ANTHONY ORDUA, DENNIS ORDUA, and ANTONITA ORDUA, Petitioners,

versus EDUARDO J. FUENTEBELLA, MARCOS S. CID, BENJAMIN F. CID,

BERNARD G. BANTA, and ARMANDO GABRIEL, JR., Respondents.
(G.R. No. 176841 June 29, 2010 1st Division)
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS: Sometime in 1996 or thereabouts, Gabriel Sr. sold the subject lot with an
area of 74 square meters located at Fairview Subdivision, Baguio City, to petitioner
Antonita Ordua (Antonita), but no formal deed was executed to document the
sale. The contract price was apparently payable in installments as Antonita
remitted from time to time and Gabriel Sr. accepted partial payments. One of the
Orduas would later testify that Gabriel Sr. agreed to execute a final deed of sale
upon full payment of the purchase price.
As early as 1979, however, Antonita and her sons, Dennis and Anthony Ordua,
were already occupying the subject lot on the basis of some arrangement
undisclosed in the records and even constructed their house thereon. They also
paid real property taxes for the house and declared it for tax purposes, as
evidenced by Tax Declaration in which they place the assessed value of the
structure at PhP 20,090.
After the death of Gabriel Sr., his son and namesake, respondent Gabriel Jr.,
secured TCT No. T-71499 over the subject lot and continued accepting payments
from the petitioners. On December 12, 1996, Gabriel Jr. wrote Antonita
authorizing her to fence off the said lot and to construct a road in the adjacent lot.
On December 13, 1996, Gabriel Jr. acknowledged receipt of a PhP 40,000 payment
from petitioners. Through a letter dated May 1, 1997, Gabriel Jr. acknowledged
that petitioner had so far made an aggregate payment of PhP 65,000, leaving an
outstanding balance of PhP 60,000. A receipt Gabriel Jr. issued dated November
24, 1997 reflected a PhP 10,000 payment.
Subsequently, Bernard sold to the Cids the subject lot for PhP 80,000. Armed with
a Deed of Absolute Sale of a Registered Land dated January 19, 2000, the Cids
were able to cancel TCT No. T-72782 and secure TCT No. 72783 covering the
subject lot. Cids subsequently sold it to Eduardo J. Fuentebella (Eduardo),
instrumental witnesses of the first transaction aboved..
Sometime in May 2000, or shortly after his purchase of the subject lot, Eduardo,
through his lawyer, sent a letter addressed to the residence of Gabriel Jr.
demanding that all persons residing on or physically occupying the subject lot
vacate the premises or face the prospect of being ejected.
Learning of Eduardos threat, petitioners went to the residence of Gabriel Jr. at No.
34 Dominican Hill, Baguio City. There, they met Gabriel Jr.s estranged wife,
Teresita, who informed them about her having filed an affidavit-complaint against
her husband and the Cids for falsification of public documents on March 30, 2000.
According to Teresita, her signature on the June 30, 1999 Gabriel Jr.Bernard

deed of sale was a forgery. Teresita further informed the petitioners of her intent to
honor the aforementioned 1996 verbal agreement between Gabriel Sr. and
Antonita and the partial payments they gave her father-in-law and her husband for
the subject lot.
On July 3, 2001, petitioners, joined by Teresita, filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Title, Reconveyance with Damages against the respondents before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4984-R, specifically praying that TCT No. T-3276 dated
May 16, 2000 in the name of Eduardo be annulled. Corollary to this prayer,
petitioners pleaded that Gabriel Jr.s title to the lot be reinstated and that
petitioners be declared as entitled to acquire ownership of the same upon payment
of the remaining balance of the purchase price therefor agreed upon by Gabriel Sr.
and Antonita.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an adequate consideration.
HELD: Yes. The Court to be sure takes stock of the fact that the contracting
parties to the 1995 or 1996 sale agreed to a purchase price of PhP 125,000
payable on installments. But the original lot owner, Gabriel Sr., died before full
payment can be effected. Nevertheless, petitioners continued remitting payments
to Gabriel, Jr., who sold the subject lot to Bernard on June 30, 1999. Gabriel, Jr.,
as may be noted, parted with the property only for PhP 50,000. On the other hand,
Bernard sold it for PhP 80,000 to Marcos and Benjamin. From the foregoing price
figures, what is abundantly clear is that what Antonita agreed to pay Gabriel, Sr.,
albeit in installment, was very much more than what his son, for the same lot,
received from his buyer and the latters buyer later. The Court, therefore, cannot
see its way clear as to how the RTC arrived at its simplistic conclusion about the
transaction between Gabriel Sr. and Antonita being without "adequate
consideration."
It is undisputed on the facts that there is a Contract to Sale between the original
owner of the land and the petitioners. This must be given favourably effect unless
other circumstance in accordance to the law warrant otherwise. Where the land
sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser must go
beyond the certificates of title and make inquiries concerning the rights of the
actual possessor. And where, as in the instant case, Gabriel Jr. and the
subsequent vendors were not in possession of the property, the prospective
vendees are obliged to investigate the rights of the one in possession. Evidently,
Bernard, Marcos and Benjamin, and Eduardo did not investigate the rights over
the subject lot of the petitioners who, during the period material to this case, were
in actual possession thereof. Bernard, et al. are, thus, not purchasers in good faith
and, as such, cannot be accorded the protection extended by the law to such
purchasers. Moreover, not being purchasers in good faith, their having registered
the sale, will not, as against the petitioners, carry the day for any of them under
Art. 1544 of the Civil Code prescribing rules on preference in case of double sales

