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Oscar
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Another nice if rather long article on Ayub Khan.. and perhaps its relevant to the likes of Musharraf as
well.
By Jamil Majid
More than four decades have elapsed since Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub
> Khan demitted high office in circumstances that were anything but
> congenial for him. The Field Marshal's achievements in office were not
> inconsiderable. Impressive strides were made in infrastructure and
> private sector development, agriculture was modernised through better
> use of irrigation, and there was industrial growth effected through
> liberal tax benefits. GNP rose by close to 45% in 10 years. Ayub Khan
> enacted land reforms, emphasised family planning, brought about
> important and welcome changes in Muslim personal law and the country's
> foreign policy and also achieved understanding with India on the
> complex Indus water sharing issue. A certain orderliness and
> predictability characterised Government practices and policies.
> Pakistan was even cited by some foreign visitors as a model for the
> Third World. There are thus people who tend to look to his years of
> power as the halcyon period of Pakistan's history, particularly in the
> context of what followed. There was, to be sure, a downside to all
> this, but more on that later. In the last decade or so, information -> in the shape of memoirs, declassified papers and diaries -- has come
> to light that afford insights into, and add to the understanding of,
> the man, his regime and his times.
>
>
> Ayub Khan's book, Friends Not Masters, was published in 1967, when he
> was no longer in ascendancy. It may well have been an attempt to shore
> up his image which took a beating after the 1965 war with India. On
> the first page of the book, he states that he was born in the village
> of Rehana on May 14, 1907. It happened to be the last day of Ramadan
> and the family was preparing to celebrate Eid-ul-Fitr. Perhaps he
> wished to suggest that the omens were propitious at the time of his
> birth. The Field Marshal's diaries, which covered the period of
> 1966-72, were published only recently after an embargo of more than 30
> years. Ayub Khan had intended these to be published, possibly to put a
> fine gloss on his life and times. One entry refers to his date of
> birth. On May 25, 1968, he noted that symposiums and discussions on
> his life were held on his birthday, May 14, that President Johnson had
> sent a message. He then reveals that he was in fact born in November
> 1905, and that an old servant who used to accompany me had given
> the incorrect date to the headmaster of his primary school. Whether or
> not it coincided with the month of Ramadan is not mentioned. Clearly
> he had not been truthful earlier about his date of birth. This begs a
> few questions. Enrolment of a boy or girl in school is the preserve,
> even pride, of parents, and it is at the time of admission that a
> child's date of birth is recorded in school. Was it the old servant
> who took him to the school for admission? Was the old servant literate
> in English or familiar with the Roman calendar? Is a servant expected
> to know the birthdays of the children of the household where he
> serves? Falsifying a date of birth was surely commonplace in those
> times, and probably still is. Was the story of the old servant merely
> fiction or a white lie, the purpose of which was to suggest that his
> parents could not be party to even such a venial offence? There is a
> discernible holier than thou attitude that runs through his diaries.
>
>
> In Friends Not Masters, Ayub Khan gives a very sketchy account of his
> exploits and role in the Burma front during World War II: he was made
> second in command of the First Assam regiment -- which fought its way
> to Mandalay -- and after 18 months was transferred back to India. More
> information has come to light in recent years. A confidential note
> --declassified in recent years -- of the British Commonwealth
> Relations Office on Ayub Khan, prepared after he seized power in 1958,
> refers to this phase of his career: He (Ayub Khan) was, according to
> our record, a failure as a Commanding Officer (Lt. Col.) on active
> service and had to be relieved. Details about this episode have
> emerged from accounts of others. Ayub Khan served in Burma during
> 1944-45. When the Commanding Officer of the regiment, Lt Col. WF Brown
> was killed, he was given command but later removed by Maj. Gen. TW
> Rees, Commander of the Indian 19th Infantry Division, for tactical
> timidity, and replaced by Lt.Col. Hugh Parsons. Ayub Khan apparently
> could be both extravagant with the truth and also economical!
