Table

of Contents
Art. IX-B Constitutional Commissions (The Civil Service Commission) ................................... 2
Section 2(1) Civil Service Coverage ................................................................................................... 2
National Service Corporation v. NLRC (1988) ...................................................................................... 2
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Hernandez (1986) ............................................. 3
Civil Service Commission v. Sojor (2008) ............................................................................................. 3
Section 2(2) Basis of Appointments to the Civil Service ..................................................................... 4
De los Santos v. Mallare (1950) ........................................................................................................... 4
Civil Service Commission v. Salas (1997) ............................................................................................. 6
Civil Service Commission v. Javier (2008) ............................................................................................ 8
Grio v. Civil Service Commission (1991) .......................................................................................... 10
Section 2(3) Security of Tenure in the Civil Service .......................................................................... 11
Briones v. Osmea (1958) .................................................................................................................. 11
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (2008) ...................................................................................... 12
Civil Service Commission v. Sojor* .................................................................................................... 12
Civil Service Commission v. Magnaye, Jr. (2010) ............................................................................... 13
Section 2(4) Prohibition Against Electioneering and Partisan Political Activities ............................. 14
Santos v. Yatco (1959) ....................................................................................................................... 14
Section 2(5) Right of Self-Organization of Government Employees ................................................. 14
De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals (1999) ................................................................................................ 14
Section 7 Appointments/Designation of Elective/Appointive Officials During Tenure ..................... 15
Flores v. Drilon (1993) ....................................................................................................................... 15
Section 8 Prohibition from Receiving Double Compensation; Perks from Foreign Governments ..... 17
Peralta v. Mathay (1971) ................................................................................................................... 17
Art. IX-C Constitutional Commissions (The Commission on Elections) ................................. 19
Section 1(1) Qualifications of the Commissioners ........................................................................... 19
Cayetano v. Monsod (1991) ............................................................................................................... 19
Matibag v. Benipayo (2002) ............................................................................................................... 20
Section 2 Powers and Functions of the Commission ....................................................................... 23
Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections (1993) .................................................................................. 23
Section 3 En Banc and Division Jurisdiction ..................................................................................... 24
Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections (1992) .................................................................................. 24

ART. IX-B CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS (THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)

Section 2(1) Civil Service Coverage
National Service Corporation v. NLRC (1988)
x x x it is belatedly argued that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Credos reinstatement.
NASECO claims that, as a government corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the
National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned corporation), the terms and
conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations. NASECO cites National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, where this Court held that
There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law and civil service rules and
regulations.
It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given
retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated, because x x x
prior to the ruling in National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this Court had recognized the
applicability of the Labor Code to, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over,
disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in government-owned or controlled
corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation (NASECO).
Furthermore, in the matter of coverage by the civil service of government-owned or controlled
corporations, the 1987 Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon which
National Housing Corporation vs. Juco is based. x x x [1987 Constitution added the clause with
original charter]
xxx
Thus, the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by the Court in
the National Housing Corporation case x x x appear relegated to relative insignificance by the
1987 Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government owned or controlled
corporations with original charter; and, therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not
include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of
government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law.
xxx
On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the
Constitution in place at the time of decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to
the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO
is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Hernandez (1986)

Evidently, the case turns upon the question: Are employees of the MWSS covered by the Labor
Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?
xxx
Now, the character of the MWSS as a government-owned or controlled corporation is not
contested; x x x. Republic Act No. 6234 created it x x x therefore, employment in the MWSS is
governed not by the Labor Code but by the civil service law, rules and regulations; and
controversies arising from or connected with that employment are not cognizable by the National
Labor Relations Commission.
The argument of the Labor Arbiter that it is only disputes between the MWSS and its regular
employees that are beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRC, not those between it and its non-regular
or contractual employees, is sophistical. There is no legal or logical justification for such a
distinction. Indeed, it is ruled out by the fact that positions in the civil service are classified into
career and non-career service, and that the non-career service includes inter alia Contractual
personnel x x x
The Labor Arbiters other postulation, that the Civil Service Law governs employment in the
MWSS in all aspect except monetary claims, and that as to the latter, it is the Labor Code that
applies, is even more patently illogical, and deserves no confutation.
Civil Service Commission v. Sojor (2008)
Is the president of a state university outside the reach of the disciplinary jurisdiction
constitutionally granted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) over all civil servants and
officials? x x x
xxx
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997, under which law
respondent was appointed during the time material to the present case, provides that the schools
governing board shall have the general powers of administration granted to a corporation. In
addition, Section 4 of the law grants to the board the power to remove school faculty members,
administrative officials, and employees for cause: x x x
The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the succeeding law that
converted CVPC into NORSU, R.A. No. 9299. Notably, and in contrast with the earlier law, R.A.
No. 9299 now provides that the administration of the university and exercise of corporate powers
of the board of the school shall be exclusive: x x x
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, there is no question that administrative power over the school
exclusively belongs to its BOR. But does this exclusive administrative power extend to the power
to remove its erring employees and officials?