of immovable property. Occeav. Esponilla laid down the following rules in the
application of Art. 1544: (1) knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot
defeat the first buyers rights except when the second buyer first register in good
faith the second sale; and (2) knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first
sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge taints his
registration with bad faith.
Upon the facts obtaining in this case, the act of registration by any of the three
respondent-purchasers was not coupled with good faith. At the minimum, each
was aware or is at least presumed to be aware of facts which should put him upon
such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the
defects in the title of his vendor.
The petitioner contract with the Gabriel Sr. should be enforce and accordingly
ordered them to pay the balance and for Gabriel Jr. to execute a Absulote Deed
of Sale in favor the petitioner for the transfer of land unto them.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and LOLITA TAN, Petitioners, versus CARMELITO
VILLAPAZ, Respondent.
(475 SCRA 720, November 22, 2005, 3rd Division)
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
(G.R. No. 160892)
FACTS: Respondent Carmelito Villapaz issued a Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom) crossed check in the amount of P250,000.00, payable to
the order of petitioner Tony Tan.
The Malita, Davao del Sur Police issued an invitation-request to petitioner Antonio
Tan inviting him to appear before the Deputy Chief of Police Office on June 27,
1994 at 9:00 oclock in the morning in connection with the request of [herein
respondent] Carmelito Villapaz, for conference of vital importance.
The invitation-request was received by petitioner Antonio Tan on June 22, 1994
but on the advice of his lawyer, he did not show up at the Malita, Davao del Sur
Police Office.
Respondent filed a Complaint for sum of money against petitioners-spouses,
alleging that, , his issuance of the February 6, 1992 PBCom crossed check which
loan was to be settled interest-free in six (6) months; on the maturity date of the
loan or on August 6, 1992, petitioner Antonio Tan failed to settle the same, and
despite repeated demands, petitioners never did.
Petitioners alleged that they never received from respondent any demand for
payment, be it verbal or written, respecting the alleged loan; since the alleged loan
was one with a period payable in six months, it should have been expressly
stipulated upon in writing by the parties but it was not.

ISSUE:Whether or not Honorable Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the

transaction in dispute was a contract of loan and not a mere matter of check
encashment as found by the trial court.
HELD: No. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the
transaction in dispute was a contract of loan and not a mere matter of check
encashment as found by the trial court.
At all events, a check, the entries of which are no doubt in writing, could prove a
loan transaction.
That petitioner Antonio Tan had, on February 6, 1992, an outstanding balance of
more than P950,000.00 in his account at PBCom Monteverde
branch where he was later to deposit respondents check did not rule out
petitioners securing a loan. It is pure naivete to believe that if a businessman has
such an outstanding balance in his bank account, he would have no need to
borrow a lesser amount.
In fine, as petitioners side of the case is incredible as it is inconsistent with the
principles by which men similarly situated are governed, whereas respondents
claim that the proceeds of the check, which were admittedly received by
petitioners, represented a loan extended to petitioner Antonio Tan is credible, the
preponderance of evidence inclines on respondent.
Petition is denied.
G.R. No. 193117

