A preliminary analysis of volcanic Na-Tech risks in the Vesuvius area

E. Salzano, A. Basco
Istituto di Ricerche sulla Combustione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche

ABSTRACT: The area surrounding Vesuvius is considered as one of the most hazardous zone in the world.
Several civil protection actions (prediction and prevention, emergency plans, evacuation plan) have been managed for the population but, quite surprisingly, industrial risks triggered by the interaction with this catastrophic natural event have been neglected (Na-Tech risks). Furthermore, Naples and its province have several
industrial areas, two industrial harbors with LPG and fuel docks, and large fuel storage plants, in the close surrounding of crowded suburbs. The analysis of volcanic Na-Tech risks presented in the paper shows a revised
event tree starting from simplification of geophysicist studies, taking into account only the possible interaction
with industrial equipment. Among the eruption phenomena (tephra fall, lava flows, pyroclastic flows and
surges, atmospheric phenomena, pyroclastic bombs) the tephra fall has been analyzed in the following, starting from the intensity of explosive eruption predicted by Italian Civil Protection.
1 INTRODUCTION
Natural catastrophic events may be able to affect the
integrity of industrial structures and possibly lead to
loss of control of production processes. As a consequence, if industrial facilities store large amount of
hazardous materials, accidental scenarios as fire, explosion, or toxic dispersion can be triggered, thus
possibly involving population living in the close surrounding or in the urban area where the industrial installation is located. Eventually, the analysis of natural-technological mutual interaction (Na-Tech) is
necessary for the development of methodology for
risk management practice, for risk assessment and
for emergency planning. On the other hand, simplified tools are mandatory because the number of
possible scenarios is often dramatically high when
large installations or areas are considered.
Despite these considerations, a recent analysis
showed that none of the European countries have
specific Na-Tech risk and emergency management
programs in place (Cruz et al., 2004). In the following, some advancement for the assessment of natural-technological risks is presented, with specific
reference to the volcanic hazards. The analysis is
part of a larger project of the Department of Civil
Protection for the analysis of industrial risks in the
surrounding of Mt. Vesuvius in Napoli, aiming at
emergency planning for population in the case of
eruption. The methodology and the insights reported
here can be usefully adopted for any large cata-

strophic natural event with long early warning time

as for instance flooding or tsunami.
2 THE DEFINITION OF VOLCANIC NA-TECH
HAZARDS
Based on the analysis of several past natural events,
Lindell & Perry (1996) and Cruz (2005) singled out
some general features of Na-Tech. To their point of
view, when large-scale destructive natural events occur territorial and urban systems, which are likely to
include industrial areas/facilities, are expected to
face simultaneously heterogeneous impacts on exposed elements (human, goods, and environment).
More specifically, technological accidents may be
triggered by natural events and their effects may add
or worsen the condition of people and environment
struggling with the natural event effects.
The combination of natural and technological hazards may also induce an overload of emergency
services, which are usually shaped to face single
events. To this regard, its worth noting that safety
and rescue operations could be impeded, as for instance has occurred for the earthquake in Turkey, by
the shortage of resources (water, energy) or by the
reduction of accessibility due to debris, traffic of escaping people. Eventually, as recognized by Lindell
& Perry (1996), the greatest concern of Na-Tech is
the overloading of emergency response system
which compromises its ability to minimize losses to
persons and property. On the other hand, with refer-

ence to volcanic Na-Tech, Baxter et al. (1982) have

reported that reduction or interruption of water
treatment caused by technologic malfunction due to
ash fallout, could lead to contamination of water
supplies. Furthermore, the transportation of hazardous materials can be hazardous due to slippery, ashcovered roads, which could lead to collisions and
contamination of areas around the collision site.
Nevertheless, we think that further concerns should
be linked to the shelter location and to land use
planning in the case of Na-Tech accidents, to the
choice of appropriate mitigation systems, to the definition of predictive simplified tools which are also
useful for decision-makers in the case of catastrophic
natural events.
For the definition of volcanic hazards, we have
started our analysis from the definition of possible
volcanic phenomena after eruption, which in the
case of Vesuvius will occur, very likely, with explosive behavior. Quite obviously, a large number of
studies have been addressed to the precursors, which
indeed are essential for preventing measures and
evacuation, as the eruption will be so catastrophic
that no mitigation systems are possible in the most
dangerous areas. In the context of this work, however, we are not interested in early warning, which in
the case of Vesuvius is of the order of days, whereas
we are mainly interested to the possible interaction
of volcanic phenomena with industrial installation.
I.e., our interest is mainly related to what happens after the eruption and, in terms of hazards, to the probability of having an explosive eruption with a specific intensity. To this aim, the Volcanic Explosion
Index (VEI) is generally used by geophysicist and
used. The VEI index is based on the volume of
material ejected and the height of the eruption
column and runs from 0 to 8 on a logarithmic scale
(Newhall & Self, 1982). Eruptions with VEI < 3
usually involve lava flows and/or minor explosive
activity and are generally localised in their effects.
Events of VEI 4 or 5 often disrupt regional
economies, while eruptions of over 6 may impact on
Origin