>
>
> Throughout his military career, Ayub Khan was -- by his own account,
> of course -- a thoroughly professional and no-nonsense soldier. In
> Friends Not Masters, he recounts that as GOC 14th Division at Dhaka,
> while attending a Divisional Commanders' Conference in Rawalpindi, he
> was invited with other senior officers to a meeting with Prime
> Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. The first Pakistani C-in-C of the army was
> about to be appointed, and the Prime Minister wondered if there would
> be a reaction among senior officers, if the senior-most officer was
> not selected for the post. Ayub Khan commented tartly to the Prime
> Minister that this question should never have been asked, army
> officers served to the best of their ability and accepted without
> reservation decisions of their superiors. If a decision was not
> acceptable to anyone, he should get the hell out of the army. Ayub
> Khan disliked HS Suhrawardy, who had defended the accused in the
> Rawalpindi Conspiracy case. After Suhrawardy became Prime Minister and
> Defence Minister in 1956, Ayub Khan told him brusquely, and quite
> gratuitously, that as C-in-C he would obey and carry out whatever
> legitimate and legal orders that were given to him. He expected
> though that there would be no interference in the internal affairs of
> the army.
>
>
> Ayub Khan became the C-in-C of the Army fortuitously. There were a
> number of officers senior to him at the time of partition, and of them
> Maj. Gen. M Iftikhar Khan was selected to be the first Pakistani
> C-in-C of the army in succession to Gen Douglas Gracey. Gen Iftikhar
> was, however, killed in a plane crash in 1949, and in 1951 Ayub Khan
> was appointed C-in-C. In 1955, on completion of his tenure, he was
> given a four year extension of service. In June 1958, a year ahead of
> the completion of his extended term, he was given a further two years'
> extension. In Friends Not Masters he gives an account of how it
> happened and his own reaction to it. Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon
> had sent him a telegram saying that he was very glad that you have
> agreed to stay on as C-in-Cfor another two years... Pakistan at this
> juncture cannot afford to lose your services. Ayub Khan in his reply
> expressed gratitude for the PM's message of appreciation and
> encouragement and added that personally he would have been just as
> happy to retire as he would be in further serving this magnificent
> army the building of which has been my life long ambition: again, the
> epitome of a dispassionate and dignified professional.
>
> In an article published in August 1997, Altaf Gauhar gives a somewhat
> different account. Gauhar served as Information Secretary during
> 1963-69. He was also, in his own words, Ayub's diarist, speech-writer,
> adviser, and one of his principal associates. British papers noted
> that he had a special personal position with Ayub Khan. In 1958, in
> the waning months of parliamentary democracy, Gauhar was Deputy
> Secretary in the Prime Minister's Secretariat. One afternoon Ayub
> Khan, in full uniform, burst into Gauhar's office to convey an
> invitation to Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon to stay with him during
> his visit to Rawalpindi the following week. When Gauhar conveyed this
> to Noon, the latter commented that Ayub Khan was anxious to get
> another extension, and wondered why the General was in such a hurry as
> his present term still had a year to go. Years later, when Gauhar
> mentioned this to Ayub, the latter's response was sheepish and
> evasive. The Prime Minister, Ayub said, under the influence of Mrs
> Noon, was considering Maj. Gen Sher Ali Khan for the post of C-in-C,
> and so my boys were keeping tabs on him.
>
>
> Sher Ali retired from the army in 1958, and was appointed High
> Commissioner to Malaysia. On 15 Dec 1969, Ayub Khan noted in his diary
> that Sher Ali was retired because he had reached the end of his
> usefulness. Sher Ali's assessment of Ayub was just as acerbic. Ayub
> Khan's knowledge of strategy, he felt, was limited to barrack and
> battalion. There are references to Ayub Khan's deficiencies as a
> soldier in declassified British documents also. A note dated October
> 28, 1958 mentions that his military knowledge is limited but there
> was no doubt who is head man.