x x x Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members, employees, and
officials of the university is granted to the BOR in addition to its general powers of
administration. x x x
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this
power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its
employees and officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows
upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is
to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the
matter.
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided
by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Section 2(2) Basis of Appointments to the Civil Service
De los Santos v. Mallare (1950)
x x x Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under Chapter 61 entitled
"City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the President) to remove at pleasure any
of the officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city engineer. The first question that presents
itself is, is this provision still in force?
xxx
It seems plain beyond doubt that the provision of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code,
x x x is incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that "No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." The two provisions
are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. One in express terms permits what the other
in similar terms prohibits.
The Constitution leaves it to the Congress to provide for the cause of removal, and it is suggested
that the President's pleasure is itself a cause.
The phrase "for cause" in connection with removals of public officers has acquired a well-defined
concept. "It means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient
warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the
exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the
mere will of those vested with the power of removal or without any cause. Moreover, the cause
must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public."

x x x It is contended that only officers and employees in the classified service should be brought
within the purview of Article XII of the Constitution [on removal for cause, such that employees
in the unclassified service may be removed at will].
Section 1 of this article ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the
Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which
are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only
according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination."
The first clause is a definition of the scope of Civil Service, the men and women which section 4
protects. It seems obvious from that definition that the entire Civil Service is contemplated, except
positions "which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature." x x
x
xxx
As has been seen, three specified classes of positions
policy-determining,
primarily confidential and
highly technical
are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and and employees
appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions involve the highest degree of
confiden[ce] or are closely bound up with and dependent on other positions to which they are
subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself
demands that appointments coming under this category be terminable at the will of the officer that
makes them. The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor
highly technical.
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the
occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence
in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.
Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a
method of action for the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to
make it. x x x
Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required
nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which
is the sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the Constitution. x x x

Civil Service Commission v. Salas (1997)

We find no merit in the petition and consequently hold that the same should be, as it is hereby,
denied.
Section 2, Rule XX of the Revised Civil Service Rules, promulgated pursuant to the provisions of
x x x Civil Service Act of 1959 x x x then in force when Presidential Decree No. 1869 creating the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation was passed, provided that upon
recommendation of the Commissioner, the President may declare a position as policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature. It appears that Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869 was predicated thereon, with the text thereof providing as follows:
All positions in the corporation, whether technical, administrative, professional or managerial are
exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed
only by the personnel management policies set by the Board of Directors. All employees of the
casinos and related services shall be classified as confidential appointees.
On the strength of this statutory declaration, petitioner PAGCOR terminated the services of
respondent Salas for lack of confidence after it supposedly found that the latter was engaged in
proxy betting. In upholding the dismissal of respondent Salas, the CSC ruled that he is considered
a confidential employee by operation of law, hence there is no act of dismissal to speak of but a
mere expiration of a confidential employees term of notice, such that a complaint for illegal
dismissal will not prosper in this case for lack of legal basis.
xxx
Prior to the passage of the aforestated Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized
instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential:
Firstly, when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service,
has declared the position to be primarily confidential; and,
secondly, in the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the
office there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
At first glance, it would seem that the instant case falls under the first category by virtue of the
express mandate under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. An in-depth analysis, however,
of the second category evinces otherwise.
When Republic Act No. 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959, Section 5 thereof provided that the
non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law
to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature. In the case of Piero, et al. vs. Hechanova, et
al., the Court obliged with a short discourse there on how the phrase in nature came to find its
way into the law, thus:

