circumstance, recontextualising
and negotiating meanings and structures (Donahue, 2008, pp. 90-103; Linell,
1998, p. 154; Plakans & Gebril, 2012) and in this perspective, constructing a
basic premise of argumentation (Baker, 2003, 2009) (figure 5). Despite this
knowledge supporting negotiation moves, students lack elaboration of
relatively standpoints constructed. Although they seem to direct themselves to a
knowledge transforming writing model, they apply ultimately a knowledge
telling model (Grabe & Kaplan, 1996, pp. 121-122; Bereiter & Scardamalia,
1987), making only a move related to the semantic transformation of the
information with no further elaboration. This, according to Plakans and Gebril
(2012), consists an indication of possible need for firm teaching direction,
especially if the task is persuasive writing (Plakans & Gebril, 2012, p. 31).
In negotiating semantically with the reading assignment text, students deploy
nomination and explicitly referential strategies drawing from a common pool of
words from the text read and cultural strategies drawing from a common
cultural pool of ideas (Lemke, 1992).
They take distances from the reading text at whatever they disagree with thus
forming implicitly stated counterarguments which is considered as a
differentiated characteristic of mature argumentative writing (Knapp &
Watkins, 2005, p. 192; Kuhn, 2005).
They invoke experiential material in their effort to explicitly construct their
arguments in lack of content knowledge (De La Paz et al, 2012, p. 417;
Donovan & Bransford, 2005; Ferretti et al, 2009).
They discursively construct, using lexico-grammar devices such as person
markers, an identity of a subject whose viewpoint and life perspective is
argumentatively and institutionally valued.
Students schematic strategies are in response to their task assignment and the
reading text.
Schematic strategies are explicitly, discursively and semantically stated with
discourse markers (conjunctions, verbs, nouns).

The contextual framing of students strategies in a continuum between the physical

observable educational context and the communicational context formed by the
language assignment task comprises an important step towards their argumentative and
communicational competence (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005; van Eemeren, 2010).
1103

Despite the variety of strategies used and their contextualization, students

argumentation remains at the start point of their standpoints, merely listing information
with little elaboration and coordination of the explicit reasoning and rhetorical steps
leading to the conclusion of their arguments and the support of the issue for which they
argue. In the argumentation strategies used, students reveal a primary and shallow
knowledge of results, routes to achieve results, constraints imposed by the institutional
context and commitments defining the argumentative situation (Igland, 2009, p. 510;
van Eemeren & Garssen, 2008, p. 11). Their argumentative strategies are inconsistent,
only applying patterns learned as steps for argumentation construction which often left
implicit and with little elaboration to reach inferences. In that sense, their strategic
maneuvering is incomplete and ineffective.
Systematic teaching and learning of contextualized argumentative moves as
classes of dynamic, rich and open ended activations of choices building argumentative
strategies and argument validity is needed. This does not mean that teaching and
learning of argumentative moves should be seen as a canonical classification and
employment of relative moves but rather as a strategic maneuvering of constantly
reflecting, structuring and restructuring moves and involving into a variety of
argumentation instances and activities in order to form a metacognitive and dynamic
awareness of argumentation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank Professor Maria Dimasi at Democritus University of
Thrace, Greece, department of Language, Philology and Culture of Black Sea
Countries, for directing her to argumentation studies and Professor Fabrizio Macagno
at Universita Nova De Lisboa, Portugal, for trusting her with a copy of his article to be
published.

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Palgrave.

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The Symbolic Meaning Of Radbruchs Formula; Statutory

(Non-)Law And The Argument Of Non-Law
Marijan Pavnik*
ABSTRACT: Statutory law that intolerably (Radbruch) violates supra-statutory law is non-law. The
content of the argument is not based on eternal and unchangeable natural law that positive law should
conform to, but upon the fundamental (human) rights that prevail in a historical period. In the modern state
the catalogue of fundamental (human) rights is so extensive that it offers a sufficiently broad basis for the
removal of any legal incorrectness (including statutory non-law). Thus, the argument of non-law also has
great symbolic value. It persuades us that legal thought should always make sense.
KEYWORDS: legal positivism, Radbruchs formula, the argument of non-law, the symbolic meaning of
Radbruchs formula, legal sense, sense of justice, mutuality, coexistence .

1. RADBRUCH AND HIS FORMULA

One of the most penetrating critiques of legal positivism is the so-called Radbruch formula.
Already at the beginning of his theoretical path, Radbruch (Gustav Radbruch, 1878-1949)
was aware that it equally belongs to the concept of right law that it is positive as it is the
duty of positive law to be right as to content (Radbruch, 1914: 163, and 1999: 74). The
basic characteristic of Radbruchs legal-philosophical thought was that, as a Neo-Kantian,
he accepted value-theoretical relativism and advocated the standpoint that legal values
cannot be identified (Germ. erkennen), but only acknowledged (Germ. bekennen)
(Radbruch, 1914: 22, 162, and 1999: 15).1
An inevitable consequence of value relativism is that the sovereignty of the people
and democracy are the central characteristics of the rule of law. The content of law has to
be decided in a democratic, responsible and tolerant way. In the paper Der Relativismus in
der Rechtsphilosophie (Relativism in Legal Philosophy), special importance is assigned to
tolerance: Relativism is general tolerance just not tolerance of intolerance (Radbruch,
1934: 21).
For Radbruch, law is a reality whose meaning is to serve the legal value, the idea
of law (Radbruch, 1999: 34).2 The idea of law includes justice (in the meaning of the
principle of equality), purposiveness (the idea of purpose), and legal certainty. The
principle of equality (equal cases have to be treated equally and unequal cases have to be
treated in an adequately different manner) has an absolute value, but is only of a formal
nature. Of a contentual nature is the idea of purpose, which is relative and extends over the
three highest legal values, which, however, cannot be ranked. The starting point may be
either man as individual, man as social being, or man as creator of cultural goods
(Radbruch, 1999: 54 ff.).3 And finally, there is legal certainty, which in Radbruchs time
before the Second World War had priority over justice (in the meaning of purposiveness).
The circumstance that the highest legal value as regards content cannot be identified

Prof. Dr. Marijan Pavnik, Faculty of Law, Poljanski nasip 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
(Marijan.Pavcnik@pf.uni-lj.si).
1
See also Radbruch, 1934: 17-22.
2
The English quotation is taken from Paulson, 2006: 31.
3
Cf. also Radbruch, 1914: 101 ff.

1108

requires that this content be determined by the authorities with regard to legal certainty
(Radbruch, 1999: 73-75).
The experience with Nazism made Radbruch intensify his standpoints and, after the
Second World War, also complement them concerning the relation between individual
legal values. His well-known paper Gesetzliches Unrecht und bergesetzliches Recht
(Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law, 1946) also contains this characteristic
passage:
The conflict between justice and legal certainty may well be resolved in this way:
The positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even when its
content is unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the conflict between statute
and justice reaches such an intolerable degree that the statute, as flawed law, must
yield to justice. It is impossible to draw a sharper line between cases of statutory
lawlessness and statutes that are valid despite their flaws. One line of distinction,
however, can be drawn with utmost clarity: Where there is not even an attempt at
justice, where equality, the core of justice, is deliberately betrayed in the issuance
of positive law, then the statute is not merely flawed law, it lacks completely the
very nature of law. For law, including positive law, cannot be otherwise defined
than as a system and an institution whose very meaning is to serve justice
(Radbruch, 1946: 277).4
Radbruchs formula has two derivations. The formula of intolerability (Germ.
Unertrglichkeitsformel) states that when the conflict between statute and justice reaches
an intolerable degree, the statute as flawed law must yield to justice. The formula of
deniability (Germ. Verleugnungsformel) applies when the statute deliberately negates
equality. In this case, the statute is not merely flawed law, it lacks completely the very
nature of law (Radbruch, 1946: 277).5 The formula of deniability is considerably less
important because the intention of negation is very difficult to prove.6 If the negation is
intolerable, we have the formula of intolerability again (R. Dreier, 2011: 42).7
Radbruch does not give in to the temptation of revenge. Striving for decisions that
are correct as to contents and for justice at the same time requires respect for legal
certainty. And we must rebuild a Rechtsstaat, a government of law, he states, that
serves as well as possible the ideas of both justice and legal certainty (Radbruch, 1946:
281).8 Non-law must only be fought against legally (i.e. by legal means) and with the
smallest possible sacrifice of legal certainty (Radbruch, 1946: 278).9
Radbruchs formula of intolerability has often been invoked in the practice of
German courts and the German Constitutional Court.10 A very significant decision refers to
the 11th Ordinance to the Citizenship Act (of 25 November 1941).11 The Constitutional
Court decided that the Ordinance was null and void from the very beginning. The
Ordinance had fatal consequences for Jews and their assets. As an example, I cite just the
first sentence of the first paragraph: A Jew having a habitual residence abroad cannot be a
German citizen. The second sentence of the same paragraph accepts the assumption that
4

The English quotation is taken from Radbruch, 2006b: 7.

The English quotation is taken from Radbruch, 2006b: 7.
6
See e.g. Kaufmann, 1995: 515.
7
See also Saliger 1995: 5.
8
The English quotation is taken from Radbruch, 2006b: 11.
9
The English quotation is taken from Radbruch, 2006b: 8.
10
See e.g. BVerfGE 3, 225 (232 ff.); 6, 132 (198 ff.); 6, 389 (414 ff.); 23, 98 (106) and 54, 53 (67 ff.).
11
BVerfGE 23, 98 ff., especially 106 ff.
5

1109

one already has a habitual residence when it can be established in view of the
circumstances that he does not live there just temporarily. In the decision of the
Constitutional Court, the first item of the pronouncement comprises just expressions from
Radbruch:
[L]egal provisions from the National Socialist period can be denied validity when
they are so clearly in conflict with fundamental principles of justice that a judge
who wished to apply them or to recognize their legal consequences would be
handing down a judgment of non-law rather than of law.12
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Radbruchs formula was also invoked in the decision of
the Constitutional Court dealing with the shooting of fugitives trying to escape from GDR
across the Berlin Wall.13 In the decision it was repeatedly stated that Radbruchs formula
was only applicable to cases of extreme non-law. It was a majority standpoint that the
killings of fugitives at the Berlin Wall were serious non-law as well.14 What has been
contentious is the issue of justifying the reasons authorising the use of firearms.15 The
dilemma is whether it can be said retroactively that the justifying reasons (Germ.
Rechtfertigungsgrnde) were non-law. The Constitutional Court of the GFR did not
completely answer this question. The court allowed that the strict prohibition of the
retroactivity of justifying reasons was not valid when the gravest criminal acts clearly
showing contempt for human rights that are generally accepted in the international
community were concerned.16
2. PITAMICS VIEW
I mention the Slovenian legal theoretician and philosopher Pitamic (Leonid Pitamic, 18851971)17 because his final view of law and the nature thereof comes close to Radbruchs.
Both Radbruch as well as Pitamic deal with the problem of statutory (non-)law I am deal
with in this paper.
Pitamic, from the very beginning, struck out on a new path: he was convinced that
law could not be understood and explored by a single method aiming at a pure object of
enquiry. He argued that it is necessary to employ other methods besides the normative
method (especially the sociological and the axiological methods), which, however, should
not be confounded. Methodological syncretism can be avoided by distinguishing clearly

12

The English quotation is taken from Paulson, 2006: 27

BVerfGE 95, 96 ff.
14
See Kaufmann, 1995: 516. See also Alexy (1993: 486), who reasons in a very convincing manner: Wenn
aber alles zusammenkommt: ein ganzes und einziges Leben, das man fhren soll, wie man nicht will, die
Unmglichkeit, sich mit Argumenten dagegen zu wehren, das Verbot, dem zu entfliehen, und der
Todesschuss fr den, der das nicht hinnimmt, dann kann an dem Urteil, dass extremes Unrecht geschah, als
das Leben der zumeist jungen Menschen ausgelscht wurde, die ihre Konzeption des guten und richtigen
Lebens, ganz gleich wie immer diese aussah, selbst um den Preis ihres Todes realisieren wollten, kein
Zweifel sein.
15
Kaufmann, 1995: 516: The bone of contention is Art. 27 II 1 of the Border Act of GDR. The provision
reads: The use of a firearm is justified when it may stop a directly imminent committance or continuance of
a criminal act that, in view of the circumstances, is also considered a heavy criminal act. This is the norm on
the basis of which the killings at the Berlin Wall were considered justified and thereby non-punishable.
16
See pt. 3 of the operative part of BVerfGE 95, 96. See also the literature for and against the allowability of
retroactivity (for justifying reasons) cited by Kaufmann, 1995: 518, fn. 16.
17
See Pavnik, 2013: 105-129.
13

1110

between different aspects of law and by allowing the methods to support each other (see
Pitamic, 1917: 365-367).
Step by step, these results prompted Pitamic to combine the positive-law and the
natural-law conceptions of the nature of law. For Pitamic, the essential elements of law are
order and human behaviour. These elements are interdependent. The order is associated
with legal norms regulating external human behaviour. It is also essential that law ceases to
be law when its norms cease to be at least grosso modo effective (Pitamic, 1956:
192193). However, not any order can function as an element of law; the condition is that
it is an order which prescribes only external human behaviour and does not prescribe or
allow its contrary, inhumane behaviour, otherwise it loses its legal quality (Pitamic,
1956: 194).
However, the legal norm ceases to be law when its content seriously threatens the
existence and social interaction of the people subject to it (Pitamic, 1956: 199). For this it
is not sufficient that there is some kind of inhumanity in the content of the legal norm (e.g.
high taxes that are unjust); there has to be a conspicuous, obvious, severe case of
inhumanity [such as the mass slaughter of helpless people (Pitamic, 1960: 214)]. There
has to be a crude disturbance (for instance, the extermination of the members of another
race), which interferes so intensely with law that its nature is negated (Pitamic, 1956:
199).18
Ulfrid Neumann convincingly observes that Pitamic does not invoke ethical
criteria beyond law, but appeals to elements of the legal concept itself (Neumann, 2011:
281). This form of justification is to some extent in accordance with Radbruch and his
formula. The similarities between Radbruch and Pitamic consist predominantly in the fact
that their projects both aim at the justification of the legal concept and that they both,
in a similar way, explore the boundary which may not be transgressed by a conflict
between single elements of law in order to remain within lawfulness. The Rubicon is
crossed once the order is blatantly inhumane (Germ. krass unmenschlich).
We are here faced with an obvious parallel to Radbruchs formula of intolerability
(Germ. Unertrglichkeitsformel).19
It cannot be concluded from Pitamics oeuvre that he drew on Radbruchs theories.
In the work An den Grenzen der Reinen Rechtslehre (On the Edges of the Pure Theory of
Law), Radbruchs name is only mentioned once in association with heteronomous
obligations (Pitamic 1918, 750). In Pitamics most important book, Drava (The State,
1927), Radbruch is not quoted at all. The majority of reasons for their affinity lie in the fact
that Radbruch and Pitamic underwent a similar development, which ultimately led to
similar results.
Pitamic encountered theory and philosophy of law as Kelsens disciple and was
impassioned by normative purism as a form. He was not very deeply affected by the sharp
distinction between the is (Germ. Sein) and the ought (Germ. Sollen) since he also
contemplated law sociologically and axiologically. From the very beginning, he was
perturbed by the self-sufficiency of law as a normative system. In the face of the assertion
that an ought can only be derived from an ought, he advanced the thesis, inspired by
Aristotle, that man is by his very nature implanted into normative relations.20 His
experiences with the barbarism of the 20th century certainly had an influence on Pitamic,
who, just like Radbruch, placed law in relation to values. Radbruch argues that law strives
18

See also Pitamic, 1960: 215: Es kann ja auch nach positivem Recht sogar eine rechtskrftige
Entscheidung aus gewissen schwerwiegenden Grnden wegen krasser Verletzungen des positiven Rechtes
angefochten und auer Kraft gesetzt werden.
19
See Neumann, 2011: 281.
20
See Pitamic, 1960: 212. See also Pavnik, 2010: 9394, 101.

1111

for justice, while Pitamic seeks the solution in a concept of law that also has to be humane.
Radbruchs formula is articulated more thoroughly than Pitamics legal concept. However,
Pitamic can also be understood as saying that conscious disavowal of equality is inhumane
and that an inequality which is intolerably inhumane lacks legal character.
Thus, Radbruch and Pitamic are also in agreement by outgrowing the division into
natural law and self-sufficient statutory law. It lies in the nature of law to include issues of
correctness as to the contents as well as effectiveness of legal decisions. If we only deal
with correct law, we can be utopian and miss reality. If we only deal with positive law, we
are in the centre of reality but can miss the values that represent the basis and give meaning
to our dealings. Law is also a value phenomenon and consists of value decisions that must
not fall below an adequate ethical minimum if they want to preserve the nature of law. If
the ethical minimum is not achieved, we are at a point that is intolerable or a crude
disturbance of law.21
3. SOME OPEN QUESTIONS
The argument of statutory (non-)law has several facets that are worth dealing with in more
detail. The argument is a radical critique of apologetic legal positivism and partially also of
scientific legal positivism that closes its eyes to the true contents of law. Due to its
positivist attitude, scientific legal positivism cannot be held responsible for the atrocities
and abuses committed in the name of law. The responsibility lies with those making
decisions and carrying them out.22 What may be objectionable regarding scientific
positivism is the fact that it does not explicitly tell how far its range extends. If it does say
it this is what Hart does and also Kelsen in his own way , then one has to focus on the
quality of the positivist approach itself.
The argument of (non-)law I am talking about it in the sense of Radbruchs
formula of intolerability is a critique of self-sufficient statutory positivism. The content
of the argument is not based on eternal and unchangeable natural law that positive law has
to be in accordance with, but on basic (human) rights as implemented in a particular
historical period. In Radbruchs case, these are the basic (human) rights that were
established together with the modern state. These rights are summarised in the so-called
declarations of human and civil rights and are so firmly anchored that only the dogmatic
sceptic could still entertain doubts about some of them (Radbruch, 1945: 14).23
Radbruchs formula of intolerability primarily functions so as to falsify a statutory law
which is claimed to be law. Thus, the argument of (non-)law does not claim that something
is law, but rather claims that something is not law. Kaufmann declares in a well-founded
21

More about Pitamic in the introductory study I wrote for the book Pitamic, 2005: 153-173. See also
Pavnik, 2013: 105 ff.
22
See Philipps, 2007: 195-196: Der Ausdruck Stoppbedingung, den man anstelle von Grundbedingung
verwenden kann, erinnert mich an etwas, das fast ein halbes Jahrhundert her ist. Ein Freund von mir und ich
wir waren Assistenten von Werner Maihofer sind damals von Saarbrcken nach Mainz gefahren, um
einen Vortrag von Hans Kelsen zu hren. An die Einzelheiten des Vortrags erinnere ich mich nicht mehr,
wohl aber an eine Szene, die sich daran anschloss. Ein Student fragte Kelsen in deutlich kritischer Weise, ob
der von ihm vertretene Positivismus nicht wieder zu einer Diktatur wie der vergangenen fhren knne.
Kelsen antwortete: Ob eine solche Diktatur wieder eintritt, das hngt von keiner Rechtstheorie ab, sei sie
nun positivistisch oder nicht. Das hngt nur davon ab, ob Menschen, jetzt die Menschen Ihrer Generation,
rechtzeitig Halt! sagen.
23
See also Radbruch, 1948: 147: Die vllige Leugnung der Menschenrechte entweder vom
berindividualistischen Standpunkt (Du bist nichts, Dein Volk ist alles) oder vom transpersonalen
Standpunkt (Eine Statue des Phidias wiegt alles Elend der Millionen antiker Sklaven auf) aber ist absolut
unrichtiges Recht.

1112

way that our knowledge is much more reliable at falsifying than at verifying (Kaufmann,
1995: 518). But one has to be careful also in falsifying. Legal certainty requires that only
that is falsified which really strikes the eye, which is intolerable (Radbruch), which is a
crude disturbance because it is a conspicuous, obvious, severe case of inhumanity
(Pitamic), or which is extreme non-law (Alexy24).
It would be naive to think that falsification is not based on a standard that has to be
verified. We have just dealt with that and seen that the basis of falsification are basic
(human) rights and generally valid principles of international law. Both cases concern
rights and principles that are positive and, as such, legally stronger than the statute in
contradiction with them. Being legally stronger gives them the character of supra-statutory
law, which laws and other provisions have to comply with.25
The result of falsification is that statutory non-law is denied legal validity. If instead
of the law being qualified as non-law, a new law is drawn up, this is an act of the
verification of law. The verification act is substantially more difficult than the falsification
act and, additionally, the results of verification are much less precise (Kaufmann, 1995:
521). Thus, we are dealing with a difficult issue that reminds us that one has to be as
circumspect as possible and that no new wrongs may be done in the name of amending old
ones. An absolute legal certainty does not exist. If we do not want to sacrifice legal
certainty, we can only approach the noble aim of justice without ever being able to achieve
it completely.
The argument of (non-)law is usually applied in the rule of law reacting to the nonlaw of previous periods that were lawless at least so to a certain extent. In such cases, the
falsification acts are the responsibility of the legislature, which replaces the previously
valid law with a new one. An important role is occupied by the courts, especially the
Constitutional Court, which abrogates the controversial laws (and other general legal acts)
or declares them non-law. Legal acts that are non-law cannot have any further legal
consequences and hence individual legal acts based on them have to be annulled or at least
abrogated.
The argument of (non-)law is a legal and/or moral argument. It is a moral argument
for all those who sharply distinguish between law and morals; for them, moral
unlawfulness is an argument that makes it legitimate that immoral positive law is changed
in a legal manner. The most typical supporters are noble legal positivists. They state that,
as scientists, they are not interested in the content of law. Thus, Kelsen says that he does
not know what justice is, but immediately adds that behind the standard of legal justice
there lies the justice of freedom, the justice of peace, the justice of democracy, the justice
of tolerance (Kelsen, 2000: 52).
If the argument of (non-)law is also a legal argument, our standpoint is that nonlaw should not have any legal consequences. This thesis is compatible with those legal
scientists who also deal with law from the point of view of contents and try to understand
the legal participants (e.g. judges) who make legal decisions in concrete cases. Mutatis
mutandis, this must also be said especially of legal participants who make authoritative
legal decisions.
The typical legal participants making authoritative legal decisions are judges. In the rule of
law where courts of law ensure the constitutionality and legality of legal acts, their role
keeps gaining significance. If I limit myself to countries with constitutional courts (e.g.
Slovenia), it must be said that countries of this type have set up a mechanism by which
24

Alexy, 2009: 159: Extremes Unrecht ist kein Recht.

About generally valid principles of international law see Degan, 2000: 70-76, krk, 2007: 281-289, and
Trk 2007: 59.
25

1113

possible statutory non-law can be reacted to very effectively. A judge who believes that the
statue he has to apply is non-law (i.e. statutory non-law) will stay the proceedings and
make an appropriate request to the Constitutional Court.26
In the modern state, the catalogue of basic (human) rights is so extensive that it
offers a sufficiently broad basis for eliminating any legal incorrectness (including statutory
non-law). The constitutional catalogue of basic (human) rights makes the achievements of
rationalist natural law positive and thereby opens the door to Radbruchs formula
becoming an element of valid law. It is not an exaggeration to say that thereby natural law
enters into constitutional law, as is the title of Hassemers paper (Hassemer, 2002: 135150). Natural law entering into constitutional law is not suprapositive law, but an integral
part of positive (constitutional) law.
4. THE SYMBOLIC MEANING OF RADBRUCHS FORMULA
Thus, Radbruchss formula has another dimension, which nowadays is its most important
virtue. In a very insightful manner, it reminds us that any law may be problematic as to its
contents:
A good lawyer would stop being a good lawyer if he were not fully aware, at any
moment of his career, that his profession is at the same time necessary and deeply
problematic (Radbruch, 1999: 105).
Something very difficult is imposed upon us lawyers: we have to believe in our
vocation and at the same time, within some deepest layer of our being, over and
over again have doubts about it (Radbruch, 1999: 105).
In this sense, Radbruchs formula has a symbolic value; its value transcends the
circumstances in which it was created and to which it reacted. It is not only intended for
legislators and other lawgivers, it is also intended for understanding law and implementing
it. A statute, also a criminal one, is only rarely (if at all) so unequivocal that its
understanding is a pure reconstruction of the thought (i.e. norm) it imparts.27 It is in the
nature of the interpretation of statutes that it is, sometimes more and sometimes less, also a
thinking through to the end of something that has been thought (Radbruch, 1999: 108).
Legal norms are not given automatically, legal norms are only the meaning of the statutory
text. Smoles Antigone would say in a literary manner, as reported by the Page,28 that also
the sense of the (written) thought has to be found.
Smoles above-mentioned Antigone is one of the excellent re-interpretations of Sophocles
Antigone.29 The primary special feature of Smoles Antigone (1959) is that Antigone never
appears on the stage: she is in the background all the time, behind the stage, behind the
26

See the Constitutional Court Act, Art. 23.

See von Savigny, 1840: 214. For him interpretation is Reconstruction des dem Gesetze inwohnenden
Gedankens.
28
Smole, 1988: Verse 118: [S]he seeks the inmost meaning of some thought.
29
Steiner, 2003: 170: As I noted above, the Sophoclean chorus tends to fall away from spoken Antigones
after the sixteenth century and such scholarly treatments as Garniers. There are exceptions. Among the most
intriguing is Domik Smoles Slovene Antigone, first staged in 1960. Here, the heroine never appears. It is via
the chorus and several secondary personae that we experience the terror and moral-political meaning of her
fate.
27

1114

text, within us and behind us. Since Antigone is physically absent, the main persona is
Creon, who in contrast to Sophocles is much less high-principled and therefore much
more pragmatic (you may trade and haggle/, he says, make merry but abide by the
citys laws and regulations;/ within the law30), philosophically and personally a sceptic
(even the/ king, who is, in spite of all, a man, sleeps sounder if he is first of all a/ human
being and king only in the last account. But thats enough of chatter;/ we have work to
do!31), yet in spite of his doubts, he is unrelenting when the foundations of power are in
question:
But someone who seeks/ fundamental changes in our world, with abolition of the
monarchy and/ other institutions, some overweening planner, with a new utopia,
who is/ not thirsting for my blood, but questions the whole basis of the monarchy,/
that is the enemy.32
Others, who keep going to see her and talk to her, report on Antigone. Of fundamental
importance is certainly the above-mentioned report by the Page that Antigone keeps
examining because she wants to obtain a deeper sense of the thought that makes her resist
Creons order that Polyneices should not have a grave. Finally, Antigone finds Polyneices
and buries him. She is, as Ismene says, a gentle flower that opens just to shed its petals.33
The symbolic power of Antigones deed tells us that the range of legal
argumentation ends where the sense of law ends. It is in the character of law and its nature
not only that so-called law is not law any more if it is humanly intolerable. These are
extreme cases that are typical of authoritarian political systems. In political systems that
accept the rule of law and are based on it, it is the opposite direction that is natural. Its
basic characteristic is that it seeks to find the right measure, which is humane and takes
into account that law is about mutual and interdependent relations that are tolerable to both
sides.34
This bilateral tolerability is one of the basic aspects of the rule of law as a legal
principle. Here the topic of a new paper can start. Its main thesis is that bilateral tolerability
is the principle directing the definition of legal rules and the manner of their application.
The principle of tolerability aims at a goal, has weight, and defines the scope (range) of the
meaning within which the legal rules operate.

30

Smole, 1988: Verses 142-143.

Smole, 1988: Verses 947-950.
32
Smole, 1988: Verses 643-648.
33
Smole, 1988: Verse 2259.
34
Cf. Sprenger, who builds upon the notion that law has to be based on an elementary pre-legal sense. Its
main characteristic is that, at either side, an adequate Answer-Behaviour is built into mutual legal relations
(Sprenger, 2003: 334). See also Sprenger, 2012: 87 ff.
31

1115

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GV Zaloba.

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Knowledge-Oriented Argumentation In Children

Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont, Francesco Arcidiacono, Stephanie Breux, Sara
Greco & Celine Miserez-Caperos
Institute of psychology and education
University of Neuchtel
Switzerland
anne-nelly.perret-clermont@unine.ch; francesco.arcidiacono@unine.ch; stephanie.breux@unine.ch;
sara.greco@usi.ch; celine.miserez-caperos@unine.ch

ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes children's argumentative discussions centered on the resolution of
cognitive tasks, starting from the hypothesis that childrens interventions are more complex and complete
than usually described in psychological research on argumentation skills. Our results can be viewed as a
possibility to reconsider the usual school situations in which children's argumentative skills are assessed in
order to better understand the social, relational and emotional conditions that support argumentation in
children.
KEYWORDS: Childrens argumentation, Communication, Implicit, Knowledge-oriented argumentation,
Reasoning, Social interactions

1. STATE OF ART AND HYPOTHESES

The distinction between pragmatic (or practical) argumentation, i.e. argumentation
oriented towards action, and knowledge-oriented argumentation, can be found as early as
in Aristotles Topica and it is confirmed by Cicero in his works on topics (see Rigotti and
Greco, forthcoming). Despite this ancient distinction, it is true that there is no much
research about knowledge-oriented argumentation in which children are involved, if we
consider the panorama of current argumentation studies. Our paper intends to contribute to
filling this gap. To this purpose, we will rely on current studies in psychology that deal
with childrens cognitive argumentation; on this basis, we will re-read adult-children
discussions, which are normally studied in psychology, from the vantage point of
argumentation, in order to analyze childrens knowledge-oriented argumentation.
Argumentation has been studied by psychologists in a developmental perspective.
In the 80s, studies led by Berkowitz, Oser and Althoff (1987) or Clark and Delia (1976)
show that justification does neither appear spontaneously nor in a complex form in 6-8
years old children. In fact, arguments produced by these children correspond to very
simple repetitions of a standpoint, while justifications are only presented when explicitly
requested by an opponent. According to these authors, children from six to eight years old
are reported to resolve their disputes by either physical or verbal power manipulations, but
without recourse to argumentative discourse. More recently, psychological research
conducted by Kuhn (Kuhn, 1991; Kunh & Udell, 2003) and Golder (Golder, 1993, 1996;
Golder & Coirier, 1996) mainly studied the argumentative abilities of children comparing
them to those of adolescents and adults. These authors report that childrens argumentative
discourse is poor, with argumentation skills only gradually developing from childhood to
adulthood.
1118

Yet, contrarily to this developmental stream of research, other studies (Anderson et al,
1997; Orsolini & Pontecorvo, 1992; Pontecorvo & Arcidiacono, 2010; Stein and Albro,
2001; Stein & Miller, 1993), have observed three years old children who are already
involved in conflictual interactions as well as four years old children who are able to
understand and participate in disagreements in family discussions, thus demonstrating
personal argumentative skills in these contexts. These observations regarding knowledgeoriented argumentation in pretty young children, which contradict previous results, are
usually interpreted with the following hypotheses. First, it is assumed that the context in
which children can produce argumentation should be always informal (family dinner,
spontaneous conversations, etc.). Second, the issues and discussions are assumed to be
related to values, moral judgment and pragmatic issues. Yet, the rationale behind these
hypotheses is not clear; in other words, it is not said what the basis is for suggesting that
informal situations would be more easy to deal with than formal ones, and that valuerelated and pragmatic questions would be more likely to be managed argumentatively than
cognitive ones.
Besides, in psychological literature on argumentation, some degree of
heterogeneity can be observed regarding the definitions of what a good (or
developmentally more advanced) argument is, and how it should be analyzed. Most
studies are quantitative (e.g. some have counted the number of reasons generated for an
opinion; others have developed a taxonomy describing the nature of the reasons given, and
counted the variety of the categories used or how complex are their inter-relations; etc.).
These quantitative analyses only represent some possible ways to measure argumentative
skills, yet without going into detail in a proper analysis of how children (together with
adults) develop their argumentative discussions, what type of arguments they use and how
these can be evaluated from the logical and communicative points of view.
This paper intends to respond to some of these open problems. We will present a
study of argumentation in adult-children interactions by relying on two analytical models:
on the one hand, our study is generally framed in a pragma-dialectical perspective (van
Eemeren, 2009; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). On this basis, we will analytically
reconstruct childrens argumentation, including argumentation structures (Snoeck
Henkemans 1997, 2000). On the other hand, we will integrate the Argumentum Model of
Topics, proposed by Rigotti & Greco Morasso (2009, 2010), which is instrumental in
reconstructing the inferential configuration of arguments, i.e. the relationship between
arguments and their premises.
Starting from this theoretical framework, we hypothesize that: 1) argumentation is
likely to occur not only in informal situations like family dinner, peer interactions, etc. but
also in formal situations like a school (or medical interviews, and others); and it does not
only occur in debates centered on moral values but also around cognitive tasks, as those
that we are taking into account; 2) childrens argumentation is probably more complex
than expected by some of the authors mentioned above, and this not only in informal
settings, but also in formal ones; 3) the relational and institutional context is very
important to understand how childrens argumentation develops.

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2. ARGUMENTATION CONTEXT
In this paper, we rely on data derived from a Neo-Piagetian task. In this type of task,
children are tested in order to assess their developmental level on cognitive concepts, for
example on the concept of chance. There is a long tradition of studies using these tasks,
which were originally designed in order to study childrens conceptual reasoning. This
allows us to assume the background of psychologists who, starting from Piaget, have been
studying childrens reasoning and to critically explore Piagets hypotheses that childrens
reasoning is best tested when children are asked to provide arguments to back up their
answers and not just assessed on verbal performances (Ducret, 2004; Piaget, 1926/2003;
Vinh Bang, 1966). Furthermore, this also allows us to study specific dialogical settings as
argumentation contexts, and explore their affordances for argumentation. The expected
results will possibly suggest insights to revisit traditional test situations in order to create
new settings which might more easily favor childrens reasoning and argumentation.
The task we are considering here sets up a specific reasoning and argumentation
context, which is worth briefly describing as for its main characteristics. First, these are
not naturally or spontaneously occurring discussions. Children are asked to comment on
tasks that have been pre-defined by an adult-researcher, who has an agenda in mind.
Arguably, this is not exclusive of (neo)Piagetian tasks; rather, this is typical of many other
adult-child interactions in formal settings, such as schools, exams, medical interviews,
speech therapy, and so on. Secondly, in most cases, we have adapted the traditional
Piagetian tasks. In fact, originally, Piagetian interviews consisted in conversations between
one adult and one child. We have departed from this face-to-face interview model and
chosen to work with little groups of children, because it is well known (Buchs, Butera,
Mugny & Darnon, 2004; Carugati & Perret-Clermont, in press; Johnson & Johnson, 1994;
Perret-Clermont, 1980) that peer interactions under certain circumstances can favor
reasoning and argumentation, in particular when partners experience socio-cognitive
conflicts i.e. the confrontation hic et nunc of different conflicting points of view that they
feel the need to overcome. It has been observed that such socio-cognitive conflicts, under
certain circumstances, are particularly likely to induce cognitive reorganizations and hence
developmental progress (for a review: Perret-Clermont & Carugati, 2001: 8587). Thirdly,
the task is intended as a cognitive task, children being tested on their understanding of
concepts. Hence the researchers expectations in these conversations normally favour
knowledge-oriented argumentation. This does not mean, however, that pragmatic
argumentation is excluded as we will see when dealing with our data (cf. section 4).
3. METHODOLOGY
We will now focus on an argumentative interaction between three children and an adult in
which the complexity of childrens argument is apparent. As mentioned in section 1, our
theoretical approach to the analysis of data is informed by the integration of the pragmadialectical perspective, which we assume as a general framework, and the Argumentum
Model of Topics for the analysis of the inferential configuration of arguments. We will
first present an analytical reconstruction of argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
2004), by specifying the standpoint(s) emerging from the discussion, the parties who are
participating in the discussion, and the arguments that are advanced. Following Snoeck
1120

Henkemans (1997, 2000), we will provide an overview of the argumentation structure in

this excerpt of discussion.
As a second step, we will focus on one of the arguments emerged and provide a
more focused analysis of its inferential configuration by means of the Argumentum Model
of Topics (Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010). This will allow us discussing the implicit
premises which children are relying on, both at the logical level and at the level of cultural
and symbolic resources they are mobilizing in order to respond to the task they are being
proposed.
The integration of these two theoretical models has been discussed in detail in
Palmieri (2014) and applied in a number of previous works (see for example Greco
Morasso, 2011). It allows integrating a general overview of an argumentative discussion,
including the connections between different arguments. At the same time, it permits to
focus on the most strategic arguments and elicit their principles of support as well as
possible implicit premises.
4. COMPLEXITY OF CHILDRENS ARGUMENTATION
4.1 Excerpt 1
At the moment of the discussion reported in the excerpt (Table 1), children have been
discussing during more than 10 minutes. They have tried different strategies to find the
tricked dice: roll the dice, knock them on the table, observe them, turn the dice, etc. They
have noticed something that was totally unintended by the adult, i.e. that the yellow dice
happens to be the only one with black spots (the others have white spots) and thereafter
they have started considering that this yellow dice might be strange! They are now
discussing the meaning of black and white.
Table 1. Participants: adult-researcher; Anita (10,9 ans); Alan (11,8 ans); Antonin (10,11
ans)
298 Anita
il est bizarre le jaune
the yellow one is strange
299 Res.
pourquoi il est bizarre Anita?
why it is strange Anita?
300 Anita
parce quil ne fait pas comme
because it doesnt react like the
les autres.
others.
301 Res.
il ne fait pas comme les autres. it doesnt react like the others.
302 Alan
il ne mrite pas le luxe
it does not deserve luxury
303 Res.
et toi Antonin?
and you Antonin?
304 Antonin parce quil a des points noirs
because it has black spots
305 Alan
((rire))
((laught))
306 Res.
et a fait quoi davoir des
and what are the consequences of
points noirs?
having black spots?
307 Antonin cest ben le blanc, le blanc cest well, white, white is good. and
bien. et le noir cest mal
black is evil
308 Alan
ouais souvent dans les films le
yeah often in movies black is evil
noir cest le mal et le blanc
and white is good.
cest le bien.
309 Antonin ouais comme le Yin et le Yang
yeah like Yin and Yang
1121

310
311

Res.
Alan

ah. et le blanc il a quoi de bien?

euh lequel celui-l? ((montre le
d rouge))
[euh le blanc cest]
[je ne sais pas tu dis dans les
films le blanc c'est bien]
je ne sais pas, souvent le noir a
reprsente le mal et le blanc a
reprsente le bien.
ouais comme le rouge et le
bleu.
((rire)) mais euh ((rire))
ah, [donc vous pensez]
[ouais par exemple aux checs]
les blancs cest les gentils vu
quils commencent et les noirs
cest les mchants.
ah daccord
dans quasi chaque jeu de
socit les noirs cest les
mchants

ah. and what is good with white?

erm which one this one? ((shows the
red dice))
[erm the white it is]
[I dont know you say in the movies
the white is good]
I dont know, often black represents
the evil and white represents the
good.
yeah as red and blue.

312
313

Antonin
Res.

314

Alan

315

Antonin

316
317
318

Alan
Res.
Alan

319
320

Res.
Antonin

...
378

Alan

cest celui-l ((d jaune)) parce

quil est moche et il a toutes les
raisons dtre un tricheur.

it is this one ((yellow dice)) because

it is ugly and it has every reason to
be a cheater.

...
383

Antonin

Cest le plus bizarre ((d

jaune)) et il a des points noirs.

it is the strangest dice ((yellow

dice)) and it has got black spots.

((laught)) but erm ((laught))

ah, [so you think]
[yeah for example in chess] whites
are good because they start and
blacks are nasty.
ah ok
in almost every board game black
are nasty

In turn 298, Anita adopts the standpoint that the yellow dice is strange. Strange could
mean, in this case, that if one has to suspect one dice, the yellow dice is the candidate to be
suspected. At turn 304, Antonin mentions the different color (i.e. white and not black as
the others) of the spots on the yellow dice. This could be interpreted as a support to
Anitas point that the yellow dice is strange. The researcher then asks children: and
what are the consequences of having black spots? (turn 306) and later and what is good
with white? (turn 310) in the hope that the children will put forward arguments in support
of their standpoints, thus engaging in a full-fledged argumentative discussion. In both
these turns, the researcher acts as an antagonist in a (non-mixed) critical discussion,
raising a question but without proposing an alternative standpoint. Her choice to act as an
antagonist, and yet without explicitly contradicting the children, can be explained in
connection with the specific features of this Piagetian dialogical setting, which has been
purposefully designed in order to observe childrens argumentation. The researchers
argumentative role is one of the aspects that we will have to consider in order to retrace
the influence of context on the development of the argumentative discussion beforehand.

1122

The researchers questions get answered, as children engage in a complex discussion, in

which they all act as protagonists while co-constructing arguments in support of the claim
that white is good and black is bad. As psychologists, following Zittoun (e.g. 2007), we
know that people rely on cultural artifacts and symbolic resources when they face
uncertainty and want to give meaning to the situation. Children seem to be using symbolic
resources here to make sense of the present situation: they refer to cultural artifacts such as
movies (turn 308), Yin and Yang (turn 309), chess (turn 318), board games (turn 320), in
which black and white have specific symbolic meanings. Starting from Anitas suggestion
that the yellow dice looks strange, Antonin and Alan co-construct a complex chain of
arguments in support of this claim.
In the diagram in Figure 1, inspired by the pragma-dialectical analysis of an
argumentation structure1, we observe that children are able to provide a standpoint and to
produce arguments to defend it, by constructing a complete and rich argumentative
discourse.
Figure 1: Argumentation structure of Excerpt 1
1
S
The yellow dice is strange

Coordinative
arg
1.1
(300) it doesnt
do like the
others

1.2b

1.2a
(304) it has black
spots

(307) white is
good black is evil

1.2b.1

Multiple arg

(308) often in
movies black is
evil and white is
good

Multiple arg

1.2b.2
(318) [for example the
chess] the whites are
good because they start
and blacks are bad

We will now focus on argument 1.2 (in both its components 1.2a and 1.2b), which could
be considered the core of the childrens argumentation, and analyse its inferential
configuration by means of the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT). This will enable us
to precisely describe how this argument is connected to its standpoint. As anticipated in
1

We have made some little modifications to the pragma-dialectical standard notation, yet without
substantially modifying the concepts.

1123

section 1, the AMT model allows distinguishing premises of procedural (logical) nature,
from premises of material or cultural or contextual premises, while at the same time it
allows understanding how such premises are interconnected in real arguments (Rigotti &
Greco Morasso, 2010).
This is particularly important when studying childrens argumentation, because it is
important to understand the procedural premises which children use in their
argumentation, while at the same time isolating explicit and implicit premises of a material
nature, which give us a sort of access to their worldview. In this sense, it is worth noting
that an argument could be correct from a logical viewpoint, while still relying on material
premises which could be discussed, or which are not immediately expected by the adults
discussing with the children; eliciting what childrens implicit premises are gives us access
to their starting points. The case we are analysing is particularly representative in this
respect.
Figure 2 presents an AMT-based analysis of argument 1.2 (a and b). As Palmieri
(2014) makes clear, coordinative argumentation is analysed with a single inferential
configuration. In our case, 1.2a and 1.2b are premises of one and the same argument,
which relies on the locus from effects to causes as a principle of support.
2: AMT representation of argument 1.2a and 1.2b
LOCUS FROM
EFFECTS TO
CAUSES

Endoxon: White is
good, black is evil

Maxim: If an entity is marked

with some evil component, it is
strange (you must be suspicious
of it)

Datum: The yellow dice has black

spots

First conclusion / Minor

premise: The yellow dice has an
evil component

Final conclusion: The yellow dice is

strange (the candidate dice to be suspected
of being tricked is the yellow one)

The locus from effects to causes establishes a connection between some data and their
possible cause. Needless to say, this principle of reasoning plays an important role in
medical discourse, as it is at the basis of diagnoses. Its logical hold, however, is limited by
1124

the fact that one and the same effect may be the result of different causes. An example in
the medical domain could be that, if a child has red spots on his face, this could be chicken
pox but it could also be the result of some other virus, or even the effect of an allergy, and
so on. In order to get to a precise diagnosis, all causes but one should be excluded (and
this is not always possible).
In argument 1.2, the locus from effects to causes is at work with the following
maxim, which constitutes a procedural premise of this argument: If an entity is marked
with some evil component, it is strange, which means that you must be suspicious of it.
Together with the minor premise The yellow dice has an evil component, this brings to
the final conclusion that The yellow dice is strange, which means that the candidate dice
to be suspected of being tricked is the yellow one. This latter is the standpoint that children
are tentatively defending, as a working hypothesis to respond to the task they have been
assigned.
It is evident, however, that the procedural component is not exhaustive of what
happens in real life argumentation. In fact, the premise The yellow dice has an evil
component is not derived from the procedural component; this is a piece of factual
evidence that must be derived from material premises. These are represented, in Figure
2, on the left side of the diagram. Two premises of different nature constitute the material
component of argumentation. First, an endoxon, i.e. a general premise representing
common knowledge, or values that are shared by the interlocutors, which in this case can
be formulated as: White is good, black is evil. Not coincidentally, endoxa are often left
implicit, as it is the case in our example, precisely because they are considered as taken for
granted by the arguers. Second, the material component includes a datum, i.e. a premise
derived from factual evidence emerging in the specific and concrete dialogical setting in
which argumentation is being developed. Data are often explicit, as in this case: The
yellow dice has black spots. Taken together, these two material premises bring to the
conclusion that the yellow dice has an evil component, which is then exploited to get to
the final conclusion.
In this case, we see that the childrens argument and we can properly speak of a
common argumentation, because the children are co-constructing it is based, from the
procedural point of view, on a maxim which is often used in everyday reasoning: If an
entity is marked with some evil component, you must be suspicious about it. Consider,
for example, when you go to the supermarket to buy some fruit and you can pick up items
yourself. You are about to choose some apples. You will identify the flawless, ideally
perfect, apples, while leaving out the ones that have some signs that could be interpreted
as effects of some undesirable cause (e.g. you wont pick an apple which has a brown spot
because it might mean that it is old or rotten). To make a more complex example, if you
need to choose someone to trust say, a babysitter, or a financial advisor, or a colleague
that you need to hire you will be naturally inclined to exclude those who seem to have
some evil component for example, they appear too nervous; because this could be
the effect of an evil cause. In sum, there are clues that attract our suspicion, even though
this type of reasoning is a sort of cognitive shortcut, whose logical hold could certainly be
discussed.
In the case of dice, children need to pick up the tricked one because they are asked
to do so. However, they do not know where to start with. Based on the locus from effects

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to cause, children identify a clue for an evil component and ascribe this to the possibility
for the yellow dice to have an evil cause.
If the procedural component of this argument, as said, could certainly be discussed
in terms of logical hold, particularly interesting in this example is the material component
of argumentation, which concerns the symbolic meaning of the black and white colours.
In the childrens view, black is evil and white is good as they reason out moving from
symbolic resources that are known to them. Needless to say, this endoxon could also be
discussed, because its symbolic validity can certainly not be extended to all occurrences in
which colours are manifested.
These limitations on the procedural and material components notwithstanding, it is
interesting to see the complexity of the argumentation co-constructed by children in this
case. It is also interesting to see how cultural and symbolic resources (i.e. the fact that
black is bad and white is good, or resources like chess, movies, etc.) are adapted in
situations that would probably not be expected by the researcher. Knowing the implicit
premises which children start from is, in any case, an important preliminary step in order
to help them engage in sounder argumentation.
4.2 Some notes on social and relational aspects in knowledge-oriented argumentation in
children
What we have done here is analyzing what happened in this interaction from a cognitive
point of view. Yet, we could also analyze the same interaction from a psychosocial point
of view. By so doing, we could observe the importance of context, in particular social and
relational processes within peers and adults interactions, for the development of an
argumentative discussion. When an interaction like this starts, there is almost always a
moment of tension: children try to decipher the adult's expectations and those of their
peers, in search of an understanding of what kind of social game they are asked to enter.
Usually, children try to comply with what they think are the social expectations in this
context. But at the same time, they usually try to find their own place, mark it by their own
moves, develop their understanding of the issue and express it (Breux & Perret-Clermont,
2014). In childrens perspective, the task they are faced with is not only that of elaborating
a proper cognitive argumentation in order to solve a problem and check that the solution is
reasonable; it is also a complex multidimensional social game that requires managing
faces, rules of politeness, gender identities, and other agendas for self and others. As a
consequence, the social situation is not fixed but dynamical. Adults interventions (as well
as peers) are not neutral. They modify the context and are interpreted by the children
who then modify their reasoning. Although the adult tries to understand the childrens
cognitive development being as neutral as possible when he or she asks questions and
makes counter-suggestions, still she is interpreted by children as if she spoke from a
position of authority. For this reason, it is very difficult for a researcher in this dialogical
setting to ask questions in order to provoke childrens argumentation without being
interpreted as an antagonist who somehow has an alternative standpoint in mind.

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5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed data taken from adult-children conversations in the
dialogical setting of a neo-Piagetian task. The analytic overview proposed on the basis of
the pragma-dialectical approach has shown that childrens argumentation is more complex
than usually expected on the basis of previous psychological research about childrens
argumentative skills; it even includes different levels of subordinate argumentation, which
children can co-construct while answering to a researchers questions.
Moreover, the AMT analysis of one of the childrens arguments shows that their
command of argumentation is complete and sophisticated. In fact, even though the validity
of some of the childrens premises might be questioned, still the reasoning backing up
their standpoints appears to be well-developed, especially in a difficult context like that of
the tricked dice. This type of analysis sheds a new light on argumentation in context, by
considering settings in which children are involved, as well as discussing the role of
researchers' interventions whose intention (but is it really the case?) is to foster childrens
argumentation. Researchers are, in fact, not "neutral" but involved in the same
argumentative discussion as the children and their role is crucial in shaping the discussion
itself. The analysis of cognitive tasks, as the one we have considered, also significantly
contributes to the analysis of knowledge-oriented argumentation.
Beside their argumentative relevance, these results bear important consequences
for education as well. Educationalists often start from deficit hypotheses about childrens
competences and then presuppose that they have to teach them how to improve their
argumentation skills. But, if we assume that the argumentative competence is already
there, as it seems to emerge from our analysis, then the educators role amounts to creating
conditions for this competence to be used. In general, before judging childrens
argumentative skills, it might be necessary to study their contributions to argumentative
discussions into detail, including procedural and material premises and the symbolic world
of each of the protagonists. It would also be interesting to evaluate the meaning of the
adults interventions in argumentative terms. In this case, for example, we often had the
adult acting as an antagonist in a critical discussion, i.e. raising doubts or asking questions,
but without explicitly presenting an alternative standpoint, as it happens in non-mixed
disputes
Yet, because of the asymmetry which is still present between adults and children,
this role of antagonist who only raises questions and doubts is not easy to maintain for a
researcher because his or her interventions tend to be interpreted by children as hinting to
some contrary standpoint that the researcher does not explicitly express. For this reason, it
is not easy for an adult in this setting to maintain the dispute as non-mixed, which poses a
psycho-social problem typical of this type of adult-child discussion, whose consequences
on childrens argumentation should be further investigated (Greco Morasso, MiserezCaperos & Perret-Clermont, in press).
Children seem to be more competent than expected. But in childrens eyes researchers
probably seem to be very strange interlocutors, opposing them but never explicitly.

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Ethos And Authority Argumentation: Four Kinds Of Authority In

Medical Consultation
Roosmaryn Pilgram
Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands
r.pilgram@uva.nl

ABSTRACT: The authority that the patient ascribes to the doctor in medical consultation influences the way
in which this consultation proceeds. In an argumentative discussion, this ascribed authority can affect the
acceptability of the doctors argumentation. To analyse a doctors authority argumentation in medical
consultation, I shall make a fourfold analytical distinction between ways in which authority can influence the
outcome of an argumentative discussion.
KEYWORDS: authority argumentation, doctor-patient consultation, ethos, pragma-dialectics

1. INTRODUCTION
In medical consultation, a patient typically requests a medical consultation to have his
health problem diagnosed by the doctor and, based on this diagnosis, to obtain medical
advice. By his request, the patient indicates that he does not know what is the matter with
him, how serious his health problem is, or how to best handle this problem, but trusts that
the doctor knows this or can refer him to a specialist based on a medical examination.
The patient, thus, ascribes authority on his health problem to the doctor.
The authority ascribed to the doctor influences the way in which the consultation
proceeds. The patient will expect the doctor to guide, and thereby structure, the
communicative exchange in order to come to an appropriate advice (or parts thereof, such
as the diagnosis and prognosis). Moreover, in case of an argumentative discussion in
medical consultation, the authority that the patient ascribes to the doctor can influence the
acceptability of his argumentation to the patient. First of all, the simple fact that the patient
regards the doctor as an authority on his health problem might be enough for the patient to
accept the doctors argumentation about this problem. Secondly, the doctor can attempt to
convince the patient of a medical advice by emphasising his expertise in the course of the
consultation or by presenting this expertise as an argument in support of the medical
advice.
To analyse a doctors use of authority in argumentative discourse, I shall, in this
contribution, distinguish analytically between four ways in which authority can influence
the outcome of a discussion. More specifically, I shall discuss: existing ethos (section 2),
acquired ethos (section 3), the argument from authority (section 4) and the argument by
authority (section 5).

1130

2. EXISTING ETHOS
A patient requests a consultation by a doctor because of the doctors medical
qualifications. These qualifications for practicing medicine are highly regulated. Council
Directive 93/16/EEC (Art. 23), for instance, lays down which standards that doctors have
to meet to practise medicine within the European Union: amongst others, doctors have to
possess adequate knowledge of clinical disciplines and practices, providing him with a
coherent picture of mental and physical diseases, of medicine from the points of view of
prophylaxis [treatment intended to prevent disease], diagnosis and therapy and of human
reproduction.
A patient who requests a consultation is not sure what his health problem is about,
how serious it is, or what to do about it, whereas the doctors qualifications indicate that
he possesses the medical knowledge and expertise to provide adequate diagnosis and
advice. In the consultation, there is consequently an asymmetry between the doctor and
patient: the doctor acts as the expert and the patient as a layman (see, on the intrinsic
nature of this asymmetry, Pilnick and Dingwall, 2011).
The excerpt of the consultation in Case 1a illustrates this asymmetry in medical
expertise between the doctor and the patient.1 In this consultation, the patient asks for the
diagnosis of a health problem that he experienced in the past. He makes clear that he
expects the doctor to possess the expertise that is necessary to provide such a diagnosis.
Case 1a
Excerpt of an argumentative discussion between a doctor (D) and a patient (P) about the
patients possible inguinal rupture
1
2
3
4.

D:
P:
D:
P:

It could be the case that it had been a fracture.

Yes.
But that is also not sure.
No, no, but I thought that doctors could feel that just like that.

The statement but I thought that doctors could feel that just like that (turn 4) shows that
the patient requests the consultation because of his expectations about the doctors medical
expertise. The doctor does not completely live up to these expectation: he cannot
determine for sure whether the patient suffered from an inguinal rupture in the past (turns
1 and 3). Nonetheless, the doctor possesses the knowledge and expertise to judge whether
and with how much certainty he can diagnose the possible fracture. Contrastingly, the
patient requested the consultation because he lacks the medical expertise to diagnose the
problem himself.
The asymmetry in medical knowledge and expertise between the doctor and the
patient can influence the acceptability of the doctors argumentation. A patient might find
argumentation on medical issues presented by a doctor more acceptable than the same
argumentation presented by someone who is not a doctor. The authority of the discussion

The examples in this contribution are obtained from the database compiled by the Netherlands Institute for
Health Services Research (transcriptions and translations from Dutch, RP).

1131

party on the issue under discussion then renders his argumentation more acceptable (see
also Walton, 1996, p. 64).
The potential effect that a speakers authority has on the acceptability of his
argumentation has already been studied in classical rhetoric. The rhetorical term ethos is
used to denote the persuasiveness of a persons character. This term stems from Aristotle
(The art of rhetoric, I2-1356a), who distinguishes it from pathos (the persuasiveness of
emotions) and logos (the persuasiveness of examples or enthymemes). Traditionally, a
distinction is made between ethos derived from a persons expertise (what one knows)
and ethos derived from his status (what one is) (Tindale, 2011, p. 343). From a
rhetorical perspective, the doctors medical expertise contributes to his ethos in the first
sense: ethos derived from what the doctor knows.
The doctor can also be expected to possess ethos in the second sense: ethos derived
from his status. Even though the doctors role in medical consultation has changed since
the 1960s from a paternalistic one to one in which he acts as the patients guide (Helmes,
Bowen & Bengel, 2002, p. 150), doctors possess professional status due to their advisory
role on issues of medicine.
Because of their professional status, doctors can be expected to provide medical
advice that is in the patients best interest. In case 2, the doctor makes this explicit after an
apparently hypochondriac patient expresses doubt about the way in which doctors practise
medicine.
Case 2
Excerpt of an argumentative discussion between a doctor (D) and a patient (P) who
complains about doctors
1
2
3

D: You know, we truly try our utmost to do it as well as possible for you [] And you do
have to trust on that.
P: Yes.
D: Because that really is the case.

In this excerpt, the doctor makes explicit that she and her colleagues do everything in their
power to adequately diagnose and advise the patient (turn 1). This is a rather exceptional
situation: characteristically, doctors do not make their good intentions explicit in the
consultation; these intentions are simply presupposed. Codes of conduct, such as the
Hippocratic Oath and the Declaration of Geneva, provide for them. The doctors
professional status, thus, generally provides him with existing ethos. Nevertheless, in case
2, the patient complaints about doctors, which leads the doctor to assure that there is no
need for distrusting them (turn 1).2

The doctors assurance can, therefore, be reconstructed as an attempt to (re-)establish her ethos. In the next
section, I shall analyse (re-)established ethos as acquired ethos.

1132

3. ACQUIRED ETHOS
For the analysis of a discussion partys ethos, it is necessary to distinguish between the
ethos that the party possesses at the start of the argumentative discourse and the ethos that
he acquires during this discourse. A discussion party can acquire ethos during the
discourse by demonstrating his authority, expertise, knowledge, professionalism, status or
trustworthiness (I was just advising a colleague on how he could better consult his client
when it occurred to me that ). The persuasiveness of the partys ethos then depends on
the manner in which he builds ethos in the discussion, not simply on the ethos that is
already in place.
As these ways in which a discussion party can come to possess ethos affect the
discourse differently, I shall make the analytical distinction between acquired ethos
(built in the discourse) and existing ethos (already in place at the start of the discourse).
This distinction is similar to Aristotles ideas on persuasive means in oratory. He
distinguishes between artistic proofs (entechnoi pisteis; sometimes also translated as
intrinsic proofs or technical proofs) and inartistic ones (atechnoi pisteis; also extrinsic
proofs or non-technical proofs). The artistic proofs are the verbal persuasive means that
the speaker uses within the discourse, while the inartistic proofs are the persuasive means
that exist independently of the speaker. So, acquired ethos corresponds with Aristotles
concept of artistic proofs, while existing ethos with his concept of inartistic proofs.
Case 3 illustrates how a doctor can acquire ethos in a medical consultation. The
example consists of a fragment of a Dutch paediatric consult in which the paediatrician is
in the process of diagnosing a toddler with behavioural and developmental problems.
Case 3
Excerpt of an argumentative discussion between a doctor (D), who is a paediatrician, and
the mother (M) of a toddler with behavioural and developmental problems
1

2
3

D: Theres, yeah, theres a very small indication [that there is an anomaly] in that [the childs]
digestion, but they [the lab] say we can only determine or see that if we do an additional
blood test.
M: But that, that it wouldnt function well or, or, how do I erm
D: Roughly speaking, erm, you have to think about that. That theres a small mistake
somewhere there in the digestion which, erm, could explain the problems. But, Ive got to
say, I think its but a tiny indication. I dont think like Oh, now, thats fantastic; weve
found something and, erm, we can work with that. Im like Well, yeah, its an
indication and Im like, well, god, if you do such a test and so youve already done those
steps, and if they [the lab] advise that its a good bunch that checks that then Id be
tempted to do that in any case.

In case 3, the doctor implicitly puts forward the standpoint that the mother should let her
daughter undergo an additional blood test: in turn 1, she asserts They [the lab] say we can
only determine or see that if we do an additional blood test and she subsequently agrees
with this by stating Id be tempted to do that in any case in turn 3. From the reasons that
the doctor provides for this advice in turn 3 (If you get such a test, and so you already did
those steps, and if they advise that and its a good bunch of people that checks that), it
1133

appears that the doctor assumes the mother is hesitant to adopt her advice otherwise
there would be no need for the presented argumentation.
In this consultation, the doctor acquires ethos by showing that she is
knowledgeable about problems in the digestive system. After the mother indicates that she
does not fully understand what it means for her daughter to have an anomaly in her
digestion (But that, that it wouldnt function well or, or, how do I erm, in turn 2), the
doctor explains what such an anomaly could amount to (theres a small mistake
somewhere there in the digestion which, erm, could explain the problems, in turn 3) and
tells the mother with how much certainty she can say the daughter suffers from this
anomaly (I think its but a tiny indication, in turn 3).
The doctor, of course, also possesses existing ethos because of her medical
knowledge. She, in fact, acquires ethos in the consultation by making explicit that she
possesses existing ethos. However, for the analysis, I shall consider making explicit
existing ethos or reinforcing existing ethos as a way of acquiring ethos. Determining
whether the acquired ethos is indeed grounded in a discussion partys existing ethos is
namely a matter for the evaluation, not the analysis in fact, the evaluation needs to be
conducted based on the analysis. As it is possible that the discussion partys acquired ethos
is not grounded in his actual existing ethos (for instance, because he is boasting), the ethos
that he claims to have should not automatically be taken for granted in the analysis.
Furthermore, the doctor also acquires ethos by demonstrating that she is
considerate in providing her advice (Im like Well, yeah, its an indication and Im like,
well, god, if you do such a test and so youve already done those steps, and if they [the
lab] advise that its a good bunch that checks that then Id be tempted to do that in any
case, in turn 3). By emphasising that, given the circumstances, it makes sense to let the
child patient undergo an additional blood test, she demonstrates her practical wisdom
and appeals to that of the mother.
Additionally, by saying Id be tempted to do that in any case (turn 3) the doctor
makes explicit that she has the patients best interests at heart. If she herself would be
tempted to let her own child undergo the additional test if she were in the mothers
position, then surely it is best to let the child patient undergo this test. The doctors earlier
remark that theres a very small indication [that there is an anomaly] in that [the childs]
digestion, but they [the lab] say we can only determine or see that if we do an additional
blood test (turn 1) functions in the same way. It implies that the doctor has done
everything in her power to examine whether there is an anomaly in the patients digestion,
but the only way in which this can be determined for sure is by letting the patient undergo
an additional blood test. In these contributions, the doctor can be said to build ethos by
stressing her goodwill.
4. ARGUMENT FROM AUTHORITY
Acquired or existing ethos should not be confused with authority argumentation. In
authority argumentation, a discussion party presents the opinion of a supposed authority
on the issue under discussion as a sign of the acceptability of his standpoint (van Eemeren
and Grootendorst, 1992, p.163; and Garssen, 1997, p.11). The idea behind this type of
argumentation is that the opinion referred to in the argumentation indicates the
1134

acceptability of the standpoint because the opinion shows that an authority on the
discussion topic agrees with the standpoint in question. Figure 1 provides a representation
of the argument scheme of authority argumentation.
Figure 1
The argument scheme of authority argumentation
1
1.1
1.1

X is the case.
Authority A is of the opinion that X.
As opinion indicates that X is the case.

In this scheme, the standpoint (1) X is the case is supported by the premises Authority
A is of the opinion that X (the minor premise, 1.1) and As opinion indicates that X is
acceptable (the major premise, 1.1). In this scheme, X could be any proposition
(descriptive, evaluative, inciting). An example of an authority argument would be: I
advise you to undergo psychosomatic physiotherapy, as I am sure youll benefit from it.
It should be noted that, in an authority argument, the authority referred to does not have to
make explicit his opinion as such; instead, the opinion could be inferred from his
behaviour, experiences, preferences, questions, remarks, etcetera. This is the case in the
example: I advise you to undergo psychosomatic physiotherapy, as I have very positive
experiences with it.
From a pragma-dialectical perspective, authority argumentation is a subtype of the
main type of symptomatic argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 163;
Garssen, 1997, p. 11). In symptomatic argumentation, a discussion party presents that
which is claimed in the argument as a sign of that which is claimed in the standpoint. For
authority argumentation, this main scheme can be specified by regarding the authoritys
opinion as the sign of the acceptability of the standpoint.
By presenting premises 1.1 (Authority A is of the opinion that X) and 1.1 (As
opinion indicates that X is the case) of an authority argument, the discussion party
performs the speech act of asserting.3 To felicitously perform this speech act, the
discussion party needs to fulfil the sincerity condition that he believes the asserted
proposition to be true (Searle, 1969, pp.66-67). A discussion party who presents authority
argumentation can, hence, be held accountable for believing that the supposed authority
really possesses authority on the subject matter and can be held accountable for viewing
this authoritys opinion as a sign of the acceptability of the standpoint. He therefore needs
to take on the burden of proof for these premises if the antagonist indicates doubt about or
opposition to them (Tell me why you are an authority on this matter or But why does
this prove your point?).
Herein lies the difference between authority argumentation on the one hand, and
acquired and existing ethos on the other. In contrast to an authority argument, a discussion
3

In practice, a discussion party does not always make both premises explicit. If one of them is left implicit,
it can be made explicit based on the concept of logical validity and pragmatic principles (van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 1992, pp.60-72). The unexpressed element is, then, reconstructed as an indirect assertion, to
which the discussion party can be held committed.

1135

partys ethos does not support a specific (sub-)standpoint. The partys ethos is, in fact,
potentially persuasive on all levels of the argumentation, influencing the effectiveness of
every proposition that he puts forward. For that reason, a discussion party does not have a
burden of proof for the justificatory force of his ethos. After all, he does not claim that his
ethos is a sign of the acceptability of the standpoint. This is in stark contrast with the
burden of proof that a discussion party has for authority argumentation, since he commits
himself to the premise Authority As opinion indicates that X is the case by presenting
this argument.
In the extant literature, the authority that a discussion party refers to in an authority
argument is typically an external source such as an expert in the field, a dictionary or an
official institution (Walton, 1997, pp. 63-90). The argument takes the form He should
change his diet, because the dietician said so and, if a dietician says so, then that must be
the case. In case 3, the doctor presents such an authority argument. In this consultation,
the doctor refers to the advice of the laboratory in support of the standpoint that the child
patient should undergo an additional blood test (They [the lab] advise that its a good
bunch that checks that in turn 3). Figure 2 provides a reconstruction of this argument.
Figure 2
Reconstruction of the doctors argument from authority in case 3
(1)
(You [the mother] should let your daughter undergo an additional blood test.)
(1).1 They [the lab] advise that.
((1).1) (If the lab advises you to let your daughter undergo an additional blood test, then
you should let your daughter undergo this test.)

Following the pragma-dialectical terminology for authority arguments in which the

referred to authority is an external source, I shall call these arguments more specifically
arguments from authority (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 163; Garssen, 1997,
p. 11).
5. ARGUMENT BY AUTHORITY
Instead of referring to an external source in an authority argument, a discussion party can
also present himself as the authoritative source in this type of argumentation. For instance,
in the authority argument in case 4, the doctor refers to himself as the authority. The
example is taken from a consultation about, amongst other things, the patients atheroma
cyst (a slow-growing, non-cancerous tumour or swelling of the skin) in a Dutch general
practice.
Case 4
Excerpt of an argumentative discussion between a doctor (D) and a patient (P) about the
removal of the patients atheroma cyst;

1136

1
2
3

P: And then I wanted to ask something else right away.

D: Yes?
P: Is it possible to get a referral note to the hospital for that lump on my head or, ehm, do I
just have to let it be done by you here?
4 D: Well, you dont have to do anything, but
5 P: No, the point is, yeah, my mother had had it removed in the hospital and she says Dear,
go to the same, it
6 D: I think that I can do it just as well as and perhaps even better than those people at the
hospital. It was such a, such a, such an atheroma cyst on your head, wasnt it?
7 P: Yeah, it becomes yes, my mother, she, ehm, she brings it up every day of course
8 D: Well
9 P: Yes
10 D: You dont have to let it be removed by me, but Im telling you, to be sure, I can do it just
as well as someone at the hospital. Ive removed a dozen of those things and its, in itself,
a piece of cake.
11 P: Yes.

In case 4, the doctor implicitly advises the patient to let the atheroma cyst on his head be
removed by the doctor himself, rather than at the hospital. Even though the doctor does not
present his advice explicitly he, in fact, emphasises that it is up to the patient to decide
by whom to let the cyst be removed (turn 4) the doctors advice can be inferred from his
reactions to the patients request for a referral note (turn 3). The doctor points out that
there is no need for such a referral: he could perform the surgery just as well as and
perhaps even better than they could do at the hospital (turn 6). The doctor indeed argues
that he has a lot of experience with removing atheroma cysts (turn 10).
The doctors argument that he could remove the atheroma cyst just as well as and
perhaps even better than the people at the hospital constitutes an authority argument. The
doctor namely explicitly emphasises his expertise in removing the atheroma cyst in
support of the advice that the patient should let him remove the cyst, thereby presenting
his authority on this matter as an indication of the acceptability of his advice.4 The
argument can be reconstructed as follows (figure 3).
Figure 3
Reconstruction of the doctors argument by authority in case 4
(It is advisable to let me [the general practitioner] remove the patients atheroma
cyst.)
(1). 1 I can remove an atheroma cyst just as well as, and perhaps even better than, people
at the hospital.
((1).1) (If I can remove an atheroma cyst just as well as, and perhaps even better than,
people at the hospital, then the patient should let me remove his atheroma cyst.)
(1)

The doctor also draws a comparison between the medical professionals at the hospital and himself (just as
well as and perhaps even better than). As the comparison is part of the authority argument and I focus on
the way in which the authority argument supports the standpoint, I shall refrain from analysing this
comparison.

1137

The authority argument in case 4 differs from the argument from authority in case 3. In
case 4, the doctor refers to his own authority, whereas, in case 3, she refers to the authority
of an external source (the lab). In order to accurately analyse these different forms of
authority argumentation, I shall distinguish between them by using the term argument by
authority exclusively for the kind of authority argumentation in which the authority
referred to is the discussion party that presents the argumentation (as in case 4) and
argument from authority exclusively for the kind in which the authority referred to is a
source outside of the discussion (as in case 3).
6. AUTHORITY IN PRACTICE
The distinction between existing ethos, acquired ethos, the argument from authority and
the argument by authority is an analytical one, meaning that it is necessary for an adequate
analysis of (the use of) authority in argumentative discourse: by using this distinction, it
can be analysed how the authority of a particular source influences the discussion
outcome. In turn, this analysis provides the basis for the soundness evaluation of (the use
of) authority. For example, analysing a discussion contribution as an argument by
authority means that the discussion party can be held accountable for claiming that his
authority indicates the acceptability of his standpoint. As a consequence, evading the
burden of proof for this claim should be evaluated as fallacious.
In practice, the analytically distinct ways in which authority can influence the
outcome of an argumentative discussion might coincide. For example, in case 1b, which is
a continuation of the argumentative discussion between the doctor and patient from case
1a, the doctor acquires ethos by affirming part of the existing ethos that the patient
ascribes to him.
Case 1b
Excerpt of an argumentative discussion between a doctor (D) and a patient (P) about the
patients possible inguinal rupture
4
5
6
7
8
9

P: No, no, but I thought that doctors could feel that [an inguinal hernia] just like that.
D: If it really is a big fracture, then you can see it just like that.
P: Yeah.
D: I mean, then, then I can do it with my eyes closed.
P: Oh.
A: But if something is really small, then you sometimes just miss it. So its a doubtful
case then. But okay, so you keep having problems with it and we dont actually
know what it is, because I havent felt that it was a fracture for sure. If it were a
clear fracture, then Id have felt it. True.

In case 1b, the patient makes clear that he expected doctors to be able to simply feel an
inguinal hernia by means of a physical examination in the consultation (turn 4). So, he
believes the doctors existing ethos to consist of the expertise to constitute whether a
patient suffers from an inguinal rupture. In reaction to this, the doctor plays down the
extent to which doctors possess expertise on this issue: they cannot always diagnose such
1138

a rupture with certainty (But if something is really small, then you sometimes just miss it.
So its a doubtful case then, turn 9). The doctor nonetheless affirms that, in case of a big
fracture, they can see it just like that (turn 5) or, at least, he can (I mean, then, then I
can do it with my eyes closed, turn 7). The doctor, thereby, reinforces the idea that he is
competent on diagnosing inguinal hernias. This reinforcement can be analysed as a way of
acquiring ethos; after all, the doctor does not simply depend on his existing ethos, but feels
the need to stress this ethos by stating he can diagnose a big inguinal rupture with closed
eyes. Thus, the doctors existing ethos and acquired ethos coincide. In fact, for acquired
ethos (and also for an argument by authority), it is imperative that the discussion party
possesses the authority that he claims to have in the discourse. Since this authority can be
reconstructed as his existing ethos, the party needs to possess the acclaimed existing ethos
for convincingly arguing by authority and using acquired ethos.
The analytical distinction between the ways in which authority can influence
discussion outcomes can, in practice, also be blurred because a discussion party can
acquire ethos by presenting an argument by authority or an argument from authority. In
case of an argument by authority, the discussion partys authority as referred to in the
argument could influence the acceptability of his later contributions to the discourse, even
though the discussion party does not specifically present his authority in support of them.
The doctors argument I advise you to undergo psychosomatic physiotherapy, as I have
very positive experiences with it could, for instance, function in this way. Before the
doctor presents this argument, the patient might not be aware of his experience with
psychosomatic physiotherapy. In such a situation, the argument brings the doctors
experience to light, which can positively affect the doctors subsequent contributions
(With all his experience, he must know what hes talking about).
In case of an argument from authority, the fact that the discussion party refers to
the authority of an external source could acquire ethos in a similar manner. The party can
show that he is knowledgeable (Im familiar with the work of Aristotle) or that he is
well connected (I know these experts) by presenting an argument from authority (The
practice of medicine should be regarded as a practical art, since Aristotle considered it as
such or The bird flu virus can cause a worldwide pandemic, as my colleagues from
virology showed at our research colloquium).
Although the ways in which authority can influence a discussion outcome can
overlap in practice, it is necessary to analytically separate them. Each way provides the
discussion party with distinct possibilities for strategic manoeuvring, due to differences in
directness and the burden of proof it places on the party. These differences should be made
clear to adequately evaluate the soundness of (the use of) authority in argumentative
discourse.
7. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I proposed a fourfold analytical distinction between the ways in which
authority can influence the outcome of an argumentative discussion. These ways are
outlined in figure 4.

1139

Figure 4
Four ways in which authority can influence the outcome of an argumentative discussion
Existing ethos:

The discussion partys authority that is in place at the start of the

argumentative discussion.

Acquired ethos:

The discussion partys authority that he constructs during the

argumentative discussion, but that he does not present in support of a
specific (sub-)standpoint.

Argument from
authority:

The argument in which a discussion party refers to an external sources

authority to support a specific (sub-)standpoint.

Argument by authority:

The argument in which a discussion party refers to his own authority to

support a specific (sub-)standpoint.

Based on this fourfold distinction, the doctors authority on medical matters can be
expected to influence the outcome of an argumentative discussion in medical consultation
in the following ways. First of all, the doctors existing ethos can positively influence the
patients evaluation of his argumentation about the health problem at issue. After all, the
patient regards the doctor as an authority on health problems otherwise he would not
have requested a consultation by the doctor. Additionally, the patient might ascribe
existing ethos to the doctor because of the doctors status as a medical professional.
Secondly, the doctor can acquire ethos during the medical consultation. By his discussion
contributions, he might, for instance, demonstrate that he is trustworthy or that he
possesses the necessary medical knowledge and expertise to deal with the patients health
problem. Thirdly, the doctor can refer to his authority to make a medical advice (or parts
thereof) acceptable by means of an argument by authority. The doctor then presents his
authority as an indication of the acceptability of the medical advice or parts thereof.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Frans van Eemeren and Nanon Labrie for their help. The proposed
fourfold distinction is based on personal communication with Frans van Eemeren, and
Nanon Labrie drew my attention to the medical consultation of case 1a and 1b.

REFERENCES
Aristotle. Ars rhetorica [The art of rhetoric]. Trans. Lawson-Tancred, H.C. (2004). London: Penguin Books.
Council Directive 93/16/EEC of 5 April 1993 to facilitate the free movement of doctors and the mutual
recognition of their diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications. Retrieved
from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0016:EN:HTML on
9 September 2014.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication, and fallacies: A pragmadialectical perspective. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

1140

Garssen, B.J. (1997). Argumentatieschemas in pragma-dialectisch perspectief: Een theoretisch en

empirisch onderzoek [Argument schemes from a pragma-dialectical perspective: A theoretical and
empirical investigation]. Amsterdam: IFOTT.
Helmes, A.W., Bowen, D.J., & Bengel, J. (2002). Patient preferences of decision-making in the context of
genetic testing for breast cancer risk. Genetics in Medicine 4, 150-157.
Pilnick, A., & Dingwall, R. (2011). On the remarkable persistence of asymmetry in doctor/patient
interaction: A critical review. Social Science & Medicine 72, 1374-1382.
Searle, J.R. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Tindale, C.W. (2011). Character and knowledge: Learning from the speech of experts. Argumentation 25(3),
341-353.
Walton, D. (1996). Argument schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Inc.
Walton, D. (1997). Appeal to expert opinion: Arguments from authority. University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press.

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Death Ppenalty Ffor Tthe Down's Ssyndrome Polish Ccultural

Ssymbols Iin Ddiscussion Aabout IVF Aand Aabortion
Piotr H. Lewinski
PIOTR H. LEWISKI
Institute of Polish Philology
University of Wrocaw
Poland
phl@uni.wroc.pl

ABSTRACT: A basic unit of analysis of ideological systems is a generalized axiological proposition, in

which as arguments serve cultural and ideological objects, which have a culturally developed interpretation
and convey the subsets of assigned values. The objective of this paper is to present how such objects
constitute the base of the discourse. Analysis of chosen texts reveals, how at every stage of argumentation
arguers create ideological systems by adopting different ascriptions to cultural objects.
KEYWORDS: abortion, axiological argumentation, collective symbols, cultural objects, ideology, IVF.

1. INTRODUCTION
The discussion concerning IVF and abortion has lasted in Poland for over 20 years and it
still occupies the first pages and covers of many periodicals. Both adherents of these
procedures and their opponents are swing from one extreme to the other using fallacious
arguments which explore collective symbols that allow the arguers to play on audiences
emotions. The stimulus for the following paper was an article under the meaningful title:
Death penalty for the Down's syndrome (Dueholm, 2013). The following is an excerpt of
the aforementioned article:
The war against people with the Down's syndrome () just because they look differently, they score
lower on the IQ tests, and sometimes they have different diseases, has begun long time ago. The
twentieth century has been defiled by their institutionalized extermination on a vast scale, initiated
by the action of eugenicists in such enlightened countries as the United Kingdom, the
Scandinavian countries, the United States, and the most well-known and effective one Germany.
The 1933 law of the Third Reich allowed for the sterilization of mentally disabled people of German
nationality, including those with Down syndrome. Later, in the period from 1939 to 1944, disabled
people were killed as part of T4. The process of their elimination began precisely from killing
children. Some of them were typed for termination by midwives, soon after their birth. Some
disabled people died killed by injection, others poisoned with gas, and still others were starved to
death ().

Hence the number of discussions on the subject is increasing. Conservative arguments of

the IVF and abortion opponents radicalized to the extent that most of the protagonists
forgot for what they are really aiming. What counts for them is just the victory, not the
satisfying solution of this complex problem. Therefore, Polish discussion on IVF can be
described as an axiological debate, in which the participants seek to aim different
directions of attributions: pro-life or pro-choice (Walton 1999, p. 118).

1142

Works on the bioethics law in Poland were first initiated in 2007, but until now Polish
parliament was not able to adopt any conclusive regulations. In result, Poland is the sole
country in Europe where this problem is not regulated. On July 1st, 2013, however, the
Government launched a program of refunding IVF from the State budget.
In Poland, IVF as a method of treating infertility has been used with great success
for the past 27 years. For the first 20 years this method was accepted by society. However,
when the draft bill was debated in 2007, there was a sudden, unexpected shift in public
opinion that favored the drastic reduction or elimination of IVF.
2. AXIOLOGICAL ARGUMENTATION
Axiological argumentation refers to issues which usually concern matters of ethics,
politics, or aesthetics. Aristotle in Topics identifies reasonable beliefs called endoxa,
accepted things, accepted opinions. These opinions are formed on the basis of the
general axiological dogmas Q (X), which evaluate real objects (X) by assigning them a
value (Q) in a way acceptable for specific social group as a product of their culture.
Ideology is understood as a relatively ordered collection of generalized axiological
dogmas recognized as legitimate by a social group. These beliefs have a predicative
internal structure, that is to say, the subject of arguments are cultural objects (X), which are
different phenomena in the cultural space (i.e. persons, institutions, actions, events,
processes, etc.), whereas values and commitments (Q) assigned to the objects serve for
predicates (Awdiejew 2008, p. 130). The entire set of generalized axiological dogmas can
be written as an ordered list of accepted evaluations and in such way it represents ideology.
For example, in the Christian system of values, such cultural objects as: LIFE, CHILD, and
HUMAN BEING occur as arguments in the beliefs:
The most valuable thing is life.
VALUE: <Q> IT IS GOOD (<X> LIFE)
COMMITMENT: PROTECT (LIFE)
Children are persons, not subpersons, and are entitled to all human rights that are
necessary to protect them from the beginning of their existence.
VALUE: TO BE (X1: A CHILD, X2: PERSON)
COMMITMENT: RECEIVE ETHICAL TREATMENT (CHILD)
The beliefs establishing such a collection are considered by speakers as a set of axioms
which do not require any proof. Ideology, in opposition to theory, does not have a strict
internal logical order, and it creates a modular system, in which the relationships between
modules are not clearly defined. Therefore, it is possible to ascribe to it any desirable
subset of values (dissoi logoi).
Since there are no ethical universals, the concepts of good and evil are quite
relative, and they depend on the implemented system of values. According to Aleksy
Awdiejew, the basis of axiological argumentation is formed by generalized axiological
beliefs, which are universal reference values in the process of dialectical reasoning.
Procedure of such argumentation consists of three stages (Awdiejew 2008, pp. 132-133):

1143

a.
b.)
c.)

) Establishing of a general axiological base, which serves as a general rule of

inference. Such a database is represented by a generalized belief.
The application of qualifying statement linking up an individual object (x) with the
universal class (X).
Transfer of the values assigned to X to the individual object x the conclusion.

While the arguments of the generalized axiological dogmas are cultural objects, the
arguments of the individual statements (xn) are real existing things. As a result of such
reference the universal values Q are transferred to the real object x, in other words, its
social evaluation occurs.
According to Michael Fleischer, the cultural objects are universals operating in a
particular culture. That culture extracts and evaluates them as representations of beliefs.
This types of objects are the carriers of conceptualizations of the cultural reality and
interpreters that allow to understand it. Michael Fleischer assigns to such objects the role
of collective symbols, which he defines as follows:
Collective symbol is a set of signs with intricate and fully developed interpretant. For this reason
they manifest the cultural meanings, depending on the particular manifestation of the culture, as well
as strong positive or negative values shared by the entire given culture, hence they give a frame of
reference for differentiation of values. In order to properly interpret a collective symbol, the
interpreter needs to have a particular knowledge regarding the semiotic and (most importantly) the
signifying aspects of the interpretant. This knowledge is acquired both through culturally-influenced
process of socialization, as well as by means of communication within the culture's discourse, which
allows the participant to adequately communicate in his interdiscourse. The cultural meaning is most
often quite different from the lexical, linguistic one. The collective symbols are the most important
elements of interdiscourse. (Fleischer 2002, p. 43)

Collective symbols are internally differentiated and they consist of three counterparts:
a.)
b.)
c.)

kernel, very stable, functionally responsible for consistency of the symbol and its
anchoring in a given culture;
up-to-date area, responsible for the particular meaning in the society of a given
culture;
connotative area, responsible for the dependency of the symbol on the natural
language and lexical meanings. (Fleischer 2007, pp. 256-257)

There is also a subclass of the cultural objects, which we will call ideological objects. They
differ from the general cultural objects because even within the same culture they can
adopt different ascriptions, creating competing ideological systems, in which they are
evaluated differently. In pro-life vs. pro-choice polemics, such ideological objects as
CONCEIVED CHILD, HUMAN DIGNITY, and CONSCIENCE CLAUSE have acquired
completely new attributions.
Typically any real, individual object has an unlimited number of parameters, and
for this reason, the crux of the argument lays in a particular reduction of these parameters
and their subsequent evaluation. Biased selection of parameters can entirely change the
reference to the ideological space.

1144

3. COLLECTIVE SYMBOLS IN AXIOLOGICAL ARGUMENTATION

In the following section, I will demonstrate how the previously mentioned ideological
objects are being transformed into collective symbols, which play the role of quasiarguments in the public discourse.
3.1. Symbol #1: CONCEIVED BABY/ CHILD
The core of the symbol's function lays in the transfer of the axiology attributed to a child
perceived as a fully shaped human being to the pre-implantation forms, such as zygote,
morula, and blastula. A child is most definitely entitled to all the human rights, both
religious and civil, but the controversy arises when the same rights are sought for a ball of
cells.
3.1.1. The kernel
The kernel of the discussion is derived primarily from the teachings of the Catholic
Church. It focuses on the question whether embryo is a person or not. Undeniably a child is
a person. The problem is that in the Bible it is said that the human fetus is not only a
biological, but also a spiritual being from the early phases of its existence. However, it
never explicitly resolves if it is so from the very conception. The Dignitas Personae of
the Church also did not decide conclusively whether an embryo is a person or not, but
requests for its treating as a person entitled to human rights. Catholic bioethics say that if
we are not able to exclude the possibility that from the very beginning of the conception an
embryo is a human, we cannot risk its existence. Since we cannot prove it to be otherwise,
we shall assume that this premise is genuinely true. If so, we cannot act for the harm of the
life from its very conception. The further argument can be built as follows: as long as
every human is entitled to preservation of his own dignity, already the first human cells
should be entitled to it as well, because the dignity is not gradable - it either exists or not.
The foundation of Church's standpoint might be found in the frequent use of the
phrase she conceived and bore in the Bible, which allows to combine these two acts into
a single continuum, and therefore, to acknowledge humanness from the very moment of
conception:
So Sarah conceived and bore a son to Abraham in his old age (Genesis 21:2)
So she conceived and bore a son and said, God has taken away my reproach. (Genesis 30:23)

3.1.2. The up-to-date area

The result of such kernel is that the contemporary Catholic theology advocates
simultaneous animation. For that fact, according to Catholic theology, there are 4
evidences confirming the humanity of the embryo / fetus:
a.)
b.)

The genetic criterion - it has all the information needed for the further growth and
development;
The criterion of continuity of growth - development of the human embryo
demonstrates continuity where none of the steps can be confronted with the
previous one and it is not possible to set any threshold to when a fetus would
become a human being. The basis of continuity is founded on genotype;

1145

c.)

d.)

The criterion of identity - at any stage: zygote embryo fetus child - adult, a
human being is the same individual creature and form of entity distinct from other
ones;
The criterion of potentiality - from the very beginning children develop the qualities
that they will reveal in adulthood.

For the reasons stated above, further argumentation is formed on the following premises:
P1:
P2:
C:

The zygotes contain all of the genetic potential of human being from the very
beginning.
Thus, from the very beginning they must already be spiritual (animated) beings.
As such, they are entitled to all the attributes of humanity including personal
dignity and moral integrity. In other words, setting up a moral sense of humanity is
synonymous with the act of conception of the human being.

However, these premises constitute an incongruent combination of clearly separate threads

of argument: biological and philosophical. Biology (genetics) can only analyze the cell as
an elementary particle that is subjected to mechanisms of creation and development of
human physis, but assertions on human psyche are not within the competence of this
scientific field. The matter of integral relationship of mental factor (human soul) and the
substrate material (human body) belongs to fields of philosophy and theology.
Some data from the genetics undermines the idea of simultaneous animation. On
the one hand, the percentage of natural miscarriages is high enough to consider that the
nature itself (or the Creator) approves this mechanism, because the percentage of both reimplantation miscarriage as well as post-implantation miscarriage is extremely high. Since
the woman is not even aware that she is pregnant, the current state of knowledge is
impossible to determine, how often does the insemination of oocyte, followed by its
defective implantation in the uterus, occur. In case of post-implantation miscarriage,
research results indicate that on average 1 out of 5 inseminated cells is subject to loss after
the implementation without any noticeable symptoms for the woman.
On the other hand, in genetics laboratories it has been observed that after the
fertilization two or even more organisms can emerge from a zygote (e.g. monozygotic
twins), or vice versa two zygotes can be joined into one body.
The reasonable solution of that problem could be the idea of post-implantation
animation. According to its followers, a human being in its proper sense arises only after
the implantation of the zygote in the uterus. Pre-implantation forms of human life, namely
zygote, morula and blastula, are not entitled to the name of person. If we assume that the
main subject of protection is maternity, then the moment of nesting shall be considered as
its beginning. A mothers body can give no warranties to a fertilized cell before its nesting,
therefore separation between the act of human conception and the moment of implantation
is more precise and methodically better.
From the philosophical and theological point of view, the most important is the
problem of the soul. The Church teaches that each soul is spiritual and it is directly created
by God. The soul is not a product of parents - and it is immortal, it does not die, so after
its separation from the body at the time of one's death, it is meant to reconnect again with it
at the time of the final resurrection.
Thomas Aquinas argued in the Summa Theologica (Aquinas 1947, I, q. 90, aa. 23), that the soul cannot be created from a previously existing material substances; it cannot
1146

be derived from spiritual substances existing formerly because spiritual substances are
simple and they never transform from one to another. Therefore, the only logical
conclusion is that the soul is a direct creation of God (the soul is of the Divine substance Aquinas 1947, I, q. 90, a. 1) hence, since IVF children have received life, they also have
received souls, that is, they became the children of God, in other words, if the IVF method
brings the desired grace, it must be the will of God.
3.1.3. The connotative area
Taking for granted the personality of embryo, the pro-life protagonists have created a
newspeak which transformed cultural object CONCEIVED CHILD into biased, loaded
term evaluating proponents and opponents in public debate. Creating such a facility is the
base of ideological discussion. The names of different pro-life associations and movements
show the variants of the basic symbol:
Polish Association of Defenders of Human Life;
Crusade of Prayer for Defense of Conceived Children;
Spiritual Adoption of a Conceived Children Endangered by Extinction.
Use of the object CONCEIVED CHILD as a discursive symbol creates new kind of
newspeak that implies phrases and metaphors making any argumentation pointless, i.e.:
gynecologists performing IVF are called the Nazis and murderers; women who decide
for IVF kill their children, they are murderers of the unborn children; abortion is
killing a defenseless, unborn children, and children themselves are breaking out of the
mother's womb or murdered before their birth, and they beget the army of martyrs.
Other peculiar metaphors that appear in Polish bishops sermons: to conceive a child by
IVF causes the death of his brothers and sisters in an embryonic state (bishop Kazimierz
Grny); IVF is shadow of Herod (bishop Piotr Libera), conception in a test tube means
implementing the idea of Frankenstein (bishop Tadeusz Pieronek).
3.1.4. Summary
The collective symbol CONCEIVED CHILD is convenient in argumentation, because it
allows for numerous fallacies, such as loaded language and false analogy. For example,
when professor gynecologist Waldemar Kuczyski, argued that the freezing is not harmful
for the embryos, his opponent, pro-life journalist Mariusz Dzierawski, replied using
astonishing analogy:
The good ones survive, and the bad ones (those which did not survive the procedure) are simply
thrown away. This kind of reasoning can be compared to the logics of slave traffickers. The good
black slaves survived the trip across the Atlantic on the slave boats, the bad ones were thrown into
the ocean.

Conversely, Professor Krzysztof ukaszuk, director of Infertility Treatment Clinic in

Gdask, said in an interview with Micha Wsowski:
Problem with IVF is that someone came up with the idea that a man is created at the time of his
conception. But we should be aware that 3/4 of conceived pregnancies end within the fifth week.
From the Churchs point of view it means that God forbids 3/4 of the population to go to heaven.

1147

Thus, if the embryo is not a person, contraception, early (pre-implementation) abortion,

and the freezing of embryos in IVF process shall not be treated as actions insulting human
dignity. The phrase a man is a person since his inception and therefore he has the right to
live belongs to the pastoral discourse.
3.2. Symbol #2: DIGNITY
In general, dignity is a concept used in axiological discussions, both religious and secular,
to signify that someone has an innate right to be valued and receive ethical treatment. In
European culture, human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.
The defense of human rights and a justice system, based on the full respect of human dignity, is a
key part of our shared European values (Jerzy Buzek, European Parliament President, 10 October,
2009).

3.2.1. The kernel

Extremely stable, well-anchored in the European culture, supported by quotations from the
Bible, international law, and the most prominent philosophers (endoxa). The Catechism of
the Catholic Church says:
The dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the image and likeness of God (article
1); it is fulfilled in his vocation to divine beatitude (article 2). It is essential to a human being freely
to direct himself to this fulfillment (article 3). (Catechism 2003, 1700)

Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union affirms the
inviolability of the human dignity.
The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but constitutes the real
basis of fundamental rights.

3.2.2. The up-to-date area

Although dignity is one of fundamental human rights, the definition of the term is vague,
i.e. The Encyclopedia of Bioethics defines the primary sense in which human dignity is
invoked today as an attribute of all human beings that establishes their great significance
or worth (Encyclopedia, p. 1193).
Most of discourses left the term undefined, and they do not precise the difference
between having dignity, having an awareness of dignity, exhibiting dignity, or being
treated with dignity. The Encyclopedia reads:
because human dignity can be invoked on both sides of various issues, there is a pressing need for
those who use that term to clarify what they mean by it. At some point they also need to defend the
plausibility of the anthropological creed that underlies their view. (Encyclopedia, p. 1198)

In public discourse, dignity is treated as an autotelic value and an indispensable condition

for other values, such as freedom and personal autonomy. However, it usually works as an
ideological object. Steven Pinker (2008) argues that the concept of dignity is pointless. It is
too subjective, and thus it is relative, fungible, and harmful, because people and cultures
keep disagreeing on a variety of behaviors, and it is questionable whether those who
engage in some of them are acting in a dignified manner, or not.

1148

A scheme of the dignity-based argument against IVF:

P1:
P2:
C:

Human dignity is an intrinsic property possessed by all human beings by nature.

IVF violates dignity of embryo.
IVF is immoral.

For example:
IVF does not respect human dignity of embryo the human being at an early stage of life, because
in the act of creation it does not take into account the will of God, who is forced by man to
perform the act of giving new life. The man - the physician in the laboratory, puts himself in the
position of the life-giver. (Sadowska, 2007, p. 2)

In case of such argument the most important critical question is: is it possible for a man to
force God to do anything?
3.2.3. The connotative area
The spiritual consequences of neglecting the embryo's humanity and personality in IVF are
characterized as a lack of respect of the conceived child's freedom, autonomy, uniqueness,
and right to be loved from the moment of conception.
According to the pro-life followers, infertile couples practicing IVF methods do not
treat the child as a person, but as an object which can be bought for a sufficiently large sum
of money. Archbishop Jzef Michalik, in the sermon during the procession of Corpus
Christi in 2013, said that IVF experiments are associated with sin of breaking the laws of
nature. The bishops wrote that the good can never be achieved by dishonorable means.
They regard IVF as one of these dishonorable methods, because under the laboratory
conditions of the conception, siblings of an IVF child are killed or frozen. According to
the episcopate, IVF crushes human dignity and human rights.
3.2.4. Summary
DIGNITY is a convenient ideological object that allows one to justify the desire to act in
accordance with concepts, which are widely believed to be morally right. This desire is
understood de dicto and not de re, due to the lack of a precise definition of the term.
In our culture, argument from dignity is always valid, yet in fact it is not sound, because
one of its premises is constituted by the collective symbol.
3.3. Symbol #3: CONSCIENCE PROTECTION
Conscience is an intuitive ability, which allows humans to judge the value of
actions/deeds, both past ones, and those yet to come. It is not only the theoretical
knowledge about the good and the evil, but also the practical skill to assert that something
was, is, or will be, either good, or bad. Conscience of a person might mean an internalized
set of norms, values, moral beliefs, and attitudes, which form that persons moral spine,
defining his/her integrity and individuality.

1149

3.3.1. The kernel

In Catholic theology, the voice of conscience is Gods voice, which manifests Gods
commandments, and to which one should be absolutely obedient. The Catechism of the
Catholic Church says that:
By his deliberate actions (article 4), the human person does, or does not, conform to the good
promised by God and attested by moral conscience (article 5). (Catechism, 1700)

Man is obliged to follow the moral law, which urges him to do what is good and avoid
what is evil (Catechism 2003, 1713). This law makes itself heard in his conscience.
The Second Vatican Council, in the constitution Gaudium et Spes, followed by John
Paul II in his Veritatis Splendor encyclical, states that Conscience is the most secret
core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, Whose voice echoes in his
depths. (Gaudium 1965, 16,9).
3.3.2. The up-to-date area
Conscience understood in this way determines moral identity. Often it is also attributed
with vital importance expressed through the order to respect someones conscience. When
we say that a certain decision is a question of someones conscience, we intend to say, it
cannot be forced from outside, but it should come from personal moral beliefs of that
person. On the grounds of this principle, we can draw the following scheme of argument
from the conscience:
P1:
P2:

C:

Some deeds, intentions, personality traits, rules are good/ just or bad/ unjust.
Person P with particular capabilities Cap, being under certain conditions Cond,
directly, in a non-inferential way recognizes the moral feature M of the evaluated
thing.
The recognized value M gives a reason to perform action A or sustain from it.

This attitude is reflected for instance in the Polish law (art. 39 Act on the Profession of
Doctor and Dentist, December 5, 1996) which states that a doctor can withhold from
performing a medical practice inconsistent with his conscience.
However, on May 25, 2014, three thousand Polish healthcare workers signed a
Declaration of Faith, in which they have recognized the precedence of divine law over
human law, and the necessity to resist imposed anti-humanitarian ideologies of modern
civilization. By signing it, doctors and medical students stated that they will not perform
treatments contrary to their Catholic conscience. The statement that the human body and
life are the gifts of God is a key element of the declaration: they are sacred and inviolable
and consequently the conception and the descent of human depend only on the decision of
God. If such a decision is to be taken by a man by committing acts such as abortion,
contraception, euthanasia, or artificial insemination, he violates not only the basic principle
of the Decalogue, but also discards the very Creator.
The Declaration, despite its name of the Declaration of Faith, essentially refers
not as much to the teachings of Christ, as to the doctrine of the Catholic Church.
Adversaries of the declaration point out to the fact that out of six points of the document,
five prevents performing the profession of doctor, and they call the document statement

1150

of bigotry. They also underline that the document violates not only the principles of
Hippocratic oath, but also the Polish law.
According to the Family Planning, Protection of Human Fetus, and Conditions of
Permissible Abortion Act, abortion is legal in three cases: when the pregnancy threatens
life or health of the woman, when it is a consequence of a criminal act, or if the fetus is
severely and irreversibly damaged. According to the previously mentioned act, a doctor
can withhold from performing a medical procedure being contrary with his/her conscience,
though he/she is obliged to indicate a viable possibility to receive the treatment from
another practitioner or at another healthcare facility. Moreover, this fact has to be recorded
in the medical records. Additionally, every doctor is obliged act in any case in which delay
of aid could cause death, severe damage of the body, or any other severe health disorders.
3.3.3. The connotative area
Meanwhile, there is an increasing number of cases in which the medical aid is being
denied, based on the reference to the conscience protection. These are some of the
examples of usage of the ideological object CONSCIENCE PROTECTION, as quasiarguments:
a.
b.
c.

) A gynecologist from the hospital in Nisko who claimed that the pregnancy
resulting from rape is not a gynecological problem, but rather a psychological one.
) A doctor from a hospital in Krakw who refused to prescribe the morning after
pill to a 16 year old rape victim.
) A gynecologist from another hospital in Krakw who refused to send a 36 year
old mother for prenatal tests, despite the mothers concerns of possible genetic
defects of her fetus.

3.3.4. Summary
Although the autonomy of the conscience is respected in many of the controversial cases, it
should not be a universal excuse. The conscience is subjective in its character, and,
therefore, it may differ depending on the system of values adopted on the axiological basis.
We can thusly assert that the argument from the conscience is an arbitrary derivative of the
ideology/philosophy/religion, and not an objectively provable truth.
4. CONCLUSION
The arguer applies the direct axiological definitions, in which individual objects play the
role of definiendum whereas definiens is represented by ideological objects, which are
emotionally loaded, often characterized by negative or positive metaphors, depending on
the propagandistic direction. The main objective of this type of discourse is not changing
beliefs, but generating the excitement of the audience for rudimentary premises that refer
to the ideological beliefs shared by the same groups to which the sender belongs.
The ideological object does not serve as the warrant of the argument, but rather as a
clich, to block any argument. Clich is the kernel of cultural objects, so it does not require
justification. It allows arguer to avoid the burden of proof, because it is the opponent that
must make an effort to demonstrate that the clich is idle talk. Therefore, calling dignity or
conscience protection a fundamental value allows for action/inaction aiming for the
axiology of the collective symbol to replace the rational argument. Defined collective
1151

symbols are means that allow users to obstruct the argumentation, or permit them to resign
from participation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue against the collective symbols.
They do not allow for the dispute, because they are too comprehensive and they leave no
room for the starting point where reasoning could begin. Activists of the pro-life
movement have implemented new linguistic rules to the debate on IVF and abortion.

REFERENCES:
Aquinas St. Thomas (1947). Summa Theologica. Translated by The Fathers of the English Dominican
Province. Available online at: http://sacred-texts.com/chr/aquinas/summa/index.htm
Awdiejew Aleksy (2008). Argumentacja aksjologiczna w komunikacji publicznej <Axiological
argumentation in public communication>. In Habrajska G. (ed.), Rozmowy o komunikacji 2.
Motywacja psychologiczna i kulturowa w komunikacji (pp. 129-139). ask: Oficyna Wydawnicza
Leksem.
Catechism of the Catholic Church (2003). Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Available online at:
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM
Dueholm Natalia (2013). Kara mierci za zesp Downa <Death penalty for the Down's syndrome>.
Available online at: http://www.fronda.pl/a/kara-smierci-za-zespol-downa,30851.html
Encyclopedia of Bioethics (2004), 3rd edition, ed. Stephen G. Post. New York: Macmillan.
Fleischer Michael (2007). Oglna teoria komunikacji <General theory of communication>. Wrocaw:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocawskiego.
Fleischer M. (2002). Konstrukcja rzeczywistoci <Construction of reality>. Wrocaw: Wydawnictwo
Uniwersytetu Wrocawskiego.
Gaudium et Spes (1965). Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. Promulgated by His
Holiness, Pope Paul VI. Available online at:
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html
Pinker Steven (2008). The Stupidity stupidity of Dignitydignity. The New Republic. Published: May 28.
Available online at:
http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/The%20Stupidity%20of%20Dignity.htm
Sadowska Ludwika (2008). Pikno ycia czowieka przed urodzeniem <Beauty of human life before birth>.
paper from conference: Modlitwa za rodziny i w intencji obrony ycia czowieka. Kalisz. Dec. 6,
2007. Available online at:
http://www.dsz.archidiecezja.wroc.pl/pdf/modlitwa_zycia_czlowieka_przed_urodzeniem.pdf
Walton Douglas N. (1999). One-sided arguments. A dialectical analysis of bias. Albany: State University of
New York Press.

1152

A Dictionary Of Argumentation / Un Dictionnaire De

LArgumentation
Christian Plantin
Sciences du langage Department
Lyon University
France
Christian.Plantin@univ-lyon2.fr

ABSTRACT: The Dictionary of argumentation (in French) presented here focuses not on theories of
argumentation but on concepts, that is, analytical instruments). A classical presentation, of main and
secondary entries, classified in alphabetical order has been adopted. Three leading principles have been
consistently followed: Argumentation is seen as an everyday natural language practice; as a situated practice;
as a proof-oriented, critical activity.
KEY WORDS: concept, criticism, dictionary, discourse, entry, language, proof, situated activity

1. INTRODUCTION : WHY A DICTIONARY OF ARGUMENTATION?

In this paper, I present my Dictionnaire de largumentation: une introduction notionnelle
aux tudes dargumentation [A Dictionary of Argumentation: A Concept-based
Introduction to Argumentation studies]. This Dictionnaire should appear this year in
Lyon, ENS ditions ; it is written in French.
Presenting to an ISSA audience a Dictionary of argumentation is a risky
experience: Many will think that their favorite issues have been overlooked or grossly
misrepresented; on every specific topic, there is certainly somebody in the audience who
knows more about this topic; not to mention all those who knows more about each topic.
To my knowledge, there is no such Dictionary in French, or in English. This may be
considered as a good reason to write one : all decent academic disciplines have their
dictionary ; or as a good reason not to write one : if such a dictionary was really needed,
for sure several would be available in English.
The language of the Dictionary is French. One English label Red herring fallacy
appears as such as a secondary entry, Red herring fallacy Wrong track (strategy)
[Fausse piste (stratgie)] (NB: In this paper, Ill mention first the English term, then,
between brackets the French term, as it appears in the Dictionnaire). Well-known latin
labels are listed as main entries, ex. ad hominem; or as secondary entries, ex. Ad quietem
Tranquility [Ad quietem Tranquillit]. Globally seventy-five latin labels
corresponding to the ab , ad , ex arguments, are listed in three tables, with some
explanation of the meaning of the latin terms and construction, and a cross reference the
relevant entry or entries of the Dictionary:
Ab / a arguments: a contrario argument (26 items) [arguments en ab / a : argument a contrario]
Ad arguments: ad hominem argument (44 items) [arguments en ad : argument ad hominem]
Ex arguments: ex concessis argument (5 items) arguments en ex:
arguments ex concessis

1153

2. CONCEPTS AND DATA

This Dictionary is neither a treatise, nor an encyclopedia, nor a critical gallery of great
works and authors. It is a concept-based dictionary ; its entries are simply the basic
concepts used in argumentation studies. It would like to provide a kind of first, and,
hopefully, stimulating, contact with the domain.
The theoretical vision of the field of argumentation studies had to be minimal, in
order to be compatible with the main theoretical visions of the field, dialogic as well as
monologic. A question-based approach of the field has been adopted has a broad governing
principle, see the entries Question [Question] and Stasis [Stase].
Concepts are analytic tools, used to build up representation of relevant data, that is,
consciously built up and organized (scientific object), in opposition with arbitrarily picked
up and delimited data (natural object). The natural object associated considered here is
discourse, defined as a monologic (oral or written) as well as a dialogic, interactional
activity. The data (scientific objects) associated with the concepts presented in the
dictionary are taken from discourse in general, and elaborated through two main
operations: first, delimiting argumentative sequences (see the entry Tagging the
argumentative text [Balisage de largumentation]) (NB. See under 3 a caveat concerning
the adjective argumentative); second, constituting argumentative corpora (on the basis of
the Discourse / Counter discourse opposition defined in the Question [Question] and Stasis
[Stase] entries.
A good representation of relevant data has two virtues, descriptive adequacy and
explanatory adequacy. First, it should be descriptively adequate; that is, it should account
for the data, not grossly misrepresent the informed intuition of the arguers, in our case.
Explanatory adequacy is reached if the representation sheds some new light on the data.
The entries have been selected from a variety of sources ; first, the index of classical
works, such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca Treatise (1958) or van Eemeren and al.
Handbook (1995) from the titles of chapters of introductory books ; from the titles and key
words of various kind of contributions; and also, from students and colleagues questions,
objections, remarks, suggestions; and from my eight ISSA experiences.
Concepts like Refutation, Relevance, Stasis illustrate what are peaceful entries,
undisputably central to the domain. Other entries request a specific decision. For example,
the entry Representation of discourse [Reprsentation du discours] refers to the fact that
argumentative discourse is anti-phonic, that is, it alludes to, reformulates, in short
represents, fairly or not, the discours of the allied and of the opponents. This entry includes
the so-called straw man fallacy, which is a case of representation re-orienting the
discourse of the opponent (see the entry Orientation [Orientation argumentative]), that is,
including a re-orientation of the discourse. The straw man concept has to be discussed in
the broadest frame of Discourse representation. Syllogistic reasoning is a case of threeterms reasoning; the concept of Two terms reasoning is used by Piaget and Grize, to
describe children reasoning; and a similar concept is to be found in the commentary of
Arabic logic texts, and it might provide useful insights into discursive ordinary reasoning
in general.
3. THE ENTRIES
The Dictionary presents, to date, 247 main entries, and 68 secondary entries ; both are
listed together, according to the alphabetical order. There is no index, the dictionary being
itself a kind of index. It also provides cross-references between main entries, in the body or
at the end of the article, ex : S. Norm ; Fallacy (IV) (S. = See) [V. Norme ; Fallacieux
1154

(IV); (V. = Voir)]. There will be an ebook version, where the full text can be browsed,
and Im anxious to learn about the results of such use.
The secondary entries are definitionaly void ; they just refers to the main entry
where it is defined, ex. Accent Paronymy [Accent Paronymie]. The secondary entry
can be a term synonym of the main entry ; a term correlated with another term both being
defined under the same main entry (see infra) : or generally, a term defined in a main entry
as a component of this main entry, ex.
A main entry is followed by an article where the concept is defined and illustrated
by case examples, taken in a range of genre and domains, from everyday talk to scientific
disputations. Main entries can be simple or double. A simple main entry correspond to a
concept, expressed by a name, ex :
Refutation [Rfutation],
Relevance [Pertinence]
Stasis [Stase]

or by an expression, a syntagm, ex.:

Representation of discourse [Reprsentation du discours]
Two-terms reasoning [Raisonnement deux termes]

A double main entry is an entry where two related terms are defined, on an equal footing,
ex. :
Argument, Conclusion [Argument, Conclusion]
Consensus, Dissensus [Consensus, Dissensus]
Orator, Audience [Orateur, Auditoire]

The second term is head of a secondary entry, ex : Conclusion Argument, Conclusion

[Conclusion Argument, Conclusion]
To avoid overloading the list of secondary entries, some double entries have no
corresponding secondary entries, for example, Laughter and Seriousness [Rire et srieux]
has no corresponding secondary entry *Seriousness Laughter [Srieux Rire]
Laughter is a not so peripheral feature distinguishing logical-argumentative discourse from
rhetorical discourse, not to mention the humoristic capacities of argument, see OlbrechtsTyteca (1974).
The number of secondary entries can be multiplied, as it should mention all the
synonyms or quasi-synonyms of the main entry. For example, a secondary entry Intuition
Immediate knowledge [Intuition Connaissance immdiate] might have been
introduced, referring to the main entry Immediate Knowledge and Knowledge by Inference
[Connaissance immdiate et connaissance par infrence]. It has been considered more
telling to stress the opposition immediate / immediate, that is, inferential or argumentative
knowledge.
A main entry can be part of a complex set of entries dedicated to the various facets
of the same concept, for ex., several entries are dedicated to Analogy [Analogie], which is
defined through four entries:
Analogy (I) : Analogical thinking [Analogie (I) : La pense analogique]
Analogy (II) : The word and the concept [Analogie (II) : Le mot et le concept]
Analogy (III) : Categorical Analogy [Analogie (III) : Analogie catgorielle]
Analogy (IV) : Structural analogy [Analogie (IV) : Analogie structurelle]

1155

The first entry, Analogical thinking, discuss the concept in a broad historical perspective.
Analogical thinking was a mode of thinking, now disappeared, favored during the XVIe
Century Renaissance period, as an alternative to causal thinking. The second entry on
Words and concepts clarifies the linguistic situation of the noun analogy, as a precondition
on its conceptual use. The third and fourth entries introduce the two core uses of the
concept of analogy, as it functions in the task of categorization and as applied to complex
domains. Two independent entries, on Metaphor and Comparison complete the entries on
Analogy.
Similarly, six entries are dedicated to Argumentation [Argumentation]. The entry
Argumentation (I), A corpus of definitions, defines argumentation through a through a
corpus of seventeen definitions ; no new definition is needed. In the subsequent articles
Definitional features are isolated from the preceding corpus, then a map of the Issues and
crossroads is proposed (Argumentation (II) and (III)). Then, entries (II) and (III) rearrange the material introduced in entry (I), in order to re-frame the unity of the field at a
higher level.
The three following entries explore specific definitional issues of the concept of
Argumentation. Argumentation (IV) is devoted to the very special case of One sentence
argumentation, (self-argued sentences), which depart from the classical vision of
argumentation consisting of a pair of sentences. Argumentation (V) presents argumentation
as Defeasible reasoning, interpreted as situated reasoning. Argumentation (VI) presents a
graphic description of the Contemporary developments of argumentation studies.
3. THREE MAIN ORIENTATIONS : ARGUMENTATION IS A LINGUISTIC
ACTIVITY; A SITUATED ACTIVITY; A CRITICAL, PROOF-ORIENTED ACTIVITY
Three main orientations have been maintained through the definitions, argumentation as a
linguistic activity, as a situated activity, as a critical, proof-oriented activity.
Argumentation is a linguistic activity. Language is not transparent. This implies,
among other consideration that the basic concepts used in the Anscombre and Ducrot
Argumentation within language theory will be found in the Dictionary, for example,
Argumentative morpheme [Morphme argumentatif], Orientation [Orientation],
Argumentative scale [chelle argumentative], etc.
All discourse is an activity having its own rules. In the case of argumentative
discourse, this implies for example, that objects are Discursive objects [Objet de
discours], as shown in the corresponding entry.
A caveat concerning the adjective argumentative: The use of the English adjective
argumentative to translate the French adjective argumentatif, (-ive) can be misleading,
particularly about its use in relation with the argumentation within language theory.
Argumentative (Eng.) derives from argument in the sense of dispute, not from argument
in the sense of good reason ; said of assertions or of personalities, it is equivalent of
controversial, or disputatious ; becoming argumentative is almost becoming angry. The
French adjective derives from argument, both meaning exclusively good reason ; un
discours argumentatif [an argumentative discourse], is a discourse offering good reasons ;
lorientation argumentative dune phrase [the argumentative orientation of an utterance],
exclusively refers to the fact that it selects a class of sentences as its possible conclusions ;
an argumentative theory of meaning hardly makes sense in English ; in French, the
expression la thorie argumentative du sens refers to the theory of meaning corresponding
to the argumentation within language theory. Nonetheless, in this presentation,
argumentative is permanently used to translate the French adjective argumentatif, for lack
of a better term.
1156

Argumentation is a situated activity. This situated character of the argumentative discourse

was taken in charge by classical rhetoric, as defined in the entry Argumentative rhetoric
[Rhtorique argumentative] ; for the criticism of rhetoric see the entry Is Rhetoric
fallacious ? [Rhtorique fallacieuse ?]).
Moreover, rhetoric provides argumentation studies with a set of concepts, which
articulates fairly well with basic argumentative concepts such as the concept of orientation.
Thats why, under the entry Orientation (II) : Inversion of argumentative orientation
[Orientation (II) : Inversion dorientation argumentative], will be found definitions and
examples illustrating the argumentative function of Antanaclasis, Antimetabole,
Antiparastasis and Paradiastole. The entry Metonymy and Synecdoche [Mtonymie et
Synecdoque] shows the parallelism between the relation argument / conclusion and proper
/ figurative meaning.
Most important, the situated character of the argumentative activity is reflected in
the subjective quality of argumentative discourse and reasoning ; consequently, the
Dictionary includes entries defining Ethos [thos], Pathos [Pathos] and Emotion
[motion] in an argumentative perspective.
As natural discursive reasoning, argumentation is a critical, proof-oriented activity.
The analysis of this activity has been specially stressed by research trends such as Natural
Logic, Informal Logic and Pragmadialectics.
Argumentation belongs to the arts of proof. As shown in the entries Proof and Arts
of proof [Preuve et Arts de la preuve], and Argumentation and demonstration
[Argumentation and demonstration], it has to be articulated with the practices of proof and
demonstration in specialized fields, and not only from the classical and outdated distinction
between Technical and non-technical proofs [Preuves techniques et non techniques].
Causality, essential in natural as well as in scientific reasoning, is considered under its two
forms, as the presupposed basis of argument, as it is defined in the entries
Causality (III) : Argumentation from cause [Causalit (III) : Argumentation par la cause]
Pragmatic argument [Pragmatique, arg.],

and as it functions in the causal methodology, in the entry

Causality (II) Argument establishing and refuting the existence of a causal link
[Causalit (II): Argument tablissant et rfutant lexistence dun lien causal]

Argumentation belongs to the arts of proof as a critical activity. The critical dimension of
argumentation is developed in a series of entries about the classical concept of fallacy :
Fallacy (I): the (French) words fallacious, fallace; (the) English (word) fallacy [Fallacieux (II) : les
mots fallacieux, fallace; ang. Fallacy]
Fallacy (II) : Definitions, theories and lists [Fallacieux (III): Dfinitions, thories et listes]
Fallacy (III) : Aristotle [Fallacieux (III) Aristote]
Fallacy (IV) : Port-Royal, Bacon, Locke [Fallacieux (IV) : Port-Royal, Bacon, Locke]

As well in the entries:

Norms [Normes]
Evaluation and evaluators [valuation and valuateurs]

The anthropological dimension of the concept of fallacy is exemplified through a parallel

definition of fallacies and sins of the tongue, in the entry Fallacies as sins of the
tongue [Fallacies comme pchs de langue].
1157

The critical orientation is present in the details of the definition of every argument type as
far as it includes considerations about their counter-discourse, their standard mode of
refutation.
4. LIST OF THE ENTRIES UNDER THE LETTER A AND B
A cohrentia Cohrence
A cohrentia Coherence
A comparatione, arg.
A comparatione
A conjugata, arg.
A conjugata
A contrario, arg.
A contrario
A fortiori, arg.
A fortiori
A pari, arg.
A pari
A priori, A posteriori (arg.)
A priori, A posteriori
A repugnantibus, arg.
A repugnantibus
A simili, arg.
A simili
Ab , ad , ex : noms latins des arg.
Ab , ad , ex : latin labels
Ab exemplo, arg.
Ab exemplo
Abduction
Abduction
Absurde : Dmonstration par l'absurde
Absurd, proof by reduction to the
Absurde, arg.
Absurdity, arg. to
Accent Paronymie
Accent Paronymy
Accident (fal.)
Accident
Accord
Agreement
Ad baculum Chtiments et rcompenses
Ad baculum Punishments and Rewards
Ad hominem, arg.
Ad hominem
Ad incommodum, arg.
Ad incommodum
Ad judicium Fond, arg.
Ad judicium Substance
Ad personam Attaque personnelle
Ad personam Personal Attack
Ad populum, arg.
Ad populum
Ad quietem Tranquillit
Ad quietem Tranquillity
Ad rem Fond, arg.
Ad rem Substance, arg. on the
Ad verecundiam Modestie, arg.
Ad verecundiam Modesty, arg. from
Affirmation du consquent Dduction
Affirmation of the consequent Deduction
Alignement, Alliance argumentative Orientation (I) Alignment, Alliance Orientation (I)
Ambigut
Ambiguity
Ambigut syntaxique
Syntactic ambiguity
Amphibolie Ambigut syntaxique
Amphiboly Syntactic Ambiguity
Analogie (I) : La pense analogique
Analogy (I) : Analogical thinking
Analogie (II) : Le mot et le concept
Analogy (II) : The word and the concept
Analogie (III) : Analogie catgorielle, arg.
Analogy (III) : Categorical Analogy
Analogie (IV) : Analogie structurelle, arg.
Analogie (IV) : Structural analogy, arg.
Antanaclase, Antimtabole Orientation (II)
Antanaclasis, Antimetabole Orientation
(I)
Antithse
Antithesis
Antonomase Imitation, Parangon, Modle
Antonomasia Imitation, Paragon, Model
Apagogique, arg.
Apagogique, arg.
Aporie Assentiment ; Stase
Aporia Assent; Stasis
Apparents Drivs ou Mots drivs, arg.
Cognate, Related words Derived words
Aprs comme avant, arg.
After like before, arg.
Argument Conclusion
Argument Conclusion
Argument, argumentation : les mots
Argument, argumentation : the words
Argumentaire Script argumentatif

Argumentation (I) : Un corpus de dfinitions

Argumentation (I) : A corpus of definitions
Argumentation (II) : Traits dfinitionnels
Argumentation (II) : Definitional feature
Argumentation (III) : questions et carrefours
Argumentation (III) : Questions and crossroads
Argumentation (IV) : nonc auto-argument
Argumentation (IV) : Self-argued sentences
Argumentation (V) : raisonnement rvisable
Argumentation (V) : Defeasable reasoning

1158

Argumentation (VI) : Dv. cont.

Argumentativit, degrs et formes Arg. (II)
(II)
Arguments en ab (ou a) : Argument a contrario
argument
Arguments en ad : Argument ad hominem
Arguments en e (ou ex) : Argument ex concesso
concesso
Assentiment
Association Dissociation
Attaque personnelle
Auditoire Orateur
Autophagie Rtorsion
Autorit, arg.
Balisage de l'argumentation
Biais langagier
Bon sens Doxa ; Autorit

Argumentation (VI) : Contemporary develop.ts

Argumentativity*, degrees and forms Arg.
Arguments en ab (or a) : a contrario
Arguments en ad : Argument ad hominem
Arguments en e (ou ex) : Argument ex
Assent
Association Dissociation
Personal Attack
Audience Orator
Autophagy
Authority
Taggingd
Language Bias
Common sense Doxa ; Authority

5. CONCLUSION
The Dictionnaire is grounded in an approach of argumentation focusing on questions of
language, interactions, knowledge building, and situated reasoning, as well as personal
implication of the arguer. It is intended as a set of tools to build up representations of
relevant data, that is, an help to analyse argumentative text and interactions.
In all cases, I hope not to have introduced or increased confusion about the notions
and issues we have tried to expose and clarify.

REFERENCES
Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., Snoeck Henkemans, A. F., Blair, J. A., Johnson, R. H., Krabbe, E. C.
W.,Plantin, Ch., Walton, D. N., Willard, C. A., Woods, J., Zarefsky, D. (1996). Fundamentals of
argumentation theory, A Handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary developments.
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., (1974). Le comique du discours. Bruxelles: ditions de lUniversit de Bruxelles.
Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca L. (1958). Trait de largumentation. La nouvelle rhtorique. Prface de E.
Brhier. Paris, PUF. 3e d. 1976, Editions de lUniversit de Bruxelles.

1159

Transparency In Legal Argumentation: Adapting To A Composite

Audience In Administrative Judicial Decisions
H. Jos Plug
Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric
University of Amsterdam
Spuistraat 134
1012 VB Amsterdam
The Netherlands
h.j.plug@uva.nl

ABSTRACT: An important topic in the debate about transparency of the administration of justice includes
the communicative function of judicial decisions. This function should be conceived as the judges aim to
have his argumentation understood (the communicative effect), as well as to have it accepted (the
interactional effect). In this paper I will analyse how the judge may maneuver strategically to achieve these
effects on a composite audience. The analysis focuses on the communicative activity type of administrative
judicial decisions.
KEYWORDS: administrative law, audience demand, composite audience, judicial decisions, legal
argumentation, legal opinions, Role-shifting.

1. INTRODUCTION
In a recent study (Broeders, Prins and Griffioen, 2013) that was conducted by the
Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) it is argued that there is a
need for `a more contemporary transparency of the administration of justice relative to the
different outside worlds with which it comes into contact. According to this study, the
need for transparency has become urgent because of changes in society under the
influence of globalisation, individualisation and populism. One of the topics in the debate
about transparency includes the communicative function of judicial decisions.
From an argumentation theoretical perspective, the communicative function of a
judicial decision should not only be conceived as the judges aim to have the
argumentation underlying his decision understood (the communicative effect), but also to
have his argumentation accepted (the interactional effect). The judge may be expected to
have the intention to achieve these effects on the parties to the proceedings, his immediate
addressees, as well as on a broader audience. Long before the current debate on
transparency, literature on legal (argumentation) theory and on decision writing
emphasized that, apart from the litigants in the case, the audience of the judge consists of
members of the legal community (other judges, lawyers interested the decision), law
students and the general public. In order to address such a so-called composite audience
(van Eemeren, 2010) in his justification of the decision, the judge may make use of
different techniques when maneuvering strategically.
A recent pilot study carried out in administrative courts in the Netherlands
demonstrates that judges do at times, indeed, attempt to address a composite audience
when justifying their decisions. In this contribution I will clarify which audiences may be
1160

addressed in administrative judicial decisions. Then I will analyse the way in which a
judge may manoeuvre strategically to adjust his argumentation to these audiences. In view
of this analysis I will start with a first attempt to characterize administrative judicial
decisions as an argumentative activity type.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS A SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TYPE
To analyse the strategic maneuvering in judicial decisions by the Dutch Administrative
Court, these decisions should first be characterized as a communicative activity type. In
the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory (Van Eemeren 2010, 40, 129), strategic
maneuvering refers to the continual efforts made in all moves that are carried out in
argumentative discourse to keep the balance between reasonableness and effectiveness.1
An argumentative activity type refers to a more or less institutionalized argumentative
practice. Requirements pertinent to the activity type may affect the strategic maneuvering.
In order to characterize judicial decisions by the Dutch Administrative Court in
terms of communicative activity type, we may start from an overview as presented by van
Eemeren (2010, 143). This overview represents examples of different types of
conventionalized communicative practices that are connected with specific kinds of
institutional contexts, such as political and medical contexts. In the example of the legal
context (figure 1), the concrete speech event of the defense pleading at O.J. Simpsons
murder trial is considered to be a representation of a particular communicative activity
type: the communicative activity type of legal proceedings. This communicative activity
type belongs to the domain of legal communication and makes use of the prototypical
genre of adjudication.

domains of
communicative
activity

general genres of
communicative
activity

specific
communicative
activity types

concrete speech
events

[=more or less
institutionalized
macro-contexts]

[= families of
conventionalized
communicative
practices]

[= types of
conventionalized
communicative
practices]

[= instantiations of
communicative
activity types]

legal
communication

adjudication

-court proceedings
-arbitration
-summons

defense pleading at
O.J. Simpsons
murder trial

Figure 1. An example of a speech event representing a communicative activity type implementing

a genre of communicative activity instrumental in the legal communicative domain.

In research in the field of law on judicial strategic behaviour, the term strategic is used differently. Baum
(2009, 6) for example, uses the term as follows: Strategic judges consider the effects of their choices on
collective outcomes, both in their own court and in the broader judicial and policy arenas. [] Whenever
(they) choose among alternative courses of action, they think ahead to the prospective consequences and
choose the course that does the most to advance their goals in the long term.

1161

Judicial decisions in general belong to the genre of adjudication and can be considered as a
subtype of the conventionalized communicative practice of court proceedings. The
communicative activity type of judicial decisions, however, should be specified in order to
characterize the activity type in a meaningful way. This specification should be made by
means of three different convention-determining features. The first feature that determines
the conventions of a judicial decision, is the field of law in which a legal dispute is
situated: administrative law, private law, punitive law etc. The second feature is the type
of court that has the competence to decide at a certain stage of the legal procedure: the
court of first instance, the court of appeal or the court of last resort. The third feature that
is relevant is the (territorial) jurisdiction under which the judicial decision has come into
being and which national or international legislation is applicable.
The ratio of this specification of features is that all three distinctive features are
relevant to the analysis of the argumentation in the concrete speech event of a judicial
decision; they entail different institutional conventions that are, in combination, pertinent
to the concrete speech event: the actual decision. The specification of the conventions that
bridge the gap between the specific legal communicative activity type of court
proceedings and the concrete speech event of a judicial decision by the administrative
section of the Dutch district court is represented in figure 2.

specific
communicative
activity types

concrete speech
events

[= types of
conventionalized
communicative
practices]

[convention
determining
features]

[= subtype of
conventionalized
communicative
practices]

[= instantiation of
communicative
activity types]

-court proceedings
-arbitration
-summons

Field of law
Criminal law
Civil law
Administrative law

Judicial decisions
by the District Court
(section
Administrative
Law)

Dutch judicial
decision [by the
District Court
Amsterdam, 5-72013]

Type of court
(procedure)
Court of first instance
Court of appeal
Court of last resort
Jurisdiction
National law (local,
state federal law)
European law
International law

Figure 2. An example of convention determining features that specify a subtype of the

communicative activity type of court proceedings.

1162

3. DUTCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCEDURE

The activity type of administrative judicial decisions by the Dutch district court concerns
binding decisions by this court in legal disputes between administrative authorities and
citizens. Administrative law provides the government with the power to administer, but it
also establishes limits on administrative activity. In the Netherlands, when a citizen
disagrees with an order or a decision made by an administrative authority, he can object to
this order or decision in court. As a general rule a citizen is required to follow a
preliminary administrative procedure before they can take his case against an order to
court. This procedure allows the citizen to explain why he disagrees with the order, after
which the administrative authority considers its order once again and to correct possible
mistakes. The General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) applies to
both administrative decisions by the administrative authorities and to judicial reviews of
these decisions by the district court (administrative law division).2 For the activity type of
administrative judicial decisions this means that the General Administrative Law Act is
pertinent to the institutional goal, the conventions and the format of the procedure
preceding the judicial decision as well as the judicial decision itself.
Some of the important characteristics of administrative legal procedure may be
summarized as follows.3 The point of departure of the administrative procedure is the
assessment of a decision ex tunc. This means that the judge has to determine whether or
not the decision by the administrative authority was legal at the time it was taken. In doing
so, the judge does not in principle take new facts into account. However, if the judge does
not merely annul the decision, and instead replaces the administrative authority's order by
inserting his own judgment, then the assessment may take new facts into consideration.
The judge must ensure that all aspects of the relevant law are applied. He may
supplement the facts himself, if necessary. He should be able to make use of this power in
situations where one party to the proceedings appears to be weaker than the other.
There are two important restrictions the judge has to observe with regard to the
scope of the dispute he decides upon and to the result of the dispute. Firstly, the judge
should not go beyond the subject of the dispute (ultra petita). Secondly, the judge should
not put the person in a worse position than he was in when he moved for an appeal
(reformatio in peius).
The judge has discretionary power in the area of procedure. Consequently, the
judge defines the length of the process, leads the investigation during the trial, and can
independently order an expert examination, if necessary. It is also the judge who ends the
investigative phase if he considers the information that he has received to be sufficient to
come to a decision.
With regard to the accessibility of the administrative procedure, parties to the
process can appeal to the judge without many requirements of form. There is no
requirement to proceed with the aid of a lawyer; trial representation is not required.
In the judicial decision, the judge is obliged to state the grounds for his decision. However,
the judge is not obliged to deal with each argument that is raised by the parties to the
2

Higher appeal against these decisions is open in the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State
(or, in specific cases, the Central Court of Appeal).
3

This characterization of the administrative legal procedure is based on Brouwer and Schilder (1998) and
Verburg (2008).

1163

proceedings. The institutional point of administrative judicial decisions is to provide a

binding decision in legal disputes between administrative authorities and citizens. The
justification should provide insight into the decision and, if at all possible, render it
acceptable. The justification should enable the parties to ascertain how and to what extent
the facts and legal foundations, as presented by them, have been taken into consideration.
On top of that, the justification should enable the public at large to monitor the
administration of justice as well as gain insight into its proceedings.4
4. ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND THE COMPOSITE AUDIENCE
In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, adaptation to the audience is one of the
three aspects of strategic maneuvering; it refers to the requirements that must be fulfilled
in strategic maneuvering to secure communion, at the point in the exchange, with the
people the argumentative discourse is aimed at. In argumentative practice this amounts to
adjusting the argumentative moves in such a way to the audience views and preferences
that there is as much agreement as possible between the arguer and the audience (Van
Eemeren 2010, 108, 112). The literature on legal theory (Makau, 1984, Rubinson, 1996)
the law and economic approach (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009) as well as the more
practical literature on opinion writing (Lebovits, 2008, Leubsdorf, 2001) recognizes that
the audience of a judge may be diverse. Often the authors focus on the audiences of
judicial decisions by the court in last instance, the Supreme Court, but the audiences of
decisions the lower courts may be discussed as well (Hume, 2009). Most authors,
however, list more or less the same groups of different (possible) audiences: the litigants
in the case, members of the legal community (other judges, lawyers interested in the
decision), law makers, legal scholars, law students, media, the general public.
In order to analyse strategic manoeuvring that takes place in administrative judicial
decisions, a more detailed analysis of the audience is needed. The audience as whole,
consisting of different persons or groups, may be considered a composite audience that is
heterogeneous with respect to the points at issue in an administrative judicial decision as
well as to the starting points pertinent to the dispute that is sentenced upon in the decision.
Both parties to the proceedings are the official antagonists who are addressed
directly by the judge and who are therefore considered the primary audience.5 The other
persons or groups that make up the audience, are the antagonists who are reached
indirectly by the judge. This third party will also evaluate the acceptability of the
argumentation that is brought forward in the judicial decision. The official antagonists are
addressed by the judge in their procedural roles as the plaintiff (or the applicant) and
the defendant. Characteristic of the primary audience of an administrative judicial
decision is that this audience is not always homogeneous. Since trial representation is not
required, the parties to the proceedings may not possess the same professional knowledge
of the law. Usually, the administrative authority is represented by a lawyer or a legal
specialist, whereas for a citizen who is party to the proceedings this may not always be the
case. Another significant difference between the parties to the proceedings is that unlike
4

The justification principle is considered one of the most important principles in (administrative) procedural
law. See also de Poorter and van Roosmalen (2009) and Plug (2012).
5

From the administrative law as well as from jurisprudence it follows that arguments from both parties to
the proceedings should be discussed in a judicial decision.

1164

most citizens who are involved in a legal dispute, an administrative authority may be
considered a repeated player. It may only be expected that, compared to the average
citizen, the (local) government is more often involved in legal disputes. This latter
characteristic may become manifest in an administrative judicial decision when the judge
addresses the administrative authority not only as a party to the present proceedings, but
also in its capacity as a party in future proceedings.
5. ADDRESSING A COMPOSITITE AUDIENCE
In administrative judicial decisions, judges could address non-litigant audiences in an
indirect way. If a judge would want to address (members of) this audience directly, he
would have to initiate a new, second, difference of opinion in which the original third
party audience would then be considered the judges primary audience. However, the
institutional requirements determined by the administrative law, impose limits to that
option. In this paragraph I will demonstrate how judges may maneuver strategically to
address a third party audience in either an indirect way or in a direct way.
The first case illustrates how a judge can make use of the argumentation that has
been brought forward by the parties to the proceedings, in order to address a third-party
audience indirectly. In this case, the applicant, a homeless Chinese lady, asked the Central
Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) for reception into the Netherlands.
Pending the COAs decision, the applicant requested the defendant, the city of Utrecht, for
temporary reception based on the Social Support Act (Wmo). The defendant dismissed the
request, but offered the applicant a temporary place in the local Sleep Inn, a shelter for the
homeless. The defendant argued that the applicant should address the COA for a structural
solution. The applicant is of the opinion that the solution proposed by the defendant is not
adequate for her situation and she requests the court for an interim relief measure. In its
decision, the court puts forward the following.
(1)

The court is of the opinion that the defendants political standpoint that reception
of the plaintiff should be a task of the central government, is very understandable.
(). It is about the positive obligation to receive vulnerable persons, article 8
EVRM, and where the treaty prevails over national legislation. The court is of the
opinion that decisions on this positive obligation, as made by the Dutch
Administrative High Court (CRvB) and decisions made by the Council of State
should be better attuned to one another. Since this is not the case, however, the
court proceeds to decide on the current appeal under the conditions of the Social
Support Act (Wmo). This decision is about the situation as it is and not about the
desired developments in the administration of justice.
(ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2012:BY8445)

In this fragment of its decision, the court evaluates one of the sub standpoints as put
forward by the defendant. With respect to this sub standpoint, the court makes a
distinction between its political content and its legal effectiveness. As far as the political
content of the argument is concerned, the court agrees with the defendant, but it refutes the

1165

argument on the grounds that it cannot be effective in the legal proceedings. In support of
this argument the court puts forward that decisions by the Dutch Administrative High
Court (CRvB) and the Council of State on the reception of vulnerable persons are not well
attuned. By means of this argument the court provides the primary audience, the
defendant, with a justification for the refutation of the defendants argument. Through this
argument, however, the court indirectly addresses a third-party audience, the
administration of justice, and criticises it for a lack of consistency in the judicial decisions
that concern article 8 EVRM.
If, however, the argumentation put forward by the parties to the proceedings does
not provide any points of departure for the judge to address (members of) a third-party
audience in an indirect way, the judge may consider addressing this audience directly.
Role shifting is one technique at the judges disposal when maneuvering strategically in
order to address the third-party audience directly. In accordance with his official,
institutional role as an impartial decision maker, the (administrative) judge decides on the
legal dispute that is brought before the court.6 This institutional constraint that stipulates
not to go beyond the subject of the dispute (ultra petita), imposes a limit on the
possibilities the judge has to address a third-party antagonist directly.7 By shifting from
the role of legal decision-maker to the role of (legal) advisor, the judge may maneuver
strategically to make use of the opportunity to direct a standpoint at a third-party
antagonist. Strategic manoevering by making use of a role shift may be motivated by a
broader interpretation of the task of the judge in view of the communicative function of
administrative judicial decisions. With a view of the social or legal consequences the
decision may have on (members of) the third party, the judge may choose not to restrict
himself to his task as a legal decision maker.
The following case illustrates the way in which judges may manoeuvre
strategically by the reversal of roles. The case concerns a difference of opinion between a
citizen (the plaintiff) and the social service of the city council (the defendant). Since 1998
the plaintiff has received a monthly social security payment provided by the local
authorities. In 2005 the defendant decided to cut back on the plaintiffs social security
benefit by 5%, because the plaintiff failed to return a signed copy of a document that listed
his schedule of activities (werkpolis). After the social service had rejected the request to
reverse the decision regarding the cut back in the social security payment, the interested
party appealed to the administrative judge. The judge decided as follows.
(2)

There is no legal obligation for the plaintiff to sign and return the said document to
the defendant. The court concludes that there is neither law nor local act that
requires such an obligation. It is open to the local government to amend their local
act on reintegration. The court advises the local government to reconsider this
adaptation of article 8 of the Work and Welfare Act. [] In doing so, attention
could be paid to [] because

Apart from the competences of a judge that are prescribed in Dutch (procedural) law, the Dutch
Association for the Judiciary (NVvR) formulated a Judges Code of Conduct (September 2011).
7

Because the constraint is one of the procedural starting points that are pertinent to the activity type of
administrative judicial decisions, it is not in contradiction with the pragma dialectical freedom rule that states
that discussants may not be prevented from bringing forward a standpoint. See also van Eemeren (2013).

1166

(ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2005:AU8054)
In the fragment under (2), the judge decides against the defendant on the ground that there
is no law or act that prescribes the legal obligation to sign and return the said document.
After that, the judge manoeuvres strategically by shifting from the institutional role of
decision maker to the role of legal advisor. The judge exploits this technique to address a
member of the third-party audience, the local government, directly. The judge advances
an implicit standpoint regarding anticipated (legal) consequences of the decision: the local
government should not amend their local act on reintegration. By presenting his standpoint
as an advice (The court advises the local government to reconsider ) the judge
attempts to avoid the risk of trespassing upon the area of the legislative powers of the local
government; an institutional constraint that follows from the principle of the separation of
powers. At the same time, by adopting the role of a legal advisor, the judge attempts to
avoid the risk of being accused of going beyond the subject of the dispute in his decision.
As is discussed in Plug (2000), the judge may explicitly present his advice as an obiter
dictum, in order to even minimize this risk.
Both examples show how an attempt by the judge to address an audience may
broaden the scope of the legal dispute he has to decide upon. By bringing forward a
standpoint that introduces a difference of opinion with a (originally) third-party
antagonist, the judge, at the same time, provides the litigants and other members of the
third-party audience with more insight in the broader impact of the current decision. In
doing so the judge may contribute to the communicative function of administrative
judicial decisions and thus to the transparency of the proceedings of the administration of
justice.
6. CONCLUSION
Administrative law prescribes the rules that public authorities must adhere to in their
decision-making and regulates relations between the government and citizens. In this
contribution I have explored on what grounds administrative judicial decisions by the
Dutch district court may be considered as a specific argumentative activity type.
Institutional requirements pertinent to this activity type determine that the justification of
these decisions should be aimed at the litigants as well as at the public at large. At the
same time, other institutional requirements that are pertinent to this activity type impose
constraints on the possibilities the judge has when addressing such a composite audience.
By means of two examples I have illustrated the way in which the judge may manoeuvre
strategically to address members of a third-party audience, without trespassing upon the
limitations that are determined by the institutional requirements.