Outcome
No eruption

Magmatic
intrusion

Magnitude

Phenomena
Tephra fall

Stop
VEI = 5

Sectors

Clone

Distance
1 Clone

Pyroclastic
flow

Eruption
VEI = 4

5 Clone
Clone

No
Stop
magmatic
intrusion

VEI = 3

5-10 Km

Lava flow Clone

Clone People

1.E-01

1.E-02

1.E-03

15-20 Km
Buildings

6 Clone

Clone

Clone

1.E+00

0-5 Km Clone

10-15 Km

4
Lahars

(1)

where a and b are two parameters time dependent

and N is the number of events. The same authors
have proposed a linear trend of this probability in
function of VEI, on a logarithmic scale, as reported

Vulnerability

2 Clone

Clone

3 Clone
Restless
volcano

Exposure

logN(M) = a bM

f [y-1]

Unrest

from eruption precursors which are necessary for the

definition of precocious alarm and evacuation plans
(see Figure 1), based on the previous study by Newhall & Hoblitt (2002).
In this work, however, re-considering and simplification the proposed event tree is possible if only industrial equipment are of concern (e.g. small amount of
cold volcanic ashes could certainly dangerous for
people health but are completely ineffective with respect to the storage of pressurised flammable gases
contained in the high strength enclosures).
In the following, a new version of event tree is then
proposed, based on geophysicist analyses on the
possible destructive phenomena which can occur after explosive eruption. To these aims, as cited above,
the magnitude of explosive eruption expressed as
VEI index can be the starting point for our analysis,
thus neglecting the precursor events.
Simkin & Siebert (1994) have analyzed the
frequency of the eruption all over the world finding
that it decreased drastically as the VEI increased: in
1000 years it took place few thousands eruptions
with VEI = 3 (as the last Vesuvius eruption of 1944),
several hundred eruption with VEI = 4 (as the
Vesuvius eruption of 1631), about one hundred
eruption with VEI = 5, about ten eruptions with
VEI=6 (as the Vesuvius eruption of 79 DC) and only
two eruptions with VEI = 7. With specific reference
to Vesuvius, Scandone et al. (1993) report that the
VEI index follows a power law similar to that of
Gutemberg-Richter (G-R) for earthquakes with
regard to magnitude M

Clone

20-25 Km

Clone

1.E-04

8 Clone

world global climate.

Figure 1. The volcanic hazard event tree as showed by Newhall
& Hoblitt (2002) and Marzocchi et al. (2004).

With respect to more general volcanic hazard, a

work by (Marzocchi et al., 2004) has produced an
event tree for volcanic hazards for Vesuvius, starting

1.E-05
1

VEI

in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Annual frequency of exceedance of VEI for Vesuvius
(Scandone et al., 1993).

From Figure 2, a probability of occurrence per year

of VEI 4 of about 2.0 10-3 y-1 and a probability of
about 2.0 10-2 y-1 for VEI 3 can be obtained.
Marzocchi et al. (2004) have demonstrated, for
Vesuvius, that a VEI 5 has a probability of
occurrence between 1% and 20% and that it is
unlikely a value of VEI 2. Furthermore, they have
estimated the probability of a specific VEI as a
function of the Repose Time, RT. For a RT = 60
years the probability for VEI = 3 is about 70%, for
VEI = 4 is about 20% and for VEI 5 is about
1%.According to Barberi et al. (1995) and Cioni et
al. (2003), the Maximum Expected Event (MEE) for
Vesuvius has VEI = 4. This intensity, used also in
the Piano Vesuvio (DPC, 2001), agrees with
Department of Civil protection and will be
considered for the following analysis, together with
VEI = 3, which is the most likely eruption.

possible in each zone, independently on VEI. Results

are reported in Table 1.

