Labor Standards Bul SU Law School Comm. Cecilio Ted C.

Villanueva
Assignment for 19 October 2016
1. Procure a copy of an employment contract for the following:
a. Probationary employment
b. Confirmation of regular employment
c. Project based employment contract
d. Employment contract for a fixed term
e. Seasonal employment
f. Employment contract for teachers in the Private Sector
2. Get a Contract between a Principal and Job Contractor like Janitorial Contract and Security Services
Contract
3. Digest the following cases:
a. Brent School Inc. vs. Ronaldo Zamora G.R> No. L 48494 February 5, 1990
b. Cesar Naguit vs. San Miguel Corp. G.R. No. 188839, June 22, 2015
c. Marlon Beduya et al vs. ACE PROMOTION AND MARKETING CORPORATION and
GLENHERNANDEZ G.R. No. 195513 June 22, 2015
d. Petron Corp vs. ARMZ Caberte et al G.R. No. 182255, June 15, 2015
e. Alumanay Jamias et al vs. NLRC, Innodata and Todd Solomon GR No. 159350 March 9, 2016
f. Arlene Samonte et al vs. La Salle Greenhills G.R. No. 199683, February 10, 2016

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------a. Brent School Inc. vs. Ronaldo Zamora G.R> No. L 48494 February 5, 1990

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990

BRENT SCHOOL, INC., and REV. GABRIEL DIMACHE, petitioners,

vs.
RONALDO ZAMORA, the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, and
DOROTEO R. ALEGRE, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea & Nolasco for petitioners.
Mauricio G. Domogon for respondent Alegre.

NARVASA, J.:
The question presented by the proceedings at bar 1 is whether or not the provisions of the Labor
Code, 2 as amended,3 have anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term.
The root of the controversy at bar is an employment contract in virtue of which Doroteo R. Alegre
was engaged as athletic director by Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. 4 The
contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution
of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28,
1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as
those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971. 5
Some three months before the expiration of the stipulated period, or more precisely on April 20,1976,
Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of
the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was
"completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." And a month or so later, on
May 26, 1976, Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing
the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of
contract."
However, at the investigation conducted by a Labor Conciliator of said report of termination of his
services, Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although
his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were
necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for
five years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for
valid cause. 6 The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to
terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the Labor
Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a
"permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages. The
Director pronounced "the ground relied upon by the respondent (Brent) in terminating the services of the
complainant (Alegre) . . . (as) not sanctioned by P.D. 442," and, quite oddly, as prohibited by Circular No.
8, series of 1969, of the Bureau of Private Schools. 7
Brent School filed a motion for reconsideration. The Regional Director denied the motion and
forwarded the case to the Secretary of Labor for review. 8 The latter sustained the Regional
Director. 9 Brent appealed to the Office of the President. Again it was rebuffed. That Office dismissed its
appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Labor Secretary's decision, ruling that Alegre was a permanent

employee who could not be dismissed except for just cause, and expiration of the employment contract
was not one of the just causes provided in the Labor Code for termination of services. 10

The School is now before this Court in a last attempt at vindication. That it will get here.
The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at a
time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated. Indeed, the
Code did not come into effect until November 1, 1974, some three years after the perfection of the
employment contract, and rights and obligations thereunder had arisen and been mutually observed
and enforced.
At that time, i.e., before the advent of the Labor Code, there was no doubt whatever about the
validity of term employment. It was impliedly but nonetheless clearly recognized by the Termination
Pay Law, R.A. 1052, 11 as amended by R.A. 1787. 12 Basically, this statute provided that
In cases of employment, without a definite period, in a commercial, industrial, or
agricultural establishment or enterprise, the employer or the employee may terminate
at any time the employment with just cause; or without just cause in the case of an
employee by serving written notice on the employer at least one month in advance,
or in the case of an employer, by serving such notice to the employee at least one
month in advance or one-half month for every year of service of the employee,
whichever is longer, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole
year.
The employer, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of
employment without just cause, may hold the employee liable for damages.
The employee, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of
employment without just cause, shall be entitled to compensation from the date of
termination of his employment in an amount equivalent to his salaries or wages
corresponding to the required period of notice.
There was, to repeat, clear albeit implied recognition of the licitness of term employment. RA 1787
also enumerated what it considered to be just causes for terminating an employment without a
definite period, either by the employer or by the employee without incurring any liability therefor.
Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce which governed employment without a fixed period, and
also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period. Its Article 302 provided
that
In cases in which the contract of employment does not have a fixed period, any of
the parties may terminate it, notifying the other thereof one month in advance.
The factor or shop clerk shall have a right, in this case, to the salary corresponding to
said month.
The salary for the month directed to be given by the said Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce to the factor or shop clerk, was known as the mesada (from mes, Spanish for
"month"). When Article 302 (together with many other provisions of the Code of Commerce)

was repealed by the Civil Code of the Philippines, Republic Act No. 1052 was enacted
avowedly for the precise purpose of reinstating the mesada.
Now, the Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective
on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period in section 2, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV;
and with contracts of labor and for a piece of work, in Sections 2 and 3, Chapter 3, Title VIII,
respectively, of Book IV. No prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any
of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.
It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre on
July 18, 1971, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration
thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court, for instance,
in Biboso v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc., promulgated on March 31, 1977, 13 and J. Walter Thompson
Co. (Phil.) v. NLRC, promulgated on December 29, 1983. 14 TheThompson case involved an executive
who had been engaged for a fixed period of three (3) years. Biboso involved teachers in a private school
as regards whom, the following pronouncement was made:
What is decisive is that petitioners (teachers) were well aware an the time that their
tenure was for a limited duration. Upon its termination, both parties to the
employment relationship were free to renew it or to let it lapse. (p. 254)
Under American law 15 the principle is the same. "Where a contract specifies the period of its duration, it
terminates on the expiration of such period." 16 "A contract of employment for a definite period terminates
by its own terms at the end of such period." 17
The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts under the
Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code
contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or definite
period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment began to take
place at about this time
Article 320, entitled "Probationary and fixed period employment," originally stated that the
"termination of employment of probationary employees and those employed WITH A FIXED
PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe." The asserted
objective to was "prevent the circumvention of the right of the employee to be secured in their
employment as provided . . . (in the Code)."
Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an employer could terminate "an employment
without a definite period."
And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in the following manner:

18

An employment shall be deemed to be without a definite period for purposes of this

Chapter where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except
where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

The question immediately provoked by a reading of Article 319 is whether or not a voluntary
agreement on a fixed term or period would be valid where the employee "has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer." The definition seems a non sequitur. From the premise that the duties of an employee
entail "activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer the" conclusion does not necessarily follow that the employer and employee should be
forbidden to stipulate any period of time for the performance of those activities. There is nothing
essentially contradictory between a definite period of an employment contract and the nature of the
employee's duties set down in that contract as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer." The concept of the employee's duties as being "usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer" is not synonymous with or
identical to employment with a fixed term. Logically, the decisive determinant in term employment
should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day certain agreed
upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship, a day
certain being understood to be "that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known
when." 19 Seasonal employment, and employment for a particular project are merely instances
employment in which a period, where not expressly set down, necessarily implied.
Of course, the term period has a definite and settled signification. It means, "Length of existence;
duration. A point of time marking a termination as of a cause or an activity; an end, a limit, a bound;
conclusion; termination. A series of years, months or days in which something is completed. A time
of definite length. . . . the period from one fixed date to another fixed date . . ." 20 It connotes a "space
of time which has an influence on an obligation as a result of a juridical act, and either suspends its
demandableness or produces its extinguishment." 21 It should be apparent that this settled and familiar
notion of a period, in the context of a contract of employment, takes no account at all of the nature of the
duties of the employee; it has absolutely no relevance to the character of his duties as being "usually
necessary or desirable to the usual business of the employer," or not.
Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and "regular"
employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December 16, 1975.
Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by eliminating the
reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was renumbered (becoming Article 271).
The article 22 now reads:
. . . Probationary employment.Probationary employment shall not exceed six
months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee
who has been engaged in a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or
when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall
be considered a regular employee.
Also amended by PD 850 was Article 319 (entitled "Employment with a fixed period," supra) by
(a) deletingmention of employment with a fixed or definite period, (b) adding a general exclusion
clause declaring irrelevant written or oral agreements "to the contrary," and (c) making the provision
treat exclusively of "regular" and "casual" employment. As revised, said article, renumbered
270, 23 now reads:

