Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 6, 2005, pp.

793-810
FRSTERLING,AND
PERSPECTIVES
SCHUSTER,
ATTRIBUTIONS
AND MORGENSTERN

PERSPECTIVES OF CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS:

A STUDY OF COUPLES AND DEPRESSION
FRIEDRICH FRSTERLING, BEATE SCHUSTER,
AND MATTHIS MORGENSTERN
LudwigMaximiliansUniversitt Mnchen

Dysphoric and nondysphoric members of heterosexual dyads made attributions

about hypothetical positive and negative events that happened (1) to themselves or
(2) their partners. Participants also (3) indicated what attributions they expected
their partner to be making about their own (i.e., participants) outcomes. Results
showed that dysphorics made more depressogenic attributions for own outcomes
(i.e., internal, stable, and global ones for failure and external, variable, and specific
ones for success) as compared to nondysphorics. Dysphorics also expected their
partners to be making depressogenic attributions about their outcomes. However,
dysphorics made more antidepressogenic causal ascriptions for their partners outcomes as compared to nondysphorics. Participants attributions were not only influenced by own level of depression but also by the mood status of the partner.
Individuals with a dysphoric partner made more antidepressogenic attributions
than individuals with a nondysphoric partner. It was found that nondysphoric
persons expectations about how their partners would attribute their outcomes
were more closely related to partners actual attributions than dysphorics
expectations.

The analyses of depressives causal attributions and their close interpersonal relations constitute two central avenues of psychological research
on this widespread disorder (see, for a summary, Hammen, 1999). These
two approaches, however, exist in (relative) isolation: Research on depressives causal attributions typically does not assess (and the respective theories do not address) the attributions of and about depressives
partners (see, for a summary, Peterson & Seligman, 1984) and research
investigating depressives close interpersonal relationships typically
does not assess attributions (see Coyne, 1976, 1999). The fact that the

Please address correspondence to Friedrich Frsterling, Institut fr Psychologie, LudwigMaximiliansUniversitt, Leopoldstr. 13, 80802 Mnchen, Germany: E-mail:
Forst@mip.paed.unimuenchen.De.

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attributional analysis of depression has not yet incorporated

attributional processes within close interpersonal relationships is even
more surprising as research addressing close relationships and marital
interaction has revealed that attributions partners make about each others behaviors have a strong influence on marital satisfaction (see, for a
summary, Fincham, 2001). Some of the research on marital interaction
has also assessed depression in addition to marital satisfaction (e.g.,
Horneffer & Fincham, 1996), and it was found that attributions made for
the partners negative behaviors were related to depression. Hence, an
integration of both interpersonal and attributional approaches to depression appears feasible, and it could be of considerable theoretical and
practical importance for our understanding of depression. Introducing
theoretical concepts, findings, and questions from depression research
to the study of interpersonal relations, in turn, might stimulate and
enrich knowledge of interpersonal attributions and marital satisfaction.
More specifically, attributional and interpersonal approaches to depression lend themselves for integration as social psychologists have for
quite a while investigated causal attributions not only from an
intraindividual perspective but also in the context of interpersonal behavior (see, for a summary, Frsterling, 2001). For instance, if we fail at a
task, we will not only ask ourselves why this has happened (i.e., the
intraindividual perspective), but our peers, partner, or spouse will also
try to find an explanation for the event (i.e., the interindividual
perspective).
The (intraindividual) attributions of our own outcomes (e.g., failure)
will determine some of our cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions, such as whether we expect success in the future, feel angry or depressed, or whether we give up or persist (see Weiner, 1986). Pertinent
research has revealed that depressives attribute failure more to internal,
stable, and global causes than nondepressives (see Buchanan &
Seligman, 1995). Similarly, our partners attributions as to why we have
failed (i.e., interindividual attributions) will determine how that partner
might react toward us. For instance, our partner might feel pity with us if
he or she explains our failure through lack of ability, whereas if our partner traces our failure both to a lack of effort it might result in anger (see
Weiner, 1995). Moreover, it is quite conceivable that the attributions one
person makes may influence the attributions of the other. For instance, if
the partner of a depressive person attributes the depressives failures to
lack of ability, shows pity and tenders advice to give up, the depressive
might take over the partners view and hence will also attribute the
failure to internal, stable, and global causes (see Graham, 1990).
As interpersonal relations have been shown to be of great importance
for the occurrence, maintenance, and therapy of depression, and as

