Wills - Affecting Legitime (Full Text)

CIAR WILLS AFFECTING LEGITIME - Page 1 of 26
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47799
May 21, 1943
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.
Ozamis and Capistrano for petitioners.
Gullas, Leuterio, Tanner and Laput for respondents.
MORAN, J.:
This is in connection with the property, real or personal, left by the deceased. As to
money advances, the trial Court found:
This is a case where the testator in his will left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with preterition of the children
by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. This Court annulled the institution of heirs and
declared a total intestacy.
But clause 8 of the will is invoked wherein the testator made the statement that the
children by his first marriage had already received their shares in his property excluding
what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles and the money they had
borrowed from him which he condoned in the will. Since, however, this is an issue of fact
tried by the Court of First Instance, and we are reviewing the decision of the Court of
Appeals upon a question of law regarding that issue, we can rely only upon the findings of
fact made by the latter Court, which are as follows:
A motion for reconsideration has been filed by the respondents on the ground (1) that
there is no preterition as to the children of the first marriage who have received their
shares in the property left by the testator, and (2) that, even assuming that there has
been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but
simply the reduction of the bequest made to them.
1. The findings of the trial court and those of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
respondents' first contention. The children of the first marriage are Eleuterio, Agripino,
Agapita, Getulia (who died a little less than eight years before the death of her father
Agripino Neri, leaving seven children), Rosario and Celerina.
As to Eleuterio, the trial court said that "it is not, therefore, clear that Eleuterio has
received his share out of the properties left by his father." It is true that Eleuterio appears
to have received, as a donation from his father, parcel of land No. 4, but the question of
whether there has been a donation or not is apparently left for decision in an
independent action, and to that effect Ignacia Akutin has been appointed special
administratrix for the purpose of instituting such action.
With respect to Agripino and Agapita, the parcels of land which they have occupied,
according to the trial Court, "are a part of public land which had been occupied by
Agripino Neri Chaves, and, therefore, were not a part of the estate of the latter."
Concerning Getulia who died about eight years before the death of her father Agripino
Neri, the trial Court found that "neither Getulia nor her heirs received any share of the
properties."
And with respect to Rosario and Celerina, the trial Court said that "it does not appear
clear, therefore, that Celerina and Rosario received their shares in the estate left by their
father Agripino Neri Chaves."
It is contented, furthermore, that the children of Agripino Neri Chaves in his first
marriage received money from their father. It appears that Nemesio Chaves is
indebted in the amount of P1,000; Agripino, in the amount of P500 as appears in
Exhibits 14 and 15; Getulia, in the amount of P155 as appears in Exhibit 16, 17,
and 18; Celerina in the amount of P120 as appears in Exhibit 19, 19-A and 19-B.
From these findings of the trial Court it is clear that Agapita, Rosario and the children of
Getulia had received from the testator no property whatsoever, personal, real or in cash.
Since all the parcels that corresponded to Agripino Neri y Chaves are now in the
administrator's possession, as appears in the inventory filed in court, it is clear
that the property of the deceased has remained intact and that no portion thereof
has been given to the children of the first marriage.
It is stated by the court and practically admitted by the appellants that a child of
the first marriage named Getulia, or her heirs after her death, did not receive any
share of the property of her father.
It is true that in the decision of the Court of Appeals there is also the following
paragraphs:
As regards that large parcel of land adjoining parcel No. 1, it is contended that
after the court had denied the registration thereof. Agripino Neri y Chaves
abandoned the said land and that later on some of the children of the first
marriage possessed it, thereby acquiring title and interest therein by virtue of
occupation and not through inheritance. It is not true that this parcel containing
182.6373 hectares is now assessed in the names of some of the children of the
first marriage, for as shown on Tax Declaration No. 9395, Exhibit 11-g, the owners
of the property are Agapita Neri de Chaves y Hermanos. Apparently, the said land
is still claimed to be the property not only of the children of the first marriage but
also of those of the second marriage.
This paragraph is but a corroboration of the finding made by the Court of Appeals that no
property has ever been advanced by the testator to the children by his first marriage. The
large parcel of land adjoining parcel No. 1 was alleged by the children of the second
marriage to have been advanced by the testator to the children by his first marriage; but
the Court of Appeals belied this claim. "It is not true," says that Court, "that this parcel
containing 182.6373 hectares is now assessed in the names of some of the children of
the first marriage, for as shown on Tax Declaration No. 9395, Exhibit 11-g, the owners of
the property are Agapita Neri de Chaves y Hermanos," that is, the children of both
marriages. And the Court of Appeals added that "apparently, the said land is still claimed
to be the property not only of the children of the first marriage but also of those of the
second marriage," which is another way of stating that the property could not have been
advanced by the testator to the children by the first marriage would not lay a claim on it.
We conclude, therefore, that according to the findings of fact made by the Court of
Appeals, the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, and that without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he
left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, he left
nothing to them or, at least, some of them. This is, accordingly, a case of preterition
governed by article 814 of the Civil Code, which provides that the institution of heirs shall
be annulled and intestate succession should be declared open.
2. Upon the second question propounded in the motion for reconsideration, respondents
seem to agree that article 814 of the Civil Code is the law applicable but, in their
discussion as to the effect of preterition, they confuse article 814 with articles 817 and
851 and other articles of the Civil Code. These three articles read:
ART. 814. The preterition of one or of all of the forced heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heirs; but the legacies and betterments shall be valid
in so far as they are not inofficious.
The preterition of the widower or widow does not annul the institution; but the
person omitted shall retain all the rights granted to him by articles 834, 835, 836,
and 837 of this Code.
ART. 817. Testamentary dispositions which diminish the legitimate of the forced
heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same in so far as they are inofficious or
excessive.
ART. 851. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for a cause
the truth of which, if contested, is not shown, or which is not one of those stated
in the four following articles, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is
prejudicial to the disinherited person; but the legacies, betterments, and other
testamentary dispositions shall be valid in so far as they are not prejudicial to
said legitime.
The following example will make the question clearer: The testator has two legitimate
sons, A and B, and in his will he leaves all his property to A, with total preterition of B.
Upon these facts, shall we annul entirely the institution of heir in favor of A and declare a
total intestacy, or shall we merely refuse the bequest left A, giving him two-thirds, that is
one third of free disposal and one-third of betterments, plus one-half of the other third as
strict legitime, and awarding B only the remaining one-half of the strict legitime? If we do
the first, we apply article 814; if the second, we apply articles 851 or 817. But article 851
applies only in cases of unfounded disinheritance, and all are agreed that the present
case is not one of disinheritance but of preterition. Article 817 is merely a general rule
inapplicable to specific cases provided by law, such as that of preterition or
disinheritance. The meaning of articles 814 and 851, their difference and philosophy, and
their relation to article 817, are lucidly explained by Manresa in the following manner:
Cuando la legitima no es usufructuria, como ocurre en los demas casos, la pretericion no puede menos
de alterar esencialmente la institucion de heredero. Esta ha de anularse, pero en todo o en parte, esto
es, solo en cuanto perjudique el derecho del legitimario preterido? El articulo 814 opta por la primer
solucion, ya que hemos de atenermos estrictmente al testo de la ley; mientras que el articulo 851, en
casos anlogos, opta por la segunda.
En efecto; la desheredacion sin justa causa no produce el efecto de desheredar. El heredero conserva
derecho a su legitima, pero nada mas que a su legitima. Los legados, las merjoras, si las hay, y aun la
institucion de heredero, son validas en cuanto no perjudiquen al heredero forzoso.
La diferencia se notara perfectamente con un ejemplo. Un solteron, sin decendientes ni ascendientes
legitimos, hace testamento instituyendo por heredero a un pariente lejano. Despues reconoce un hijo
natural, o se casa y tiene descendencia, y muere sin modificar su disposicion testamentaria. A su
muerte, el hijo natural, o los legitimos, fundadose en la nulidad total de la institucion, con arreglo al
articulo 814, piden toda la herencia. En el caso del articulo 851 solo podrian podrian pedir su
legitima. Preterdos,adquieren derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos
tercios, segun el caso.
En el fondo la cuestion es indentica. El testador puede siempre disponer a su arbitrio de la parte libre. El
legitimario, contra la voluntad expresa del testdor, solo tiene derecho a su legitima. Preterido o
desheredado sin justa causa la legitima. Preterido o desheredado sin justa causa la legitma es suya.
Desheredado o preterido, la porcion libre no le corresponde, cuando el testador la asigna a otro.
Logicamente no cabe que el legitmario, en caso de pretericion, reciba todos los bienes cuando el
testador haya dispuesto de ellos a titulo de herencia, y no cuando haya dispuesto del tercio lebre a titulo
de legado.
Cual es la razon de esta differencia? En la generalidad de los casos puede fundarse el precepto en la
presunta voluntad del testador. Este, al desheredar, revela que existe alguna razon a motivo que le
impulsa a obrar asi; podra no ser bastante para privar al heredero de su legitima, pero siempre ha de
estimarse sufficiente para privarle del resto de la herencia, pues sobre esta no puede pretender ningun
derecho el desheredad. El heredero preterido no ha sido privado expresamente de nada; el testador, en
los casos normales, obra si por descuido o por error. Hemos visto un testamento en el que no se institula
heredera a una hija monja, por creer la testadora que no podia heredar. En otros caos se ignora la
existencia de un descendiente o de un ascendiente. Cuando el preterido es una persona que ha nacido
despues de muerto el testador o despues de hecho el testamento, la razon es aun mas clara; la omision
ha de presumirse involuntaria; el testador debe suponerse que hubiera instituido heredero a esa persona
si hubiera existido al otorgarse el testamento, y no solo en cuanto a la legitima, sino en toda la herencia,
caso de no haber otros herederos forzosos, y en iguales terminos que los demas herederos no mejorados
de un mode expreso.
La opinion contraria puede tambien defederse, suponiendo que la ley anula el titulo de heredero, mas no
en absoluto la participacion en el caudal; que asi como al exceptuar la mejora se refiere a todo el tercio o
a la parte de el que haya distribuido el causante, al exceptuar los legados se refierse a la parte libre de
que haya dispuesto el mismo testador, considerando como un simple legatario de esa porcion a la
persona a quien el testador designo como heredero. Abonaria esta solucion el articulo 817, al declarar
que las disposiciones testamentaria que menguan la legitima de los herederos forzosos han de reducirse
en cuanto fueren inoficiosas, pues amparado en este articulo el heredero voluntario, puede pretender
que la disposicion a su favor sea respetada en cuato no perjudique a las legitimas.
La jurisprudencia no ha resuelto de frente esta cuestion, porque no se le ha presentado en los terminos
propuestos; pero ha demonstrado su criterio.
Hemos citado las Resoluciones de la Direccion de 30 de octubre de 1896 y de 20 de mayo de 1893. En la
primera se decide con valentia, con arreglo al texto expreso del articulo 814; la institucion de heredero