. . . Regular and Casual Employment.The provisions of written agreement to the

contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be
employed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to he casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph:provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such actually exists.
The first paragraph is identical to Article 319 except that, as just mentioned, a clause has
been added, to wit: "The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreements of the parties . . ." The clause would appear to be
addressed inter alia to agreements fixing a definite period for employment. There is withal no
clear indication of the intent to deny validity to employment for a definite period. Indeed, not
only is the concept of regular employment not essentially inconsistent with employment for a
fixed term, as above pointed out, Article 272 of the Labor Code, as amended by said PD
850, still impliedly acknowledged the propriety of term employment: it listed the "just causes"
for which "an employer may terminate employment without a definite period," thus giving rise
to the inference that if the employment be with a definite period, there need be no just cause
for termination thereof if the ground be precisely the expiration of the term agreed upon by
the parties for the duration of such employment.
Still later, however, said Article 272 (formerly Article 321) was further amended by Batas Pambansa
Bilang 130, 24to eliminate altogether reference to employment without a definite period. As lastly
amended, the opening lines of the article (renumbered 283), now pertinently read: "An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following just causes: . . . " BP 130 thus completed the elimination
of every reference in the Labor Code, express or implied, to employment with a fixed or definite period or
term.
It is in the light of the foregoing description of the development of the provisions of the Labor Code
bearing on term or fixed-period employment that the question posed in the opening paragraph of this
opinion should now be addressed. Is it then the legislative intention to outlaw stipulations in
employment contracts laying down a definite period therefor? Are such stipulations in essence
contrary to public policy and should not on this account be accorded legitimacy?
On the one hand, there is the gradual and progressive elimination of references to term or fixedperiod employment in the Labor Code, and the specific statement of the rule 25 that
. . . Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to
the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer except where the employment has been fixed for a specific

project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at

the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be
employed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph:provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such actually exists.
There is, on the other hand, the Civil Code, which has always recognized, and continues to
recognize, the validity and propriety of contracts and obligations with a fixed or definite period, and
imposes no restraints on the freedom of the parties to fix the duration of a contract, whatever its
object, be it specie, goods or services, except the general admonition against stipulations contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. 26Under the Civil Code, therefore, and as a
general proposition, fixed-term employment contracts are not limited, as they are under the present Labor
Code, to those by nature seasonal or for specific projects with pre-determined dates of completion; they
also include those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of termination.
Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contracts which may be neither for seasonal
work nor for specific projects, but to which a fixed term is an essential and natural appurtenance:
overseas employment contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of the engagement, the
concept of regular employment will all that it implies does not appear ever to have been applied,
Article 280 of the Labor Code not withstanding; also appointments to the positions of dean, assistant
dean, college secretary, principal, and other administrative offices in educational institutions, which
are by practice or tradition rotated among the faculty members, and where fixed terms are a
necessity, without which no reasonable rotation would be possible. Similarly, despite the provisions
of Article 280, Policy, Instructions No. 8 of the Minister of Labor 27 implicitly recognize that certain
company officials may be elected for what would amount to fixed periods, at the expiration of which they
would have to stand down, in providing that these officials," . . . may lose their jobs as president,
executive vice-president or vice-president, etc. because the stockholders or the board of directors for one
reason or another did not re-elect them."
There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition that where from the circumstances it is
apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the
employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc. But
where no such intent to circumvent the law is shown, or stated otherwise, where the reason for the
law does not exist, e.g., where it is indeed the employee himself who insists upon a period or where
the nature of the engagement is such that, without being seasonal or for a specific project, a definite
date of termination is a sine qua non, would an agreement fixing a period be essentially evil or illicit,
therefore anathema? Would such an agreement come within the scope of Article 280 which
admittedly was enacted "to prevent the circumvention of the right of the employee to be secured in . .
. (his) employment?"
As it is evident from even only the three examples already given that Article 280 of the Labor Code,
under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts
to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without
reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of
his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided.

The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing
the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to
remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security
of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by
lopping off the head.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption
that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and
that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will
avoid all objecionable mischievous, undefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences. 28
Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would
lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. That s a principle that does back to In re
Allen decided oil October 27, 1903, where it was held that a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. That is a strong argument against
its adoption. The words of Justice Laurel are particularly apt. Thus: "The fact that the
construction placed upon the statute by the appellants would lead to an absurdity is
another argument for rejecting it. . . ." 29
. . . We have, here, then a case where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the
application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent of spirit must
prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the
statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. 30

Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the
present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent
circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article
indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept
of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the
Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It
should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon
knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or
where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less
equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless
thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly
stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to
absurd and unintended consequences.
Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso 31 upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of
employment as still good rulea rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero vs. Office of the
President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served
by her school a notice of termination following the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term
employment contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her
employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period.
At the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment was

deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is
not a condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the
employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of
employment was due to expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It
is not a letter of termination. The interpretation that the notice is only a reminder is
consistent with the court's finding in Labajo supra. ... 32
Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the expiration of his
last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance
written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the
impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to
terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his
services effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.
WHEREFORE, the public respondent's Decision complained of is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and
by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to
reinstatement and the other relief awarded and confirmed on appeal in the proceedings below. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Corts, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I am agreed that the Labor Code has not foresaken "term employments", held valid in Biboso V.
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. (No. L-44360, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 250). That notwithstanding,
I can not liken employment contracts to ordinary civil contracts in which the relationship is
established by stipulations agreed upon. Under the very Civil Code:
Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They
are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts are subject to the special
laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages,
working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The courts (or labor officials) should nevertheless be vigilant as to whether or not the termination of
the employment contract is done by reason of expiration of the period or to cheat the employee out
of office. The latter amounts to circumvention of the law.

Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I am agreed that the Labor Code has not foresaken "term employments", held valid in Biboso V.
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. (No. L-44360, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 250). That notwithstanding,
I can not liken employment contracts to ordinary civil contracts in which the relationship is
established by stipulations agreed upon. Under the very Civil Code:
Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They
are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts are subject to the special
laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages,
working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The courts (or labor officials) should nevertheless be vigilant as to whether or not the termination of
the employment contract is done by reason of expiration of the period or to cheat the employee out
of office. The latter amounts to circumvention of the law.

b. Cesar Naguit vs. San Miguel Corp. G.R. No. 188839, June 22, 2015

G.R. No. 188839, June 22, 2015

CESAR NAGUIT, Petitioner, v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 13, 2009 and July 15, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No.
107311. The Resolution of February 13, 2009 denied petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Certiorari,2 while the Resolution dated July 15, 2009 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was employed as a machine operator of San Miguel Corporation Metal Closure and Lithography
Plant, a division of herein respondent corporation which is engaged in the business of manufacturing printed
metal caps and crowns for beer, beverage and pharmaceutical products.
Sometime in the afternoon of September 23, 2002, petitioner and one Renato Regala (Regala), also an
employee of respondent corporation, got involved in an altercation in respondent corporation's Canlubang
Plant. In his Position Paper, petitioner claimed that Regala went to the Canlubang Plant to distribute antiunion materials that are libelous and defamatory and that, as union steward, petitioner confronted Regala,
which confrontation developed to a heated exchange of words. Petitioner then elbowed Regala, hitting him in
the face, causing him to lose his balance and fall to the ground.
As a consequence, Regala filed a complaint with respondent corporation's Human Resources Department.
Respondent corporation then conducted an administrative investigation giving both parties the opportunity
to defend themselves. However, petitioner opted to remain silent and did not address the charges against
him. On January 29, 2003, the company-designated investigator submitted his report and recommendation
finding petitioner guilty of willful injury to another employee within company premises, which is an infraction
of the company's rules and regulations. On February 7, 2003, respondent corporation served upon petitioner
a letter informing him of the termination of his employment on the basis of the findings and
recommendation of the investigator. Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent
corporation.3
On January 4, 2005, the Labor Arbiter (LA) assigned to the case rendered a Decision4 in favor of respondent
corporation. Accordingly, petitioner's complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed an Appeal5 with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In its Decision6dated April
30, 2008, the NLRC dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the Decision of the LA. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it in its Resolution 7 dated October 31, 2008.
Aggrieved, petitioner intended to file a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to assail the NLRC
Decision.
On February 9, 2009, petitioner filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
forCertiorari8 Petitioner claimed that on December 10, 2008, his former counsel received a copy of the NLRC
Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision dated April 30, 2008; that he had
until February 9, 2009 to file a certiorari petition; and, that he just hired a new counsel who still had to
study the records of the case.
On February 13, 2009, the CA promulgated a Resolution9 denying petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Certiorari. Citing the amended provisions of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
CA held that the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is non-extendible.
On March 9, 2009, the CA issued another Resolution10 resolving to consider petitioner's certioraripetition as
filed out of time and declaring the questioned NLRC Decision as final and executory.
On even date, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 11 of the CA Resolution which denied his Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari.
On July 15, 2009, the CA promulgated its Resolution 12 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the following ISSUES, to wit:
I.

II.

III.

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FAILED TO DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE MERITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE AFFORDED TO LABOR CASES;
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO LOOK INTO THE SUBSTANTIAL
FACTS AND APPLICABLE LAWS OF THIS CASE;
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER FIAD BEEN UNLAWFULLY DISMISSED AND THUS IS
ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT AND FULL BACKWAGES AND OTHER BENEFITS AS WELL AS
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.13

The petition lacks merit.

As to the first issue raised, which pertains to the procedural aspect of the case, the Court is not persuaded
by petitioner's contention that the CA should have decided the case on its merits and not simply dismissed
his certiorari petition by denying his motion for extension to file the said petition.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in the recent case of Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. (Formerly Intermare
Maritime Agencies, Inc.) v. Court of Appeals 14 is instructive, to wit:
In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., we had the occasion to settle the seeming conflict on
various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be
extended. In said case, we stated that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metis Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from
the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition
for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but
only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, and as held
inDomdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the 60-day period may be extended subject to
the court's sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining
to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the
intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that 'no extension of time to file
the petition shall be granted.' Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the
court's sound discretion."
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Then in Labao v. Flores, we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period
rule, thus:
[T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty
reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the
case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without
appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name
of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the
part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to
comply with the rules.15
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In the instant case, petitioner asserts that, due to the unavailability of his former lawyer, he retained the
services of a new counsel who has a heavy workload and that the records were forwarded to the latter only
a week before the expiration of the period for filing of the petition with the CA.
The Court is not convinced.
Suffice it to say that workload and resignation of the lawyer handling the case are insufficient reasons to
justify the relaxation of the procedural rules.16 Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving.17

In addition, it is also the duty of petitioner to monitor the status of his case and not simply rely on his
former lawyer, whom he already knew to be unable to attend to his duties as counsel. It is settled that
litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back and relax, and await
the outcome of their case.18 They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel, for at stake is their
interest in the case.19
Moreover, it is true that rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Also, the
general rule is that every litigant must be given amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. However, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner's
failure to file his petition on time does not involve mere technicality but is jurisdictional. 20 Petitioner's failure
to timely file his petition renders the questioned NLRC Decision final and executory, thus, depriving the CA of
its jurisdiction over the said petition.21
Furthermore, no one has a vested right to file an appeal or a petition for certiorari. These are statutory
privileges which may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. Rules of procedure must be
faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with by the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit.22 In Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General Services, Inc.,23 this Court held that:
xxxx
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xxx Although technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves, they are necessary, however, for an
effective and expeditious administration of justice. It is settled that a party who seeks to avail
of certiorari must observe the rules thereon and non-observance of said rules may not be brushed aside as
"mere technicality." While litigation is not a game of technicalities, and that the rules of procedure should
not be enforced strictly at the cost of substantial justice, still it does not follow that the Rules of Court may
be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation, assessment and just resolution
of the issues. Procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because they may have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for
compelling reasons.24
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As to the substantive aspect of the case, petitioner, in the second and third issues raised, insists on
questioning the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC. However, it is settled that in a petition for review
on certiorari with this Court, only questions of law may be raised. Questions of fact may not be inquired into.
While there are exceptions to this rule, to wit:
(1) the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on misappreciation of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) in making its findings, the
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.25
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the Court finds that none exists in the instant case.