The change from the original wording of the bill (expressly declared by law x x x to be policydetermining, etc.) to that finally approved and enacted (or which are policy-determining, etc. in
nature) came about because of the observations of Senator Taada, that as originally worded the
proposed bill gave Congress power to declare by fiat of law a certain position as primarily
confidential or policy-determining, which should not be the case. The Senator urged that since the
Constitution speaks of positions which are primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly
technical in nature, it is not within the power of Congress to declare what positions are primarily
confidential or policy-determining. It is the nature alone of the position that determines whether
it is policy-determining or primarily confidential. x x x
SENATOR TAADA: Well, at the first instance, it is the appointing power that determines that:
the nature of the position. In case of conflict then it is the Court that determines whether the
position is primarily confidential or not
Hence the dictum that, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature
of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policydetermining or highly technical. And the Court in the aforecited case explicitly decreed that
executive pronouncements, such as Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no more than initial
determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. It must be so, or else it would then lie
within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the protection
of Section 4, Article XII (now Section 2[3], Article IX-B) of the Constitution. In other words,
Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 cannot be given a literally stringent application without
compromising the constitutionally protected right of an employee to security of tenure.
xxx
The question that may now be asked is whether the Piero doctrine x x x is still controlling with
the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987, Book V of which deals
specifically with the Civil Service Commission, considering that from these later enactments, in
defining positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, the
phrase in nature was deleted.
We rule in the affirmative. The matter was clarified and extensively discussed during the
deliberations in the plenary session of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the Civil Service
provisions, x x x
It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether apparent, that the primary purpose of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitive
examination as a means for determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed further that these
positions are covered by security of tenure, although they are considered non-competitive only in
the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations for purposes of
determining merit and fitness.
x x x Accordingly, the Piero doctrine continues to be applicable up to the present and is hereby
maintained. Such being the case, the submission that PAGCOR employees have been declared

confidential appointees by operation of law under the bare authority of CSC Resolution No. 91830 must be rejected.
xxx
It can thus be safely determined therefrom that the occupant of a particular position could be
considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the
appointing authority was, to repeat, the latters belief that he can share a close intimate relationship
with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or
misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Withal, where the
position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between
them is no longer predominant.
Civil Service Commission v. Javier (2008)
Under Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, civil service positions are
currently classified into either
1) career service and
2) non-career service positions.
Career positions are characterized by:
(1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications;
(2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and
(3) security of tenure.
In addition, the Administrative Code, under its Book V, sub-classifies career positions according
to appointment status, divided into:
1) permanentwhich is issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
positions to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed,
in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof; and
2) temporarywhich is issued, in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when it
becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil
service eligibility; provided, that such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve
months, and the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible
becomes available.
Positions that do not fall under the career service are considered non-career positions, which are
characterized by:
(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the
career service; and
(2) tenure
which is limited to a period specified by law, or
which is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment
was made.

A strict reading of the law reveals that primarily confidential positions fall under the non-career
service. It is also clear that, unlike career positions, primarily confidential and other non-career
positions do not have security of tenure. The tenure of a confidential employee is co-terminous
with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latters pleasure. However, the confidential
employee may be appointed or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory retirement age
of 65 years.
x x x the instant petition raises the question of whether the position of corporate secretary in a
GOCC, currently classified by the CSC as belonging to the permanent, career service, should be
classified as primarily confidential, i.e., belonging to the non-career service. x x x
xxx
Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of positions in the civil
service made by the legislative or executive branches, or even by a constitutional body like the
petitioner. The Court is expected to make its own determination as to the nature of a particular
position, such as whether it is a primarily confidential position or not, without being bound by
prior classifications made by other bodies. The findings of the other branches of government are
merely considered initial and not conclusive to the Court. x x x
xxx
In classifying a position as primarily confidential, its functions must not be routinary, ordinary and
day to day in character. A position is not necessarily confidential though the one in office may
sometimes handle confidential matters or documents. Only ordinary confidence is required for all
positions in the bureaucracy. But, as held in De los Santos, for someone holding a primarily
confidential position, more than ordinary confidence is required.
xxx
It is from De los Santos that the so-called proximity rule was derived. A position is considered
to be primarily confidential when there is a primarily close intimacy between the appointing
authority and the appointee, which ensures the highest degree of trust and unfettered
communication and discussion on the most confidential of matters. This means that where the
position occupied is already remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust
between them is no longer predominant. On further interpretation in Grio, this was clarified to
mean that a confidential nature would be limited to those positions not separated from the position
of the appointing authority by an intervening public officer, or series of public officers, in the
bureaucratic hierarchy.
xxx
In fine, a primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the positions of
the appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their
relationship.