1167

REFERENCES
Baum, L. (2006). Judges and their audiences: a perspective on judicial behaviour. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Broeders, D., J.E.J. Prins, H, Griffioen, a.o. (Eds.) (2013). Speelruimte voor transparantere rechtspraak
(Scope for a more transparent justice system). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Brouwer, J.G. & A.E. Schilder (1998). A survey of Dutch administrative law. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri.
Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Eemeren, F.H. van (2013). Fallacies as derailments of argumentative discourse: Acceptance based on
understanding and critical assessment. Journal of pragmatics, 59, 141-152.
Garoupa, N. & Ginsburg, T. (2009). Judicial audiences and reputation: Perspectives from comparative law.
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 452-490.
Hume, Robert J. (2009). Courting multiple audiences: The Strategic selection of legal groundings by judges
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The Justice System Journal, 30 (1), 14-33.
Lebovits, G. (2008). Ethical judicial opinion writing. The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 21, 237-309.
Leubsdorf, J. (2001). The structure of judicial opinions. Minnesota Law Review, 86, 447-496.
Makau, J. M. (1984). The Supreme Court and reasonableness. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 70, 379-396.
Marseille, A.T. (2007). De bestuursrechter en diens vrijheid. Van actief naar lijdelijk (en weer terug). Trema,
10, 423-431.
Mazzi, D. (2007). The construction of argumentation in judicial texts: combining a genre and a corpus
perspective. Argumentation, 21, 21-38.
Plug, H.J. (2000). Indicators of obiter dicta. A pragma-dialectical analysis of textual clues for the
reconstruction of legal argumentation. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 8,189-203.
Plug, H.J. (2012). Obscurities in the formulation of legal argumentation. International Journal of Law,
Language & Discourse, 2 (1), 126-142.
Poorter, J.C.A. de & Roosmalen, H.J.Th.M. van. Motivering bij rechtsvorming. Over de motivering van
uitspraken met een rechtsvormend element door de Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van
State. Den Haag: Raad van State.
Rubinson, R. (1996). The polyphonic courtroom: Expanding the possibilities of judicial discourse. Dickinson
Law Review, 101(3), 3-40.
Verburg, D.A. (2008). De bestuursrechtelijke uitspraak - en het denkmodel dat daaraan ten grondslag ligt.
Zutphen: Uitgeverij Kerckebosch.

1168

A Defense Of Taking Some Novels As Arguments

Gilbert Plumer
Law School Admission Council (retired)
1812 Laurel Oak Dr. N.
Rockledge, FL 32955
U.SA.
plumerge@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: This papers main thesis is that in virtue of being believable, a believable novel makes an indirect
transcendental argument telling us something about the real world of human psychology, action, and society. Three
related objections are addressed: a Stroud-type philosophical objectionas well as an empirical objection
questioning the force of this kind of transcendental argument, and the objection that a version of the paradox of
fiction applies to this account.
KEYWORDS: Currie, narrative, novels, paradox of fiction, Stroud, transcendental argument, truth in fiction

1. INTRODUCTION
This papers main thesis is that in virtue of being believable, a believable novel makes an
indirect argument telling us something about the real world of human psychology, action, and
society. This involves that believable novels are arguments, not in the sense that they are stories
that explicitly offer arguments (perhaps didactically or polemically), but in the sense that, as
wholes, they indirectly exhibit the distinctive structure of a kind of transcendental argument. As
applied here, Strouds influential objection (1968) to transcendental arguments would be that
from believability, the only conclusion that could be licensed concerns how we must think or
conceive of the real world. Moreover, Currie holds that such notions are probably false: the
empirical evidence is all against this ideathat readers emotional responses track the real
causal relations between things (2011b). Finally, a version of the the paradox of fiction
pertains. Certainly, responding with a full range of emotions to a novel requires that it be
believable. Yet since we know the novel is fiction, we do not believe it. So in what does its
believability consist? This paper will address these three related objections.1
I start with the idea that believability is the master criterion of the novel (as one
reviewer of an ancestor of this paper put it), or at least is a central criterion of assessment. It is
always reasonable to ask about a novelis it successful make-believe? No doubt the
distinctive power and sweep of the novel is its unrivaled potentiality for intricate plot and
associated character development. But for any believable plot/character development complex,
we can askwhat principles or generalizations would have to be true about the real world (of
human psychology, action, and society) in order for the fictional complex to be believable?
Because this also always seems a reasonable question to ask, and because it can be an
unanalyzed datum or given that a novel is indeed believable, the following transcendental
argument scheme is generated:
1

While this paper addresses these three possible objections, in two previous papers I consider other issues that arise
in understanding some novels to be arguments (2011; 2012).

1169

(1)
(2)
(3)

This story (complex) is believable.

This story is believable only if such and such principles operate in the real world.
Therefore, such and such principles operate in the real world.

The believability premise, (1), is a proposition about the novel; it is not a self-referential claim
made by the novel (although in degenerate cases such as parts of Henry Fieldings Tom Jones the
novel seems to be explicitly claiming about itself that it is believable). If (1) were an implicit or
explicit claim made by the novel, the question of whether this claim itself is believable would
arise, and so on into an unpleasant regress. The idea is that in virtue of being believable (not
claiming to be believable), a novel makes an argument telling us something about the real world.
(2) expresses the specific inference license or rule that allows a novel to be an argument,
according to the present theory; it is not something that any novelist need intend or even be
aware of. The idea is that the believability of a novel requires that certain principles or
generalizations be true about the actual world. (3) is the conclusion. It indicates which principles
operate in the real world, which is primarily of human nature given the subject matter of novels.
For illustration, consider Nussbaum (1990, pp. 139-140) on Henry James The Golden Bowl:
The claim that our loves and commitments are so related that infidelity and failure of response are more or
less inevitable features even of the best examples of loving is a claim for which a philosophical text would
have a hard time mounting direct argument. It is only when, as here, we study the loves and attentions of a
finely responsive mind such as Maggies, through all the contingent complexities of a tangled human life,
that. . .we have something like a persuasive argument that these features hold of human life in general.

As applied here, (3) is the generalized (and rosy) claim that our loves and commitments are so
related that infidelity and failure of response are more or less inevitable features even of the best
examples of loving, which is implicated by the believability of the plot/character development
complex: the loves and attentions of a finely responsive mind such as Maggies, through all the
contingent complexities of a tangled human life.
The Nussbaum quotation also illustrates what is not all that uncommon: a vague,
undeveloped recognition of the (transcendental) structure of the argument of a novel. Here is
another example: Rodden (2008, p. 155) says in more didactic novels such as George Orwells
1984, we are often aware of a presence arranging and evaluating ideas and characters in building
a convincing argument. I am trying to shed some light on how characters can be arranged into
an argument, not, trivially, how (e.g.) the speeches of characters sometimes overtly state
arguments.
These considerations mean that (1)-(3) constitute a schematic meta-level representation
of the argument of a believable novel, which, at the object level, is only indirectly expressed by
the novel.
2. BELIEVABILITY AND THE PARADOX OF FICTION
In what does believability consist? A novels believability seems to be determined mostly by
what can be called the internal and external coherence of the event complex. I take Schultz
(1979, p. 233) to be succinctly explicating internal coherence where he says: the events must be
motivated in terms of one another. . .either one event is a causal (or otherwise probable)
consequence of another; or some events [sic] happening provides a character with a reason or

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motive for making another event happen (cf., e.g., Cebik, 1971, p. 16). A novel is not believable
if in it things keep happening for no apparent reason or in a way that is inadequately connected
with the other events in the novel. Certainly, this applies to some degree to James Joyces
Ulysses and William Burroughs Naked Lunch, for example.
But even if the events of a novel are fully connected, the novel may still not be
believable because those connections do not cohere well with our widely shared basic
assumptions about how human psychology and society not only actually, but necessarily work.
This is the main component of external coherence. The believability of a novel requires that its
plot and characters be developed in ways that generally conform to our fundamental shared
assumptions about human nature. It might be wondered whether there is circularity here. I am
saying both that the believability of a novel requires this kind of external coherence and, with the
rule of inference (2) above, that the believability of a novel implicates certain truths of human
nature. However, it seems there is no pernicious circularity, mainly because both of these
statements are meta-level generalities. Even though at the object level a given novels specific
argument is only indirectly made by the novel itself, the reader or reviewer can summarize how
the argument proceeds. And in this summary, there is no appearance of circularity. The summary
starts with the unadorned premise that the novellet Henry James The Golden Bowl again be
the exampleis believable. It seems that generally, believability is experienced by the reader as
a simple, unanalyzed datum or measure of the novel, continuously updated as the reader
progresses through the novel and imaginatively engages with it. And, like Aristotle said about
judging the happiness of a person, you do not know for sure about believability until you reach
the novels end. Of course, a few paragraphs back, there is already a conveniently short
abbreviation of the remainder of this novels argument. Put another way, the experience of a
novels believability is one thing, determining which specific truths of human nature are
implicated may be quite another and may lie in the province of literary criticism.
A novel does not have to be realistic in order to be believable. The events of a novel can
be far-fetched or remote, as in a science fiction, fantasy, or allegorical novel. Extremism of this
sort seems to have little effect on believability so long as the events related are reasonably wellconnected, and our fundamental shared assumptions about human nature, and about physical
nature of course, are generally respected. Even with substantial alterations in fiction of physical
or psychic reality, if the authors development of these alterations is internally consistent and
coherent and exhibits firm suspension of the authors disbelief, and if the author successfully
depicts the characters as believing what is going on as if it is normal, this can make the novel
believable for the reader. (The author in effect says, suppose for the sake of argument) There
may be a kind of transference or transitivity of the suspension of disbelief here. For such a novel,
trusting the characters and watching them for signs seems analogous to watching flight
attendants for signs the flight is going well or badlya kind of reality check, as it were. On the
other hand, a novelist may push the envelope regarding physical nature (a possible example is H.
P. Lovecrafts novella The Call of Cthulhu) or psychic reality (a possible example is Max
Beerbohms Zukeila Dobson), to the point where neither we, nor the characters, nor the author
really understand what is going on. Here, believability breaks down, and consequently, no
argument can get off the ground.
In using Coleridges (1817, p. 314) phrase suspension of disbelief here, I do not mean
to suggest that the believability of a novel involves believing that its event complex is true;
rather, it involves believing that the event complex could have been true in a strong sense of
couldstronger, for example, than that of mere logical possibility. As Aristotle famously said,

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the poets job is not to tell what has happened but the kind of things that can happen, i.e., the
kind of events that are possible according to probability or necessity (Poetics, Ch. 9). So while
nonfictional narration (history, biography, etc.) aims at veracity, the novel aims at verisimilitude
or depicting events and characters according to probability or necessity, which I would explain
as determined principally by internal and external coherence.2
This approach suggests a solution to the much-discussed paradox of fiction/of fictional
emotions. It certainly seems that the believability of a novel and our emotional response to the
novel are interrelated: a novels being believable allows responding to it with a full range of
emotions, or conversely, responding with a full range of emotions to a novel requires that it be
believable. Yet since we know it is fiction, we do not believe it. So how can it be both steadfastly
unbelieved and believableknown to be false and (e.g.) a tear-jerker? More formally, the
paradox of fiction is that although all three of the following propositions seem plausible, they
cannot all be true:
a:
b:
c:

We have genuine emotional responses to certain fictional narratives.

We believe that those narratives are fictional.
(a) and (b) are incompatible (each implies the denial of the other).

Thus, solutions typically deny one or the other of these three propositions. What are generally
regarded as implausible or distorted solutions, either deny (a), as in the case of Waltons
postulation of quasi-emotions (e.g., 1978), or they deny (b) (e.g., Suits, 2006).
The solution suggested by the above, like most solutions, denies (c), but I think it
uniquely gives believability a prominent role. It is a possible-world solution. We believe that the
plot/character development complex (event complex) of a novel is not real because we know that
generally it is a merely possible (nonactual) world constructed by the novelist. However, for a
believable novel, the possible world constructed by the novelist is strongly accessible from the
actual world, where the core idea of one world being accessible to another is that the one is
possible given the facts of the otherin this case, notably, the basic facts of human nature. The
basic facts of human nature are held common across the worlds. Thus, accessibility grounds
believability, which in turn grounds emotional response. Although believability requires that
perceived fundamental facts of human (and physical) nature be respected, a novel is a complex
counterfactual. But it is commonplace that we have emotional responses, unquestionably
genuine, to all manner of situations that are not presently actualand so are counterfactual in at
least this sense. Indeed, it is hard to see how there could be practical reasoning without such
responses.
I dont know about you, but I fear a stock market crash. This fear fully motivates me to take
measures to minimize the financial damage to me should a crash occur. It may be that the
particular kind of crash that I fear has not and will never in fact occur (though it could be
significantly probable), and so, unbeknownst to me, the possibility is metaphysical and not
merely epistemic (for all I know, were in for a crash). Of course, the counterfactuals of a novel
are generally metaphysicalthe events and characters depicted have not and will never occur or
exist (in the actual world). But this is by no means always the case. For example, consider some
of the events of From the Earth to the Moon by Jules Verne, or consider any historical fiction.
2

The distinction between nonfictional and fictional narration with respect to believability may not be as sharp as
suggested here. Olmos (2014; forthcoming) proposes a general account of credibility that covers both types of
narration.

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My key point is that it seems to make little if any difference to our emotional response whether
the possibilities (counterfactuals) we consider are perceived to be metaphysical or epistemic,
fictional or temporary, so long as they are believable. The critical link and parity among them is
that they are all creatures of the imagination, wherein their believability is determined. However,
the perceived status of the possibility may of course make a big difference in our behavioral
response. Adapting a favorite example, we may be horrified by the events depicted in a horror
film because they are believable; yet because we dont believe them, we dont flee the theater. In
other words, we dont flee the theater because we know the possible world of the horror film is
metaphysical, in relevant ways. Failing to adequately take into account such differences in
behavioral response perhaps (confusedly) leads to thinking that emotional responses to fiction
are themselves qualitatively distinctive or are only quasi-emotions.
We use our emotionalor more generally, affectiveresponses to different possible
courses of future actions or events (and their potential consequences) to help test them out and
select among them where we have a choice, or to be prepared where what will happen is out of
our control. The thought of such a possibility may bring fear, anger, disgust, anxiety, interest,
arousal, joy, or whatever, but the bottom line seems to be that emotions have a cognitive
dimension in that they embody some of our most deeply rooted views about what has
importance, views that could easily be lost from sight during sophisticated intellectual
reasoning (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 42; cf. Johnston, 2001). Such affective responses to fictional
possibilities figure in the contribution that reading novels makes to enhancing practical reasoning
skill, which is by offering us the opportunity to practice thinking about difficult and interesting
situations and complex personalities and providing us with examples of how to discriminate
salient features of such situations and characters (Depaul, 1988, p. 563; cf. also Clark, 1980,
and Gendler & Kovakovich, 2006 for some similarities to the approach I take here).
3. THE STROUD-TYPE PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTION
Transcendental arguments on the order, for example, of Davidsons directed against skepticism
about other minds (1991, pp. 159-160), reason that since certain aspects of our experience or
inner world are undeniable, the external world must have certain features, on the grounds that its
having these features is a necessary condition of our experience being the way it is. In my
representation, the argument of a believable novel is of this type. Stroud (1968) famously
objected to such transcendental arguments that they are too ambitious (the terminology is
Sterns, 2007)that the only condition and conclusion that could be licensed is that we must
think or conceive of the external world as having certain features, not that it actually does. The
objection as applied to the novels case is that it would be enough to allow our experience of
believability if having this experience implicated only that we perceive the real world as
operating in accordance with certain principles.
The first thing to note in response is that this modest version of the transcendental argument of
a believable novel is still an argument; there is still an argument whether we take real world in
(2) and (3) of the schematic representation above to refer to the real world simpliciter or to how
we must conceive of the real world.
Second, no doubt in certain cases I may find a novel believable, whereas you do not. But
I think that there is no fundamental relativity of believability because there is such a thing as
human nature, which we all share and to which we have significant introspective or privileged

1173

access, or at least psychological attunement.3 The believable novel taps into and relies on these
facts, bringing operant principles to the fore. If this general idea were not true, then it would be
pretty inexplicable that there is widespread agreement about which novels are good novels.
Being believable is a central necessary condition for a novel to be a good novel. So in the case of
the ambitious version of the argument of a novel that began this paper, the leap from the inner to
outer worlds is limited and facilitated. The leap is from our psychological experience of
believability of the novel to the real world of human psychology, action, and societywhich is
the primary subject matter of all novels. This subject matter is basically human nature, I take it.
The inner and outer worlds of the ambitions argument are significantly the same; it is not as if
the worlds are distinct as, for example, thought and a brain in a vat, as in Putnams memorable
transcendental argument (1981, Ch. 1). And, as Nagel (1979, Ch. 12) forcefully argued, because
after all we are human, we know what it is like to be human in a way we do not know what it is
like to have a different nature, such as a bats (and perceive the world primarily through
echolocation, be capable of flying, etc.).
Such philosophical considerations indicate that the principles identified in the argument
of the novel resonate in believability largely because they are true of human nature; they indicate
that some ambitious version of the argument of the novel is justified.
4. THE CURRIE-TYPE EMPIRICAL OBJECTION
In recent years, Currie has made something of a cottage industry for himself questioning such
claims on empirical groundsquestioning, as he likes to put it, whether we learn about the
mind from literature. It is no doubt common to think that we do so-learn; for example, consider
Lehrers 2007 book Proust Was a Neuroscientist. Curries writing on this topic includes pieces
in the popular press (2011a; 2011b; 2013). Perhaps his most strident, though scholarly,
articulation of his view is this (2012, p. 30):
And could [Samuel] Johnson have been rationally confident that Shakespeare has shown how human nature
acts in real exigencies, when he, Johnson, carried out no surveys, no carefully structured experiments, to
find out whether it really was so? Johnson was delightfully confident in his opinions of many things, and
rated himself a great observer of his fellow creatures, but the last 50 years of psychological investigation
has shown how often we are wrong about our own motives and actions, and those of others, and how little
penetrating intellect and common sense can help us overcome our ignorance. When Leavis says, rather
grudgingly, that Hard Times does not give a misleading representation of human nature (Leavis 1948, p.
233) it is tempting - to ask how he could possibly know something that not even the greatest psychologist
would think of claiming: what human nature is.

Of course my answer to Curries last point is that the believability of Hard Times has something
to do with it. Curries view constitutes a challenge to my claim that some ambitious version of
the transcendental argument of a believable novel is justified, which would require that our
conceptions of human nature are generally true. Again, I claim that the believable novel taps into
and relies on these conceptions, bringing operant principles to the fore.
3

A recent influential article on introspection (Schwitzgebel, 2008) poses little threat to my points here concerning
human nature and its operant principles, because the focus of the article is on the untrustworthiness of introspection
of immediate conscious experience.
Differences among readers in the perceived believability of a novel may be largely attributable to relatively
extraneous factors, such as the setting of the novel. For example, if I could get past the fantastic details of Tolkeins
trilogy, I think I could better appreciate these novels as implicating truths of human nature.

1174

Let us for the moment try to step back from the possible detail of surveys and carefully
structured experiments and look at the big picture. By virtually any biological measure such as
population numbers and adaptability to different environments, Homo sapiens are an extremely
and uniquely successful social species. (Indeed, we are so successful that in some ways we are
victims of our own success: overpopulation, pollution, etc.) Is it not obvious that this success
would not be possible if we were largely wrong about our own motives and actions, and those
of others or in general about our conceptions of human nature, and if penetrating intellect and
common sense were of little use in augmenting self- and social knowledge? We know ourselves
and others and the operant psychological/sociological principles or generalizations well enough
that our actions and interactions are mostly predictable, often drearily so. Our fundamental,
shared conceptions of human nature allow us to function and flourish, and this is evidence of
their (at least approximate) truth, in much the same way that the spectacular success of the
physical sciences in their predictive power and technological applications (they work) is
evidence of their (at least approximate) truth.
This seems to be so even if something like epiphenomenalism is true, whereby our
conscious and self-conscious life is not causally efficacious in the physical world. As far as any
competition for world domination by a social creature goes, ants are perhaps our only real
rival. But we are sharply unlike ants. We have a mental life, and it is a rich mental life. It is hard
to see how we could function and flourish if our mental life were so out of sync with reality as in
Curries bleak picture, even if mental processes only attend physical processeswhere the real
action is. It seems that such a mental life would consist largely of bewilderment and confusion.
But epiphenomenalism is a radical view. Suppose rather that conceptualization and
thinking come to the fore and are causally efficacious primarily in such things as problemsolving, including in response to when we act or interact in unexpected fashion, and that
otherwise we mostly unthinkingly function with reliable animal expectations of our behaviors
(behaviors that are predictable by us but not predicted). This seems to be more like what is
actually the case. Yet of course it is then all the more implausible that we could function and
flourish and our mental life be so out of sync with reality as in Curries view.
None of this is like a suspicious evolutionary argument about the origins of some specific
creature feature. One may easily get tangled up in alternative possible explanations of particular
adaptations. For example, at one point paleontologists thought that the regression relationship
between the dorsal fin area and the body volume of the pelycosaur showed that this sail fin was
a temperature-regulating mechanism. Later, this explanation was more or less replaced by the
behavioral explanation that the fin was used for sexual display (Gould, 2007, p. 253). Of course
it could have had both functions, or neither. Our conceptions of human nature, as a whole, lie at
an altogether different level. There is no alternative possible explanation of their existence and
entrenchment other than that they have evolved in answer to millions of years of human needs.
So what are the kinds of psychological surveys and carefully structured experiments Currie
uses to make his case that our conceptions of human nature are largely wrong, that our insight
into the mind generally is very limited? One is the imagined professor experiment, which
indicates that to do better at a game of Trivial Pursuit, for example, imagining a professor helps,
whereas imagining a soccer hooligan hurts. This is supposedly surprising, and illustrates that
our minds are prone to capture by unconscious imitation. More significantly, this principle is
said to be borne out in the strong empirical evidence of a causal relationship between media
violence and imitative aggression, about which there is supposedly a huge disconnect between
research results and public opinion (2010, p. 201).

1175

Another allegation is that folk psychology, like the novel, believes in character and character
explanations, and that makes us prone to error, as when we infer good character from attractive
appearance. Experiments suggest that small changes in circumstances can make a big difference
in our behavior, as where people who have just found a dime in a phone booth are a lot more
likely to assist someone outside in need of help than those who had no such luck. (I know the
example is dated!) Of seminarians on their way to give a short talk on the parable of the Good
Samaritan, one group was told there was no hurry, and the rest that they were slightly late.
On the way, a confederate faked a collapse. Compared to those in the no-hurry group, the
others were a great deal more likely to ignore and even step over the collapsed person (2010, pp.
202-203).
Another allegation is that our minds are prone to illegitimately link the literal and the
metaphorical, as in the case of our ready use of a warmth-coldness scale for personsfrom
developmentally important experiences of physical closeness to caregivers. If you briefly hold a
hot cup of coffee, you are then more likely to behave generously and classify a person with
whom you are interacting as warm (2010, p. 204).
It seems that each of these specific allegations is to some degree disputable, but I will not
do that here. Similarly, I will not respond to Curries ad hominem against novelists and other
creative people; for example, he cites a mid-1990s study of creative groups which found that
only one of fifty writers (Maupassant) was free of psychopathology (2011b). It should be
enough to point out that compared to the reasons for believing that our conceptions of human
nature, on the whole, allow us to function and flourish, the kind of evidence of detail that Currie
presents seems to be a case of not being able to see the forest for the trees. Indeed, it is hard to
see how any amount of such evidence of detail would be equal to the task Currie assigns it.
To be sure, at a higher level, Currie says we have little grounds on which to trust our
folk-psychological theoriesany more than we these days trust folk physics, which has been
shown to be substantially at odds with scientifically informed theories of the interaction of
bodies (2010, pp. 201-202). Yet does this just confuse the general vagueness of folk psychology
and folk physics with falsity, or is it trying to say what anyone should admit, that as you go from
folk to scientific theories, the truths identified tend to become less approximate (where this trend
is less clear or more plagued with historical exceptions in the social sciences)? Should we stay
off the pyramids because the ancient Egyptians used folk physics? At perhaps a less exacting
level than the pyramid builders, we are always or almost always interacting with bodies in ways
that could reasonably be said to require our use of folk physics, e.g., cooking dinner, driving a
car, or playing baseball. Current theoretical physics should undermine our trust here not one wit,
or if it did, one wants to say that way insanity doth lie.
5. CONCLUSION
Finally, Currie says that we have been strangely complacent in assuming that we do learn [from
fiction], without any better evidence than our own feelings of having learned something (2011a,
p. 49). This paper has tried to show that, on the contrary, such feelings may be firmly grounded
in the believability of the fiction, and all that is entailed by that, so the complacency is not
strange. It is warranted.

1176

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper has benefited from correspondence with Trudy Govier, and from comments by Jason
Dickenson, Teresa Plumer, and the audience at the ISSA reading. Some of the material in this
paper derives in earlier form from my 2011 and 2012.

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The Argumentative Relevance Of Rhetorical Strategies In Movie

Trailers
Chiara Pollaroli
Institute of Argumentation, Linguistics and Semiotics
University of Lugano
Switzerland
chiara.pollaroli@usi.ch

ABSTRACT: Movie trailers are hybrid (combining narrative and advertising) audiovisual discourse genres
that exploit a carefully selected re-montage of moving and still images, sound, music, voice-over, intertitles,
etc. to persuade potential spectators/consumers that a forthcoming movie is worth watching. I hypothesize
that movie trailers reach their goal by advancing monomodal (e.g. only pictorial or only verbal) and
multimodal arguments and by employing monomodal and multimodal rhetorical schemas and tropes (e.g.
metonymy and synecdoche).
KEYWORDS: dispositio, elocutio, inventio, loci, movie trailers, metonymy, multimodal argumentation,
multimodality, synecdoche.

1. INTRODUCTION
This is an exploratory study which looks at movie trailers as discourse genres from a
rhetorical and argumentative point of view.
With this study, I wish to contribute to the research on visual/multimodal
argumentation and the research on the relationship and isomorphism between rhetorical
figures/tropes and argumentative topoi (or loci). On the one hand, the study on
visual/multimodal argumentation has flourished since a special issue of Argumentation
and Advocacy came out in 1996. This year marks a shift in the studies on argumentation:
since then, scholars have become more and more aware of the fact that real argumentative
discourses in real contexts do not convey arguments only verbally but exploit all the
semiotic resources available to make their point and to persuade people. On the other
hand, the study of the link between patterns of elocutio from ornatus (i.e. rhetorical figures
and tropes) and patterns of inventio (i.e. argumentative loci) is not completely new. The
author of the website Silva Rhetoricae puts into question the sharp division between tropes
and topoi:
The difference between a figure and a topic of invention, then, may sometimes simply be a matter
of degree, or it may be a matter of whether one views the strategy as one of expression of an idea
(an issue of style) or the composition or discovery of an idea or argument (an issue of invention).
The point is, we should recognize the close proximity of the figures and the topics of invention.

In order to understand the role of rhetorical figures/tropes, Fanhestock (1999, p. 23)

suggests shift[ing] the emphasis from what the figures are to what it is they do
particularly well, that is epitomize lines of reasoning. Also, Tindale (2004) says that
figures are arguments if they engage the audience in a premise-conclusion process. More
1178

recently, Kjeldsen (2012) has investigated how tropes contribute to the inferential
reconstruction of enthymemes in advertisements. He argues that pictorial rhetorical figures
delimit the interpretation of the message of an advertisement and evoke the intended
argument. I have tried to contribute to this line of research in Pollaroli and Rocci
(forthcoming).
Movie trailers are an interesting discourse genre to be explored because of their
multimodal and hybrid nature. Unfortunately, they have hardly ever raised scientific
interest, as Carmen Maier (2011) complains about. Movie trailers are multimodal
discourse genres because they combine meaning manifested through different semiotic
modes such as moving and still images, sound, music, written and spoken language. As
Dornaleteche Ruiz (2007) says, movie trailers are shows of other shows, they are
audiovisual discourses anticipating and promoting other audiovisual discourses. Indeed,
movie trailers are communicative practices that employ the same semiotic modes (and
often the same media, especially when they are broadcast in cinemas) of the
communicative practices they promote.
Movie trailers are hybrid because they combine the narrative nature of the movie
they are constructed upon and the promotional nature of advertising; as Maier (2011, p.
141) says trailers are designed to sell and tell a story. The goal of movie trailers is to
persuade potential consumers/spectators that a forthcoming movie is worth watching
(Dusi, 2002; Kernan, 2004; Dornaleteche Ruiz, 2007, 2009; Maier, 2009, 2011). For this,
they can be considered as a type of advertising, especially as a type of TV commercials
(Dornaleteche Ruiz, 2007). The product is a movie, specifically it is a movie experience;
in fact, one cannot properly buy a movie as if it was a pair of shoes, but can go to the
movies and watch it. In order to reach their advertising goal, movie trailers have to both
give some information on the forthcoming movie to arouse the prospective
consumer/spectators interest and leave out some other information to encourage the
audience to go and watch the movie in the case they are interested in the story (or other
features of the movie) and wish to know more about it. As Dornaleteche Ruiz (2007, p.
102) says, the marketing strategy of movie trailers is similar to those types of marketing
(known as merchandising) that tempt the audience by offering an anticipation of the
product (e.g. pieces of a new brand of cheese at the supermarket, free trails on websites
that teach languages, demo of videogames sold with magazines) in order to whet the
appetite of the consumer. Movie trailers are appetizers of coming attractions (Kernan,
2004). In this study I wish to explore the hypotheses that:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Movie trailers are argumentative activity types;

Movie trailers employ multimodal arguments to fulfil their promotional goal;
Movie trailers employ multimodal rhetorical patterns from ornatus (e.g.
synecdoche, metonymy, hyperbole, ellipsis);
The rhetorical patterns employed are argumentatively relevant, that is, they make
the audience infer the arguments advanced in support of the standpoint put forward
in the movie trailer.

This study does not present final results but only some preliminary results of a path of
research that should be further developed.

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2. MOVIE TRAILERS ARE ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSES

So far movie trailers have not been studied as argumentative discourses; yet, the
persuasive purpose of film trailers is acknowledged among those few scholars that have
written about them (Dusi, 2002; Kernan, 2004; Dornaleteche Ruiz, 2007, 2009; Maier,
2009, 2011).
Following Rigotti and Roccis (2006) model for communication contexts, movie
trailers can be described as communicative activities which result from the application of
the advertising interaction scheme namely a culturally shared scheme of interaction
which helps in achieving a goal to the interaction field namely the institutional reality
defined by shared goals and commitments of the market of movies. Broadly speaking,
the goal of the people working in the market of movies is the positioning of a movie in the
film market (Dornaleteche Ruiz, 2007, p. 100) in order for it to perform well at the box
office in theatres. The goal of movie production companies is achieved only when
spectators go and watch the movie in theatres; their goal will not be satisfied if spectators
limit themselves in receiving the information provided in the trailer. Movie trailers are
argumentative as advertisements are. Arguing that movie trailers are argumentative
discourses because they are a specific type of advertising may not be easily accepted,
especially among scholars who do not believe that advertisements can argue (see Blair,
1996, 2004). However, other scholars provide good reasons for claiming that
advertisements argue (Pateman, 1980; Slade, 2002, 2003; Atkin & Richardson, 2005;
Ripley, 2008; Rocci, 2008, 2009; van den Hoven, 2012; Kjeldsen, 2012; Mazzali-Lurati &
Pollaroli 2014; Rocci, Mazzali-Lurati & Pollaroli, 2013; Wierda & Visser, 2013; Pollaroli
& Rocci, forthcoming). The following quotation from Atkin and Richardson (2005, p.
167) clearly summarizes the position of these scholars:
Advertising discourse [is] per se argumentative given that advertising offers evidence often
implicit, indirect or semiotic support in addition to (largely non-requisite) premises in defence of
a contested or contestable position.

Ripley (2008) shows that advertising can be seen as argumentative from the perspective of
different argumentation theories. Advertising for products, for instance, is, from a pragmadialectical point of view, a single non-mixed difference of opinion (see van Eemeren,
Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002; Wierda & Visser, 2013). Following this
perspective, movie trailers can be seen as single non-mixed differences of opinion between
a movie production company (the protagonist) and potential consumers/spectators (the
antagonist). The standpoint often remains implicit, but it can be easily reconstructed from
the context and verbalized as Movie X is worth watching in the theatre or You should
watch movie X in the theatre. Moreover, it is often the case that the arguments are
enthymematic and implicit, but the context and the recognizable overall purpose of the
discourse make it possible to make them explicit and reconstruct the whole discourse as
argumentative.
In order to fulfil their promotional goal, movie trailers advance arguments employing
either the verbal, visual, or aural semiotic systems or a combination of them, that is they
advance arguments multimodally. Although the scepticism about multimodal
argumentation persists (Johnson, 2003; Blair, 1996, 2004; Jacobs, 2000), more and more
scholars in argumentation theory claim that pictures, odours, sounds, moving images, etc.
1180

provide arguments in support of claims (Alcolea Banegas, 2009; Groarke, 2009; Kjeldsen,
2012; Dove, 2012; van den Hoven, 2012; Pollaroli & Rocci, forthcoming). For these
scholars the argumentative role of discourse elements is independent from their
manifestation in the verbal mode. The audience of multimodal argumentative discourses is
able to recognize arguments manifested in other semiotic systems rather than the verbal
one and to understand and correctly interpret the communicated message without
translating it into words. Yet, analysts interested in the reconstruction of the claim(s) and
argument(s) of multimodal argumentative discourses need to translate
visual/aural/multimodal arguments into words; this may result in the loss of part of the
original meaning. Seeing visual/aural/multimodal arguments as enthymemes may be a
good starting point. Some scholars (Birdsell & Groarke, 1996, p. 6; Smith, 2007; Kjeldsen,
2007, 2012) claim that images can be enthymemes, that is rhetorical syllogisms that need
the active participation of the audience to be completed with contextual-bound premises.
The effectiveness of enthymemes relies on these contextual premises. Kjeldsen (2012, p. 241)
sees images as offer[ing] a rhetorical enthymematic process in which something is condensed
or omitted, and, as a consequence, it is up to the spectator to provide the unspoken premises.
3. INVENTIO AND DISPOSITIO IN MOVIE TRAILERS
Movie trailers are composed of a carefully selected re-montage of dialogues, moving
images, sounds, and music from the movie they promote and arrange them together with
non-diegetic voice-over, shots and scenes created for the trailer only or original shots that
were not included in the final editing of the movie, shots with information about the
actors, the director, the production company, day of release, prizes that the movie has been
awarded, empty black or white shots etc.
All this makes movie trailers something completely different from summaries of
movies. The chronological structure of a movie in transformed into the mainly nonchronological structure of a trailer. Dornaleteche Ruiz (2007, p. 105) says that trailers may
be constituted of bracket syntagmas (Metz, 1989; Bateman, 2007) of the story that is told
in the coming movie. Bracket syntagmas are shots put together because they represent
examples of a reality, a topic, without chronological order and temporal link.
Maier (2009, p. 162) points out that consumers/spectators evaluate the characters, the
relationships, the events, the film company, the actors, the director presented in the movie
trailer, and consequently the movie advertised, visually. In fact, Maier defines evaluative
devices as being those verbal, visual and aural resources that inherently or contextually
signal a process of appraisal (2009, p. 165); thus, her concept of evaluation is similar to
argumentation. In my view, these are all diegetic and extra-diegetic visual (or
multimodal) arguments. Examples of promotional evaluative devices in movie trailers are,
for Maier (2009), the film companys logo which not only reminds the viewer of the
companys prestige, it may also be an indication of the quality or type of films created by
the company (p. 171) and the name of an actor, which has a similar effect to that of the
film companys logo. Maier (2009, p. 172) also points out that no single semiotic mode is
supposed to carry the whole or only evaluative information of a shot or scene. Visual,
verbal and aural evaluative devices are co-deployed to maintain or subvert each others
evaluative load both on the diegetic and non-diegetic levels. These evaluative devices
may be seen as the recurrent patterns of inventio that are employed in movie trailers.
1181

How do these elements hold together in movie trailers as discourses? As Carmen Maier
(2009, p. 161) points out the whole structure of these film trailers is motivated by their
promotional purpose. This insightful remark can be better explained adopting the
pragma-rhetorical perspective on discourses that Congruity Theory has developed (Rigotti,
2005; Rocci, 2005; see the literature cited in Mazzali-Lurati & Pollaroli, 2014). Following
Congruity Theory, we see monomodal/multimodal discourses as complex acts governed
by a superordinate act that corresponds to what the addresser does to the addressee with
the discourse; all discourse elements are subordinate acts that contribute to fulfil the goal
of the text as a whole. The promotional goal of movie trailers determines the complex
multimodal act of the text which is similar to that of advertising for product and the
functions fulfilled by the multimodal sequences of the movie trailer are subordinate to the
advertising one. Multimodal sequences in audiovisual discourses are clusters of shots
combined together with sound, music and other elements that form a unit; in order to
determine the boundaries of each sequence we must look at changes in music, sound,
images, etc. The voiceover may help in marking the multimodal sequences. I agree with
Carmen Maier pointing out that all stages or multimodal sequences fulfil a
promotional function through different informative means (p. 144). From the
perspective of Congruity Theory, the promotional function corresponds to the complex
superordinate act whereas the informative means correspond to the subordinate acts.
In other words, movie trailers are multimodal argumentative discourses that
perform the complex act that, for the purpose of this paper, we can name the movie trailer
act. All multimodal subordinate units concur in performing the high-level act. Maier
(2009) identifies different stages that fulfil specific functions in movie trailers. We will see
some of them through the analysis of an example in Section 5.
Movie trailer act (Addresser, Addressee, T)
Presupposition
Addresser is a motion picture company that produced movie X;
Addressee is a potential consumer/spectator; T is a movie trailer having
a propositional content Y which shows the movie story and other
information about the movie. Movie X will be available at time t.
Addresser reasonably believes that movie X will satisfy a desire of
Addressee.
Pragmatic effect By stating T, Addresser commits himself in offering movie X and
expresses the desire that Addressee benefits from movie X.
The complex act determines the inferential process that the audience is invited to perform
in order to correctly understand and interpret each multimodal sequence of a movie trailer.
The meaning in movie trailers is condensed (Wildfeuer, 2014; see also Kjeldsen, 2012 and
the enthymematic nature of visual/multimodal argumentation mentioned in Section 1) and
the way multimodal sequences are arranged may seem incoherent and chaotic because, for
instance, information about the production company is followed with brief shots from the
movie and this is interrupted by information about the actors, etc. Indeed, Wildfeuer
(2014) notes that the inferential work required by viewers in order to interpret a trailer is
different from the inferential work they operate to interpret a movie. This is consistent,
from a Congruity Theory perspective, with the very different superordinate complex acts
that movie trailers and movies perform, respectively a promotional goal and an
1182

entertainment goal.1 However, a link between the inferential work performed when
watching a movie trailer and the process of interpretation of the promoted movie remains.
Indeed, a movie trailers invites the audience to operate anticipatory hypotheses (Moeschler
& Reboul, 2009) on the cinematic discourse that we are invited to watch in theatres.
4. ELOCUTIO IN MOVIE TRAILERS
Movie trailers employ patterns from elocutio, such as synecdoche, metonymies,
hyperbole2, ellipsis (here I will focus only on metonymy and synecdoche for reasons of
space).
In the last few decades, cognitive linguists have shown that traditional rhetorical
figures and tropes are deep and pervasive structures of our thoughts through which people
conceptualize and understand the world (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003[1980]; Barcelona,
2003; Ortony, 1993; Panther & Radden, 1999). Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980], p. 5),
for instance, claim that the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one
kind of thing in terms of another. Stemming from this approach to metaphor, Forceville
(1996) shows that the manifestation of a metaphor is not necessarily verbal but it can also
be pictorial and multimodal: metaphors can be manifested by images and by a
combination of different semiotic modes such as words and images, sound, moving
images, etc. (see contributions in Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009).
Metonymy is a substitution of one concept with another which plays a contiguous
semantic role within the same frame (Bohnomme, 2005). The focus shifts from the proper
concept and role to the substituted one. Metonymic concepts usually involve[s] direct
physical or causal associations which are systematic and grounded in our experience.
Indeed, it is possible to identify certain general metonymic concepts in term of which we
organize our thoughts and actions; for example, the relations producer for product,
object used for user, controller for controlled, institution for people responsible,
place for the institution and place for the event (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003 [1980], p.
39). Consider, for example, the sentence Shes wearing an Armani in which the producer
substitutes the product, or a TV commercial of a brand of water where the mountains from
which the water springs are shown (metonymy of the origin-for-product type). Works on
pictorial and multimodal metonymy (Forceville, 2009; Bonhomme & Lugrin, 2008; UriosAparisi, 2009; Yu, 2009; Villacaas & White, 2013; see also Forceville 1996) identify
instances of metonymic relationships represented by visual elements in static or dynamic
images in advertising texts.
Since Antiquity synecdoche has been recognized as a rhetorical figure independent
from metonymy. Yet, already Quintilian noticed the little difference that exists between
the two rhetorical tropes and that it is but a short step between synecdoche and
1

I am aware of the fact that the complex act performed by movies should not be easily dismissed and
classified as entertainment. Indeed, Alcolea-Banegas (2009) and Chatman (1990) claim that movies can
argue. However, I will not deal with this issue here because it exceeds the topic of this paper.
2
Movie trailers exaggerate the films plot to maximise the viewers expectations and curiosity concerning
various aspects of the film and not just the films story (Maier, 2011, p. 145) and to raise doubt which are
left unsolved to trigger the viewers keener expectations and persuade them to see the whole film later on
(p. 146). For Dornaleteche Ruiz (2007, p. 105) the selection and montage of shots from the movie to realize
a trailer is done with the objective of magnifying the movie and making its excellence stand out.

1183

metonymy (Institutio Oratoria VIII.VI.23). Burkhardt (2010, p. 247) laments that a

clear principle for the distinction between metonymy and synecdoche, which is more than
2,000 years old, is still missing. Nerlich (2010) agrees and points out that it is a hard task
to give a definite and agreed upon definition of synecdoche as well as to find its position
in the realm of rhetorical figures. The distinction has been made even harder as
synecdoche has been sometimes considered as a subtype of metonymy (Lakoff and
Johnson, 2003 [1980]). For space reason, I cannot report all the characterizations and
classifications that have been proposed on synecdoche, but I can plausibly claim that
synecdoche is a structure of thought that substitutes the part for the whole (There where
only ten heads today in the classroom) or the genus for the species (He has a
temperature), the singular for the plural (The Roman won the battle), and vice versa.
Some research has been conducted on the manifestation of rhetorical patterns in
audiovisuals, especially in movies and in TV commercials (Whittock, 1990; Forceville,
2007, 2009; Urios-Aparisi, 2009; Yu, 2009). Whittock (1990) lists nine cinematic
metaphors that include metonymy, synecdoche, explicit comparison and distortion.
Forceville (2007) claims that metaphor can be manifested multimodally in TV
commercials and metonymy (Forceville, 2009) is employed in movies when, for example,
the spectator hears a sound that is connected with something that is not displayed on the
screen (e.g. the creaking floorboards that stand for an unwelcome visitor) or the spectator
watches a close-up of a part of the body (e.g. moving mouth) that stands for an action (e.g.
talking). It follows that movie trailers as well may manifest rhetorical patterns such as
synecdoche parts of the movie stand for the whole movie and metonymy the director
and the film production industry stand for the movie.
I hypothesize that these rhetorical patterns epitomize lines of reasoning, saying it with
Fanhestock (1999), and make the viewer infer the intended argument, saying it with
Kjeldsen (2012). For example a metonymy condenses an argument based on a locus from
final cause or efficient cause and a synecdoche condenses an argument based on a locus
from parts to whole.
5. A CASE STUDY
In this section I will analyze a movie trailer that won the 15th Golden Trailer Awards for
the best in show trailer. It promotes the movie Gravity (2013) by Alfonso Cuarn.
This movie trailer is a one-minute 51 seconds audiovisual discourse composed of 7
multimodal sequences. A preliminary step for the analysis of audiovisuals is the
transcription of the discourse into the written modes. The transcription is useful because it
gives a synthetic representation of the linearity and strata of the audiovisual text (Casetti &
Di Chio, 2009). The transcription table proposed here (table 1) is a simplified version of
the transcription table presented in Rocci, Mazzali-Lurati & Pollaroli (2013) constructed
on the basis of Baldry & Thibault (2006), Bateman (2007), and Casetti & Di Chio (2009).

1184

00:01 00: 04

Warner Bros
Pictures logo

MS1 Promotional Identification

00:05 01: 36

Diegetic
sequence

MS2 Promotional Orientation and

Complication

01:37 01: 39

Title of the
movie

MS3 Promotional Identification/

Specification

01:40 01: 42

Main actors

MS4 Promotional Identification

01:43 01: 45

Director

MS5 Promotional Identification

01:46 01: 49

Date of release
in theatres

MS6 Promotional Information/Specification

01:50 01: 51

other details

MS7 Promotional Identification

Table 1

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The movie trailer for Gravity is composed of multimodal sequences that fulfil specific
functions in the trailer (Maier, 2011) and concur to perform the overall promotional act of
the discourse. Combining Maiers functions and Congruity Theory, we can identify the act
performed by each multimodal sequence.
The multimodal sequence 1, which lasts 4 seconds, shows the Warner Bros
Pictures logo and accomplish what Maier (2011) calls the Promotional Identification
function because gives non-diegetic information about the film company. The multimodal
sequence 2 is diegetic and is composed of only one shot, that is one uninterrupted image,
without editing cuts but with many frames. It lasts 1 minute 31 seconds and it shows an
entire scene from the movie advertised. This multimodal sequence functions both as
Orientation and as a Complication (always following Maiers stages) because it introduces
the characters and the situation and also what seems to be the disruptive event. The
audience watches three astronauts working outside of the space shuttle Explorer. The
mission control in Houston warns the team about debris in the space which do not last
much in arriving. One of the astronauts is hit and seems dead, the astronaut Stone cannot
unbuckle the belt that keeps her tied to the shuttle arm; while the astronaut Kowalski is
trying to help Dr. Stone, the shuttle arm is broken by some debris and she starts tumbling
through space. The spectator watching this sequence operates many inferences and
anticipatory hypotheses (Moeschler & Reboul, 2009) about the plot and the chronological
order of the events (is this the beginning of the movie or the end? What is the reason for
the accident and the debris being around the Earth?) and the characters (Are those the only
characters? How is the relationship between them? What happens to Dr. Stone after she is
thrown away from the space shuttle?). The following multimodal sequences give extradiegetic information.
Multimodal sequence 3 identifies the title of the movie thus specifying one of the
elements presupposed in the movie trailer act we have seen in Section 2. Multimodal
sequence 4 identifies the famous actors playing the two characters the audience has just
seen in multimodal sequence 2. The multimodal sequence 5 identifies the director. The
multimodal sequence 6 gives information of the date of release in theatres and specifies a
detail of the movie trailer act. Multimodal sequences 1 to 6 are composed of one shot
each. Two shots compose MS7 in which some information is repeated (director, film
company, actors) and some information is added about the music and the production.
The overall act performed in this movie trailer is:
Movie trailer actGravity (Addresser, Addressee, T)
Presupposition:
Warner Bros Pictures is a motion picture company that produced
Gravity; Addressee is a potential consumer/spectator; T is a movie
trailer having a propositional content Y which shows the movie
story and other information about the movie. Gravity will be
available on 10.04.2013. Warner Bros Pictures reasonably believes
that Gravity will satisfy a desire of Addressee.
Pragmatic effect:
By stating T, Warner Bros Pictures commits himself in offering
Gravity and expresses the desire that Addressee benefits from
Gravity.

1186

A reconstruction of the standpoint and the arguments following the pragma-dialectical

analytical overview shows that the movie trailer benefits from a complex argumentative
structure in which subordinate argumentation combines with multiple argumentation (van
Eemeren, Grootendorst, 2004; van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002).
1.
You should watch Gravity (which will be released in theatres on 10.04.2013)
1.1
The movie Gravity is entertaining
1.1.1 The multimodal sequences (parts) that you are watching in the movie trailer are
entertaining
1.2
Gravity is good (is a movie of high quality)
1.2.1 Sandra Bullock and George Clooney are starring
1.2.2 Gravity is directed by Alfonso Cuarn
1.2.3 Gravity is produced by Warner Bros. Pictures
The analytical overview shows that single aspects, or parts, of the movie are presented as
details of quality; the quality of the parts of the movie is transferred to the movie as a
whole and are presented as reasons for making Gravity worth watching.
The Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010; see the
literature cited there) is helpful in making explicit the inferential path that links the
arguments and the standpoint by making explicit the locus that licenses the premisesconclusion relation. According to Rigotti and Greco Morasso, arguments are composed of
two equally important dimensions: the endoxical (also known as material or contextual)
dimension and the logical (or procedural) dimension. In our case study, we see that the
argument The movie Gravity is entertaining (1.1) and The multimodal sequences (parts)
that you are watching in the movie trailer are entertaining (1.1.1) are linked by a
synecdoche of the part-whole type that condenses a locus from parts to whole (figure 1).
In the contextual dimension the endoxical premise The multimodal sequences that you
are watching in the movie trailer are parts of the movie Gravity combines with the factual
premise (datum) The multimodal sequences that you are watching in the movie trailer are
entertaining. The positive feature of being entertaining is transferred to the movie
according to the maxim If all parts share a property, the whole will inherit this property.

Figure 1
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The arguments Sandra Bullock and George Clooney are starring (1.2.1), Gravity is
directed by Alfonso Cuarn (1.2.2), and Gravity is produced by Warner Bros. Pictures
(1.2.3) that support the evaluative standpoint Gravity is good (is a movie of high quality)
(1.2) are linked to the movie by a metonymical relation. Warner Bros. Pictures is the film
production company that produces the movie, it is linked through a metonymy of the
producer-for-product type and makes the viewer infer an argument licensed by a locus
from efficient cause (figure 2). The director Alfonso Cuarn is also linked to the movie
with a metonymy of the producer-for-product type and it is based on a locus from efficient
cause as well (figure 3). Sandra Bullock and George Clooney are the actors that play the
main characters of the movie; their link to the movie operates upon a metonymy and the
line of reasoning is a locus from efficient cause (figure 4). In the three arguments the
quality of the production company, the actors and the director which is accepted as an
endoxical premise is transferred to the movie in accordance with the maxim If a quality
characterizes the efficient cause such quality characterizes the effect too.

Figure 2

Figure 3
1188

Figure 4
6. CONCLUSION
For now I am able to draw only some very preliminary conclusions that I will develop in
future research.
Movie trailers can be reconstructed as argumentative discourses where the
standpoint You should watch movie X in the theatre is supported by multimodal
arguments. The multimodal sequences contribute in performing the overall act of movie
trailers as discourses. The rhetorical patterns employed in movie trailers are
argumentatively relevant, that is they make the viewers infer the intended argument
licenses by a specific argument scheme or locus, e.g. synecdoche makes the view infer an
argument licenses by a locus from parts to whole and metonymical relations make the
viewer infer an argument licensed by a locus from efficient cause.
From the discussion and the presentation of the case study, I can draw the
methodological consideration that a combination of approaches and disciplines is the only
way to analyze complex audiovisual argumentative discourses.

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Suppositions In Argumentative Discussions: A Pragma-Dialectical

Solution For Two Puzzles Concerning Thought Experimentation
Eugen Octav Popa
Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands
O.E.Popa@uva.nl

ABSTRACT: The practice of constructing imaginary scenarios for the sake of argument is sometimes
referred to as thought experimentation. In this paper, I employ analytical tools from the pragma-dialectical
theory of argumentation in order to clarify two theoretical puzzles that have been formulated with respect to
thought experimentation. I do so by analysing the place and function of argumentative moves that contain
suppositions in their propositional content. Three such moves are distinguished: proposing suppositions,
accepting suppositions and using suppositions.
KEYWORDS: thought experimentation, argumentation, suppositions, pragma-dialectics, speech acts

1. INTRODUCTION
Thought experimentation is a pattern of argumentative discourse in which the speaker
constructs an imaginary scenario with the aim of showing that a previously expressed
opinion is unacceptable. The pattern is usually encountered in scholarly communication
and unfolds along the following lines. The author begins by calling into question a theory
(principle, claim etc.) that some fellow scholar accepts. Next, the author proposes that
some imaginary scenario is supposed for the sake of argument. This imaginary scenario
will typically contain borderline impossible events and objects. Some well-known thought
experiments speak of superhuman abilities, incredibly precise mechanisms, fantastic
worlds, highly improbable coincidences etc. The borderline impossibility of the described
events, however, does not seem to affect the authors argumentation. Because of what
would happen in the imagined scenario, we are told, the academic theory under discussion
is deemed unacceptable.
The following thought experiment has been put forward by Jackson (1986) and it is
known as Marys Room (sometimes also The Knowledge Argument). The targeted
position in this case is physicalism, a philosophical conception according to which
everything is (ultimately) physical. For a physicalist, all knowledge of the world is,
generally speaking, knowledge of physical particles in motion. In response to this, Jackson
invites us to consider the following scenario:
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black
and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of
vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes
on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like red, blue, and so on. She discovers,
for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly
how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion

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of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence The sky is blue. What will happen
when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will
she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and
our visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete.
But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is
false. (p. 130)

Until the early 1990s, thought experiments were discussed only in passing, and more as a
curious case than as proper forms of academic discourse (see for example Fodor, 1964;
Kuhn, 1977; Mach, 1976; Popper, 1992; Sheldon, 1973). Subsequently, several
monographs, collections of essays and papers brought the topic back to life, prompting
quite intense debates over how thought experimentation works and how it should work
(Brown, 1991; Dennett, 2013; Frappier, Meynell, & Brown, 2013; Gendler, 2000;
Hggqvist, 1996; Horowitz & Massey, 1991; Wilkes, 1988). The practice turned out to be
the source of some enduring puzzles about science and argumentation. I want to focus on
two such puzzles. I think these particular two are variations on what is essentially the same
theme and I will later claim that both can be resolved (or dissolved) by employing tools
developed in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 1984; 2004; van Eemeren, 2010).
2. TWO PUZZLES CONCERNING THOUGHT EXPERIMENTATION
The first puzzle has arisen when trying to answer a seemingly simple question: Are
thought experiments arguments? To some scholars, the answer is clearly yes; to others, it
is clearly no. The practice of thought experimentation seems to have an argumentative
dimension, but seems, at the same time, to be intriguingly different from the typical,
deductive or inductive schemes in which argumentation is usually cast. According to
Norton (1991; 1996; 2004), thought experiments are merely picturesque arguments
(2004, p. 1139) and to conduct a thought experiment is to execute an argument (1996, p.
356). According to the other camp, equating thought experiments with arguments or
reconstructing them as such misses a more general (perhaps the) point about this
practice. For example, Brown (1986; 1991) argues that at least in some cases,
reconstructing thought experiments as arguments would obscure the way in which we
grasp the scientific laws and concepts. In a similar vein, Gendler (2000; 2004) argues
that reconstructing thought experiments as arguments is misleading because thought
experiments do not reach their conclusion inferentially but quasi-observationally (2004,
p. 1154). The variety of positions that have been taken with respect to this puzzle is not
captured, of course, by this brisk overview (De Mey, 2003; Hggqvist, 1996; Moue,
Masavetas, & Karayianni, 2006). However, the crux of the matter should be evident:
thought experiments seem to have an obvious argumentative dimension, they work fully or
partially in much the same way arguments do, but pinpointing this dimension brings one
into conceptual problems. Are they just arguments? Are they more than that?
The second puzzle has its origin in the papers of Fisher (1989) and Bowels (1993)
on the so-called suppositional argument. The suppositional argument presents the
logician with a problem because its premises are made up of suppositions, and
suppositions are quite clearly not in the same class with assertions (Fisher, 1989, p. 402).
Supposing for the sake of argument that there is a brilliant scientist locked up in a room is
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indeed an altogether different speech act than asserting the same content. If the notion of
argumentation is defined as a sequence of assertives put forward in support of a
conclusion, the suppositional argument appears to be a contradiction in terms. Fishers
proposed solution is to redefine our conception of argument altogether so as to include this
deviant case. Theories that model argumentation merely as a sequence of assertives should
then recognize the suppositional argument as a serious omission (1989, p. 401).1 While
Fisher and Bowels do not use the term thought experiment, it is evident from the
examples they discuss (Galileos Falling Bodies thought experiment inter alia) that the
raised issues pertain to the practice of thought experimentation. The question becomes: is
thought experimentation an altogether different class of argumentative behaviour? If so,
what kind of theory would cover both thought experiments and the more normal
arguments made up of assertives?
While these two puzzles and their corresponding debates belong to different
disciplinary contexts, it should be clear that they are not worlds apart. The general claim of
this paper is that the puzzlement in each case has its origin in a persistent ambiguity
concerning the relationship between the imaginary scenario and the targeted academic
claim. Resolving this ambiguity should resolve the puzzlement.
3. ARGUMENTATIVE MOVES WITH SUPPOSITIONS
The analytical distinctions that will be introduced in what follows are based on the
pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; van
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; van Eemeren, 2010). In this model, a speech act counts as
an argumentative move if it contributes to the process of resolving of a difference of
opinion. Two speakers are said to have a difference of opinion when they externalize
different standpoints with respect to the same propositional content. For example, one
speaker might put forward a positive standpoint (e.g. I think jazz is more difficult to lear
than blues), while the other speaker puts forward either doubt (e.g. Im not so sure about
that) or the opposite standpoint (e.g. I think its the other way around: Blues is way more
difficult!). In pragma-dialectics, a critical discussion is divided into four stages: the
confrontation stage in which the difference of opinion is externalized, the opening stage in
which the parties try to find a common ground, the argumentation stage in which the
standpoint is tested against critical reactions and the concluding stage in which the
speakers commitments are reaffirmed or withdrawn. In each of these stages, the
discussants will perform specific argumentative moves such as putting forward
standpoints, asking critical questions, putting forward argumentation, and requesting
definitions. As an ideal model, the critical discussion is meant to offer a systematic basis
for the analysis and evaluation of real-life argumentative discourse. In this paper, I will
employ the model exclusively for analytical purposes.
Examined through the model of a critical discussion, a thought experiment will appear as a
sequence of argumentative moves performed by an antagonist in an attempt to resolve a
difference of opinion concerning the targeted academic claim. For example, Jacksons
1

For an overview of theories that take argumentation to be exclusively a matter of putting forward assertions
see Bowels (1993, p. 237).

1195

thought experiment would be reconstructed as a contribution to a discussion on the

physicalist claim that all knowledge of the world is, roughly, knowledge of physical
particles in motion. The author takes a negative standpoint with respect to this claim,
while physicalists presumably maintain their positive standpoint (confrontation stage). The
imaginary scenario of Mary the brilliant scientist is then introduced as a common ground
for discussing the acceptability of physicalism (opening stage). Jackson then argues, based
on what is said to happen in the scenario, that physicalism is unacceptable (argumentation
stage). Finally, in a section of the paper that has not been reproduced here, Jackson
proposes that the doctrine of physicalism is too rudimentary to cover the many sources of
human knowledge, so it should be either significantly modified or altogether retracted
(concluding stage). What this short reconstruction shows is that this thought experiment
can be reconstructed as a contribution to a process of resolving a difference of opinion.
The next step in resolving the above-mentioned puzzles is reconstructing the role of
suppositions in such a resolution process. This will amount to specifying (1) the kind of
argumentative moves that are performed based on suppositions, (2) the stage(s) in which
these argumentative moves are performed, and (3) the contribution of these argumentative
moves to the process of resolving the difference of opinion. I propose to distinguish three
such argumentative moves.
The first argumentative move that can take one or more suppositions as part of its
propositional content is the proposal of suppositions. This move is typically performed
explicitly and is signalled textually by lets-constructions such as lets suppose, lets
say, and lets imagine. Being directive (more precisely: an invitation), the proposal of
suppositions will belongs to the opening stage of a resolution process. Its illocutionary
point is to have the hearer join the speaker in temporarily discussing as if some
propositions, the ones making up the imaginary scenario, are true. For ease of reference, I
will represent the set of all introduced suppositions with the variable SCENARIO, and
the protagonist and antagonist as LU1 and LU2, respectively. The proposal of a supposition
can thus be given as the following argumentative move performed by the antagonist (LU2)
in the opening stage:
LU2: !/(LU1 & LU2 discuss as if SCENARIO)
The details of how the parties will discuss-as-if will vary from context to context and
need not concern us for the present purposes. Generally, the antagonist (LU2) will invite
the protagonist (LU1) to temporarily refrain from questioning the truth of the propositions
under the set SCENARIO. LU2 is thus trying to establish a discussion rule, a formal starting
point that will regulate the discussants future contributions.1
In order for such a formal starting point to be applicable, however, the protagonist
(LU1) must also accept the antagonists proposal. The acceptance of suppositions is the
second argumentative move that must be distinguished. By accepting the proposal, the
protagonist is effectively consenting to the discussion rule of discussing as if SCENARIO is
true. This can be reconstructed as the performance of a commissive in the opening stage of
the resolution process. Following the same formula, the commissive can be represented as
follows:
1

For the notion of formal starting point see van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1984, p. 84)

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LU1: +/(LU1 & LU2 discuss as if SCENARIO)

It is important to note that neither of the two moves discussed so far needs to be performed
explicitly in order for other argumentative moves to follow. Generally, since thought
experiments are put forward in monological texts, the antagonist will propose the
suppositions and then simply continue his contribution. This is exemplified in Jacksons
thought experiment, where the readers (inevitable) silence is provisionally taken to count
as acceptance. A proposal-acceptance sequence performed with respect to a set of
suppositions forming a SCENARIO can be referred to as the introducing of those
suppositions in the discussion.
Introducing suppositions in a discussion can be pragmatically justified only if the
proposer means to subsequently use these suppositions in the discussion. Abandoning the
discussing-as-if venture after the proposal was accepted would be equivalent to inviting
someone to dinner and not showing up at best, this would suggests a speakers misuse of
the lets-construction (Clark, 1993). It is important then to distinguish a third
argumentative move, a move that will be called using suppositions. This move is an
assertive speech act that contributes to the resolution process because it provides support
for the antagonists standpoint. The move will thus be reconstructed as part of the
argumentative stage of the resolution process. In this terminology, to use a scenario in an
argumentative discussion means to put forward an argument that contains those
suppositions as antecedents.
It follows from the previous analysis that suppositions must appear both in the
simple premises of an argument and in the bridging premise.1 This should square well
with the intuitive idea that scenario works against the academic claim both because of
what the other party says it would happen and because of what would really happen. Let
us denote the protagonists standpoint as T and the consequences derived from the
scenario as c. The simple and the bridging premises in which suppositions are used can
be represented respectively as follows:
LU2: +/(If SCENARIO, then c)
LU2: +/(If T, then if SCENARIO, then c)
Putting forward these two speech acts is not like, say, asking a question and then later
asking another question. Rather, the two taken together form a complex speech act of
argumentation they are premises of the same argument. In pragma-dialectics, the relation
between premises is represented in argumentation structures, which in this case would take
the following form:

1. T
1.1 If SCENARIO, then c
1.1 If T, then if SCENARIO, then c
1

The distinction between simple and bridging premises is discussed, in a slightly different terminology, by
van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, chapter 6).

1197

The double conditional in the bridging premise (1.1) is usually avoided in natural
language, partly because of the strange if-then-if-then construction, and partly because it is
often obvious that the arguer is labouring under the introduced suppositions. Jacksons
thought experiment is a good example. While no if-then-if-then construction appears
explicitly, the bridging premise can be reconstructed from the following sequence of
assertives: It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our
visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was
incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that,
and Physicalism is false. Taken together, these assertives can be reconstructed in the
following structure:
1. (PHYSICALISM is true)
1.1 If MARY-IN-THE-ROOM SCENARIO, then Mary does
learn something new
1.1.1 Mary learns about coloured objects
1.1 If PHYSICALISM, then if MARY-IN-THE-ROOM
SCENARIO, then she doesnt learn anything new
During real-life instances thought experimentation, the simple premise (1.1) is typically
questioned implicitly or explicitly by the protagonist, which prompts further
argumentation from the antagonist. A more detailed analysis is required for establishing
how these more complex structures can best be represented. For the present purposes, it
need only be stressed that suppositions can be part of the argumentation stage of an
argumentative discussion without necessarily being in the same class of speech acts as
assertives. The suppositions (represented by the variable SCENARIO) are part of the
antagonists argumentation, yet only as antecedents, not as premises.
Distinguishing between the proposal, acceptance and use of suppositions as three
separate argumentative moves that can be performed in an argumentative discussion is
crucial for understanding the argumentative dimension of thought experimentation.
Though the distinctions above have been introduced at a rather swift pace, they should be
sufficient to throw some light on the two puzzles discussed above.
4. THE TWO PUZZLES REVISITED
The distinctions introduced in the previous section are not meant to exhaust the topic of
suppositions and their functions in argumentative discourse. They do provide a basis for
approaching the two puzzles described in section 2. As explained, both puzzles concerned
the relationship between thought experimentation and argumentative moves. Before going
back to each of the two puzzles and see what insights can be drawn, it might be useful to
first delineate the principal points of the solution here proposed.
What the analysis above has indicated is that putting forward a thought experiment
commits two speakers to a variety of argumentative moves. The expression to put
forward a thought experiment covers in its present usage a more complex form of
linguistic behavior than, say, to put forward a question or even to put forward an
argument. To engage in thought experimentation means to take part in a structured
dialogical process whose aim is (inter alia) the resolution of a difference of opinion. Due
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to various institutional conventions that constrain this process, we can only see the
antagonists moves, the protagonists moves being quoted, reported or left implicit. The
monological performance, however, does not change the argumentative dimension of the
antagonists behavior. The antagonist is in the position of someone displaying his tangoing
skills with an invisible partner: his moves are still meant as tango moves even though, as
we know, the real process takes two. If the pragma-dialectical model is used to analyze
this process, it will be trivial to observe that a thought experiment is not an argument and
that supposing is not asserting. With the introduced distinctions, one can also pinpoint
more precisely why this should be so.
The first puzzle was brought forth by scholars who disagreed upon the general
relationship between thought experimentation and argumentation. In this debate, thought
experiments are either arguments, in which case they can be reconstructed as such, or not,
in which case the reconstruction must fail on some account. Whatever epistemological
assumptions might fuel this dilemma, it does not seem to have a pragmatic basis.1 The
analysis developed here has shown that the texts quoted as instances of thought
experimentation are evidently more than arguments since two of the argumentative moves
identified (the proposal and the acceptance of suppositions) are not assertives. At the same
time, the speech acts put forward by the antagonist in the argumentation stage of the
discussion are evidently nothing but arguments since the illocutionary point of using
suppositions is to support the standpoint. Thought experimentation is thus a complex
argumentative phenomenon consisting of many argumentative moves performed at
different stages of a discussion, all of which realize the point of convincing the other party
of the unacceptability of T.
The second puzzle was brought forth by scholars who disagreed upon the
relationship between suppositions and argumentation. In the analysis above, suppositions
where shown to have a function in various stages of an argumentative discussion. This
versatility can be explained technically by pointing out that suppositions are not
illocutionary acts. Rather, suppositions are contained in the predication act of various
types of illocutionary acts such as directives (when they are proposed), commissives
(when they are accepted) and assertives (when they are used). The supposition Mary is a
brilliant scientist who investigates the world from a black-and-white room is only part of
the propositional content of an illocutionary act such as (Lets) Suppose Mary is a
brilliant scientist who investigates the world from a black-and-white room. Because of
this, the label suppositional argument designates, not an altogether different form of
argumentative behavior, but a rather common argumentation structure in which both the
simple and the bridging premises are conditional statements taking suppositions as
antecedents.

One of the first formulations of this dilemma appears in Norton (1991): Thus there is only one noncontroversial source from which this information can come: it is elicited from information we already have
by an identifiable argument, although that argument might not be laid out in detail in the statement of the
thought experiment. The alternative to this view is to suppose that thought experiments provide some new
and even mysterious route to knowledge of the physical world (p. 129, my italics).

1199

5. CONCLUSION
Thought experimentation has been analyzed here as a contribution to a process of
resolving a difference of opinion. While the reader who is accustomed to the rigid
language of scientific communication will perhaps see them as rarities, there is
pragmatically speaking nothing strange about engaging in thought experimentation. The
antagonist proposes some formal starting points (discussion rules), the protagonist accepts,
after which the two make use of the introduced starting points in order to test the
acceptability of the standpoint under discussion. While a thought experiment might appear
as a monologue, through pragma-dialectical analysis these dialogical processes can be
reconstructed. The result of such a reconstruction is that the relationship between the
imaginary scenario and the targeted claim becomes clear and the various functions of
speech acts containing suppositions can be characterized as argumentative moves in a
resolution process.

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Obama And The 2011 Debt Ceiling Crisis: The American Citizen
And The Deliberative Power Of the Bully Pulpit
John L. Price
Communication Studies
University of Kansas
United States of America
John.Price@ku.edu

ABSTRACT: During the summer of 2011, Obama was faced with the difficult task of breaking the partisan
stalemate in Congress that threatened to plunge the world into another recession. . This study examines
President Obama's rhetorical strategy during the debt crisis and discusses his extensive use of the bully
pulpit. This paper argues that in the case of the debt ceil crisis the bully pulpit served as a means to restore
deliberation to Congress.
KEYWORDS: [Bully Pulpit, Debt ceiling debate, Presidential rhetoric, Rhetoric].

1. INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 2011, President Obama was confronted with a debate that
economists labelled as insane and dangerous (Jackson, 2011). The issue of raising the
debt ceiling, an event that had for years been a formality, became a thorn in the Presidents
side that threatened the economy of not just the U.S., but the world as well. Many experts
argued that if the debt ceiling was not raised it could cripple the U.S. economic recovery
and plunge the world into another recession (Isidore, 2011).
During the final weeks of July the negotiations between the parties over the debt
ceiling reached a breaking point, with both President Obama and House speaker John
Boehner walking away from the negotiation table multiple times. Between July 19th and
the 29th, at the height of the crisis, President Obama addressed the American people
numerous times concerning the debt ceiling debate. During these remarks, President
Obama attempted to sway public opinion in favour of a compromise between the two
parties. Obamas remarks were by all accounts successful in gaining public support;
shifting public opinion away from Republicans who were viewed as hold outs on the debt
ceiling (Feldmann, 2011). Citizens outrage over the issue went so far that many
Congressional members offices were flooded with calls and letters about the debate
(Memoli, 2011).
In this essay, I argue that President Obamas rhetoric during the debt ceiling crisis
accomplished two things. First, President Obama used constitutive rhetoric to cast
American citizens as fundamental elements of decision making concerning the debt ceiling
debate, in order to apply pressure on Congress for a resolution for the debt crisis. Second,
Obamas use of the Bully Pulpit during the debt debate was aimed at returning the debate
to a rational dialog between the two parties. To support these claims, I will first visit the
existing literature concerning constitutive rhetoric and the debate surrounding the role of

1202

the rhetorical presidency. Next, I describe the context of the debt ceiling. Finally I
demonstrate how Obama positioned the American people during the crisis
2. THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY
Over the last hundred years, the role of the president has fundamentally changed from a
leader of the government to a leader of the people (Bessette, Ceaser, Thurow & Tulis,
1981). An example of this change can be seen during the Carter administration when he
attempted to address the issue of malaise surrounding the nation. Carter believed he
needed to take action, and rally the nation as the leader of the people, in order to revive
Americas morality (Bessette, Ceaser, Thurow & Tulis, 1981). Though Carter inevitably
went back to being what he defined as the head of the government later in his
presidency, his speech and actions demonstrates how the role of the President has changed
over the years. The advent of the Bully Pulpit as a tool for a President can also be traced to
the rise of the Rhetorical Presidency.
The Rhetorical Presidency is a departure from what has been called the old way
of presidential rhetoric, in which a President would address their rhetoric to Congress
almost exclusively in order to pass policies (Bessette, Ceaser, Thurow & Tulis,
1981;Saldin, 2011). With the rise of the Rhetorical Presidency, the presidency now takes a
different route that uses rhetoric to sway the public at large in order to pressure Congress
(Ivie, 1998; Saldin, 2011; Stuckey, 2006). The emergence of the Rhetorical Presidency
began a heated debate in the academic community about its impact on democracy and
public deliberation. Some critics argue that the Rhetorical Presidency may derail rational
deliberation and discussion through demagoguery (Tulis, 1998). Other critics claim that
the Rhetorical Presidency has led to a simplification of debate concerning public policy
(Ivie, 1998). Tulis argued that the Rhetorical Presidency threatens to undermine the
deliberative role of Congress in favor of appeals to public opinion (2007).
While Tulis (1996) warned that the Rhetorical Presidency has the potential to
undermine rational discussion, he acknowledged that the Bully Pulpit does have a place
in Presidential rhetoric. In particular, Tulis (1996) proposed that the Bully Pulpit could
be used to break partisan deadlock and restore deliberation. Tulis (1996) explains that
recent political times have been gripped with a complete lack of discussion and debate, a
conclusion that certainly was an accurate description of the situation that President Obama
faced during the debt ceiling crisis. In such a context the president might employ the
Bully Pulpit in order to pressure Congress so that deliberation could be restored. At the
same time, it is possible that a president could use the Bully Pulpit to stymie or prevent
deliberation.
In recent years, critics have decried extremism in public debate as it promotes
otherization. In particular, the danger that those with different opinions will be labelled
as evil or outside of the bounds of democracy itself (Ivie, 1998, 2002). This clearly
happened in the stalemate that occurred during the debt ceiling debate. Where neither side
was willing to negotiate, reasoned debate was precluded and those that call for
compromise were labelled as soft. Parties were willing to engage in the nuclear option
of letting the debt ceiling not pass and possibly plunging the world into another economic
crisis. In this crisis, however, President Obama was able to sway public opinion in favour
of compromise and debate. Through the use of constitutive rhetoric Obama tapped into
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underlying national and cultural narratives of the American citizen in order to apply
pressure on congress to resolve the debt crisis.
3. CONSTITUTIVE RHETORIC
One of the avenues that a president has for changing public perception is through the
definition or redefinition of terms. Zarefsky argued that presidents have historically
created and defined terms that they deem important as a method for shaping public
perceptions (2004). One example of this is the use of the term war after September 11th
by President Bush. President Bush claimed we were at war with the terrorists.
Technically, such a thing did not occur since war is defined as a conflict between nations
and the terrorists had no sovereign nation or what many would define as a military force
(Zarefsky, 2004). By redefining the situation as a war, President Bush was able to create
a perception of a war mentality and set the stage for military conflict.
The Presidents rhetorical power to define is a fundamental part of how
constitutive rhetoric functions to form an audiences identity. Zagacki noted that
constitutive rhetorics are crucial during founding moments when advocates try to
interpellate or hail audiences, calling a common, collective identity into existence.
(2007, p. 272). Using the power of definition, Presidents can attempt to unite their
audiences using narratives that touch cultural, ideological, and national identities in order
to move them to action (Stuckey, 2006; Zagacki, 2007). In the case of the debt ceiling
debate, I argue that Obama used constitutive rhetoric to cast the American people as a key
part of the deliberation process. Using different historical American narratives and values
such as self-sacrifice, hard work, and compromise, Obama united American citizens in
order to pressure congress towards rational discussion and a resolution of the debt ceiling
crisis.
4. DEBT CEILING DEBATE
The debt ceiling was originally created in 1917 to allow the Treasury Department to pay
expenses for government activities through borrowing without having to submit requests
to Congress to approve already allotted spending (Kessler, 2011). Since then, the debt
ceiling has been used to pay for government programs ranging from wars to Medicare
(Kessler, 2011). However, failure to extend the debt ceiling could cause the government to
default on its debt; an action that could drastically affect the world economy.
During the crisis Republicans wanted a debt ceiling deal consisting of spending
cuts only, without revenue increases such as taxes being included. Part of the reason
Republicans were unwilling to compromise was because many of the freshmen
Republican representatives had campaigned on a platform of no new taxes. In addition,
some did not believe in the economic doomsday scenarios that many experts were
claiming would occur if the ceiling was not raised (Fahrenthold, 2011). This created a
crisis for Republican leaders. If a deal was authored with increased revenue provisions, it
risked splintering the Republican caucuses. Such a possibility forced the leadership to take
a hard line stance on excluding new taxes in the deal. Democrats took a contrasting
position, willing to cut spending, but unwilling to accept a deal that didnt include at least
some increase in revenue.
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Obama gave four separate speeches between the 19th and 29th of July that focused
exclusively on the debt situation. It was during these speeches that Obama made his case
to the American citizen for the need to take action and make their voices heard concerning
the debt ceiling debate. Obamas success in swaying public opinion was noted by many
pundits (Benen, 2011; Feldmann, 2011; Mason, 2011). These addresses occurred at the
height of the debt ceiling debate and, I argue, are examples of Obamas use of constitutive
rhetoric and also demonstrate how the Bully Pulpit can be used to restore rational debate
and discussion.
5. THE DEBT CEILING AND THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN CITIZEN
While Obamas use of constitutive rhetoric in relation to the American public reached its
height during his address on the 25th of July, the groundwork for the address was laid days
before on the 19th and 22nd. Two key rhetorical moves were made during these addresses.
First, Obama attempted to place the American citizen as an active part of the political
landscape and not a passive spectator, stating If both sides continue to be dug in, if we
dont have a basic spirit of cooperation that allows us to rise above immediate electionyear politics and actually solve problems, then I think markets here, the American people,
and the international community are going to start reacting adversely fairly quickly
(Obama, July 19, 2011). This rhetoric placed the American people as active members of
the discussion.
This trend of invoking the American citizen as a check on Washington politics
emerges again during Obama remarks on July 22nd where he stated: Now, Ill leave it up
to the American people to make a determination as to how fair that is. And if the
leadership cannot come to an agreement in terms of how we move forward, then I think
they will hold all of us accountable. (Obama, July 22, 2011). This section demonstrates
that Obama was using the threat of the Bully Pulpit to bring the parties back together in a
deliberative discussion in order to find a compromise on the debt ceiling. The use of the
Bully Pulpit to restore deliberation is in line with what Tulis (1996) discussed.
Specifically, Tulis argued that Presidents might use the Bully Pulpit to revitalize
congressional debate and deliberation (1996).
Second, Obama appealed to shared values to create the communal identity of the
American citizen. Obamas rhetoric discusses numerous values ranging from hard work to
fairness, but the value that became the core of his definition of the American citizen is that
of compromise. Obama states: What the American people are looking for is some
compromise, some willingness to put partisanship aside, some willingness to ignore talk
radio or ignore activists in our respective bases, and do the right thing.(Obama, July 22,
2011). In this instance, compromise doesnt seem to meet the criterion established by
Charland (1987) for constitutive rhetoric. Constitutive rhetoric generally creates a
narrative around ancestral ideologies and cultural values (Charland, 1987; Zagacki, 2007).
While in this address compromise was not fleshed out in such a way to show how it is
endemic to the American citizens identity, it was a foreshadowing of Obamas
constitutive rhetoric to come.
The July 19th and 22nd remarks were followed by a negotiation breakdown that occurred
early on the 25th. This led Obama to deliver an address to the nation during prime time
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television to discuss the debt crisis. It is in this address that constitutive rhetoric is clearly
used by President Obama in order to unify the American public in the call for a return to
negotiations. In particular Obama used his address to create a shared narrative of hardship
and ancestry for the American people to reinforce the value of compromise. Through the
value of compromise, Obama called on American citizens to take action against partisan
politics and resolve the debt ceiling debate. He did this in two distinct ways. The first
appeal defined compromise as distinctly American. Second, the American public were
cast as having a role to play in the resolution of the debt ceiling debate. We can see these
arguments begin to develop in the following passage:
Theyre fed up with a town where compromise has become a dirty word. They work all
day long, many of them scraping by, just to put food on the table. And when these
Americans come home at night, bone-tired, and turn on the news, all they see is the same
partisan three-ring circus here in Washington. They see leaders who cant seem to come
together and do what it takes to make life just a little bit better for ordinary
Americans. Theyre offended by that. And they should be. The American people may have
voted for divided government, but they didnt vote for a dysfunctional government.
(Obama, July 25, 2011)

Obama attempted to cast the frustration felt by the American people as a direct result of
the lack of compromise in American politics. He also contrasted the daily grind of the
average citizen, a grind that forces citizens to compromise between leisure and work, to
the political process. Finally, he provided an outlet for the publics frustration by
suggesting that they inform their legislator of their opinions on the crisis.
By linking compromise with the daily life of an American citizen, Obama cast
compromise as central to both American politics and what it means to be a citizen. In his
view, to be an American is to work together and compromise. President Obama connected
compromise to the daily grind and hard work in order to bridge any political barriers in his
audience. To reinforce the narrative, Obama drew upon American history to prove why
compromise is distinctly American:
America, after all, has always been a grand experiment in compromisewe have put to
the test time and again the proposition at the heart of our founding: that out of many, we
are one. Weve engaged in fierce and passionate debates about the issues of the day, but
from slavery to war, from civil liberties to questions of economic justice, we have tried to
live by the words that Jefferson once wrote: Every man cannot have his way in all things
without this mutual disposition, we are disjointed individuals, but not a society. (Obama,
July 25, 2011)

Obama used the Founding Fathers, and the history of the country, in order to illustrate how
compromise is at the heart of the American identity. This connection between compromise
and American history is a prime example of how constitutive rhetoric forms a narrative
around cultural and national ideologies (Charland, 1987; Zagacki, 2007). Obama created a
narrative that placed the American citizen in a group identity transcending political party
identities (Charland, 1987). Constitutive rhetoric creates a feeling of belonging to
something that possesses meaning. This transcendence bridges political and ideological
differences that might normally create rifts in the audience.
Obama argues that a commitment to compromise is at the core of America,
something he highlights in the final two paragraphs of his address:
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History is scattered with the stories of those who held fast to rigid ideologies and refused
to listen to those who disagreed. But those are not the Americans we remember. We
remember the Americans who put country above self, and set personal grievances aside for
the greater good. We remember the Americans who held this country together during its
most difficult hours; who put aside pride and party to form a more perfect union. Thats
who we remember. Thats who we need to be right now. The entire world is watching. So
lets seize this moment to show why the United States of America is still the greatest
nation on Earth not just because we can still keep our word and meet our obligations, but
because we can still come together as one nation. (Obama, July 25, 2011)

Two key arguments come into focus here. First, Obama connects the past greatness of
America with compromise. This is evident with his comment about setting grievances
aside and how Americans help each other in times of need. Here, President Obama takes
the value of compromise and places it at the heart of the identity of the American citizen.
The rise of America had been interwoven into Obamas view of compromise as an integral
part of national identity. While Obamas use of compromise becomes the central theme of
his narrative about the role of the citizen, he also relies on historical examples. In doing so,
Obama counters the political narrative of the Tea Party and others on the right.
5.1 Contemporary historical examples
President Obamas narrative about compromise and its relationship to American identity
faced a difficult obstacle during the debt ceiling debate, the counter narrative proposed by
Republicans. Many Republicans argued that the debt ceiling represented an expansion of
government and irresponsible spending which violated American values. In order to
combat this, Obama needed to demonstrate that raising the debt ceiling was not against
American values and fit with his narrative of compromise.
Obama relied on historical argument for two reasons. First, historical evidence
such as quotations from former Republican leaders, like Ronald Reagan, and statistics that
spanned multiple Republican administrations made it difficult for the House Republicans
to argue against Obama without seeming disconnected from the American public and the
Republican Party. The second reason Obama chose these specific pieces of evidence was
because they resonated with the Republican base. Reagan and Eisenhower are still seen as
heroes by Republicans. If Obama could convince Republicans that the officials they
elected were not following Reagans own directions, he could spur real negotiations. We
can see Obama begin to align himself with some of the Republican Partys great leaders in
the following example. The first approach says; lets live within our means by making
serious, historic cuts in government spending. Lets cut domestic spending to the lowest
level its been since Dwight Eisenhower was President. Lets cut defence spending at the
Pentagon by hundreds of billions of dollars (Obama, July 25th, 2011).
Here, Obama compares his proposed budget to the policies enacted by Eisenhower.
Contrasting his budget proposal with the actions taken by the Eisenhower administration,
by association, strengthened his position with Republicans. Moreover, this argument
strengthened the narrative created by Obama that compromise is an integral part of
American History, by demonstrating that compromise has been a part of past Republican
administrations.
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Obamas attempt to cast the House Republicans as disconnected from the American
people is further demonstrated when he discusses the need for a balanced approach to the
debt ceiling debate:
The first time a deal was passed, a predecessor of mine made the case for a balanced
approach by saying this, Would you rather reduce deficits and interest rates by raising
revenue from those who are not now paying their fair share, or would you rather accept
larger budget deficits, higher interest rates, and higher unemployment? And I think I know
your answer. Those words were spoken by Ronald Reagan. But today, many Republicans
in the House refuse to consider this kind of balanced approach an approach that was
pursued not only by President Reagan, but by the first President Bush, by President
Clinton, by myself, and by many Democrats and Republicans in the United States Senate.
(Obama, July 25, 2011)

Obama turns the iconic figure of the Republican Party, Ronald Reagan, against the House
Republicans, thereby casting doubt on whether Republicans in the House truly represent
the American people. The contemporary examples cited by Obama are part of a two
pronged argument that shows that compromise is not only a basic American value, but
also an approach that has been followed by Democrats and Republicans alike.
In sum, Obama used historical evidence to create a wedge between the Republican
leadership and the American people in an attempt to pressure the Republicans to return to
negotiations. This wedge helped to reinforce the constitutive narrative used by Obama
concerning the American citizen. The use of historical evidence created a discontinuity in
the narrative put forth by Republicans concerning the debt ceiling and made it look as
though Republicans were going against their own values and past leaders. This
strengthened Obamas constitutive narrative about the value of compromise.
6. CONCLUSION
For any narrative to resonate within a group of individuals there must be a sense of shared
identity and values that connect the members together. In the case of the 2011 debt ceiling
debate, President Obama created a narrative for the American citizen that centered on the
values of compromise and deliberation, a narrative he grounded in American history.
Through the value of compromise, Obama constituted the American citizen as champions
of rational discussion and placed the American citizen in a position to restore those values
to Congress.
The 2011 debt ceiling debate also shows that President Obamas use of the Bully
Pulpit was not an attempt to disrupt reason as some theorists might contend, but was
instead an attempt to restore deliberation and discussion to Congress. Similar to what Tulis
(1996) had described as a possible role for the rhetorical Presidency, Obamas use of the
Bully Pulpit attempted to break the partisan gridlock that had prevented deliberation on the
debt ceiling. Throughout the addresses, Obama stressed the need for discussion and
negotiation with both sides. It is important to recognize that Obama did not limit
compromise to only one side of the political spectrum, but instead asked for both
Democrats and Republicans to be willing to sacrifice in order to pass the Debt Ceiling.
Obamas rhetoric during the debt ceiling crisis is an example of an effort to
transcend the bounds of party politics and invoke the national identity of the American
citizen as a tool for political reform. President Obama used the Bully Pulpit, not to derail
1208

deliberation and rational thought, but instead to reinforce them. Obamas support of
compromise reflected a view of democracy based in public opinion.
In this study I demonstrated how the Bully Pulpit can be a tool in restoring
deliberation and reason to policy making discussions. There is evidence that Obamas
message, at minimum, moved the public to apply pressure on Congress to return to the
negotiating table and is possibly partly responsible for helping find a compromise to raise
the debt ceiling in 2011. The debt ceiling debate, as an example of partisan politics at their
peak when all other negotiation strategies have failed, indicates that the Bully Pulpit can
be used to restore deliberation and rational debate instead of stifling it as some scholars
feared.

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Linguistic Argumentation As A Shortcut For The Empirical Study

Of Argumentative Strategies
Pierre-Yves Raccah
CNRS LLL UMR 7270
University of Orlans
France
pyr@linguistes.fr

ABSTRACT: A recent interest for the empirical observation of argumentation through institutional practices
was underlined by van Eemeren (2010). Since discourses give empirical hints which inform the observer on
the institutional conventionalized practices involved in the study of strategic manoeuvring, there must be
ways of describing meaning which allows to account for the dynamics of this field: a study of these ways is
the object of this paper.
KEYWORDS: empirical study of strategic manoeuvring, experiments in semantics, utterance meaning,
sentence meaning, empirical observation of institutional practices, indirect observation, inhabited words,
points of view, viewpoints semantics.

1. INTRODUCTION
Research in argumentation has acknowledged the important role of discourse in the study
of argumentative strategies and manoeuvring. This acknowledgement is not recent;
however, more recent is the inclusion, within the possible objects of research on
argumentation, of the relationship between institutional contexts and argumentative
discourse, via conventionalized institutional practices. The recent interest for the empirical
observation of argumentation through institutional practices was underlined by van
Eemeren (2010, p. 129) in these terms:
the term argumentation [ also refers to] an empirical phenomenon that can be observed in a multitude
of communicative practices which are recognized as such by the arguers. Because these communicative
practices are generally connected with specific kinds of institutional contexts [] they have become
conventionalized. Due to this context-dependency of communicative practices, the possibilities for strategic
manoeuvring in argumentative discourse in such practices are in some respects determined by the
institutional preconditions prevailing in the communicative practice concerned.

This new interest for an empirical approach to the relationship between institutional
contexts and argumentative strategies, via communicative practices linked to institutional
preconditions, opens a wide and important field of research, as van Eemeren convincingly
shows it in his 2010 book.
As van Eemeren pointed out, the empirical study of this multidimensional space is
possible because, among other reasons, all the terms of these relations are, at least
partially, observable through discourse. Since discourse gives empirical hints to grasp the
different facets of this space, it may be argued that there may be a way of describing
meaning, which would allow to account, at lest partially, for the dynamics of those
relations: this would provide a sort of shortcut to the description of argumentative
1211

strategies, as they are partially in-formed by the institutions. Obviously, such a shortcut
lives aside an enormous part of the field opened by the abovementioned remarks.
Nevertheless, for one who is only interested in a better description of the semantics of
natural languages, it offers interesting and rich perspectives.
This is what this paper is intended to show. We will also see that this shortcut is not a
completely new idea in semantics: I will examine how several ideas borrowed from the
paradigm of Argumentation Within Language can be adapted to an empirical study of the
relationship between argumentation and the institutional constraints. Finally, I defend the
idea that this shortcut is useful also for the one who is engaged in the complete study of
the field: since most of what is observable in that field is discourse, it may be useful to
make explicit the reasoning which compels to describe the institutional conventions the
way we do. A rigorous semantic description is more than useful for this purpose.
Among the various ways of describing meaning that might meet those requirements, I
emphasize the interest of several aspects of the so called View-Point Semantics (VPS),
partially inspired by Mikhal Bakhtins work on the inhabited character of natural
language words (see, for instance, Bakhtin (1929, p. 279), as well as by Oswald Ducrots
work on the semantic constraints on argumentative orientation and strength (see, for
instance, Ducrot (1988)). In particular, I insist on the technique it provides for, so to speak,
extracting ideological and cultural preconditions from discourses, which inform the
observer on the institutional conventionalized practices.
2. FROM STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING TO SEMANTICS
(through the route of empiricity)
The field of research opened by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2009) and further
investigated by van Eemeren (2010) includes, among other, the study of the multidimensional space of relationships between the different kinds of institutional contexts, the
different types of institutionalized purposes, the different aspects of conventionalized
communicative practices, the different aspects of communicative activities, and the
different types of argumentative strategies. As for the parameters that must be taken into
account in order to investigate that field, van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2009, p. 11)
circumscribe them in this way:
In analyzing the strategic function of the maneuvering that is carried out by making a
particular argumentative move, the following parameters need to be considered:
1.
2.
3.
4.

the results that can be achieved by the manoeuvring;

the routes that can be taken to achieve these results;
the constraints imposed by the institutional context;
the commitments defining the argumentative situation

Following van Eemeren and Houtlosser (and one really wants to follow them at least on
those points), what we have to observe are things like results, routes, constraints and
commitments. Moreover, in agreement with one of the cornerstones of pragma-dialectical
theories, the empirical study of that field is possible because those ingredients are
observable through discourse. Finally, as van Eemeren insisted in his introductory lecture

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at ISSA 2014, the study of strategic manoeuvring must be contextualized, empirical and as
formal as possible.
We will see how an empirical semantics of human languages can do the job and
collect and organize observational data for a study of strategic manoeuvring that would
meet the requirements proposed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2009).
2.1. Empirical observation for strategic manoeuvring and semantics
From the three theses I underlined (the ingredients, the observability through discourse,
and the three desired properties of the study) it follows there must be a way of describing
meaning which accounts for how utterances inform with respect to results, routes,
constraints and commitments.
The claim is stronger than what it first appears: the term meaning is used here in a
technical sense, where it refers to the semantic value of languages units, independently of
the situation in which they are used; as opposed to the term sense, (utterance meaning),
which we use to refer to the semantic value of utterances in situations.
The reason why that claim has to be acceptable is that the only observable facts
that lead a hearer, in a given situation, to reach a particular result, route, constraint or
commitment, rather than others, are the linguistic units used in the utterance. Obviously, in
other situations, the same linguistic units might (and will) lead the hearer to reach other
results, etc., so that the study of strategic manoeuvring really has to be contextualized, in
spite of that claim. But, given that in each particular situation, it is the choice of some
linguistic unit rather than some other that produce some effect rather than some other, in
order to carry an empirical study, it must be acknowledged that a set of instructions which
is stable with respect to situations, must be given by the language units which are used in
the discourse. Acknowledging this allows to meet the last requirement underlined by van
Eemeren: having the study of strategic manoeuvring supported by semantic descriptions
(i.e. independent of context), is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a possible
formal study.
2.2. Empirical observation in general
From a more general perspective, I will now address two essential aspects of empirical
observation: causality and subjectivity. This will help understand (a) why and how, in
spite of the fact that causal relations are not accessible to our sensorial system, they play
an essential role in empirical sciences, and (b) why and how, in spite of the necessary
radical subjectivity of individual observation, a certain degree of constructed objectivity
can be achieved within a community.
a. Causality
Empirical observation concerning the parameters underlined by van Eemeren and
Houtlosser can be expressed by (meta-)statements of the form:
The linguistic segment X used in the institutional situation S
produced the effect R, with respect to parameter P.

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As can be seen by the reference to produced effects, these (meta-)statements convey

implicit causal attributions. This is not specific to the field of strategic manoeuvring, nor
to that of argumentation, and not even to linguistics or any human or social science:
indeed, any scientific observational statement, like, for instance, water boils at 100 C,
carry implicit causal attributions; in our last example, if we try to substitute 43 years old
to 100 C, we immediately understand that the original statement conveys the implicit
causal assumption according to which the cause of the boiling is the temperature (and not
the age of the technician).
Now, no scientist and no thinking human being in general would ever pretend they
have observed some causal relation with their sensorial apparatus: causal relations are not
observable through our sensorial apparatus and causality is always only a hypothesis.
Obviously, some causal attributions are more plausible than others, but plausibility is not a
proof...
Acknowledging that causal relations are not directly observable through our
sensorial apparatus does not imply believing that causality doesnt exist, but only
understanding that causal statements cannot be used as empirical evidences
And, since we have just seen that all scientific empirical observational statements convey
an implicit causal attribution, it follows that no scientific empirical observational statement
can be directly used as an evidence for some theoretical standpoint. This may seem
paradoxical, but it is not so. The same idea can be reformulated in another way, which
shows an exit to that apparent paradox: any statement about the world, which evokes a
causal relation between facts of the world, refers to non directly observable facts. The
apparent paradox dissolves itself as soon as we abandon the nave belief that only material
things really exist for science, belief which entails that only direct observation can count
as an evidence. This is why sciences, and especially hard sciences have developed a very
sophisticated system of indirect observation, including criteria of validity for the causal
attributions supposed by that indirect observation.
b. Objectivity and intersubjectivity
Since scientific statements suppose previous causal attribution hypotheses, our perception
of the world is significantly influenced by our theoretical biases.
Again, acknowledging that our beliefs about the existence of what we perceive
cannot be invoked as a proof of its existence is something different from believing that
those beliefs are false. And, in the same way, acknowledging that the way we perceive the
world is influenced by our theoretical biases is something different from believing that the
world plays no role in the way we perceive it.
Roughly, the essential reason for that difference is that, though we cannot directly
access the world (we can only access it through the individual interpretation of what our
sensorial apparatus gives), the world accesses our actions and reacts to them. Thus,
analyzing what is stable in different selected human actions and in the world reactions to
them may give us collective stable elements to make hypotheses about how the world is
within that zone of stability.
In Raccah (2005), I showed that an essential scientificity requirement, valid for any
kind of science, is that it should provide descriptions of a class of phenomena, in such a
way that the descriptions of some of those phenomena provided de dicto explanations for
the descriptions of other ones. I also pointed out that fulfilling empiricity requirements
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could not lead to believe that science describes the phenomena the way they are, since
one cannot seriously believe that there is a possibility, for any human being, to know the
way things are. Though scientific observers cannot prevail themselves of knowing how the
world is, they have access to the world through their interpretation of the states of their
sensorial apparatus: that interpretation often relies on previously admitted scientific or
non scientific theories.
If we want to apply these requirements to semantic theories, we have to find
observable semantic facts, which can be accessed to through our senses. As we will see in
the next section, it seems that we are faced with a big difficulty, which might force us to
admit that there cannot be such a thing as an empirical semantic theory: we will see that
semantic facts are abstract and thus not directly accessible to our sensorial apparatus. We
seem to be in a situation in which the very object about which we want to construct an
empirical science prevents its study from being an empirical study
However, if we admit that physics is a good example of empirical sciences, we
should realize that we are not in such a dramatic situation. For what the physicist can
observe through her/his senses, say, the actual movements of the pendulum (s)he just built,
is not what her/his theory is about (in that case, the virtual movements of any existing or
non existing pendulum): the object of physical theories is not more directly accessible to
the observers sensorial apparatus than the object of semantic theories. Physicists use
different tricks in order to overcome that difficulty, one of which is the use of indirect
observation: some directly observable1 entities are considered to be traces of non directly
observable objects or events, which, in some cases, are seen as one of their causes, and, in
other cases, as one of their effects.
If we are willing to keep considering physics as an empirical science, we are bound
to consider that that indirect observation strategy is not misleading; we only have to see
how it could be applied to the study of meaning. In order to illustrate how this could be
done, I will examine an example and will abstract from it.
2.3. Empiricity in what concerns the study of human languages semantics
Now that we have been reminded that (i) causality is not directly observable, (ii) scientific
empirical statements of observations suppose causal attributions, (iii) sciences speak of
indirectly observable entities embedding relations between directly observable entities, I
would like to elaborate on a few interesting properties of the causal attributions used
within the sciences of language(s), and, in particular, semantics. This will help understand
why semantics can be a shortcut for strategic manoeuvring.
2.3.1 A few conceptual distinctions
The concepts I resort to for this study are not all used in a normalized way: in the intent to
be understood by different trends of thoughts, I will first insist on several conceptual
differences (it should be noted that the terms I used do refer to these concepts may very
1

Though I have shown (ibid.) that nothing can be directly observable by a human being (since anything
requires the interpretation of the state of our sensorial apparatus), I will use that expression to refer to objects
or events whose access is granted by the interpretation of the effect they directly produce on our sensorial
apparatus. This terminological sloppiness is introduced for the sake of legibility

1215

well not be the ones some or other reader would use. I do not mean to compel them to use
the same terms I use rather than the ones they prefer: I only aim at characterizing the
concepts and insist on their differences.
a. Several concepts of language
Though it is unavoidable that notions which are deeply related to our ways of thinking are
grasped in different manners, according to the differences in those ways of thinking, it is
avoidable, and highly desirable (see Pascal 1655, pp. 523-535) to ascertain that these
conceptions are about the same concept. In the case of language, the differences in
conceptions are frequently altered by an abusive assimilation of three distinct concepts:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

something that human beings speak (or write) in, that is usually acquired by all
human beings between birth and 24 months, that may serve to communicate, to
think, to deceive, etc., that may be different from one group of human beings to
another, that may be learnt, taught, etc.; English, French, Spanish, etc. are different
instances of this something, which is called idioma in Spanish, langue in
French; the noun referring to it may be pluralized;
the faculty that human beings have (some people may believe that it is also the
case for some animals, robots, gods, etc.), and that enables them to learn, use and
possibly forget the something I coined as the first concept; this second object is
called lenguaje in Spanish, langage, in French; the noun referring to it cannot
be pluralized;
an abstract system, consciously and deliberately built by a human being, or by a
team of human beings, in order to achieve a specific goal or set of goals.

The fact that these three different concepts happen to be called, in English, by the same
name is not an evidence for their being the same concept To avoid such confusions, I
will use the term human languages for concept (i), Language Faculty, for concept (ii), and
artificial language, for concept (iii).
b. Several concepts of meaning
The difference between a sign and its use in a particular situation is acknowledged by most
linguists. However, one of its consequences on the study of semantics and pragmatics,
namely the essential difference in nature between utterance meaning and sentence
meaning, is not so often taken into account2.
In order to fully understand the rest of this paper, it will be necessary to keep this
difference in mind: I will speak of utterance meaning in order to refer to the result of some
interpretation of a discourse or of an utterance in a particular situation; in contrast, I will
speak of sentence meaning in order to refer to the contribution of language units (not only
grammatical sentences) to the interpretation of their different possible utterances.
Note that this apparently neutral terminology presupposes that each unit of any
language has something stable which is partially responsible for the infinitely many

As far as I know, one of the first explicit modern presentation of the conceptual difference between
utterance meaning and sentence meaning is due to Dascal (1983).

1216

possible interpretations its use may lead to3.

2.3.2 Instructional semantics
Semantics can thus be conceived of as the discipline which empirically and scientifically
studies the contribution of language units (simple or complex) to the construction of the
meanings of their utterances in each situation. The contribution of the situations to the
construction of utterance-meanings is studied, according to that conception, by pragmatics.
According to that conception of semantics, utterance-meaning is, clearly, the result
of a construction achieved by some hearer, construction influenced by the linguistic
meaning (sentence-meaning, phrase-meaning) of the language units used in the utterance
and by the elements of situation taken into account by the hearer. Diagram 1 illustrates this
conception:

Diagram 1: The determination of utterance-meaning by sentence-meaning and situation

This pre-theoretic way of understanding the canvas of utterance-meaning construction

belongs to the instructional semantics trend, as presented, for instance, in Harder (1990, p.
41):
the emphasis is on meaning as something the speaker tells the addressee to do. If A (the addressee) does as
he is told (follows the instructions), he will work out the interpretation that is the product of an act of
communication

2.3.3 Causal attributions in semantics, and their essential properties

Suppose an extra-terrestrial intelligence, ETI, wanted to study the semantics of English
and, for that purpose, decided to observe speech situations. Suppose ETI hides in a room
where several supposedly English speaking human beings are gathered, a classroom,
for instance. Suppose now that ETI perceives that John pronounces It is cold in here. If
all of ETIs observations are of that kind, there is no chance that it can formulate grounded
3

This very strong claim is evidenced by the fact that any dunce can acquire, and does acquire, a human
language in 18-24 months, being exposed only to speech and human attitudes

1217

hypotheses about the meaning of the sequence it heard. For what can be perceived of
Johns utterance is only a series of vibrations, which, in themselves, do not give cues of
any kind as to what it can mean (except for those who understand English and interpret the
utterance using their private know-how). If ETI wants to do its job correctly, it will have
to use, in addition, observations of another kind. Intentional states are ruled out since they
are not directly accessible to the observers sensorial apparatus. It follows that we will
have to reject any statement of the kind: the speaker meant so and so, or normally when
someone says XYZ, he or she wants to convey this or that idea or even (in case the
observer understands English) I, observer, interpret XYZ in such and such a way and
therefore, that is the meaning of XYZ. ETI will have to observe the audiences behaviour
and see whether, in that behaviour, it can find a plausible effect of Johns utterance: it will
have to use indirect observation. The fact that it may be the case that no observable
reaction followed Johns utterance does not constitute an objection to the indirect
observation method: it would simply mean that ETI would have to plan other experiments.
After all, even in physics, many experiments do not inform the theorists until they find the
experimental constraints that work.
Before we go further, let me insist and emphasize that we have just seen that the
different popular learned conceptions4 of semantics are wrong. Indeed, the observable
phenomena of semantics (i) cannot be directly meanings, since these are not accessible to
our sensorial apparatus; (ii) they are not just utterances, since that would not be enough to
describe meaning phenomena; (iii) they are not pairs consisting of utterances and
intended meanings, since such intentional things are not accessible to empirical
observation. In our extra-terrestrial example, we suggested that they are pairs consisting of
utterances and behaviours.
I will take that suggestion as seriously as possible: in the rest of this section, I
examine how to constrain the relationship between utterances and behaviours, and sketch
some of the consequences of this choice.
a. The causal attribution hypothesis
Suppose that, in our example, ETI notices that, after Johns utterance, the following three
actions take place:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

Peter scratches his head,

Paul closes the window and
Mary writes something on a piece of paper.

We all know (actually, we think we know, but we only believe) that the correct answer
to the question what action was caused by Johns utterance? is most probably Pauls.
However, ETI has no grounds to know it and, in addition, it may be the case that Paul
closed the window not because of Johns utterance (which he may even not have heard),
but because he was cold, or because there was too much noise outside to hear what John
was saying Obviously, the most plausible hypothesis, in normal situations, is the one
according to which Pauls action was caused by Johns utterance; but the fact that it is
4

That is, the conception an educated person could have about semantics without having learnt and reflected
about it previously This is, it must be admitted, the conception held by many people who speak or write
about language!

1218

plausible does not make it cease to be a hypothesis

Thus, before ETI can continue its study, it must admit the following general hypothesis
H0: Utterances may cause behaviours
Moreover, in each experimental situation s, ETI must make specific hypotheses hS which
particularise H0 in the situation s, and relate particular actions with the utterance under
study (an aspect of van Eemerens contextualization).
It is important to remind that H0 and the different hS are not facts about the world
but hypotheses: they do not characterise the way things are but rather the way things are
conceived of in our rationality.
b. The non materiality hypothesis
Let us suppose that ETI shares with us the aspects of our contemporary occidental
rationality expressed by H0. This would not prevent it from believing that the way Johns
utterance caused Pauls action is that the vibrations emitted by John during his utterance
physically caused Paul to get up and close the window. Though it hurts our contemporary
occidental rationality, this idea is not absurd: the fact that we simply cannot take it
seriously does not make it false5. Moreover, utterances do have observable physical
effects: a loud voice can hurt the hearers ears, specific frequencies can break crystal, etc.
What our rationality cannot accept is the idea that the linguistic effects of the utterances
could be reduced to material causality. In order to rule out this idea, we need another
hypothesis, which is also characteristic of our rationality rather than of the state of the
world:
H1: The linguistic effects of an utterance are not due to material causes
As a consequence of H1, if we cannot believe that the observable actions caused by an
utterance are due to its materiality, we are bound to admit that they are due to its form. In
our rationality, the causal attribution requested by H0 is constrained to be a formal
causality.
c. The non immediateness hypothesis
If we use the term sentence to refer to a category of form of utterances, we start to be in
the position to fill the gap between what we can observe (utterances and behaviours) and
what we want semantics to talk about (sentences and meanings). However, there is yet
another option that our rationality compels us to rule out: ETI could accept H1 and yet
believe that though the causality that links Johns utterance to Pauls action is not material,
it directly determined Pauls action. That is, one could believe that Johns utterance
directly caused Paul to close the window, without leaving him room for a choice. This sort
of belief corresponds to what we can call a magic thinking; indeed, in Ali Babas tail, for
instance, there would be no magic if the sesame formula were recognised by a captor
5

Some Buddhist sects seek the language of nature in which the words emit the exact vibrations which
correspond to the objects they refer to Even though most of us, occidental thinkers, reject the belief
underlying that quest, there is no ground to profess that the belief is silly independently of our set of beliefs.

1219

which would send an open instruction to a mechanism conceived in such a way that it
could open the cave. The magical effect is due to the directedness of the effect of the
formula. It is interesting to note that this feature of our rationality, which compels us to
reject direct causality of forms, is rather recent and probably not completely installed in
our cognitive systems: there are many traces in human behaviour and in human languages
of the magic thinking. From some uses of expressions like Please or Excuse me to
greetings such as Happy new year!, an impressing series of linguistic expressions and
social behaviours suggests that, though a part of our mind has abandoned the magic
thinking, another part still lives with it. Think, for instance, about the effects of insults on
normal contemporary human beings
However, for scientific purposes, we definitely abandoned the magic thinking
and, again, since it is a characteristic of our rationality and not a matter of knowledge
about the world, no observation can prove that it has to be abandoned: we need another
hypothesis, which could be stated as follows:
H2: The directly observable effects of utterances are not directly caused by them
The acceptance of that anti-magic hypothesis has at least two types of consequences on
the conception one can have of human being.
The first type of consequences pertains to ethics: if utterances do not directly cause
observable effects on human actions, no human being can justify a reprehensible action
arguing that they have been told or even ordered to accomplish them. If a war criminal
tries to do so, he or she will give the justified impression that he or she is not behaving like
a human being, but rather like a kind of animal or robot. As human beings, we are
supposed to be responsible for our actions; which does not mean that we are free, since a
reprehensible decision could be the only way of serving vital interests. Though this type of
consequences of H2 are serious and important, they do not directly belong to the subject
matter of this paper and we will have to end the discussion here. However, we think they
were worth mentioning
The second type of consequences of H2 concern the relationship between semantics
and cognitive science. Indeed, H2, combined with H0 and H1, can be seen as a way of
setting the foundations of a science of human cognition and of picturing its relationship
with related disciplines. If we admit, in agreement with H0, H1 and H2, that an utterance
may indirectly and non materially causes an action, we are bound to accept the existence
of a non physical causal chain linking the utterance to the action, part of that chain being
inaccessible to our sensorial apparatus. The object of semantics is the first link of the
chain; the first internal state can be seen as the utterance meaning. The action is
determined by a causal lattice in which the utterance meaning is a part, and which includes
many other elements and links; none of these elements or links are directly observable,
though indirect observation can suggest more or less plausible hypotheses about them.
Different theoretical frameworks in cognitive science construe that causal lattice in
different ways; they also use the variations of different observable parameters in order to
form these hypotheses. In our example, the only two directly observable parameters were
utterances and actions, for the part of the lattice that we are interested in is the chain that
links utterances to actions. However, other kinds of cognitive science experiments could
be interested in studying the variations of other directly observable parameters, such as
1220

electrical excitation, visual input, outside temperature, etc. for the beginning of the chain
and movement characteristics, body temperature, attention, etc. for the end of the chain6.
Note that the fact that cognitive science and semantics may share experimental
devices is not sufficient to adhere to the present fashion and suggest that there can be a
cognitive semantics: the object of semantics (the link between utterances and utterance
meanings, as it is inscribed in languages units) does not belong to the causal lattice which
constitutes the object of cognitive science7.
3. STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING, HUMAN LANGUAGES & ARGUMENTATION
From the necessity of devising experiments providing indirect observation for semantics,
as analyzed above, many consequences follow, from many different points of view. For
the purpose of this paper, I would like to insist on two of them, which are related to the
connection between strategic manoeuvring and semantic approaches to argumentation:
namely the essential role of discourses analysis, and the essential insufficiency of ordinary
corpora.
3.1 The essential role of discourses analysis in semantics
As acknowledged by the pragma-dialectical approach to strategic manoeuvring, most, if
not all, of what we know about results, routes, constraints and commitments involved in
the that is carried out by making an argumentative move, we know it through the
interpretation of texts or discourses. It follows that, if we dont use an empirically
grounded formal model in order to account for how this knowledge is built out of these
texts and discourses, the essential knowledge used for describing argumentative strategies
will remain intuitive.
In order to account for how this knowledge is built, out of the interpretation of
texts and discourses, the semantic models that can be used must enable to describe how
languages units impose the construction of the particular senses (utterance meanings), in
the situations in which they are uttered, senses which constitute the different pieces of that
knowledge. And, in order to allow such descriptions, the language units have to crystallize
some aspects of the socialized world which constitute the institutional situation. Diagram 2
illustrates this point.

Diagram 2: from situations and language units to knowledge concerning strategic manoeuvring
6
7

I obviously didnt choose realistic nor very interesting parameters but my purpose is only illustrative.
See Raccah (2011) for more about this subject.

1221

3.2 About corpora

The second consequence of this causal study which I would like to emphasize concerns
the kind of corpora that can be useful for an empirical study of strategic maneuvering
through semantics. The requirements for such corpora are limited to the ones for semantic
corpora, since any discourse and any text refers to the institutional constraints on its own
interpretation. However, these limited requirements that must meet a corpus in order to
be usable for an empirical study of semantics are not so weak and, actually, are very
seldom met in the corpora used in the literature.
Indeed, ordinary corpora provide only (in the best cases) one half of the empirical
data required to study semantics: they usually only provide the linguistic units that have
been used (the signifier), but do not give cues for the utterance meanings that have bean
actually constructed in the real situation in which they have been used. This leaves the
second half of the necessary data to the observers intuition. The fact that observers
intuitions are usually rather good does not help: on the contrary, it makes the observer rely
on these intuitions without even noticing it. In order to illustrate this point, one only needs
to imagine a physicists reaction to another physicist claiming I know where the cannon
ball will fall, so I dont have to tire myself to examine what is happening in the field
Obviously, the actual interpretation that a reader or a hearer made in the actual
situation in which those linguistic units were used (like any interpretation whatsoever) is
not accessible through our sensorial apparatus. Therefore, no corpus could possibly
provide it. However, it is the burden of the observers to justify the interpretations they
assign to those texts and discourse. Again, indirect observation is necessary: a useful
corpus for semantics should contain cues for assessing the correctness or, at least, the
plausibility of hypotheses on what has been understood.
4. PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS, AND PERSPECTIVES
I will conclude underlining some of the consequences of the ambition to use semantics in
order to more formally and more empirically access institutional knowledge within the
study of strategic manoeuvring.
In this study, we saw that, if we want to take seriously the findings of the pragmadialectical approach to strategic manoeuvring, we must be in the position to take into
account the institutional preconditions prevailing in the communicative practice,
preconditions which can be observed mainly through discourses and texts. For that reason,
we must be able to, so to speak, extract those preconditions out of these discourses and
texts, as rigorously as possible; in particular, in order to limit the role of intuition, we need
a semantic model which can determine the contribution of language units to the
assessment of those preconditions.
Neither cognitive semantics nor truth-conditional semantics can do the job because
the descriptions they provide have nothing to do with socialized ways of understanding the
institutions: what is needed is an instructional semantics that accounts for how the
languages units influence the hearers ways of seeing the role of institutions, or, from a
complementary point of view, how the languages units reveal the speakers ways of
understanding the impact of institutions. As a consequence, what is needed is a semantics
that assigns socialized points of view to language units, constraints on points of view to
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connectors and operators, in order to allow to compute the points of view suggested by
more complex language units. Given that causal relations are not observable though our
sensorial apparatus, particular attention must be paid to the refutability of each
observational statement. Moreover, given that the interpretation that was actually built out
of a discourse or a text is not directly accessible to observation, particular attention must
also be paid to the justification of the interpretation assigned to the triple
<language unit, situation, addressee>.
Such semantic models, called ViewPoint Semantics (VPS), have been developed
and are mainly used to extract knowledge and/or ideologies from texts and discourses.
Their use for assessing institutional preconditions prevailing in the communicative
practice, in order to study strategic manoeuvring, is promising, from a practical point of
view, and inspiring, from a theoretical point of view.

REFERENCES
Bakhtin, M. M. (1929). Bakhtine Mikhail Mikhalovitch (1929). Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo.
Leningrad 1929. 2nd edition: Probemy poetiki Dostoevskogo. Moscow, 1963. Translated to French
by Kolitcheff, Isabelle. La potique de Dostoievski. Paris, 19701998; Le Seuil.
Dascal, Marcelo (1983). Pragmatics and the philosophy of mind 1: Thought in Language. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Ducrot, O. (1988). Topo et formes topiques, Bulletin d'tudes de linguistique franaise de Tokyo 22, 1-14.
Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam and Philadelphia; John Benjamins.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Houtlosser, (2009). Strategic maneuvering. Examining argumentation in context. In
F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Examining Argumentation in Context. Fifteen Studies on Strategic
Maneuvering. Amsterdam and Philadelphia; John Benjamins.
Harder, Peter (1990). The Pragmatics and Semantics of Reference. Copenhagen studies in language, 13, 4178.
Pascal, B. (1655). De lesprit gomtrique. Fragments edited by Ernest Havet in Penses de Pascal publies
dans leur texte authentique. Paris, 1883; Delagrave.
Raccah, P.-Y. (2005). What is an empirical theory of linguistic meaning a theory of? In Z. Frajzyngier et al.
(eds.). Diversity and Language Theory. Studies in Language Companion Series; Amsterdam and
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Raccah, P.-Y. (2011). Linguistique critique : une exploration cognitive. Intellectica 56: 305-314. Special
issue: Linguistique cognitive : une exploration critique, dir.: Jean-Baptiste Guignard.

1223

Current Trends In Educational Research On Argumentation. What

Comes After Toulmin?
Chrysi Rapanta1 & Merce Garcia-Mila2
1

College of Business
Zayed University
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Chrysi.rapanta@zu.ac.ae
2

Developmental and Educational Psychology

University of Barcelona
Spain
mgarciamila@ub.edu

ABSTRACT: Although many education researchers exclusively use Toulmins model, more and more
scholars opt for other Informal logic tools, such as dialogue models or argumentation schemes. The present
paper describes this tendency of slowly moving from Toulmin to other models and gives a narrow focus to
those articles that use other argument models than Toulmins to analyze and assess students and/or teachers
arguments. As a final contribution, we provide a taxonomy of argumentation tools used in educational
research in relation to a number of variables such as type of task, age of participants, disciplinary subject,
and main skills assessed as significant.
KEYWORDS: argument analysis and assessment, education, skills, taxonomy, tools, Toulmin.

1. INTRODUCTION
Since the early beginning of the informal-plausible logic theories as a counter-balance to
the existing formal-deductive ones, scholars from the informal logic field have made
suggestions on how argumentation should be instructed, or what is important when
teaching argumentation (e.g. Voss & Means, 1991; Voss, Perkins, & Segal, 1991). In its
almost 50 years of existence, if we consider Kahanes Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric
(1971) as the first official informal logic manuscript as proposed by Johnson (2000),
informal logic has expanded into many schools of thought, especially regarding how
informal arguments should be analyzed and assessed. Among them, we distinguish the
following for their applicability in education research and practice: dialogue analysis,
which focuses on argument as a dialogical process taking place in a specific dialogue
context in which participants make a series of moves forming strategic sequences or
even a dialogue game (e.g. Felton & Kuhn, 2001; De Vries, Lund, & Baker, 2002; Felton,
2004; Mcalister, Ravenscroft, & Scanlon, 2004; Prakken, 2005); argumentation schemes,
which is a device that aims to formalize (in the sense of giving structure to) everyday
arguments mostly related to plausible reasoning (e.g. Walton, 1996; van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004; Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008; Rigotti & Morasso, 2010); and
dialectics and pragmadialectics, which apply in conflict argumentative contexts where one
of the opposing views is more sound or acceptable than the other(s) (e.g. Barth & Krabbe,
1982; Walton & Krabbe, 1995; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).
1224

Notwithstanding the plethora of informal logic tools and methods of analysis and
assessment proposed, there is a remarkable tendency among educational researchers to
apply Toulmins Argumentation Pattern (TAP) as it was proposed in the late fifties
(Toulmin, 1958). TAPs main original contribution was to oppose to the mathematical
standards in logic at the time. From an informal logic perspective, TAP is still considered
an acceptable method, as several contemporary authors have successfully addressed
questions that Toulmins model had provoked (see Hitchcock & Verheij, 2005, for an
overview). In the field of education, some of the reasons for its predominance are the
following: a) its strong connection with science and scientific reasoning (Duschl &
Osborne, 2002); b) its success in coding large data protocols (Voss, 2005); and c) its
easiness to use as a measurement of both teaching and learning performance (Erduran,
Simon, & Osborne, 2004). On the other hand, TAP also received several criticisms, such
as: a) the model concentrates on the proponent (Leitao, 2000), b) it can be difficult to
structure reasoning in real time (Simon, Erduran, & Osborne, 2006), c) we should study
argumentation in a more holistic and emergent manner rather than imposing an existing
analytical pattern such as TAP (Sampson & Clark, 2009), and d) the scheme is restricted
to short arguments and the categories impose ambiguities (Kelly, Druker, & Chen, 1998).
The goal of this paper is to provide a reflective overview of educational research in
argumentation, and to identify any existing trends in terms of tendencies of preference
towards one tool of argument analysis and assessment or another. More precisely, we seek
answers to the following questions:
1.

2.

Is there a correlation between the use of one tool of argument analysis and
assessment or another and the studys characteristics such as date, design, focus,
and variables?
Can we discuss about an evolution in the tendency of educational research in the
field of argumentation skills?

2. METHOD
The data collection was based on both preliminary and secondary sources. Among the
first, the databases of Wiley, ScienceDirect, and Springer were used. We also identified
some primary journals focusing on the subject of argument and education. Among the
secondary sources, three reviews were of special interest to our goal and questions, namely
Clark, Sampson, Weinberger & Erkens (2007), Nussbaum (2011), and Rapanta, GarciaMila & Gilabert (2013). Further details for both types of sources are provided below.
The criteria for preliminary articles selection were the following:
a)

b)

Peer-reviewed articles published in scientific journals related to argument and/or

education with an explicit focus on argument skills and their enhancement or
analysis through concrete interventions and/or methods which lead to the
presentation of concrete results regarding the quality of arguing of different age
participants in the field of education;
Clear dependent variables assessed in sufficient ways and related either to concrete
independent variables, in case the study is experimental, or to influencing factors
or task characteristics in case the study is non-experimental;
1225

c)

Exclusion of studies entirely focusing on outcomes of arguing such as

collaborative learning or problem solving.

Finally, we reviewed 73 scientific articles published from 1985 to 2013 with an explicit
focus on argument skills enhancement in education. The goal of the review was to give
answers to the two research questions mentioned in the introduction.
Three secondary sources were also used in order to better contextualize the
observations based on the preliminary review results presented in the next section. Clark et
al. (2007) reviewed frameworks for analyzing online dialogical argumentation, and they
came up with five most predominant types of focus regarding argument analysis: a) formal
argumentation structure, b) conceptual quality, c) nature and function of contributions
within the dialogue, d) epistemic nature of reasoning, and e) argumentation sequences and
interaction patterns. Toulmin (1958) appears as contributing only to the first focuscriterion of argument analysis and assessment. Rapanta et al (2013) reviewed 97 studies in
order to describe how argumentative competence is conceived by educational researchers.
They propose three general conceptions of argument, as form, as strategy, and as goal, and
three main levels of argument assessment, namely metacognitive, metastrategic and
epistemological. Among the findings, TAP is used by more than two thirds of the total
studies that define argument as form and mainly when the task is written argumentation,
showing its strong connection with structural elements of argumentation. On the other
hand, when the focus of the study is argument strategy or goals, TAP is hardly used. Last
but not least, in his recent essay Nussbaum (2011) argues that other frameworks of
argumentation rather than Toulmins may be used for both research and practice in
education, such as Waltons dialogue theory and Bayesian models of everyday arguments.
Both tools provide a detailed focus on important aspects of in-class argumentation, such as
plausibility and dialecticity. Yet, their application in educational research is still stunted.
The secondary sources helped us identify the main characteristics of the
preliminary sources, in terms of the following:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

f)

Study design, meaning if it is experimental or non-experimental;

Type of task, including production (written, oral, semi-oral) or assessment tasks
(e.g. fallacies identification, test on argument understanding);
Age of participants, meaning children, adolescents, or adults;
Subject of argumentation, ranging from natural sciences and mathematics to
social/socio-scientific issues and general/everyday issues;
Independent variables, including age/grade, prior knowledge, gender, and
epistemological knowledge (knowledge about argumentation) of participants, and
also task characteristics such as goal instructions, topic, explicit argument teaching
as an intervention, or use of diagrams and computer scaffolds;
Dependent variables, focusing mainly on quantity and quality of grounds and
reasons, quantity and quality of counterarguments and rebuttals, argument strategy,
epistemic strength, and quality of argumentative interaction.

1226

3. FINDINGS
Not to our surprise, of the 73 studies reviewed, 30 (41 %) use TAP as their main tool of
argument analysis and assessment. However, nearly the same percentage of studies (36 %)
uses other informal logic tools, such as interaction analysis, dialectics and
pragmadialectics. Last but not least, 23% of the studies use the analytical framework of
argument skills proposed by Kuhn (1991), initially as a tool to analyze participants
interview answers on everyday issues, and later adapted to dialogue and interaction
analysis (e.g. Kuhn & Felton, 2001). Regarding our first question on whether there is a
significant correlation between tool of analysis and year of study, the answer is positive.
As shown on Table 1, the use of Toulmins model, either in its original form (Toulmin,
1958) or adaptations of it (e.g. Toulmin, Rieke, Janik, & Allan, 1984; Erduran et al.,
2004), has increased in the last years, together with a re-awakening of Kuhns tool and a
steady increase of other informal logic tools (especially interaction analysis, dialectics and
pragmadialectics).

Table 1. Distribution of Use of Argument Analysis Tools Over Years

Toulmin

Kuhn

Other

Total

1985-1995

1996-2005

11

11

30

2006-2013

22

11

38

Total

30

17

26

73

Chi (4) = 13.43, p = .001

We also asked whether there is a significant correlation between tool of analysis and more
specific study characteristics, presented in the Method section. More precisely, we did not
find any significant correlation [Chi2 (2) = 3.3, ns] between study type and use of specific
analytical tool, which means that the fact of conducting an experimental study or not does
not influence on the researchers decision regarding using one tool or another. In regards
to whether the task assigned to the study participants was a production, an assessment, or a
combined task, again no significant differences in the distribution of frequencies of tool of
analysis were found [Chi2 (4) = 4.8, ns]. However, we observed a tendency in not
considering Kuhns tool as appropriate for assessment tasks, but rather for production
(oral, written, semi-oral) tasks. As seen on Table 2, for assessment tasks, which are mostly
related to the identification of fallacies, dialectical informal logic tools are preferred.

1227

Table 2. Distribution of Frequencies of Tool of Argument Analysis According to Type of

Task
Toulmin

Kuhn

Other

Total

Production task

12

13

32

Assessment task

Combined

15

10

32

As far as the age of participants is concerned, no significant correlation was found [Chi2
(6) = 1.1, ns], which means that whether the study focuses on children, adolescents, or
adults is not a factor influencing on the tools decision. On the other hand, when the
subject of argumentation is considered, there is a strong tendency (Chi2 (4)=24.6, p<.001)
in using Toulmins tool and its adaptations for natural sciences, whereas Kuhns and other
informal logic tools for general issues. Table 3 shows the distribution of frequencies.

Table 3. Distribution of Frequencies of Tool of Argument Analysis According to Subject of

Argumentation
Toulmin

Kuhn

Other

Total

Natural sciencesMathematics

18

23

Social sciencesSocioscientific

20

General issues

12

14

30

When it comes to independent variables and their use in combination with Toulmin,
Kuhn or Other, a rather homogeneous distribution appears as shown in Table 4. In
spite of the low frequencies, we still may observe a qualitative tendency: When the
intervention is at a general level, i.e. explicit argument teaching, Toulmin seems to work,
but when it becomes more concrete or combined with other variables, Kuhn and other
tools are preferred.

1228

Table 4. Distribution of Frequencies of Tool of Argument Analysis According to

Independent Variable
Toulmin

Kuhn

Other

Total

Age/Grade

Prior Knowledge

Gender

Epistemological
Knowledge

Goal Instructions

Topic

Argument
Teaching

11

Computer
scaffolds

Mixed

20

Last but not least, some interesting insights emerged when we crosstabulated the tool of
analysis used with some main dependent variables related to argument characteristics
assessed by each reviewed study. More precisely, we identified the following three
significant correlations, presented in detail on Table 5:
a)

b)

c)

For the assessment of the quality and quantity of grounds and reasons, Toulmin is
considered more appropriate, followed by Kuhn and then others [Chi2 (2) = 22,
p=.001];
For the assessment of the quality and quantity of counterarguments and rebuttals,
Kuhn is considered more appropriate, followed by Toulmin and then others [Chi2
(2) = 6.2, p=.05];
For the assessment of argument strategy, other tools are considered more
appropriate, followed by Kuhn and then Toulmin with no studies at all [Chi2 (2) =
13.6, p=.001].

1229

Table 5. Distribution of Frequencies of Tool of Argument Analysis According to

Dependent Variable
Toulmin

Kuhn

Other

Total

No

16

22

Yes

29

12

10

51

CAs &
Rebuttals

No

13

19

39

Yes

17

10

34

Argument
Strategy

No

30

12

16

58

Yes

10

15

Grounds &
Reasons

Based on these findings, a taxonomy of preferences towards one of the three most frequent
types of argument analysis tools (i.e. Toulmin, Kuhn, and Other) based on the researchers
focus each time may be proposed, as presented in Table 6.
Table 6. A Taxonomy of Argument Analysis Tools And Focus of Educational Research

Toulmin

Subject

Task

Ind.Variable

Dep.Variable

Natural
Sciences

All

Explicit
Argument
Teaching

Quantity and
Quality of
Reasons

General

No
assessment
tasks

Goal/Task
instructions

Quantity and
Quality of CAs
& Rebuttals

General

All

Mixed

Argument
Strategy

Kuhn

Other

5. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we studied the dominance of argument analysis and assessment tools in
regards to their use by educational researchers. Our main motivation lies on the fact that
most educational researchers still prefer to use Toulmins model (TAP), which is based on
the structural rather than strategic aspects of arguments. The main question was whether
the choice for TAP or other tools is systematically related to any study characteristics, and,
thus, we can identify any trends in educational research in argumentation.

1230

After a careful analysis of both primary and secondary sources, we found that some
significant correlations between tool of analysis and study characteristics do exist,
especially regarding the year of study and the type of dependent variables involved. The
subject of argumentation and the task proposed to the participants are also related to the
researchers preference for TAP, which is mainly the choice for both production and
assessment tasks in the field of natural sciences. On the other hand, when the research
focus is more general, the design more complex (variety of independent variables) and the
unit of analysis is either argument strategy or argumentative interaction, Toulmin is not
the first preference of educational researchers, who also tend to use Kuhns analytical
categories or other proposals such as argument schemes, dialectics and pragmadialectics.
However, TAP continuous to be the most predominant (but not necessarily the better
justified) choice for researchers who endeavour to analyse and assess students and
teachers argument skills.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper led to some first insights regarding what guides educational researchers
towards the choice of a tool of argument analysis or another. It was shown that the choice
for TAP or other tool is not hazardous, but it is based on criteria related to the studys
focus and characteristics. The taxonomy presented on Table 6 might guide future
educational researchers regarding their choice of one tool or another in respect to what
others have done thus far.
The pre-dominance of Toulmins pattern as an argument analysis tool has been
confirmed also in this study. However, this fact alone does not make TAP or any other
tool more powerful or more appropriate. Our duty as argumentation scholars is to look at
the main challenges of education research in argumentation and try to find ways to better
approach those. For example in our previous study (Rapanta et al., 2013) we showed that
the main argument skills that teachers-researchers focus on are the correct use of evidence,
the distinction of arguments from explanation, and the achievement of learning goals
through arguing. More researchers should focus on the profound assessment and
enhancement of these skills and others. At the end of the day, our question should not be
What comes after Toulmin? but what hinders educational researchers from applying other
tools of assessment, more related to the well-known informal logic standards of quality,
such as the relevance, sufficiency and acceptability of the arguments and
counterarguments used in different contexts of the curriculum.

REFERENCES
Barth, E. M., & Krabbe, E. C. (1982). From axiom to dialogue: A philosophical study of logics and
argumentation. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Clark, D. B., Sampson, V., Weinberger, A., & Erkens, G. (2007). Analytic frameworks for assessing
dialogic argumentation in online learning environments. Educational Psychological Review, 19,
343-374.
De Vries, E., Lund, K. & Baker, M.J. (2002). Computer-mediated epistemic dialogue: Explanation and
argumentation as vehicles for understanding scientific notions. The Journal of the Learning
Sciences, 11(1).

1231

Duschl, R. A., & Osborne, J. (2002). Supporting and promoting argumentation discourse in science
education. Studies in Science Education, 38(1), 39-72. Doi: 10.1080/03057260208560187
Erduran, S., Simon, S., Osborne, J. (2004). TAPping into argumentation: Developments in the application of
Toulmin's Argument Pattern for studying science discourse. Science Education, 88(6), 915-933.
Felton, M. (2004). The development of discourse strategy in adolescent argumentation. Cognitive
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Felton, M., & Kuhn, D. (2001). The development of argumentative discourse skills. Discourse Processes,
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Hitchcock, D., & Verheij, B. (2005). The Toulmin model today: Introduction to the special issue on
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Johnson, R. H. (2000). Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument. London: Routledge.
Kelly, G. J., Druker, S., & Chen, C. (1998). Students reasoning about electricity: combining performance
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Leitao, S. (2000). The potential of argument in knowledge building. Human Development, 43, 332360.
Mcalister, S., Ravenscroft, A., & Scanlon, E. (2004). Combining interaction and context design to support
collaborative argumentation using a tool for synchronous CMC. Journal of Computer Assisted
Learning, 20(3), 194-204.
Nussbaum, M. (2011). Argumentation, dialogue theory, and probability modelling: Alternative frameworks
for argumentation research in education. Educational Psychologist, 46(2), 84-106.
Prakken, H. (2005). Coherence and flexibility in dialogue games for argumentation. Journal of logic and
computation, 15(6), 1009-1040.
Rapanta, C., Garcia-Mila, M., & Gilabert, S. (2013). What is meant by argumentative competence? An
integrative review of methods of analysis and assessment in education. Review of Educational
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Rigotti, E., & Morasso, S. G. (2010). Comparing the Argumentum Model of Topics to other contemporary
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489-512.
Sampson, V., Clark, D.B. (2009). A comparison of the collaborative scientific argumentation practices of
two high and two low performing groups. Research in Science Education, DOI 10.1007/s11165009-9146-9.
Simon, S., Erduran, S., & Osborne, J. (2006). Learning to teach argumentation: Research and development
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Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Toulmin, S. E., Rieke, R. D., Janik, A., & Allan. (1984). An introduction to reasoning. New York:
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Van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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Voss, J. F., Perkins, D. N., & Segal, J. W. (Eds.) (1991). Informal reasoning and education. Hillsdale, NJ:
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Walton, D. N., & Krabbe, E. C. (1995). Commitment in dialogue. Basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning.
Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
Walton, D. N., Reed, C., & Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation schemes. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.

1232

Karl Poppers Influence On Contemporary Argumentation

Theory
Henrique Jales Ribeiro
Department of Philosophy, Communication and Information,
University of Coimbra,
Coimbra,
Portugal 3004-530
jalesribeiro@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: Karl Popper's influence, from the nineteen sixties to the nineteen eighties, over the dialectical
schools of contemporary argumentation theory (namely pragma-dialectics and formal dialectic) is often
evoked by some of these schools (as is the case of the first one). It appears suggested, at least at first sight,
through a comparison between Popperss critical rationalism and the relevant normativist conceptions. The
author analyses and explores in detail all of these historical and philosophical connections.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, critical rationalism, descriptivism, formal dialectic, normativism, Popper,
pragma-dialectics.

1. INTRODUCTION: POPPERS INFLUENCE AND ITS LIMITS

Karl Popper is one of the most brilliant philosophers of the 20th century. His influence on
philosophy in general, and science in particular, is well-known. Compared to others such
as Toulmin or Perelman (see Ribeiro, 2009), however, Popper's influence (and of his
disciple, Hans Albert) on rhetoric and argumentation theory during that period has yet to
be studied and analysed. It is occasionally pointed out by some schools, like pragmadialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 16-17, 51). I say occasionally
becauseas far as I knowit has never been truly assessed in the detail and depth that
would be expected, which is what we will attempt to do in this paper.
The absence of the studies and research I have alluded to is presumably due to the
following: we know that Popper wrote profusely about argumentation, that this was even
one of the main facets of what this philosopher called critical rationalism (see
Musgrave, 2007; and Bouveresse, 1981, pp. 143-163), but the fact is that he never
developed an actual argumentation theory as a (more or less) specialised field of research,
and least of all an argument theory, i.e. a theory about what constitutes an argument, its
form and/or structure, and the way its elements relate to each other (on the distinction
between argumentation theory and argument theory, see van Eemeren, Grootendorts,
Henkemans et al., 1996, p. 12ff.; and Johnson, 2000, pp. 30-31). Which is why his
influence on contemporary argumentation theoryhowever significant it may behas
possibly little to do with this, i.e., a technical view of argumentation and arguments in
particular. Therefore, while addressing such influence I do not have in mind a direct
impact of Poppers philosophy, even if such impact actually existedand today we have
every reason to believe that it did someway exist, since the fact has been acknowledged,
namely in the case of pragma-dialectics (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 16-

1233

17). In other words, and methodologically speaking: it is not a question herein this
paperof the main schools of argumentation theory (the dialectic schools, like pragmadialectics and formal dialectic, and the others, such as the so-called school of informal
logic) expressly adapting or applying Popper's theories to their own individual scopes.
Instead, the aforementioned schools regarded these theories as brilliant philosophical
confirmations of their conceptions of argumentation, and even, to some extent, as their
overall framework. It is from this perspective, in my view, that pragma-dialectics
appearsin the text quoted aboveas an extended version of the Popperian critical
perspective. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 17) Based on this fundamental
presupposition, we can establish a parallel, or even a rather essential connection, between
Popper's philosophy and the conceptions alluded to, in particular the ones of the dialectical
schools. Both have a timeframe, they are products of one and the same era, historically
and philosophically speaking, as is the case of the second half of the 20th century; in fact,
to not be able to establish that parallel or connection is what would be most surprising.
My paper is organised in the following manner:
(1)

(2)

(3)

first, I will analyse the model submitted by Popper for science in Popper
(1959/1974), and in other works immediately after (Popper, 1945, 1963/1991,
1972), and suggest the implication thereof for contemporary argumentation theory;
then I will seek to analyse and discuss in detail each such implication, under what
we could call, albeit with some hesitation and doubts, Popper's argumentation
theory;
to conclude, I will highlight the original features and, particularly, the limitations
and shortcomings of that theory, in the present and more general context of the
originality, limitations and shortcomings of contemporary argumentation theory
itself.

2. POPPERS ARGUMENTATIVE MODEL OF SCIENCE

Popper's conception of argumentation is addressed through his philosophy of science in
Popper (1959/1974) a book first published in German in 1934 and translated into
English in 1959. (This was his third book in English language, after Popper (1945), and
Popper (1957).) The essence of the link between science and argumentation in this book
involves rejecting the criterion of demarcation between science and metaphysics
introduced by logical positivism during its time, in other words, the idea that, in contrast
with philosophical and/or metaphysical theories (or hypotheses), the theories of science
(i.e. physical-natural sciences, maths included) can be empirically verified and/or entirely
corroborated (Popper, 1959/1974, pp. 34-39). On the contrary, Popper finds that such
criterion is legitimised on the following grounds: theories or hypothesis are metaphysical
if they cannot be conclusively refuted or falsified; they are, otherwise, scientific if this can
be done successfully (Popper, 1959/1974, pp. 40-48). This new criterion resulted in a
discussion and controversy, in philosophical terms, which is not called for here. Its
relationship with argumentation and critical thought, from a dialectical standpoint, is
obvious: when we argue, what actually happens is that we seek to falsify or deny a claim
that has been submitted to discussion. This is, I repeat, what dialectical schools of
argumentation theory (such as pragma-dialectics and formal dialectics) upheld in the late
1234

nineteen-eighties. From this perspective, Popper's basic logical model of critical

rationalism in Popper (1959/1974) is the modus tollens, not the modus ponens of logical
positivism and science philosophy: it involves denying, refuting the implications or the
consequences of any theory and/or hypothesis (the consequent thereof), in order to
deny/refute its pressupositions (its antecedent). As I will show ahead, Popper does not
address that model in social, cultural and political terms in Popper (1959/1974), although
he broadly suggests that this may and must be done. Such conception does not appear until
Popper (1945). In this book, he defines his critical rationalism in the following terms:
(...) In order therefore to be a little more precise, it may be better to explain rationalism in terms of
practical attitudes of behaviour. We could then say that rationalism is an attitude of readiness to
listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience. It is fundamentally an attitude of admitting
that I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get near to the truth. It is an
attitude which does not lightly give up hope that by such means as argument and careful
argumentation, people my reach some kind of agreement on most problems of importance. In short,
the rationalist attitude, or, as I may perhaps label it, the attitude of reasonableness, is very similar
to the scientific attitude, to the belief that in the search for truth we need co-operation, and that, with
the help of argument, we can attain something like objectivity. (Popper, 1945, vol. II, pp. 212-213)

Now, the consequences of the new criteria for the demarcation between science and
metaphysics, in The logic of scientific discovery, were deep and revolutionary:
Popperassuming that in the past scientists had always pursued in their research, more or
less consciously, his principle of falsification (which is far from being clear or
evident)proposed that the science of his time (in this case, classical mechanics,
thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, and the theory of relativity) be completely
reconstructed, from bottom to top according to that principle; in other words, as he
retrospectively acknowledges in his intellectual autobiography (Popper, 1976, p. 87ff.) the
theory and practice of that science required complete recasting. In The logic of scientific
discovery he states: what is to be called science and who is to be called scientist must
always remain a matter of convention or decision. (Popper, 1959/1974, p. 52) This has to
do with Popper's conventionalism and normative outlook on science. Popper finds that the
true scientific method is composed of a set of conventions or basic rules to be adopted by
the scientific community or communities in the light of the principle of falsification, i.e. of
fundamentally negative conventions or rules (cf. Popper, 1959/1974, pp. 53-56). These are
not logical conventions, as in positivism in Popper's time, but rather epistemological
conventions which are enormously significant from that perspective, because ultimately
and in the light of that principle, in his view, science is a social, cultural and political
phenomenon. On the other hand, while these conventions are agreed freely among
scientistsas has been mentionedthey underpin (and have always underpinned) current
scientific theory and practice in an essential and substantial way. The originality of
Popper's epistemology, seen from the dialectical perspective of argumentation, resides in
the following:
(1)
(2)

Science (just as everyday language) is a social phenomenon.