Equally settled is the rule that factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, if supported by
substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court, more so when they coincide with
those of the LA.26
In any case, even if the case be decided on its merits, the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from
the findings of the LA and the NLRC that petitioner was validly dismissed from his employment. As noted by
both the LA and the NLRC, substantial evidence exists to show that petitioner committed acts which are
tantamount to serious misconduct and willful disobedience of company rules and regulations. On the other
hand, the Labor Arbiter noted that, other than his bare allegations, petitioner did not submit proof to
support his allegations nor did he provide evidence to counter those which were submitted by respondent.
Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioner's argument that the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him
is too harsh and is not commensurate to the infraction he has committed, considering that he has been in
respondent's employ for fifteen years and that this is just his first offense of this nature.
The settled rule is that fighting within company premises is a valid ground for the dismissal of an
employee.27 Moreover, the act of assaulting another employee is serious misconduct which justifies the
termination of employment.28

Also, the Court agrees with respondent's contention that if petitioner's long years of service would be
regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for
disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks
of all undesirables.29 In addition, where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of
the employees, the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and
a habitual delinquent.30 In the present case, all the more should petitioner's years of service be taken
against him in light of the finding of the lower tribunals that his violation of an established company rule was
shown to be willful and such willfulness was characterized by a wrongful attitude. Moreover, petitioner has
never shown any feelings of remorse for what he has done, considering that the lower tribunals found no
justification on his part in inflicting injury upon a co-employee. To make matters worse, petitioner even
exhibited a seemingly arrogant attitude in insisting to remain silent and rejecting requests for him to explain
his side despite having been given numerous opportunities to do so.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in denying petitioner's motion
for extension of time to file his petition for certiorari.
cralawred

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated February 13,
2009 and July 15, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 107311, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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c. Marlon Beduya et al vs. ACE PROMOTION AND MARKETING CORPORATION and

GLENHERNANDEZ G.R. No. 195513 June 22, 2015

G.R. No. 195513

June 22, 2015

MARLON BED UY A, ROSARIO DUMAS* ALEX LEONOZA, RAMILO FAJARDO, HARLAN

LEONOZA, ALVIN ABUYOT, DINDO URSABIA,** BERNIE BESONA, ROMEO ONANAD,***
ARMANDO LIPORADA,**** FRANKFER ODULIO, MARCELO MATA, ALEX COLOCADO, JOJO
PACATANG, RANDY GENODIA and ISABINO B. ALARMA, JR., Petitioners,******
vs.
ACE PROMOTION AND MARKETING CORPORATION and GLEN********
HERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Procedural rules should be relaxed if only to serve the ends of justice.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the November 30, 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111536 affirming the February 23, 2009 Decision and August 4,
2009 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which granted respondents
appeal from the April 24, 2008 Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the dismissal of petitioners
complaint for illegal dismissal. Likewise assailed is the February 3, 2011 CA Resolution which
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the said CA Decision.
1

Antecedent Facts

Respondent Ace Promotion and Marketing Corporation (APMC), with respondent Glen Hernandez
as its President, is a contractor engaged in the deployment of workers to various companies to
promote the latters products through promotional and merchandising services. In pursuance of its
business, APMC entered into a Promotional Contract with Delfi Marketing, Inc. (Delfi) whereby the
former undertook to conduct promotional activities for the latters confectionery products. For this
purpose, APMC employed workers, including petitioners Marlon Beduya, Rosario Dumas, Alex
Leonoza, Alvin Abuyot, Dindo Ursabia, Bernie Bosona, Romeo Onanad, Armando Liporada, Frankfer
Odulio, Marcelo Mata, Alex Colocado, Jojo Pacatang, Randy Genodia and Isabino B. Alarma, Jr.
(petitioners), as merchandisers and assigned them to various retail outlets and supermarkets under
fixed-term employment contracts. The last contracts of employment that petitioners signed were
until January 30, 2007.
7

In a letter dated December 27, 2006, Delfi notified APMC that their Promotional Contract will expire
effective January 31, 2007. On January 29, 2007, APMC informed petitioners, among other workers,
that their last day of work would be on January 30, 2007.
10

Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter

Before the Labor Arbiter, three separate complaints for illegal dismissal and money claims against
respondents were filed by petitioners and by other employees (complainants) w hose employment
was terminated allegedly by reason of the expiration of APMCs contract with Delfi. The said
complaints, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No s. 00-02-01022-07, 00-02-0185-07 and 00-03-0275607, were consolidated.
11

In their Position Paper, complainants alleged that: they are regular employees of APMC, having
continuously worked in APMC since 1997; they are bona fide members of the Social Security
System (SSS) and the companys Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF); the expiration of the
Promotional Contract between APMC and Delfi does not automatically result in their dismissal; and,
the said Promotional Contract is still subsisting as new workers were hired as their replacements. All
of the complainants asked for wage differentials, claiming that part of their wages were unlawfully
withheld unless they sign a waiver and quitclaim in favor of APMC, while 18 of them additionally
prayed for recovery of unpaid ECOLA.
12

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that AP MC is a legitimate job contractor that hires
employees for a specific job on a contractual basis. With respect to complainants, respondents
claimed that they were duly apprised of the contractual nature of their employment, its duration,
working hours, basic salaries, and the basic work policies as stipulated in their contracts of
employment. And since complainants were hired as merchandisers for Delfi, their employment
automatically ended when APMCs Promotional Contract with Delfi expired. On the complainants
allegation of continuous employment, respondents explained that, indeed, complainants were
previously engaged as merchandisers for a client, Goya, Inc. (Goya). But when Goyas business
interest was sold to Delfi, complainants fixed-term employment contracts also accordingly expired.
They were then rehired and reassigned to Delfi, again on a fixed-term basis, which employment was
necessarily terminated upon the end of the term. In view of this, respondents denied liability over
complainants money claims, damages, and attorneys fees.
In a Decision dated April 24, 2008, the Labor Arbiter, after finding no credible evidence to prove that
they were employed on a contractual basis, declared complain ants to have been illegally dismissed.
He found unconvincing APMCs allegation that complainants employment was terminated due to the
expiration of its contract with Delfi considering that it continued to hire new employees as
replacements for complainants. This, the Labor Arbiter opined, infringed upon complainants right to
security of tenure. On the other hand, he viewed complainants continuous employment with APMC
13

for a considerable length of time and the fact that they are SSS and HDMF members, as indications
of their being regular employees. Thus, he ordered complainants reinstatement or payment of
separation pay, payment of backwages, unpaid wages, ECOLA, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the dismissal illegal
and ordering respondents, as follows:
1. To reinstate complainants to their former position with full backwages to be reckoned from
the date of their dismissal up to the finality of this decision.
2. In the alternative, to pay them x x x their backwages plus separation pay equivalent to half
month salary for every year of service if employment is no longer tenable.
3. To pay the named eighteen (18) employees x x x their unpaid ECOLA for one (1) year.
4. To pay complainants x x x their unpaid wages for fifteen (15) days.
5. To pay moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 each.
6. To pay exemplary damages [in] the [amount] of P5,000.00 each.
7. To pay attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
The computation of the monetary award as computed by the Computation Division of this Office is
attached hereto and forms part of this decision.
SO ORDERED.

14

Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission

Respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal with Motion for Reduction of Bond with the NLRC.
They maintained that complainants were contractual employees. As such, their contracts of
employment were terminated upon the expiration of APMCs Promotional Contract with Delfi. Anent
their motion for reduction of appeal bond, respondents contended that the awards granted to
complainants amounting to 6,269,856.89 should be decreased considering that:
15

(1) eight complainants did not sign the position paper submitted to the Labor Arbiter and therefore,
the monetary awards given in their favor should be excluded in the computation of the total award;
(2) nine complainants already withdrew their complaints as shown by their Affidavits of
Desistance; (3) assuming that separation pay was correctly awarded, the computation thereof
should start from year 2003 when complainants started working for Goya and not from year 1997 as
computed by the Labor Arbiter; and (4) the backwages should be computed only up to January 31,
2007 or up to the expiration of the Promotional Contract with Delfi and not until July 31, 2008.
Respondents attached a supersede as bond in the amount of 437,210.00 along with their appeal.
16

17

In their Opposition with Motion to Dismiss Appeal, complainants prayed for the dismissal of
respondents appeal based on insufficiency of the bond posted. This thus resulted in the nonperfection of the appeal, and consequently, the Labor Arbiters Decision had become final and
executory.
18

Without acting on respondents motion for reduction of bond and the complainants opposition
thereto, the NLRC rendered a Decision on February 23, 2009 finding complainants to be
contractual employees hired for a specific duration. The NLRC noted that complainants were duly
informed at the commencement of their employment that they were hired for a definite period and for
a specific project, i.e., Delfi, and that they voluntarily agreed to these and the other terms of their
employment contracts. Hence, when the specific project or undertaking for which they were hired
cease d, their employment also ceased. They were therefore not illegally dismissed. In the ultimate,
the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision and dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal. It,
however, affirmed the awards of unpaid wages and ECOLA in favor of complainants. Thus:
19

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant appeal.
The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 24 April 2008 is hereby reversed and set aside, and a new
one is issued dismissing the complaint. Respondents-Appellants are, however, directed to cause the
immediate satisfaction of complainants-appellees unpaid wages for fifteen (15) days and ECOLA for
one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.