Ineluctably therefore, the position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS, or any GOCC, for that matter,
is a primarily confidential position. The position is clearly in close proximity and intimacy with
the appointing power. It also calls for the highest degree of confidence between the appointer and
appointee.
Grio v. Civil Service Commission (1991)
We shall first discuss whether the position of a provincial attorney is primarily confidential so that
the holder thereof may be terminated upon loss of confidence.
In Cadiente vs. Santos, this Court ruled that the position of a city legal officer is undeniably one
which is primarily confidential x x x
xxx
We agree with the petitioners and answer the question earlier propounded in the affirmative. A
city legal officer appointed by a city mayor to work for and in behalf of the city has for its
counterpart in the province a provincial attorney appointed by the provincial governor. In the same
vein, a municipality may have a municipal attorney who is to be named by the appointing power.
The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created under Republic Act No.
5185 which categorized them together as positions of trust x x x
The fact that the position of respondent Arandela as provincial attorney has already been classified
as one under the career service and certified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission cannot
conceal or alter its highly confidential nature. x x x This being the case, and following the principle
that the tenure of an official holding a primarily confidential position ends upon loss of confidence,
the Court finds that private respondent Arandela was not dismissed or removed from office when
his services were terminated. His term merely expired.
The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and confidence
of the highest degree, irrespective of whether the client is a private person or a government
functionary. The personal character of the relationship prohibits its delegation in favor of another
attorney without the clients consent.
However, the legal work involved, as distinguished from the relationship, can be delegated. The
practice of delegating work of a counsel to his subordinates is apparent in the Office of the
Provincial Attorney wherein it can be gleaned from the power granted to such officer to exercise
administrative supervision and control over the acts and decision of his subordinates.
It is therefore possible to distinguish positions in the civil service where lawyers act as counsel in
confidential and non-confidential positions by simply looking at the proximity of the position in
question in relation to that of the appointing authority. Occupants of such positions would be
considered confidential employees if the predominant reason they were chosen by the appointing
authority is the latters belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant
which measures freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible
betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of state.

10

This implies that positions in the civil service of such nature would be limited to those not
separated from the position of the appointing authority by an intervening public officer, or series
of public officers, in the bureaucratic hierarchy. x x x
There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff which assists the
confidential employer above described. Since the positions occupied by these subordinates are
remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer
predominant. The importance of these subordinates to the appointing authority now lies in the
contribution of their legal skills to facilitate the work of the confidential employee. At this level of
the bureaucracy, any impairment of the appointing authoritys interest as a client, which may be
caused through the breach of residual trust by any of these lower-ranked lawyers, can be
anticipated and prevented by the confidential employee, as a reasonably competent office head,
through the exercise of his power to review, approve, reverse, or modify their acts and decisions.
At this level, the client can be protected without need of imposing upon the lower-ranked lawyers
the fiduciary duties inherent in the attorney-client relationship. Hence, there is now no obstacle to
giving full effect to the security of tenure principle to these members of the civil service.
Section 2(3) Security of Tenure in the Civil Service
Briones v. Osmea (1958)
x x x Our review of the evidence on record convinced us that the reasons given for the abolition
of the positions of the appellees (alleged to be economy and efficiency) are untrue, and constitute
a mere subterfuge for the removal without cause of the said appellees, in violation of the security
of Civil Service tenures as provided by the Constitution.
Considering that the appellees have served in the office of the Mayor of Cebu, since
Commonwealth days, before the war; that their efficiency and merit has been attested by repeated
and constant promotions and increases in salary; that petitioner Rosagaran was even proclaimed
"Model Employee" as recently as 1955; and that just a short time before the abolition of their
positions, the respondents had created for the same office of the City Mayor no less than 35 new
positions calling for an outlay of P68,100 per annum, almost P6,000 a month, the excuse of
promoting efficiency and economy is most transparent and unimpressive. A decent respect for the
Civil Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that civil service eligibles, like petitioners
herein who have rendered long and honorable service, should not be sacrificed in favor of noneligibles given positions of recent creation, nor should they be left at the mercy of political changes.
xxx
x x x while abolition of the office does not imply removal of the incumbent, the rule is true only
where the abolition is made in good faith; that the right to abolish can not be used to discharge
employees in violation of the civil service law nor can it be exercised for personal or political
reasons. x x x