It is more relevant, as a methodology of scientific research, to deny and/or to refute
(It is not true that) , than to seek to verify or to corroborate, because, as Popper
puts it, one can never verify nor corroborate completely a given theory or

1235

(3)

(4)

(5)

hypothesis (Popper, 1959/1974, p. 40ff.) The same applies to the role of refutation
in argumentative discourse overall.
It is by violating the aforementioned rules that we may ultimately distinguish
between a normalor correctscientific practice and another allegedly
abnormal, fallacious or metaphysical one (Popper 1959/1974, p. 53ff.). The same
is true of the rules governing argumentative discourse in general, or the rules of
what van Eemeren & Grootendorts (2004, pp. 21-22), call the ideal model of
critical discussion.
As already said, these rules are not logical conventions, i.e. conventions based on
the requirements of formal logic, but rather epistemological (cf. Popper, 1972, pp.
30-31); they entail the intersubject agreement between stakeholders, i.e., scientists
(as is the case in argumentative discourse of the rules governing a discussion of a
claim at stake between parties).
It is necessary to reread or reconstruct all current scientific discourse and practice
in the light of rules like these (or, if you prefer, it is necessary to reread or
reconstruct argumentative discourse in each one of its institutional contexts in the
light of rules like these, whatever they may be).

There is no question that, from these five viewpoints, one can trace a tight link between
critical rationalism and the dialectical schools, namely, the normativist conceptions of
argumentation developed by Barth and Krabbe (1982), Walton (1989), Walton & Krabbe
(1995), and van Eemeren & Grootendorst's (2004). In Walton (1989, pp. 17-18), for
example, the rules of persuasion dialogue (i.e., argumentative discourse) are explicitly
presented as negative, following a Popperian view on science, society and politics;
fallacies (in Poppers demarcation criterion: metaphysics, or the bad science) result from
their violation; and in order to understand argumentation in daily life (and the specific
dialogues in which it occurs), as for understanding science in Popper, we must reconstruct
it precisely according to this kind of rules.
In pragma-dialectics, Poppers legacy (and that of his disciple, Hans Albert), and in
particular the contribution of the aforementioned aspects to argumentation theory,
involvesas we started off by saying in the introductionidentifying that theory with the
philosophers critical rationalism; furthermore, such legacy is expressly acknowledged
and interpretedin a way which we cannot analyse nor discuss herein the light of
Toulmins (1976) pioneering distinction between three essential types of approaches to
that theory (the geometrical or logical, the anthropological and the critical). Having in
mind what was summarised above in (3), (4) and (5) about the status of the rules for
critical discussion, van Eemeren and Grootendorts state:
The critical perspective of reasonableness combines certain insights from the geometrical and
anthropological perspectives with insights advanced by critical-rationalists such as Karl Popper ()
and Hans Albert (1967/1975). By proposing a discussion procedure in the form of an orderly
arrangement of independent rules for rational discussants who want to act reasonably, the aim of
formalization is reminiscent of the geometrical approach to reasonableness. This formal procedure
in the critical sense, however, is aimed at facilitating a discussion intended to resolve a difference of
opinion. The proposed procedural rules are valid as far as they really enable the discussants to
resolve their difference of opinion. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 16).

1236

Further down they substantiate:

In order to have a suitable medium for discussion, or a least a suitable frame of reference (or ideal
model) for discussing the quality of argumentation, we must detach ourselves from various
problematic peculiarities of ordinary language use and introduce new conventions. In our
terminology, this is called the critical-rationalistic view on reasonableness, which is in fact an
extended version of the Popperian critical perspective. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, p.
17).

3. A SKETCH OF POPPERS ARGUMENTATION THEORY

Let us call the scientific model summarised above an argumentative model of science.
Popper had the honour of introducing it for the first time in the history of Western
philosophical thought. (An argumentation model, in general, is said to have been
conceived in Toulmin (1958); yet the philosopher never really addressed the topic of
agumentation in science. One could say the same about Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca
(2008); but Perelmans outlook is essentially that of rhetoric, not of argumentation theory
itself.) Unfortunately, Popper is seldom quoted by historiography specialised in these
matters, unlike Toulmin and Perelman. In Popper (1945), Popper (1957) and Popper
(1963/1991), he applies the alluded outlook on culture, society and politics, under the
broader scope of a reconstructed history of Western philosophical thought from ancient
Greece (pre-Socratic philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle) up to nowadays. Popper
(1972) is a development of Popper views on the theory of knowledge. It is in Popper
(1945) that the expression critical rationalism came up for the first time to refer to
Popper's own conceptions (cf. vol. II, pp. 217, 224). The core idea regarding
argumentation theory is essentially the same in all of the mentioned books, although there
are some details one must address and analyse.
(1)

(2)

(3)

Human reason is mostly argumentative and conjectural: it consists of trying to

challenge and finally refuting, under any of its scopes, a given theory or
hypothesis, that is, any claim submitted to us, while keeping oneself intellectually
and ethically available to take the challenge or refutation through to the end; this is
what arguing means to Popper (cf. Popper 1945, vol. II, p. 212ff.; 1963/1991, p.
33ff.; 1972, p. 1 ff.) Popper does not look into the detail of how that, i.e. the
challenge and refutation, may and should be done outside the scientific field; which
suggests, as I will explain ahead, that he is not interested in an argumentation
theory by itself, or even less in a theory of argument.
As it is argumentative and conjectural, it is not a dogmatic and authoritarian
reason, but rather an essentially open one, sceptical yet humble, and optimistic as
regards the possibility for deciding, finally, in face of opposing and apparently
indisputable arguments.
Which means that it is not a speculative reason, in the traditional sense of the
conceptof Plato and Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. It is not a superior and
legislative faculty, with which one could intellectually build social, cultural and
political institutions, or on which to impose rather ideal models and foresee the
history of societies (historicism).

1237

(4)
(5)

Nor is it a collectivist reason, like that of the aforementioned philosophers, but a

different one, mostly individual, open and tolerant, in ethical and/or moral terms.
History, as the philosopher will tell using a brilliant and revolutionary formula,
has no meaning (Popper, 1945, vol. II, p. 246ff; cf. Popper, 1957, p. 105ff.).

From the perspective of this last fundamental thesis, Popper is lead to reject and
deconstruct, philosophically speaking, all political ideologies, which include supporting
the models I have alluded to. He places major emphasis on that thesis, which is
understandable, after assimilating adequately the idea (developed in Popper, 1945) that
what we call reason in philosophy, since the Greek philosophers, is/was also a social,
cultural and political reason, and that this very reason lead to the apparent meltdown of
Western civilisation as a whole, as the last two World Wars of the 20th century suggest.
Hereunder, as under other topics, an analogy could be traced between Popper, who as we
know was Austrian and received Viennese education, and Toulmin or, rather, the way
Toulmin read the Austro-Hungarian society in the last quarter of the 19th century and the
early 20th century, in books like Toulmin & Janik (1974).
4. CONCLUSIONS: ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF PHILOSOPHY TO
ARGUMENTATION THEORY
I have suggested that only with some reservations or limitations can one talk about an
argumentation theory in Popper's philosophy. We are not dealing here exactly with
argumentation i.e., a more or less specialised field of research that can be studied
separately, but rather with rationality (or with exercising human reason) generally
speaking. This explains why the philosopher never devised an argumentation model per
se, unlike what happened in the 20th century with others, like Toulmin (1958) and, to
some extent, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (2008); and, consequently, why we do not find
in him a theory of argument, in other words a theory about the way arguments, in general,
may be analysed, assessed and represented. The only explanation I find for this situation is
that Popper assumed that philosophy could not be reduced, nor likened overall to
rhetoric (as it was called in their time, based on the different outlooks of each of them,
Perelman on one side and Toulmin on the other) and/or to an argumentation theory. (I
have supported in Ribeiro (2012), controversially, that reducing and/or likening it to
rhetoric is one of the main outcomes of the authors inputs, which I have mentioned, to
that which we call today argumentation theory.) He always believed, from Popper
(1959/1974) onwards, and specially after the collapse of Western philosophy overall
announced and celebrated in Wittgenstein, Kuhn and Quine's main works in the sixties and
seventies (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001; Kuhn, 1962; Quine, 1969), that it was possible to
work in philosophy following the classical patterns of what in the past (until the late 20th
century) we called, for example, philosophy of science (see Popper, 1994, pp. 33-64).
Regarding this issue, he does not agree with the Toulmin we know, particularly with
Toulmin (2001).
Anyhow, the impact of Popper's critical rationalism from the second half of the
20th century to the present was enormous, althoughas I have suggestedit was
essentially diffuse. Such impact could have been deeper and more decisive had Popper,
during the second half of the 20th century, not been the outspoken enemy of what we still
1238

call nowadays analytical philosophy, and had not been completely ostracised by it (as
actually happened to Toulmin). The biggest contribution of that critical rationalism to
contemporary argumentation theory and to what, generally speaking, we call today
critical thinking was that it showed emphatically that human reason is mostly dialogical
and argumentative, that it is something that is (always) under construction, and is not a
finished and definitive essence. Therefore, it largely destroyed, practically for the first
time in the history of Western philosophy, the myth according to which both science and
society are essences, whose nature we should describe and analyse. From this
perspective, Popper's falsificationism and conventionalism, regarding philosophy of
science, is clearly compatible with the dialectical schools of contemporary argumentation
theory; specially, in the case of pragma-dialectics, because it is/was not a topic of logic or
of any kind of science philosophy subordinated to it, as was the case of logical positivism
in his time. And this philosopher's conception of society (sceptical, but in the end
essentially optimistic), as an ever open place for arguing, discussing and criticising, is
clearly in line with today's general conceptions, in particular with those that feed into the
schools mentioned above.
Anyhow, Popper's legacy draws our attention to what I have called provocatively,
elsewhere and in another time, the divorce between philosophy and argumentation
theory (Ribeiro, 2012a). Karl Popper, like Jrgen Habermas for example (see Habermas,
1984, 1987), is strongly convinced of the fundamental importance of argumentation for
contemporary philosophy; this conceptionas he shows in the forties already in Popper
(1945)is broad, because it involves a more general conception of human reason and its
role in the evolution of European and Western societies from the classical Greeks to the
present day. However, he clearly does not have, in fact as Habermas himself did not have,
a theory of the argument itself. All of which explains why both philosophers are hardly
ever mentioned and appreciated as they deserve to be in 20th century historiographies of
rhetoric and argumentation. In contrast, however, the main contemporary argumentation
schools strongly and convincingly uphold conceptions about argumentation theory without
these being based upon philosophical and, particularly, metaphysical pressupositions, like
those which are disputed by these philosophers. The study of these pressupositions is
absolutely essential if we intend to safeguard in the futureon sound groundthe socalled interdisciplinarity of argumentation theory. To ensure the desired success of such
interdisciplinarity, it must be built on a founding matrix; and, the way I see it, only
philosophy could deliver itbut certainly in very different terms from those of the past
(see Ribeiro, 2013). To conclude my paper, I would say that this is perhaps the most
important lesson that we may draw today of Poppers views on argumentation.

REFERENCES
Albert, H. (1967/1975). Traktat ber kritische Vernunft. 3rd ed. Tbingen: Mohr.
Barth, E. M., & Krabbe, E. C. W. (1982). From axiom to dialogue. A philosophical study of logics and
argumentation. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Bouveresse, R. (1981). Karl Popper ou le rationalisme critique. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.
van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., Henkemans, F. S. et al. (1996). Fundamentals of argumentation
theory: A handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary developments, New Jersey:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of comunicative action. Vol. 1: Reason and the rationalization of society.
Cambridge, UK: Poltity Press.
Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action. Vol. 2: The critique of functionalist reason.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Johnson, R. (2000). Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Publishers.
Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Musgrave, A. (2007). Critical rationalism. In E. Surez-Iiguez (Ed.), The Power of Argumentation (pp.
171-211). Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi.
Perelman, Ch., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (2008). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. J. Wilkinson
& P. Weaver transl. Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press. French edition: Trait
de largumentation: La nouvelle rhtorique, Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1958.
Popper, K. R. (1945). The open society and its enemies. Vol. I: The spell of Plato. Vol. II: High tide of
prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the aftermath. London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.
Popper, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism. London: Routeledge & Kegan Paul.
Popper, K. R. (1959/1974). The logic of scientific discovery. 7th impression. London: Hutchinson of
London. This book first published in German in1934.
Popper, K. R. (1963/1991). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. 5th ed.
(revised). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press.
Popper, K. R. (1976). Unended quest: An intellectual autobiography. La Salle (IL): Open Court Publishing.
Popper, K. R. (1994). The myth of the framework: In defence of science and rationality. M. A. Notturno ed.
London/New York: Routledge.
Quine, W. V. O. (1969). Ontological relativity and other essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ribeiro, H. J. (2009). Perelman and Toulmin as philosophers: On the inalienable connection between
philosophy, rhetoric and argumentation. In H. J. Ribeiro (Ed.), Rhetoric and Argumentation in the
Beginning of the XXIst Century (pp. 33-53). Coimbra, Coimbra University Press.
Ribeiro, H. J. (2012). Editors Introduction: A quiet revolution: The birth of argumentation theory in the
20th century. In H. J. Ribeiro (Ed), Inside arguments: Logic and the study of argumentation (pp. 120). Newcastle upon Tyne (UK): Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Ribeiro, H. J. (2012a). On the divorce between philosophy and argumentation theory. Revista Filosfica de
Coimbra, 42, 472-498.
Ribeiro, H. J. (2013). What argumentation can do for philosophy in the 21st century. In D. Mohammed & M.
Lewinski (Eds.), Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013 (pp. 1-8). Windsor, ON:
OSSA.
Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Toulmin, S. (1976). Knowing and acting: An invitation to philosophy. New York/London: Macmillan
Publishing Co., Inc./Collier Macmillan Publishers.
Toulmin, S. (2001). Return to reason. Cambridge-Massachusetts/London: Harvard University Press.
Toulmin, S., & Janik, A. (1974). Wittgenstein Vienna. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Walton, D. N. (1989). Informal logic: A handbook for critical argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Walton, D. N., & Krabbe, E. C. W. (1995). Commitment and dialogue: Basic concepts of interpersonal
reasoning. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953/2001). Philosophical investigations. G. E. Ascombe transl. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.

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Persuasion,Visual Rhetoric And Visual Argumentation

Georges Roque
Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS)
France
roque@ehess.fr

ABSTRACT: It is often said that images are excellent persuasive means. However, if images are persuasive,
can they also be argumentative? After discussing authors who have tried to fill the gap between rhetoric and
argumentation (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Reboul, Bonhomme), I will argue that the same figures or
tropes can have both a persuasive and an argumentative function.
KEYWORDS: metonymy, persuasion, visual argumentation, visual rhetoric.

1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between visual rhetoric and visual argumentation is a topic to which
several essays have been dedicated. Some scholars deal with it in a general way (Blair,
2004; Kjeldsen 2012). Others focus on figures or tropes in particular (for antithesis, van
Belle, 2009). Indeed, it has becoming a sub-field in the domain of visual argumentation.
That said, the way in which visual rhetoric and visual argumentation have been related is
not completely satisfactory. I will try to show that most attempts to link rhetoric and
argumentation are based on the assumption that figures of rhetoric are above all
persuasive. This assumption has a dramatic consequence upon visual argumentation,
specifically because one argument against visual argumentation is that images are merely
persuasive. As a result, considering visual rhetoric as persuasive would not reinforce
visual argumentation, but rather critiques against it. Furthermore, another critique must be
taken into account: in the frequent case of mixed media, i.e. when an argument is
displayed in both words and images (such as in ads or commercials), the text alone is
supposed to be argumentative, while the image would be merely persuasive (Adam &
Bonhomme, 2005, p. 194 & 217).
So, in the first part of this paper, I will examine some of the principal ways figures
of rhetoric and argumentation have been related in order to determine the extent to which
figures have been considered as arguments. Then, in the second part, I will argue that
some figures of rhetoric can be persuasive and argumentative at the same time.
Simply stated, I am interested in the argumentativity of figures. In saying this, I am
using a French concept (argumentativit) that was coined by Ducrot and is used in the
French theory of argumentation in order to refer to figures (Bonhomme, 2009; Plantin,
2009). This concept essentially suggests that an utterance can have an argumentative value
instead of being limited to providing merely informational value (Anscombre et Ducrot,
1986, p. 91). Such an argumentative value comes from the fact that we can find, in an
enunciate, elements that allow for a given conclusion by way of a commonplace, which
Ducrot calls a topos (Ducrot, 1992). However, this concept is used in a slightly different
way when applied to figures: in this case, it refers to their argumentative value, which can
1241

be considered as persuasive or argumentative, in this case when figures provide reasons to

support a claim. Note that in what follows, I use the adjective argumentative with this
restrictive meaning, unlike those who use it in a broader way, i.e. including all mean of
influencing the addressee.1
Yet, why is the issue of the argumentativity of figures so important? Simply put, if
figures are considered to mainly have a persuasive role, it is hardly possible to see them as
arguments, at least for those who believe argumentation and persuasion are mutually
exclusive (Plantin 2012; Doury 2012; Micheli 2012).
It is generally accepted that persuasion is an important feature of images (Scott &
Batra, 2003). It seems even that the syntagm visual persuasion is almost pleonastic since
the supposed essence of image is closely related to persuasion (Hill, 2004). The
problem, however, is that this understanding of images as persuasive does not have a
positive connotation, as it is very often linked to propaganda. Propaganda and persuasion
are indeed often seen as techniques for manipulating (Jowell & ODonnel, 1992 ;
Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001; Spangenburg & Moser, 2002), in particular regarding political
posters (Seidman 2008) as well as advertising (Messaris 1997). This shows that we must
be very careful when dealing with issues of visual persuasion. As we will see, this is all
the more the case because figures of rhetoric are usually considered as persuasive, at least
in French scholarship.
2. FIGURES OF RHETORIC AND ARGUMENTS
2.1 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are amongst the first to have drawn our attention to the
relationship between figures of rhetoric and argumentation. These scholars were indeed
interested in showing why and how the use of certain figures of rhetoric can be explained
by the need for argumentation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 227). At its core,
their theory aims to call into question the old understanding of figures of rhetoric as pure
ornament, i.e. without any other function than embellishment. This would explain their
need to distinguish between times when a figure is purely ornamental, and those when it
may play a part in an argumentative process. For this reason, they consider a figure to be
argumentative if it brings about a change of perspective, and its use seems normal in
relation to its new situation. If, on the other hand, the speech does not bring about the
adherence of the hearer [], the figure will be considered an embellishment, a figure of
style (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 229; authors emphasis).
To be sure, the idea of considering figures from an argumentative standpoint was
an important step forward for the field. However, it is insufficient to say that a figure is
argumentative simply if it is accepted. Insofar as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca consider
that the same figure, recognizable from its structure, doesnt necessarily produce the
same argumentative effect (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 232), they proposed
their own classification of figures, aimed at emphasizing how figures can help
argumentation. They organized figures into three categories: choice, presence, and
1

I will leave aside the complex issue of the relationship between verbal rhetoric and visual rhetoric, i.e.
examining to what extent the verbal rhetoric terms can be transposed into visual rhetoric.

1242

communion. Indeed, this classification has the purpose of showing that the effect, or one
of the effects, certain figures have in the presentation of data is to impose or suggest a
choice, to increase the impression of presence, or to bring about communion with the
audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 232-233).
From this point of view, figures are considered as argumentative if they increase
the adherence of the audience, which is a consequence of the concept of argumentation
developed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, i.e. a concept aimed toward influencing a
given audience (Plantin, 1990, p. 16).
2.1.1 Hypotyposis
Interestingly, the first example of a figure they give is hypotyposis. This figure has a lot to
do with images. According to Fontanier, for instance, Hypotyposis paints things in a such
a lively and dynamic way that it puts them, so to say, in front of our eyes and turns a
narrative or a description into an image, a painting, a tableau vivant (Fontanier, 1968, p.
390). They comment on this figure by writing: It is therefore a way of describing events
that make them present to our conscience. Could we negate the eminent part it plays as a
factor of persuasion? (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 226). And they added: If
we neglect this argumentative role played by figures, their study will quickly be a vain
hobby.
We can see in this quotation that hypotyposis is considered as a factor of
persuasion. In turn, persuasion is assimilated to the argumentative role played by figures.
The aim of the chapter on the relationship between figures of rhetoric and argumentation
is indeed to resituate argumentation figures in their proper place concerning the
phenomenon of persuasion (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 231). Such a
conception is not surprising, given that Perelman aims to reconcile rhetoric and
argumentation. But it has, however, important consequences. From my point of view,
playing a persuasive role is not enough to warrant seeing a figure as argumentative. If
hypotyposis is eminently visual, we need to be sure that, beyond its effectiveness, it is also
argumentative.
Yet within Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas own classification of figures,
hypotyposis belongs to the category of figures of presence. Besides hypotyposis, other
figures belong to the same category: ekphrasis and energeia, among others, since they
have the same purpose: namely, to make the object of the discourse present (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 235). However, once again, if such a figure is highly
persuasive and contributes to the effectiveness of the discourse, is it also argumentative? I
am not sure it is.
As we know, presence is very often visual. A well-known example of energeia that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca use when dealing with presence - is that of Caesars
bloody tunic. This is a classic example that illustrates the use of concrete objects to move
the audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 157). Once more, I wonder whether
such a very persuasive device can be considered as argumentative, since it is explicitly
intended to move the audience through an appeal to pity. Aristotle described energeia as
vividness, liveliness, bringing-before-the-eyes, (Rhetoric 1411b 24), but also limited its
use and that of similar figures in so far as it is not right to pervert the judge by moving

1243

him to anger or envy or pity (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1354a 24-26). Unlike Cicero, Quintilian
also wished to limit its use in courts (Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, VI, 2, 1).
2.1.2 Phryne
A famous example of a similar rhetoric device is that of Phryne, a Greek courtesan known
for her beauty. It has been said that Praxiteles used her as a model for his famous
Aphrodite of Knide. She is also known for the legendary trial in which she was probably
charged with impiety. According to some of the sources, such as Quintilian (Institutio
Oratoria, II, 15, 9), the trail had a surprising turn of events. Just when it seemed that the
verdict would be condemnation, her lawyer, Hypereides, (who was also, by the way, one
of her lovers), removed Phrynes robe and bore her breasts before the judges. Awe-struck
by her beauty, and undoubtedly impressed with a sense of pity, they acquitted her.
The anecdote soon became a topos used to illustrate the persuasive power of
rhetoric in Greek and Latin rhetoric treatises (Vouilloux, 1995, p. 102 & 109). It also
illustrates quite well an appeal to pity based on sight (Lvy & Pernot, 1997, p. 6). For this
reason, it is known to have inspired painters, like Baudouin and Grme (fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Grme, Phryn devant lAropage, 1861.

Not surprisingly, Grmes painting has been used as an illustration in books on rhetoric
and persuasion (fig. 2 & 3).

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Fig. 2. Grmes painting illustrating a book

Fig. 3. Grmes painting illustrating a book

This shows again that we must be very careful when dealing with visual rhetoric and its
relationship to argumentation. Hypotyposis and energeia belong, as we said, to figures of
presence according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas classification. However,
increasing the feeling of presence (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 236) is not
necessarily an argumentative tool. To round up the story about Phryne, its worth noting
that after her acquittal, Athens published an official decree forbidding the use of the

1245

appeal to pity figure, in particular by exposing an accused individual to the judges (Lvy
& Pernot, 1997, p. 6).
Once again, why is presence so effective? It must be said that the word presence
is rather deceiving in this usage. For Perelman, it is important because it makes something
more present and enhance[s] the value of some of the elements of which one has actually
been made conscious (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 235). This is true.
However, why is visual presence so effective? One way of understanding this effect is that
presence is evident, or even self-evident. It should be noted that the effect of presence can
also be rendered by another rhetorical tool, enargeia, sometimes confused with energeia2.
Interestingly, when Cicero translated enargeia from Greek, he decided to invent a new
word, instead of using adjectives available in Latin like clarus or perspicuus. As we know,
the term created is evidencia (Lvy and Pernot, 1997, p. 10), based on videre, to see.
Ironically, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca - who have renewed the field of argumentation
by explicitly rejecting the Cartesian concept of vidence (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1970, p. 4) - take for granted the argumentative value of presence as enargeia or
evidencia!
The same holds true for another category of figures that, according to Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, plays an argumentative role: that of communion. Its purpose is to
create or confirm communion with the audience. Again, this is a very persuasive means.
Also, from these examples, it should be clear that, for Perelman, the argumentativity of
figures corresponds to their persuasiveness. Furthermore, Charles Hill, in his essay on the
psychology of rhetorical images, shows that vividness is almost a direct synonym of
visualization, and that vividness enhances persuasiveness, so that vividness, emotional
response and persuasion have all been shown to correlate to each other (Hill, 2004, p.
32). So, even if presence is one of the four major rhetorical qualities of images - and is
therefore crucial for visual argumentation (Kjeldsen, 2012, p. 240) - one can still wonder
whether it is argumentative or persuasive. The problem, here, arises from Perelmans
understanding of argument as aiming to provoke or increase the adherence of the
audience. Yet such an understanding doesnt make it easy to distinguish between
argumentative means (i.e. giving reasons to support a point of view) and nonargumentative means. Indeed, not all means used to influence an audience can be
considered as argumentative. For this reason, it seems to me that it is not enough for visual
argumentation to rely on The New Rhetoric to found the argumentativity of figures.
2.2 Reboul and Bonhomme
The same position has been adopted by some of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas
followers. As is often the case, followers have a tendency to exaggerate when they adopt a
systematic idea, i.e. in this case, considering that all the figures can be understood as
argumentative. For example, in his book Introduction la rhtorique, Olivier Reboul
dedicates a chapter to the argumentative role that the figures of rhetoric may play. When
Reboul writes about the argumentative strength of a figure, he is above all referring to
2

Both deal with rhetoric and visuality, and their names are very similar. However, energeia, usually
translated as activity, means vividness, while enargeia has the general meaning of visual clarity,
but also pictorial vividness. As it has been noted, Aristotle uses the first one in his Rhetoric, not the second
one (Zanker 1981, note 40 p. 307).

1246

its persuasive force. For him, a figure is rhetorical only to the extent that it contributes to
persuading (Reboul 1991, p. 121). Hence the fact that his chapter includes figures - like
rhythm - that are based on the sound of the words. This is not surprising, given his
objective. As he puts it, the rhythm produces a feeling of obviousness able to satisfy the
mind, but also to enroll it (Reboul 1991, p. 124). Indeed, how would it be possible to
claim that all figures can be argumentative? Only from a broadened understanding of
argumentation associated to persuasion, but also to pleasure. According to Reboul,
Perelmans theory on the relationship between figures and argumentation is too
intellectualist, too oblivious of the figure pleasure, a pleasure deriving either from emotion
or from comic, but always from pathos (Reboul, 1991, p. 122).
Another interesting case in point is found in Marc Bonhomme. At the end of his
book Les figures cls du discours, a few pages are dedicated to argumentation through
figures, in which he posits that besides their aesthetic function, figures also have a
practical end oriented toward the productivity of utterances. In this case, figures are seen
as argumentation tools, influencing the opinions of their addressees and stimulating their
adherence to the discourse that has been produced. More precisely, they work like
persuasive speech acts playing with reasoning (to persuade), but above all on the affects
(to hit) (Bonhomme 1998, p. 88). Such an understanding is again very close to that of
Perelman.
This same author developed this issue in a paper focused on the argumentativity of
figures. In the introduction, he explains that, for him, there are three ways of
understanding the relationship between rhetoric and argumentation. The first one is
convergence: an argumentative discourse is considered to be rhetorical if its aim is to
persuade. The second is differentiation: from this point of view, a discourse can be seen as
rhetorical without being argumentative. And the third one is inclusion: in this case,
argumentativity is only one amongst the different dimensions of a rhetoric discourse. As a
rhetorician, Bonhomme adopts this third option. This explains why he distinguishes five
functions in a rhetoric discourse: aesthetic, phatic, pathemic, cognitive, and finally
argumentative. According to the definition he gives, a rhetoric discourse plays an
argumentative function when, through different factors [] the figures contribute to
persuasion, acting on the addressees capacity to change their behavior. When it succeeds,
such persuasion reinforces their beliefs and their convictions (Bonhomme 2009, 20).
According to this understanding, argumentation is a province of rhetoric, and
rhetoric is (again) reduced to persuasion. This, in turn, has consequences on the way
Bonhomme conceives of the argumentativity of visual figures. For example, for him,
metonymy works as a transfer from agent to product, matter to product, product to place,
and so on. He explains: These isotopic transfers make it possible for advertising to
manipulate the universe of the products so as to make them desirable for the public and
trigger the act of buying (Bonhomme 2009, 46). An example given by Bonhomme in
another paper (Bonhomme, 2008, p. 221) is an ad for a Corsican wine, The Island
vineyard (fig. 4).

1247

Fig. 4 The Island vineyard, advertisement, France Soir Magazine, 1984

It relies upon the fact that the grapevine is shaped like the island of Corsica (fig. 5).
Hence Bonhommes analysis of the metonymy as a transfer from product to place. Here, it
seems that this visual metonymy has a purely persuasive function, as it helps the
consumer, at the moment of purchase choice, to associate wine and Corsica. Even though
it is important to show that some figures play an important persuasive role in images,
visual rhetoric cannot be confused, however, with visual argumentation if we consider the
latter as providing reasons to support a claim. (Fig. 5 Map of Corsica)
2.2.1 Metonymy
In fact, Bonhommes conception of the argumentativity of figures
depends on his theoretical presuppositions, namely the rhetorical
approach he applies to figures. But, besides this understanding of the
rhetorical function of metonymy as persuasive, others interpretations
are possible. For instance, Christian Plantin suggests that the
mechanism that explains how metonymies work is like the
mechanism that makes it possible to derive a conclusion from an
argument. In the metonymy of effect, the designation of the effect is
replaced by that of the cause associated to it. In argumentation
through consequences, the value judgment given to a consequence is
transferred to its cause. The laws governing this kind of substitution
of signifiers in a trope are not different from those that conclude to
the acceptability of a cause from that of its effect (argument by
consequences). We could therefore speak of a metonymic
argumentation (Plantin 2009, 22). For sure, there are many images

1248

corresponding to this kind of metonymy of effects and causes. Let me examine one (fig.
6).

Fig. 6. Advertisement for Crdit Agricole, Havas Conseil, 1976

I previously focused on this ad precisely because it recycles a series of paintings by
Magritte (La Belle Captive) (Roque, 1983, p. 111-113). Here, I will analyze its
argumentativity. So Ill first describe the contents and context of the ad. It is taken from an
ad campaign used by a French savings that focuses on housing. The text in bold just below
the house reads: The Crdit Agricole savings housing plan is an investment to live at
home. And below the road sign that points to the bank, there reads an inscription:
common sense close to your home, which served as a slogan as well as an identification
code for the bank in the eighties, across multiple ad campaigns.
This ad represents a case of a mixed media argument. According to a classification
I proposed, it is what I call a joint argument, i.e. an argument produced by using visual as
well as verbal elements (Roque, 2012, p. 283). It is also important to note that in a joint
argument, both parts (verbal and visual) contribute to the argument. In this case, the text
alone doesnt advance all the reasons to open a savings account: the body text, printed in
small letters, is a description of the savings program. The text below the picture of a house
is also informative, explaining the purpose of the savings plan (to live in ones own
house). And finally, the text Common sense close to your home could serve as a
conclusion to the argument (in addition to its role of reinforcing the banks brand), but not
as the argument itself.
The image is based on a famous painting by Magritte that shows a canvas painting
of a house that blends into the landscape in its background. The image relies upon a visual
pun that pivots on the word plan, namely a savings plan and a house plan on paper.
1249

Rhetorically, it corresponds to a visual syllepsis, since the same graphic element can be
perceived as being simultaneously part of two distinct sets (Noguez, 1974, p. 120). Now
the house plan blends into the land where it is to be built. We could see it a metonymy of
effect or otherwise of product and place. I have also suggested elsewhere (Roque, 2005, p.
275-276) that it could be understood as a particular case of metonymy, i.e. a metalepsis,
since there is an inversion of cause (a savings plan) and consequence (building a house): in
the image, the house is presented as having already been built.
The Magrittean image is quite effective, since it shows that the plan to have ones
own house is not just a dream but can easily become real thanks to Crdit Agricoles
savings plan. It is very persuasive, too: the house has a strong presence and helps suggest
that it is easy to turn a dream into a house. If we consider the image as persuasive, it would
be interesting to ponder whether it is also argumentative. But first of all, what is the visual
argument here? We could say that it is something along the lines of: a saving account is a
good investment because soon youll be the owner of your own home. Therefore a savings
account is a common sense investment. The reference to the common sense is important
as a way of suggesting that opening a savings plan is a rational and good decision.
Furthermore, if one accepts that the visual might be dialogic (Roque, 2008), I would like
to suggest that this is the case here: the visual part of the argument also seems to be a
proleptic3 response to a possible objection about time: how many years would I have to
save money before having my own house? Yet the image collapses the distance between
cause and effect, project and realization. Therefore it helps to think that a savings plan is a
good investment.
So how are we to analyze the visual rhetoric used in such an ad? As persuasive or
as argumentative? The response is: both. The syllepsis can be considered as persuasive, as
it suggests that the house simultaneously belongs to representation (painted on a canvas)
and reality (built in the estate). As for the metonymy, it can be seen as persuasive, like
Bonhomme does, if we understand the metonymy as a transfer through contiguity,
between the product (a house to be built thanks to a savings plan) and the place (the
private housing estate where the house has to be/is built). Conversely, we can see it as
argumentative, like Plantin does, in so far as the acceptability of the consequence (to be
landlord) is transferred to the cause (to buy a savings plan). Finally, the prolepsis, when it
is used to anticipate a possible objection, is argumentative, too. The conclusion we can
draw from it is that the same figure, in this case a trope (metonymy), can be understood
either as persuasive or as argumentative. Therefore, these points of view are not exclusive.
The fact that some visual figures are persuasive doesnt prevent them from also being
argumentative, at least in some cases. This first conclusion already has an important
consequence: visual images cannot be easily rejected from the field of visual
argumentation for being persuasive if we succeed in showing that they also work
argumentatively.

On the prolepsis as persuasive and argumentative, see Nettel and Roque, 2012, p. 64-65.

1250

3. PERSUASION AND ARGUMENTATION.

In a previously published paper, I made the following argument: since a figure can be
persuasive and argumentative at the same time, a distinction should be made between a
strong and a weak notion of visual argumentation. I proposed to call a visual
argumentation strong when an image is fully argumentative, i.e. when it gives reasons in
order to support (or criticize) a point of view. Conversely, it should be qualified as weak
when it is merely persuasive and influences the addressee (Roque 2011, p. 98-99). Such a
suggestion doesnt seem satisfying any longer. Why? Because it supposes that it would be
possible to clearly distinguish which images would be purely persuasive and which are
purely argumentative. In practice, such a distinction is challenging to apply. It turns out
that persuasive and argumentative elements are often closely combined. The reason for
distinguishing between strong and weak visual argumentation was to fortify visual
argumentation as a well-founded field because it excluded visual persuasion from it.
However, such a view also presupposes that persuasion is not rational. But there are
indeed cases of rational persuasion, sometimes even ones that use emotional means of
arousal (OKeefe, 2012).
So, instead of separating persuasive and argumentative aspects, it is more
convenient to accept that they often work together. This is, nevertheless, a controversial
issue. Some authors hold that persuasion and argumentation should be carefully separated.
My opinion is that in some cases - and visual argumentation is certainly one of them persuasion and argumentation intersect and are intertwined (Nettel & Roque, 2012). This
understanding corresponds to that held by informal logicians, like Ralph Johnson and
Tony Blair, who claim that argumentation is rational persuasion (Johnson 2000, p. 149150; Blair, 2012). Blairs analysis of different types of advertising is a good case in point
(Blair, 2012, p. 75-77). In some advertisements, there is a mix of rational and non-rational
- or irrational - reasons given for preferring one brand over others. Yet, if the argument is
the effective persuasive tool [] persuasion occurs through the use of arguments (Blair,
2012, p. 76) and we have a case of rational persuasion.
Now, once we stop considering persuasion and argumentation as mutually
exclusive, it becomes essential, when analyzing images, to determine whether or not
persuasion is accompanied by a set of rational reasons provided to support a claim. Indeed,
adversaries of visual argumentation could claim that in such cases, even though it is true
that there is persuasion as well as argumentation, the persuasive role would be that of
images.
For this reason it is important to better understand the relationship between figures
of rhetoric and argumentation. Two different kinds of relationship have been envisaged:
either figures help better present arguments, or figures are arguments themselves (Reboul,
1986, p. 184; Bonhomme, 1998, p. 88; Tindale, 2004, p. 59). In the first case, the
relationship between figure and argumentation is extrinsic. In the second, it is intrinsic.
When the relationship is extrinsic, the figure cannot be considered properly
argumentative; it remains exterior to the argument and is merely persuasive most of the
time. In the second case, it must be recalled that when a figure itself is an argument, this
doesnt necessarily mean that it cannot also be persuasive. Yet, what happens for the
general relationship between persuasion and argumentation holds true, too, for the figures.
As we already saw, a trope like metonymy can be simultaneously seen as persuasive and
1251

argumentative. So it turns out that it is hardly possible to separate persuasive and

argumentative aspects of a given figure. Furthermore, the distinction between extrinsic and
intrinsic relationship is itself relative. Indeed, at the end of his 1986 paper, Reboul
considers that the two different cases, extrinsic and intrinsic are almost always
indistinguishable (Reboul, 1986, p. 186). For this reason, he relinquished the distinction
when reprinting his paper as a chapter of his book (Reboul, 1991).
4. CONCLUSION
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

By examining the relationship between figures of rhetoric and argumentation, it

turns out that, for most authors, when a figure is used in discourse, its function is
primarily persuasive. Consequently, we must be careful when transposing their
idea to the field of visual argumentation, since images are generally considered as
more persuasive than argumentative.
This is particularly true for what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call figures of
presence (hypotyposis, energeia). The fact that they are effective and impress the
audience doesnt necessarily transform them into argumentative tools.
Some figures (like metonymy) appear to be considered as persuasive and also
argumentative. Furthermore, it is hardly possible to separate figures that would be
persuasive from figures that would be argumentative.
If we admit that persuasion and argumentation are very often combined, the fact
that many images are persuasive doesnt prevent them from being simultaneously
argumentative (at least in some cases). This point is quite important to counter the
argument according to which images would be mainly persuasive. However, this
raises the need to distinguish between these two complementary functions of
images.
The concept of strategic maneuvering can be helpful here because it refers to the
continual efforts made in all moves that are carried out in argumentation discourse
to keep the balance between reasonableness and effectiveness (van Eemeren,
2010, p. 40). Similarly, I would like to suggest that something similar occurs in
visual images. When there is a balance between reasonableness and effectiveness,
visual images can be considered as successfully displaying a visual argument. But
when effectiveness (i.e. persuasiveness even though van Eemeren warns us that
effectiveness and persuasiveness are not completely synonymous: van Eemeren,
2010, p. 39) gets the better of reasonableness, visual images are mainly persuasive.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Marc Bonhomme for giving me a reproduction of fig. 4.

1252

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The Sequester And Debt Ceiling Talks Of 2013: A Case-Study Of

The Liberal Public Sphere
Robert C. Rowland
Communication Studies
University of Kansas
USA
rrowland@ku.edu

ABSTRACT: Liberal public sphere theory can be used to test the functionality of debate in the American
public sphere. Four actors each play a crucial role: the representatives of the public, the public, the media,
and the expert community. Application of liberal public sphere theory to the long-running debate about
budget cuts and the debt ceiling that dominated American domestic politics for most of 2013 reveals a
deeply dysfunctional liberal public sphere.
KEYWORDS: liberal, Madison, public sphere

1. INTRODUCTION
Budget policy and the debt ceiling have been the focus of several political controversies in
the United States over the last five years. In fact, there were four debt ceiling crises in a
three year period (Lowrey, 2014, February 7, B1), despite the absolute consensus that
failing to extend the debt ceiling could produce a global crisis (Woodward, 2012, 188,
220; Lowry & Popper, 2013, October 14, A1). Leaders in business and finance, often
allies of Republicans on fiscal issues, agreed with this judgment and as the crisis escalated
in October 2013 the stock market experienced the worst two-day dip . . . in months
(Lowrey & Popper, 2013, October 14, A14). A chief executive at Deutsche Bank said
that if there was a default it was not possible to come up with measures that would
significantly stem the losses, because default would be a very rapidly spreading fatal
disease (Lowrey & Popper, 2013, October 14, A14). The characterization of the crisis
as a potentially fatal disease is a strong indication of the threat it posed.
The resolution of the crisis should not have been difficult since the debt ceiling had
been extended on more than 75 occasions under both Republican and Democratic
presidents and before 2011 there had never been any serious risk of default (Harwood,
2011, p. A11; Mann & Ornstein, 2012, pp. 5-7; Popper, 2013, October 4, A21).
Moreover, increasing the debt ceiling did not actually result in any additional spending,
but only guaranteed that spending which Congress had authorized would be paid for. In
addition, unlike 2011, the long-term Federal deficit was shrinking rather than expanding in
the fall of 2013. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reported that Since 2010,
projected ten-year deficits had shrunk by almost $5.0 trillion, with 77 percent of the
savings from program cuts (Kogan & Chen, 2014, 1). There also was a general expert
consensus as stated in multiple national commissions that long-term action to put the
nations fiscal house in order required both expanded revenues and reform of entitlements,

1255

precisely the general approach being offered by the president (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, 1516).
The government shutdown and debt ceiling crises of fall 2013 and early 2014
would seem to provide a perfect case to test the functioning of American democratic
decision making. The issues being debated had been resolved successfully many times
previously, there was absolute consensus on the dangers associated with a failure to act,
and a previous crisis only two years before had produced substantial negative economic
impacts (Million Jobs, 2013, February 3, A18). There also was a consensus among
policy experts on the best way forward, a consensus that would require both liberals and
conservatives to make significant compromises. Given these factors, it would seem that
preventing a government shutdown and raising the debt ceiling should not have been
difficult. And yet in the crises of October 2013 and February 2014, the United States
came perilously close to default on two different occasions.
2. THE LIBERAL PUBLIC SPHERE
The most appropriate means of examining the twin crises is with liberal public sphere
theory (Rowland 2003, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2013). Until recently, public sphere
research in argumentation was shaped almost exclusively by theories developed by Jrgen
Habermas (1989) and then applied by Goodnight (1982, 1992), Calhoun (1992a, 1992b,
1993), and other scholars. However, recent scholarship has focused on what Rob Asen
and Dan Brouwer label a multiplicity of dialectically related public spheres rather than a
single, encompassing arena of discourse (2001, 6). Given the many actors involved in
public debate and the variety of arenas in which this debate occurs this evolution is
understandable. Moreover, Habermas developed his theory out of a focus on European
coffee house culture of the 17th and 18th centuries and therefore a kind of politics and
culture very different from the contemporary United States.
While the value of a focus on multiple spheres, publics, and counterpublics is
obvious, sometimes the issue is not how argument worked in a particular case but how it
functioned for the whole. Nicholas Garnham writes There must be a single public
sphere in cases where the society is faced with the unavoidable problem of translating
debate into action (1992, 371). Habermas himself observed that There are problems that
are inescapable and can be solved only in concert. Who, then makes up the concert?
(1992, 467). Liberal public sphere theory isolates the key agents that make up that
concert and also provides a means of assessing the debate on issues that impact the
whole.
In addition to focusing on the whole rather than the part, liberal public sphere
theory provides an appropriate means for considering the debate on American fiscal policy
because it is rooted in foundational works justifying American democracy. The most
important source for understanding the ideas behind the American liberal public sphere is
James Madison (1999), who was the primary drafter of the Constitution and Bill of Rights
and one of the two main authors of the Federalist Papers. In the most famous of those
short essays, Federalist 10, Madison laid out the essential idea of the liberal public sphere
when he said that the key was to construct a system of governance that created a
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government (1999, 167).
Unlike Habermas who according to Calhoun believed that rational argument was the sole
1256

arbiter of any issue (1992b, 13), Madison was a realist who understood that politics
would always involve conflict, passion, self-interest, and irrationality. He noted in
Federalist 10 that As long as the reason of man continues fallible and he is at liberty to
exercise it, different opinions will be formed, a situation that could produce decisions
based in a fractious spirit that would result in politics serving the interest of faction,
rather than the common interest and decisions that tainted our public administration
(1999, 161). Madison also recognized that political leaders would themselves be both the
leaders of and dependent on factions and that in such a circumstance it was inevitable that
public measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to
a just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good (Federalist
37, 1999, 194). Based on a close analysis of his thought Richard Matthews argues that
Madison believed that individual and collective tendencies toward the irrational were . . .
multifaceted and powerful (1995, 23).
Despite recognizing the dangers posed by special interests, irrationality and other
aspects of human fallibility, Madison still believed that over the long run . . . cool and
calculated rational argument would win out over passion and hyperbole (Mathews, 1995,
144). His faith came from the power of free and open debate, what he called the
republican remedy. Over time, he believed that better ideas would triumph over inferior
ones as long as counterfeit (1999, p. 501) public opinion did not short circuit the process
of public discussion.
For Madisons faith in the republican remedy to be justified, four key actors in
the liberal public sphere must each do their job. The actorsthe representatives of the
public, the public, the expert community, and the mediaeach play a role in achieving the
key functions of the liberal public sphere: representing all sides in debate on an issue and
ultimately choosing a policy that is consistent with democratic governance and also
sensible. If the liberal public sphere works, the four actors all present their views and the
ultimate decision is made by the public acting through their representatives. However, in
Madisons view, simply representing all views was not sufficient; the system also needed
to come to reasonable decisions (Federalist 37, 1999, 196). This point was made in the
preamble of the Constitution where the new system was justified in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty.
What then must the four actors do to make the system work? The representatives
of the public are found in the legislative, executive, other government agencies, and any
other body that makes policy. Their function is to strongly present the views of various
groups in society in a way that authentically represents their understanding of the facts
about any given issue. Thus, for the system to work, all relevant views must be presented
in a way that balances faction against faction, but the views must be based in genuine
argument, not an inauthentic statement of self-interest or ideology. When representatives
of the public base policy on ideology, rather than the best available arguments, the liberal
public sphere cannot function, because ideology is immune from refutation.
Madison did not expect the public to participate in the kind of purely rational
debate described by Habermas. But for the system to work, the public must pay enough
attention to any given controversy to recognize when better ideas emerge. Members of the
public also may participate in any debate, but unlike some modern advocates for

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deliberative democracy, Madison did not expect that such participation would be the
norm.
Unlike Goodnight (1982), Fisher (1984), and other contemporary scholars who
have pointed to the danger of expert usurpation of the role of the public, the liberal public
sphere is based in recognition that on complex issues it is folly to ignore the specialized
knowledge present in expert communities. In the fiscal debates of 2013-2014, for
example, it was crucial that the public understood the real danger that a default could have
catastrophic effects on the global economy. The fourth actor in the liberal public sphere is
the media, which fulfills the function of informing the public about all sides of the debate
and also about the specialized knowledge of the expert community.
The foregoing description of the roles played by the key actors in turn suggests
criteria for evaluating the degree to which the liberal public sphere fulfills its functions in
any given case. The success of Madisons republican remedy can be assessed by asking
five questions:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Were the views of all significant stakeholders presented in the debate?

Was the debate shaped by informed expert opinion? It is especially important that
expert opinion be included in the debate on issues that are largely outside the
experience of ordinary people and on which there is consensus.
Did the media report the dispute in a way that informed the public on the issue?
Did the public as a whole gather adequate information to assess the debate?
Did the better arguments in some sense win out in the end? While it is not always
possible to make a principled choice among policy positions, there are cases such
as global warming, where there is a broad consensus among those with significant
knowledge of the issue that action is required.

In what follows, I describe the evolution of the fiscal crises of fall 2013 and winter of
2014 and then evaluate the resolution based on liberal public sphere theory. It seems clear
that Madisons faith in the republican remedy would have been shaken by the
development and resolution of the crisis.
3. THE CRISIS
The twin crisis in 2013 and 2014 developed out of the 2011 budget agreement. In order to
resolve the 2011 crisis, President Obama and Democrats in the Congress agreed to $1.2
trillion in cuts in spending over nine years that would be automatically triggered if a super
committee of Republicans and Democrats were unable to come up with a plan to reduce
the deficit by that amount. When the committee failed to agree to a plan, the mandatory
cuts, half in domestic programs and half in defense, went into effect (Khimm, S., 2012,
September 14).
The crisis of 2013-2014, which the New York Times called the annual Republican
crisis, occurred because after the Democratically controlled Senate passed a budget plan
that would have replaced the sequester with a mix of revenue increases and less-harmful
cuts (The Annual Republican Crisis, 2013, September 15, SR 10), the Republican led
House rejected that plan and attempted to use budget cuts to defund the Affordable Care
Act. The plan to defund the Affordable Care Act was agreed to by more than three dozen
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conservative groups, who endorsed a take-no-prisoners legislative strategy, that one

leader described as a fight we were going to pick (Stolberg & McIntire, 2013, October
6, A1). The cause of the crisis was not the deficit, which not only posed no immediate
threat to the economy, but as noted earlier had shrunk substantially since 2010. Nor was it
that Obama did not recognize that a long-term deal was still needed to stabilize the debt.
Obama emphasized a willingness to negotiate a long-term budget deal, but not to negotiate
over the debt ceiling, stating we cant make extortion routine as part of our democracy
(Qtd. in Kumar and Douglas, 2013, A17). He consistently advocated a grand bargain in
which a combination of program cuts, entitlement reform, tax reform, and tax increases
would produce $4 trillion in savings in 10 years (Calmes, 2013, October 13, A14).
The main players in the crisis took quite different argumentative approaches. The
Obama administration focused their advocacy around five points. Obamas first argument
was that it was the obligation of Congress to both fund the government and to pay the
nations debts. In a short address prior to the shutdown, the president stated, the most
basic Constitutional duty Congress has is passing a budget. At the end of this statement,
addressing the debt ceiling, he said, The United States of America is not a deadbeat
nation (2013, September 21). He made similar statements on a number of occasions.
Obama also argued that using the threat of shutdown and debt default to force
concessions was illegitimate. In a press conference on October 1st, he observed that one
faction of one party in one house of Congress in one branch of government shut down
major parts of the government all because they didnt like one law. He went on to label
their actions as an ideological crusade and stated plainly, I will not negotiate over
Congress responsibility to pay bills its already racked up (2013, October 1).
Essentially, Obama was making the same argument that Paul Krugman had made
repeatedly that what was going on was blackmail. . . threatening to bring the federal
government, and maybe the whole economy to its knees unless . . . demands were met
(2013, September 20, A27).
The third point was a strong argument that the shutdown was harming the nation
and failing to raise the debt ceiling risked a real economic catastrophe. A good example is
a statement on the White House Blog that cited five different negative economic impacts
from the 2011 crisis to indicate the dangers in failing to extend the debt ceiling. The blog
then quoted from seven Republican leaders in Congress and the Chamber of Commerce to
argue that it would be reckless and irresponsible to use the threat of default as a
bargaining chip (Brundage, 2013, September 19). The president fleshed out the argument
in more depth in a press conference, where he focused on the harms that the shutdown was
having and the risks of default (2013, October 1).
Fourth, the president continued to make it clear that he was willing to negotiate on
fiscal reform and other issues as long as Republicans understood that a negotiation meant
give and take from both sides. He said Im happy to talk with him [Speaker Boehner]
and other Republicans about anythingnot just issues I think are important but also issues
that they think are important, but added that negotiations shouldnt require hanging the
threats of a government shutdown or economic chaos over the American people (2013,
October 8).
Finally, he spoke about how the crisis reflected a damaged political system. In a statement
immediately after the government was reopened, but before the debt ceiling was resolved,
he said how business is done in this town has to change and then added that the
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American people dont see every issue the same way. But that doesnt mean we cant
make progress. And when we disagree, we dont have to suggest that the other side
doesnt love this country or believe in free enterprise, or all the other rhetoric that seems to
get worse every single year. If we disagree on something, we can move on and focus on
things we agree on, and get some stuff done (2013, October 17).
In contrast to Obama who cited a great deal of evidence and appealed to basic
democratic values, the proponents of the shutdown largely ignored fiscal issues and the
arguments made by the president and instead presented a set of arguments that might best
be described with the phrase ideological solidarity. Again and again, Tea Party
Republicans, including Senator Ted Cruz of Texas labeled the Affordable Care Act as a
nightmare. Cruz added, ObamaCare is causing health insurance premiums to skyrocket
all over this country. ObamaCare is jeopardizing the health care for millions of
Americans, threatening that they will lose their health insurance altogether (2013,
September 27, S6988). Notably, Cruz cited no supporting evidence for claims that as I
note later simply were untrue.
Advocates of the shutdown such as Cruz also called for continued commitment by
conservative activists to the showdown with the president. In a press conference, Senator
Cruz bizarrely said that the Washington establishment is refusing to listen to the
American people. He also praised the actions of the House of Representatives as a bold
stance, listening to the American people (2013, October 16a). Cruz added that he wished
for a world in which Senate Republicans united to support House Republicans (2013,
October 16b, S6988). Here, Cruz wildly mischaracterized public opinion to call for
solidarity among conservative activists.
While activists were implementing this rhetoric of solidarity, more mainstream
conservatives were distancing themselves from the crisis. Representative and former vice
presidential candidate Paul Ryan blamed the president for giving Congress the silent
treatment. He claimed that the crisis could actually be a breakthrough to pass
common-sense reforms of the countrys entitlement programs and tax codes (2013,
October 9, A15). In other words, the crisis could end if the president were willing to agree
to half of the grand bargain, the half that Ryan and other conservatives wanted.
Some mainstream conservatives who were no longer in Congress recognized the
folly of a strategy based in political blackmail. Former Senator Judd Gregg labeled the
arguments of those advocating confrontation as self-promotional babble and added that
it had become the mainstream of Republican political thought. He noted that default
was not an option because You cannot in politics take a hostage you cannot shoot. He
observed that those supporting a shutdown are folks who have never governed and then
added Most Americans do not seek purity; they seek answers to the everyday problems
they confront. They expect their government to be of assistance in addressing those
problems, not to aggravate them (2013, September 23).
Little meaningful clash occurred between the multiple sides in the dispute.
President Obama laid out a strong case. Proponents of the confrontation not only did not
respond to this case, but largely ignored fiscal issues, including the danger of default, that
were the genesis of the crisis.

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4. EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS

The failure to pass a budget did not result in the shutdown of the entire government, but it
did result in closure of agencies and programs that were not considered essential. Thus, the
military was funded and Social Security checks were issued, but the national parks and
other agencies were closed or partially closed. Even so, the shutdown impacted many
people either directly by limiting available services or indirectly because pay was withheld
and business confidence was undermined. As a result, various business groups
demanded the immediate reopening of the government (Weisman, 2013, October 10,
A12).
The shutdown lasted for 16 days and ended with a near total defeat for
Republican conservatives, when the Congress agreed to a deal that would fund the
government through January 15, 2014 and raise the debt ceiling to a level that would allow
borrowing until February 2014 (Weisman & Parker, October 17, 2013, A1). The deal was
reached after the Treasury Department warned that it could run out of money to pay
national obligations within a day (Weisman & Parker, 2013, October 17, A1). The
combination of public outrage and the threat of an inevitable market crash led
Republicans to accept an agreement in which all they achieved was a slight tightening of
income verification rules relating to the Affordable Care Act (Republican Surrender,
October 17, 2013, A28; Weisman & Parker, 2013, October 17, A19).
President Obama, rather than celebrating his victory, continued to state his position
that he was willing to have a wide-ranging budget negotiation once the government was
reopened and the debt limit was raised (Weisman & Parker, 2013, October 17, 19). The
hope of both the President and Republican leaders was that the public debacle of the
government shutdown and near debt default had changed the situation and the fever was
broken in the faction that opposed any compromise and that consequently broader
negotiations on resolving the fiscal crisis might be possible (Weisman & Parker, 2013,
October 17, A19).
These broader negotiations were supposed to begin with an effort led by
Republican Representative Paul Ryan and Democratic Senator Patty Murray to find
agreement on modest confidence-building measures to replace the sequestration cuts in
2014 (Weisman & Calmes, 2013, October 18, A18). It quickly became clear, however,
that the shutdown had not broken the fever. In fact, conservative activists Far from being
chastened responded by ratcheting up their efforts to rid the party of the sort of timorous
Republicans who, they said, doomed their effort to defunding the health law from the
start (Martin, Rutenberg, & Peters, 2013, October 20, A20). When the argument that a
debt default threatened the economy is viewed as a sign of moral weakness, it is clear that
rational discussion or negotiation is not possible.
The crisis was only partially resolved with the end of the shutdown, since the debt
ceiling would need to be raised by late February 2014. As in October that crisis was not
decided until days before authority to issue additional debt would have expired, triggering
a potentially catastrophic default (Parker & Weisman, 2014, February 13, A3).

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5. CONCLUSION
The government shutdown and the debt ceiling brinksmanship flirted with a market
crisis (Hulse, 2014, February 13), A3). The cost was considerable. One study estimated
that the cumulative effect of fiscal uncertainty was to reduce economic growth by .3
percent, cutting income by $150 billion and reducing employment by 900,000 jobs
(Lowrey, Popper, & Schwartz, 2013, October 17, A19).
Ultimately the fiscal crises of fall 2013 and winter 2014 were resolved when, the
Congress passed a clean extension of the debt limit, an extension that simply expanded
the ability of the nation to purchase additional debt without any other policy action. This
result, however, did not occur because the liberal public sphere worked as Madison
designed it to work. In fact, there was almost no real argumentative clash between
advocates of extending the debt ceiling and their primary opponents in the Tea Party wing
of the Republican Party. President Obama made a case for extending the debt ceiling and
continued to advocate for a so-called grand bargain to produce a long-term solution to
the deficit problem. He also clearly explained why threatening to cause a catastrophic
result unless a given action was taken undercut democracy itself and inevitably would
result in disastrous policy outcomes. There certainly are grounds to critique his
argumentation, but he clearly fulfilled his role in the liberal public sphere.
In contrast, Senator Cruz and others focused their attention on defunding
Obamacare. It is notable that their strongest arguments for the shutdown and for
brinksmanship about the debt ceiling were not focused on budget policy itself, but on the
necessity of protecting the nation from the nightmare of Obamacare. They also
absolutely refused to consider any proposal that would address long-term fiscal problems
both with spending cuts and tax increases. In that way, their views were totally
constrained either by ideological vision or by the demands of a political faction. In either
case, the debate that was produced was clearly inauthentic.
Moreover, their fixation on repealing the health care law was not based in actual
experience with the law. Although the Obama administration initially had predicted that 7
million people would enroll in coverage, even with the bad rollout, 8.1 million people
actually enrolled and almost another eight million received coverage through Medicaid
expansion or because children under 26 were allowed to stay on their parents coverage
(Vanishing Cry, 2014, June 2, A16). Nor were the predictions of vast increases in
health care spending supported by the data (Kogan & Chen, 2014, 3). Thus the future of
the American and world economy was put at risk because of a law unrelated to the
Congressional budget process and the law in question was a policy success, although a PR
failure.
The expert consensus that the debt ceiling had to be raised was widely reported in
the mainstream media, although this had little impact on public opinion. While the media
focused on the political give and take, they did report on the dangers posed by failure to
resolve the crisis. Thus, the media and expert communities did their jobs in the liberal
public sphere. The same cannot be said of the public.
Going into the final week before the shutdown only a quarter of Americans were
following the budget talks closely (Pew, 2013, September 23). The lack of attention may
partially explain their inconsistent views. In relation to the risks of default, the public was
deeply skeptical of the consensus that the debt ceiling needed to be extended, with 39
1262

percent believing that the country can go past the deadline for raising the debt limit
without major economic problems (Pew, 2103, October 7). Among Republicans, 52
percent overall and 56 percent of conservatives believed that failing to raise the debt
ceiling would not produce major problems (Pew, 2013, October 15).
Public opinion was split on who was responsible and who should give ground.
Prior to the beginning of the shutdown, Pew found that 39 percent would blame
Republicans in Congress, while 36 percent would blame Obama (2013, September 23).
On the issue of compromise, Pew found that 57 percent of the public want lawmakers
they agree with on this issue to be more willing to compromise, even if it means passing a
budget they disagree with (2013, September 23). Of course, Obama repeatedly had
offered a grand bargain on fiscal issues. Moreover, polling previous to the crisis made it
quite clear that the public favored a balanced approach to deficit reduction, including both
program cuts and increased tax revenues (see Rowland, 2013, 6). The apparently
conflicting attitudes cannot be explained based on public views of the Affordable Care
Act. A New York Times/CBS poll found that 56% of Americans favored upholding and
improving the law, while 38 percent favored repeal (Martin & Kpicki, 2013, September
26, A21; also see Pew, 2013, September 13).
It would seem that the public strongly wanted a compromise on the budget,
favored a balanced approach to deficit reduction, and wanted to preserve and improve the
Affordable Care Act, but also blamed both sides almost equally, despite the fact that
President Obama actually supported the positions they favored, while Republicans
opposed them.
If the liberal public sphere had worked properly, there either would have been no
crisis or it would have been quickly resolved when the one-sided nature of the debate
became clear. Instead, the crisis was resolved only when the Republican leaders in
Congress collectively decided that they needed to quickly dispose of the debt ceiling fight
in order to maintain the political focus on President Obama, his health care law and a
souring political atmosphere for the presidents party (Parker & Weisman, 2014,
February 13, A3). Even after that calculation was made, only 12 Republicans in the
Senate and 28 in the House voted for the final legislation (Parker & Weisman, 2014,
February 13, A3; Hulse, 2014, February 13, A3). It would seem that the shutdown and
debt ceiling crises were resolved despite, not because of, the balance of argument in the
dispute.
At the same time, Madison recognized that democracy is an inherently messy
system of government. It is for this reason that he argued in Federalist 51 that ambition
must be made to counteract ambition, concluding that: In the extended republic of the
United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties and sects which it
embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place upon any
other principles than those of justice and the general good (1999, 295, 298). The various
fiscal crises from 2011 through 2014 surely would have sorely tested Madisons faith
expressed in Federalist 41 that A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself (1999, 230).
Even some Republicans recognized that risking debt default was a very bad cause.
Speaker of the House John Boehner privately told Republican lawmakers in early
October that he would not allow a potentially more crippling federal default (Parker &
Lowrey, 2013, October 4, A1). Yet, the crises were not resolved until after a significant
shutdown of the government and only when the nation went to the brink of default. For a
1263

significant period, it appeared that the bad cause might win out. Ultimately, however,
Madison was right and the crisis was averted, not with a truly reasonable plan for action
on the deficit, but at least with legislation that avoided an economic catastrophe.
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Rowland, R.C. (2010). Health care reform and the status of the public sphere. In F.H. van Eemeren, B.
Garssen, D. Godden, and G. Mitchell (Eds.), ISSA Proceedings 2010, Rozenberg Quarterly: The
Magazine, http://rozenbergquarterly.com/issa-proceedings-2010-health-care-reform-and-the-statusof-the-public-sphere/.
Rowland, R.C. (2012). The battle for health care reform and the liberal public sphere. In F. H. van Eemeren
and B. Garssen (Eds.), Exploring Argumentative Contexts (pp. 269-288). Amsterdam: John
Benjamins.
Rowland, R.C. (2013). The debt ceiling and the liberal public sphere. In D. Mohammed & M. Lewiski
(Eds.), Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
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Ryan, P. (2013, October 9). Heres how we can end this stalemate. Wall Street Journal, A15.
Stolberg, S.G. & McIntire, M. (2013, October 6). A federal budget crisis months in the planning. New York
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The vanishing cry of repeal it. (2014, June 2). New York Times, A16.
Weisman, J. & Calmes, J. (2013, October 18). Two parties start work to avoid repeat crisis. New York
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A1, A19.
Woodward, B. (2012). The price of politics. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

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Changes In The Use Of The Question When Teaching To Argue In

Sciences
Francisco Javier Ruiz Ortega, Oscar Eugenio Tamayo Alzate & Conxita
Mrquez Bargall
Educative Studies Departament
Caldas University
Colombia
Francico.ruiz@ucaldas.edu.co
Educative Studies Departament
Caldas University
Colombia
Oscar.tamayo@ucaldas.edu.co
Education Departament
Barcelona Autnoma University
Espaa
Conxita.marquez @uab.cat

ABSTRACT: This study shows the changes identified in the type of questions used by an elementary school
teacher, who participated in a process of critical reflection on the teaching of argumentation in science class.
In this study, three classes were recorded (before, during and after the process), and after discourse analysis
realized to information collected, the results show how the teacher understands the importance of combining
different kinds of questions: descriptive, causal and evaluative, questions.
KEYWORDS: Argumentation, reflective critical process, science education,

1. INTRODUCTION
The importance of argumentation in the science class is supported by numerous studies. On
the one hand, some research shows that students involved in argumentative activities can
better understand how science is produced and validated (Driver et al. 2000, Osborne et al.
2004), while improving their communication skills (Kuhn & Udell, 2003). These findings
justify giving a priority to discourse practices and, specifically, argumentative processes in
school settings. On the other hand, despite the fact that there are many studies highlighting
how teachers thinking influences classroom practices (Benarroch & Marin, 2011; Ireland,
Watters, Brownlee & Lupton, 2011; Gunstone et al, 1993; Lebak & Tinsley, 2010 , Milner,
Sondergeld, Demir, Johnson & Czerniak, 2012; Porlan et al., 2010, Smart & Marsall,
2012), few studies try to identify how teachers promote classroom argumentation and
understand how the teachers thinking, related to what it is supposed to be argued in
science, influences the way to promote classroom argumentation.
Also, we know that the argumentation as a social practice demands that the teaching
of the sciences must be focus in the importance and relevance at least of two components.
First, the epistemic; the acknowledgement of the role of the argumentation in the
construction of the science is taken as a central element. The second component: the social,
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requires offering spaces to promote debate and work in small groups to give the possibility
to listen to the other and to establish their own ideas.
In this sense, the question becomes one of the possible tools to support these
previous aspects: the epistemic and the social. The first one because the scientific
knowledge advances when it asks questions which establish a dialogue about theory and
observable phenomenon, allowing to explain, to structure and to change the condition of a
theory, (Kuhn, 2010; McDonald & McRobbie, 2012; Milne 2012; Osborne, Erduran &
Simon, 2004; Sard & Sanmart, 2000). The second one; because in order to try to rebuild
scholar scientific knowledge; it is mandatory to provide classroom social interactive
moments (Mercer, 1997), to foster in the students not only the interest but also the
motivation to establish their own questions, problems and basic actions of the to do
science (Mrquez & Roca, 2006).
From this perspective, the research tries to identify the changes in the kinds of
questions worked by an elementary school teacher who participates in a critical reflexive
process about the teaching of the argumentation in the science class.
2. METHODOLOGY
The study was focused in the process developed by a teacher who Works with children
from nine to ten years old. They belong to a public elementary school institution from
Manizales city (Colombia) Called Fe y Alegra. To obtain the stated goal, during seven
months of work there were programmed three critical reflexive meetings, which included
several surveys, questionnaires and interviews, to discuss topics related to the
argumentation and to the teachers performance inside the classroom. On the other hand,
there were three classes recorded by audio and video, coded and analyzed during three
moments of the process. These classes were transcribed using the note taking proposed by
Candela (1999) and systematized with the software Atlas-ti help. The analysis developed to
this information was comprehensive-qualitative from which was identified the
communicative interaction between the teacher and the students, as consequence of
identifying and analyzing the argumentative episodes (EA) in each one of these three
classes. The episodes, in this research are assumed as the sequences of interactions between
students-teacher, in which these communicative interactions are recognized and supported
by the dialogic inquiry, or the use of questions that besides of working an specific content
(conceptual, procedural or attitudinal) foster dialogues and debates among the subjects with
the final goal to promote the argumentation in an implicit or explicit form.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
Two important aspects of the teachers performance can be identified in the exhibited
results in the figure 1 and 2. The first one, related with the increasing in the number of EA
registered in the developed classes by the teacher (one in the first class, four in the second
one and seven in the third one). This shows the advance and consolidation of the dialogic
inquiry, as a mechanism of communicative interaction teacher-students and the
unforgettable tool for the development of the argumentation.
The second aspect refers to the increasing incorporation, of new kinds of questions. It was
noticed how the teacher used to ask generalization questions in the first class (87.5%, e.g.:
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the water is?) and rational questions (12.5%: why do the trees belong to the plant
kingdom?). with the first ones, it is stated the relationship between the theoretical content
and the studied situation; with the second ones it is asked to the student to expose the why
of an action, or the participation, forcing him/her to present evidences or justifications that
support their affirmations. In the second class, besides the decrease of the percentage of the
generalization questions (52,6%) and the rising in the percentage of the justification
questions (42,1%: why could they have the reason, they that 500 they that 100 or they that
80?), the teacher uses also the evaluative questions (5,3%: lets see what do you think?),
those which promote reflection about the implicit contents in their participation and foster
confrontations that affect positively the development of argumentative processes in the
classroom. In the third one, we could notice the presence of a new kind of questions, the
predictive (16,5%: do you believe that the violin will be heard under the water? Now from
what we have seen, you are going to tell me why yes or why not, Emanuel, do you feel
OK? Do you think that the violin will be heard the same way under the water?); with those
questions the student is invited to establish hypothesis and to ask questions about possible
behaviors, facts or phenomena, which are very important actions to the development of
argumentative processes.

First Class

Second Class

Third Class
7

First Class

Second Class

Figure 1. Argumentative episodes registered in classes

1269

Third Class

90,0
80,0
70,0
60,0
50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0

% class one
87,5

% class two
52,6

% class three
48,2

12,5

42,1

34,1

Prediction

0,0

16,5

Evaluation

5,3

1,2

Generalization
Justification

Figure 2. Types of questions identified in clasrrom

4. CONCLUSIONS AND EDUCATIVE IMPLICATIONS

The teacher provides better and larger communicative interactive spaces supported by the
dialogic inquiry. Two indicators show this advance in the developed process by the teacher.
First, the incorporation of questions from different nature and the confident environment
created by the teacher, in order to engage the students in the discussions. Second indicator
the increasing of the quantity of argumentative episodes identified in the three classes
developed by the teacher: one in the first one, four in the second one and seven in the third
one.
Finally, the results ratify two things: The first one, the value that the question has;
and the combination of different kinds of questions, as a device to foster the debate and the
development of very important competences as the quality to hear and respect others
opinion to argue in a proper way. The second one; the relevance to involve to the teachers
in critical reflexive space about their own performance, as an opportunity to help to the
improvement of the sciences teaching processes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Based on work supported by Spanish MCYT grant EDU-2009-13890-C02-02, Spanish
MCYT grant EDU-2012-38022-C02-02 and Catalan PRI 2009SGR1543 . From the same
way the acknowledgement to Caldas university, Manizales Colombia.

1270

REFERENCES
Benarroch, A. & Marn, N. (20011). Relaciones entre creencias sobre enseanza, aprendizaje y conocimiento
de ciencias. Enseanza de las Ciencias. 29(2), 289-304
Candela, A. (1999). Ciencia en el aula. Los alumnos entre la argumentacin y el consenso. Mxico: Paids.
Driver, R., Newton, P & Osborne, J. (2000). Establishing the Norms of Scientific Argumentation in
Classrooms. Science Education, 84(3), 287-312.
Gunstone, R., Slattery, M., Bair, J. & Northfield, J. (1993). A case study exploration of development in
preservice science teachers. Science Education, 77(1), 47-73.
Ireland, J., Watters, J., Brownlee, J., & Lupton, M. (2011). Teachers conceptions of how to engage students
through inquiry learning: Foundations for STEM. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference
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Technology, Brisbane, QLD.
Kuhn, D. (2010). Teaching and learning science as argument. Science Education, 94(5), 810824.
Kuhn, D., & Udell, W. (2003). The development of argument skills. Child Development, 74, 1245 1260.
Lebak, K. & Tinsley, R. (2010). Can inquiry and reflection be contagious? Science teachers, students, and
action research. Journal of Science Teacher Education, 21(8).
Mrquez, C. & Roca, M. (2006). Plantear preguntas: un punto de partida para aprender ciencias. Educacin y
Pedagoga, 18(44), 63-71.
McDonal, Ch. y McRobbie, C. (2012) Utilising Argumentation to Teach Nature of Science. En B. Fraser, C.
McRobbie & K. Tobin (Eds), Second International Handbook of Science Education (pp. 969-985).
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Milne, C. (2012). Beyond Argument in Science: Science Education as Connected and Separate Knowing. In
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(pp. 951-967). New York: Springer International Handbooks of Education.Osborne, J., Erduran, S. &
Simon, S. (2004). Enhancing the quality of argumentation in school science. Journal of Research in
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Milner, A., Sondergeld, T., Demir, A., Johnson, C., & Czerniak, C. (2012). Elementary teachers' beliefs about
teaching science and classroom practice: An examination of pre/post NCLB testing in science.
Journal of Science Teacher Education, 23(2), 111-132. doi: 10.1007/s10972-011-9230-7
Mercer, N. (1997). La construccin guiada del conocimiento. Barcelona: Paids.
Porln, R., Martn del Pozo, R., Riviero, A., Harres, J., Azcrate, P. & Pizzato, M. (2010). El cambio del
profesorado de ciencias I: Marco terico y formativo. Enseanza de las ciencias, 28(1), 31-46.
Sard, A. (2005). Enseando a argumentar en torno a la educacin ambiental. Educar. Recupero de
http://www.quadernsdigitals.net/datos/hemeroteca/r_24/nr_655/a_8779/8779.pdf

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Argumentation In Ronald Reagans Presidential Campaign

Commercials
Marta Rzepecka
University of Rzeszw
Rzeszw
Poland 35-310
americana2180@wp.pl

ABSTRACT: This article reflects on the role of argumentation in running a successful presidential campaign.
It describes the notions of presence and communion by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca,
uses them to identify and analyze arguments and argumentation strategies used in Ronald Reagans campaign
commercials and suggests conclusions which can be drawn on the basis of the analysis.
KEYWORDS: Political argumentation, political commercials, presidential campaigns, presidential rhetoric,
Ronald Reagan

1. POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION AND PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN RHETORIC

Political argumentation is about how politicians argue their cases to either win others
acceptance or persuade them to change their thinking, behavior or decision. It helps to
specify political goals and identify the means available to achieve these goals. Seen as an
essential part of political communication, argumentation creates a political reality and
allows structuring, controlling, and manipulating its interpretation. It defines situations,
communicates information, and evaluates events. In politics, arguments link politicians
with the public. They serve to express their political positions, convey their identifications,
and reveal their commitments. As elements of political discourse, arguments function as
stimuli for action. Appropriate arguments result in the acceptance of proposed policies,
support for specific issues, and obedience to laws while inadequate arguments bring about
rejection, objection and disregard. Political argumentation most often includes persuasion
a tool used to influence others and shape their ways of thinking and behavior. Political
public speaking seems to be designed to persuade more than inform or argue. It appears to
be constructed to mask rather than reveal true meanings, to appeal to emotions rather than
reason, to mute and eliminate potential problems rather than raise difficult questions or
give rise to substantive and essential discussions. In the United States, this is especially
evident when one listens to presidential campaign rhetoric. American electoral discourse
demonstrates that political argumentation serves to convince more than enlighten. Based
on carefully planned and presented arguments, be it those which appeal to reason or
emotions, it primarily means to influence public cognitions and impressions. While it does
not coerce voters to make specific choices, it does involve a deliberate attempt to influence
their decisions and actions.
In The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, Chaim Perelman and Lucie OlbrechtsTyteca define argumentation as the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to
increase the minds adherence to the theses presented for its assent (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 4). Perelman believes that a rhetor can gain the adherence of the
audience he speaks to if he first creates a presence and then establishes communion with it.
He creates a presence when he identifies the audiences opinions and beliefs and
strengthens the aspects of the audiences views and convictions which further his cause. He
1272

establishes communion with the audience when he recognizes and appeals to its shared
values and thus predisposes the audience to a desired action. After all, as Perelman states
in an article The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, the rhetors ultimate
goal is to get the audience participate in the action (Perelman, 1970, p. 82). The means to
reach the goal is the language. According to Perelman, both presence and communion are
closely connected to the rhetors choice of rhetorical devices which vary according to
factors such as the audience that he addresses, the context within which the language is
used, the constraints that determine its effectiveness and the exigencies that define its form
and content. To create a presence the rhetor uses both linguistic devices, which bring
desired elements into the audiences consciousness, and argumentative schemes, which
persuade the audience to accept the premises the rhetor puts forward and provoke it to act.
Perelman lists a number of linguistic tools which stylistically amplify certain elements and
two techniques of argumentation: associative, which links separate phenomena together so
that the audience can see a unity among them, and dissociative, which separates concepts
originally interconnected in order to restructure the audiences idea about them.
Furthermore, within the associative scheme, he classifies arguments into quasilogical and real where the former are based in formal reasoning and the latter appeal to
reality and establish the real. As for ways which the rhetor uses to enter into communion
with the audience, Perelman mentions appeals to values, abstract or concrete, which
dispose the audience to a certain course of action, and rhetorical techniques, literary
devices, figures, and oratorical communication which turns the audiences disposition into
action.
2. SETTING
To gain a fuller understanding of the discursive techniques used by Ronald Reagan in the
1984 presidential elections, the specific circumstances which shaped the form and content
of his campaign discourse should be outlined briefly. In 1981 Reagan entered the White
House with a conviction that peace was achievable only through strength and that
confrontation was the most effective means of controlling Soviet behavior. At the heart of
his foreign affairs was the containment of Soviet expansionist inclinations which he though
could be curbed only through a renewed arms race. Nuclear superiority was the means to
achieve an effective Communist rollback. Another important aspect of Reagans foreign
policy was an ideological offensive launched against the Soviets. It demonstrated that the
United States was the leader of the free world, that American know-how provided
solutions to the problems of the underdeveloped nations and that American approach to
politics ensured progress and defended democracy. Finally, restoration of American
prosperity through low inflation and high growth rates was seen as the means to strengthen
Americas ability to confront Soviet power.
Reagan put these foreign policy concepts into action through a massive military
spending on new weapons systems, research and development, and improvements in
combat readiness and troop mobility, through support and aid to groups fighting against
Communism in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, and through an
anti-Communist rhetorical crusade. He used his public statement to portray the Soviet
Union as evil, labeling it as a power untamed, a totalitarian force (Reagan, 1982), and
an evil empire (Reagan, March 8, 1983). He presented a negative image of the Soviet
system and its means of power, calling Communism a regime, and a [tyranny] and its
instruments subversion, conflict, assault, and violence (Reagan, 1982). Finally, he
described members of the Soviet leadership as people who reserve unto themselves the
right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat and called their exercise of authority
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oppression, repression, destruction (Reagan, 1982), and aggression (Reagan,

March 23, 1983).
Relying on strident rhetoric and clear-cut policies, Reagan, on the one hand, restored
American sense of strength and leadership, but, on the other, evoked the fear of war. While
his rhetoric led many Americans to believe that he managed to defend and protect the
nations interest effectively, it, at the same time, made them feel threatened by the
possibility of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Opinion polls carried out at the end of
Reagans first term seemed to indicate that most Americans wished to reorient AmericanSoviet relations, moving from confrontation to cooperation, from competition to
coexistence, from intensification to relaxation of tensions. Reagans task was to capture the
new attitude and articulate it. To win the reelection campaign, he had to reflect voters
attitude and persuade them that he understood their fears and that he identified with their
concerns and that it was in their interest to identify with him. Realizing that effective
expression of voters attitude and establishment of a trustful relationship with them were
crucial to his reelection, he focussed on identifying the opinions and strengthening the
views which he shared with the public and on recognizing and addressing the values which
he thought would help him encourage the public to take the desired action. He used
rhetoric which conveyed his moral and political judgments and attitudes, with emotional
appeals so constructed as to reveal both the values he believed in, the actions he favored
and the depth of his commitment to the actions and with logical arguments designed to
accomplish his proof of rationality and convince voters to place their trust and confidence
in his performance. While the forms with which Reagan chose to convey his emotional
appeals and logical arguments were in part determined by his personal characteristics, they
were also in part dictated by revised public attitudes to American-Soviet relations.
Considering the new political context, Reagan had to ensure voters that in his handling of
foreign affairs he would take decisions and actions which would help to reconcile the
differences that divided the two powers instead of thriving on them, to soothe tensions
rather than intensifying them, to solve problems instead of aggravating them.
3. ANALYSIS
Reagan made at least three points of departure for his campaign argumentation. First, he
argued that the Soviet Union was a threat. Second, he maintained that America was strong
again. Third, he persuaded that peace was Americas highest aspiration. He sought to gain
adherence to his statements through quasi-logical arguments, through arguments based on
the structure of reality, and through arguments that establish the structure of reality. He
argued by sacrifice when he declared that America will negotiate for [peace], sacrifice for
it. He used the association of succession when he recalled that we stopped complaining
together and started working together to the effect that Today, America is strong again.
He relied on the association of coexistence when he stated that With your help, weve
renewed our strength and working together, weve prepared America for peace, stressing
the link between the people and their actions. Finally, he argued by analogy when he
compared the Soviet Union to a bear, the United States to a hunter and the woods to the
context of the Cold War.
In his argumentation, Reagan relied on both inductive and deductive reasoning.
Used in the argumentation of the assumption that the Soviet Union was a threat, he did not
mean to prove definitely that the war with the Soviets was real but intended to merely
increase the probability that it was not imagined. Reagan drew on the publics inability to
predict the future and posed an open question about the issue. While, on the one hand, he

1274

allowed the possibility of a military conflict to evoke the fear of the threat and use of force,
on the other, he stated that there was no evidence that the threat of confrontation was real.
He presented two sides of the issue, trying not to support one side over the other or
to reconcile the two positions, to let voters decide which option they favored. Reagan
involved the public into his consideration intentionally. He knew that the audience was
more likely to accept his conclusion if they arrived at it together. And to that end he
created the impression that he did not impose any opinion on it, that he respected its
freedom, that he invited it to make its own choice and let it make the decision. By contrast,
he relied on deductive reasoning to convince that America was strong again. He
maintained that the United States was strong again because it was respected again. He
argued that four years of hard work in the area of foreign relations, frequent diplomatic
visits, difficult talks and negotiations with foreign governments, noticeably improved
Americas global position. He strengthened his deductive reasoning with a sequence of
shots, contrasting groups of people protesting against US policies and burning the
American flag with crowds of people and foreign government representatives of Japan,
China, France, Italy and Britain welcoming and hosting official US delegations. Reagan
used contrast to emphasize that there had been a change in the perceptions about and the
attitude towards the United States among foreign nations and point out that his diplomacy
caused that perception and attitude change.
Just as he wanted to construct his argumentation according to reason, Reagan liked
also to appeal to emotions. He evoked the feeling of mission when he said that we can
work toward a lasting peace for our children, and their children to come, the feeling of
hope when he envisioned that Americas best days, and democracys best days, lie ahead
as well as the feelings of fear and terror when he recalled that weve faced two world
wars, a war in Korea, and then Vietnam and when he speculated about another war with
the Soviets. He reasoned that arguments evoking the feelings of patriotism and the fear of
war were universal enough to attract the attention of the majority of voters. He meant
positive feelings to make his listeners feel proud if they decided to support him, and
negative feelings to make them feel ashamed and guilty if they chose to do otherwise.
Reagan used very simple and general appeals over complex and specific ones to reach the
widest audience possible.
The fact that he used only three objects of agreement seemed to have served the
same purpose. Reagan directed how public perceived and conceived his lines of argument
through assumptions, truths, and promises. He assumed when he stated that many
countries thought America had seen its day. But we knew better to enhance the value of
the fact that America had regained its strategic advantage and to stress that it did so under
his presidency. He expressed a self-evident opinion when he said that while governments
sometimes disagree, all their people want peace to convey his realistic understanding of
foreign policies and of the differences between peoples desires and governments
difficulties in addressing them. He pledged not to surrender for [peace] now or ever to
justify his potential controversial and debatable moves and actions taken to ensure peace
worldwide.
Regan amplified his argumentation with stylistic techniques of imagery and
repetition. He persuaded the public that the Soviet Union was a threat in a series of shots
presenting a grizzly bear the Soviet threat lumbering through the woods, standing face
to face with a hunter the United States and retreating. He strengthened his message
with an expression of doubt if the threat was real or imagined and with a rhetorical
question asking viewers if it was not smart to be as strong as the bear? If there [was] a
bear? Regan maintained presence with the audience by repeating the view that it takes a
strong America to build a peace that lasts, by reiterating the belief that working together
1275

helped to make America strong again and by restating the conviction that America is
prepared for peace. He increased adherence to his statements through images as well. He
conveyed the notion of a strong America by comparing the United States to a South
Russian Ovcharka, a large and robust sheepdog, and by showing shots of him and major
world leaders meeting together. He communicated to the public that renewed Americas
power was the result of a collaborative effort using shots of a space shuttle launch and of a
satellite in orbit. He convinced viewers that America was ready for peace with a shot of a
smiling child on a porch with the US flag flying beside him. Reagan heightened the
persuasive effect, arguing through soothing and calm narrative of advertising executive Hal
Riney and his soft and avuncular voice and through suspenseful music and heartbeat sound
effect.
He also strengthened his argumentation with techniques designed to establish
communion with the audience. He adhered to at least two self-evident abstract values of
peace and strength, which best reflected the motifs, needs and interests he wanted to
address. He drew on the value of peace when he maintained that it was the highest
aspiration of the American people and when he declared that A presidents most
important job is to secure peace not just now, but for the lifetimes of our children to
convey that he shared the publics ambitions and to assure it that he had strong will and
determination to fulfill them. Once Reagan centered the publics attention around the value
of peace, he enhanced his sense of communion with the audience with the value of
strength. Making the statement that it takes a strong America to build a peace that lasts,
he expressed his strong belief in the notion of peace through strength, implying that his
policy of a military build-up was an indispensable component of peace. Aware that the
concept of peace through strength failed to win full public approval in the first four years
of his presidency, Reagan deliberately gave voters the chance to choose between peace and
war to use their support for peace the publics choice was fairly predictable into their
support for peace through strength. Aware that he was unlikely to win wider support for
the cause of peace through strength rather than for peace alone, Reagan structured his
message around three points: first in which he talked about the virtues of peace, second in
which he mentioned the military means necessary to achieve it, and third in which he listed
the benefits of peace achieved through strength thus increasing his chances for reaching the
goal of his argumentation.
4. OUTCOME
Reagan surely achieved the aim of his polemic winning an unprecedented landslide
victory. He carried 49 of the 50 states, becoming only the second presidential candidate to
do so after Richard Nixons victory in the 1972 presidential election, and won 525 out of
538 electoral votes, which is the highest total ever received by a presidential candidate.
Running a campaign which was the inverse of the 1980 race, he called for relaxation of
tensions and for peaceful solutions of problems. Reagan restrained from his former antiSoviet rhetoric but he also stayed relatively vague about his foreign policy plans. The
absence of a clear foreign policy vision may indicate that he did not mean to change his
tough anti-Soviet approach. The change in attitude articulated in the campaign spots might
have been merely a change in tactics only. Reagan might have used new campaign
techniques to relax public vigilance and win their mandate for another term in which he
would continue developing his hard line anti-Soviet policies. Vague foreign policy vision
may also suggest that he did not really have a precise plan of action. He knew that his
second term diplomacy had to be different than the first but he did not really have a plan in
place. Realizing that voters concerns based on his inclinations shaped in the first
1276

administration about his rigid anti-Soviet posture which could increase the danger of war,
expand armaments and develop nuclear arsenal could not be ignored, he chose to construct
vague statements to create the impression that he had in fact addressed the subject matter.
It can also be suggested that the lack of clearly articulated foreign policy platform
meant that Reagan indeed had a vision of what American-Soviet relations would look like
in his second term but did not reveal it for fear of losing his strategic advantage. He did not
want to be involved into a discussion about his give-and-take attitude and chose to run a
campaign based on public trust in the results of his foreign policy making. One final
suggestion is that the absence of a coherent policy and a unifying vision of American
foreign affairs resulted from Reagans unsuccessful four years on the international scene.
Aware that the controversies surrounding the massive military build-up of US
weapons and troops, the escalation of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the US
intervention in Lebanon, the invasion of Grenada, and the deteriorating US relations with
Libya hurt his rating in the polls, Reagan might have run a campaign strategy based on
vague foreign policy plans to avoid a public discussion about his diplomatic failures. He
knew that it was politically damaging to defend ones position, especially if one were the
incumbent president, therefore he might have decided not to respond to the oppositions
accusations in order not to undermine his chances for victory.
5. CONCLUSION
Reagans achievements in foreign affairs in the next four years of his presidency indicate
that he well calculated the risks of his campaign strategies and well suited his campaign
discourse techniques to the circumstances. Avoiding assertive anti-Soviet rhetoric and a
precise foreign policy plan Reagan made space for himself to adequately react to the new
developments in American-Soviet relations initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, the first Soviet
leader who actively sought political and economic reform in the Soviet Union and who
seriously wanted to discuss a possible peace with the United States and was ready to make
concessions necessary to achieve the goal. The fact that in his campaign Reagan neither
kept his anti-Soviet approach nor presented a specific foreign policy proposal allowed his
administration to observe Soviet actions and react responsibly to them. Drawing on the
image of a negotiator and peacemaker that Reagan was trying to create through his
campaign discourse, the president could shift from anti-Soviet policies, cutting armaments,
reducing nuclear weapons and developing more cordial relations with the opponent,
without being accused of yielding ground to or a point to the Soviets. Moreover, he was
communicating to his detractors that he was not a reckless, unpredictable and
unaccountable warmonger, but an idealist devoted to the American ideal of peace, as well
as a pacifist who proved that conflicts could be solved in a nonviolent way. While during
the campaign Reagan could not have predicted that the Soviets would reorient their
policies during his presidency, it should be noted that taken completely by surprise he
reacted to them quickly and appropriately, fostering prospects for global peace and for the
end of the Cold War.

1277

REFERENCES
Perelman, P. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Trans. J.
Wilkinson & P. Weaver. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Perelman, P. (1970). The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Trans. E. Griffin-Collart and O.
Bird. In R. M. Hutchins & M. J. Adler (Eds.), The Great Ideas Today (pp. 281-297). Chicago, IL:
Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Reagan, R. (1982, June). Address to Members of the British Parliament. Speech presented in London,
England. Retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42614&st=&st1=.
Reagan, R. (1983, March). Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security. Speech presented in
Washington, D.C. Retrieved from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=41093&st=&st1=.
Reagan, R. (1983, March). Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals.
Speech presented in Orlando, FL. Retrieved from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=41023&st=&st1.
Tuesday Team. (Maker). (1984). Museum of the Moving Image, The Living Room Candidate: Presidential
Campaign Commercials 1952-2012. Bear. Podcast retrieved from
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1984.
Tuesday Team. (Maker). (1984). Museum of the Moving Image, The Living Room Candidate: Presidential
Campaign Commercials 1952-2012. Foreign Policy. Podcast retrieved from
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1984.
Tuesday Team. (Maker). (1984). Museum of the Moving Image, The Living Room Candidate: Presidential
Campaign Commercials 1952-2012. Peace. Podcast retrieved from
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1984.
Tuesday Team. (Maker). (1984). Museum of the Moving Image, The Living Room Candidate: Presidential
Campaign Commercials 1952-2012. World Leaders. Podcast retrieved from
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1984.

1278

When Argumentative Discourse Evolves In A Legal Context: A

Discursive Approach Of Formal Testimony In A Swiss Criminal
Court
Camilla Salas
French Literature Department
University of Neuchtel
Switzerland
Camillia.salas@unine.ch

ABSTRACT: By considering public hearings in Switzerland, especially criminal courtroom interactions, the
major undertaking in this article is to show how argumentative speech evolves during dialogic interactions
taking into account diaphonic repetitions. Somehow, when the judge rephrases the witness speech and
interprets it in its own discourse, we assume that it is possible to distinguish how this kind of rewording
process can work as a language marker of the interpretation of the witness evaluation by the judge.
KEYWORDS: Argument, diaphony, disagreement, formal testimony, institutional dialogue, maintenance of
ones face, proleptic argumentation.

1. INTRODUCTION
Formal testimony in a criminal court is not really a problematic notion in an intuitive
sense: witnesses are called in, give their statement, and leave. Clearly testimony in a trial
is something obvious. But, this form of institutionalized discourse occurs in a legal context
and under specific discourse circumstances as well. In that case, formal testimony can
become something much more complex.
First of all, direct examinations or cross-examinations of witnesses are considered
as institutional interactions. In Switzerland and other continental countries, the
decision about the force and weight of the evidence and the answer to the question whether the facts
lead to required legal consequence is taken by the judge and not by a jury. It is the judge who
decides on factual and legal order (Feteris, 2000, p. 120).

Therefore, in the Swiss criminal procedure, the judge can also question the witness, or the
parties. These interactions are typically asymmetrical, since power and control are
located in the institutional participant, rather than being equally distributed (Coulthard &
Johnson, 2007, p. 15). For example, asymmetry can be revealed through:
1.
2.
3.

The institutional members being much more familiar with the legal system;
The institutional members being much more comfortable with the legal language;
A questioning-answering relationship1;

Questioning/answering relationship forces in a way the answerer to answer, but where the answerer is
pressured to answer in the way the questioner wishes by means of a range of linguistic means (Gibbons,
2008, p. 128).

1279

4.

The configuration of the courtroom, which is hierarchically organized.

Secondly, institutionalized dialogue relies on a specific context, in which participants can

pursue different goals and where institutional members are in control of the legal goals
(Coulthard & Johnson, 2007, p. 16). On the one hand, the witness is sworn to tell the truth
and on the other hand, the judge has to evaluate this kind of evidence since he is in charge
of the legal decision-making. So in a way, he has to evaluate testimony credibility, but
also the witness reliability.
In that case, both the examination and the cross-examination are characterized by
interactions in which participants are open to several types of negotiations. And
sometimes, these verbal interactions might be the place of conflict. In other words, we
consider that the construction of any verbal interaction might reflect a process of
negotiation in which speakers recursively initiate, react on, or ratify clauses by means of
text constituents (Roulet et al., 1985). Thanks to these text constituents, it is possible to
point out how the negotiation process shows itself. That is to say: how interlocutors
understanding and evaluating each others speech can be observed in text constituents.
In particular, we are going to analyze how a specific kind of text constituent i.e. the
process of diaphony (Idem.) may help the judge to show to the audience how s/he
attributes credibility to one or another testimony. Diaphony can be defined as a verbal
activity related to: (1) rephrasing the speakers utterances and/or wordings and (2)
interpreting this rephrasing.
(1)

You say that we are surrounded by aliens, but you seem to me either a conspiracy
theorist or just a crazy person.

As a result, this kind of communicative practice helps, typically, the [last] speaker in
guiding the hearer [i.e. the original speaker] through the interpretive process (Glich &
Kotshi, 1983, p. 231). Indeed, Repetitions in discourse can be of different kinds and have
various cognitive, psychological, interactional, ritualistic, stylistic or didactic effects
(Johnstone, 1994; Tannen, 1989 cited by Perrin et al., 2003, p. 1844). In other words,
they most notably represent a minimal reaction to the fact that something has been said to the
individual who utters the repetition, a reaction that pragmatically (and interactionally) satisfies the
interlocutors most basic expectations (Idem.).

In this context, diaphonic structures have especially two functions: the first one is a
communicative function (to clarify a misunderstanding, for instance). The second one is
an interpretive function. Both functions deal with argumentative and interactional moves
(negotiation of social roles and different kind of identities) (Roulet et al., 1985). Moreover,
we can distinguish different kinds of diaphonic structures such as potential diaphony, local
diaphony, real or effective diaphony, or even distant repetition (Idem. Perrin, 1995;
Perrin et al., 2003; Torck, 1994). In this article, we are going to mainly focus on potential
diaphonic structures and real or effective ones, as well.
Now, regarding testimony, even if it is a commonly shared argumentative
interaction, it hasnt been extensively studied by specialists of argumentation, though
(Doury, 2013). Thats why we will focus, especially on the argumentative moves that can
be highlighted thanks to the process of diaphony. Thus, this article aims to analyze how
1280

argumentative moves can reflect the evaluation of the witness testimony by showing how
the judge performs the process of diaphony in order to manifest his difference of opinion
or his agreement. In this perspective, argumentation theory, we have chosen to focus on, is
mainly developed in the French speaking area (Doury,1999, 2003; Jacquin, 2011, 2014;
Jacquin & Micheli, 2012; Micheli, 2012; Plantin, 1996). This approach considers that
most of discourse can have an argumentative orientation that can be revealed through
linguistic and mostly pragmatic means (Amossy, 2005, p. 89).
Data analysis presented here focuses on a single trial at the Criminal Chamber of
Lausanne, in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. The following questioning
exchanges focus especially on the interaction between a judge and a character witness.
The accused in custody at the time of the trial was charged with several felony offences
such as swindling, stealing, breach of trust, unlawful appropriation, forgery of certificates
and threatening behavior. The witness, Ms. Lori2, is a nurse and a program coordinator at
the Brenant Institute for addiction (fictitious place).
In order to have a better understanding of how argumentative moves are going be
settled between the two participants, it is important to be more specific about the
situational frame in which the judge and the witness are involved in.
2. DISAGREEMENT AND ARGUMENTATIVE DISCUSSION UNDER SPECIFIC
CIRCUMSTANCES
The background of this trial is mostly characterized by the criminal status of the accused
since he is a repeat offender. Indeed, he has been charged at several occasions with the
same felony: swindling. Therefore he became well known among the police but also the
Criminal Chamber of Lausanne since 2006 (2006, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012).
At the same time, the accused has drug issues and for that reason, he has been
placed several times in different treatment centers instead of being held in prison. So, if in
the first place, cocaine dependence and felonies were associated; since 2009 it turned out
not to be the case anymore. Indeed, it has been stated that drug addiction wasnt a
sufficient ground to excuse or mitigate the accuseds behavior. That was also corroborated
by the experts report. Actually, he suggested an outpatient treatment that could be
associated to a custodial sentence instead of a residential treatment for individuals with
substance use disorders.
Therefore, the judge, during the examination of Ms. Lori, will have to state on
which type of program the accused would best benefit from, knowing that all the previous
treatments did not work out well. As a result, when Ms. Lori comes to testify, we can
assume that she might consider that the accused could still benefit from a residential
treatment.
Thus, the background of the case might explain why the examination of this
witness in particular could become a place for an argumentative discussion, or even a
disagreement. In the following sections, we are going to observe how the process of
diaphony (potential repetition and effective one) can work as linguistic marker of a
proleptic argumentation and a marker of maintenance of ones face as well (real or
effective repetition).
2

The original proper names have been replaced by fictional ones.

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3. THE DIAPHONY PROCESS AS A LINGUISTIC MARKER OF A PROLEPTIC

ARGUMENTATION
The following exchange3 shows the beginning of the witness's examination, once the
personal data of Ms. Lori have been collected.

Figure 1. Exchange between the judge and Ms. Lori.

Lets consider for a while the monologual turn of this questioning exchange. From line 111, we can notice that the speech act structure is mostly a polyphonic one. This polyphonic
structure may help us to show how the judge seems, finally, not to agree with the character
witness. At first glance, the judge refers to the Brenant Institute and Ms. Lori as well, in
line 1, 2, 3, 8, 9. But, at the same time, the judge doesnt seem to take into account what
the witness might say, since he is making use of a dichotomous discourse. In a way, this
dichotomous discourse (we all heard the story, he has screwed up everything, youre
capable of () doing something with this guy) that makes use of the judge reveals, as a
matter of fact, a proleptic argumentation. According to Walton, proleptic argumentation
refers to the anticipation and answering of an objection or opposed argument before ones
opponent has actually put it forward (2008, p. 143).
This monologual turn is proleptic for two reasons: Fist, we can notice the use of an
ironical tone that we can notice in line 3 with the hyperbole to be consumed with
ambition and incorrigible optimist. Actually, the ironist is showing to his audience that
3

Transcription conventions for the French version are used as follows: (.) indicates a brief interval; (1.2)
indicates elapsed time by tenth of seconds; [ a left bracket indicates the point of overlap onset; :: colons
indicate the prolongation of the immediately prior sound; underscoring indicates where the word is punched
up; / or \ indicates high or low pitch; if a letter or word is underscored, the sound of the letter or the word is
punched up.

1282

he may have a difference of opinion. In that case, irony announces in a way the refutation
coming in the next clause (Eggs, 2009). Secondly, we can observe the use of key
indicators of speech act structure that do not refer to the Brenant Institute, such as the
exclusive we pronoun in line 1-2. Even if this key indicator is not strong enough to
exclude the Brenant Institute as an enunciator; when the judge actually says we all heard
the story it expresses something that can be drawn on discourse context. Indeed, it refers
to the accused criminal records and by extension to the situational frame we mentioned
earlier. Moreover, the lines 5-8 can be put in connection with documents relating to the
criminal proceedings, since it refers to the different institutions that try, unsuccessfully, to
help the accused (i.e. the confidence the prosecutor had towards him, the previous
residential treatment at the Linon institute that did not work out well). Lets point out the
figures of speech that express this: (1) gradation of degree of responsibility attributable to
the accused (l.5-6) and (2) enumeratio (l.6-8).
At last, the potential diaphony in line 9 reveals the expressed standpoint of Ms.
Lori, but this one is actually reported by the judge. Potential diaphony is characterized by
an anticipated imaginary rephrasing (Roulet et al., 1985). In that case, the judge is
rephrasing something that has never been said by the witness, but he acts as if Ms. Lori
might have put it forward. By using a potential diaphony, we may think that the judge
agrees with Ms. Lori, but actually, there is a difference of opinion, that can be revealed
through the ironical tone. Indeed, the use of irony in the judges argumentation plus the
figures of speech and the potential diaphony reveal the real standpoint of the judge, even if
its not actually expressed.
So, in conclusion thanks to linguistic markers, it is possible to reconstruct the
elements of argumentation that have been left out, in this monologual turn:
Standpoint 1: You believe that Brenant Institute is going to work out (expressed)
Standpoint 2: I believe that Brenant Institute is not going to work out (unexpressed)

Figure 2.Argumentative Schema of a proleptic argumentation

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This argumentative schema outlines that:

(1)
(2)

The judge seems not to consider this testimony as a powerful evidence, since he
put forward a standpoint and cast doubt on it.
The witness seems to have little chance of expressing her standpoint, since the
judge has placed limits on it. At least, he placed doubts on the standpoint the
witness may express.

4. THE DIAPHONY PROCESS AS A LINGUISTIC MARKER OF THE MAINTENANCE OF

ONES FACE

The following questioning exchange we would like to discuss is an argumentative one and
is preceded by an explanation structure (l1-4):
In an explanation, someone tries to explain why some claim is true, whereas in an argument a
person tries to demonstrate that it should be accepted. Typically, explanations are given by citing
causes of the event, fact, or thing to be explained (Govier, 2005, p. 16).

This explanation structure allows us to have a better understanding of the grounds of a

possible disagreement. Indeed, thanks to the previous exchange we have observed how the
judge may express, in a way, a negative opinion about the residential treatment and the
ability of the Brenant Institute to help the accused. Within this extract, as the examination
of the witness goes on, it seems that its reliability might be questioned4. So, when the time
came to discuss about the circumstances of the accused treatments failure, Ms. Lori is
about to act as if she was qualified to testify. Therefore, it seems that the witness is more
worried about her status rather than the difference of opinion that she might have with the
judge. However, the way she acts is not going to prevent the judge from expressing, in a
way, his standpoint.

Figure 3. Exchange between the judge and Ms.Lori

4

At this point, it is important to precise that other analyses that come from the same interaction reveal that
the status of Ms. Lori as a witness has been thwarted by the judge (especially because she was talking on
behalf of someone else, namely the director of the institute). But, we are not going to discuss it here due to
lack of space.

1284

If the relation between legal and lay participants is usually asymmetrical, in this exchange
we can observe how the witness will go through a process of negotiation in order to make
the judge aware of her contextual identity (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2005). In other words, Ms.
Lori is going to talk about the accused in a therapeutic way5 so as to look good as a
qualified nurse and therefore as a qualified witness6.
First, negotiation is related to the maintenance of ones face. By using a
prototypical discourse (l.4, 18), her assessment sounds like an objective one. This effect is
associated to the enunciative effacement from the speaker (Rabatel, 2004) i.e. it allows
the speaker to efface himself from what he says, bringing about varied pragmatic effects
(Idem.). Clearly, the pragmatic effect is the ability of the witness to look good as a reliable
one by using a therapeutic discourse (l.4, l.8). But, that contrasts with the judges
rephrasing (l.5-7) that sounds as a subjective assessment. This assessment is related to the
degree of responsibility of the accused and can be observed by the use of an effective
diaphony (Roulet et al., 1985) in line 5. Effective diaphony can be defined as explicit
rephrasing that comes directly afterwards what the original speaker has said. The absence
of answer in line 6 crystallizes the difference of opinion (even if this one is not really
expressed) between the two discussants: whereas Ms. Lori seems to consider that the
accuseds drug addictions are not questioned, the judge allows uncertainty to persist. This
absence of answer shows also how the witness tries to maintain her face and how the
judge will be forced in a way to back down on his comments (l.7).
Secondly, there is another type of negotiation regarding the grounds that could
explain why the treatment wasnt successful. Indeed, the explanation structure helps us to
reveal an argumentative orientation. We shall keep in mind that the first and second
negotiations occur simultaneously.
Now regarding the argumentative orientation, it can be revealed through linguistics
and pragmatics means. For instance, the way the judge rewords himself shows that he is
not going to change his mind regarding the residential treatment, since the accused is
responsible, in a way, for not stopping abusing drugs. Lets explain this thanks to figure 4.

Figure 4. Argumentative schema of maintenance of one's face

5

Much more noticeable in the French version.

Since Ms. Lori has been in touch with the accused in a professional context, her testimonys credibility
relies on her professional skills. Therefore, it seems that she has to (1) act as a qualified nurse when she talks
about the accused and (2) show that she actually provided appropriate medical care for Mr. Popovic.

1285

We can notice in this argumentative schema that the judges reasoning relies on a verb
phrase and a verbal periphrasis (translation effects), which are semantically different.
Indeed, to cheat has a stronger meaning than to take the responsibility for the
consequences of ones actions, since in the first case the idea of offense is much more
obvious. Even if the verb phrase and the verbal periphrasis express the deontic modality,
the former indicates the socially regulated behavior whereas the latter indicates moral
values. However, these verb phrases are not pragmatically different since they express the
idea of not stopping abusing drugs and also that the accused is responsible for it.
At this point, if we take into account the situational frame of this trial, we can
notice that the main negotiation between the judge ant the witness is to state on which type
of program the accused would best benefit from. Considering this, and keeping in mind
that the witness has some difficulties to act as a good one, we could illustrate the
argumentation as:
If P then Q
But not-Q
Therefore not-P
This kind of argumentation could explain why the witness has been considered less
reliable by the judge.
5. CONCLUSION
To conclude, by considering a specific linguistic marker, the main purpose of this paper
was not only to describe what actually happens when the judge rewords the witness
speech, but also to show how the practice of judging doesnt only rely on the rule of Law,
that calls for legal certainty, reasonableness, and predictability. The practice of judging
can also be associated to how the judge actually interprets facts and evidence and how the
judge might have sometimes a presupposed way to bring these interpretations up, putting
the person hes questioning somehow in a difficult situation (threatening face, acting as
qualified of witness, etc. ) However, as it has been noted by Eveline Feteris,
legal argumentation forms part of a discussion between various participants: the parties in dispute
[witness in this case] and the judge. To decide whether a legal standpoint is acceptable, is [sic] must
be determined whether it has been defended successfully against certain critical reactions (2000, p.
121).

In other words, the judge has to decide if the witness has defended his standpoint
successfully. In so doing it, the pragma-dialectical theory suggests that
in order to evaluate an argumentation adequately, one must first determine which argumentation
scheme is employed and identify the set of critical reactions that are relevant to argumentation
(Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2009, pp. 98-101)

For that reason, as Marianne Doury pointed it out, testimony can be evaluated considering
multiple critical questions, such as witness reliability, selfless witness, qualified witness,
admissibility of the testimony, etc. (2013, p. 3). For instance, as we may have observed
1286

within the second exchange, Ms. Lori tries to look good as a qualified witness in order to
make her statement admissible, especially because she is talking on behalf of someone
else (namely the director of the Institute). However, according to Trudy Govier
three main factors undermine our sense that a persons testimony is reliable. These are (1) the
implausibility of the claim asserted; (2) the poor reputation of the person making the claim or
source in which the claim appears; and (3) the claims having content that clearly goes beyond the
experience and competence of the person who tell us it is true (2005, p. 138).

The latter factor associated to the situational frame we mentioned earlier, and the fact that
the judge may sometimes have a presupposed way to bring interpretations up could
explain why he might cast doubts on the witnesss standpoint, as we may have observed in
the first questioning exchange.

REFERENCES
Amossy, R. (2005). The argumentative dimension of discourse. In F.H. Eemeren van & P. Houtlosser (eds.),
Argumentation in Practice, (pp. 87-98). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing
Company.
Coulthard, M., & Johnson, A. (2007). An Introduction to Forensic Linguistics: Language in Evidence, USA,
Canada: Routledge.
Doury, M. (1999). Les procds de crdibilisation des tmoignages comme indices des normes
argumentatives des locuteurs. In E. Rigotti (Eds.), Rhetoric and Argumentation. Proceedings of the
International Conference (pp. 167-180). Lugano, Tbingen, Niemeyer.
Doury, M. (2003). Lvaluation des arguments dans les discours ordinaires. Le cas de laccusation
damalgame, Langage et socit, 3, 9-37.
Doury, M. (2013). Type dargument, questions critiques et rfutation : le cas de largument du tmoignage,
Communication dans le cadre de la journe dtude Largumentation par la ralit dans les
discours politico-mdiatiques et conomiques ou la persuasion testimoniale, 15.11.2013,
Universit de Picardie.
Eggs, E. (2009). Rhtorique et argumentation: de lironie, Argumentation et Analyse du Discours, 2.
Feteris, E.T. (2000). A dialogical theory of legal discussions: Pragma-dialectical analysis and evaluation of
legal argumentation, Artificial Intelligence and Law, 8, 115-135.
Govier, T. (2005). A Practical study of argument (6th edition), Belmont: Wadsworth.
Jacquin, J. (2014). Dbattre : largumentation et lidentit au cur dune pratique verbale, Bruxelles : De
Boeck-Duculot.
Gibbons, J. (2008). Questioning in common law criminal courts. In: J. Gibbons & M.T. Turell (eds.),
Dimensions of Forensic Linguistics, (pp.115-130). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins
Publishing Company.
Glich, E., & Kotschi, T. (1983). Les marqueurs de reformulation paraphrastique, Cahiers de linguistique
franaise, 5, 305-351.
Jacquin, J. (2011). Localiser, dcrire et faire voir le fait argumentatif : le modle dialogal de l'argumentation
au dfi d'un corpus complexe, A contrario, 16,88-109.
Jaquin, J., & Micheli, R. (2012). Entre texte et interaction : propositions mthodologiques pour une approche
discursive de largumentation en sciences du langage, Congrs Mondial de Linguistique Franaise,
EPD Sciences, 599-611.
Kerbrat-Orecchioni, C. (2005). Le discours en interaction, Paris : Armand Colin.
Micheli, M. (2012). Les vises de largumentation et leurs corrlats langagiers : une approche discursive ,
Lanalyse du discours entre critique et argumentation, 9.
Perrin, L. (1995). Du dialogue rapport aux reprises diaphoniques, Cahiers de Linguistique Franaise, 16,
211-240.

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Perrin, L., et al. (2003), Pragmatic functions of local diaphonic repetitions in conversation, Journal of
Pragmatics, 5, 1843-1860.
Plantin, C. (1996). Largumentation, Paris : Editions du Seuil.
Rabatel, A. (2004). Leffacement nonciatif dans les discours rapports et ses effets pragmatiques,
Langages, 4.
Roulet, E., et al. (1985). Larticulation du discours en franais contemporain, Berne : Peter Lang.
Torck, D. (1994). Diaphonie et interaction dans le dbat politique, Littrature, 93, 1530.
Walton, D. (2008). Proleptic argumentation, Argumentation & Advocacy, 44, 143-154.

1288

Conflict And Tension: The Discursive Dissonance At The UN

Lineide Salvador Mosca
Departamento de Letras Clssicas e Vernculas
Universidade de So Paulo
So Paulo/Brasil
05508-01
lineide@usp.br

ABSTRACT: We aim at examining the governmental political marketing and its rhetorical strategies of
maintenance, which also has the task of projecting an innovative image, so that the government survive
and perpetuate. Among these strategies, it is included the dialogue with others governments in the
international community and the engagement with common causes to the globalized world. This scenario
requires an interdisciplinary field, mediated by the theories of argumentation, which constitute the core of
all efforts of political nature. Speeches taken from the UN Assembly on September 23rd 2013,
pronounced in a moment of great tension, not softened by diplomatic diligences, will be examined. The
study of actio, the performance of political actors, is included.
KEYWORDS: Actio, conflict, image, interdisciplinarity, negotiation, political speeches, stasis, strategies,
tension, United Nation.

1. INTRODUCTION
The confrontation of speeches or stasis is frequent in contemporary political speeches,
in a world that grows more complex and where it is increasingly more difficult to
understand the various focuses of the questions. When one thinks of the deliberative
discourse as it was conceived in the Greek-Latin world, it is possible to notice that the
clash of discourses then was also heated, with the raise of discordant voices against
what was being proposed. However, the transition from the Greek polis to the modern
concept of State has introduced significant changes. In the latter, the political discourse
is a conflictive setting in which the many manifestations are exacerbated, modulated,
and softened by the norms of courtesy and diplomatic mediation necessary for modern
life to work. New genres and formats arise, aiming at diverse audiences and media
outlets. Although the concept of politics remains the same as in its origin - that which
preserves the Common Good and what is useful and necessary to the collectivity
(deliberative), what is fair (judiciary), and the cohesion of society (epideictic) - the
process of institutionalization that was gradually taking place gave it new
configurations. Conversely, the media, in its role as an agent that presents different
angles of a story or fact, exaggerates some aspects more than one can imagine. It is up
for the citizen to disentangle the questions and form an opinion about the different
situations.
In the political life, the official voice also has an important role when taking a
stand on controversial situations or when communicating serious pieces of news which
affect the lives of citizens. This is, many times, carried out by immediate advisors or
spokespersons, in order to protect the figure of the Chief of State.
The UN is a privileged environment to observe the aforementioned
confrontations, given the circumstances that gather people of distinct origins and
cultures, who meet in assemblies, either as members of the permanent Council or as
observers.
1289

Created in 1945, following the two World Wars, one of its main roles is to mitigate the
world tensions and help the conflicting nations establish dialogue. Lately, however,
there have been talks of its weakened performance in this role.
2. A ANALYZING TWO PRESIDENTIALS SPEECHES
In this study we look into two presidential speeches delivered on the 24th of September
2013, during the 68th edition of the General Assembly, when the President of Brazil,
Dilma Rousseff, was the opening speaker. By tradition, Brazil is the first country to
speak at the opening for having been the first country to join this organization. It is the
third time, since 2011, that she participates in this event.
Immediately afterwards, it was the turn of the President of the United States,
Barack Obama. The situation was considerably tense once there had been indiscriminate
collection, by the United States, of government data and even personal information of
Brazilian citizens, including espionage targeted on the Brazilian presidents private mail
and government entities, such as Petrobrs. It is worth mentioning that two months prior
to this Assembly, the episode related to the revelations of Edward Snowden, former
CIA member, was very much alive in the collective memory.
The speech from the Brazilian leader proved to be harsh in rejecting this kind of
attitude, characterizing it as espionage, taking the opportunity to outline the principles
that underpin her government and what is expected from the UN: multilateral
mechanisms that ensure freedom of expression, privacy of the individual and respect for
human rights, without prejudice of political, commercial, religious or of any other
nature; democratic governance, carried out with transparency; universality that ensures
human development and the construction of inclusive and non-discriminatory societies;
respect to cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs, customs, and values.
There was no immediate reaction on the part of the American president to the
remarks about the interventions mentioned by the Brazilian president. As usual, he
presented an overview of the U.S. politics, with emphasis on its weak points in the
world panorama: integration of the world economy in a time of crisis, limitation of the
use of drones, the work to close the Guantnamo Bay prison; the pacification of regions
in turmoil, such as Kenya, Pakistan, the north of Africa and the Middle East, especially
Syria, with the elimination of chemical weapons, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It is, evidently, what the pragma-dialectics characterizes as a critical discussion,
based on certain norms that govern the rules and codes of conduct and by which
concrete practices of argumentation are evaluated to attain a critical evaluation of the
maneuvers in play.
In Chapter 3 of A Systematic Theory of Argumentation, this situation is well
described when the authors, Eemeren and Grootendorst affirm:
Argumentation is not just the expression of an individual assessment, but a contribution to a
communication process between persons or groups who exchange ideas with one another in
order to resolve a difference of opinion.
() In pragma-dialectics, argumentative discourse and texts are conceived as basically social
activities and the way in which the argumentation is analyzed depends on the kind of verbal
interaction that takes place between the participants in this communication process (Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2OO4, p. 55).

In this presentation, the theoretical presupposition we adopt is one of an interactional

view of argumentation, which encompasses the conjunction of a descriptive view and a
normative perspective, considering the presence of a counter-discourse, even if implicit.
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In case of a debate, it is necessary to focus on the collision points and reflect on the
influence each of these projects on its interlocutor or the audience. It is necessary, thus,
to know exactly what type of manifestation is in question.
Just as there is not a single and exclusive view on argumentation comprising
these various approaches, likewise the concepts which argumentation deals with are not
homogeneous, depending on the adopted points of view and the choices made when
constructing its analyses. This is what happens with the concept of rationality and
fallacy, among others. In the first case, it is preferred to work with reasonableness, with
several nuances, but when fallacies are concerned, they are either seen as reasoning
flaws or interaction mechanisms, making part of social convenience depending on the
interpersonal relationships, such as white lies, affected modesty, and other forms of
interaction in which the affective element is present.
The samples under our consideration are excerpts from the address from the
Brazilian president, which is 25 minutes long (equivalent to 08 pages) and the address
from the President of the United States, which is 44 minutes long (equivalent to 11
pages). Following the argumentation phases proposed by Eemeren and Grootendorst,
we will cover the moment of confrontation, the opening, the argumentation and the
conclusion, and we will analyze them according to the chosen argumentative
techniques, as well as the figures present within, according to the classification of
Perelman and Tyteca, in The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. We will pay
special attention to the concluding phase, the peroration, based on Chapter 8 of
Argumentative Indicators in Discourse, (EEMEREN, HOUTLOSSER, and
HENKEMANS, 2007, pp.223-230).
The confrontation happens from the problems that motivate the speech, opening
to the description that constitutes the grounds for argumentation itself, leading to the
conclusion, when appeals to the UN and the international community are made.
In Dilma Rousseffs speech there is, initially, the exordium, with its habitual
salutations, followed by the opening for considerations about recent problems of
international repercussion, that is, the terrorist attack in Nairobi:
Allow me initially to express my satisfaction in having a renowned representative of Antigua
and Barbuda - a country that is part of the Caribbean, which is so cherished in Brazil and in our
region - to conduct the work of this session of the General Assembly. You can count,
Excellency, on the permanent support of my Government.
Allow me also, at the beginning of my intervention, to express the repudiation of the Brazilian
Government and people to the terrorist attack that took place in Nairobi. I express our
condolences and our solidarity to the families of the victims, the people and the Government of
Kenya.
Terrorism, wherever it may occur and regardless of its origin, will always deserve our
unequivocal condemnation and our firm resolve to fight against it. We will never give way to
barbarity.

President Obama, in a concise way, salutes the President of the Assembly as well as his
General Secretary, the delegates, and remaining attendees and, in three sentences,
makes considerations about the institution, the UN, briefly outlining the history of its
foundation, which constitutes an act of captatio benevolentiae.
Each year we come together to reaffirm the founding vision of this institution. For most of
recorded history, individual aspirations were subject to whims of tyrants and empires. Divisions
of race and religion and tribe were settled through the sword and the clash of armies. The idea
that nations and peoples could come together in Peace to solve their disputes and advance a
common prosperity seemed unimaginable.
It took the awful carnage of two world wars to shift our thinking.

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For decades, the United Nations has in fact made a difference from helping to eradicate
disease, to educating children, to brokering Peace.

These movements are made by means of figures of presence, which bring back to
memory past facts, contrasting them with the present situation and presenting them as a
stimulus for further progress.
Next, reports of his actions in the presidency follow, describing them as a result
from collective attitudes, by means of figures of communion, which involve the
audience, constituted by the representatives of the countries attending the meeting.
When talking about the economic crisis, which he highlights first, he thanks the efforts
of all and points to what is still left to be done:
Now, five years after the global economy collapsed, and thanks to coordinated efforts by the
countries here today, Jobs are being created, global financial systems have stabilized, and people
are once again being lift out of poverty. But progress is fragile and unequal, and we still have
work to do together to assure that our citizens can access the opportunities that they need to
thrive in 21st century.

The central part of the argumentation of the President of Brazil is developed in three
movements:
a.

The global network of electronic espionage

In reference to it, she expresses indignation and repudiation on the part of large sectors
of public opinion around the world. She dislocates and projects beyond her the evoked
sentiments, which softens the possibility of an ad hominem that would make the
continuation of her speech impossible. Next, she anticipates possible arguments from a
counter-discourse, by means of a prolepsis figure, in order to refute them:
The arguments that the illegal interception of information and data aims at protecting nations
against terrorism cannot be sustained.

When addressing the president, she refers to the president of the Assembly and, at that
moment, establishes a tripolar argumentation, in which there is a proponent, an
opponent and the question itself, the ad rem, before an audience which is also part of
the proposal, once she refers to the International Human Rights, the ad humanitatem.
Friendly governments and societies that seek to build a true strategic partnership, as in our case,
cannot allow recurring illegal actions to take place as if they were normal. They are
unacceptable.

b.

Post 2015 Development Agenda

After enumerating the feats from her government and showing the changes that
happened in the country in the social and educational scenario, - after the Rio-20
meeting on poverty and environment, - she sums up her thought in an attempt to make
the spirit that governs the 2015 agenda clear:
The meaning of the Post-2015 Agenda is the development of a world in which it is possible to
grow, include and protect.
Citizens with new hopes, new desires and new demands.

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The figure of repetition, with which greater stress is associated, besides being
deliberate, thus rhetorical, adds the presence effect to what she has proposed and
considers feasible within the presented conditions.
c.

The June 2013 demonstrations

The theme of change is the keynote and, with it, the maintenance of democracy,
presenting what she calls pacts, another technique of the figure of communion, once the
pact presupposes an agreement, consent:
We were educated day to day by the great struggles of Brazil. The street is our ground, our base.
We cannot just listen, we must act. We must transform this extraordinary energy into
achievements for everyone.

Pay attention to the metaphor, the street as the foundation, which appeared in posters
carried in last Junes demonstrations and the language used by the media,
metonymically personified in the voice from the streets, listen to the streets and
other expressions that overran the news and other genres.
If in the first part the tone of the speech was that of irritation, present in the body
language of the orator, projecting her body forward, her facial expression, the eyes fixed
on the audience, with a defiant air, the second part is the tone of firm determination that
she categorically assumes. All of this constitutes what the architectural system of
rhetoric calls actio, composing the scenario of the enunciation, which includes all the
items involved in the circumstances in which the pronunciation of the question is given:
rhythm of speech, pauses, intonation, movement in the scene, body language and
gestures and other elements that constitute the act of communication itself. Socially, it is
a rite, once it happens in well determined circumstances, following pre-codified
parameters with the possibility of predicting the sense effects it will produce. That can
be clearly observed in the repercussions broadcasted by the international media on the
same day of the event or even on the following day. It is possible to observe the
thermometer of these reactions in news outlets such as The Guardian, New York Times,
BBC for World Latin America; in Brazil, the newspaper O Estado de So Paulo and the
magazines Veja and Carta Capital. Lets see some of them in important media outlets:
The Guardian
Brazils president, Dilma Rousseff, has launched a blistering attack on US espionage at the UN
general assembly, accusing the NSA of violating international law by its indiscriminate
collection of personal information of Brazilian citizens and economic espionage targeted on the
countrys strategic industries.
() the most serious diplomatic fallout over revelation of US spying.
() in a global rallying cry against what she portrayed as the overwhelming power of the US
security apparatus.
() Brazils new foreign minister, Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, will remain at the UN throughout
the week and will meet his opposite number, John Kerry, Brazilian officials said, in an attempt
to start mending the rift between the two countries.

O Estado de So Paulo
In its electronic page, it published a summary of what had circulated in the international
press:

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For The Guardian, the Brazilian president has made a harsh attack against the US
espionage and accused the American government of violating the international law
when it performed an indiscriminate collection of information from Brazilians. It has
deemed the tone of Dilmas discourse as furious and a direct challenge to Obama,
who was waiting to deliver his address immediately afterwards.
The Internet page of the BBC published the headline Brazils president
Rousseff attacks the US over spy claims and draws attention to what the address
classifies as untenable, the argument given by Washington that the espionage in
Brazil had the object of protecting nations from terrorists.
El Pas, the most important Spanish newspaper, brings the following headline:
Rousseff denounces espionage practices before the United Nations.
El Clarn, from Argentina, stressed the fact that the US espionage was an affront
to Brazil and a lack of respect that cannot be justified by combat to terrorism. La Nacin
called attention to the accusation that the US breached the international right, violated
the human rights and civil liberty.
It can be noticed that these do not constitute insult (ad hominem), because the
argument is amply based on the fact (ad rem), confirmed by the media, even if in the
speech of President Obama they appear to be diluted, a technique employed by him in
order to minimize the question, presenting a highly impacting picture, with
considerations that a fortiori overshadow those of the opponent.
In his speech, President Obama shows confidence, with an apparently calm
countenance, at moments looking to one side of the audience and then to the other side,
with his habitual pauses, which confer certain weight to his affirmations, leaving longlasting resonances with the intention of leading the audience to reflection. In order to
attain that, the figure of communion is present at all times, such as when he affirms all
of us have a work to do, the interest of all, the international community.
In this scenario, it is possible to visualize the hierarchy of offices, with the
tribune of the leaders from the UN above, and the presidential representatives below.
The cameras focus on the room and its ampleness, closing in some personalities such as
Obamas Secretary of State, John Kerry, and also the represented parties which are cited
in speeches, such as Mali or Libya.
3. PERORATIO: BOTH SPEECHES
When closing their speeches, the orators must present the results of their argumentation.
That is what both do, presenting a follow-up of their programs and executions. We have
highlighted the words and expressions that indicate the profiles and decisions, as well as
the indicator of the phase of conclusion. Actually, there are two discussions and they do
not reach a consensus once the question remains.
In Dilmas speech, three expressions can be found:
to reiterate (The general debate offers the opportunity to reiterate the fundamental principles
which guide my countrys foreign policy and our position with regards to pressing international
issues);
I repeat (those arms. Their use, I repeat, is heinous and inadmissible under any circumstances).
I renew (I renew thus, an appeal in favor of a wide and vigorous convergence of political wills
to sustain and reinvigorate the multilateral system, which has in United Nations its main pillar.

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In Obamas speech, the conclusion is well characterized and marked by the expressions:
Finally, To summarize, final point, Ultimately. He finished with a figure of
example, citing Martin Luther King and Mandela.
It is worth noticing his propositional attitude with I believe, which he repeats
several times. It is known that this phrase refers not to the knowledge or ideas, but to the
belief in something, so he is, with it, expressing his optimistic stance:
I Believe such disengagement would be a mistake. I believe America must remain engaged for
our own security.
But I believe we can embrace a different future.

In his last argument, with anaphoric value, he reaffirms everything he has said before in
his start point and reinforces the idea of community with a figure of communion:
And thats why we remain convinced that this community of nations can deliver a more
peaceful, prosperous and just world to the next generation.

Bringing them both together now, for a final consideration:

Dilma:
a.
She maintains her initial point of view, as antagonist in the question of privacy
violation. The antagonists criticism.
b.
She was successful, based on the reaction from the press.
Obama:
a.
As a protagonist, he did not retract. He did not withdraw his position.
b.
He did not have anything to say, to refute, he could not appeal to the argument
ad ignorantiam.
The pragmatic consequences could be noticed immediately, since the official visit of
President Rousseff, that should have taken place the following month (October), was
cancelled due to the fact that President Obama did not retract, uttering generic words
aimed at the international community.
4. CONCLUSION
Finally, some reflections can be made taking three points into consideration:
a.
b.
c.

Interests are always at play: it is possible to understand each other without being
in agreement.
Diplomatic efforts require negotiations that not always produce effective results
in the short run. Democracy demands effort.
The art of coexisting is part of the civilizatory movement that societies go
through.

In fact, there is an incessant movement of construction of identities in which the

individual and collective ethos are being molded and project themselves into the
circulating images, either in the maintenance and reinforcement work of what already
exists, or by proposing new ways of behaving and living in the world. That is why we
consider the argumentation as a dynamic and interactive fact.

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REFERENCES
Angenot, Marc (2008). Dialogues de sourds. Trait de rhtorique antilogique. Paris: Mille et une nuits.
Bellenger, Lionel (1984). La Ngociation. 6 ed. Paris: PUF.
Conley, Thomas (2010). Toward a Rhetoric of Insult. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.
Eemeren, Frans H. van; Grootendorst, Rob (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge/UK: CUP.
Eemeren, Frans H. van; Houtlosser, R., Peter; Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. (2007). Argumentative
Indicators in discourse. A pragma-dialectical study. Dordrecht: Springer.
Grcio, Rui (2012). Teorias da Argumentao. Coimbra: Grcio Editor.
Houtlosser, Peter; Rees, Agns van (2006). Considering Pragma-Dialectics. A festschrift for Frans
Eemeren. New Jersey and London: L. Erlbaum.
Meyer, Michel (2011). La Problmatologie. Paris: PUF.
Mosca, Lineide L. S (2007). O espao tensivo da controvrsia: uma abordagem discursivo-argumentativa.
Filologia e Lingustica Portuguesa, 09, 293-310.
Mosca, Lineide L. S (org.) (2004). Retricas de Ontem e de Hoje. 3 ed. So Paulo: Humanitas.
Perelman, Cham; Olbrechts-Tyteca, L (1983). Trait de LArgumentation: La Nouvelle Rhtorique. 4
ed. Bruxelles: Editions de lUniversit de Bruxelles;
Perelman, Cham (1971). The New Rhetoric: a treatise on argumentation. Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press.
Perelman, Cham (2009). LEmpire Rhtorique. Rhtorique et Argumentation. 2a ed. Paris: Vrin.
Meyer, Michel (2010). Principia Rhetorica. Une thorie gnrale de largumentation. Paris:
Quadrige/PUF.
Meyer, Michel (2010b). La Problmatologie. Paris: PUF.

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Should We Teach Epideictic?

Benot Sans
Langues et littratures anciennes & Groupe de recherche en Rhtorique et en Argumentation Linguistique
(GRAL)
Universit Libre de Bruxelles
Belgique
Benoit.Sans@ulb.ac.be

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I consider the possibility of recreating a rhetorical teaching of epideictic inspired
by the ancient practice. First, I remind of the usefulness of epideictic. Then, I try to reconstruct the technical
knowledge that an ancient student acquired through epideictic training. Finally, I make some suggestions
based on the ancient pedagogical material about the way we could teach epideictic to contemporary
audiences.
KEYWORDS: ancient rhetoric, blame, epideictic, praise, exercises, teaching, speech genres, technique

1. INTRODUCTION: TEACHING ANCIENT RHETORIC TODAY

It is well known that since the beginning of its history, rhetoric has been taught. This
teaching, as our sources still allow us to know it, seemed to closely associate theory and
practice through rhetorical exercises. After the first sophists and their dissoi logoi
(Danblon, 2013, pp. 127-148; Ferry, 2013; Pearce, 1994) rhetoric teaching evolved
progressively and new kinds of exercises appeared. Around the beginning of the Roman
Empire, there was a relatively homogeneous set of exercises called progymnasmata, which
were organized in a progression from basic writing exercises to complete speeches and
argumentations (Cribiore, 2001; Pernot, 2000, pp. 194-200; Webb, 2001). These exercises
were supposed to prepare the students for full speeches and declamations (Patillon, 2002,
p. xviii), considered as the closest to reality, and beyond them, for every circumstance or
field of their future public life (local politics, advocacy, imperial service, literary contests,
teaching; see Heath, 2004, pp. 276-331). In addition to the famous treatises of Aristotle,
Cicero or Quintilian, we still have a lot of works whose practical dimension is more
marked, like manuals of exercises and declamation collections, which inspired teachers of
rhetoric for centuries. We also have some papyrological evidence, which show us the
every day practice in rhetorical schools. But when rhetoric was excluded from teaching
and schools programs, all these pedagogical tools were almost forgotten. My research
team and I have recently started a research project that aims to reintroduce some rhetorical
training at Brussels University but also in high schools, by reconnecting the ancient
exercises with actual practice. In doing so, we undertake a kind of experimental
archaeology. We test the ancient teaching techniques and exercises in classrooms to
observe the effects they produce on contemporary audiences, to see whether they still meet
the objectives they were supposed to and whether we can create other exercises that could
help to stimulate and to train useful capacities and technical skills. In conducting these
exercises, the usefulness and the goal of each of them became clearer: the ekphrasis
consisted in making a vivid depiction of an object or a scene, the ethopoiia in imitating the
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ethos and the pathos of a person or character in a given context; the declamation called
suasoria imitated the deliberative genre and the controversia imitated the forensic genre;
both of them corresponded to actual institutions that, mutatis mutandis, we still have
today. But the ancient students were also trained in a third genre, according to Aristotles
theory: the epideictic, i.e. speeches of praise or blame (Pernot, 1993, pp. 25-42; 117-127;
Pratt, 2012). In this lecture, preparing our future work with our pupils and students, I
would like to propose a preliminary inquiry, through ancient pedagogical material and
modern works, about what we can hope to achieve if we practice the epideictic genre and
how we could do it.
2. THE FUNCTION OF EPIDEICTIC
To begin, we should ask ourselves what the epideictic speeches are good for and why the
Ancients used them. The epideictic genre has often been understood as a ceremonial kind
of speech, a pleasant and aesthetic spectacle without a link with persuasion, where the
audience admires the orators technique and talent. As the word epideixis (demonstration)
shows, this technical aspect has always been present in the epideictic genre. But, as Chaim
Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1950; 1958 [2008], pp. 62-68) pointed out, it
would be a mistake to reduce the genre to this only function, forgetting the deep, social,
rhetorical and political role it could play. Unlike the forensic and deliberative speeches,
where adversaries are struggling over disputed facts, the epideictic speech tries to gather
the community around undisputed views. The epideictic orator is the spokesman of the
community: he invokes ancestors and gods, quotes poets and leaders, rediscovers the past
to remind the audience of the ideas they chose to believe in, and why, to form a
community in the present and to counter future objections. The very function of the
epideictic is then to reinforce the support to the values that ground the community and its
decisions. The speech meets this effect by temporarily suspending criticism, but it only
makes sense if criticism is allowed on other occasions. If the end is already known, the
attention is drawn to the way the orator reaches it, on his art of creating a communion of
thought (homonoia) and of arousing emotions. But it is a consequence and not a goal.
Such kind of rhetoric, focusing on gathering rather than dividing, could still be useful in
our modern multicultural societies, where we still have occasions to express it. In addition
to its function, epideictic speeches required specific techniques that may contribute to the
intellectual development of the learners and could be used as rhetorical devices in many
circumstances.
3. EPIDEICTIC IN THE BASIC RHETORICAL TRAINING
The next question is to know what kind of techniques the ancient students did learn
through epideictic and how. For this, we need to reconsider the epideictic training. The
starting point will be the papyrus Mil. Vogl. III 123 (Pack2 2525; LDAB 7011). This
papyrus, dated from the IIIth century B. C. by the editor Cazzaniga (1957; 1965), is one of
the few documents that we still have for the Hellenistic period. It presents some encomia
or epanoi of heroes, among which we can recognize Minos, Rhadamanthus and Tydaeus.
In the treatment of each subject, we can also recognize some typical epideictic topoi
(eugeneia, paideia), defined by Aristotle and in the rhetorical manuals of the first centuries
1298

A.D. The editor considers that this is a collection of encomia of an earlier period, but
Pernot (1993, pp. 43-44) and, more recently, Delgado (2012), convincingly argued that it
is rather the teaching notes of a rhetor. This would be a unique piece that could help us to
make a link between the early developments of rhetorical teaching in the Classical Period
and the many sources of the Second Sophistic in the first years of the Roman Empire. But
it is also worth stressing the technical aspects of this document that, I think, point to later
evolutions of the genre. First, there is something strange about those three names: Minos
and Rhadamanthus are often quoted with a third hero, Aeacus (Men. Rhet. II, 379, 13-18;
380, 21-22). Those three have a perfect heroic resume and after their life on earth became
the judges of the Greek underworld; they are endoxoi, famous and positive subjects to start
rhetorical training and good comparative examples in actual speeches. So we may suppose
that the rhetor broke the trilogy to surprise his students and increase the difficulty of the
exercise. Tydaeus has some embarrassing holes or misbehaviours in his resume (Grimal,
1951[2007], p. 465): he was the son a second relationship (maybe out of a wedlock or
incestuous), he was raised by pig keepers, he had to leave his homeland because he
committed murder and then became a hero in the war of the Seven against Thebes; but at
the end of it, when he was about to die, he lost the support of the goddess Athena, and
immortality, because he ate his enemys brain out of his skull. This subject, combining
positive and negative aspects, would be called amphidoxon in the later treatises. Another
interesting detail is the way the teacher tackled the lack of a good education. Even if the
document is very damaged, the editor proposes to read two times ou pepaideumenos
which means even if he has not received a (good) education; we may suppose that the
following lines would have been something like he became a hero or he built up his
own glory thanks to his natural qualities. From a technical point of view, it means that
instead of avoiding the difficulty, the teacher thought it would be a better choice to
confront the problem and to turn it into a source of praise; and that he wanted to train his
students to this particular possibility.
This technical reflection brings us to the later period of the Second Sophistic,
where rhetorical teaching was widely spread in the Roman Empire, where the sources are
many and we can hope to learn more about the way technique was taught. The encomium
or epainos (Pernot, 1993, pp. 117-127) had been integrated as an exercise in the
progymnasmata program as we can see in the manuals of Aelius Theon, PseudoHermogenes, Aphthonius and Nicolaus (Patillon, 2002; 2008; Kennedy, 2003; Pernot,
1993, pp. 56-60). During this part of their training, the students learned a method that
combined inventio and dispositio. To praise a person, after a brief introduction, you had
first to find his origins and to praise his family, city and nation; then, you might speak
about the childhood, the education, activities and early career; you might also add the
external goods and gifts of nature (wealth, beauty, physical strength, talent); the main part
of the speech was devoted to the presentation of the virtues, illustrated by some famous
deeds or reciprocally. If there was something remarkable or glorious about it, you might
also tell the audience about the death. The speech ended with a comparison (always in
favour of the one you were praising) and a brief conclusion. The orator could freely fill the
different parts of the speech, but the global frame was very strict. Another exercise, called
the common-place (koinos topos), was supposed to train amplification from determined
kinds of facts or persons, like the murderer or the seducer; such rhetorical developments
could easily be inserted in forensic or deliberative speeches. It reminds us that praise itself
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could be used as a rhetorical strategy in other kinds of speeches (Rhet. Her. III, 15; Quint.
III, 7, 1-3; 28; Pernot, 1993, pp. 25-26). The students also practised blame, but the
manuals do not tell a lot about it: the blame was confined to school and could not be
expressed in public life, but as a part of other speeches (Pernot, 1993, pp. 481-490).
Inspired by the first sophists, the Second Sophistic loved the paradox and we may also
suppose that the paradoxical encomium (Pernot, 1993, pp. 532-543; Dandrey, 1997, pp. 935) was practised as well, but it was not a part of the basic training: such as Gorgias
commented his encomium of Helen, it was a pleasant game (paignion), an exercise of
virtuosity for high level rhetors who wanted to show their talent and be admired thanks to
an impressive demonstration (epideixis) of the rhetorical technique and its power. But
many technical skills were already required for standard epideictic speeches (Pernot, 1993,
pp. 129-178; 254-265; 674-710). To achieve a proper encomium, a student had to learn
and master specific techniques of amplification and argumentation: he had to show why
the person could be praised, why his deeds illustrated some virtues; sometimes, when the
subject was not fully endoxon, he had to defend the reputation of the one he praised. To
find arguments, the students used rhetorical topoi and their cultural background. They had
to know the world they lived in, what could be a reason for praise or blame in their
society, what the audience, or even, everyone, could praise or admire. So, the students
progressively built up a rich and flexible amount of values, sometimes contradictory (see
for instance: Arist., Rhet. I, 9 = 1367b 12-20), to face every situation or case. The encomia
had of course to be written and delivered with an appropriate style (Pernot, 1993, pp. 333421). Through the Hellenistic and Roman period, we observe an evolution of the subjects:
they praised heroes, past leaders and writers, gods, animals, objects or abstract notions, but
also contemporary and actual subjects like family members, friends, cities, officials and
emperors (Pernot, 1993, pp. 178-249).
4. ADVANCED TRAINING: SPEECH GENRES AND DETOUR STRATEGY
After the basic courses, some students received an advanced or extensional training in the
epideictic genre (Heath, 2004, pp. 218-254; Pernot, 1993, pp. 60-66) for the many speech
contests organized in the Empire next to other competitions, but also for the many
circumstances of the private and public life where an epideictic speech could take place.
Some ancient treatises were only devoted to the epideictic genre, like the two treatises
attributed to Menander Rhetor and the one of Pseudo-Dionysius, dating from the IIIth
century A.D (Russell & Wilson, 1981 [2004]). The first treatise of Menander is organized
following the subjects of encomium; the second one and the treatise of Pseudo-Dionysius
are organized following the different types of epideictic speeches according to specific
circumstances: the gamlios logos is the wedding speech, the kltikos is the speech of
invitation, the epibatrios is the speech of arrival, the syntaktikos is the leavetaking speech
(Pernot, 1993, pp. 67-111). Every coming and going, every private or public event
(birthday, funeral, crowning, opening) was an occasion for speech: this was a way to draw
attention and get renown, to begin a public career and get closer to those who had power.
In a world where the most important political and forensic issues were controlled by the
emperor or those who represented him, some of the rhetorical and political activity moved
to the epideictic genre through a detour strategy of advice and encouragement (Pernot,
1993, pp. 710-723; Danblon, 1999; 2001). For instance, the speech of an embassy of a city
1300

which suffered a disaster and asked for the help of the emperor, started by an encomium of
the emperor and his past generosity, followed by a lamentation about the city and its past
splendour: the emperor could feel forced to be generous again for a city that deserved his
help. The welcoming address to a new governor praised him and the city he was coming
to: the governor learned what the city was famous for, what the citizens cared about and
implicitly, what a good governor should do to be appreciated.
These circumstantial speeches are particularly interesting because they had to deal
with the past, present and future reality. Several problems and tensions arose from this
(Pernot, 1993, pp. 254-265). First, the orator had to find information and interesting
arguments to fill the different parts of speech; secondly, he has to be specific and not only
general: he had to explain what makes the praised person or object different and better
than the others; thirdly, he could not say all the good things he found but had to make a
selection of the most appropriate arguments. But the main problem was that reality rarely
corresponded to the model. It is then not surprising that Menander Rhetor (I, 346, 9-19;
353, 25-26) proposed another classification of the epideictic subjects, maybe more realistic
and probably inspired by the forensic genre: next to the endoxon and the paradoxon, he
speaks about the amphidoxon and the adoxon: this later word, which already appeared
earlier, referred to something that was obviously negative or, more interestingly,
something that simply didnt fit with the standard endoxon scheme but on a lesser degree
than the paradoxon: something obscure or of no reputation, insignificant (Pearce,
1926; Pernot, 1993, pp. 536-539). Sometimes or maybe more often, the new governor you
had to welcome with an appropriate speech, had no famous family, was born in an obscure
town or had not made brilliant military campaigns; sometimes, you also barely knew him.
But still, you had to say something. With a kind of jurisprudential thought and clearly
pedagogical intention, Menander, and other rhetors, tried to consider every possible
situation and to find practical solutions, and I will now detail some of them.
(1)
First, you could avoid the problem by simply skipping the embarrassing part of the
speech (Pernot, 1993, pp. 522-523). But as everyone knew the topoi and the organization
of the speech, it created expectations that you had to satisfy; the treatises generally
recommended to hide the fault by some technique and to draw attention on better
elements: for instance (Men. Rhet., II, 370, 15-20; 21-28), you could speak only about the
famous ancestors or say that the one you were praising gained enough glory by himself. In
a wedding speech, if you had nothing interesting to say about the bride and the grooms
family, you could say a few words about their moderation and honesty, and quickly move
to the praise of the bride and the groom (II, 403, 21-25).
(2)
Secondly, when the problem was too obvious and couldnt be simply eluded, you
could try to turn it into a source of praise (Pernot, 1993, pp. 523-524), like we saw in the
case of Tydaeus. Menander (I, 347, 23-30) writes that if a city has no grounds of
encomium from the point of view of its position, if it is situated in very cold region or
surrounded by a desert, you could say that it makes the inhabitants more philosophical and
enduring. The treatises are based on the principle that every element could be source of
praise and offered a double treatment for each topos (Pernot, 1993, p. 520); the students
were trained to look for any source of praise in their collection of topoi and values. Here
are a few more examples:
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If he [a young man] is of illustrious descent, he has been their peer or their or superior; if of
humble descent, he has his support, not in the virtues of his ancestors, but in his own (Rhet. Ad
Her., III, 13 ; transl. H. Caplan, LCL, 1954)
Surely growing things (can be praised) in a similar way. (). If they should need much care, you
will marvel at that; if little at that too. (Ps-Hermog., Prog., 18, 1-4; transl. G. Kennedy, 2003)
If the god is adored by the Greeks, and not by the Barbarians, you could say that the god avoided
this (); if the is also found by the barbarians, you could say that even the Barbarians didnt ignore
him. (Alex. Noum. 338, 19-26; Spengel III, p. 5)
We usually take praise from the neighbouring cities as well: if our city is more powerful, because
we protect the others; if we are less powerful, because their brilliance shines upon us. (Excerpta
rhetorica, Halm, p. 587, 28-30)

(3)
A step further was blaming the predecessors or speaking about the hopes for the
future (Pernot, 1993, pp. 715-716), about the positive things that the one you praised
maybe did not have yet but would certainly get, and about the mistakes he certainly
wouldnt do. For instance, according to Menander (II, 379, 13-18; 380, 21-22), concerning
justice, you could say to the new governor that he will rival Minos, imitate
Rhadamanthus, compete with Aeacus; or more generally: For if a man understands
everything that is right, and examines everything with care, how can he not be seen and
confessed by all men to be one who will rule for the benefit of those under him (Men.
Rhet. II 380, 3-6).
(4)
Finally, you could simply invent qualities and facts (Pernot, 1993, pp. 524-525). In
Aristotles Rhetoric, (Rhet. I, 9, 1367a 32- b 7; transl. J. H. Freese, LCL, 1926) we already
read that we must also assume, for the purpose of praise or blame, that qualities which
closely resemble the real qualities are identical with them; and in the Rhetoric to
Alexander (III, 1 =1425b 36-38; transl. D. C. Mirhady, LCL, 2011): In short, the species
of praise is an amplification of reputable choices, acts, and words, and an appropriation of
those that are not present. The epideictic genre is not about historical factuality but about
moral and social values, about seeing and making reality better than it really is, and for
good reasons. Again, it is not a problem if criticism can be expressed elsewhere. Besides,
rhetorical treatises have to examine every possible mean: their topic is the technique and
not the ethics, but that doesnt mean that they do not care about ethics. Some of them
suggested inventing things (Ps-Dionysius, 273, 18-22; 274, 10-11; Men. Rhet. II, 371, 1114; 378, 12-14 (28); 390, 5.10-13), but according to likelihood and mostly when there
were no consequences to fear. This solution was the last resort and the other techniques
helped to avoid it. When it comes to actual speeches, rhetors hesitated to recommend
complete lie for philosophical or ethical reasons, but also for practical ones. In front of the
one you were praising and of an audience that already knew him, lying could make the
speech unconvincing or awkward and could draw suspicion on your talent and morality
(Men. Rhet. II, 397, 30-398, 5). The actual encomium was always flattering, but had to be
close to the original, plausible and relevant, and thats what made it challenging.