se anula en absoluto, y se abre para toda la herencia la succesion intestada. En la segunda se rehuye la
cuestion, fundandose en circunstancias secundarias. En el articulo siguiente examinaremos la sentencia
de 16 de enero de 1895.
La interpretacion que rectamente se deprende del art 814, es la de que solo valen, y eso en cuanto no
sean inoficiosas, las disposiciones hechas a titulo de legado a mejora. En cuanto a la institucion de
heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo, o en parte? No se aade limitacion alguna,
como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara a institucion de heredero en cuanto
perjudique a la legitima del desheredado. Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total,
y que este articulo, como especial en el caso que le motiva, rige con preferencia al 817. (6 Manresa, 3.a
ed., pags. 351-353.) (Emphasis supplied).
The following opinion of Sanchez Roman is to the same effect and dispels all possible
doubt on the matter:
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos
en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion entestada, total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la
pretericion, hubiere dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los hrederos instituidos,
cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del articulo 814, al determinar, como efecto
de la pretericion, el de que "anularia la institucion de heredero". Cierto es que la preericion esta intorducida, como
remedio juridico, por sus efectos, en nombre y para garantia de la intergridad de la legitima de los herederos forzosos y
como consecuencia del precepto del 813, de que "el testador no podra privar a los herederos de su legitima, sino en los
casos expresamente determinados por la ley", que son los de desheredacion con justa causa.
Cierto es, tambien, que en la desheredacion es muy otro el criterio del Codigo y que su formula legal, en cuanto a sus
efectos, es de alcance mas limitado, puesto que, conforme al articulo 851, la desheredacion hecha sin condiciones de
validez, "anulara la institucion de heredero", lo mismo que la pretericion, pero solo "en cuanto perjudique la desheredado
de modo ilegal e ineficaz; salvedad o limitacion de los efectos de nulidad de la institucion de los efectos de nulidad de la
institucion hecha en el testmento, que no existe, segun se ha visto en el 814, por el que se declara, en forma general e
indistinta, que anulara la institucion de heredero sin ninguna atencuacion respecto de que perjudique o no, total o
parcialmente, la cuantia de la legitima del heredero forzoso en linea recta, preterido.
El resultado de ambos criterios y formulas legales, manifestamente distintas, tiene que ser muy diverso. En el caso de la
pretericion, propiamente tal o total pues si fuera parcial y se la dejara algo al heredero forzoso por cualquier titulo,
aunque see algo no fuere suficiente al pago de sus derechos de legitima, no seria caso de pretericion, regulado por el
articulo 814, sino de complemento, regido por el 815 y la institucion no se anularia sino que se modificaria o disminuiria
en lo necesario para dicho complente o de institucion de heredero en toda la herencia, al anularse la institucion, por
efecto de la preterido o preteridos, respecto de toda la herencia, tambien; mientras qeu en el caso de desheredacion y de
institucion en la totalidad de la herencia, tambien; mientras que en el caso de desheredacion y de institucion en la
totalidad de la herencia a favor de otra persona, solo se anulara en parte precisa pra no perjudicar la legitima del
deshersado, que aun siendo en este caso la lata, si no hubo mejoras, porque no se establecieron o porque los intituidos
eran herederos voluntarios, dejaria subsistente la institucion en la poarte correspoondiente al tercio de libre disposicion.
Asi es que los preteridos, en el supuesto indicado, suceden abintestato en todo, en concurrencia conlos demas herederos
forzosos o llamados pro la ley alabintestato; los desheredados, unicamente en dos tercios o en uno o en uno tan solo, en
la hipotesis de haberse ordernado mejoras.
En cambio, ni por la desheredacion ni por la pretericion pierde su fuerza el testamento, en cuanto a dicho tercio libre, is se
trata dedescendientes; o la mitad, si se trata de ascendientes, ya desheredados, ya preteridos, proque, ni por el uno ni por
el otro medio, se anula mas que la institucion de heredero, en general, y totalmente por la pretericion, y solo en cuanto
perjudique a la legitima del desheredado por la desheredacion; pero subsistiendo, en ambos casos, todas acquellas otras
disposiciones que no se refeiren a la institucion de heredero y se hallen dentro del limite cuantitativo del tercio o mitad de
libre disposicion, segun que se trate de descendientes o ascendientes, preteridos o desheredados.
La invocacion del articulo 817 para modificar estos efectos de la pretericion, procurando limitar la anulacion de la
institucion de herederos solo en cuanto perjudique a la legitima, fundadose en que dicho articulo establece que "las
disposiciones testamentarias que menguan la legitma de los herederos forzosos se reduciran, a peticion de estos, en lo
que fueren inoficiosas o excesivas," no es aceptable ni puede variar acquellos resultados, porque es un precepto
de caracter general en toda otra clase de dsiposiciones testamentarias que produzcan el efecto de menguar la legitima,
que no puede anteponerse, en su aplicacion, a las de indole especial para sealar los efectos de la pretericion o de la
desheredacion, regulados privativa y respectivamente por los articulos 814 y 851.
No obstante la pretericion, "valdran las mandas y legados en cuanto no sean inoficiosas." El texto es terminante y no
necesita mayor explicacion, despues de lo dicho, que su propia letra, a no ser para observar que constituye una
confimacion indudable de los efectos de la pretericion, en cuanto alcanzan solo, pero totalmente, a la anulacion de la
institucion de heredero, pero no a la de las mandas y mejoras en cuanto no sean preteridos; calficativo de tales, como
sinonimo legal de excessivas, que en otros articulos, como el 817, establece la ley. (6 Sanchez Roman, Volumen 2.o pags.
1140-1141.)
These comments should be read with care if we are to avoid misunderstanding. Manresa,
for instance, starts expounding the meaning of the law with an illustration. He says that
in case of preterition (article 814). the nullity of the institution of heirs is total, whereas in
case of disinheritance (article 851), the nullity is partial, that is, in so far as the institution
affects the legitime of the disinherited heirs. "Preteridos, adquieren derecho
atodo;desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, segun el caso." He then
proceeds to comment upon the wisdom of the distinction made by law, giving two views
thereon. He first lays the view contrary to the distinction made by law, then the
arguments in support of the distinction, and lastly a possible defense against said
arguments. And after stating that the Spanish jurisprudence has not as yet decided
squarely the question, with an allusion] to two resolutions of the Spanish Administrative
Direction, one in favor of article 814 and another evasive, he concludes that the
construction which may rightly be given to article 814 is that in case of preterition, the
institution of heirs is null in toto whereas in case of disinheritance the nullity is limited to
that portion of the legitime of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
He further makes it clear that in cases of preterition, the property bequeathed by
universal titled to the instituted heirs should not be merely reduced according to article
817, but instead, intestate succession should be opened in connection therewith under
article 814, the reason being that article 814, "como especial en el caso que le motiva,
rige con preferencia al 817." Sanchez Roman is of the same opinion when he said: "La
invocacion del articulo 817 para modificar estos efectos de la pretecion, procurando
limitar la anulacion de la institucion de heredero solo en cuanto perjudque a la legitima,
fundandose en que dicho articulo establece que "las disposiciones testmentarias que
menguan la legitima de los herederos forzosos se fueren inoficisosas o excesivas," no es
aceptable ni puede variar aquellos resultados, porque es un precepto de caracter
general en toda otra clase de disposiciones testmentarias que produzcan el efecto de
menguar la legitima, que no puede anteponerse, en su aplicacion, a las de indole
especialpara sealar los efectos de la pretericon o de la desheredacion, regulados
privativa y respectivamente por los articulos 814 y 851.
Of course, the annulment of the institution of heirs in cases of preterition does not always
carry with it the ineffectiveness of the whole will. Neither Manresa nor Sanchez Roman
nor this Court has ever said so. If, aside from the institution of heirs, there are in the will
provisions leaving to the heirs so instituted or to other persons some specific properties
in the form of legacies or mejoras, such testamentary provisions shall be effective and
the legacies and mejoras shall be respected in so far as they are not inofficious or
excessive, according to article 814. In the instant case, however, no legacies
or mejoras are provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased having been left
by universal title to the children of the second marriage. The effect, therefore, of
annulling the institution of heirs will be necessarily the opening of a total intestacy.
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal titled in favor of the
children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and,
accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted,
will result in a complete abrogation of articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case
of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments
reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of articles 814 and 851 regarding
total or partial nullity of the institution, would be absolutely meaningless and will never
have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article
concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage
because they would be absorbed by article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be
destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to
distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a
special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to the
disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt
with as a thing of separate and distinct from legacies or betterment. And they are
separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said
article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by
universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property
bequeathed by a particular or special title. The first is also different from a betterment
which should be made expressly as such (article 828). The only instance of implied
betterment recognized by law is where legacies are made which cannot be included in
the free portion (article 828). But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a
legacy.
It is clear, therefore, that article 814 refers to two different things which are the two
different objects of its two different provisions. One of these objects cannot be made to
merge in the other without mutilating the whole article with all its multifarious
connections with a great number of provisions spread throughout the Civil Code on the
matter of succession. It should be borne in mind, further, that although article 814
contains who different provisions, its special purpose is to establish a specific rule
concerning a specific testamentary provision, namely, the institution of heirs in a case of
preterition. Its other provision regarding the validity of legacies and betterments if not
inofficious is a mere reiteration of the general rule contained in other provisions (articles
815 and 817) and signifies merely that it also applies in cases of preterition. As regards
testamentary dispositions in general, the general rule is that all "testamentary disposition
which diminish the legitime of the forced heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same in
so far as they are inofficous or excessive" (article 817). But this general rule does not
apply to the specific instance of a testamentary disposition containing an institution of
heirs in a case of preterition, which is made the main and specific subject of article 814.
In such instance, according to article 814, the testamentary disposition containing the
institution of heirs should be not only reduced but annulled in its entirety and all the
forced heirs, including the omitted ones, are entitled to inherit in accordance with the law
of intestate succession. It is thus evident that, if, in construing article 814, the institution
of heirs therein dealt with is to be treated as legacies or betterments, the special object
of said article would be destroyed, its specific purpose completely defeated, and in that
wise the special rule therein established would be rendered nugatory. And this is contrary
to the most elementary rule of statutory construction. In construing several provisions of
a particular statute, such construction shall be adopted as will give effect to all, and when
general and particular provisions are inconsistent, the latter shall prevail over the former.
(Act No. 190, secs. 287 and 288.)
The question herein propounded has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court of
Spain in a case wherein a bequest by universal title was made with preterition of heirs
and the theory was advanced that the instituted heirs should be treated as legatarios.
The Supreme Court of Spain said:
El articulo 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la

institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la
persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto, aun cuando parezca, y en algun
caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en
Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado,
debiendo, por lo tanto, procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
consiguientemente, en un testmento donde fate la institucion, es obligado llamar
a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra
clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribuido todos sus bienes en legados,
siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de
testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion,
que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quein testa si esta voluntad no
aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea
valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpertacion arbitraria, dentro del
derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese
anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del
testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, peo
que no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios
que informan la testamnetificaion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el
terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay rason para convertir este juico en regla
de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el
legislator quiere establecer. (6 Sanchez Roman, Volumen 2.o, p. 1138.)
It is maintained that the word "heredero" under the Civil Code, is not synonymous with
the term "heir" under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the "heir" under the latter
Code is no longer personally liable for the debts of the deceased as was the "heredero"
under the Civil Code, should his acceptance be pure and simple, and from all these the
conclusion is drawn that the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code regarding the total
nullity of the institution of heirs has become obsolete. This conclusion is erroneous. It
confuses form with substance. It must be observed, in this connection, that in construing
and applying a provision of the Civil Code, such meaning of its words and phrases as has
been intended by the framers thereof shall be adopted. If thus construed it is inconsistent
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, then it shall be deemed repealed;
otherwise it is in force. Repeals by implication are not favored by the courts and when
there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible
(Posadas vs. National City Bank, 296 U. S., 497). The word "heir" as used in article 814 of
the Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has under the Code of Civil Procedure,
but this in no wise can prevent a bequest from being made by universal title as is in
substance the subject-matter of article 814 of the Civil Code. Again, it may also be true
that heirs under the Code of Civil Procedure may receive that bequest only after payment
of debts left by the deceased and not before as under the Civil Code, but this may have a
bearing only upon the question as to when succession becomes effective and can in no
way destroy the fact that succession may still be by universal or special title. Since a
bequest may still be made by universal title and with preterition of forced heirs, its nullity
as provided in article 814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code
of Civil Procedure. What is important and is the basis for its nullity is the nature and effect
of the bequest and not its possible name nor the moment of its effectiveness under the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, there were in the Code of Civil Procedure sections Nos. 755 and 756 which
read:
SEC. 755. Share of child born after making will. When a child of a testator is
born after the making of a will, and no provision is therein made for him, such
child shall have the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died
intestate; and share of such child shall be assigned to him as in cases of intestate
estates, unless it is apparent from the will that it was the intention of the testator
that no provision should be made for such child.
SEC. 756. Share of child or issue of child omitted from will. When a testator
omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or for issue of a deceased child,
and it appears that such omission was made by mistake, or accident, such child,
or the issue of such child, shall have the same share in the estate of the testator
as if he had died intestate, to be assigned to him as in the case of intestate
estates.
It is these provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that have affected substantially
articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code, but they have been expressly repealed by Act No.
2141, section 1 of which read as follows:
Sections seven hundred and fifty-five, seven hundred and fifty-six, seven hundred
and fifty-seven, seven hundred and fifty-eight, and seven hundred and sixty of
Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled `An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands are
hereby repealed and such provisions of the Civil Code as may have been
amended or repealed by said sections are hereby restored to full force and
effects. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the provisions of the Civil Code which are thus expressly restored to full force are
undoubtedly articles 814 and 851. There can be no possible doubt, therefore, that those
two articles are in force.
Article 1080 of the Civil Code that is also invoked deserves no consideration except for
the observation that it has no relevancy in the instant case.
Our attention is directed to the case of Escuin vs. Escuin (11 Phil., 332). We have never
lost sight of the ruling laid down in that case which has been reiterated in Eleazar vs.
Eleazar (37 Off. Gaz., p. 1782). In the Escuin case, the deceased left all his property to his
natural father (not a forced heir) and his wife with total preterition of his father and wife.
Without reconsidering the correctness of the ruling laid down in these two cases, we will
note that the doctrine stands on facts which are different from the facts in the present
case. There is certainly a difference between a case of preterition in which the whole
property is left to a mere friend and a case of preterition in which the whole property is
left to one or some forced heirs. If the testamentary disposition be annulled totally in the
first case, the effect would be a total deprivation of the friend of his share in the
inheritance. And this is contrary to the manifest intention of the testator. It may fairly be
presumed that, under such circumstances, the testator would at leave give his friend the
portion of free disposal. In the second case, the total nullity of the testamentary
disposition would have the effect, not of depriving totally the instituted heir of his share
in the inheritance, but of placing him and the other forced heirs upon the basis of
equality. This is also in consonance with the presumptive intention of the testator.
Preterition, generally speaking, is due merely to mistake or inadvertence without which
the testator may be presumed to treat alike all his children.
And specially is this true in the instant case where the testator omitted the children by
his first marriage upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares
in his property than those given to the children by his second marriage. It was, therefore,
the thought of the testator that the children by his first marriage should not receive less
than the children by his second marriage, and to that effect is the decision of this Court
sought to be reconsidered. Motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
Yulo, C.J., I concur in the result.
Generoso, J., concurs.
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285,
6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991, 57403 and 12507/T-337.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17818
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share
of these properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros
Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa
Barretto and his nephew an nieces The usufruct o the fishpon situate i barrio Sa
Roque Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow,
Maria Gerardo I the meantime Maria Gerardo was appointe administratrix. By virtue
thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf
and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by
the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate
and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence, Salud
Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the
original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
January 25, 1967
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all
surnamed Reyes y Barretto, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.
Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Civil Case
No. 1084, dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the same to
deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, the properties receivea
by his deceasea wife under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto, consisting of
lots in Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000.
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:
"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the barrio
of San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T13734 of the Land Records of this Province, being the share of plaintiff's wards as
minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto, widow of plaintiff Tirso Reyes,
guardian of said minors."
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they
acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan,
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the
distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948.
Upon her death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which,
she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the
second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto
alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will
presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court
held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband
Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the
same.1
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir
of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased
Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this
action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not
only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to
Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of
Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of
partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the
fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title
thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the defendant,
who was then a minor.'
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared the
project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null
and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto,
predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano
Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the
basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: .
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has
been included, shall be null and void.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano
Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his
will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free
part. And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano
Barretto, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and
successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the
provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing that
property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real
owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not only
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to return the properties received
under the project of partition previously mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros
Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, this
appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and defendant.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been
misapplied to the present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto
admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament
together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be
one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and
was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak
of children, or descendants, but ofheirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or
intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator
does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for
Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he
chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud
did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her
legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or
total ommission of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by
appellee, is not at all applicable, that case involving an instance of preterition or omission
of children of the testator's former marriage.
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil
status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is erroneous,
since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual
concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article 1809; Civil Code of the Philippines,
Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto, while
untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There
can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a compromise over civil
status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the share
that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is
merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is
the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons
entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629,
643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it
is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the
decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same should
have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its binding effect
is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction
or fraud.
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the
estate, and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition
becomes irrelevant.
It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of the estate of
the late Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition executed by Salud
Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who signed for herself and as guardian of the
minor Milagros Barretto), and since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the heirs, nor
were any findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution can have no greater
validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being in the nature
of a judgment by consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil. 426, is
invoked in support of the proposition. That case is authority for the proposition that a
judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of mistake or fraud, upon
petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise
agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p. 436). In the case before us,
however, the agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of
distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the
deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long before
the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata does not apply.
Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were shown that
the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact, even
without it, the distribution could stand, since it was in conformity with the probated will of
Bibiano Barretto, against the provisions whereof no objection had been made. In fact it
was the court's duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force in 1939, provided: .
SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court
shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all
the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such estate, after the payment
of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to
such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be
disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in these Islands belonging to
persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed
the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without
jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Passing upon a like issue, this Court ruled
in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports, pp. 741 and 742:
If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene,
still they would be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their
civil status but as the distribution of the estate as well. As this Court has held in
Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The proceeding for probate is one in rem (40
Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested,
through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 C.P.C.; and any
order that any be entered therein is binding against all of them." (See also in
re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final order of distribution of the estate of a
deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees".
(Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is no
reason why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines should not apply to intestate
proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason
of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is
reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period,
instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in
the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order
already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of.
It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in Reyes vs.
Barretto Datu, 94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that:
... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the partition,
and that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian. The claim is not true.
Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the minor. (Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.)
The mere statement in the project of partion that the guardianship proceedings of the
minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are pending in the court, does not mean that the guardian
had not yet been appointed; it meant that the guardianship proceedings had not yet
been terminated, and as a guardianship proceedings begin with the appointment of a
guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been already appointed when she signed the project
of partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in the project of
partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings, which shows that Maria
Gerardo had no power or authority to sign the project of partition as guardian of the
minor Lucia Milagros Barretto, and, consequently, no ground for the contention that the
order approving the project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked
collaterally in these proceedings.
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a party
by publication but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through her
guardian: she, therefore, can not escape the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First
Instance which settled her father's estate.
Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo) could
not have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said widow in
agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud on appellees rights and
entitles her to relief. In the first place, there is no evidence that when the estate of
Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed appellants' predecessor, Salud Lim
Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was committed, it
was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither Salud nor her
minor children, appellants herein, can be held liable therefor. In the second placegranting
that there was such fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from its
discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed long ago.
Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old (Exhibit
24), she became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of action
accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court decree distributing her father's estate
and the four-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948 (Section 43, Act.
190). In fact, conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946
(Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the
action was already barred when in August 31, 1956 she filed her counterclaim in this case
contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.
In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced evidence that
appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to
reconvey the properties received by his deceased wife, Salud. There is no reliable
evidence of the alleged promise, which rests exclusively on the oral assertions of Milagros
herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court made no mention of such promise in the
decision under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise was made, the
same can not bind the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the real parties in
interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of disposition, and not
of administration, can not bind his wards, being null and void as to them unless duly
authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).
In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the
Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for being
contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros
Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred by the
statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a
possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the properties
inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the
plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have been
given due course.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is
reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee
Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumeracted in said decision, and the same is
affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the records be
returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with the action for partition of
the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the fruits thereof, as prayed for in
the complaint No costs.
It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It consists
in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the
testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the
hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the
will in the latter case. But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a
descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced
heir.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983
ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S.
GARCIA, respondents.
Benjamin H. Aquino for petitioner.
Alfredo Kallos for respondents.
(1/3) each, without prejudice to the legacy given to Trinidad Tuagnon and the right
of any creditors of the estate. No pronouncement as to costs.
MELENCIO HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
A Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals affirming
the judgment rendered by the former Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, in Civil
Case No. 3956, an action for Recognition.
On July 7, 1969, Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia (GARCIAS), claiming to be
illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton SOLANO, filed an action for recognition against him. In
his Answer, SOLANO denied paternity. On February 3, 1970, during the pendency of the
suit, SOLANO died. Petitioner ZONIA Ana Solano was ordered substituted for the
DECEDENT as the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will and Testament probated
on March 10, 1969, or prior to his death, in Special Proceedings No. 842 of the same
Court. ZONIA entered her formal appearance as a "substitute defendant" on March 4,
1970 claiming additionally that she was the sole heir of her father, SOLANO, and asking
that she be allowed to assume her duties as executrix of the probated Will with the least
interference from the GARCIAS who were "mere pretenders to be illegitimate children of
SOLANO".
On April 6, 1970, the GARCIAS filed their "Reply to ZONIA's Appearance and
Supplemental Cause of Action" impugning the recognition of ZONIA as an acknowledged
natural child with the prayer that she be declared instead, like them, as an adulterous
child of the DECEDENT. ZONIA did not file any responsive pleading and the case
proceeded to trial. The GARCIAS further moved for the impleading of the SOLANO estate
in addition to ZONIA, which was opposed by the latter, but which the Trial Court granted
in its Order dated April 15, 1970. 1
In the hearing of May 13, 1970, the Trial Court specified the legal issues to be treated in
the parties' respective Memoranda as: 1) the question of recognition of the GARCIAS; 2)
the correct status of ZONIA, and 3) the hereditary share of each of them in view of the
probated Will. 2
On July 14, 1970, the Trial Court, presided by Judge Ezequiel S. Grageda, rendered
judgment the dispositive portion of which decrees: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiffs Bienvenido S.
Garcia and Emeteria S. Garcia and the defendant Sonia Ana Tuagnon as the
illegitimate children of the late Dr. Meliton Solano under the class of ADULTEROUS
CHILDREN, with all the rights granted them by law. The institution of Sonia Ana
Solano as sole and universal heir of the said deceased in the will is hereby declared
null and void and the three (3) children shall share equally the estate or one- third
Appealed to the Court of Appeals by ZONIA, said Court affirmed the