11

Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (2008)

x x x RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed
from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded
the employee.
In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The
action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: public interest,
justice and equity, public convenience and welfare and simplicity, economy and welfare. In
this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
Civil Service Commission v. Sojor*
Career service positions are those where:
(1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical qualifications;
(2) there is opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and
(3) there is security of tenure.
xxx
Career positions are further grouped into three levels. Entrance to the first two levels is determined
through competitive examinations, while entrance to the third level is prescribed by the Career
Executive Service Board. The positions covered by each level are:
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions
which involve non-professional or subprofessional work in a non-supervisory or
supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which
involve professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory
capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief level; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.
On the other hand, non-career service positions are characterized by:
(1) entrance not by the usual tests of merit and fitness; and
(2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, coterminous with the appointing
authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose employment was made.

12

The Non-Career Service shall include:

(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure
of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and
their personal or confidential staff;
(4)
Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or
technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific
period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific
work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision
from the hiring agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Civil Service Commission v. Magnaye, Jr. (2010)
Under Civil Service rules, the first six months of service following a permanent appointment shall
be probationary in nature, and the probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory
conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary period.
The CSC is of the position that a civil service employee does not enjoy security of tenure during
his 6-month probationary period. It submits that an employees security of tenure starts only after
the probationary period. Specifically, it argued that an appointee under an original appointment
cannot lawfully invoke right to security of tenure until after the expiration of such period and
provided that the appointee has not been notified of the termination of service or found
unsatisfactory conduct before the expiration of the same.
The CSC position is contrary to the Constitution and the Civil Service Law itself. Section 3 (2)
Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers not just in terms of selforganization, collective bargaining, peaceful concerted activities, the right to strike with
qualifications, humane conditions of work and a living wage but also to security of tenure, and
Section 2(3), Article IX-B is emphatic in saying that, no officer or employee of the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.
Consistently, Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides that no officer or employee in the
Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due
process.
Our Constitution, in using the expressions all workers and no officer or employee, puts no
distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee which means that both
probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of tenure. Probationary employees enjoy
security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed
except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees. x x x
xxx

13

The constitutional and statutory guarantee of security of tenure is extended to both those in the
career and non-career service positions, and the cause under which an employee may be removed
or suspended must naturally have some relation to the character or fitness of the officer or
employee, for the discharge of the functions of his office, or expiration of the project for which
the employment was extended. x x x
Notably, jurisprudence has it that the right to security of tenure is unavailing in certain instances.
In Orcullo Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, it was ruled that the right is not available to those
employees whose appointments are contractual and co-terminous in nature. Such employment is
characterized by a tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or that which is
coterminous with the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made. In Amores M.D. v. Civil
Service Commission, it was held that a civil executive service appointee who meets all the
requirements for the position, except only the appropriate civil service eligibility, holds the office
in a temporary capacity and is, thus, not entitled to a security of tenure enjoyed by permanent
appointees.
Section 2(4) Prohibition Against Electioneering and Partisan Political Activities
Santos v. Yatco (1959)
x x x considering that respondent Alejo Santos is Secretary of National Defense and head of the
Department of National Defense, with power of control and supervision over the armed forces;
considering that the position of Secretary of National Defense is not embraced and included within
the term "officers and employees in the civil service" (as disclosed in the proceedings in the
Constitutional Convention wherein the attempt of Delegate Mumar to include the heads of
executive departments within the civil service was rejected) x x x considering that respondent[,]
in campaigning for Governor Tomas Martin, candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the Province
of Bulacan, was acting as member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and
defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs; x x x the Court hereby x x x
sets aside the order of the Honorable Nicasio Yatco, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
prohibiting respondent Alejo Santos from campaigning personally or in his official capacity.
Section 2(5) Right of Self-Organization of Government Employees
De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals (1999)
In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, we denied the claim that the teachers were thereby
denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised
within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare.
But the public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their
constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to
the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning
their classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers

14

availed of their free timerecess, after classes, weekends or holidaysto dramatize their
grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no onenot the
DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme Courtcould have held them liable for their participation in
the mass actions.
x x x the PBM rulingthat the rights of free expression and assembly could not be lightly
disregarded as they occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil libertieswas not
applicable to defend the validity of the 1990 mass actions because what were pitted therein against
the rights of free expression and of assembly were inferior property rights while the higher
consideration involved in the case of the striking teachers was the education of the youth which
must, at the very least, be equated with the freedom of assembly and to petition the government
for redress of grievances.
x x x the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass actions by the conventional term
strike did not erase the true nature of the mass actions as unauthorized stoppages of work the
purpose of which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers economic grievances. We
again stressed that the teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably
assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized
and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced
adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were responsible.
Section 7 Appointments/Designation of Elective/Appointive Officials During Tenure
Flores v. Drilon (1993)
The principal question is whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of RA 7227 which states,
Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of
the Subic Authority, violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts.
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: x x x
The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person,
so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in
the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a
public officer or employee, like the head of an executive department x x x x x x should be allowed
to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or
employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too
many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency x x x
Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, (t)he basic idea really is to prevent a situation
where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his constituents x x x x

15

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e.,
the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to
prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7,
first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may
be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
xxx
x x x the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2)
paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes
holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any
exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to other government
posts, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g.,
the President as head of the economic and planning agency [Sec. 9, Art. XII];
the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet [Sec. 3, Art. VII]; and,
a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council [Sec. 8, Art. VIII].
xxx
It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo
City, hence, an excepted circumstance, x x x
This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate making the
subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo
City without need of appointment. The phrase shall be appointed unquestionably shows the
intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of
Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress
would have, at least, avoided the word appointed and, instead, ex officio would have been
used.
xxx
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. x x x
[Other Doctrines]
Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.
Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board
and the Chief Executive Officer of SMBA, although he really has no choice under the law but to
appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.

16

xxx
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise
of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the
appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the
appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress)
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of
appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of
whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress
may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his
discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress
can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the
appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
Section 8 Prohibition from Receiving Double Compensation; Perks from Foreign Governments
Peralta v. Mathay (1971)
It is expressly provided in the Constitution: No officer or employee of the government shall
receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law. This is to
manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a public office is a public trust. It is
expected of a government official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the demands of
public welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the
performance of the functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration.
The intrusion of the thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The temptation to further
personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of wealth, is to be resisted. That
at least is the ideal.
There is then to be an awareness on the part of an officer, or employee of the government that he
is to receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. With such a realization, he is
expected not to avail himself of devious or circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached
to his position. It is an entirely different matter if the legislative body would itself determine for
reasons satisfactory to it that he should receive something more. If it were to be thus though, there
must be a law to that effect. So the Constitution decrees.
x x x petitioner cannot receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized
by law. Under the GSIS Act, he is entitled as trustee to a per diem of P25.00 for each day of actual
attendance in session. As in the case of government-controlled corporations, the term per diems
was used in the sense of the compensation or remuneration attached to the office of Trustee. Such
is not the meaning usually attached to it. x x x A per diem is commonly identified with the daily
allowance for each day he (an officer or employee) was away from his home base. Its usual
signification is thus that of a reimbursement for expenses incurred in the performance of ones
duties. If employed in a statute, as in this case, in the concept of remuneration, however, there

17

must be, to justify an additional compensation [to the per diem], a specific law that so provides.
Otherwise, fidelity to the constitutional command is lacking.
A similar approach is called for in determining the nature of a cost of living allowance. x x x x x
x it is universally held that an allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of the duties of
office is not an increase of salary, a perquisite, nor an emolument of office. x x x x x x Legislative
acts which directly in terms, or as construed, attempted to increase such salaries, have been held
invalid. But no decision has been found or, as we believe, can be found, which holds a legislative
act to be unconstitutional which merely relieves an officer, who received a fixed salary or
compensation, from expending such salary for expenses incident to the performance of his official
duties. x x x the accepted doctrine is that an allowance to take care of expenses incurred by an
official to enable him to fulfill his task cannot be looked upon as an additional compensation. Such
a principle does not come to the aid of petitioner though. He was unable to show that the cost of
living allowance received by him was in the nature of a reimbursement. It did amount then to an
additional compensation.
So it is in the case of the bonuses received by him. It is quite obvious that by its very nature, a
bonus partakes of an additional remuneration or compensation. The very characterization of what
was received by petitioner as bonuses being intended by way of an incentive to spur him possibly
to more diligent, efforts and to add to the feeling of well-being traditionally associated with the
Christmas season would remove any doubt that the Auditor General had no choice except to deduct
from petitioners gratuity such items.