>
>
> He was not considered to be of high intellectual stature. The
> British High Commissioner in a letter dated May 9, 1969 addressed to
> the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, noted that Ayub Khan was not
> a particularly successful Army officer, was a little secretive about
> his early military career, showed no great enthusiasm for meeting
> visiting military leadersbecause he thought there was some danger of
> the shallowness of his military knowledge being exposed.
>
>
> Two entries in his diary suggest that the Field Marshal was not quite
> comfortable with the notion that most people considered him to have
> been the author and architect of the 1958 military coup. On July 12,
> 1967, he confirmed to his old friend former Chief Justice Munir,
> what Iskander Mirza had told the latter in London: the decision to
> abrogate the constitution in October 1958 had been Mirza's, and that
> he, Ayub Khan, had not been consulted on its drafting or issue. On
> July 20. 1969, the Field Marshal was irked by a comment of Chaudhury
> Mohammad Ali, in a newspaper interview, blaming him for being
> overambitious and conspiring with Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza
> for dismissing constituent assemblies, abrogation of the constitution
> etc. This, he wrote in his diary, was all nonsense; the truth he
> had explained in his book Friends Not Masters, without any
> reservations.
>
>
> In his book, the Field Marshal recounts, somewhat cursorily, the
> circumstances leading to the Coup. He mentions that by the middle of
> 1958, the whole country was in the grip of a serious economic crisis.
> He did not think that Mirza ever seriously wanted to hold elections
> and was looking for a suitable opportunity to abrogate the
> Constitution. Ayub would tell Mirza that if the country was to be
> saved, the latter would have to give a constructive lead. By May of
> 1958, Ayub was certain that if the country was left to politicians,
> we should expect nothing but ruin. On October 5, Ayub reached
> Karachi by train; where an agonizingly prolonged political farce was
> drawing to a close. Mirza had informed him a few days earlier that
> he had decided to act. On meeting Mirza, he received confirmation
> that the latter had indeed made up his mind, and was also assured by
> him that it was absolutely necessary. On October 7, 1958, Iskander
> Mirza abrogated the Constitution and proclaimed Martial Law. Ayub
> promptly assured Mirza that he had done the right thing. The Field
> Marshal clearly preferred to shelter behind the fig leaf of orders
> from above. The paragon of probity, who had cautioned Suhrawardy that
> he would obey only legitimate and lawful orders, seemed to have
> undergone a metamorphosis! Other accounts of the 1958 coup do not
> suggest such a quiescent role for him.
>
>
> The late SM Khan served as Pakistan's Foreign Secretary during
> 1970-72. In 1958, he was Deputy High Commissioner in London. In his
> memoirs he recalls a curious incident. The then C-in-C of the Army,
> Gen Ayub Khan was on a visit to London, a few months before 1958 army
> coup. One day he went to the High Commission and was closeted with
> High Commissioner Ikramullah for a long time. Ikramullah wore a
> thoughtful look after seeing off the General and observed laconically:
> I do not know if I am right in my judgment, but if I am, then the
> General is headed for bigger things in life. Ikramullah did not
> elaborate and changed the subject quickly.
>
>
> Altaf Gauhar was a very competent civil servant, who had functioned as
> Ayub Khan's apologist and spin-doctor. In his not unsympathetic
> biography of the Field Marshal, he has touched on Ayub's role in the
> 1958 coup. Ayub Khan, according to Gauhar, was always on the side of
> the Governor General (Ghulam Mohammad) in his tussle for power with
> parliament. After the adoption of the Constitution, Ayub, on more
> than one occasion, urged Mirza to save the country from the
> patterned on the Rann of Kutch accord. He was persuaded that the time
> was opportune for a decisive move on Kashmir. The plan of action
> comprised two phases, Operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam. In the
> first phase armed infiltrators were to be sent across the cease-fire
> line into the Indian part of Kashmir to start a guerrilla war. With
> strong local support Indian forces would be harassed and eventually
> driven out of Kashmir. Grand Slam would be the piece de resistance,
> the strategic town of Akhnur would be captured and the only rail link
> between India and Kashmir severed, isolating the five Indian divisions
> in Kashmir. The plan was based on certain assumptions that were more
> wishful than realistic; the Indian leadership was thought to be
> untried and weak, the local people would support the freedom
> fighters and that fighting would be confined to Kashmir. Wary of a
> strong Chinese reaction, India would not risk a wider conflict. The
> Information Ministry was given the responsibility to broadcast the
> Voice of Kashmir that would propagate the cause of freedom
> fighters. By end July the five forces that comprised Operation
> Gibraltar had crossed the cease fire line to reach operational
> positions inside Indian Kashmir.