20

In their Motion for Reconsideration, complainants maintained that the

21

437,210.00 appeal bond is in sufficient and unreasonable in relation to the total monetary award of
6,269,856 .89, which should have warranted the dismissal of respondents appeal. Complainants
likewise pointed out that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it did not re solve
respondents motion to reduce bond and their opposition thereto with motion to dismiss before
rendering its decision granting the appeal. Complainants Motion for Reconsideration was, however,
denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated August 4, 2009.
22

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Some of the complainants, including petitioners, filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. They
insisted that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in granting respondents appeal despite the
latters failure to perfect the same since the appeal bond filed was grossly insufficient and
inadequate. Consequently, the Labor Arbiters Decision had already become final and executory.
23

On November 30, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition. It found respondents
willingness and good faith in complying with the requirements as sufficient justification to relax the
rule on posting of an appeal bond. Moreover, the CA agreed with the NLRC in finding that
complainants were not illegally dismissed. The termination of their employment was simply brought
about by the expiration of the fixed period stipulated in their contract s that they voluntarily signed
after the terms thereof were fully explained to them.
24

Complainants Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution of February 3,
2011.
25

26

Thus, petitioners, from among all the complainants, are now before this Court through the present
Petition.
Issues
(a)

WHETHER X X X THE FILING OF APPEAL WITH MOTION TO REDUCE APPEAL BOND

WILL TOLL THE RUNNING OF THE PERIOD TO PERFECT AN APPEAL
(b)
WHETHER X X X AN APPEAL BOND IN THE AMOUNT OF P473,210.00 IS REASONABLE
IN RELATION TO [A POSSIBLE] MONETARY AWARD OF 6,269,856.00
(c)
WHETHER X X X THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE LABOR ARBITER IS DEEMED
FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS THE APPEAL WAS NOT PERFECTED
(d)
WHETHER X X X IT IS PROCEDURALLY CORRECT TO PASS JUDGMENT ON A CASE
WHEN THERE IS STILL A PENDING MOTION TO BE RESOLVED
27

For respondents alleged failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements on appeal bonds,
petitioners maintain that the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over respondents appeal. Moreover,
they claim that the NLRC erred in resolving the merits of the appeal without first ruling on
respondents motion to reduce appeal bond and their opposition thereto with motion to dismiss.
Our Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
such decisions, awards, or orders.
Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the finding of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable
damage or injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
While Sections 4(a) and 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provide:

SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL. (a) The Appeal shall be: 1) filed within
the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by appellant himself in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed
decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly written or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by
i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in
Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other
parties.
SECTION 6. BOND. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond
which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary
award, exclusive of damages and attorneys fees.
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds, and only upon the
posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the requisites in the preceding
paragraphs shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that the filing of supersede as bond for the perfection of an appeal
is mandatory and jurisdictional and failure to comply with this requirement renders the decision of the
Labor
Arbiter final and executory.

28

However, this Court, in many cases, has relaxed this stringent requirement whenever justified.
Thus, the rules, specifically Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, allows the reduction of the appeal bond subject to the conditions that: (1) the motion to
reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to
the monetary award is posted by the appellant. Otherwise, the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall
not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. Still, the rule that the filing of a motion to
reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court
may relax the rule under certain exceptional circumstances which include fundamental consideration
of substantial justice, prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment and special
circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue
involved. Indeed, in meritorious cases, the Court was propelled to relax the requirements relating to
appeal bonds such as when there are valid issues raised in the appeal and in the absence of any
valid claims against the employer.
29

30

31

32

33

In the case at bench, the Court finds that respondents motion to reduce appeal bond was predicated
on meritorious and justifiable grounds. First, the fact that eight complainants failed to verify or affix
their signatures on the position paper filed before the Labor Arbiter merits the exclusion of the
monetary awards adjudged to them. In Martos v. New San Jose Builders, Inc., it was held that the
failure of some of the complainants therein to verify their position paper submitted before the Labor
Arbiter brought about the dismissal of the complaint as to them who did not verify. The Court went on
to say that their negligence and passive attitude towards the rule on verification amounted to their
refusal to further prosecute their claims. Second, the withdrawal of seven complainants in this case
likewise warrants the reduction of the monetary award rendered against respondents. Suffice it to
say that the said seven complainants are bound by the Affidavits of Desistance which are presumed
34

35

to have been freely and voluntarily executed by them. Accordingly, they no longer participated in the
subsequent proceedings after having received their last salaries and due benefits.
Petitioners, however, posit that the amount of the appeal bond posted, i.e.,
437,210.00, is unreasonable and inadequate vis-a-vis the total monetary award of 6,269,856.83.
What they consider as reasonable percentage of the total monetary award is at least 30% thereof.
In the recent case of Mcburnie v. Ganzon, the Court has set a provisional percentage of 10% of the
monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorneys fees, as a reasonable amount of bond that an
appellant should post pending resolution by the NLRC of a motion to reduce bond. It is only after the
posting of this bond that an appellants period to perfect an appeal is suspended. Here, after
deducting from the total monetary award the amount of attorneys fees and the amounts awarded to
those complainants who did not verify their position papers and those who had withdrawn their
complaints, the total monetary award amounts to only more than 3 million. Hence, the appeal bond
of 437,210.00 posted by respondents is in fact even more than 10% of the said total monetary
award. Thus, applying the same parameter set in Mcburnie, the Court finds the amount of bond
posted by respondents in the present case to be reasonable.
36

37

In any event, the Court notes that in Mcburnie, it was held that the required 10% of the monetary
award as appeal bond is merely provisional given that the NLRC still retains the authority to exercise
its full discretion to resolve a motion for the reduction of bond and determine the final amount of
bond that should be posted by an appellant in accordance with the standards of meritorious grounds
and reasonable amount.
38

In consideration of the foregoing, the Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that the NLRC fa
iled to establish its jurisdictional authority over respondents appeal. Again, the filing of a motion to
reduce bond predicated on meritorious grounds coupled with the posting of a reasonable amount of
cash or surety bond suffice to suspend the running of the period within which to appeal. As
discussed, respondents in this case have substantially complied with these requirements and, on
account thereof, their appeal from the Labor Arbiters Decision was timely filed. Clearly, the NLRC
was conferred with jurisdiction over respondents appeal thus placing the same within the power of
the said labor tribunal to review.
With respect to the NLRCs failure to initially ac t upon respondents motion to reduce bond and
petitioners opposition thereto with motion to dismiss, suffice it to say that the same did not divest the
NLRC of its authority to resolve the appeal on its substantive matters. After all, the NLRC is not
bound by technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in
deciding labor cases. Further, the NLRC is mandated to use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the fact s in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process.
39

40

Coming now to the substantive matters, the Court finds that the CA correctly affirmed the NLRC
Decision which granted respondents appeal and dismissed the illegal dismissal complaints. As aptly
found by them, petitioners were fixed-term employees whose respective contracts of employment
had already expired. Therefore, there can be no illegal dismissal to speak of. The following
observations made by the CA were supported by substantial evidence on record, viz:
We find and so rule that private respondents are independent contractors, and petitioners were
deployed to Delfi Foods to render various services. This was admitted by petitioners during the
proceedings before the labor tribunal. The relationship between the parties is governed by the
Employment Contract which petitioners voluntarily signed before being deployed at Delfi Foods.
1wphi1

The NLRC extensively quoted the aforesaid contract which primarily provided that petitioners
employment was for a fixed period, that is, from 1 December 2006 until 30 January 2007.
Significantly, no allegations were made that petitioners were forced or pressure d into affixing their
signatures upon the contract. There is likewise no concrete proof that private respondents prevailed
upon petitioners, exercising moral dominance over the latter, to accept the conditions set forth in the
said contract. Having accepted the terms thereof, petitioners were bound by its unequivocal
stipulation that their employment was not permanent, but would expire at the end of the fixed
period.
41

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November 30, 2010 Decision and February 3, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111536 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

d. Petron Corp vs. ARMZ Caberte et al G.R. No. 182255, June 15, 2015
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182255, June 15, 2015
PETRON CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ARMZ CABERTE, ANTONIO CABERTE, JR., MICHAEL
SERVICIO,* ARIEL DEVELOS, ADOLFO GESTUPA, ARCHIE PONTERAS, ARNOLD BLANCO, DANTE
MARIANO,* VIRGILIO GALOROSA, AND CAMILO TE,* Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the November 14, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 82356 which reversed the May 14, 2003 Decision 3 and November 27, 2003 Resolution4 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000329-2002. The NLRC affirmed the
March 7, 2002 Decision5 of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the Complaints for illegal dismissal and payment of
monetary claims filed by respondents Armz Caberte (Caberte), Antonio Caberte, Jr. (Caberte Jr.),
MichaeServicio (Servicio), Ariel Develos (Develos), Adolfo Gestupa (Gestupa), Archie Ponteras (Ponteras),
Arnold Blanco (Blanco), Dante Mariano (Mariano), Virgilio Galorosa (Galorosa) and Camilo Te (Te) against
petitioner Petron Corporation (Petron), ABC Contracting Services (ABC), and its owner Antonio B. Caberte,
Sr. (Caberte Sr.). Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution6 dated March 4, 2008 which denied Perron's Motion
for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
Petron is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution to the general public of
various petroleum products. In pursuance of its business, Petron owns and operates several bulk plants in
the country for receiving, storing and distributing its products.
On various dates from 1979 to 1998, respondents were hired to work at Petron's Bacolod Bulk Plant in San
Patrick, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental as LPG/Gasul fillers, maintenance crew, warehousemen, utility
workers and tanker receiving crew.