judgment in toto (CA-G.R. No. 49018).
ZONIA seeks a reversal of that affirmance in this petition, which was given due course.
At the outset, we should state that we are bound by the findings of fact of both the Trial
Court and the Appellate Court, particularly, the finding that the GARCIAS and ZONIA are,
in fact, illegitimate children of the DECEDENT. The oral testimony and the documentary
evidence of record inevitably point to that conclusion, as may be gleaned from the
following background facts: SOLANO, a resident of Tabaco, Albay, married Pilar Riosa. The
latter died. On a world tour he met a French woman, Lilly Gorand, who became his
second wife in 1928. The union was short-lived as she left him in 1929. In the early part
of 1930, SOLANO started having amorous relations with Juana Garcia, out of which affair
was born Bienvenido Garcia on March 24, 1931 (Exhibits "A" & "3"); and on November 3,
1935, Emeteria Garcia was born (Exhibits "B " & "2"). Their birth certificates and
baptismal certificates mention only the mother's name without the father's name. The
facts establish, however, that SOLANO during his lifetime recognized the GARCIAS as his
children by acts of support and provisions for their education.
In 1935, SOLANO started living with Trinidad Tuagnon. Three children were born out of
this relation but only petitioner ZONIA Ana Tuagnon, born on July 26, 1941, is living. In her
Birth Certificate, her status was listed as "illegitimate"; her mother as Trinidad Tuagnon;
her father as "P.N.C. " (Exhibit "V"), or "padre no conocido".
During the Japanese occupation, SOLANO obtained a divorce from Lilly Gorand on
November 29, 1943 (Exhibits "R-1" and "S-1"). On December 22, 1943, SOLANO and
Trinidad Tuagnon executed an "Escritura de Reconocimiento de Unit Hija Natural" (Exhibit
"Q"; "7"), acknowledging ZONIA as a "natural child" and giving her the right to use the
name ZONIA Ana Solano y Tuagnon. The document was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar on the same date.
On January 18, 1969, SOLANO executed his "Ultima Voluntad y Testamento" (Exhibit
"11"), instituting ZONIA as his universal heir to all his personal and real properties in
Camalig, Tabaco and Malinao, all in the province of Albay, except for five parcels of land
in Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, which were given to Trinidad Tuagnon in usufruct Upon
SOLANO's petition (Exhibit "10"), the Will was duly probated on March 10, 1969 in Special
Proceedings No. 842 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, in a Decision also
rendered by Judge Ezequiel S. Grageda (Exhibit "12").
As above stated, these facts are not in question.
Petitioner maintains, however, that: t.hqw