>
>
> The plan floundered; local support was not forthcoming, and the Indian
> response was robust and purposive. On August 8, some of the
> infiltrators were captured and their interviews broadcast over All
> India Radio. By the end of August, C-in-C, Gen Musa, admitted to Ayub
> that Gibraltar had been a complete failure and that Grand Slam was
> frozen in its tracks. A decision had been taken to wind up
> operations, when in the early hours of September 6 India launched an
> attack on Lahore; both Ayub and his C-in-C, according to Gauhar, were
> taken by complete surprise. Lahore did not fall, but the Field Marshal
> woke to the reality that Pakistan lacked the strength and capability
> for the role he had chosen to play. British High Commissioner, Sir
> Morrice James, in a dispatch to the Commonwealth Relations Office,
> after meeting Ayub on September 7, described him as a deeply strained
> and troubled man. On September 9 US Ambassador, Walter McConaughy,
> informed Foreign Minister Bhutto that the US had decided to stop all
> military aid to Pakistan and India. In Moscow, Indian Ambassador TN
> Kaul was assured by Prime Minister Kosygin that the USSR would
> continue its regular arms supplies to India. In a related
> development, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk told Ambassador BK Nehru
> that the US would extend military aid to India, if it were attacked by
> China. Prime Minister Harold Wilson gave a similar assurance. Faced
> with dwindling supplies of spares and ammunition, and the certainty
> that India's superior numbers and greater military resources would
> begin to tell, Ayub's initial posture of defiance and resolution was
> no longer an option. He was not averse to a cease-fire, but wanted a
> Security Council resolution that would include a self-executing
> machinery to resolve the Kashmir dispute.
>
>
> During the night of 19/20 September, Ayub, accompanied by Bhutto,
> paid a secret visit to China to discuss the whole situation directly
> with Chou En-lai. Chou and Chen Yi were supportive and, based on
> their own experience, suggested a prolonged people's war, something
> neither Ayub nor Bhutto was prepared for. On September 22, Ayub
> accepted the Security Council's cease-fire resolution, which fell
> short of what he had hoped for. It did not provide for any follow-up
> mechanism to address the Kashmir issue. To Gauhar, he seemed to have
> lost all power of decision.
>
>
> By the end of November both Shastri and Ayub had accepted Kosygin's
> invitation to meet at Tashkent for negotiations in January 1966. Prior
> to Tashkent, Ayub visited London and Washington in December; neither
> Prime Minister Wilson nor President Johnson, however, could be
> persuaded to get involved in the Kashmir issue. Both were content to
> let the Soviet Union mediate. For Ayub, the war had turned out to be a
> military stalemate, a political setback and a diplomatic rebuff.
> Addressing the UN General Assembly in New York, he urged the
> settlement of the Kashmir issue through self-determination. He saw
> nothing inconsistent between demanding a plebiscite in Kashmir, on the
> one hand, and, denying his own people the right to directly elect
> their leaders, on the other.
>
>
> The war caused considerable economic damage. There was also another
> subtle and deadly impact on the economy and the regime. British High
> Commissioner Cyril Pickard, in a persuasive assessment of the Ayub era
> addressed to Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart on May 9, 1969, covered
> this aspect. American military aid -- of the order of $100 million
> annually -- was stopped after the war started, obliging Pakistan to
> purchase arms. This became an added burden on the economy. US economic
> aid was also substantially reduced, from $412 million in 1965 to $283
> million in 1966, with PL 480 wheat supplied on far more onerous
> terms. Pickard believed that by 1965 the economy was poised for a
> great leap forward, and that this reduction of aid was a major and
> what had happened because the Nawab was a friend Asad's reply was
> very perfunctory, without much regret. To the Field Marshal, the
> murder of a friend was merely a sad incident, and he saw nothing
> bizarre in offering tea and sympathy to the unrepentant murderer!