November 26, 2014

HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANGEL LIWAGON AND FRANCISCA DUMALAGAN, namely: NARCISA

LIWAGON-LAGANG, represented by her Heir VICTOR LIWAGON LAGANG, LEONCIO
LIWAGON, represented by his Heir GERONIMA VDA. LIWAGON, and JOSEFINA LIWAGONESCAUSO represented by their Attorney-in-Fact and for herself, JOSEFINA LIWAGONESCAUSO, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES DEMETRIO LIWAGON AND REGINA LIWAGON, namely: RODRIGO
LIWAGON, MINENCIA LIWAGONOMITTER, JOSEFINA LIWAGON-NUEVO, TERESITO
LIWAGON and DANILO LIWAGON,Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal before the CA in Cagayan de Oro City, raising the issues on
whether or not the purported deed of sale is void and whether the present action is barred by
prescription. Petitioners maintained that the purported Deed of Sale was simulated and fictitious
because the signature of their father was forged. They emphasized that the deed was never shown
to them by the late spouses Demetrio and Regina who, during their lifetime, could not have had the
financial capacity to make the purchase. As to the issue of prescription, petitioners argued that their
cause of action is imprescriptible because it involves the declaration of nullity of a forged document.

In its assailed Decision dated October 23, 2009, the appellate court denied the appeal for lack of
merit, viz.:
FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appealed Decision dated 5 September 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5, Mati, Davao Oriental, is AFFIRMED in toto; with costs against the plaintiffs
appellants.

Issue : WHETHER THE ALLEGED DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY ANGEL LIWAGON IN FAVOR
OF REGINALIWAGON IN 1972 IS VALID.
Held : It is well settled in this jurisdiction that forgery cannot be presumed; it must always be proved
by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Those who make the allegation of forgery have the
burden of proving it. Unarguably, no examination of the alleged different signatures was ever
conducted in the instant case. Plaintiff-appellant Josefina Liwagon Escausos allegation to the effect
that the signature found in the assailed document is not the real and true signature of their father will
not suffice to overcome the positive value of the notarized Deed of Sale dated 24 July 1972.

[G.R. No. 175994 : September 29, 2010]

JESUS CAMPOS AND ROSEMARIE CAMPOS-BAUTISTA V. NENITA BUENVENIDA PASTRANA, ROGER
BUENVENIDA, SONIA BUENVENIDA, TEDDY BUENVENIDA, VICTOR BUENVENIDA, HARRY
BUENVENIDA, MILDRED BUENVENIDA. MANOLITO BUENVENIDA AND DAISY BUENVENIDA,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY'-IN-FACT, CARLITO BUENVENIDA

Facts: 1. The properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-26092 and T-26093
in the name of Rosemarie Campos (Rosemarie) are situated in Roxas City

[5]

and not in the Province of Capiz.

Hence, respondents pray that the dispositive portion of the affirmed CA's Decision be corrected by ordering
the Register of Deeds of Roxas City, instead of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Capiz, to cancel the
said

titles

and

restore

the

same

in

the

name

of

the

previous

owner

Carlito

Campos.

[6]

2. One of the subject titles, TCT No. 26092, despite the Notice of Lis Pendens annotated thereon was the
[7]

subject of a mortgage between petitioner Rosemarie and Francisco Elagor.

was foreclosed with Francisco Elagor emerging as the prevailing party.

[8]

Subsequently, the said property

A new title, TCT No. T-56655, was

issued on June 25, 2008 in favor of Francisco Elagor during the pendency of the instant case before this
Court.

[9]

In this connection, respondents pray that the Register of Deeds of Roxas City be likewise ordered to

cancel TCT No. T-56655 in the name of Francisco Elagor.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct to rule that the sale contracts made by the Campos
spouses to their children and petitioners herein are void and without effect?