For the periods from March 1, 1996 to February 28, 1999 and November 1, 1996 to June 30, 1999, Petron
and ABC, a labor contracting business owned and operated by Caberte Sr., entered into a Contract for
Services7 and a Contract for LPG Assistance Services.8 Under both service contracts, ABC undertook to
provide utility and maintenance services to Petron in its Bacolod Bulk Plant.
Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
On July 2, 1999, respondents Caberte, Caberte Jr., Servicio, Develos, Gestupa, Ponteras, Blanco and Mariano
filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint9 for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and non-payment of
allowances, 13th month pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees against Petron, ABC and Caberte Sr., docketed as NLRC RAB VI Case No. 0607-10588-99. Subsequently, respondents Galorosa and Te separately filed similar Complaints 10 docketed as
NLRC RAB VI Case No. 06-07-10675-99 and RAB Case No. 06-09-10785-99, respectively. The three
Complaints were consolidated in an Order11 dated October 25, 1999 of the Labor Arbiter.
Respondents averred that even before Petron engaged ABC as contractor in 1996, most of them had already
been working for Petron for years. However, every time Petron engages a new contractor, it would designate
such new contractor as their employer. Despite such arrangement, Petron exercised control and supervision
over their work, the performance of which is necessary and desirable in its usual trade and business.
Respondents added that ABC is a mere labor-only contractor which had no substantial capital and
investment, and had no control over the manner and method on how they accomplished their work. Thus,
Petron is their true employer. On July 1, 1999, however, Petron no longer allowed them to enter and work in
the premises of its Bacolod Bulk Plant. Hence, the complaints for illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, Petron asserted that ABC is an independent contractor which supplied the needed
manpower for the maintenance of its bulk handling premises and offices, as well as for tanker assistance in
the receiving and re-filling of its LPG products; that among the workers supplied by ABC were respondents,
except Caberte Jr., who does not appear to be one of those assigned by ABC to work for it; that it has no
direct control and supervision over respondents who were tasked to perform work required by the service
contracts it entered into with ABC; and, that it cannot allow the continuous employment of respondents
beyond the expiration of the contracts with ABC. To prove the legitimacy and capacity of ABC as an
independent contractor, Petron submitted the following documents: (1) Contractor's Pre-Qualification
Statement;12 (2) Petron's Conflict of Interest Policy signed by Caberte Sr., as proprietor of ABC; 13 (3) ABC's
Certificate of Registration issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); 14 (4) Value-Added Tax Return for
the year 1995;15 (5) BIR Confirmation Receipt;16 (6) Caberte Sr.'s Tax Identification Number (TIN) issued by
the BIR;17 (7) Caberte Sr.'s Individual Income Tax Return for the years 1993 18 and 1994;19 (8) ABC's Audited
Financial Statements for the years 1992,20 199321 and 1994;22 (9) ABC's Mayor's Permit for the year
1995;23 and, (10) ABC's Certificate of Registration of Business Name issued by the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI).24 In addition, it averred that ABC, as a contractor, had duly posted a performance bond 25 and
took out insurance policies26 against liabilities. Petron likewise presented affidavits 27 of two Petron employees
stating that respondents do not perform activities related to Petron's business operation but only tasks
which are intermittent and which can be contracted out. Also submitted were affidavits 28 of three former
employees of ABC attesting to the fact that during their stint in Petron, they used materials such as floor
polisher, floor wax, broom, dustpan, cleaning rags and other equipment owned by ABC to accomplish their
tasks and that they worked under the supervision of Caberte Sr., through the latter's designated overall
supervisor, respondent Caberte. Petron further revealed that ABC/Caberte Sr. has the power to hire and fire
respondents and was the one paying their wages.
In a Decision29 dated March 7, 2002, Executive Labor Arbiter Danilo C. Acosta (LA Acosta) held that ABC is
an independent contractor that has substantial capital and that respondents were its employees. He likewise
ruled that ABC's cessation of operation is a force majeure that justifies respondents' dismissal. Nonetheless,
LA Acosta awarded respondents separation pay based on the applicable minimum wage rate at the time of
expiration of the contracts of service. He, however, denied the claims for overtime pay and night shift
differential pay for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
Conformably with the foregoing, respondent ABC is hereby ORDERED TO PAY EACH COMPLAINANT, namely,
complainants Antonio Caberte, Jr., Armz M. Caberte, Michael Servicio, Ariel Develos, Adolfo Gestupa, Archie
Ponteras, Arnold Blanco, Dante Mirano, Virgilio Galorosa and Camilo Te, separation pay of one month for
every year of service.
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All other claims and the claims against respondent PETRON are hereby ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.30

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Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission

Respondents appealed to the NLRC where they insisted that they are regular employees of Petron since ABC
is a labor-only contractor.
In a Decision31 dated May 14, 2003, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter after it found that ABC
is not a mere labor contractor but a legitimate independent contractor. In so ruling, the NLRC took into
account the following: (1) ABC/Caberte Sr. has the power of control over respondents as Caberte Sr. was the
one controlling and supervising respondents in their work. While Petron intervened at times, the same was
limited to safety precautions due to the hazardous nature of the products the workers were dealing with; (2)
ABC possessed sufficient capital and equipment per the various documents that Petron submitted showing
the former's financial capability to maintain its status as an accredited contractor of the latter. In fact,
Caberte Sr. was even able to establish ABC's Bacolod City Office; and, (3) ABC/Caberte Sr. has the power to
hire and dismiss respondents. Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter
is AFFIRMED.
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SO ORDERED.32

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Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was, however, denied in the NLRC Resolution 33dated
November 27, 2003.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari34 before the CA ascribing upon the NLRC grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in holding that they are not employees of Petron.
The CA, in a Decision35 dated November 14, 2007, found merit in respondents' Petition. It ruled that ABC is
engaged in labor-only contracting because: first, it did not have substantial capital or investment in the form
of tools, equipment, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used in the
performance or completion of the job it contracted out from Petron; second, the work assigned to
respondents were directly related to Petron's business; and, third, the nature of Petron's business requires it
to exercise control over the performance of respondents' work. Consequently, the CA declared respondents
as Petron's regular employees. And since Petron did not comply with the requirements under the Labor Code
when it terminated their employment, respondents were illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, with the alternative relief of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement, and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual
reinstatement. The CA, however, denied respondents' claims for moral and exemplary damages in the
absence of bad faith in Petron's act of dismissing them but awarded respondents 10% attorney's fees for
having to litigate to protect their interests. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated May
14, 2003, in NLRC Case No. V-000329-2002, affirming the March 7, 2002 Decision of Executive Labor
Arbiter Danilo C. Acosta of the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch VI, Bacolod City, is hereby REVERSED.
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Respondent Petron Corporation is ordered to reinstate Armz Caberte, Antonio Caberte, Jr., Michael Servicio,
Ariel Develos, Adolfo Gestupa, Archie Ponteras, Arnold Blanco, Dante Mirano, Virgilio Galorosa and Camilo Te
to their former positions with the same rights and benefits and the same salary rates as its regular
employees.
Respondent Petron Corporation is likewise ordered to pay petitioner's attorney's fees equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the monetary award.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
Costs against private respondent Petron.
SO ORDERED.36

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Petron's Motion for Reconsideration37 was denied by the CA in its Resolution38 dated March 4, 2008. Hence,
this present recourse.
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Issues
Petron presents the following grounds for review:
XXX THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN FINDING THAT ABC CONTRACTING
SERVICES IS A MERE LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTOR AND IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE THUS
REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY CONSIDERING THAT:
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A.

THERE IS A LEGITIMATE SERVICE CONTRACTING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMPANY

AND ABC CONTRACTING SERVICES;

B.

THE CONTRACTED SERVICES THAT RESPONDENTS PERFORMED ARE NOT DIRECTLY

RELATED AND NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE TO THE COMPANY'S PRINCIPAL BUSINESS;

C.