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795

causal attributions have been shown to guide important interpersonal

reactions, it is surprising that the attributions of and about depressive
partners have not yet been systematically investigated (see, for exceptions, Horneffer & Fincham, 1996; Schlenker & Britt, 1996; Sweeney,
Shaeffer, & Golin, 1982); such studies could shed light on important
aspects of depression.
First, the assessment of attributions participants varying in depression
make about their partners would be informative as to whether depressives have a general pessimistic schema which they apply to all individuals (including their partners) or whether they only have a specifically
negative view of the self, while viewing others as superior. Schlenker
and Britt (1996) have addressed this question and report that depressives make pessimistic attributions for themselves but optimistic attributions for a good friend and romantic partner. Nondepressives, by contrast, attributed outcomes for the self and the partner about equally
strongly to internal, stable, and global factors. These findings suggest
that the pessimistic causal schemata of depressives apply only to the
own person and not to others.
Second, the assessment of the attributions that partners of depressed
persons make for the depressed (stimulus) person are informative as to
what type of cognitions, behaviors, and affect the partner will direct towards the depressed person. For instance, it is possible that the partners
of depressed persons also attribute the depressives outcomes pessimistically and hence amplify in their communications with the target person their pessimistic attributional style. In addition, some of the dynamic of the relationship between depressives and their partners might
be explained through the interpersonal attributions. For instance, the
observation that depressives are overly dependent on their partners
may reflect attributional mechanisms: The depressives dependency
may be fueled by the partners pity and willingness to help, which, in
turn, might be triggered by the internal, stable, and global attributions
which the partner makes for the depressives failure.
Third, while measuring both the attributions of the depressive person
and the causal ascriptions of her or his partner, an additional assessment
of a further attributional concept, expected attributions (see Schuster,
2001), opens interesting possibilities for investigations. More specifically, asking participants which attributions they expect their partner to
be making tests assumptions about the veridicality of depressives and
nondepressives meta attributions. It can be tested whether depressives have accurate, unrealistically pessimistic, or unrealistically optimistic assumptions about their partners attributions by comparing the
expected attributions to the attributions the partner actually makes.
Hence, the simultaneous assessment of the actual and expected attribu-

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FRSTERLING, SCHUSTER, AND MORGENSTERN

tions of the members of the dyad could shed light on the central question
of depression research (see, for a summary, Ackermann & DeRubeis,
1991): whether depressives are more or less realistic than
nondepressives.
The present study investigated causal attributions and depression status of members of close (heterosexual) interpersonal dyads. We assessed
attributions about own outcomes and the partners outcomes, as well as
attributions that participants expected their partner to be making about
themselves. In addition, the depression status of each participant was
assessed. These assessments allow investigation of the influence of depression as a participant variable on attributions of own outcomes, outcomes experienced by depressives partners, and the attributions one expects oness partner to be making. This design also tests how depression
as a stimulus variable (i.e., the depression status of a partner) influences
how participants attribute their own and their partners outcomes as
well as the attributions they expect their partner to be making. And finally, a comparison of the attributions a participant expects her or his
partner to be making about their own (i.e., the participants) outcomes
with the partners actual attributions provides a measure of depressive
(metaattributional) realism as the expectations can be compared
with an objective external criterion (i.e., the attributions the partner
actually made).

METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Eighty-nine heterosexual couples with individuals ranging in age from
19 to 53 years (M = 26 years, 3 months) were recruited with flyers on the
campus of the University of Munich and received 10 German marks for
participation. The members of each couple individually filled out the experimental material while together in small groups in the laboratory.
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAL AND DESIGN
The experimental material was contained in a booklet. On the first page,
participants were requested to give some general information about
their person and their relationship: In addition to their age, sex, profession, marital status, and the duration of their relationship, it was assessed, on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), how well
participants thought they could appraise their partner, how content they
were with their relationship, whether they had common interests, and
how important the relationship was for them. Subsequently, partici-

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797

pants were asked to fill out the German version (Kammer, 1983) of the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mock, &
Erbaugh, 1961).
Moreover, they responded to the 16 items of the German version of Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalski, and Seligmans (1982)
attributional style questionnaire (Stiensmeier, Kammer, Pelster, &
Niketta, 1985). Eight of these items depicted situations with a positive
outcome (e.g., you meet a friend or an acquaintance who gives you a
compliment"), and eight scenarios consisted of negative outcomes (e.g.,
you give an important talk or presentation and the audience reacts negatively). Participants were asked to vividly imagine experiencing each
of the situations, to then write down the main cause which they considered to be responsible for the described event, and to then rate this cause
with regard to its locus of control (1 = resides entirely within myself (internal), 7 = resides entirely outside of my person (external); this scale was
recoded for the analyses), stability (1 = will never have importance in the future (variable), 7 = will be of importance again and again (stable), and
globality (1 = concerns only one area of my life (specific), 7 = concerns all areas
of my life (global)).
In addition to the above described variant of the attributional style
questionnaire, this measure had to be filled out in two other versions. In
the first of these versions, participants were asked to vividly imagine
that their partner would experience the respective situation (e.g., imagine that your partner meets a friend or an acquaintance who gives
her/him a compliment), they were again asked to write down what the
main cause for their partners success or failure would be and to rate the
locus (1 = resides entirely within my partner, 7 = resides entirely outside of my
partner; this scale was later recoded), stability (1 = will never have importance for my partner in the future, 7 = will be of importance to my partner again
and again), and globality (1 = concerns only one area of life of my partner, 7 =
concerns all areas of my partners life). In the third version, participants had
to imagine that their partner would fill out the questionnaire with respect to outcomes happening to the participant (e.g., you meet a friend
who gives you a compliment, how would your partner explain this
event which has happened to you?). Again, participants wrote down
the attribution they suspected their partner to be making (for their own
person) and rated this cause along the three dimensions. Hence, participants filled out the ASQ with regard to their own outcomes, their partners outcomes, and with regard to their expectations as to how the
partner would explain their own outcomes.

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FRSTERLING, SCHUSTER, AND MORGENSTERN

RESULTS
About 10% of the couples were married, the duration of the relationship
varied between 2 weeks and 22 years with a mean = 3.1 years. Most participants thought they could appraise their partner quite accurately (M =
5.21), were content with their relationship (M = 5.8), shared the same interests (M=5.08), and thought of their relationship as being important (M
= 6.35).

DEPRESSION AND ATTRIBUTIONS

To test our central hypotheses, a general attributional style index was
formed by summing up, separately for the eight success and the eight
failure scenarios, participants ratings across the three dimensions (locus, stability, and globality); the failure index was then subtracted from
the success index. High scores on this index indicated a tendency to attribute success to internal, stable, and global factors and failure to external, variable, and specific causes. For sake of simplicity, we refer to
antidepressogenic and depressogenic attributions when referring to
high vs. low values of this measure. The internal consistency of the
attributional style index was satisfactory: For self attributions
Cronbachs alpha was .57 for the success items, .70 for the failure items,
and .65 for the combined scale. Similar internal consistencies were obtained for the index for partner attributions (success: .61, failure: .73,
combined: .66) and for the expected attributions (success: .67, failure:
.79, combined: .77).
First, we investigated the effects of depression as a participant variable (i.e., the impact that the depression status of a participant had on her
or his attribution was analyzed). Subsequently, depression status was
used as a stimulus person variable (i.e., what influence the participants
partners mood had on the participants attribution was analyzed).
Third, the relation between expected attributions and the attributions
partners actually made were analyzed to investigate attributional
veridicality.
We conducted ANOVAs as well as multiple regression analyses for
the attributional style index as dependent variable. In the regression
analyses we used the continuous depression scores and the perspective
factor (self attributions, attributions for the partner, and expected attributions) as predictors. The correlation between individuals within each
couple was taken into account by using a linear mixed model (see Little,
Milliken, Stroup, & Wolfinger, 1996). The results of these analyses
werewith one exception (see below)identical with the results ob-