Held:

In the instant case, we have declared the Deeds of Absolute Sale to be fictitious
and inexistent for being absolutely simulated contracts.It is true that the CA cited
instances that may constitute badges of fraud under Article 1387 of the Civil Code on
rescissible contracts. But there is nothing else in the appealed decision to indicate that
rescission was contemplated under the said provision of the Civil Code. The
aforementioned badges must have been considered merely as grounds for holding that
the sale is fictitious. Consequently, we find that the CA properly applied the governing
law over the matter under consideration which is Article 1409 of the Civil Code on void
or inexistent contracts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. 179743, August 02, 2010 ]

HADJA FATIMA GAGUIL MAGOYAG, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, HADJI
HASAN MADLAWI MAGOYAG, PETITIONERS, VS. HADJI ABUBACAR
MARUHOM, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
Respondent Hadji Abubakar Marahum sold to Petitioner Hadji Fatima Magoyag a certain twostorey market stall located in the public market of Marawi City. The sale was evidenced by a
Deed of Assignment which also stated that although there was a sale, possession will remain with
the seller Hadji Maruhom and that he will pay a monthly rental. However, after several years
Hadji Maruhom suddenly stopped paying rentals. Petitioner demanded payment but respondent
failed to fulfill his promise and refused to vacate the premises. On August 22, 1994 petitioner
filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with the RTC of Marawi City.
Issue: Did the Deed of Assignment prove the existence of a sale?
Is the sale valid?
Decision: The Deed of Assignment is a clear indication that the transaction was really of a sale
and not of a loan with an equitable mortgage. The language in the document is crystal clear,
unambiguous and needs no further interpretation.

However, the validity of the sale lies not with the interpretation of the contract. The sale was
ultimately declared as invalid because the respondent, Hadji Maruhom is not the owner of the
property. Records show that it is the city of Marawi who owned the property and as a mere
grantee, he was expressly prohibited from selling, donating or otherwise alienating the said
property without the consent of the city government. Violation of the condition shall
automatically render the sale, null and void.
One cannot give what one does not have. Nemo dat qoud non habet.
CONJUANGCO VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 166859; G.R. No. 169203; G.R. No. 180702

April 12, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: These cases are consolidated complaints.
For over two decades, the issue of whether the sequestered sizable block of shares
representing 20% of the outstanding capital stock of San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) at the time of acquisition belonged to their registered owners or to the
coconut farmers has remained unresolved. Through this decision, the Court aims
to finally resolve the issue and terminate the uncertainty that has plagued that
sizable block of shares since then.
Allegedly, Cojuangco purchased a block of 33,000,000 shares of SMC stock
through the 14 holding companies owned by the CIIF Oil Mills. For this reason, the
block of 33,133,266 shares of SMC stock shall be referred to as the CIIF block of
shares.
Several parties intervene. Several motions and amendments took place.
Consequently, on March 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the PCGG from voting the sequestered shares of stock of the
UCPB.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a trust relationship.
HELD: The conditions for the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Civil
Code (like the trustee using trust funds to purchase, or a person acquiring
property through mistake or fraud), and Section 31 of the Corporation Code (like a
director or trustee willfully and knowingly voting for or assenting to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation, among others) require factual foundations to be
first laid out in appropriate judicial proceedings. Hence, concluding that
Cojuangco breached fiduciary duties as an officer and member of the Board of
Directors of the UCPB without competent evidence thereon would be unwarranted
and unreasonable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan could not fairly find that Cojuangco had committed
breach of any fiduciary duties as an officer and member of the Board of Directors
of the UCPB. For one, the Amended Complaint contained no clear factual
allegation on which to predicate the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the