ABC CONTRACTING SERVICES CARRIES ON AN INDEPENDENT BUSINESS AND POSSESSES

SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT;

D. RESPONDENTS ARE EMPLOYEES OF ABC CONTRACTING SERVICES.39

Petron asserts that ABC, as an independent contractor, rendered janitorial, utility and LPG assistance
services by virtue of legitimate contracts entered into by and between them. As such, the services rendered
by respondents were purely maintenance and utility works which are not directly related, necessary and
desirable to Petron's main business.
Petron likewise insists that ABC is not a labor-only contractor as it carries on an independent business and
uses its own equipment, tools, materials and supplies in the performance of its contracted services. Further,
it asserts that ABC wielded and exercised the power of selection or engagement, payment of wages,
discipline or dismissal, and of control over respondents.
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Our Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Labor-only contracting and permissible job contracting, defined; a contractor is presumed by law to be a
labor-only contractor; anyone claiming the supposed status of an independent contractor bears the burden
of proving the same.
As defined under Article 106 of the Labor Code, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement
where the contractor, who does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, among others, supplies workers to an employer and the workers recruited are
performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer.
Permissible or legitimate job contracting or subcontracting, on the other hand, "refers to an arrangement
whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out with the contractor or subcontractor the performance or
completion of a specific job, work, or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of
whether such job, work, or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the
principal. A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following
conditions concur: (a) the contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and partakes the
contract work on his account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free
from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of
his work except as to the results thereof; (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investment; and (c)
the agreement between the principal and the contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees'
entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to selforganization, security of tenure, and social welfare benefits." 40
To determine whether a contractor is engaged in labor-only contracting or permissible job contracting, "the
totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered." 41
Petron contends that the CA erred in ruling that ABC is a labor-only contractor since respondents failed to
prove that ABC is not an independent contractor. The contention, however, is incorrect. The law presumes a

contractor to be a labor-only contractor and the employees are not expected to prove the negative fact that
the contractor is a labor-only contractor.42 Thus, it is not respondents but Petron which bears the burden of
establishing that ABC is not a labor-only contractor but a legitimate independent contractor. As held in Alilin
v. Petron Corporation,43 "where the principal is the one claiming that the contractor is a legitimate
contractor, the burden of proving the supposed status of the contractor rests on the principal."
Petron failed to overcome the presumption that ABC is a labor-only contractor.
Foremost, Petron banks on the contracts of services it entered into with ABC. It contends that the said
contracts were legitimate business transactions and were not only for the purpose of ABC providing
manpower or labor-only to Petron, but rather for specific services pertaining to janitorial, utility and LPG
assistance.
Suffice it to state, however, that Petron cannot place reliance on the contracts it entered into with ABC since
these are not determinative of the true nature of the parties' relationship. As held in Babas v. Lorenzo
Shipping Corporation,44 the character of the business, whether as labor-only contractor or as a job
contractor, should be determined by the criteria set by statute and the parties cannot dictate by the mere
expedience of a unilateral declaration in a contract the character of their business.
Next, Petron endeavours to prove that ABC is a legitimate independent contractor.
To restate, a contractor is deemed to be a labor-only contractor if the following elements are present: (i) the
contractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or service under
its own account and responsibility; and (ii) the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor
are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal. 45 Conversely, in
proving that ABC is not a labor-only contractor, it is incumbent upon Petron to show that ABC has substantial
capital or investment and that respondents were performing activities which were not directly related to
Petron's principal business.
To show that ABC has substantial capital or investment, Petron submitted, among others, ABC's BIR
Certificate of Registration, VAT Return, BIR Confirmation Receipt, TIN, Individual Income Tax Return, Mayor's
Permit and DTI Certificate of Registration. However, the Court observes that these documents are not
conclusive evidence of ABC's financial capability. At most, they merely show that ABC is engaged in business
and licensed by the appropriate government agencies.
As for the financial statements presented, it appears that only the audited financial statements of ABC for
the years 1992, 1993 and 1994 were submitted. As aptly observed by the CA, these documents cannot be
given much credence considering that the service contracts between Petron and ABC commenced in 1996
and ended in 1999. However, no audited financial statements for the years material to this case (1996,
1997, 1998 and 1999) were submitted. Also, as per record, ABC was obligated to submit to Petron at least
once every two years its latest audited financial statements, among others, as a requirement for the
retention of its status as an accredited contractor of Petron. 46 If it is true that ABC continued to possess its
financial qualification after 1994, Petron should have presented ABC's financial statements for the said years
which are presumed to be in Petron's possession considering that they are part of the requirements that it
itself set for its accredited contractors.
Neither does the performance bond taken out by ABC serve as significant evidence of its substantial capital.
As aptly explained by the CA:
The performance bond posted by ABC Contracting Services likewise fails to convince us that the former has
substantial capital or investment inasmuch as it was not shown that the performance bond in the amount of
P596,799.51 was enough to cover not only payrolls, rentals and equipment but also possible damages to the
equipment and to third parties and other contingent liabilities. Moreover, this Court takes judicial notice that
bonds of this nature are issued upon payment of a small percentage as premium without necessarily
requiring any guarantee.
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If at all, the bond was a convenient smoke screen to disguise the real nature of ABC's employment as an
agent of Petron.47
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Anent substantial investment in the form of equipment, tools, implements, machineries and work premises,
Petron likewise failed to show that ABC possessed the same. Instead, what is evident in the records was that
ABC had been renting a forklift from Petron in order to carry out the job of respondents. 48 This only shows
that ABC does not own basic equipment needed in the performance of respondents' job. Similarly and again

as correctly held by the CA, the fact that ABC leased a property for the establishment of its Bacolod office is
immaterial since it was not shown that it was used in the performance or completion of the job contracted
out. "Substantial capital or investment," under Section 5, Rule VIII-A, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code (Implementing Rules), as amended by Department Order No. 18-02, 49 does
not include those which are not actually and directly used in the performance of the job contracted out.
Going now to the activities performed by respondents, Petron avers that the same were not necessary or
desirable to its principal business. In fact, the service contracts it entered into with ABC clearly referred to
respondents' functions as maintenance and utility works only which are remote to its principal business of
manufacturing and distributing petroleum products.
The Court finds otherwise. Gestupa, Ponteras, Develos, Blanco and Mariano were LPG fillers and
maintenance crew; Caberte was an LPG operator supervisor; Te was a warehouseman and utility worker;
and Servicio and Galorosa were tanker receiving crew and utility workers. Undoubtedly, the work they
rendered were directly related to Petron's main business, vital as they are in the manufacture and
distribution of petroleum products. Besides, some of the respondents were already working for Petron even
before it engaged ABC as a contractor in 1996. Albeit it was made to appear that they were under the
different contractors that Petron engaged over the years, respondents have been regularly performing the
same tasks within the premises of Petron. This "the repeated and continuing need for the performance of
the job is sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of the activity to the business." 50
What further militates against Perron's claim that ABC, as an alleged independent contractor, is the true
employer of respondents, is the fact that Petron has the power of control over respondents in the
performance of their work. It bears stressing that the power of control merely calls for the existence of the
right to control and not necessarily the exercise thereof.51 Here, Petron admitted in its Position Paper that
the supervision of a Petron employee is required over LPG and tanker assistance jobs for inventory control
and safety checking purposes. It explained that due to the hazardous nature of its products, constant
checking of the procedures in their handling is essential considering the high possibility of fatal accidents. It
also admitted that it was the one supplying the needed materials and equipment in discharging these
functions to better insure the integrity, quality and safety of its products.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Petron failed to discharge its burden of proving that ABC is not a laboronly contractor. Consequently, and as warranted by the facts, the Court declares ABC as a mere labor-only
contractor. "A finding that a contractor is a 'labor-only' contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an
employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor, and
the 'labor-only' contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer." 52 Accordingly in
this case, Petron is declared to be the true employer of respondents who are considered regular employees
in view of the fact that they have been regularly performing activities which are necessary and desirable to
the usual business of Petron for a number of years.
Respondents, except Antonio Caberte, Jr., were illegally dismissed.
With respect to respondents' dismissal, Petron claimed that the same sprang from the termination or
conclusion of the service contracts it entered into with ABC. As earlier held, respondents are considered
regular employees. In cases of regular employment, an employer may only terminate the services of an
employee for just or authorized causes under the law.53 As the reason given by Petron dismissing
respondents does not constitute a just or authorized cause for termination, 54 the latter are declared to have
been illegally dismissed. Respondents are thus entitled to all the remedies of an illegally dismissed
employee, i.e., backwages and reinstatement, or if no longer feasible, separation pay. The CA is thus correct
in ruling that respondents are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
However, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, respondents are entitled to receive separation pay equivalent
to one month salary for every year of service. In addition, respondents are entitled to full backwages from
the time they were not allowed to work on July 1, 1999 up to actual reinstatement or finality of this Decision
as the case may be.
An exception must be taken, however, with respect to Caberte Jr. From the beginning, Petron disputes the
fact he ever worked for Petron. Therefore, before his case against Petron can prosper, Caberte Jr. must first
establish that an employer-employee relationship existed between them since it is basic that the issue of
illegal dismissal is premised on the existence of such relationship between the parties. 55 Unfortunately,
nowhere in the records does it show that he indeed worked for Petron. Consequently, his complaint should
be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The November 14, 2007 Decision and the March 4, 2008 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82356 are MODIFIED in that: (1) the Complaint of respondent
Antonio Caberte, Jr. against petitioner Petron Corporation is dismissed; and (2) petitioner Petron Corporation
is ordered to reinstate all of the respondents, except for Antonio Caberte, Jr., to their former positions with
the same rights and benefits and the same salary rates as its regular employees, or if reinstatement is no
longer feasible, to separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service and to pay them
their full backwages from July 1, 1999 until actual reinstatement or upon finality of this Decision as the case
may be, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award, with costs against Petron
Corporation.
SO ORDERED.