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799

tained by the ANOVAs. For the sake of simplicity of the description and
consistency with the figures, we report the analyses using ANOVA.
Depression as Participant Variable. The attributional style index was
first subjected to a 3 (Perspective: self attributions, attributions for the
partner, and expected attributions) 2 (high vs. low dysphoria of the
participant; median split: BDI 6 nondysphoric, BDI > 6 = dysphoric)
ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. Figure 1 shows that
this index (success minus failure attributions) was in all instances positive, reflecting the fact that participants attributed success more than
failure to internal, stable, and global causes, F (1, 144) = 201.20, p < .0001.
The analysis also revealed a main effect for the factor perspective, F (2,
288) = 13.77, p < .001. Participants attributed their partners hypothetical
outcomes in a more (t (149) = 4.90, p < .001) antidepressogenic fashion
(M = 27.41) than their own outcomes (M = 18.47) and than they expected
their own outcomes to be attributed by their partners (M = 20.78; t (151) =
3.10, p < .003). The attributions that participants actually made and that
they expected their partners to be making did not differ significantly (t
(155) = 1.77, n.s.).
Participants depression status did not significantly influence attributions independently from perspective (F = 1.3), however, there was a significant interaction between perspective and depression, F (2, 288) =
5.28, p < .01.1
It reflected the fact that dysphorics made, and expected their partners
to be making, more depressogenic attributions for themselves than
nondysphorics. With respect to their partners, however, dysphorics
made more antidepressogenic attributions than nondysphorics. Two
separate 2 (Depression Status) 2 (Perspective) ANOVAs revealed significant interactions, reflecting the fact that depression status differentially influenced actual selfattributions when compared to the attributions they made for the partner F (1, 147) = 4.56, p < .05, as well as
expected attributions when compared to attributions made for the partner, F (1, 149) = 6.12, p < .02 (see Figure 1).
Depression as a Stimulus Person Variable. To analyze the influence of
the partners depression status on participants attributions (see Figure
2), we also conducted a 3 (Perspective) 2 (Depressions Status of the
Partner) ANOVA on the attribution score. It naturally revealed the significant main effect for perspectivealready discussed aboveas the
same ratings went into the analysis. The main effect for the partners de-

1. In the regression analysis, the interaction between depression score and perspective
failed to reach significance when all three perspectives were introduced as predictor,
whereas there was a significant main effect for depression as a participant variable.

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FRSTERLING, SCHUSTER, AND MORGENSTERN

Depression as a Participant Variable

Antidepressogenic Attributions

30

25

20
Dysphorics

15

Non-Dysphorics

10

0
Self

Partner

Expected

Perspective

FIGURE 1. Attributional style as a function of perspective and participants depression

status.

pression status on participants attributions was not significant; however, the interaction between perspective and the partners depression
score approached significance, F (2, 142) = 2.54, p < .08. It can be seen in
Figure 2 that the partners depression score had an influence on participants attributions that can be described as the mirror image of the influence of their own depression status. A 2 (Perspective: Self vs. Partner Attributions) 2 (Depression Score for the Partner; low vs. high) ANOVA
revealed that participants with dysphoric partners made less
depressogenic attributions for their own outcomes than individuals
with nondysphoric partners. With respect to their partners, however,
participants with dysphoric partners made more depressogenic attributions as compared to participants with nondysphoric partners, F (1,
147) = 4.84, p < .029. The attributions that were expected from the (more
or less depressed) partner did not differ significantly from the ones that
individuals actually made for themselves or their partners, F < 1, for
both interactions.
To summarize: Dysphoric persons make more depressogenic attributions for themselves than nondysphoric individuals, whereas
dysphoric persons make more antidepressogenic attributions than
nondysphoric for their partners behavioral outcomes. In addition, persons with dysphoric partners made more antidepressogenic attributions

PERSPECTIVES AND ATTRIBUTIONS

801

Depression as a Stimulus Person Variable

Antidepressogenic Attributions

35
30
25
20

Dysphoric
Non-Dysphoric

15
10
5
0
Self

Partner

Expected

Perspective

FIGURE 2. Attributional style as a function of perspective and partners depression status.