I. The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction in declaring substitute defendant Zonia Ana Solano, now
petitioner, an illegitimate child of the late Dr. Meliton Solano in an action where
private respondents, as plaintiffs in the Court below, sought recognition as natural
children of Dr. Meliton Solano.
II. The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction in ordering the division of the estate of Dr. Meliton Solano
between the petitioner and private respondents, when said estate is under the
jurisdiction and control of the probate Court in Special Proceedings No. 842.
III.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring nun and void the
institution of heir in the last will and testament of Dr. Meliton Solano,
which was duly probated in special proceedings No. 842 of the Court of
First Instance of Albay, and in concluding that total intestacy resulted
there from. 3
Directly challenged is the jurisdiction of the lower Court, in an action for recognition: 1) to
declare ZONIA as an illegitimate child of SOLANO; 2) to order the division of the estate in
the same action despite the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 842; and 3) to declare
null and void the institution of heir in the Last Win and Testament of SOLANO, which was
duly probated in the same Special Proceedings No. 842, and concluding that total
intestacy resulted.
It is true that the action below was basically one for recognition. However, upon notice of
SOLANO's death, the Trial Court ordered his substitution by ZONIA, "the only surviving
heir ... as of as of now" 4 In her "Appearance of Substitute Defendant Zonia Ana T.
Solano ... Sole and Universal Heir", ZONIA specifically prayed that she be 6 allowed to
assume her duties as executrix and administratrix of the probated will and testament of
the late Dr. Meliton Solano, under Special Proceedings No. 842, which is already final and
executory, with least interference from the plaintiffs (GARCIAS) who may be classified for
the moment as only pretenders to be illegitimate children". In other words, ZONIA did not
only rely upon SOLANO's Answer already of record but asserted new rights in her
capacity as sole and universal heir, "executrix and administratrix, "and challenged the
right of the GARCIAS to recognition. Thus, she was not defending the case as a mere
representative of the deceased but asserted rights and defenses in her own personal
capacity. So it was that the GARCIAS filed a "Reply to Appearance of ZONIA ... and
Supplemental Cause of Action ... "vigorously denying that ZONIA was SOLANO's sole and
universal heir; that ZONIA could not legally be considered as SOLANO's acknowledged
natural child because of a legal impediment; that the admission to probate of SOLANO's
Will was merely conclusive as to its due execution; that the supposed recognition under a
notarial instrument of ZONIA as an acknowledged natural child was fraudulent and a