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

e. Alumanay Jamias et al vs. NLRC, Innodata and Todd Solomon GR No. 159350 March 9, 2016

f. Arlene Samonte et al vs. La Salle Greenhills G.R. No. 199683, February 10, 2016

G.R. No. 199683, February 10, 2016

ARLENE T. SAMONTE, VLADIMIR P. SAMONTE, MA. AUREA S. ELEPANO, Petitioners, v. LA SALLE
GREENHILLS, INC., BRO. BERNARD S. OCA, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
As each and all of the various and varied classes of employees in the gamut of the labor force, from nonprofessionals to professionals, are afforded full protection of law and security of tenure as enshrined in the
Constitution, the entitlement is determined on the basis of the nature of the work, qualifications of the
employee, and other relevant circumstances.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
110391. affirming the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 044835052 finding that petitioners Arlene T. Samonte, Vladimir P. Samonte and Ma. Aurea S. Elepano were fixedterm employees of respondent La Salle Greenhills, Inc. (LSGI). The NLRC (First Division) ruling is a
modification of the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that petitioners were independent contractors of respondent
LSGI.3
The facts are not in dispute.
From 1989, and for fifteen (15) years thereafter, LSGI contracted the services of medical professionals,

specifically pediatricians, dentists and a physician, to comprise its Health Service Team (HST).
Petitioners, along with other members of the HST signed uniform one-page Contracts of Retainer for the
period of a specific academic calendar beginning in June of a certain year (1989 and the succeeding 15
years) and terminating in March of the following year when the school year ends. The Contracts of Retainer
succinctly read, to wit:
CONTRACTOFRETAINER
Name of Retainer _________________________________________
Address_________________________________________________
Community Tax Cert. No.__________________________________
Issued at_______________ on ____________________________
Taxpayer Identification No. (TIN)_________________
Department Assigned to________ HRD-CENTRO Operation___________
Project/Undertaking (Description and Duration)
____________ Health Services__________________
Job Task (Description and Duration)
School [physician] from June 1, [x x x] to March 31, [x x x]
Rate__________________
Conditions:
1. This retainer is only temporary in character and, as above specified, shall be solely and exclusively limited
to the project/undertaking and/ or to the job/task assigned to the retainer within the said
project/undertaking;
2. This retainer shall, without need of any notice to the retainer, automatically cease on the aforespecified
expiration date/s of the said project/undertaking and/or the said job/task; provided, that this retainer shall
likewise be deemed terminated if the said project/undertaking and/or fob/task shall be completed on a
date/s priot to their aforespecified expiration date/s;
3. The foregoing notwithstanding, at any time prior to said expiration or completion date/s, La Salle
Greenhills, Inc. may upon prior written notice to the retainer, terminate this contract should the retainer fail
in any way to perform his assigned job/task to the satisfaction of La Salle Greenhills, Inc. or for any other
just cause.
HERMAN G. ROCHESTER
Head Administrator
BELEN T. MASILUNGAN
Personnel Officer

_____________________
Retainer
_____________________
Date Signed
Signed in the Presence of:

DANTE M. FERRER
FRD Head Administrator

BRO. BERNARD S. OCA

President4

After fifteen consecutive years of renewal each academic year, where the last Contract of Retainer was for
the school year of 2003-2004 i.e., June 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004, LSGI Head Administrator, Herman
Rochester, on that last day of the school year, informed the Medical Service Team, including herein
petitioners, that their contracts will no longer be renewed for the following school year by reason of LSGI's
decision to hire two (2) full-time doctors and dentists. One of the physicians from the same Health Service
Team was hired by LSGI as a full-time doctor.
When petitioners', along with their medical colleagues', requests for
payment of their separation pay were denied, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
separation pay, damages and attorney's fees before the NLRC. They included the President of LSGI, Bro.
Bernard S. Oca, as respondent.

In their Position Paper, petitioners alleged that they were regular employees who could only be dismissed for
just and authorized causes, who, up to the time of their termination, regularly received the following
amounts:
1. Monthly salary for the ten-month period of a given school year:

Name
a) Jennifer A. Ramirez

Monthly Salary
Php 20,682.73

b) Brandon D. Ericta

28,603.62

c) [Petitioner] Arlene T. Samonte

20,682.73

d) [Petitioner] Vladimir P. Samonte

20,682.73

e) Alma S. Resurrecion

12,700.83

f) Ma. Socorro A. Salazar

21,117.00

g) [Petitioner] Ma. Aurea S. Elepano

8,429.43

2. Annual 13th Month Pay equivalent to their one month salary;

3. Automatic yearly increase to their monthly salary, the rate of which is discretionary to LSGFs Executive
Administrator based on a comparative rate to the across the board increase of the regular school employees
which increase was subsequently reflected in their [HST'S] monthly salaries for the following school year;
4. Since 1996, as a result of the HST's request for a performance bonus, the team was likewise evaluated
for a year-end performance rating by HRD- CENTRO Head Administrator, the Assistant Principal, the Health
Services Team Leader and the designated Physician's Coordinator, complainant Jennifer Ramirez.
To further bolster their claim of regular employment, complainants pointed out the following in their Position
Paper:
In the course of their employment, each of the complainants served an average of nine hours a week. But
beyond their duty hours, they were on call for any medical exigencies of the La Sallian community.
Furthermore, over the years, additional tasks were assigned to the complainants and were required to suffer
the following services/activites:
a) To attend staff meetings and to participate in the formulation/adoption of policies and programs designed
to enhance the School services to its constituents and to upgrade the School's standards. Complainants'
involvement in Staff Meetings of the Health Services Unit of respondent school was a regular activity
associated with personnel who are regular employees of an institution;
b) To participate in various gatherings and activities sponsored by the respondent school such as the
Kabihasnan (the bi-annual school fair), symposiums, seminars, orientation programs, workshops, lectures,
etc., including purely political activities such as the NAMFREL quick count, of which the respondent school is
a staunch supporter;
c) Participation of the complainants in Medical/Dental Missions in the name of respondent school;
d) Formulation of the Health Services Unit Manual;
e) Participation in the collation of evaluation of services rendered by the Health Services Unit, as required for
the continuing PAASCU (Philippine Association of Accredited Schools Colleges & Universities) accreditation of
the School;
f) Participation in the yearly evaluation of complainants, which is a

function of regular employees in the HRD-CENTRO Operations, of the HRD-CENTRO Head Administrator;
g) Designation of certain complainants, particularly Dr. Jennifer A. Ramirez, as member of panel of
investigation to inquire into an alleged misdemeanor of a regular employee of respondent school; and
h) Regular inspection of the canteen concessionaire and the toilet facilities of the school premises to insure
its high standards of sanitation.
Complainants were likewise included among so-called members of the "LA SALLIAN FAMILY: Builder of a
Culture of Peace," under the heading "Health Services Team" of the La Salle Green Hills High School Student
Handbook 2003-2004. Such public presentation of the complainants as members of the "LA SALLIAN
FAMILY" leaves no doubt about the intent of respondent school to project complainants as part of its
professional staff.5
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On the other hand, in their Position Paper,6 LSGI denied that complainants were regular employees,
asserting that complainants were independent contractors who were retained by LSGI by reason of their
medical skills and expertise to provide ancillary medical and dental services to both its students and faculty,
consistent with the following circumstances:
1. Complainants were professional physicians and dentists on retainer basis, paid on monthly retainer fees,
not regular salaries;
2. LSGI had no power to impose disciplinary measures upon complainants including dismissal from
employment;
3. LSGI had no power of control over how complainants actually performed their professional services.
In the main, LSGI invoked the case of Sonza v. ABS-CBN7 to justify its stance that complainants were
independent contractors and not regular employees citing, thus:
SONZA contends that ABS-CBN exercised control over the means and methods of his work.
SONZA's argument is misplaced. ABS-CBN engaged SONZA's services specifically to co-host the "Mel & Jay"
programs. ABS-CBN did not assign any other work to SONZA. To perform his work, SONZA only needed his
skills and talent. How SONZA delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were outside
ABS-CBN's control. SONZA did not have to render 8 hours of work per day. The Agreement required SONZA
to attend only rehearsals and tapings of the shows, as well as pre and post-production staff meetings. ABSCBN could not dictate the contents of SONZA's script. However, the Agreement prohibited SONZA from
criticising in his shows ABS-CBN or its interests. The clear implication is that SONZA had a free hand on
what to say or discuss in his shows provided he did not attack ABS-CBN or its interests.
As previously adverted, the Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioners' (and their colleagues') complaint and ruled
that complainants, as propounded by LSGI, were independent contractors under retainership contracts and
never became regular employees of LSGI. The Labor Arbiter based its over-all finding of the absence of
control by LSGI over complainants on the following points:
1. The professional services provided by complainants, including herein petitioners, cannot be considered as
necessary to LSGI's business of providing primary and secondary education to its students.
2. The pay slips of complainants are not salaries but professional fees less taxes withheld for the medical
services they provided;
3. Issuance of identification cards to, and the requirement to log the time-in and time-out of, complainants
are not indicia of LSGI's power of control over them but were only imposed for security reasons and in
compliance with the agreed clinic schedules of complainants at LSGI premises.
4. In contrast to regular employees of LSGI, complainants: (a) were not required to attend or participate in
school-sponsored activities and (b) did not enjoy benefits such as educational subsidy for their dependents.
5. On this score alone, complainants' respective clinic schedule at LSGI for two (2) to three (3) days a week
for three (3) hours a day, for a maximum of nine (9) hours a week, was not commensurate to the required