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5. CONCLUSION: TEACHING EPIDEICTIC

These techniques are to be added to the preceding ones. To resume, besides its own
function, practicing the epideictic speeches trains specific argumentation techniques and
useful skills, like amplification, indirect praise, detour strategy, flexibility and creativity.
But the ancient treatises also give us some clues about the way we could learn or teach
epideictic. The main principle of this progressive teaching is quite simple, but probably
efficient: first, the students learned and imitated a specific pattern and were then
confronted to other subjects and problematic cases in the eyes of the pattern itself and the
rule of saying something good; facing these difficulties, they had to adapt the model, to
find creative solutions and exercise their sense of judgement by choosing the right
technique. Furthermore, this learning was probably a relevant and consistent way to
prepare them for actual speeches. Contrary to the understanding of the epideictic as an
entertaining spectacle, the ancient sources suggest us that we can increase difficulty and
learn technique through actual practice of exercises and real issues. We should not forget
that in Antiquity, gods, heroes, poets or leaders, were a part of a living culture and of the
contemporary reality. A modern and experimental teaching of encomium could start with
some familiar endoxa (like praising your favourite character, your own city) and next
move to adoxa (praising a common thing) or amphidoxa (praising a controversial
celebrity), rather than paradoxa. Blaming the same objects could be used as a way to
practice mental flexibility and to feel the advantages, as well as the limits, of this strategy
(Dominicy, 2001, pp. 49-50; Ferry, 2014). We could also place the learners in plausible
situations where an epideictic speech could still take place, on the model of the ethopoiia,
like someone who has to make a speech for a commemoration, an anniversary or the
opening of an exhibition. We could make it more challenging by adding potentially
problematic circumstances, like making a speech for the Nobel Peace Prize when your
country is still engaged in military conflicts. This way, students would feel the difficulty
of creating homonoia around shared values and the tensions between good ideas and
reality; it could be a practical initiation to ethics. This way, the learners would also feel
that such a speech requires specific techniques. Then, when they become more conscious
of the technique and manage to master it, we could go further with something more
fanciful or paradoxical, for the challenge, for the performance and the pleasure of
technique itself.
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Cazzaniga, I. (1957). Frammenti di encomia a Minosse, Radamanto e Tideo , Studi Italiani di Filologia
Classica, 29, 133-173.
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Mass. - London: Loeb Classical Library.
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Heath, M. (2004). Menander. A Rhetor in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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1304

Euphoria And Panic Bubbles In Presidential Debate Evaluations

Flemming Schnieder Rhode
Annenberg School of Communication & Journalism
University of Southern California
University of Southern California
rhode@usc.edu

ABSTRACT: This project examines the first presidential debate of 2012 as a disturbance of the existing
horse-race trajectory, creating partisan bubbles of euphoria and panic through mimetic argument
evaluations. Prior to the debate the expectations set by the campaigns and the media commentary about the
performance and political effect became a reflexive part of the argument itself setting evaluative thresholds.
This created a mimesis leading to radically different expectations and evaluative criteria for the next debates.
KEYWORDS: bubbles, media, mimesis, politics, presidential debate

1. INTRODUCTION
Presidential debates have been a perennial object of inquiry in fields of argumentation,
political communication, political science, and rhetorical criticism both to answer
empirical questions of media effects and as opportunities for critique and normative
considerations of public argument (e.g. Berquist & Golden, 1981; Erikson & Wleizen,
2012; Goodnight, Majdik & Kephart, 2009; Lang & Lang, 1978; Majdik, Kephart III &
Goodnight, 2008).
Despite this cross-disciplinary focus on presidential debates, the literature does not
reflect an unambiguous hope of its social value. Following the seminal works of Anthony
Downs (1957) and Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes (1960) in political science much
doubt arose whether political campaigns, let alone the presidential debates claimed to
influence them, really mattered to voters who appeared to vote based on party identity and
with no real incentive to follow debates. Contemporary researchers like Erikson & Wleizer
(2012) follow this research tradition and claim that polling on candidates occasionally
changes around debates, but then revert to the mean and that the candidate leading the
polls before the first debate is a better predictor of who wins the election than the
candidate crowned winner of the debates. Even amongst those who do consider
presidential debates politically important, the content of the debate themselves are often
dismissed as glorified press conferences, (Kraus, 1987, p. 215) counterfeit debates,
(Auer, 1962) and not debate by standards of rhetorical and argument analysis (Meadow,
1987, p. 208). Goodnight et al. characterize these verdicts collective as an assessment of
presidential debates as pseudo-argumentation. Debate generally has always had a
troubled relationship to the field of argumentation. Doug Walton (1989) characterized
debate as occupying a half-way house between a quarrel and a dialogue, and presidential
debates have been primarily treated in the field of communication studies and not in
argumentation. However, the critical approach of public argumentation combines
positivistic with critical studies in analysing the political communication of an election

1305

(Goodnight et al., p. 274). Such an approach in my view combines the realistic appraisal of
candidates motivations and incentives from the traditional formalist rhetorical approach,
and the more holistic contextual outlook on debates from the sociocultural tradition
exemplified by Jamieson and Birdsells (1988) description of debates being not so much
discrete events as they are acts of argument whose meaning depends upon and resists
contexts constructed from national campaigns and spin (p. 13). Indeed, presidential
debates are like snowflakes, no two are alike or take place in the same or even comparable
rhetorically situated campaign environments and collectively they are fragments fitting
into larger pictures finding meaning only through their relationships with the campaigns
and are difficult to compare across election cycles. Finally, from the critical theory
approach we get the essential question of how the public read and participate in the
debates rather than merely focus on the reasons behind electoral success or immediate
persuasion. In the words of Goodnight et al.: Debates are enactment of public argument.
(p. 273) and are thus deserving of study within the field of argumentation, even or
maybe especially - if the argumentation itself leaves a lot to be desired, which is a charge I
will wholeheartedly endorse.
Furthermore, I follow Arnie Madsens (1991) view of presidential debates, seeing
the argumentation process as extending beyond the 90 minutes and instead consisting of
three phases, pre-debate expectation setting, the debate itself and the post-debate spin.
I contend that the media convention of seeing campaigns and debates through the prism of
the horse-race metaphor also makes it the sole evaluative criterion for presidential debates,
and thus in effect also how the candidates and campaigns approach the debates. The
mechanism through which the horse-race frame achieves this effect is through exploiting
the tendency for media induced bubbles of euphoria and panic fuelled by mimetic
argument evaluations. The question is thus not who won or why, but how what constitutes
winning is determined in the interplay between campaigns, media outlets and society at
large.
The horse-race frame is the tendency to see any event natural disasters, terrorist
attacks, etc. - only through the lens of how it affects a candidates chance of winning an
election1. The implication of column space is zero sum in political reporting means that
foregrounding who is winning the election necessitates casting issue positions, candidate
qualifications or policy proposals as secondary (Nisbet, 2008). To make my case I will use
the first debate between Gov. Romney and President Obama as a case study, treating each
stage of the debate.
2. BEFORE THE DEBATE
As predictable and tiresome as it may seem the practice of each campaign attempting to
lower expectations for their own candidates performance while raising them for their
opponent persists. According to former Liberty University Director of Debate and adviser
to Mitt Romneys 2012 campaign Brett ODonnell: The expectations game is
enormousYou want to try to raise the bar for your opponent (Cottle, 2012). This is why
1

A case in point is the announcement that Hillary Clinton is set to become a grandmother, only for this
prompt questions of how it will affect her chances of winning the 2016 election (see e.g. Feldman, 2014).
The absurdity of this example is not unusual, the horse-race frame has come to completely dominate political
coverage.

1306

this is the only time during a campaign when candidates have nothing but respect and
admiration for their opponent.
President Obamas campaign manager Jim Messina emphasized Gov. Romneys
advantage in preparation: we saw a revamped Mitt Romney who has emerged fresh from
weeks of intense debate preparations Hes quick, polished, and ready (Burns, 2012).
Governor Romney also attempted to downplay expectations of himself while shifting the
pressure onto the president stating: Now, hes a very eloquent speaker and so Im sure in
the debates hell be very eloquent in describing his vision. However, some of Gov.
Romneys surrogates were unwilling to play along in the expectations management game.
Senator McCain said that "I think you could argue that Mitt has had a lot more recent
experience, obviously. (Killough, 2012). Not to be outdone New Jersey Gov. Chris
Christie set the bar shockingly high by telling Bob Schieffer on national tv This whole
race is going to turn upside down come Thursday morning (Caldwell, 2012).
Collectively, these efforts are mimetic arguments deployed by campaigns to create
bubbles of euphoria and panic for their opponents and supporters respectively. Bubbles,
usually theorized in connection to financial events, are characterized by the public
perception of a probability substantially moving away from its fundamental underlying
value. In the context of an election, the fundamental value is how probable either a debate
or electoral victory really was. For present purposes I define mimetic argumentation as an
elementary social act achieved through copying and repetition that can, if socially
contagious, cause bubbles. Essential to the process of copying is imitation; just as
investors imitate each others behaviour and standards, so political reporters and campaign
advisers imitate conventional wisdom and boilerplate statements to fit within the
mainstream of respectability. For a more complete treatment of the history of mimesis
going from Plato, Isocrates, through Gabriel Tarde extended by Elihu Katz to Walter
Benjamin, Jacques Derrida and Jean Baudrillard see Tom Goodnight and Sandy Green
(2010).
Regardless of how effectively each campaign played the expectation game, a
Washington Post-ABC poll found that 55% of likely voters thought the president would
win the debate compared to 31% who thought Gov. Romney would win thus setting the
bar each would have to clear in order to be determined winner (Henderson, 2012).
3. THE DEBATE AND ITS IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT
The debate itself included some rather significant substantive changes to Gov. Romneys
platform, exemplified by his outrage that the president would allege his tax policy would
provide tax relief for the richest 1% of Americans, despite also taking umbrage to Rick
Santorums claims in an earlier primary debate that Gov. Romneys tax policy did not
provide tax relief for the richest 1%. However, the policy positions of the candidates and
their argumentative consistency was not central, or even present, in the post-debate
analysis and evaluations.
In the immediate aftermath of the debate, all instant polls confirmed that Gov.
Romney was perceived as the winner by the public, an impression reinforced by pundits of
all political stripes. No doubt, this is in part because all the pundits and spokespersons
approached the analysis the same way taking the instant polls at face value and then
rationalizing the results. Though the verdict of pundits and spokespeople was consistent
1307

with the initial verdict of the public, it has become political wisdom that the post-debate
spin is crucial and that what is said after the debate has more political impact than what is
said during it, exemplified by the publics muted reaction to Gerald Fords gaffe against
Jimmy Carter until the press seized on it (Lang & Lang, 1979; Madsen, 1990). It is the
norm that campaign spokespersons never admit that their candidate was anything less
than brilliant and insightful or that the opposing candidate succeeded in accomplishing
anything (Hollihan, 2008, p. 235). This also means that campaigns each try to burst their
previously induced bubbles of panic and euphoria before the debate and now reverse them
so that ones own side is pleased and buoyant and likely to turn out to vote, while
depressing opposition turnout by making their candidate seem a lost cause.
However, it seems there are exceptions in lopsided debates, which is supported by
Arnie Madsens (1990) case study of the debate between Governor Dukakis and President
Bush. After the first presidential debate in 1988 the Bush campaign in essence admitted
their candidate was the weaker debater in the first joint appearance, but that Bush still won
because he smoked Dukakis liberal tendencies out. (Madsen, p. 107).
In striking contrast to the normal partisan divide in cable news over almost every
issue of fact and value, the post-debate evaluations of Democrats like James Carville and
Van Jones were in complete agreement with Republicans such as Alex Castellanos, Carly
Fiorina and Michael Steele. Not only was the end verdict identical, so were the evaluative
criteria which did not include the logic of the arguments, the argumentative consistency or
the facts supporting the positions of the two candidates. Rather, references to President
Obama as listless, passive, and not wanting to be there prevailed, while Romney was
described as confident, comfortable and driving the debate.
The attractiveness of using non-verbal communication as the decisive evaluative
criterion for pundits is clear. It has an air of objectivity about evidenced by the bipartisan
consensus in analysing the two candidates physical appearance, tone and nonverbal
argumentation. James Fallows (2012) at the Atlantic goes so far as to recommend
watching the debate with the sound turned off, in order to determine the true winner.
Furthermore, evaluations based on non-verbal communication are difficult to falsify and
they liberate pundits and journalists from having to grapple with issues of fact like what
Gov. Romneys tax policy really was or what if any logical inconsistencies candidates
tried to get away with. Moreover, it is easy to communicate to lay audiences. In a
particular jarring moment on MSNBCs coverage, former Chairman of the RNC Michael
Steele (2012) conceded that on the substance Gov. Romney might have said some untrue
things: So the substance of it I think you`re absolutely right. We can have that debate
on the substance. However, in the next sentence Steele directly stated that the truthfulness
of Gov. Romneys arguments were irrelevant: But how the American people fed off the
debate tonight, looking at the Twitter feeds, they saw a Mitt Romney they hadn`t seen
before and they liked him. Time Magazine journalist Mark Halperin (2012) concurred
stating: there`s a bunch of things he said on taxes, Medicare, on Romneycare, that fact
checkers will go to town onBut in the end you look at the polls. At the ABC Sunday
talk show roundtable, New York Times columnist and Professor of Economics Paul
Krugman tried to gently suggest a different way of evaluating the debate: Isnt our job, at
least partlially never mind the quality of the theatrical performance but to ask about,
were there untruths spoken?(Kirell, 2012). The other panellists quickly rules this out as
Peggy Noonan and James Carville stated that this was the presidents job, not theirs.
1308

On his New York Times blog, Krugman (2012) later asked: The question now is whether
the revelation that Romney was making stuff up matters. The answer, on the basis of the
evidence, is that Romney suffered no adverse consequences. Collectively, and across
political fault lines, the pundits agreed not just on awarding Gov. Romney with the
victory, but that the horse-race frame should be the way to not just analyze, but also report
the debate. This bipartisan agreement formed a consensus which took hold in the media
and gained strength and momentum through mimetic repetition across media outlets, in
particular by late night comedians and cable news anchors as the public gauged the debate
through the affective reactions by various media figures with known partisan leanings.
Enabled by a consensus verdict, these mimetic repetitions formed what I argue to be
bubbles of panic and euphoria amongst liberals and conservatives.
If prominent journalists and those paid to inform and educate the public over the
airwaves are to blame, so are the candidates themselves. The formal traditional
rhetoricians are right that the content of the presidential debate does not lend itself to great
analysis or sophisticated argument evaluations. And this is not a bug, it is a feature.
President Obamas debate training included memo cards that said advocate (dont
explain) trying to reign in the presidents heartfelt desire to rise above the gamification of
the event and participate in a meaningful way (Heileman & Halperin, 2013). The president
told his inner circle: Its easy for me to slip back into what I know, which is basically to
dissect arguments (Ibid.). A deeply concerned David Axelrod replied comfortingly and
without the slightest irony that he could help the president with his problem: you have
to find a way to get over the hump and stop fighting this gameto play this game, wrap
your arms around this game. (Ibid.). During debate drills the debate coach Ron Klain
shouted fast and hammy fast and hammy at the president when he tried to veer away
from the slogan based strategy (Ibid.). In terms of liberal panic, perhaps no image stands
out more clearly than Chris Matthews of MSNBC shouting on air, while referring to
Obama: What was he doing, where was he? visibly worried the president may have lost
the election claiming he did not watch enough MSNBC to learn how the issues ought to be
debated (Kirell, 2012b). Left leaning comedian Bill Maher, who had publicly announced
donating $1 million to the pro-Obama Super PAC Priorities USA, expressed dismay at the
presidents performance joining Michael Moore, Ed Schultz and others in not just
criticizing Obamas performance, but worrying the debate cost him the election.
Conservatives on the other hand were not just elated with Gov. Romneys
performance but convinced that Gov. Christies prediction was prophetic that Mitt
Romney had gone from being a big underdog to prohibitive favorite, now that the debate
had shown America what the real Mitt Romney was like. In the 48 hours after the debate
Gov. Romney generated $12 million in online contributions, as well as a surge in
volunteers and bigger crowds at his events, not to mention an additional 300,000 facebook
friends (OConnor & Nelson, 2012).
Faux conservative Stephen Colbert started his late night comedy show by dancing
down the stairs to the tune of Aint No Stopping us Now stating weve got a whole new
horse-race in between yelps of celebration and the occasional external oxygen supply to
contain his euphoric celebration of the debate and its implication for the race. But perhaps
nobody was as sincerely euphoric about the impact of the debate as Wall Street Journal
columnist Peggy Noonan (2012): There is no denying the Republicans have the passion
now, the enthusiasm. In Florida a few weeks ago I saw Romney signs, not Obama ones.
1309

4. THE BUBBLES AND THE AFTERMATH

The case of Romneys bubble of euphoria is perhaps exceptional because of the rare
bipartisan consensus on the verdict of the debate, but it may also in part be attributed to
the nature of the way in which people experience debates now: often across many
platforms like Twitter, TV and live blogging simultaneously. Many viewers will now
know the collective verdict of the debate before it is over as some TV outlets show live
graphical representations of focus group sentiments. Moreover, the increased speed of the
news cycle, the number of polls taken often reported daily and the ubiquitous media
coverage accelerates the building of the bubbles, which are also aided by the emergence of
social media platforms and the ability of the public to generate and remix debate
evaluations through their own memes. As these accumulate, the consensus deepens and
gets more attention in a spiral effect.
Some may claim that Romney euphoria after the first was not a bubble. After all, it
was supported by many polls, so how can do know what happened was media induced
mass hysteria rather than justified Republican optimism? There are three arguments in
response. First, irrational exuberance in the moment after the debate is the job description
of any communication director of a campaign. The Romney campaign later announced
with great fanfare that they were moving out of North Carolina and into new states,
essentially going on offense because they were so confident of winning North Carolina. It
turns out they moved one staffer. This led Jonathan Chait (2012) to categorize these efforts
as an attempt at a momentum narrative by carefully attempting to project an
atmosphere of momentum, in the hopes of winning positive media coverage and, thus,
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Second, an undeniable effect of the euphoria was a
change in expectations, and thus evaluative thresholds, for the second debate, in which
Gov. Romney did not impress. Third, a quarter of all ballots cast in the election were early
ballots, and early voting started in many states up to a month before the debate even
occurred. Moreover, the Obama campaign was a lot less nervous because their massive
polling and analytics operations knew that Gov. Romney essentially only won back
disaffected registered Republicans as opposed to independents or Democrats. Matt
Yglesias (2013) contrasted the internal polling of OFA (Organizing For America,
President Obamas Election Organization) which was steady and stagnant with the wildly
oscillating Gallup poll, ultimately concluding that public polls are made to drive media
interest and build brands which they do by proclaiming important and frequent
disturbances, not by accurately stating that not much has changed and claims that
Republican euphoria after the first debate is a bubble. In other words, polling companies
make profit by building and bursting bubbles throughout political campaigns.
5. CONCLUSION
The debate evaluations of the first presidential debate suggests that though partisan affect
is perhaps more relevant than ever, partisan debate evaluations may very well move in the
same direction, and if they do, they can enable mimetic argument evaluations that flourish
on social media with contagious amplification of what were perhaps overreactions in the
first place. These ubiquitous verdicts can drown out concerns about the costs to the public
sphere of the established campaign function of the debates.
1310

The case study of the first presidential debate of 2012 shows that bubbles of euphoria and
panic surrounding presidential elections is an empirical reality and that these bubbles are a
consequence of a flawed public argument practice driven by media conventions and
campaign strategies enabled by an insistence on interpreting the debates through the horserace frame. While presidential debates can be productive interventions changing national
debates and conversations, the risk remains that they merely operate as government
sponsored fund raising events.
To mitigate against these risks future research in public argumentation may
profitably address how presidential debates can and should be read, how society rewards
good debate and penalize deceptive, obfuscatory or otherwise socially harmful debate
practices. One intriguing suggestion, made by a journalist after the first 1988 debate
between Gov. Dukakis and President H. W. Bush, was to challenge the candidates live, on
the air, on things they said which were false and let them answer the charge. Todays
immense crowdgathering and crowdsourcing capacity of social media and digital archives
makes this a no less tempting idea. Maybe argumentation could be become a more integral
part of education from an earlier age in teaching social studies. In terms of format, David
Zarefsky has previously advocated a return to the Lincoln-Douglas format, a view he
shares with Newt Gingrich, and when two such otherwise entirely different historical
scholars reach agreement it is worth pursuing further. Finally, why not ask of analysts and
pundits to have formed a judge philosophy in advance of the debate, sketching out how
they will evaluate arguments rather resorting to ad-hoc or post-hoc rationales. The
prospects for these and other suggestions for presidential debates are certainly contestable,
but given the social and political significance of the debates theories for improvement
ought to be a continued priority for the field of argumentation.
It takes collective social responsibility to make debates work media, coaches, and
citizens alike must ask why answers to questions are or are not satisfactory, and the
significance of this. We must insist on what Tom Goodnight terms a shared ethos, and I
believe this can be done by more closely aligning the social function of presidential debate
with the campaign function for the candidates. As Charlotte Jrgensen (1998) puts it one
may either take the more cynical path and accept the restrictions imposed by TV on public
deliberation or try to make the media adapt to the needs of informed political debate.
(p. 441).
REFERENCES
Berquist, G. F., & Golden, J. (1981). Media rhetoric and the public perception of the 1980 presidential
debates. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 67, 125-137.
Burns, A. (2012, September 20th). Not since Cicero himself debated in the Roman Senate ...Politico.
Retrieved from polito.com
Caldwell, L. A. (2012, September 30th). Christie: Debate will turn race "upside-down." CBS News. Retrieved
from cbsnews.com
Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. & Stokes, D. (1960). The American Voter. Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press.
Chait, J. (2012, October 23rd). Romney Says Hes Winning Its a Bluff. The New York Magazine.

1311

Cottle, M. (2012, September 28th). The Debate Expectations Game. The Daily Beast. Retrieved from
dailybeast.com
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row.
Erikson, R. S., & Wleizen, C. (2012). The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How Campaigns Do (and Do
Not) Matter. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Fallows, J. (2012, October 3rd). Debate Cold Reaction: Yes Romney Can Debate. The Atlantic.
Feldman, L. (2014, April 17th). Chelsea Clinton baby: Will Hillary Clinton be less likely to run in 2016? The
Christian Science Monitor. Accessed June 10th from csmonitor.com.
Goodnight, G. T. & Green, S. (2010). Rhetoric, Risk, and Markets: The Dot-Com Bubble. Quarterly Journal
of Speech, 96(2), 115-140.
Goodnight, G. T., Majdik, Z., & Kephart III, J. M. (2009). Presidential Debate as Public Argument. In Scott
Jacobs & Marc Zarefsky (Eds.) Concerning Argument: Selected Papers from the 15th Biennial
Conference on Argumentation (pp. 267-280). Washington, D.C.: National Communication
Association.
Haberman, M. (2012, September 20th). Romney on Obama in debates: He'll be 'eloquent.' Politico. Retrieved
from politico.com
Heileman, J. & Halperin, M. (2013, November 2 nd). The Intervention. New York Magazine.
Halperin, M. (October 3, 2012). Special Coverage midnight hour. MSNBC, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Henderson, N. (2012, October 2nd). Ahead of presidential debate, polls show Obama ahead on key issues.
The Washington Post.
Hollihan, T. (2008). Uncivil Wars: Political Campaigns in a Media Age. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martins.
Jamieson, K. H., & Birdsell, D. S. (1988). Presidential debates: The challenge of creating an informed
electorate. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jrgensen, C. (1998). Public Debate An Act of Hostility? Argumentation, 12, 431-445.
Kirell, A. (2012a, October 7th). Paul Krugman Blasts Media for Debate Reaction: Press Just Doesnt Know
How To Handle Flat-Out Untruths. Mediate. Retrieved from mediate.com
Kirell, A. (2012b, October 3rd). Chris Matthews Epic Meltdown Over Obama Performance: What Was He
Doing Tonight?. Mediate. Retrieved from mediate.com
Kraus, S. (1987). Voters win. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 4, 214-216.
Krugman, P. (2012, October 3rd). A Test of the System. The Conscience of a Liberal. Retrieved from
blogs.nytimes.com
Killough, A. (2012, October 1st). Campaigns dig in ahead of first presidential debate. CNN. Retrieved from
cnn.com
Lang, G. E., & Lang, K. (1978). Immediate and delayed responses to a Carter-Ford debate: Assessing public
opinion. Public Opinion Quarterly, 42(3), 322341.
Madsen, A. (1991). Partisan commentary and the first 1988 presidential debate. Argumentation & Advocacy,
27, 100-113.
Meadow, R. G. (1987). A speech by any other name. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 4, 207-210.
Majdik, Z. P., Kephart III, J. M. & Goodnight, G. T. (2008). The Presidential Debates of 2004: Contested
Moments in the Democratic Experiment. Controversia, 6(1), 13-38.
Nisbet, M. C. (2008). Horse-Race Journalism. In P. Lavrakas (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Survey Research
Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Noonan, P. (2012, November 5th). Monday Morning. Peggy Noonans Blog. Retrieved from wsj.com
OConnor, P. & Nelson, C. M. (2012, October 5 th). Romney Gets a Post-Debate Jolt. The Wall Street
Journal.
Steele, M. (October 3, 2012). Special Coverage midnight hour. MSNBC, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Walton, D. N. (1989). Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Yglesias, M. (2013, June 6th). Gallups 2012 Presidential Election Polling Did Exactly What It Was
Supposed To Do. Slate. Retrieved from slate.com

1312

Think Twice: Fallacies And Dual-Process Accounts Of Reasoning

Jan Henning Schulze
Institut fr Germanistik
University of Bamberg
Germany
jan-henning.schulze@uni-bamberg.de

ABSTRACT: This paper presents some ideas of how to conceptualize thinking errors from a cognitive point
of view. First, it describes the basic ideas of dual-process theories, as they are discussed in cognitive
psychology. Next, it traces the sources of thinking errors within a dual-process framework and shows how
these ideas might be useful to explain the occurrence of traditional fallacies. Finally, it demonstrates how
this account captures thinking errors beyond the traditional paradigm of fallacies.
KEYWORDS: fallacies, thinking errors, dual process theories, cognitive processes

1. INTRODUCTION
The last three decades have seen a rapid growth of research on fallacies in argumentation
theory, on the one hand, and on heuristics and biases in cognitive psychology, on the other
hand. Although the domains of these two lines of research strongly overlap, there are only
scarce attempts to integrate insights from cognitive psychology into argumentation theory
and vice versa (Jackson, 1995; Mercier & Sperber, 2011; O'Keefe, 1995; Walton, 2010).
This paper contributes an idea on how to theorize about traditional fallacies on the basis of
dual-process accounts of cognition.
2. DUAL-PROCESS ACCOUNTS OF COGNITION
The basic idea of dual process theories is that there are at least two different types of
cognitive processes or cognitive systems (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011;
Stanovich, 2011). System 1 consists of cognitive processes that are fast, automatic and
effortless. System 1 is driven by intuitions, associations, stereotypes, and emotions. Here
are some examples: When you associate the picture of the Eiffel Tower with Paris, when
you give the result of 1+1, or when you are driving on an empty highway, then System 1
is at work. System 2, in contrast, consists of processes that are rather slow, controlled and
effortful. System 2 is able to think critically, to follow rules, to analyse exceptions, and to
make sense of abstract ideas. Some examples include: backing into a parking space,
calculating the result of 24x37, and finding a guy with glasses, red-and-white striped
shirt, and a bobble hat in a highly detailed panorama illustration. These processes take
effort and concentration.
In what follows, Im going to use processing speed as the main criterion for
distinguishing between System 1 and System 2 (Kahneman, 2011). As System 1 is the fast
cognitive system, its responses are always first. System 1 responses are there, long before
System 2 finishes its processing.

1313

Table 1 lists some characteristics that are commonly associated with System 1 and System
2 in the literature (cf. Evans, 2008, p. 257 for further attributes associated with dual
systems of thinking).

System 1
Parallel
Holistic
Unconscious (preconscious)
Independent of working memory
Independent of general intelligence
Universal

System 2
Sequential
Analytic
Conscious
Limited by working memory
capacity
Linked to general intelligence
Heritable

Table 1 Characteristics of System 1 vs. System 2 processing

The central idea of dual-process theories is that these two cognitive systems interact with
one another and that these interactions may be felicitous or infelicitous. When comparing
the vertical lines in figure 1 and figure 2, one gets the impression that the shafts of the
arrows differ in length. This is a response of the fast and automatic System 1. As long as
one doesnt take the effort of measuring lengths, one accepts this impression as
provisionally true.

Figure 1 and Figure 2 of the Mller-Lyer Illusion (Mller-Lyer, 1896, p. 1)

By using a ruler, one finds thatcontrary to the first impressionthe shafts of the arrows
are of equal length. Although one knows that the shafts are of equal length, one still sees
them as differing in length. One cannot switch off System 1, but one can override its
impressions and tell oneself that this is an optical illusion and that one must not trust ones
sensations.

1314

3. FELICITOUS INTERACTIONS AND SOURCES OF ERROR

How may one apply this framework to the domain of argumentation? Consider the
following argument.
Animals must be given more respect. Monkeys at the circus are dressed like pygmies in a zoo.
Sheep are auctioned like on a slave market. Chickens are slaughtered like in a Nazi extermination
camp.
(Adapted from the fallacyfiles.org, cf. Curtis, 2008)

System 1 might give a first response, that there is something odd about this argument,
though it cannot tell straight away what exactly is wrong with it. So System 2 gets alert for
checking the argument. Reflecting on the line of reasoning, System 2 may find that the
argument begs the question of whether animals are morally equal to humans and that the
standard view holds the reverse, i.e. humans should not be treated like animals. And
therefore slave auctions, pygmy zoos, and extermination camps are morally wrong. One
cannot shift the burden of proof by simply comparing animals to humans, because
according to current moral standards, Pygmies, slaves and Nazi victims have more moral
rights than monkeys, sheep and chickens.
This is how the interaction of System 1 and System 2 should work. System 1
produces the intuition that there is something wrong about an argument, but cannot tell
what exactly it is. System 2 starts scrutinizing the argument and comes up with analytical
reasons for why this is an unhappy argument.
However, the interactions of System 1 and System 2 are prone to error. There are
at least four different sources of such errors (Stanovich, 2011; Stanovich, Toplak, & West,
2008). The first three errors are initiated by an incorrect response of System 1, i.e. System
1 uses a heuristic rule of thumb that works well in most every-day contexts, but not in the
given context. It would be the task of System 2 to detect the error and to correct it.
However, System 2 does not perform these tasks. The fourth error originates in System 2,
when System 2 uses inappropriate rules or strategies for analysing a problem. The details
are explained in the following paragraphs.
The first kind of error: System 2 might fail to check the intuitive response of
System 1. The bat-and-ball problem is a classic example.
A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost? ____ cents
(Frederick, 2005, p. 26)

The intuitive answer is 10 cents, which is wrong. If the ball costs 10 cents and the bat
costs $1 more than the ball, then the bat costs $1.10. The sum of bat and ball thus equals
$1.20. Many intelligent people, nonetheless, give the intuitive answer without checking for
arithmetic correctness. 10 cents is the answer to an easy question, namely the question:
What is the difference of $1.10 and $1? This is a task for System 1. But that is not the
original question. The original question is a hard one and cannot be answered by intuition.
It is a task for System 2.
The second kind of error: System 2 might detect an error in the response of System 1, but
fail to override this response.
1315

A small bowl contains 10 jelly beans, 1 of which is red.

A large bowl contains 100 jelly beans, 8 of which are red.
Red wins, white loses. Which bowl do you choose?
(Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994, pp. 820ff.)

The majority of participants (82%) chose the large bowl in at least 1 out of 5 draws. This
problem can be understood as the substitution of an easy question for a hard question, too.
The easy question reads: Which bowl contains more of the red jelly beans? And it is
answered immediately by System 1: The large bowl. The original question is a hard one:
Which bowl contains a higher percentage of red jelly beans? To answer this question,
one needs to calculate a ratio. It is a task for System 2.
The third kind of error: System 2 might lack knowledge of appropriate rules for
checking the correctness of System 1 responses. Statistical illiterateness is a classic
example. Physicians were given the following task.
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of 5%, what is the
chance that a person found to have a positive result actually has the disease, assuming you know
nothing about the persons symptoms or signs?
(Casscells, Schoenberger, & Graboys, 1978)

Only 18% of medical staff and students gave the correct answer. If you dont know, how
the false positive rate is calculated, then you give an intuitive answer which is provided by
System 1. That is, youre answering an easy question, for example: What is the difference
of 100% and 5%? You were originally asked a hard question. If you do the calculation
properly, you get the correct answer, which is a chance of about 2%.
The fourth kind of error: Even if System 2 checks the intuitive response of System
1, it might happen that System 2 uses what has been called contaminated mindware
Perkins, 1995, p. 13; Stanovich, 2011, pp. 102104; Stanovich et al., 2008). System 2
might use faulty rules, misleading information, inappropriate procedures, and deficient
strategies. Consider the illusion of skill in share trading.
Overconfident investors overestimate the precision of their information and thereby the expected
gains of trading. They may even trade when the true expected net gains are negative.
(Barber & Odean, 2001, p. 289)

Again this can be considered the substitution of questions. One question is: Do I have
information that suggests selling share A and buying share B? You can think about it
using your System 2. The more you do so, the more you become confident in your
decision, which is now rationally justified. But the most important question to answer is
somewhat different: On balance, do I expect positive net gains from selling share A and
buying share B? System 2 sometimes answers the wrong questions, too.
In summary, we get a picture of different levels at which errors might occur (cf.
Stanovich, 2011, pp. 95119): System 1 uses a heuristics rule of thumb in an inapt
environment, System 2 fails to check System 1, System 2 fails to override System 1,
System 2 lacks rules or strategies to check System 1, or System 2 uses flawed rules or
strategies. All these errors can be described as substitutions of questions. Either System 1
answers an easy question instead of a hard question, or System 2 answers a hard question
with unsuitable means.
1316

4. APPLICATION TO FALLACIES
Now that I have traced the sources of thinking errors form a dual-process perspective, let
me demonstrate how this idea can be applied to traditional fallacies.
Fallacies are substitutions of easy questions for hard questions. The easy questions
are answered by System 1 in an intuitive way. The hard questions require some effort and
analytical thinking by System 2. A fallacy occurs when System 2 is not alert enough or
when System 2 applies faulty rules and strategies. Consider Affirming the consequent as
an example.
(1)

Affirming the consequent

If it rains, the streets are wet.
The streets are wet.
---------------------------------Therefore, it rains.
Hard question: Is the argument logically valid?
Easy question: Is there a strong correlation between rain and wet streets?

System 1 can answer the easy question immediately: Is there a strong correlation between
rain and wet streets? It is part of our daily experience that if the streets are wet, it usually
is because of the rain and not because someone spilt out water on the streets. Thus, System
1 gives an intuitive answer based on experience. And indeed, answers like these help us in
our daily lives. Its sensible to take an umbrella with you, when the streets are wet. Even if
the streets might theoretically be wet for other reasons than rain.
But the original question was, whether the argument is logically valid. In order to
answer this question, one needs to know the definition of logically valid and apply it to
the logical structure of this argument. Only then, after some mild effort, one arrives at the
answer that it is not logically valid. The logical fallacy of affirming the consequent
consists in not answering the hard question: Is the argument logically valid? There are
two main sources of error here. Either System 2 fails to check the intuitive answer of
System 1 (lack of awareness), or System 2 does not know the meaning of logical validity
and, therefore, is not able to correct the intuitive answer (lack of knowledge).
(2)

Argumentum ad misericordiam
Could you please grant me an extension to complete my thesis?
My dog just died and I didnt make it in time.
Hard question: Does the student meet general criteria for granting the extension.
Easy question: Do I feel pity for the student (or the dog)?

Some students are very good at finding heart-breaking reasons for not being able to meet
deadlines. Whatever triggers strong emotions, is likely to trigger a substitution of
questions. The feeling of pity strikes one without effort. Emotions are a part of System 1.
1317

One can easily answer the question: Do I feel pity for the student (or the dog)? In
contrast, it is hard work for System 2 to establish general criteria for granting an extension.
And it takes some effort to check whether the student really meets those criteria. Thus, the
hard question is: Does the student meet general criteria for granting the extension? It is
much easier to grant an extension on the basis of pity than on the basis of general criteria.
The argumentum ad misericordiam usually exploits a lack of willpower. In the
light of heart-breaking reasons, one may find it inappropriate to insist on a list of criteria,
despite the fact that one thinks extensions cannot be granted on the basis of pity.
(3)

Post hoc, ergo propter hoc

The computer worked fine until I installed the latest Windows update.
The update crashed my computer.
Hard question: Is there a causal link between the update and the crash?
Easy question: Is there a temporal link between the update and the crash?

It is very hard to establish a causal relation between two events. In order to answer the first
question, one would have to run an experiment and show that this update always crashes
any comparable computer. It is a task for System 2. Yet a causal relation implies a
temporal relation: First update, then crash. Consecutiveness is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for causality. However, it is easy to perceive consecutiveness. Thus
the second question can be answered swiftly by System 1: Is there a temporal link
between the update and the crash?Yes.
The fallacy occurs when the answer to the easy question is mistaken for an answer
to the hard question. This might happen if one is stressed about the crash and does not
have the time to think analytically about the issue (lack of awareness), or if one does not
know how to proof a causal relation between update and crash (lack of knowledge), or if
one has a prejudice against Microsoft (contaminated mindware).
5. CONCLUSION
Traditional fallacies, such as affirming the consequent, argumentum ad misericordiam, or
post hoc, ergo propter hoc, can be viewed as substitutions of questions. A fallacy occurs
whenever one substitutes an easy question for a hard question without good reason. Easy
questions can be answered fast and without effort; hard questions are characterized by
them being answered slowly and with effort.
Conceptualizing fallacies this way opens a venue for applying dual-process
accounts of reasoning to traditional fallacies. Cognitive processes in System 1 are fast,
automatic, and effortless; cognitive processes in System 2 are slow, controlled, and
effortful. This results in System 1 answering the easy question first. System 2 should
check and correct the easy answer, where necessary. However, it may fail to do so for
quite different reasons: (a) System 2 might fail to check the first response because of a
lack of awareness, (2) it might detect an error but fail to override this response, or (c) it
might not know how to check and correct the first response, and (d) sometimes it uses

1318

flawed rules and strategies to fulfil this task. All four kinds of thinking errors result in
fallacies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In memoriam of Thomas Becker, a great teacher and an encouraging supervisor. I would
like to thank Hans V. Hansen for providing valuable hints and feedback on my talk. All
shortcomings remain my own.

REFERENCES
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2001). Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common stock
investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 261292. doi:10.1162/003355301556400
Casscells, W., Schoenberger, A., & Graboys, T. B. (1978). Interpretation by physicians of clinical laboratory
results. New England Journal of Medicine, 299(18), 9991001.
doi:10.1056/NEJM197811022991808
Curtis, G. N. (2008). Fallacy files: Question-begging analogy. Retrieved from
http://www.fallacyfiles.org/qbanalog.html
Denes-Raj, V., & Epstein, S. (1994). Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: When people
behave against their better judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(5), 819
829. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.819
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. Annual
Review of Psychology, 59(1), 255278. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the
debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223241. doi:10.1177/1745691612460685
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4),
2542. doi:10.1257/089533005775196732
Jackson, S. (1995). Fallacies and heuristics. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A.
Willard (Eds.), Analysis and Evaluation. Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on
Argumentation, Volume II (pp. 257269). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. London: Allen Lane.
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(2), 5774. doi:10.1017/S0140525X10000968
Mller-Lyer, F. C. (1896). Zur Lehre von den optischen Tuschungen: ber Kontrast und Konfluxion.
Zeitschrift fr Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, 9, 116.
O'Keefe, D. J. (1995). Argumentation studies and dual-process models of persuasion. In F. H. van Eemeren,
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the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation (University of Amsterdam, June 21-24, 1994)
(pp. 6176). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. Retrieved from http://www.dokeefe.net/pub/OKeefe95ISSAProceedings.pdf
Perkins, D. N. (1995). Outsmarting IQ: The emerging science of learnable intelligence. New York: Free
Press.
Stanovich, K. E. (2011). Rationality and the reflective mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stanovich, K. E., Toplak, M. E., & West, R. F. (2008). The development of rational thought: A taxonomy of
heuristics and biases. Advances in child development and behavior, 36, 251285.
Walton, D. N. (2010). Why fallacies appear to be better arguments than they are. Informal Logic, 30(2),
159184. Retrieved from
http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/2868

1319

Argumentation As A Rational Choice

Menashe Schwed
Philosophy
Ashkelon Academic College
Israel
m.schwed@outlook.com

ABSTRACT: The paper focuses on the thesis that argumentation essentially involves a choice. I wish to
show how argumentation theory might reflect this essential feature. In the 2013 OSSA conference, I argued
that practices of argumentation reflect choices made on moral and political grounds. My purpose in this
paper is to develop this thesis, such that it deals with the problem of rationality in argumentation in a like
manner.
KEYWORDS: Argumentation, theory, choice, epistemology, philosophy, rationality, pragmatic,
Wittgenstein, Grice.

1.
My main thesis is that argumentation is a practice and essentially involves a choice. The
practice of argumentation is historically and culturally situated. In my paper for the last
2013 OSSA conference I focused on two propositions (Schwed, 2013): The first one is
that the historical and philosophical roots of argumentation are in ethics and politics and
not in any formal ideal, be it mathematical, scientific or other. Furthermore, argumentation
is a human invention and practice, deeply tied up with the emergence of democracy in
ancient Greece. The second proposition is that argumentation presupposes and advances
Humanistic values, especially the autonomy of the individual to think, decide and choose
in a free and uncoerced manner, and the choice to prefer the way of reason. I named it the
humanistic stance, which provides for philosophical skepticism, whence argumentation is
one choice among other ethical and political choices to resolve differences of opinions.
My purpose in this paper is to further develop this thesis, such that it deals with the
problem of rationality in argumentation in a like manner. The general idea is that the
demand for rationality is a basic choice, derived from the moral and political ones, which
are essential to it.
The preoccupation with the concept of rationality in the modern time starts with
the philosophy of the Enlightenment:
Enlightenment was a desire for human affairs to be guided by rationality rather than by faith,
superstition, or revelation; a belief in the power of human reason to change society and liberate the
individual from the restraints of custom or arbitrary authority; all backed up by a world view
increasingly validated by science rather than by religion or tradition. (Outram, 1995, p. 3)

However, despite the fact that this modernist paradigm was challenged beginning with the
19th century, it has survived. The inheritance of the Enlightenment survived not only
within philosophy, but more importantly in and through science. One of the ideas that
1320

survived is the idea that rationality is a choice made for dealing with controversies and
other problematic situations in John Dewy terms (Dewey, 1981-1990). The claim made in
this paper is that this idea of rationality as a choice should be used also to characterized
rationality in argumentation.
The first step in this direction is to propose to redefine the debate regarding the
place rationality has in argumentation and its nature in terms of two basic approaches: the
approach of Externalism in epistemology (Brueckner, 2012; Lau & Deutsch, 2014) versus
the approach of Cultural-Pragmatic akin to the late Wittgensteinian philosophy. The first
approach of Externalism in epistemology argues that rationality is inherent in the practices
of argumentation and that arguments manifest rational adequacy as a necessary part of
their essence. I terms the first approach as 'externalist' since rationality is given as an
epistemic norm or value, external to the argumentation practices. It is external, since
arguments are evaluated according to how good they fulfil their epistemic function. This
approach is held by many in argumentation to some degree or other (Biro J. I., 1977; Biro
J. I., 1984; Blair, 2004; Johnson, 2000; Siegel, 1989; Biro & Siegel, 2006). The second
approach argues that rationality should be understood pragmatically and is nothing more
than a norm or value that arguers choose to employ. I term the second approach the
Cultural-Pragmatic approach since this approach finds its foundation in Paul Grice (1989)
and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) and their cultural-pragmatist philosophy.
The externalist approach assumes that the capacity to hold beliefs, make
judgments, give reasons for actions, and hold something for true and false is due to a given
epistemological norms of rationality. Argumentation, under this view, is a manifestation of
rationality through language as an instrument of communication. Hence, without
rationality there is no reasonable communication and hence no argumentation. What is
crucial for this approach is that rationality will transcendent those actual usages of
argumentation and function as a regulative ideal that will enable criticism of activities and
institutions. This approach, therefore, tends to favor the allegedly non cultural essence of
rationality (Habermas, 1994, p. 139; Putnam, 1982, p. 8). Obviously, adherents of the
externalist approach recognize the immanence of rationality and its being always relative
to context and institution. This approach do not fail in the philosophical fantasy of
rationality being abstract beyond history, culture and the complexity of social life but
acknowledge its being situated in actual history and the complexities of social practices.
The externalist approach, however, strives to maintain a balance between the contextdependency or immanence of rationality and its transcendence as a regulative ideal at the
same time.
The cultural-pragmatic approach, on the other hand, rejects the urge to maintain
this balance by rejecting the universal side and argues for the resulting adoption of cultural
relativism. Wittgenstein is known for his criticism of the idealistic concepts of reason and
rationality. He argues that the primacy of the universal over the particular is the dominant
view in Western intellectual tradition and the continental European philosophical tradition.
However, he describes this dominant view as "the craving for the generality" and "the
contemptuous attitude towards the particular case (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 18).
Obviously, this Wittgensteinian approach fully integrates contextual, historical and
cultural considerations as part of the complexities of social life. However, what is more
crucial to the point made here is that this approach takes rationality as a manifestation of a
1321

choice rather than of a good argument. This choice is a part of a historical and cultural
context that contains ideas which give rise to certain way of dealing with controversies
and other problematic situations. The choice in rationality as part of argumentation
practices is part of a given culture, influenced and dominated by rational ideas (Habermas,
1984). Rationality, according to this approach, is not universal or objective or even just a
regulative ideal. Thus, communication in general and persuasion in particular do not have
any intrinsic ties with rationality. For rationality to be a constitutive element of persuasion,
a choice has to be made for adopting rationality as the constitutive element of arguments.
This debate concerning the place rationality has in argumentation theory naturally
presupposes different conceptions of philosophical approaches for confronting
epistemological questions. This paper is a criticism of externalist approaches in
epistemology on the one hand, and on the other an attempt to reconceive the
epistemological approach of Wittgenstein's later philosophy (Wittgenstein, 1958). The
question regarding the proper philosophical approach to rationality in argumentation
pertains to the forms of account given in analyzing argumentative practices. Any
philosophical approach often implicitly shapes the specific claims concerning the nature of
rationality in argumentation theory. In the following sections, I discuss the philosophical
approach of the Externalism in epistemology and argue that this approach is prone to end
up in aporia by attempting to authorize a conception of rationality in general. Furthermore,
I argue that another, pragmatic, conception of rationality deserve consideration as a better
approach to argumentation theory.
2.
The externalist approach to rationality suggests that this notion precedes that of
argumentation. I propose to invert the anteriority of rationality. The shift in emphasis is an
attempt to move away from the question concerning the proper conception of rationality
that has occupied philosophy in general and argumentation theory in particular since its
inception. Instead, the focus should be on the practices of rationality that stand behind
accounts, which claim to capture the proper meaning of this notion. This shift in focus is
relevant to many debates about both argumentation theory and rationality. These debates
center on two related sets of questions that have occupy the philosophy of argumentation
and which can be summarized as follows:
1.

2.

The problem of Demarcation: What is the proper ontological or epistemological

demarcation between argumentation and other related fields such as rhetoric?
Consequently, what is the proper methodological attitude for studying
argumentation in light of the character of its possible objects? For instance, does
some visual objects can be considered as proper arguments?
The problem of Rationality: What are the correct criteria of rationality for
evaluating arguments? Are these criteria fixed, variable or set by the context of
research, as supposedly the criteria of scientific rationality? Are they emergent in
the specific context of the community that uses them? Consequently, does
rationality is the key concept for answering the previous problem of Demarcation
between rhetoric and argumentation?
1322

The first question concerning demarcation had been premised on the affirmation or denial
of the thesis that rationality is the key to the problem of demarcation between
argumentation and rhetoric (Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002; Johnson, 2000). The question is
also whether it is a strict demarcation or continuity between argumentation and rhetoric.
The second question begins with the failure of the conception of rationality as an abstract,
objective, universal and unitary concept. One of the reasons for this failure is the apparent
social dependency of rationality itself. Although these reasons are still much debated, they
should lead to a less abstract and unitary conception of rationality. More specifically, the
idea of a unitary concept of rationality applied to any argument in general has to be
generally given up: different argument assume different modes or concepts of rationality
and, thus, leads the way for a more relaxed naturalism and epistemological pluralism.
The externalist approach to the above questions of demarcation and rationality may
be committed to a wrong philosophy of meaning. The traditional approaches to these
debates, objectivist and hermeneutic alike, base the rational of their approaches on a
conception of meaning as a sui generis concept which was rejected by many. This concept
is more than questionable given the skepticism of Quine's (1951), Kripke's (1982) and
Davidson's (1974) among others. Quine and others undermine the conception of meaning
as based on the notion of language as independent of their uses and practices.
Consequently, it weakens the possibility of theories of meaning that will be able to ground
rationality or argument as categorically different from the actual practices in which they
are involved. In other words, it weakens the possibility of non-naturalized theories of
meaning in this context and, thus, a non-naturalized conception of rationality.
Indeed, the focus should not be on whether but how the concepts of meaning,
normativity, and rationality as hallmark concepts of argumentation practices are to be
naturalized. The important question in the philosophy of argumentation is how meaning,
normativity, rationality, and the like can be placed in a naturalistic framework.
3.
The suggestion of how the naturalization of the concept of rationality in argumentation
should be done is a paraphrase to one of Wittgenstein's known remarks regarding 'meaning
as use" (PI, 43): For a large class of cases of the employment of the word 'rationality' it
can be defined thus: the rationality of an argument is its use in the language. What it
means is that the use of rationality in arguments is part of a language activity of a language
game, such as describing an object, giving or obeying an order, telling a joke, or
convincing in a rational way. The suggestion of 'rationality as use' illustrates a more
general aspect of use and Wittgenstein sometimes speaks of it as kinds of use (PI, 23). It is
the use of rationality in argumentation that matters: "Every sign by itself seems dead. What
gives it life? In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? Or is the use its life?" (PI,
432).
One way to fully understand the importance of the overemphasis of 'use' is to begin
with the simple complaint that rational behavior is not as prevalent in communication as
the tradition of philosophy makes it seems. This complaint expresses at least two different
approaches: either rationality is universal and objective, although in practice there are
more instances that do not conform to it than admitted. Or rationality is not universal and
1323

objective to begin with. The two approaches disagree on whether to see rationality as a
backdrop, which has important consequences for the understanding of argumentation.
One such important consequent to the cultural-pragmatic approach is the
importance of socialized motives in communication in general and in argumentation in
particular. Its view of rationality posits that rationality is just one among a number of
possible socialized motives. This approach is the answer to the criticism that accuses the
externalist approach of being oblivious to the fact of socio-cultural variation. For instance,
the linguistics and pragmatics Jacob Mey argues that:
[This criticism of universal rationality] can be extended to other domains of human behavior; in
particular, I want to apply it to the rationality of language and its use. Negatively [a] rationality
of language use, if such a concept indeed has validity, must relate itself to the structure of the
particular society which is the carrier of that language. Positively, it entails that we must carry out a
close investigation of the society we're dealing with... before making any statement about language
and its use in that society... My only claim is that language functions in a particular society. Its use
as a tool of societal activity depends on the way society itself functions. (Mey, 1985, p. 178)

It does not make much sense to postulate a theory of argumentation which only consider
abstract norms of efficiency and reasonableness as constitutive properties of
argumentative practices. According to the cultural-pragmatic approach, many other sociocultural factors must be taken into consideration in theorizing about argumentation, such
as the role of stereotyping, prejudice, preconceptions, affections, and so on. The
conception of rationality is reconstructed as a set of norms, which constitutes one possible
practice in persuasion, along with many other different practices. Thus, rationality
becomes a non-universal, inter-subjective and socialized concept and hence opens up for
socio-cultural variation and factors (Sarangi & Slembrouck, 1992).
This characterization brings to mind Habermas known concept of communicative
rationality (Habermas, 1984, p. 10). Being rational in Habermas' terms means striving for
consensus by argumentative speech, and the process is embedded in language, culture and
social practices. It emphasis motivation by inter-subjective common interest in achieving
consensus from a rational perspective (Habermas, 1984, p. 19). Habermas' approach
emphasizes the normative essence of that consensus seeking motivation: a rational
community encourages rational behavior in terms of consensus seeking by valuing it as
morally good and by valuing communication as the best means to that end.
This norm or value of rational communication is just another example of socialized
norm, which will be manifested in societies where rationality is a dominate norm.
However, no society is so rational that its norms are never violated, rationality and
consensus seeking among others (Briggs, 1997). The fact of constant disappointment in
such norms and ideals is one of Habermas' concerns in his theory of communicative action.
However, one of the weakness in Habermas' approach is that he does not fully apprehend
how crucial the elements of choice in this normative characterization of rationality are.
One of the reasons for this was mentioned above. Habermas as well as Putnam strive to
keep some allegedly non cultural essence of rationality, which in their view is necessary
for its function as a communicative norm. However, if rationality is conceived as a choice
which is not necessarily taken nor obeyed, then there is plenty of room to study the
complexity of communication and argumentation giving this social fact. Acknowledging

1324

this social and cultural fact is one important step towards the naturalization of the concept
of rationality.
Such a naturalization in a Wittgensteinian way must begin with Grice. He was one
of the first philosophers to emphasize the cultural, social and intersubjective aspects of
language in his principles and maxims of conversation. In the Retrospective Epilogue to
his Studies in the way of words (1989), he re-emphasizes these aspects regarding the place
rationality has in conversation maxims, and re-labelling his maxims principles of
conversational rationality:
Perhaps some refinement in our apparatus is called for. First, it is only certain aspects of our
conversational practice which are candidates for evaluation, namely those which are crucial to its
rationality rather than to whatever other merits or demerits it may possess; so, nothing which I say
should be regarded as bearing upon the suitability or unsuitability of particular issues for
conversational exploration; it is the rationality or irrationality of conversational conduct which I
have been concerned to track down rather than any more general characterization of conversational
adequacy. So we may expect principles of conversational rationality to abstract from the special
character of conversational interests. Second, I have taken it as a working assumption that whether
a particular enterprise aims at a specifically conversational result or outcome and so perhaps is a
specifically conversational enterprise, or whether its central character is more generously conceived
as having no special connection with communication, the same principles will determine the
rationality of its conduct. It is irrational to bite off more than you can chew whether the object of
your pursuit is hamburgers or the Truth. (Grice, 1989, p. 369)

Grice's philosophical spirit lies in the cultural, social and pragmatic nature of rationality
and its inherent ties to conversation (Kasher, 1976). Grice's Cooperation Principle is part
of a theory of meaning built around the notion of rationality within Grice's social
pragmatics framework. Rationality signifies the adoption of the common aim of
negotiating for some solution such as a consensus. However, even if communication is
viewed as driven by a common interest, rationality will still be just one choice among
several other possible choices. Rationality, according to this approach, does not account
for the traditional epistemological requirements, but will conform to how rationality is
used in argumentation practices.
4.
The importance of understanding 'rationality as use' is the outcome of bonding the concept
of rationality with Wittgenstein's later philosophy. That means understanding rationality in
terms of "language games" as a social practice, "form of life", and cultural institutions.
However, Wittgenstein's conception in this paper is extended to forms of not only
language usages and actions, but also any form of cultural choice, which is surely hinted in
his concept of "form of life". Wittgenstein's approach of the pragmatic and social practice
of language games and life forms may also be used philosophically on different level to
grasp and to constitute a cultural choice. A choice in a language game plays a pragmatic
role in Wittgenstein's approach. However, not only socially based speech forms and
actions as well as "life forms" are dependent on active pragmatic choice, but also a choice
as a cultural action and even institutionalized one. Not only do language games rely on
choice but, philosophically speaking, they are special case of a wider meaning of 'choice'.
Thus, constituting a parallelism between "language games" and life forms in the
1325

Wittgensteinian sense and political and cultural choice in the cultural relativism sense,
similar to that of Franz Boas.
Cultural relativism is the refusal of Western philosophical claims to universality on
epistemological grounds (Marcus & Fischer, 1986, p. 1), much in Wittgenstein's sense of
philosophizing (PI, 124, 217, and 654). This is most obvious in the case of language,
which is not only a means of communication but also a means of categorizing experiences
and different world views. In this sense, judgments and preferences are obviously based on
experience, but these experiences are interpreted by each individual or community in
terms of their language games, form of life and eventually by their enculturation. It is not
just a philosophical and anthropological stance, but a critical stance in response to Western
ethnocentrism. The general idea is that rationality according to the approach of
externalism in epistemology is just one example to this Western ethnocentrism.
Furthermore, cultural relativism is based on specific epistemological approach that
was also transformed into methodological pragmatics and qualitative research methods.
This epistemological approach has its origin in skepticism regarding the possibility of
direct and unmediated knowledge of reality. It is the skeptical argument regarding the
epistemological impossibility to distinguish reality from illusion. Thus, experiences of
reality according to this approach are mediated through language and culture and not just
dependent on the cognitive structure of the human mind. In other words, human
experience is mediated not only by the cognitive structure, but by particular language
game, form of life and particular cultural structure as well. This is somewhat a more
radical reading of Davidson's "conceptual scheme" but still well positioned in the
boundaries of this concept (Davidson, On the very idea of a conceptual scheme, 1974).
The notions of rationality and reasonable belief are very flexible (Davidson, 2005, p. 121)
as he indicated in the following:
The issue is not whether we all agree on exactly what the norms of rationality are; the point is rather
that we all have such norms and we cannot recognize as thought phenomena that are too far out of
line. Better say: what is too far out of line is not thought. It is only when we can see a creature (or
object) as largely rational by our own lights that we can intelligibly ascribe thoughts to it at all, or
explain its behavior by reference to its ends and convictions. (Davidson, 2004, pp. 97-8)

The most obvious implication is the case of language as a means for reconstructing
experiences. In anthropology this hypothesis is known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.
Different cultural communities, using different languages, will have different conceptual
schemes that might be non-compatible or non-commensurable to some degree, and nor
more or less in accord with reality or the external world (Gumperz & Levinson, 1996;
Leavitt, 2011). These ideas are known in philosophy through the works of Wittgenstein,
Quine and Searle. They all argue that conceptualization and categorization are learned and
that they are basically arbitrary. Thus, reality can be conceived in multiple ways, giving
rise to different ways of understanding and theorizing of the same phenomena. In this
respect, Wittgensteinian philosophical attitude is of fundamental methodological
importance, because it calls attention to the importance of the understanding the rules of a
language game in understanding the meaning of particular form of life and social and
cultural practice. This understanding of the rules can be acquired only by learning the
language game from within and by partially enculturated into that form of life.
1326

But this cultural relativism should not be confused with moral relativism or even
ethnocentrism. More specifically, it does not follow that if there are many forms of life
and cultures, than they are all equally accepted and however different they are, they are all
equally valid. Rather, the acceptability of any form of life must be evaluated with regard to
the fact that there is a choice at the bottom of each form of life. And although one's
choices, be it moral, political or other, are rooted in one's culture or form of life, the fact is
that people could have choose otherwise. The ability to choose might be considered as a
universal moral standard. Or whether this ability to choose makes sense only in terms of
specific form of life or culture? What if the emphasize of choice expresses a value that far
from being universally human, is really Western?
One sensible solution to this problem would be the following formulation of
cultural relativism: "there are or can be no value judgments that are true, that is,
objectively justifiable, independent of specific cultures" (Schmidt, 2009, p. 170). The
methodological function of this formulation is that it requires anyone trying to understand
a language game to reflect on how their own enculturation has shaped their point of view
and realize also that the emphasis of choice might be a form of cultural imperialism.
Making a choice for some moral or epistemological value or norm is neither self-evident
universal, nor entirely personal and thus idiosyncratic, but rather an act in relation to one's
own culture or form of life. Within this relativistic approach, the thesis is that people do
have moral and epistemological choices and these choices have consequences. One of
these moral and epistemological choices is to choose to be rational in the argumentative
sense. Here is where the element of choice becomes crucial. One's experiences is not
limited by one's culture and one's culture is not the center of everything (Antweiler, 2012,
pp. 130-138).
5.
So how rationality becomes a choice in argumentation? A pragmatic answer to this
question was already given by Grice. When he discusses speaker-meaning and speakerintention, he makes a decisive connection between rationality and choice via the notion of
value:
my own position, which I am not going to state or defend in any detail at the moment, is that the
notion of value is absolutely crucial to the idea of rationality, or of a rational being I have strong
suspicions that the most fruitful idea is the idea that a rational creature is a creature which
evaluates Value is in there from the beginning, and one cannot get it out. (Grice, 1982, p. 238)

Value is connected then to the idea of 'what is preferable to do' and 'what one should
choose' (Grice, 1982, p. 239). This idea is rooted in the Cooperation Principle as the
concept of rationality is used by Grice in characterizing this principle: "one of my
avowed aims is to see talking as a special case of variety of purposive, indeed rational
behavior" (Grice, 1975, p. 47). It is hard to figure out precisely what is Grice's notion of
rationality since he never addressed the subject separately, but always as a mean to explain
other concepts. In some places, Grice understands the idea of rationality in terms of
purposiveness, assuming that this understanding is self-explanatory. Thus, Grice sees
cooperation as the necessary outcome from the application of reason to the process of
1327

conversation and as the realization of rationality (Grice, Reply to Richards, 1986, pp. 65,
87). Yet, in other places, Grice makes clear that to be rational in context of conversation is
a choice that should be made:
A dull but, no doubt at a certain level, adequate answer is that it is just a well-recognized empirical
fact the people do behave in these ways I am, however, enough of a rationalist to want to find a
basis that underlies these facts, undeniable though they may be; I would like to be able to think of
the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do in fact
follow but as something that it is reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon. (Grice,
1975, p. 48)

This ambiguity in the writings of Grice made others to try and solve it. Kasher (1976), for
instance, seeks to replace the Cooperation Principle by some form of Rationality Principle,
where participants seek to minimize effort. However, this line of reasoning leads Kasher to
characterize rationality in means-end terms, where the minimization of effort is the
consequent of rationality. Thus, redefining rationality in utilitarian terms of efficiency.
The question whether this is the right interpretation to Grice's approach, given his rejection
of utilitarianism, will not be addressed here. Rather, it should be pointed out that the
deficiency in Kasher's approach is that it ignores the place value and choice have in
Grice's notion of being rational.
The participants in communication chose to be rational on the assumption that
rationality is the backbone of cooperativity and thus that of argumentation as the mean for
solving controversies. It is a choice since rationality is not intrinsic to human nature, but
rather only one choice among a number of possible choices. This is visible more in Grice's
later work (Grice, 1986; 1989) as he comes to favor the notions of 'value' and 'evaluating'.
Principles and maxims of conversation has their technical meaning in Grice's work and in
pragmatic in general. However, these have also a more general and philosophical meaning,
which transcend linguistics into philosophy. Only then, the place of rationality in
argumentation can be characterized as a choice. Argumentative practices that display
rationality are bounded by certain rules, which are necessary only from within the
language game point of view. But the rules were adopted in light of achieving the ends for
which the language game is used. Thus understanding rationality or being rational in terms
of a choice in specific language game and form of life.
To conclude this paper, I have presented what I see as an important shift in the
discussion of the nature of rationality in argumentation. I have argued against the tendency
to exclude the notion of rationality from its uses in argumentation practices. It is suggested
that rationality is a constituent of specific language games, which are examples of human
rational behavior and action, and thus to be accounted for through the study of
argumentation. My aim was to stress the need for a cultural-pragmatic approach, which
can account for the uses of rationality. This approach seek to study the manifestations of
rational behavior and action while rejecting the traditional Western tendency to exclude
rationality from its uses.

1328

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Putnam, H. (1982). Why reason can't be naturalized? Synthese, 52(1), 3-23.

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A Formal Model Of Conductive Reasoning

Marcin Selinger
Department of Logic and Methodology of Sciences
University of Wrocaw
Poland
marcisel@uni.wroc.pl

ABSTRACT: I propose a formal model of representation and numerical evaluation of conductive

arguments. Such arguments consist not only of pro-premises supporting a claim, but also of contrapremises denying this claim. Offering a simple and intuitive alternative to accounts developed in the area of
computational models of argument, the proposed model recognizes internal structure of arguments, allows
infinitely many degrees of acceptability, reflects the cumulative nature of convergent reasoning, and
enables to interpret attack relation.
KEYWORDS: argument evaluation, argument structure, attack relation, conductive reasoning, logical force
of argument, rebuttal.

1. INTRODUCTION
According to Wellmans original definition (1971) the conclusion of any conductive
argument is drawn inconclusively from its premises. Moreover, the premises and the
conclusion are about one and the same individual case, i.e. the conclusion is drawn
without appeal to any other case. Wellman also gave three leading examples of
conductive arguments, which determine three patterns of conduction:
(1)
(2)
(3)

You ought to help him for he has been very kind to you.
You ought to take your son to the movie because you promised, and you have
nothing better to do this afternoon.
Although your lawn needs cutting, you want to take your son to the movies
because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow.

Wellmans definition was an object of many interesting views, opinions and

interpretations, mostly surveyed in (Blair & Johnson 2011). However, we do not discuss
this issue here, but we simply follow these authors who, as Walton & Gordon (2013),
focus on the third pattern and propose to take conductive arguments to be the same as
pro-contra arguments. Such arguments, except of a normal pro-premise or premises (The
picture is ideal for children; It will be gone by tomorrow), have also a con-premise or
premises (Your lawn needs cutting).
In the next two chapters we analyze conductive arguments from the logical point
of view. The conduction is regarded here as one act of reasoning, in which a conclusion is
drawn by the same time from both types of premises. In Chapter 2 we describe the
structure and in Chapter 3 a method of evaluation of conductive arguments. This
method is based on the model of argument proposed in (Selinger 2014). In Chapter 4 we

1331

introduce a dialectical component of the analysis. Namely, by means of our model, we

discuss definition of attack relation holding between arguments.
2. STRUCTURE OF CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS
There are many ways of expressing conductive arguments in natural language. Some of
them are the following:

Since A, even though B, therefore C.

A, therefore C, although B.
Although B, C because A.
B, but (on the other hand) A, therefore C.
Despite B, (we know that) A, therefore C.

In the above schemes the letter A represents a pro-premise (or pro-premises), B a conpremise (or con-premises) and C a conclusion. It is worth to note that pro-premises are
presented as overcoming con-premises, so that an argument can be accepted if they really
do. There are two types of inference in conductive arguments: pro-premises support and
con-premises deny (contradict, attack) conclusions. They can be represented using the
standard diagramming method. Figure 1 shows the diagram of Wellmans third example.

Relation of support is represented by the solid and relation of contradiction by the

dashed line.1 In order to reflect this duality in our formal model we follow Walton &
Gordons idea involving the assignment of Boolean values to these two types of
inference, however, we propose to use simpler formal structures than the so-called
argument graphs (cf. Walton & Gordon 2013).
Let L be a language, i.e. a set of sentences. Sequents are all the tuples of the form
<P, c, d>, where P L is a non-empty, finite set of sentences (premises), c L is a single
sentence (conclusion), and d is a Boolean value (1 in pro-sequents and 0 in con-sequents).
1

Let us note that Walton & Gordon (2013) interpret both pro-premises as supporting the claim
independently of each other, and they draw separate arrows connecting each pro-premise with the
conclusion, which represent convergent reasoning. However, it seems to be problematic whether the
premise The picture will be gone tomorrow alone (i.e. without any further information about the movie)
actually supports the conclusion.

1332

An argument is simply any finite, non-empty set of sequents. If an argument consists of

only one sequent then it will be called an atomic argument.
The premises of an argument are all the premises of all its sequents. The
conclusions of an argument are all the conclusions of all its sequents. The first premises
are those premises, which are not the conclusions, and the final conclusions are those
conclusions, which are not the premises. Finally, the intermediate conclusions are those
sentences, which are both the conclusions and the premises. A typical (abstract) argument
structure is presented in Figure 2 by the diagram corresponding to the set: {<{1}, 5, 1>,
<{2}, 5, 0>, <{3}, 5, 0>, <{4}, 9, 1>, <{5}, 13, 1>, <{6}, 15, 1>, <{7}, 15, 1>,
<{8}, 15, 0>, <{9}, 16, 1>, <{10}, 18, 1>, <{11}, 18, 0>, <{12, 13, 14}, 20, 1>,
<{15, 16}, , 1>, <{17}, , 1>, <{18, 19}, , 0>, <{20}, , 0>}. This argument
consists of 16 different sequents (10 of them are pro- and 6 are con-sequents), so it is the
sum of the same number of atomic arguments. The premises are all the sentences in the
diagram except of , which is the final conclusion; the conclusions are: 5, 9, 13, 15,
16, 18, 20, ; the first premises: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 19; the
intermediate conclusions: 5, 9, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20.

By the means of our formalism also atypical structures can be distinguished (cf. Selinger
2014). Some of them are illustrated by Figure 3. Circular arguments can have no first
premises and/or no final conclusion (two examples in Figure 3 have neither the first
premises nor the final conclusion). They are interesting argument structures, e.g. for those
who deal with antinomies, however, we do not discuss them, since they are mostly
regarded as faulty. On the other hand, divergent arguments and incoherent arguments can
have more than one final conclusion. They are not faulty (unless from some purely
pragmatic point of view), but they can be represented as the sums of non-divergent and
coherent arguments. Therefore, when discussing evaluation of conductive arguments in
the next chapter, we focus on typical argument structures like that shown in Figure 2.

1333

3. EVALUATION OF CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS

The central question to be considered in this section is: how to transform the values of
first premises into the value of final conclusion? We answer this question in three steps
concerning evaluation of atomic, convergent and, finally, conductive arguments.
First we introduce some basic notions. Each partial function v: L[0, 1], where
L L, is an evaluation function. The value v(p) is the (degree of) acceptability of p. We
consider also a predefined function w: LL[0, 1]. The value w(c/p) is the acceptability
of c under the condition that v(p) = 1, so that the function w will be called conditional
acceptability.
We assume that L contains the negation connective. If the premises of some
sequent deny its conclusion c then evaluation of c will be based on evaluation of the
sentence c in the corresponding pro-sequent, in which the same premises support c.
Let us note that for a perfectly rational agent the condition v(c) = 1 v(c) should be
satisfied. This postulate will be useful to evaluate con-sequents.
Let v be a given evaluation function (we assume that v is fixed in the following
part of our exposition). By P we denote the conjunction of all the sentences belonging
to a finite, non-empty set P (if P is a singleton then P is the sole element of P). We
assume that L contains the conjunction connective, and if P dom(v) then P dom(v).2
The value w(c/P) will be called the internal strength of a pro-sequent <P, c, 1>, and the
value w(c/P) the internal strength of a con-sequent <P, c, 0>.
Let A = {<P, c, d>} be an atomic argument, where P dom(v), c dom(v), and d
is a Boolean value. The function vA is the following extension of v to the set dom(v)
{c}:
(4)
(5)

If d = 1 then vA(c) = v(P)w(c/P);

If d = 0 then vA(c) = 1 v(P)w(c/P).

Thus the acceptability of the conclusion of an atomic argument under condition that its
premises are fully acceptable is reduced proportionally to the actual acceptability of the
premises. The value vA(c) will be called the (logical) strength (or force) of an argument
2

In order to avoid this assumption the acceptability of an independent set of sentences can be calculated as
the product of the values of its elements. Thus the acceptability of a conjunction can be smaller than the
acceptability of its components considered separately (cf. Selinger 2014).

1334

A. We will say that a pro-argument is acceptable iff its strength is greater than , and a
con-argument is acceptable iff its strength is smaller than .
In the next step we consider evaluation of convergent reasoning. Since convergent
argumentation is used to cumulate the forces of different reasons supporting (or denying)
a claim we have to add these forces in a way adapted to our scale. Strengths of pro- and
con-components will be added separately in each of both groups, independently of the
other. Let A = A1 A2 , where both A1 and A2 are acceptable arguments and they either
consist of only pro- or of only con-sequents having the same conclusion c. Let vA1(c) = a1
and vA2(c) = a2.
(6)
(7)

If A1 and A2 are independent pro-arguments, and a1, a2 > , then vA(c) = a1 a2;
If A1 and A2 are independent con-arguments, and a1, a2 < , then vA(c) = 1 (1
a1) (1a2), where x y = 2x + 2y 2xy 1.

In (Selinger 2014) we provide a justification of this algorithm, deriving it from the

principle (satisfied also by the algorithms given in (4) and (5)) that can be called the
principle of proportionality, according to which the strength of argument should vary
proportionally to the values assigned to its components. We also discuss properties of the
operation (here let us only mention that it is both commutative and associative,
therefore the strengths of any number of converging, independent arguments can be
added in any order).
Finally, we consider conductive reasoning. In order to compute the final value of a
conductive argument we will subtract the strength of its con- from the strength of its procomponents in a way adapted to our scale. Let A = Apro Acon, where Apro consists only
of pro-sequents and Acon only of con-sequents having the same conclusion c. We assume
that both groups of arguments are acceptable, i.e. vApro(c) > and vAcon(c) < .
(8)

If vApro(c) < 1, and vAcon(c) > 0, then vA(c) = vApro(c) + vAcon(c) ;

The idea of this algorithm is illustrated by Figure 4. Since we want to know how much
pro-arguments outweigh con-arguments (or vice versa), we subtract the value vAcon(c)
represented by the interval [vAcon(c), ] in this figure from the value vApro(c)
represented by the interval [, vApro(c)]. In order to finally receive the acceptability of c
we add this differential to . Let us note that the considered value is directly proportional
to the acceptability of pro- and reversely proportional to the acceptability of conarguments, so that the algorithm satisfies the principle of proportionality.

The algorithm given by (8) assumes that both pro- and con-arguments are, as defined by
Wellman, inconclusive. However in real-life argumentation it happens, for example in
1335

mathematical practice, that initial considerations concerning some hypothesis, which are
based on subjective premonitions, analogies, incomplete calculations etc., are finally
overcame by a mathematical proof. Then all the objections raised originally are no longer
significant, and the hypothesis becomes a theorem. Therefore, if either pro- or conarguments are conclusive, then so the whole conductive argument is.
(9)
(10)

If vApro(c) = 1, and vAcon(c) 0, then vA(c) = 1;

If vApro(c) 1, and vAcon(c) = 0, then vA(c) = 0.

If both pro- and con-arguments happen to be conclusive then it is an evidence of a

contradiction in underlying knowledge, and the initial evaluation function requires
revision. Therefore we claim that the values of such strongly antinomian arguments
cannot be found.
(11)

If vApro(c) = 1, and vAcon(c) = 0, then vA(c) is not computable.

Otherwise, the strength of weakly antinomian arguments, which consist of equal

inconclusive components, can be computed as using the algorithm given by (8).
In order to complete this section let us add that the acceptability of the
conclusions of complex, multilevel argument structures, as the one represented by Figure
3, can be calculated level by level using the algorithms (4) (10). An analogous process
concerning only pro-arguments is described in (Selinger 2014).
4. ATTACK RELATION
Our goal is to define attack relation, which holds between arguments. For the sake of
simplicity we consider only attack relation restricted to the set of atomic arguments.
There are three components of atomic arguments that can be an object of a possible
attack: premises, inferences and conclusions. The latter is the case of conduction. If we
take into account a pro- and a con-argument, which have the same conclusion, then the
stronger of them attacks the weaker one (in the case of an antinomy both arguments
attack each other, so that it can be called the mutual attack case).
(12)

An argument A attacks (the conclusion of) an argument B iff A = {<P1, c, d>},

B = {<P2, c, 1 d >}, and either d = 0 and 1 vA(c) vB(c), or d = 1 and 1 vA(c)
vB(c).

The second kind of attack is the attack on a premise. Obviously, it is effective if (i) some
premise of an attacked argument is shown to be not acceptable on the basis of the
remaining knowledge.
(13)

An argument A attacks (a premise of) an argument B iff A = {<P1, c1, 0>}, B =

{<P2, c2, d>}, c1 P2, and vA(c1) , where v is the function obtained from v
by deleting c1 from its domain, i.e. dom(v) = dom(v) {c1}.

1336

However, with respect to the proposed method of evaluation, two further situations are
possible: (ii) the premises of an attacked argument considered separately are acceptable,
however their conjunction is not; (iii) the conjunction of the premises of an attacked
argument is acceptable and the internal strength of its constituent (pro- or con-) sequent is
greater than , but the product of these values is not. Thus, in view of the evaluation
method proposed here, merely weakening a premise can cause an effective attack, and the
definition (13) should be replaced by the following broader one.
(13) An argument A attacks (a premise of) an argument B iff A = {<P1, c1, 0>},
B={<P2, c2, d>}, c1 P2, vA(c1) v(c1), and either d = 1 and vA(P2)w(c2/P2)
, or d = 0 and vA(P2)w(~c2/P2) , where v is the function obtained from
v by deleting c1 from its domain.
In order to consider attack on the relationship between the premises and the conclusion of
an attacked argument, let us take into account the following Pollocks example of an
undercutting defeater:
(14)

The object looks red, thus it is red unless it is illuminated by a red light.

Following Toulmins terminology, the sentence The object is illuminated by a red light
will be called rebuttal. Let us note, that rebuttals are not con-premises, since they do not
entail the negation of the conclusion (the fact that the object is illuminated by a red light
does not imply that the object is not red). Thus Pollocks example cannot be diagrammed
like conductive arguments. Since it is an arrow that represents the inference, which is
denied by the rebuttal, rather the diagram shown by Figure 5 seems to be relevant here.

However, structures such as the one in Figure 5 have no direct representation within the
formalism introduced in this paper to examine conductive reasoning. In order to fill this
gap we propose to add the fourth element, namely the set of rebuttals, to the sequents
considered so far. Such extended sequents will have the form <P, c, d, R>, where R is the
set of (linked) rebuttals.
Since our goal is to define attack relation as holding between arguments, we
propose to take an argument without rebuttals (i.e. with the empty set of rebuttals) as
being attacked by the argument with the same premises and conclusion, but with a
rebuttal added. For example (14) can be regarded as an attacker of the simple argument

1337

(15)

The object looks red, thus it is red.

This argument (15) has the following representation: {<{The object looks red}, The
object is red, 1, >}, and its attacker (14): {<{The object looks red}, The object is red, 1,
{The object is illuminated by a red light}>}. In general, an argument of the form {<P, c,
d, >} can be attacked by any argument of the form {<P, c, d, R>}. Effectiveness of this
sort of attack depends on evaluation of such arguments. It is not the aim of this paper to
develop an evaluation method for arguments with rebuttals systematically, however, let
us note that the strength of an argument {<P, c, d, R>}, where R , seems to be strictly
connected with the strength of the corresponding argument {<P{~R}, c, d, >},
which has an empty set of rebuttals. For example, the strength of (14) depends on the
strength of the argument:
(16)

The object looks red, and it is not illuminated by a red light, thus it is red.

If this argument is acceptable then so is its second premise (The object is not illuminated
by a red light), which is the negation of the rebuttal in (14). By the same the rebuttal is
not acceptable so that the attack on (15) cannot be effective. Thus (16) cannot be
acceptable if (14) attacks the inference of (15). In general, if A = {<P, c, d, R>} attacks
(the inference of) B = {<P, c, d, >}, then R and A = {<P{~R}, c, d, >} is not
acceptable. Obviously, the converse does not hold, because not any acceptable set of
sentences can be a good rebuttal. If the attack is to be effective the set R must be relevant
to deny the inference in B. A test of relevance that we propose is based on an observation
concerning (15) and (16). Intuitively, the inference in (16) is stronger than the inference
in (15), i.e. the internal strength of the sequent in (16) is greater than the internal strength
of the sequent in (15). This is because (16) assumes that a possible objection against the
inference in (15) has been overcome. Thus, the condition w(c/P~R) > w(c/P) can be
proposed to determine the relevance of the rebuttal in A. Following these intuitions we
recognize arguments overcoming rebuttals as hybrid arguments in the sense defined by
Vorobej (1995). Such arguments contain a premise that strengthens them, but this
premise does not work alone so that it cannot be taken as the premise of a separate
convergent reasoning (in (16) such a premise is the sentence The object is not illuminated
by a red light).
Summing up, we claim that (a) non-acceptability of the hybrid counterparts
corresponding to arguments having rebuttals and (b) relevance of rebuttals are necessary
for attack on inference to be effective. However, we leave open the question whether they
are sufficient.
5. CONCLUSION
We showed how the model of representation and evaluation of arguments elaborated in
(Selinger 2014) can be enriched in order to cover the case of conductive reasoning. The
extended model allowed us to define in formal terms two kinds of attack relation, namely
attack on conclusion and attack on premise. However, the definition of attack on
inference requires further extension of the model. In order to initiate more profound
studies, we outlined a possible direction of making such an extension.
1338

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Professor David Hitchcock for his inspiring remarks concerning my
ideas, and for his helpful terminological suggestions.

REFERENCES
Blair, J. A., & Johnson, R. H. (2011). Conductive argument: an overlooked type of defeasible reasoning.
London: Kings College Publications.
Selinger, M. (2014). Towards formal representation and evaluation of arguments. Argumentation, 26(3),
379-393. (K. Budzynska, & M. Koszowy (Eds.), The Polish School of Argumentation, the special
the issue of the journal.)
Vorobej, M. (1995). Hybrid arguments. Informal Logic, 17(2), 289-296.
Wellman, C. (1971). Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press.
Walton, D., & Gordon, T. F. (2013). How to formalize informal logic. In M. Lewiski, & D. Mohammed
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th OSSA Conference at the University of Windsor, May 2013 (pp. 113). Windsor: Centre for Research in Reasoning, and the University of Windsor.

1339

Argumentative Norms: How Contextualist Can They Be? A

Cautionary Tale
Harvey Siegel
Department of Philosophy
University of Miami
P.O. Box 248054
Coral Gables FL 33124-4670
USA
hsiegel@miami.edu

ABSTRACT: Are argumentative norms contextual? Yes: argument quality sometimes depends upon criteria
that are context-relative. But this contextual dimension of argumentative norms depends upon a kind of
context-independence: That a given argument is strong in its context is a claim that is not itself dependent
upon any particular context. Consequently, there is an in-principle limit on the degree to which
argumentative norms can be rightly regarded as contextual.
KEYWORDS: argument, argumentation, argument norms, argument purposes, contextualism,
epistemological relativism

1. THE CASE FOR AND LIMITS OF CONTEXTUALISM

Argumentation is always situated: it always occurs in context.
(van Eemeren and Garssen 2012b, p. xiii)
It is true, as van Eemeren and Garssen say, that argumentation always occurs in context: to
engage in argumentation, an arguer must be in some context or other. But are argument
norms similarly contextual? That is, are the norms governing argument quality relative to
or dependent upon the context in which the argument is either asserted or evaluated? Let
contextualism1 be the view that criteria of argument quality vary by context: According to
contextualists, whether an argument is good or not, and how good it is, depends upon the
context in which it is either uttered or evaluated. Many authors have urged that
contextualism, or something like it, is true.2
There is an obvious prima facie case for contextualism which rests on the fact that
the good-making features of arguments seem to vary by context: What makes an
argument good in a scientific context seems to differ in some respects from what makes an
1

The questions pursued here do not concern the view called contextualism in epistemology and philosophy
of language. There contextualism is understood as a response to skepticism, according to which in
ordinary, low-stakes contexts we know, e.g., that we have hands, but in high stakes contexts we dont
know this because we cant rule out the possibility that were being deceived by an evil demon. For an
overview of the literature and a defense of this sort of contextualism, cf. DeRose 2009.
2

Among many others, in addition to those authors discussed below, cf. Fogelin 1985/2005 and Battersby
and Bailin 2011. Battersby and Bailin helpfully distinguish dialectical, historical, intellectual, political,
social and disciplinary contexts; I strongly recommend their discussion.

1340

argument good in a court of law, a conversation among friends, or a marketing strategy

discussion in the corporate boardroom. That is, it seems to be the case that the quality of
arguments sometimes depends upon criteria that are context-relative. For example,
scientific arguments at least often have to meet criteria of explanatory adequacy; legal
arguments often have to meet criteria of evidence admissibility; etc. So it seems that the
norms of argument quality are relative to context: an argument can be good although it
doesnt meet legal criteria of evidence admissibility if it is offered or evaluated in a
scientific or corporate boardroom context; an argument can be good although it doesnt
meet criteria of explanatory adequacy if it is offered or evaluated in the context of a court
of law or a conversation around the dinner table.
However, it would be too quick to conclude on the basis of this prima facie case
that argument norms are indeed contextual. For we should distinguish between differences
in argumentative context entailing differences in criteria of argument quality, on the one
hand, and differences in the purposes of argumentation entailing such differences, on the
other. We should agree that people argue for different purposes, a point generally agreed
among argumentation scholars and reflected in the range of approaches reflected in their
scholarship. Three important such purposes are: the persuading of ones audience of a
particular claim, thesis, or standpoint (reflected in rhetorical approaches to the study of
argument); the achieving of consensus (reflected in dialectical approaches); and the
enhancement of the epistemic status of claims or conclusions argued for (reflected in
epistemic approaches). Argument norms do differ across these: an effective persuasive
argument may be less successful at fostering consensus or supporting a conclusion, etc.
But these are differences of purpose, not context.3
More importantly, and the main point argued for here: contextualism, if correct,
depends upon an underlying non-contextualism. Suppose there is a genuine contextual
dimension of argumentative norms, such that (C):
(C): What makes a good argument good in a particular context, say, a scientific one, differs at least
in part from what makes an argument good in contexts such as corporate boardrooms, conversations
among friends, or courts of law.

From what context might (C) itself be established by argument? If (C) is worthy of belief,
as asserted by contextualists, there must be a good argument that supports it; good reasons
that render it so worthy. But that arguments quality cant itself be limited to some
particular context, because if it is so limited, (C)s epistemic status will itself be relative to
context. That is, the argument that establishes (C) will itself be good in some contexts but
not in others. And this seems to undercut the argument for (C): if it supports (C), it will do
so only in some contexts, and will fail to do so in others. And this sounds like the familiar
problem with (epistemological) relativism.4

Notice that I am not claiming that argument purpose differs systematically across context this I would
deny but rather asking whether the criteria that arguments must meet in order to be good differ in this way.
Here I am indebted to the good advice of John Biro and Jan Steutel. It is uncontroversial that arguments are
advanced for a variety of purposes. For a typical acknowledgement of this, see Toulmin 1958, p. 12.
4

I am speaking throughout only of epistemological relativism.

1341

2. THE PROBLEM WITH RELATIVISM

What is relativism, and what is the problem with it? Let relativism be understood as:
ER: For any knowledge-claim p, p can be evaluated (assessed, established, etc.) only according to
(with reference to) one or another set of background principles and standards of evaluation s1,sn;
and, given a different set (or sets) of background principles and standards s1,sn, there is no
neutral (that is, neutral with respect to the two (or more) alternative sets of principles and standards)
way of choosing between the two (or more) alternative sets in evaluating p with respect to truth or
rational justification. ps truth and rational justifiability are relative to the standards used in
evaluating p. (Siegel 1987, p. 6)

If this is relativism, what is the problem with it? The problem, familiar since Platos
Theatetus, is that it is self-referentially incoherent or self-refuting, in that defending the
doctrine requires one to give it up. Why?
Insofar as she is taking issue with her non-relativist philosophical opponent, the
relativist wants both (a) to offer a general, non-relative view of knowledge (and/or truth or
justification), and assert that that general view i.e., that knowledge is relative is
epistemically superior and preferable to its rivals; and also (b) to deny that such a general,
non-relative view is possible or defensible. The relativist needs to embrace both (a), in
order to see her position both as a rival to, and, further, as epistemically superior to, the
position of her non-relativist opponent; and (b), in order to honor the fundamental
requirements of relativism. But the mutual embrace of (a) and (b) is logically incoherent.
For the embrace of (a) forces the rejection of (b): if relativism is the epistemically superior
view of knowledge (i.e., (a)), then one general view of knowledge is both possible and
defensible as epistemically superior to its rivals (contrary to (b)). Similarly, the embrace of
(b) forces the rejection of (a): if no general, non-relative view of knowledge is possible or
defensible (i.e., (b)), then it cannot be that relativism is itself epistemically superior to its
rivals (contrary to (a)). This argument strongly suggests that the assertion and defense of
relativism is incoherent.5
3. RELATIVISM AND CONTEXTUALISM
Of course, contextualism is not the same as relativism. Can the contextualist escape this
incoherence problem? The key question is: From what context might the contextuality of
argument norms be established? The worry is this: It appears that any argument for
contextuality will itself necessarily be made from some context or other. Consequently the
contextualist appears to be committed to the claim that the norms governing its quality
will be forceful only contextually. If its quality is context-dependent, its normative force is
equally so, thus rendering it unable to stand against or compete effectively with parallel
arguments for the contrary conclusion launched from alternative contexts. The problem for
the contextualist can be illustrated by drawing explicitly the analogy between the selfreferential argument against relativism just rehearsed and the analogous argument against
contextualism with respect to argument norms:
5

For a more precise and detailed analysis of relativism and its vicissitudes, cf. Siegel 1987, 2004, and 2011,
from which the version of the argument just given in the text is adapted.

1342

CAN: For any argument A purporting to establish (C), A can be evaluated (assessed, established,
etc.) only according to (with reference to) one or another set of contextually bound argument norms
n1,nn; and, given a different set (or sets) of argument norms n1,nn, there is no neutral (that is,
neutral with respect to the two (or more) alternative sets of principles and standards) way of
choosing between the two (or more) alternative sets in evaluating A with respect to its ability to
establish the truth or rational justification of (C). (C)s truth and justificatory status are relative to
the contextual norms used in evaluating A.

The problem with CAN can now be spelled out on analogy with the problem with ER:
Contextualism appears to be self-referentially incoherent or self-refuting, in that defending
the doctrine requires one to give it up. Why?
Insofar as she is taking issue with her non-contextualist philosophical opponent,
the contextualist wants both (a) to offer a general, non-contextual view of argument
norms, and assert that that general view i.e., that argument norms are contextual is
epistemically superior and preferable to its rivals; and also (b) to deny that such a general,
non-contextual view is possible or defensible. The contextualist needs to embrace both
(a), in order to see her position both as a rival to, and, further, as epistemically superior
to, the position of her non-contextualist opponent; and (b), in order to honor the
fundamental requirements of contextualism. But the mutual embrace of (a) and (b) is
logically incoherent. For the embrace of (a) forces the rejection of (b): if contextualism is
the epistemically superior view of argument norms (i.e., (a)), then one general, noncontextual account of argument norms is both possible and defensible as epistemically
superior to its rivals (contrary to (b)). Similarly, the embrace of (b) forces the rejection of
(a): if no general, non-contextual account of argument norms is possible or defensible
(i.e., (b)), then it cannot be that contextualism is itself non-contextually superior to its
rivals (contrary to (a)). This argument strongly suggests that the assertion and defense of
contextualism is incoherent.
4. THE FATE OF CONTEXTUALISM
Thus the contextualization of argument norms is capable of being established only from a
universal, a-contextual6 context. How should we make sense of this situation?
The threat of incoherence establishes a strong, in-principle limit on the degree to
which argument norms can be rightly regarded as contextual. As we saw earlier,
arguments can be offered for different purposes. Can the norms governing their quality be
relativized to context more generally, such that argument A can be good in (e.g.) a
scientific journal but bad in a court of law or a casual conversation among friends? Yes,
but only in so far as those contextualized norms e.g., that scientific arguments can be
good/bad in so far as they meet (or not) norms of explanatory adequacy are themselves
6

There is of course no view from nowhere or a-contextual context hence the scare quotes. All our
arguments are offered and evaluated in some context or other and from some conceptual scheme, perspective
or point of view. The point on the table is just that the quality of arguments used to establish this very point
is not itself dependent on the context in which the argument is offered or evaluated, and acknowledging it
does not commit one to either relativism or contextualism. It is central to philosophical discussions of
relativism; for systematic treatments of it in that context, cf. Siegel 1987, 1997, 2004, and 2011. Thanks to
Derek Allen and Geoff Goddu for pressing me on this.

1343

established by arguments whose quality is not itself contextual or contextually bound. The
argument constitutes an incoherence proof7 of a thoroughgoing contextualism concerning
argument norms such a thoroughgoing contextualism is incoherent -- and establishes the
limits of a defensible contextualism. We can coherently be pluralists about argument
norms,8 allowing that there are multiple legitimate argument norms, and that some of them
are operative only in particular contexts. We should be pluralists in this sense. But we
cannot, on pain of incoherence, be so thoroughgoingly contextualist as to hold that the
case for this view is itself sanctioned by norms whose force is itself limited to particular
contexts.
5. ARE PROMINENT THEORISTS PROBLEMATICALLY CONTEXTUALIST?
Let us now briefly consider some prominent argumentation theorists who embrace one or
another sort of contextualism to see whether their contextualisms violate the limits of a
defensible contextualism just adduced.
5.1. Stephen Toulmin
Toulmin famously held that the merits of our argumentsare field-dependent (1958, p.
15, emphasis in original):
[A]ll the canons for the criticism and assessment of argumentsare in practice field-dependent,
while all our terms of assessment are field-invariant in their force. We can ask, How strong a case
can be made out? [for arguments in three different fields] and the question we ask will be how
strong each case is when tested against its own appropriate standard. We may even ask, if we
please, how the three cases compare in strength, and produce an order of meritBut in doing so we
are not asking how far the cases for the three conclusions measure up to a common standard: only,
how far each of them comes up to the standards appropriate to things of its kind. The form of the
question, How strong is the case?, has the same force or implications each time: the standards we
work with in the three cases are different. (1958, p. 38, emphases in original)

It is unclear whether a Toulminian field is the same sort of thing as that which other
writers refer to as a context. If these are not the same, then Toulmin should not count as
the sort of contextualist we are concerned with here. But assuming for the sake of
argument that he should so count, it is clear that he does not face the incoherence worry
laid out earlier. He does not argue or suggest that his case for the field-dependence of
argument quality9 is itself launched from any particular field or context; he seems clearly
enough to hold that the field-dependence of argument quality he advances is not itself
dependent on any particular field or context. He does not suggest, for example, that judged
from the context of argumentation theory argument quality is field-dependent, but judged
from the context of physics, formal logic or history argument quality is field-independent.
7

Thanks to Christoph Lumer for this felicitous expression.

A similar pluralism is endorsed by David Godden (2005).

In his discussion Toulmin uses the words canons, criteria and standards to pick out those things in
accordance with which argument quality is determined or assessed. These are not synonymous but I wont
tarry on this point here.

1344

Rather, he urges that it is a field-independent truth that argument quality is fielddependent. So he does not embrace or endorse the problematic (b) above. So he cannot
fairly be charged with a problematic incoherence.
Toulmin makes an important point: some criteria of argument quality apply in
some contexts but not others e.g., a good inductive argument will not be good in most
logico-mathematical contexts, in which deductive soundness is required10 and this is one
example of the way in which argument norms are contextual. That said, I am not here
endorsing Toulmins overall views concerning argument quality; those views are not my
present concern. I am arguing only that, insofar as his view is rightly thought of as
contextualist, it is not such as to run the risk of incoherence set out above.11
5.2. Douglas Walton
Walton has long defended a version of contextualism. Consider, from among many such
passages in his writings:
[T]he validity or correctness of an argumentation scheme, as used in a given case, depends on the
context of dialogue appropriate for that case. (1996, p. 13)
[A]ny claim that a fallacy has been committed must be evaluated in relation to the text of discourse
available in a given case... [A]n argument will always occur in a context of dialogueMuch of the
work of analysis and evaluation of the allegedly fallacious argument will involve placing that
argument in a context of dialogue. (1996, p. 14).
[A]rguments are evaluated as correct or incorrect [on Waltons proposed pragmatic standard of
argument evaluation] insofar as they are used either to contribute to or to impede the goals of
dialogue. (1998, p. 3)
[A] presumptive argument based on an argumentation scheme should always be evaluated in a
context of the dialogue of which it is a part. (2001, p. 159)
This pragmatic dimension [of justifying schematic arguments] requires that such arguments need to
be examined within the context of an ongoing investigation in dialogue in which questions are
being asked and answered. (2005, p.8)

Like Toulmins, Waltons contextualism is not guilty of the sort of incoherence illustrated
above. He makes the important points that instances of argumentation take place in the
context of particular dialogues, that particular argumentation schemes are suitable (or not)
for such contexts, and that the evaluation of particular argumentative moves and
exchanges depends upon the schemes appropriate for the context in question. He does not
suggest that his own (pragmatic, dialogical) theory of argument evaluation is itself
justified only contextually. That is, he does not assert (b) above. So there is no

10

Although we must be careful here, for these criteria do not vary systematically by field. The variation is
messier than one might expect. Cf. Siegel 1997, pp. 29-33.
11

I think the same can be said of the prominent Toulminians Mark Weinstein and John Woods. Cf.
Weinstein 2013 and, e.g., Woods 2005, p. 497.

1345

incoherence here. (Whether or not his pragmatic, dialogical approach is a good one I do
not take up here.)
5.3. Geoff Goddu
Goddu argues compellingly that the correct evaluation of an argument is context
dependent. (2003b, p. 381) The most important reason he offers for thinking so is that
when evaluating an argumentwe must take into account not only the actual support that
the premises provide, but the degree of support the premises need to provide as well. We
need to know if the actual degree of support is enough and what support is enough will
change from context to context. (2004, p. 30, emphases in original, note deleted; cf. also
p. 33) He illustrates his claim with several suggestive examples. The most straightforward
is that of the same argument, utilizing the same evidence, put forward by the prosecution
in both civil and criminal trials: in the former the argument is adequate if it establishes the
defendants guilt by a preponderance of the evidence; in the latter the evidence must
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the argument establishes that the probability
of the defendants guilt is .6, it is adequate in the context of the civil trial but not that in of
the criminal trial.12
As with Toulmin and Walton, Goddus contextualism does not involve the sort of
incoherence we are concerned with here. His correct point concerning the context
dependence of argument adequacy is not itself true only in some contexts and not in
others; he does not suggest either that his argument for context dependence is itself
context dependent or that that argument is adequate in some contexts and not others.
Rather, he establishes the context-independent conclusion that argument evaluation is
contextual. Like Toulmin and Walton, he does not assert (b) above. So there is no
incoherence here.
5.4. Frans van Eemeren
The final author to be considered is Frans van Eemeren. Van Eemeren (in collaboration
with several of his co-authors) embraces a substantial but constrained version of
contextualism. He acknowledges both general, context-independent and context-dependent
criteria for the fulfilment of norms of reasonableness, which norms are incorporated in
the rules of critical discussion at the heart of the Pragma-Dialectical approach:
Because the application of the critical norms of reasonableness is partially dependent on the
requirements that result from the exact circumstances in which the argumentation occurs, such that
these norms can be implemented in slightly different ways, the content of these criteria can
sometimes be context dependent. This means that the context in which the argumentative exchange
takes place has to be, in principle, taken into account explicitly in determining the fallaciousness [of
a given argumentative move/strategic maneuver].

12

For this and other examples see Goddu 2003b, p. 380 and Goddu 2004, pp. 27-30; cf. Goddu 2001 for an
early articulation of his view of argument evaluation and Goddu 2003a and 2005 for systematic discussions
of the difficulties of specifying the context of an argument and context dependence respectively. A
closely related point concerning the context-dependence of the evaluation of some scientific arguments is
made in Rudner 1953.

1346

Besides the general criteria which are context independent, specific criteria which are contextdependent will also play a role in the evaluation of [such moves/maneuvers] (van Eemeren
2011b, p. 40)
When reflecting upon the criteria that can be brought to bear to distinguish between sound and
fallacious strategic maneuvering, I make a distinction between general criteria for judging
fallaciousness that are context-independent and more specific criteria that may be dependent on the
macro-context in which the strategic maneuvering takes place. (van Eemeren 2011a, p. 154)

As these citations make clear, van Eemerens contextualism is not so thoroughgoing as to

run into the incoherence problem described above. It explicitly acknowledges contextindependent criteria for the satisfaction of the pragma-dialectical norms of reasonableness.
Moreover, those norms, incorporated in the pragma-dialectical rules governing critical
discussions, are themselves context-independent: whatever the context, if one violates a
rule one violates the associated norm. Most importantly for present purposes, van
Eemerens argument for contextualism is not itself contextually bound. Like our other
authors, he does not assert (b) above. Once again, there is no incoherence here.13
6. CONCLUSION: CONTEXTUALISM, BUT ONLY WITHIN LIMITS
If the argument offered here is successful, argument norms can be established only by
arguments/reasons that are non-contextual in character and epistemic force. This leaves
room for a healthy pluralism concerning argument norms. There are important contextual
dimensions of argument quality and important things concerning contextually specific
aspects of argument quality for argumentation theorists to study and say.14 There are
multiple legitimate argument norms, and some of them are operative only in particular
contexts. But that any particular argument norm is a legitimate norm in a particular
argument context cannot itself be established contextually.
Is this really a problem worth worrying about? After all, as weve just seen, none
of the theorists considered above go over the line; their contextualisms are all sufficiently
bounded so as to not risk the incoherence worry I have been belaboring. That these
theorists stay clear of the difficulty is of course a good thing. The lesson to be learned
from this discussion, if there is one, is a cautionary one: in theorizing about the contextual
character of argument norms, dont go over the line. Contextualism defended noncontextually is, or at least might be, OK; contextualism that extends to the defense of that
view itself, not so much. As with other such topics, self-referential incoherence is a worry
to take seriously when theorizing about argument norms.
13

Van Eemerens general approach, like Waltons, is both pragmatic and dialectical. For a very helpful
comparison of the two views, especially with respect to contextualism, cf. van Eemeren et. al. 2010. I should
note once again (but not pursue here) a widespread ambiguity in the argumentation literature:
dialogical/dialectical approaches, like those of Walton and van Eemeren, focus on norms governing
particular argumentative moves in dialogue, while other approaches, and in particular Goddus and epistemic
theorists such as Lumer and Biro and me, focus not on the norms governing such moves but rather on those
governing the evaluations of particular arguments conceived as abstract objects. Cf. Goddus papers cited
above, Lumer 2005, Biro and Siegel 2006 and Siegel and Biro 2010.
14

Some of which are said in such venues as van Eemeren and Garssen 2012 and the series in which this
volume appears, as well as the work of Walton and van Eemeren cited above.

1347

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I presented an ancestor of this paper as a powerpoint talk at the Argumentation and
Philosophy: Different Issues or Productive Tensions? symposium at the Universidad
Nacional Autnoma de Mxico in Mexico City in 2009 and at the 7th ISSA conference in
Amsterdam in 2010 but never wrote it up for publication. I presented a revised and
expanded talk at the 8th ISSA conference in July 2014. I am grateful to Jan Steutel and to
the audiences at the several presentations, especially Derek Allen, John Biro, Geoff
Goddu, Cristoph Lumer, Mark Weinstein and John Woods for insightful comments,
criticisms and suggestions.

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Eemeren, F. H. van (2011a). In context: Giving contextualization its rightful place in the study of
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Goddu, G. C. (2004). Cogency and the validation of induction. Argumentation, 18.1, 25-41.
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uses of argument: Proceedings of a conference at McMaster University, 18-21 May 2005 (pp. 148155). Windsor, Ontario: The Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.
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Reasonableness In Context: Taking Into Account Institutional

Conventions In The Pragma-Dialectical Evaluation Of
Argumentative Discourse
A.F. Snoeck Henkemans & J.H.M. Wagemans
Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands
a.f.snoeckhenkemans@uva.nl
Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands
j.h.m.wagemans@uva.nl

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we raise the question of how to take institutional conventions into account in a
pragma-dialectical evaluation of argumentative discourse. First, we describe the main steps of the pragmadialectical evaluation procedure and provide an explanation of the types of norms and rules involved. Then,
we present an overview of various types of discrepancies between institutional conventions and pragmadialectical norms and discuss their implications for the pragma-dialectical evaluation of argumentation in
context.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, deontic rules, evaluation, fallacy judgments, institutional conventions, nondeontic rules, pragma-dialectics.

1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last couple of years, the pragma-dialectical research program has focused on the
development of tools for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse in specific
institutional contexts, such as the domains of legal, political, medical, and academic
communication.1 An important reason for taking the institutional context into
consideration is that the aims and conventions of a certain context of argumentative
activity may influence the evaluation of the argumentation put forward in that context.
Within the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacy judgments are considered to be contextdependent. At the same time, the norms to be applied by the evaluator are regarded as
generally applicable to all contexts of argumentative activity:
Although we agree [] that fallacy judgments are in the end always contextual
judgments that depend on the specific circumstances of situated argumentative
acting, we do not agree that the norms underlying these judgments are contextdependent. In our view, the norms expressed in the rules for critical discussion are
general who knows even universal norms for sound argumentation that are not
1

For a short overview of this research program and its collaborators, see Van Eemeren et al. (2014, pp. 517519).

1350

limited to one particular type of argumentative activity. (van Eemeren and

Houtlosser, 2007, p. 64)
A consequence of the point of view that the norms expressed in the rules for critical
discussion are generally applicable is that the influence of the institutional conventions on
the evaluation of the argumentation cannot be situated at the level of these rules
themselves. In some pragma-dialectical analyses of specific institutional contexts,
however, cases do occur in which the aims and rules for the argumentative discourse in a
particular context seem to differ in some respects from the rules of critical discussion. An
example is to be found in Feteriss analysis of the legal setting, where a discrepancy can
be noted between the legal procedures and one of the rules for critical discussion.
According to Feteris, to safeguard legal rights, there are time limits within which an
appeal must be taken. Otherwise the party who has won the trial can never be sure about
his rights (1990, p. 113). The existence of this time limit is not completely in accordance
with the pragma-dialectical freedom rule, according to which discussants have the
unconditional right to put forward a standpoint or call into question the standpoint of the
other party in the discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 136, 190-191).2
In this paper, we address the question of how the possibility of such a discrepancy
between institutional conventions and rules for a critical discussion can be reconciled with
the abovementioned claim that the pragma-dialectical rules express general norms that are
applicable to all contexts of argumentative activity. First, we describe the main steps of the
pragma-dialectical evaluation procedure and provide an explanation of the types of norms
and rules involved. Then, we present an overview of various types of discrepancies
between institutional conventions and pragma-dialectical norms and discuss their
implications for the pragma-dialectical evaluation of argumentation in context. Finally, we
briefly recapitulate and discuss our findings.
2. TYPES OF NORMS IN THE EVALUATION PROCEDURE
Institutional conventions may influence the pragma-dialectical evaluation of
argumentative discourse in various ways. In this section we address the question which
types of norms play a role in such an evaluation and how they may relate to the norms
expressed in institutional conventions. We will start with a short explanation of the
pragma-dialectical evaluation process.
A pragma-dialectical evaluation is preceded by an analysis of the discourse in
terms of the so-called model of a critical discussion. Such an analysis is aimed at
providing a reconstruction of the discourse containing all the elements that are relevant to
the evaluation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 95-122).
In order to determine the reasonableness of the reconstructed discourse, the
evaluator makes use of two different types of norms. First, the evaluator needs to
determine which standards of reasonableness should be projected onto the reconstructed
discourse. A proposal for such standards is expressed in the so-called code of conduct for
reasonable discussants, a set of ten rules (or commandments) that is derived from a
2

Another example is the medical consultation, where, according to Snoeck Henkemans and Mohammed, an
institutional burden of proof is imposed on doctors to justify treatment options without patients having to
express any disagreement about these options (2012, p. 30, note 3).

1351

larger set of fifteen rules that constitute the procedure of a critical discussion, which is an
integral part of the model of a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004,
pp. 123-186).
Second, the evaluator needs to determine which criteria should be used in order to
decide whether a specific discussion move constitutes a violation of the standards just
mentioned. For in order to determine the reasonableness of such a move, it is not enough
to know which rule of the code of conduct is at issue. According to van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1992, p. 106), the norms that are at stake in these rules need to be
supplemented with criteria for deciding whether or not a certain speech act satisfies the
norm. As to these criteria, van Eemeren distinguishes between general and specific
criteria:
I make a distinction between general criteria for judging fallaciousness that are
context-independent and more specific criteria that may be dependent on the
macro-context in which the strategic maneuvering takes place, because this specific
context requires a well-adapted implementation of the general criteria. (van
Eemeren, 2010, p. 201)
This means that when justifying a particular fallacy judgment, the evaluator does not only
refer to the rule that is violated, but also to the (general or specific) criterion that is used to
establish that the rule is violated.
In principle, in the evaluators justification of fallacy judgments, institutional
conventions may thus play a role on two different levels: the level of the rules and the
level of the criteria. This raises the question as to how the evaluator may find out on which
of the two levels a given institutional convention is operative. In order to answer this
question, we will now analyze the difference between rules and criteria in more detail. As
we already explained, the rules that constitute the code of conduct for reasonable
discussants are derived from a larger set of rules that constitute the procedure of a critical
discussion. Several differences exist between these two sets of rules. For our current
purposes, it suffices to point at a difference concerning the nature of the rules involved.3
The first set of rules, which constitutes the code of conduct for reasonable
discussants, entirely consists of deontic rules, i.e. rules that are prescriptive in nature
because they specify the rights and obligations of the discussants. In abstract terms, such
deontic rules are formulated as X should do Y or negatively as X should refrain from
doing Y. An example is the so-called freedom rule, which is listed as Commandment 1
of the code of conduct: Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing
standpoints or from calling standpoints into question (van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
2004, p. 190). Some of the deontic rules of the code of conduct specify conditional
obligations. In abstract terms, such conditional deontic rules are formulated as if Z is the
case, X should do Y or negatively as if Z is the case, X should refrain from doing Y. An
example is the so-called obligation-to-defend rule, which is listed as Commandment 2 of
the code of conduct: Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this
standpoint when requested to do so (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 191).
3

We summarize here the account of the nature of the pragma-dialectical rules as provided in Wagemans
(2009, pp. 36-37; 41-42).

1352

The second set of rules, which constitutes the procedure of a critical discussion, differs
from the first set because it does not only consist of prescriptive rules, but also of rules
that are definitional or constitutive in nature.4 Such non-deontic rules take the form X
counts as Y and they specify the conditions for the correct use of terms that occur in one
or more of the other rules of the procedure. An example is the rule that defines what
counts as a conclusive attack on a standpoint, which is listed as Rule 9b of the procedure:
The antagonist has conclusively attacked the standpoint of the protagonist if he has
successfully attacked either the propositional content or the force of justification of the
complex speech act of argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 151). The
need for specifying what is meant by the conclusiveness of an attack follows from the
occurrence of the term in Rule 14a, which is a deontic rule that specifies when the
protagonist should withdraw his standpoint: The protagonist is obliged to retract the
initial standpoint if the antagonist has conclusively attacked it [] in the argumentation
stage [] (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 154).5
In some cases, the evaluator is only able to decide whether a discussant complied
with a deontic rule by making use of the definitions of terms provided in a non-deontic
rule of the procedure of a critical discussion. For instance, in order to answer the question
whether an antagonist rightly demands that the protagonist should withdraw his standpoint
after it has been attacked by the antagonist, the evaluator needs to establish whether the
attack can be seen as successful by applying the rule for what counts as a successful
attack. In this sense, we think that it would be in accordance with the pragma-dialectical
distinction between rules and criteria to identify all the non-deontic rules that are part
of the procedure for a critical discussion as general criteria for determining the
reasonableness of discussion moves.
Since the non-deontic part of the procedure for a critical discussion only provides
part of the criteria that are needed in order to justify fallacy judgments, van Eemeren and
Grootendorsts aforementioned call for the supplementation of the rules with criteria is
still in place. At several places in the pragma-dialectical literature one may find
descriptions of such criteria. As an example of a context-independent general soundness
criterion for assessing whether the argumentation scheme rule has been violated in the
case of an argument from authority, van Eemeren (2010, pp. 203-204) mentions the
critical question whether the authoritative source is quoted correctly. Van Eemeren (2010,
p. 197) also mentions several specific criteria for fallaciousness, which may vary
depending on the macro-context. We observe that these general and specific criteria are all
non-deontic in nature: They do not concern rights or obligations but specify which
conditions have to be fulfilled in order for a discussion move to count as a violation of a
particular deontic rule. The general criteria are of the form X counts as Y and the
specific criteria are of the form X counts as Y in context Z.
In order to prevent terminological confusion, we will reserve the term rules for all the
deontic rules and reserve the term criteria for the non-deontic rules of the procedure of a
critical discussion and other general and specific criteria. This helps us to characterize the
two levels of norms used in the pragma-dialectical evaluation process in a consistent way.
4

Like some of the rules of the code of conduct, some of the rules of the procedure specify conditional
obligations. This is for example the case in Rules 3, 4, and 14.
5
Other examples of such non-deontic rules are Rules 7, 8, and 9a of the procedure, which define terms that
play a crucial role in Rules 10, 11, and 14b of the procedure.

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On the one hand, there is the deontic level of the rules, and on the other hand, there is the
non-deontic level of the criteria.
The terminological distinction between rules and criteria also helps us to
answer the question as to how the evaluator may find out on which of the two levels a
given institutional convention is operative. If the convention is deontic in nature, it
operates on the level of the rules, and if the convention is non-deontic in nature, it operates
on the level of the criteria.6
3. JUSTIFYING A RULE ADAPTATION
As we have established in Section 2, institutional conventions can be deontic or nondeontic in nature. If a non-deontic convention needs to be taken into account in the
evaluation of the argumentative discourse in a certain activity type, this convention
functions as a context-specific criterion for deciding whether a rule has been violated.
Such a type of contextuality does indeed not imply that the rules for critical discussion
themselves are context-dependent. Since the criterion is context-dependent, a particular
move may be fallacious in the one context but not in the other. It is this type of contextual
dependency of fallacy judgments that van Eemeren and Houtlosser are referring to:
The context-dependency of judgments of argumentative discourse lies in the way
in which the conduct of argumentative discourse is conventionally disciplined in a
certain activity type by specific criteria for determining whether or not a certain
type of maneuvering agrees with the relevant norm, which criteria may vary to
some extent per argumentative activity type in a law case, for instance, different
criteria apply to making a legitimate appeal to authority, e.g. by referring to a
certain law code, than in a political debate. (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2007, p.
64)
An example of such a contextual criterion can be found in the activity type of Prime
Ministers Question Time in the British House of Commons. As Mohammed points out, as
representatives of a certain party, politicians may be held accountable not just for
standpoints which they have put forward personally, but also for positions which are
central to their political party:
In principle, it is necessary, in order to hold political parties to account, to consider
that the commitments that can be attributed to a certain MP are not restricted to
those deriving from his own positions. It should be possible, to different degrees of
justifiability, to attribute to MPs from a certain political party commitments
6

Although it is theoretically possible to convert a non-deontic rule into a deontic one, such a conversion
always results in the description of an obligation that the arguer is free to take upon himself or not. For
instance, the abovementioned non-deontic rule 9b concerning the requirements for a conclusive attack may
be rewritten as the following conditional deontic rule: If the antagonist wants his attack to count as a
conclusive attack, he is obliged to successfully attack either the propositional content or the force of
justification of the complex speech act of argumentation. Conversely, rewriting a deontic rule as a nondeontic rule requires a formulation of the form X counts as obligation Y. Such conversions therefore show
that the distinction between rules and criteria still holds.

1354

deriving from positions that have been assumed by the leaders of their parties,
election manifestos, or other public expressions of opinion made in the name of the
Party. (Mohammed, 2009, p. 132)
In consequence of their political party obligations, politicians may be required to account
for a position that they have not put forward themselves, but which is an official viewpoint
of their political party. In such a case, an attack on the point of view ascribed to the
politician does not necessarily constitute a violation of the so called standpoint rule,
which forbids attacks on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other
party (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 191).7 In a different context, a discussant
attacking a standpoint that the opponent had not put forward himself would be accused of
committing a straw man fallacy. In the context of Question Time, however, such an
accusation would not hold if the attack concerns a central party commitment of the
opponent.
From the example it becomes clear that the deontic rule expressing the general
obligation that discussants have to account for those standpoints that they can be held
committed to remains in force. The institutional convention only gives rise to a
specification of the non-deontic criterion for determining when exactly this deontic rule is
violated in the specific context.
There are, however, also cases in which the institutional conventions are deontic in
nature and express rights or obligations that differ from the ones expressed in the pragmadialectical rules for a critical discussion. The rights or obligations of the discussion parties
in the institutional context are then in some respects restricted or extended in comparison
to the rights or obligations attributed to the parties in the rules for critical discussion. We
will now address the question how this possibility can be reconciled with the claim that the
pragma-dialectical rules express norms that are generally applicable to all contexts of
argumentative activity.
In case of a discrepancy between an institutional convention and a pragmadialectical rule, the consequences for the evaluation of a discussion move made within the
context at hand depend on what the rationale for this discrepancy is. Sometimes, the
difference between the convention and the rule can be interpreted as a way of repairing
the non-fulfillment of one or more higher-order conditions.8 These are conditions that need
to be fulfilled in order to enable the discussants to comply with the first-order discussion
rules. One such type of condition relates to the state of mind of the participants in the
discussion, while the other type relates to the external circumstances in which the
discussion takes place:9

In fact, the rule does not forbid attacks on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other
party, but rather on a standpoint that the other party cannot be held committed to.
8
Feteris (1990, p. 111) mentions this as one of the reasons why some rules in the legal process deviate from
the pragma-dialectical rules: The distinction between the rules for discussion and the conditions which have
to be fulfilled in order to conduct a rational discussion, forms an analytical distinction which makes it
possible to explain why legal proceedings differ on one level in certain respects from a critical discussion
and why these differences are compensated on a higher level in order to make the procedure a rational one.
9
For a description of these conditions, see also van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, pp. 189-190) and van
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1993, pp. 30-34).

1355

The internal mental states that are a precondition to a reasonable discussion

attitude can be regarded as second-order conditions for a critical discussion,
while the presupposed external circumstances in which the argumentation takes
place apply as third-order conditions. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp.
36-37)
If a specific convention can be interpreted as a way of repairing the non-fulfillment of
one or more higher-order conditions, moves that are in accordance with the institutional
convention but not with the rule for critical discussion may still be judged as reasonable.
The point of the adaptation of the institutional convention is then exactly to further the
reasonable resolution of the dispute, by overcoming the restrictions posed by the nonfulfillment of particular higher-order conditions.
An example of an institutional context in which a deviating deontic convention
applies is the medical consultation. As Goodnight (2006) and Snoeck Henkemans and
Mohammed (2012) have pointed out, in doctor-patient consultations, the doctor has an
institutional obligation with respect to the burden-of-proof. Ideally, a physician needs to
present all the available treatment options and provide evidence in favor of and against
each of these options (Snoeck Henkemans & Mohammed, 2012, p. 22). The main reason
to impose this burden of proof upon the physician is that in medical consultations there
usually is an asymmetric relationship between the discussants: In most cases, the
physician will be an expert and the patient a layman.
According to van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs, the ideal model
assumes skill and competence in the subject matter under discussion and on the issues
raised (1993, p. 32). The specific burden of proof that is imposed on the doctor is thus
motivated by the fact that a second-order condition pertaining to the abilities of arguers to
engage in critical discussion cannot be taken to be automatically fulfilled. Since such
higher-order conditions need to be fulfilled in order for a discussion to lead to resolution,
the extension of the obligations of one of the discussion parties in a medical consultation
may be seen as a deviation from the pragma-dialectical burden-of-proof rule that does
not endanger the resolution of a dispute, but, on the contrary, promotes it.
There are, however, also cases in which the discrepancy between institutional
conventions and the pragma-dialectical rules cannot be explained as a way of creating the
conditions for reasonable discussion, but only as a means of achieving specific other
institutional goals. An example of this third possibility of how institutional conventions
may relate to pragma-dialectical norms is the restriction of the obligation expressed in the
pragma-dialectical obligation-to-defend rule in the context of the legal civil process. As
van Eemeren and Grootendorst make clear, unlike a legal dispute, an argumentative
dispute can in principle never be settled once and for all. The discussion can always be
reopened (2004, p. 138). In accordance with this starting-point, the obligation-to-defend
rule states that discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this
standpoint when requested to do so (2004, p. 191). But as we have seen, in the civil
process, the right to reopen the discussion is limited in order to guarantee that specific
legal aims can be achieved. The legal rules limit the obligations of the party who has won

1356

the trial to defend his point of view to a certain time span.10 Imposing such time limits is a
measure that is taken to achieve the legal aim of safeguarding parties legal rights. Aiming
for this type of security is, strictly speaking, not conducive to a maximal critical testing of
the acceptability of a standpoint. From the perspective of a critical discussion, this type of
limitation can therefore be seen as unreasonable, even though it is defensible from a legal
perspective.
4. CONCLUSION
A pragma-dialectical evaluation of argumentative discourse takes place on the basis of
standards of reasonableness that are expressed in the rules for critical discussion. These
rules are deontic in nature, because they specify the rights and obligations of the parties
involved in the discussion. A fallacy is a violation of such a rule, and in order to establish
whether a particular discussion move should be evaluated as fallacious, general and
specific criteria may have to be applied. These criteria are non-deontic in nature, because
they either specify the meaning (or scope) of the terms that occur in the rule or specify
which context-specific conditions have to be fulfilled in order for a discussion move to
count as a rule violation.
The influence of institutional conventions on the pragma-dialectical evaluation of
argumentation in context depends on several parameters. As a first step, the evaluator
should establish whether a particular convention is deontic or non-deontic in nature and
whether it deviates from the deontic rules of the code of conduct for reasonable
discussants. If there is no conflict, the convention may still play a role in the evaluation.
For in this case, the convention may be used to (further) specify the context-dependent
criteria on the basis of which the evaluator can decide whether a particular rule has been
violated or not. If the convention is deontic in nature and deviates from one or more of the
rules of a critical discussion, the evaluator may have to adapt the rules on which his fallacy
judgments are based. As we have argued, such a rule adaptation can only be justified by
showing that the adaptation compensates for the non-fulfillment of certain higher-order
conditions for resolving a difference of opinion. Only in this way can it be maintained that
the norms that are used in the evaluation further the realization of an argumentative aim. If
such a justification for the adaptation of the institutional convention cannot be given, the
pragma-dialectical rule should be decisive for the evaluation.
In our view, a rule adaptation cannot be motivated only by referring to specific
institutional aims that the activity type has to bring about. For in this case, the norms that
are used in the evaluation are not necessarily conducive to a reasonable resolution of a
dispute. This does of course not preclude them from being effective in bringing about
other institutional aims, such as the need to provide legal certainty to one of the parties.
And given the fact that such other aims need also to be realized, within the context at hand
the adaptation can make it possible to approach the ideal of a critical discussion as much
as possible, without sacrificing competing institutional aims. In such cases, one could say
that there is not a maximal but, given the institutional constraints, only an optimal critical
testing of the acceptability of the standpoint at issue.
10

At the same time, this means that the rights of the party who has lost the trial to challenge his opponents
standpoint (Rule 1, Freedom rule) are also limited to a certain period of time.

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On a more general level, our discussion of the influence of institutional conventions on the
pragma-dialectical evaluation of argumentation in context relates to the much debated
issue of the context-dependency of fallacy judgments. Some scholars in the field of
argumentation theory take it as a starting point that in different contexts, different
standards for the reasonableness of the discourse apply. According to Walton, for instance,
an argument that is reasonable in one context may be fallacious in a different context,
because the norms to be applied by the evaluator depend on the goal of the type of
dialogue at hand:
In order to evaluate whether an argument in a particular case is relevant or
irrelevant, reasonable or fallacious, and so forth, it is necessary to determine
whether the argument has been put forward in a deliberation, for example, as
opposed to a negotiation or persuasion dialogue or other type of dialogue. For the
goals and the rules for each type of dialogue are quite different. (Walton, 1998, p.
254)
In the pragma-dialectical approach, as emphasized below, the rules for critical discussion
are context-independent standards of argumentative reasonableness:
The difference between Walton and Krabbes approach and ours is that between a
good argument is one that contributes to the specific goal of a type of dialogue
(Walton and Krabbe) versus a good argument is one that complies with the
general rules of critical discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser). Using the rules
for critical discussion as a context-independent standard, we take the peculiarities
of the various argumentative activity types into account when we start evaluating
whether these rules have been obeyed or violated. (van Eemeren & Houtlosser,
2007, p. 65, original italics)
As we have shown, the claim that the rules for critical discussion are generally applicable
to all contexts of argumentative activity can be maintained even in cases where deontic
institutional conventions deviate from these rules. Moreover, our discussion of the
consequences for the evaluation of adaptations of the pragma-dialectical rules due to
institutional aims competing with the aim of maximal critical testing has made it clear that
we do not believe that the notion of reasonableness differs per institutional context. In our
view, regarding the reasonableness of argumentative discourse as dependent on the aims
of the institutionalized context in which the discourse is situated amounts to confusing
argumentative reasonableness with institutional efficacy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank Bart Garssen for helpful comments on an earlier version of this
paper.

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REFERENCES
Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Amsterdam / Philadelphia:
John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. A pragmadialectical perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2007). The contextuality of fallacies. Informal Logic, 27(1), 59-67.
Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1993). Reconstructing argumentative
discourse. Tuscaloosa / London: The University of Alabama Press.
Eemeren, F. H. van, Garssen, B. J., Krabbe, E. C. W., Snoeck Henkemans, A. F., Verheij, B., & Wagemans,
J. H. M. (2014). Handbook of Argumentation Theory. Dordrecht, etc.: Springer.
Feteris, E. T. (1990). Conditions and rules for rational discussion in a legal process: A pragma-dialectical
perspective. Argumentation and Advocacy, 3, 108-117.
Goodnight, T. G. (2006). When reasons matter most: Pragma-dialectics and the problem of informed
consent. In P. Houtlosser & M. A. van Rees (Eds.), Considering pragma-dialectics: A festschrift for
Frans H. van Eemeren on the occasion of his 60 th birthday (pp. 7585). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Mohammed, D. (2009). The honourable gentleman should make up his mind: Strategic manoeuvring with
accusations of inconsistency in Prime Minister's Question Time. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.
University of Amsterdam.
Snoeck Henkemans, A. F., & Mohammed, D. (2012). Institutional constraints on strategic maneuvering in
shared medical decision-making. Journal of Argumentation in Context, 1(1), 19-32.
Snoeck Henkemans, A. F., & Wagemans, J. H. M. (2012). The reasonableness of argumentation from expert
opinion in medical discussions: Institutional safeguards for the quality of shared decision making.
In J. Goodwin (Ed.), Between scientists & citizens: Proceedings of a conference at Iowa State
University, June 1-2, 2012 (pp. 345-354). Ames, IA: Great Plains Society for the Study of
Argumentation.
Wagemans, J. H. M. (2009). Redelijkheid en overredingskracht van argumentatie: Een historischfilosofische studie over de combinatie van het dialectische en het retorische perspectief op
argumentatie in de pragma-dialectische argumentatietheorie [Reasonableness and persuasiveness
of argumentation: A historical-philosophical study concerning the combination of the dialectical
and the rhetorical perspective on argumentation in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation].
Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Amsterdam.
Walton, D. (1998). The new dialectic: Conversational contexts of argument. Toronto / Buffalo / London:
University of Toronto Press.

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Theory Of Argumentation: The Argumentological Twist Is

Necessary
Viktor Tchouechov
Department of Philosophy,
Academy of Public Administration,
Minsk, Belarus, 220009,
tchoue@mail.ru

ABSTRACT: Today we need some kind of background knowledge of argumentation theory. It is the
philosophy of argumentation, or argumentology. Argumentology studies ontological, epistemological
etc. fundamentals of argumentation. Argumentological ontology answers the following question: Does
a Homo arguer really exist as a theoretical problem? Argumentological epistemology deals with the
problem of cognitive backgrounds of theory and practice of argumentation. Argumentological
methodology comprises logical, rhetorical, and dialectical approaches to argumentation.
KEYWORDS: argumentology, dialectic, epistemology, Homo arguer, logic, ontology, rhetoric of
argumentation.

1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays theory of argumentation (TA) is the field of research and study with vague
basic principles and intellectual tools of the domain conceptualization. There are a lot
of definitions of the term argumentation (argument). Indeed, according to Ch.
Perelman for argumentation to exist, an effective community of minds must be
realized at a given moment (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, p. 14). On the
contrary, L. Groake stresses that photographs, drawings, cartoons, logos, symbols,
film footage, dramatic performances, etc. may all function as elements of visual
arguments. One can find examples of visual arguments which are expressed in entirely
visual ways, but most combine visual and verbal cues. (Groake, 2007, p. 535). F. van
Eemeren, R. Grootendorst and T. Kruiger define argumentation as social, intellectual,
verbal activity serving to justify or refute an opinion, consisting of a constellation of
statements and directed towards obtaining the approbation of an audience (van
Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger, 1987, p. 7). In this case one may consider the
following problems: Is argumentation rational or not only rational entertainment? Is
argumentation a verbal or not only verbal construction? Is argumentation a set of
words or both a set of words and a variety of images? What is more we can add that
some other problems exist. What is an argument (ation) layout? What is the aim and
the peculiarities of argumentation? All these questions are usually problematic in
almost all contemporary theories of argumentation and their academic presentations.
So what should we do in this case? We think in order to answer the questions correctly;
we need some kind of background knowledge of argumentation or the philosophy of
argumentation that is called argumentology.

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2. ARGUMENTOLOGY AND TA
In 1993 I used the term argumentology in my second Ph.D. dissertation: Theoryhistorical backgrounds of argumentology (defended at Saint-Petersburg State
University, Russia) (Tchouechov, 1993). I had an idea that argumentology is the
philosophy of theory and practice of argumentation. It is not a scientific theory or
empirical model of argumentation.
Argumentology studies backgrounds or ultimate presuppositions of theory and
practice of argumentation. Being philosophical enterprise argumentology is based on
three intellectual pillars. The first one is ordinary experience of argumentation. The
second one is scientific experience, or theory of argumentation and the third one is
philosophical experience or the history of Western and Orient philosophy of
argumentation (Tchouechov, 2003, pp. 34-77).
If we construct argumentology on the basis of ordinary experience, or common
sense we should take into account that there are at least four hints about the
perspectives of scientific experience, or argumentation theory. From ordinary and
etymological point of view we should take into consideration that the English word
argumentation derives from Latin argumentum as well as from Old French
argument and it has four basic Latin meanings: 1.evidence; 2.ground; 3.support; 4.
proof (logical argument) (Merriam-Websters, 2014).
It is interesting to stress that the Russian word argumentation derives from
Latin argumentum as well as Polish argument and it has four basic Latin meanings:
1. persuasion; 2. demonstration (proof); 3.confirmation (substantiation, support); 4.
cause (causality) (Dal, 1955, p. 21). It is reasonable to distinguish among ordinary
meanings of the word argumentation in various languages. For example, F. van
Eemeren distinguishes three types of differences between the ordinary meaning of the
English word argumentation and its counterparts in the Dutch language. The first
difference is that in English the process side of argumentation is predominant while
the product side remains more passive, uncovered. At the same time in the Dutch
language there is a kind of balance between above mentioned sides in ordinary usage.
The second difference is that in English the ordinary meaning of the word
argumentation is connected to a non-deliberate, skirmishing approach to dispute
resolution, whereas non-English ordinary meanings of the word argumentation are
immediately associated with reasonableness. The third difference is that in the Dutch
language the meaning of the word argumentation deals only with constellation of
reasons put forward in defense of a standpoint. While in the case of English the
ordinary meaning of the word argumentation covers both a standpoint and arguments
advanced (van Eemeren, 2010, 308 pp.). It is clear that such meanings as evidence,
ground, support, proof, a logical argument, reasoning, opinion constitute
demonstrative, confirmative, explanative etc. approaches to theory of argumentation.
At the same time a critical approach is formed by such meanings as to argue,
accusation, and charge.
As compared to Russian etymological perspective the English one holds more
critical character.
One may discuss which (English, Russian or Dutch) etymological meaning of
the word argumentation is better to provide TA machinery. I would like to point out
the up-to-date F. van Eemerens remark on the question. He writes:

1361

it is clear that conceptually the lexical meaning of the non-English counterparts of the English
word argumentation constitutes a better basis for a theoretical definition (all italicized by me.V.Tch.) of the technical term argumentation than the meaning of the ordinary English word
argumentation (if it is even an ordinary word) (van Eemeren, 2010, 308 p.).