>
>
> The desire to be appreciated or praised is innate to humans, and Ayub
> certainly was not averse to either praise or appreciation. He
> diligently recorded in his diary, without discernment, comments that
> reflected to his credit.
>
> On October 16, 1966, Foreign Minister Pirzada cabled to him after
> meeting Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in New York. Pirzada
> reported that India had realised Nehru was wrong in not accepting my
> (i.e. Ayub's) advice which I gave him from time to time. On October
> 13, 1967, General Cariappa and Mr Desai (presumably CC Desai former
> High Commissioner to Pakistan) called on Ayub. They were engaged in
> what would be track two diplomacy today. Ayub professed to be
> embarrassed to hear that he was the master of this subcontinent and
> could prove its saviour. On March 25, 1967, former civil servant G
> Mueenuddin gave Ayub the impressions of his visit to India. He had
> met RK Nehru (former diplomat) and Indira Gandhi. Both had told him
> that because of great envy towards Pakistan, there was no hope of
> making any concessions on Kashmir.
>
> On February 19, 1967, at a lunch hosted by the Judges of the Lahore
> High Court, Chief Justice Inamullah confessed to have been frightened
> and shaken by Ayub's ability to assess men and their character on
> casual association and contact. Ayub sagely replied that it has been
> my lifelong profession. On July 3, 1968, former Deputy Minister of
> West Pakistan, Begum GA Khan, spoke to Ayub in glowing terms about his
> son Gohar. She had got to know him during a mission to China, and was
> deeply impressed by his manners and conduct. She urged Ayub to take
> care of Gohar, and thought one day he should lead Pakistan. Ayub
> noted that though this might sound like flattery, it was not so; his
> own assessment of Gohar was the same! The diaries are liberally
> sprinkled with similar entries. Altaf Gauhar writes that by the middle
> of 1966, the cabinet, with the exception of Khwaja Shahabuddin, was a
> colourless body composed of mindless persons, whose principal
> occupation was sycophancy. And High Commissioner Cyril Pickard
> reported to the Commonwealth Secretary on August 8, 1966 that Ayub
> suffers from all the defects of an autocrat who isolates himself in
> the company of sycophants.
>
>
> Ayub's sweeping comments in his diaries on eminent personalities,
> especially political adversaries, sound peevish. A few examples:
> Maudoodi is this traitor and true enemy of Islam, and would have
> been lynched in any other Muslim country; Daultana has no scruples,
> principles and character; Nurul Amin, Daultana and Mohammad Ali
> (presumably Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali) killed democracy, are all
> traitors; Qayyum will sell the country if it benefits him; Bugti is a
> scoundrel; Ghaffar Khan is a traitor; Justice Cornelius lacks
> commonsense, is a poor judge of men; ZA Suleri is an opportunist and
> thoroughly unreliable; Sobur Khan is an opportunist; Wahiduzzaman is a
> big mischief-maker; Asghar Khan is neurotic, unreasoned and not
> above deceit; businessmen, the Dawoods and Habibs excepted, are
> nothing short of scoundrels, damn rascals. His comments on Bhutto are
> harsh. Bhutto is unscrupulous and soulless, thoroughly vindictive,
> an utter exploiter and scoundrel, has unbounded ambitions and
> fascist tendencies. Even in his gentler comments Ayub stints on
> praise; Monem Khan though a very good man, knows nothing about
> economics, development or higher administration; Jabbar Khan may
> have other limitations, but he certainly does not lack patriotism.