number of hours work rendered by a regular employee in a given week of at least 40 hours a week or 8
hours a day for five (5) days. In addition, the appointed clinic schedule was based on the preference of
complainants.
Curiously, despite the finding that complainants were independent contractors and not regular employees,
the Labor Arbiter, on the ground of compassionate social justice, awarded complainants separation pay at
the rate of one-half month salary for every year of service:
Separately, both parties, complainants, including herein petitioners, and respondents appealed to the NLRC.
At the outset, the NLRC disagreed with the Labor Arbiter's ruling that complainants were independent
contractors based on the latter's opinion that the services rendered by complainants are not considered
necessary to LSGI's operation as an educational institution. The NLRC noted that Presidential Decree No.
856, otherwise known as the Sanitation Code of the Philippines, requires that private educational institutions
comply with the sanitary laws. Nonetheless, the NLRC found that complainants were fixed-period employees
whose terms of employment were subject to agreement for a specific duration. In all, the NLRC ruled that
the Contracts of Retainer between complainants and LSGI are valid fixed-term employment contracts where
complainants as medical professionals understood the terms thereof when they agreed to such continuously
for more than ten (10) years. Consequently, the valid termination of their retainership contracts at the end
of the period stated therein, did not entitle complainants to reinstatement, nor, to payment of separation
pay.
At this point, only herein petitioners, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the Court of Appeals alleging that grave abuse of discretion attended the ruling of the NLRC that they were
not regular employees and thus not entitled to the twin remedies of reinstatement to work with payment of
full backwages or separation pay with backwages.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the appellate court ruled that the NLRC did not commit an error of
jurisdiction which is correctible by a writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that the NLRC's ruling was
based on the Contracts of Retainer signed by petitioners who, as professionals, supposedly ought to have
known the import of the contracts they voluntarily signed, i.e. (a) temporary in character; (b) automatically
ceasing on the specified expiration date, or (c) likewise deemed terminated if job/task shall be completed on
a date prior to specified expiration date.
The Court of Appeals ruled against petitioners' claim of regular employment, thus:
Moreover, this Court is not persuaded by petitioners' averments that they are regular employees simply
because they received benefits such as overtime pay, allowances, Christmas bonuses and the like; or
because they were subjected to administrative rules such as those that regulate their time and hours of
work, or subjected to LSGFs disciplinary rules and regulations; or simply because they were treated as part
of LSGFs professional staff. It must be emphasised that LSGI, being the employer, has the inherent right to
regulate all aspects of employment of every employee whether regular, probationary, contractual or fixedterm. Besides, petitioners were hired for specific tasks and under fixed terms and conditions and it is LSGI's
prerogative to monitor their performance to see if they are doing their tasks according to the terms and
conditions of their contract and to give them incentives for good performance. 8
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for resolution of the Court:
I.

II.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS WERE
FIXED-PERIOD EMPLOYEES AND NOT REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF LSGI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT
PETITIONERS WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED FROM WORK.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT, BACKWA'GES AND OTHER MONETARY
BENEFITS PROVIDED BY LAW, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AS WELL AS
ATTORNEY'S FEES.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT
RESPONDENTS ARE SOLIDARILY LIABLE AS THEY ACTED IN BAD FAITH AND WITH MALICE
IN DEALING WITH THE PETITIONERS.9

The pivotal issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that petitioners were not regular employees who may only be dismissed
for just and authorized causes.
Our inquiry and disposition will delve into the kind of employment relationship between the parties, such
employment relationship having been as much as admitted by LSGI and then ruled upon categorically by the
NLRC and the appellate court which both held that petitioners were fixed-term employees and not
independent contractors.
Article 280 of the Labor Code classifies employees into regular, project, seasonal, and casual:
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the . work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That
any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exists.

The provision classifies regular employees into two kinds (1) those "engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer"; and (2) casual employees
who have "rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken."
The NLRC correctly identified the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioners and
LSGI and not a bilateral independent contractor relationship. On more than one occasion, we recognised
certain workers to be independent contractors: individuals with unique skills and talents that set them apart
from ordinary employees.10 We found them to be independent contractors because of these unique skills and
talents and the lack of control over the means and methods in the performance of their work. In some
instances, doctors and other medical professional may fall into this independent contractor category,
legitimately providing medical professional services. However, as has been declared by the-NLRC and the
appellate court, petitioners herein are not independent contractors.
We need to examine next the ruling of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that petitioners were fixed-term
employees.
To factually support such conclusion, the NLRC solely relied on the case of Brent v. Zamor11 and perfunctorily
noted that petitioners, professional doctors and dentists, continuously signed the contracts for more than
ten (10) years. Such was heedless of our prescription that the ruling in Brentbe strictly construed, applying
only to cases where it appears that the employer and employee are on equal footing. Observably, nowhere
in the two and half page ratiocination of the NLRC was there reference to the standard that "it [should]
satisfactorily appear that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with
no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former on the latter."
From Brent, which remains as the exception rather than the rule in the determination of the nature of
employment, we are schooled that there are employment contracts where a "fixed term is an essential and
natural appurtenance" such as overseas employment contracts and officers in educational institutions. We
learned thus:
[T]he decisive determinant in the term employment contract should not be the activities that the employee
is called upon to perform, but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and

termination of their employment relationship, a day certain being understood to be "that which must
necessarily come, although it may not be known when.
xxx
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present
Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention
of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely
ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined
therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements
entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a
fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force,
duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances
vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over
the latter.
Tersely put, a fixed-term employment is allowable under the Labor Code only if the term was voluntarily and
knowingly entered into by the parties who must have dealt with each other on equal terms not one
exercising moral dominance over the other.
Indeed, Price, et. al. v. Innodata Corp., teaches us, from the wording of Article 280 of the Labor Code, that
the nomenclature of contracts, especially employment contracts, does not define the employment status of a
person: Such is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. Equally
important to consider is that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest such that labor
contracts must yield to the common good. Thus, provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into
the contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact
of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.
Further, a fixed-term contract is an employment contract, the repeated renewals of which make for a regular
employment. In Fuji Network Television v. Espiritu,12 wenoted that Fuji's argument that Espiritu was an
independent contractor under a fixed-term contract is contradictory where employees under fixed-term
contracts cannot be independent contractors because in fixed-term contracts, an employer-employee
relationship exists. Significantly, we ruled therein that Espiritu's contract indicating a fixed term did not
automatically mean that she could never be a regular employee which is precisely what Article 280 of the
Labor Code sought to avoid. The repeated renewal of Espiritu's contract coupled with the nature of work
performed pointed to the regular nature of her employment despite contrary claims of Fuji and the
nomenclature of the contract. Citing Dumpit-Murillo v. Court of Appeals13 and Philips Semiconductors, Inc. v.
Fadriquela,14 we declared in Fuji that the repeated engagement under contract of hire is indicative of the
necessity and desirability of the [employee's] work in respondent's business and where employee's contract
has been continuously extended or renewed to the same position, with the same duties and remained in the
employ without any interruption, then such employee is a regular employee.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals disregarded the repeated renewals of the Contracts of Retainer of
petitioners spanning a decade and a half. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners never became regular
employees:
[T]his Court is not persuaded by petitioners' averments that they are regular employees simply because
they received benefits such as overtime pay, allowances, Christmas bonuses and the like; or because they
were subjected to administrative rules such as those that regulate their time and hours of work, or
subjected to LSGl's disciplinary rules and regulations; or simply because they were treated as part of LSGLs
professional staff. It must be emphasised that LSG1, as the employer, has the inherent right to regulate all
aspects of employment of every employee whether regular, probationary, contractual or fixed-term. Besides,
petitioners were hired for specific tasks and under fixed terms and conditions and it is LSGl's prerogative to
monitor their performance to see if they are doing their tasks according to the terms and conditions of their
contract and to give them incentives for good performance. 15
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We completely disagree with the Court of Appeals.

The uniform one-page Contracts of Retainer signed by petitioners were prepared by LSGI alone. Petitioners,
medical professionals as they were, were still not on equal footing with LSGI as they obviously did not want

to lose their jobs that they had stayed in for fifteen (15) years. There is no specificity in the contracts
regarding terms and conditions of employment that would indicate that petitioners and LSGI were on equal
footing in negotiating it. Notably, without specifying what are the tasks assigned to petitioners, LSGI "may
upon prior written notice to the retainer, terminate [the] contract should the retainer fail in any way to
perform his assigned job/task to the satisfaction of La Salle Greenhills, Inc. or for any other just cause." 16
While vague in its sparseness, the Contract of Retainer very clearly spelled out that LSGI had the power of
control over petitioners.
Time and again we have held that the power of control refers to the existence of the power and not
necessarily to the actual exercise thereof, nor is it essential for the employer to actually supervise the
performance of duties of the employee.17 It is enough that the employer has the right to wield that power.
In all, given the following: (1) repeated renewal of petitioners' contract for fifteen years, interrupted only by
the close of the school year; (2) the necessity of the work performed by petitioners as school physicians and
dentists; and (3) the existence of LSGI's power of control over the means and method pursued by
petitioners in the performance of their job, we rule that petitioners attained regular employment, entitled to
security of tenure who could only be dismissed for just and authorized causes. Consequently, petitioners
were illegally dismissed and are entitled to the twin remedies of payment of separation pay and full back
wages. We order separation pay in lieu of reinstatement given the time that has lapsed, twelve years, in the
litigation of this case.
We clarify, however, that our ruling herein is only confined to the three (3) petitioners who had filed this
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of theRules of Court, and prior thereto, the petition forcertiorari under
Rule 65 thereof before the Court of Appeals. The Decision of the NLRC covering other complainants in NLRC
CA No. 044835-05 has already become final and executory as to them.
Not being trier of facts, we remand this case to the NLRC for the determination of separation pay and full
back wages from the time petitioners were precluded from returning to work the school year 2004 and
compensation for work performed in that period.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 110391
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decisions of the NLRC in NLRC CA No. 044835-05 and NLRC CASE No.
00-0607081-04 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The Complaint of petitioners Arlene T. Samonte,
Vladimir P. Samonte, Ma. Carmen Aurea S. Elepano against La Salle Greenhills, Inc. for illegal dismissal
is GRANTED. We REMAND this case to the NLRC for the computation of the three (3) petitioners'
separation pay and full back wages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Velasco, (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

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