product of misrepresentation; that ZONIA's recognition in the Will as an acknowledged
natural child is subject to nullification and that at most ZONIA is, like them, an adulterous
child of SOLANO with Trinidad Tuagnon.
During the trial, the GARCIAS presented evidence to prove their allegations not only in
their main complaint but also in their "Reply to Appearance and Supplemental Cause of
Action". ZONIA presented no objection to the presentation by the GARCIAS of their oral
and documentary evidence and even cross-examined their witnesses. ZONIA, for her
part, presented her own testimonial and documentary evidence, denied the relationship
of the GARCIAS' to SOLANO and presented the notarial recognition in her favor as an
acknowledged natural child by SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon (Exhibit "Q"). Thus, as
raised by the parties in their own pleadings and pursuant to their respective evidence
during the trial, the litigation was converted into a contest between the GARCIAS and
ZONIA precisely as to their correct status as heirs and their respective rights as such. No
error was committed by either the Trial Court or the Appellate Court, therefore, in
resolving the issue of ZONIA's status.
ZONIA additionally assails the jurisdiction of the Trial Court in declaring null and void the
institution of heir in SOLANO's will; in concluding that total intestacy resulted therefrom;
and distributing the shares of the parties in SOLANO's estate when said estate was under
the jurisdiction and control of the Probate Court in Special Proceedings No. 842.
Normally, this would be the general rule. However, a peculiar situation is thrust upon us
here. It should be recalled that SOLANO himself instituted the petition for probate of the
Will during his lifetime. That proceeding was not one to settle the estate of a deceased
person that would be deemed terminated only upon the final distribution of the residue of
the hereditary estate. With the Will allowed to probate, the case would have terminated
except that it appears that the parties, after SOLANO's death, continued to file pleadings
therein. Secondly, upon motion of the GARCIAS, and over the objection of ZONIA, the Trial
Court ordered the impleading of the estate of SOLANO and proceeded on that basis. In
effect, therefore, the two cases were consolidated. The records further disclose that the
action for recognition (Civil Case No. 3956) and Spec. Procs. No. 842 were pending before
the same Branch of the Court and before the same presiding Judge. Thirdly, it is settled
that the allowance of a Will is conclusive only as to its due execution. 5 A probate decree
is not concerned with the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the Will. 6
Thus, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to conclude that, upon the
facts, the GARCIAS and ZONIA were in the same category as illegitimate children; that
ZONIA's acknowledgment as a "natural child" in a notarial document executed by
SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon on December 22, 1943 was erroneous because at the time
of her birth in 1941, SOLANO was still married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been
obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did not have the legal capacity to contract
marriage at the time of ZONIA's conception, 7that being compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS
were, in fact, pretended from SOLANO's Last' Will and Testament; and that as a
result of said preterition, the institution of ZONIA as sole heir by SOLANO is null
and void pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code. t.hqw
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. ... 8
of
heir'.
Considering,
however, that the will
before us solely provides
for the institution of
petitioner as universal
heir, and nothing more,
the result is the same.
The entire will is null." (at
p. 459)
As provided in the foregoing provision, the disposition in the Will giving the
usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the five parcels of land in Bantayan,
Tabaco, Albay, is a legacy, recognized in Article 563 of the Civil Code, 9and should
be respected in so far as it is not inofficious. 10
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is a