> British High Commissioner Sir Morrice James reported to the
> Commonwealth Secretary on April 22, 1964, that Ayub distrusts and
> dislikes people who argue with him. Five years later his successor,
> Sir Cyril Pickard, reported that Ayub was arrogant, intolerant of
> criticism and with little sense of loyalty to his colleagues.
>
>
> In 1966 Yahya Khan was appointed to succeed Gen Musa as the C-in-C of
> the army. A report of the British High Commission dated May 5, 1966
> described him as having the reputation of being a brilliant soldier,
> certainly a colourful character: a near alcoholic with a marked
> weakness for the opposite sex. The British Military Attache, in a
> personality note, described him as a heavy drinker, womanizer,
> intriguer and possible anti-British. An intelligence note of the US
> State Department dated March 26, 1969 referred to Yahya's unsavory
> reputation in his personal habits. Yahya, the note stated, drinks
> heavily and is accused (probably with justification) of
> 'womanizing'with wives of his military subordinates. Jahandad Khan
> quotes Kalabagh as telling him that Ayub will make the blunder of his
> life if he appoints Yahya as C-in-C because he is a debauchee and
> drunkard. Ayub could not have been unaware of Yahya Khan's unholy
> proclivities.
>
>
> On March 24, 1969, in the face of mounting public unrest and agitation
> throughout the country, Ayub decided to step aside. He could have,
> but did not, invoke the provision in the constitution -- a
> constitution that he had himself foisted on the country -- by which
> after his departure, the Speaker would assume office as Acting
> President, with elections soon to follow. SM Khan felt that the
> Speaker, being from East Pakistan, was not trusted by Ayub Khan.
> Instead he invited Army Chief Yahya Khan to fulfill his
> constitutional responsibilities and restore normal, social, economic
> and administrative life. Yahya Khan responded with alacrity. Altaf
> Gauhar writes, Yahya had led Ayub to believe that the army would put
> down the agitation and eliminate his political opponents and put him
> back in power after three months. Sir Cyril Pickard reported to the
> Foreign and Commonwealth Office on April 9, after a meeting with Ayub
> the previous day, that Ayub had earnestly commended President Yahya
> to us, as a sound and a cautious man who could be trusted. Ayub's
> assessment would begin to change before too long.
>
>
> On September 13, 1969 he noted in his diary, disturbing statements
> about Yahya's conduct by responsible and knowledgeable people; Yahya
> went to office late, left by 1 PM, and spent the rest of the time
> drinking, womanizing and some sleep. On November 12, 1969 his
> physician Col. Mohiuddin, who was also the President's physician, told
> him that Yahya drinks very heavily and is an alcoholic; that
> Generals Hamid and Peerzada, the only persons with access to him, join
> him in the evening for drinking and bouts of womanizing. On February
> 24, 1970, Gen KM Sheikh informed him that Yahya spent most of his
> time in orgies and drinking and womanizing. On February 2, 1971 he
> heard that at a meal for the Iranian Foreign Minister, Yahya drank so
> much that he was leaking whilst drinking and his trousers were wet
> throughout. On September 7, 1971, he noted that the opening
> ceremony of Yahya's house in Peshawar cantonment, financed by the
> Alvi brothers of Standard Bank, was followed by several days of orgy,
> drinking and womanizing; that at one point Yahya had two women on
> his lap and Gen Hamid one.
>
>
> Ayub always took pride in his judgment of people, and it is an irony
> that his most scathing comments should be aimed at onetime favourite
> proteges, Bhutto and Yahya.
>
>
> Ayub Khan himself faced angry questions about Yahya. On January 22,
> 1971, an unnamed friend told him that Yahya did not have any strength
> of character, was an unprincipled appeaser, and accused Ayub of
> appointing him as C-in-C. On October 26, 1971 Col. Mohiuddin, who
> is normally very tongue-tied, told Ayub's brother, Sardar Bahadur
> Khan, that Ayub might or might not have made other mistakes but
> appointing Yahya was a great blunder, for which God would never
> forgive him. Ayub's reaction to both comments was essentially the
> same, what else was the answer at that time. On December 17, 1971 he
> noted that Yahya and the political leaders were being abused by the
> people, and he (i.e. Ayub) was also blamed for handing over to
> Yahya. Ayub, however, did not see how he could have acted
> differently, as Yahya was the C-in-C of the army. Even with the
> wisdom of hindsight, and in the full knowledge of Yahya's moral lapses
> and villainous instincts, Ayub would not concede that he had erred.