From Russian etymological perspective there are at least four approaches to theorizing
about the ultimate foundations of argumentation. Firstly, the approach which deals
with persuasion or persuasive approach. Secondly, there is one that is concerned about
demonstration or demonstrative approach. Thirdly, there is an approach which covers
confirmation or confirmative approach. Fourthly, there is one which is associated with
explanation or explanatory approach. Consequently, ordinary experience supposes that
there are four ways (directions) of the approaches transformation into theories of
argumentation. The demonstrative approach to studying of ultimate foundations of
argumentation has been often associated with logic (formal logic); the persuasive one
with rhetoric; the confirmative one with dialectic. As far as the explanatory approach
is concerned, it originally deals with the lost Aristotles Methodic and nowadays this
approach is frequently associated by non-philosophers with cognitive science, whereas
in argumentological perspective it should be connected to epistemology.
Recently the features of theoretical approaches to argumentation and relations
between its inseparable levels have been considered by such scholars as J. Wenzel, A.
Blair, R. Johnson, F. van Eemeren, D. Walton, C. Tindale and others. It should be
mentioned that studying argumentation requires a clear demarcation between its levels
and non-discrimination of all approaches. The non-discrimination means that an
argumentation theorist shouldnt consider his favorite approach to be discriminatory to
other inferior or subordinate levels. Consequently, theoretical and practical realization
of these approaches must be based on a clear difference between logic and rhetoric,
rhetoric and dialectic, dialectic and epistemology of argumentation and their multiand interdisciplinary connection.
One of the consequences of clearness violation is the emergence of various and
today not yet well studied argumentological dilemmas. For example: the dilemma of
persuasive demonstrativeness (in accordance with which persuasiveness is a criterion
for demonstrativeness) and demonstrative persuasiveness (according to this dilemma,
for example, logic is persuasive itself, that is it is something like rigorous, ironclad
logic). The dilemma of confirmative explanativeness (according to it a standpoint is
supported but this support is not an obvious one) and explanative confirmativeness
should also be pointed out. Therefore, one may consider that there are four theoretical
perspectives for the argumentological twist in TA: logical; rhetorical; dialectical, and
epistemological.
The possibility of existence of at least four relatively independent approaches
to theorizing about argumentation focuses on the problem of their general justification
or, philosophically speaking, ontology of theory and practice of argumentation. But
what is ontology of argumentation? This question is relatively new in contemporary
theory and philosophy of argumentation. To answer the question, one may suppose that
this ontology should be connected to anthropological turn in ontology that was
proposed by M. Heidegger and J. - P. Sartre in the first half of the XX-th century
(Heidegger, 1996; Sartre, 1984).
However, general and particular peculiarities of ontology of argumentation
should be more reasonably connected with the concept of Homo arguer. Moreover, we
can make much clearer the ontological minimum of argumentation, according to which
(as H. Johnstone Jr. indirectly mentioned) man is a persuading and persuaded animal

1362

(Johnstone Jr., 1965, pp.41-46), or speaking in other words, who has no ability to argue
is not yet man in the real sense of the word, or is not a Homo arguer. Following the
American philosopher H. W. Johnstone Jr. discourse about persuading and persuaded
animal, we may also say that ontology of argumentation should be the ontology of
Homo arguer. The status of Homo arguer as a concept in contemporary theory of
argumentation as well as in ontology of argumentation can hardly be overestimated.
It is ontology of argumentation that defines perspectives of its epistemology,
dialectic, rhetoric, and logic. Homo arguer is a person who would argue and has
knowledge of logical laws and their rhetorical imitation as well as dialectical rules of
argumentation and so would rebut logical, rhetorical, dialectical, and epistemological
fallacies that contest basic ontological principle of argumentation.
Ontological minimum of argumentation is realized in logical maximum of
argumentation. This maximum is concretized in three fundamental principles of formal
logic: the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle. As
it was shown by G. Leibniz,
our reasoning is grounded upon two great principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of which
we judge false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or
contradictory to the false; (Theod. 44, 169.)and that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which
we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient
reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known
by us. (Theod. 44, 196.) (Leibniz, 2014).

It seems to me that the principle of sufficient reason is a kind of bridge from logic to
rhetoric and may be even dialectic of argumentation.
Logical maximum of argumentation represented in three basic logical laws is
imitated and extended in its rhetorical minimum. One may suppose that rhetorical
minimum of argumentation is founded on the rule of justice. According to Ch.
Perelman, this rule requires giving identical treatment to beings or situations of the
same kind (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, p. 218).
On the contrary, rhetorical maximum of argumentation consists of schemes of
argumentation which were clearly elucidated by Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca
in The new rhetoric. Ch. Perelman has also shown that logic of argumentation
is identified, both by Schopenhauer and by J. S. Mill, with the rules applied in the conduct of
the ones own thought and this individualistic outlook has done much to discredit, not only
rhetoric, but, in general, any theory of argumentation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, p.
41).

In this perspective, logic of argumentation is self-evident and its audience is universal

audience. On the contrary, rhetoric of argumentation is evident to other people, or
directed to a concrete audience in Ch. Perelmans sense of this word. Therefore, there
is logic of argumentation and its rhetorical imitation (Tchouechov, 2008, pp. 37-41).
The concept of imitation, or speaking in retro manner, mimesis (Auerbauch,
1953) plays a crucial methodological role in elucidations of inner connections not only
between logic and rhetoric, but between other levels of argumentation theory building.
For example, Ch. Perelman correctly distinguishes logical and rhetorical, or quasilogical arguments (imitating the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction) and
argumentative relations based on the structure of reality and only establishing the
structure of reality (imitating the principle of sufficient reason) etc. (Perelman,
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, pp. 193-260; 350-410).

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As it was suggested above, Ch. Perelman himself considered that the bridge from logic
to rhetoric of argumentation is connected with the rule of justice. The inner connection
between the Perelmans rule of justice and the Leibnizs principle of sufficient reason
needs, of course, more special attention. One may consider these principles are both or
separately the bridges between not only logic and rhetoric, but also logic, rhetoric, and
dialectic of argumentation. However in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation
the bridge between rhetoric and dialectic of argumentation is based on the concept of
strategic maneuvering.
It is known that pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation has five
constituents: philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical, and practical (van
Eemeren, 2004, p. 38-39). The philosophical estate is based on the critical-rationalistic
view of reasonableness, which in its part stems from the ideas of Karl Popper (van
Eemeren, 2004, p. 17). The other element of the pragma-dialectical philosophical
ground of theory of argumentation is utilitarianism. But due to the high influence of the
Popperian concept of falsification the main utilitarian principle is changed and
understood as minimization of disagreement (not as maximization of agreement) (van
Eemeren, 2010, p. 34).
At the end of the 20th century two Dutch scholars F. van Eemeren and P.
Houtlosser proposed the concept of strategic manuevring and at the beginning of the
21th century they conjoined dialectical and rhetorical dimensions of argumentation
with the help of Aristotelian principle (usually translated as: a mirror
image, a counterpart, a correlative, a coordinate, a transformation which is
reciprocal and reversible, a subordination, a mutual dependence, etc.). Indeed, in
Rhetoric Aristotle denoted the type of relationship between rhetoric and dialectic
using the word . It is interesting to note that in the latest English edition
of Rhetoric the word is not translated and is given in transcription:
rhetoric is an antistrophos to dialectic (Aristotle, 2007, p.30). It is important to admit
that in the Russian edition of this book the word is translated as
correspondence: rhetoric is a cor-respondence of dialectic (Aristotle, 2000, p. 5).
The Dutch theorists offer the concept of strategic maneuvering as the
continuation of the ancient rhetorical and dialectical tradition (van Eemeren, 2013, p.
49-70). One may insist on the fact that the strategic maneuvering is a bridge from
rhetoric to dialectic of argumentation. But what does it mean? According to F. van
Eemeren, the integration of dialectical and rhetorical approaches should be functional
(van Eemeren, 2010, p. 90).
The other three inseparable aspects of strategic maneuvering are: topical
potential (selecting among possible topoi in the discussion), audience demand
(adapting to audiences commitment store) and presentational devices (selecting the
communicative means that can increase an adherence to argumentative moves). Of
course, all of them correspond to classical areas of rhetoric: the study of invention, the
study of audience adaptation and the study of elocution and pronunciation (van
Eemeren, 2010, p. 95).
Argumentation also refers to different conventionalized communicative
practices. They are institutionalized in the sense that the constituents of these practices
are organized in order to reach the institutional aim. The other aspect of the
institutionalization of argumentation is the implementation of the genres of
communicative activity. They are adjudication, deliberation, mediation, negotiation,
consultation, disputation, promotion, communion, and others (van Eemeren, 2010, p.

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139). The unity of institutional and organizational aspects of argumentation one can
simply call organizational and verbal (OV) rules of argumentation.
It is necessary to stress that the strategic maneuvering as well as the principle
of sufficient reason and the rule of justice dont give us insight into the philosophy of
rhetoric and dialectic of argumentation.
However, using the philosophy of imitation, one may suppose that the
rhetorical maximum of argumentation is imitated and extended in its dialectical
minimum and vice versa (Tchouechov, 2008, pp.37-49).
The dialectical minimum of argumentation consists of the basic dialogical law
and three rules (four sub-rules) of argumentation (Tchouechov, 2009, pp. 194-195).
Today dialectic (dialogics) of argumentation is usually considered as the theory
of dialogue. Dialogue is a multifaceted communicative process. Depending on what
goals people have or are trying to achieve, various forms of dialogue can be
distinguished. Argumentation has a crucial role in each of these forms. Even from Ch.
Perelmans rhetorical point of view
dialogue, as we consider it, is not supposed to be a debate, in which the partisans of opposed
settled convictions defend their respective views, but rather a discussion in which the
interlocutors search honesty and without bias for the best solution to a controversial problem
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, p. 37)

Although it doesnt exhaust all the aspects of quarrel, polemics, discussion and other
forms of dialogue, argumentation is understood as their inseparable element.
Therefore the philosophical bridge from logic to rhetoric and dialectic
(dialogics) of argumentation is based on the above mentioned dialogical law and the
rules of argumentation. The basic dialogical law of argumentation states the following:
the lesser weight argumentation holds in the life of society, the greater weight violence
and (or) threats of its use would hold.
The highest organizational form of dialogue in epistemological perspective is
critical discussion which is centered on the process of truth finding. Following Gricean
Cooperative principle as well as his Maxims of conversation and according to pragmadialectical rules of critical discussion and the concept of strategic maneuvering (Grice,
1975, pp.45-58; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren, 2010), the next
general rules of dialogue (critical discussion (CD)) organization are worth
distinguishing.
They are the following rules and sub-rules of dialogue (CD). The first
organizational-verbal (OV) rule a participant in discussion must be interested in
achieving its final goal.
The second OV rule a participant in discussion must strongly contribute to
the achievement of its final goal. It is known, that according to P.Grice, the Principle of
Communication is the basis of interaction among people. This principle can be
concretized by way of the following postulates or, in my terms, sub-rules of dialogue.
The first OV sub-rule all information on certain standpoint must be contained
in discussion. The second OV sub-rule only truthful information must be used in
discussion. The third OV sub-rule only relevant information must be applied to
discussion (compare to the Gricean Maxim of Relevance). The fourth OV sub-rule
only comprehensible and clear information must be used in discussion (compare to the
Gricean Maxim of Manner). Obviously, the generalization of the Gricean one to four
(1-4) sub-rules leads to the formulation of the third OV rule participants in CD must
be honest, objective, efficient and clear.

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Dialogical (dialectical) rules of critical discussion are generalization, imitation and

extension of logical and rhetorical laws and principles.
It should be noted that the revision of both the amount of rules and their
content has a great impact on any procedure of responding to a fallacious move of any
kind. For example, H. Jos Plug, a Dutch scholar, correctly distinguished five ways
(basing on the works of F. van Eemeren) of reaction to fallacious moves (to ignore a
fallacy, a discussion stoppage, a counter fallacy, a meta-dialogue and a fallacy
readjustment) (Plug, 2010, pp.1-12). A study of the list of discussion rules and their
content may lead to the creation of a new critical responding technique and change the
above mentioned ones, because while criticizing we are making an appeal to some list
of discussion rules. Basic dialogical law and OV dialogical rules of argumentation
together form dialectical maximum of argumentation.
I think that dialectical maximum of argumentation is imitated and extended in
epistemological minimum of argumentation. Important information on epistemological
maximum of argumentation can be found in the works of Norwegian philosopher A.
Naess (Naess, 1966). But this idea needs further consideration which is beyond the
scope of my article. Let me make only one hint about that perspective.
According to Biro and Siegel, an epistemic approach founds itself on the
claim that it is a conceptual truth about arguments and that argumentation should
provide a bridge from known truths or justified beliefs to as yet unknown (or at least
unrecognized) truths or as yet unjustified beliefs (Biro & Siegel, 1992, p. 92).
From argumentological point of view, the argument of Biro and Siegel, that
argumentation theory should be understood as being concerned with ability of
arguments to render beliefs rational (Biro & Siegel, p. 97) should be complemented
with following: epistemology of TA should be understood as being concerned with
ability to render basic dialogical law and rules of argumentation. The epistemological
maximum of argumentation is imitated in the ontological minimum of argumentation.
Again, this minimum is connected with the Basic law and three dialectical rules of
argumentation. Consequently, one may think that its possible to establish an unbroken
unity of ontology, methodology and epistemology of Homo arguer.
By the way, Carl Linnaeus introduced not only the concept of Homo sapiens.
He also distinguished it from two other concepts: a troglodyte and a monster. For me it
means that a man (Homo arguer) who is not able to catch the ontological-dialogical
minimum of argumentation can be considered to be a modern caveman or a troglodyte,
whereas a man who can argue sophisticatedly has all grounds to transform into a posthuman or an argumentative superman. It is obviously that today this kind of man
would face difficulties in communicating with a less educated man, who does not
match the unattainable ideal of Homo arguer.
Today various theories of argumentation propose a lot of necessary conceptions
about ideal Homo arguer. One of the examples is pragma-dialectics of the Amsterdam
school. Firstly, this theory of argumentation has provided a researcher and a user of
argumentation with 21 rules of reasonableness and then their number was decreased to
10 (van Eemeren, 1992, p. 208). Of course, 10 rules is less than 21, but is more than
one law and three rules. Consequently, the theory of argumentation supported by basic
law and three rules of argumentation is more up-to-date to almost all contemporary
theories and practices of argumentation. It allows us to consider pragma-dialectics as
well as other too sophisticated theories of argumentation not argumentological
supported by serious backgrounds. They are a plethora of ways to scrutinize Homo
arguer as a superman.

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3. CONCLUSION
Homo arguer does not exist in vacuum but acts and argues in the real historical
process. His yesterday, present and tomorrow stance depends not only on him, but also
on his audience, argumentative means used, peculiarities of civilization and culture.
This indicates that not any argumentological turn in TA is of current importance
nowadays. We must seek for such an argumentological twist in which contextdependent, dynamical, ultimate grounds of theory of argumentation will be studied and
evaluated thoroughly. Consequently, there are several logical, rhetorical, dialectical,
and epistemological theories of argumentation, but the pragma-dialectical theory of
argumentation (initially formulated at the Amsterdam school by the professors Franz
van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst) is the most instructive of them.
But in order to provide unity of theory and practice of argumentation we need a
more profound contemporary socio-historical and dialectical argumentology to correct
the minimum and the maximum of ontology, epistemology, dialectic, rhetoric, and
logic of argumentation.

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Eemeren, F. H. van (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach.
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Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins publ.com.
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Leibniz, G. (1898). The monodology. (R.Latta, Trans). Retrieved from http://home.
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Naess, A. (1966). Communication and argument. Elements of applied semantics. (A. Hannay, Trans.).
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Perelman, Ch., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1971). The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation. (J.
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About An Emotion, Indignation, And Its Argumentation. The Case Of

The Argumentum Ad Selectivum
Danile Torck
VU-University
Amsterdam
The Netherlands, d.m.f.torck@vu.nl

ABSTRACT: This paper is about Indignation (defined as Anger about something Unjust) in everyday
argumentation, when it becomes the object of an argumentative construction involving the pathos (genuine or
phony emotion), the logos (legitimacy of the sets of beliefs and judgments concerning the state of affairs that
generated the emotion) and the ethos (righteousness of the Indignant Person or Institution). I will focus on a
frequent refutation in public discourse of someones Indignation, that is its Selectiveness.
KEYWORDS: Indignation, expression of strong emotion, pathos, logos, ethos, selectiveness, Stephane Hessel
(2010)

INTRODUCTION
At the origin of this paper, there was the international popularity of the word
Indignation/Outrage in 2011 and the debates and polemics in France following the editorial
success of Stphane Hessels little book, Indignez-vous!(American title: Time for
Outrage!). As a discourse analyst, my main interest is in the approach of an Emotion
(Indignation) in every day argumentation, following Plantin (2011) and Micheli (2010): the
expression of emotion can be used as a persuasive argument to bring people into action, and
can be evaluated as such, but the emotion may first need to be legitimized, and this process of
legitimization will concern the three means of persuasion and their interaction: Pathos
(genuine or phony emotion), Logos (righteousness of the object of indignation, legitimacy of
the sets of beliefs and judgments concerning the state of affairs that generated the emotion)
and Ethos (righteousness of the Indignant Person or Institution).
I will first specify the meaning of the word Indignation, and then will make a brief
reference to approaches to Indignation in philosophy and argumentation studies. I will
illustrate this argumentation of Indignation with examples mostly taken from the French
media, the Internet and small publications concerning the Stephane Hessel controversy. This
will be followed by an exploration of the frequent denunciation of the Selectiveness of
Indignation, and a reflection on its argumentative value.
1. INDIGNATION
In definitions of Indignation, we find three words, anger, moral and injustice, the cause
of anger being something unjust, contrary to morality, moral norms (Merriam-Webster). A
first interesting difference with another strong, violent emotion, Anger, is the fact that
Indignation is never directed at oneself, which for some people weakens its moral dimension:
Ce sentiment est de ceux qui ne sappliquent quaux autres, jamais soi, () et la morale
authentique suppose dabord des exigences quon formule pour son propre compte.1
Indignation has drawn the attention of philosophers since Plato. Mattei (2005) presents a
1

Luc Ferry, 6/1/2011, in a commentary on Hessels publication (Le Figaro).

1369

summary that refers in the first place to the source and nature of indignation: sentiment que
nous prouvons face au dni de dignit dont souffre injustement un homme ou un groupe
dhommes. Cest la dignit comme principe premier de lhumanit qui justifierait
lindignation, comme sentiment second dhumanit(p.14).2 In his chapter on political
indignation, with references to the Valladolid controversy and the Dreyfus Affair, he writes:
Sindigner, cest souffrir et, dans un premier temps, nous souffrons seuls (p.126). Then
comes a second reaction, which moves from the unjust act to the Victim (Pity) and to the
Agent (Anger). If felt repeatedly, Indignation engenders hatred. The just Indignation can then
become wrong or false, as it is less involved with justice and more with vengeance. In
another chapter, Attac, ou lindignation idologique, Mattei refers to collective Indignation
(illustrated by Anti-globalization movements), and its dangers as it moves the accusation of
individuals, real persons to nations or systems, leading to collective culpability.
Cognitive antecedents, that is the awareness of an injustice, are usually recognized in
emotions such as pity or indignation. But the emotion is not universally shared, as it will
depend on beliefs and judgments of the Indignant. For Boltanski (1993), the consequence is
that Quand certains indigns en viennent sindigner des indignations des autres, et non des
offenses faites la justice, ils considrent comme indignes les sentiments de leurs
adversaires, et bientt, leurs adversaires eux-mmes (p.22).
Elster (1999) describes Indignation as a social emotion that feeds on comparison.3 It
is also described as a triadic emotion: A feels indignant about Bs treatment of C. I will add a
fourth element, making it a quaternary emotion: A feels indignant about the injustice B done
to C by D, as any argumentation of Indignation will concern, one of, or more often, these
four elements.
A distinction has to be made between the emotion itself and its public expression
(speech, article, book, street protests, art). I will focus on the verbal expression and its
context. The speech act that manifests Indignation is a denunciation-accusation of what is
considered unjust and against moral norms, and of the Agent judged responsible for said
injustice4.
In order to argue in favor of Indignation as a moral, righteous, virtuous emotion, we
have to consider the three means of persuasion and their interaction. In the following, I will
focus on the argumentative construction of Indignation.
2. ARGUMENTATION OF INDIGNATION
In the field of argumentation, following cognitive and philosophical studies of the relation
between cognition and emotion, recent studies have considered emotions as arguments and
defined the conditions of their reasonableness (Walton, 1992). Other recent studies have
focused on the argumentation of emotions (Plantin, 2011, Micheli, 2010).
Brinton (1988) in his Appeal to Angry Emotions considers the relationship between
emotions and reason, and the conditions for a strong emotion to be justified and legitimate,
according to a general or circumstantial approach to morality. In reference to Aristotle,
Brinton sees in Indignation a call for action: But, even in this narrow strict sense,
indignation is not a mere cool assessment or judgment; it is, or includes, a feeling or a
complex of feelings it is an emotion of passion. As such, it is a motivation to action, which
is why it is appealed to in rhetorical situations, for example in public speeches whose aim is
to get people to take certain courses of action (p.81). He proposes an Argumentum ad
2

Emphasis by the author.

This might explain the frequency of the Selectiveness argument and its compulsory comparative dimension, as
we shall see.
4
I will favor Agent instead of Persecutor as used by Boltanski.
3

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Indignationem the logical correctness of which will be a matter of two things : (1) whether
the reasons given for the emotion are good ones, whether the truth of certain propositions,
namely those which are appealed to, would, in fact, justify the feelings which they are
supposed to arouse ; (2) whether the degree or intensity of the emotional responses (or
intended emotional response) is appropriate to the reasons given, in the context of the
rhetorical situation considered as a whole (p.81). When the grounds appealed to are
inappropriate or inadequate, either for indignation , or for the called-for degree of
indignation, then there will be a logical failure (p.83) . Brinton warns that the evaluation of
ad indignationem is often difficult and often has to be tentative, or has to be made relative to
a restricted point of view (p.83).
In other words, a virtuous Indignation will, as claimed by Aristotle (quoted in Brinton
p.78), depend on feel[ing it] at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards
the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way. Arguing for or against
Indignation will involve the three modes of proof:
Pathos: genuine emotion (vs. manipulative strategy), form given to the pathetic
discourse
Logos: legitimacy of the Object of Indignation (Injustice, Victim, Agent)
Ethos: Righteousness of the Indignant Person/Institution5
The accusation of Selective Indignation (in the following SI) will stress the interaction
between the three modes of proof. I will briefly illustrate this process with the Hessel
Controversy.
3. COUNTER-ARGUMENTATION OF AN INDIGNATION
3.1 The Hessel controversy
In October 2010, a short text (19 pages, in the first edition of 8000 copies), based on a speech
held for an audience of French youths6, was published without any prior publicity by a small
publishing house (Editions Indignes, Montpellier)7. The author was Stephane Hessel, 93
years old, an ex-diplomat, a member of the French resistance, a survivor of concentration
camps, with a life filled with activities in the domain of human rights and social justice. The
success of the publication was immediate: almost 800,000 copies had been sold in France by
the beginning of 2011. It then became international, with translations into different languages
(34, according to Le Monde, on September 28, 2011).
In the first place, it is an appeal to an emotion, Indignation, said to be the first motif of
the Resistance in World War Two, and presented as the opposite of indifference and
passivity, an appeal which argues for action and involvement against various injustices. The
winter and spring of 2011 saw many discussions and reflections in France on the emotion and
its intentional object. At the same time came the protest movements in the Middle East, in
5

As put by Boltanski (1999, pp. 58,59): the Indignant must demonstrate that he is free from any prejudice
towards the designated persecutor () and has no favourable prejudice towards the unfortunate. This applies
to distant suffering and the commitment to action against a particular injustice. The question asked will be of it
can also apply to ones Indignation .
6
At an annual commemoration ceremony, on the Plateau des Glires, organized by the association Citoyens
rsistants dHier et dAujourdhui (May 17, 2009).
7
Created in 1996, Editions Indignes is an independent publishing company, specialized in cultures and arts of
primary nations (American Indians, Inuits, Aborigenes) and brochures on social contestation (Ceux qui
marchent contre le vent).

1371

Europe and North America, which saw hundreds of thousands of people, mostly young, take
to the streets and to symbolic places (squares, rich avenues, financial centers).
In Spain, the movement adopted the name of Los Indignados, in reference to Hessels
brochure. Historians will have the task to determine the real influence that Hessels
publication, and its mediatization8, have had on these events.
In France the editorial success has been differently interpreted: as an extraordinary
intuitive feeling of deep anger and fear for the future of many people that ignited a mood of
protest, as an illustration of the intellectual poverty of the buyers/readers (mostly said to be
related to left wing thinking and politics), as the instrument of a political (leftish)
manipulation, sometimes correlated to the proximity of the French presidential elections
(2012), or as propaganda against Israel, and a strategy of the Boycott-Divestment-Sanctions
Movement (BDS). This last accusation was related to the two pages of the brochure
expressing the authors current Indignation regarding the Palestinian question and illustrated
by the situation in Gaza.9 These pages generated critical reactions from journalists, polemists,
politicians and ordinary people, and as many critical counter-reactions. This offers a very rich
field of observation on the argumentation of the emotion, Indignation, and of its Object.
3.2 Argumentation against a particular Indignation
The Object of Hessels personal, current Indignation is the situation in Gaza/of the
Palestinians. In critical commentaries, this is considered to be a one-sided position, as nothing
is said about the crimes of Hamas. This SI originates in a personal obsession, which is hatred
of Israel/Jews.
3.2.1 The Pathos
The emotion is denounced as being dpasse (out-moded), nave or disproportionate,
possibly as the result of manipulative actions undertaken by the BDS movement, aggravated
by the senility of the Indignant. In the most extreme critical reactions, the emotion is related
to hatred towards Israel, and so is its editorial success, which is au coeur mme de cette
indignation aussi obsessionnellement slective queffroyablement, monstrueusement,
pathologiquement, indignement disproportionne (Goldnadel, 2012: 19).
3.2.2 The Logos
The Logos concerns the Injustice committed (the blockade of Gaza, the Cast Lead Operation,
the Palestinian question), the Victims (the Palestinians in general and in Gaza in particular),
and the Agent (Israel, its army). The argumentation against Hessels Indignation
concentrates on what is perceived as a fallacious representation of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. It questions the nature of the Injustice, and reconsiders the attribution of the roles of
Victims and Agent. In its most developed forms (such as Szlamowicz 2011), it combines the
denunciation of the numbers given by Hessel (of Palestinian refugees, of victims from both
sides) of the Palestinian narrative (Nakba), of the lies concerning actions by the Israeli army
and specific interventions (Cast Lead in Gaza); words such as settlements/occupation are
rejected based on historical facts(San Remo Treaty 1920, territories legally obtained
through winning wars, security- reasons), questions are asked about the Palestinian ideology
8

In terms of numbers of articles and reactions in different media, and participation in radio and television
programs. This mediatization deserves to be studied in its own right.
9
The 2 pages on Gaza refer to a 2009 visit to Gaza, with his wife, Christine Hessel Chabry, who was then
president of the association EJE (Enfants, Jeu, Education), a Palestinian antenna of La Voix de lEnfant.

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(undemocratic, focused on destruction and judeophobia10, Hamas terrorism), and about the
existence of a Palestinian people. There is talk of a one-sided position in Hessels text, as
nothing is said about the crimes of Hamas11 and of the Palestinians. The designation of
Palestinians as rfugis is rejected, as well as victimes, since la part active du camp arabe
dans ce conflit interdirait moralement de solliciter le statut de victimes (34). 12 The
conclusion is that the denomination (rfugis/victimes) is equivalent to the premises of an
argumentation: Israel is the oppressor. Denying the premises leads to another conclusion:
there is no injustice, there are no (Palestinian) victims.
Then comes the accusation of SI. An example: Vous ny trouverez pas non plus
dindignation sur la violation des droits de lhomme en Birmanie, en Chine, en Iran, en Core
du Nord, en Libye, en Tunisie et dans dautres pays car lindignation de Stphane Hessel est
gomtrie variable. Manifestement, sa boussole intrieure sest bloque sur ce pays honni
(Assouline, cf. Torck 2013). Goldnadel (2012) criticizes the title, which, contrary to what its
generic form might lead one to expect, is not an appeal for an indignation universelle since
the book ne sindigne de rien, ou presque, and then enumerates a dozen countries that
should have been the object of Hessels Indignation (17).
The SI argument is composed of two elements: the accusation of focusing on one
country and the mention of other countries that deserve Indignation, as a form of X Quoque.
The most common counter-arguments to the Argument of Selectiveness, in relation to these
two pages, are the following. First, Israel is a democracy, whereas the other countries usually
mentioned are not democracies. Land occupation (and its consequences for the population) is
not democratic. So Israel may be/should be criticized for its politics. The second argument is
the Argument of Proximity, which argues, on historical (Jews in European/Western history),
cultural (religion, sciences, art), geopolitical (Israel is in the Middle-East) and economical
grounds (financial help from Europe to the Palestinians), for a natural, legitimate interest in
Israels actions.
Hessels SI is seen as a one-sided strategy and is quickly connected to the Ethos of
the Indignant: Non seulement il ne dit pas la vrit historique et factuelle du conflit mais,
quand mme il dirait vrai, pourquoi son indignation sexerce-t-elle uniquement sur ce pays et
nullement sur les dictatures islamiques, la Chine, lIran, ou les massacres dopposants
rgulirement perptrs par le Fatah et le Hamas ? (Szlamowicz, p.9, my emphasis).
When Personal Indignation is seen as a personal obsession, to which a name can be given
(Hatred of Zionism/Israel/Jews = anti-Semitism), then we turn to the Ethos of the Indignant.
As the French adage says, tell me what your indignation is, and I will tell you who you are.
3.2.3 The Ethos: the despicable old man (le vieil homme indigne)
The denunciation of Hessels Ethos concerns his social Ethos, Amossy (1999)ethos
pralable, the image and reputation of the person, and the discursive Ethos.
The attacks on his Social Ethos concern his family first, and his earlier self-presentation as a
Jew (his grand-parents were Jewish immigrants who joined the Lutherian Church, his mother
was la fille dun banquier prussien et antismite", precizes Goldnadel p.(31). Then there is
his alleged participation in the writing of the Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, he turns
out to have only been an observer to the editing of the Declaration. His participation in the
10

The word designates the new anti-Semitism, especially related to Moslim countries and communities in
Europe (P-A. Taguieff, 2002).
11
Hessels text mentions the rockets attacks on the Israeli town of Sderot.
12
Szlamowitcz rejects Edward Saids expression victimes des victimes to refer to Palestinians, as occultant
totalement leur rle historique dagresseurs, qui est double: lors de la guerre de 1948 et, auparavant, lors de la
collaboration avec les Nazis sous lgide du grand mufti de Jerusalem(p.35).

1373

Resistance and his deportation to concentration camps (Buchenwald, Dora) are not usually
questioned, although his declarations about the Resistance and his experience are the object
of various comments (Who gives him the right to speak in the name of the Resistance? being
the most frequent).
The Discursive Ethos is the topic of Szlamowics (2011). His objective is to show
comment le texte de Stphane Hessel, en tant quil participe plus largement du mouvement
politique que constitue la nbuleuse du BDS, veut influer sur la langue pour instituer un halo
de connotations ngatives autour du mot Isral (p.21). Chapter IV ( Indignation et
Emphase: la posture du succs), following one chapter on linguistic approaches, and two
chapters which denounce the myths and factual lies, concerns Hessels Ethos: the claim
of Jewishness (which has already been denounced as false) is presented as a way to escape
the accusations of anti-Semitism, and to advance an Authority argument. Mention is made of
the Alterjuifs (the Self-Hating Jews), for who lantisionisme est aujourdhui le plus sr
moyen de faire carrire mdiatique (p.81). The Authority argument is also based on the
creation of an image by the author through references to the War and the Resistance, to his
age, his family and cultural background. With the title of the brochure: Hessel soffre ainsi
au lecteur comme modle dontique, cette donticit () qui articule indignation et action,
formule un appel au militantisme qui ressemble fort un discours de sergent recruteur. Cest
dailleurs la stratgie avoue du BDS (p.77). Again, the main aim of Hessels text is said to
be the denunciation of Israel; if there is mention of other objects of indignation, it is seen as a
construction which might be attractive to young people. The chapter concludes that the
incohrences philosophiques have nothing to do with Logos, but with Ethos and Pathos,
with la posture quil entend camper: lindignation pacifique (p.84). As the French adage
says, tell me what your indignation is, and I will tell you who you really are.
Two remarks as a conclusion to this part of the study. First, Szlamowiczs aim was to
show that Hessels call was, in the first place, a strategy of the BDS movement. This,
however, was repeatedly taken as a given fact. Surprisingly, for a linguist, there is also no
reference to the textual genre and its context13. Second, there is a total absence of reflection
on, or even reference to, the events taking place in different countries. Published in April
2011, the study limits itself to the two pages on Gaza, while hundreds of thousands of
people had taken to the streets for reasons that had nothing to do with Israel or Gaza.
I will now enlarge the descriptive field, looking at other uses of the argument of Selective
indignation.
4. SELECTIVE INDIGNATION
Selective can be understood as resulting from a process of selection, often related to
specific goals or norms (highly selective admission process to a club for instance, selective
tastes as choosy, particular tastes). Combined with a word of emotion, the implication often
will be related to the person having the emotion (his past, his personality, his character, etc..).
A selective fear for dogs, but not for snakes, will possibly be related to a childhood
experience; a selective anger, to the persons character (she doesnt care about the mess I
make but gets really mad when I borrow something from her without asking).
So does Mattei (2012) : Quand un chercheur tudie en gopolitique le conflit isralo-palestinien, ses
indignations ne sont pas affectes ; ce sont ses raisonnements qui sont convoqus et qui lui permettent le cas
chant de sengager dun ct ou dun autre. Stphane Hessel, lui, ne sengage que dun ct en suivant une
indignation slective issue dun jugement qui ne lest pas moins . As opposed to the following: On ne peut
reprocher un petit texte sans prtention de ne pas tre exhaustif ou de simplifier une situation complexe.
Hessel na jamais prtendu crire une thse philosophique ou un manifeste politique (Esteve, 31/12/2010,
Slatee.fr).
13

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In the following I will consider some examples of accusations of SI taken from a data
collected on Google.fr/com, using the search terms Selective indignation/Indignation
slective in the winter and spring of 2013, and in March 2014. It shows a big diversity of
Addressees (accused of SI), but by far the most frequent are governments, organizations,
institutions, (political) groups, (protest) movements, media or their representatives (vs.
Individuals). The Indignation, sometimes considered legitimate, is then opposed to silence or
indifference regarding other Objects.
4.1 A brief exploration of Accusations of Selective Indignation
(1)

Looking at [Australian] Foreign Minister Bob Carr's ministerial website, though, you could be forgiven
for wondering exactly what criteria the Foreign Minister uses to condemn incidents. There appears to
be no rhyme or reason as to the threshold for such public utterances. Why for instance, does the
Foreign Minister expressly condemn the firing of three rockets from Gaza into Israel on 26 February
that caused no injuries, as well as a bomb attack in Hyderabad that left 15 people dead, and yet say
nothing on the record regarding a targeted series of attacks against a religious minority in Pakistan that
has left more than 250 people dead in a little more than a month? 14 Note that two events on a specific
day are opposed to one event or series of events that took place in a period of a month; another
difference is the number of victims, 0/15 as opposed to more than 250.

(2)

Why should it be impossible for the Indian intelligentsia to read Israeli novels and poetry, attend
exhibitions by Israeli artists, listen to Israeli musicians, watch Israeli theatre performances, and still
stay sensitive to the cause of Palestinians? I have not heard of boycotts anywhere of Chinese goods,
Pakistani novels or Indian films, though these originate in states that oppress people in similarly
unbearable ways.15
The argument against the boycott seem relevant, especially because it concerns the Israeli Art world,
which is almost entirely located within the Green line, as opposed to the boycott of goods made or
harvested on the West Bank. Note the form given to the comparison of Injustices with the expression
in similarity unbearable ways, while denying the legitimacy of the choice. This seems to argue in
favor of another motivation behind the emotion.

Religion appears frequently as a criterium for Selective Indignation. In France, it will often
concern the attention given to Jews and Muslims vs. Christians, as Agents or Victims, as in
(3)

Affaire Charlie Hebdo : une indignation slective? Aprs lincendie criminel de la rdaction du journal
Charlie Hebdo dans la nuit de mardi mercredi, la question de la libert dexpression face aux
sensibilits religieuses est nouveau pose, une libert d'expression dfendue gomtrie variable
selon les polmiques. Dj en 2006 Charlie Hebdo avait suscit la colre de certains musulmans avec
des caricatures de Mahomet. )Au-del du milieu mdiatique, cest la classe politique dans son
ensemble qui sest indigne () Cette vritable union nationale, ces avalanches de communiqus de
soutien dfendant la libert dexpression, le "droit au blasphme", la libre pense ou la lacit, ont pris
une telle ampleur quelles posent dsormais la question du traitement partial ou non, gal ou non, des
affaires mlant libert dexpression et religion. () Car avant les attaques contre la rdaction du
journal Charlie Hebdo, ce sont des catholiques intgristes qui ont suscit la polmique, celle-ci ne
crant en aucun cas le mme lan de solidarit et de soutien que pour lhebdomadaire satirique.(.) Et
16
aucun ministre na alors pris la peine de sexprimer sur la question.

The data is rich in alternative Objects that refer to states of affairs or events of a different nature, from
a different time or place. For instance: addressing the Media, Object 1 : Aggression DSK-

Diallo and its media coverage opposed to Object 2, silence on rapes and crimes on women in
Africa; addressing Politics/Media/Public, O1: Bin Laden as opposed to O2: dictators
14

Rodger Shanahan, 6/3/2013www.fowyinterpreter.org.

www.openthemagazine.com/.../in-defence-of-isra..
16
Matthieu Mgevand (3/11/2011), LeMondedesReligions.fr.
15

1375

supported by the US, victims from US sanctions and bombing in Iraq and Native American
slavery; On LeMondeJuif.fr site, O1, support of some French mayors for the liberation of
Palestinian prisoners, silence on 02, violence in Palestinian jails and detention conditions in
French jails. The Site Altermedia/Libration opposes 01, acquisition by Bernard Arnault of
the Belgium nationality for tax evasion, to the silence over 02, Rothschild (French, part
owner of the newspaper) and his Israeli citizenship.
The following example concerns the Indignation of an historian, about the French
Memory Laws in France and the interference of politics in science (History) through
legislation, for instance relative to the condemnation of the Armenian genocide. If this
indignation is recognized as righteous, it is judged incomplete:
(4)

Il est ds lors regrettable que Pierre Nora ne dise pas un mot, dans sa tribune, du harclement juridique,
policier, ou parfois mafieux, des chercheurs et des crivains qui jugent que le mot "gnocide" est
17
appropri pour dcrire les massacres d'Armniens par les Turcs autour de 1915 .

One reaction to the accusation:

Il existe des dizaines de pays qui contestent les gnocides, des pays arabes par exemple qui
pratiquent le ngationnisme sur la Shoah. En utilisant le mme procd que vous, M. Chouat,
on peut donc vous renvoyer la balle, votre indignation est slective. Nora a dnonc
l'volution juridique du moment dans le domaine qui est le sien, l'histoire, et du pays qui est
le sien.
Noras Ethos is questioned in another reaction:
Le GROS problme de la dmarche de Pierre Nora c'est qu'elle est clairement a motivation
idologique. Jamais Pierre Nora ne dnoncera l'attitude de la Turquie et son historiographie
dtat..... Il demande donc clairement une protection des ngationnistes (et de la violence
sous-jacente de leur attitude) sans oser prendre position sur la dfense de la vrit historique
qu'il prtend prner.
Examples (5) and (6) illustrate accusations of SI directed to the Victims-Indignant or to the
Indignant close to the Agent:
(5)

Selective indignation on the streets of Israel. Middle-class Israelis, aware they have lost social security
and affordable housing, are protesting by pitching tents and demonstrating in city streets. But will they
demand equality for all? For now, they seem intent only on their own lost privileges.18

(6)

There's nothing wrong per se with paying more attention to tragedy and violence that happens relatively
nearby and in familiar places. Whether wrong or not, it's probably human nature, or at least human
instinct, to do that, and that happens all over the world. I'm not criticizing that. But one wishes that the
empathy for victims and outrage over the ending of innocent human life that instantly arises when the
US is targeted by this sort of violence would at least translate into similar concern when the US is
perpetrating it, as it so often does (far, far more often than it is targeted by such violence). 19

The following example presents a very rare case of an identical Injustice (death penalty) and its
Victims (executed persons), taking place at the same moment, in the same country:

17

Bruno Chaouat, directeur du Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Universit du Minnesota (4/1/2012),
following an article by Nora (Le Monde, 30/12/2011).
18
mondediplo.com/2011/09.
19
Glen Greenwald over the victims of the Boston Marathon, Indignation and empathy when it happens to us
vs. none when we do it to others (Theguardian.com, 16/4/2013).

1376

(7)

Dans la nuit du 21 au 22 septembre dernier tait excut par injonction ltale, dans un pnitencier de
lEtat amricain de Gorgie, Troy Davis, un jeune noir accus du meurtre, en 1991, dun policier blanc,
mais que tout portait croire, faute de preuves matrielles et de tmoins fiables, innocent. Le monde
entier, lopinion publique comme la presse internationale, stait alors mu, trs justement, de cet
horrible et cruel sort que cette justice aussi barbare quaveugle avait ainsi rserv ce malheureux
devenu, bien malgr lui, le symbole plantaire de la lutte contre la peine de mort. (..) Et, pourtant, les
opposants rsolus la peine de mort que nous sommes auront-ils failli, sur le plan moral, ailleurs. Car
le mme jour, quasiment au mme moment, mais dans lindiffrence gnrale et en un oubli dautant
plus indcent, tait excut, dans un autre pnitencier dun autre Etat amricain, le Texas, un autre
condamn mort : Lawrence Brewer, un jeune blanc, membre de linfme et trs raciste Ku Klux Klan,
accus, en 1998, dun meurtre particulirement odieux, quil a par ailleurs toujours revendiqu,
lencontre dun citoyen noir. () Mais il nempche : lopposition la peine de mort, quant elle, ne
peut souffrir, en tant que rgle universelle et principe absolu, daucune exclusive, ni hirarchie. 20

4.2. Value of the Selectiveness argument

Most of the examples refer to media texts, political declarations, street protests and topical
articles, produced at a certain moment, in a particular context, by different people, who may
be or are politically or ideologically oriented. When the accusation is addressed to an
institution (governments, political groups, media, NGOs), in order to be considered
legitimate, it would have to be based on a large corpus, analyzed on the long term21. Its study
would not be, in the first place, rhetorical or discursive, but political and critical of the media.
When it comes to the Indignation of an individual (much less frequent in the analyzed data),
the accusation of SI may lose all grounds for the following reasons.
First, one could consider that the expression selective indignation is a pleonasm.
Each violent emotion can be said to be unique, as it concerns one person, at a certain
moment, in a specific context, and whose intensity will depend on the identity of the
Indignant (his/her life story), the direct knowledge of the Injustice, the personal involvement,
or in other words, the Proximity. As said by Mattei (2012:24): Ce sentiment sveille
devant une injustice vcue, dont nous sommes les tmoins (my emphasis); Il sagit donc
non dun jugement intellectuel, dun choix idologique ou dune posture sociale, mais dune
motion spcifique, elle-mme sa propre fin (27) This makes it difficult to force an
universal dimension to the emotion itself (as done by Mattei22). But, Indignation is also seen
as a judgment of value, is related to what is perceived as an injustice according to universal
justice principles.
If Indignation is accepted as a primary affect, some will say that it loses its virtue once it is
subjected to reason (and public expression!): Ds lors que lindignation nobit plus aux
ordres du coeur mais se plie aux dcrets de lentendement, elle trouble sa puret pour se
mettre au service de lidologie. Et lidologie, mme quand elle combat le mal au nom de la
justice ne repose le plus souvent que sur le ressentiment (Mattei, 2012 : 28).
In the second place, as the emotion embodies a persons knowledge and beliefs about
the Object, it will most often lead to an Ethotic argument, as the Object of Indignation, and
the expression of the emotion, will be related to and explained by the personality and beliefs
of the person. And the denunciation will as often be related to the personality and beliefs of
the denunciator. 23 In very sensitive cases, such as the Israel-Palestine question, this
20

Salah-Eddine Sidhoum, Marianne, 28/11/2012

Cf. the long term criterium as presented in Bourdon 2009.
22
Mattei (2012) denounces successively lindignation feinte, et pour tout dire rhtorique, sur un engagement
qui tient plus de lidologie que de la raison, the fact that HesselIndignations ne sont jamais universelles, on
cherche en vain une justification universelle- cest -dire rationnelle de lauteur dont la conscience parat tre
hmiplgique, indignation slective suivant un jugement aussi slectif, un texte sans motion !
23
If, as a woman, I express my indignation about violence carried out against women in a specific country,
could I be accused of Selective Indignation? The answer to that question will depend on whom I am talking to
21

1377

accusation can /will back-fire on the denunciator of the Selective Indignation (see Torck
2013).
In the third place, it brings the denunciation into slippery argumentation fields:
argument of Incompleteness24, Justice Argument, Double Standard, Red Herring, forms of Tu
Quoque, and especially Arguments of Comparison (weak analogy or comparison25, hierarchy
of Injustices or Victims). All can be linked to varieties of Ethotic arguments. What does it say
for instance of the Feminist who is indignant about a Muslim woman wearing a Hijab in
Quebec, and says nothing about a Jewish Hassidic woman wearing a wig? And who ignores
the deaths or disappearance of Native women? 26
In a provisional, pragmatic, conclusion on the Argument of Selectiveness, I will leave
the floor, so to speak, to a French humourist, frequently quoted in the debates, Guy Bedos: Il
y a des gens qui ont des indignations slectives. Moi, jai des indignations successives.
CONCLUSIVE REMARK
Can Indignation be considered a virtuous emotion? To answer this question, one is tempted
to quote Aristotle again (a virtuous emotion will be felt at the right time, about the right
object, towards the right people, with a right motive, in the right ways), as this covers all the
sensitive domains of the evaluation of Indignation. If one accuses someone else of SI, it often
takes the form of an emotional discourse, one Indignation reacting to another, both claiming
righteousness, but directed to different Objects. In the Hessel case, the Injustice is questioned,
or reversed, as we are dealing with opposite, and concurrent, Victims and Agents
(Palestinians vs. Israel/Jews).27
The interaction between Pathos, Logos and Ethos was particularly present in the case
studied, but is also specific for the emotion itself. As a strong emotion, which is never
directed to oneself as an Agent, and refers to principles and norms of justice, Indignation is
never just a personal emotion, once publically expressed, and consequently generates
questions and doubts about the Injustice and its corollaries, the Victim and the Agent. But as
it is also an accusation, it makes the Indignant (and his/her Ethos) an object of debate. Le caf
philosophique de Margency, organized a meeting on the topic of the usefulness of
Indignation (January 2011), and posted on its site the results of the discussion, on topics such
as Objects of Indignation28 , social changes that were founded on Indignation (abolition of
slavery, human rights, education,...), controversial Indignations (abortion, euthanasia, arms
control,). The question Why does one become indignant? combined with the adage Dismoi ton indignation, je te dirai qui tu es provided 14 brief answers, of which only one can be
and which country I am talking about. Reacting to recent events in India to a lover of India, living in Israel, I
was told that I should direct my indignation towards Arab countries.
24
Bolacre (2011),whose critical brochure does not refer to the pages on Gaza, questions the status of victim
given by Hessel to (illegal) immigrants, and denounces the selectiveness of his indignation, as not a word is said
in the text about technical mutations.
25
Would the argument One cannot compare what is happening in a democracy to what is happening in a nondemocracy be acceptable as a reaction to the British prime minister David Cameron address to the Knesset in
March 2014: Britain opposes boycotts. [..] Israels fate will never rest on statements by amateur politicians. It
is founded in law both to put right historic wrongs and because Israel is a democracy []An end to the
ridiculous situation where last year the United Nations General Assembly passed three times as many
resolutions on Israel as on Syria, Iran and North Korea put together!. Haaretz, 13/3/2014.
26
Et tant pis pour la nuance, dans ce pays o la grande majorit des musulmanes, stigmatises collectivement,
ne porte pas le voile. Mais o 600 femmes autochtones ont disparu ou ont t assassines depuis 20 ans sans que
quiconque ne sen soucie. On a lindignation slective(Marc Cassivi, La Presse, 17/10/2013).
27
Cf. Torck, 2013.
28
One of the Objects was selective indignation!

1378

considered positive: par conviction morale. The others threw a negative light on the
Indignant (pour paratre moral), on his/her motivations (peur de lautre, de lavenir,
pour dconsidrer un adversaire, pour dire son appartenance ou son opposition un groupe
(politique ou catgorie sociale), par suivisme. This distrust is also to be found in
philosophical commentaries (frequently quoting Nietszches No one lies so boldy as the man
who is indignant) and sociological studies, as Indignation is said to often drift to personal or
ideological resentment. As for the public expression of it, distrust will be, with good reasons,
related to the pathemization and personalization of news and politics.

REFERENCES
(A)
Ambroise-Rendu, A-Cl & Delporte, Ch. (2008). Lindignation. Histoire dune motion politique et morale.
Paris : Nouveau Monde Editions.
Amossy, R. (1999). Images de soi dans le discours. La construction de lethos. Lausanne/Paris : Delachaux et
Niestl.
Boltanski, L. (1993). La Souffrance Distance. Paris : Editions Mtaili.
(1999). Distant Suffering. Morality, Media and Politics. Cambridge University Press.
Bourdon, J. (2009). Le rcit impossible. Le conflit isralo-palestinien et les mdias. Bruxelles : De Boeck.
Brinton, A. (1988). Appeal to Angry Emotions. Informal Logic, X.2, 77-87.
Elster, J. (1999). Alchemies of The Mind. Rationality and the Emotions, Cambridge University Press.
Mattei, JF. (2005). De lindignation. Paris : Editions de la Table Ronde.
(2012) Lhomme indign. Paris : Les ditions du Cerf.
Micheli, R. (2010). Lmotion argumente. Labolition de la peine de mort dans le dbat parlementaire
franais. Paris : Cerf.
Plantin, Ch. (2011). Les bonnes raisons des motions. Berne : Peter Lang.
Torck, D. (2013). A propos dune motion, lindignation, et de son argumentation : un regard sur la
polmique Hessel. Le discours et la Langue. Vol. 4, 95-116.
Walton, D, (1998). Ad Hominem Arguments. Tuscaloosa : Alabama University Press.
(B)
Assouline, P. (2011) A-t-on le droit de ne pas sindigner avec Stphane Hessel ?
http://passouline.blog.lemonde.fr. .
Bolacre, O. (2011). Jy crois pas ! Une rponse Stphane Hessel la demande de Renaud Camus. David
Reinharc & Parti de lIn-nocence.
Hessel, S. (2010). Indignez-vous ! Montpellier : Indignes ditions.
Goldnadel, G-W. (2012). Le vieil homme mindigne! Les postures et impostures de Stphane Hessel. JeanClaude Gawsewitch Editeur.
Szlamowicz, J. (2011). Dtrompez-vous ! Les tranges indignations de Stphane Hessel dcryptes. Editions
Intervalles.

1379

The Argumentative Role Of Visual Metaphor And Visual

Antithesis In Fly-On-The-Wall Documentary
Assimakis Tseronis, Charles Forceville & Melle Grannetia
Department of Media Studies
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands
a.tseronis@uva.nl; c.forceville@uva.nl; mellegrannetia@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we explore the argumentative role of visual metaphor and visual antithesis in the
so-called fly-on-the-wall documentary. In this subtype of documentary, which emphatically renounces
voice-over narration, the filmmakers guide their viewers into reaching certain conclusions by making
choices regarding the editing as well as the cinematography. We analyse a number of scenes from two films
by one major representative of the Direct Cinema or fly-on-the-wall documentary, Frederick Wiseman.
KEYWORDS: visual/pictorial metaphor, visual antithesis, multimodal rhetoric, fly on the wall documentary,
Direct Cinema, Frederick Wiseman

1. INTRODUCTION
While a number of argumentation scholars would probably still maintain that
argumentation is essentially a verbal activity, there has been substantial work in the last
two decades arguing for the possibility and actuality of conveying argumentation by
means of other modes than the verbal one (Groarke, 1996; Kjeldsen, 2012; Roque, 2012;
Tseronis, submitted; Van den Hoven & Yang, 2013). It is to this line of research within
argumentation studies that we want to contribute by discussing the possible argumentative
functions of metaphor and antithesis conveyed visually or multimodally in a specific genre
of documentary film, the fly-on-the-wall documentary. To identify the verbal and visual
cues that may be combined in order to convey a certain figure constitutes the first step. To
explain their use and effect as having to do with argumentation is the next one. For the
latter task, the analyst needs to have systematic recourse to the properties of the modes
used, their interaction, as well as to the broader context (consideration of the narrative, the
genre as well as the cultural context and background knowledge).
By taking a broad understanding of argumentation as a procedure, not merely as a
product consisting of premises that support the acceptability of a conclusion, we seek to
identify the function of such figures as metaphor and antithesis, when conveyed
multimodally, in the process of arguing for ones position. Such functions are not merely
decorative but, as explained by Fahnestock (1999), can be understood as epitomizing the
line of reasoning of the filmmaker. Kjeldsen (2012, p. 239) makes a similar point with
regard to the use of pictures in advertisements, namely that figures are not only
ornamental, but also support the creation of arguments. According to him, rhetorical
figures direct the audience to read arguments (ibidem) by delimiting the possible
interpretations of the pictures used, and thereby evoking the intended arguments.

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Among the various rhetorical figures, metaphor has received substantial attention within
the Cognitive Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Lakoff and Johnsons central
idea is that humans think metaphorically rather than just use metaphorical language.
Acceptance of this idea means that, in principle, metaphor can have visual manifestations
as well. Indeed, the past two decades have witnessed a series of studies (see for example,
Forceville, 1996, 2008; Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009; El Refaie, 2003) that analyse
visual and multimodal metaphors in genres including advertising and political cartoons,
wherein verbal elements interact mainly with static images. Steps have also been taken to
analyse visual metaphors in other genres of argumentative communication centrally
involving moving images, and to investigate how tropes other than metaphor can be cued
non-verbally or multimodally (Forceville, 2009; Teng & Sun, 2002). The argumentative
effect that the use of metaphor and other tropes may have is an area that needs to be yet
further explored.
The fly-on-the-wall documentary1 constitutes an object of study that allows us to
explore the potential of combining insights from argumentation studies and metaphor
theory and to illustrate their usefulness for the multimodal analysis of moving images. As
this type of documentary is a genre that leaves the drawing of conclusions largely to the
viewer, due to the fact that it lacks voice-over narration and staging of events, it becomes
even more important to study the visual (and audio) means by which the filmmaker guides
the audiences inference process. To show the direction this kind of research could take,
we analyse the argumentative use of metaphors and antitheses in a number of scenes from
two documentary films by one representative of the fly-on-the-wall cinema, Frederick
Wiseman.
2. ON METAPHOR AND ANTITHESIS
2.1 Metaphor
Metaphor is traditionally studied under the banner of tropes, together with synecdoche,
metonymy and irony, among others. It has received extensive attention from both
rhetoricians and cognitive linguists. While the former have been sensitive to the fact that
metaphor is not the only figure of speech, Lakoff and Johnson take metaphor to underlie
much, if not all, of our thinking. In the first chapter of her book, Fahnestock takes issue
with this dominance of metaphor. She writes (1999, pp. 5-6):
The tight focus on metaphor in science studies, like the fixation on metaphor and allied tropes in
textual studies, has taken attention away from other possible conceptual and heuristic resources that
are also identifiable formal features in texts and that also come from the same tradition that
produced metaphor, the rhetorical tradition of the figures of speech.

According to Aristotle, metaphor plays an important role for prose style, since it
contributes clarity as well as the unfamiliar, surprising effect that avoids banality and
tediousness. While in the later tradition the use of metaphors has been seen as a matter of
mere decoration, which has to delight the hearer, Aristotle stresses the cognitive function

See Aitken (2013) under the term direct cinema.

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of metaphors. In order to understand a metaphor, the hearer has to find something

common between the metaphor and the thing the metaphor refers to (Rapp, 2010).
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) discuss metaphor under their third type of
argumentative techniques, namely those establishing the structure of reality. Within this
technique, two subcategories are identified, namely those arguments that establish the
structure of reality through a particular case (by example or illustration) and those
whereby one reasons by analogy. They write (p. 399):
In our view, the role of metaphor will appear most clearly when seen in the context of the
argumentative theory of analogy. ... In the context of argumentation, at least, we cannot better
describe a metaphor than by conceiving it as a condensed analogy, resulting from the fusion of an
element from the phoros with an element from the theme.

Forceville (1996) has combined insights from Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and from Black
(1979) in order to propose a way for extending the cognitive account of metaphor into the
field of visual communication. He formulates the following three questions for identifying
a pictorial metaphor of the creative variety in static advertisements:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Which are the two terms of the metaphor, and how do we know?
Which is the target and which is the source, and how do we know?
Which are the features that are mapped from source to target, and how do we decide on these
features?

These questions remain pertinent in the analysis of visual metaphor in moving

advertisements, that is, commercials although the latter can draw on a wider variety of
techniques than static advertisements that help answer these three questions. Moving
images can for instance make use of specific camera movements and montage to create
metaphors. What makes the identification of metaphors in advertising (whether in static or
in moving images) relatively easy, is the genre convention, namely that advertisements
always want to make a positive claim about a product or service. This means that usually
the target of the metaphor coincides with the product, which is then presented in terms of a
source domain from which appropriate positive features are mapped onto the
target/product. As we will see later on, in the absence of such clear-cut genre conventions,
identifying metaphors and other tropes in fly-on-the-wall documentaries is less easy.
2.2 Antithesis
Fahnestock (1999, pp. 46-47), following Aristotle, defines antithesis as a verbal structure
that places contrasted or opposed terms in parallel or balanced cola or phrases. She writes:
Parallel phrasing without opposed terms does not produce an antithesis, nor do opposed terms alone
without strategic positioning in symmetrical phrasing. Instead, the figure antithesis, according to
Aristotle, must meet both syntactic and semantic requirements.2

Tindale (2009), on the other hand, maintains that the figure antithesis does not require that two cola contain
opposites, stressing the syntactical rather than the semantic property of this figure.

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The opposed terms may be contraries (both terms can be true of an object depending on
the perspective one adopts: good vs evil; cold vs hot), contradictories (pairs that form
exhaustive either/or alternatives: clean -/- unclean; polite -/- impolite), or correlatives
(pairs that convey reciprocal or complementary relationships: buying and selling; cause
and effect; lead and follow) (see Fahnestock, 1999, p. 48). When it comes to identifying
the various contrasting relations in the visual mode, it may be difficult to identify
exhaustive either/or alternatives. Based on the viewers knowledge of what is being
depicted and on such formal cues as the use of colour (or the use of sounds when it comes
to the audio mode), it may be possible to identify contraries or correlatives.
As regards the syntactic requirement, the opposed terms need to be placed in some
parallel structure. This syntactic requirement is also typical of the figure parallelism.
Antithesis, however, contains only two parallel clauses, featuring pairs of antonyms and
cannot be used to deliver more than two examples, while parallelism does not use
antonyms and typically presents three things before an audience (see Fahnestock, 2003, p.
128). In film, such a parallel structure can be conveyed first and foremost by the mere
sequencing of the scenes but also within the shot by means of composition and mise-enscne.
Questions one can ask for identifying an antithesis and distinguishing it from mere
contrast (following Forcevilles questions for the identification of a pictorial metaphor)
would be:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Which are the two terms of the antithesis, and how do we know?
How are these two terms opposed (contraries - contradictories - correlatives), and
how do we know?
What are the differences being stressed?

In antithesis, unlike metaphor, the direction (identifying which is target and which is
source) of opposition between the two elements does not play a role. Moreover (as in
metaphor), the two elements of the antithesis may be conveyed each in a different mode,
verbal, visual, or audio, for example. As we have pointed out above, the contrasting
relation between the two elements can be conveyed not only in what is being depicted but
also in how something is being depicted.
Both metaphor and antithesis seem to rely on a certain comparative/parallel
structure, whereby in the first case likeness is stressed (or differences are backgrounded)
while in the second case it is difference that is stressed (or likeness that is backgrounded).
Clifton (1983), who provides an inventory of rhetorical figures found in films, notes the
following with respect to simile, a figure that is usually seen as related to metaphor (p.72):
It is clear then that in every simile there is present both difference and likeness, and both are a part
of its effect. By ignoring differences, we find a simile and may perhaps find an antithesis in the
same event, by ignoring likeness.

Fahnestock, too, observes that both a simile and an antithesis are based on a parallelism
structure, that invites comparison. The question then arises: how do the similarities
become salient in one case and how do the differences stand out in the other? It seems that
audiovisual cues as such can be used to trigger different tropes; we need to take into

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consideration genre-conventions and contextual information within a specific scene to

make an appropriate assessment which trope, if any, is at stake.
2.3 Possible argumentative functions
As has been suggested above, metaphor can be related to the use of analogy in
argumentation. The distinctive argumentative work of metaphor, according to Fahnestock
(2011, p. 105) is that it creates new links, allowing the rhetor to illuminate one term (or
concept) by features or senses borrowed from another. For Fahnestock then, metaphor,
like other figures, does not merely have a decorative role, accompanying an argument, but
constitutes
a verbal summary that epitomizes the argument. It is a condensed or even diagram-like rendering of
the relationship among a set of terms, a relationship that constitutes the argument and that could be
expressed at greater length. (1999, p. 24)

Whether metaphor is to be identified exclusively with a scheme of arguing from analogy,

however, is an issue that requires further study. According to Garssen (2009), for example,
the argumentative relevance of the use of figurative analogy in argumentation should not
to be related to the analogy argument scheme. Instead, Garssen maintains that figurative
analogy functions as a presentational device used to put forward other (symptomatic or
causal) types of argumentation. Moreover, Garssen and Kienpointner (2011, p. 40) stress
the fact that not all metaphors are to be analysed as argument by analogy:
utterances containing metaphors can only be classified as arguments from figurative analogies if
they are used as argumentative utterances and the speaker wants to prove a controversial standpoint
by making a comparison based on relevant similarities between entities from different domains of
reality.

Garssen and Kienpointner (2011, p. 46) mention, among others, the following functions of
figurative analogies: creative function (used as a creative means of opening the
argumentative space),3 persuasive function (a means of shifting the burden of proof by
choosing highly persuasive types of phoros), didactic function (a pedagogical device for
illustrating and clarifying complicated issues), refutative function (as ironical reductio ad
absurdum), and competitive function (as provocative attack at the opponent).
When it comes to antithesis, a distinction can be drawn between antithesis of
words and antithesis of thought, the former being a purely stylistic one, while the latter
provides a premise-conclusion pair, according to Fahnestock (1999). Within the latter type
of antithesis, three cases can be distinguished, depending on the status of the opposed
terms. In the first case, the antithesis employs two opposing terms that are already known
to the audience. In this way, the arguer exploits the audiences prior recognition of the
contrast as well as the values attached to the opposed terms. In the second case, the
antithesis pushes the two terms apart, creating thus an opposition between them that the
audience was not necessarily previously aware of. In the last case, the antithesis
3

Interestingly, this function of figurative analogy is similar to the one that Tindale (2009) describes for
antithesis, namely to assist an audience in testing or weighing a case.

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reconfigures an existing opposition by changing or reinforcing the relation between the

two terms in order to change the audiences conception of a known antithetical pair.
Following Garssen and Kienpointner (2011), who take metaphor to constitute a
presentational device for conveying a number of argumentative functions, we believe that
antithesis, too, can be shown to contribute in a number of ways to the argumentative
activity. To begin with, it needs to be acknowledged that not all antitheses have an
argumentative role, just as is the case with metaphors. Contrasting two elements in order
to win the viewers attention or merely claiming that two elements are opposed, without
making it explicit that the stated opposition contributes in a direct or indirect way to an act
of convincing an audience about the tenability of a standpoint, do not count as an
argumentative use of antithesis. In a clearly defined argumentative situation, antithesis can
be said to contribute directly to the argumentation when it is used to convey the claim for
which further support is advanced. In this case, the antithesis is either used to push two
terms apart or to reconfigure an existing opposition. Antithesis may also be used to convey
the argument in support of a contested claim. In this case, the arguer would be making use
of an antithesis that contains opposed terms already accepted as such by the audience.
Finally, another direct contribution of antithesis to an argumentative discussion would be
its use to refute or anticipate counter-arguments advanced by the audience. When
antithesis contributes in an indirect way to the argumentative discussion, its role is to draw
attention to the argument or to assist the audience in testing the case in dispute, as Tindale
(2009) suggests.
In general, the rhetorical effect of the use of metaphor or antithesis - or of any
other figure for that matter - can be explained in terms of the inference process that the
audience is invited to follow in order to determine the meaning of the similarities or
contrasts that each of these two figures conveys. The audience confronted with a metaphor
or antithesis is invited to participate in the construction of the meaning, adding the second
term of the antithesis or identifying the properties that are mapped in the metaphor, for
example, or attaching their own values and norms to the terms involved in either figure.
Once the audience understands the metaphor or the antithesis, it may be more prone to
accept the mappings proposed by the figure as premises for a certain conclusion. In what
way exactly the different nature of metaphor and antithesis can be exploited so as to
contribute accordingly to the possible argumentative functions named in the previous
paragraph remains a subject for further study. Moreover, the effect achieved by conveying
either of these figures verbally, visually or multimodally deserves further attention.
Kjeldsen (2013, p. 437) explains the effect of conveying figures visually or multimodally
instead of using exclusively the verbal mode in the following way:
In order to make meaning of the multimodal presentation, the viewer has to actively transform a
main line of reasoning. In this way, the images contribute to making the viewer himself construct
the arguments meant to persuade him.

When it comes to the argumentative role these figures may play in a film, in particular, it
is important not to over-interpret their presence and their use. Clifton (1983) has
inventoried a great number of figures found in scenes from a number of films; but even if
one takes the identification of these figures to be correct, it is another matter whether these
figures have an argumentative function in all of the scenes described. In addition, it is
important to consider whether their role is to contribute to an argument identified at a local
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level, within a sequence or scene of the film, or to an argument that can be said to run
through the whole film.4 In order to be justified in searching for the argumentative
function of these figures in film, one needs to specify an argumentative situation in which
a contested claim is being supported and in which a figure may play a role other than a
purely aesthetic one. One needs therefore to have recourse to the specific genre of the film
as well as to background knowledge concerning the theme of the film and the filmmakers
own interests. Assuming that the documentary is a genre that seeks to communicate a
message to its audience more than simply to please them, we can be justified in searching
for the argumentative function of metaphor and antithesis when we have identified these
figures in a documentary film.
3. ON DOCUMENTARY FILM AND FLY ON THE WALL DOCUMENTARY
As Nichols (2010, p. 104) puts it, in his Introduction to Documentary:
Documentary work does not appeal exclusively to our aesthetic sensibility: it may entertain or
please, but does so in relation to a rhetorical or persuasive effort aimed at the existing social world.

Compared to fiction films and experimental films, the subject matter of documentaries is
real life itself.5 It is from this reality that filmmakers extract their material to use as
evidence in support of the assertive stance they take towards what is being filmed (see
Plantinga, 1997). In the various typologies of documentary film that exist, three main
forms can be identified namely narrative, categorical and rhetorical (Bordwell &
Thompson, 2013, p. 355). But even when a documentary represents historical events as
they occurred in time (narrative form), or when it conveys categorized information about a
given topic mostly from a synchronic perspective (categorical form), it is safe to expect
that it still employs rhetorical techniques to address an audience so that they eventually
accept that information as valid or endorse the filmmakers perspective. After all, as
Plantinga (1997, p. 105) remarks, it is rarely the case that each of these forms appears
independent of the others and does not mix in the course of a documentary film.
An extensive typology of documentary films has been proposed by Nichols (2010),
based on the voice that is predominant throughout the film. He identifies the following
six modes: the expository, the observational, the interactive (also called participatory), the
reflexive, the performative and the poetic. Of these, it is the expository mode, the mode
that most people associate with documentary in general, that emphasises verbal
commentary and has a clear argumentative logic. The Direct Cinema documentary (also
known as fly-on-the-wall) falls under the observational mode.
Documentary films of the observational mode have no voice-over commentary, no
supplementary music or sound effects, no inter-titles, no historical re-enactments, no
behaviour repeated for the camera, and do not make use of interviews (Nichols, 2010, pp.
4

Clifton (1983) remarks that antithesis or metaphor can be conveyed within one single shot and that the
most extended form of antithesis or metaphor is when either is used to condense the meaning of the whole
film. See the examples he discusses on pages 121 and 125 for antithesis, and on page 100 for metaphor.
5

Nichols (2010, pp. 7-17) summarizes the three commonsense assumptions about documentaries thus:
documentaries are about reality; documentaries are about real people; documentaries tell stories about what
happens in the real world.

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172ff). Editing and cinematography in the fly-on-the-wall documentary avoid directing the
viewer along a clear path of meaning, as Plantinga (1997, pp. 153-155) observes. The
viewer is therefore invited to take a more active role in determining the significance of
what is said and done, as Nichols (2010, p. 174) also remarks. It is thus not without a
reason that we focus on the use of rhetorical figures such as metaphor and antithesis,
which may be construed by choices made regarding the editing and the cinematography,
as an alternative means employed by the filmmaker to guide the viewers through a path of
meaning.
4. FREDERICK WISEMANS DOCUMENTARIES
Frederick Wiseman began making films in the 1960s, working at the same time as Richard
Leacock, D.A. Pennebaker and David and Albert Maysles, who are all considered as
representatives of the fly on the wall documentary (see Aitken, 2013). His films focus on
American institutions, such as the school, the court, the hospital, the army, and the prison,
among others; they thus become studies of the exercise of power in American society, as
Barnouw (1993, p. 244) puts it.
Nevertheless, as Plantinga writes (1997, p. 195), Wiseman has always distanced
himself from direct cinema, even though his films are considered prototypical examples of
the observational mode of documentary film. Wiseman calls his cinema reality fiction
and acknowledges the creative manipulation in his films, whereby he makes use of editing
in order to restructure his material according to principles other than chronology and
narrative (see Benson & Anderson, 2002, pp. 1-2). Nichols (1981, p. 211) notes that while
the individual sequences are organized by narrative codes of construction, aiming for a
smooth flow of time and space, the relations between these sequences are organized by
principles that are more rhetorical. The sequences may thus relate, for example, in terms of
comparison, contrast, parallelism, inversion, irony, evidence, summation and so on.
Benson (1980, 1985), who has analysed High School (1968) and Primate (1974), from the
perspective of rhetorical criticism, concludes that Wisemans films are characterized by a
dialectical structure that invites the audience to construct meaning and grasp the films
logic.
Wiseman acknowledges that he began making films out of an urge for social
reform and awareness (Grant, 1998). At the same time, he refrains from dictating his own
point of view to the audience. In an interview cited in Nichols (1981, p. 218), he says:
One of the things that intrigues me in all the films is how to make a more abstract, general statement
about the issues, not through the use of a narrator, but through the relationship of events to each
other through editing.

While it is true that Wisemanss films, like other documentary films of the observational
mode, leave it up to the audience to interpret the film and discover the directors position,
it does not mean that the director himself does not have a point of view. It is then up to a
close examination of his films to show how such a view can be reconstructed.
4.1 Titicut Follies (1967)
Titicut Follies is Wisemans first documentary. It was filmed at Massachusetts
Correctional Institution at Bridgewater, a prison hospital for the mentally ill. Due to a
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legal ban by the state of Massachusetts on the presentation of the film in public, it was
only in 1991 that the film became widely known.6 The title of the film refers to the title of
the musical show that the inmates put on.
The films opening sequence shows eight inmates lined up in two rows and dressed
up in parade costumes singing George Gershwins song Strike up the band. The camera
is placed among the audience giving a view of the stage on which the inmates perform,
before it zooms in to the face of each inmate singing in the front row. The light comes
from below, illuminating their faces in a horror-like manner. At the end of the act, the
director of the institution appears, saying It keeps getting better and goes on to tell a
joke to the audience who is applauding. The opening scene contrasts with the following
sequence that shows the guards at the institution inspecting the new inmates and asking
them to take their clothes off. In this scene, the director appears again, wearing his
uniform this time, instead of the black costume of the master of ceremonies he was
wearing in the opening scene. In the rest of the film, there are at least two other moments
where the inmates and the director of the institution are shown singing. Nevertheless, the
majority of the film depicts moments in which the inmates are being treated rather
disrespectfully and as less than human by the staff.
Wiseman makes thus a salient choice from his material by not only opening the
film with a scene from the inmates musical show but also by ending it with the final act
of the same show. Grant (1998, p. 243) remarks that by framing the film in this way
Wiseman suggests that the inmates are forever on stage, as they are always under
observation by the staff. The director of the institution is thus presented as the ringmaster
and the patients as attractions in a theatre of curiosities, where they are being inspected,
undressed, washed, put into their cells, entertained, fed etc. A metaphor could thus be
construed whereby the mental institution is associated with a theatre of curiosities and
freaks. The close-ups of the faces of the inmates performing on stage as well as their body
language do not suggest that they are particularly enjoying it - unlike the director of the
institution - but rather that this is just one other chore they are asked to perform.
In the rest of the film, Wiseman creates contrasts between the inmates world and
the outside world, doctors and patients, sanity and insanity inviting the audience to think
over these boundaries. Even if Wiseman does not stage the events or directs the inmates
and controls their positions, he nevertheless succeeds in conveying these antitheses not
only be means of editing the material in the post-production but also by means of
composition within the frame, while filming.
One such moment is the scene where an inmate is singing a popular song from the
1920s called Chinatown, my Chinatown in front of the camera, while in the background
a TV screen shows Nana Mouskouri singing a love-song called Johnny. The contrast is
cued not only in the audio mode, with the inmates cacophonous voice juxtaposed with
Mouskouris melodious voice, but also by the posture: the inmate is facing the audience
directly while Mouskouri is facing the side (see Figure 1).

The film was banned for reasons pertaining to the issue of the patients informed consent and the of the
prison authorities in it. See chapter 2 in Benson and Anderson (2002) for a detailed chronicle of the
production of the film and the ensuing trials and controversy.

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Figure 1. Still from Titicut Follies (1967), scene starting at app.18:44.

1967 Bridgewater Film Company, Inc. - Photo provided courtesy of Zipporah Films, Inc.

Another moment is the scene where inmate Vladimir is arguing with dr. Ross about his
wish to leave the institution and return to prison where he believes he belongs, since he
claims that he is not mentally insane. For the most part of the scene the two interlocutors
are filmed in medium long shot facing each other against the background of the bricked
wall of the institutions courtyard. Wiseman spots the water pipeline going down the wall
and slightly reframes the camera so as to let the pipeline appear in the background, thereby
dividing the two interlocutors, the one representing the institution and the other the
patients (see Figure 2).7

Figure 2. Still from Titicut Follies (1967), scene starting at app.34:01.

1967 Bridgewater Film Company, Inc. - Photo provided courtesy of Zipporah Films, Inc.
7

Interestingly, when one also follows the content of the dialogue between Vladimir and dr. Ross, it becomes
clear that it is Vladimir who builds a clear and strong argument in support of his request to be transferred to
a prison, while the doctors responses seem dogmatic and unconvincing. This provides an ironic view of
who is the sane and who is the mad one of the two.

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These antitheses, and others conveyed by the editing of the scenes, can be considered as
putting forward evidence for Wisemans claim about the internal contradictions of the
mental institution or as opening up the space for discussion on what is (in)sanity and who
decides on the boundaries.
The sequence which crowns the film, and in which Wisemans critique of the staff
becomes most apparent, is the one which depicts the forced tubefeeding of an aged and
starving patient, Mr. Malinowski, by dr. Ross (see also Aitken, 2013, p. 914). It is part of a
larger sequence which lasts for almost ten minutes, starting with the scene where dr. Ross
visits the patient in his cell and asks him whether he has eaten, and ending with the scene
of a staff member pushing a tray with a dead body inside the mortuary refrigerator. The
whole sequence is placed almost in the middle of the film. The scene of Mr. Malinowskis
tubefeeding is cross-cut with shots from another scene in which the dead body of an
inmate, probably Mr. Malinowski himself, is being shaved and perfumed. While there is a
certain parallelism between the two scenes (there is a match on action between the shot
where the doctor removes the towel from the patients face and the shot where a staff
member is airing a towel on the corpses face, as well as between the shot where the
guards shut the door of Mr. Malinowskis cell and the shot where the guard is pushing the
tray with the dead body in the refrigerator), overall a stark contrast is created both through
the visual and the audio mode. In the shots of the tubefeeding scene, one hears the
dialogue between the staff involved in the action as well as the surrounding sounds from
the room. The shots of the embalming scene, however, have no sound whatsoever.
Moreover, a great contrast exists between the way the patient in the two scenes is treated.
While in the tubefeeding scene the live Mr. Malinowski is kept tied and treated
disrespectfully, the dead body of Mr. Malinowski receives the careful attention of the
staff.
With the last shot of the whole Malinowski sequence being the pushing of the tray
with the dead body into the refrigerator, Wiseman lets the audience see the paradoxical
consequences of the doctors act of feeding that patient. By creating a parallel between the
two events, Wiseman lets the inconsistencies in the behaviour of the staff members come
to the fore. At the same time, the acts carried out by the staff members in both scenes
underlie the passivity of the patient who is treated as a lifeless object (in the second scene
this is literally the case). As a whole, the sequence can be understood as evidence in
support of Wisemans critique of the institution and its staff for acting upon and treating
the patients in ways that counter the patients own dignity and needs, if not put their lives
in danger.
4.2 Primate (1974)
Primate is Wisemans eighth film and the first of a trilogy of films, produced over a period
of three years, expressing how far life has become objectified and commodified (see
Aitken, 2013, p. 988).8 As the title suggests, the film is about a federally funded research
institute on primates, the Yerkes Primate Research Centre in Atlanta. Grant (1998, p. 251)
notes that this is the only other Wiseman documentary, next to Titicut Follies, to have
caused substantial controversy, not only about its disturbing scenes of vivisection
8

The other two films are Welfare (1975) and Meat (1976).

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experiments carried out on gibbons, chimpanzees and gorillas, but also on the questions it
raises on the ethics and goals of medical research involving animals.
The opening sequence of the film establishes an analogy between apes and
humans. This is how Benson (1985, p. 208) describes it:
The film opens with a long series of shots in which we may first notice the ambiguity of the films
title, which applies equally well to men and apes. We see a large composite photograph, with
portraits of eminent scientists, hanging, presumably, on a wall at the Yerkes Center. Wiseman cuts
from the composite portrait to a series of eight individual portraits, in series, then to a sign, an
exterior shot of the Center, and then a series of four shots of apes in their cages. The comparison is
obvious, though not particularly forceful, and it depends for its meaning both upon the structure
Wiseman has chosen to use - at least he does not intercut the apes and the portraits - and upon our
own predictable surprise at noticing how human the apes look.

While the analogy could indeed be read in either direction, humans are like apes or apes
are like humans, we think it is important for understanding the way the rest of the film
builds up to consider that Wiseman takes apes to be the source not the target of the
metaphor. The assumption that humans are like apes is used to justify the research carried
out on primates with the aim of discovering more about humans, by conducting
experiments that otherwise could not have been carried out on humans. Framing the films
topic in this way, it becomes even more gruesome for the viewer to imagine that the
vivisection experiments shown later in the film could have actually been carried out on
humans. Moreover, the analogy between humans and apes, underscored in a number of
sequences throughout the film, succeeds in making even stronger the contrasts that
Wisemans camera captures between the words and deeds of the scientists. As Benson
(1985, p. 209) observes:
comparison both justifies and condemns the research, and Wiseman exploits that comparison not
simply to attack vivisection, or scientific research in general, but also to engage us in actively
considering the paradoxes of our institutions and ourselves.

The metaphor is thereby used to open the space for the discussion, in a similar way that
the various antitheses discussed in Titicut Follies do.
One interesting moment, in which Wiseman employs antithesis as a means for
countering possible refutations of the analogy he has established between humans and
apes, is the sequence in which a researcher explains his view about the differences
between the great apes on the one hand and humans on the other. The sequence starts with
a number of shots where the researcher is shown interacting with a chimpanzee in a
laboratory room, inciting the animal to grab fruits hanging from a rope and to hang from a
swing. At one moment, the researcher is shown being suspended from the swing in an
attempt to make the chimpanzee imitate him (see Figure 3).

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Figure 3. Still from Primate (1976), scene starting at app.56:38.

1974 Zipporah Films, Inc. - Photo provided courtesy of Zipporah Films, Inc.

Then comes a shot of the researcher in close-up against a background of electronic

equipment explaining how the experiment is conducted and what its rationale is (see
Figure 4). From then on, there is intercutting between the researcher and shots of the
actual experiment carried out by himself and an Afro-American assistant. Wiseman lets
the researchers voice run over the shots from the laboratory experiment, functioning, in a
certain way, as a voice-over commentary of what is being depicted.

Figure 4. Still from Primate (1976), scene starting at app.57:01.

1974 Zipporah Films, Inc. - Photo provided courtesy of Zipporah Films, Inc.

1392

When the researcher utters the sentence: I do not subscribe to the theory that the living
apes, chimpanzee and gorilla, closely resemble the ancestry of man, a shot from the
laboratory experiment is shown in which the researcher is running around, jumping from
one corner of the room to the other inviting the chimpanzee to chase him (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Still from Primate (1976), scene starting at app. 58:04.

1974 Zipporah Films, Inc. - Photo provided courtesy of Zipporah Films, Inc.

Wiseman lets the image of the researcher defeat the content of the latters own words. He
thereby exploits editing and voice-over to refute any possible objection to the idea that
humans are like apes, that one may put forward in order to suggest that violence to apes is
not the same as violence to humans. By similarly contrasting the filmed actions of the
researchers with their own words, Wiseman shows that the increasingly violent and
ultimately mortal experiments carried out on gibbons and gorillas are not necessarily
justified by the significance of the findings. After the climactic sequence in which a
researcher is shown cutting the head of a living gibbon, a scene in a laboratory is edited,
where two colleagues looking through a microscope at tissues from presumably the same
dead gibbons brain have difficulty in specifying what it is they are looking at and what its
significance is (see Benson, 1985, p. 211).
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have only begun to tease out the valuable contributions that the
combination of insights from metaphor theory, argumentation studies and film analysis
can make to the argumentative analysis of multimodal communication. By extending
Fahnestocks (1999) view of rhetorical figures as epitomes of a line of reasoning to the
visual and the audio modes we have tried to describe the possible argumentative functions
of such tropes as metaphor and antithesis. In order to illustrate the usefulness of the
distinctions we propose, we have analysed a number of scenes from two documentaries by
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Frederick Wiseman, a representative of the so-called fly-on-the-wall documentary. Despite

the lack of a voice-over commentary that could have made explicit the filmmakers own
position on the depicted material, the identification of metaphors and antitheses construed
visually or multimodally has allowed us, in connection with our knowledge of the specific
genre and of the specific directors work, to propose an interpretation of the contribution
these figures make to the argument of the film.
A more systematic identification of the various metaphors and antitheses used in
the two films as well as in other films by Wiseman is still required in order to show how
these figures may combine in order to contribute to the overall argument that is built
throughout the film. Moreover, a comparative study involving films by other
representatives of the fly-on-the-wall genre would help support our view that these figures
and possibly others can help guide the viewers interpretation of the filmmakers
stance, despite the characteristic lack of voice-over and of other techniques that would
explicitly mark the directors presence. Finally, further study is required for developing
criteria to identify the various visual and multimodal tropes as well as to specify their
argumentative relevance in a given situation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would wish to thank Zipporah Films for granting permission to use stills from
Frederick Wisemans films, Tituct Follies (1967) and Primate (1974). Zipporah Films is
the distribution company of the Frederick Wiseman films. For more information visit
http://www.zipporah.com/.

REFERENCES
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Barnouw, E. (1993). Documentary: A history of the non-fiction film. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Benson, T. W. (1980). The rhetorical structure of Frederick Wisemans High School. Communication
Monographs, 47, 233-261.
Benson, T. W. (1985). The rhetorical structure of Frederick Wisemans Primate. Quarterly Journal of
Speech, 71, 204-217.
Benson, T. W. & Anderson, C. (2002). Reality fictions. The films of Frederick Wiseman. Second edition.
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.
Black, M. (1979). More about metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and Thought (pp. 19-43). Cambridge
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Bordwell, D. & Thompson, K. (2013). Film art: An introduction. Tenth Edition. New York: McGraw Hill.
Clifton, R. (1983). The figure in film. London: Associated University Press.
El Refaie, E. (2003). Understanding visual metaphors: The example of newspaper cartoons. Visual
Communication, 2, 75-95.
Fahnestock, J. (1999). Rhetorical figures in science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fahnestock, J. (2003). Verbal and visual parallelism. Written Communication, 20, 123-152.
Fahnestock, J. (2011). Rhetorical style. The uses of language in persuasion. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Forceville, C. (1996). Pictorial metaphor in advertising. London: Routledge.
Forceville, C. (2008). Metaphor in pictures and multimodal representations. In R.W. Gibbs, Jr. (Ed.), The
Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought (pp. 462-482). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Forceville, C. (2009). Metonymy in visual and audiovisual discourse. In E. Ventola & A.J. Moya Guijarro
(Eds.), The World Told and the World Shown: Issues in Multisemiotics (pp. 56-74). Basingstoke:
Palgrave MacMillan.

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Forceville, C., & Urios-Aparisi, E. (Eds.) (2009). Multimodal metaphor. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Garssen, B. (2009). Comparing the incomparable: Figurative analogies in a dialectical testing procedure. In
F.H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Pondering on problems of argumentation (pp. 133-140).
Amsterdam: Springer.
Garssen, B., & Kienpointner, M. (2011). Figurative analogy in political argumentation. In E.T. Feteris, B.
Garssen & A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Keeping in touch with pragma-dialectics (pp. 39-58).
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Grant, B. K. (1998). Ethnography in the first person. Frederick Wisemans Titicut Follies. In B.K. Grant & J.
Sloniowski (Eds.), Documenting the documentary. Close readings of documentary film and video
(pp. 238-248). Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
Groarke L. (1996). Logic, art and argument. Informal Logic, 18, 105-129.
Kjeldsen, J. (2012). Pictorial argumentation in advertising: Visual tropes and figures as a way of creating
visual argumentation. In F.H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Topical themes in argumentation
theory (pp. 239-255). Amsterdam: Springer.
Kjeldsen, J. (2013). Strategies of visual argumentation in slideshow presentations: The role of the visuals in
an Al Gore presentation on climate change. Argumentation, 27, 425-443.
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Nichols, B. (1981). Ideology and the image. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Nichols, B. (2010). Introduction to documentary. Second edition. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The New Rhetoric [trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell
Weaver]. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Plantinga, C. (1997). Rhetoric and representation in nonfiction film. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Rapp, C. (2010). Aristotles rhetoric. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2010 Edition), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/>.
Roque, G. (2012). Visual argumentation: A further reappraisal. In F.H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.),
Topical themes in argumentation theory: Twenty exploratory studies (pp. 273-288). Amsterdam:
Springer.
Teng, N.Y., & Sun, S. (2002). Grouping, simile, and oxymoron in pictures: a design-based cognitive
approach. Metaphor and Symbol, 17, 295-316.
Tindale, C.W. (2009). Commentary on Hilde van Belles Playing with oppositions. Verbal and visual
antithesis in the media. In J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09 (pp. 1-5).
Windsor, ON: OSSA, CD-Rom.
Tseronis, A. (submitted). Multimodal argumentation: Beyond the verbal - visual divide. Semiotica.
Van Belle, H. (2009). Playing with oppositions. Verbal and visual antithesis in the media. In J. Ritola (Ed.),
Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09 (pp. 1-13). Windsor, ON: OSSA, CD-Rom.
Van den Hoven, P., & Yang, Y. (2013). The argumentative reconstruction of multimodal discourse, taking
the ABC coverage of President Hu Jintaos visit to the USA as an example. Argumentation, 27,
403-424.

FILMS CITED
Wiseman, F. (Director). (1967). Titicut Follies. Cambridge Massachusetts: Zipporah Films.
Wiseman, F. (Director). (1968). High School. Cambridge Massachusetts: Zipporah Films.
Wiseman, F. (Director). (1974). Primate. Cambridge Massachusetts: Zipporah Films.
Wiseman, F. (Director). (1975). Welfare. Cambridge Massachusetts: Zipporah Films.
Wiseman, F. (Director), (1976). Meat. Cambridge Massachusetts: Zipporah Films.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 - The Disguised Ad Baculum Fallacy

Empirically Investigated - Strategic Maneuvering With Threats
Frans H. van Eemeren
Bart Garssen
Bert Meuffels
Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation theory and Rhetoric
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands
f.h.vaneemeren@uva.nl, b.j.garssen@uva.nl, h.lm..meuffels@uva.nl

Ad baculum threats can be seen as a mode of strategic maneuvering which takes on a reasonable
appearance in real life situations when it mimics, legitimate pragmatic argumentation. In this paper the
hypothesis was tested that ad baculum fallacies are seen as less unreasonable than clear cases when
they are presented as if they are well-meant advices in which the speaker cannot be held responsible for
the occurrence of the unpleasant consequences if he does not get his way.
KEYWORDS: argumentum ad baculum, pragma-dialectics, pragmatic argumentation, strategic
maneuvering

1. THE ARGUMENTUM AD BACULUM IN THE STANDARD THEORY OF

PRAGMA-DIALECTICS
Threatening the other discussion party with negative, unpleasant consequences for
instance, by threatening him with physical violence or (more subtly) by threatening
him implicitly with sanctions if that party is not willing to refrain from advancing a
particular standpoint or from casting doubt on a particular standpoint, is an outspoken
example of a fallacy (Of course, you can hold that view, but then you should realize
that it will very hard for me to control my men in response to you). Not surprisingly,
this particular type of fallacy (conventionally named the argumentum ad baculum or
the fallacy of the stick) has become firmly incorporated in the traditional lists of
fallacies presented in introductory textbooks in (informal) logic and argumentation
(cf. Walton 2000).
Seen from the perspective of the standard theory of pragma-dialectics (van
Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992; 2004), the argumentum ad baculum is an example of
fallacies violating the Freedom Rule (i.e. the rule for governing the first stage of a
critical discussion, the confrontation stage, where standpoints are put forward by the
protagonist and doubt or criticism are raised by the antagonist, in short: the stage
where the difference of opinion is expressed) because, by threatening the other party
and putting pressure upon him to silence and to close his mouth, the inalienable right
of a discussion party to put freely forward standpoints or cast doubt on standpoints is
severely hampered and restricted. As a result, a full-blown discussion hardly gets off
the ground, ruling out the possibility of a resolution of the difference of opinion on
the merits.
Based on the consistent results of a 13 year-lasting, comprehensive empirical
research project concerning the judgments of ordinary arguers of the reasonableness
of fallacious and non-fallacious discussion contributions, entitled Conceptions of
Reasonableness, it can safely be concluded that ordinary arguers deem fallacious
1396

contributions as unreasonable moves, while they evaluate sound contributions as

reasonable (van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels 2009); compared with the
unreasonableness of the 24 investigated fallacies in that project (such as the ad
hominem, the ad misericordiam, evading the burden of proof, the ad populum, the ad
consequentiam and so on), the ad baculum fallacy the particular fallacy we will
focus on in this paper was judged as the least reasonable discussion move (cf. van
Eemeren, Grootendorst & Meuffels 1999).
From the empirical data collected in the project Conceptions of
Reasonableness it can be inferred that ordinary arguers know (at least on a pretheoretical level) where precisely to trace the boundaries of dialectical rationality;
thus, at least to a certain extent, ordinary arguers are aware of their dialectical
obligations. Moreover, ordinary arguers also expect that their interlocutors apply
similar norms and criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of discussion
contributions as they themselves do, upholding more or less the same standards of
dialectical reasonableness. Last, so can be inferred from the results of our empirical
research that formed a sequel of the above mentioned project, ordinary arguers use the
concept of reasonableness not only in a descriptive, but also in a normative sense:
the discussant who violates one of the rules for critical discussion and thus does not
observe the critical ideal of dialectical reasonableness, can be held accountable and
reproached for violating commonly shared norms incorporated in the rules for critical
discussion (van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels 2012).
2. THE ARGUMENTUM AD BACULUM IN THE EXTENDED THEORY OF
PRAGMA-DIALECTICS
All these firmly established empirical facts, however, seem at first sight not quite in
line with the (supposed) frequency of the ad baculum fallacy in everyday
argumentative discourse: why ever would rational discussants use hardly efficient
means like the ad baculum fallacy, a discussion move they can know and expect to be
denounced by the other discussion party? Why ever would they portray themselves as
being unreasonable by openly deviating from the rules of critical discussion, in the
knowledge that this will make their discussion move non-persuasive in the end? Part
of an answer to this paradox can be found in the so called extended standard theory of
pragma-dialectics, in which a rhetorical component of effectiveness has been added
to and integrated within the dialectical framework of classical, standard pragmadialectics (van Eemeren 2010).
In their aim to be effective, discussants will maneuver strategically in such a
way that they will try to achieve their dialectical goal keeping to the rules of critical
discussion while simultaneously trying to realize their rhetorical goal: winning the
discussion by having their standpoint accepted by the other party. Balancing these two
objectives of dialectical resolution-oriented reasonableness and rhetorical
effectiveness and trying to reconcile the simultaneous pursuit of these two aims,
which may be at times at odds, the arguers make use of what can be called strategic
maneuvering: a discussant tries to steer and maneuver the discussion to his advantage
like a ship maneuvers for the best position in a sea battle (van Eemeren 2010: 40).
In itself there is nothing wrong with wanting to win a discussion, but trying
too hard can lead to a derailment: if arguers allow their commitment to having a
reasonable exchange be overruled by their eagerness for achieving effectiveness, their
strategic maneuvering has been derailed. Viewed from this perspective, fallacies are
derailments of strategic maneuvering that involve violations of critical discussion
1397

rules. By violating the rules for critical discussion the argumentative move they have
made hinders the process of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits and so
their strategic maneuvering must be condemned as fallacious.
Derailments of strategic maneuvering may easily escape attention of the
interlocutors because deviations of the rules of critical discussion are often hard to
detect since none of the parties in the discussion will be keen on portraying
themselves as being unreasonable if only because this will make their contribution
ineffective in the end. So arguers will most likely try to stick to the established
dialectical means for achieving rhetorical objectives which are possibly at odds with
the dialectical rationale for a certain discussion rule, and stretch the use of these
means so much that the fallacious maneuvering is also covered (van Eemeren 2010:
140).
As a consequence, derailments of strategic maneuvering can be very similar to
sound instances of strategic maneuvering, so that in practice it is not always crystal
clear where precisely the boundaries between sound and fallacious strategic
maneuvering are to be found: the discrimination between fallacious and sound modes
of strategic maneuvering is not a simply black or white issue. The various modes of
strategic maneuvering that can be distinguished in argumentative reality can be
imagined as representing a continuum ranging from evidently fallacious to evidently
sound strategic maneuvering. This also goes for strategic maneuvering with particular
variants of the argumentum ad baculum: at the one pool one can distinguish
straightforward, clear-cut cases of illegitimate, fallacious ad baculum moves,
subsequently a grey zone of argumentative threatening moves whose soundness or
fallaciousness is not immediately clear, and at the other pool evidently legitimate,
sound uses of threats (for instance, at the breakfast table when one authoritative party
(the parents) threatens the other party (the child) with sanctions if she refuses to
obey).
In the project Conceptions of Reasonableness, purposely, only clear cases of
fallacies had to be judged by the participants: after all, the aim of that project was to
test the conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules (i.e.
investigating whether the norms of ordinary arguers when evaluating the soundness of
argumentative discourse are in agreement with the critical norms of pragmadialectics); it was certainly not the aim of that project to investigate the factors that
could influence the identification and recognition of fallacious or sound discussion
moves. As said before, in everyday argumentative practice discussants maneuver
strategically, attempting to hide and mask clearly unreasonable moves like the ad
baculum fallacy by presenting these moves in such a way that they mimic and look
like reasonable moves. We conjecture that one of the ways to disguise the ad baculum
fallacy is to present this move as a well-meant advice backed up by legitimate
pragmatic argumentation in which the speaker cannot be held responsible for the
occurrence of the unpleasant consequences if he does not get his way. This hypothesis
was tested systematically in two experiments.
3. PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTATION, ADVISING AND THREATENING
The soundness of argumentation depends among other things on how it employs
one of the possible argument schemes.
In pragmatic argumentation, which is a subtype of causal argumentation, the
standpoint recommends a certain course of action (or discourages a certain course of
action) and the argumentation consists of summing up the favorable respective
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unfavorable consequences of adopting that course of action (You shouldnt drink too
much alcohol, because it leads to long-term health problems).
The pragma-dialectical characterization of the argument scheme of pragmatic
argumentation is as follows:
1

Standpoint:

Action X should be carried out

1.1

Because:

Action X will lead to positive result Y

(1.1) And:

(Actions of type X [such as X] that lead

to positive results of type Y [such as Y] must be
carried out)

Pragmatic argumentation can only succeed if the causal relation between the two
elements concerned (X is the cause of Y; cf.: too much alcohol consumption leads to
health problems) is evident and if the positive (or negative) value of the consequence
Y (i.e. having health problems is undesirable) speaks for itself or is immediately
recognized as such. In case of the ad baculum threat the other party is put under
pressure by pointing or hinting at negative consequences for the other party if that
party does not give in; pragmatic argumentation and the ad baculum move are thus in
argumentation-theoretical respects alike in the sense that in both moves the
(un)desirability of the consequences of a cause, event or act are being exploited.
However, in contrast with pragmatic argumentation, the (implicit or explicit)
consequences of an ad baculum move are without exception negative (in certain
circumstances even frightening and fear-inducing).
Pragmatic argumentation is by convention associated with the speech act of
advising (or warning) (cf. van Poppel 2013): in order to make an advice or warning
acceptable for an audience (You should do or You shouldnt do ), pragmatic
argumentation is characteristically adduced. Both the act of advising and the act of
threatening are speech acts that can be classified looking at their (primary)
illocutionary goal as directives; moreover, both speech acts have felicity conditions
in common (such as the preparatory condition concerning the authoritative status of
the source of the advice/threat).
Mimicking the ad baculum as a well-meant advice that is in the interest of the
hearer would certainly not be sufficient as we conjecture for the persuasiveness of
such disguised form of threat. Despite all the similarities and resemblances between
the uses of the pragmatic argument scheme adduced in advises and threats, there is
one crucial difference between these two speech acts: in case of an advice or warning
(You shouldnt drive so speedy, darling. Its raining!) the other party in the
discussion has full freedom and responsibility for the occurrence (or non-occurrence)
of the effect Y (in the causal relation: If X, then Y); however, in case of a threat the
party who advances the threat can be completely held responsible for the occurrence
of the negative outcome (If you still persist in that awful behavior, I have to dismiss
you). The secondary illocutionary goal of a threat can thus be conceived as that of a
commissive (i.e. a commitment undertaken by the speaker vis--vis the listener to do
something and act according to what is explicitly said or implied by what is said).
In order to disguise the ad baculum in a strategically effective way and to
make this fallacious move look like a legitimate discussion move, it is vital for the
1399

speaker to suggest/hint that evidently not he or she, but another party or event outside
the discussion can be held accountable for the occurrence of the undesirable, negative
outcome. Expressed differently: the causal relation in the pragmatic argument scheme
(X is the cause of the effect Y, or: the act of X is leading to the consequence Y) is
deceitfully represented and treacherously exploited in such a way that the arguer (the
person who advances the threat) cannot be held accountable for the occurrence of the
negative effect Y: it is after all not the arguer but a party outside the current
discussion that can be blamed.
To illustrate these points, take the following two examples (the first is an
example of an openly, straightforward clear-cut case of an argumentum ad baculum,
the second an example of a disguised ad baculum disguised according to the
conjectural ideas above). Suppose two neighbors (Sally and John) argue about the
annoying barking of Johns dog. Sally is completely fed up with that barking,
especially in the night.
Sally: You should learn that dog not to bark at night; every night I wake up
because of that terrible noise.
John: What nonsense, he really doesnt bark that much at all.
Sally: If you keep saying that, Ill harm him.
Sallys last move is forthright ad baculum: she explicitly commits herself to kill the
dog if John refuses to take any measures. But Sally could have chosen to present her
last move in a strategically, perhaps more effective way more effective as we
predict , namely as a well-meant advice, disguising the threat but without undoing it:
Sally: You should learn that dog not to bark at night; every night I wake up
because of that terrible noise.
John: What nonsense, he really doesnt bark that much at all.
Sally: I would strongly advise you to take effective measures to stop that awful
barking. You wouldnt like it if somebody would harm your beloved dog,
wouldnt you?
In the two experiments reported in this paper, the crucial contrast is that between the
(perceived) unreasonableness of straightforward ad baculum moves and the
unreasonableness of disguised ad baculum moves. In all cases we present
instantiations of the disguised fallacy as a well-meant advice that is in the interest of
the addressee, making use of indicators of the speech act of advising such as: I
would advise you; It would be wise if you.; If I were you, I would; If I
were in your position, I would; I would recommend you , If you are asking
me, I would I think .
The arguer, however, has still various other perhaps strategically effective
presentational devices at his disposal to mask other aspects of the threat, for instance
devices to undo the inherent, annoying pressure of the ad baculum move, which is at
odds with someones personal freedom. To guarantee that it is absolutely not his
intention to threaten the opponent and to put pressure on him, the arguer can
strategically emphasize that the other party is totally free to decide whatever she
wants: Of course you are absolutely free to decide whatever you want, but if I were
in your position ; Its totally up to you, but I would advise you. In the two
experiments we conducted, we presented (hypothetical) discussion fragments to the

1400

participants in which in case of the disguised ad baculum only indicators of the

speech act of advising were used.
4. THE EXPERIMENT
In the current study we tested the following main hypothesis:
Ad baculum fallacies are judged as less unreasonable than clear-cut,
straightforward cases of ad baculum moves when they are presented as if they
are well-meant advices in which the speaker cant be held responsible for the
occurrence of the unpleasant consequences if he does not get his way.
The experimental (Dutch) subjects (Ss) were exposed to 42 discussion fragments;
some contained fallacious moves, others did not. In each dialogue, the Ss had to rate
the (un)reasonableness of the last contribution to the discussion on a 7-point Likert
type of scale, ranging from very unreasonable ( = 1) to very reasonable ( = 7).
4.1 Material
42 discussion fragments were constructed, in which 7 different types of fallacious and
non-fallacious discussion contributions occurred; each type was represented by 6
instantiations:
(1) straightforward, clear-cut cases of ad baculum moves,
(2) disguised ad baculum moves,
(3) sound, i.e. reasonable moves (not based on a pragmatic argument
scheme),
(4) sound, i.e. reasonable moves (based on a pragmatic argumentation
scheme),
(5) the circumstantial variant of the ad hominem fallacy,
(6) the tu quoque variant of the ad hominem fallacy,
(7) the abusive variant of the ad hominem fallacy.
The general structure of these discussion fragments was fixed: all fragments consisted
of 3 turn dialogues between two discussants; each fragment was preceded by a short
contextual description to ensure that the Ss interpreted the fragment in a more or less
homogeneous way. Just like in our previous studies we did not include loaded topics;
we tried to keep the dialogues as simple as we could and avoided humorous situations
or elements that could otherwise distract our respondents.
In the first turn, the protagonist put forward a standpoint, supported by an
argument. In the second turn, the antagonist made explicitly or implicitly clear not to
accept that standpoint, backed up by an argument. In the last turn (in case of a
straightforward ad baculum), the protagonist implicitly and indirectly threatened the
other party by pointing at negative consequences if he does not get his way, like this:
(1) Straightforward ad baculum

1401

Employer and employee during a performance interview

Employee:

I think it is time for a promotion. My work really improved much and I

receive a lot compliments from my colleagues.

Employer:

I dont agree, there are a lot of points for improvement.

Employee:

Well, you may maintain that point of view, but I know about your
creative way of making your tax returns and you do not want that out
in the open.

Notice that in the example above, as in all the other 5 instantiations of the
straightforward ad baculum move, the protagonist threatens the other party implicitly
with non-physical consequences that are indirectly put forward, i.e. not explicitly
spelled out. Making use of such indirect, non-physical consequences in spelling out
the negative consequences makes it much harder for us to confirm our main
hypothesis, compared with physical, direct ad baculum moves.1 The following is an
example of a disguised ad baculum, constructed according to the theoretical insights
outlined above:
(2) Disguised ad baculum
The stage-manager and the key actress are discussing the suitability of her costume.
Stage-manager: This costume is really splendid, it does perfectly fit with the
role.
Actress:
I hate it!! That dress makes me look awfully fat!
Stage manager: I would advise you just to put it on, its really a nuisance if
another main actress has to be looked for.
Once again, in the current experiment the disguised ad baculum is always presented
(in the 6 instantiations) as an explicit advice which is in the interests of the addressee,
accompanied by an explicit indicator of the speech act advising.
For the purpose of constructing a base line for comparisons and contrasts
between fallacious and non-fallacious moves, in 6 dialogues normal non-fallacious
reactions were included (reactions, however, in which no pragmatic argumentation
was used, but other argument schemes). For an example of this type of dialogue, see
(3):

In the experiments pertaining to the unreasonableness of different forms of ad baculum fallacies (such
as threatening with physical consequences vs. threatening with non-physical consequences; and
threatening in a direct way vs. threatening in an indirect way) it was found that threatening with
physical consequences was judged most strictly, while indirect threatening was deemed to be the least
unreasonable move (see van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Meuffels 1999). So, by making use of only
indirect forms of straightforward ad baculum fallacies in the present experiment, a far too easy
confirmation of our hypothesis is avoided.

1402

(3) Sound argumentation (in which the pragmatic argument scheme is not used)
A young couple discusses their opinions after seeing the stage play.
Alissa: What a wonderful play! The actors had a very professional mimic and
attitude.
Mark: I didnt like the play at all, the topic was very boring.
Alissa: No, on the contrary, that topic wasnt boring at all! It covered all the
facets of real life and it was highly instructive.
In (4), an example of sound argumentation in which pragmatic argumentation is used,
is presented. Evidently, such examples are relevant for an appropriate contrast
between the (perceived) (un) reasonableness of the fallacious use of pragmatic
argumentation (as is the case in disguised ad baculum moves) and the (perceived)
(un) reasonableness of sound, non-fallacious use of pragmatic argumentation:
(4) Sound argumentation (in which the pragmatic argument scheme is used)
Pim and Anke in their car on the highway, discussing the speed limits:
Anke: Please slow down! The upper limit here is 100 km.
Pim: Dont be so nervous, everybody is driving faster so it doesnt really
matter.
Anke: If I were you, I would keep up to the maximum speed; soon you will
be caught and get a ticket.
Three types of filler items were included as well: 6 dialogues containing a tu quoque
fallacy, 6 dialogues containing a circumstantial ad hominem fallacy, and 6 dialogues
containing an abusive ad hominem fallacy (for concrete examples, see van Eemeren,
Garssen & Meuffels 2009). These fillers acted as gate keepers: we included these
kinds of fallacies in the questionnaire because, given the consistent results reported in
the Conceptions of Reasonableness project, we know exactly what to expect when it
comes to reasonableness judgments about these fallacies (namely, the abusive attack
is judged as a very unreasonable move, whereas the circumstantial as well as the you
too-variants tend to be judged as reasonable moves).2 If these expectations would not
be met in the current study, this would imply a serious threat to the validity of the
present investigation. A second reason for including these fillers was to mask the
precise aim of our research focusing on ad baculum fallacies. Varying the type of
fallacy made it more difficult for our respondents to infer a pattern in the material and
to guess what our experiment was aimed at.

That the circumstantial as well as the you too variants tend to be judged as reasonable moves is only
the case when participants have to judge the reasonableness of these fallacies presented in unspecified
contexts. When these two types of fallacies are presented in a scientific context, these variants of ad
hominem are deemed to be unreasonable, like the abusive variant.

1403

4.2 Participants
A total of 93 secondary school students (pre-university level, ranging in age from 14
to 18; M = 15.94; SD = .75; 41% male, 59% female) took part in the pencil-and-paper
test during regular class hours. Some of them knew the term fallacy, but none of them
had received any systematic education regarding argumentation.
4.3 Statistical analysis
The data were analyzed by means of a multivariate analysis of variance (mixed
model approach for repeated measurements), with subject and instantiation as
random factors and the variable type of fallacy as a fixed factor. The random factor
instantiation is nested within the levels of the fixed factor type of fallacy, whereas
the random factor subject is fully crossed with the random factor instantiation and
the fixed factor type of fallacy. The statistical consequence of this design is that
instead of ordinary F-ratios so-called quasi F-ratios have to be computed (denoted
as F), while the degrees of freedom have to be approximated (see Clark 1973).
4.4 Results
Looking first at the fillers (Table 1), it is evident that the present results are in line
with the results we found in our previous studies conducted in the project Conceptions
of Reasonableness. The abusive fallacy is again judged to be most unreasonable, next
the circumstantial attack and last the tu quoque fallacy, both of which tend again to be
viewed as reasonable moves. Moreover, the perceived unreasonableness of the
straightforward ad baculum fallacy as well as the judged reasonableness of sound
argumentation is equally well in accordance with the empirical findings in of
Conceptions of Reasonableness. In sum, the reasonableness scores depicted in Table 1
are a positive indication for the validity of the data.
M
SD
Clear-cut case ad baculum (k = 6)
2.81
0.70
Abusive ad hominem (k = 6)
2.74
0.77
Circumstantial ad hominem (k = 6)
4.33
0.77
Table 1: Average reasonableness score for the fillers, ad baculum moves and
sound moves; n = 93 (k = number of instantiations)
Do the respondents as predicted in our hypothesis regard hidden ad baculum
moves which mirror well-meant advices supported by pragmatic argumentation
indeed less unreasonable as straightforward, clear-cut cases of ad baculum? In Table
2 the relevant data are presented.
M
SD
Clear-cut case ad baculum (k = 6)
2.81 0.70
Disguised ad baculum (k = 6)
4.39 0.86
Sound (non-pragmatic) argumentation (k = 6)
5.17 0.60
Sound (pragmatic) argumentation (k = 6)
5.74 0.66
Table 2: Average reasonableness score for four types of moves; n = 93 (k =
number of instantiations)

1404

The average reasonableness scores pertaining to the four types of moves in Table 2
proved to differ statistically from each other: F' (3,22) = 14.27, p < .01; 2 = .36. By
means of three orthogonal post hoc comparisons we contrasted, first, sound nonpragmatic argumentation with sound (pragmatic) argumentation, but no statistical
difference could be found (F' (1,22) = 1.43, n.s.). Second: the disguised ad baculum
differed significantly from the average of the sound non-pragmatic argumentation and
the sound pragmatic argumentation: F' (1,22) = 6.64, p < .07; 2 = .03. Last, and most
important for our hypothesis, the disguised ad baculum was indeed found to be less
unreasonable than the straightforward ad baculum: F' (1,22) = 10.97, p < .01, 2 = .10.
The difference between these two fallacious threats (1.58) is considerable, given the
range of a 7-point scale. Our respondents clearly judged the straightforward ad
baculum threat as an unreasonable argumentative move, but when it comes to judging
the disguised form of this fallacy they are clearly in doubt: overall this fallacious
move is judged as neither unreasonable nor reasonable.
5. REPLICATION
In order to be able to generalize the results with more confidence, a replication was
carried out, making use of different messages and different subjects. 128 students
(high vocational education; age range 17-31 (M = 20.59; SD = 2.66)) were exposed to
42 different, but equivalent messages as in the experimental study above. Instead of
the circumstantial variant of the ad hominem, we now used the fallacy of shifting the
burden of proof and once again - the tu quoque variant of the ad hominem as
gatekeepers of the validity. This time each type of fallacy and sound argumentation
was represented not by 6, but by 7 instantiations.
The average reasonableness scores for the gatekeepers were again in line with
the expectations, derived from the consistent results in the Conceptions of
Reasonableness project (clear case ad baculum: M = 2.74; SD = 0.65; shifting the
burden of proof: M = 3.06; SD = 1.05; tu quoque: M = 4.12; SD = 0.84; sound (nonpragmatic) argumentation: M = 5.59; SD = 0.59). The statistical results of the
replication are also in accordance with those of the original experiment. Once again,
there were statistically significant differences between the four types of reactions
depicted in Table 3: F'(3, 25) = 16.65, p < .001, 2 = .40.
M
SD
Clear-cut case ad baculum (k = 7)
2.74
0.65
Disguised ad baculum (k = 7)
3.76
0.66
Sound (non-pragmatic) argumentation (k = 7)
5.59
0.59
Sound (pragmatic) argumentation (k = 7)
5.58
0.74
Table 3: Average reasonableness score for different types of moves; n = 128
(experiment 2: replication); k = number of instantiations
The orthogonal post hoc contrast between sound non-pragmatic argumentation and
sound pragmatic argumentation was once again found to be statistically not
significant: F'(1,25) = 0.00, p = .99. Just as in the previous experiment, the disguised
ad baculum fallacy differed significantly from the average of the two types of
reasonable argumentation: F'(1,25) = 18,49, p < .001. Last, the disguised ad baculum
was once again found to be substantially less unreasonable than the explicit variant of
the ad baculum fallacy: F'(1,25) = 4.33, p < .05.

1405

6. CONCLUSION
The empirical results of the original experiment and those of the replication are quite
similar and in line with our theoretical expectations: Ordinary arguers clearly reject
straightforward ad baculum moves; disguised forms of such moves are judged
substantially less unreasonable by our experimental subjects, since these moves take
on a reasonable (but treacherous) appearance - indeed, the Latin word fallax means
deceptive or deceitful when they are presented as if they are well-meant advices
backed up by pragmatic argumentation in which the speaker cannot be held
responsible for the occurrence of the unpleasant consequences if he does not get his
way.
In earlier empirical studies in which we investigated strategic maneuvering
with abusive ad hominem attacks, we showed that direct attacks are judged as less
unreasonable when they are presented as if they are critical questions pertaining to the
argument scheme for authority argumentation (van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels
2010); we coined that strategic effect the mimetic effect. Given the current empirical
findings concerning ad baculum fallacies it can be concluded that this mimetic effect
is not specifically bound to strategic maneuvering with ad hominem fallacies, but can
be generalized to other types of fallacies.
Another remarkable empirical finding that is strikingly similar in both studies
is the size of this mimetic effect: the disguised forms of both fallacies (i.e. the ad
hominem as well as the ad baculum) are evidently not judged as fully or fairly
reasonable moves; the judgments center around the neutral midpoint of 4 on the 7point scale. So, ordinary arguers are clearly in doubt and are quite uncertain when it
comes to judging the reasonableness of these disguised forms. The appearance of a
certain, modest degree of reasonableness is presumably sufficient for arguers to get
away with such treacherous moves in argumentative discussions.

REFERENCES
Clark, H. H. (1973). The language-as-fixed-effect fallacy: A critique of language statistics in
psycholinguistics. Journal of verbal learning and verbal behavior, 12, 335-359.
Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Eemeren, F. H. van, Garssen, B., & Meuffels, B. (2009). Fallacies and judgments of reasonableness:
Empirical research concerning the pragma-dialectical discussion rules. Dordrecht: Springer.
Eemeren, F. H. van, Garssen, B., & Meuffels, B. (2012). The disguised abusive ad hominem
empirically investigated; Strategic manoeuvering with direct personal attacks. Thinking and
Reasoning, 18(2012), 2, 344-364.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Garssen, B., & Meuffels, B. (2012). The Extended Pragma-Dialectical
Argumentation Theory Empirically Interpreted. In: Frans H. van Eemeren & Bart Garssen (eds.),
Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory: Twenty Exploratory Studies (Argumentation Library,
vol.22). Dordrecht: Springer, 323-343.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication, and fallacies: A
pragma-dialectical perspective. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Meuffels, B. (1999). De onredelijkheid van de ad baculumdrogreden. Taalbeheersing, 21, 1, 29-48.
Walton, D. N. (2000). Scare tactics: Arguments that appeal to fear and threats. (Argumentation Library,
Vol. 3). Dordrecht: Springer.

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Poppel, L. van (2013). Getting the vaccine now will protect you in the future! A pragma-dialectical
analysis of strategic maneuvering with pragmatic argumentation in health brochures. Diss. University
of Amsterdam.

1407

Bingo! Promising Developments In Argumentation Theory

Frans H. van Eemeren, ILIAS
University of Amsterdam & Leiden University
The Netherlands

f.h.vaneemeren@uva.nl

ABSTRACT: On the occasion of the publication in 2014 of the new Handbook of Argumentation Theory,
which provides an overview of the current state of the art in the field, van Eemeren identifies three major
developments in the treatment of argumentation that he finds promising. First, there is in various theoretical
traditions the trend towards empiricalization, which includes both qualitative and quantitative empirical
research. Second, there is the increased and explicit attention being paid to the institutional macro-contexts
in which argumentative discourse takes place and the effects they have on the argumentation. Third, there is,
particularly in the dialectical approaches, a movement towards formalization, which is strongly stimulated
by the recent advancement of artificial intelligence. According to van Eemeren, if they are integrated with
each other and comply with pertinent academic requirements, the developments of empiricalization,
contextualization and formalization of the treatment of argumentation will mean bingo! for the future of
argumentation theory.
KEYWORDS: contextualization, dialectical perspective, empiricalization, formalization, pragma-dialectics,
rhetorical perspective, state of the art

1. CHANGES IN THE STATE OF THE ART OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY

Since the conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation held in
Amsterdam in July 2014 was the eighth ISSA conference, argumentation theorists from
various kinds of backgrounds have been exchanging views about argumentation for almost
thirty years. My keynote speech at the start of this conference seemed to me the right
occasion for making some general comments on the way in which the field is progressing.
I considered myself in a good position to strike a balance because during the past
five years I have been preparing an overview of the state of the art in a new Handbook of
Argumentation Theory. I have done so together with my co-authors, Bart Garssen, Erik C.
W. Krabbe, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Bart Verheij, and Jean H. M. Wagemans. In
this complicated endeavour we have been supported generously by a large group of
knowledgeable reviewers and advisors from the field. On the 2 July reception of the ISSA
conference the Handbook was to be presented to the community of argumentation
scholars.
The Handbook of Argumentation Theory is the latest offshoot of a tradition of
handbook writing that I started with Rob Grootendorst in the mid-1970s. We presented
first several overviews of the state of the art in Dutch before publishing the handbook in
English, the current lingua franca of scholarship (van Eemeren, Grootendorst &
Kruiger,1978, 1981, 1986, and van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger, 1984, 1987,
respectively). The most recent version of the handbook is Fundamentals of Argumentation
Theory, which appeared in 1996 and was co-authored by a group of prominent
argumentation scholars (van Eemeren et al., 1996).

1408

The overview offered by the newly-completed version of the handbook constitutes the
basis for giving a judgment of recent developments in the discipline. It goes without
saying that a short speech does not allow me to pay attention to all developments that
could be of interest; I limit myself to three major trends that I find promising. They
involve innovations which are, in my view, vital for the future of the field.
Argumentation scholars are not in full harmony regarding the definition of the term
argumentation.1 There seems to be general agreement however that argumentation always
involves trying to convince or persuade others by means of reasoned discourse.2 Although
I think that most argumentation scholars will agree that the study of argumentation has a
descriptive as well as a normative dimension, their views on how in actual research the
two dimensions are to be approached will diverge.3 Unanimity comes almost certainly to
an end when it has to be decided which theoretical perspective is to be favoured.4
The general theoretical perspectives that are dominant are the dialectical, which
concentrates foremost on procedural reasonableness, and the rhetorical, focusing on
aspired effectiveness. In modern argumentation theory both theoretical traditions are
pervaded by insights from philosophy, logic, pragmatics, discourse analysis,
communication, and other disciplines. Since the late 1990s, a tendency has developed to
connect, or even integrate, the two traditions.5 Taking only a dialectical perspective
involves the risk that relevant contextual and situational factors are not taken into account,
while taking a purely rhetorical perspective involves the risk that the critical dimension of
argumentation is not explored to the full.6
1

See van Eemeren (2010, pp. 25-27) for the influence of being or not being a native speaker of English on
the perception of argumentation and argumentation theory.
2

In my view, instead of being a theory of proof or a general theory of reasoning or argument, argumentation
theory concentrates on using argument to convince others by a reasonable discussion of the acceptability of
the standpoints at issue. My view of argumentation theory is generally incorporated in more-encompassing
views that have been advanced.
3

As we observed in the new Handbook, [s]ome argumentation theorists have a goal that is primarily (and
sometimes even exclusively) descriptive, especially those theorists having a background in linguistics,
discourse analysis, and rhetoric. They are interested, for instance, in finding out how in argumentative
discourse speakers and writers try to convince or persuade others by making use of certain linguistic devices
or by using other means to influence their audience or readership. Other argumentation theorists, often
inspired by logic, philosophy, or insights from law, study argumentation primarily for normative purposes.
They are interested in developing soundness criteria that argumentation must satisfy in order to qualify as
rational or reasonable. They examine, for instance, the epistemic function argumentation fulfills or the
fallacies that may occur in argumentative discourse (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 29).
4

According to the Handbook of argumentation theory, The current state of the art in argumentation theory
is characterized by the co-existence of a variety of theoretical perspectives and approaches, which differ
considerably from each other in conceptualization, scope, and theoretical refinement (van Eemeren et al.,
2014, p. 29).
5

See for various views on combining insights from dialectic and rhetoric van Eemeren and Houtlosser (Eds.,
2002). Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002) have proposed to integrate insights from rhetoric into the
theoretical framework of pragma-dialectics. According to Tindale, who considers the rhetorical perspective
as the most fundamental, the synthesis of the logical, dialectical and rhetorical perspectives should be
grounded in the rhetorical perspective (1999, pp. 6-7).
6

In our new Handbook we take the position that argumentation theory can best be viewed as an
interdisciplinary study with logical, dialectical, and rhetorical dimensions (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 29).

1409

Compared to some thirty years ago, both the number of participants and the number of
publications in argumentation theory have increased strikingly. Another remarkable
difference is that nowadays not only North-American and European scholars are involved,
but also Latin Americans, Asians and Arabs. In addition, an important impetus to the
progress of argumentation theory is given by related disciplines such as critical discourse
analysis and persuasion research.7
Today I would like to concentrate on some recent changes in the way in which
argumentation is examined. In my opinion, three major developments in the treatment of
argumentation have begun to materialize that open up new avenues for research. Although
they differ in shape, these developments can be observed across a broad spectrum of
theoretical approaches. The three developments I have in mind can be designated as
empiricalization, contextualization, and formalization of the treatment of argumentation.8
2. EMPIRICALIZATION OF THE TREATMENT OF ARGUMENTATION
Modern argumentation theory manifested itself initially by the articulation of theoretical
proposals for concepts and models of argumentation based on new philosophical views of
reasonableness. In 1958, Stephen Toulmin presented a model of the various procedural
steps involved in putting forward argumentation or argument, as he used to call it
(Toulmin, 2003). He emphasized that, in order to deal adequately with the reasonableness
of argumentation in the various fields of argumentative reality, an empirical approach to
argumentation is needed. On their part, Cham Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, who
co-founded modern argumentation theory, claimed to have based the theoretical categories
of their new rhetoric on empirical observations (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969).9
Like Freges theory of logic was founded upon a descriptive analysis of mathematical
reasoning, they founded their argumentation theory on a descriptive analysis of reasoning
with value judgments in the fields of law, history, philosophy, and literature.10
In spite of their insistence on empiricalization of the treatment of argumentation,
the empirical dimension of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas own contributions to
argumentation theory remains rather sketchy. In fact, all prominent protagonists of modern
argumentation theory in the 1950s, 60s and 70s concentrated in the first place on
presenting theoretical proposals for dealing with argumentation and philosophical views in
their support. This even applies to the Norwegian philosopher Arne Nss, however

According to van Eemeren et al. (2014), a great number of contributions to the study of argumentation are
not part of the generally recognized research traditions; some of them stem from related disciplines or have
been developed in non-Anglophone parts of the world. See Chapter 12 of the Handbook.
8
It goes without saying that, depending on ones theoretical position and preferences, other promising trends
can be distinguished. A case in point may be the study of visual and other modalities of argumentation.
9
In spite of various criticisms of the empirical adequacy of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas taxonomy of
argument schemes (van Eemeren et al., 1996, pp. 122-124; van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 292), Warnick and
Kline (1992) have made an effort to carry out empirical research based on this taxonomy.
10
The norms for rationality and reasonableness described in the new rhetoric have an emic basis: the
criteria for the evaluation of argumentation that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca provide are a description of
various kinds of argumentation that can be successful in practice with the people for whom the
argumentation is intended.

1410

practical and empirical his orientation was.11 The empirical research Nss wanted to be
carried out with regard to argumentation was designed to lead to a more precise
determination of the statements about which disagreement exists.12 In his own work
however he refrained from giving substance to the empirical dimension of argumentation
theory.
Despite the strongly expressed preferences of the founding fathers, I conclude that
the development of the empirical component of argumentation theory did not really take
off until much later. Making such a sweeping statement however, forces you often to
acknowledge exceptions immediately. In this case, I must admit that there is an old and
rich tradition of empirically-oriented rhetorical scholarship in American communication
studies.13 The empirical research that is conducted in this tradition consists for the most
part of case studies. One of its main branches, for instance, rhetorical criticism,
concentrates on analysing specific public speeches or texts that are meant to be persuasive.
An excellent specimen is Michael Leff and Gerald Mohrmanns (1993) analysis of
Abraham Lincolns Cooper Union speech of February 27, 1860, designed to win
nomination as spokesman for the Republican Party. David Zarefsky (1986) offers another
example of such empirical research of historical political discourse in President Johnsons
War on Poverty. His more encompassing central question is how Johnsons social
program, put in the strategic perspective of a war on poverty, and laid down in the
Economic Opportunity Act, gained first such strong support and fell so far later on.
In my view, in argumentation theory argumentative reality is to be examined
systematically, concentrating in particular on the influence of certain factors in
argumentative reality on the production, interpretation, and assessment of argumentative
discourse.14 Two types of empirical research can be pertinent. First, qualitative research
relying on introspection and observation by the researcher will usually be most appropriate
when specific qualities, traits or conventions of particular specimens of argumentative
discourse need to be depicted. Second, as a rule, quantitative research based on numerical
data and statistics is required when generic If X, then Y claims regarding the production,
interpretation or assessment of argumentative discourse must be tested. It is basically the
nature of the claim at issue that determines which type of evidence is required examples
or frequencies and which type of empirical research is therefore most appropriate.
Although qualitative as well as quantitative empirical research has its own function in
11

In Interpretation and Preciseness, published in 1953, Nss revealed himself as a radical empirical
semanticist, who liked questionnaires and personal interviews to be used for investigating what in particular
circles is understood by particular expressions. However, he did not carried out such investigations himself.
12
Although Nsss empirical ideas stimulated the coming into existence of the Oslo School, a group of
researchers investigating semantic relations, such as synonymy, by means of questionnaires, their influence
in argumentation theory has been rather limited.
13
Already since the 1950s, contemporary argumentative discourse in the political domain has been carefully
studied by rhetoricians such as Robert Newman (1961) and Edward Schiappa (2002), to name just two
outstanding examples from different periods.
14
Because of its ambition to be an academic discipline which is of practical relevance in dealing with
argumentative reality, argumentation theory needs to include empirical research relating to the
philosophically motivated theoretical models that have been developed. To see to what extent argumentative
reality agrees with the theory, the research programme of an argumentation theory such as pragma-dialectics
therefore has an empirical component.

1411

examining argumentative discourse, and the two types of research may complement each
other in various ways, carrying out qualitative research is in my opinion always a
necessary preparatory step in gaining a better understanding of argumentative reality. 15
In France, Marianne Doury has recently carried out qualitative empirical research
that is systematically connected with research questions of a more general kind (e.g.,
Doury, 2006). Her research, which is strongly influenced by insights from discourse and
conversation analysis, aims at highlighting "the discursive and interactional devices used
by speakers who face conflicting standpoints and need to take a stand in such a way as to
hold out against contention" (Doury, 2009, p. 143). Doury focuses on the spontaneous
argumentative norms revealed by the observation of argumentative exchanges in
polemical contexts (Doury, 1997, 2004a, 2005). Her emic, i.e. theory-independent,
descriptions contribute to a form of argumentative ethnography (Doury, 2004b).
In contrast to theoretical research, in informal logic empirical research is rather
thin on the ground. Nevertheless, Maurice Finocchiaro has carried out important
qualitative research projects focusing on reasoning in scientific controversies (e.g.,
Finocchiaro, 2005b). His approach, which is directed at theorizing, can be characterized as
both historical and empirical. Finocchiaro states explicitly that the theory of reasoning he
has in mind has an empirical orientation and is not a purely formal or abstract discipline
(2005a, p. 22).16 Rather than judging arguments in historical controversies from an a
priori perspective, as formal logicians do, Finocchiaro holds that the assessment criteria
can and should be found empirically within the discourse.
The oldest and most well-known type of quantitative empirical research of
argumentation takes place, mainly in the United States, in the related area of persuasion
research. More often than not however persuasion research does not concentrate on
argumentation. When it does, it deals with the persuasive effects of the way in which
argumentation is presented (message structure) and the persuasive effects of the content of
argumentation (message content). In the past years, both types of persuasion research have
cumulated in large-scale meta-analyses, carried out most elaborately by Daniel OKeefe
(2006).
Recently the connection between argumentation and persuasion has been examined
more frequently, also outside the United States, in particular by communication scholars
from the University of Nijmegen. Their research concentrates for the most part on
message content. Hans Hoeken (2001) addressed the relationship between the perception
of the quality of an argument and its actual persuasiveness. His initial research, which can
be seen as an altered replication of research conducted earlier by Baesler and Burgoon
(1994), examined the perceived and actual persuasiveness of three different types of
evidence: anecdotal, statistical, and causal evidence. The experimental results indicate that
the various types of evidence had a different effect on the acceptance of the claim.
However, the differences only partly replicate the pattern of results obtained in other
studies. Contrary to expectations, in Hoekens study causal evidence proved not to be the
15

Although in general quantitative research is only necessary with regard to more general claims, claims
pertaining to a specific case can sometimes also be supported quantitatively. In any case, quantitative
research is only relevant to argumentation theory if it increases our insight into argumentative reality.
16
At the same time, Finocchiaro emphasizes that the empirical is contrasted primarily to the a priori, and
not, for example, to the normative or the theoretical (2005a, p. 47).

1412

most convincing evidence. It was in fact just as persuasive as anecdotal evidence, and less
persuasive than statistical evidence.17 Later research conducted in Nijmegen has focused
on the relative persuasiveness of different types of arguments.
Since the 1980s, quantitative empirical research has also been carried out in
argumentation theory, albeit not by a great many scholars. In order to establish to what
extent in argumentative reality the recognition of argumentative moves is facilitated or
hampered by factors in their presentation I conducted experimental research together with
Grootendorst and Bert Meuffels (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Meuffels, 1984).18 Dale
Hample and Judith Dallinger (1986, 1987, 1991) investigated in the same period the
editorial standards people apply in designing their own arguments.19 And Judith Sanders,
Robert Gass and Richard Wiseman (1991) compared the assessments given by different
ethnic groups in evaluating the strength or quality of warrants used in argumentation with
assessments given by experts in the field of argumentation and debate (p. 709).20
Several quantitative research projects have concentrated on ordinary arguers pretheoretical quality notions or norms of reasonableness. Judith Bowker and Robert Trapp
(1992), for example, studied laymens norms for sound argumentation: Do ordinary
arguers apply predictable, consistent criteria on the basis of which they distinguish
between sound and unsound argumentation? Their conclusion is that the judgments of the
respondents partially correlate with the reasonableness norms formulated by informal
logicians such as Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair, and Trudy Govier (p. 228).21
Together with Garssen and Meuffels I carried out a comprehensive research
project, reported in 2009 in Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness, to test
experimentally the intersubjective acceptability of the pragma-dialectical norms for
judging the reasonableness of argumentative discourse (van Eemeren, Garssen &
Meuffels, 2009).22 Rather than being emic standards of reasonableness, the pragmadialectical norms are etic standards for resolving differences of opinion on the merits.
They are designed to be problem-valid or, in terms of Rupert Crawshay-Williams
(1957), methodologically necessary for serving their purpose. Their intersubjective or,
in terms of Crawshay-Williams, conventional validity for the arguers however is to be
tested empirically. The general conclusion of our extended series of experimental tests is
that all data that were obtained indicate that the norms ordinary arguers use when judging
17

Corresponding with its actual persuasiveness, statistical evidence is rated as stronger than anecdotal
evidence. Ratings of the strength of the argument are in both cases strongly related to its actual
persuasiveness. In contrast, causal evidence received higher ratings compared to its actual persuasiveness.
18
See Garssen (2002) for experimental research into whether ordinary arguers have a pre-theoretical notion
of argument schemes.
19
More recently, Hample collaborated with Fabio Paglieri and Ling Na (2011) in answering the question of
when people are inclined to start a discussion.
20
Another type of quantitative research focuses on cognitive processes. Voss, Fincher-Kiefer, Wiley and
Ney Silfies (1993), for instance, present a model of informal argument processing and describe experiments
that provide support for the model.
21
Making also use of an empiricistic method, Schreier, Groeben and Christmann (1995) introduced the
concept of argumentational integrity to develop ethical criteria for assessing contributions to argumentative
discussions in daily life based on experimental findings.
22
This research was, of course, not aimed at legitimizing the model of a critical discussion. All the same, by
indicating which factors are worth investigating because of their significance for resolving a difference of
opinion on the merits, the model gives direction to the research.

1413

the reasonableness of contributions to a discussion correspond quite well with the pragmadialectical norms for critical discussion. Based on this indirect evidence, the rules may be
claimed to be conventionally valid taken both individually and as a collective.23
3. CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE TREATMENT OF ARGUMENTATION
A second striking development in argumentation theory is the greatly increased attention
being paid to the context in which argumentation takes places. By taking explicitly
account of contextual differentiation in dealing with the production, analysis and
evaluation of argumentative discourse this development goes beyond mere
empiricalization. All four levels of context I once proposed to distinguish play a part in
this endeavour: the linguistic, the situational, the institutional, and the intertextual
level (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 17-19). Most prominent however is the inclusion of the
institutional context I designated earlier the macro-context, which pertains to the kind of
speech event in which the argumentation occurs. Paying attention to the macro-context is
necessary to do justice to the fact that argumentative discourse is always situated in some
more or less conventionalized institutional environment, which influences the way in
which the argumentation takes shape.
Although in formal and informal logical approaches the macro-context has not very
actively been taken into account,24 in modern argumentation theory the contextual
dimension has been emphasized from the beginning. In the rhetorical perspective in
particular, contextual considerations have always been an integral part of the approach,
starting in Antiquity with the distinction made in Aristotelian rhetoric between different
genres of discourse. Characteristically, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca see context in
the first place as audience, which is accorded a central role in their new rhetoric.
Christopher Tindale (1999) insists that in a rhetorical perspective there are still other
contextual components than audience that should be taken into account (p. 75).25

23

Within the field of experimental psychology, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber (2011) have recently
proposed an argumentative theory which hypothesizes that the (main) function of reasoning is
argumentative: to produce arguments so we can convince others and to evaluate others arguments so as to
be convinced only when appropriate (Mercier, 2012, pp. 259-260). Putting forward this hypothesis on the
function of reasoning enables them to (re)interpret many of the findings of tests conducted in experimental
psychology. As to further research, Mercier (2012, p. 266) proposes to take typologies regarding argument
schemes and their associated critical questions developed in argumentation theory as a starting point for
experimental studies regarding the evaluation of arguments. In this way, it might become clear which
cognitive mechanisms are at play when people evaluate certain types of argumentation.
24
The exception is natural logic, which studies arguments in a context of situated argumentative discourse
in describing the logic of ordinary argumentative discourse in a non-normative, naturalistic way.
25
A first contextual component Tindale (1999) distinguishes is locality, the time and the place in which the
argument is located (p. 75); a second one is background, those events that bear on the argumentation in
question (p. 76); a third one is the arguer, the source of the argumentation (p. 77); and a fourth component
of context he distinguishes is expression, the way in which the argument is expressed (p. 80).
Characteristically, Tindale defines audience relevance an important element of contextual relevance which
is a precondition for the acceptability of argumentation as the relation of the information-content of an
argument, stated and assumed, to the framework of beliefs and commitments that are likely to be held by the
audience for which it is intended (1999, p. 102, my italics).

1414

According to Lloyd Bitzer (1999), rhetoric is situational because rhetorical discourse

obtains its character from the situation which generates it. By the latter he means that
rhetorical texts derive their character from the circumstances of the historic context in
which they occur.26 The rhetorical situation should therefore be regarded as a natural
context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites
utterance (1999, p. 219). Thanks to Bitzer, more and more rhetorical theorists began to
realize that their analyses should take the context of the discourse duly into account.
In the 1970s, in contextualizing the study of argumentation, American
communication scholars picked up Toulmins (2003) notion of fields. In 1958, Toulmin
had maintained that two arguments are in the same field if their data and claims are of the
same logical type. However, the difficulty is that he did not define the notion of logical
type but only indicated its meaning by means of examples. Some features or
characteristics of argument, Toulmin suggested, are field-invariant, while others are fielddependent. In 1972, in Human Understanding, Toulmin had already moved away from
this notion of fields, and had come to regard them as akin to academic disciplines.27
Because, in Zarefskys view, the concept of fields offers considerable promise
for empirical and critical studies of argumentation, he thought it worthwhile to try to
dispel the confusion about the idea of field without abandoning the concept altogether
(1992, p. 417).28 He noted an extensive discussion at conferences of the communication
and rhetoric community in the United States on whether fields should be defined in
terms of academic disciplines or in terms of broad-based world-views such as Marxism
and behaviourism (2012, p. 211). It can be observed however that, varying from author to
author, the term argument fields is generally used more broadly as a synonym for
rhetorical communities, discourse communities, conceptual ecologies, collective
mentalities, disciplines, and professions. The common core idea seems to be that
claims imply grounds, and that the grounds for knowledge claims lie in the epistemic
practices and states of consensus in specific knowledge domains.29
26

In Bitzers view, every rhetorical situation has three constituents: (1) the exigence that is the
imperfection (problem, defect or obstacle) which should be changed by the discourse; (2) the audience that
is required because rhetorical discourse produces change by influencing the decisions and actions of persons
who function as a mediator of change; and (3) the constraints of the rhetorical situation which influence
the rhetor and can be brought to bear upon the audience (pp. 220-221). The rhetorical situation may therefore
be defined as a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence
which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain
human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence (Bitzer, 1999, p.
220).
27
In spite of the confusion, some argumentation scholars still found the idea of argument fields useful for
distinguishing between field-invariant aspects of argument and aspects of argument that vary from field to
field.
28
Zarefsky identifies and discusses three recurrent issues in theories about argument fields: the purpose of
the concept of argument fields, the nature of argument fields, and the development of argument fields.
29
The positions of the advocates of the various denominators can be interpreted by inferring the kinds of
backgrounds they presuppose: the traditions, practices, ideas, texts, and methods of particular groups
(Dunbar, 1986; Sillars, 1981). Willard, for one, advocated a sociological-rhetorical version of the field
theory. For him, fields are sociological entities whose unity stems from practices (1982, p. 75). Consistent
with the Chicago School, Willard defines fields as existing in the actions of the members of a field. These
actions are in his view essentially rhetorical. Rowland (1992, p. 470) also addresses the meaning and the

1415

Currently, in communication research in the United States the notion of argument field
seems to be abandoned. Instead, a contextual notion has become prominent which is
similar but not equal to argument field. This is the notion of argument sphere, 30 which
was in 1982 introduced by Thomas Goodnight.31 Each argument sphere comes with
specific practices.32 Goodnight offers some examples but does not present a complete list
of such practices or an overview of their defining properties. For one thing, spheres of
argument differ from each other in the norms for reasonable argument that prevail.33
Members of societies and historical cultures participate, according to Goodnight, in
vast, and not altogether coherent, superstructures, which invite them to channel doubts
through prevailing discourse practices. In the democratic tradition, these channels can be
recognized as the personal, the technical, and the public spheres, which operate through
very different forms of invention and subject matter selection.34 Inspired by Habermas and
the Frankfurt School, Goodnight aims to show that the quality of public deliberation has
atrophied since arguments drawn from the private and technical spheres have invaded, and
perhaps even appropriated, the public sphere.35
A rather new development in the contextualization of the study of argumentation is
instigated by Douglas Walton and Erik Krabbe (1995), who take in their dialectical
approach the contextual dimension of argumentative discourse into account by
differentiating between different kinds of dialogue types: normative framework[s] in
which there is an exchange of arguments between two speech partners reasoning together
in turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal (Walton, 1998, p. 30).36 Walton and
utility of argument fields. He argues for a purpose-centred approach. In his view, the essential characteristics
of an argument field are best described by identifying the purpose shared by members of the field (p. 497).
30
See Goodnight (1980, 1982, 1987a, 1987b). For a collection of papers devoted to spheres of argument, see
Gronbeck (Ed., 1989).
31
Although Goodnight does not reject the notion of argument field, he finds it not a satisfactory umbrella
for covering the grounding of all arguments (2012, p. 209). In his view, the idea that all arguments are
grounded in fields, enterprises characterized by some degree of specialization and compactness,
contravenes an essential distinction among groundings (p. 209).
32
Zarefsky (2012, pp. 212-213) proposes a taxonomical scheme for spheres which consists of the following
distinguishing criteria: Who participates in the discourse? Who sets the rules of procedure? What kind of
knowledge is required? How are the contributions to be evaluated? What is the end-result of the
deliberation?
33
While the notion of argument field seems to be abandoned, argumentation scholars still frequently use
the notion of sphere. Schiappa (2012), for instance, compares and contrasts in his research the arguments
advanced in the technical sphere of legal and constitutional debate with those used in the public sphere.
34
Michael Hazen and Thomas Hynes (2011) focus on the functioning of argument in the public and private
spheres of communication (or, as they call them, domains) in different forms of society. While an
extensive literature exists on the role of argument in democracy and the public sphere, there is no
corresponding literature regarding non-democratic societies.
35
Goodnight (2012) suggests that the grounds of argument may be altered over time: A way of arguing
appropriate to a given sphere can be shifted to a new grounding. This means that spheres start to intermingle.
It is important to realize that Goodnight combines in fact two ideas (the idea of the spheres and the idea of a
threat to the public sphere), but that this is not necessary: One can find the spheres notion analytically
useful without accepting the idea of a threat to the public sphere.
36
Walton (1998) defines a dialogue as a normative framework in which there is an exchange of arguments
between two speech partners reasoning together in turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal (p. 30).
There is a main goal, which is the goal of the dialogue, and there are goals of the participants. The two kinds
of goals may or may not correspond.