for themselves and more depressogenic attributions for their partners

outcomes than individuals with nondysphoric partners.
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND EXPECTED ATTRIBUTIONS
Now we come to the question of metaattributional veridicality. As
already outlined, the simultaneous assessment of the attributions
that the participant expects from the partner with the attributions the
partner actually makes for the outcome of the participant allows to assess metaattributional veridicality. Specifically, we computed a difference score by subtracting the expected attributions of a participant
(across the 8 success minus the 8 failure scenarios) from the respective
score of the attributions that the partner actually made. When dividing our participants along the median of their depression scores, we
found higher values for our dysphoric (M = 10.21) than for our
nondysphoric participants (M = 4.85); however, this difference
failed to reach significance. When comparing only the 25% of the least
and the 25% of the most dysphoric individuals of our sample, this difference was more pronounced (M(subdep)sub = 16.58,
M(subnondep)sub = 1.46) and significant, t (66) = 2.07 p < .05. This
difference reflects the fact that dysphorics expected their partners to
be making more depressogenic attributions than they in fact did (pos-

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FRSTERLING, SCHUSTER, AND MORGENSTERN

Intraindividual Correlations
0,35
0,3

Correlation SIze

0,25
0,2

Success
Failure

0,15
0,1
0,05
0
Dysphorics

Non-Dysphorics
Mood Status

FIGURE 3. Mean intra-couples attributions for (4) success and (4) failure scenarios.

itive values of our attribution index reflect antidepressogenic attributions, hence, a negative difference score between expected and actual
attributions indicates that the actual attributions were more
antidepressogenic than the expected attributions). In other words,
these findings suggest that dysphorics are unrealistically pessimistic
as to what they think their partners think about them, whereas
nondysphorics were comparatively accurate.
A second possibility of assessing the veridicality of participants attributions consists of a comparison of the intracouple correlations between the eight success and the eight failure situations. High correlations would reflect agreement and low correlations disagreement
between the members of a couple as to how outcomes are attributed.
When only comparing the 25% of participants with the lowest and those
with the highest depression score, a 2 (Depression Score; high vs. low)
2 (Situation; positive vs. negative ) ANOVA on these correlations revealed a significant interaction, F (1, 87) = 7.46, p < .008. It reflected the
fact (see Figure 3) that nondysphorics were more accurate with regard
to the partners attributions in the success condition, whereas
dysphorics were more accurate in the failure conditions.

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803

FURTHER CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES

Next, we analyzed the relation between the BDI and each of the three
attributional style measures as well as the relation among the
attributional style measures themselves via correlational analyses. Recall that dysphoric and nondysphoric participants significantly differed in both attributions they made for own outcomes and the
attributions that they expected their partner to be making about themselves (i.e., the participant). These differences reflect that participants
attributions for own outcomes correlated significantly with their depression score, r (165) = .22, p < .005. This correlation was significant for
the failure scenarios, r (173) = .27, p < .001, and nonsignificant for the success scenarios, r (166) = .01, ns.
In addition, the correlations between BDIscores and expected attributions reflected that dysphorics expected their partners to be making
less antidepressogenic attributions, r (161) = .24, p < .001, in general, but
it was entirely due to the failure situations, r (168) = .29, p < .001, whereas
there was no relation in the success condition, r (165) = .00. Most notably,
the relation between depression and failure selfattributions shrank to
an insignificant magnitude when expected failure attributions were
partialed out from the analysis, r (164) = .10, p < .16, whereas the correlation between expected failure attributions and depression remained significant also after self attributions were partialed out, r (164) = .20, p <
.012. This pattern of partial correlations suggests the possibility that not
only attributions for own outcomes might be important for the occurrence and maintenance of depression but that the attributional social reality (i.e., how one expects others, especially personally important individuals to be thinking about oness own outcomes) might also be a
determinant, or a concurrent, of depression.
Correlational analyses were also conducted to further investigate the
relation between the explanatory style (i.e., the success minus failure index) for own outcomes, partners outcomes and the expected explanations for own outcomes by the partner. These data were analyzed separately for males and females. Individuals who made antidepressogenic
attributions for own outcomes also made such attributions for their partners outcomes, r (70) = .45, p < .001, for male attributors, and r (73) = .55,
p < .001, for female attributors, and they expected the partner to be making antidepressogenic attributions, r (76) = .63, p < .001, for males, and r
(74) = .67, p < .001, for females. Finally, males and females who made
antidepressogenic attributions for their partner expected their partner to
be making antidepressogenic attributions for themselves, r (72) = .51, p <
.001 and r (75) = .39, p <.001, for males and females, respectively. There
were interesting sex differences with regard to the correlation between