specific bequest or legacy so that Article
854 of the Civil Code, supra, applies
merely annulling the "institution of heir".
So also did the Trial Court have jurisdiction in resolving the issue of the hereditary
shares of the GARCIAS and ZONIA. However, contrary to the conclusions of the
Courts below, holding that the entire Will is void and intestacy ensues, the
pretention of the GARCIAS should annul the institution of ZONIA as heir only
insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired. The Will, therefore, is
valid subject to that limitation. 11 It is a plain that the intention of the testator
was to favor ZONIA with certain portions of his property, which, under the law, he
had a right to dispose of by Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be
upheld as to the one-half (1/2) portion of the property that the testator could
freely dispose of. 12 Since the legitime of illegitimate children consists of one half
(1/2) of the hereditary estate, 13 the GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right to
participation therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each. ZONIA's hereditary
share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate, while the GARCIAS
will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the estate.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the

jurisdiction of the Trial Court and the
Appellate Court was never questioned
before either Court. ZONIA herself had
gone, without objection, to trial on the
issues raised and as defined by the Trial
Court. Neither had ZONIA assigned lack of
jurisdiction of the Trial Court as an error
before the Appellate Court. She should
now be held estopped to repudiate that
jurisdiction to which she had voluntarily
submitted, after she had received an
unfavorable judgment, The leading case
of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 16 on this point,
declared: t.hqw
As heretofore stated, the usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the properties
indicated in the Will is valid and should be respected.
The case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., 14 reiterating the ruling in Neri, et al. vs.
Akutin, et al., 15which held that where the institution of a universal heir is null and
void due to pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and intestate succession
ensues, is not applicable herein because in the Nuguid case, only a one-sentence
Will was involved with no other provision except the institution of the sole and
universal heir; there was no specification of individual property; there were no specific
legacies or bequests. It was upon that factual setting that this Court declared: t.
hqw
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question 'a complete
nullity. Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies 'the institution
A party cannot invoke the

jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and
after failing to obtain such
relief,
repudiate
or
question
the
same
jurisdiction. The question whether the court has jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties is not because the judgment
or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication but for the
reason that such practice cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of
public policy. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court.
ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No

special pronouncement is made as to costs.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified in that the hereditary share
in the estate of the decedent of petitioner Zonia Ana T. Solano is hereby declared to be
(1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of said estate, while that of private respondents, Bienvenido S.
Garcia and Emeteria S. Garcia, shall each be (1/3 of 1/2) or (1/6) of the estate. The
usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon shall be respected. The judgment is affirmed in all
other respects. No costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA
A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of Appeals
in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the
dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on
October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for
reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial
Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the
issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in
which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita,
Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by
Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation
in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection raised by private
respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the
appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands
and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be
given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal
age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case
my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties,
lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute
my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are
claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591
ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors
(respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased
and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court,
respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3;
Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and

ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain
in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition
for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6).
Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153).
Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the
Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass
upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to
probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code
refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not
apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct
line; their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the
law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that
suggests that mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give
the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite
distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in
his will. This is what matters and should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to
file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of
Nemesio Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore
unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450
[1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is
concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if
the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted
from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the
same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the
Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he
were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is
a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto
en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result
in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of
such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the willamounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear
terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid
v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole
property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers
and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the
opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper
legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who
has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA
1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there
being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of
personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the
outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of
the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent
adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of
the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the
deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned
order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465
[1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of
Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is
axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available where the
petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of law (DD Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590
[1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the
trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda.
de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent
Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and
the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity
of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449
[1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478
[1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v.
Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a
complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations. The Court
said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity
or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief
that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the
surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the
proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in
connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the
petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the
probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited
the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. Where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon
even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet
the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals,supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds:
(1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a
universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo,
p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason
that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a
hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985
(Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to
progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his
brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that
one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in
futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial
court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of
certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v.
Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the
Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari
may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate
relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and
its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. Nos. 140371-72
November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,

vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D.
SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D.
SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIOOBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the

proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed
as SP. Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise
reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98
90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as
follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
DECISION
Tantunin ng sinuman
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders,
dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in
the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396,
and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D.
Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy
Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
1
The facts of the cases are as follows:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the
RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as
special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.
They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as
the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant;
and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of
the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic
will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita,
Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang
inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio
dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama
harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at
sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako
nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay
nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China
Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng
Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong
inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya
anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng
tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does
not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 99
93396 were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic
will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to
private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent
of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is
not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal
of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally,
the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic
validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic
validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent;
and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute
a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. 6
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to
an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate
Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have
tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the
will appears to be intrinsically void would have been an exercise in futility. It would
have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could
have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary
provisions
before
the
extrinsic
validity
of
the
will
was
resolved (underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October
14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that: THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B"
HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF

RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS,
DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL
IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE
THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF
THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES
OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II.
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE
FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE
WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III.
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE

INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et
al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo
and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus
Petitioners argue, as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the
will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of
such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed
time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the
heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its
title clearly states,Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic
will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents
alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was
no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the
hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated,
signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition,
private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos
intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that
he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must
be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard
to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the
Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the
life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the
law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been
found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage
with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who
disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; 8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo
can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in
the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the
supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give
effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law,
morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. 11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law,
as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn
by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator. 12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that
the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law
in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, 13 the disinheritance cannot
be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in
the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir 16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document
did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a
witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1wphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law
favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article
838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the
will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered
nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic
will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent
judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the
holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is
hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
In Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27,
2006, there was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was
denominated as Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana. The private respondents moved for
the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document
purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of
the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other
compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there
was preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents
maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic
validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and
ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear
that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
I S S U E : VA L I D I T Y: T h e w i l l o n l y s h o w s a n a l l e g e d a c t o f d i s i n h e r i t a n c e b y
t h e d e c e d e n t o f h i s e l d e s t son
SC: T h e re w a s d i s i n h e r i t a n c e o f A l f re d o b y S e g u n d o ; w h i c h i s VA L I D Fo r
d i s i n h e r i t a n c e t o b e v a l i d , A r t i c l e 9 1 6 re q u i re s t h a t i t m u s t b e e l e c t e d
t h ro u g h a Wi l l w h e re i n t h e l e g a l c a u s e s h a l l b e s p e c i fi e d . I n C A B , t h e
i n c i d e n t s , t a ke n a s a w h o l e , c a n b e c o n s i d e re d a f o rm o f m a l t re a t m e n t
b y A l f re d o o f h i s f a t h e r , a n d t h a t t h e m a t t e r p re s e n t s a s u ffi c i e n t
c a u s e . T h u s , t h i s i s a s u ffi c i e n t c a u s e f o r t h e d i s i n h e r i t a n c e o f a c h i l d
o r d e s c e n d a n t u n d e r Article 919 (6) "Maltreatment of the testator by word or
deed, by the child ord e s c e n d a n t ;
( 2 ) T h e d o c u m e n t c o n f o rm s t o t h e f o rm a l i t i e s o f a h o l o g r a p h i c
w i l l . Wr i t t e n , d a t e d a n d s i g n e d b y t h e h a n d o f S e g u n d o h i m s e l f. W h i l e i t
d o e s n o t m a ke a n a ffi rm a t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e S e g u n d o ' s p ro p e r t y ,
t h e d i s i n h e r i t a n c e o f A l f re d o , n o n e t h e l e s s , i s a n a c t o f d i s p o s i t i o n i n
i t s e l f. I t i s a d i s p o s i t i o n i n f a v o r o f t h o s e w h o w o u l d s u c c e e d i n t h e
a b s e n c e o f A l f re d o.
( 3 ) T h e c o m p u l s o r y h e i r s i n t h e d i re c t l i n e w e re n o t p re t e r i t e d i n t h e
w i l l T h e w i l l w a s S e g u n d o ' s l a s t ex p re s s i o n t o b e q u e a t h h i s e s t a t e t o a l l
h i s c o m p u l s o r y h e i r s , w i t h t h e s o l e exc e p t i o n o f A l f re d o. Also, Segundo did
not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirsM e re m e n t i o n o f
t h e n a m e o f o n e o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r s , V i rg i n i a , i n t h e d o c u m e n t d i d
n o t o p e r a t e t o i n s t i t u t e h e r a s t h e u n i v e r s a l h e i r.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA,
BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.
ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES
DE LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages
and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena
Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as
follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17,
1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four
daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in
three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased
son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole
heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself
the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The
said properties consist of the following: 1wph1.t
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of
P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest
in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine
Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles),
80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202,
48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal,
now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry
of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of
the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San
Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of
T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of
adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as coowner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein
she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the
children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The
document reads: 1wph1.t
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado
de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada
a los hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de
Jesus, en Guipit

La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre
terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1wph1.t
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving
children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito
Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito
Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The
decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R.
No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on
May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that
said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's
three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an
ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's
estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her
grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs.
Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal
under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower
court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under
article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error
contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of
her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the
estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales
waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel,
laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs.
Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December
16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for
review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under
undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only
the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the
only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual
matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those
issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article
891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda
could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six
children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her
daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees
in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the
second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt
was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability
to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be
useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also calledlineal,
familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting
on the nature of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion
legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from
being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation
(which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to
discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which
situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization
of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented
agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship,
is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas
has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891,
which reads:
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este
hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se
halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en
favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea
de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother
or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from
an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3)
the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to
the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance
or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a
posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the
reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor
to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the
deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the
deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna
died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan,
those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first
cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811
(Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from
whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2)
the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by
operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
theprepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and
for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098;
Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA
412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos
secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por
el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide
personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado
en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs.
Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case,
Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902,
single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two
parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The
reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan,
the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name
but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law,
should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share
of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana
died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac
who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was
held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto
Maalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot,
sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from
which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480;
Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs.
Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa
vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58
Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de
retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at
the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186,
190).
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition,

meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of
the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46
Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia
Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his
hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person
entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her
nearest relative within the third degree.
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His
expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become
absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They
cannot even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives
within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require
that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs.
Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil.
944).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule
of representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from
the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property
is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58
Phil. 89, 96).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and

relationship by affinity are excluded.
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and
dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to
the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111
Phil. 349, 353). 1wph1.t
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives
nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186,
189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant
obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership
of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at
the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director
of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant

(prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The
authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists,
the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the
reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right,
and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry
of property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts.
168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the
natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no
part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so
long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1wph1.t
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p.
286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes
in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant

(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as
forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the
reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same
as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the
same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in
the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a
certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree
of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the
reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her
sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three
daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res
judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter
Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the
reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable
properties from theprepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the
nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six
children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable
property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable
properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That
testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina
Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties
from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his
mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as
heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through
their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and
the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino
for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had
inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and
which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be
disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this
Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of
Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of
the properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six
reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case
the doctrine of theFlorentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the
reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the
reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its
reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor
cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property should
be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only
relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased
ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans
binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable
properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have
survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen
grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the
paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the
reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored
the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by
the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the
daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of
the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one
reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that
the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded
upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the
reservable property (pp. 894-5).
third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891,
should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from
Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the
reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis
causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino,
L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the
non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of
the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree
relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the
absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death,
there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the
disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said
properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal
and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not
form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged
that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter
Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties
which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda
y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in
1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her
will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the

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Republic of the Philippines

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El articulo 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la

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Republic of the Philippines

January 25, 1967

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Republic of the Philippines

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Appealed to the Court of Appeals by ZONIA, said Court affirmed the

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Petitioner maintains, however, that: t.hqw

notarial instrument of ZONIA as an acknowledged natural child was fraudulent and a

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In contrast, in the case at bar, there is a

Lastly, it should be pointed out that the

A party cannot invoke the

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ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No

Republic of the Philippines

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Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and

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Republic of the Philippines

November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,

intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the

The facts of the cases are as follows:

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Nilagdaan sa harap namin

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF

RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE

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Petitioners argue, as follows:

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Republic of the Philippines

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BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,

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The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition,

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant

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Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant

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