1416

Krabbes typology of dialogues consists of six main types: persuasion, negotiation,

inquiry, deliberation, information-seeking, and eristics, and additionally some mixed
types, such as debate, committee meeting, and Socratic dialogue (1995, p. 66).37 The
various types of dialogue are characterized by their initial situation, method and goal.38
Over the past decades the pragma-dialectical theorizing too has developed
explicitly and systematically towards the inclusion of the contextual dimension of
argumentative discourse, especially after Peter Houtlosser and I had introduced the notion
of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002). Strategic manoeuvring does
not take part in an idealized critical discussion but in the multi-varied communicative
practices that have developed in the various communicative domains. Because these
practices have been established in specific communicative activity types, which are
characterized by the way in which they are conventionalized, the communicative activity
types constitute the institutional macro-contexts in which in extended pragma-dialectics
argumentative discourse is examined (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 129-162). The primary aim
of this research is to find out in what ways the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring are
determined by the institutionally motivated extrinsic constraints, known as institutional
preconditions, ensuing from the conventionalization of the communicative activity types
concerned.
In order to identify the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring in the
communicative activity types they examined, the pragma-dialecticians first determined
how these activity types can be characterized argumentatively. Next they tried to establish
how the parties involved operate in conducting their argumentative discourse in
accordance with the room for strategic manoeuvring available in the communicative
activity type concerned. To mention just a few examples: in concentrating on the legal
domain, they examined strategic manoeuvring by the judge in a court case (Feteris, 2009);
in concentrating on the political domain, strategic manoeuvring by Members of the
European Parliament in a general debate (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2011); and in
concentrating on the medical domain, the doctors strategic manoeuvring in doctor-patient
consultation (Labrie, 2012).
Meanwhile, at the University of Lugano, Eddo Rigotti and Andrea Rocci have started a
related research program concentrating on argumentation in context. Characteristic of their
approach is the combination of semantic and pragmatic insights from linguistics, and
concepts from classical rhetoric and dialectic, with insights from argumentation theories
such as pragma-dialectics. The communicative activity types they have tackled include
mediation meetings from the domain of counseling (Greco Morasso, 2011), negotiations
about takeovers from the financial domain (Palmieri, 2014), and editorial conferences
from the domain of the media (Rocci & Zampa, 2015).
Recently the pragma-dialectical research of argumentation in context has moved
on to the next stage. It is currently aimed at detecting the argumentative patterns of
constellations of argumentative moves that, as a consequence of the institutional

37

In a recent version of the typology (Walton, 2010), the list consists of seven types, since a dialogue type
called discovery, attributed to McBurney and Parsons (2001), is added to the six types just mentioned.
38
An inquiry, for instance, has a lack of proof as its initial situation, uses knowledge-based argumentation as
a method, and has the establishment of proof as a goal.

1417

preconditions for strategic manoeuvring, stereotypically come into being in the various
kinds of argumentative practices in the legal, political, medical, and academic domains.39
4. FORMALIZATION OF THE TREATMENT OF ARGUMENTATION
The third development I would like to highlight is the formalization of the treatment of
argumentation. When Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, each in their own
way, initiated modern argumentation theory, they agreed unconsciously but emphatically
that the formal approach to argumentation taken in modern logic was inadequate. In
spite of the strong impact of their ideas upon others, their depreciation did not discourage
logicians and dialecticians from further developing such a formal approach.
It is important to note that in the various proposals formality enters in rather
diverse ways and a borderline between approaches that are formal and those that are not is
not always easy to draw. A theory of argumentation, whether logical or dialectical, can be
formal in several senses and can also be partially formal or formal to some degree.40
Generally, in a formal logical or a formal dialectical argumentation theory formal
refers to being regimented or regulated. Often, however, formal also means that the
locutions dealt with in the formal system concerned are rigorously determined by
grammatical rules, their logical forms being determined by their linguistic shapes.
Additionally, an argumentation theory can be formal in the sense that its rules are
wholly or partly set up a priori.
A formal theory of argumentation can be put to good use in different ways. The
most familiar kind of use probably consists in its application in analyzing and evaluating
arguments or an argumentative discussion. Formal systems often used for this purpose are
propositional logic and first order predicate logic. Their application consists of
translating each argument at issue into the language of one of these logics and then
determining its validity by a truth table or some other available method.
Using a formal approach to analyse and evaluate real-life argumentative discourse
leads to all kinds of problems. Four of them are mentioned in the Handbook. First, the
process of translation is not straightforward. Second, a negative outcome does not mean
that the argument is invalid if an argument is not valid according to one system it could
still be valid in some other system of logic. Third, by overlooking unexpressed premises
and the argument schemes that are used the crux of the argumentation is missed. Fourth, as
a consequence, the evaluation is reduced to an evaluation of the validity of the reasoning
used in the argumentation, neglecting the appropriateness of premises and the adequacy of
the modes of arguing that are employed in the given context. Formal logic can be of help
39

The underlying assumption here is that in the argumentation stage protagonists may in principle be
supposed to aim for making the strongest case in the macro-context concerned by trying to advance a
combination of reasons that will satisfy the antagonist by leaving no critical doubts unanswered. In the
process they may be expected to exploit the argument schemes they consider most effective in the situation
at hand and to use all multiple, coordinative and subordinative argumentation that is necessary to respond to
the critical reactions the antagonist may be expected to come up with.
40
Of the three distinct senses of formal pointed out by Barth and Krabbe (1982, pp. 14-19), and the two
added by Krabbe (1982, p. 3), only three are pertinent to argumentation theory. Krabbes first sense refers to
Platonic forms and need not be considered here. The same goes for the fifth sense, which refers to systems
that are purely logical, i.e., that do not provide for any material rule or move.

1418

in reconstructing and assessing argumentation, but an adequate argumentation theory

needs to be more encompassing and more communication-oriented.
A second way of using formal systems consists in utilizing or constructing them to
contribute to the theoretical development of argumentation theory by providing
clarifications of certain theoretical concepts. In this way, John Woods and Douglas Walton
(1989), for instance, show how formal techniques can be helpful in dealing with the
fallacies. Employing formal systems to instigate theoretical developments is, in my view,
more rewarding that just using them in analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse.
From Aristotles Prior Analytics onwards, logicians have been chiefly concerned
with the formal validity of deductions, pushing the actual activity of arguing in discussions
into the background. This has divorced logic as a discipline from the practice of
argumentation. Paul Lorenzen (1960) and his Erlangen School have made it possible to
counteract this development. They promoted the idea that logic, instead of being
concerned with a rational minds inferences or truth in all possible worlds, should focus on
discussion between two disagreeing parties in the actual world. They thus helped to bridge
the gap between formal logic and argumentation theory noted by Toulmin and the authors
of The New Rhetoric.
Because Lorenzen did not present his insights as a contribution to argumentation
theory, their important implications for this discipline were initially not evident. In fact,
Lorenzen took not only the first step towards a re-dialectification of logic, but his insights
concerning the dialogical definition of logical constants also signal the initiation of a
pragmatic approach to logic. In From Axiom to Dialogue, Else Barth and Erik Krabbe
(1982) incorporated his insights in a formal dialectical theory of argumentation. Their
primary purpose was to develop acceptable rules for verbal resolution of conflicts of
opinion (p. 19). The rules of the dialectical systems they propose, which are formal in
the regulative and sometimes also in the linguistic sense, standardize reasonable and
critical discussions.
A third kind of use of formal systems consists in using them as a source of
inspiration for developing a certain approach to argumentation. Such an approach may
itself be informal or only partly formal. In argumentation theory the approaches inspired
by formal studies serve as a link between formal and informal approaches. The semiformal method of profiles of dialogue is a case in point.41 A profile of dialogue is
typically written as an upside down tree diagram, consisting of nodes linked by line
segments. Each branch of the tree displays a possible dialogue that may develop from the
initial move. The nodes are associated with moves and the links between the nodes
correspond to situations in the dialogue.
In pragma-dialectics, the method of profiles of dialogue inspired in its turn the use
of dialectical profiles (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007, esp.
Section 2.3), which are equally semi-formal as argument schemes and argumentation
structures. A dialectical profile is a sequential pattern of the moves the participants in a
critical discussion are entitled to make and in one way or another have to make to

41

Walton was probably the first to introduce profiles of dialogues by that name (1989a, pp. 37-38; 1989b,
pp. 68-69). Other relevant publications are Krabbe (2002) and van Laar (2003a, 2003b).

1419

realize a particular dialectical aim at a particular stage or sub-stage of the resolution

process (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 98).
A fourth and last use of a formal approach proceeds into the opposite direction.
This is, for instance, the case when insights from argumentation theory are employed for
creating formal applications in Artificial Intelligence. In return, of course, Artificial
Intelligence offers argumentation theory a laboratory for examining implementations of its
rules and concepts. Formal applications of insights from argumentation theory in Artificial
Intelligence vary from making such insights instrumental in the construction of
argumentation machines, or at any rate visualization systems, interactive dialogue
systems, and analysis systems, to developing less comprehensive tools for automated
analysis. Of preeminent importance in these endeavours is the philosophical notion of
defeasible reasoning, referring to inferences that can be blocked or defeated (Nute, 1994,
p. 354). In 1987, John Pollock pointed out that defeasible reasoning is captured by what
in Artificial Intelligence is called a non-monotonic logic. A logic is non-monotonic when a
conclusion that, according to that logic, follows from certain premises need not always
follow when more premises are added. In a non-monotonic logic, it is possible to draw
tentative conclusions while keeping open the possibility that additional information may
lead to their retraction.42
Although in The Uses of Argument the term defeasible is rarely used, Toulmin
(2003) is obviously an early adopter of the idea of defeasible reasoning. He acknowledges
that his key distinctions of claims, data, warrants, modal qualifiers, conditions of
rebuttal, and his ideas about the applicability or inapplicability of warrants, will not be
particularly novel to those who have studied explicitly the logic of special types of
practical argument (p. 131). Toulmin notes that H. L. A. Hart has shown the relevance of
the notion of defeasibility for jurisprudence, free will, and responsibility and that David
Ross has applied it to ethics, recognizing that moral rules may hold prima facie, but can
have exceptions. The idea of a prima facie reason is closely related to non-monotonic
inference: Q can be concluded from P but not when there is additional information R.
In order to take the possibility of defeating circumstances into account, in Artificial
Intelligence the notion from argumentation theory called argument scheme or
argumentation scheme has been taken up.43 The critical questions associated with
argument schemes correspond to defeating circumstances. Floris Bex, Henry Prakken,
Christopher Reed and Walton (2003) have applied the concept of argumentation scheme,
for instance, to the formalization of legal reasoning from evidence. One of the argument
schemes they deal with is argument from expert opinion.

42

Dung (1995) initiated the study of argument attack as a (mathematical) directed graph, and showed formal
connections between non-monotonic logic and argumentation. Just like Bondarenko et al. (1997), Verheij
(2003a) developed an assumption-based model of defeasible argumentation. Prakken (1997) explored the
connection between non-monotonic logic and legal argumentation.
43
In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, argument schemes are distinguished from the formal
schemes of reasoning of logic. These argument schemes are defeasible. They play a vital role in the
intersubjective testing procedure, which boils down to asking critical questions and reacting to them. By
asking critical questions, the antagonist challenges the protagonist to make clear that, in the particular case at
hand, there are no exceptions to the general rule invoked by the use of the argument scheme concerned.

1420

Viewed from the perspective of Artificial Intelligence, the work on argument schemes of
Walton and his colleagues can be regarded as a contribution to the theory of knowledge
representation. This knowledge representation point of view is further developed by Bart
Verheij (2003b). Like Bex, Prakken, Reed and Walton (2003), he formalizes argument
schemes as defeasible rules of inference.44
5. BINGO!
In my view, argumentation theory can only be a relevant discipline if it provides insights
that enable a better understanding of argumentative reality. The empiricalization,
contextualization, and formalization of the treatment of argumentation I have sketched are
necessary preconditions for achieving this purpose. Without empiricalization, the
connection with argumentative reality is not ensured. Without contextualization, there is
no systematic differentiation of the various kinds of argumentative practices. Without
formalization, the required precision and rigour of the theorizing are lacking.
Only if all three developments have come to full fruition, an understanding of
argumentative reality can be achieved that constitutes a sound basis for practical
intervention by proposing alternative formats and designs for argumentative practices,
whether computerized or not, and developing methods for improving productive, analytic,
and evaluative argumentative skills. In each case, however, there are certain prerequisites
to the indispensable empiricalization, contextualization, and formalization of the treatment
of argumentation.
Case studies, for instance, can play a constructive role in gaining insight into
argumentative reality by means of empirical research, but, however illuminating they may
be, they are not instrumental in the advancement of argumentation theory if they only
enhance our understanding of a particular case. Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to
other qualitative and quantitative empirical research that lacks theoretical relevance.45
Some scholars think wrongly that qualitative research is superior because it goes deeper
and leads to real insight, while other scholars, just as wrongly, consider quantitative
research superior because it is objective and leads to generalizable results.46 In my
view, both types of research are necessary for a complete picture of argumentative reality,

44

Reed and Rowe (2004) have incorporated argument schemes in their Araucaria tool for the analysis of
argumentative texts. Rahwan, Zablith and Reed (2007) have proposed formats for the integration of
argument schemes in what is called the Semantic Web. Gordon, Prakken and Walton (2007) have integrated
argument schemes in their Carneades model.
45
A great deal of the qualitative empirical research that has been carried out in argumentation theory is not
only case-based but also very much ad hoc. In addition, a great deal of the quantitative persuasion research
that is carried out suffers from a lack of theoretical relevance.
46
An additional problem is that the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is not always
defined in the same way. Psychologists and sociologists, for instance, tend to consider interviews and
introspection as qualitative research because the results are not reported in numerical terms and statistics
does not play a role. There are also less restrictive views, in which numerical reporting and the use of
statistics are not the only distinctive feature.

1421

sometimes even in combination.47 In all cases however it is a prerequisite that the research
is systematically related to well-defined theoretical issues and relevant to the advancement
of argumentation theory.
In gaining insight into the contextual constraints on argumentative discourse both
analytical considerations concerning the rationale of a specific argumentative practice and
a practical understanding of how this rationale is implemented in argumentative discourse
play a part. In order to contribute to the advancement of argumentation theory as a
discipline, the analytical considerations concerning the rationale of an argumentative
practice should apply to all specimens of that particular communicative activity type or
dialogue type, if a different theoretical approach is favoured. To enable methodical
comparisons between different types of communicative activities, and avoid arbitrary
proliferation, the description of the implementation of the rationale must take place in
functional and well-defined theoretical categories.
In the recent trend towards formalization, which has been strongly stimulated by
the connection with computerization in the interdisciplinary field of artificial intelligence,
not only logic-related approaches to argumentation are utilized, but also the Toulmin
model and a variety of other theories of argumentation structure and argument schemes,
such as Walton and Krabbes (1995). However, responding to the need for formal
adequacy so strongly felt in information science may go at the expense of material
adequacy, that is, at the expense of the extent to which the formalized theorizing covers
argumentative reality. Relying at any cost on the formal and formalizable theoretical
designs that are available in argumentation theory, however weak their theoretical basis
may sometimes be, can easily lead to premature or too drastic formalizations and halfbaked results. Because of the eclecticism involved in randomly combining incompatible
insights from different theoretical approaches, these results may even be incoherent.
Provided that the prerequisites just mentioned are given their due, empiricalizing,
contextualizing, and formalizing the treatment of argumentation are crucial to the future of
argumentation theory, and more particularly to its applications and computerization. As
the title of my keynote speech indicates, succeeding in properly combining and integrating
the three developments would, in my view, mean: Bingo!.
Let me conclude by illustrating my point with the help of a research project I am
presently involved in with a team of pragma-dialecticians. The project is devoted to what I
have named argumentative patterns (van Eemeren, 2012, p. 442). Argumentative patterns
are structural regularities in argumentative discourse that can be observed empirically.
These patterns can be characterized with the help of the theoretical tools provided by
argumentation theory. Their occurrence can be explained by the institutional preconditions
for strategic manoeuvring pertaining to a specific communicative activity type.
Dependent on the exigencies of a communicative domain, in the various
communicative activity types different kinds of argumentative exchanges take place. The
discrepancies are caused by the kind of difference of opinion to which in a particular
communicative activity type the exchanges respond, the type of standpoint at issue, the
47

In the pragma-dialectical empirical research concerning fallacies, for instance, qualitative and quantitative
research are methodically combined in this case by having a qualitative follow-up of the quantitative
research, as reported in van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels (2009).

1422

procedural and material starting points, the specific requirements regarding the way in
which the argumentative exchange is supposed to take place, and the kind of outcome
allowed.48
Each argumentative pattern that can be distinguished in argumentative reality is
characterized by a constellation of argumentative moves in which, in dealing with a
particular kind of difference of opinion, in defence of a particular type of standpoint, a
particular argument scheme or combination of argument schemes is used in a particular
kind of argumentation structure (van Eemeren, 2012).49 The theoretical instruments used
by the pragma-dialecticians in their qualitative empirical research aimed at identifying
argumentative patterns occurring in argumentative reality, such as the typologies of
standpoints, differences of opinions, argument schemes, and argumentation structures,50
are formalized to a certain degree.51 Further formalization is required, in particular for
computerization, which is nowadays a requirement for the various kinds of applications in
actual argumentative practices instrumental in realizing the practical ambitions of
argumentation theory.52
Certain argumentative patterns are characteristic of the way in which
argumentative discourse is generally conducted in specific communicative activity types.
In parliamentary policy debates, for example, a stereotypical argumentative pattern that
can be found consists of a prescriptive standpoint that a certain policy should be carried
out, justified by pragmatic argumentation, supported by arguments from example. Such
stereotypical argumentative patterns are of particular interest to pragma-dialecticians
because an identification of the argumentative patterns typically occurring in particular
communicative activity types is more insightful than, for instance, just listing the types of
standpoints at issue or the argument schemes that are frequently used.53 Thus documenting
48

Viewed dialectically, argumentative patterns are generated by the protagonists responding to, or
anticipating, (possible) criticisms of the would-be antagonist, such as critical questions associated with the
argument schemes that are used.
49
If an argument in defence of a standpoint is expected not to be accepted immediately, then more, other,
additional or supporting arguments (or a combination of those) need to be advanced, which leads to an
argumentative pattern with a complex argumentation structure (cumulative coordinative, multiple,
complementary coordinative or subordinative argumentation (or a combination of those), respectively).
50
We will make use of the qualitative method of analytic induction (see, for instance, Jackson, 1986).
51
To determine and compare the frequencies of occurrence of the various stereotypical argumentative
patterns that have been identified on analytical grounds while qualitative research has made clear how they
occur, the qualitative empirical research will be followed by quantitative empirical research of representative
corpuses of argumentative discourse to establish the frequency of occurrence of these patterns. This
quantitative research needs to be based on the results of analytic and qualitative research in which it is
established which argumentative patterns are functional in specific (clusters of) communicative activity
types, so that theoretically motivated expectations (hypotheses) can be formulated about the circumstances in
which specific argumentative patterns occur in particular communicative activity types and when they will
occur.
52
In view of the possibilities of computerization, other theories of argumentation that have been formalized
only to a certain degree could in principle benefit equally from further formalization.
53
An argumentative pattern become stereotypical due to the way in which the institutional preconditions
pertaining to a certain communicative activity type constrain the kinds of standpoints, the kinds of criticisms
and the types of arguments that may be advanced.

1423

the institutional diversification of argumentative practices paves the way for a systematic
comparison and a theoretical account of context-independency and context-dependency in
argumentative discourse that is more thorough, more refined, and better supported than
Toulmins account and other available accounts. In this way, our current research
systematically tackles one of the fundamental problems of argumentation theory:
universality versus particularity.

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Argumentation In Hierarchical And Non-Hierarchical

Communication
Ekaterina Vargina
Philological faculty
St. Petersburg State University
St. Petersburg
Russia, 194000
kvar63@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: There are two major patterns of communication hierarchical and non-hierarchical,
depending on the communicative intention of the speakers. Hierarchical communication is a monologue or a
pseudo-dialogue while intrinsic dialogism is a feature of non-hierarchical communication. Some
argumentative strategies are characteristic to either hierarchical or non-hierarchical pattern. A line can be
drawn between dialogue as an aim and dialogue as a form of communication. Both verbal and non-verbal
arguments are considered.
KEYWORDS: communicative intention, hierarchy, non-hierarchical, monologue, pseudo-dialogue.

1. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL RHETORIC

Rhetoric is an art of using arguments, that is, an art of using language to achieve certain
goals. There have been many studies of argumentative strategies, rhetoric devices, kinds of
pathos. The effectiveness of these strategies and devices can be evaluated with regards to
various kinds of addressees. The task of my report is to specify two principally different
strategies vertical or hierarchical and horizontal or non-hierarchical.
These two major patterns of communication depend on the communicative
intention of the speakers. Intentions can be very different, and if we approach language as
a set of tools, we choose the instrument according to the job we want to do. Another
question to ask is how we want the job to be done and what social costs we are prepared to
bear.
However important communication may be in our life, it is not an end in itself, we
communicate with other people to solve certain tasks. When we follow the vertical
pattern we either want to use power to achieve our goals or power is the goal in itself. In
any case, other people are considered as an enemy force which we need to neutralize. In
case of the horizontal pattern we aim at cooperation with other people. In this latter case
each participant of the communicative act is free to use the information they receive in
their own cognitive pursuits.
A modern Chilean philosopher and biologist H. Marturana writes about two
possible ways of interaction between systems. The first case is the so called initialization
the behavior of the first organism rigidly determines consequent behavior of the second
organism. Thus a chain is established, in which the second organism has no freedom of
choice. In human society the possibilities of this model are limited. The aim of human
communication is establishing a consensual area of behavior by means of developing

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cooperation (Marturana, 1996, p. 119). According to Marturana, we can only do

something together if we do not deny each other in the process of doing. This second
model is not based on power and it cannot be imposed on people without being destroyed.
People can only establish it spontaneously in the life process.
The speakers intentions (achieving a consensus or winning the case) influence the
choice of argumentative strategies. Intrinsic dialogism is a feature of non-hierarchical
communication. As M. Bakhtin wrote, understanding is already a response, it always
provokes response in this or that form (Bakhtin, 1970, p. 254). This is why, the main
means of influencing the addressee here is convincing them. To convince the addressee it
is necessary to make them understand and accept the message. So, explanations and other
rhetoric devices aimed at achieving understanding are so important in the horizontal
pattern.
2. HIERARCHY AS A MONOLOGUE
Hierarchical communication is a monologue or a pseudo-dialogue. Of cause, this does not
mean that hierarchal discourse does not need explanations. The more authority the person
has the less arguments they need. Sometimes, it is enough if it is understood that what the
person says is an order and that the speaker has non-verbal means at their disposal to
enforce it.
Yet, power is seldom absolute, authority is permanently challenged, it cannot only
rely on power. Typical arguments used in a vertical discourse include:
-

expressing an order in the form of a request,

use of such notions as duty, honor or disgrace,
promising material and idealistic rewards for obedience and punishment for failing
to execute the order,
presenting the order as given directly by the people, motherland, etc.

As an example, we can quote here the famous order by Admiral Nelson before the
Trafalgar battle: England expects that every man will do his duty or the Soviet poster of
the WWII time Motherland calls.
In real life it is difficult to find an example of purely monologue vertical
communication, as even those, who have very much power have to engage in dialogue
with their subordinates and listen to their objections. For an example we may turn to
literary fairy tales where hierarchy is given from the very beginning by the opposition of
humans and super-human beings, here we can clearly observe the strategies which are not
so obvious in real life. The dialogue here is not an aim but only the form of
communication, these can be called dialoguised monologues. This can happen in two
situations:
a.

The character who has power does not care about others and pursues the aims that
contradict the aims of other characters;
b.
This character knows better what others need and does not consider their
possible objections serious enough.
The example from the book about Marry Poppins demonstrates the second scenario:
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(1)

Is that your medicine? inquired Michel, looking very interested. No, yours said Mary Poppins,
holding out the spoon for him. Michel stared. He wrinkled up his nose. He began to protest. I
dont want it. I dont need it. I wont! But Mary Poppinss eyes were fixed on him and Michel
suddenly discovered that you could not look at Mary Poppins and disobey her something that was
frightening and at the same time most exciting. The spoon came nearer. He held his breath, shut his
eyes and gulped He swallowed and a happy smile came round his face.
But when she saw Mary Poppins moving towards the twins with the bottle Jane rushed at her.
Oh, no please. They are too young. It would not be good for them. Please! Mary Poppins,
however, took no notice, but with a warning terrible glance at Jane, tipped the spoon towards
Johns mouth.

(Travers L. P. Mary Poppins. Moscow, 1979, p. 7)

The analyses of argumentation in vertical discourse enables us to specify two groups of
lexical, grammatical and extra-linguistic means:
a.

b.

Means to achieve lack of understanding (avoiding questions and objections,

using language or words that the addressee does not know, voluntary starting and
checking the conversation, etc.);
means to achieve agreeing without understanding (mentioned above linguistic
ones well as extralinguistic glance, posture, gestures, special effects aimed at
psychological influence.

In the above example we see means from both groups: brief, formal answer to the question
putting the interlocutor to a standstill, the absence of any response to the request, fixed
eyes, warning terrible glance , something that was frightening and at the same time
most exciting.
The power does not necessarily rely on institutionalized authority, we can speak
about the use of power in all cases when the interests of the other part are being ignored.
The speaker then may tend to disguise the monologue. A form of this disguised
monologue is the so-called pseudo-dialogue. This is a strategy used when the speaker
wants the listener obey by making them believe that they are making a decision
themselves, without an outside pressure. According to E. Vargina and E. Menschikova
(Vargina & Menschikova, 2013, pp. 16 27), pseudo-dialogue structure has to contain one
or more of the following components.
1.

Question that does not require an answer:

(2) Miranda's face was a wooden mask. She plumped up her pillows and sat up
straighter. 'But there's no question of that, is there?
(Murdoch I. An unofficial rose. Random House, 2008, p.167)

2.

Question already containing an answer:

(3) 'Did he say anything then which well, about going away for good? He must
have let you know that he was. Ann was breathless.
(Murdoch I. An unofficial rose. Random House, 2008, p. 167)

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3.

Answer that does not logically match the question/statement of the first speaker:
(4) D.B.: Were gonna keep Big Daddy as comfortable as we can.
B.M.: Yes, its just a bad dream, thats all it is, its just an awful dream.
(Williams T. Cat on a hot tin roof. New Directions Publishing, 1954, p. 81)

4.

Absence of answer:
(5) Look at that! Call that a signal fire? Thats a cooking fire Now youll eat and
therell be no smoke. Dont you understand? There may be a ship out there
He paused, defeated by the silence and the painted anonymity of the group
guarding the entry.
(Golding W. Lord of the flies. Putnam Publishing, 1954, p. 92).

Another example of a pseudo-dialogue is when the speakers are indifferent to each other
and exchange meaningless remarks.
For a dialogue to take place it is not only the exchange of information that is
important, but the fact of communication itself, the desire to cooperate, work on solutions
together. Pseudo-dialogue is a forged communication.
Lewis Carroll in his Alice presents different communication models in a
situation of absurd, that is of total lack of understanding. Those who give others riddles do
not know the answer, explanations make things even more vague and stories end at thee
most interesting places. Yet, formally, the dialogue goes on and all recommended rules of
politeness are observed:
(6) Well, then, The Gryphon went on, if you dont know what to uglfy is, you
are a simpleton.
Alice did not feel encouraged to ask any more questions, so she turned to the Mock
Turtle and said, What else had you to learn?
(Carrol L. Alice in Wonderland. Moscow, 1979, p. 141)
- And how did you manage on the twelfth?, Alice went on eagerly.
Thats enough about lessons, The Gryphon interrupted in the most decided tone:
Tell her something about the games now.
(Carrol L. Alice in Wonderland. Moscow, 1979, p. 142)
Wonderland is hierarchical and the close to the top of the pyramid the fewer dialogues and
explanations. The Queen only gives orders, she does not attempt to understand others and
does not care if others understand her. The only way of problem solving she knows is to
behead. Queens monologue continues until grown up Alice starts objecting her then
the monologue is over and the whole kingdom of cards falls into pieces.
Since Bakhtin much has been said about dialogue nature of a formally monological
discourse, much less has been written about the monologue nature of a formal dialogue.
Yet, in all speech genres, be it formally dialogical ones, like a learned dispute, political
debate or an everyday argument, we can find features of a monologue. These are all
attempts to ignore the interests of the other part, to impose something on other people.
1432

Beside the strategies we have seen in Mary Poppins example, here also belong all
sophistic and eristic devices, use of overcomplicated language to make a text concerning
the interests of many only understood by the few. All these are manifestations of power
and it is no surprise that the language of power itself - the language of laws and
regulations is so difficult to understand. Often, people cannot understand them without
specially trained professionals, lawyers. Bureaucratic, overcomplicated language of a legal
document is supposed to avoid ambiguity of interpretation. Yet, what is achieved is not
clarity but monologue, exclusion of those whom the law concerns from the circle of
communicators. To make a text understandable one needs not these devices, one needs
dialogue, one needs the intention to achieve mutual understanding. The power does not
need response, when it cannot avoid it altogether, it wants to make as much delayed,
indirect and disperse as possible.
In a situation of power and subordination communication is an unaffordable
luxury. In a democratic society - largely because time is money. A person engaged in
earning a living cannot afford serious involvement in something that does not bring profit.
Not so long ago, when we taught English to Russian students we had to explain that to a
standard question How are you? One is supposed to answer Fine, thanks and not try to
explain how things really are. Now this difference between Russian and English mentality
is disappearing.
In a totalitarian society there is another motivation for freedom of being sincere
and say what you think one has to pay a big price. It is not just the possibility of
immediate repression, it is also the threat of not being the object of gift-giving any more.
This might include certain privileges, good job, possibility to travel abroad. If the power
wants it can donate it all to a person and it depends on the person whether it will want to
or not.
3. GIFT-GIVING AS NON-VERBAL HIERARCHICAL COMMUNICATION
Hierarchical and non-hierarchical arguments can also be non-verbal. There are two great
anthropological models of how to deal with the other communication and gift-giving
(Pelicci, 1986, pp. 85-89). If we transfer these models from anthropology to linguistics, we
can say that communication is dialogue, equality of participants, while gift-giving is a
monologue by nature The difference between a monologue and a turn of a dialogue is that
the first is directed not to cooperation but to ignoring the other. To present means to
establish a vertical, execute power, impose something on the partner. Power does not
imply equal exchange, power is about gift-giving.
A material present may be accompanied by an idealistic substance one can give
friendship, love, patronage. There can also be a gift without a material part. The other side
of a gift is a threat (verbalized or not) to seize giving. The principal here is that it is
impossible to give something in return, which puts the receiver of the gift in a subordinate
position. As soon as this possibility appears the gift turns into exchange.
What is a gift then, which we have just associated with a monologue and authority? Does
this notion need rehabilitation? Is there an unavoidable contradiction between gift-giving
and cooperation?
If after giving a gift we expect a gift in return it makes gift a phenomenon of our
culture. Culture evolves certain patterns of behavior, meaning is ascribed both to their
1433

observance and violation. In this sense all that we do can be treated as non-verbal
arguments used to say something to our environment and as long as the people from our
environment belong to the same culture as we do can understand our message and reply to
it.
J. Derrida said that everything that we tend to call a present is in fact an indirect
form of exchange (Derrida, 1991, p.55). The gift-giving we have been discussing does not
imply communication on equal turns. Let us consider an example of a gift as an argument
in vertical communication.
A short documentary has been widely discussed in Russia recently. A well-known
businessman throws five-thousand notes from the window of his Petersburg office and
watches people pushing each other to get hold of the money. The people in the street have
two possibilities in this situation to accept the unexpected present or to reject it The only
thing they cannot do is to as easily give something equal in return. That is they do not have
the right for their turn in the dialogue. If they had the act of the businessman would have
been senseless. It only had a sense within a certain culture (including the memory of
previous gift of this kind), certain social relationship and value system.
The fact of the recording and publishing this act transforms it from an action into
an utterance having its own pragmatic task. Such presents always imply hierarchy and
division into us and them. The businessman and his friends on top, the people they
experiment on below. The utterance is not directed to them, having been published in the
Internet it has other pragmatic tasks. We can only suppose what these tasks are.
It is this demonstrative establishing of a hierarchy between the donator and the
public led made a lot of people who saw the video feel offended. They even discussed
plans for revenge. Here are the ideas suggested: wait till the businessman leaves the office
and throw small coins into his face, leave coins at the entrance to the office and even shoot
coins into his window from a catapult. For us it is interesting that all these suggestions are
in fact attempts of a reply, their aim is to make if only a symbolic return present, that is to
make the donator accept those who are below as his equals, get him involved in
communication on equal terms.
A gift can only be part of horizontal communication if it is not a ritual, if it is not
meant to symbolize anything, if the person who gives it does not want anything in return.
Then it stops being part of the hierarchy-based culture. For a non-hierarchical rhetoric the
necessary prerequisite is separate individuals - subjects of communication, each with their
own aims, interests and demands. It is only in this case that a dialogue between them is
possible.
4. CONCLUSION
Although we live in a hierarchical world we can observe non-hierarchical communication
in many instances. Let us specify the main features which let us distinguish horizontal
argumentation from vertical. First, we shall note that although there may be whole texts
written in either this or that manner, particular arguments belonging to horizontal or
vertical type can be found in the same text. We can base the analysis on consideration of
the speakers values, which are used as the basis for choosing the arguments. Appealing to
the so called universal values, which have very abstract nature and have a different
meaning for different people, can be manifestation of an attempt of manipulation. This is
1434

especially so when appealing to these values is connected with dubious positions: You
are a good boy, you love your Mum, dont you? Why did you, then, get a bad mark at the
music lesson?!. Universal value good son thus gets a dubious attribute necessity to
do well in music.
Another example of this kind is the notorious referendum on preservation of the
USSR in 1991. The question the people had to answer was the following: Do you believe it
is necessary to preserve the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed
federation of equal sovereign republics in which rights and freedoms of people of all
nationalities will be fully guaranteed?. Universal value rights and freedoms becomes
rigidly connected with a highly controversial position the necessity to preserve the
USSR.
The conclusion we can make is that the division of rhetoric into vertical and
horizontal mainly belongs to the sphere of methodology. It enables us to relate the aims
of the speaker to the strategies used for their realization. Thus, analysis of language
phenomena (arguments) becomes determined by non-linguistic phenomena. To be
successful argumentation not only helps the speaker realize the goals they declare but it
also helps realize the interests of the addressee and the society as a whole

REFERENCES
Bakhtin M. M. (1979). Estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva. oscow: Iskusstvo.
Derrida, J. (1991). Donner le temps :1. Paris: Galilee.
Marturana H. (1996). Biologiya poznaniya. Yazyk i intellect. Moscow. p. 95-142.
Pelicci F. (1986). Kriticheskiy discurs: pyat tipov dialoga. Ritorika. Specializirovanny problemny zhurnal
chelovecheskoy rechi. Moscow : Labirint, 1(3), pp. 85-95.
Vargina E. I. & Menschikova E. V. (2013). Psevdodialog kak ritoricheskaya kategoriya v situaciyah
erarkhicheskogo i neierarkhicheskogo obscheniya. Materials of XLII International conference.
Issue 17. St.-Petersburg: Philological faculty SpbGU, p. 16 27.
.

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Self-Argumentative Words: The Case Of Nature And Natural

Zsfia Vrkonyi
L.L.L.
University of Orlans
France
zsofia.varkonyi@linguistes.fr

ABSTRACT: The words nature and natural operate in a specific way while used in an argumentation.
Observation confirms that these words are never used with a negative argumentative orientation. This
functioning will be illustrated on a corpus of sequences of public debate about same sex marriage. The
hypothesis according to which this fact is due to the intrinsic semantic properties of these words will be
examined.
KEYWORDS: nature / natural, point of view, semantics, argumentative potential

1. INTRODUCTION
Several words seem to be arguments in themselves: the choice of those words tend to
determine a statements argumentative potential. This idea, far from being new, has been
sustained for a long time by various branches of Argumentation Within Language, a
semantic theory developed by the French scholars Ducrot and Anscombre (1983). Its basic
thesis consists in the claim that any sentence in any language can be used as an argument
for some (but not any!) conclusion (Raccah, 2002). Consequently, this argumentational
potentiality ought to be taken into account while semantic descriptions of sentences, and
their components, are carried out. This potentiality can be described after shrewd
observation of language use and a generalization of the observations results. That also
means that observation of language use, in this framework, is not a purpose but a way
towards abstraction.
It will be shown that in a debate, nature or natural are of the kind of words that
influence consistently the outcome of an argument. Through the analysis of sequences of
public debate on topics such as, for example, same sex marriage, we can observe that the
inherent argumentative power of these words is independent of their relevance to reality
and, in some cases, prevail over the argumentative power of ideas.
Incidentally, a few theoretical issues will be addressed, among which the instability
of words intrinsic value judgments through language evolution, and the relevance of the
traditional distinction between connotation and denotation. Indeed, an examination of the
words used in this study illustrates the position that, in at least some cases, properties that
are usually relegated to the space of connotation are objectively describable semantic
instructions, while denotation could only be described in vague terms.

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2. WORDS AS ARGUMENTS
It is commonly admitted that the possible conclusions of argumentations are determined
by several situational or contextual factors, but also restricted by their linguistic
components. For example, any sentence containing the word but follows the same
argumentative structure1. Many other examples could be listed of this kind of structural
constraints triggered by connectives or operators.
It has been shown in Bruxelles & al. (1995) that some simple sentences (i.e.
sentences without connectives or operators) can also be used in argumentations in a
restricted way. This fact is due to the presence of words that crystallize widespread ideas
in the language. Thus, said in a schematic way, peoples ideas affect languages and
languages affect peoples ideas This matter is abundantly discussed in Ducrots and his
followers works, especially in those that deal with the Theory of Topoi. It is not the aim
of this paper to repeat those demonstrations. However, the analysis of the words nature
and natural and of their argumentative behaviour in the selected discourse sequences will
illustrate and fully corroborate these findings.
2.1. Examples
The following examples have been selected with the aim of giving an insight of the way
speakers use the words nature and natural in actual argumentations. This is a token
corpus2, picked out from English speaking web articles, and their comments, about same
sex marriage. The close context of the words under study is highlighted. There are
arguments of both pro-gay-marriage and anti-gay-marriage.
(1)

If you plant a tomato seed, or a human seed and nourish them, they will grow
naturally to bear fruit in the form of luscious tomatoes or a beautiful child. Thats
nature at work. If you destroy the tomato and the human seeds in their gestation
period, you violate Natural Law. If you condone and allow the marriage of two
homosexuals, thats also a violation of natural law.
http://www.pennlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/09/samesex_marriage_violates_natural_law_as_i_see_it.html

Comments of Internet users on (1):

(1.1)

I think it would be considered more natural to be with the person you fell in love
with, rather than choosing a partner someone else told you to be with. Should my

(i) [] the presence of but in a sentence requires that its utterances present the argumentative orientations
of the utterances of the two halves of the sentence as opposed [].
(ii) [] the presence of but in a sentence produces the effect that its utterances are presented as arguments
for the same conclusion as utterances of the second half of the sentence would be arguments for.
(iii) The presence of but in a sentence does not require an absolute choice of a particular argumentative
orientation, nor does it produce any effect in this sense. (Raccah, 1990)
2
The corpus is not the object, in the sense it could be the object of a sociolinguistic study or one of discourse
analysis, but an illustration. Therefore, it has not been relevant to restrict their origin to a specific geographic
area, or a particular period.

1437

wife and I utilize any particular position in bed, or should we wait until you
approve it first?
(1.2)

I was unaware that tomato plants marry. Also, if humans intervene in the natural
activity of something, it is not really breaking a law any more than, say, a lion
interrupting zebras mid-coitus to eat one of them. Zebras and lions also do not
marry. They gravitate together in a family unit, true, but humans are the only
species that require someone else to approve and bless their natural union. You
might say that marriage is a violation of natural law because man is interfering
with the natural act of reproduction. How, then, is a churchs mandate against premarital sex any different than your assertion that stomping down a tomato's right to
reproduce is a violation of natural law? If you are a proponent of natural law
then I suggest abolishing marriage as it limits what a man and woman can do with
their sexual drives and relationships. Marriage is not a natural condition but a
social contract developed by people to regulate who has sex, when, and why. You
can make it whatever you want it to be. Be fruitful and multiply. Some marry
without the desire or ability to bring children into the world. Is that interpretation
of the word unnatural?

(1.3)

He should have noted that he supports Christian Natural Law as opposed to the
classical liberal believe of natural law as put forth by thinkers such as Cicero and
Rothbard. Natural law simply states that through our creation we are born free
and that our actions should not interfere with the freedom of others. Homosexuals
who wish to marry do not interfere with the actions of anyone and cause no harm
to anyone except the perceived harm inflicted on Gerard and his ilk. Under the
belief that because homosexuals cannot produce offspring as a direct result of their
union sets a dangerous precedent. There are numerous traditional unions of
heterosexuals that cannot or will not produce offspring. Are you to say now that
barren couple of child bearing age or couples past their child bearing age should
not marry?

(1.4)

Just because ones own religious texts mislabel the diction concerning effeminate
men as spunk pockets (the texts that say homosexuality is referring to debasing
weaker men sexually, not entering into a whole, meaningful, lifelong relationship),
doesnt make it against natural law, especially considering that natural law
actually has a rather set place for homosexual unions in all species.

(2)

Much of the anti-gay-marriage argument rests on two commonly held assumptions:

Life-long exclusive mate-bonding for purposes of rearing joint offspring is natural,
and homosexuality is unnatural. Both assumptions have little basis in fact.
Homosexual acts have, in fact, now been widely documented across a range of
mammal species (thats right were outing mammals!), including our closest
relatives, apes and monkeys. [] Meanwhile, there seems to be nothing
particularly natural about marriage. Only about 3% of mammal species are
monogamous meaning they cohabitate and few of these species mate for life.

1438

And nearly each partner in these animal marriages engage in extra-pair mating.
Lifelong sexual loyalty in nature is, it turns out, a vanishingly rare commodity.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-j-zak/gay-marriage-is-natural_b_112256.html
(3)

Natural laws most elementary precept is that good is to be done and pursued,
and evil is to be avoided. By his natural reason, man can perceive what is morally
good or bad for him. Thus, he can know the end or purpose of each of his acts and
how it is morally wrong to transform the means that help him accomplish an act
into the acts purpose. Any situation which institutionalizes the circumvention of
the purpose of the sexual act violates natural law and the objective norm of
morality. Being rooted in human nature, natural law is universal and immutable. It
applies to the entire human race, equally. It commands and forbids consistently,
everywhere and always.
http://www.tfpstudentaction.org/politically-incorrect/homosexuality/10-reasonswhy-homosexual-marriage-is-harmful-and-must-be-opposed.html

(4)

Is gay marriage also contrary to natural law? Many argue that it is, but theres no
obvious reason to think so. The Vatican states that marriage exists solely between
a man and a woman, but even a cursory look at the history of marriage reveals
that that isnt always the case. Marriages with multiple partners, for example, have
been very common and same-sex unions have existed in one form or another in
many cultures. Catholic teaching also says that the natural purpose of marriage and
sex is procreation; thus, any union or sexual act where procreation isnt
theoretically possible isnt in accordance with natural law and is intrinsically
immoral. Curiously, only gay marriages are typically cited as examples of
naturally sterile unions. Are they the only sort that exists? Of course not but
they are the only sort the Catholic Church wants banned by law. Unfortunately for
the Vatican, however, most people today no longer consider procreation the
necessary and intrinsic purpose of either sex or marriage.
http://atheism.about.com/od/gaymarriage/a/GaysUnnatural.htm

(5)

Comment of an Internet user on http://guardianlv.com/2014/03/same-sex-marriageban-violates-natural-law/

The natural law is what is in keeping with biology. Same sex revulsion is natural,
cause it is a species survival instinct.

(6)

Marriage in general is unnatural. A romantic union recognised in law and based in

a traditional ceremony isnt something non-humans have much time for. A lion
does not fill out extensive legal documents whenever he mates with a lioness [].
http://www.theguardian.com/science/brain-flapping/2013/may/29/scientificreasons-oppose-gay-marriage

Comments of Internet users on (6):

(6.1)

The article argues against the point that same-sex sexual interaction is unnatural by
claiming that animals dont have marriage ceremonies. The author could have
1439

pointed out that some animals accidentally engage in same-sex interaction, but
instead makes the pointless comment that animals dont have marriage ceremonies.
Thats like saying all deaths are natural because animals dont have funerals.
(6.2)

[] when one looks at the laws of nature there is not a gay couple on the face of
the earth that can reproduce between themselves. This by itself should tell us that a
gay marriage and a heterosexual marriage are not equal.

(6.3)

Marriage is a natural mating habit for humans of opposite sexes and has been for
millennia. It is also an expression of their reason which distinguishes them from
animals. End of science lesson.

(6.4)

Its funny how they make a conclusion that homosexualism (sic!) in humans is
natural based on some examples from animal world. I know about some frogs and
fish which can change their sex in absence of the opposite sex. Can humans do the
same (without any surgeries, etc.)? So how applicable are those comparisons to
frogs, birds, and other creatures? Its just ridiculous.

3. THE CONCEPTION OF INSTRUCTIONAL SEMANTICS

Argumentation Within Language and the Semantics of Points of View, a theoretical model
arose from the latter, which is the framework of this paper, belong to the so-called
instructional branch of semantics. This type of semantics aims at describing the modus
operandi of linguistic units, thus, the instructions that words (or linguistic structures)
supply to their own interpretation. In order to understand the conception of semantics of
this approach, an important conceptual distinction between sense and (word) meaning
needs to be clarified.
According to this branch of semantics, sense concerns utterances; hence it is
variable (with respect to language units), depending on the situation of utterance and other
extra-linguistic elements. It is subjective. Meaning (or sentence meaning) concerns
linguistic units, is stable in every situation of utterance and, therefore, is objectively
describable.
The understanding of an utterance implies a process of interpretation. According to
Raccah (2005, pp. 208-210, 2006, pp. 125,130,), the sense of an utterance is not
transmitted from the speaker to the hearer but constructed by the hearer, by means of
linguistic and extra-linguistic elements. These different inputs to the construction of sense
work as instructions: each of them demarcates more or less precisely the ways one can, or
cannot understand the utterance (if there were no such constraints, there would not be any
possibility of understanding each other). Extra-linguistic instruction can be difficult,
sometimes even impossible to objectivize, while linguistic instructions the ones that
interest us constrain the construction of sense in a systematic manner. The latter
constitute sentence meaning, and is the object of semantics as a discipline.

1440

3.1 Lexicalized points of view

With regard to the crystallized ideas in language, the Semantics of Points of View
maintains that widespread ideologies, value judgements, etc (called in a more neutral way
points of view) can be carried by words. These points of view become stable semantic
instructions, thus, they are part of the meaning of these word. According to Raccah,
The points of view carried by words, which combine the yield to the argumentation of utterances
are implicit: they are not the object of the discourse, but are necessary to accept (perhaps very
provisionally) in order to understand the utterance. (Raccah, 2011, p. 1600).

The most simple of these points of view are the positive or negative value judgements.
The words that carry these points of view are called euphorical (for the positive
judgements) or dysphorical words (for the negative judgements). The positive
(respectively negative) points of view that these words trigger are part of their meaning.
Thus, they are independent of the situations of utterance. This is the case of words like
beautiful, honest, improve / horror, spoil, ugly An important consequence of the
stability of these points of view is that euphorical words cannot be used negatively, and
dysphorical words cannot be used positively in argumentations (unless in specifically
marked discourses).
3.2. Nature / natural: euphorical words?
The hypothesis according to which nature and natural belong to the euphorical category3
is likely to explain the above observed phenomenon. In fact, if these words cannot be used
negatively in argumentations because their semantic properties do not allow it, it is not
surprising that both sides in the debate appropriate the nature-argument. It is a simple
explanation but it has to be examined and tested before we accept it.
First of all, we have to determine if nature and natural are euphorical words. Yet,
at first sight, they seem to be absolutely neutral, neither positive, nor negative. The
hypothesis has to be tested: if it is possible to use these words in a negative way in an
argumentation, the hypothesis falls naturally. One single example is sufficient to illustrate
the difficulty in using them negatively:
Ex. * This juice is natural but it is really tasty.
The oddness of this utterance indicates that a semantic constraint proscribes such an
argumentative orientation. Many other examples can be found or invented, but this
oddness remains in all cases. As it has been already said, the euphorical (or dysphorical)
character of the words does not completely prevent the negative (or positive)
argumentations: anything is possible in specifically marked discourses (literature, irony,
etc). But if so, the oddness of this kind of argumentation is part of the effect of these
discourses. So, unless the contrary is proved, we can consider that nature and natural
belong to the category of euphorical words.

Unless they are used as technical terms, as terms are supposed to be free from value judgements.

1441

One could object that the fact that the nature-argument is used positively is not
necessarily bound to the semantic properties of these words but simply to the commonly
accepted idea that natural is good. Indeed, the commonly accepted idea is definitely the
origin of its crystallization in the English language. But it could not explain the systematic
character of the positive use of this argument. Every reasonable person knows that not
everything that is natural is good. Firstly, philosophers have since long time acquired the
painful conviction that there is no possible definition to the concept of nature. And yet, the
natural argument is ubiquitous in food or cosmetics marketing... and it works. Moreover,
we know that diseases and death are natural, too; but the natural-argument still remains
positive. If we say in an argumentation that death is a natural thing, we do it, for example,
in order to relieve the pain a person could feel, facing someones death.
In summary, the euphorical character of the words nature and natural is more
likely to explain the argumentative performance of the utterances containing them than the
supposition that people actually think that natural things are always better than others.
4. TWO ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS OF PRINCIPLE
One can easily observe that the positive point of view conveyed by the words nature and
natural is rather a recent phenomenon in history. Indeed, the idealization of nature has
progressively come along with the evolution of civilization and languages (not only
English) have crystallize this ideology. Which leads us to a first possible objection of
principle: this fact seems to be contradictory with the above asserted stability of
lexicalized points of view. To answer this objection, it has to be clarified that the stability
concerns the situations of utterance at a given moment. No stability in language history is
claimed. On the contrary, it is interesting to observe that words can carry a specific point
of view at a moment in time, and may lose them at some other moment. This fact makes
pointless the efforts people can deploy to justify an actual use of a word by its etymology
(for example: to pretend that calling someone a Negro is not insulting because this word
means originally black...).
A second objection of principle has to be briefly examined. The introduction of the
terms point of view, euphorical / dysphorical words may seem to be redundant, given the
existence of the concept of connotation, which refers to the same kind of phenomenon.
Simonffy (2010, pp. 308-310) carries out a detailed comparison between lexicalized points
of view and connotation. The main difference is that connotation is seen as secondary to
denotation, while the different branches of Argumentation Within Language have always
claimed the opposite of this assertion. Ducrots early works (1972, 1980...) contain
efficient demonstrations of the primacy of argumentative values over informative ones.
Lexicalized points of view, as we have seen, belong to the realm of argumentation and are
not considered to be secondary to denotation.
5. CONCLUSION
This short study has aimed at showing how linguistic units can constitute constraints in
actual argumentations. We could observe that, in a debate, both sides are likely to be
trapped by words that impose a specific point of view. Falling in this linguistic trap is
not inevitable. Even if it is not possible (and maybe not even necessary) to use nature or
1442

natural in a negative way, it is possible to get round the problem by contesting the general
relevance of the nature-argument. To be fair to the participants of the public debate
about same sex marriage, let us cite a few who did so:
(7)

Ultimately, the homosexuality is unnatural argument fails to support the case

against same-sex marriage because there is no clear and convincing content to the
concept of unnatural in the first place. Everything that is claimed to be
unnatural is either arguably very natural, arguably irrelevant to what the laws
should be, or is simply immaterial to what should be treated as moral and immoral.
Its no coincidence that what is unnatural also happens to be condemned by the
speaker's religious or cultural traditions. Just because some trait or activity isnt the
norm among humans doesnt make it unnatural and therefore wrong.
http://atheism.about.com/od/gaymarriage/a/GaysUnnatural.htm

(8)

The nice thing about natural law is that it doesnt appeal to sectarian or
confessional doctrine to justify its conclusions but on what is determined through
the use of reason to be natural to human beings as rational animals though it
often requires belief in a divine creator as the source of natural law. Principles or
goods derived from natural law can be things as basic as the duty of selfpreservation or the care of children. What it isnt, however, is looking at nature for
examples of good behaviour for example, monogamous pairing among bird
species is not a natural law argument or at least not a good one for
monogamous marriage among human beings. You can always find a counterexample in nature; same-sex sexual behavior, for example, is commonly observed
among animals. http://www.uscatholic.org/blog/201212/birds-and-bees-naturallaw-and-same-sex-civil-marriage-26711

(9)

The first issue is the massive amount of ground that the naturalness argument
concedes to the opponents of gay rights. It is understandable to want to rebut the
being gay isnt natural argument, but the way many gay-rights campaigners have
chosen to do so commits the exact same error as their opponents: the mistaken idea
that morality has anything to do with whats natural. Change the subject of the
opening quote above to, say, cannibalism, and the idea that we should look to
nature and animals as a guide to what humans should be doing becomes obviously
absurd. Being gays unnatural? So what? http://www.spikedonline.com/newsite/article/just_how_natural_is_homosexuality/13918#.U6_UZR_vTp

The Semantics of Points of View supplies theoretical tools to the description of the
semantic constraints that linguistic units trigger (cf. the concept of lexical topical field,
Raccah 1990, Bruxelles & al. 1995). As discourse analysis has to deal with the linguistic
elements that form texts and discourses, these tools can be used by discourse analysts.
This lead has been explored several times, among others in Chmelik (2007), Vrkonyi
(2012).

1443

REFERENCES
Anscombre, J-C. & Ducrot, O. (1983). Largumentation dans la langue. Bruxelles: Mardaga.
Bruxelles, S., Ducrot, O.& Raccah, P-Y. (1995). Argumentation and the lexical topical fields. Journal of
Pragmatics, 1/2, pp. 99-114.
Chmelik, E. (2007). Lidologie dans les mots. Contribution une description topique du lexique justifie
par des tests smantiques. Application la langue hongroise. PhD thesis presented October 10th
2007 in Limoges.
Ducrot, O. (1991[1972]). Dire et ne pas dire. Paris: Hermann.
Ducrot, O. (1980). Les chelles argumentatives. Paris: Minuit.
Raccah, P-Y. (1990). Modelling Argumentation and Modelling with Argumentation . Bruxelles:
Argumentation 4, pp. 447-483.
Raccah, P-Y. (2005). Une smantique du point de vue : de lintersubjectivit ladhsion. Discours Social,
2004, N spcial Lnonciation identitaire : entre lindividuel et le collectif , 205-242.
Raccah, P-Y. (2006). Polyphonie et argumentation : des discours la langue (et retour). In Simonffy, Zs.
(d.). Lun et le multiple. Budapest : TINTA Knyvkiad, pp. 120-152.
Raccah, P-Y. (2011). A semantic structure for points of view: about linguistic constraints on argumentation.
Proceedings of the 7th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation.
2011, Amsterdam, SicSat, pp. 1596-1604.
Simonffy, Zs. (2010). Vague : de la smantique la pragmatique et retour. Pour une approche
argumentative des rapports entre langue et culture. Saarbrcken : ditions universitaires
europennes.
Vrkonyi, Zs. (2012). Vers une identification des potentialits smantico-rhtoriques de la langue dans la
perspective de la traduction des textes et des discours. SEPTET N5. La rhtorique lpreuve de la
traduction, pp. 132-148.

1444

A Cognitive Style Parameter Of Argumentation

Lev Vasilyev
Department of Linguistics
Kaluga State University
Kaluga
Russia248023
email address argumentation@mail.ru

ABSTRACT: A cognitive style is is viewed as individual traits in argumentation organization and

processing. A parameter of CS is cognitive complexity (CC) / simplicity (CS). We studied how 200 Russian
respondents used Toulmin functions in reconstructed argumentation of an education article. Claims given by
both style groups were mostly of policy and evaluative. Evidence (Data) did not differ significately.
Warrants mostly had grouping semantics in both CC and CS. Backings and Reservations (Rebuttals) were
more actively used by CC-respondents, Quantifiers by CS-respondents.
KEYWORDS: argument components, argument interpretation, cognitive style, poles of a cognitive style,
cognitive complexity, cognitive simplicity, functional semantics, the Toulmin Model

1. INTRODUCTION
Peoples communicative activities are interpretative. In our perception of situations we
often distort the initial state of affairs. According to psychological research such
distortions are neither intentional nor accidental. They are based on personal peculiarities
of people. The cognitive style approach is one of possible approaches that help
operationalize such peculiarities in people.
According to psychological research cognitive style is an individual-specific mode
of processing information about the environment manifested in peculiarities of perception,
analysis, structuring, categorization and evaluation of a situation.
Depending on starting points of analysis, psychologists single out a number of
independent dimensions that characterize individual features in processing information.
Each of these dimensions have opposing sides (poles). They are: field dependence /
independence; flexible / rigid cognitive control; tolerance / intolerance to non-realistic
experience; focusing / scanning control; concrete / abstract conceptualization; cognitive
complexity / cognitive simplicity. These features gave names to cognitive styles.
The cognitive style approach views a person in various types of activities, and the
characterization of the person is linear.
What do these linear criteria mean? Their significance lies in opening a new road
towards studying the intellectual actions of an arguing person. Earlier, it used to be a unipolar psychological dimension of discourse activity. Respectively, the criteria were levelbased, i.e. based on the principle high-rate VS low-rate. Now the dimension becomes bipolar with a typological criterion, i.e. belonging of a person to one or the other type of one
and the same dimension. Also, the scheme of diagnostic analysis itself was changed.
Earlier, an individual result was evaluated on the basis of its comparison with the norm.

1445

Now, there notion of norm is not used anymore, which means that no side of the same
cognitive style is viewed as good or bad [Kholodnaya 2004].
2. COGNITIVE STYLE PRINCIPLES FOR ARGUMENT ANALYSIS
To generate an argument, a person should comprehend, interpret, and evaluate a situation
with debatable ideas. How do we do it? We do it on the basis of our subjective experience.
Not only the situation, but also our experience has a specific organization which needs to
be considered.
According to G. Kelly (1955), our personal experience can be represented as a
system of personal constructs. A construct is a bi-polar scale, and it is person-specific. The
scale has two principal functions: establishing similarity and detecting difference. These
two functions manifest themselves when we evaluate people and things.
Constructs are not isolated phenomena, they are systematic, i.e. inter-related and
inter-dependent. So, when we study argument activities, we are to remember that these
activities are not identical they depend on the arguing individuals. Argument is to a large
extent an evaluative activity, and, as we all know, the evaluation differs from individual to
individual. Still, such individuality can be systematized if we choose to view individuals
as belonging to a group for example, to one or the other pole of one and the same
cognitive style. To study argument organization based on psychological principles we
have chosen one cognitive style parameter cognitive complexity / cognitive simplicity.
We can establish how complex or how simple our argumentative evaluative space
is. To do that, we take into account the degree of differentiation and the degree of integrity
of a particular construct system.
According to J. Biery (1955), cognitive differentiation is an ability to construct
social environment (in our case, argumentative process). Such construction is made on the
basis of a number of distinct parameters. Cognitively complex individuals have stronglydifferentiated cognitive structures, while cognitively simple people have weaklydifferentiated cognitive structures.
Operationally, the degree of differentiation is measured by means of the so-called
factorial analysis. A factor is, simply speaking, a single unit of measurement. The less
inter-connected isolated constructs are, the more measurements, or factors, can be singled
out in the procedure of factorization of a construct matrix so, the more differentiated
system of constructs we find in a given person; in other words, the more cognitively
complex the person is.
Actually, quantity of factors is not a decisive criterion. It is only one of important
criteria of cognitive complexity of a person. Applied to our field, it is not only important
how many elementary arguments are given for supporting a standpoint. No less important
is if they are organized in cluster-arguments or not. Also important is how complex those
cluster-arguments are. I state that the more cluster-arguments for a standpoint are given in
a written argument, the more cognitively-complex a person is.
On the other hand, functional semantics of arguments can give innovative data for
cognitively complexity / cognitively simplicity. By functions I here mean the roles of
argument components described by S. Toulmin (1958) and later elaborated by a number of
argumentologists (cf. Ehninger 1974; Ehninger, Brockriede 1963, 1978; Crable 1976).

1446

For example, we detect preferences in using certain functions, Y-functions by cognitively

complex people, and Z-functions by cognitively simple individuals. Out of that, if we have
sufficient statistics, we can make predictions that in the same type of argument situations,
cognitively complex people will be likely to use Y-functions, while cognitively simple
Z-functions. So, knowing that, we can analyze the arguments and we can easily detect
what kind of person has written it a cognitively complex, or a cognitively simple one.
What is important here is diagnostics itself: we can reveal the cognitive type of the author
of an argument without using complicated psychological experiments. Moreover, the
experiments, like Kellys grid, are made in the presence of live people. We, on the other
hand, can detect the cognitive type of the author of written arguments with no physical
presence of the former. In other words, we can speak about an innovative approach to
argumentative expertise.
It is interesting for analytical purposes, but not only. For example, some
cognitively complex students are known to prefer to hide their aggressiveness and use
manipulative forms of communication. If we detect cognitively complex people by
analyzing their arguments, we can be ready to confront or predict possible manipulation
on their side in further communication with them.
3. COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY / COGNITIVE SIMPLICITY REVEALED IN
ARGUMENTS: RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT
Based on research done by Y. Besedina (2011) and myself, the following can be
formulated.
3a. Experiment details and methods used.
Processing (subordinate) purpose: to get (a) cognitive style attribution to 200 Tsiolkovsky
Kaluga State University students (both sexes, age of 1723); (b) their interpretation
(responsive discourse) of a Russian language argumentative text on secondary school
exams.
Ultimate (primary) purpose: comparison of using arguments by the persons of the
opposing poles of the Cognitive Complexity / Cognitive Simplicity style.
Stage 1. Respondents cognitive style identification.
G.A. Kellys personal constructs method of repertoire grids was used to reveal the
respondent cognitive style; completed grids were processed by the IDIOGRID program for
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the resulting constructs. Diagnostic Indices taken
into account were: (a) the degree of differentiality (the matching score parameter (Bieri
1955); (b) the degree of integrity (the intensity parameter (Fransella and Bannister
1967)).
Results for Stage-1: division of the respondents into Cognitively Complex persons
(37%, or 74 people), Cognitively Simple persons (55%, or 110 people), and Mixed Type
(8%, or 16 people).

1447

Stage 2. Argumentation trait detection in the experts texts.

The respondents were asked to analyze an argumentative text by fulfilling the task
Expose the problems the author formulated and their argumentation. Y. Besedina and
myself gave our own expert analysis of the initial text argumentation structure and
functions to have an opportunity of checking the quality of the respondents analysis.
3b. Functional argument analysis of the respondents texts.
The analysis in question was centered on detecting argument functional components and
their semantics. We used R. Crables (1976) system of functional-semantic analysis who
singled out the following:
(a)
(b)

(c)

Claims of four types Declarative; Policy; Classificatory; Evaluative;

Evidence (=Toulmins Data) of three compound types: (b-1) Occurrences
(Contrieved; Planned; Hypothetical); (b-2) Reports of Occurrences (Unplanned;
Contrieved); (b-3) Expression of Beliefs (Personal; Reported);
Warrants of four compound types: (c-1) Comparison (Parallelism; Analogy); (c-2)
Grouping (Classification; Generalization; Residual); (c-3) Causality (Correlation;
Circumstance; Cause); (c-4) Authority.

Also used were semantically non-differentiated Backings, Reservations (=Toulmins

Rebuttals), and Qualifiers.
Argumentative texts made by our respondents were then analyzed structurally and
functionally, and the results were compared to the data given in the expert analysis.
The results gave us the following peculiarities of the lingvo-argumentative
responses of the bearers of CC and CS poles.
CC respondents re-organized initial arguments rather actively, though almost all
initial Claims and Warrants were retained. Peculiarities of the argumentation by CC
people were these:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

most Warrants were made explicit;

Warrants of Causality were most often used;
Claims were mostly of Policy and Evaluative;
implicit intentions and information in the initial arguments were made explicit;
most arguments were structurally simple single and were manifested in separate
paragraphs;
Reservations and Backings were often used in the arguments;
almost no Qualifiers were given in the argumentation;
on the global level, the Macro-Claims were placed in the beginning of the text.

CS respondents did not change the initial order of arguments, i.e. the authors sequence of
arguments was retained. Explicit Claims, Evidence and Warrants given in the initial text
were sometimes made implicit in the interpretations under this style. Peculiarities of the
argumentation by CS people were these:

1448

(1)
(2)
(3)

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Warrants in the arguments were sometimes implicit;

Warrants of Generalization were most often used;
among Claims, 3 types were practically equally used Declarative, Policy,
Evaluative; (4) implicit intentions and information in the initial arguments
remained implicit;
many argumentative functions of the initial text were not used in resulting texts of
this style;
most arguments were structurally simple single and were manifested in separate
paragraphs;
almost no Reservations and Backings were used;
Qualifiers denoting supposition were actively used;
on the global level, the Macro-Claims were placed in the end of the text as
conclusions.

4. HOW VALID ARE THE RESULTS?

Some people would ask: does the cognitive style pole remain the same in all situations?
No, it does not have to. In real conditions there can be movement from one pole to the
other and even change of the poles [cf. Kholodnaya 2004]. But it is important to stress for
our study, that we had only one problematic situation in our experiment. It means that
there were no significant factors that could somehow influence the style-change (which is
of frequent occurrence when people communicate in different situations). Thus, in our
experiment, the temporal factor was stable (the time for the written assignment did not
change for different respondent groups). The physical environment was also the same (the
experiment was made in the same university classroom at the same time of the day). In
other words, the conditions were stable, so our results are valid for at least Russian
academic student atmosphere and there were no factors which could entail the pulsation
of the constructs that could make them move from one pole of the line to the other. It is
also important to note that our both experiments (dividing our respondents into polar
groups and their making their own argumentation) were made in the similar environment
by the same experiment makers.
5. CONCLUSION
In sum, we detected considerable differences in argument interpretation by representatives
of CC and CS poles of the style in question. It means that knowing such principal features
of argument making, an argumentation scholar having no special training in psychology
and using no special psychological techniques can differentiate the poles of the style using
only such features and can see what kind of person gave specific arguments; the scholar
can also predict how CC and CS people would construct argumentation in similar
conditions.

1449

REFERENCES
Besedina, Y. (2011) Argumentativnyj diskurs kognitivno-prostykh i kognitivno-slozhnykh litchnostej
(Argumentative discourse of cognitively-simple and cognitively-complex persons) (Unpublished
PhD dissertation). Kaluga: Kaluga State University.
Biery, J. (1955) Cognitive complexity simplicity and predictive behavior. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 51, 263-268.
Crable, R. E. (1976). Argumentation as communication: Reasoning with receivers. Columbus, OH: A. Bell
and Howell Company.
Ehninger, D. (1974) Influence, belief, and argument: An introduction to responsible persuasion. Glenview,
IL: Scott, Foresman and Co.
Ehninger, D., Brockride, W. (1963). Decision by debate. New York etc.: Dodd, Mead and Co.
Ehninger, D., Brockride, W. (1978). Decision by debate. New York etc.: Harper and Row.
Fransella, F. and Bannister, D. (1967) A validation of repertory grid technique as a measure of political
construing. Acta Psychologica, 26, 97-106.
Kelly, G.A. (1955) The psychology of personal constructs. 1-2. New York: Norton.
Kholodnaya, M.A. (2004) Kognitivnyje stili: O prirode individualnogo uma (Cognitive styles: On the
nature of individual mind). St. Petersburgh.: Piter.
Toulmin, S. E. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

1450

A Mediator As A Pragma-Dialectical Critical Designer Of

Acceptance
Anton Vesper
Department of Philosophy of Technology
Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg
03046 Cottbus, Germany
anton.vesper@tu-cottbus.de

ABSTRACT: Starting from the layout of the five components of the pragma-dialectical research program a
mediator, the third intermediary in a mediation session, is characterized as a critical analyst and as a
designer, i.e. a practitioner, of acceptance. On the spot of the mediation session she analyses the discourse
and puts forward proposals to improve argumentative reality. Consequently the mediator is characterized as
a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance.
KEYWORDS: argumentative strategy, critical question, facilitate, mediation, mediator, pragma-dialectical
critical designer of acceptance, pragma-dialectics, research program.

1. INTRODUCTION
The research program of pragma-dialects has five components: the philosophical
component, the theoretical component, the component of analysis, the empirical
component, and the practical component (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs,
1993, pp. 21-25; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 11-41). The target of this paper
is to present the mediator as a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance. In order
to achieve this target I show why a mediator can be characterized as a critical analyst and
as a practitioner within the research program of pragma-dialectics. Thus, in this paper I
particularly refer to the component of analysis that rests upon the research results from the
theoretical component, and to the practical component of the research program.
2. THE RESEARCH PROGRAM OF PRAGMA-DIALECTICS
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 41) envision in their introduction of the layout of
the five components of the Realm of Argumentation Studies to get an overall picture of
the state of the art in the discipline, to distinguish different approaches from each other,
and to indicate where there are genuine opportunities for mutual cooperation. A research
program consists of its five components. Every component is distinct from, as well as
related to the other components. Thus the layout of the five components is an option to
separate and to cluster the matters of argumentation research (cf. van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004, p. 41). Pragma-dialectics is a research program (cf. van Eemeren,
Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, p. 275).
In the philosophical component of pragma-dialectics, the philosopher characterizes
termini technici by defining them (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1994, p. 11). Van

1451

Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 21) designate the critical-rationalist philosophy as

the start of the research in this component in pragma-dialectics.
In the theoretical component of pragma-dialectics, the theorist uses terms to build a
blueprint. Scopes and functions of the blueprint are characterized, e.g., for the use of the
grid in accessible analyses of fragments from discourse. For instance, particular
presuppositions are due, and particular means, such as translation criteria, are to be used in
the analysis (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson
& Jacobs, 1993; van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007). Apparently only
those actual matters can be replaced for which there is a stand-in in the grid, thus the
scopes of the grid are restricted (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 19, who
employ the metaphor of a grid as a magnifying glass that constrains the matters in focus).
In the blueprint in pragma-dialectics protagonist and antagonist discuss about a
claim to solve a problem through a problem-solving discussion. Thus the aim of problemsolving discussion is the solution of the problem, i.e. acceptance of the claim. Note that
acceptance of the claim is determined in a sense within the connectivity of problemsolving discussion, thus acceptance is determined in a sense of pragma-dialectics. The
parties apply argumentative strategies, i.e. they arrange modules of the blueprint oriented
towards a particular aim. For example, critical questions are argumentative strategies
because applying a critical question manifests a speech act that is a means to get to the aim
of problem-solving discussion. In particular, I suggest that a critical question manifests the
speech act Requesting argumentation (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 68).
Voicing a critical question is an option to appear critical towards the application of an
argument scheme. By asking a critical question the character voices the speech act
requesting argumentation to infer the very application of the argument scheme.
In the component of analysis, the analyst uses the grid to reconstruct and evaluate
fragments.1 As the scopes of the grid are restricted the scopes of an analysis are restricted.
For example, an analyst can reconstruct and evaluate argument schemes. Garssen (2001)
presents the pragma-dialectical argument schemes and the respective critical questions. I
want to spell out two functions of critical questions. First, they are means of the characters
in problem-solving discussion to get to the aim of the solution of the problem. It is an
assumption of the analyst that a person in a dispute can ask a question that a pragmadialectical analyst can localize as a critical question in problem-solving discussion. In the
blueprint it is characterized when and how an actual question is localized as a critical
question.2 However, second, a critical analyst herself uses critical questions to test whether
an argument scheme she has reconstructed has been employed correctly in the very
constellation of the dispute (cf. Garssen, 2001, p. 91). I suggest that when an analyst uses a
matter from the grid, e.g. a critical question, he uses the grid. In pragma-dialectics, in
order to apply the respective means to analyse a text the analysts intuition is required. The
result of the analysis is an interpretation of the text and this interpretation is restricted to
the scopes of the grid used.
In the empirical component, the empiricist does empirical research. The aim of empirical
research is to refine (parts of) the blueprint. An empiricist tests whether the blueprint suits
argumentative reality, whether it can be used to analyse discourse.
1

Cf. Vespers PhD (2015) why in pragma-dialectics an analyst is a critical analyst.

Likewise, in the blueprint other matters, e.g. acceptance, are determined and it is characterized when and
how an utterance can be localized as, e.g., acceptance.
2

1452

In the practical component, the practitioner has the target to improve argumentative
reality. The research results from the other four components are used to arrive at that aim.
Consequently, four practitioners can here be distinguished. For instance, the practitioner
that uses research results from the theoretical component is the practitioner (theoretical). I
want to present two examples of actual practitioners in pragma-dialectics.
First, in reflection-minded (van Eemeren, 1990, p. 43) teaching, a practitioner
(theoretical) teaches students the grid. However, based on her skill with respect to analyses
the same person as a practitioner (analytical-intuitive)3 teaches students to analyse
fragments with the help of the grid. She supports to route the intuition of students in the
sense of the grid. Argumentative reality is improved because she supports the students to
achieve clarity to resolution processes in disputes in their everyday life as they can make
use of the grid on the spot of their conversations.
Second, the research results from the component of analyses can be made use of
for the design of discourse processes (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs,
1997, p. 227). In this paper I present the mediator as a pragma-dialectical practitioner who
particularly uses those research results. As a designer the mediator intuitively uses the
diagnostic power (cf. van Rees, 2001) of the grid to facilitate getting to clarity to (how
to) manage problem-solving discussion. The diagnostic power means not (only) that the
grid can be used to anticipate what can go wrong (cf. van Rees, 2001, p. 459) but I suggest
that it can also be used to present what is needed in a dispute in order to actualize the
respective sense of reasonableness. Thus through proposals of this practitioner
argumentative reality is improved in a purposeful way (van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
2004, p. 32). For example, making use of the diagnostic power of the grid an
argumentation researcher in pragma-dialectics can spell out when an argument scheme has
been or will have been employed correctly: [] if all the relevant critical questions that
the antagonist in the dispute could ask can [will] be answered satisfactorily. (Garssen,
2001, p. 91)
3. THE MEDIATION SESSION AND THE TARGET OF THE MEDIATOR
I want to elucidate on some important terms I employ. I briefly refer to mediation
session and mediator.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (2009, p. 2) establishes
mediation as an informal procedure in which a neutral intermediary, the mediator,
assists the parties in reaching a settlement of the dispute. What is here spelled out as
dispute in my terms means conflict. In the course of a mediation session about a
conflict there are utterances that the participants and the third intermediary put forward
that can be reconstructed as matters from the sequence of problem-solving discussion.
When I employ the term mediation session I refer to the course of those utterances. In a
mediation session there are the participants and a mediator (cf. above: third intermediary).
The target of a mediation session is the resolution of the disagreement between the
participants. The target of a mediation session is achieved when the point of view about
which the disagreement occurs is acknowledged by both participants.
3

Cf. Vespers PhD (2015) why I label the pragma-dialectical component of analysis the analytical-intuitive
component.

1453

The mediator has two targets. First, she wants to support the participants achieving a
resolution of the respective disagreement. Second, she wants to appear neutral. In order to
appear neutral a person actualizes a particular behaviour. In this paper I show that in order
to achieve her targets the mediator behaves like a critical analyst and like a practitioner (a
designer of acceptance) in pragma-dialectics.
4. THE MEDIATOR AS A PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL CRITICAL ANALYST
The mediator behaves like a pragma-dialectical critical analyst.
As a critical analyst on the spot of the mediation session the mediator chains the
discourse to matters from problem-solving discussion. Aakhus (2003, p. 284) employs the
term reconstruction in practical circumstances. The mediator checks whether or not the
participants behave correspondingly to the grid, whether they particularly actualize
problem-solving discussion. Thus, apparently as a critical analyst a mediator assumes in
her reconstruction and evaluation that the utterances in the dispute are put forward by
actual parties in an actual problem-solving discussion: making a decision on the
resolution of their conflict [disagreement], necessarily involves critical reflection and
evaluation [] as [t]he communicative process in mediation [session] [] largely
constitutes an argumentative discussion (Greco Morasso, 2008, p. 104, italics by A.V.).
Note that Greco Morasso writes largely which I suggested, too, with the sense that I
established for mediation session. The mediator as a critical analyst can put forward
utterances in the dispute. Then she chains the content of her utterance to the results of her
reconstruction and evaluation of the discourse.
As a critical analyst the mediator evaluates the discourse by intuitively making use
of particular matters from the grid; she can employ an actual argumentative strategy. For
example, as a critical analyst the mediator has the target to evaluate the actualization of
argument schemes in a mediation session. Checking whether the actualization of an
argument scheme is plausible is a means to support the participants achieving a resolution
of the respective disagreement in accordance to the manifestation of reasonableness that is
determined in the blueprint. Thus behaving like a critical analyst in pragma-dialectics in
the course of a mediation session a mediator can ask a question that a pragma-dialectical
analyst can locate as a critical question, i.e. right on the spot in the mediation session the
mediator can make use of the grid. Jacobs (2002, p. 1414) writes:
[B]y asking questions, mediators can also perform argumentatively relevant tasks. In many
respects, such questioning in context can substitute for the kind of advocacy that would be heard in
direct rejections, open disagreement, and explicit argumentation.

Note, that Jacobs suggests that the mediator can employ questions to actualize an
argumentative strategy because at the very constellation of the dispute the mediator may
put forward particular actual critical questions as she seeks to accomplish her target to
appear neutral. The mediator thus avoids (substitutes for), e.g., direct rejections yet
achieves her target to evaluate the actualization of an argument scheme.

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5. THE MEDIATOR AS A PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL PRACTITIONER

The mediator behaves like a pragma-dialectical practitioner.
It is plausible to assume that a mediator wants to improve argumentative reality in
a mediation session (cf. van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs, 1997; Aakhus,
2003; WIPO, 2009). As a practitioner the mediator improves argumentative reality in the
dispute by chaining the discourse to matters from problem-solving discussion. The
mediator supports reaching acknowledgment of particular matters from the stencil which
have (not) been actualized in the mediation session. However, clarity and actual
acceptability of matters from problem-solving discussion are needed as the basis to
achieve acknowledgment of those matters.
Clarity to the matters should be a target in a mediation session. Jacobs (2002, p.
1423) writes that it is a mediators official behaviour to support the participants
achieving clarity: mediators [] officially act to clarify and inform Clarity to the
matters is yielded in the course of the mediation session as the mediator employs her
argumentative skills for supporting to achieve clarity in the course of the dispute. For
example, a means that the mediator can employ to support achieving clarity is a question:
The asking of questions thus functions not merely to perform such tasks as probing,
clarifying [] (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993, p. 138). With the
actualization of clarity to a particular matter through a clarity formula a person spells out
her commitment to having recognized that matter. The utterance I get it. is not to be
understood as a point of view. In a mediation session it makes no sense when one person
asks another Why do you recognize this? Instead, the mediator may put forward that the
person has spelled out clarity to that matter.
Clarity to a matter is needed for actual acceptability of that matter to occur.
Acceptability of a matter is actualized when a person says that this matter can be
accepted. It does make sense to ask this person Why do you say that this matter can be
acknowledged? Again, the mediator can actually facilitate that this question occurs. Thus
the mediator supports reaching a clarity formula as to the actual acceptability of the
particular matter. Actual acceptance of a matter, in turn, is based actual acceptability of the
matter.4
The mediator may spell out her intent to intuitively make use of a pragmadialectical grid and its diagnostic power to support achieving clarity to (how to) handle the
discourse that has been stated, and to that which is advisable to be stated in the respective
dispute. As clarity to (how to) handle the respective discourse is the basis for actual
acceptance the mediator thus makes use of the diagnostic power of the grid to actually
facilitate acknowledgment of the respective matters. When the mediator puts forward that
and how particular matters from the grid have been actualized, or that and how particular
matters from the grid are advisable to be actualized in the course of the dispute she
appears neutral as to content matters in the dispute because she chains her proposals to
(research results from) pragma-dialectics. Still she actually facilitates acceptance (in the
sense of the grid).

Cf. Vespers PhD (2015) for the relationships of clarity, acceptability, and acceptance particularly in
mediation.

1455

Making use of Aakhus (cf. 2003) distinction I suggest that the mediator as a practitioner
in a mediation session is a designer. She actualizes the character of a pragma-dialectical
designer of acceptance: the object to be designed is the actualization of particular
actions in accordance to, particularly, the respective statute of problem-solving discussion,
the environment in which the object is used is the very dispute. The mediator does
neither decide that any matter in the course of the mediation session can be acknowledged,
i.e. that it is actually acceptable, nor that it is acknowledged, i.e. that it is actually
accepted. The mediator supports the parties accomplishing acknowledgment of matters as
she supports their achieving clarity to this matter.
6. THE MEDIATOR AS A PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL CRITICAL DESIGNER OF
ACCEPTANCE
The mediator can be characterized as a pragma-dialectical analyst because she has the
argumentative competence of a critical analyst. She uses the grid, e.g. critical questions, as
a standard in the analysis of speech acts in mediation. The mediator can be characterized
as a practitioner because in pragma-dialectics a designer is a practitioner, and the mediator
is a designer of acceptance as she facilitates acceptance of particular matters in mediation.
Moves with the intention to get to clarity to and acceptability of particular matters are
means to facilitate acceptance of those matters in mediation.
The mediator is a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance. Acting like a
pragma-dialectical critical analyst and like a designer of acceptance she facilitates
manifesting problem-solving discussion (cf. Greco Morasso, 2008, p. 14 who writes the
mediator is a facilitator of parties communicative interaction). As an architect of the
dispute (Greco Morasso, 2008, p. 14) the mediator pursues to realize the [pragmadialectical] ideal in practice. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993, p.
174)
In order to arrive at her aims to appear neutral and to facilitate acceptance of
particular matters from problem-solving discussion (to facilitate arriving at the solution of
the problem) the mediator as a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance instantly
analyses in the sequence of mediation with the help of the grid and instantly voices her
recommendations, e.g. by asking critical questions.
The mediator uses her intuition to instantly reconstruct the speech acts; just as the
parties instantly reconstruct the speech acts in problem-solving discussion (cf. van
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993, p. 92):
If an analytic account of a sequence is given [by the mediator] in which certain reconstructed
commitments of a protagonist are used to explain the sense and force of an antagonists response,
the account implies that the antagonist has performed or could perform a similar sort of
reconstruction.

For example, in article 17 WIPO (2009, p. 13) states that the mediator and the parties
shall not introduce in any other context, e.g., (i) any views expressed or suggestions
made by a party with respect to a possible settlement of the dispute and (ii) any
admissions made by a party in the course of the mediation [session]. Note that in order to
behave in accordance to that article there must be clarity to which utterances in the dispute
are views expressed, suggestions made or admissions made by the participants.
1456

Accordingly, as a critical analyst with the aim to improve argumentative reality the
mediator reconstructs a speech act, for example, as a view expressed. The result is
clarity to this matter which is the groundwork for acceptance of this matter.
As a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance the mediator instantly
manages particularly those matters that she senses to be important in order to solve the
problem. For example, as a critical analyst with the aim to improve argumentative
reality the mediator facilitates acceptance of the presuppositions of problem-solving
discussion in mediation: Turn 120 questions a pragmatic presupposition of the mediation
activity itself. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993, p. 128) The
mediators recommendations rest on her reconstruction and evaluation and are manifested
by, for instance, the educational work [s]he makes for bringing them [the parties] to
argumentation (Greco Morasso, 2008, p. 272, italics by A.V.). As a critical analyst with
the aim to improve argumentative reality the mediator as a pragma-dialectical critical
designer of acceptance applies argumentative strategies. For example, she can ask
questions that come up to the function of critical questions and thus more or less strongly
suggest a particular answer (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993, p.
137). As critical questions are matters from the grid the mediator uses the grid. Since
applying a critical question manifests a speech act that is a means to get to the aim of
problem-solving discussion the mediator applies an argumentative strategy.
7. SUMMARY
In this paper I made use of the form of five components of pragma-dialectics as a means to
present the character of a mediator as a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance.
In order to achieve clarity to the matters (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 24) I
characterized the mediator to act like a critical analyst and like a designer of acceptance in
pragma-dialectics. The grid connects critical analyst and practitioner. As a pragmadialectical critical designer of acceptance the mediator applies argumentative strategies,
e.g. critical questions, to appear neutral yet facilitate manifesting problem-solving
discussion.
I suggested that clarity to, acceptability of and acceptance of the matters in
problem-solving discussion yield the groundwork for arriving at a solution of the problem
in mediation. However, [v]erbal externalization of acceptance (or non-acceptance) by the
listener [which] means that the mutual obligations between the interlocutors are firmly and
clearly established (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 57) is a means to achieve the
resolution of the disagreement and thus it is a means to resolve the conflict in a mediation
session.

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REFERENCES
Aakhus, M. (2003). Neither Nave nor Critical Reconstruction: Dispute Mediators, Impasse and the Design
of Argumentation. Argumentation, 17(3), 265-290.
Eemeren, F.H. van (1990). The study of argumentation as normative pragmatics. Text; an interdisciplinary
journal for the study of discourse, 10(1/2), 37-44.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions. A Theoretical
Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed towards Solving Conflicts of Opinion. Berlin/
Dordrecht: de Gruyter/ Foris Publications.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R. (1994). Rationale for a pragma-dialectical perspective. In F.H. van
Eemeren & R. Grootendorst (Eds.), Studies in Pragma-Dialectics (pp. 11-28). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S. & Jacobs, S. (1993). Reconstructing Argumentative
Discourse. Tuscaloosa/ London: The University of Alabama Press.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R, Jackson, S. & Jacobs, S. (1997). Argumentation. In T.A. van Dijk
(Ed.), Discourse as Structure and Process (pp. 208-229). London: SAGE Publications.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R. & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (1996). Pragma-Dialectics and Critical
Discussion. In F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst & A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.),
Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of Historical Background and Contemporary
Developments (pp. 274-311). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Houtlosser, P & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2007). Argumentative indicators in
discourse. A pragma-dialectical study. Dordrecht: Springer.
Garssen, B. (2001). Argument Schemes. In F.H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Crucial Concepts in Argumentation
Theory (pp. 81-100). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Greco Morasso, S. (2008). Argumentative and other communicative strategies in the mediation practice.
University of Lugano, Ph.D.
Jacobs, S. (2002). Maintaining neutrality in dispute mediation: managing disagreement while managing not
to disagree. Journal of Pragmatics, 34, 1403-1426.
Rees, A. van (2001). The diagnostic power of the stages of critical discussion in the analysis and evaluation
of problem-solving discussion. Argumentation, 15(4), 457-470.
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Center (2009). WIPO
Arbitration, Mediation, and Expert Determination Rules and Clauses. New York, www.wipo.int.

1458

How To Put It Vaguely

Laura Vincze
Department of Educational Sciences,
University of Macerata
Italy
laura.vincze@unimc.it

ABSTRACT: The paper examines speakers possible goals in employing vague expressions in a gas bill, as
well the harmful effects such expressions can have on addressees (i.e. consumers). The paper tries to
demonstrate that vagueness does not exclusively boil down to lexical vagueness, i.e. uninformative words
(Channell 1994). Vagueness also means not explicitating relevant information but giving them as
presupposed, the speaker taking for granted that the addressee is already familiar with such content.
KEYWORDS: Gas Bills, Grice, Cooperation Principle, Presupposition, Vagueness, Violations of
conversational maxims, Withholding information.

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Vagueness
The notion of vagueness has been mainly investigated in philosophy (Russell 1923; Keefe
2000) with the challenge posed by the Sorite Paradox: how many sand grains make a
sorite, a heap of sand? In semantics it is recognized that fuzzy boundaries are a
characteristic of words. Take for instance Labovs (1973) continuous transition between
cups and bowls; the borderline between them is not clear-cut, but fuzzy and graded. As
Anolli (2001) puts it, things deviate progressively from a standard (or prototypical) type,
and we enter a semantic vagueness zone, where the same object could be, in turn, a bowl,
a mug or a glass.
Besides the researchers interest in the intrinsic vagueness of terms, scholars in
pragmatics started to focus on the art of being vague in communication. Research started
to be conducted in order to investigate how ordinary language leaves room for people to
be vague, to avoid precision and the commitment associated with. Studies - mainly in
English (Crystal & Davy (1979); Prince et al. (1982); Channell (1994); Cutting (2007), but
also on Romance languages (Mihatsch 2007; Voghera 2013) and Chinese (Drave 2000)
proved that one of the ways speakers demonstrate their competence is through their use of
a degree of vagueness which is right for the purpose of the linguistic context. According to
whether they are involved in a gossipy chat, an interview, a student professor interaction
(Channell 1994), a conversation with a doctor colleague about the state of a patient (Prince
et al. 1982) or even in a written context, speakers are perfectly able to tailor their language
by varying the precision and vagueness level to make it suitable to the situation (Channell
1994: 4). As a matter of fact, vague expressions occur both in spoken and written
language, but given the fact that they tend to induce an informal flavour to
communication, they are more frequent in oral rather than written contexts.

1459

Channell (1994:18) distinguishes between three different ways in which speakers can
avoid being precise or exact. These are: vague additives (adding a word/phrase to what
would otherwise be a precise statement, so that it results in a vague reading: a team of
around 10 people; maybe a little bit of stone or something like that); vague words
(words which are always, and unabashedly vague, such as thingummy, whatsit. For
quantities, there exist such terms as loads of, heaps of); and at last, vagueness by
implicature (when an apparently precise sentence can be used and understood to have a
vague meaning, as for instance Sam is 6 feet tall, sentence which can be understood as
both precise (Sam is 6 feet tall) and vague (He is actually 6 foot and a quarter of inch)
and where the vagueness seemingly consists precisely in not knowing whether the
utterance is to be interpreted as precise or approximate.
Channells main contribution is having showed that, in contexts where less
precision is judged to be required, vague expressions can be used to tailor the amount of
information given according to the perceived purposes of the interaction. According to
the author, therefore, vagueness in language is neither all bad nor all good, what
matters is that vague language is used appropriately (Channell 1994: 3).
1.2 Uses and goals of vague language
Along with the function of tailoring utterances such that the right amount of information
is given (for instance not providing precise information in a context where approximate
information would do), vague language also enables speakers to talk about a topic they are
not very knowledgeable about or they do not have the necessary vocabulary (Channell
1994: 170). When this is case, markers of the type: or things like that; or something,
and the like help speakers to find a way of actually talking about something they do not
quite have the vocabulary to express; signalling at the same time the speakers lack of
knowledge to the interlocutor.
Another possible use of vague language is deliberately withholding information
which might be expected by the hearer in a given situation. According to Channell (1994),
the speaker can withhold information either for deceitful reasons (or simply reasons of
personal privacy), or as a defensive tactic to avoid committing himself to a precise reply.
A possible case of defending ones privacy or even intentionally deceiving the
other, can be illustrated by a very pertinent and amusing example taken by Channell from
a Boopsie cartoon strip. Boopsie, asked by her conversational partner (possible her partner
in life as well) what she has bought from Elvis memorial house (A: Did you buy a
postcard or something?), responds with a very vague formulation (B: Or something),
letting the interlocutor infer that what she actually bought is much more than a postcard.
By withholding, that is, not giving information which the speaker (here Boopsie)
possesses and which questioner expects to receive, the speaker performs a violation of the
Quantity maxim and triggers implicatures (Channell 1994:179).
The speaker may opt for a vague reply also when putting in practice a defensive
tactic. If asked for instance something like When is the work going to be done?, one can
say something like Well the quote might be done within three or four days but the job

1460

wont be done for at least five weeks1) authorizing the hearer to infer that a precise date
cannot be provided as the speaker does not know how much time the job will exactly take.
In both cases, either deceitful or simply not wanting to commit, from the listeners
perspective the speakers reply can be seen as unhelpful and insufficiently informative and
possibly trigger implicatures.
In a similar vein to Channell (1994), Poggi & Vincze (2012); Vincze et al. (2013)
see vagueness as determined by a lack of detail in what one knows or in what one decides
to communicate about a certain topic. Namely, according to Vincze et al. (2013) one may
be vague either because one personally has vague knowledge (no power to be precise), or,
although having detailed information, one does not want to reveal it to the listener (no
goal to be precise) because possibly harmful, either for the Interlocutor (take the case of
negative diagnoses), or for himself. On the basis of whether the speaker chooses to
withhold information to protect the interlocutor or himself, Vincze et al. (2013) distinguish
between altruistic and selfish goals of vagueness. If the latter is the case, the speaker may
be guilty of concealing relevant information for the interlocutor, i.e. of deceitful behaviour
(Castelfranchi & Poggi 1998).
2. PRESUPPOSITIONS
In view of our case study analysis in Section 3, together with the concept of vagueness, we
also want to introduce the concept of presupposition, a concept primarily investigated in
philosophy and linguistics.
Before moving on, we first have to distinguish between presuppositions as
intended in ordinary usage (as for instance John wrote Harry a letter, presupposing he
could read), and the technical notion of presupposition, restricted to some pragmatic
inferences or assumptions that seem at least to be built into linguistic expressions and
which can be isolated using specific linguistics tests, (especially, traditionally, constancy
under negation2) (Levinson 1983:168).
The first philosopher dealing with the concept of presupposition is Frege (1892).
As stated by Frege,
If anything is asserted, there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple or compound
proper names used have a reference. If one therefore asserts Kepler died in misery, there is a
presupposition that the name Kepler designates something. That the name Kepler designates
something is just as much a presupposition of the assertion Kepler died in misery as for the
contrary [i.e. negative] assertion [Kepler did not die in misery]. (Frege, 1892 (1952:69).

We see how a presupposition is something the speaker assumes to be the case before even
making an utterance. Namely, an utterance such as Kepler died in misery, presupposes
that Kepler has/had a referent in real life. i.e. that Kepler does/did exist. Besides
1

(Channell 1994:178)
Constancy under negation is one of most common linguistic tests to identify presuppositions. It checks
whether the presupposition of statement remains constant (i.e., still true) even if the statement is negated.
Lets take for instance the following statement Annes dog is cute where it is presupposed that Anne exists
and that she has a dog. If we instead negate the statement, like in Annes dog is not cute, the same thing
holds true, that is, it still presupposes that Anne exists and she has a dog.
2

1461

presupposing that Kepler has/had a referent in real life, an utterance like Kepler died in
misery presupposes as well that Kepler can be univocally identified by both speaker and
hearer (Levinson 1993:186).
Linguists over time came up with a list of linguistic forms which are considered to
be indicators of potential presupposition (Karttunen 1971 mentions a list of 31 such
presupposition triggers). Definite description is one of them. Any referent encoded by a
definite article + noun, definite pronoun, definite possessor + noun, or proper noun is
presupposed to exist. The very presence of such definite descriptions presupposes both the
existence of the referent, as well as the fact that the referent is represented in both speaker
and hearers mind. By means of presupposition speakers avoid foregrounding that which
they have no reason to foreground, presupposition representing a necessary condition for
language to function in everyday world.
To illustrate a case of presupposition triggered by definite descriptions (here in the
form of a proper noun and a definite possessor + noun), let us choose the same
straightforward example as in footnote (2):
Annes dog is cute,

where it is presupposed that Anne exists and that Anne has a dog. At the same time, it is
also presupposed (by the speaker) that Anne and her dog are familiar to both speaker and
hearer. If it hadnt been so, the speaker would have provided further information on Anne,
to guarantee the interlocutors understanding. We can therefore state that taken into
account that the speaker does not come up with further information on Annes account, he
takes for granted that the interlocutor is familiar with the person at issue (of course, he
sometimes may be wrong).
This is very much in line with a pragmatic theory of presupposition, having at its
basis concepts such as appropriateness (felicity) and mutual knowledge (or common
ground or joint assumption).
An utterance A pragmatically presupposes a proposition B iff A is appropriate only if B is
mutually known by the participants. (Levinson 1983:205).

It is worth recalling Levinsons point concerning the concepts of appropriateness and

mutual knowledge at the basis of pragmatic presuppositions. Levinson (1983) points out
that it is not inappropriate for the speaker to state something like
I am sorry Im late, my car broke down

even though the hearer did not previously know that the speaker possessed a car. A
presupposition such as Speaker has a car and drove to the meeting point, although not
initially part of speaker/hearer shared knowledge, is assumingly part of the more general
mutual knowledge that
Average people do posses a car (which can sometimes break down).

It is interesting to note that the following utterance

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I am sorry Im late, my fire-engine broke down

is probably not appropriate in circumstances where it is not mutual knowledge that the
following presupposition is true:
Speaker has a fire engine

As Levinson (1983) points out, this is so because it is not consistent with the average
mans beliefs that average people own fire engines.
Although inappropriate, presuppositional constructions are sometimes used even
though the presupposition is not part of the shared background of the two interactants
(whether the speaker knows it or not). Moreover, there are other cases when speakers
deliberately put [new information] in a background position thus in a sense it is
shielded from challenge (Givn 1989). In the same line, Eco & Violi (1987) argue that
with presuppositions we are not so much interested in what is-the-case, but rather in what
someone tries to make someone else believe to be the case. And again, through
presupposition the speaker/writer frequently rhetorically constructs a background rather
than simply responds to one that is already there (Hardy 2003: 54).
3. A CASE STUDY: BILLS AND VAGUE REFERENTS
Bills are a type of informative texts whose role is to inform consumers about their
payment obligations (precise amount to pay as well as payment deadlines). In case of
service shut off for non-payment, the consumer has to be able to find on the bill
information on the re-connect fee and deposit3. Such relevant information should be
provided on the bill and the consumer shouldnt have any difficulty in finding them.
Nonetheless, this is not always the case.
I will analyse below a real example of a gas bill where by means of a definite
presuppositional construction, not previously given information is put in a background
position, the utility provider taking for granted that the consumer is abreast of the
presupposed content. The following extract is taken from a gas bill issued by E-on, a
German provider of natural gas in Romania, among other countries. I will analyse a
reference E-on makes to a governmental decision, GD 1043/2004, formulation that can be
qualified as vague and that has the effect of leaving the consumer puzzled. I argue that Eons communication can be seen as a case of possibly deliberately withholding
information which is relevant for the addressee, and therefore as a case of selfish
vagueness (Poggi & Vincze 2011; Vincze et al. 2012). Vagueness does not exclusively
boil down to lexical vagueness and uninformative words; vagueness also means not stating
information (relevant for the hearer) and giving them as presupposed, as taken for granted.
In my analysis of E-on communication, I make use of the two concepts introduced above,
presuppositions and deliberately vague communication, trying to establish a link between
the two.

In case of service terminated for non-payment, besides the re-connect tax, a utility service provider may
also charge a deposit to turn back on the service.

1463

Let us take a look at the content of the bill. After having informed the consumer of being
at risk of gas shut-off for nonpayment, the utility provider goes on listing the re-connect
conditions in case the consumer is confronted with a gas shut-off.
Gas will be turned on again once the bill, the late payments interests and the re-connect fee are
entirely paid and once a deposit equivalent to the gas consumption determined according to GD4
1043/2004 is constituted [by the consumer].

Let us focus on the last part of the sentence signalled in italics, more precisely on the part
mentioning a deposit to be paid according to a certain GD 1043/2004. This part of the
sentence presupposes5 that there is a deposit and there is a GD 1043/2004 which regulates
the amount of the deposit to be paid. The author of the text may also hold the more
specific presupposition that the reader is abreast of the provisions of the governmental
decision 1043/2004.
These presuppositions present in the bill are problematic because it is not mutual
knowledge between all participants in the exchange (E-on and average bill payers) that
GD 1043/2004 even exists, let alone the content of its provisions6.
The reader is therefore invited to construct the background knowledge that would
justify the presupposition (i.e. that GD 1043/2004 exists) and moreover, to come up with
GD 1043/2004 provisions. But while consumers, on the basis of an inferential process, are
able to come up with the presupposition that GD 1043/2004 does exist, they cannot come
up (or at least not on the spot, without a documented research through the database of
governmental decisions, or, if inspired enough, through the contract signed with E-on)
with its provisions7. This second type of presupposition (concerning GD 1043/2004
provisions) can be classified as a marked presupposition8 (Hardy 2003: 54), i.e. involving
new information which cannot be deduced from previous information.
It is unreasonable to assume that the consumer would know about the
governmental decision GD 1043/2004 and be familiar with its provisions. One would
expect that such important information for the consumer, although specified in the distant
contract, would not be presupposed in the bill (the only piece of document accurately read
by the consumer).

Governmental Decision

5. ..
6

Truth be told, GD 1043/2004 regulations are specified on the contract (but not on the bill). Hence E-on can
be seen as having attempted to inform the consumer on this issue at the moment of signing the contract.
Nonetheless, considering that users are known to sign contracts without a prior detailed reading of each
section of the contract, we can say that there is no real attempt to establish shared knowledge between the
two parts from E-ons side. Moreover, the fact that E-on did not repeat such regulations on the bill (which is
the only informative act the consumer is known to consult for payment clarifications), and did nothing but
simply referred to the governmental decision as if the consumer were already familiar with its regulations,
cannot be seen as an attempt from E-on to establish shared knowledge between the two parts.
7
i.e. that the deposit consists of 300 metre cubed gas, which amounts to approximately 100 Euro and that the
deposit will be returned to the consumer two years after.
8
Hardy (2003) applies the concept of marked presuppositions in the field of narration analysis and
characterizes marked presuppositions as presuppositions in which the narratee or listener does not share
background knowledge signalled by the narrator or speaker.

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3.1 Possible goals in using GD 1043/2004 abbreviation

As Vallauri & Masia (2014) observe concerning presuppositions, the act of informing the
addressee is absent, or more accurately it is skipped and treated as not necessary (Vallauri
& Masia 2014:162). In our case as well, E-on envisages a world where the addressee
already knows about the existence of GD 1043/2004 as well as its content. This being the
case, there is no need to assert it again, but just resuming it for the sake of understanding
the rest will do the job (Vallauri & Masia 2014: 162). E-on behaves as full explicitation of
some already-known content would be the superfluous repetition of some information the
consumer already knows.
Vallauri & Masia (2014) come up with several hypotheses some benevolent and
some less to explain why the speaker/writer would not invest effort in fully explicitating
content taken for granted. Such a strategy may be aimed at:
(1)

saving the addressee superfluous effort, because that content is already known to
her/him;

(2)

saving the addressee superfluous effort, because that content can be processed
with minor attention without any damage to the comprehension of the message;

(3)

preventing the addressee from becoming completely aware of (all the parts of) that
content, lest (s)he may challenge and reject it. Presupposition weakens the
tendency to critical reaction.
(Vallauri & Masia 2014: 165)

Lets examine these three cases one by one.

A possible reason why speakers/writers resort to presuppositions is economy of
effort. When some information is already in the knowledge of the addressee, the speaker is
entitled to present it as presupposed. Lets take for instance the above-mentioned example
Annes dog is cute. If the speaker believed that the addressee werent familiar with Anne
and her dog, he would have said something like There is a girl I know, she is called Anne
and she has a cute dog. Having instead chosen presupposing triggers such as proper
names and possessive determiners, Annes dog is cute, indicates both that the speaker is
entitled to believe that the addressee knows about the existence of Anne and her dog, as
well as the fact that the piece of information that truly deserves the hearers attention, is
the dogs cuteness (and not the fact that Anne has a dog, which might actually be new
information for the hearer).
This way the hearer will pay much less attention to the presupposed content
because it comes with the warning that it does not need thorough examination, being
something already known to her/him [] while full examination of already-known
content would be a superfluous repetition of some effort that one has done in the past
(Vallauri & Masia 2014: 163).
But what if the information presupposed by the sender is not stored in the knowledge of
the addressee, can we still grant the benefit of the doubt to the sender or should his
strategy be seen as malevolent and damaging the addressee?

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According to (Vallauri & Masia 2014), in most of the cases, although the presupposed
content is not familiar to the addressee, we can still consider that the speakers non explicit
mention can be aimed at saving superfluous effort to both addressee and sender, as the
content at issue is not that important and doesnt jeopardize the overall comprehension of
the message.
A message on a piece of paper left by the wife on the kitchen table Heat the stew
in the oven is adequately processed by the husband, although he did not previously know
that his wife had prepared stew for dinner.
This is just one possible example of possible presuppositions put into place by
speakers in everyday conversations, presuppositions that although they play something off
and present it as taken for granted (while actually unknown to the addressee), at the same
time, they do not jeopardize in any way the comprehension of the message from the part of
this latter.
As Vallauri & Masia (2014) mention, there are nonetheless cases when the
sender, in his playing off details, has less honourable intentions. As they put it,
Presenting information as not to be processed thoroughly although it is actually unknown to the
addressee may be aimed not only at allowing the addressee some economy of effort, but also at
avoiding full understanding of that information on the part of the addressee (Vallauri & Masia
2014: 163)

3.2 Expliciting information a risky business

Knowing that consumers are not aware of the conditions of the Governmental Decision
regulating the deposit, E-on should have said the following:
There is a Governmental Decision 1043/2004 which regulates the amount of the deposit to be paid
in case of gas shut off. The amount of the deposit is calculated at the current market price of natural
gas, including VAT. The quantity of gas calculated for the purpose of the deposit consists of 300
metre cubed gas, which amounts to XXXX Lei9. The deposit will be seized for 2 years and will be
returned to the consumer after the end of this period.

which represents the conditions stipulated by GD 1043/2004 and present on the E-on
contract. But such a formulation is very likely to capture the consumers attention because
alarming. Instead, a message stated in the following way might evade more easily the
readers attention.
Gas will be turned on again once the bill, the late payments interests and the re-connect fee are
entirely paid and once a deposit equivalent to the gas consumption determined according to GD
1043/2004 is constituted [by the consumer].

Reference to the GD 1043/ 2004 is made en passant, not to attract attention on the
negative consequences having to pay such a deposit would have for the consumer.
Nonetheless, due to such a formulation, E-on is on the safe side: they cant be accused of
not having quoted the governmental decision (where the exact amount of metre cubes is
specified, as well as the period of time this deposit will be seized by the service provider).
9

Romanian currency

1466

E-ons formulation violates the cooperative principles of communication, where

interactants are supposed to collaborate to reach a maximally effective exchange of
information.
4. VIOLATING GRICEAN MAXIMS
According to Grice (1975), speakers (generally) observe a Cooperative Principle, i.e. they
conceive their utterances in such a way to contribute towards a maximally effective
exchange of information. The cooperation principle is divided in four maxims (Quantity,
Quality, Relevance, Manner) describing specific rational principles observed by people
who obey the cooperative principle. The conversational maxims [] are specially
connected with the particular purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange) is adapted to serve
and it is primary employed to serve (Grice 1975)
If we look at the bill fragment under analysis from the perspective of the
Cooperative Principle, we notice some maxim violations.
As already mentioned, E-on does not state on the bill the amount in Lei of the
deposit demanded by the company in case of shut off for non-payment, but simply makes
reference to the governmental decision 1043/2004. As we saw, on the contract stipulated
between the provider and the consumer, E-on specifies that the deposit is equivalent to 300
m3 of gas as well as the fact that the value of the deposit is calculated on the basis of
natural gas prices (VAT included) in force the day of the constitution of the deposit.
Considering that the price of 1 m3 can be subjected to changes due to gas market price and
euro fluctuations, the companys choice of not stating an exact amount (on the contract)
can be seen as a self-protection strategy against approximate or inaccurate declarations. If
we accept this hypothesis, E-on can be considered to respect the Quality maxim, i.e. not
saying something for which one lacks adequate evidence.
The Quantity Maxim instead (Make your contribution as informative as it required
for the current purposes of the exchange and Do not make your contribution more
informative than is required) is overtly violated. By referring to the Governmental
Decision, they appear to be rigorous and precise. The consumer would have nonetheless
settled with a more informal notice of how much the deposit amounts to (expressed for
instance in cubed metres, as in GD 1043/2004 and as in the contract). We see how, on the
one side, by referring to the Governmental Decision, E-on goes beyond the precision
threshold required by the addressee, while at the same time they dont reach it: what they
fail to mention on the bill is precisely what the consumer requires to know: the amount of
the deposit to pay in case of service shut off.
Considering that what the deposit amounts to has already been indicated twice (on
the contract stipulated between E-on and consumer, as well as in the Governmental
Decision 1043/2004 they refer to), E-on might have considered that saying it again would
be redundant, over informative. But the bill is precisely the context where one expects to
be informed on all the payment obligations. According to Grice, being over informative is
not even a transgression of the Cooperation Principle, but merely a waste of time (Grice
1975:26). Not giving the required information in the required context, can be instead seen
as a violation of the CP.
Making reference to a Governmental Decision when one expects to find out the amount of
the deposit, can be seen as a violation of the relevance manner as well. As Grice puts it, I
1467

expect a partners contribution to be appropriate to the immediate needs at each stage of

the transaction. If I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a good
book [] Grice 1975: 28. Moreover, considering that the consumer cant be expected to
be familiar with such technical notions as GD 1043/2004, employing such a terminology
in a document which is supposed to have an informative purpose, can be seen as an
obscure expression, and therefore a violation of the Manner maxim.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper I examined what communicative effects arise from using vague expressions,
as well as speakers possible goals in employing such expressions. Vagueness does not
exclusively boil down to lexical vagueness and uninformative words, vagueness also
means not stating information (relevant for the hearer) and giving them as presupposed, as
taken for granted.
As highlighted by van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992), in everyday conversation
and argumentation, many premises are presupposed and left unexpressed as they go
without saying. Advancing them in full word would be superfluous and hence inefficient,
as it overloads speech and can even irritate the hearer if in the argumentation all sorts of
things were advanced explicitly that the listener was already well aware of or could work
out for himself. Nonetheless, certain elements are sometimes with less noble intentions
omitted while the speaker behaves as if they were self-evident while something that has
been presented as self-evident need, of course, not always be so. (van Eemeren &
Grootendorst 1992: 141)
In our E-on bill, it cannot be said whether the omitting has been intentional or not,
but its consequences are no doubt harmful for the interlocutor. Not explicitly mentioning
what GD 1043/2004 implies, the consumer is not alerted on the fact that, in case he is
subjected to service shut off, he will be demanded a two-year deposit which amounts to
the equivalent of 300 cubed metres of gas (around 100 euro).
Also justified by the fact that the GD 1043/2004 regulations have already been
listed on the contract, E-on hold that they can afford to mention en passant the
governmental decision on the bill, taking for granted that the consumer already knows
what it implies.
Having instead expressed the GD 1043/2004 regulations explicitly, would have
implied that they werent treated as information already stored in the knowledge of the
addressee, but as new information. But having treated the information as unknown to the
hearer goes against E-ons interests as our attention is generally much more stimulated by
new information than by old ones.
Smuggling in unknown content by means of presuppositions has the advantage (for
the speaker) of making new content appear less flashy. The use of an obscure formulation
such as GD 1043/2004 has the communicative effect of creating a smokescreen round the
deposit. But let us not forget that the communicative function of a bill is that of informing
consumers on their payment obligations and possible risks they meet with in case of nonpayment. All this makes the use of presuppositions in informative texts possibly even
more detrimental than in other types of contexts.

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As a matter of fact, in contexts where precision is not of primary concern, using vague
formulations does not damage anyone. Clearly, though, there are other contexts (like
financial contexts) where knowing the exact amount is extremely relevant.
Channell makes a distinction between contexts where vagueness by means of
approximation is tolerated and even encouraged by listeners (informal contexts where too
much information doesnt contribute in any way to listeners understanding) and contexts
which demand the use of precision and in which being told exact numbers, does get the
addressee further (such as stock market reports; radio programs whose purpose is to
inform listeners the usual prices of consumer goods; economic newspapers). Utility bills
represent another context where full explicitation is not seen as overinformative, but on
the contrary, it is required in order to ensure readers full understanding.
To E-ons possible counter-argumentation Ignorantia juris non excusat, one
could reply that there are so many governmental decisions that no conscientious citizen (or
even a conscientious legislator, lawyer, or judge) could possibly know what they require.
Repetita iuvant and on this basis one is justified to require more precision from E-on,
although this implies being repetitive and seemingly violating economy principles.

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communication and miscommunication. In Anolli, L., Ciceri, R. & Riva, G. (Eds.), Say not to Say.
New perspectives on miscommunication, IOS Press.
Eco, U., Violi, P. (1987) Instructional semantics for presuppositions, Semiotica, Volume 64, Issue 1-2 (Jan
1987)
Van Eemeren, F.H. & Grootendorst, R. (1992) Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A PragmaDialectical Perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Frege, G. (1892). ber Sinn und Bedeutung. eitschrift f r Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, 2550.
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Grice, P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In Cole, P.; Morgan, J. Syntax and semantics. 3: Speech acts. New
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Hardy, D., E. (2003) Narrating Knowledge in Flannery O'Connor's Fiction, Columbia, University of South
Carolina Press
Karttunen, L. (1971) Implicative Verbs. Language Vol. 47, 2, 340-358
Keefe, R., (2000) Theories of Vagueness, Cambridge University Press
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analysing variation in English (Washington, D.C. 1973).
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(1993) Il Mulino, Bologna (Trans. by Marcella Bertuccelli Papi)
Mihatsch, W. (2007). The construction of vagueness: sort of expressions in Romance languages. Aspects of
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concepts to utterance, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins, 225-245.
Poggi I., Vincze L. (2012) Communicating vagueness by hands and face. In Proceedings of the ICMI
Workshop on Multimodal Corpora for Machine Learning, Alicante
Russell, B. (1923). Vagueness. The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 1, 84-92. Stanford:
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Castelfranchi, C., Poggi, I. (1998) Bugie, finzioni, sotterfugi. Per una scienza dell'inganno. Carocci, Roma
Crystal, D., Davy, D. (1979) Advanced Conversational English. London, Longman
Prince, E., F., Frader, J, Bosk, C. (1982) On hedging in physician-physician discourse. In di Pietro, R., J.
(Eds.), Linguistics and the Professions. Norwood: Ablex.
Channell, J. (1994). Vague language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Drave, N., (2002) Vaguely speaking: a corpus approach to vague language in intercultural conversations. In
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Vallauri, L., E., Masia. V. (2014) Implicitness impact: Measuring texts. In Journal of Pragmatics, 61, 161
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Synchrony and diachrony, a dynamic interface. John Benjamins Publishing Company, pp. 283-311.

1470

A Formal Perspective On The Pragma-Dialectical Discussion

Model
Jacky Visser
Speech communication, Argumentation theory, and Rhetoric
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands
j.c.visser@uva.nl

ABSTRACT: For the development of computation tools to support the pragma-dialectical analysis of
argumentative texts, a formal approximation of the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion
theory is required. A basic dialogue game for critical discussion is developed as the foundation for such
formal approximation. To this basic dialogue game, which has a restricted complexity, the more complex
features of critical discussion can gradually be added.
KEYWORDS: computerisation, critical discussion, dialogue game, formalisation, pragma-dialectics.

1. FORMALISATION IN PREPARATION OF COMPUTERISATION

Formalisation is one of the important developments in the field of argumentation theory
emphasised by van Eemeren in his keynote address at the 8th ISSA conference. My
contribution to the ISSA conference deals with the formalisation of one theory of
argumentation: the pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; van
Eemeren et al., 2014, pp. 517-613). This study is intended to contribute to a more
encompassing research project, the overall goal of which is to create a formal foundation
for a computational application of the pragma-dialectical theory.
The computational application of argumentation theory in general has developed
into several directions, as is evident from, e.g., the overviews by Rahwan and Simari
(2009) and van Eemeren et al. (2014, pp. 615-675). Instead of trying to formalise and
computerise every possible application of the pragma-dialectical theory at once, the
current aim is to create a foundation for computational tools to support the analysis of
argumentative discourse. Although fully computerised pragma-dialectical analysis will
presumably not be feasible for quite some time, smaller digital tools to assist human
analysts in their analytical tasks can be realised on a shorter term.
One area in which such a smaller tool can offer support is the composition of the
analytic overview. As the outcome of a (standard) pragma-dialectical analysis of an
argumentative text, the analytic overview brings together systematically everything that
is relevant to the resolution of a difference of opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
2004, p. 118).1 In order to arrive at an analytic overview, the analyst applies a two-step
1

In the extended pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren, 2010), the rhetorical dimension of a text is also
analysed, which would lead to a more elaborate result of the analysis. At the moment I will not take such
analysis of strategic manoeuvring and activity type into account.

1471

method. First, the ideal model of a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004,
pp. 42-68) is used as a heuristic to determine which parts of the original text are (or can be
considered as) argumentatively relevant. By applying four analytical transformation, the
original text is reconstructed in terms of a critical discussion (van Eemeren et al., 1993, pp.
61-62). In the second step, an analytic overview is abstracted from this reconstruction. The
composition of the analytic overview is fully determined by the content of the
reconstruction in terms of a critical discussion. Based on the discussion moves made by
discussants in the analytical reconstruction, the following is determined as part of the
analytic overview: the nature of the difference of opinion, the distribution of discussion
roles, the starting points, the arguments, the structure of the argumentation and the
argument schemes (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 118-119).
To develop a computational tool to support analysts in composing an analytic
overview on the basis of a reconstruction of the original text in terms of a critical
discussion, it is necessary to have a computational representation of the relations between
the possible variations in the constitutive parts of the ideal model and those of the analytic
overview. Preliminary to these relations, computational representations of the ideal model
of a critical discussion, and of the analytic overview themselves are necessary. In the
current paper a preparatory step towards the computational representation of the ideal
model of a critical discussion is made by formalising part of the ideal model.
2. A FORMAL APPROXIMATION OF CRITICAL DISCUSSION
The formal perspective on the pragma-dialectical ideal model is developed as a dialogue
game. This dialogue game can be considered a formal approximation of the ideal model of
a critical discussion. As an approximation, the dialogue game is not intended to replace
the original model in any way a conclusion that might inadvertently be drawn if it would
be called a 'formalisation' proper. Additionally, the term 'approximation' indicates that it is
unlikely that all features of the original ideal model can be preserved entirely in the formal
dialogue game.
When a discrepancy between the original model and its formal counterpart occurs,
this may in some cases indicate a flaw or imprecision in the original. In other cases it can
be the result of the streamlining that is required to conform to the expressiveness of the
formalism used. More often than not, a formalism is less expressive than a model
expressed in natural language. One reason why this is so, is the requirement in formal
models to explicitly and unambiguously define what is included, while excluding
everything else. In this respect the formal approximation is stricter than the original ideal
model.
The notion of a formal approximation is analogous to that of an empirical
approximation of critical discussion introduced by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005).
Empirical approximations are used in the extended pragma-dialectical theory (van
Eemeren, 2010), where the focus is shifted from the idealised case of a critical discussion
in the standard theory to studying the intricacies of argumentative discourse in everyday
use. Unsurprisingly, interlocutors in ordinary discourse turn out not to behave exactly in
accordance with an ideal model of communication. This does however not mean that they
abandon all ideals entirely. For argumentative discourse, the ideal of reasonableness is a
case in point.
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To study the actual practice of argumentative discourse, the pragma-dialectical ideal

model can be used as an analytic heuristic to make sense of the conventionalised
communicative activities by seeing how they diverge from the ideal model. In this view,
the ideal model is realised in terms of its empirical counterparts in ordinary
communication. An actual argumentative exchange is then said to be an empirical
approximation of the ideal model of a critical discussion.
Although it should be clear that an ideal model does not actually occur in
communicative reality2 which is why actual argumentative discourse can merely be
regarded empirical approximations it may not be so clear why an ideal model could not
be formal. Indeed, Krabbe and others (Krabbe & Walton, 2011, p. 246; Krabbe, 2012, p.
12; van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 304) have observed that the pragma-dialectical ideal
model can already be said to be formal in the sense of being procedurally regimented
(formal3 in Barth and Krabbes taxonomy (1982, pp. 14-19; Krabbe, 1982)) and a priori or
normative (formal4). The formal approximation of critical discussion developed as a
dialogue game, is intended to also be formal in the sense of rigorously specifying the
linguistically well-formed expressions and the way in which these can be combined and
used in a discussion (formal2).
3. RESTRICTING THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MODEL
The formal approximation of critical discussion is not developed all at once. Instead, a
basic dialogue game is developed to which more complex features of the original ideal
model can be gradually introduced. This systematic approach has the practical advantage
of decomposing a larger task, so that the smaller components can be developed at different
times or by different people. A second, theoretic advantage is that the gradual introduction
of complex features provide insight into the model itself because its features can be
studied in isolation, without other aspects complicating matters.
The basic dialogue game is developed to fulfil the role of the simplified basis to
which more complexity can later be added. To lower the complexity of the dialogue game,
three restrictions are in place with respect to the original ideal model, which the dialogue
game is a formal approximation of. First, only the dialectical dimension of critical
discussion is taken into account, disregarding the realisation of discussion moves in the
ideal model through speech acts (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984) and the rhetorical
dimension of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren, 2010). Second, the dialogue game
offers players fewer choices and opportunities compared to the original model. This
restriction is most evident in the exclusion of complex argumentation, only allowing an
arguer to put forward one single argument for his standpoint. Third, only the
argumentation stage of critical discussion is explicitly part of the dialogue game, while of
the other three discussion stages a specific (uncomplicating) outcome is assumed.
For the confrontation stage, the assumption is that a single positive standpoint was put
forward, which met with doubt. This restricts the dialogue game to single non-mixed
differences of opinion about a single positive standpoint, excluding differences of opinion
2

There has nevertheless been confusion about the possible occurrence of critical discussion (introduced as a
theoretical ideal model) in communicative reality, see e.g. the remarks by Garssen (2009).

1473

about multiple standpoints or where a negative or opposing standpoint is assumed. The

main restriction resulting from the assumed outcome of the opening stage is that only a
single argument may be put forward, which may only be challenged by doubt, not by
contradiction. Since the concluding stage only comes after the argumentation stage, no
assumptions have to be made about that stage.3 The overall result of the assumed
outcomes of the confrontation and opening stages is that the basic dialogue game
developed in the next section is a formal approximation of the dialectical dimension of the
argumentation stage of non-complex, consistently non-mixed critical discussions about
one positive standpoint which is defended by appealing to a single justificatory reason.
4. A BASIC DIALOGUE GAME FOR CRITICAL DISCUSSION
The dialogue game is introduced by means of five categories of rules. First, there are rules
that determine the initial state of the game. Second, the moves that are available to the
players are defined. Third, the effect of making moves on players' commitments is made
clear. Fourth, the sequential rules determine in which order moves may be made,
sanctioning the structure of the dialogue. Fifth, there are rules specifying how the game
ends; both when and in whose favour. The rules of the dialogue game are based on the 15
'technical' rules of critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 135-157).
These rules should not be confused with the 'practical' code of conduct consisting of 10
commandments for reasonable discussants (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 208209), which are based on the aforementioned 15 rules and are intended to be used as a rule
of thumb in evaluating and conducting actual argumentative discussions. Due to the
restrictions introduced in the preceding section, of the 15 rules, in particular rules 6-13 are
relevant for the basic dialogue game.4
In line with the ideal model, the basic dialogue game for critical discussion is
played by two (teams of) players. The constitution of the players is left undetermined. In
the ideal model the assumption is that the discussion parties are human interlocutors, but
because the development of the dialogue game for critical discussion is intended to form a
basis for pragma-dialectically oriented work in artificial settings, the nature of players of
the game is left undefined. Eventually the dialogue game should be such that both human
and artificial agents can play it.
How players internally represent the current and past states of the dialogue during
the game and how they keep track of their own and the other player's commitments is not a
concern for the rules of the dialogue game. In the case of human players the internal makeup is a matter for cognitive psychology (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 6), in the
case of artificial agents, for software engineering. For the basic dialogue game it is
sufficient to assume there to be some way of modelling the players. The rules of the

The outcome of the concluding stage does become important when complex argumentation is taken into
account, but in the basic dialogue game only single argumentation can occur. In the case of single
argumentation, the outcome of the concluding stage is not directly relevant for what happens in the
argumentation stage (obviously this does not hold the other way around).
4
Exactly how the rules of the dialogue game relate to the 15 rules of the ideal model cannot be covered in
this paper, for this I refer to my dissertation.

1474

dialogue game will not refer to, nor take into account, the individual modelling or private
belief sets of the players.
A further aspect of the make-up of players which is not addressed in the rules for
the dialogue game, is the matter of strategy. While playing the dialogue game, players
have choices to make about their subsequent moves. Players can employ different
strategies in playing the game to increase their chances of winning. Similar to the internal
constitution of the players, their strategies are left undefined in the dialogue game rules.
Rather, these strategies are taken to be part of the ('subjective' or 'internal') make-up (i.e.
artificial modelling or psychological constitution) of the players.
The dialogue game rules assume there to be a formal language in which the
propositions the game is about can be expressed. The nature of is not the object of the
current study. It is therefore at present sufficient to take to consist of the sentences of
propositional logic closed under the usual classical operators. All occurrences of or in
the rules refer to (atomic or molecular) propositions of .
A second (formal) system is required to represent the inferences appealed to by
players in the dialogue game. Because the basic dialogue game is only intended as a
simplified foundation, no assumptions are made about the particular reasoning system
underpinning the inferences used in the game. The only requirement is that there is some
external method of deciding the soundness of inferences. Although more elaborate
systems (for example the pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes with critical
questions (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Garssen, 1997), or non-monotonic systems
of defeasible reasoning (e.g., Pollock, 1987; Dung, 1995) can be introduced as part of the
gradual addition of complexity to the dialogue game, for the moment classical
propositional logic can be taken to provide the inference rules applied by players in the
dialogue game. Any reference to can then be interpreted as an appeal to a rule of
inference from propositional logic on the basis of which the acceptability of justifies the
acceptability of .
4.1 Commencement rules
The commencement rules determine the initial state of the game before the first move has
been made. Because both the confrontation and the opening stages of critical discussion
are not explicitly modelled, the assumed outcomes of these stages are reflected in the
initial state. With respect to the confrontation stage, the result is that the basic dialogue
game for critical discussion is played by two players to determine the tenability of a
positive standpoint with respect to some proposition .
Based on the assumed outcome of the opening stage, the two players are
designated Prot and Ant, corresponding to the discussion roles of protagonist and
antagonist in (the argumentation stage of) a critical discussion. Prot is defending a positive
standpoint with respect to , while Ant critically assesses the defence, having doubt
regarding the acceptability of . Another outcome of the opening stage is the agreement
upon a set of material and procedural starting points. In the dialogue game the material
starting points are represented by a static set SP (for Starting Points) of propositions both
players accept. Because the players need at least one common starting point to engage in a
fruitful discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 139), SP is assumed to be non-

1475

empty: SP .5 The procedural starting points are reflected in the following three
assumptions: the players agree to play by the rules of the game; the players conform to a
turn-based approach, where a player makes one of the moves defined in the next
subsection after which the turn passes to the other player; the players have agreed upon an
inferential system and a way to check the acceptability of instantiated inferences.
Finally, the purpose of the dialogue game is for the players to resolve their
difference of opinion about , where Prot will defend a positive standpoint with respect to
by providing argumentation supporting and Ant critically tests 's tenability by
challenging the argumentation.
4.2 Move rules
Each turn one of the players makes one move. The moves made are of the form type().
The function the move fulfils in the context of the dialogue game is designated by type.
The propositional content of the move is made up by either an (atomic or molecular)
proposition , or the application of an inference rule () on a pair of propositions ,
. Each unique instantiation of a move, i.e. the combination of a type and propositional
content, can only be used as a move by a player once per game in other words, a player
may not repeat the exact same move he has already made before.
The basic dialogue game for critical discussion is asymmetrical with respect to the
role the two players fulfil. Because of this, there are two separate sets of moves which are
available to the two players of the game depending on their role. To defend his standpoint
about , Prot has the following moves available to him:
(M1) argue(): to present as an argument for . (Note that , to prevent
circular reasoning).
(M2) identify(): to initiate the intersubjective identification procedure, in order to
check the mutual acceptability of , here taken to be decidable by checking
whether SP.
(M3) test(): to initiate the intersubjective testing procedure, in order to test the
acceptability of the justificatory force of for , assumed to be decidable through
some external method, by determining whether is a sound instantiation of an
inference rule.
(M4) retract(): to retract commitment to an argument, where CSProt.
(M5) conclusive_defence(): to claim victory after a successful defence of a
positive standpoint with respect to .

In the current dialogue game the set of common starting points SP is static: it is determined at the
beginning of the game, and even if the common ground (understood as the commitments shared by both
players) changes by some player acquiring or retracting a commitment, the set of common starting points is
not increased or reduced. This obviously is something that is important to think about and possibly change in
more complex dialogue games. For the current basic dialogue game, whether SP is static is irrelevant,
because SP is referenced once at most during the course of a game: as part of the intersubjective
identification procedure, which can only occur before any accept(.) or retract(.) moves can be made.

1476

To critically test Prot's argumentation, Ant can make use of the following moves:
(M6) accept(): to accept in defence of .
(M7) challenge(): to cast doubt on the material premise of an earlier move
argue().
(M8) challenge(): to cast doubt on the justificatory force of an earlier
move argue().
(M9) successful_attack(): to claim the successful challenging of the acceptability
of .
(M10) successful_attack(): to claim the successful challenging of the
acceptability of .
(M11) conclusive_attack(): to claim victory after a successful criticism of Prot's
argumentative defence of .
4.3 Commitment rules
As a result of making moves, players acquire (and retract) commitments. These
commitments are called 'dialectical', referring to their dialectical function in a discussion,
and are conceived of in line with Hamblins (1970) conception. If a player is committed to
a certain proposition, this means he should be prepared (or is even obliged) to defend the
acceptability of the proposition if prompted to do so, in other words he assumes a potential
burden of proof.6
Both players are associated with an individual commitment store in which the
propositions a player is committed to in the dialogue are kept track of. A players
commitment store is represented by a set of propositions, which is publicly readable
(meaning that it is available for all players) and privately writeable (meaning that a player
can only directly update his own commitment store, not that of the other player). At the
start of the game, the players' commitment stores are filled with some propositions. Based
on the requirements at the start of the game, Prot's commitment store contains the
common starting points and the standpoint ,7 while Ant's commitment store only contains
the common starting points. It is important to note that the respective commitment stores
may contain additional propositions than those mentioned here, so long as CSAnt
otherwise Ant would also be committed to the standpoint before starting the game, so that
no difference of opinion would arise in the first place. Before any moves are made, the
players' commitment stores are as follows:
(C1) CSProt = SP {}.
(C2) CSAnt = SP.
6

In my dissertation I give a more elaborate account of what kind of commitments are considered in the
dialogue game for critical discussion. This is especially relevant once the pragmatic dimension of the ideal
model is taken into account: the felicity conditions of the speech acts used to make discussion moves, will
then be modelled in terms of 'dialogical' commitments.
7
Technically is the propositional content of the standpoint Ant doubted, cf. the discussions about
standpoints and propositions by, e.g., van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 78-79) and Houtlosser
(1995, pp. 65-91).

1477

As a result of moves during the game, these commitment stores can be updated. The
performance of some moves results in the acquisition of new commitments, while other
moves retract commitments. There are three moves in the basic dialogue game for critical
disussion that result in an update of the player's commitment store (with the affected
commitment store before the equals sign, and the resulting updated commitment store after
it):
(C3) argue(): CSProt = CSProt {, }.
(C4) retract(): CSProt = CSProt {, }.
(C5) accept(): CSAnt = CSAnt {, }.
4.4 Sequential rules
The preceding two subsections presented respectively which moves there are in the basic
dialogue game for critical discussion and what the effect is of making these moves in
terms of the players commitments. The sequential rules introduced in this subsection
define when moves can be made. The dialogue game is always started by Prot making a
move argue() to put forward in defence of the standpoint at issue, . At which
moments the other moves can legally be made is dependent on the state of the game at that
moment. The relevant aspects of the state of the game in this respect are the move made
by the other player in the preceding turn, and in some cases the content of the commitment
stores of the players. This results in the following rules:
(S1) argue(): starting move, if is argued for, then .
(S2) identify(): may follow challenge(), where represents an argument's
propositional content.
(S3) test(): may follow challenge(), where represents an argument's
justificatory force.
(S4) retract(): may follow challenge(), challenge(), successful_attack(),
or successful_attack().8
(S5) conclusive_defence(): follows accept().
(S6) accept(): may follow identify() if SP, test() if is sound, or
argue().
(S7) challenge(): may follow argue(), or test() if is sound.
(S8) challenge(): may follow argue(), or identify() if SP.
(S9) successful_attack(): follows identify() if SP.
(S10) successful_attack(): follows test() if is not sound.
(S11) conclusive_attack(): follows retract().

Note that this means that failure in intersubjective procedures cannot be rectified by Prot in the current
dialogue game. This would require further argumentation, resulting in complex discussions, the
consequences of which I have explored before (Visser, 2013).

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Prot: argue()

Ant: challenge()

Ant: challenge()

Prot: identify()

Prot: test()

Ant: successfull_attack()

Ant: successfull_attack()

Prot: retract()

Ant: accept()

Ant: conclusive_attack()

Prot: conclusive_defence()

Figure 1: The sequential structure of the basic dialogue game.

To clarify the sequential structure of the basic dialogue game, I present Figure 1 as a
visualisation of the sanctioned sequences in terms of a tree. The nodes of the tree are the
moves of the dialogue game (with the format [Player: type(propositional content)] and the
arrows indicate the possible transitions between moves (from one turn to the next).9 The
node at the top of Figure 1 denotes the start of the game, i.e. the first move. The dialogue
game terminates at one of the two nodes at the bottom of Figure 1. The route straight
through the middle of the tree is the shortest route where Ant immediately accepts the
9

This visualisation is very similar to the dialectical profiles of the argumentation stage of a critical
discussion developed by van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007), and the elaboration
thereof by Lewiski (2010, p. 121). One important difference between the dialectical profile and this
visualisation of the dialogue game becomes clear once complex argumentation is incorporated into the
dialogue game. An example is the profile visualisation of the dialogue game presented by Visser et al.
(2011), which takes the form of a graph, incorporating cyclic routes to capture the recursive composition of
complex discussions.

1479

argument. In the left and right routes, the acceptability of, respectively, the propositional
content and the justificatory force of the argument are challenged.
4.5 Termination rules
The concluding stage is not explicitly incorporated in the basic dialogue game for critical
discussion. It is nevertheless clear that the winning or losing of the dialogue game can be
based on the outcome discussants can obtain in the argumentation stage of the ideal model.
The dialogue game terminates if one of the players performs the move
conclusive_attack() or conclusive_defence(). Once the game has stopped in this way,
the winner is Prot if CSAnt, (corresponding to the case where the antagonist accepts as
an argument in defence of ) and Ant otherwise.10
5. CONCLUSION
I began this paper by discussing the role the basic dialogue game for critical discussion
plays in a more encompassing research project. The aim of this project is to lay a formal
foundation for the development of digital tools to aid the pragma-dialectical analysis of
argumentative discourse. To constrain the scope of the project, the current focus is on
tools to computerise the abstraction of an analytic overview from a reconstruction of a text
in terms of a critical discussion. In preparation of the development of such an analytical
tool, a formal approximation of the ideal model of a critical discussion is necessary,
together with the relation between this formal approximation and the elements of an
analytic overview.
The formal approximation is started in this paper with a basic dialogue game for
critical discussion. The game is defined in terms of rules for commencement, moves,
commitments, sequences and termination. By following the rules of the basic dialogue
game, two players can play a game by entering in a simple dialogue. One of the players
presents an argument in defence of a standpoint that has not been mutually accepted. The
other player can respond by challenging the propositional content or justificatory force of
the argumentation, or by accepting it. A challenge can be parried by initiating the relevant
intersubjective procedure to check the acceptability, or can be followed by a retraction of
the argumentation. Depending on the outcomes of the intersubjective procedures and the
acceptance or retraction of the argumentation, one of the two players wins the game.
Even though it is obvious from this simple characterisation that there is not much inherent
value in the basic dialogue game as a playable game, it does however serve a purpose as a
foundation for future work. This goal required the dialogue game to be relatively easy to
develop and understand, so that formal approximations of more complex features of the
ideal model can be modelled on the basis of this simplified dialogue game, and their effect
be investigated systematically and in isolation.

10

Note that neither will be added to the Ant's commitments yet, nor that commitment to will be retracted
by Prot yet. Drawing such conclusions with respect to the acceptability of the standpoint on the basis of the
argumentation stage is what happens in the concluding stage.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper builds on continued discussions and prior work with Frans van Eemeren,
Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Bart Garssen, Floris Bex, and Chris Reed. I am grateful for
their suggestions and collaboration.

REFERENCES
Barth, E. M., Krabbe, E. C. W. (1982). From axiom to dialogue: A philosophical study of logics and
argumentation. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Dung, P. M. (1995). On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning,
logic programming and n-person games. Artificial Intelligence, 77(2), 321-357.
van Eemeren, F. H. (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Extending the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
van Eemeren, F. H., Garssen, B., Krabbe, E. C. W., Snoeck Henkemans, A. F., Verheij, B., & Wagemans, J.
H. M. (2014). Handbook of argumentation theory. Amsterdam, etc.: Springer
van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions: A theoretical
model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion. Dordrecht:
Foris.
van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication, and fallacies: A pragmadialectical perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1993). Reconstructing argumentative
discourse. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press.
van Eemeren, F. H., & Houtlosser, P. (2005). Theoretical construction and argumentative reality: An
analytic model of critical discussion and conventionalised types of argumentative activity. In D.
Hitchcock & D. Farr (Eds.), The uses of argument. Proceedings of a conference at McMaster
University, 18-21 May 2005 (pp. 75-84). Hamilton, ON: OSSA
van Eemeren, F. H., Houtlosser, P., & Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. (2007). Argumentative indicators in
discourse. Dordrecht: Springer.
Garssen, B. (1997). Argumentatieschemas in pragma-dialectisch perspectief [Argument schemes in
pragma-dialectical perspective]. Amsterdam: IFOTT.
Garssen, B. (2009). Book review of Dialog theory for critical argumentation by Douglas N. Walton (2007).
Journal of Pragmatics, 41, 186-188.
Hamblin, C. L. (1970). Fallacies. 1970. London: Methuen.
Houtlosser, P. (1995). Standpunten in een kritische discussie [Standpoints in a critical discussion].
Amsterdam: IFOTT.
Krabbe, E. C. W. (1982). Studies in dialogical logic. (Doctoral dissertation). Groningen University.
Krabbe, E. C. W. (2012). Formal dialectic: From Aristotle to pragma-dialectics, and beyond. In B. Verheij,
S. Szeider& S. Woltran (Eds.), Computational models of argument. Proceedings of COMMA 2012.
Amsterdam, etc.: IOS Press
Krabbe, E. C. W., & Walton, D. N. (2011). Formal dialectical systems and their uses in the study of
argumentation. In E. Feteris, B. Garssen & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Keeping in touch with
Pragma-Dialectics (pp. 245-263). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Lewiski, M. (2010). Internet political discussion forums as an argumentative activity type. Amsterdam:
SicSat.
Pollock, J. (1987). Defeasible reasoning. Cognitive Science, 11, 481-518.
Rahwan, I., & Simari, G. R. (Eds.). (2009). Argumentation in artificial intelligence. Dordrecht: Springer.
Visser, J.C. (2013). A formal account of complex argumentation in a critical discussion. In D. Mohammed &
M. Lewiski (Eds.), Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of
the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013 (pp. 1-14). Windsor,
ON: OSSA.

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Visser, J., Bex, F., Reed, C. & Garssen, B. (2011). Correspondence between the pragma-dialectical
discussion model and the argument interchange format. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric,
23(36), 189-224.