Figure 3: Revised event tree for volcanic Na-Tech risks as

proposed in this work.

3 THE MODIFIED EVENT TREE

Table 1: Probability of occurrence and typology of the posteruption phenomena (Blong, 1984, as reported by Perrella,
2005)

Aiming at Na-Tech analysis, the nodes presented in

Figure 1 are revised accordingly. The main sketch of
revised event tree is proposed in the following
Figure 3.

Volcanic
phenomenon

Probability
of occurrence
24%
60%
60%
5%
6%
50%
50%
< 1%

Maximum
distance
(km)
100
20
800
100
300
50

Characteristic
temperature
(C)
600-1200
< 1000
25
< 600-900
< 100
25

As cited previously, Figure 3 shows clearly that

VEI 3 and VEI 4 (which the conservative option
with respect to the most likely VEI 3 intensity), will
be considered as Node 1. Quite obviously, event tree
routes have to be followed for the two VEIs.

Lava flow
Ballistic projection
Tephra fall
Pyroclastic flow
Lahars
Seismic activity
Soil deformations
Anomalous waves
Atmospheric phenomena
Acid rain and gas

3.2 Node 2: Post eruption phenomena

In the following paragraphs we discuss and describe

the events reported in Table 1.

3.1 Node 1: Eruption magnitudo

The Vesuvius emergency (evacuation) plan, or Piano

Vesuvio (DPC, 2001), is based on the Maximum
Expected Event (MEE) for Vesuvius, characterized
by VEI = 4. Regarding the emergency plan, the
volcanic area has been then divided in three zones
according to risk typology and entity:
the red zone (about 200 km2 of extension and
about 10 Km of distance from crater) can be
subjected to total destruction due to
pyroclastic flows, surges, mud flows and
blocks, bombs, tephra fall;
the yellow zone (about 1100 km2 of
extension and about 30 Km of distance from
crater) can be interested by tephra fall, with
load up to 200 kg/m2, and by lahars;
the blue zone (about 100 km2 of extension) is
included in the yellow zone but it is also
subjected to floods.
Blong (1984) summarized the probability of
occurrence of the catastrophic post-eruption events

600

60%

800

40%

2000

25

3.2.1. Lava flow

A lava flow is a stream of liquid magma which
comes out of the crater at a temperature between
600C and 1200C and races down the slopes of the
volcano with a speed which gradually reduces as the
material solidify.
In the case of Vesuvius only the red zone will be
interested by this phenomenon.
As it regards the industrial installations, damages are
only economical because people will be previously
evacuated. However, prevention action could be
considered as fuel transportation to safe location.
3.2.2. Ballistic projections
Very often eruptions are coupled with the projection
of fragments of rocks removed by the wall of the
volcano chimney. Besides, explosive eruptions
determine the projection of clastic elements such as
volcanic bombs, blocks and pumice clasts as large as
30 cm. This phenomenon rarely regards zones at

distance from the crater larger than 5 km. It is clear

that, regarding Na-Tech risk analysis for Vesuvius
and VEI < 5, this phenomenon is not of concern in
the yellow zone whereas in the red zone it is
necessary to identify all the possible plants located
closer than 5 km from the crater.
3.2.3. Tephra fall
Ashes and lapilli deposits are rarely dangerous. Even
in the case of very large amount of tephra, the
damages can be limited by preventing their
accumulation on the structures. Nevertheless in
some cases the accumulation can be so fast that it is
impossible the intervention of persons or mechanical
means, thus creating serious problems to viability.
This phenomenon can reach large distances from the
crater and can represent, as it is showed in the
following, the main hazard for industrial areas
located in the region around the volcano.
3.2.4. Pyroclastic flow and avalanche of debris
Pyroclastic flows (nub ardente, surges) have a big
mobility and represent a serious problem for
populated zones in the surroundings of explosive
volcanoes. These phenomena are associated with
explosive eruptions of high energy (Plinian)
characterized by enormous columns of gas, magma
fragments and solid blocks which are violently
expulses over 20 km on the volcanos vertical.
The pyroclastic flow are generated by the
gravitational collapse of the eruptive column that
creates a dense cloud consisting in hot gas (600C
900C), solid blocks and pumices which flows at
high speed along the Volcano.
The surges are ring made clouds which expand
themselves at high velocity on the basis of the
eruptive column. They are very violent phenomena
originated by the interaction of magma with
groundwater layers or on the surface (lakes, sea). In
the case of Vesuvius these phenomena may interest
only the red zone. The damages related to ambient,
population and property are so catastrophic that the
effects of Na-Tech interaction can be neglected.
3.2.5. Lahars
Lahars can be defined as mud avalanche that flows
down the slope of a volcano in response to gravity.
They are due to the heavy rainfall subsequent the
eruption and to the movement of water-saturated
volcanic debris.
The probability of occurrence of the lahars depends
on the thickness of the deposits, on particles
dimension, on the slope, on the quantity and
intensity of the rain and on the draining conditions of
the soil. Lahars flow with a very high velocity and
can cover large distances. The risk connected with
lahars can be high for several months after eruption,
as they can create landslides in different areas. The
Na-Tech risk connected with lahars is linked to the