> Sir Cyril Pickard's report of August 8, 1966 described Ayub as
> obstinate, overbearing, and therefore not always informed about what
> he would not like to hear.
>
>
> Two entries in his diaries show that Ayub was not lacking in
> compassion for Yahya. On December 19, 1971 he wrote that Yahya's
> house and its furniture were burnt by an agitated mob, a very sad
> and bad precedent. On December 21, 1971, he noted that in spite of
> Yahya's betrayal and disloyalty, he felt sorry for him and the
> manner and circumstances under which he had to go. Singularly enough,
> Ayub did not have a word of sympathy or concern for Bengalis -- who
> incidentally constituted the majority of the country -- when they were
> put to the sword by a ruthless military junta.
>
>
> A very bigoted and baleful aspect of Ayub is reflected in his comments
> on Hindus and Bengalis. In a diary entry on August 12, 1967, he
> regretted the urge in East Pakistanis to isolate themselves from West
> Pakistan and revert to Hindu language and culture. This was because
> Bengalis had no culture and language of their own. To Ayub it was a
> tragedy that they had forced two state languages on Pakistan. On
> August 23 he told a gathering of intellectuals in Dhaka that the
> Bengali had cut himself off from Urdu, which was the vehicle in
> which Muslim thought and philosophy was expressed, was thus totally
> at sea, and may drift back to Hinduism. Ayub thought that a large
> refashion Pakistan in his own image. He was also scornful of and
> antipathetic to intellectualsand incompatible with Bengalis.
>
>
> In August 1966, Sir Cyril Pickard reported to the Commonwealth
> Secretary that the elan of the regime had subsided in the eight
> years since 1958, Ayub was becoming increasingly isolated and
> autocratic, the Assemblies were powerless, Ayub had created around
> himself a political vacuum, he had fewer and fewer friends and
> advisers who could give him disinterested advice, corruption was on
> the increase, and the unpleasant symptoms of a police Statehave
> continued. Ayub, however, genuinely desires to help the people of
> Pakistan. Sir Cyril likened him to the man from Brobdingnaghe who
> can make two ears of corn grow where only one grew before deserves
> better of mankind than the whole race of politicians put together.
> Ayub had done more than any previous government to encourage
> development and stimulate economic progress in East Pakistan. Regions
> outside the Punjab, however, felt they were not getting a fair deal.
> It was in the British interest and in the interest of the West that
> Ayub should remain in power. After Ayub left office, Sir Cyril, in a
> dispatch to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Michael Stewart,
> gave a general overview of the man and his times: Ayub doubted the
> relevance of democratic institutions and held politicians in
> contempt, his regime was based on paternalism, he dispensed with
> any men of statureand tended to finish up with a Cabinet of apparent
> nonentities, the Basic Democracies system had all the vices of the
> Rotten Boroughs of 18th century Britain, and in the end Ayub lost the
> will to rule.
>
>
> Dr Humayun Khan believed that the 1958 Martial Law -- as distinct from
> subsequent ones -- was not essentially reactive. There were no
> compelling reasons for such an extra-constitutional intervention. Many
> would concur. The first ever general elections were, in any case, due
> in February 1959. Altaf Gauhar had a somewhat different perspective.
> He writes that Ayub's accession to power was generally, and quite
> genuinely, acknowledged as the only way out of the mess which the
> politicians had created during the first 11 years of Pakistan's
> existence. Sir Cyril Pickard seems to agree. In a dispatch dated
> March 26, 1969, he suggests that the 1958 Martial Law regime was
> welcomed by the whole country. Whatever the truth, a big question
> remains unanswered. Was Ayub driven by political ambition? Or had he
> persuaded himself that a firm hand was needed at the helm, and only he
> could provide it? Iskander Mirza clearly had a personal angle. He knew
> that after the general elections, regardless of which party won, a new
> President would be elected.