1482

Two Kinds Of Arguments From Authority In The Ad Verecundiam

Fallacy
Douglas Walton & Marcin Koszowy
Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric
University of Windsor
Canada
waltoncrrar@gmail.com
Department of Logic, Informatics and Philosophy of Science
University of Biaystok
Poland
koszowy@uwb.edu.pl

ABSTRACT: In this paper, an argumentation scheme for argument from an administrative authority is
formulated along with a matching set of critical questions used to evaluate it. The scheme is then compared
to the existing scheme for argument from expert opinion. The hypothesis is explored that it is the ambiguity
between the two types of authority that is the best basis for explaining how the fallacy of appeal to authority
works.
KEYWORDS: administrative authority, argument from authority, argument from expert opinion,
argumentum ad verecundiam, Bocheski, deontic authority, epistemic authority, Locke

1. INTRODUCTION
There is now a considerable literature, both in argumentation studies generally and in
artificial intelligence research on argumentation, on argument from expert opinion. This
form of argument was traditionally categorized as an informal fallacy by the logic
textbooks, but in recent years a revolution has taken place, and it is now regarded as a
legitimate argument. It is nevertheless a dangerous one that can go wrong in some
instances and be quite deceptive as a rhetorical tool for strategic maneuvering in
argumentation. Hence we have the problem of distinguishing between the fallacious and
non-fallacious cases. When this form of argument is legitimate, it is important to recognize
its defeasible nature. It provides the user only with presumptive reasoning for accepting
the conclusion, subject to further investigations and to critical questioning. Through the
studies of this form of argument in the recent literature, we now have a pretty good idea of
how it works as a defeasible argument, and we even have formal and computational
argumentation systems that have been built in artificial intelligence and that can
accommodate argument from expert opinion as a standard form of argument.
Given that it is widely recognized that this type of argument can also be fallacious
however, there remains more work to fully explain the fallacy or fallacies involved in it.
What has been suggested is that the fallaciousness is linked with the notion of authority,
since the argument from expert opinion has long been traditionally linked to the notion of
authority and textbook treatments of the fallacy, and a few authors, as we shall see, have

1483

distinguished between argument from an expert opinion, and argument from appeal to
authority of a different sort, resting on a notion of deontic or administrative authority.
In this paper, an argumentation scheme for argument from an administrative
authority is put forward along with a matching set of critical questions that can be used to
evaluate it. This scheme is then compared to the existing scheme for argument from expert
opinion, and the hypothesis is explored that it is the ambiguity between the two types of
argument that is the best basis for explaining how the fallacy of appeal to authority takes
place.
2. THE SCHEME FOR ARGUMENT FROM EXPERT OPINION
The most basic version of the argumentation scheme1 for argument from expert opinion is
given (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008, p. 310) as follows.
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A.
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false).
Conclusion: A is true (false).
An argument from expert opinion should be evaluated by the asking of six basic critical
questions.
Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?
Field Question: Is E an expert in the field F that A is in?
Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
Backup Evidence Question: Is Es assertion based on evidence?
If a respondent asks any one of the six critical questions, the original argument defaults
unless the question is answered adequately. Once a question has been asked and answered
adequately, the burden of proof shifts back to the questioner to ask another question or
accept the argument.
The explanation for the traditional informal fallacy of the argumentum ad
verecundiam given in (Walton, 1997) is that it is hard for a layperson in the field of
knowledge to critically questioning an expert, or the opinion of an expert brought forward
by a third party, because a claim based on expert opinion is so powerfully supported by
this form of argument that in fact it may be hard, or even appear inappropriate, for a
questioner or to raise doubts about it. Thus the clever sophist who appeals to argument
from expert opinion in a forceful way may be abusing what should be regarded as an
essentially defeasible form of argument that should always be open to critical questioning,
collection of further evidence and potential revision.
Any discussion of arguments from authority must take as their starting point the passage
on this subject from Lockes Essay Concerning Human Understanding quoted in Hamblin
1

For the conditional version of the scheme see e.g. Walton & Reed (2002, p. 2) and Walton (2010). For a
variety of contemporary (computational) methods of evaluating arguments from expert opinion see also
(Walton, 2014).

1484

(1970, pp. 159-160). This passage is widely taken to be the origin of the recognition of the
informal fallacy called argumentum ad verecundiam, and it offers an explanation of why
and how arguments from authority can be fallacious. Locke starts from describing a
general mechanism of establishing authorities in the social sphere:
The first is, to allege the opinions of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other
cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of
authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for
others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it
(Locke, 1836, p. 524).

We may here observe that the idea of associating ad verecundiam fallacy with the broader
notion of authority (which is definitely not restricted exclusively to fallacious arguments
from expert opinion) is not only well rooted in the philosophical tradition, but it may
constitute the rationale for the systematic study of arguments basing on authorities. Since
Locke clearly points to a variety of authorities involved in the ad verecundiam technique,
we may note that one should not tailor the study of argumentum ad verecundiam to
arguments from expert opinion. On the contrary, by claiming that some kind of authority
may be related to learning, eminency, power, Locke is rather pointing to the broader
social mechanisms of employing authorities related not only to learning (cognitive or
epistemic authorities), but also to eminency and power (deontic or administrative
authorities). It may be a matter of some interest that this original broad notion of authority
related to ad verecundiam arguments was to some extent left aside in the study of
argumentation which focuses mostly on only one aspect of argumentum ad verecundiam,
i.e. on the fallacious appeals to expert opinion (Copi & Cohen, 1990, pp. 95-96; Hurley,
2003, pp. 130-132).
In what follows in this much quoted passage, Locke explains that when a man has
a reputation showing that he is high in the common esteem and is recognized as an
authority, any other man who does not readily yield to the opinion of this man is looked
upon as insolent. Anyone who backs his argument with the pronouncement of such an
authority thinks the opinion cited ought to be final, and considers anyone who questions it
to be impudent.
This explanation of why arguments from authority, especially the ones classified as
arguments from expert opinion, can so easily and so often be fallacious. A fallacy can be
defined as deceptive argument used as part of strategic maneuvering by means of which
one party in argumentation is employing a clever tactic to get the best of his or her speech
partner party unfairly. But what kind of strategic maneuvering is involved in the fallacious
use of expert opinion? Moreover, it seems possible that there can be other kinds of
argument from authority than specifically argument from expert opinion type of appeal.
Could somehow the fallacy be linked with the ambiguity or confusion between two
different types of argument both coming under the general heading of authority?
3. TWO KINDS OF AUTHORITY
One theory offered to explain how the traditional informal fallacy of argumentum ad
verecundiam (appeal to authority) works is that of Walton (1997, pp. 252-52). Verecundia
literally means modesty, but it is linked to authority through the idea of intimidating an
1485

opponent by citing a respected authority. According to the Walton theory (1997, p. 250),
the fallacy resides in the confusion between two different types of appeal to authority. One
is the appeal to a cognitive authority in which an argument from expert opinion is put
forward, while the other is that appeal to a different kind of authority, for example in a
case in which one might cite a religious authority, or the authority of an administrator who
makes decisions about public policy. The second kind of authority is called administrative
authority in (Walton, 1997, p. 76), in contrast with the other type of authority called
cognitive authority. It can be easy to confuse these two kinds of authority. For example a
physician may make a claim based on his or her medical knowledge and knowledge of the
circumstances of the case in offering a patient advice on which kind of medication is
appropriate, or on conveying factual medical knowledge to the patient. This kind of case is
classifiable as an argument from expert opinion. However the same physician might reach
a decision that an elderly person is no longer fit to possess a drivers license because of
some medical condition that she has that prevents her from being a safe driver, and
therefore revoke this persons drivers license. This kind of case is an instance of the
exercise of administrative authority, because it is the professional standing of the doctor as
a licensed physician that makes his ruling authoritative. That doesnt mean his ruling
cannot be questioned, but nevertheless it does mean that it has a certain authoritative basis
backing it up. It is not difficult to see that in cases such as these kinds, it is very easy to
conflate the two types of appeal to authority together, and therefore it can also be used in
some cases to get them mixed up, with results that relate to the fallacy of argumentum ad
verecundiam.
It is helpful in this regard to revert to a distinction made in (Bocheski, 1974, p.
71), where two types of authority were distinguished. An epistemic authority is said to be
an expert in a field of knowledge. Deontic authority is typified by the kind of military case
in which a superior commander gives orders on what should be done in specific
circumstances. To illustrate the ease with which these two types of authority blend
together in specific cases, Bocheski (1974, p. 71) offers the example of the professor who
is an epistemic authority for his student, but is at the same time a deontic authority
concerning the procedures governing the operations of a laboratory.
On this basis it is useful to draw broad distinction between two types of authority,
each of which has different kind of justification. The cognitive or epistemic type of
authority is invoked where the agent making the claim is an expert in a field of knowledge.
It is on the basis of her mastery of this field of knowledge, given her justified title of being
an expert in that field, that her pronouncement has greater authority than that of someone
who is not an expert in that field. The ultimate justification supporting an argument based
on this kind of authority is that the expert has knowledge in the field of her
pronouncement, and therefore if she puts forward a claim, it is supported by that
knowledge.
The difference between the two types of authority can only be brought about
precisely by interpreting how each of them is used as a speech act in a dialectical
exchange between two parties. Budzynska (2010) has shown the basis for this distinction
by describing the speech acts appropriate for the use of argument from administrative
authority as follows. Putting arguments from administrative authority into the speech act
framework results in the following argumentation scheme:

1486

X performs F(A)
X is authorized to perform F(A)
--------------------------------------A
Since the sources of this authorization do not lie in cognitive skills or knowledge, there is
a need of seeking for a proper model which would describe and explain most typical
communication phenomena related to such arguments.
The problem here is that the administrative type of appeal to authority typically
seems like it should be less open to critical questioning than the epistemic type of appeal
to authority. Therefore if there is some confusion about which category a given appeal to
authority should fall into, it may be easy to treat an argument from expert opinion as
though it were based on an administrative appeal to authority. Hence there is a normal
tendency for the recipient of the argument to be overly intimidated by it, and to presume
that it would be inappropriate to raise critical questions about it. So the fallacy in such a
case resides in the reaction of the recipient to such an argument, but it may also arise from
the way the proponent of the argument puts it forward. The proponent may presume, or
even state explicitly, that the respondent has no right to question the argument from
authority at all. In the most characteristic instances of the argumentum ad verecundiam
(Walton, 1997) the person to whom the argument was directed is intimidated by what he
takes to be the apparent authority of the speaker. Hence the hypothesis put forward in
(Walton, 1977, p. 252) is that one of the most common kinds of cases in which an appeal
to authority is fallacious is one in which the appeal to administrative authority is put
forward in such a way that it appears more conclusive, and hence less open to critical
questioning, than can be justified by the circumstances of the case. It is also noted in
(Walton, 1977, p. 252) that this particular fault often co-occurs with cases where an appeal
to epistemic authority is confused with an appeal to administrative authority.
4. THE SCHEME FOR ARGUMENT FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
Administrative authority is a more difficult to specify with precision than the authority of
expert opinion, but we can lay out the basis of its justification as follows. Lets consider
the example of the minister, or some civil official authorized to conduct the marriage
ceremony, who makes the pronouncement that a particular couple are now officially
married. Once he makes this pronouncement, the couple are at that moment legally
married, subject to certain exceptions. For example if it is found that one of them was
already married, that would nullify the standing of the present pronouncement. Another
example is the pronouncement of a judge who has arrived at a decision on the outcome of
a trial, lets say a criminal trial or civil trial. Such a decision is final in some ways. For
example in a criminal trial there is double jeopardy, meaning that the same defendant
cannot be tried for the same crime twice. Even so, the finding of a criminal trial is subject
to review in some cases, and a retrial can be ordered, for example if it was found that
certain evidence was overlooked in the first trial that might have made a significant
difference to its outcome.
Lets say then that we can define the notion of administrative authority clearly
enough so that we can recognize one when we are confronted with what seems to be one.
1487

On this basis we can define a form of argument that is not characteristic of argumentation
in epistemic reasoning, where the premises are put forward to support the claim that the
conclusion is true or false. Instead, they argument from administrative authority is a
practical kind of argument used in deliberations on deciding what to do in a situation
requiring a choice. In this framework of use, the following argumentation scheme can be
advanced to represent a form of argument from administrative authority.
is an administrative authority in institution .
According to , I should do .
----------------------------------------------------------Therefore I should do .
One could now ask whether this general scheme is indeed capable of explaining the
mechanism of arguing by means of directives. In order to give an answer to this question,
let us discuss an example of directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 June 2008 on the interoperability of the rail system within the Community
(18.07.2008). The point 27 states that:
Implementation of the provisions on the interoperability of the rail system should not create
unjustified barriers in costbenefit terms to the preservation of the existing rail network of each
Member State, but must endeavour to retain the objective of interoperability.

When reconstructing the general mechanism of arguing by means of directives we may

point to the following scheme:
Premise 1: The EU official is an administrative authority in EU.
Premise 2: The EU official says: The EU directive 2008/57/EC should be obeyed by each
Member State.
Premise 3: The EU directive 2008/57/EC states that the rail system should not create
unjustified barriers to the preservation of the existing rail network of each Member State.
Conclusion: The rail system in your country should not create unjustified barriers to the
preservation of the existing rail network of each Member State.
Matching the scheme is a set of basic critical questions that can be used by the person to
whom the argument is directed as a device to raise doubts about whether the argument
holds a given instance.
CQ1: Do I come under the authority of institution ?
CQ2: Does what says apply to my present circumstances C?
CQ3: Has what says been interpreted correctly?
CQ4: Is genuinely in a position of authority?2

Thanks are due to Dale Hample for pointing out the need of including a critical question which would play
a controlling role in distinguishing genuine and apparent authorities.

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These are not the only critical questions that can be asked, but they are useful ones that
can provide guidance to someone who is presented with an argument from administrative
authority, and has doubts about it, but cant think of a suitable reaction on the spot.
Now we are in a bit of a pickle, because it seems from our earlier remarks that the
best hypothesis might be best to classify both the epistemic type of argument and the
deontic or administrative type of argument as two subcategories of the more general
category of appeal to authority. But the term authority is specifically mentioned in the
argumentation scheme for argument from administrative authority, and in the first and the
fourth critical question as well.
The above initial list of critical questions for arguments from deontic authority
may be further developed by discussing some more specific problems and ideas related to
the notion of authority. In what follows, we propose some more detailed critical questions
which point specifically to the need of distinguishing epistemic and deontic authority in
argumentation.
Let us think of a situation where someone (e.g. a principal or commander) is
definitely not an epistemic authority for the employee (e.g. because of his or her lack of
knowledge in a given field), but he or she wants to be an authority for the employee.
Hence, he or she gives such orders which are aimed at stressing the relationship of
deontic) authority. This example points to the need of asking a kind of critical question
which could turn out to be instructive for identifying possible confusions of two main
types of authority: epistemic and deontic. For instance, such an ambiguity of authority or
authorization may be noticed in the case of arguments which are in line with the scheme
discussed in (Koszowy, 2013; Koszowy and Araszkiewicz, 2014):
is authorized to perform directives.
says A.
A belongs to assertives.
--------------------------------------------------A should be accepted.
This example shows that the next two critical questions could be added to our list:
CQ5: Is deontic rather than epistemic authority?
CQ6: Did perform a directive rather than an assertive?
Another problem related to the distinction between epistemic and deontic authority
concerns unjustified transitions from epistemic to deontic authority. Since epistemic
authority does not have to entail any competence to formulate directives (Bocheski,
1974, p. 263), the typical fallacy rests on extrapolating authority from the set of assertives
to the set of directives. Hence we may formulate the next critical question:
CQ7: Does someone claimed to be an authority utter assertives or directives?
(Koszowy and Araszkiewicz, 2014, p. 292).

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As we may notice, these additional critical questions (CQ5-CQ7) point directly to the need
of elaborating such procedure for evaluating arguments from authority which would take
into account (i) the distinction between appeals to deontic or epistemic type of authority
(CQ5), and, consequently, (ii) the distinction between the two domains of authority, i.e.
assertives and directives (CQ 6 and CQ 7).
In our view, the set of critical questions proposed in this section should be rather
treated as an open list which may be further enriched by some other detailed
considerations regarding procedures for evaluating arguments basing on deontic authority.
However, it may serve as a general framework for developing such procedures. Once this
list of critical questions determines the main criteria which would allow us to identify
fallacious arguments which correspond to the scheme for argument from administrative
authority, we may now turn to the question regarding their fallacious nature.
5. WHY ARE ARGUMENTS FROM AUTHORITY FALLACIOUS?
Locke made no attempt to define the concept of authority. A later writer, Richard Whately,
in his Elements of Logic, did distinguish between two senses of the word authority. To
illustrate the meaning of this word used in its primary sense, he offered (1870, p. 194) the
example of correcting a reading in a book on the basis of an ancient manuscript, based on
the authority of the historian. This meaning of the term authority seems like it mainly
referred to expert opinion, but it could also partly refer to the authority of tradition.
Whately (1870, p. 194) also refers to another sense of authority when the word is
employed as equivalent to the word power, for example when we speak of the authority
of the magistrate. He writes that this kind of appeal to authority is a claim to obedience. It
would appear that Whately is distinguishing between two senses of authority, an epistemic
kind of authority typical of appeal to expert opinion, and an administrative kind of
authority, which commands obedience and represents and exercise of power, for example
judicial power, institutional power or military power.
However, one interesting aspect of it for our purposes here is that it introduces the
notion of deference. Authorities command deference, on this analysis, and this
psychological phenomenon that people confronted with appeals to authority tend to defer
to them, not only ties in with Lockes analysis of the fallacy, but seems like it should be
part of a good explanation of why this kind of argumentation becomes fallacious in some
instances. The proponent of such an argument expects deference, and may often or even
normally be expected to get it, so that if the respondent to the argument tries to question it,
he may find that his critical questions are simply dismissed, either by the proponent or by
the wider audience following the argumentation. What is clearly brought out in Hansens
explication (2006, p. 326) of Whatelys remarks on deference in the Elements of Rhetoric
is that deference is a psychological notion that depends on personal feelings. Such a
remark ties in with recent work on the power of appeal to authority in the social sciences,
which has emphasized that a certain type of personality is prone to accepting the
pronouncements of a source who seems to be authoritative without questioning them. This
psychological analysis could help to explain why appeals to authority of any kind, whether
epistemic or administrative or both, tend to have is such a strong power, and can tend
therefore to be associated with fallacies. If the respondent to an argument has a tendency
to defer to it, that certainly may be the main reason why he or she fails to critically
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question it in a situation where critical questioning would be appropriate and useful.

6. CONCLUSION
The recognition of argument from administrative authority as a distinctive type of
argumentation scheme in its own right provides some support for the hypothesis of
(Walton, 1997) that the fallacy arises from the ambiguity and confusion between the two
types of argument, the argument from expert opinion and the administrative appeal to
authority. Moreover, the administrative appeal to authority is an important form of
argument in its own right, and it will prove useful to have an argumentation scheme
representing this type of argument. But still the question of why either of these kinds of
arguments are fallacious in some instances has not been entirely answered. Even though in
logic textbooks the most common cases cited as instances of the fallacy of ad verecundiam
are overwhelmingly instances of argument from expert opinion, in some instances the
argument from administrative authority could potentially be fallacious in its own right.
However, it is not too hard to see why this kind of argument is hard to question in many
instances, and is therefore susceptible to fallacious misuse. Obviously, there are penalties
for failing to obey a command made by an administrative authority who has power over
you, such as your boss or a representative of the police or the government (Goodwin,
1998).
It is interesting to note that some of the classic cases of argument from authority
combine argument from expert opinion with argument from administrative authority. One
of the classic kinds of cases is that of a patient who visits her doctor and who has difficulty
critically questioning the information or advice that the doctor is giving to her. She is not
an expert, and because she is somewhat intimidated by physicians, and worried about her
situation, and therefore having to rely on physicians, she has difficulty not only trying to
ask the right questions but even remembering the information the doctor is trying to
transmit to her. Some classic cases of this sort were studied in (Walton, 1997). In this case
there is a mixture of the two different kinds of authority. The physician as a medical
doctor is required to have a certifiable degree of medical knowledge appropriate for the
case, but she or he also has the administrative power to tell the patient what to do or what
not to do in certain circumstances, and this power often carries with it an administrative
justification for actions and advice given. In studying cases, the problem here may be to
differentiate between the roles of the two types of authority in the argumentation and its
outcomes.
It is a promising hypothesis to conjecture that both forms of fallacy may be due
simply to undue deference, even though the argument from expert opinion type of fallacy
may also be due to confusion between the two types of argument. Further research could
test this hypothesis on examples on each form of argument, and in cases where an
ambiguity between the two types of argument could be involved.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada for Walton under Insight Grant 435-2012-0104 and the support of the
Polish National Science Center for Koszowy under grant 2011/03/B/HS1/04559.

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REFERENCES
Bocheski, J. M. (1974). An analysis of authority. In F.J. Adelman (Ed.), Authority (pp. 58-65). The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff.
Budzynska, K. (2010). Argument analysis: Components of interpersonal argumentation. In: P. Baroni et al.
(Eds.), Frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications. Proceedings of 3rd International
Conference on Computational Models of Argument (COMMA 2010) (pp. 135-146). AmsterdamBerlin-Oxford-Tokyo-Washington, DC.: IOS Press.
Copi, I.M., & Cohen, C. (1990). Introduction to logic. 8th ed. New York: MacMillan.
Goodwin, J. (1998). Forms of authority and the real ad verecundiam. Argumentation, 12, 267-80.
Hamblin, C. L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen.
Hurley, P.J. (2003). A concise introduction to logic. 8th ed., Belmont: Wadsworth.
Hansen, H.V. (2006). Whately on arguments involving authority. Informal Logic, 26(3), 319-340.
Koszowy, M. (2013). Polish logical studies from an informal logic perspective. In D. Mohammed & M.
Lewiski (Eds.), Virtues of argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013 (pp. 1-10). Windsor, ON:
OSSA.
Koszowy, M. & Araszkiewicz, M. (2014). The Lvov-Warsaw School as a source of inspiration for
argumentation theory. Argumentation, 28, 283-300.
Locke, J. (1836). An essay concerning human understanding. 27th ed. with the authors last additions and
corrections. London: Balne.
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row.
Walton, D. (1997). Appeal to expert opinion. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Walton, D. (2010). Why fallacies appear to be better arguments than they are. Informal Logic, 30(2), 159184.
Walton, D. (2014). On a razors edge: Evaluating arguments from expert opinion. Argument and
Computation, 5(2-3), 139-159.
Walton, D. & Reed, C. (2002). Argumentation schemes and defeasible inferences. In: G. Carenini, F.
Grasso, & C. Reed (Eds.), Working Notes of the ECAI 2002 workshop on Computational Models of
Natural Arguments, Lyon, France, 22 July 2002 (pp. 1-5).
Walton, D., Reed, C., & Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation schemes. Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Whately, R. (1870). Elements of logic. Reprinted from the 9th Octavo edition of 1826. London: Longmans
Green, Reader and Dyer.
Whately, R. (1846). Elements of rhetoric. 7th ed. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press (1st ed.,
1828).

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The Possibility Of Visual Argumentation: A Point Of View

Chen Wei
School of Philosophy
Fudan University
P. R. China
greatchen@126.com

ABSTRACT: The verbal and the visual are different complementary means for argumentation, and there is an
uncontentious fact that visual argumentation exists. And, visual argumentation can learn much more from
Freges theory of meaning, which is helpful for the theorical basis or the philosophical ground of visual
argumentation. Finally, some further far-reaching questions are brought forth, especially about the schemes of
visual argumentation, and the relation of visual argumentation to artificial intelligence.
KEYWORDS: artificial intelligence, philosophical ground, visual argumentation, the context principle, the
scheme of visual argumentation

1. INTRODUCTION
The visual usually can convey much more meanings that cannot be expressed as well
through the verb. Then, can the visual express an argument or an argumentation?
For example, there is a picture (see Figure 1).
Figure 1.

When you as an audience see the picture, what would you think? Perhaps there are at least
three possibilities:

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(1)
(2)

(3)

you dont know about the related context, so you could not understand what on earth
the picture wants to express;
you dont know about its related context. You dont care about what it wants to
express. You direct your attention at the eyes, the fingers, the color of the picture, and
even the pencil, and so on;
you know about the related context, so you could know this is a poster, which is the
poster of Hope Project Big Eyes Girl in China, and it appeals to the people to
donate.

Suppose you could know about the related contexts, and understand what the picture wants
to express. Then, as an audience you could have different attitudes to what the poster
expresses. For example, three kinds of attitudes are as follows
Approver A: Yes, I will and prefer to donate to the Hope Project.
Objector B: No, I will not donate to the Hope Project, because I am not very rich, and I
myself also need donation.
Objector C: No, I will not donate to the Hope Project, because I dont believe its organizer.
But I prefer to donate to the poor directly.
When the audiences begin their argumentations in their brains, the argumentations seem to
take place. Here, some questions will be raised, which are too diversified for a paper, so I
will talk some of them roughly:
(1)
(2)
(3)

What are the challenges to the possibility of the concept of visual argumentation (VA
for short)? This is about the realistic possibility of visual argumentation.
Why VA is possible in the realm of argumentation? That is to say, how to make sense
of the logical possibility of VA?
How can the visuals express an argument or argumentation1? And some further
questions raised by VA, for example, the schemes of visual argumentation, and the
relation of VA to artificial intelligence (AI for short).

I agree with Birdsell and Groarke that the first step toward a theory of visual argument must
be a better appreciation of both the possibility of visual meaning and the limits of verbal
meaning. (Birdsell & Groarke, 1996) It is obvious that Birdsell & Groarke talk about this
issue from pragmatics, not from semantics. I think this is a proper route for talking about this
question. The following examples will illustrate three kinds of possibility of visual meaning.
2. WHAT CAN VA LEARN FROM CHINESE TRADITIONAL CULTURE?
2.1 Three relevant examples
The followed three examples are respectively from The Book of Changes in the Six
Classics, poem and painting, and Buddism.
The Book of Changes (pronounced Yijing in Chinese) is one of the oldest philosophical
books in China. In fact, it is also a book of drawings, and its representative image is in
Figure 2.

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Figure 2.

When you look at this picture at the first sight, what do you think about? Two parts, and
eight hexagrams. The clarity is that the hexagrams are not only changing, but also changing
regularly. The vagueness is that what on earth the hexagrams express. If you dont know the
explanation about them, and you are difficult to know the meaning of them well and truly,
then you cannot tell what they express. So, the clarity is that what the visual itself is. The
vagueness is about what on earth the author wants to express.
In this case, we can not tell determinately what the drawing expresses. So, not every
visual expresses an argument, just as not every sentence group expresses an argument.
Perhaps in the cases like this, the visual can express some proposition, but not argument,
because the authors purpose is not to argument something, but to explain something.
Now we turn to the next example, which is the poem and painting. In china, there is a
saying, no poem, no painting, and no painting, no poem. That is meaning though poem and
painting are two different ways to express humans feelings/thoughts, they are the sameness
at the level of logic. For example, the followed is a poem written by Su Shi, who was a
famous poet in Song dynasty. This poem is well-known in China. The poem (see Figure 3) is
translated as followed.
[Song dynasty] Su Shi:
From the side, a whole range; from the end, a single peak.
Far, near, high, low, no two parts alike.
Why cant I tell the true shape of Lu-shan?
Because I myself am in the mountain.

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Figure 3.

Written on the Wall at West Forest Temple

The meaning of this poem is what we saw is affected by the visual angle. Perhaps someone
will bring forth an objection-alike here: according to what this poem means, there seems to
that, similarly, different audiences cannot have the same thing in their brains for the same
visual. My reply is: in this kind of objection there is a difference neglected. What the author
faced was a natural object, here is the mountain named Lu-shan. What the audiences face are
man-made objects, for example, a drawing or a picture. The makers usually, although not
always, try to express clearly what they want to express by the visuals.
If we must make a reason by analogy any way, the elicitation of the example is that
the audience will have different visions if they see an object from different point of view;
similarly, the audience will have different visions if they see a visual from different point of
view, but vision / idea is different from thought2. And, there is a fact that they can see the
same thing, for example, it is a mountain or some parts of the same mountain or a visual or
some parts of the same visual. The conclusion is: the audiences are affected by the point of
view, and the audiences can see the same thing which I will expound in the second part; and,
in essence, poem and the drawing is the same one, because they are the different
representations of the same one, which is a kind of status. So, to some degree, the verbal and
the visual is the same one, because they are the representations of the same one, which is
also a kind of status. The visual is different from not only object, but also idea. The Visual is
alike the verbal because both of them are the description of the being. The visual and the
verbal are different complementary means for argumentation.
The third example talks about, according to Zen Buddhism, the reflection on the relation
between the subject and the object. The great master in Zen Buddhism Qingyuan Xingsi in
Tang dynasty said:
What you have seen, the mountain is the mountain, and the water is the water.

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What you have seen, the mountain isnt the mountain, and the water isnt the water.
What you have seen, the mountain is still the mountain, and the water is still the
water.

What the above said is there are three levels of outlook in Zen Buddhism: world with me,
world without me (anatman), and world beyond me. The elicitation of three levels of
outlook is that, at bottom, the understanding on the visual is limited and affected heavily by
the understanding ability of the audiences. The audience is an important factor that impacts
the running of the argumentation. What visuals are is affected by many factors, such as the
points of view, and the levels of outlook.
Here, perhaps an objection will be brought forth, that the visual is ambiguous
regarding that the audience have different levels of outlook. My answer is: to some degree,
this proves well that VA is possible. Argumentation is interpersonal form the surface form,
but it is personal from the inner intention.
2.2 Replies to some objections
Along with the birth of VA, there are many objections surrounding it. Here at least two
objections will be discussed as an opening.
Objection 1: If what we mean by argument is the act of advancing reasonable
position in contexts of doubt and difference, then a picture cannot, independent of language,
be an argument.
This objection focuses on whether the visual itself can express an argument, and the
precedent condition is how to define the concept of argument. Just as there is no consensus
on the definition of logic, there is also no consensus on the definition of argument.
According to OKeefe (OKeefe, 1982), the concept of argument has two definitions. The
concept of argument1 is described as involving a linguistically explicable claim and one or
more linguistically explicable reasons; and the concept of argument2 is described as overt
disagreementbetween interactants. It is obvious that the concept of argument1 is
relatively strict, and the concept of argument2 is relatively broadened. About the scope of the
concept argument, although some scholars, for example, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
(1969) and Blair (1996), think it should be strict; some scholars, for example, Willard (1989)
and Hesse (1992), think it should be broadened. They think that the concept argument
should be clarified from the point of interactive and argumentative communication. Visual
arguments are a kind of enthymeme. Here, this opinion hides an important precondition
which all discourse is productive of belief. (Hesse, 1992)
Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger (1984) also argue that argumentation is
necessarily verbal, and argumentation without the use of language is impossible. Toulmin,
Rieke and Janik (1979) pointed out that reasoning could not exist in the absence of
language. Both claims and all the considerations used to support them must be expressed by
some kind of a linguistic symbol system. I think there is a fact worthy of noting, when these
opinions were given, at that time there is no big data, so those scholars cannot realize the
power of visual reasoning in virtue of the big data technology.
A systematic objection as Fleming argued (1996),

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Argument is reasoning towards a debatable conclusion. It is a human act conducted

in two parts (claim and support) and with awareness of two sides (the claim allows
for and even invites opposition). By this definition, something which cannot be
broken down into claim and support, and whose claim is not reliably contestable, is
not an argument, whatever else it may be and how else it may participate in
argument.
I dont deny the correctness of this opinion, but I must note that here is the concept of
argument, not the concept of sentence group. As Woods and Walton (1982) said, an
argument is a set of propositions that can be divided into two categories: premises and
conclusion. The word used here in the definition is also proposition, not sentence. As to
Fleming argues that a picture can not satisfy the two part structure of argument because it
lacks the internal linear arrangement that characterizes verbal discourse. (Fleming, 1996)
For Fleming3, the visual sometimes can serve as support for a linguistic claim, but it itself
cannot, without language, be a claim.
For this objection, my question is that, can no any picture really be an argument? Can
some pictures, with a certain inner connection and structure, be an argument? The answer
from the experience is: VA exists. It is well known that propositions can be expressed in any
number of ways, including by signs, signals, and visuals. Fleming didnt divide different
visuals into valid and invalid. But the reality is that, according to the province of argument,
visuals can be divided into valid and invalid as well as sentence group. So, we must
distinguish the valid visual expressions from other visual expressions. How is a visual
expression valid? A visual expression is valid, if and only if it can be judged as true or false.
No doubt, for instance, this kind of visual expression exists in the province of legal
evidences.
Objection 2: Visual expresses as a form of persuasion and rhetoric, not independently
an argument.
According to Blair (1996), there is no doubt that images can be influential in
affecting attitudes and beliefs. Still, from the fact that images influence beliefs and attitudes
it does not follow that such images are arguments, for there is any number of other ways of
influencing attitudes and beliefs besides arguing. The concept of visual argument is an
extension of rhetorics paradigm into a new domain. If the persuasive function lies at the
heart of rhetoric, then any form of persuasion, including visual persuasion, belongs within
rhetorics province.
I dont deny that visuals sometimes take its persuasive function, but I dont think the
persuasive function is its one and only function. Just as the functions of the verbal, they
include persuasion, argument, imperative, and etiquette. Argument is just one of the
functions of the verbal. So, are the functions of the visual just one? No, it is not the truth. In
the next place, to some degree, the difference between argument and persuasion is clear. The
main difference between argument and persuasion is the purposes of them. The purpose of
argument is to prove something is true, and the purpose of persuasion is to persuade the
audience regardless of the truth value. According to the intention of certain agent, the visual
can be used for both the truth value and persuasion. So, visual expresses not only as a form
of persuasion and rhetoric, but also independently an argument. If we expect to find VA in
such things as dramatic paintings and sculptures, magazine and other static advertisements,

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television commercials and political cartoons, (see Bair, 1996) we will be disappointed that
there is hardly any qualified one, because most of these visual expresses indeed are not
expressions with truth value.
Blair also talked about the importance of VA (1996), and he argues that if
suggestiveness is the aim, this is a virtue; where clarity or precision are desiderata, it is a
disadvantage. Blairs main point is that visual arguments are not distinct in essence from
verbal arguments. The argument is always a proposition entity, merely expressed differently
in the two cases. Therefore VA is not a particular exciting conceptual novelty; they do not
constitute a radically different realm of argumentation. According to Bair (1996), the attempt
of conceive of the possibility of non-propositional argument comes up empty, and the
possibility of non-propositional persuasion is possible. Here, the precondition of Blairs
claim is that the visual can not express propositions distinctly and precisely.
Here, once again, it deserved great notice that the verbal is a kind of means for
arguments, then is the verbal is the only and all media instrument though relatively it
perhaps the most explicit form? I agree to Birdsell & Groarke (1996), vague and ambiguous
are not the distinction between the visual and the verbal, and the visual meaning can be in
some cases neither arbitrary nor indetermination; and both the visual and the verbal can
convey claims and arguments. Blair mainly cited the concept of argument1 to analyze the
concept of visual argument. What it would be like if citing the concept of argument2 to
analyze the concept of visual argument?
3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL GROUND OF VA: SENSE AND REFERENCE
If VA is possible, why so many scholars argue it is impossible? At least, probably there is
one reason is that a very important difference is confused or neglected: the language and
what the language expresses. About this difference, the first system research is Gottlob
Freges works ber Sinn und Bedeutung. (On sense and reference).
The fundamental thoughts of Freges theory of meaning are three differences: the
first difference is between language and what language expresses, the second one is between
concept and object, and the third one is between sense and reference. According to Freges
context of scientific researches, natural language is often mixed with rhetoric, psychology
and others, but what language expresses is the focus. Here our emphasis is the difference
between sense and reference (see Figure 4).
Figure 4:
language

sentence

proper name

concept word

What language sense

expresses?

thought

a part of the thought

a part of the though

object

concept

reference truth-value

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What can VA learn from Freges theory of meaning? At any rate, VA itself keeps to some
fundamental epistemological principles as followed: the context principle, the objectivity
principle.

3.1 The context principle

The context principle is the central concept of the theory of VA. According to Frege, the
context principle means that never ... ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in
the context of a proposition (Frege [1884/1980] x). In the same way, never ask for the
meaning of a picture in isolation, but only in the context of where it occurs. If no knowing
about the context of where a picture occurs, you have no knowing about the meaning of that
picture.
Though in many instances in our culture the conditions of interpretation of visual
expression are indeterminate to a much greater degree than is the case with verbal expression
(see Blair, 1996), but many of them are determinate yet. It is undeniable that some of them
are very complicated, even the meanings of some visual claims or arguments obviously
depend on a complex set of relationships between a particular image/text and a given set of
interpreters. Context can involve a wide range of cultural assumption, situational cues,
time-sensitive information, and/or knowledge of a specific interlocutor. (Birdsell & Groarke,
1996) For instance, some ancient frescoes can be deciphered in line with their contexts and
some relevant theories by the experts.
About the contents of the context, Birdsell & Groarke brought forth there are at least
three kinds of contexts are important in the evaluation of visual arguments: immediate visual
context, immediate verbal context, and visual culture4. For the same visual in different
contexts, it will perhaps have different meanings. For example, when Figure 2 is being seen
by a person accustomed to Chinese culture, it will be associated with The Book of Changes
and the law of changes. When it is being seen by a Korean person or certain persons
accustomed to Korean culture, it will be easily associated with the national flag of Korean.
The contexts are the important hidden premises for a valid VA. They supply the basic
premises for understanding it rationally, so they must be known by the audiences. The
audiences who know about the contexts exclude the reasonable objections on the visual.
Otherwise, the visual is obscure for the audiences, and as a result, VA fails to develop
rationally. If necessary, providing keywords or sentences for a visual. That will be helpful for
clearing up the misunderstandings in VA.
3.2 The objectivity principle
According to Frege, the difference between logic and psychology is distinct, but often
confused by many mathematics and logicians. (see Frege [1884/1980]) He set up
Begriffsschrift (a formalized language of pure thought modelled upon the language of
arithmetic) to avoid the ambiguity of the natural language which involves a lot of
psychological contents. Here, the objectivity principle refers to make a difference between
language and what language expresses. If we present the triple relationship between
language and what language expresses and things, it can be find from Ogden Triangle of
Reference (Ogden and Richards, 1923, p.11) (See Figure 5).

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Figure 5:

In Ogden Triangle of Reference, what symbol is? Symbol is sign, which can be the verbal or
the non-verbal. That does not deny that the visual, which is a non-verbal form, can be also
the symbol. It can be said that the verbal and non-verbal has the same status and influence in
Ogden Triangle of Reference.
There are also both thoughts and ideas in VA. We must pay attention to that
difference between them. Our goal here is to distinguish between logical contents and
psychological contents in VA. Just as the sentences in the meaning of language, according to
Frege, the language there refers to the declarative sentences, not any form of sentences. So,
here we must define the scope and domain of VA to the field of the visual involving the truth
value. For example, the visual is some kind of evidence, such as in the fields of legal
argumentation or natural science. Of course, that straint does not deny other functions of VA,
such as persuasion, explanation and rhetoric.
What is the difference between image and visual? Here, visual is objective, referring
to everything relating to or using sight, and able to be seen. Image is subjective here,
referring to a visual representation (of an object or scene or person or abstraction) produced
on a surface in the mind. Some scholars, for example, Fox (1994b, p. 70, 77), think that the
image is the ultimate tool of nuance, intimation, hint, and suggestion, so that imagemakers
focus on values, attitudes, feelings, and effects, caring little about logic, proof, and argument.
Perhaps some images make such effect, but many of them make other functions, such as
argumentative effect. This opinion also neglected the logical difference between image and
visual. Alike verbal sentences, visuals are also the expression of arguments, not the
arguments themselves. The visual and what the visual expresses must be distinguished. This
is a very important line.
Just as sentences have different types, drawings or pictures also have different types.
Here, a drawing or a picture refers to the visual which has an explicit record of facts or
objects, and has clear topic understood by the general audiences. I argue that, like an

1501

assertive sentence in language, any of such drawings or pictures has its sense and reference.
A visual itself has a meaning, which can be a proposition, as a datum. And, what the visual
expresses is another meaning, as a claim. Common contexts are the hidden premises.
Subsequently, an argument is formed, and the reference of which is relevancy, sufficiency
and acceptability. For example, in Figure 1, the argument is as followed: I need donation,
because I want to go to school, but I am very poor. Different audience has different
responses to its reference, and their responses can be drawn into different pictures.
Consequently, a VA is formed.
Postman (1985, pp. 72-73) said, The photograph itself makes no arguable
propositions, makes no extended and unambiguous commentary. Can the verbal itself make
any arguable proposition? No. The verbal and the visual are two kinds of tools for any
arguable proposition. Just as hand sign is also a kind of tool for the communication of the
human being. Is hand sign the verbal or the visual? I think it is rather the visual.
In addition, Birdsell & Groarke (1996) brought forth the question of representation
and resemblance. They are very important in a VA, because they may construct the
argumentative aspects. This is also the third prerequisite for a satisfactory account of VA5.
Note that the discussion of this question implies that the objectivity of VA.
4. SOME FURTHER FAR-REACHING QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE
FEASIBILITIY OF VA
To take VA as a strand of argumentation theory, even provisional, will perhaps finally open a
new lands for this world. As Birdsell & Groarke said (1996), A decision to take the visual
seriously has important implications for every strand of argumentation theory, for they all
emphasize a verbal paradigm which sees arguments as collections of words. The fact is that,
the paradigm is not unique, because arguments can be also as collections of visuals. About
any type of informal logic theory, we will ask the possibility of its scheme, and its
extensional application. VA is no exception.
4.1 The schemes of VA
Are there any schemes to analyze a visual argument? Yes, the schemes of VA can be
constructed, and the scheme will be helpful for analyzing, explaining, assessing, and
reconstructing a visual argumentation.
For example, for the poster of Hope Project Big Eyes Girl, its scheme of the argument is
as followed6.

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Premise:
Value

Every child has the right to go to

school.

Goal

I want to go to school.

Means

Money
Premise

I am poor.

Means to get money

Audience

Donation
I need your donation.

In the above scheme, the major premise is from the context, which is a common sense: every
child has right to go to school. The goal is from the visual itself, which can be told in the
verbal or from what the picture expressed directly: I want to go to school. The means are
also from the context: I need money to go to school because I have to buy pencils, exercises
books, and so on. The minor premise also from what the picture expressed directly: I am
poor and have no enough money to go to school. Finally, the conclusion is the result of the
argument: I need your donation.
In addition, as to Figure 1, those three kinds of attitudes enumerated can be expressed by the
pictures, and that is not only possible, but also feasible. For example, there are gesture
language, silent movies, and childrens picture story books without any verbal.
Up to now, we can construct a structure for VA, which should include three factors:
the context, the interpersonal argument, and the reasonability. This structure for VA can be
expressed as <C, I, R>. Any VA is a reasonability of an interpersonal argument in some
certain context.
4.2 The relation of VA to AI
We are conditioned to reasoning and inference by virtue of the verbal, and dont realize the
possibility of the visual. In essence, VA is a new epistemology, which can make reasoning by
the visual, not by the verbal and the voice. Now that VA is possible, can we inference in
virtue of the consistency, and the coherence of the visual?
Perhaps one day just like what we saw in the American TV serial named
Person of Interest, we can apply masterly the scheme of visual argumentation into AI, and
consequently make the qualitative progress in the field of AI.
In the TV serial Person of Interest, A computer genius built the machine, which can
identify automatically who is criminal suspect and who is not. The machine can reason
validly only by the visual reasoning. Of course, there should consist of the process of
analyzing, contrasting and assessing the visuals in the machine. Everyone is being watched
by the cameras all around, and everyone has the unique social security number. A social
security number will be given by the machine if the corresponding person has the
performance disobey the attributes, such as the consistency and the coherence, of visual
reasoning. For instance, in certain set of the TV serial, a female doctor works as a doctor in a
1503

hospital and drinks all the nights in a bar for several days on end. This is abnormal for
anyone because a person needs fixed sleep unless some wrong with him/her. So the number
of this female doctor is given by the machine, and the story of the play proofs the correctness
of the machine.
An objection may be brought forth, that the machine is man-made, which means its
procedure coding is also man-made that cannot be totally the visual. But this does not deny
that the reasoning is a different type from the verbal one. The important issue here perhaps is
not whether VA can be running completely independent of the verbal, just as the
argumentations with the verbal sometimes cannot be run well without any supports, but its
running makes sense to the development of AI. Although this TV serial is fictional, the
visual reasoning is rooted in reality, and for example, we can find their traces in some legal
reasoning and argumentations. Meanwhile, the question of dynamic visual is being solved by
the rapid development of the dynamic cognitive science. So, VA could have important
relations to AI.
Of course, the ethics of visual argumentation will be on the agenda. Should we hand over
our analyzing abilities and decision-making power to the computer? This is another matter,
and the precondition is that VA has soundness, adequacy and completeness.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The original version of this paper was presented at the Centre for Research in Reasoning,
Argumentation and Rhetoric, Windsor University, on October 3 2013. I wish to thank
Christopher W. Tindale, Han V. Hansen, Douglas Walton, J. Anthony Blair and Leo A.
Groarke for important corrections, constructive criticisms, suggestions and lots of kind help.

REFERENCES
Blair, J. Anthony. (1996). The Possibility and Actuality of Visual Arguments. Argumentation and Advocacy,
Vol. 33, Issue 1, 23-39.
Birdsell, David S. & Groarke, Leo. (1996). The Possibility and Actuality of Visual Arguments. Argumentation
and Advocacy, Vol. 33, Issue 1, 1-10.
Chryslee, Gail J., Foss, Sonja K., & Ranney, Arthur L. (1996). The Construction of Claims in Visual
Argumentation. VCQ, Spring 1996.
Fleming, David. (1996). Can Pictures be Arguments? Argumentation and Advocacy, Vol. 33, Issue 1, 11-22.
Frege, Gottlob (1884/1980). The Foundations of Arithmetic. Trans. J. L. Austin. Second Revised Edition.
Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
Fox, R. F. (1994b). Where we live. In R. F. Fox (Ed.), Images in language, media, and mind (pp. 69-91).
Urbana, IL: NCTE.
Hesse, D. D. (1992). Aristotles Poetics and Rhetoric: Narrative as Rhetorics Fourth Mode. In R. Andrews
(Ed.), Rebirth of Rhetoric: Essays in Language, Culture and Education (pp. 19-38). London:
Routledge.
Ogden, C. K., & Richards, I. A. (1923). The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon
Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. New York: Harcourt , Brace & World, Inc.
OKeefe, D. J. (1982). The Concepts of Argument and Arguing. In J. R. Cox and C. A. Willard (Eds.),
Advances in argumentation theory and research (pp. 3-23). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois
University Press.
Postman, N. (1985). Amusing ourselves to death: Public discourse in the age of show business. New York:
Penguin.
Toulmin, S., Rieke, R., & Janik, A. (1979). An Introduction to Reasoning. New York: Macmillan.
Willard, C. A. (1989). A Theory of Argumentation. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.

1504

NOTES
1. In this paper, I dont deliberately distinguish the difference between visual argument and visual
argumentation, because in general the visual can express an argumentation if it can express an argument.
2. See the second part, which clarifies the difference between idea and thought.
3. Fleming provided a long bibliography for the rejection of the possibility of VA
4. Birdsell & Groarke has given an explicit explanation for these concepts. I dont think they are sufficient
contents for the context of a visual argument, for example, sometimes the indirect cues deserve much more
attention, but I agree those three aspects are the fundamental contents.
5. According to Birdsell & Groarke, the other two prerequisites for a satisfactory account of VA are: we
must accept the possibility of visual meaning, and we must make more of an effort to consider images in
context.
6. I wish to thank Douglas Walton for the original version of this scheme. Responsibility for the scheme
and the views expressed here are, of course, mine alone

1505

Cognitive Science And The Model Of Emerging Truth

Mark Weinstein
Educational Foundations
Montclair State University
USA
weinsteinm@mail.montclair.edu

ABSTRACT: This paper looks at the developing field of cognitive science showing how its epistemic power
can be explained using key constructions from my model of emerging truth (MET). The MET sees warrants
as tied to a field of models in definable relationships that account for the relative power of the arguments in
which they are employed. The paper identifies epistemologically crucial model relationships in various
strands of cognitive science accounting for its explanatory potential.
KEYWORDS: argument, brain, cognitive science, epistemology, MET, psychology, truth, warrants

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper continues an agenda that has exercised me for more than two decades
(Weinstein, 1990; 1994 are early contributions. Weinstein, 2013b is a recent sustained
effort). The core of my approach can be succinctly states as follows: evaluating arguments
put forward whether in defense or attack essentially requires being able to give a
comparative estimate of the strength of the warrants employed, whether tacit or overt
(Weinstein, 2006). This challenges much of the theory of argument, since it precludes
dialogical and dialectical considerations from being definitive, focusing rather on
epistemology.
My initial agenda was practical, concerned with critical thinking across the
disciplines (Weinstein, 1994, 2012b). My subsequent agenda was theoretical (Weinstein,
2009a; 2012a), resulting in a metamathematical theory of emerging truth (MET) that
offered a formal account of warrant strength and the dialectics of its application to
arguments (Weinstein, 2013b). The metamathematics gives formal substance to a
foundational concept upon which the construction of the MET is based: the history of
mappings between models of a theory over time. The MET distinguishes between two
classes of models, empirical models, models of the theory in available data, and reduction
models, higher order theoretic models that reinterpret a theory in terms of more abstract
theories of greater explanatory power. The MET can be seen as formal metaphor for three
essential and hopefully intuitive epistemological desiderata: consilience, the increasing
adequacy of empirical descriptions over time; breadth, the scope of theories as applied to a
range of empirical descriptions and generalizations; and depth, a measure of levels of
theoretic redefinitions which results in increasing breadth and higher levels of consilience.
A crucial aspect of all the relations defined in the MET is that they permit
mappings across models that are approximations (see Apostel, 1961 for a early and salient
discussion of the possibilities). In the MET levels of acceptable approximation are
determined by the practice in the field, but there is a requirement that approximations

1505

improve over time. Consilience requires that empirical models achieve better
approximations to intended models over time, And similarly for breadth, the scope of
explanations, which should increasingly approximate the range of concerns as they
become apparent and depth, reducing theories should capture increasing numbers of
accepted generalizations, reinterpreting them in terms of the intended models of the
reducing theory. And so the MET moves from increased acceptability to emerging truth
(Weinstein, 2002, 2013b).
Given the novelty of my approach, an exploration of actual cases is needed. My
first application of the theory to an exemplar was an examination of a core logical moment
within the development of the periodic table of elements: Prouts hypothesis (Weinstein,
2011). Physical chemistry was the basis for my theoretic intuition and so a fit between
theory and exemplar was not surprising. So I looked to an argumentative context that was
far removed from physical science. I looked at the arguments that can be seen as
supporting the defeat of scientific racism (Weinstein, 2013a). Unlike physical chemistry,
which, at least in retrospect, can be seen as forming a unified theoretical context within
which arguments can be appraised, arguments against scientific racism draw upon many
theoretical points of view, including anthropological, biological, psychological and
sociological perspectives. This paper presents another case: cognitive science seen as an
emerging research agenda.
The application of the MET to the history of the periodic table was
straightforward. The key logical relations in the MET, empirical modeling and theoretic
redefinition are easy to interpret in the sort of unified theoretic complex that physical
chemistry was to become. The key epistemological elements in the MET, the progressive
nature of sequences of models over time and the increasing unification of empirical and
theoretic generalizations through higher-order reducing theories, reflected the history of
the table and so estimations of warrant strength were both natural and consistent with
obvious trends in physical chemistry. No such easy interpretation was available for the
network of theoretically disparate concerns found in argumentation relevant to the
scientific basis for racism. But the exploration of the arguments against scientific racism
highlighted another aspect of the MET, the flexibility of its model relations. The core
logical relations, partial mappings across models and the tracking of such mappings over
time could capture relations between disparate points of view, and the possibility of deeper
theoretic unification could offer reinterpretations of empirical models drawn from
different theoretical perspectives that enabled a stable and coherent platform for drawing
together disparate bodies of empirical evidence. Both of these features will become
apparent as we look at the developing framework of cognitive science.
2. THE SEARCH FOR AN UNDERLYING MECHANISM
The beginning of cognitive science can be connected with a number of distinct events
(Gardner. 1987), but from our perspective two stand out. The first was the seminal paper
by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts A Logical Calculus of the ideas Immanent in
Nervous Activity (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943) and the publication of Noam Chomskys
Syntactic Structures (Chomsky, 1957). The first of these made the connection between the
work of logicians in the preceding decades and the growing interest in neuropsychology,
resulting in part from the increase of neurological trauma as a result of WWII (Gardner,
1506

1987, p. 22). The second responding to the obvious inadequacy of behaviorist accounts of
language learning and use posited a complex theoretic account of an abstract mechanism
deemed potentially sufficient to ground the complex and creative use of language
characteristic of human beings as a class. Further, the connection with the newly develop
attempt at an abstract theory of information advocated by Claude Shannon and Warren
Weaver as well as the work of John von Neumann and Norbert Weiner linking logic and
cybernetics with neurological metaphors set the stage for the developments that followed.
Although these various approaches had affinities in that they were all willing to use
abstract logical characterizations for complex phenomena, mirroring the demand of
psychologists as Karl Lashley who rejected the simple models of behavior that reflected
the dominant behaviorist paradigm, each of these projects were independent in structure
and method and each reflected the particular concerns that drove their progenitors
(Gardner, 1987, chapter 2).
The connection between abstract models with clear affinities to logic and
mathematics began to bear fruit as the computer revolution began to show the enormous
power of simple ideas of computation in performing tasks that heretofore had been the
function of human reasoning alone. Early on, the field that would be called artificial
intelligence by John McCarthy developed computer programs that were both based on and
applied to logical reasoning. The availability of computational power enabled simulations
of characteristic cognitive tasks, showing learning across many iterations and with
complex variables (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986: Sejnowski and Rosenberg, 1987).
This foreshadowed the central dispute concerns the underlying logic of thought as
the field of cognitive science emerged. The competing perspectives were so called
classical accounts, which use rule based inferential structures, as in Jerry Fodors
language of thought (Fodor, 1975) and connectionism, replacing rules by a dynamic
probabilistic weighting of factors, describable in physiological metaphors. Rather than
changes of state as a function of a rule as in the classical account, connectionism identified
states of virtual neurons as the outcomes of the states of other virtual neurons, seen as
forming a network, responsive to thresholds that sum across myriad connections, by
analogy with neurons in the human brain. The first of these is clearly a computer-based
metaphor and binary machines have proved powerful beyond human imagining. The logic
of computation, as envisioned in the seminal ideas of logic based computer programs gave
the hope that such constructions would ultimately prove effective in identifying the basic
structure of human cognition. But whatever the reach, the basis was a logical construction
on rules. Connectionism, drawing on developing neurological understanding, saw things in
a very different way. Seen physiologically and as realized in computer models of neural
functioning the connectionist account offered a very different logical image of cognitive
architecture.
Arguments brought forward in attack and defense of the competing positions
including deep philosophical issues, including such basic issues as the nature of status of
mental representation on the competing accounts. Argument, often a priori, included
impossibility proofs showing that a proffered cognitive structure cannot logically
account for aspects of cognitive behavior. Context determined semantic meanings seem to
be unavailable in principle to classical rule-based accounts. Alternatively, systematicity
in language production and understanding, that is the ability to produce and comprehend
variations, is easy to account for in classical approaches but seemingly intractable within
1507

connectionism (Garson, 2112 offers an overview and examples). As often the debate is
based on available applications in salient areas of cognitive function. Both connectionist
and classical models have been applied with some degrees of success to a number of areas
of cognitive functioning, including offering different structural models of the same
phenomena, as for example, aspects of language production and understanding (Thagard,
2012, pp. 60-61 offers a summary table). The argument is ongoing and not decided.
The MET gives a particular perspective on reconstructing the developing inquiry.
Like the early atomic theory, cognitive science begins with deep theoretic concepts that
serve as potential reducing theories for newly acquired, but relatively impoverished
empirical data. From the perspective of the MET it is not surprising that theories are
inadequate in many ways and the debate among proponents of competing points of view is
unresolved as inquiry progresses. Taking physical chemistry as a paradigm we should
expect deep theoretical metaphors that are inadequate to the phenomena, which as
described is subject to both empirical and conceptual flaws (Weinstein, 2011). So, for
example, in early physical chemistry, data sets for the relative proportions of chemical
components were subject to the vagaries of inadequate measurement (Scerri, 2007, p. 40).
And even as measurements improved empirical models of chemical reactions could not
possibly be given an adequate theoretical account until the discovery of isotopes (Scerri,
2007, p. 58). When applied to physical chemistry, the MET looks to the developing of the
network of ideas over time and the interplay of empirical evidence and theoretic modeling.
This exposes an essential aspect of argument that moves far beyond how argument in
inquiry is generally addressed.
The perspective of the MET moves beyond argument resolution in either the
rhetorical or logical sense. Certainly convincing others is an essential aspect of argument
in inquiry. It creates adherents, funding and possible recognition. But being right is
another thing all together. Once thought of as the purview of logical principles,
methodological principles as viewed from the perspective of the MET look beyond
argument structure, whether deductive or inductive and sees the satisfaction of dialogical
rules to be insufficient to identify the core of an argument: the strength of the warrants in
support of a claim or counter-claim. The theory of warrant that the MET puts forward
moves away from the local context of argument resolution and towards that larger
concerns upon which the ultimate evaluation of the arguments must ultimately turn. This
is seen in the MET as the evolving strengths of the warrants that underlie a claim in terms
of the evolving properties of the network within which the warrant sits. The network and
its history, both actual and projected, serve as an index of the warrants power to support
inference.
And so as heated and philosophically ingenious the arguments about classical
versus connectionist models in cognitive science appear, from the point of the ongoing
inquiry, who is right remains to be seen. The MET tells us what to look for, and so we can
evaluate where the argument has been and speculate as to where it is headed: the three
properties of the MET: consilience, breadth and depth. This moves us to why, despite
foundational problems and difficulties of all sorts, cognitive science is an ongoing
concern.

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3. INCREASING THE RANGE OF CONCERNS

Breadth of concern is perhaps the most apparent characteristic of cognitive science. The
Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science (Frankish and Ramsey, 2012) lists 8 related
research areas that reflect different aspects of cognition, including perception, action,
learning and memory, reasoning and decision making, concepts, language, emotion and
consciousness. In addition, they list 4 broad area that extend the reach of cognitive science
from human cognition standardly construed to include animal cognition, evolutionary
psychology, the relation of cognition to social entities and artifacts and most essential, the
bridge between cognitive science and the rest of physical science: cognitive neuroscience.
Each of these is a going concern, and none of them is free of difficulties. Yet in all cases
there is a sense of advance, of wider and more thoughtful articulation of theoretical
perspectives that address a growing range of cognitive concerns. The MET offers a logical
account of why that is a telling epistemological attribute, crucial for evaluating the
structure of support that warrants confidence in the truth-likeness of the enterprise and,
perhaps, its ultimate vindication as the basis for emerging truth.
Like the inquiry project surrounding the periodic table from its onset, cognitive
science has a wide variety of empirical projects, reflecting the range of concerns and
available theories. In chemistry it was the entire range of the physical world and its
processes. Cognitive science looks to analogously comprehensive concerns, the mental life
of humans, that rich competence that human beings show in their engagement with their
environments, their fellows and their cultures. In order to ascertain the adequacy of the
projects within cognitive science we must look to examples. The study of learning and
memory as contrasted with work on reasoning and decision-making serve as indications of
the progressive nature of cognitive science.
The cognitive architecture of memory, the discussion between short and long-term
memory has been understood for some time. With the additional concept of working
memory the model for understanding memory encoding and retrieval was in place.
Elaboration and controversies still abound, but the basic physiological structures though
which memory can be physically impaired have been identified. Additional details and
functional analyses have been postulated, for example the distinction between declarative
and episodic memory, the deepening understanding of recollection and familiarity has all
been explored both experimentally and physiologically. In terms of the MET there has
been a steady increase in the models of memory and elaborations that form related
sequences of models each supported by empirical evidence that link models to cognitive
tasks and physical deformations. The connection with brain anatomy connects different
levels of analysis in that some aspects of the cognitive tasks can be interpreted in terms of
an underlying mechanisms; more detailed reductions to neurophysiological theories have
been have been identified through fMRI studies linking visual memories with high-level
visual cortical areas (see Ranganath, Libby and Wong, 2012 for a review and
bibliography).
The study of reasoning and decision-making, rather than looking at basic cognitive
tasks, hopefully, interpreted in physiological terms, developed from the normative model
already understood in logic and probability theory. Empirical studies were focused on the
contrast between the normative models and actual performance (Wason and JohnsonLaird, 1972). Formal logic, the basis for the mental models that articulated the image of
1509

reasoning under investigation was expanded to include probabilistic accounts of logical

inference and which of these was the most productive arena for further studies remains an
issue in the field (Oaksford and Chater, 2007). Probability theory formed the normative
basis for an analogous attempt to understand errors in inductive reasoning (Nisbett and
Ross, 1980) and decision-making (Kahneman, Slavic and Tversky, 1982). The need to
assign weight to both probabilities and utilities in decision-making has proven to be a
fruitful basis for mathematical elaboration and experimentation (Stewart, Chatter and
Brown, 2006).
The MET sees a very different status for the work on reasoning and decisionmaking in contrast to theories of memory. There are competitive models for understanding
reasoning, all of which have some evidence and capture aspects of the cognitive domain,
but the theories of reasoning are at best as strong as their available empirical support.
Since they are based on empirical models of behavior the warrants are generally weaker
than those in memory research, which draw upon a richer theoretic basis in brain research.
If the discussion of reasoning and decision making is to have the robustness of theories of
memory additional work has to be done, and recent efforts, moving away from logic-based
discussion of reasoning and to broader considerations show indications of deeper
understanding than normative-based paradigms afford. The link is the connection between
memory, emotions and the levels of commitment, whether in terms of probabilities or
utilities, required to make sense of decision-making. The connection between memory and
emotions was postulated as early as Freud and continues to be an active area of research
(for example, Lewandowsky, et. al, 2005, 2012). And there are attempts to conceptualize
cognitive function within a knowing brain and feeling body (Damasio, 1995).
Seeing reasoning in the light of normative models, whether logical or probabilistic
may seriously underestimate how the brain reasons and decides. Emotions or other biasing
constraints on reasoning are more than impediments to sound practice. Cognitive science
points to possibility of deep understanding, looking at cognitive functioning within the
possibilities and constraints of the supporting mechanism. This has been typical of
advances in all of the life sciences, and cognitive science fits the model.
Speculations as to the neural mechanisms have systemic power much greater than
their evidentiary weights. We look briefly at two ambitious accounts that attempt to bridge
the gap between abstract structure and physiological knowledge: Thagard and Aubie
(2008) and Damasio (2010). Although speculative and very likely inadequate they offer
an image of enormous potential warrant. For their enterprise, bridging between
fundamental pre-cognitive processes such as physiological control and emotions to build
the functional potential for memory and cognition, offers deep structural warrants
supported by reliable evidence and accepted theories. Moreover their materialist
assumptions point to the deep reduction to physiology, neurobiology, biochemistry and
electrochemistry that an adequate theory of brain function would depend on. And this is
despite the enormous gap between the simple models of neurological activity proffered
and the brute facts of the living brain: 30 billion neurons making countless trillions of
connections and sensitive to a wide array of known biochemical agents, with more perhaps
to come. The MET tells us why this so.

1510

4. MEASURES OF INCREASING ADEQUACY

Thagard and Aubie draw upon both neurophysiology and computer modeling. This
enables both theoretic depth and the possibility of increasing adequacy, even if the latter is
no more that computer simulations of simplified cognitive tasks. They cite ANDREA, a
model which involves the interaction of at least seven major brain areas that contribute to
evaluation of potential actions: the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate
cortex, dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex, the ventral striatum, midbrain dopaminergic
neurons, and serotonergic neurons centered in the dorsal raphe nucleus of the brainstem
(Thagard and Aubie, 2008, p. 815). With ANDREA as the empirical basis, they construct
EMOCON, which models emotional appraisals, based on a model of explanatory
coherence, in terms of 5 key dimensions that determine responses: valance, intensity,
change, integration and differentiation (pp. 816ff). EMOCON employs parallel constraint
satisfaction based on a program, NECO, which provide elements needed to construct
systems of artificial neural populations that can perform complex functions (p. 824ff. see
pp. 831 ff. for the mathematical details). This points to the potential power of their
approach. Computer models, even if gross simplifications, permit of ramping up. A logical
basis with a clear mathematical articulation has enormous potential descriptive power as
evidenced by the history of physical science.
Damasio (2010) has a similarly ambitious program. He begins with the brains
ability to monitor primordial states of the body, for example, the presence of chemical
molecules (interoceptive), physiological awareness, such as the position of the limbs
(proprioceptive), and the external world based on perceptual input (extroceptive). He
construes this as the ability to construct maps and connects these functions with areas of
the brain based on current research (pp. 74ff.). This becomes the basis for his association
of maps with images defined in neural terms, which will ground his theory of the
conscious brain.
Given that much he gives an account of emotions elaborating on his earlier work, but now
connecting emotions with perceived feelings. As with the association of maps and images,
Damasio associates emotions with feeling and offers the following account: Feeling of
emotions are composite perceptions of (1) a particular state of the body, during actual or
simulated emotion, and (2) a state of altered cognitive resources and the deployment of
certain mental scripts (p. 124). As before he draws upon available knowledge of the
physiology of emotional states but the purpose of the discussion is not an account of
emotions per se, but rather to ground the discussion of memory, which becomes the core
of his attempt at a cognitive architecture (pp. 339ff.). The main task is to construct a
system of information transfer within the brain and from the body the brain. The model is,
again, mediated by available physiological fact and theory about brain function and
structure. The main theoretic construct in his discussion of memory is the postulation of
convergence-divergence zones (CDZs), which store mental scripts (pp. 151ff.). Mental
scripts are the basis of the core notion of stored dispositions, which he construes as
know-how that enables the reconstruction of explicit representation when they are
needed (p. 150). Like maps (images) and emotions (feelings) memory requires the ability
of parts of the brain to store procedures that reactivate prior internal states when triggered
by other parts of the brain or states of the body. Dispositions, unlike images and feelings
are unconscious, abstract records of potentialities (p. 154) that enable retrieval of prior
1511

images, feelings and words through a process of reconstruction based in CDZs, what he
calls time-locked retroactivation (p. 155). CDZs form feedforward loops with, e.g.
sensory information and feedback to the place of origination in accordance with
coordinated input from other CDZs via convergence-divergence regions (CDRegions) by
analogy with airport hubs (pp. 154ff.). Damasio indicates empirical evidence in primate
brains for such regions and zones (p. 155) and offers examples of how the architecture
works in understanding visual imagery and recall (pp. 158ff.).
The result of all of this is an attempt, as the title of the book suggests, to construct
a brain-based theory of self, which building on what he has developed so far distinguishes
three stages, the proto-self a neural description of relatively stable aspects of the
organism.... spontaneous feeling of the living body, the core self, which connects the
body to the external world through a narrative sequence of images, some of which are
feelings and an autobiographical self when objects in ones biography generate pulses of
the core self that are, subsequently, momentarily linked in a large-scale coherent pattern
(p. 192).
Damasio like Thagard and Aubie offer speculative models that reference current
physiological knowledge, rely on concepts from computer science and information theory
and bypass the deep philosophical issues that are seen by many to create an unbridgeable
gap between the mental and the physical short of deep metaphysical reorientation
(Chalmers, 1996). Yet, whatever the ultimate verdict on these two authors, the rich
program in cognitive science persists and has a strong appeal. The reason is the potential
strength of the warrants, that is to say, if such models prove to be correct the epistemic
force of the warrants that support them will be enormous, swamping the force of
alternative approaches that rely on, for example, psychological evidence alone. This
requires a more careful look at the perspective that the MET provides.
The MET determines a hierarchy of epistemic adequacy in terms of models and
chains of models viewed over time. Each level of adequacy supports correlative levels of
warrant strength. The level of warrant strength has consequences both for the acceptance
of the theory and for its power to resist counterexamples (see Weinstein, 2013b, chapter 4
for the dialectical details and a related adaptive logic.). For a theory to have sufficient
warrant to be taken seriously it must reflect its intended models in that it either holds in the
models or is increasingly adequate to the evidence it strives to explain. But the models in
which it holds, whether exactly or with better approximations over time, are frequently a
small set of the available concerns potentially within the scope of the theory. Looking at
the history of the periodic table we find a similar pattern. Theoretic models held for small
subsets of the known chemical elements and theoretic approximations to empirical data
were typical. But as the research program persisted more and more chemicals were
brought under the scope of explanatory models and approximations of empirical data
improved as both theoretical and the experimental understanding was refined.
Given the claims of both Thagard and Aubie and Damasio to base their models on
accepted facts about brain function, if proved correct, the accounts, however speculative
meet the first test and so are warranted at a minimal level. That is their views capture
aspects of the brain or they approximate accepted knowledge to a degree that is close
enough to merit consideration. If they are close enough approximations, we look to their
progress as they refine their models and as knowledge of brain function increases. If the
approximations are becoming closer the speculations are seen as increasingly adequate.
1512

Adequacy in light of neurological facts is compelling and increasing adequacy is a sign of

the fecundity of the theoretic approach as chains of linked models progress.
Both Thagard and Aubie and Damasio take synoptic approaches and offer models
which cross the boundaries of brain functions, offering generalizable schemes for neural
architecture. This shows enormous potential for breadth. Cognitive scientists who connect
cognition with other brain functions, that like cognition, require and mediate information
across systems (for example, physiological control and emotions) add empirically relevant
models of essential brain functions, so the theory is not merely more adequate to its
models, but there is an increasing range of models to which it applies. Again this is typical
of the history of the periodic table and was a predictor of its potential strength as the
research program flourished.
The far-ranging interests of cognitive science lend prima facie force to any
reasonable attempt at articulating a neurophysiological account of core cognitive functions
that might increasingly account for aspects of the field. The wide range of empirical and
theoretic studies characteristic of cognitive science points to enormous potential breadth
for anybody who gets it right, mirroring the history of the periodic table. Physical
chemistry was initially concerned with gases; over time, independent areas of studies,
ultimately including the entire range of physical substances, were incorporated under the
basic concept of periodicity, as the basic ideas were reorganized around theoretic advance
and more adequate empirical evidence. The result is a massive unification of the entire
field of physical chemistry, arguable the most successful inquiry project in human history.
Whatever the challenges, the epistemic payoff of a correct cognitive science is enormous,
whence the power of the field despite its many problems
Tying cognitive science to neurophysiology gives an evolving empirical basis with
warrants tied to the underlying structures of physiology. Physiological understanding is
increasingly grounded in foundational sciences such as biochemistry and electrochemistry. The empirical basis is necessary but it is the foundational knowledge that
ultimately has the more powerful evidentiary force. Reducing neuroanatomy to a
functional neurophysiology is the pathway to physicalism. Claims within physical science
have the most powerful warrants, supported by networks of evidence at the highest level
of articulation and affording enormous explanatory depth. Speculative talk about c-fibers
reflecting what little was known about the physical correlates for mental episodes (in this
case pain) was deemed worthy of decades of philosophical discussion just because the
possibility of reducing the mental to the array of physical knowledge grounded the mental
firmly within the scientific worldview. Unlike much of the discussion of the mind-body
problem, which was concerned with identity, the MET sees reduction through
identification. The reduction relation in the MET does not seek identities, but rather tracks
the reinterpretations of aspects of theories when appropriate model relations hold. As we
can reinterpret more and more phenomena in terms of a more basic theory our confidence
in the warrants that result increases, first as a function of the adequacy of the reduction,
then the increasing depth of the reduction, the increase in theoretic adequacy in light of the
reduction, the increases in theoretical reach as the various reductions mutually
reinforcement refinement in theory in light of symmetries between the various theories in
light of the over-arching reducing theory and finally the increase in scope across large
areas of inquiry as the reducing theory captures networks of theories. It is on the basis of
such a history of progress that ontological claims are warranted and is the basis for the
1513

view that scientific materialism is the most plausible candidate for what the world is really
made of.
5. CONCLUSION
If cognitive scientists are successful in modeling cognitive behavior in terms of brain
processes, and if, as is becoming more evident, a wide range of psychological processes
are implicated in cognition, possible co-extensive with the range of phenomena identified
with so called folk psychology, the possibility of a scientific basis for the mind becomes
more than philosophical speculation. Whether cognitive scientists will succeed remains to
be seen. Whether a grounding of the mental in the physical will satisfy philosophers is
even more uncertain, especially as phenomenology becomes a favored perspective among
philosophers. But short of a wholesale disregard of science, perhaps in the name of some
heir of post-modernism, the network of concepts and generalizations that constitute
cognitive science has a potential for epistemic adequacy that transcends the arguments that
support particular claims. The metamathematics of the MET shows how such a network
can be precisely envisioned. Analysis of actual cases indicates how complex substantive
arguments may the understood.

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1515

Rule Of Law, Freedom, And Democracy: Domestic And

International Building Blocks Of Contemporary Russian Political
Ideology
David Cratis Williams, Marilyn J. Young & Michael K. Launer
School of Communication and Multimedia Studies
Florida Atlantic University
Boca Raton, Florida
United States
dwill@fau.edu
College of Communication and Information
Florida State University
Tallahassee, Florida 32306
United States
myoung@fsu.edu
RussTech Language Services, Inc.
1338 Vickers Road
Tallahassee, Florida, 32303
United States
mklauner@russtechinc.com

ABSTRACT: We analyze the definitional arguments of Vladimir Putin relative to the terms democracy,
freedom, and rule of law. We examine the definitional relationships among these terms in Putins rhetoric,
with a focus on rule of law. We look at primary appeals targeting domestic Russian audiences as well as
Putins message to the American people on possible US air strikes against Syria, looking for the definitional
construction of rule of law in the discourse.
KEYWORDS: Putin, Russia, democracy, freedom, rule of law, argument by definition, rhetorical choices,
translation

1. INTRODUCTION
Periods of national transition are, by definition, times of change. Sometimes that change is
sought, driven by a desire to move to a different place or time. When that happens, change is
guided by a rhetorical and argumentative transformation of needs and desires. Although
material conditions are clearly part of the equation producing national change, the
interpretation of those conditions is at least as important. As Zarfesky (1997) notes,
Although some of the political science literature still mistakenly regards problems as empirical
conditions to be found, a growing number of writers recognize that they are categories to be created.

He continues, To define a condition as a problem is to invoke a frame of reference within

which the condition is assessed, causality and blame are determined, and solutions are
considered (1997, p. 6).

1516

Change, in other words, is directed through definition of the situation. Burke approaches this
in different language, suggesting the labels and descriptions of situations must encompass
those situations in ways that coherently account for the diverse elements evident in the
situation (Burke, 1973, p. 109). Periods of national transition typically highlight
themes/grounds related to national identity, in addition to those that concern more tangible or
material components of the problem defined in the situation; this requisite element of
national identity brings both rhetorical opportunities and constraints to those advancing
arguments either for or against specific changes.
In this paper, we sketch our approach to understanding definitional argument in
periods of national transition. We discuss definitions of situation, considerations involved in
definition of key terms, current approaches to definitional argument, and critical procedures
for interpreting definitions of situation. We then analyze the presidential discourse in Vladimir
Putins third term as President, looking specifically at how the terms Rule of Law,
Freedom, and Democracy become redefined through argument by definition.
2. ARGUMENT BY DEFINITION
Definitions of situation constitute personal and public motives for actions. Arising out of
symbolic interaction theory, the theory presupposes the understanding that Human behavior
is based upon the meaning the person attaches to objects, events, relationships, or activities of
other individuals (Cox, 198-199. Emphasis added). Or, as Burke puts it, much our reality is
but an extension of our terms that, according to Burke, select, reflect, and deflect. All
interpretations are therefore necessarily partial and contestable (Burke, 1966, pp. 45-46). At
the public level, factors affecting the viability of competing definitions of a situation include:

the adequacy of the definition to encompass the situation;

the resonance of the definition both with widely shared cultural attitudes, values, and
beliefs and with the underlying historical memories; and
the invention of acceptable analogies between the current situation and previous
national or cultural experiences.

Definition of situation refers to both individual interpretations as well as culturally...shared

perceptions and interpretations of situations considered identical or similar. (Cox, 1981, p.
199, citing Gould and Kolb).
Definitions of situations are constructed from language that is, from words.
Collectively, these words form definitions that are salient to the context and can adequately
encompass it. The collective definition that is, the meaning of a definition of a situation
transcends the meaning of the individual words in the sense that the interinanimation of
those meanings creates a broader, higher order of meaning that is not reducible to the unitary
meanings of each term (Richards, 1936, pp. 47-66). Yet the definition of the situation is in the
most literal sense a collection of individual words. Occasionally, some of the terms in a
definition of a situation may be neologisms, but even then the other terms will have
conventional meanings (some clearly more ambiguous than others); and if the definition of the
situation is to obtain resonance with the public, key terms must carry historical weight. In
constructing a definition of a situation, political actors may redefine the individual terms
employed in the definition even before it is constructed; moreover, by putting individual terms
1517

in relation to each other, the interinanimation among the terms has the effect of redefining
the terms in that particular context.
In our analysis of definitions of individual terms, we are guided in part by work on
both persuasive definition and ideographs. The concept of a persuasive definition comes
from Stevenson, who emphasized that terms have both descriptive and emotive meanings
(Walton, 2001, p. 118). Drawing upon the work of Ogden and Richards, descriptive
meaning is understood as the core factual or descriptive content of a word, while the
emotive meaning represents the feelings or attitudes (positive or negative) that the use of the
word suggests (Walton, 2001, p. 118). Stevensons theory is that a persuasive definition
works by redefining the descriptive meaning of the word while retaining its old familiar
emotive meaning (Walton, 2001, p. 118). We embed our application of persuasive definition
in our consideration of ideographs, a concept advanced by McGee (1980).
An ideograph is a one-term summation of an ideological commitment (e.g.,
democracy). These are common words that carry historic freight in a given culture: they
have a history of significant usage in the culture, and the public has become conditioned to
respond more-or-less automatically to the words (but not necessarily to any particular
meaning for the words) (McGee, 1980). In the U.S., words such as freedom, democracy,
and rule of law are examples of ideographs to which the automatic response is favorable: the
public is for freedom, for democracy, etc. Conversely, words such as tyranny or
communism are words that generate automatic opposition. In each of these examples, the
precise descriptive meaning of the words is ambiguous, and there is great range in historical
usage of what the term may mean a diachronic panoply of significant applications of the
term. Despite, or perhaps because of, descriptive ambiguities, these are the words from which
ideology is constructed; they are the building blocks of ideology (McGee, 1980, p. 7). The
legitimacy of a particular ideological construction at a given point in time (which McGee calls
the synchronic structure of the ideology) is bolstered by selective appropriation of historical
instances in which the ideographs align with the descriptive meaning of the term as it is used
in the synchronic construction.
Although concerns with the relationships between definition and argument have been
evident since the classical period, the domain of definitional argument is less developed than
other aspects of argumentation theory. In an important keynote address to the 1997 Alta
Conference on argumentation, Zarefsky (1997) maintained not simply that definitions are
important in argumentation (although he did do that, citing among other sources his own selfdescribed aphorism, The power to persuade is, in large measure, the power to define), but
also that definitional argument may take multiple forms, which he identified as argument from
definition, about definition, and by definition.
The distinctions among these forms of definitional argument are important: argument
from definition proceeds in a deductive form, with the definition taken as an essential or true
premise. As many examples demonstrate, argument from definition tends toward stalemate
because advocates and opponents simply reject the definition, the foundational premise,
offered by the other side (Zarefsky, 1997, p. 4). Argument about definition tends toward a
similar fate. Citing Schiappa, Zarefsky suggests that arguments about definition, that is,
arguments about the real nature of something, become abstracted too quickly, losing
connection with peoples real life experiences and hence with their values and commitments.
This leads to unproductive impasses in the argumentation, another form of stalemate
(Schiappa, cited in Zarefsky, 1997, p. 4).
1518

The third form of definitional argument developed by Zarefsky is argument by definition, and
this is the form upon which we will elaborate. In argument by definition, The key definitional
move is simply stipulated, as if it were a natural step along the way of justifying some other
claim. In this sense, the key argumentative step of defining ones terms
is taken by making moves that are not themselves argumentative at all. They are not claims supported
by reasons and intended to justify adherence by critical listeners. Instead they are simply proclaimed as
if they were indisputable facts (Zarefsky, 1997, p. 5).

Yet arguments by definition are critical moves that are often deployed in the construction of
broader situational definitions. Zarefsky notes that in the examples of argument by definition
that he discusses what is really being defined is not a term but a situation or frame of
reference (1997, p. 5). He suggests four types of argumentative moves that can be employed
in producing arguments by definition. These are associations, dissociations, ambiguities, and
frame-shifting language (1997, pp. 7-9). Of these, we will focus on two techniques of
association suggested by Zarefsky:
1.

expanding the meaning of a term of art, that is, of a seemingly common and nontechnical term that, when placed in a particular context, normally is given precise
meaning, (e.g., rape of the environment).

2.

using persuasive definitions: A persuasive definition is one in which favorable or

unfavorable connotations of a given term remain constant but are applied to a different
denotation. In this way, connotations surrounding the original term are transferred to a
different referent (1997, p. 7), (e.g., the war on drugs).

In our analysis of argument by definition in the contemporary political discourse of Vladimir

Putin, we rely heavily on such associative argumentative moves.
We also use the method of textual indexing advanced by Burke, who suggests a
Theory of Indexing key terms in a text as a procedure by which a critic can discover and
prove what may be non-obvious motives in a text (Burke, 1964, pp. 145-172). In a
discussion of our words for motive, Burke maintains that these words (he gives an example
of duty) are in reality words for situations, as we have construed or defined those
situations (1935, pp. 29-31). We contend that the indexical structures also reveal evidence of
redefinitions of terms. We see them as techniques by which to identify the interinanimated
meaning of terms when used in relation to each other in specific texts. The four indexical
structures suggested by Burke are: Association, Dissociation, Progression, and Transformation
(Burke 1964, pp. 145-172)
The use of words in ways that create transparent patterns of association is the clearest
illustration of argument by definition, and persuasive definitions could be an example of that.
In contrast, dissociation is primarily concerned with the creation of oppositions. These may be
polarities (e.g., freedom or death) or more subtle forms of dialectical play between terms.

1519

3. PUTINS USE OF ARGUMENT BY DEFINITION

Turning, then, to Vladimir Putin, one might argue that he has been moving toward the Russian
version of a reset in relations with the West almost since he became President in 2000. Still,
for much of his first two terms, he argued that Russia was a European nation. Recently,
however, by turning the countrys focus eastward, Putin has moved Russia into another period
of transition, what he terms the Third Revolution, reanimating the historical and traditional
separation of Russia from the West. In doing this, Putin has recontextualized and redefined
many of the terms associated with Western ideologies: rule of law, freedom, even democracy
itself.
Putin began this reorientation by reclaiming Russian history, including the Soviet
period, reviving a sense of nationalism, and identifying both with a renewed relationship
between the citizen and the state. The interinanimations of these elements with the
reconstituted ideographs of Western democracy produces the New Russia, oriented
eastward rather than toward the West, proud of its 1000 year history, glorifying the defeat of
Germany in the Great Patriotic War, with its own interpretations of freedom and democracy.
To explicate the definitional moves that result in this reanimated Russia, we focus
primarily on 4 speeches given in Putins current term as President: a speech on Russia Day
(June 12) 2013; a pair of remarks celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the Russian Constitution
(December 12 and 13, 2013); and the address on the annexation of Crimea (March 18, 2014).
These speeches illustrate Putins use of definitional argument to reconstitute freedom as
prosperity and well-being; democracy as an instrumental value rather than a terminal one; and
the rule of law as law-and-order. In addition, we examine Putins letter to the American
people, published in The New York Times, September 11, 2013.
Russia Day is a relatively new holiday, established to celebrate Russian history and to
encourage greater national pride at a time when the Russian people were looking outward for
moral leadership and validation. There is an instrumental overlay to most of Putins speeches,
and this one is no exception, as Putin collapses all 3 terms that are of interest here into a
process-oriented marker melded with a history lesson. After a sentence that encapsulates a
decade of economic change and hardship following the fall of the Soviet Union (ironically,
probably the period of greatest personal freedom and freedom of speech in post-Soviet
Russia), Putin declares that the character of the Russian people brought the country through
the transition and set our country firmly on a development track that is inseparable from the
ideas of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law. (June 12, 2013).
Putins public approach to governance describes Russia as something of a work in
progress, constantly in transition, moving along an arc of progress demarcated by ticks on a
yardstick visible primarily to Putin. The goal is a better quality of life for all Russians, and
democratic procedures, the federal system, the market economy and guarantees for human
rights all must work toward this goal. By assuming that the purpose of democratic process,
rule of law, and human rights is to progress along this continuum toward a better life, he
reduces them to an instrumentality of economic prosperity. Their value lies not in their
intrinsic worth as values of a free people, but, rather, in their ability to move the country along
the continuum. As instrumentalities, then, if progress is deemed insufficient, they can be
modified, truncated, or even eliminated in the interest of progress toward the goals.
By referendum on December 12, 1993, the Russian people approved the Constitution that is in
force today. It was one of the earliest acts of the new Russian Federation and represented a
1520

major move toward democratization. Last year2013marked the 20th anniversary of the
passage of the Russian Constitution; the country celebrated that anniversary with a concert
and, the next day, a meeting between the Constitutional Court Judges and the President.
Presented with a perfect opportunity to discuss the rule of law in Russia, Putin did not
disappoint. Again, however, his instrumentalist approach to democratic values prevailed.
As Putin notes, The Constitution validated the unwavering priority of our peoples
rights and freedoms and raised the status of the state itself ... to a new, democratic
foundation. Certainly, the Constitution instantiated the democratic process that followed the
years of Soviet rule. Yet Putin sees the Constitution as the initiator of the path to the countrys
goals, not as the guarantor of rights and democratic process:
The Constitution opened a new, constructive path to development on the basis of clear goals, intentions
and values. It represents a long-term strategy for Russias development, a foundation for
strengthening public stability. (December 12, 2013)

The Constitution, then, functions much as ordinary laws do providing stability, order,
continuous development.
Two events in the past year have grabbed the worlds consciousness and focused
attention on Russia: Syria and Crimea. In Syria, as the U.S. pondered its response, Putin
published an open letter to the American people in The New York Times (September 11,
2013). The date was not lost on many. We believe such a move is unprecedented, and even
today it is hard to imagine a similar letter from Obama or any U.S. President appearing in
a Russian newspaper. Putin attributes his strategy to the diminished contact between the U.S.
and Russia, and interestingly, ascribes this action to a desire to preserve world order and
stability. In the letter, Putin uses a slippery slope argument to set up the definitional move that
underlies his message. A strike by the U.S., should it occur, would escalate the conflict and
enable it to spread beyond Syria. It would destabilize the Middle East and North Africa even
further. And, it would throw the entire system of international law and order out of balance
(Putin, 2013).
Setting aside the merits or lack thereof with regard to Syria, here we see Putins
conflation of rule of law, international law, and order. In other words, the purpose of the rule
of law is order; it is not a guarantor of citizen rights, but serves to strengthen the state. Surely,
one purpose of laws is order; but the concept rule of law is a philosophical approach
designed to spare citizens the capriciousness of the rule of individuals. Thus its promise is
consistency of treatment and a form of justice. In Putins construction, however, the purpose
of law melds into the states desire to suppress chaos.
Putin posits the conflict in Syria not as a struggle for democracy, but as a conflict
between government and opposition in a multireligious country. [NYT September 11, 2013]
In Putins view, to attempt to restore order from the outside would not only violate
international law, it would undermine international law in the world community. After
scolding the U.S. about its tendency toward interventionism and belief in its own
exceptionalism, Putin urges America to join non-interventionist efforts to resolve the issue. A
grateful Obama put any plans he had for a military strike against Syria on hold.
About 6 months later, following the successful completion of the Sochi Olympics, Russia
stunned the world by annexing Crimea; on March 18, Putin spoke to the Duma and other
Federal officials, as well as the people of Russia, Crimea and the world.

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We noted at the beginning of this paper that the legitimacy of a particular ideological
construction at any given point in time is bolstered through selective appropriation of
historical instances in which the ideographs employed by a rhetor align with the descriptive
meaning of the term as it is used in the synchronic construction. It follows, therefore, that if
the denotation of a term is materially different in one society as compared to another society
that single term can be deployed to achieve differing effects in international discourse.
Similarly, if a term has one set of associations in one societal milieu, but conjures up a
different set of associations in a different milieu, its use (or the choice of a different term
instead) can serve varying rhetorical purposes depending on the audience.
A specific instance of speaking to different audiences can be seen on the official
website of the Russian presidency http://www.kremlin.ru/ . This Russian language site
provides the text of all official statements, pronouncements, and speeches by Vladimir Putin.
But there also exists an English language web page http://eng.kremlin.ru/ that mirrors the
Russian language site; it provides official government translations of the materials presented
originally in Russian.
We studied fourteen public statements by Vladimir Putin that touch upon the themes
democracy, freedom, and rule of law. (Four of these speeches are analyzed here in some
detail.) We compared the Russian and English versions of all fourteen statements primarily
to ensure that our English language analysis was based on a correct understanding of the
actual Russian statements, but also to determine if there were any substantive differences
between the versions heard and read by Russians and the translated versions accessible to
English speakers. On the whole there is a high level of conformance between the Russian and
English texts: the translations correspond very closely to the source files in content and tone.
That is, an English reader can gain from the translations both a reliable understanding of
Putins meaning and a good feel for his rhetorical posture. This makes it possible for us to
analyze his speeches with a great degree of confidence in our conclusions.
An important exception is the critical speech given by Putin on the annexation of
Crimea into the Russian Federation. This was a major political appearance, and here one can
discern substantive differences between word choices and phrasing uttered by Putin in
comparison to the equivalent passages quoted in English below.
We are not concerned with instances where Western readers would simply disagree
with the Russian President. Rather, there are a number of instances in which the Russian and
English versions of Putins speech create and, we contend, purposely so completely
different impressions on his domestic and foreign audiences. We discuss these by type.
3.1 Great and small
We have great respect for people of all the ethnic groups living in Crimea. This is their common home,
their motherland, and it would be right I know the local population supports this for Crimea to have
three equal national languages: Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar.

This is pretty innocuous in English, but there are two subtle differences from the Russian
one insignificant, but the other crucial to an understanding of Putins ultimate geopolitical
strategy in the region. Putin actually says, We respect // have respect for the various
nationalities that make up the local population: nothing in the Russian equates to great
respect. More importantly, he uses a common term malaya rodina home region for
motherland that presages his later use of the 19th century term Malorossiya in reference to
1522

all of eastern and southern Ukraine that portion of the country he needs to control in order to
have a land route to Crimea and the Transdnestria region of Moldova, two areas he claims
want reunification with the Russian Federation. This is, we believe, the first verbal hint of his
ultimate goal.
3.2 Now and then
Putin claims that the 1954 decision of Nikita Khrushchev to declare Crimea a portion of the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic a decision that makes geographical sense, but was of no
political consequence within the structure of the USSR was illegal. What matters now is
that this decision was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place
even then. One can agree or disagree with Putins judgment. However, in the Russian, the
text more properly reads: What is important to us is (something quite) different this
decision was made. This is important to me; this is important to Russia.
Putin readily admits that the 1954 decision was a mere formality, since it never
occurred to Khrushchev or anyone else that the Soviet Union would ever fall apart. It was
only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realized that it was not
simply robbed, it was plundered. So, all Russia has done in reclaiming Crimea is take back
what had been stolen from it, stolen, presumably, by the Ukrainians.
3.3 Riots in the streets
Putin claims that he understands and even supports the protesters
who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and
poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of
replacing the authorities that do not satisfy the people.

But, he says, those who stood behind the events in Ukraine leading to the overthrow of
President Yanukovych had a different agenda: They resorted to terror, murder and riots.
Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes, and anti-Semites executed this coup.
Anyone who followed reports of the Maidan uprising knows how violent the protests
became. A peaceful demonstration against the government decision not to engage with the
European Union for economic and political reasons soon turned nasty. Protesters and the
troops deployed to control them battled continuously. Extreme right-wing (nationalist) groups
and neo-Nazi skinheads provided muscle in support of the protest. Both pro- and antigovernment forces were accused of murdering supporters in the other camp. And many
citizens of Ukraine who are of Ukrainian descent (a large segment of population is Russian)
do indeed hate the Russian Federation as the successor to a Soviet Union that treated them
brutally before, during, and after World War II.
What is wrong with the statement quoted above beyond the obvious hyperbole and
over-simplification is that in Russian the text actually reads, terror, murders, and
pogroms. In pre-Soviet Russia Ukrainian Cossacks were used by the czars representatives to
carry out pogroms against Jews in their midst. The word itself is guaranteed to inflame
passions against all Ukrainians. But neither the Maidan uprising nor any of the events that
followed had anything to do with anti-Semitic impulses among the Ukrainian population. We
would contend that the use of riots in the English text is a deliberate attempt to mask from
1523

Western readers the inflammatory, anti-Ukrainian subtext of this speech. Had the government
translators written what Putin actually said, the single word pogrom could have undermined
any sympathetic reading Westerners might have attributed to this speech.
3.4 Imposters and executioners
The word pogroms, which appears about one-third of the way into this speech, introduces a
particularly inflammatory segment of Putins rhetoric a segment that is masked in the
English version. We will highlight two other choices that clearly show the intent behind this
speech, which was to make a direct appeal to Russian sensibilities, while hiding that appeal
from outside observers by carefully redacting the official translation.
Putin states, It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in
Ukraine now. To the extent that the elected President has fled the country and most of his
inner circle has been replaced in the government without general elections, this claim has
credibility. A certain level of interregnum certainly obtained. What is most interesting at this
juncture is the manner in which Putin describes that situation: Many government agencies
have been taken over by the imposters.
Imposter is a fascinating choice made by the government translators: while not
incorrect, it clearly lacks the connotative power of the source word samozvanets it
represents in the original Russian. Literally that word means the self-proclaimed. But
psychologically it refers unambiguously to the interregnum that occurred at the beginning of
the 17th century when Ivan the Terrible died without an heir to the throne (having killed his
own son in a fit of insane rage) and to the ascendance of the so-called False Dmitry a
peasant, supported by certain noblemen, who claimed he was that son, still alive and come to
claim his rightful place on the throne. This period in Russian history, called the Time of
Troubles, led to the installation of the Romanov dynasty that ruled until the 1917 socialist
revolution. Upon hearing this word most Russians will immediately think of the chaos and
political instability that characterized the period. It is obvious that Putin has chosen his words
carefully, playing on their desire for stability, harkening back to the chaos and strife that
characterized the Yeltsin years, and striking fear in the minds of the citizenry. Imposter can
never evoke to a Westerner the visceral impact generated by samozvanets in the hearts and
minds of Russians.
Putin goes on to say, This is not a joke this is reality.Those who opposed the
coup were immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was
Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. One could quarrel with Putin regarding his
characterization of the protesters in Ukraine and the manner in which they treated those who
supported Yanukovych. But the translation is accurate, insofar as it goes. Unfortunately, the
English rendition leaves out one small element: Those who opposed the coup were
immediately threatened with repression and execution.
All of the differences in content, tone, and psychological appeal described above make it clear
that the Russian government sees its English language website as a rhetorical vehicle to
influence Western opinion in ways that differ from its attempts to influence the opinions of the
Russian speaking electorate at home. Putin carefully chooses the ideographs he deploys in his
public pronouncements. Obviously, his official translators are equally careful in making their
rhetorical choices.

1524

The English version of this speech represents the culmination of the definitional moves made
by Putin following his inauguration. He constructs the situational definition through a series of
carefully selected analogies, thereby illustrating the themes running through the other
speeches we have examined: rule of law (and order), instrumental values, democracy, and
freedom not as intertwined reflexive concepts but as separate concepts that must work to
strengthen the state. Thus Putin defines the situation relative not only to Crimea, but also to
the West. In so doing he emphasizes themes related to national identity:
Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones,
where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall
basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine, and
Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also
in Crimea.
we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we
cannot live without each other.

Each of these points is an ideograph that carries historical weight and reveals personal and
public motives for action. Thus, Putin revealed his synchronic definition of the situation:
Russia restored, protecting its people from the depredations of the West. This line of argument
also foreshadows the anti-Western [especially anti-American] propaganda that has become
commonplace in Russian media.
4. CONCLUSION
Hill and Gaddy interpret Vladimir Putin as a statist, appointed to serve the Russian state and
restore its greatness. He is, from this perspective, an executor of the states interests: The
demise of the USSR meant a weakening of the Russian state, its institutions, its reach and
influence. Thus, restoring Russias power has been a clearly stated goal of Putins tenure from
the beginning.
To achieve this goal, Putin must first redefine the situation of the post-Soviet world
and Russias place in it. In doing so, he can change the underlying premises of future
action.
REFERENCES
Burke, K. (1969 ). Language as symbolic action. Berkeley: University of California press.
Burke, K. (1984). Permanence and change: An anatomy of purpose. Third Edition. Berkeley: University of
California press.
Burke, K. (1973). The philosophy of literary form. third edition. Berkeley: University of California press.
Casula, P. (2014). The road to Crimea: Putins foreign policy between reason of state, sovereignty and biopolitics. Russian analytical digest.
Cox, J.R. (1981). Argument and the definition of the situation. Central states speech journal, 32, 197-205.
Gaddy, C. and Hill, F. (2013). Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. Washington: Brookings institute.
McGee, M.C. (1980). The ideograph: A link between rhetoric and ideology. The quarterly journal of speech,
66, 1-16.
Putin, V. V. (June 12, 2013). Speech at Reception on Russia day. (English) http://eng.kremlin.ru/ ; (Russian)
http://www.kremlin.ru/
Putin, V. V. (September 11, 2013). A plea for caution from Russia: What Putin has to say to Americans about
Syria. The New York Times.

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Putin, V. V. (December 12, 2013). Gala concert to mark the 20th anniversary of Russian constitution. (English)
http://eng.kremlin.ru/ ; (Russian) http://www.kremlin.ru/
Putin, V. V. (March 18, 2014). Address by President of the Russian Federation. (English) http://eng.kremlin.ru/ ;
(Russian) http://www.kremlin.ru/
Richards, I.A. (1936). The Philosophy of rhetoric. Oxford: Oxford university press.
Zarefsky, D. (1997). Definitions. In J.F. Klumpp (Ed.), Argument in a time of change: Definitions, frameworks,
and critiques (pp. 1-11). Annandale, VA: National communication association.

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Some Considerations Concerning Pragmatism And Dialectics In

Argumentation Theory
Harald R. Wohlrapp
Universitt Hamburg

ABSTRACT: As Argumentation theorys philosophical fundament stemming from Aristotle is scarcely

capable to cover the dynamic and the subjective traits of todays argumentative practice, an update is
advisable. The philosophies of Dialectics and Pragmatism allow to form some new basic concepts which on
the one hand embed argumentation into general human activities and on the other hand relate it to the
subjective views of individuals, which, however, need to be kept open (concept of transsubjectivity).
KEYWORDS: Dialectics, dialogue, inquiry, objection, orientation, Pragmatism, rationality, reflection,
subjectivity, transsubjectivity.

INTRODUCTION
Pragmatism and Dialectics seem to be well considered in contemporary argumentation
theory. Pragmatism is taken up in the general focus on the practice of argument,
particularly in the attention to the relevant speech activities; and dialectics is present in the
exercise to take the other person not only as an addressee but as a participant of the
argumentative process and to care about differences of opinions. It is true, that in all the
established approaches these traditions play a certain role; and in the Pragma-dialectic
school of Amsterdam they are even exposed as the constitutive parts of the theory.
I think, however, that both, Pragmatism and Dialectics, deserve a more profound
consideration.
Why: Because they can, if they are ingeniously combined, provide the appropriate philosophical fundament for argumentation theory, which we are missing. So here is my thesis:
We have no sound philosophy of argument we rather dwell in the remains of the
Aristotelian theories, replenished with several other antiquated philosophies like
metaphysical realism, nave empiricism and cartesian dualism. All this is outdated and can
no longer work as a philosophical fundament for modern argumentation theory. The result
of this lack is a remarkable uncertainty about the basics, hence, a variety of approaches and
perspectives and opinions about all the fundamental determinations of aims and means,
powers and limits of argumenttation. Of course in the present short paper I can only give a
cursory impression of the thought directions which I propose. I hope that it will at least
raise some interest for these topics, whose elaboration can be found in my book.1
What I will do here is the following: I will first discuss the commonplace that good
or reasonable argumentation has to be rational; and I will claim that the usual concept of
rationality is unsufficient for the determination of perfection in argument (Sect. 1). Then I
will give a short characterization of pragmatist thinking by way of discussing the
relationship between theory and practice. This leads to the concept of orientation and
hence to the aim of argument as maintenance and advancement of orientation (Sect. 2).
After this I will expose some elements of dialectical thinking. Argumentation is here to be
taken as a reflexive activity. It proceeds on two levels, ground- and meta-level and between
two parts of the arguing subject (Proponent and Opponent) and thus takes up a principally
1

See Wohlrapp (2014)

1527

dialogical structure. The recognition of reflexivity opens up the theory for the additional
dimension of change (Sect. 3). Finally I will propose to establish transsubjectivity as the
constitutive principle of reasonable argumentative practice (Sect. 4).
SECTION 1: ARGUMENTATION AS A RATIONAL ENTERPRISE
We will easily agree about the statement that argumentation is or should be a rational
enterprise. Charles Willard spoke of rationality as the Gold Standard for argumentation2,
and by Ralph Johnson it was even described as Manifest Rationality3. However, when it
comes to the question what that means and whether we have a sufficiently clear and
unified concept of rationality the agreement might rather vanish.
Obviously there are different areas in which the term appears, and obviously very
different things can be referred to with the word rationality. In Logic it stands for
consistency and precision, in technical fields it connects aims with appropriate means, in
economics it refers to maximum benefit at given costs, in ethics it demands conformity
with established norms and in science the recognition of evidence in the search for truth.
Do we encounter here five different forms or aspects? But of what? What is the connecting
link between them? And what is their relationship to arguments?
Probably it is the assumption that the regard of rationality in one or more senses
makes an argument universally acceptable. But this assumption is also far from being
clear. I will only emphasize one problematic aspect. If the said forms of rationality are
related to argumentation they are regarded as criteria of rationality. However, when these
are applied to real problem situations, then a gap opens up between the abstract standards
and the concrete material. In order to overcome this gap, there is more needed than the
abstract criteria: The meaning of the term rational needs to be opened and possibly
adjusted with elements of the particular situations. Yet the way to do this, cannot be
completely standardized4.
Therefore reasonable argumentation must be conceived in such a way that its
characteristics exceed the static and abstract general criteria of rationality. Classical
German philosophy made a distinction between Verstand and Vernunft. Verstand
stood for the human capacity to recognize and follow general rules and criteria. It was seen
that these were bound to the limits of the present understanding of the social and natural
world. Vernunft, on the other hand, was the capacity to transcend these limits. It was, as
Hegel has put it, the Capacity of the Unconditioned5.
The English speaking world, however, did not so much ponder over this distinction
and therefore there are no equivalents established in English. I have here taken Reason
as a translation for Vernunft (because of the English title of Kants opus maximum:
Critique of pure Reason). Hoping that the meaning of this distinction can reach my
audience I would now state that Reason is the heart of the philosophical fundament of
argumentation theory. Consequently it is clear that no strict criteria can ever be sufficient
to define reasonable argumenttation. What can be done to specify reason in argument, if
not in a criterion or rule, so at least in a principle of attitude, is exposed in my last section
about transsubjectivity. But in order to set the ground for its understanding I must first
expose the main ideas of pragmatist and dialectic philosophies.
2

See Willard (1989), p 158.

See Johnson (2000).
4
See Wittgensteins argument against the demand for rules to guide the rule application, Wittgenstein
(2009), 85 (see also Wittgenstein (1967), p. 154).
5
See Hegel (1830), 45
3

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SECTION 2. A FLASHLIGHT ON PRAGMATISM

The pragmatist way of thinking is, in my opinion, the silver bullet to solve the problems
around the question of how to determine the status of claims and conclusions in
relationship to mere opinions on the one side and true knowledge on the other. If claims
were no more than opinions (standpoints) then why do we engage in arguing about
them? Why not simply state: This is what I mean and if you dont like it, let it be? And
if conclusions were truths How could we achieve them by mere talking, i.e. without
carrying out a specific investigation about the issue?
Indeed I think that the argumentative thesis is located between the two. It is more
than opinion and less than knowledge. This can be clarified when taking up pragmatist
thinking. With pragmatist thinking I do not mean a non-specific reference to practical life
or to the performance aspect of speaking. I rather refer to the great and revolutionary ideas
of the philosophy of pragmatism, as they were present in the thinking of e.g. Kant, Vico,
Nietzsche; then Peirce, Mead, Dewey and finally Dingler, Lorenzen and Janich.
The essence of philosophical pragmatism concerns the relationship from practice to
theory: All the relevant qualities of theory, but in particular the meaning of concepts and
the truth or falsehood of sentences, are clarified with regard to human practice6; i.e. with
regard to the practical circumstances of the issue that is named by a concept and the
sentences that are taken to describe or prescribe the issue. In short, the fundamental insight
of pragmatist thought puts practice as primary to theory.
This leads to a specific way of viewing: All sorts of theory, i.e. distinctions,
concepts, sentences, theoretical systems, are taken as orientations in practice. Their
usefulness and their possible truth are defined by their orientation value. And this seems
realistic: We have accepted certain distinctions (such as e.g. the distinction between day
and night) and certain theories (such as e.g. classical mechanics) as true, insofar as we
conceive our actions within the restrictions, that they demand; and we trust these actions to
be successful in the respective areas of practical life.
Now the pragmatic term of orientation allows to determine the area of human life
in which argumentation is located. This area is inquiry; inquiry in its widest sense from
usual problem solving to scientific research, from juridical questioning to philosophical
reflection. Inquiry is the condition of the alert human being. It is a twofold activity with a
cognitive and a practical layer. In the practical layer it is test and exploration. In the
cognitive layer, however, it is argumentation: Here we pose claims which, if they are taken
seriously, become theses that are to be justified with reasons and defended against
objections.
Hence, argumentation typically occurs, when orientation is lacking; i.e. when there
is not enough knowledge and experience to be oriented in some new situation. The
orientation gap can appear in different forms: As a question, a doubt, as a problem, or as a
difference of opinions ( however, only when this is not interesting and enriching, but
disturbing).
In this view the specific function of a thesis becomes evident: It is meant to
reconstruct orientation. And the subsequent argumentative process of justifying and
critically examining the theses is a unique method to find out whether that thesis is suitable
to function as New orientation. If the argumentation comes to a successful end, it results
in a conclusion that has passed the intellectual test. After this we can dare to act upon it
6

See Peirces famous pragmatist maxim: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole
of our conception of the object. Peirce (1965), 258, Collected Papers 5.402 (How to make our Ideas clear)

1529

viz. proceed in the practical layer of our inquiry.

A thesis which is in this sense valid is no longer a mere opinion. It has been
reflected (through possible objections), i.e. it has immersed into instances of the other
and it has come up as the same (which can imply that it has been modified) but more
stable and better understood.
On the other hand a valid conclusion is not yet knowledge. Knowledge, in the
pragmatist sense, must be anchored in successful human practice which shapes the world.
(Therefore the question whether a conclusion, that is argumentatively valid, can be
regarded as true or as knowledge has to be determined not in argumentation but in
future praxis.)
SECTION 3. A FLASHLIGHT ON DIALECTICS
The essence of philosophical dialectics is the insight into the reflexive structure of human
thinking. Aristotle spoke of Noesis noeseos7. Mind is able to bend back to itself,
objectify itself and produce the amazing relationship of self-identity and non-identity.
I have taken argument as aiming at the advancement of orientation. If this is meant
to be an autonomous endeavor it must comprise not only a performing but also a
supervising instance that cares for keeping on tracks. Thus, argumentation is basically
reflexive. If this is understood, some features become obvious which seem to be blurred todate. I will shortly highlight three of them.
The first is, that argument proceeds simultaneously on two levels in modern
terms: On object- and metalevel. Some scholars have been more or less aware of this. The
Amsterdam school shows a certain presentiment of it in the relationship between opening
stage and argument stage. A lot more distinctive is Maurice Finochiaros notion of metaargumentation8. But even there the relationship between ground- and meta-level is not yet
completely understood because the two layers are regarded as separable. In argumentation
this is not so. The practice of arguing cannot be separated from constructing the theory in
which we seek to comprehend that practice. The only way to secure argumentation theory
is via argumentative practice. In usual examples of the theory-practice relationship this is
different. Take e.g. boxing. (I refer to this example because the Amsterdam school has
several times chosen a picture of two men in a fistfight as a cover illustration of their books
which may expose, in an innocent manner, their view of theory and practice of
argument.) Boxing has become a real discipline because it has been theorized. Certainly
the theory has been buildt up and improved through inquiry comprising the observation
and the analysis of relevant boxing episodes, of tentative variations of those episodes etc.
Any conclusions of such inquiry, however, are not determined by boxing but by argument.
Insofar practice and theory are separated here.
The second consequence of the reflexive structure is, that argumentation is in
principle dialogical. We have to admit not just one agent in the arguing subject but always
two. I have named them proponent and opponent. These names describe only roles,
they do not stand for any personal or emotional attitude between the partners; not the
slightest adversariality is meant.9 The two roles can be taken over even by one person in
his or her reasoning process. The central point in assuming a dialogical structure is, that
argumentation is always done by two agents one, who carries out the steps of a
7

See Aristotle (1935), Metaphysics 1074b 34

See Finocchiaro (2013)
9
See Goviers considerations about a kind of adversariality between Opponent and Proponent in Chapter
14.2. (Adversariality and Argument) of her book Govier (1999).
8

1530

justification and another one who critically supervises the performance.

Again this is not comprehended by all argumentation theorists. Here the
Amsterdam school is simply right, but others have criticised them for various reasons. I
will shortly flash on two positions which try to evade the demand for principally assuming
a dialogue in argument. First there is the often cited article of Anthony Blair, criticising the
ubiquity of the dialogical structure10. This position works with a concept where a dialogue
is a two parties exchange of utterances, guided by certain fix rules. Certainly these
dialogue games exist. And that they cannot serve as models for all argumentative practice
is evident but this evidence is due to the narrow concept of dialogue which is here
presupposed. A somehow contrary position is presented by Christopher Tindale in the
wake of the Russian scholar Michail Bakhtin11. Here the word dialogue stands for a
communicative endeavour that is carried out in mutual acknowledgement. With such a
wide concept argument is indeed (or should be) always dialogical; but now this ascription
is no more specific for argumentative practice instead for any serious and good willing
human encounter.
The third consequence of the reflexive structure of argument is a specific kind of
change due to the deepening of reflection. This possibility is, in my opinion, the most
significant of those consequences. I mean the following: When a seemingly self-evident
presupposition is questioned and put up to consideration, then reflection becomes
intensified it gets deeper (or higher). And now, in the deepening of reflexion all the
relevant instances and factors of argumentation can change. Theses can change, arguments
can change, and so can issues and even the arguers themselves. They can loose their shapes
viz. transform themselves in mutual influencing. (I have developed the square of
dimensions in order to cover as much as possible of these happenings12).
It is amazing that the circumstances and possibilities around this dynamics are
hardly recognised in contemporary argumentation theory. My explanation for this fact is
the ongoing imprint of the old logical paradigm viz. the unmitigated opposition between
logical and rhetorical approaches. I believe there is quite some effort necessary to give
philosophical dialectic its appropriate place in the theorising of argument.
SECTION 4. REASON IN ARGUMENT: THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSSUBJECTIVITY
In a last section I will try to shed a little light upon what I consider the most important element of the philosophy of argument. Argumentation is not only instrumental but requires a
specific attitude and education in the personality of the arguer: It is the firm conviction that
ones subjective certainties (i.e. prejudices, vested interests and even the contemporary
knowledge) have to be subordinated under the aim of truly understanding and shaping the
human world. This conviction is the secret spirit of reasonable argumentation. It is only
partly externalisable in prescriptive norms or rules. The most explicit instruction may be
the hint to respect objections to ones own theses and arguments. (Still it is clear that even
this can be done within the limits of subjectivity, i.e. as a mere habitual reaction.)
As far as I know, the best articulation of this spirit, is Paul Lorenzens Principle of
Transsubjectivity. Lorenzen was the founder of Operative Mathematics and Dialogue
Logic in Germany during the 50ies and 60ies. This is well known. Less known is, that in
his late work he engaged in constructing a framework of concepts and principles for
reasonable ethics and politics. Very soon he realised that all the specific norms which
10

See Blair (1998).

See Tindale (2004), 94-98.
12
See Wohlrapp (2011) and, more extensive, Wohlrapp (2014), Chapter 6.
11

1531

could be considered, had to be based upon the willingness to work upon ones subjectivity.
This willingness he proposed to articulate in a general principle: Transsubjectivity.
Transsubjectivity is not a fact, but it is not a postulate either. Transsubjectivity is simply a term
characterizing that activity in which we are always already involved if we begin to reason at all
Transsubjectivity is still subjectivity, but a subjectivity which is aware of its own limits and
tries to overcome them.No person can do more than try to overcome his/her subjectivity
(Lorenzen 1969, pp 82f)

Please note that here we envisage something like a middle course between the sheer
acknowledgement of subjectivity and a complete self surrender. I will not go into further
considerations about a more conscious implantation of this principle into argumentation. I
would only like to finally state:
Without a commitment to the principle of transsubjectivity (of course not necessarily under
this name) all arguing will be no more than sophistry.

REFERENCES
Aristotle (1935), Metaphysics Books X-XIV, Oeconomia and Magna Moralia, ed. H. Treddennick & C.
Armstrong, London: Heinemann
Blair, Anthony (1998), The limits of the dialogue model in argumentation. Argumentation 12, pp. 325-339
Finocchiaro, Maurice (2013), Meta-argumentation. An Approach to Logic and Argumentation Theory,
London: College Publications
Govier, Trudy (1999), The Philosophy of Argument, Newport News: Vale
Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm, (1830), Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse,
hrg. von F. Nicolin & O. Pggeler 1959, Hamburg: Meiner
Johnson, Ralph, (2000), Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument, Mahwah NJ: Erlbaum
Lorenzen, Paul (1969), Normative Logic and Ethics, Mannheim: BI
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1965), Collected Papers, (ed. Ch. Hartshorne), Cambridge: Harvard University
Press
Tindale, Christopher (2004), Rhetorical Argumentation. Principles of Theory and Practice, London/ New
Delhi: Sage
Willard, Charles Arthur (1989), A theory of argumentation. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1967), Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis von Friedrich Waismann ed. B. F.
McGuiness), Oxford: Blackwell
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009), Philosophical Investigations, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell
Wohlrapp, Harald (2011), Conductive Arguments: A Misleading Model for the Analysis of Pro- and ContraArgumentation, in: Blair, A. & Johnson, R. (eds.), Conductive Argument. An overlooked type of
defeasable reasoning , London: College Publications, pp. 210-223
Wohlrapp, Harald (2014), The Concept of Argument. A Philosophical Foundation. Berlin/ Heidelberg/ New
York: Springer

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Consideration On The Notion Of Reasoning

Xiaojing Wu
School of Humanities
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
China
tun1980@126.com

ABSTRACT: I started my discussion from Ralph H. Johnsons view, and examined the phenomenon that
theorists have used the notion of reasoning in different way and tried to explain why they use it in a
confusing manner. I compared the notion of reasoning with the notions of argument and argumentation. I also
pointed out some misunderstood concepts related to reasoning, such as soundness, completeness and validity.
And hence proposed a new definition of reasoning.
KEYWORDS: Argument, Argumentation, Reasoning

1. INTRODUCTION
It is known to us that informal logic has been developed over thirty years since the late
1970s last century. During decades, discussions that mainly concerns on the issues on
interpretation, construction and evaluation of argumentation have led to remarkable
accomplishment. Although they first started from the demand of pedagogical reform that
launched by students and teachers in universities of Canada by rejecting the way symbolic
logic treated to our daily arguments, these research were carried out from distinct
perspectives, and rapidly developed in north America, Europe and now Asia. Gradually
researchers gained accumulated agreement that the strict and artificial symbolic language
only can never be enough for us to construct and evaluate arguments in natural discourse.
And argumentation theory has been benefited from examining the way we look at
logic. Under this naturalizing turn of logic, reasoning has also been studied from a different
manner than what traditional symbolic logic has done. Not only did researchers start to pay
attention to those who deduction and probability were hard to resolve, but among them,
they incorporate a number of various reasoning types to reasonable use in different
contexts.
However, although the discussion of reasoning has all the way accompany
discussion on argumentation theory (a broad sense including informal logic so), it is still
far away from what we should achieve. As Ralph Johnson has pointed out, if we type the
theory of reasoning and try to look up through The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, then we
will find no entry, nor standard indices of The Philosopher's Index, whereas the other
related concepts are given intensive discussion, say, rationality (Johnson, 2000). As we
have seen, although different reasoning under different contexts has been studied under the
title of informal reasoning, there is still little research on the notion reasoning itself from a
perspective of philosophy. However, understanding reasoning means not only how much
we know about itself, but also vital in understanding the other related concepts. As Johnson
also pointed out the First Form of Network problem, it is significant for us to understand
the concept and the interrelationship of critical thinking, problem solving, metacognition,
argumentation, informal logic and reasoning (Johnson, 2000). And only in understanding
these definition and interrelationship of them all can we situate what we have known in a
comprehensive and confusion-avoiding location, which leads to the Second Form of
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Network Problem How does reasoning relate to argumentation? How is reasoning related
to rationality? to intelligence? to knowledge? to thinking? to argument?1And to constitute
a theory of reasoning, Johnson made a list for us to answer:
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

What is reasoning? Is reasoning either identical to, essentially the same as, or else
reducible to, inference, implication, and entailment...How does reasoning differ
from thinking?
What is the relationship between reasoning and rationality? Are they the same
concept under different guises? And what about reasoning and intelligence?
reasoning and knowledge?
Is there a discernible pattern in the historical development of the various
exemplifications of reasoning? And what can we learn from various historical
theories of reasoning?
Are there universal principles of reasoning? Or are substantive principles of
reasoning always field dependent?
What is an appropriate conceptual scheme (or framework) for the theory of
reasoning? How can reasoning be most plainly categorized?
What are the criteria of adequacy that a theory of reasoning must satisfy?2

Beside Johnson, Finocchiaro also had clarified what he called the theory of reasoning By
theory of reasoning I mean the attempt to formulate, to test, to clarify, and to systematize
concepts and principles for the interpretation, the evaluation and the sound practice of
reasoning. I claim that the theory of reasoning so defined is a legitimate philosophical
enterprise which is both viable and important. (1984, p. 3). To sum up, if there is
anything we call theory of reasoning, then the first issue for us to approach is to answer
the question what is the notion of reasoning?
2. THE POPULAR DEFINITIONS OF REASONING
2.1 Operational view
In realm of formal logic, reasoning and argument have been defined as a sequence of
formulas, the very last of which is conclusion and the remainders are premises. Each
formula comes either from the set of axioms or follows from the previous members by
application of specific reasoning rules. This definition is widely applied in various
branches of symbolic logic, and even has been regarded as a standard definition in logic to
introduce into other disciplines. There are also, although privately, some logicians even
believe that the application of reasoning rules themselves is already reasoning, for instance,
modus ponens. However, more commonly, logicians treat reasoning and argument as the
same thing; and they have no interest in differentiating these two notions. These logicians
hold the view that it makes no sense in distinguishing reasoning and argument as they have
little difference in the dealing way in symbolic language system, in that all the
corresponding natural language have been abstracted into formulas composed of mere
variables and connectives that represent specific meaning.
According to this, reasoning as well as argument can be classified into different categories,
by criteria that how strong the link between premises and the conclusion. Hence, we have
1 Johnson, & H. Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, (2000), 23.
2 ibid. 97.

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deduction and induction. By deduction, it refers to those reasoning whose conclusion

follows necessarily from premises that have been known as true; while by induction, it
refers to reasoning that the conclusion is probably true, instead of being necessarily true, if
their premises are true.
Looking at this point of view, we can see that scholars agree on it regard reasoning
as purely abstract operation (or calculation). It is by no means that I am denying that
reasoning has close relationship with abstract calculation, however, in daily life, there is
not a single kind of real reasoning can be carried out regardless of real subject and real
environment that subject has been situated. For instance, we can of course complete an
abstract operation of mathematical proof by systematic calculation. However, we must
complete it out of some real reasons. We may do it to complete our homework, or to
satisfy our curiosity, or sometimes just for time-killing. But any reason is out of human
practical purpose, which means real reasoning that conducted by human subject can never
be separated from practical appeals. This is to say, by real reasoning, it by no means equals
to abstract mathematical operation, rather, it is a kind of practical activity that also closely
related to pragmatic environment and specific context. This also explained that why results
from psychological experiments went so against logic.3 Although formal logicians regard
reasoning as pure abstract operation through their normative concern and characteristic of
discipline, if we treat the operation view as the only legitimate manner to study reasoning,
we simply overlooked the diversity and flexibility of human reasoning in real life. And real
reasoning has so much for us to explore, it deserves a new and complete consideration of
its notion.
2.2 Inferential view
Unlike formal logicians who concentrate on transformation of logical structure between
statement forms and the truth-value calculation of formulas in symbolic system, informal
logicians paid more attention on considering the content and context of reasoning from a
pragmatic point of view. One popular point of view goes that reasoning is inference, or a
sequence of inference. Take these definitions for example,
Dagobert D. Runes:
Reasoning is the process of inference; it is the process of passing from certain
propositions already known or assumed to be true, to another truth distinct from them but
following from them; it is a discourse or argument which infers one proposition from
another, or from a group of others having some common elements between them.4
Douglas Walton:
Reasoning is the making or granting of assumptions called premises and the process of
moving toward conclusions (end points) from these assumptions by means of warrants.5
Stephen Toulmin:
The term reasoning will be used, more narrowly, for the central activity of presenting the
reasons in support of a claim, so as to show how those reasons succeed in giving strength
to the claim.6
3

Dunbar, G. L.Traces of reasoning with pragmatic schemas, Thinking & Reasoning (2000), 6:2, 173-181.
Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, (1984). 281.
5
Douglas. Walton, WHAT IS REASONING? WHAT IS AN ARGUMENT? Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87,
(1990), 403.
6
Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, Allan Janik, An introduction to reasoning, 2nd edition, New York,
4

1535

These definitions seem that they emphasized the centre status of the roll that inference
played in process of reasoning, and supporting structure played in inference. Beside the
scholars I mentioned above, Jaakko Hintikka, C.L.Hamblin are also on the list, which
reflects how popular this point of view is. However, it seems to me that, the definition that
defines reasoning to inference or superimposition of inference seems too narrow, which
reminds us to be vigilant. According to Johnson, inference is the transition of the mind
from one proposition to another in accordance with some principle; at its best, guided by
the theory of probability.7 If we admit reasoning equals to inference, then we simply
overlooked the fact that reasoning can be very flexible. Reasoning can not only be
proceeded forward to the product of our mind, but also backward to the state of mind that
can complete our problem space. For instance, problem solving is very typical. In many
cases we search the arithmetic from not only beginning stage to end stage, but also do it
inversely to search problem space. And sometimes it even goes circular, like A A. And
second, reasoning can repeat, stop and restart whenever the subject wants to, for instance,
mathematical calculation. If we calculate the value of n in equation n = m+1, we can
start from wherever m = 1, n = 2; m = 2, n = 3; m = 3, n = 4or stop whenever we
like to stop in this sequence. And if it is in need, we can surely repeat the process from
necessary part. And third, reasoning can conduct not only in language but also on image,
and sometimes reasoning on image can speed up our reaction. Fourth, reasoning can
correct itself, and correctional reasoning takes place frequently among our everyday life.
So the question is, can inference behave the same all? Or, even if it can, do
inference and reasoning follow the same process or proceed in same mental mechanism?
The answer to these questions would be very tricky and it is better for us to combine the
related disciplines results, say, cognitive psychology. However, before that, we have to be
careful with this inferential view.
3. CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION
Till now, it seems that the notion of reasoning has been confused with a bunch of related
concepts. Among those concepts I see argument is a highly appearing term. If we look at
the views we have discussed above, it would not be surprise for us to see the confusion
between the notion of argument and reasoning. In fact, not only in formal logic, but also in
informal logic it has also been full of this conceptual confusion. For instance Toulmin
(1984), after defined reasoning as I mentioned above, he immediately offered his
definition of argument, which says An argument, in the sense of a train of reasoning, is
the sequence of interlinked claims and reasons that, between them, establish the content
and force of the position for which a particular speaker is arguing. From here we can
observe, for Toulmin, the chain of inference makes reasoning, and the chain of reasoning
makes argument. This point of view is endorsed by countless scholars which spreaded
widely within informal logic. It seems make sense in the first place. However, if inference
cannot be as equal as the only component of reasoning as we had expected, then how come
the longer length and larger size of reasoning makes argument? If the notion of reasoning
and the notion of argument only differ in its complexity, then what is the distinction
between these two in nature?
The problem lies whenever we mentioned the notion of reasoning, we seldom
really separate it from the notion of argument. There are countless logic textbooks starting
Macmillan Publishing Company (1984).14.
7
Johnson, & H. Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, (2000), 94.

1536

with introduction to argument and then immediately tell students that reasoning can be
classified as deduction and inductionas if argument and reasoning are the same
words which can be used in turn. No matter in formal logic and informal logic, the notion
of reasoning has all the way been bundled with the notion of argument. However, even we
often try to convince other people by displaying our line of reasoning, it by no means that
they are the same thing essentially in equal. One can surely experience that we always
reason before we argue. And even Newton had indeed been hit by an apple which inspired
him the law of gravity, he would never had composed his paper by the way he was
inspired. Instead, he would certainly choose the normative treatment according to his own
discipline. Why? Because reasoning is different from arguing.
Besides, if we trace the earlier root of history all the way back to this confusion, we
would find that even in Aristotles works, he also used these two terms as interchangeable,
although he did distinguish reasoning and argument. And hence Aristotle influenced all the
way that we look at reasoning and argument.
4. CLARIFICATION
In order to clarify this confusion, we still have to return to formal logic, where validity has
been complained quite a lot since last century. If we look at formal logic, no matter
proposition logic, predicate logic, or non-monotonic logic, although formal logicians had
studied logic by making use of symbolic mathematical treatment, their research object are
human reasoning with distinctive characteristics, instead of single argument in everyday
life. Precisely, what they study is the abstract form of reasoning; and symbolic systems are
used to simulate the specific reasoning phenomenon with different characteristics.
Theoretically, anyone can construct a symbolic system without considering its
interpretation meaning. If all the propositions of this system are valid under the semantic
interpretation that the system tried to describe and simulate, then it means this system
successfully re-displayed this kind of reasoning phenomenon that the system tried to
simulate. And in turn, if all the semantic interpretation can find its corresponding
proposition within formal system, it means that the system constructed can completely
show the reasoning phenomenon that the system intends to simulate. In this sense, formal
logic used strict mathematical tools to describe, simulate and predict the different
characteristics of reasoning phenomenon. And validity should be understood as the micro
nature of both syntactic system and semantic model. It functioned as a kind of media which
connects and guarantees the macro nature of symbolic system constructed can fit its
semantic interpretation very well. In other words, what formal logic study is reasoning,
instead of argument as informal logicians have focused on. Therefore, the term validity,
soundness and completeness should be understood from the macro nature of logic
system and its corresponding semantic interpretation that the formal system tries to
capture. However, those criticisms from informal logicians had mixed the difference
between reasoning form that formal logicians focused on and the real arguments that we
come across in daily life. For instance, if we take A A as an argument, then it surely is
not a successful one, however, if we take it as a piece of self-evident reasoning, then no
one can deny it is no wrong.
As Johnson had pointed out, if we want to clarify the notion of reasoning, then it is
better for us to understand it in a network of its related concepts. To understand the notion
of reasoning, one has to understand its relationship with argument, as well as the
relationship with argumentation. To free the notion of reasoning from the bundling of
argument, I think there are some key points that we have to consider:

1537

Reasoning is a mental process. Although logicians may feel uneasy about this point
as it seems drifted away from encompass of logic, we have to face it. In saying so,
one must realize that the notion of reasoning has become into a broad sense. The
truth is, the notion of reasoning was too narrow from what I have discussed above.
And this narrowness seriously hindered our understanding of reasoning and placed
a lot of terms that caused confusion in degree. For instance, under the previous
narrow sense of reasoning, problem solving, critical thinking and argumentation
would seem close but still difficult to explain each other in a proper relationship.
However, under this broad sense of reasoning, these concepts would be covered as
application of reasoning practice that conducted through the product of reasoning,
which will be discussed later. Only in admitting this, can we make distinction
between reasoning and argument, in that, argument, no matter oral or written, is a
kind of product of reasoning process. While argumentation is essentially a kind of
social activity that is the application of the product of reasoning.

Reasoning has practical purpose which leads reasoning to be situated in diverse

contexts. As we have discussed before, in real life, there is no such reasoning can
be conducted without any practical purpose, even conducting mathematical proof.
This is to say, to study reasoning under different titles requires exploration that
differs from formal logic which focused on the nature of symbolic system and its
corresponding interpretation; rather, we should take more things into account as the
research for real reasoning process can never be satisfied with the only
mathematical treatment. And real reasoning is real because it conducted in a real
environment that lots of factors have to be taken into account. This is to say, as
Finocchiaro had proposed, if there is anything can be called the theory of reasoning,
it has to incorporate the attempt to formulate, to test, to clarify, and to systematize
concepts and principles for the interpretation, the evaluation and the sound practice
of reasoning.8

Reasoning seeks to obtain products of mind which can be belief, argument, plan,
solution, and image, etc. This explained why people prefer to persuade others by
displaying their reasoning line, as it is an effective convincing method by simply
revealing how they arrive at their mental product. This is to say, reasoning differs
from argument in persuasion. Argument aims to convince other people that might
disagree with the arguer, but reasoning has no such function, in that reasoning is
only proceeded to arrive something. If anything is in charge of being convincing,
thats argument. So, construct argument means selecting useful things among all
sorts of reasoning products. And it can explain why the theory of argument always
related to dialectics and pragmatics, for they are all related to convincing.

Reasoning has operation (or calculation) level. Cognitive psychology has proved
that human can conduct mental operation by not only language but also image. This
also explains why for many years formal logic has been taken as the born legitimate
discipline aims to study reasoning and why visual image could also influence our
state and product of mind. Although real reasoning takes place everywhere in our
life, we surely have the ability to calculate or to operate on abstract state of mind
while conducting reasoning. And by operation and calculation, we obtain our
thinking product. However, the quality of this ability differs from context to

Maurice A. Finocchiaro Informal Logic and the Theory of Reasoning, Informal Logic, Vol.6, (1984), 4.

1538

practical environment which reasoning is being conducted.

What is reasoning? After so much discussion, it is time for us to consider the notion of
reasoning from a distinctive perspective. In saying reasoning in the realm of informal
logic, it is a kind of mental process which proceeds through mental operation to arrive at
thinking products under practical environment. This seems like a descriptive definition;
however, it helps us to understand reasoning under a real and broad environment of our
daily life. And in saying theory of reasoning, it aims to capture and explain the conceptual
natures and principles of reasoning that is conducted by real subject in pragmatic
environment; it aims to formulate, interpret and evaluate the practice of reasoning.
5. CONCLUSION
Although for all the time, the notion of reasoning has been used in a very narrow sense
while the notion of argument to the contrary very broad, we finally have to clear up the
conceptual confusion that caused from this narrowness. To better understand reasoning, we
should look at formal logic from a fair angle and check its definition by contrast of
argument and argumentation.
Finally I discussed the fundamental natures that reasoning has, and explained the
new definition of reasoning and the main contents that a theory of reasoning should cover.
To sum up, the theory of reasoning comes from also the philosophical demand and
the practical needs of our understanding of real reasoning that takes place in everyday life.
In this point, it has no conflict with formal logic treatment as they function differently in
study of reasoning. Formal logic is more interested in abstracting the mathematical rules of
human reasoning phenomenon; and the theory of reasoning is interested in understanding
real reasoning with its relationship of the related concepts and practical application in real
life.
To complete informal logic, the theory of reasoning plays significant role in the
development of the theory of argument and argumentation, only in clarity of the
fundamental issues of reasoning that the related concepts can gain greater progress in
understanding themselves.
Besides, the theory of reasoning should be friendly with its related disciplines as
cognitive science needs a cooperative work. And in doing this, it can explain the conflict
conclusions that are from research of distinctive disciplines. In this sense, the theory of
reasoning can function as bridge for us to coordinate with each related disciplines. In turn,
the development of other subjects can also help us understand reasoning.

1539

REFERENCES
Aristotle (2010). The works of Aristotle. Translated into English under the editorship of W.D. Ross. Oxford:
Nabu Press.
Dunbar, G. L (2000).Traces of reasoning with pragmatic schemas, Thinking & Reasoning, 6:2, 173-181.
Eemeren, F. H. van & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The pragmadialectical approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Finocchiaro, M. A. (1984). Informal Logic and the Theory of Reasoning, Informal Logic, 6, 3-7.
Hamilton, A. G. (1988). Logic for Mathematicians, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd.
Johnson, & H. (2000). Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Runes, D.D. (1984). Dictionary of Philosophy, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.
Toulmin, S. E. & Rieke, R & Janik, A (1984). An introduction to reasoning, 2nd edition, New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company.
Walton, D. (1990).WHAT IS REASONING? WHAT IS AN ARGUMENT? Journal of Philosophy, 87 , 399419

1540

Chinese Understanding Of Interpersonal Arguing: A Cross-Cultural

Analysis
Yun Xie, Dale Hample & Xiaoli Wang
Institute of Logic and Cognition
Sun Yat-sen University
China
xieyun6@mail.sysu.edu.cn
Department of Communication
University of Maryland
United States
dhample@umd.edu
Faculty of Educational Sciences
South China Normal University
China
wxl.scnu@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: China has a longstanding tradition of stressing the values of harmony and coherence, and
Chinese society has always been alleged to be a group where conflict avoidance is viewed more positively
than direct confrontation and argumentation. In order to evaluate the validity of this claim, this paper
sketches Chinese peoples feelings and understandings of interpersonal arguing by reporting results of a data
collection in China, using measures of argumentativeness, verbal aggressiveness, argument frames, and
personalization of conflict. Chinese and U.S. data differed in complex ways, but did not show Chinese
respondents to be more avoidant. The Chinese correlations among variables were a reasonable match to
expectations based on Western argumentation theories. The paper offers evidence that Chinese respondents
had a more sophisticated understanding of interpersonal arguing than their U.S. counterparts, and were more
sensitive to the constructive possibilities of face-to-face disagreement.
KEYWORDS: argument predispositions, China, confrontation, interpersonal arguing

1. INTRODUCTION: CHINESE ORIENTATIONS TO INTERPERSONAL ARGUING

Most of the existing literature on argumentation and communication studies suggests that
the Chinese culture has long stressed the values of harmony, coherence, and holism,
implying that Chinese people would prefer non-confrontational, non-argumentative, and
conflict avoidance approaches over direct argumentation and confrontation in their social
lives (Jensen, 1987, Leung, 1988; 1997; Lin, Zhao, & Zhao, 2010; Oetzel & TingToomey, 2003; Oetzel et al, 2001; Triandis, 1995). Accordingly, Chinese society has
always been regarded as a group where conflict avoidance is viewed more positively than
direct confrontation and argumentation, and Chinese peoples understanding of, and
attitudes towards, interpersonal arguing have been supposed to differ significantly from
those of Western people, whose culture has appreciated, from its very beginning, the
importance of argumentative practices.

1541

Moreover, it has also been argued by many scholars that, within Chinese social-cultural
tradition, there is indeed a lack of argumentation and debate, a deprecation of speeches,
and even a disinterest in logic (Becker, 1986; Kennedy, 1980). This longstanding tradition
has not only contributed to a deficiency of argumentation studies in ancient China, but has
also shaped in an important way the Chinese peoples orientations to interpersonal arguing
behaviors in modern times (Oliver, 1971; Kincaid, 1987). In the last decades, a
considerable amount of work has been done to argue against the absence of argumentation
and its study in ancient China (Garrett, 1993; Jensen, 1992; Lu & Frank 1993), but there
seem to be few studies that examine what the modern Chinese peoples orientations to
interpersonal arguing really are, and whether they do differ from those of Westerners in a
significant way. The purpose of this paper is to address these last two questions with
empirical findings. In what follows, we first explain the instruments we have used to
sketch understanding of interpersonal arguing, then we present the results of our study and
make comparisons between the Chinese and the U.S. data, and finally we end with some
discussion concerning Chinese orientations to confrontation and argumentation.
2. SKETCHING CHINESE PEOPLES UNDERSTANDING OF INTERPERSONAL
ARGUING
There are quite a few possible approaches to providing an empirical summary of Chinese
peoples views on arguing, and in fact we have already addressed this topic in a different
way (Xie, Shi, Evans & Hample, 2013). However, this paper is also part of a systematic
cross-cultural project in which we are trying to compare different nations and cultures on
the same instruments. The projects intention is to establish some general findings and
comparisons that can be explored further with other methods and aims. To that end, we
have decided to make use of several instruments that we believe have clear implications
for most arguing behaviors and orientations. These instruments have all been developed in
the United States, which immediately raises questions about their relevance to other
cultures. However, even the finding that these concepts lack importance elsewhere in the
world would be substantially informative.
2.1 Argumentativeness and Verbal aggressiveness
The first instruments bear on peoples motivations and orientations to interpersonal
arguing. These are argumentativeness (Infante & Rancer, 1982) and verbal aggressiveness
(Infante & Wigley, 1986). These both represent approach/avoid motivations that are
relevant to arguing, but they differ in their motivational targets. Argumentativeness is the
predisposition to engage or attack the other persons evidence, reasoning, or position.
Verbal aggressiveness is the predisposition to attack the other persons character,
background, or identity. Being argumentative is constructive and has a host of positive
consequences, but being verbally aggressive is destructive and is corrosive to relationships
(Rancer & Avtgis, 2006).
Some prior research has applied these concepts in China (or, in several cases,
Taiwan). Only a little of this work bears very directly on the present project, but it may be
worthwhile to summarize it all in one place. Lin, Rancer, and Kong (2007), using Chinese1542

language materials, found that Chinese college students argumentativeness scores were
associated with communication practices in their families of origin. Students with high
argumentativeness scores tended to come from consensual or pluralistic families rather
than protective or lassiez-faire ones. Consensual and pluralistic families have in common
that they emphasize conceptual development in their conversations, whereas protective
families cut off substantive discussion to prevent stress and lassiez-faire families do not
pursue either conceptual or social goals. Yeh and Chen (2004), also using non-English
materials, compared the argumentativeness of residents of mainland China, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong. They discovered that argumentativeness was positively associated with
assertiveness and independent self-construals, and was negatively correlated to
interdependent self-construals and social traditionalism. Students living in mainland China
had the highest argument-approach scores compared to students living in Taiwan or Hong
Kong, and Taiwanese students had the lowest argument-avoid results. Bresnahan,
Shearman, Lee, Ohashi, and Mosher (2002) found that in China, Japan, and the U.S., men
had higher argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness scores than women. Chinese
participants had higher verbal aggressiveness scores than Japanese or American
respondents. The researchers also discovered that U.S. participants responded more
aggressively to a personal complaint than people from China or Japan. Hsu (2007)
compared U.S. and Taiwanese undergraduates, and found Americans to be higher in
argumentativeness. Hsu found no sex difference among Taiwanese respondents on the
argumentativeness measure. Hsu also compared English- and Chinese-language versions
of the instrument for Taiwanese respondents and found no mean differences and a
correlation of .79 between them.
Considered together these results are rather mixed, mainly due to the differences
between mainland and Taiwanese samples, which are hard to interpret in the present
context. However, the results are theoretically sensible (see Rancer & Avtgis, 2006), and
afford evidence that the argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness constructs and
measures have validity in China. The current project will re-test some of the inconsistent
findings, particularly the male-female differences and the comparisons of U.S. and
Chinese college students.
2.2 Argument frames
Argument frames refer to the expectations and understandings that people have for
interpersonal arguing (Hample, 2003). These scales were developed to provide a summary
answer to the question, What do people think they are doing when they are arguing? The
frames fall into three categories, which are held to be in order of argumentative
sophistication. The most basic group consists of the primary goals for arguing. Those
goals are utility (obtaining some benefit), displaying identity, asserting dominance, and
play. All of these are self-centered motivations that treat the other person as no more than
a means to achieving ones own objectives. The second group, in contrast, takes the other
arguer into account in a more genuine way. These frames include blurting (non-blurters
adapt to the other person), cooperation (as opposed to competition), and civility. The final
group of frames has only one measure, called professional contrast. This lists a number of
paired descriptors that argumentation professionals have one view about and many
1543

ordinary arguers have the opposite (e.g., is argument an alternative to violence, or an

invitation to it?). High scores on this scale indicate agreement with the professionals.
Development of the measuring scales has taken place over the years (Hample, Richards, &
Skubisz, 2013; Hample, Warner, & Young, 2009).
Except for some unreported work in our own multinational project, we are unaware
of these measures having been used in countries or cultures outside the U.S. However,
they should serve their summarizing function and provide a useful platform for comparing
U.S. and Chinese orientations to interpersonal arguing.
2.3 Taking conflict personally
The final set of topics investigated here concerns the personalization of conflict (Hample
& Cionea, 2010; Hample & Dallinger, 1995). People vary in the degree to which they take
conflict personally (TCP). Again, a battery of scales is employed to measure this set of
predispositions. Direct personalization is the most immediate measure of a persons
inclination to take conflicts personally. Stress reactions include both physical and
psychological stress experiences connected to conflict. Persecution feelings refer to the
belief that other people are participating in the conflict in order to victimize the
respondent, rather than to settle any substantive issue. Positive and negative relational
effects measure peoples estimates that conflicts can enhance or damage personal and
workplace relationships. Finally, valence is a general summary of whether the respondent
enjoys or dislikes interpersonal conflict.
The TCP instruments have been applied outside the U.S. (Avtgis & Rancer, 2004),
but not in China to our knowledge. The Bresnahan et al. (2002) finding that Americans
responded more aggressively to complaints than Chinese respondents did may be helpful,
although the relationships between TCP and aggression have proved to be complex
(Hample & Cionea, 2010). Comparing U.S. and Chinese respondents on the TCP
measures should enhance our understanding of how arguments are approached and
conceptualized in these nations because interpersonal arguments often involve
disagreements and goal incompatibility.
2.4 Summarizing argument orientations
Collecting data on all these instruments at once permits more information than if they
were explored in separate studies. We intend to examine two sorts of information: means
and correlations. Whether college students from the two countries have similar mean
scores will be informative, and this analysis may permit us to say that students from one
country are higher or lower on some particular measure. But a more theoretically
provocative question is whether the instruments have the same dynamic interconnections
in both countries. Do the measures have the same connections to one another in the U.S.
and China? It is possible that national means could be comparable but the correlations
could differ, or the reverse. By examining both sorts of outcomes, we hope to begin a
comparative sketch of U.S. and Chinese arguing profiles.