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the attributions individuals expected their partners to be making and the

attributions partners actually made. Males who were expected by their
female partner to be making antidepressogenic attributions for the females outcomes in fact made more antidepressogenic attributions r (65)
= .31, p < .01, whereas the attributions males expected their female partners to be making did not correlate with the attributions females in fact
made for the male, r (71) = .06.
The attributions males and females made for own outcomes were positively but not significantly correlated, r (74) = .14. In addition, the attributions that males made for their female partners outcomes correlated
significantly, r (72) = .24, p < .05, with the attributions that the female
partner made for her own outcomes; similarly, the attributions males
made for own outcomes were correlated with the attributions females
made for their male partners outcomes, r (72) = .24, p < .05.
In sum, the correlational analyses of the attributional style measures
revealed that the attributions individuals made for themselves, their
partner, and the ones they expected their partners to be making showed
strong similarities: Individuals who make antidepressive attributions
for own outcomes also make antidepressogenic attributions for their
partners outcomes and they expect their partners to be making such attributions. In addition, there was a small but theoretically interesting
(positive) correlation between the attributions for own outcomes and the
attributions the partner made for the respective outcomes.
GENERAL INFORMATION
We conducted some exploratory data analyses with general information
about the participants and the relationship. Most variables such as age,
relationship length, or profession were generally unrelated to other variables or revealed trivial relations (e.g., that older individuals tended to
have longer relationship durations than younger persons). Males (M =
6.44) and females (M = 6.90) did not differ significantly with regard to
their depression scores (t < 1), suggesting that the above reported differences between dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals are not due to
a confound of depressive symptoms and gender.
There were some interesting patterns of results, however, with regard
to the single item measure as to how content participants were with the
relationship. For instance, dysphoric participants were less content with
their relationship than nondysphoric persons, r (177) = .20, p < .008,
and the partners depression score correlated significantly with the participants contentedness with the relationship, r (177) = .30, p < .001, indicating that individuals with dysphoric partners were less content with

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805

their relationship than individuals with nondysphoric partners. For females, the correlation between own depression score and relationship
contentedness was insignificant r = .06, whereas the correlation between their relationship contentedness and their (male) partners depression score was high, r (89) = .38, p < .001. For males, high (own) depression scores went along with low contentedness with the
relationship, r (86) = .32 p < .001, whereas their contentedness with the
relationship was less strongly associated with their female partners depression score, r (85) = .20, p < .07. Or, to put it more simply, women
were dysphoric when their partners were unhappy with the
relationship, whereas men were dysphoric when they were discontent
with the relationship themselves.
Relationship contentedness was also higher when a person perceived
her or his partner to have similar interests, r (178) = .18, p < .02, when the
relationship was considered to be important, r (178) = .57, p < .001, and it
was inversely related to the age of the participant, r (178) = .19, p < .05.
There was a small correlation between paticipants depression scores
and their partners depression score, r (87) = .18, p < .10, reflecting the fact
that dysphoric persons tended to have dysphoric partners. In addition,
satisfaction with the relationship was significantly correlated between
partners, r (88) = .30, p < .005.
Mention should also be made at this point that relationship contentedness went along with a tendency to make more antidepressogenic attributions about own outcomes, r (166) = .14, p < .07, about the outcomes of
the partner, r (156) = .24, p < .002, and on the attributions one expected
the partner to be making about ones own outcomes r (162) = .21, p < .008.
These correlations also remained significant after depression was
partialed out from the analyses.