interactions between industrial equipment and

flooding or landslides.
3.2.6. Seismic activities and soil deformations
Seismic phenomena and soil deformations are
important signals useful to predict and prevent the
eruptive phenomena (Festa et al., 2004). Volcanic
earthquakes, generally, have less intensity than those
of tectonic origins even if they can determine very
relevant damages to the buildings. The destructive
power of a volcanic earthquake is negligible for
industrial equipments. Nevertheless, it is possible to
estimate the Na-Tech risk once it is known the
earthquake intensity in terms of Peak Ground
Acceleration (PGA), see Salzano et al. (2007) for
more details.
3.2.7. Anomalous waves
Anomalous waves may be produced by volcanic or
seismic phenomena thus interesting the sea floor.
They have a high destructive power and can
determine a large number of fatalities. The damages
on industrial facilities located along the coast or in
the harbours are related to the wave impact on the
structures (oil or gas ships, oil terminal, LPG cargo
and loading arms).
3.2.8. Atmospheric phenomena
The accumulation of electric charges in the
atmosphere, due to the friction between the erupted
particles, produces intense lightning phenomena.
Shock waves can be originated by explosive
eruptions. Their effects on industrial facilities can be
evaluated by using the methodology described by
Salzano et al. (2005; 2007) on the domino effects
triggered by explosions.
3.2.9. Acid rain and gas
Acid rain has been shown to have adverse impacts
on forests, freshwaters and soils, killing off insect
and aquatic life forms as well as causing damage to
buildings and having possible impacts on human
health. One of principal natural phenomena that
contribute to acid-producing gases to the atmosphere
is the emission from volcanoes.
3.3 Node 3: Radial sector
To the aims of this work, the area interested by
volcanic Na-Tech risk is divided into four quadrants
at 90 with the principal axe parallel to the line
coast. In this way, the two coastal quadrants are the
only exposed to the anomalous waves originated by
the eruptive phenomenon. The two internal
quadrants of Vesuvius, in particular, are particularly
exposed to lahars phenomena (see the blue zone in
Piano Vesuvio, DPC, 2001).

3.4 Node 4: Distance of the industrial target by the

crater
For each eruption phenomenon, it is possible to define a threshold distance beyond which no Na-Tech
events are possible. For instance, as seen in Table 1,
ballistic projections very rarely may interest a distance from crater greater than 5 km, hence no NaTech risks may occur for yellow zone. Furthermore,
because people have been previously evacuated in
the red zone, which is larger than the maximum ballistic projection, no Na-Tech risks may be present also for distances lower than 5 km, and only industrial
prevention measures should be organized, if necessary.
Eventually, for the assumed VEI, the accidental phenomena that may interact with industry outside the
evacuated zones are: i) tephra fall; ii) lighting; iii)
lahars; iv) anomalous wave; v) seismic wave.
3.5 Node 5: Damage to the facilities (structural
fragilities)
The analysis should be now addressed to the definition of structural fragility of industrial equipment
with respect to the specific volcanic phenomenon,
and to the definition of possible following loss of
content of hazardous material or energy from the
damaged processes.
As cited previously, seismic wave are generally of
low intensity during the eruption phenomenon and
will not considered in this work. Furthermore,
lightning effects, though intense, may be generally
limited by classical industrial prevention measures
and will not be further analyzed. Eventually, tephra
(ash) fall, lahars and tsunami are of main interest. In
the following, only ash will be analyzed, whereas
other phenomena will be faced in next works.
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As cited above, one of the main volcanic Na-Tech
regards tephra fall, which can interest zones at kilometers of distance from the crater. For this phenomenon, the even tree analysis is defined and the relevant risks due to accidental scenarios triggered by
the load of ash on industrial equipment will be assessed.
To these aims, Lirer et al., (2001) have studied the
total distribution of the pyroclastic deposits during
the last 10,000 years in the surroundings of Vesuvius
and have quantified the volcanic hazards. The
authors have found that layers higher than 50 cm
may interest areas at a distance only smaller than 10
km from the crater. If the average density of volcanic
ash is considered as 1600 kg/m3 (Nunziante, 1997) a
total load of 7840 N/m2 can be then considered as a
reference value for that radius from crater. To this
regard, Nunziante (1997) has evaluated the