>
>
> Major General Wajahat Husain, as a young Lieutenant, served as ADC to
> the C-in-C, General Douglas Gracey, in 1948-49. In an interview with
> the Defence Journal, he related a curious conversation he had with
> General Gracey in London in early 1956. Gracey had asked him pointedly
> when Ayub was taking over the country. The biggest problem with
> Pakistan, Gracey thought, was senior army officers, with ambitions,
> trying to take over the country. Gracey believed that Ayub was very
> ambitious and had cautioned Prime Minister Liaquat about this. He
> had, with reservations, recommended Ayub as his own successor, as he
> was the only one of the three Generals under consideration -- the
> other two being Generals Nasir and Raza -- with some experience of
> command.
>
>
> Ideally a person should be judged by his best, and not his worst. For
> a leader of a people or nation, more specific criteria may apply; his
> highest achievements and also worst abuses and mistakes, opportunities
> created and exploited, and also ignored and squandered, the quality of
> political and moral leadership brought to bear, and lastly his or her
> impact on history. These elements can be applied to Attila the Hun and
> Genghis Khan, and also Peter the Great and Napoleon. The Field Marshal
> deserves no less.
Ziras
FULL MEMBER
Joe Shearer
PROFESSIONAL
Thought provoking.
The article gives so many clues about the future. Meddling with the top ranks and deviating from strict
considerations of merit is an extremely dangerous thing to try. Ayub concealed his early history very
carefully, but there were those who knew; why did they keep quiet? What were Noon and Mirza up to,
extending his term? There were enough competent officers, Sher Ali prominent among them, who could
have taken over.
The references to the hatred for Indians and for Hindus makes sombre reading. There is a self-deluding
myth that the Pakistani at large was neutral to blandly disdainful; the picture that emerges from this
essay is rather bleak. Such a depth of feeling with not much to have generated it, apart from Partition
with its attendant Grand Guignol, and Kashmir. It does seem that some got over things earlier than
others.
Many more things can be deduced. Overall, it is a gloomy piece, filled with dark hints for the future.
MastanKhan
PDF VETERAN
Hi,
One of my family friends studying at Chandka medical college larkana---the very first batch---went on a
student trip to islamabad---they decided to visit Pres Ayub Khan---. One of the students asked Pres
Ayub---"you knew what Gen Yahya was---why did you put him in that position"---Pres Ayub's reply---"
the nation disgraced me---that was my revenge"--.
A1Kaid
PDF THINK TANK: ANALYST
Pres. Gen. Ayub Khan was arguably one of the best leaders in Pakistani history. It was under him
Pakistan became a fast pace semi-industrialized country and brought many legal reforms. Expansion of
the private sector, built an oil refinery in Karachi, improved railways, land reforms, education reform,
manufacturing boom, and put Pakistan in a politically well-off situation. In his decade the 60's Pakistan
had transformed for the better. His greatest achievement in my opinion was the founding of Islamabad
in 1959 and began construction in 1960.
Jan 5, 2013
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
ayub khans greatest strength was that he was a very good administrator. he was not the brightest or
intelligent amongst his peers but he definately got things done. setting up the framework for the army,
mangla dam, indus water treaty (only treaty with india) agriculture self sufficiency in wheat by
introducing 'mexipak' high yield varieties etc, industrial infrastructure etc. where he failed was land
reforms and geing fair to the needs of the eastern wing.
idealsome425
FULL MEMBER
Very useful reading, though it shows more of a dark side of the Great president of the past. However
every individual has some dark sides on his/her account the main thing is how they make decisions for
the country which I believe General Ayub Khan did well within his capabilities. Only thing that hurts me
throughout the reading is Ayub's attitude towards Bengalis which I think could have been bit lenient and
soft If advised sincerely by any of his close affiliates.
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