DISCUSSION
The present research was guided by the goal to bridge cognitive and interpersonal approaches to depression by including the interpersonal
perspective while investigating cognitive correlates (and possibly
causes) of depression (i.e., depressogenic causal inferences). More specifically, we did not only measure the typically assessed selfattributions for outcomes, but also investigated attributions made within the
heterosexual dyad; for example, the attributions individuals varying in
depression made for their partners outcomes and the attributions these
individuals expected their partners to be making (about the individuals
outcomes). These assessments revealed results relevant for (1) selected
aspects of attribution theory in general, (2) the attributional and interpersonal analyses of depression, (3) the question of whether depressives

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FRSTERLING, SCHUSTER, AND MORGENSTERN

are more realistic than nondepressives, and (4) the relation between the
contentedness with the relationship with some of the investigated
variables.
Relevant for general attribution theory is the finding that individuals
attributed positive events more to internal, stable, and global factors
than negative ones (see Figure 1). At first glance, these findings seem to
reflect what is usually referred to as self-serving bias. From this perspective, however, a second finding is informative: the pattern of selfserving attributions is also foundeven in a more pronounced fashionwhen attributions are not made for the self, but for the partner: Our
participants made more glorifying attributions for their partners than
for themselves. The latter finding is consistent with and possibly extends
findings reported by Schlenker and Britt (1996). They found that the attributions made for the outcomes of a stranger are not more
antidepressogenic than for the self but that attributions made for a best
friend and a romantic partner are more gloryfying than for the self. All
these findings suggest that the emotional ties between the self and a
stimulus person might be an important determinant of the attributions
we make for the stimulus person: The more the other person forms a
unit with the attributor, the more one is inclined to make
antidepressogenic attributions about this person.
In this (general) context it is also worth noting that the research revealed that the attributions one makes about the own person, the partner, and the attributions one expects the partner to be making are all
strongly correlated, even stronger than the attributions that one expected the partner to be making and the attributions the partner in fact
made. Hence it seems that the attributional style is a generalized cognitive schema that is projected onto others.
Nevertheless, the present research also uncovered a smaller but theoretically interesting relation between the participants attributions and
the attributions participants partners make for participants outcomes
( a n d , na tu r a l l y vi c e ver s a ) : If a pa r tn e r te n d e d to ma k e
antidepressogenic attributions for the participants outcomes, the participant tended to do so as well. The correlational nature of the design
certainly does not allow to decide whether the partners attributions influenced the participants attributions or vice versa; however, the fact
that such a relation was found points to the possibility that communication in close interpersonal relationships might be an important determinant of attributional style and hence suggests the possibility that mutual
influences of members of close interpersonal relationships on
depression might, at least in part, be mediated by attributional
communication.
Still staying with the general psychological implications of our find-

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807

ings, it is worth pointing out that we did not only find a significant correlation between depression and the explanatory style for own outcomes
but a similarily strong correlation between depression and the assumed
(expected) attributions of the partner. Although we prefer to refrain
from putting too much emphasis on a correlational pattern that has not
yet been replicated, these findings give rise to an interesting hypothesis:
Possibly, it is not the depressogenic attribution for the own outcomes
that makes individuals depressed but the assumption that significant
others have such a negative view with regard to the causes of ones
outcomes.
With regard to the attributional differences between depressed and
n o n d e p r e s s e d pe r s o n s , we r e p l i c a t e d a cl a s s i c a l f i n d i n g :
Dysphoricsmore so than nondysphoricsattribute failure to internal, stable, and global factors and success to external, variable, and specific ones (i.e., in a more depressogenic fashion). This well documented depressogenic attributional style, however, did not generalize
to the attributions participants made for their partners: dysphorics attributed their partners outcomes even in a more antidepressogenic fashion than nondysphorics. In other words, dysphorics tended to believe,
more so than nondysphorics that their own failures were due to internal, stable, and global causes while believing that their partners failures
were due to external, variable, and specific causes.
Attributions were not only influenced by patricipants own mood status but also by the participants partners mood status: Individuals with
a dysphoric partner made more antidepressive attributions for own outcomes and more depressogenic attributions for the partners outcomes
than individuals with a nondysphoric partner. This finding suggests
that individuals might attributionally benefit from their partners
dysphoria. Although the mechanisms are entirely unaddressed by the
present purely correlational research, it may be worth speculating about
what might be responsible for these findings. One possibility is that the
partner is an important source for social comparison. Having a
dysphoric partner who is possibly inactive, demotivated, and unsuccessful might be an important piece of consensus information. The negative outcomes of a dysphoric partner might indicate that own failures
are due to external reasons and successes to internal ones. By contrast,
individuals with nondysphoric partners might have a salient input for
their social comparisons pointing into the opposite direction:
Nondysphoric partners are, by comparison, more energetic and successful. Their successes might suggest to their partners that successes are
normal, failures abnormal, and could therefore lead the partner to make
external attributions for success and internal ones for failure.
With regard to the question of attributional veridicality, the study re-