maximum layer of ashes which the most common

structures (buildings) can tolerate before collapsing.
In particular, as regard the roofs of civil habitations,
it reaches the plastic deformation with a layer of 48
cm for roofs with girder of reinforced concrete and
86 cm for roofs with steel girder.
When industrial equipment are analyzed, no concerns may be addressed to mounded or underground
tanks, and the fragility analysis should only be addressed to atmospheric storage tank, over-ground
pressurized equipment (sphere, horizontal tank, reactor). However, in the light of economical losses and
recovery after the eruption, the preventive transportation of fuels to safe location is recommended.
With specific reference to aboveground atmospheric
storage tank, different technology and design should
be considered. Indeed, they are either designed as
atmospheric or low pressure tanks and can operate at
maximum pressures of 3500 N/m2 in the first case
and 100,000 N/m2 in the second case (API 620,
2008).
A weak shell-to-roof" design, either for fixed conical or domed shape roof, is normally adopted aiming at venting of vapor in the case of overpressure
build-up within the tank. This design is clearly hazardous in the case of ash layers.
To reduce fuel evaporation on the top section of
tank, floating roofs are designed to float on the liquid surface, either with inside a closed top tank (internal floating roof, IFR) or for open top tank (contact deck or external floating roof, EFR).
All tanks are necessarily included in a catch basin
whose volume is equivalent to the volume of liquids.
Quite clearly, the catch basin would be filled by ash;
hence, release of fuel is likely to flow out the confinement.
The methodology adopted in the following is based
on snow load design as indicated, for instance, by
BS 2654 (1984) and API 650 (1988). These two
guidelines specify that all tanks have to be designed
for a minimum roof snow load of 1200 N/m2 both
for floating and fixed roof. That means that a total
weight of 122 kg/m2 is the minimum design requirement, i.e. a layer of about 7.6 cm of ash is already able to produce damages to the roof. Besides,
AWWA D100-96 of American Water Works
Association reports design data for water tank,
which can be considered a standard for oil tanks, too.
Accidental load on roof, as snow, can reach 1205
N/m2 for roof slope less than 30, and 720 N/m2 for
greater slopes, which means an ever lower layer with
respect to indication of API 650.
Quite clearly, structural damages which can give NaTech accident require higher loads, because the data
reported above are only the minimum threshold values for design.
For atmospheric storage tank, the maximum pressure
of 3500 N/m2, as defined by working pressure, can
be considered as the second threshold value for

1.00

7.6 cm
22 cm
0.50
45 cm
0.40

0.30

0.20

0.10

10

20 km
30 km

15

20

25

30

35

Distance*, km

10 km

0.80

Prob [layer>layer*]

0.60

0.00

5 km

0.90

Figure 5: Exceedance probability of distance for different layer

Prob [distance()>distance*]

structural damage. This load corresponds to ash layer

of 22 cm.
Finally, a static pressure threshold value for structural damage of atmospheric storage tanks in the case
of blast wave loading the steel construction (Salzano
et al., 2007) is 7000 N/m2, which takes into account
also damage to roofs and which can correspond to
the third value for loading and for having a visible
damage to the structure. The ash layer threshold is in
this case is 45 cm.
For the calculation of risks, we have now used the
analysis of Newhall & Hoblitt (2002), which give a
set of data of the exceedance probability of a certain
ash layer thickness at different distances from the
crater for VEI = 3 and for VEI 4.

thickness : : 7.6 cm; : 22 cm; : 45 cm.