18

ART. IX-C CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS (THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS)

Section 1(1) Qualifications of the Commissioners
Cayetano v. Monsod (1991)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perfom
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.
xxx
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 197273. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked
in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod
worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked
with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently
of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal
and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsods work involved being knowledgeable In
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmens Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also
made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasijudicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(19861987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he
was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. x x x
xxx
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term practice of law, particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by
the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a Iawyer-

19

legislator of both the rich and the poorverily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
[Other Doctrines]
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages:
(1) nomination;
(2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
(3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and
(4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc.
Matibag v. Benipayo (2002)
The rationale behind petitioners theory is that only an appointee who is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments can guarantee the independence of the COMELEC. A confirmed
appointee is beyond the influence of the President or members of the Commission on
Appointments since his appointment can no longer be recalled or disapproved. Prior to his
confirmation, the appointee is at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers since his
appointment can be terminated at any time for any cause. In the words of petitioner, a Sword of
Damocles hangs over the head of every appointee whose confirmation is pending with the
Commission on Appointments.
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. x x x
xxx
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the
President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is
utterly without basis.
xxx
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus
an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and
exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. x x x

20

xxx
x x x the term ad interim appointment, as used in letters of appointment signed by the President,
means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess.
It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. x x x
xxx
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution.
The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on
Appointments.
The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on
Appointments acting on his appointment.
These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim
appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the
heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself
that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an
appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the
COMELEC. x x x
xxx
Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of
office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are constitutional, the renewal of their ad interim
appointments and their subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the
prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides
as follows: x x x
Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is by-passed by the Commission on
Appointments, his ad interim appointment can no longer be renewed because this will violate
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution which prohibits reappointments. x x x
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments
can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of
the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since
the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and
binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no
longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but

21

because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the
appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission
on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been
finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session
of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold
its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President
is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. x x x
xxx
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither
to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment
cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1
(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new
ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed
term of seven years.
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that [t]he Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment. x x x
There are four situations where this provision will apply.
The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such person cannot
be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will
then be actually serving more than seven years.
The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term
and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be
reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement
because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years.
The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of
someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such
person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from
retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than
seven years.
The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven
years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving
more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also
prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second
sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision refers to the first
appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than seven years, but are
barred from ever being reappointed under any situation. [abandoned in Funa v. Villar]
Not one of these four situations applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.

22

xxx
x x x an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments
does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made
to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean
that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office
in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation
renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments.
The phrase without reappointment applies only to one who has been appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his
term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous
appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to
absurdities and negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments.
xxx
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous
appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A reappointment
presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and renewals
of appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the appointments and
renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February
2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office.
Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of
these three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the twin
prohibitions in the Constitution. The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these
three respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate
the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Section 2 Powers and Functions of the Commission
Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections (1993)
Petitioner contends that the above-quoted provision is unconstitutional, insofar as it disallows preproclamation controversies in the election of members of the House of Representatives because it
violates Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: x x x
The petitioner claims that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to hear and decide
pre-proclamation controversies without distinction as to whether the pre-proclamation controversy
involves the election of Members of the House of Representatives or provincial or local elective
officials. x x x
We do not accept petitioners contention, Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution should be
read in relation to Sec. 2 [2], Article IX-C of the same Constitution which provides, among others,
as follows: x x x

23

It will be noted that the aforequoted provision of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications
of all elective regional, provincial and city officials. It has no jurisdiction over contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. On the
other hand, under Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of its members. Consequently, the phrase including pre-proclamation
controversies used in Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution should be construed as referring
only to preproclamation controversies in election cases that fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., election cases pertaining to the election of regional, provincial
and city officials.
Section 3 En Banc and Division Jurisdiction
Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections (1992)
Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions x x x as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the
appeals without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
xxx
It is clear from [Sec. 3, Art. IX-C] of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include preproclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the
Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the
same at the first instance.
xxx
Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without
first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must
be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper
referral to a Division.

24