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FRSTERLING, SCHUSTER, AND MORGENSTERN

vealed that dysphoric individuals expected their partners to make more

negative attributions than they in fact did. This finding was obtained
when attributions and expected attributions were aggregated across
success and failure situations. Naturally, the expected attribution is not
an attribution itself but an hypothesis about the attribution another person might be making (i.e., a metaattribution). However, as this
metaattribution is in our study related as closely to depression as
selfattributions and as we clearly have an objective standard to compare the meta-attribution to (i.e., the attribution the partner actually
made), these findings seem to be of theoretical significance. They suggest that dysphorics compared to nondysphorics are unrealistically
negative with regard to this relatively global measure. This aggregated
measure, naturally, has the disadvantage of being silent as to whether,
for instance, a low difference score across the 16 situations reflects large
positive and large negative deviations for some of the situations or generally low deviations across all situations. Or, in other words, it reflects
an overall judgment or bias across situations rather than a measure of
correspondence in attribution between two persons across the eight success and eight failure situations (see also Frsterling, Bhner, & Gall,
1998). Therefore, a second measure of meta-attributional veridicality
was calculated.
Our second measure for metaattributional veridicality were
intraindividual (or better: intradyadic) correlations. This measure reflects to what extent one member of the dyad is correct in his or her expectation as to how the partner attributes the members outcomes across
eight success and eight failure situations, respectively. This measure, by
contrast, is not sensitive to the absolute differences between expected
and actual attributions that were used as our first measure of
veridicality: It is quite possible to expect unrealistically negative attributions across a variety of situations (e.g., a person might expect across all
failure situations that the partner attributes 2 units in the average
more to internal, stable, and global causes than the partner in fact does,
while the expected and the actual judgments might still be perfectly correlated). We found that the intradyadic correlations across success situations is lower for dysphorics than for nondysphorics, whereas for the
failure situations, dysphorics showed higher correlations than
nondysphorics.
Taking the results of both our measures of veridicality together, it
seems that dysphorics have a general bias toward expecting that their
partners think more negative about them than they actually do (i.e., the
aggregated difference score). When looking at the interpretation about
positive events, dysphorics judgments seem to be not only negatively
biased, they also are insensitive to crosssituational variation of their

PERSPECTIVES AND ATTRIBUTIONS

809

partners judgments (intraindividual correlations for positive events).

For negative situations, however, dysphorics seem to be more sensitive
to their partners judgments variations across situation. Or more abstractly: The present data suggest that dysphorics have an unrealistically negative bias with regard to their beliefs about what their partners
think about them, they might process relevant information for positive
outcomes more unrealistically than nondysphorics, and for negative
situations more accurately than nondysphorics.
Finally, the present study has revealed some interesting findings with
regard to the single item measure of relationship contendedness: Individuals who indicated that they were content with their relationship
were, compared to individuals indicating low relationship
contendentedness, less dysphoric, tended to have a less dysphoric partner, and had partners who were also content with the relationship. In addition, individuals with high relationship contentedness made more
benign attributions for both their own behavioral outcomes as well as
for their partners outcomes.
All these findings clearly indicate that the analyses of interpersonal attributions in close interpersonal relationships is a fruitful activity to understand both the interpersonal and the cognitive determinants of depression. It opens avenues of research on the determinants of
attributional style and attributional veridicality and it might shed light
on the intervening mechanisms that make the relationship so important
for the occurrence, maintenance, and alleviation of depression.

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