0.70

The data reported in Fig. 5 allows the definition of

maximum distance for the threshold thickness to be
expected in the yellow zone, which is characterized
by a maximum distance from crater of about 30 km.
To this aim, we have linearized the distribution
function by means of probit analysis (Finney, 1971).
Results for the two coefficient k1 and k2 are reported
in Table 3.

0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10

Table 3: Parameters for the log-normal distribution function of

0.00
0

25

50

75

100

layer*, cm

Figure 4: Exceedance probability of ash layer thickness with respect to layer thickness reported on x-axis (layer*) for different
distances from crater. VEI = 3.

Ash layer
thickness
cm
7.6
22
45

Probit coefficient
k1
4.21
4.45
4.86

Maximum
distance

k2
0.49
0.67
0.74

km
> 50
> 50
22

ash layer thickness with respect to distance. VEI = 3.

Table 2: Parameters for the log-normal distribution function
reported in Figure 4. VEI = 3.
Distance,
km
5
10
15
20
30

Layer thickness, cm

10% exc
2.01
1.70
65.93
1.40
1.70
35.82
1.20
1.70
29.33
0.84
1.70
20.46
0.50
1.70
8.83

1% exc
389.47
211.62
173.26
120.88
52.18

Starting from these results, we can assume in first

approximation that 10% percent of exceedance
probability of layer thickness is the conservative
choice for structural analysis, design purposes and
for emergency, prevention/mitigation measures. Results are reported in Table 2.
Finally, for the reference structural threshold values for ash layer thickness * = 7.6 cm, 22 cm and
45 cm, respectively, we have reproduced the exceeding probability with respect to distance to which the
ash thickness *. Results are reported in Figure 5.

Results of Table 3 shows that, for VEI = 3, worst

case occurrence (the 45 cm layer) can be restricted to
a value of about 20 km, for which 1% of probability
is found. No useful information is obtained for lower
threshold values. These data here reported can be
easily implemented in any risk assessment code for
the ri-composition of risks.
The same analysis should performed also for
VEI = 4. However, it can be assumed that in this
case the entire yellow zone will be likely interested
by ash layer thickness greater or equal to 45 cm.
5 CONCLUSIONS
When higher values of ash layers load tank roof, in
the case of fixed or floating roof structural damage,
economical losses are not the only concerns. Indeed,
as cited above, lightning and, more in general, static
electricity or other sources of ignition are likely.

Hence, flammable vapors flowing out the systems

after damage may be ignited and tank fire can be
triggered, whereas Vapour Cloud Explosion can be
considered rare events as late ignition are, for the
same reason discussed above, unlikely.
When a tank fires, domino effects can spread the fire
to the adjacent equipments: emergency and prevention plan effectiveness can be strongly affected by
the necessity of coping the industrial risks. Quite
clearly, people safety depends more on building roof
collapse than heat radiation by tank fire in the unevacuated areas.
If we consider the probability of early ignition of
flammable vapour as 3%, as given by Cox et al.
(1990), and the data reported in Table 1, Figures 1 &
5, by simple calculation we can obtain the annual
probability of having accidental scenario (the tank
fire) at distance greater than the distance reported on
the x-axis, for VEI 3 only. The ash layer thicknesses
of 22 cm and 45 cm have been used as tank fire can
only occur if relevant damages to tank have occurred.
The choice of industrial priorities, after early warning, can be now obtained by choosing a reference
threshold value for the annual occurrence probability
given in Figure 6.
Tank Fire Probability at distance>distance* [year-1]

1.E-03

1.E-04

1.E-05

1.E-06

1.E-07

1.E-08
0

20

40

60

80

100

Distance* from crater, km

Figure 6: Exceedance annual probability of tank fire at any given distance* for layer thickness : : 22 cm; : 45 cm.

If 10-6 event/year is considered as a negligible

occurrence, following indications given by HSE
(2005) as likelihood indicator, it is clear that NaTech event can only occur at distances lower than 20
km from crater if 45 cm is chose as reference. This
data is equivalent to the threshold data for distance
reported in Table 3 which was based only on exceedance probability of ash layer as a function of
distance.

The analysis of industrial risks for other destructive

phenomena as lahars and tsunami and for VEI = 4
will be faced in next work.
6 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to thank Dipartimento di Protezione Civile della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri of Italy for its financial support.
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