G.R. No.

204894
March 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS,
FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and ROGER JALANDONI y
ARI, Appellants.
Facts
At around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, PO2 Eduardo
Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) and P02 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan)
were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they
spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass
shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The
officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as accused
Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but, having entertained
doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they asked him to
come with them to the police station in their mobile car for further
questioning. Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and
left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the ZapoteAlabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to
relieve himself there. As he approached the stores door, however, he came
upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot
one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone
fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an
armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another
man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road
while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men
were able to take a taxi and escape. On returning to his mobile car, he
realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las
Pias Police, testified that he and PO2 Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito)
immediately responded to PO2 Gregorios urgent call. Suspecting that
accused Enojas was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the
abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind.
P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its
incoming messages. PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they
monitored the messages in accused Enojas mobile phone and, posing as
Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an
entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and
Jalandoni.

Issue
Whether the text messages in the mobile phone of one of the accused
is admissible in evidence.
Ruling
Yes, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Courts earlier
Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi,
posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi
had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on
them.

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, A.C. No. 5921

Vs.
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA,
Facts
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear
before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court
for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of the 30 July
2001 motion. In her explanation Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His Honor
knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will
show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in
this case. Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any conscious or deliberate intent to
degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any
form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice. She
expressed willingness to apologize for whatever mistake [they] may have
committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have
stepped on the line and gone out of bounds.
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty
of contempt. She moved for reconsideration, recounted that on her way out
of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba (Jacoba) stopped her
and said O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli. She signed
the pleading handed to her without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her
husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted her whole life and future.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time
directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt. Jacoba
complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he
denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against VelascoJacobas statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege
rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding Jacoba
guilty of contempt of court. On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the
present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they
appear at the hearing set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro
despite sufficient notice. IBP Commissioner Navarro recommended the
suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months finding
that respondents were prone to use offensive and derogatory remarks and
phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority.
Issue
Whether the marital privilege rule may be waived for failure of the
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by an implied consent through

ones conduct.
Ruling
Yes, the marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be
waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by
any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies
to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer
with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes
account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by
stating that he trained his guns and fired at the errors, which he perceived
and believed to be gigantic and monumental.
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible,
for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was immediate and
spontaneous, unlike Jacobas defense which was raised only after a
considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2)
Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836,
supporting Velasco-Jacobas assertion that she had not actually participate[d]
in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836,
praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari
before deciding the contempt charge against him. This petition for certiorari
anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact,
Jacobas handiwork.

G.R. No. 201001

November 10, 2014
MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP.
vs.
MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP.
Facts
MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment
from Monark Equipment Corporation (Monark) for various periods in 2000,
the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus, Monark
delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of MCMP in
Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon, the delivery evidenced by invoices as well
as Documents Acknowledgment Receipt Nos. 04667 and 5706, received and
signed by representatives of MCMP, namely, Jorge Samonte on December 5,
2000 and Rose Takahashi on January 29, 2001, respectively. Despite the
lapse of the thirty (30)-day period indicated in the invoices, MCMP failed to
pay the rental fees. Upon demands made upon MCMP to pay the amount
due, partial payments were made in the amount of PhP100,000.00 on April
15, 2001 and PhP100,000.00 on August 15, 2001. Further demands went
unheeded. Monark filed a suit for a Sum of Money with the RTC docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-02-47092. MCMP alleged in defense that the complaint
was premature as Monark has refused to give a detailed breakdown of its
claims. MCMP further averred that it had an agreement with Monark that it
would not be charged for the whole time that the leased equipment was in its
possession but rather only for the actual time that the equipment was used
although still on the project site. MCMP, however, admitted that this
agreement was not contained in the Contract.
During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo
Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior Account Manager. Peregrino testified that
there were two (2) original copies ofthe Contract, one retained by Monark,
while the other was given to MCMP; that Monarks copy had been lost and
that diligent efforts to recover the copy proved futile. Instead, Peregrino
presented a photocopy of the Contract which he personally had on file. The
RTC rule in favor of Monark. MCMP filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
the same was denied. Appeal and MR before the CA was likewise denied,
hence the petition.
Issue
Whether or not the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the
existence of the Contract should be allowed following the Best Evidence
Rule.
Ruling

Yes, presentation of secondary evidence should be allowed. The Best

Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original
document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in
Section 3 of Rule 130 ofthe Rules of Court which provides:
"Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office. (Emphasis supplied)"
Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on
the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a lost
document:
"Section 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original
document has been lost ordestroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control.
If the document is inthe custody or under the control of adverse party, he
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss."
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the
existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of
the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents.

In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are
present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of
Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been
lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail.
Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. Hence, the Court will respect
the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.