Civil Code, and Section 31 of the Corporation Code. Although the trust
relationship supposedly arose from Cojuangcos being an officer and member of
the Board of Directors of the UCPB, the link between this alleged fact and the
borrowings or advances was not established. Nor was there evidence on the loans
or borrowings, their amounts, the approving authority, etc. As trial court, the
Sandiganbayan could not presume his breach of fiduciary duties without evidence
showing so, for fraud or breach of trust is never presumed, but must be alleged
andproved.[128]
The thrust of the Republic that the funds were borrowed or lent might even
preclude any consequent trust implication. In a contract of loan, one of the parties
(creditor) delivers money or other consumable thing to another (debtor) on the
condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid.[129]
Owing to the consumable nature of the thing loaned, the resulting duty of the
borrower in a contract of loan is to pay, not to return, to the creditor or lender the
very thing loaned. This explains why the ownership of the thing loaned is
transferred to the debtor upon perfection of the contract.[130] Ownership of the
thing loaned having transferred, the debtor enjoys all the rights conferred to an
owner of property, including the right to use and enjoy (jus utendi), to consume
the thing by its use (jus abutendi), and to dispose (jus disponendi), subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.[131] Evidently, the resulting relationship
between a creditor and debtor in a contract of loan cannot be characterized as
fiduciary.[132]
To say that a relationship is fiduciary when existing laws do not provide for such
requires evidence that confidence is reposed by one party in another who exercises
dominion and influence. Absent any special facts and circumstances proving a
higher degree of responsibility, any dealings between a lender and borrower are not
fiduciary in nature.[133] This explains why, for example, a trust receipt transaction
is not classified as a simple loan and is characterized as fiduciary, because the
Trust Receipts Law (P.D. No. 115) punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence
in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another regardless of
whether the latter is the owner.[134]
Based on the foregoing, a debtor can appropriate the thing loaned without any
responsibility or duty to his creditor to return the very thing that was loaned or
to report how the proceeds were used. Nor can he be compelled to return the
proceeds and fruits of the loan, for there is nothing under our laws that compel a
debtor in a contract of loan to do so. As owner, the debtor can dispose of the
thing borrowed and his act will not be considered misappropriation of the thing.
[135] The only liability on his part is to pay the loan together with the interest
that is either stipulated or provided under existing laws.
VDA. DE GUALBERTO vs. GO
G.R. No. 139843, July 21, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Generoso Gualberto, former registered owner of a parcel of land
situated at Redor Street, Barangay Redor, Siniloan, Laguna under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 9203, containing an area of 169.59 square meters, more or less, and declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 4869.
Sometime in 1965, the subject parcel of land was sold by Generoso Gualberto and his wife, herein
petitioner Consuelo Natividad Vda. De Gulaberto (Consuelo, for brevity), to respondents father Go
S. Kiang for P9, 000.00, as evidenced by a deed entitled Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan dated
January 15, 1965 (Kasulatan, for brevity), which deed appears to have been duly notarized by
then Municipal Judge Pascual L. Serrano of the Municipal Court of Siniloan, Laguna and recorded in
his registry as Doc. No. 9, Page No. 12, Book No.12, Series of 1965. On April 1, 1973, petitioner
Consuelo executed an Affidavit attesting to the fact that the aforementioned parcel of land had truly
been sold by her and her husband Generoso to the spouses Go S. Kiang and Rosa Javier Go, as borne
by the said Kasulatan. Evidently, the affidavit was executed for purposes of securing a new tax
declaration in the name of the spouses Go.
In December, 1973, in a case for Unlawful Detainer filed by a certain Demetria Garcia against herein
petitioners, the latter alleged that therein plaintiff Garcia is not a real party in interest and therefore
has no legal capacity and cause of action to sue the defendants; that the real parties in interest of the
parcel of commercial land and the residential apartment in question are Generoso Gualberto and Go
S. Kiang respectively as shown by TCT No. 9203 issued by the Register of Deeds of Laguna. In a
Forcible Entry case filed by respondents against petitioners before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Siniloan-Famy, Siniloan, Laguna docketed as Civil Case No. 336, a decision was rendered in favor
of respondents, which decision was affirmed in toto by the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna. When elevated
to the Court of Appeals, that same decision was affirmed by the latter court, saying that the Court
finds that the judgment of the court a quo affirming the previous judgment of the municipal court is
supported by sufficient and satisfactory evidence and there is no reason for the Court to hold
otherwise.
ISSUE:
Whether an action for reconveyance of property based on nullity of title prescribes
HELD:
Petitioners insist that their action for reconveyance is imprescriptible.
An action for reconveyance of real property based on implied or constructive trust is not barred by
the aforementioned 10-year prescriptive period only if the plaintiff is in actual, continuous and
peaceful possession of the property involved. Generally, an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust, such as the instant case, prescribes in 10 years from the date of issuance
of decree of registration. However, this rule does not apply when the plaintiff is in actual possession
of the land. Thus, it has been held:
An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner
thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason
for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof
may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is Page 537 of 745

attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be
claimed only by one who is in possession.
Here, it was never established that petitioners remained in actual possession of the property after
their fathers sale thereof to Go S. Kiang in 1965 and up to the filing of their complaint in this case
on August 10, 1995. On the contrary, the trial courts factual conclusion is that respondents had
actual possession of the subject property ever since. The action for reconveyance in the instant case
is, therefore, not in the nature of an action for quieting of title, and is not imprescriptible.