1544

3. METHOD
3.1 Respondents
Respondents were 235 first year students at two Chinese universities, Sun Yat-sen
University (N = 212, 90% of the sample) and South China Normal University (N = 23,
10% of the sample). Both universities are comprehensive multi-disciplinary institutions,
located in Guangzhou, the biggest city in the Southern part of mainland China. Sun Yatsen University is the best university in this area, ranking as one of the top ten universities
in mainland China. Its enrolled students are normally elites in their generation. All the
respondents were native Chinese, approximately a half of them were local (i.e. from
Guangdong province), and the other half were from different parts throughout China. 86 of
the respondents were men (37%) and 149 (63%) were women, and they were all about the
age of 19. Respondents at Sun Yat-sen University majored in Law, and those at South
China Normal University were Education majors.
3.2 Procedures
Survey instruments were in Mandarin, using the Chinese-language versions published in
Xie, Shi, Evans & Hample (2013). Data were collected in classes. Completing a booklet
typically took about half an hour.
3.3 Measures
Reliabilities, means, standard deviations and sample sizes for all measures are in Table 1.
Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbachs alphas, and Number of Items for
Chinese and U.S. Samples
China
Measure

compare

US

alpha

#
Mean SD
items

Mean SD

Argument Predispositions
Arg-avoid
***
Arg-approach
*
VA-antisocial
VA-prosocial
***

.77
.81
.73
.73

10
10
10
10

2.92
3.18
2.40
3.84

.58
.57
.50
.52

420
420
420
420

3.11
3.05
2.45
3.39

.64
.67
.63
.52

Argument Frames
Identity
Play
Dominance
Cooperation

.72
.69
.84
.70

8
4
6
6

3.38
2.69
2.32
4.13

.48
.74
.73
.51

419
419
419
419

3.51
2.60
2.63
3.64

.55
.87
.70
.49

**
***
***

1545

Civility
Prof Contrast

***

Personalization of Conflict
Direct Personal
***
Persecution
***
Stress
**
Pos Relational
Neg Relational
***
Positive Valence

.59
.85

8
7

2.89
3.63

.38
.76

419
419

3.39
3.54

.48
.63

.72
.68
.65
.80
.81
.79

7
6
4
7
5
7

2.58
2.74
3.02
3.49
2.70
2.77

.54
.55
.68
.57
.63
.65

192
192
192
192
192
192

3.15
2.54
2.84
3.42
3.09
2.89

.55
.68
.58
.53
.74
.71

Note: The Chinese data were recorded on 1 5 Likert scales, as were the US data. A higher number means
more of the named construct. In the Chinese data, items 2 and 9 were dropped from the civility scale and
item 30 dropped in the stress scale, in the standard orderings, to increase reliability. The U.S. data were
taken from the data sets for Hample, Han, and Payne (2010) and Hample, Richards, and Skubisz (2013). The
compare column reports the significance levels of t tests between the countries.

* p < .05

** p < .01

*** p < .001

Argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness are both twenty item scales, each composed
of two subscales. Argumentativeness includes argument-avoid and argument-approach.
Verbal aggressiveness includes both an antisocial and a prosocial subscale. Reliabilities
for all four subscales were acceptable (see Table 1).
Six of the argument frames subscales were used in the present study. Scales for
blurting and utility were still under development in the U.S. at the time the current project
was planned. First order frames include identity display, dominance assertion, and play.
Cooperation and civility represent the second order frames. The professional contrast
instrument was included, and of course reflects the third order of framing. The reliability
for play was very slightly less than what was wanted, and the reliability for the civility
measure was low even after two items were dropped (see Table 1).
The six Taking Conflict Personally (TCP) subscales are direct personalization,
persecution feelings, stress reactions, positive relational effects, negative relational effects,
and valence. One item needed to be omitted from the stress scale to increase internal
consistency. Reliabilities for persecution feelings and stress reactions were a bit low, but
the other instruments had acceptable Cronbachs alphas (see Table 1).
3.4 Comparison data
U.S. data used for comparison to the present results were reported in Hample, Han, and
Payne (2010) and Hample, Richards, and Skubisz (2013), and further details about the two
data sets can be found in the original reports. These data were collected online from
undergraduates at the University of Maryland, a large public university in the U.S. MidAtlantic Region. Combined sample size from the two studies was about 420 for several
measures, but only 192 for the TCP instruments. These data are also summarized in
Table 1.

1546

4. RESULTS
4.1 Sex differences
As summarized earlier, prior research has reported that men tend to have higher
argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness scores in both China and the U.S. Table 2
shows the relevant results for this study.
Table 2: Sex Differences in China and the U.S.
China
Male

Female

U.S.
Male

Female

Argument Predispositions
Arg-avoid
2.82
Arg-approach
3.22
VA-antisocial
2.54 a
VA-prosocial
3.70 b

2.97
3.16
2.32
3.91 ab

3.06 b
3.05
2.71 ab
3.23

3.13 b
3.05
2.33
3.46 a

Argument Frames
Identity
Play
Dominance
Cooperation
Civility
Prof Contrast

3.39
2.81 a
2.43
3.95 b
2.89
3.48

3.38
2.62 b
2.26
4.24 ab
2.88
3.73 ab

3.56 b
2.96 a
2.78 ab
3.54
3.44 b
3.53

3.49 b
2.45
2.57 b
3.68 a
3.37 b
3.55

Personalization of Conflict
Direct Personal
2.55
Persecution
2.71 b
Stress
2.82 b
Pos Relational
3.46
Neg Relational
2.68
Positive Valence
2.91 a

2.60
2.75 b
3.14 ab
3.50
2.72
2.69

2.96 b
2.48
2.54
3.43
3.05 b
3.13 ab

3.23 ab
2.56
2.95 a
3.41
3.11 b
2.80

Notes: The notation a indicates that this score is higher than the other sexs score within that nation at p
< .05, two-tailed. For example, Chinese men had a significantly higher verbal aggressiveness (antisocial)
score than Chinese women. The notation b indicates that this score is higher than the same sexs score in
the other nation at p < .05, two tailed. For example, U.S. men had a higher score on argument-avoid than did
Chinese men.

Chinese men and women displayed some different patterns. Men were significantly higher
in verbal aggressiveness (antisocial), interest in arguing for play, and in general valence
for conflict (valence is scored so that high scores indicate positive affect). Chinese women
were higher in verbal aggressiveness (prosocial), cooperative orientations to argument,
professional contrast scores, and feelings of stress while engaged in conflict. The general
1547

pattern here is that, compared to Chinese women, Chinese men were more aggressive and
less advanced in their understandings and expectations about interpersonal arguing. Sex
differences in the U.S. are not of special interest here, except to notice that many of the
same sex differences in China were also present in the U.S. data.
Same sex comparisons between the two countries are of more interest. First
consider the men. Compared to U.S men, Chinese men had higher verbal aggressiveness
(prosocial) scores, were more cooperatively oriented, felt more persecution in conflicts,
and had greater stress reactions. U.S. men, on the other hand, were more avoidant when
faced with an argument, were more antisocial, made more use of arguments to display
own identity, were more oriented to domination purposes for arguing, saw arguments as
more civil, took conflicts more personally, were more pessimistic about relational
consequences of conflict, but enjoyed conflicts more. The pattern here is somewhat
delicate, but Chinese men seemed to try to be more pleasant in argument and had
markedly more stress and persecution feelings. U.S. men seemed to have a more intense
ambivalence about arguing: they wanted to avoid it, but made more use of it for identity
and dominance displays, worried more about negative repercussions, but took more
pleasure in conflicts.
Cross-national differences also appeared for women. Chinese women, compared to
those in the U.S., were more avoidant, made more use of arguing for identity and
dominance displays, were more civil, took conflicts more personally, and were more
pessimistic about the relational consequences of conflicts. U.S. women were more
prosocial, more playful, more cooperative, more sophisticated in their understanding of the
activity, and felt more persecuted and stressed by conflicts. Again, this comparative
pattern is complex, but it may be that U.S. women were more engaged in arguing for both
good or ill, whereas Chinese women tended to be more avoidant and personal in their
arguments.
4.2 National mean differences
Table 1 displays the mean scores for both countries, along with results of significance tests
between them. Compared to U.S. respondents, Chinese students had higher approach
motivations, were more prosocial in their intentions, were more cooperative, felt more
persecuted, and experienced more stress. Chinese respondents also were less avoidant,
made less use of arguments to display identity or assert dominance, were less civil, took
conflicts less personally, and were less pessimistic about the relational consequences of
conflicts. This pattern is mixed. Chinese respondents were more inclined to participate in
arguments, but not for every reason (e.g., they did not orient to identity functions). They
reacted negatively to conflicts in some respects (persecution and stress) but not others
(personalization and negative relational consequences). Chinese respondents politeness
orientations were also mixed, compared to Americans. Chinese students reported that
they were comparatively less civil, but more cooperative and prosocial. Overall, the
comparisons of Chinese and U.S. orientations show that the two nations students have
many differences, but these do not congeal into a clear statement to the effect that one
nation enjoys arguments more, avoids them more, is more polite during them, or
understands them in a simple and dramatically different way.
1548

4.3 Dynamic associations in China

Table 3 reports correlations among the measures, restricted to the Chinese data. First, let
us consider the subscales for each group of measures.
Table 3: Correlations among Measures, Chinese Sample
1
1 Arg-avoid
2 Arg-approach
3 VA-prosocial
4 VA-antisocial
5 Identity
6 Play
7 Dominance
8 Cooperation
9 Civility
10 Prof Contrast
11 Dir personal
12 Persecution
13 Stress
14 Pos Relation
15 Neg Relation
16 Pos Valence

10

11

12

13

14

15

-.40
.08 .12
.09 .26 -.31
-.18 .48 .07 .26
-.25 .42 -.07 .28 .37
.15 .06 -.35 .36 .23 .27
.12 .10 .34 -.16 .15 -.10 -.27
-.27 .10 -.01 -.16 -.04 .09 -.24 -.09
-.26 .21 .18 -.17 .10 .10 -.36 .19 .37
.34 -.27 -.28 .31 .01 -.07 .48 -.14 -.34 -.43
.46 -.31 -.21 .20 -.04 -.21 .43 -.03 -.39 -.35 .68
.58 -.40 .03 -.01 -.10 -.35 .13 .15 -.25 -.27 .44 .56
-.27 .38 .32 -.05 .36 .26 -.26 .19 .28 .40 -.48 -.41 -.28
.46 -.26 -.17 .13 -.14 -.21 .31 -.08 -.39 -.41 .61 .57 .41 -.56
-.55 .51 -.07 .08 .34 .49 -.03 -.14 .31 .33 -.44 -.55 -.59 .50 -.51

Note: Correlations of |.13| or more are statistically significant at p < .05, two-tailed.
The relationships among the argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness measures were
conceptually expectable. Argument-avoid and argument-approach were correlated
substantially and negatively, as were the prosocial and antisocial subscales of verbal
aggressiveness. A noticeable positive correlation between argument-approach and VAantisocial also appeared, and this matches the measures common status as a sort of
assertiveness.
The frames measures also showed substantial associations among themselves. The
first order frames (identity, play, and dominance) were all positively associated. The
second-order frames, cooperation and civility, were not associated at significant levels,
although both had positive connections to professional contrast scores. Conceptually,
cooperation and civility ought to have been positively correlated, but the other results
match theoretical understandings of the constructs.
Finally, the subscales of TCP were also intercorrelated. The measures that are
sometimes collected into one measure in the U.S. (called core TCP) are direct
personalization, persecution feelings, and stress reactions, and these three subscales were
positively and very substantially associated in Table 3. The positive and negative
relational consequences subscales had their expectable large negative correlation, and the
negative consequences scale was directly associated with the core TCP measures. Valence
1549

had very strong correlations with the other subscales, all in the conceptually expectable
directions.
Some mention should also be made of noticeably strong patterns from one scale
battery to another, especially for particularly important measures. Conflict valence was
strongly correlated with nearly every other measure in the study, indicating that this
instrument affords very good predictions of how much a Chinese respondent will enjoy
interpersonal conflicts. Another key measure is professional contrast, which summarizes
the sophistication with which participants understand face-to-face arguing. Professional
contrast scores were also well predicted here. Those with the most sophisticated
understandings were also those with the highest scores on argument-approach, prosocial
motivations, cooperativeness, civility, optimism about relational consequences, and
enjoyment of conflict; these people also had the lowest scores for avoidance, antisocial
motivations, dominance impulses, core TCP, and pessimism about relational consequences
of interpersonal conflicts. Chinese respondents who were most eager to engage
argumentatively were those who saw the identity, dominance, and play uses for arguing;
who had notably low scores on the core TCP measures; who believed that conflicts
improve relationships; and who enjoyed the experience of an interpersonal conflict. The
most antisocially aggressive individuals in the sample were also sensitive to the identity,
dominance, and play potentials for arguing; had low scores for cooperation, civility, and
professional contrast; and tended to take conflict personally.
4.4 Comparisons of Chinese and U.S. associations
Finally, Table 4 reports correlations parallel to those in Table 3, but drawn from the U.S.
samples. Since those associations were discussed in the original reports, here we will only
take notice of similarities and differences when comparing Tables 3 and 4 with one
another.
Table 4: Correlations among Measures, U.S. Sample
1
1 Arg-avoid
2 Arg-approach
3 VA-prosocial
4 VA-antisocial
5 Identity
6 Play
7 Dominance
8 Cooperation
9 Civility
10 Prof Contrast
11 Dir personal
12 Persecution
13 Stress
14 Pos Relation

10

11

12

13

-.63
.12 .05
.08 .08 -.52
.08 .03 -.13 .29
.10 -.05 -.19 .32 .48
.01 .12 -.37 .51 .27 .31
.13 -.06 .44 -.31 .12 -.15 -.27
-.05 .02 .26 -.19 .12 .17 -.26 .25
.06 -.05 .25 -.25 .08 .03 -.26 .30 .53
-.15 .34 .09 -.06 .01 -.19 .01 .13 -.08 -.08
.11 .11 -.04 .17 .13 -.03 .10 -.00 -.09 -.10 .60
-.28 .41 .21 -.13 -.12 -.32 -.05 .13 -.08 -.06 .39 .36
.12 -.17 .01 .02 .11 .27 .19 .01 .06 .03 -.18 -.21 -.25
1550

14

15

15 Neg Relation -.08 .14 -.04 .16 .01 .06 .16 -.12 -.15 -.14 .04 -.06 .17 .09
16 Pos Valence .43 -.41 -.13 .16 .24 .27 .16 -.02 .06 .09 .08 .26 -.27 .08 -.45
Note: Correlations of |.12| or more are statistically significant at p < .05, two-tailed, for correlations not
involving the Taking Conflict Personally measures. For those, the parallel value is |.15|.

The general patterns noted in the Chinese sample were also present in Table 4, although
not always to the same extent. The argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness subscales
had their expectable relationships in the U.S. sample, as they did in Table 3. The argument
frames subscales internal relationships were similar in tone: the first order frames
intercorrelated positively, and cooperation and civility were both directly associated with
professional contrast. In the U.S. sample, however, cooperation and civility were
positively related to one another, a result not present in the Chinese data. The TCP
subscales also showed the same general patterns as in the Chinese data, although the
negative relational consequences subscales showed much weaker relationships to core
TCP in the U.S. data set. The conflict valence score was not as strongly predicted in the
U.S. data as in the Chinese results. This was also true of argument-approach and perhaps
professional contrast scores.
In sum, comparison of Tables 3 and 4 reveals a number of differences in detail that
might be worth pursuing in the future, but the overall patterns are generally comparable.
This means that correlational analyses do not point to any radically different variable-tovariable dynamics in China, as compared to the U.S. The variables seemed to be
performing similar functions in both countries.
5. DISCUSSION
In general, the results in our study and its comparisons to the U.S. data indicate that
Chinese and U.S. respondents were often similar, but still differed in complex ways in
their understanding of interpersonal arguing, and several findings worthy of discussion
appeared.
The most striking one is that our study did not show that Chinese respondents were
more avoidant of confrontation and interpersonal argumentation, compared to Westerners.
On the contrary, the national mean scores show that Chinese respondents actually had
higher argument approach motivations and higher verbal aggressiveness scores than the
U.S. students. This shows that Chinese were comparatively less avoidant to confrontation,
and more oriented to participate in interpersonal argumentation. Hence the allegation that
China is a nation where conflict avoidance is viewed more positively than direct
confrontation and argumentation seems to be problematic. The results of our study have
disproved this claim, and have made its flaws much more apparent.
As we mentioned in the first part of this paper, many scholars have argued for this
allegation from the perspective of traditional Chinese philosophy and culture. The gist of
their argument could be summarized as follows: the values of harmony and coherence are
prominently stressed within Chinese culture and philosophies (namely, Confucianism,
Taoism and Buddhism), but confrontation and argumentation are threats to the realization
of these values, since they involve disagreement and goal incompatibility. This would
1551

seem to undermine interpersonal relationships, so they will be strongly discouraged in

Chinese social life. This appears to be an over-simplification of the way these cultural
values could influence ordinary peoples thinking and behaviors. It may also reflect an
unsophisticated understanding of the ways in which face-to-face arguing can be socially
productive. In fact, given that the prevailing values of harmony and coherence in Chinese
culture, the cogency of the avoidance position boils down to the correctness of two other
claims: that in Chinese philosophical theories the realization of those values do preclude
confrontation and argumentation, and that in Chinese peoples social-cultural practices
conflicts and argumentative behaviors are truly recognized as damages to interpersonal
relationships. We believe that neither of these two premises is correct, but here we only
take issue against the latter one.
Consider first the argument frames results. These measures were designed to reveal
the understandings that people have for interpersonal arguing. Compared to U.S.
undergraduates, Chinese respondents made less use of arguments to display identity or
assert dominance, were noticeably more cooperatively oriented, and had higher scores on
professional contrast. All these results implied that Chinese people indeed had a more
sophisticated understanding of arguing. They could better keep their self-centered
motivations under restraint, and take the other arguer into consideration in a more genuine
way. Hence in China interpersonal arguing was far more than a confrontation of
disagreements and a struggle of achieving ones own objectives. Chinese respondents
seemed more attuned to the socially constructive potentials of interpersonal arguing than
were the U.S. participants.
Next consider the results from the measures of personalization of conflict and
verbal aggressiveness, both of which are supposed to reflect peoples views of arguing as
being destructive and corrosive to relationships. Chinese respondents were more prosocial,
they took conflicts less personally, and were less pessimistic about the relational
consequences of conflicts. Moreover, the correlations among the measures also revealed
that Chinese respondents who were most eager to participate in arguing were those who
believed that conflicts improve relationships, and who enjoyed the experience of an
interpersonal conflict. These results could be taken to mean that in their social lives
Chinese people were actually less inclined to recognize interpersonal arguing as damaging
to interpersonal relationships.
Interpersonal arguing is as common and important a sort of interpersonal
communication in China as in the U.S. In fact, the present study gives evidence that
Chinese undergraduates were more sophisticated in their understandings of arguing than
Westerners. This implies that interpersonal arguing may well be more pleasant and
constructive in China than in the U.S. Our data leads to conclusions that are quite unlike
those of some previous scholars.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Yun Xie would like to acknowledge the support from the National Social Science Fund
Projects (13CZX063), (13&ZD186), and the Chinese MOE Project of Key Research
Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities (12JJD720006).

1552

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Recognising Argumentation In Dialogical Context

Olena Yaskorska
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology
Polish Academy of Sciences
Poland
and
Institute of Argumentation, Linguistics and Semiotics,
Universit della Svizzera italiana,
Switzerland
OYaskorska@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: The aim of the paper is to present an analytical method for the dialogical argument structure
analysis. The method is used for the extension of the existing models of the recognition of argumentation
which typically focus on inference indicators as cues for argument detection. In the proposed approach the
aim is to identify argument structures via dialogue protocols. In the dialogue Bob: We should increase
funding for science; Alice: Why?; Bob: Science is necessary for successful industry the standard method is
not sufficient to recognise the argument. The solution is to use the Inference Anchoring Theory which allows
us to understand how it is that when e.g. A asks why it is that p; and then B say q, we recognise an inference
from p to q. In the paper sample analysis of the natural dialogues is presented using the transcripts of the
BBC Radio4 program Moral Maze. Basing on those examples the method for recognition of argument proand con- in debate is presented.
KEYWORDS: Argument mining, argument structure, corpus studies, dialogue protocols, inference
anchoring theory, protocol for debate

1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to introduce a procedure for the description of arguments
performed in dialogues. Analysis of argument structure in this approach will be used as an
'ore' for the argument mining techniques, consisting of methods for automated and semiautomated argument extraction from texts in natural language. The proposed method is an
extension of existing methods which typically focus on inference indicators such as
because, since, therefore as cues for argument recognition (see e.g. van Eemeren et
al. 2007). Let's consider the following example:
Example 1
Bob: We should increase funding for science because science is necessary for
successful industry.
In Bob's utterance from example 1, argument structure can be easily recognised by means
of the inference indicator because which allows recognition of the part We should
increase funding for science as a premise, and science is necessary for successful

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industry as a conclusion of the argument. This method is usually used for the argument
mining techniques (see Budzynska & Reed, 2011). Yet, it is not always sufficient for
argument detection for all communicative situations, e.g. argumentation performed in the
dialogue where there is no indicators. To illustrate such a situation, let's consider Bob's
utterance from example 1 as it was performed during Bob's conversation with Alice:
Example 2
Bob: We should increase funding for science
Alice: Why?
Bob: Science is necessary for successful industry
Here Bob's argument cannot be recognised by means of procedure based of inference
indicators description since this fragment does not contain any inferential components.
The conclusion of the argument was performed by Bob in the first locution in example 2,
and its premise was performed in the third locution. Moreover, between the premise and
the conclusion performed by Bob, Alice executed one more locution which does not
belong to the structure of the argument. Such a case becomes problematic when it comes
to the description of automated method for dialogical argument recognition.
The motivation of this research is to explore the possibility of building an
analytical method which will reliably work in situations like example 2, and be used for
the techniques of automated and semi-automated argument extraction. Proposed method
aims to identify argument structures not only via inferential components, but also via
dialogue protocols, e.g. certain sequences of utterances in a dialogue (Budzynska et al.
2014). This procedure allows us to understand, e.g. how is that when one participant
performs challenging move in a dialogue after which another participant via performing an
assertive move performs also argumentation.
Proposed approach to argument structure recognition aims to deal with the
resources in natural language, such as transcripts of conversations. In the current paper the
analyses of structure of the argument is presented for the discourse of debate.
The paper consists of three parts. In section 2 the methodology for the analysis is
described. In sections 3 and 4 the analyses of examples from corpus studies, in which
structure for argumentation pro- and con- in debate is illustrated, will be presented.
2. METHODOLOGY
In this section the state of the art representing the background of the research is described.
Firstly, theoretical framework introducing main assumptions and terms in the proposed
model for argument identification if introduced (see: 2.1). Secondly, general description of
the corpus studies during the analyses of debate is reported (see: 2.2).
2.1 Theoretical framework
The proposed method for the argument structure analysis is based on two theoretical
models describing dialogue and argument structures. Firstly, during the dialogue structure
analysis assumptions from formal dialogue systems (Hamblin, 1970) were taken. Then,
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during the dialogical argument structure description, inference anchoring theory (IAT) is
used as a core framework for the analysis (Budzynska & Reed, 2011).
The concept of a dialectical system was introduced by Hamblin (1970), as a rulegoverned structure of organised conversation. The main goal of such systems was to
model contexts for everyday conversation which will allow us to analyse argumentation
performed in natural communication (Walton & Krabbe, 1995). Formal dialogue systems
aim to determine rules governing the course of a dialogue. Currently a lot of systems are
built depending on the type of conversation those systems aim to model, e.g. system DC
by Mackenzie (1979), system CB by Woods and Walton (1978), system PPD and RPD by
Walton and Krabbe (1995), system TDG by Bench-Capon (1998) and system ASD by
Reed and Walton (1995).
Most of such dialogue systems can be described as in general specification for
dialogue systems described in Prakken (Prakken, 2006). According to this framework
dialogical systems contain three main types of moves. The first type, called locution rules,
determines what type of illocutionary forces a player can execute during the conversation,
e.g. participant may be allowed to use: claim p, for asserting a proposition p; why p?, for
challenging a standpoint p, and retract p, for withdrawing p. The second type of moves,
called commitment rules, describes how a particular utterance affects the commitment
base of the player, e.g. the performance of claim p by the agent results in adding the
proposition p into his commitments. The key element of a dialogue system is its protocol
describing what kind of utterance a player can execute in the particular stage of the
dialogue, e.g. after why p? the participant can utter: argue(p,q); or retract p.
In the proposed method for argument recognition the normative approach for
dialogue structure description will be applied. Though, the protocol will be described for
the real-live dialogues performed during the radio debate Moral Maze basing on the
analysis of its transcripts (for detailed description of corpus studies see sec. 2.2). Basing
on the protocol description the argument structure recognition will be fulfilled using the
core element for the proposed method for argument analysis which is Inference Anchoring
Theory (Budzynska & Reed, 2011) showing deeper interrelation between communicative
process and argument structure explored in this process.
The inference anchoring theory is built in order to explore the interrelation between
argumentation and dialogical processes. The main goal of the theory is to show how the
complex language structures (particularly inference) are linked to communicative
structures (such as e.g. speech acts of arguing or disagreeing) (Budzynska et al. 2013).
IAT framework bases on the assumption, that argumentation structures are anchored into
the communicative process via illocutionary connectives related to the illocutionary force
(Austin 1962, Searle 1969). Dialogue fragments in IAT are represented as graphs
particular elements of which are described in language of Argument Interchange Format
(AIF+) (Reed et al. 2010).
Using the IAT framework the dialogue between Bob and Alice from example 2 can be
represented as in figure 1:

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Figure 1: IAT representation of example 2

On the right side of the IAT diagram (see: figure 1), called in AIF+ L-nodes (locutions)
particular utterances of the dialogue between Bob and Alice are represented. They are
connected via TA1- and TA2-nodes (transitions), representing specific dialogue rules
according to which conversation is governed, like e.g. a participant can perform an
assertion after a challenging move. In the left side of the diagram, argument introduced by
Bob is represented as I-nodes holding the propositional content of players utterances and
RA1 node representing relation of inference between them. In the case when participant
performs an argumentation against particular statement (argumentation con-) the relation
between premise and conclusion of his argument is represented as CA-node representing a
conflict between them. Argument structure and dialogue process are linked via
illocutionary forces represented via YA-nodes. Illocutionary forces represented in YA1,
YA2 and YA4 are called unitary illocutionary forces, since they were used in the dialogue
in relation to the units of propositional content. Illocutionary forces represented in YA3,
though, is a relational illocutionary force since it was used in the dialogue for the
introduction of the relation of support between premise and conclusion of the argument
introduced during the dialogue.
Using this framework we can analyse argument performed by Bob in dialogue
from example 2, which we can reconstruct in a following way.
(1)
(2)
(3)

Bob: asserting (We should increase funding for science)

Alice: challenging (We should increase funding for science)
Bob: asserting (Science is necessary for successful industry)

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In the move (1), represented by the node L1 (see: figure 1), Bob performs an assertion,
represented by the YA1 node, of the proposition content We should increase funding for
science represented by I1 node. In the move represented in L2 Alice challenges statement
made by Bob in move (1), therefore Alice's move (2) has the same propositional content as
Bob's move (1), but different illocutionary force challenging, represented by YA2. In the
move (3) Bob performs another assertion of the propositional content Science is
necessary for successful industry represented via I2 node. There is a relation of inference
RA1 between contents of I-nodes, where I2 supports I1. Both those contents are
introduced by Bob what indicates that he performs an argumentation in the dialogue. The
illocutionary force of Arguing according to the inference anchoring theory is anchored in
the transition between Alice's challenge L2 and Bob's second assertion L3 and points into
the relation between the premise and the conclusion of the argument performed by Bob
represented as RA-node (for more details see Reed & Budzynska, 2011). This approach
defers from, e.g. pragma-dialectical description of argumentation (Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004), where this illocutionary force, in the current example, would refer to
the illocutionary force in Bob's second assertion (L3) and would be represented as YA4node.
Proposed model for the argument recognition in the dialogical context is based on
the formal dialogue structure description and representation of interrelation between the
dialogue process and structure of the argument performed in this process. This allows to
use particular sequences of moves in the conversation described by its protocol in order to
detect argumentation performed in this conversation, e.g. in example 2 in the Assertion
Challenge Assertion between challenge and second assertion argumentation is anchored.
Propositional content of the first assertion can be indicated as a conclusion of the
argument and propositional content of second assertion as a premise supporting it.
2.2. Corpus studies
The model for dialogical argument recognition was applied to the studies on debate basing
on the analyses of real-live dialogues. Corpus consists of the collection of a data base
which is a set of transcripts from BBC radio4 program Moral Maze. This program
typically involves a moderator, a panel of four persons and several witnesses who discuss
on the moral aspects of the controversial issues in Great Britain. The corpus contains a
large diversity of argumentative situations which make it relevant for the research on the
model for argument structure detection from the dialogical context.
The MM2012 corpus containing three transcripts (15 200 words) is available at
AIFdb Corpora: http://arg.dundee.ac.uk/corpora. The analysis was made in OVA+ tool
(Online Visualisation of Argument, see: Janier et al. 2014): http://arg.tech.org/ova. OVA+
is an online based graphical interface for IAT structure representation for the text analysis.
Current stage of the corpus studies includes two parts. Firstly, locutions made by
participants during the discussion had to be described with the relevant and applicable
illocutionary forces. In such a way, set of illocutionary forces characteristic for this type of
dialogue was identified. As a result a taxonomy for illocutionary forces in Moral Maze
dialogue is specified (for detailed description see: Budzynska et al. 2013 and Budzynska et
al. 2014a). For the sake of analysis, which will be shown in the following parts of paper,
main categories are mentioned. There are three main types of unitary illocutionary forces
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in the MM-type of dialogue: Asserting, Questioning and Challenging, and two main types
of relational illocutionary forces: Agreeing for the introduction of the relation of support
and Disagreeing for the introduction of relation of conflict. Types of unitary illocutionary
forces consist also of subcategories, depending on the dialogical intention of participant.
For example, Questioning and Challenging can be regarded as a Pure Questioning and
Pure Challenging, in the case where speaker wants to get only hearer's opinion; Assertive
Questioning and Assertive Challenging in the case where speaker not only asks about an
opinion but also conveys his own believes on the topic; and Rhetorical Questioning and
Rhetorical Challenging in the case where speaker performs locution which is shaped like a
question but aims only to introduce his beliefs, not to hear someone's response (see
Budzynska et al. 2013).
Second part of the corpus studies is to reconstruct argument structures from the
MM dialogues. Having two types of relational illocutionary forces linked to the relation of
support and relation of conflict, the argument structures pro- and con- are investigated,
what will be illustrated in the following parts of the paper.
3. ARGUMENTATION PRO- IN DEBATE
In this section the procedure for the identification of the structure of argumentation pro- is
described. On the base of the example from the corpus MM2012 (see: sec 2.2) the analysis
for cases in which participant of a debate provides means in order to support his standpoint
is introduced.
The dialogue interaction shown in example 3 is a fragment of the transcript of
Moral Maze program titled Welfare State. During this audition participants discuss about
moral premises and virtue goals of the welfare state concept as also as its influence on
the contemporary society. James Bartholomew introduces his understanding of the
possible uses of the concept:
Example 3
James Bartholomew: The real question, as opposed to going out to theoretical
nowhereville, is to ask What is the best welfare state we can make, in the real
world?. [...]
Kenan Malik: Go on, explain.
James Bartholomew: Well, I believe there are lots of ways in which we can change
our welfare state to make it better.
AIFdb corpora: Argument Map 1484

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The graphical representation of the IAT structure of this fragment using the language of
Argument Interchange format is shown below in figure 2.

Figure 2: IAT representation of example 3

In this dialogue fragment James Bartholomew (JB) introduces his standpoint about the
way we can define and use the concept of welfare state in the current point of history. This
move is represented in locution L1 (see: figure 2). He uses an illocutionary force of
assertion represented in YA1-node for providing propositional content represented in I1node. In the second move Kenan Malik (KM) says Go on, explain, which is analysed as
a challenging move related to the propositional content in I1-node. In order to support his
standpoint James Bartholomew (JB) provides another propositional content (I2-node)
which supports his main opinion (RA1-node). Analogically to the analysis of example 2,
here argumentation is performed by JB, and Arguing relational illocutionary force links
the TA2-node and relation of support (RA1) between propositional contents represented in
I1 and I2.
JB's performance in example 3 is analysed as argumentation but not as explanation
despite that KM challenges JB's standpoint via saying Go on, explain. This analysis is
made due to the nature of propositional contents introduced by JB which are opinions, but
not facts. Also, KM, being an opponent to KM's standpoint, does not have certainty about
the conclusion in JB's argument and asks for some premises to it. To analyse this case the
description of argumentation and explanation in the dialogue introduced in (Bex et al.
2012, Walton, 2011). Here the explanation in the dialogue is defined as a situation where
opponent has no doubts about the conclusion of the argument but asks proponent to
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explicate why the main standpoint to be the case. Yet, argumentation is described as a
situation where proponent has not only provide reasons why his standpoint is a case but
also remove opponents doubts about his standpoint. Referring to this definitions string
Go on, explain was analysed as a rhetorical tool for the invitation for justification of
JB's standpoint. KM seems to not be convinced about the merit of JB's utterance in L1 and
asks for providing some reasons why the question What is the best welfare state we can
make, in the real world? should be asked.
In the dialogue interaction shown in example 3 players perform sequence of moves
Assertion Challenge Assertion. Also, the relational illocutionary force of Arguing is
anchored in its second and third locutions of the interaction Challenge-Assertion. In the
existing corpus of dialogues for the debate there is a significant number of transitions
Challenge Assertion and all of them anchoring an Arguing illocutionary force.
According to this data, mentioned sequence can be used for the argument structure
recognition and be implemented to the model for argument mining. Knowing the
illocutionary forces of participants moves a system can guess that there is also an
illocutionary force of Arguing.
4. ARGUMENTATION CON- IN DEBATE
In this section the analysis of the argumentation con- in debate is described. Examples
from the MM2012 corpus (see: sec 2.2) in which participants provide means against
particular standpoint are presented.
According to the IAT framework arguing against particular standpoint is related to
the relational illocutionary force of Disagreeing. Via this communicative intention
participants introduce propositional contents being in the relation of conflict to the
standpoint with which they do not agree. This relation is represented as CA-node in the
language of Argument Interchange Format. Disagreement in the discourse of debate can
be expressed in several ways. Two examples of argumentation con- and its IAT
representation are introduced bellow.
Example 4 present a fragment of the debate conducted in the audition Morality of
Money, during which participants discussed moral aspects of getting into depth and causes
and effects of crisis in Eurozone. The interaction represents a standpoint delivered by
Michael Buerk (MB), in which he on behalf of John Lamiday's (JL) critics provides a
fault-finding in concept of giving credits:
Example 4
Michael Buerk: Mr. Lamiday, I suppose your critics would say that you are
actually financing consumer spending, as opposed to investment. You're
actually financing lifestyles that people cant actually afford.
John Lamiday: No. What were financing is the ability of people to smooth out
the peaks and troughs of their income and expenditure.
AIFdb corpora: Argument Map 1590

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The example introduces two turns in the dialogue, yet, the analysis of the disagreement
performed in a debate requires only two locutions in exchange between MB and J: MB:
You're actually financing lifestyles that people cant actually afford.; JL: No. The
graphical representation of the IAT structure of this fragment using the language of
Argument Interchange format is shown below in figure 3.

Figure 3: IAT representation of example 4

In figure 3 the first locution performed by MB is represented in L1-node where MB

introduces a propositional content represented in I1-node via illocutionary force of
assertion (YA1-node).
In the second locution JL responds to this assertion saying No (L2-node).
Utterance No does not have propositional content since this is regarded as a reaction to
the previous move and its propositional content. In formal protocol for debate this
dialogical move can be defined only as a response, not as independent move and,
consequently, has to be preceded via dialogue rule application, i.e. transition (TA1-node).
Transition between assertion of propositional content I1 and locution No anchors an
assertion (YA3-node) of propositional content I2, which is contradictory to the I1.
Contradiction between I1 and I2 is applied via relation of conflict (CA1-node).
Such representation indicates JL's standpoint (or commitment, referring to the
dialogue structure specification described in sec 2.1) which he does not introduces
explicitly so it is not shown as a propositional content of locution L2 but still can be
recognised in a dialogical context so it is also represented as an Assertion anchored into
the transition (TA1). Besides an Assertion the transition TA1 also anchors JL's
communicative intention of disagreement with previous speaker (YA2-node). Disagreeing
illocutionary force indicates the conflict CA1 representing contradiction between MB's
and JL's commitments.
The sequence Assertion-No, where Assertion indicates an illocutionary force with
which a player introduces a propositional content and No indicates a string being the
response to the previous move can be used in method for automated argument recognition
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as an anchor for the Disagreeing illocutionary force. This anchor will indicate
argumentation against particular standpoint. In example 4 JL in fact introduces a
counterargument in his next locution What were financing is the ability of people to
smooth out the peaks and troughs of their income and expenditure, which can be
analysed as argument supporting JL's standpoint reconstructed from the dialogue structure
in I2-node.
In the discourse of debate, participants argue con- not always via introducing
commitments contradictory to the opinion they disagreeing with. Very frequently they just
provide premises conflicting with standpoints represented by their opponent which can be
regarded as counterarguments to particular standpoint. Such a case is illustrated in
example 5, which is a fragment of the audition of Moral Maze program titled British
Empire. During this audition participant tried to give a moral evaluation to the behaviour
of British army in the colonial territories in the Twentieth century. Discussion also
concerned the contemporary issue of retribution for moral and material damage to the
victims by the present government of UK. In this context participants discussed also an
issue of the racism within black people who are subjects of United Kingdom:
Example 5
Lee Jasper: I don't agree black people can be racist in the United Kingdom context.
They can be racially offensive
Melanie Phillips: They can't be prejudiced against white people?
AIFdb corpora: Argument Map 1520

Figure 4: IAT representation of example 5

The graphical representation of the IAT structure of this fragment using the language of
Argument Interchange format is shown in figure 4.

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In the example 5 Lee Jasper (LJ) introduces his standpoint about an issue of racism within
black people. His utterance is represented via locution L1-node, which starts with an
expression I don't agree. This fragment allows us to analyse LJs move as an assertion
(YA1-node) of the propositional content as Black people cannot be racist... (I1-node)
being an opposite sentence to the one which LJ explicitly introduce. In the next move
represented in L2-node Melanie Phillips (MP) asks a question. Yet, via posing this
question MP not only wants to hear LJ's response but also conveys her own opinion.
According to the IAT framework such communicative intention is analysed as Assertive
Questioning (for more details see: sec 2). Using this illocutionary force participant also
introduces a propositional content which in this case is a sentence represented in I2-node.
The propositional content They can be prejudiced against white people
introduced by MP is clearly in the relation of conflict with propositional content Black
people can be racist in the United Kingdom context introduced by LJ. This allows us to
verify MP's disagreement (YA1-node) with her opponent which she delivers via
introducing the opinion being an counterargument to LJ's standpoint by means of
questioning so that LJ also provide his commitments on the topic. Disagreeing
illocutionary force aims to the conflict (CA1-node) between opinions introduces by LJ and
MP.
Sequence of moves Assertion - Assertive Questioning can be used for the
detection of argumentation con- in debate. In this case propositional content of the first
move will be regarded as a standpoint; and the propositional content of second move will
be indicated as a counterargument to it.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In the paper a methodology for argument structure recognition in the real live dialogues
was introduced. Examples from the corpus studies (corpus MM2012) on the discourse of
debate where illustrated in which participants performed argumentation pro- and conparticular statement. The corpus of analysed argumentation in debate is used for the
description of the method for automated and semi-automated ways of argument extraction
from the resources in natural text (see Budzynska et al. 2014a and Budzynska et al.
2014b).
Presented approach, however, should not be regarded only as a tool for the
automated argument structure recognition. Proposed corpus studies disclosed also a
structure of a dialogue performed in natural context. This allows as to capture the
rhetorical means by which people perform their argumentation in the context of debate
during the radio audition. The IAT structure of particular fragments illustrate deep
interrelation between the process of communication within participants and the argument
structure they perform. For example, providing an argumentation using question is a
characteristic feature of this type of dialogue since Assertive Questioning is a second
frequent illocutionary force after Asserting (for more detail see Budzynska et al. 2014a).
Such evidences from corpus studies will be used also for the dialogue game description in
the context of debate in which means for argumentation in the context of debate will be
normatively described.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Special thanks are due to Dr hab. Katarzyna Budzynska and prof. Chris Reed, who
contributed to this paper by sharing their knowledge and valuable comments. Author
gratefully acknowledges the support of the CRUS.ch under grant 12.257 (SCEX-NMSch).

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Arguing With Oneself In writing For The News

Marta Zampa
Institute of Argumentation, Linguistics and Semiotics (IALS)
University of Lugano
Via Buffi 13 6904 Lugano
Switzerland
marta.zampa@usi.ch

ABSTRACT: This paper addresses intrapersonal argumentation in the soliloquy occurring within oneself
while making decisions. It focuses on the analysis of an example of soliloquy by a journalist arguing about
his choices in newswriting, made observable by means of a cue-based Retrospective Verbal Protocol from
Progression Analysis. After having reconstructed the argumentation structure of the soliloquy in pragmadialectical terms, the Argumentum Model of Topics is applied to explain the inferential relation between
standpoints and arguments.
KEYWORDS: argumentative soliloquy, Argumentum Model of Topics, intrapersonal argumentation,
newsmaking, progression analysis.

1. INTRODUCTION
If inner dialogue is not a form of argumentation, what is it then? Should we think of two
completely idiosyncratic phenomena, we would paradoxically maintain that, in a public
argumentative discussion, standpoints are defended reasonably; yet that they originate
uncritically in the black box of the arguers minds. So one would be bound to publicly
defend in a reasonable fashion what he has unreasonably decided in his silent thoughts.
(Greco Morasso 2013, p. 60)

From this provocative quote from Greco Morassos (2013) account of argumentative inner
dialogue in migrant mothers,1 I shall start my reflection upon the much-debated issue of
arguing with oneself. Although this topic has received a lot of attention from psychology
and sociology (e.g. Billig, 1996 [1987]), as well as from philosophy (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca 2010 [1958] mention Isocrates, Pascal, Schopenhauer and Mill, but Plato
dealt with it too), argumentation theory devoted only marginal interest to it. In fact, the
main focus of the latter has always been dialogue. Nevertheless, some scholars (amongst
others Dascal, 2005; Greco Morasso, 2013; Perrin & Zampa, under review; Rigotti, 2005;
Rocci, 2005) turned to intrapersonal argumentation. Therefore I set the present
contribution in a still less explored branch of argumentation studies. More precisely, I
consider self-directed argumentation (Rigotti, 2005, p. 94) enacted within oneself while
making decisions in what I call the argumentative soliloquy. I assume the soliloquy to be
comparable to a critical discussion, whose protagonist and antagonist are one and the same
person.
1

See also Greco Morassos contribution to the present volume. Apart from the investigation of journalistic
inner argumentation conducted in the present paper and in Perrin and Zampa (under review), Greco
Morasso is to my knowledge the only scholar doing corpus-based research on this issue.

1567

But how can such a claim be proven? How can a soliloquy be captured? A precise,
flawless recording of inner speech is still not feasible today, as it would require installing
some science-fiction device in the thinkers brain. Anyway, data that get close to it are at
disposal: cue-based Retrospective Verbal Protocols (from now on, RVP) from Progression
Analysis (Perrin, 2003, 2013). RVPs are verbalizations of decision-making during writing,
made by the author while watching video recordings of the writing process he just
completed. I here take as an example an RVP produced in a television newsroom, i.e., a
journalists reflections about the coming into being of the textual part of a television news
item. The data analysis (Section 4) is conducted on two levels: first I reconstruct the
argumentation structure of the soliloquy following Pragma-Dialectics (van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004), then the inferential relation between selected standpoints and
arguments by means of the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti 2006; Rigotti & Greco
Morasso, 2009, 2010, in preparation from now on, AMT). Before moving to the
analysis, I provide a brief account of the state of the art of the studies on argumentation in
inner speech I base my analysis upon (Section 2) and introduce the corpus and research
method I work with (Section 3).
2. ON INTRAPERSONAL ARGUMENTATION2
The data I analyze in this paper (see Section 3) comes as close as possible to reproducing a
soliloquy in the sense of the process of speaking to oneself (Rigotti, 2005, p. 94). The
soliloquy is all the more relevant to argumentative analysis because [it] appears as the
human activity in which so to speak one works for persuading oneself (2005, p. 114).
In other words, in a soliloquy the same person plays the role of protagonist and antagonist
in turn, and the result is rational persuasion.
The similarities between intra- and intersubjective argumentation are particularly
relevant to the present analysis, as they make it possible to analyze soliloquies with the
same tools used for dialogues. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2010 [1958]) address such
similarity by describing argumentation with oneself as self-deliberation:
when a person is thinking, his mind would [] strive to assemble all arguments that seem to it to
have some value, without suppressing any, and then, after weighing the pros and cons, would
decide on what, to the best of its knowledge and belief, appears to be the most satisfactory solution
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2010, p. 40)

In self-deliberation one does not follow any shortcut, but argues for and against
standpoints exactly as he would do in deliberating with other people. Dascal (2005)
focuses on this link too. He assumes that between external debates and mental activities
there are metonymic relations: they both belong to the social activity debate and the
mental moves that take place in foro interno [] are entirely subservient to what is
currently going on in foro externo. (ibid., p. 44). At the same time, they are in a
metaphorical relation, for some features of the source domain external debate are
projected onto the target domain internal debate. Both are a form of deliberation in the
Aristotelian sense of the mental process through which an individual establishes his
preferences and decides how to act, aiming at leading to rational persuasion in favour of
2

This literature review on arguing with oneself is proposed also in Perrin and Zampa (under review).

1568

one of the options (ibid., p. 52). Finally, Greco Morasso (2013) signals the presence of
interlocutors in the arguers mind as a proof of the connection between external and inner
debate. This claim is supported by developmental psychology (Vygotsky, 1962 [1934])
and literary criticism, especially by Bakhtins (2006 [1935]) concept of dialogism inherent
to all kinds of discourse, which means that every word is directed toward an answer and
cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates (ibid., p.
280).
3. METHODOLOGY AND CORPUS PRESENTATION
In this section I first describe the corpus I work on and its collection method (3.1), then the
tools used for argumentative analysis (3.2).
3.1 The corpus
The example I consider here (see Section 4) is taken from a television news corpus
constructed by applying Progression Analysis at the Swiss public broadcasting service
(SRG SSR) during the Swiss National Science Foundation project Ide Suisse: Language
policy, norms, and practice as exemplified by Swiss Radio and Television (2005-2008),
included in the National Research Program 56, Language Diversity and Linguistic
Competence in Switzerland.
Progression Analysis is a computerized multimethod approach that combines
ethnographic observation, interviews, computer logging, and cue-based retrospective
verbalizations to gather linguistic and contextual data (Perrin & Zampa, under review) on
three levels: the situation in which writing is produced (macro level); the material activity
of writing (meso level); the reflection on the writing process (micro level). In the
newsmaking context, the macro level is defined thanks to interviews with journalists and
editors and field observation, with a focus on interpersonal, professional, institutional and
technological conditions and constraints in the newsroom. Particularly relevant
components at this level are editorial conferences, the actual setting of decision-making
about what journalists will write about. The meso level, on the other hand, is concerned
with the writing activity. Each keystroke and writing movement is recorded by means of
key logging and screenshot recording programs (Perrin, 2013, p. 256). The recording does
not influence the writers performance, since it operates automatically in the background,
without changing the user interfaces of the writing or editing software used. Finally, the
micro level consists in the RVP, in which the journalist watches on the screen how his text
came into being and comments on each writing step, explaining what happened and at the
same time giving reasons for it. It aims at opening a window onto the mind of the writer
that reveals the decisions that an author could have made in principle (Perrin, 2013, pp.
63-64), i.e. the writing strategies and practices he is aware of.
An important remark shall be made with respects to this data type I am about to
analyse. The RVP is produced together with a researcher, whose role is to make sure that
the journalist keeps on commenting by posing standard questions. The researcher is not
engaging in a discussion with the journalist nor expressing opinions, she only triggers the
writers account of his own thoughts, strategies and decisions (Perrin & Zampa, under
review). Despite these precautions, it cannot be avoided that the journalist (who, by the
1569

way, is not aware of the research goals) views the researcher as a real interlocutor. This
can of course influence the way past actions and decisions are accounted for, and
eventually lead to rendering them differently from how they were made inside his mind.
Therefore the soliloquy is an approximate reconstruction a posteriori but still, probably
the best we can achieve with todays means.
The chosen RVP has been recorded at Tagesschau, the German-language news
bulletin of SRF1 (Schweizer Fernseher). Tagesschau aims at reporting information that is
considered important for the audience in a clear and neutral way (Gnach, 2013, pp. 103104). As stated on the official website:
(http://www.srf.ch/sendungen/tagesschau/sendungsportraet). The program pictures itself
as committed to the news values (see 3.2 for a definition) of relevance, recency, interest
for the audience (related to the news content) as well as credibility, adherence to facts and
understandability (related to the reporting style). Journalists are expected to apply these
criteria when producing news items.
3.2 Tools for argumentative analysis
The present analysis is embedded in the above mentioned (Section 1) frameworks of
Pragma-Dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) and of the AMT (Rigotti 2006;
Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2009, 2010, in preparation).
Pragma-Dialectics considers argumentation the process of defending or refuting a
standpoint by putting forward arguments for or against it, with the aim of resolving a
difference of opinion on the merits. This process is staged in a critical discussion that has a
protagonist, who puts forward a standpoint and defends it, and an antagonist, who casts
doubt on it or argues against it. A model of an ideal critical discussion (i.e. of how an
argumentative discussion would ideally develop if all standards of reasonableness were
met) is proposed as a normative and descriptive tool (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
2004 for an exhaustive account of the model and of the theory).
The AMT allows moving from the pragma-dialectical overview of how
argumentation is articulated to its deep inferential structure. According to it, in order to
understand why a given argument supports a standpoint it is not enough to rely on its
logical soundness. A connection to the actual context of the discussion must be established
for argumentation to be effective. This aim can be achieved by reconstructing the
endoxical3 premises that root reasoning in the common ground of the participants to a
discussion. In the newsmaking context I am considering, such endoxical premises are
often news values, i.e. criteria for news selection that are shared in a community of
newsmakers and among its audience, and guide the choice of events as potential news
items.4 Being part of the communitys common ground, these criteria usually remain
implicit, and are verbalized only when disagreement occurs. An example of news values
playing the role of endoxa is displayed in Section 4.

With Aristotle (Topics I, 100b) I understand endoxa as [those opinions] which commend themselves to all,
or to the majority, or to the wise that is or to all of the wise or to the majority or to the most famous and
distinguished of them.
4
The notion of news values is a much-debated one in journalism studies, nevertheless due to space
limitations I here only present the definition I adopt.

1570

4. DATA ANALYSIS: ARGUMENTATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTED

SOLILOQUY
The RVP I here analyze has been recorded on November 08, 2006 at Tagesschau
(sf_ts_061108_HS_rumsfeld_verbal_1.doc). Some contextual information are taken from
other interviews5 with the journalist (sf_ts_061106_1315_HS_frame_1.doc and
sf_ts_061108_2400_HS_rumsfeld_review) and from the item itself
(sf_ts_061108_2400_HS_rumsfeld_item.doc).
The journalist under investigation, HS, started working in the field in the 70 and has long
being based in Latin America, where he was also involved with local political movements.
He is thus an experienced newswriter, especially on political issues.
The item whose production he comments on regards the resignation from duty by
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. secretary of defense under George W. Bush. He resigned quite
unexpectedly, right after the Republicans lost the mid-term elections and only few days
after Bush declared his intention to have him at his side during the whole mandate. It is an
historical moment, because actually it is Bush who fires Rumsfeld and, by doing so, he
implicitly communicates that he is aware that they made mistakes in the Iraq war.6 The
item features part of Rumsfelds resignation speech and of Bushs comments on it. Both
politicians seem pretty emotional about the event. Nevertheless, as HS repeatedly notices,
the whole situation is odd: Rumsfeld is pushed to resign because of the negative effects of
the disastrous Iraq war (in particular because of the inhuman interrogation techniques he
allowed) on the Republican administration, but nothing about this real reason is said on
this occasion. On the contrary, Bush underlines his generals achievements,7 whereas
Rumsfeld depicts himself as a humble servant and admirer of the army.8 The journalist
wants to make this incongruity evident to the audience, to make it clear that it is all part of
a show business strategy to protect the image of Bushs war policy9 because he feels it is
his duty to tell the truth.10 At the same time he cannot say it overtly,11 because there is no
statement by Bush or Rumsfeld on the topic.12
5

The frame interview is conducted by the researcher at the very beginning of the collaboration with a
journalist in order to reconstruct his background and understanding of his role as a newsmaker. The review
interview is conducted right after the RVP. In this occasion, the journalist is requested to sum up what he
had to do, wanted to do and actually did when writing the item (Perrin & Zampa, under review).
6
sf_ts_061108_2400_HS_rumsfeld_review.doc: 0110-0117 and I wanted that the spectator gets something-/
catches something of the- of the historical moment/ thats an historical moment now yes/ ehm three four
five six it was more than three years of war in iraq/ and ehm now all of a sudden one realizes ehm-/ it is for
the first time overtly admitted/ we have made a mistake there/ the man has to go.
7
sf_ts_061108_2400_HS_rumsfeld_item.doc: 0026-0033 he disempowered saddam hussein/ and helped the
iraqi people/ establish a constitutional democracy/ it will go down in history/ that under donald rumsfelds
leadership/ our troops/ overthrew two terrorist regimes/ and freed about 50 million people.
8
sf_ts_061108_2400_HS_rumsfeld_item.doc: 0037-0041 I must say/ that it was the highest honor/ that I
have experienced in my life/ to have been able to serve with the amazing young men and women/ in
uniform.
9
sf_ts_061108_0000_HS_rumsfeld_verbal_1.doc: 1296-1299 as a journalist now it is something very
important for me/ one must always keep at the back of ones mind in this kind of public appearance/ this
now was again pure show business/ a public relations exercise.
10
sf_ts_061108_0000_HS_rumsfeld_verbal_1.doc: 1305-1308 nonetheless as a journalist I have the duty/ to
make the spectator somehow perceive/ that I know it that they are doing show business there.

1571

This brings up a key issue in newsmaking: the requirement to report neutrally what
happened, without adding any interpretation. Such characteristic of journalistic discourse
has been named reporter voice by Appraisal Theory13 (Martin & White, 2005), meaning
a regime of strategic impersonalisation by which the authors subjective role is
backgrounded, that allows expressing esteeming meanings (ibid., p. 183) indirectly and
warrant[ing] the widespread impression that news reporting is objective (Pounds, 2010,
p. 109). Such strategic impersonalisation serves as a measure to protect news
organizations from the accusation of gross partiality (ibid.). As noticed in Section 3,
Tagesschaus mandate clearly encourages this attitude. HS is very aware of this, as he
himself explains during the frame interview.14 Furthermore, when he was allocated the
task of preparing this item, he was told not to provide any background information, but to
focus only on the press conference.15
Taken all this into consideration and having pondered on various options,16 HS
decides to end the item with a slightly ironical description of what happens in the video,17
so that an acute spectator can understand what is really going on behind the curtains.18 He
is aware that, by doing so, he might cross the line of what is allowed to a reporter, and
considers the issue worth discussing for journalism in general.19 Nonetheless, from the
RVP it can be understood that HS values telling the truth more than complying to mandate
indications like neutrality and facticity. I shall get back to this issue later in the analysis.
Lets now reformulate HSs reasoning in argumentative terms. He ponders on three
alternatives in reporting the Rumsfeld story: making the audience understand something
which is not explicit and for which he has no evidence, but that he considers worth
communicating (alternative A); not making the audience understand something which is
not explicit and for which he has no evidence (alternative B) and making the audience

11

sf_ts_061108_0000_HS_rumsfeld_verbal_1.doc: 1310-1311 of course as a journalist I cant say/ this was

the show business for today.
12
sf_ts_061108_0000_HS_rumsfeld_verbal_1.doc: 1300-1302 because as a matter of fact he had to throw
out rumsfeld/ because he was not supportable anymore/ of course he doesnt say that.
13
A theory based on Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday, 1985) that investigates the interpersonal
dimension of language use, and devotes considerable attention to journalistic discourse.
14
sf_ts_061106_1315_HS_frame_1.doc: 0676-0686 the aim of tagesschau is to show pictures of events/ that
have happened/ []/ the aim cannot be that of analyzing/ the tagesschau doesnt have the task to analyze/
[]/ the task of analyzing/ and conveying the background/ and to exhaustively represent the connections/
that is the newspapers task.
15
sf_ts_061108_2400_HS_rumsfeld_review_1.doc: 0135-0143 I was requested/ not to make it longer than
one minute twenty/ and not to make any background material on rumsfeld/ thus no life of rumsfeld/ quick
retrospection that was it then/ the so-called background/ but that I should only show the press conference/
it went like this/ and they said this.
16
sf_ts_061108_0000_HS_rumsfeld_verbal_1.doc: 1285-1291 now the question was/ how do I comment on
this/ do I simply leave it very dry/ do I say just something/ or do I go into it/ and comment it just as it is/ or
do I comment it slightly ironically.
17
sf_ts_061108_0000_HS_rumsfeld_verbal_1.doc: 1327-1329 rumsfeld was visibly moved/ and also
president bush somewhat touched/ patted on his commanders back.
18
sf_ts_061108_0000_HS_rumsfeld_verbal_1.doc: 1312-1314 thus I try to include a bit of irony in it/ that
signals the spectator/ well that should not be taken one to one.
19
sf_ts_061108_0000_HS_rumsfeld_verbal_1.doc: 1335-1342 it would be interesting/ to discuss again
about this concluding sentence from a journalistic viewpoint/ to say is it allowed/ is it not allowed/ is it
even necessary/ that the journalist shows the spectator/ whoops I know more/ than I can say now.

1572

understand that something important, but not explicit and for which he has no evidence, is
going on by means of irony (alternative C).
Alternative A can be formulated as the standpoint I should make the audience
understand that there is more going on than what is self-evident (1), supported by
coordinative argumentation (Figure 1). HS has to do so because it is his professional duty
to tell the truth (1.1b) and because he knows that there is show business going on in Bush
and Rumsfelds speech (1.1a), given his knowledge of how public appearances of this kind
usually function (1.1a.1b) and of the excessively emotional reaction of the politicians to
the public announcement (1.1a.1a). Such a reaction is excessive because on the one hand it
was Bush who decided to fire Rumsfeld (1.1a.1a.1a), on the other hand because it
contrasts with Rumsfeld usual tough guy attitude (1.1a.1a.1b).

Figure 1
The opposite standpoint I should not make the audience understand that there is more
going on than what is self-evident (2), corresponding to alternative B, is supported by
coordinative argumentation too (Figure 2). HS should not do so because there is no
evidence about the real reasons why Rumsfeld is leaving (2.1a) and he is not entitled to
provide an interpretation of the event (2.1b) because he is writing a report, not a
commentary (2.1b.1).

1573

Figure 2
Eventually the journalist chooses alternative C. Again, the standpoint is supported by
coordinative argumentation: the best way to make the audience understand that there is
more going on than what is self-evident is by means of irony (3) because irony warns the
spectator not to take everything that is said literally (3.1a), and HS cannot explicitly say
show business is going on here (3.1b), because he lacks evidence, as mentioned in
support of standpoint 2 (Figure 3).

Figure 3

But how does HS come to the decision that one alternative shall prevail upon the other?
And how is this decision connected to the choice of irony as a good means to convey the
message? This connection can be made clear by applying the AMT. Lets proceed step by

1574

step. First of all I consider the reasoning behind the standpoints that fail (1 and 2, in
Figures 4 and 5).

Figure 4

If it is a journalistic duty to make the audience understand what is going on, even if one
does not have evidence (i.e. pictures or documents) for it (endoxon) and HS knows that
show business is going on in Rumsfelds resignation, even if he does not have any
evidence (datum), then making the audience understand that show business is going on in
Rumsfelds resignation means fulfilling a journalistic duty (first conclusion). Thus if this
is the case, and if an action that enables fulfilling a professional duty should be undertaken
(maxim from the locus from the final cause), then HS should make the audience
understand that show business is going on (final conclusion).
Again the locus from the final cause secures the logical validity of the reasoning
behind the opposite standpoint (2) (Figure 5).

1575

Figure 5
If the aim of Tagesschau, as foreseen by its mandate, is to report events in a neutral way,
on the basis of evidence and without analyzing them, and making the audience understand
something without providing evidence means analyzing events (endoxa), and if HS has no
evidence that show business is going on (datum), then making the audience understand
that show business is going on means analyzing the event and going against the mandate
(first conclusion). The latter becomes the minor premise of a topical syllogism whose
major premise is the maxim if the action X goes against the mandate of an institution Y,
X should not be undertaken. The final conclusion thus is that HS should not make the
audience understand that show business is going on.
Until now though it has only become clear why standpoints 1 and 2 were eligible
for consideration, and they both seem very reasonable. Why the third alternative is
selected can be explained by the following reconstruction (Figure 6).

1576

Figure 6
The endoxon at the roots of this reasoning is based on two news values that HS wants to
fulfil, and that are valid throughout the journalistic community in Western countries:
truthfulness (report what actually happened) and neutrality (do not take stance on events
you report about). Furthermore it entails the fact that the three possibilities considered by
HS (A, B, C) are alternative. These alternatives involve fulfilling the news values in a
different way (datum): saying that show business is going on means being truthful but not
neutral (A); not saying that show business is going on means being neutral but not truthful
(B); making understand that show business is going on by means of irony allows being
truthful and neutral at the same time (C). Therefore only alternative C allows HS to fulfil
both news values (first conclusion). Onto this first conclusion the maxim is applied if an
agent wants to fulfil multiple values, and among the alternatives at disposal only X enables
him to achieve them all at the same time, X has to be chosen, derived from the combined
loci from alternatives and from end to means. It follows that alternative C should be
chosen (final conclusion).
Anyway, it strikes the attentive observer that using irony to convey a message does
not really mean embracing neutrality. Instead, it means shifting the responsibility of
catching the meaning implied in the ironical expression to the audience, without a clear
stance taking on the journalists side. Thus HS avoids the risk of being accused of
adopting a position towards an event while reporting it an action that would go against

1577

Tagesschaus mandate but still can attempt to convey a message he cares for. It remains
unclear whether the audience will understand his intention or not.20
5. CONCLUSION
The claim of this contribution was to show that arguing with oneself when making a
decision in newswriting is comparable to dialogic argumentation, and that RVPs are data
that allow demonstrating it. Proof has been given by analyzing a journalists reflections on
his writing activity, which includes decisions on how to frame and formulate a news item.
In the RVP, HS accounts for his reasoning process for and against each alternative
considered. As the reconstruction has shown, while writing he has (or at least believes he
has) argued for each possibility within himself, as he would have done with an external
interlocutor. His decisions are backed by endoxa and news values, constrained by
contextual limitations, professional duties and requirements and regulated by inferential
rules in all comparable to those active in an interpersonal critical discussion. In particular,
in the present example it became evident how journalists struggle between contrasting
forces and need to find concrete solutions to problems that emerge in everyday work, e.g.
between the urge to inform the audience about a relevant issue and the neutrality
requirement. In HS case, irony is the tool adopted to reach a balance between contrasting
aspects of the mandate, or at least to convey a message without overtly violating an
institutional norm. Argumentative reasoning thus helps the journalist to get through the
maze of possible options and find an emergent solution for a given instance of
newsmaking.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author sincerely thanks Rudi Palmieri for his precious advice in the analysis of the
RUMS case.

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1579

Argumentation In Lincolns Gettysburg Address

David Zarefsky
Department of Communication Studies
Northwestern University (Emeritus)
Evanston, Illinois 60208
U.S.A.

ABSTRACT: Abraham Lincolns Gettysburg Address normally is understood as epideictic, intended only to
dedicate a national cemetery. In fact, however, an important argument is subtly and implicitly developed in this
brief text: that nationalism is necessary for democracy to flourish. This argument will be identified and its layout
described. Moreover, Lincoln employs all three dimensions of strategic maneuvering (topical potential, audience
demand, and presentational choices) to enhance this argument. Its placement within an epideictic address is
strategically useful and illustrates the ways in which epideictic can have argument content.
KEYWORDS: argument structure, burden of proof, coordinative argument, deliberative, epideictic, eulogy,
Gettysburg, Lincoln, strategic maneuvering.

1. INTRODUCTION
Probably no figure in United States history is better known worldwide than Abraham Lincoln,
who is taken as representative of the upward mobility Americans value and of the ideals the
nation espouses. No speech delivered by Lincoln is better known around the world than the
Gettysburg Address. Seemingly a model of simplicity, the Address actually is quite complex/
Seemingly a purely ceremonial address, it actually also presents and develops an argument
whose contents are mostly implicit. Seemingly a recitation of communal values, it actually
upholds values that are highly controversial. And seemingly transparent in its message, it
actually relies on silence, ambiguity, and assertion as means of strategic maneuvering.
This essay is written in honor of the 150th anniversary of the Gettysburg Address in
2013. In what follows, a brief sketch of the context will be followed by an analysis that seeks
to unpack the paradoxes noted above.
2. THE BATTLE AND THE SPEECH
The battle of Gettysburg, a small town in southeastern Pennsylvania, was fought on 1-3 July
1863. Although not fully evident at the time, it was a turning point of the war. It stopped the
bold attempt by Robert E. Lees Confederate army to invade the North through Maryland and
to threaten the capital, Washington. It thereby meant that the South could not win the war
through invasion (although a later attempt at a raid was made) but would need to rely on
attrition and war-weariness on the part of the North. But the Northern failure to capture Lees
army after the battle, allowing it instead to escape to Virginia, meant that the war would not
end decisively, certainly not soon.
For the most part, the thousands who died in battle were left where they fell on the
ground. Hoping to give the Union soldiers a dignified burial and also to control the stench and
disease caused by rotting corpses, a group of private citizens undertook to establish a military
1580

cemetery on part of the battlefield. Their efforts, though not complete, progressed far enough
for the cemetery to be dedicated on November 19, about five months after the battle.
The principal speaker for the occasion was Edward Everett, former governor,
representative, and senator from Massachusetts, former president of Harvard University,
former secretary of state, and 1860 vice-presidential candidate of the Constitutional Union
Party, one of the four major parties that year. Everett spoke for over two hours and, although
he has been ridiculed for its length, his speech was an excellent example of its kind. (The text
is readily available as an appendix in Wills 1992.) He verbally recreated the battle from start
to finish and celebrated the Union victory. His detailed rhetorical depiction enabled audience
members to feel as though they were present for all three days of the historic battle. Everetts
speech was followed by a musical interlude and then Lincoln rose for brief remarks formally
dedicating the cemetery the role he was invited to play. Popular myth has it that Lincoln
wrote the speech on the back of an envelope while riding on the train to Gettysburg. This
myth was created during the 1880s and has no basis in fact (Johnson 2013). In fact he wrote a
draft before leaving Washington and then did final editing in Gettysburg the night before
delivering the speech (Boritt 2006).
At only 272 words, the text (Basler 1953, 7:23) is easily accessible; a copy is included
in the Appendix. Briefly, Lincoln positions the present moment as part of a war testing the
commitment of the American founders to nationalism premised on liberty and equality. It is
appropriate, he says, for us to hallow the ground on which the soldiers defending this
commitment fell, but in a larger sense we cannot, since the battlefield already has been
dedicated through their bravery and sacrifice. What we should do, therefore, is to rededicate
ourselves to their ideals and to finish the work on their project.
3. THE ARGUMENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE SPEECH
The speech can be characterized as a eulogy, a genre of epideictic discourse whose functions
are to offer praise for the dead and advice for the living. While fulfilling these functions,
however, it also implicitly contains a significant argument about what the audience should do.
(A diagram of the argument appears in Figure 1.) The major standpoint (1) is the claim, We
should strengthen our commitment to the nation and its founding principles. This claim is
derived from Lincolns statement that it is for us the living . . . to be dedicated here to the
unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced, and the earlier
statement that the Civil War is testing whether any nation conceived in liberty and dedicated
to equality can endure.
HIER DE FIGUUR (OF ER ACHTER)
Supporting this standpoint is a three-point coordinative argument structure, featuring
the claims that (1.1a) the founders created the nation in liberty and committed it to equality,
(1.1b) war tests the endurance of the national commitments, and (1.1c) our role is to
rededicate ourselves to the task. The parts of this argument together support the major
standpoint and prevent its being circular. The claim about the founders stands on its own,
seemingly unchallenged. The claim that the war is a test brings with it the subsidiary claim
that Gettysburg is a great battle field of that war. A fortiori, if the larger war is a kind of test,
then its specific instantiation at Gettysburg is part of that test.
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The claim that our role is to rededicate ourselves to the founding principles is supported by a
more elaborate subsidiary structure of multiple coordinative arguments. First is the pair
(1.1c.1a) we are here to dedicate a cemetery, and (1.1c.1b) that, in a larger sense, we cannot
dedicate a cemetery. The combination of these two statements creates a paradox that is
resolved through the claim in (1.1c) that we have a less obvious purpose, namely to rededicate
ourselves to the commitment of the founders. The second pair of subsidiary statements is also
a coordinative argument, though independent of the first: (1.1c.2a) what we say here will not
be long remembered, and (1.1c.2b) we must assure that the dead did not die in vain. If our
statements at the cemetery will not by themselves be enough to assure that the deaths were not
in vain, then we must do something else to assure that result: we must rededicate ourselves to
the task to which they presumably were committed.
Laying out the argument in this fashion helps to make clear what Lincoln
accomplishes in this speech. First, he not only consoles the living but directs them in a
particular way: toward reaffirming what he claims are the nations founding ideals. Second, he
portrays this action as a duty by showing that it is the natural progression in a sequence that
begins with our fathers who proclaimed these ideals and the great civil war which is
testing them. Third, the steps in this progression are asserted briefly rather than developed in
any depth. This may be appropriate in a eulogy, where one does not expect the structural
presentation of claims and reasons, but it has the effect of making contestable claims appear as
if they are self-evident. Lincoln is taking advantage of the generic expectations of a eulogy in
order to reduce his burden in advancing a deliberative claim about what we should do. Fourth,
Lincoln adds force to the claim that it is for us the living, rather, to rededicate ourselves to
the founding ideals by implying that doing so resolves the paradoxes. It is a way out of the
predicament that it is appropriate for us to dedicate the ground and yet in a larger sense we
cannot do so, by offering something we can do that will be at least as good as dedicating the
ground. And it offers a way out of the tension between wishing to assure that the dead not die
in vain and yet believing that what we say here will be little note[d] nor long
remember[ed]; that is, that our words will not rescue the dead from oblivion. The act of
rededicating ourselves to the founding national ideals is thus doubly attractive.
4. STRATEGIC MANEUVERING
Not only does the Gettysburg Address contain the implicit structure of an argument, but it also
clearly reflects strategic maneuvering to present Lincolns position in the most favorable light.
The speech reflects all three of the categories of strategic maneuvering discussed by van
Eemeren (2010).
4.1 Topical potential
Lincolns choices regarding topical potential can be made clear by observing what he elects
not to discuss. First, unlike Everett, he makes no mention of the battle of Gettysburg itself
not its progression, not even its outcome. Second, there is no discussion of slavery unless
that is how one chooses to read all men are created equal, which probably was not the
intended context and none of emancipation, even though the proclamation had been issued
on 1 January and emancipation was recognized as an aim of the war. Third, there is no selfreference to Lincoln himself or to his office.
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What all of these silences enabled Lincoln to do was to focus his remarks less on the
past than on the future, less on the dead than on the living. Everetts focus was on the events
of 1-3 July; Lincolns was on how those attending the dedication could give those events a
larger and more transcendent meaning. For Everett, listeners could use the battle by
vicariously participating in it and basking in the glory of a Union victory. These were purely
consummatory ends. For Lincoln, however, they could use the battle as a stimulus to their
own acts of rededication.
The absence of references to slavery and emancipation may be harder to explain,
because they are what we perceive the war ultimately to have been about. But Lincoln saw it
somewhat differently. Despite his own strong antislavery beliefs, freeing the slaves was not
his cardinal purpose in prosecuting the war. That was a means granted, a necessary means,
as he came to see toward the goal of preserving democratic self-government and majority
rule, which had been undermined by the act of Southern secession, especially when that act
had no basis other than that slaverys advocates had lost a lawful and fairly conducted popular
election. Lincoln had said in his First Inaugural Address (Basler 1953, 4:262-271) that the
essence of secession was anarchy. That was the end to be prevented by victory in the great
civil war, toward which both emancipation of slaves and the victory at Gettysburg were
essential means.
4.2 Audience demand
Lincoln also adapted his presentation to audience demand, as is evident in his use of strategic
ambiguity. Terms and phrases are used that admit of multiple readings, with quite different
implications. For instance, just who are these honored dead? Gettysburg was a Union
cemetery; no Confederate dead were buried there. Lincoln says as much when he refers to
those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. But in the next paragraph he
refers to the brave men, living and dead, who struggled here and they who fought here.
These phrases are broader in scope and could be taken to refer to both Union and Confederate
soldiers. Contemporary audiences often read the speech this way, as a universal tribute to all
the fallen, although that reading is not completely faithful to text or context. This ambiguity
allows Lincoln to speak to multiple audiences across time. Audiences in 1863 might have
been more likely to celebrate the fallen Northerners, whereas after the wounds of war have
healed, the speech can be understood by later audiences say, those of 2013 as national
consecration in memory of all the Gettysburg dead. Since it is constrained within the moment
of the battle, Everetts speech cannot achieve such transcendence.
A similar ambiguity is found in the pronoun we. It may refer to all people, both
North and South: we are engaged in a great civil war. Or it may refer to his immediate
audience: we are met on a great battlefield of that war. Universal and particular views of
we interweave throughout the speech. In such a gifted writer as Lincoln, such shifts
probably are not accidental. It seems more likely that Lincoln responds to audience demand by
regarding his immediate audience both in its own right and as a synecdoche for the entire
nation, North and South (those who are only metaphorically here at Gettysburg) and also for
those not yet even born, who will be here when they are in the act of reading or memorizing
the speech. In this way, Lincoln raises the audience onto a different and more abstract plane,
on which partisan or sectional conflict is out of place and national reaffirmation is appropriate.

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The fact that he moves back and forth between the particular and the general suggests that the
speech should be intended as simultaneously embracing both.
The most obvious example of an ambiguous term is dedicate. It is used in the phrase
dedicated to the proposition, meaning committed or pledged. But when the president
says, we have come to dedicate a portion of that field, it means to designate or to set
aside. In the next paragraph he means something different still, as he signals by his comment
that he is referring to a larger sense. Here he supplies his own synonyms, consecrate and
hallow., suggesting a meaning such as to distinguish sacred from profane. The final uses,
referring to us the living, return to the original sense of dedicate as to pledge or commit.
What is more, Lincolns use of the word rather contrasts this sense of dedicate with to
set aside or to hallow, which he used earlier.
These shifts in the terms meaning satisfy audience demand by providing a
constructive outlet for audience energy despite the fact that listeners cannot rise to the act of
consecration because the soldiers already have done that. If the audience cannot do what they
came to do, Lincoln does not send them away with nothing. What they can do, and should do,
is to commit themselves to give the nation a new birth of freedom, so that it once again is
committed to the proposition that all are created equal. By using the same term, dedicate,
Lincoln implies that his audiences action is equivalent, at least in value, to what the soldiers
did who consecrated the Gettysburg battlefield with their lives.
The last example of strategic ambiguity to adapt to audience demand is the phrase,
the great task remaining before us. Lincoln does not say exactly what the task is. To be sure,
he offers clues in the final phrases of the speech. But is each synonymous with the great task
remaining before us or is each an element of that task? And how might each of these phrases
translate into practical action? To take just one example, it is reasonable to assume that to
take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion
means that the Union must fight on until it wins the war. But to make that meaning explicit
would be to stipulate that the war must be ended by military victory, and Lincoln probably
would not want to exclude the possibility that the South might simply tire of the struggle. Nor
did he want to confirm the perception that he was stubborn and inflexible. This view was held
by Northern critics who were themselves tired of the war and were calling for reconciliation
with the South without the abolition of slavery. Besides, to call explicitly for Northern victory,
even if that is what Lincoln really meant, would make it impossible for the speech to be read
then or later as a conciliatory message addressed to North and South alike. The same could be
said about what one would do to highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain,
depending on whether these dead refers to the Union soldiers who were buried at
Gettysburg or to all who died on either side of the battle. By leaving the matter ambiguous,
Lincoln is able to enlarge and unify his audience, thereby fulfilling the epideictic function of
the speech.
4.3 Presentational choices
The final category of strategic maneuvering is presentational choice decisions about
arrangement and language that advance the purpose of the speech. Several examples can be
cited from the Gettysburg Address. To begin with, Lincoln chooses to present some of his key
claims as assertions, claims put forward as if they are self-evident rather than standpoints to be
justified by argument. A nominally epideictic address such as a dedication speech may be the
1584

perfect vehicle for doing so, since a structure of claims and proofs is not normally expected.
Instead the speaker typically states and celebrates shared knowledge. Lincoln follows this
pattern except that his values and knowledge claims, though stated as if unquestioned, in fact
were highly controversial.
For example, Lincoln says that the country was brought forth by our fathers in the year
1776, four score and seven years ago. That was, of course, the year of the American
Declaration of Independence, when our fathers declared their commitment that all men are
created equal. That is one of several possible dates that might have been selected for the
national origin, but it was not the only one available to Lincoln. Others included 1765, when
the Stamp Act Congress (the first intercolonial body) met; 1775, when the military rebellion
began; 1778, when aid from France made the revolution viable; 1781, when the Articles of
Confederation were ratified; 1787, when the Constitution was drafted; 1788, when the ninth
state ratified it; or 1790, when Rhode Island made it unanimous. To have selected any of those
dates would have implied a very different origin story. By selecting 1776 and presenting it as
if there were no question, Lincoln locates the countrys beginning in the expression of ideals
and not just any ideals, but those of liberty ad equality, the very values to which Lincoln
would have his audience reaffirm their commitment.
Furthermore, Lincoln characterizes the ideal of equality as a proposition. In context, a
proposition was a hypothesis that would be tested and proved through the life of the country.
It was like a geometric asymptote, something that would be continually approached even
though never actually reached. It would serve as a goal toward which the nation always would
strive. This was the same view of equality that Lincoln had expressed during his prepresidential years, when he had attributed it to the founders and used it to resolve the paradox
of how slavery could have been condemned by those who themselves owned slaves. The other
obvious way out of that paradox was to say that the founders did not regard blacks as men
within the scope of the Declaration. This was the view taken, for example, by Lincolns
perennial political opponent, Stephen A. Douglas. How to choose between these
interpretations? Fortunately, one doesnt have to. By making the presentational choice to state
as fact what is a highly contestable assertion, Lincoln is able to define away the controversy
and leave listeners with the simple truth of what our fathers had in mind.
Moreover, what was it to which our fathers gave birth in 1776? Lincoln states as fact
that they brought forth, on this continent, a new nation. But it is questionable whether they
did any such thing. The Declaration says that the former colonies are, and of right ought to
be, free and independent states. The emphasis is on states, plural, and there is no reference to
a single nation. Eleven years later, the Preamble to the Constitution announces its aim to
form a more perfect union, not a more perfect nation. By 1863, it was clear that movement
was in the direction of nationalism, of seeing the people as a single entity and the nation as
its embodiment. But rather than acknowledge that this is a new development or a gradual
evolution, Lincoln read backwards and claimed it to be the view of the founders themselves. It
was the view of some founders, but Lincoln swept away the whole historical controversy.
What the country needed to be in 1863, he said it actually had been all along. This is what
Robert L. Scott (1973) called the conservative voice in radical rhetoric. It enabled Lincoln
to claim that the very same nation had survived for 87 years and was now being tested. To
succeed at that test not only would meet the needs of the moment but also would vindicate the
vision of the founders. This simple statement that the founders created a new nation enacts a

1585

theory of history and politics. Stated as a bold assertion, the claim no longer requires any
argument.
A final example of assertion as a presentational choice was the statement that the
function of the Civil War was testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so
dedicated, can long endure. That is, the war will determine whether democratic selfgovernment, in the United States or anywhere else, is sustainable beyond the 87 years it
already has survived. To abandon the war would be to forfeit the test, permitting those who
had lost a fair election to overturn the results by military action until they got their way. Doing
that would negate the legitimacy of popular elections, and without them there would be no
democratic self-rule. If such a thing could happen in the United States, with its tradition and
over 80 years of experience, then it could happen anywhere; so if democracy fails here, it fails
everywhere. Lincoln puts forward this theory as fact, not needing to argue for it. In the process
he obscures other possible accounts for the war, such as the view of many Southerners that
military action now was necessary to interrupt the arc of history which, since Lincolns
election, was tending toward slaverys demise. Lincolns strategic maneuver redirects
attention from slavery to the even higher principle of democracy and self-rule, which he
pronounces to be the ultimate object of the struggle.
The speech reveals several other presentational choices. The opening line, Four score
and seven years ago, evokes the Biblical claim, in Proverbs, that the days of a mans life are
threescore years and ten, or if by reason of strength, fourscore years. The Union already has
exceeded that boundary, so it is on course to long endure, provided that there is no
successful revolt by dissatisfied Southerners. The persuasiveness of Lincolns argumentative
claim for a commitment to nationalism is enhanced by its Biblical resonance.
Another presentational choice is the use of negation as an indirect means of providing
support. After saying that his audience was present to dedicate a cemetery, Lincoln states that
they cannot do so because it already has been done by the brave men, living and dead, who
struggled here. We therefore must do something else, and Lincoln presents what is a far
greater and more important task than setting aside a piece of ground. But rather than saying
directly that our task is more significant than theirs, he seems to do the opposite, maintaining
that the world will little note, nor long remember , what we say here, but it can never forget
what they did here. The first clause in the sentence was clearly false, but the second clause is
true in the sense that doing trumps saying. Since our talk is less significant than their action,
we ought to do something else in order to even the exchange and assure that the dead will not
have died in vain. Talk plus personal dedication is at least equal to action. But had Lincoln
said this explicitly, he would be rightfully accused of hubris. So he made his point by using
the presentational choice of negation.
A final example of strategic maneuvering through presentational choice involves the
closing prepositions of, by, and for, each of which relates to the noun, the people.
The point of this closing statement is not the differentiation of the prepositions but the
repetition of the noun. The people by 1863 was a term of nearly universal veneration,
especially when it stood in opposition to terms such as special interests. The people could
be dominated by elites just as they could be ruled by monarchs. The genius of the United
States, and its uniqueness in the world, was that the people ruled. Government acted upon
them, but also was created and composed by them, and it operated for their benefit. The great
task remaining before us was to assure the survival of this form of government. That was
what was at stake in the war, and that what was what required a new commitment to American
1586

nationhood, keeping the people free from the elites that Lincoln thought had hijacked the
Southern state governments and led them into the abyss of secession. The case of the United
States would prove the viability of popular rule.
5. CONCLUSION
Within the pragma-dialectical framework (van Eemeren 2010), strategic maneuvering offers
advocates the chance to increase their rhetorical effectiveness while also meeting their
dialectical obligations. On first glance, it may seem that the Gettysburg Address does the
opposite: maximizing rhetorical success while evading ones dialectical obligations. After all,
Lincoln never substantiates that the United States is one nation, or that it was founded in
1776, or that its goal is the achievement of equality under popular rule. Even less does he
answer objections that could be set out against any of these standpoints. What gives them
force is that they are embedded within an epideictic framework that celebrates the dead while
urging the living to dedicate themselves to a larger task. It is perhaps in this sense that
Wills (1992) wrote that listeners to the speech had their intellectual pocket picked, leaving
the battlefield on 19 November with a different sense of the United States from what they
had when they arrived. It has become commonplace to observe that the Gettysburg Address
epitomizes the war-induced shift from regarding the United States as a plural noun
(The United States are...) to a singular noun (The United States is ...).
But this may be taking too limited a view of the matter. The defense of American
nationalism did not issue forth from Lincoln at Gettysburg for the first time. He had been
striking these themes for some years, at least since the Peoria speech of 1854 (Basler 1953).
Often he had fully-developed arguments that anticipated or replied to critics, even if he did not
reprise them at Gettysburg. In the Lincoln-Douglas debates he argued why the Union was
older than the Constitution and perhaps older than the states (Zarefsky 1990). In the First
Inaugural Address he had developed the case against secession and explained why the essence
of the Civil War was a struggle for popular rule (Zarefsky 2012).
What an epideictic address might do is to evoke the more fully developed argument
through allusion to it and restatement of its conclusion. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
(1958/1969) are right in observing that epideictic has an argumentative character, but it
typically achieves that result by indirection rather than explicitly. Analysis of a masterpiece
such as the Gettysburg Address helps us to see how. If argumentative structure and rhetorical
functions are discernible in such an iconic text as this, then a fortiori they should be even
easier to discern implicitly in more quotidian examples of epideictic discourse.

REFERENCES
Basler, R.P., ed. (1953). Collected works of Abraham Lincoln. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 8
vols.
Boritt, G. (2006). The Gettysburg gospel. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Eemeren, F.H. van. (2010). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Johnson, M.P. (2013). Writing the Gettysburg Address. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958/1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (J. Wilkinson
& P. Weaver, trans.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Originally published in
French in 1958.)

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Scott, R.L. (1973). The conservative voice in radical rhetoric: A common response to division. Communication
monographs, 40: 123-135.
Wills, G. (1992). Lincoln at Gettysburg: The words that remade America. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Zarefsky, D. (1990). Lincoln, Douglas, and slavery: In the crucible of public debate. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Zarefsky, D. (2012). Philosophy and rhetoric in Lincolns First Inaugural Address. Philosophy & rhetoric, 45:
165-188.

APPENDIX
LINCOLNS GETTYSBURG ADDRESS, 19 NOVEMBER 1863
Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation,
conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so
conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war.
We have cone to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here
gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do
this.
But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate we can not consecrate we can not
hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated
it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember
what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be
dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly
advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us that
from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last
full measure of devotion that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in
vain that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom and that government of
the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

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Denying The Antecedent Probabilized: A Dialectical View

Frank Zenker
Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science
Lund University,
LUX, Box 192, 221 00 Lund
Sweden
frank.zenker@fil.lu.se

ABSTRACT: This article provides an analysis and evaluation for probabilistic version of arguments that
deny the antecedent (DAP). Stressing the effects of premise retraction vs. premise subtraction in a
dialectical setting, the cogency of DAP arguments is shown to depend on premises that normally remain
implicit. The evaluation remains restricted to a Pascalian notion of probability, which is briefly
compared to its Baconian variant. Moreover, DAP is presented as an exam-question plus evaluation that
can be deployed as a learning assessment-instrument at graduate-level.
KEYWORDS: affirming the consequent, delay tactic, denying the antecedent, dialectics, inductive logic,
modus ponens, modus tollens, probabilistic independence, probabilistic relevance, retraction, subtraction

1. INTRODUCTION
We treat the evaluation of DAP, a probabilistic version of what classical logic correctly
treats as the formal fallacy of denying the antecedent (DA), i.e., the deductively invalid
attempt at inferring the conclusion ~c from the premises a->c and ~a, where a stands
for antecedent, c for consequent, and ~ for negation. Examples include:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Had my client been at the crime scene (a), then he would probably be
guilty (c). But he wasnt (~a), so he probably isnt (~c).
If the lights are on (a), then probably someones at home (c). But the
lights are out (~a), so probably no one is (~c).
If the product sells (a), then our marketing measures should probably be
trusted (c). But it doesnt (~a), so measures should be reviewed (~c).

Here, (1) states a counterfactual conditional (had), (2) an indicative one (are), and
that in (3) might even sustain a deontic reading (should). Disregarding such
differences, we proceed to treat such DAP-arguments on the following schema, its
formal version becoming clearer soon:
(DAP) If a then probably c. But not a, so probably not c.
Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>Pi(c). But Pi(a)=0, so Pf(~c)>Pi(c).
As should be uncontroversial, if natural language instances of DAP instantiate a
probabilistically valid inference, or argument, then only if the relevant probability
values are right. A probabilistic version of modus ponens (MPP) can be stated as the
conditional probability of c given a, i.e., P(c|a), where P(c|a) directly depends on
P(~c|a) whenever P(c|a)=1P(~c|a) holds, which is the complement-relation of
Pascalian probability (see Sect. 5.3 on the Baconian). A probabilistic version of
denying the antecedent (DAP), P(~c|~a), contrasts by depending on not one, but three

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values: P(c|~a), P(a), P(c). This asymmetry between MPP and DAP is mirrored by one
between probabilized versions of modus tollens (MTP) and affirming the consequent
(ACP), not being treated here (see Oaksford & Chater, 2008; 2009).
As will be seen below, since particularly P(c|~a) is necessary to evaluate DAP,
but need not be readily available from context, evaluations of DAP regularly remain
conditional on analysts assumptions with respect to P(c|~a). Our main objective is to
present one such assumptionbroadly one of relevance, referred to as AR, below
then trace ARs effects on arguers dialectical commitments, in a context where
PROPONENT (PRO) argues MPP, and OPPONENT (OPP) responds with DAP. On
assumption, PRO can respond to OPPs DAP either by retracting or subtracting prior
commitment; the first proves to be a delaying-tactic, and the validity of OPPs DAP is
shown to depend on commitments reconstructed for PRO.
We introduce DAP as an exam-question (Sect. 2), then discuss the choice of
logic (3.1), the projection of linguistic forms onto logical forms (3.2), and the
retraction vs. subtraction distinction (3.3). Having provided an evaluation (4), we argue
for the plausibility of AR (5.1), explain how retraction delays interaction (5.2), and
briefly contrast this broadly Pascalian result with a Baconian notion of probability. Our
conclusions are in Sect. 6.
2. DAP AS AN EXAM-QUESTION
An evaluation of a probabilistic version of denying the antecedent (DAP) in a
dialectical setting might be assigned as an exam-question, such as the following, where
PRO argues MPP in lines 1 and 2, to which OPP responds, in line 3, by denying PROs
antecedent, and subsequently raising the claim in line 4, thus arguing DAP. Assuming
OPP to have the last wordOPP-statements trump PRO-statements PROs response
options are limited to either of those in lines 5a or 5b, provided OPP is committed to
PROs claim in line 1. So, in line 6, can PRO reasonably deny OPPs claim in line 4?
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5a)
(5b)
(6)

PRO: a makes c more probable.

PRO: a is the case.
OPP: a is not the case.
OPP: So, not c is more probable.
PRO: I retract (2).
PRO: I subtract (2), i.e., I agree to (3).
PRO: But I disagree with (4).

Task: Assume that (3) trumps (2), i.e., that OPP has the last word, and that OPP commits
to (1). Evaluate line (6) as reasonable, or not, vis--vis (1-4), for both the variants (5a)
and (5b). Trace and justify additional assumptions.
We now present a task-solution that presupposes an evaluation of DAP vis--vis a
Pascalian notion of probability.
3. EVALUATING DAP
3.1 Choice of Logic
As holds generally for argument-evaluation, an evaluation of DAP proceeds via a
projection of natural language material (aka linguistic form) onto a logical form, itself
1590

provided through analyst-choice among available logics. The logic employed below is
inductive, consistent with the Kolmogorow-axiomatization of probability, thus
modeling a Pascalian notion of probability. As our evaluation of DAP holds relative to
this logic only, external criticism of the evaluation should elaborate on inadequacies in
the Pascalian notion of probability, if any (see Sect. 5.3).
3.2 Linguistic and Logical Form
The application of logical forms (Lo-F) to linguistic forms (Li-F) yields a
reconstruction of Li-F at Lo-F level, technically a projection of the Li-F onto the Lo-F.
Analysts must subsequently ask: Is a particular Lo-F validity-assessable, i.e., is the
projection complete? It will be only if the Li-F readily provides information necessary
to evaluate the Lo-F with respect to validity. Conversely, incomplete projections only
require analysts to add information at Lo-F level.1 Once completed, the evaluative
result may then be read-off, and transferred to the Li-F. The yield is an evaluation
conditional on information added.
To appreciate the projection of statements containing probable and its
cognates, compare the Li-F and potential Lo-F instances, below, where
Pi(c|a)>Pi(c)=1Pi(~c) states the initial probability of c given a, Pi(c|a), to exceed the
initial probability of c, Pi(c), which equals one minus the probability of the logical
complement, ~c, since P()=1P(~) holds, and similarly for conditional probabilities:
P(|)=1P(~|).
Above, we had seen PRO to utter the Li-F a makes c more probable in line (1).
Onto which Lo-F, now, should this utterance be projected?
(i) a makes c more probable.
(ii) a makes c more probable than not c.
(iii)
than not c given a.
(iv)
than not c given not a.

Pi(c|a)>Pi(c)=1Pi(~c)
Pi(c|a)>Pi(~c)=1Pi(c)
Pi(c|a)>Pi(~c|a)=1Pi(c|a)
Pi(c|a)>Pi(~c|~a)=1Pi(c|~a)

The Lo-F in line (i) yields perhaps the most faithful projection, as its content most
closely mirrors that of a makes c more probable. While (ii) to (iv) need not be
implausible candidates, they nevertheless add content to PROs utterances. We return to
(i) in Sect. 4
Except for the point-probability Pi(c)=Pi(~c)=0.5, the utterances in (i) and (ii)
mutually and directly imply their negations. After all, (i) compares Pi(c|a) to Pi(c), so
Pi(c|a) is also compared to Pi(~c), the latter being the complement of Pi(c), as in (ii).
Similarly, (iii) compares Pi(c|a), again merely internally, to its complement, Pi(~c|a). In
contrast, (iv) compares Pi(c|a) to Pi(~c|~a), which, importantly, does not directly
dependent on Pi(c|a). Note that Pi(~c|~a) had, in Sect. 1, been seen to state a
probabilistic version of denying the antecedent (DAP).
On the assumption that contents expressed by Pi(a), Pi(c), Pi(c|a), and Pi(c|~a)
are contingent, when Pi(c|~a) cannot simply be obtained from PROs Li-F, then Pi(c|~a)
should be stipulated in view of PROs commitments with respect to Pi(a), Pi(c), Pi(c|a),
effectively compensating for cases where PRO avoids an explicit commitment with
respect to Pi(c|~a). Sect. 4 will identify one such compensation, consisting in an

Other tweaks are subtracting information, and changing its order (permutation); both modifications,
however, normally presuppose possessing information that is necessary for an evaluation.

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assumption of relevance assumption (AR). First, we turn to PROs dialectical options in

lines 5a and 5b (see Sect. 2).
3.3 Retraction vs. Subtraction
A non-formal version of the retraction vs. subtraction distinction is found, among
others, in Godden & Walton (2004). In probabilistic terms, to retract amounts to PRO
no longer holding a commitment with respect to the probability of a. As we now argue,
retraction would only be represented unfaithfully as a PRO-update to the unspecific
commitment Pf(a)=[0,1], where the subscripted f indicates the final probability after
retraction. To subtract, in contrast, amounts to having stated that a is false, and can be
represented as a PRO-update to the specific commitment P(~a)=1.
One may assume that, having used MPP at time t0, PRO is at time t1 committed
to Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) and Pi(a)=1. After retraction, her commitments at t2 could update to
Pi(c) and Pf(a)=[0,1], where [0,1] marks the closed interval from zero to one, including
the end-points, and Pi(c) is the prior probability of c. Alternatively, at t2, PROs
commitments could update merely to Pi(c). In the first case, given Pf(a)=[0,1], PRO
cannot meaningfully maintain a commitment to Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), for if Pf(a)=[0,1] and
Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) together entail anything, then they entail the probability of c given a to be
greater than the probability of c, for any value of P(a)=1P(~a)=[0,1]. But this is
incompatible with the probability of a impacting on the probability of c. So a could
not, in any standard sense, remain relevant to c, for a would now raise the probability
of c come what may, given any probability-value of a, including 0 and 1 (see Sect.
5.2). To avoid as much, retraction should be modelled such that, at t2, PRO updates her
commitments merely to Pi(c).
After subtraction, PROs commitments with respect to a have been updated
from Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) and Pf(a)=1, at t1, to Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) and Pf(~a)=1, at t2. They now
starkly contrast with PROs commitment at t1. Such flippingaka take it back and
claim the oppositemakes it conditionally relevant for PRO to incur a comparative
commitment with respect to Pi(c|~a) vs. Pi(c). Note that this is unlike the case of
retraction. In both cases, of course, OPP may well ask PRO to compare Pi(c|~a) with
Pi(c). In the exam-case (Sect. 2), this comparison was not made.
What may one reasonably assume about this comparison on behalf of PRO?
Introduced as part of the evaluation of DAP in the next section, the assumption (AR)
compares Pi(c|~a) with Pi(c). Along with other assumptions, AR will be seen to yield
the very conclusion OPP seeks to establish with her DAP argument: Pf(~c)>Pf(c).
4. CONDITIONAL EVALUATION OF DAP
4.1 PROPONENT and OPPONENT commitments
In evaluating the OPPONENTs DAP, one supposes that if a then c, i.e., ac, can be
interpreted probabilistically such that P(ac)=P(c|a), an assumption referred to as the
equation (Oaksford & Chater, 2008; 2009). One should start from the weakest
possible PROPONENT-commitment in this context (see Sect. 3.2), namely that a
provides some support to c, as expressed in (7). Again, Pi(c) marks the initial or prior,
and Pf(c) the final or posterior probability.

1592

(7)

[PROPONENT-commitment]2

Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>Pi(c)

As we saw, if inductive support is measured over the closed interval from 0 to 1, and
reflects a Pascalian notion of probability, then a degree of support for a proposition
entails that of its complement via P()=1P(~), and likewise for conditional
probabilities via P(|)=1P(~|). Moreover, Pi(c|a) is given by the principle of
conditionalization (PC), aka the definition of conditional probability:
(PC)

Pi(c|a)=P(c&a) / P(a)

[definition of conditional probability]

Since P(c&a)=P(a|c)P(c), by substitution, the PC yields Bayes theorem

(BT)3, to which we return in Sect. 4.3:
(BT)

[Bayes theorem]

P(c|a)=(P(a|c)P(c)) / P(a)

With retraction (see Sect. 3.3), the support for c in the absence of a can only depend on
the prior probability Pi(c). So, if conditionalization on a results in Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), as
stated in (7), then retracting a leaves the probability of c at its prior value, Pi(c). This is
what Godden and Waltons (2004) claimthat retraction does not incur new
commitmentsamounts to when using probabilities. As OPP was to have the last
word (see Sect. 2), one is concerned not with retraction, but with subtraction of a, i.e.,
conditionalization on ~a. Hence, OPP is committed to (8), which says that ~a is
negatively relevant to c, as ~a makes ~c more probable than it was initially:
(8)

Pf(~c)=Pi(~c|~a)>Pi(~c)

[OPPONENT-commitment]

Already in genuinely probabilistic contexts, where 0<P()=1P(~)<1, the inequalities

in (7) and (8) depend on suitable probability values. As the next subsection shows,
such values need not be readily available in a given natural language context.
4.2 Finding Pi(~a|~c)
To illustrate the issue, assume thatunlike the extremal cases in Sect. 2, where either
P(a)=0 or P(a)=1PROP assigns 0.5<Pi(a)<1, so that a is more probable than not, and
moreover choses the likelihood, Pi(a|c), such that Pi(c|a) is rendered sufficiently high
for the purpose at hand, i.e., beyond some threshold, t, to which we return in the next
section. But assume also that PROP remains uncommitted to the exact value of Pi(c).
Therefore, Pi(c) need not be fixed, but can in fact range over the interval satisfying
Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) given the chosen likelihood, Pi(a|c). To reach a probabilized dialectical
scenario, assume finally that PRO responds to OPPs objection by adopting OPPs claim
2

(7) leaves open the exact degree of support; one of its measures, S(c|a), can be defined as:
S(c|a)=Pi(c|a)Pi(c)>0 (Korb, 2003, 44; Howson & Urbach, 1993, 117).
3
Dropping the subscripts, BT comes in two equivalent versions:
(BT)
P(c|a)=(P(a|c)P(c)) / P(a)
(BT*) P(c|a)=P(a|c)P(c) / (P(a|c)P(c)+P(a|~c)P(~c))
One reaches BT* by substitution in BT, since P(a)=P(a|c)P(c)+P(a|~c)P(~c). Here, P(a|c) and P(a|~c)
express likelihoods, namely the probability of a given c, and the probability of a given ~c, respectively.
P(a|c) can be read as the impact of a on P(c). P(a|~c) is also known as the false positive rate. To express
the classically valid modus pones inference with (BT), if ac is true, then P(c|a)=1. So the rate of
exceptions, P(~c|a), is zero since P(c|a)=1P(~c|a). See Oaksford and Chater (2008; 2009).

1593

that 0.5<Pi(~a)<1. When evaluating this move, one must conditionalize on Pi(~a) to
find Pi(~c|~a). Because of PROs loose stance with respect to Pi(c) before hearing OPPs
objection, however, that Pi(a)>0.5, and that Pi(c|a) were deemed sufficiently high
simply does not entail a definite value for Pi(~a|~c), nor only values thatupon
conditionalization on ~aleave Pi(~c|~a) sufficiently low (see Sober, 2002). But some
such discrete value is required to calculate with this instance of Bayes theorem:
Pf(~c|~a)=(Pi(~a|~c)Pi(~c))/Pi(~a). See Oaksford and Chater (2008; 2009) and Wagner
(2004) for an analytical characterization of the bounds that arise when letting
0.5<P(c|a),P(~c|~a)<1, so that both terms count as probabilistically supported, or
confirmed, if 0.5<P(a),P(~a)<1.
The commitments in (7) and (8) are here treated as contingencies, and so do not
express general truths about probabilistic support relations between antecedents and
consequents. Hence, particularly OPPs desired conclusionthat ~c is sufficiently
probable given ~awont follow from any old assignment of probability values, even
if 0<P()=1P(~)<1. The next subsection supplies information that leaves OPPs
claimthat Pf(~c|~a)>Pf(c|~a)acceptable through introducing the assumption AR on
behalf of PRO.
4.3 Bayes Theorem, Jeffrey Conditionalization, and AR
In our example in Sect. 2, Pi(a) and Pi(~a) were assigned the values zero or one. In
both extremal cases, however, premise subtraction remains ill-defined in the context of
Bayes theorem. After all, when P(a)=1, then a is treated as indubitable, upon which
the theorem ceases to offer guidance for the subtraction of a; likewise when P(~a)=1.
In fact, subtraction of what is beyond doubt does widely count as an arational move in
this context, a move BT does not guide one way or another. Therefore, rather than
employ BT, one can turn to Jeffrey conditionalization (JC) in order to address premise
subtraction (see, e.g., Jeffrey, 2004):
(JC) Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)Pf(a)+Pi(c|~a)Pf(~a)
[Jeffrey conditionalization]4
In our case, when the proponent claims that a makes c more probable (see Sect. 2), she
can be assumed committed to Pf(c)>tPi(c), where t is a threshold given by a
probability value arbitrarily smaller than Pf(c), and at least as large as Pi(c). Further, if
Pf(a)=1 and so Pf(~a)=0, i.e., a is true, then (JC) reduces to its left hand term:
(9)

Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)Pf(a)>t

As an assumption of relevance (AR) that will be crucial for our evaluation, the
proponents initial claimthat a raises the probability of c to a value above some
threshold tmay be assumed to entail the following:
(AR) If ~a (also) raises the probability of c, then at most to t, i.e., Pi(c|~a)t.
4

(JC) has the posterior probability of the conclusion, Pf(c), depend on the posterior probability of the
antecedent, Pf(a)=1Pf(~a), as well as the prior probabilities Pi(c|a) and Pi(c|~a), the latter two terms
being mutually independent. Jeffrey conditionalization generalizes the Bayesian theorem, where (BT)
corresponds to the limiting case that arises by setting one of JCs summands to 1. To verify, recall that
Pf(c)=Pi(c|a). Since P(a&c)=P(c&a)=P(a|c)P(c)=P(c|a)P(a), by substitution, if Pf(a)=1, then the
expression Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)Pf(a)+Pi(c|~a)Pf(~a) reduces to Pf(c)=Pf(a&c), so Pf(c|a)=P(a|c)P(c)/P(a)
becomes Pf(c|a)=Pf(a&c). The case is analogous when Pf(~a)=1.

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Sect. 5.1 will argue why it is reasonable to assume AR on behalf of PRO. Let us first
complete the evaluation of DAP.
4.4 Evaluative result
When, per our example-case, a is subtracted because a is deemed false, i.e., Pf(~a)=1,
and so Pf(a)=0, thenin analogy to (9)JC reduces to its right hand term:
(10)

Pf(c)=Pi(c|~a)Pf(~a)t

Because Pi(c|~a)=1Pi(~c|~a), it follows for the standard threshold of probabilistic

support t=0.5 that, upon subtracting a, i.e., Pf(~a)=1, the value of Pf(c) falls below t
only if Pi(~c|~a)>t.5 The evaluation, therefore, depends not only on the initial
assumption Pf(c)>Pi(c), as stated in (5), but additionally on ARi.e., Pi(c|~a)tand
t=0.5, which together effectively state OPPs desired conclusion (i.e., line 4 in Sect. 2).
After all, once Pi(c|~a) falls to, or below, the value 0.5, then c can no longer receive
sufficient support in the event that ~a, sinceanalogously to (9)we have it that
Pf(~c)=Pi(~c|~a)P(~a), and so if P(~a)=1, then Pf(~c)=Pi(~c|~a).
Hence, rather than Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), as in (7), PRO would have had to be
committed to:
(11)

Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>t>Pi(c) and Pi(c|~a)t, for t=0.5,

for OPP to establish probabilistic support for ~c by subtracting a. Therefore, with a

view to the example in Sect. 2, (5b) is unreasonable given AR. In contrast, line (5a) is
at least not immediately unreasonable. But, as Sect. 5.2 argues, (5a) delays the
evaluation that becomes available under AR.
5. DISCUSSION
This section briefly discusses why AR is reasonable, shows retraction to be a delayingtactic, and inquires whether the evaluative result transfers to a non-Pascalian notion of
probability.
5.1 The reasonability of AR
Recall that, because the example in Sect. 2 lacked information on Pi(c|~a) that our
inductive logic did require in order to evaluate DAP, Sect. 4.3 had introduced an
assumption of relevance (AR) on behalf of PRO, namely Pi(c|~a)t for t=0.5. The
evaluative result (Sect. 4.4) was then seen to depend on AR. Evaluating AR requires
considering whether PRO can deny AR, provided she is committed, at t1, to both
Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) and Pi(a)=1, then retracts only the latter commitment by updating,
at t2, to P(~a)=1 (see Sect. 3.3). A straightforward way of addressing this consists in
considering if PRO remains consistent were she to deny AR. As we saw, Pi(c|a)>Pi(c)
expresses that a is positively relevant to c. So, at t1, does PRO incur a contradiction
were she to commit to Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), but reject Pi(c|~a)Pi(c)?
5

To assume that Pi(~c|~a)>t for t=0.5 amounts to a probabilized version of the conditional perfection
strategywhere, as part of the analysis, -> is perfected to <->for this very assumption renders the
conditional a then c convertible, probabilistically speaking.

1595

What if PRO were to reject Pi(c|~a)Pi(c), i.e., accept Pi(c|~a)>Pi(c), and so be

committed both to Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) and to Pi(c|~a)>Pi(c)in words: both a and ~a raise
the probability of c. In this case, were a and ~a to provide the same probabilistic
support to c, i.e., Pi(c|a)=Pi(c|~a)>Pi(c), then PRO would well have avoided the
commitment that c and a are probabilistically independentwhich is expressed by
Pi(c|a)=Pi(~c|a). But without the assumption AR qualifying the support that a and ~a
lend to c as a differentially large support, the question would arise why PRO had
initially offered a in support of c, when ~a could have served as well. Hence, not so
much to remain consistent, but to remain relevant: at t1, if ~a shall provide some
support to ~c, then such support should be lower than the support that a confers onto c,
exactly as expressed by AR.
In contrast, interpreting PROs Li-F a makes c more probable from the outset
to mean a makes c more probable than not c given a, i.e., Pf(c|a)>tPf(~c|a),
necessitates setting the threshold to t=0.5, since Pf(c|a)=1Pf(~c|a). Moreover, if
P(~a)=1, then OPPs conclusion Pf(~c|~a) takes a value greater than t, which in turn
shows how PROs subtraction of a, i.e., the change in commitment from P(a)=1 to
P(a)=0, establishes, or concedes, the cogency of OPPs DAP.
Besides AR, the two complement-relations P()=1P(~) and
P(|)=1P(~|) for conditional probabilities remain crucial to our evaluation,
because information not provided at Li-F was inferred by means of these relations. We
discuss both in Sect. 5.3, and now proceed to argue that, here, retraction is at best a
delaying-tactic.
5.2 Retraction as a delaying-tactic
In Sect. 3.3, we had seen that retraction amounts to avoiding a commitment with
respect to the probability of a, including a lose commitment such as P(a)=[0,1].
Assume, then, that PRO has successfully avoided as much, and so is committed, at t2,
merely to Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), and Pi(c). As argued above, this set of commitments allows
PRO to disagree, in line (6) of Sect. 2, with OPPs claim that Pf(~c)>Pf(c). The
disagreement is not immediately unreasonable because, after retraction, information
necessary for OPPand for analyststo establish Pf(~c)>Pf(c) was seen to be
unforthcoming from PROs commitments.
As PRO had, at t1, claimed that P(a)=1, even after retraction, OPP can demand
that PRO commit to some comparison of Pi(c|a) with Pi(c|~a) vis--vis the threshold
t=0.5, provided this OPP-move is not otherwise blocked. Moreover, provided that PRO
would act in an irrelevant manner were she to reply with a comparison other than
ARas argued in Sect. 5.1then OPP can still establish her claim in line (6). So when
interlocutors can elicit commitments and criticize irrelevant claims, retraction merely
delays the OPPONENTs conclusion, minimally by one turn.
These considerations all highlight the role of the assumption AR. As AR
compares Pi(c|~a) and Pi(~c|~a), being terms directly related via the complement
principle Pi(c|~a)=1Pi(~c|~a), it should be of interest to compare this evaluation with
a Baconian notion of probability, where this principle does not hold.
5.3 Baconian probability
Jonathan L. Cohen (1980) has coined the term Baconian for a notion of probability
whose central assumptions differ from those of its Pascalian counterpart. Crucially,
Baconian probabilities are non-additive; therefore, the above complement-relations do
1596

not generally hold, and also conditional probabilities may be defined differently. Being
ordinal values, Baconian probabilities can be compared but, unlike Pascalian
probabilities, one cannot readily add, subtract, multiply, or divide them (see Cohen,
1980; Schum, 1991; Hajek & Hall, 2002; Hjek, 2012; Spohn 2012).
For our case, which was seen to depend on AR, it may thus well be the case
that, for instance, Pi(c|a)=0.8>Pi(c)=0.5, while nevertheless Pi(~c|a)=0, rather than
Pi(~c|a)=0.2, as the complement-principle of the Pascalian calculus has it. So, a may
make c more probable to an extent e, without it being entailed that the probability of ~c
given a is calculated as 1e. The scale of Pascalian probability runs upward from
disproof to proof, while the Baconian scale runs upward from non-proof, or no
evidence, to proof (see Cohen, 1980). Evidence for having been provided thus
remains compatible with no evidence having been provided for its negation, ~.
Baconian probability is particularly applicable to the legal domain. For
instance, the probability that a defendant is guilty may be assumed to be determined by
evidence typically provided by the prosecution. Is the prosecutors evidence less than
conclusive, however, then whatever evidence is lacking will, on the Pascalian notion,
entail a corresponding disproof of the defendants guilt (compared the first example in
Sect. 1). On the Baconian notion, in contrast, the prosecutors evidence in support of
the defendants guilt compares independently to evidence forwarded on behalf of the
defendants innocence, or lack thereof. In the absence of such evidence, then, the
probability of the defendants innocence would (hopefully) register at 0. And if
disproving evidence is forwarded, the probability of the defendants innocence
(hopefully) registers at values independent of the probability of the defendants guilt.
We cannot claim to have done any justice to the Baconian notion of probability,
but may nevertheless conclude that the evaluative result (Sect. 4) need not without
further ado transfer to a non-Pascalian notion of probability. So analysts are required to
decide, for the particular case and in view of the natural language material, whether a
Baconian or a Pascalian notion of probability is more appropriate.
6. CONCLUSION
Presupposing a Pascalian notion of probability, we have provided an analysis and
evaluation for probabilistic version of arguments that deny the antecedent (DAP).
Stressing the effects of premise retraction vs. premise subtraction in a dialectical
setting, the cogency of DAP arguments was shown to depend on a premise that
normally remains implicit, namely Pi(c|~a)t, for t=0.5, which we had identified as a
relevance assumption. Moreover, premise retraction was shown to be a delaying-tactic
as long as the opponent can ask the proponent to incur new commitments. Generally,
the cogency of DAP arguments was seen to depend on commitments ascribed to the
proponent. As we have stressed, the evaluative result is restricted to a Pascalian notion
of probability, which was briefly compared to its Baconian variant. On these
qualifications, the abstract version of DAP presented in Sect. 2 can be deployed as a
learning assessment-instrument at graduate-level.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Earlier versions were presented to audiences at the 8th conference of the International
Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), held July 1-4, 2014 in Amsterdam,
The Netherlands; at Giornate Tridentine di Retorica 14 (GTR 2014), held June 12-13
in Trento, Italy; at the 2nd International conference on Rhetoric, Days of Ivo Skaric
(DIS 2014), held April 23-26 in Brac, Croatia; as well as to members of the research
1597

seminars in philosophy and law at Lund University, Sweden. Sect. 4 is based on a joint
article with David Godden (Old Dominion) currently under review. Research was
funded by the Swedish Research Council (VR).

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1598

Interplay Of Implicitness And Authority: Some Remarks On

Roman Rhetorical Ethos
Janja mavc
Educational Research Institute and
University of Primorska
Slovenia
janja.zmavc@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: In the paper we present an analysis of ethos in the early Roman rhetoric. After a brief
conceptualization of Roman ethos and different social roles of orator Romanus, we apply such a view of
ethos to the Verschuerens model of linguistic pragmatics. Focusing on different types of implicit meaning
we demonstrate how an interaction between the explicit and the implicit reflects a discursive construction of
a speakers character.
KEYWORDS: argumentation, authority, ethos, implicit meaning, linguistic pragmatics, Roman rhetoric.

1. INTRODUCTION
The research of rhetorical ethos varies from historical and theoretical conceptualizations to
practical instances as well as possible approaches for analysis. In this paper we focus on
Roman rhetorical ethos and its representations as they can be reconstructed from the texts
of early Roman republic. As a general conceptual framework we adopt a more sociocultural viewpoint on rhetorical ethos and try to apply it to the field of linguistic
pragmatics.
Rhetorical ethos reveals at least three characteristics that should be kept in mind
when classical texts are considered: a) being a part of oratorical practice, ethos is primarily
rooted in a Greco-Roman socio-cultural world (Enos, 1995); b) ethos as a theoretical
concept of Greco-Roman rhetorical system significantly extends over Aristotles or
Isocrates conceptualizations as two most frequently studied directions in classical rhetoric
(Amossy, 2001; mavc, 2012); c) in terms of ancient cultural presuppositions of character
as a moral and pragmatic category (May, 1988), ethos as a rhetorical representation of
such character manifests itself through different means, which all gravitate towards the
same rhetorical purpose: to secure a speakers successful persuasion of their audience.
In this case study we are interested in the function, forms and contexts of Roman ethos and
its explicit/implicit nature, where speakers, along with what they say explicitly, try to
communicate something else in terms of presenting their character. The purpose of our
investigation is grounded in the nature of the early Roman rhetoric and the speaker/orator
as a focal point of public persuasion. It is a well known fact that in Roman society
especially in the 3rd and 2nd century B.C. most of the public performance was limited to
the members of governing elite.1 Hence, rhetorical ethos as a persuasion strategy based on

Cf. Kennedy (1972), Enos (1995), Steel (2006).

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a presentation of speakers character reflected and at the same time helped to secure their
dominant social position.
Considering specifics of socio-cultural context of Roman rhetoric, our main objective is to
analyse rhetorical ethos as a certain manifestation of language use, which is anchored in
the context of early Roman rhetoric as a time and place specific communicative practice.
With such perspective we hope to contribute to an understanding of early Roman
rhetorical ethos as well as set an example of methodological framework for further
comparative and contrastive perspectives in analysis of rhetorical ethos.
A pragmatically oriented approach towards the analysis of rhetorical ethos also
opens a perspective for investigation of implicitness as ethotic strategy, especially in
terms of representations of speakers authority. The concept of implicitness has been
thoroughly studied within linguistic pragmatics, where it is generally defined as a range
of meanings that go beyond what is given by the language form itself, or what is literally
said (Verschueren, 1999, p. 25). Following Verschuerens conceptualisation three
important characteristics of implicit meaning must be taken into account when we
approach to language as a form of action anchored in a real-world context, or what is
perceived as such (ibid.): a) due to the impossibility of complete explicitness in language
implicit meaning emerges from the contextually embedded action character of speech or
text; b) implicit meaning is not a fixed entity but is shaped and reshaped in the course of
linguistic interaction; it is a part of the meaning-generating processes where it interacts
with explicit meaning; c) conventional means for conveying implicit (and explicit)
meaning are manipulable and can be strategically exploited.
If we apply these general remarks on implicitness to rhetorical ethos, we can define
the implicit nature of construction of speakers character: considering ancient cultural
presuppositions on character and the role of the speaker, a Roman orator (among other
things) had to be capable of strategically exploiting the impossibility of being fully
explicit (Verschueren, 1999, p. 31) in terms to present himself as an authority. Needless
to say, implicitness in the context of persuasion is not characteristic only for Roman
rhetoric or rhetorical ethos.2 However, due to the socio-cultural context, Roman ethos can
be seen as a rhetorical strategy that includes carriers of implicit meaning with an important
persuasive function.
Let us say a few words about the methodology. Our main research questions were:
What happens with the construction of speakers character from the explicit/implicit
perspective? Are strategies for implicit meaning generating somehow characteristic for
construction of Roman rhetorical ethos? In order to try to answer these questions we
incorporated theory and methodology of linguistic pragmatics into analysis of rhetorical
ethos in texts of early Roman orators.
In the rhetorical framework we adopted Aristotles concept of rhetorical ethos as part of
the three means of persuasion (ethos-pathos-logos) and contextualized it with theoretical
perspectives of Roman rhetoric as a social practice. The latter are based on studies of
Roman rhetoric and oratory by prominent scholars, such as May (1988), Kennedy (1972),
2

Let us point out just two examples: a) one of the corner stone elements in rhetorical argumentation,
Aristotles enthymeme, is fundamentally grounded on the implicit element (i. e. major premise); b) there are
conventional linguistic strategies within the classical concept of ornatus (e. g. wide range of tropes and
figures of speech) that are based on deliberate avoiding of explicitness and are used to communicate
implicature-type added meaning (cf. Verschueren, 2012, p. 171).

1600

Steel (2006) and Enos (1995). We defined ethos as a speaker's favourable character
presentation, whose qualities and persuasive function are contextualized with specific
moral and social norms of a given society (in our case early Roman republic) and activated
in a language use.
At this point a linguistic pragmatics perspective becomes relevant. As an
interdisciplinary science of language use with a well-established theoretical and
methodological framework it provides useful tools for analysing meaning generating. The
study of implicit meaning was especially motivated by Grice's famous theory of
implicature, which has been extensively treated in different theoretical perspectives by
prominent scholars, such as Levinson (2000), Verschueren (1999), Sperber and Wilson
(2004) and Carston (2009). Our analysis is based on Verschuerens theoretical model of
linguistic pragmatics, which represents a dynamics of meaning generation in connection to
social structures, processes and relations. We believe that such model can represent useful
addition to the research of classical rhetorical ethos, because it enables a thorough analysis
and adds a broader perspective to the persuasive role of a speaker. A combined approach
can be also open new possibilities for comparative and contrastive analysis of other
ethotical discourses (e. g. ancient Greek, medieval, nation-based etc.).
Here is a brief summary of the core elements of Verschuerens theory. Using
language for Verschueren represents an activity that generates meaning. It consists of
continuous making of choices, not only on various level of linguistic structure, but also
pertaining to communicative strategies and even at the level of context.3 In his research of
implicit meaning Verschueren (1999, pp. 27-36) focuses on investigation of
conventionalized carriers of implicit meaning, which link explicit content to relevant
aspects of background information and are conceptualized as types of implicit meaning. He
distinguishes between the more highly coded (1) presupposition (implicit meaning that
must be pre-supposed, understood, taken for granted for an utterance to make sense) and
(2) implication (known as logical implication, entailment, or conventional implicature, i.e.
implicit meaning that can be logically inferred from a form of expression). The other three
types need to be inferred by addressees: (3) generalized conversational implicature
(implicit meaning that can be conventionally, or by default, inferred from forms of
expression in combination with assumed standard adherence to conversational maxims),
(4) particularized conversational implicatures (implicit meaning inferred from the obvious
flouting of a conversational maxim in combination with assumed adherence to a principle
of conversational cooperation), and (5) a residual type of inferences not directly related to
basic maxims or heuristics (e. g. unspoken ways of an utterers orientation to aspects of
meaning and context). The general idea behind this concepts is to investigate how
different types of implicit meaning, functioning at different (mostly) structural levels,
interact with explicit meaning in the meaning-generating processes in any discourse.4
In our analysis we focus on such interaction in relation to the construction of
rhetorical ethos. In order to get meaningful interpretations of strategic interplay between
explicit and implicit in the construction of rhetorical ethos, we applied different principles
from Verschuerens pragmatic approach. They include investigation of interrelated tasks,
3

The concept of linguistic choices and notions of variability, negotiability, adaptability that make sense of
process/activity of choice-making, as well as contextual correlates of adaptability that motivate and/or are
affected by the choices are outlined in Verschueren (1999).
4
Cf. Verschueren (2012, p. 159).

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such as a) investigation of different aspects of context from the general to the specific
levels (i. e. wider social, political and historical context of early Roman rhetoric;
immediate context of situation referring to the of actors involved in the analysed
discourse; linguistic context a textual/speech dimension of contextualization) and b)
investigation of certain conventions of language use, which are mobilised in the analysed
discourse as linguistic choices relevant for construction of ethos (e. g., language code and
style, patterns of word choice, carriers of implicit meaning, activity type).
2. ROMAN RHETORICAL ETHOS, AUTHORITY AND IMPLICITNESS A
LINGUISTIC PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS OF THE DEFENCE OF SCIPIO AFRICANUS
In the second part of our paper we present a case study of the role of implicitness in
construction of rhetorical ethos in early Roman rhetoric. As an example we used a
fragment of the defence of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (235-183 BC), a famous
Roman politician and a military general from the period of early Roman republic, who was
also known for his oratorical skill and public performance. The fragment is preserved in
Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae, and refers to historical events around the year of 184 BC
when tribune M. Naevius charged Africanus of accepting money from King Antiochus of
Asia.
The purpose of analysis of Scipios words is to identify main elements of
construction of his ethos and to determine its function in the context of his defence.5 A
special attention is paid to the strategies where interplay between explicit and implicit
meaning generation is relevant for representation of his authority. We also investigated,
which character features of Scipios ethos are presented through presuppositions,
implications and implicatures and how is a set of propositions of who and what he is
related to the issue that he is presenting. Contextualized with general features of early
Roman rhetoric and society we conceptualise Roman rhetorical ethos as a means of
persuasion that is specific in its structure, dynamics and function.
Let us now see what Scipio said in his defence according to Gellius:
(1) Cum M. Naevius tribunus plebis accusaret eum ad populum diceretque accepisse a rege
Antiocho pecuniam, ut condicionibus gratiosis et mollibus pax cum eo populi Romani nomine fieret,
et quaedam item alia crimini daret indigna tali viro, tum Scipio pauca praefatus quae dignitas vitae
suae atque gloria postulabat, Memoria, inquit, Quirites, repeto, diem esse hodiernum quo
Hannibalem Poenum imperio vestro inimicissimum magno proelio vici in terra Africa pacemque et
victoriam vobis peperi spectabilem. Non igitur simus adversum deos ingrati et, censeo, relinquamus
nebulonem hunc, eamus hinc protinus Iovi optimo maximo gratulatum. Id cum dixisset, avertit et
ire ad Capitolium coepit. Tum contio universa, quae ad sententiam de Scipione ferendam
convenerat, relicto tribuno, Scipionem in Capitolium comitata atque inde ad aedes eius cum laetitia
et gratulatione sollemni prosecuta est. (Aul. Gell. NA 4.18.3-5)
(When Marcus Naevius, tribune of the commons, accused him before the people and declared that
he had received money from king Antiochus to make peace with him in the name of the Roman
people on favourable and easy terms, and when the tribune added sundry other charges which were
unworthy of so great a man, then Scipio, after a few preliminary remarks such as were called for by
5

For a discussion on problems of authenticity of Scipios words see Kennedy (1972, p. 6.). In analysis of
implicitness we used only words that Gellius literary ascribes to Scipio, while Gellius description
circumstances is partly included among elements of immediate context.

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the dignity and renown of his life, said: I recall, fellow citizens, that this is the day on which in
Africa in a mighty battle I conquered Hannibal the Carthaginian, the most bitter enemy of your
power, and won for you a splendid peace and a glorious victory. Let us then not be ungrateful to
the gods, but, I suggest, let us leave this worthless fellow, and go at once to render thanks to
Jupiter, greatest and best of gods. So saying, he turned away and set out for the Capitol.
Thereupon the whole assembly, which had gathered to pass judgment on Scipio, left the tribune,
accompanied Scipio to the Capitol, and then escorted him to his home with the joy and expressions
of gratitude suited to a festal occasion. (transl. by J. C. Rolfe; italics are ours)

Since implicit meaning is highly context dependent, the first step is to set the referential
framework that constitutes the cultural, social and linguistic context, in which Scipios
defence is anchored.6 Besides mutual knowledge of Scipio (utterer), Roman people and M.
Naevius (interpreters, first as direct addressees, the second as side participant in the event),
which consists of the world of unexpressed but assumed to be shared information (e. g.
recursive and mutual embedings: I know that you know that I know etc.), we also need to
consider social and cultural aspects of rhetoric in the period of early Roman republic that
motivate and/or are affected by the linguistic choices in Scipios speech.
Here is a short outline of the relevant wider context. Before it came into close
contact with a conceptualized Greek rhetorike tekhne, early Roman rhetoric (3/2nd
century B.C.) as an oratorical practice reflects of Romes social and political situation.
Public oratory played an important part in society; however, a group of Roman aristocratic
families who directed economic and political growth of res publica influenced all sociocultural activities, public speaking as well. Such native rhetoric would in some part present
a tool of political power, but at the same time it was tools for sustaining and transmitting
traditional political, social and cultural values of the dominant social group (Kennedy,
1972; May, 1988). Social and political structures, such as courts (with patronus-cliens
system), political offices (contio and senatus each with special audiences and procedures
for speakers) as well as funerals (a well known place for emotional character
presentation and establishing connections between individuals traits and cultural
patterns), offered main opportunities for orators as well as determined their key persuasive
strategies (Steel, 2006). Regardless of the rhetorical situation, in Rome persuasion was
always subordinated to the strategy of speakers character presentation. Roman orator,
based on his social and political ranking, represented a widely recognised authority and
was a focal point of traditional (native) forms of public speaking. Consequently, rhetorical
ethos of that time reveals some of the characteristics that are connected with the strategic
exploitation of the explicit and the implicit. This circumstance influenced further
development of Roman rhetoric, which is particularly evident in Ciceros speeches and
theoretical discussions on rhetoric (May, 1988, pp. 5-6).
For a clearer picture let us point out some of the most typical characteristics of
rhetorical ethos as a strategy of persuasion that can be identified in the early and late
republican Roman oratory.7 The concept of Roman rhetorical ethos is based on Roman
conceptions of a persons character, which was believed to be inherited from family
ancestors and remained constant from birth. Consequently, a character would also
determine persons actions. As a strategy of persuasion it represented a broad concept on
the quantitative and qualitative level, which significantly differed from Greek conceptions
6
7

Theory of contextual correlates is outlined in Verschueren (1999).

For extensive discussion cf. May (1988, pp. 5-12).

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of rhetorical ethos.8 Roman ethos was a combination of collective and individual ethos.
The first one consisted of political and military accomplishments of a speakers family
members (i. e. collective ethos of the gens), the second one was a result of speakers own
authority, which arose from actions of the speaker himself and proved his ethotic value.
Individual ethos consisted of set of virtues, recognised in Roman society as
praiseworthy and vital for persons public activity. These virtues were: 1) gratia: influence
and popularity based on the number of services owed to the speaker, 2) gloria: glory as a
consequence of speakers past actions (i. e. res gestae), 3) existimatio: reputation based on
his oratorical and political skills, 4) dignitas: dignity as a result of speakers social status
and moral conduct, 5) auctoritas: authority as a consequence of exhibition of wisdom
gained through practical experience, expert knowledge and a sense of responsibility in
public and private life.9Another characteristic of Roman ethos as strategy of persuasion
refers to the ways of its realisation in the discourse. Since it reflected socio-political
circumstances and cultural assumptions about human nature and character, Roman
rhetorical ethos conveys an entirely pre-existing nature (i. e. it is not constructed in the
discourse but reflected by the discourse) as well as it contains emotional connotations (i. e.
a conflation with pathos). As a final remark we should add that Roman rhetorical ethos
also carries an argumentative function. Arguments based on speakers character
represented a legitimate source of proof and were discursively realised either in the form
of ethical narrative (i. e. facts that were represented as reflections of speakers character)
or as a part of argument from authority (i. e. arguments based on explicit or implicit
premise because I say so).10
We are now returning to our example of Scipios defence, where ethos reveals a
similar position. Before we present characteristics of his persuasion strategy let us briefly
sketch relevant elements of the immediate/situational and linguistic context as they can be
identified on the discursive (i. e. textual/speech) level and are relevant for implicit
meaning generation in Scipios ethos construction11:

Utterers and interpreters:

o utterer: Scipio presents himself as a well known to audience and uses his
own voice (1st person) when referring to his role in the past historical event
and the importance of his actions for Romans (memoria repeto/I recall;
vici/I conquered; victoriam peperi/I won). He switches to the use of 1st
person plural when he positions himself as a part of the collective (i. e.
Romans) and present actions, which should to be taken in order to prevent
anger of the gods (non simus ingrati/let us not be ungrateful;
relinquams/let us leave; eamus/let us go);

For discussion cf. mavc (2012, pp. 181-189).

Cf. Balsdon (1960) and May (1988) for ancient sources on the use of specific notions.
10
For ancient testimonies about Roman conceptions of character and its rhetorical/persuasive function see
Cic., De sen. 61.7.10, Brut. 111.4-112.1, De or. 2.182; Quint. Inst. 5.12.10.1-4.
11
A short historical background of the event: After Antiochus had advanced into Greece, Scipios brother
Lucius was given the command, Publius serving as his legate; they defeated Antiochus at Magnesia. In 187
BC Lucius was accused for refusing to account for 500 talents received from Antiochus; Publius may have
been accused but not condemned in 184 BC.
9

1604

interpreters: a) people of Rome primary audience, directly addressed by

Scipio to secure their attention and influence their decision; b) M. Naevius
tribune of the commons a prosecutor, presented as a side participant and
indirectly addressed by the use of pejorative description (hic nebulo/this
worthless fellow).
Mental states: The use of the 1st person plural and a hortatory subjunctive mood in
the second part reveals utterers personal and emotional involvement into actions
he is proposing.
Aspects of social/institutional settings: Within a defence speech preformed in the
context of judicial event (contio ... ad sententiam ... ferendam
convenerat/assembly ... gathered to pass judgement) religious practices
(adversum deos ingrati/not be ungrateful to the gods; gratulatum/render
thanks) and institutions (Iovi Optimo Maximo/Juppiter greatest and best of
gods; in Capitolinum/for the Capitol) are invoked as a reminder of the role of
religion in Roman social structures (e. g. Juppiter as a bestower of military
victory).
Temporal and spatial anchor of the discourse: As a response to the accusations,
relevance of past events for a present state of affairs is emphasised and a new
spatial point of reference is presented. The present spatial point is judicial and
bares a negative connotation as a representation of an unnecessary and improper
trial. It is marked by linguistic choices of a description of the accuser, who should
remain at the present place (relinquamus nebulonem hunc/let us leave this
worthless fellow), and of the swiftness of leaving the present location by the
utterer and the rest of the audience (eamus hinc protinus/let us go at once). The
new spatial point, which is suggested by utterer, is religious and bares a positive
connotation as a place where a sacred duty that needs to be performed.
Markers of co(n)textual cohesion: anaphora (vestro vobis), self-reference (repeto
vici peperi censeo), contrasting (ingrati gratulatum; nebulo Iuppiter).
o

With all these correlates in mind we now proceed to the final part of our analysis, where
the strategy of construction of Scipios ethos is analysed through the interplay between
explicit and implicit information and interpreted as a vital communicative element in the
process of his successful persuasion of the audience.
From the linguistic choices in the fragment we can see that the construction of Scipios
authority, as a basis for the standpoint that charges against him must be dropped, is
entirely based on his individual ethos. The authority that comes from his character is
justified by Scipios specifications of a) his past actions, b) his social status and moral
conduct, as well as c) his auctoritas.12 As means for such presentation we can identify the
following examples of the strategic interplay between explicit and implicit information
(see table 1).

12

Engl. word 'authority' is not a sufficient translation of Latin auctoritas.

1605

Table 1: A schematic presentation of explicit and implicit information in Scipios defence,

which are relevant to the construction of his rhetorical ethos.
EXPLICIT
(2) ...vici.../I conquered

(3) Hannibalem Poenum imperio vestro

inimicissimum magno proelio vici/
I conquered Hannibal the Carthaginian
the most bitter enemy of your power

(4) pacemque et victoriam vobis peperi

inspectabilem/
I won for you a splendid peace and a
glorious victory

(5) Memoria, Quirites, repeto, diem esse

hodiernum, quo .../
I recall, fellow citizens, that this is the
day, on which

(6) ... relinquamus nebulonem hunc

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IMPLICIT
- The use of a 1st person presupposes a
commonly known fact that he was a
commander of a Roman army (not a
warrior in an individual combat or a
common soldier) and that he (not
someone else) defeated Hannibal.
- ETHOS: The fact that he was a
commander implies the importance of
his social status.
- Inimicissimum and magno/the
most bitter presuppose a great danger
for Scipio and Romans (vestro
imperio/your power) and that it may
not have been an easy task.
- Hannibalem Poenum vici/I
conquered Hannibal the Carthaginian
use of pars pro toto (analogy with the
use of 1st person a commander
instead of an army) implies two great
military minds juxtaposed.
ETHOS: Description of the event
implies the highest possible military
achievement and thus establishes
undisputed gloria and auctoritas
within Scipios ethos.
Pax, victoria inspectabilis/splendid
peace and a glorious victory
presuppose praiseworthy final actions
of the great danger.
- ETHOS: Both actions (res gestae)
serve as implicit proofs of Scipios
gloria and auctoritas.
Memoria repeto presupposes
Scipios ability to remember nationally
important anniversary (diem
hodiernum, quo.../I recall, that
this is the day, on which) and implies
a contrast with his prosecutor, who
clearly ignores that fact.
- ETHOS: Implies his responsibility in
public life (part of auctoritas).
- The portrayal of his prosecutor as

eamus Iovi optimo maximo gratulatum/

let us leave this worthless fellow,
and go at once to render thanks to
Jupiter, greatest and best of gods

(7) Non igitur simus adversum deos ingrati

.../Let us then not be ungrateful to the
gods

(8) ...Hannibalem Poenum imperio vestro

inimicissimum magno proelio vici in
terra Africa pacemque et victoriam
vobis peperi spectabilem/
...in Africa in a mighty battle I
conquered Hannibal the Carthaginian,
the most bitter enemy of your power,
and won for you a splendid peace and a
glorious victory

(9) the whole utterance

1607

nebulo/a worthless fellow, who

should be left behind (relinquamus/
let us leave) implies insignificance
(compared to Iuppiter optimus
maximus/Jupiter, greatest and best of
gods) and unfitness to join the solemn
ceremony (repeated 1st person pl.
relinquamuseamus gratulatum/let
us leave goto render thanks).
ETHOS: Nebulo implies a contrast
with Scipios character, who is a
leader of the ceremony (1st person pl.
'eamus') and emphasises his moral
qualities (dignitas).
- The use of potential subj. non simus
ingrati/let us not be implies a
proposition: To prosecute Scipio on
such day might seem as an act of
ingratitude and impiety toward gods
who granted Scipio and Rome a
military success.
- The use of igitur/then presents a
proposition, with which it occurs as
logical and sufficient conclusion from
preceding proposition (i. e. victory
over Hannibal and peace).
With a detailed description of what he
did, Scipio might flout Grices maxim
of quantity, since more information
than needed is given about the
accused: Roman audience was
undoubtedly well aware of the
anniversary and the military
accomplishments of Scipio the
description might carry implicature of
importance of Scipio (auctoritas), as
well as evoke the danger and fear of
the Roman people (emotional effect): I
am a very important person for Rome;
Remember the terror and fear you felt
at that time.
The whole utterance might flout
Grices maxim of relevance, since
Scipios battle with Hannibal in Africa
is not relevant to the case about
accepting Antiochus bribery in Asia.

The statement might carry implicature:

The fact that I, Scipio, have won such
a historic battle in Africa is enough to
drop the charges related to the events
in Asia.
Reading Scipios defence in the broader frame, that is, as a specific language activity type
(i. e. judicial oratory) with its typical structure, language, code and style, we can interpret
the fragment from A. Gellius as a part of refutation. The general argumentative pattern
consists of the main argument from authority about Scipios merits and moral conduct (i.
e. his ethos), followed by a conversed argument from authority (i. e. ad hominem) about
Scipios opponent. Both arguments support the conclusion about dropping charges against
Scipio. We can reconstruct this in the following scheme:
(10)

Premise 1: I am such and such authority, and I believe that charges must be
dropped.
Premise 2: My accuser is not an authority (he is a nebulo). ad hominem.
Conclusion: Charges must be dropped.

In the fragment both premises remain implicit and so does the conclusion. But Gellius
description of the situation (i. e. the cotext of the quotation) and the above-indicated
pragmatic aspects of the speech itself provide us with enough information for such a
general meaning construct. The question is: Why would Scipio Africanus, one of the most
respected Romans use implicit argument from authority in order to succeed in a trial
against him? A coherent answer unfortunately cannot be provided on the basis of
(linguistic pragmatic) analysis of A. Gellius fragment. However, we can rephrase our
question and include results of our background analysis into a tentative answer that would
in some part explain his linguistic choices in terms of construction of his ethos, which
were identified in the schematic presentation above. Namely, we can ask ourselves, what
types of implicit meaning do premises and conclusion belong to and why? Taking into
account our investigation of referential framework and strategies of language use, it is
evident that Scipios implicit argument from authority (i. e. his ethos) could be seen more
as presupposition and not as implication or implicature. The elements of Scipios authority
(i. e. his merits, social status etc.), due to the Roman cultural presuppositions, represented
a shared to be assumed background knowledge and not something to be logically inferred
from a form of expression or conventionally (much less) conversationally inferred by his
addressees. His ethos as a persuasive/argumentative strategy is the effect of the use of
implicitly communicated content, which had a pre-discursive nature and preceded him as
an utterer/orator. In other words, he was able to use his ethos as a main argument
regardless of its relevance to the conclusion/charges because of the Roman socio-cultural
context, which legitimated such use. As for other two elements in the argument scheme,
we can interpret a) the conclusion as implication, based on the sufficient grounds that
Scipio is offering in the context of his self-characterisation, and b) a second premise as
implicature. The ad hominem contains a characterisation of Scipios accuser/opponent (i.
e. nebulo). What nebulo stands for and why he cannot be seen as a proper authority in
the trial, which is taking place on the anniversary of Scipios defeat of Hannibal, is
1608

something that audience must infer from Scipios description of his past actions, social
status and moral conduct. And this might be another reason why he takes the effort of
enumerating his ethotical qualities otherwise known to the audience: to imply that his
opponent is something completely opposite, which would make his ethos inconsistent with
the accusations he has set forth against Scipio.
3. CONCLUSION
From the analysis of Scipios strategic use of explicit and implicit meaning generation in
construction of ethos we could see that his argumentation entirely relied on the impact of
his self-characterisation made upon cultural presuppositions of that time. Such strategies
were common and are evident in many other fragments of Roman orators. Again, it is the
importance of persons character in Roman society that made these strategies a focal point
of persuasion and a formal means of proof. This is a unique Roman perspective on ethos
that despite of adoption of Greek rhetorical system fundamentally influenced further
development of Roman rhetorical practice and theory.

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